No. 85-370 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

WILLIAM STELLING, JR., 

Claimant and Appellant, 

RIVERCREST RANCHES, INC., 

Employer, 

and 

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, 

Defendant and Respondent and 

Cross-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable 

Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Lloyd E. Hartford argued, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hughes, Alke, Kellner & Sullivan; Mike McCarter argued, 

Helena, Montana 

For Amicus Curiae: 

Milodragovich, Dale & Dye; Lon J. Dale argued for 

Gary Larson, Missoula, Montana 

Rossbach & Whiston; John Whiston argued for Rubye 

Kauffman, Missoula, Montana 

Submitted: July 24, 1986 

Decided: December 12, 1986 

Filed: 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Claimant, William Stelling, Jr., appeals the June 27, 

1985, judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court which 

awarded him only a small portion of the lump-sum advance he 

had requested. We affirm the lump-sum advance and dismiss 

the remainder of Stelling's appeal for lack of standing. 

Stelling was injured January 5, 1981, in the scope and 

course of his employment with Rivercrest Ranches, Inc. He 

continued to work through June 8, 1981, entered the hospital 

June 10, 1981, and underwent back surgery June 15, 1981. A 

second operation was performed November 1, 1982. 

The State Compensation Insurance Fund commenced paying 

Stelling workers' compensation benefits June 9, 1981. It 

also paid all of his related medical expenses. Thereafter, 

the Fund requested permission to relieve itself of liability 

by purchasing an annuity to provide Stelling with the 

expected benefits to which he would be entitled. 

On December 6, 1984, Stelling filed a petition for 

hearing with the Workers' Compensation Court, asking that the 

Fund's request be denied and that he be awarded a substantial 

lump-sum advance. A pre-trial conference was held February 

15, 1985. The hearing was held March 20, 1985. After the 

taking of a post-trial deposition and the filing of briefs by 

all parties, the matter was submitted to the Workers' 

Compensation Judge on May 31, 1985. 

Meanwhile, on April 15, 1985, the Montana Legislature 

enacted Senate Bill 281 in response to this Court's decision 

in Willis v. Long Construction Co. (Mont. 1984), 690 P.2d 

434, 41 St.Rep. 2050. Willis forbid discounting to present 

value lump-sum awards to workers' compensation claimants. 
The bill amended 5 39-71-741, MCA, by (1) creating new 

criteria for establishing the need for a lump-sum award; and 

(2) requiring that lump-sum payments of permanent total 

disability benefits be discounted at 7% for each year of the 

estimated compensation period. 

Thereafter, with the permission of the Workers' 

Compensation Judge, Stelling amended his pre-trial order to 

include Contract Clause, due process and equal protection 

challenges to the application of S.B. 281 to his case. 

Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment were 

entered June 27, 1985, finding claimant to be permanently 

totally disabled and entitled to $219 in weekly benefits and 

a partial lump-sum payment sufficient to satisfy the balance 

due on his 1984 pickup truck. The judge denied claimant's 

request for a lump-sum award sufficient to purchase an 

annuity paying $1297 a month for twenty years and to purchase 

a $65,000 house and $12,000 in furnishings. The Workers' 

Compensation Judge also held constitutional retroactive 

application of that portion of S.B. 281 establishing 

procedures for proving entitlement to a lump-sum payment. 

However, he found retroactive application of the discounting 

provision to be unconstitutional. 

Stelling challenges the constitutionality of S.B. 281 

again on appeal and raises the following issues: 

1. Whether the application of 39-71-741, MCA, as 

amended by Ch. 471, Laws of Montana (1985), in the 

determination of workers' compensation benefits to be awarded 

to workers injured before April 15, 1985, (the effective date 

of the amendment): 
A. violates the Contract Clauses found in art. 1, S 10 

of the United States Constitution and art. 11, § 31 of the 

1972 Montana Constitution? 

B. denies due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and by art. 11, 

§ 17 of the 1972 Montana Constitution? 

C. denies equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and by art. 11, S 4 of the 1972 Montana. Constitution? 

2. Whether, under the test in effect at the time of his 

injuries - best interests of the claimant, Stelling is 

entitled to the conversion of his biweekly benefits to a 

lump-sum payment? 

The State Fund cross-appeals, raising the following 

issue: 

1. Whether the Workers' Compensation Judge erred in 

refusing to retroactively apply that portion of S.B. 281 

requiring that lump-sum payments to permanently totally 

disabled claimants be discounted to present value? 

The issue raised on cross-appeal is addressed in another 

case decided this same day, Buckman v. Montana Deaconess 

Hospital, Slip Opinion #85-530, the case with which this case 

was consolidated for oral argument. 

In Buckman, supra, we held that the procedures of 

S.B. 281 merely expand the methods by which a claimant proves 

entitlement to a lump-sum award. The threshold test remains 

that of the best interests of the claimant. Here, the 

Workers' Compensation Judge held that Stelling failed to 

prove that a lump-sum award would be in his best interests. 

. . . Claimant has requested a sum to purchase an 

annuity which will pay him a sum certain for the 
rest of his life. An annuity purchase does not 

rise to the standard of best interests . . . 

. . . Under case law precedent claimant is equally 

unsuccessful in demonstrating that it is in his 

best interests that he be awarded a sum sufficient 

to purchase a home . . . Claimant has established 

that his current housing situation, in the back of 

his pickup, is intolerable. This alone does not 

establish that the cash purchase of a home is in 

his best interests. Claimant offered no evidence 

establishing an inability to live on his biweekly 

benefits in the rental market in Missoula. The 

file is equally bereft of other financing options 

for claimant's proposed home purchase other than 

cash. Claimant has not demonstrated that the cash 

purchase of a home with new furnishings is in his 

best interests. 

Claimant has established that his monthly truck 

payment is a significant drain on his budget. 

Claimant is awarded a lump sum sufficient to pay 

off the balance due on his 1984 pickup. This will 

decrease his monthly expenses and allow him to 

obtain decent housing. 

Judgment, p. 27. 

Because the trial judge failed. to find that Stelling's 

best interests would be met by conversion of his biweekly 

benefits to a lump-sum payment, Stelling lacks standing to 

contest the constitutionality of S.B. 281 and S 39-71-741, 

MCA . 

Standing of parties to bring their claims is a 

threshold question a court must face before 

reaching the substantive issues of a case. 

Traditionally, courts require that a plaintiff have 

a. "personal stake" in the outcome of a case, "to 

assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the 

presentation of issues upon which the court so 

largely depends for illumination of difficult 

constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 

186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). 

Stoianoff v. State of Montana (9th Cir. 1983), 695 F.2d 1214, 

1223. If Stelling is not entitled to a lump-sum at all, then 

he cannot challenge the constitutionality of the methodology 

computation. 

There is substantial credible evidence to support the 

trial judge's determination that the purchase of a home is 
not sufficient basis for awarding a lump-sum to this 

claimant. As noted in the trial judge's opinion, once 

Stelling is no longer making truck payments, he will have 

more money with which to provide himself housing. In 

addition, there is no evidence that Stelling is unable to 

live within Missoula's rental market. 

The lower court judgment is af 

/ 

We concur: 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority 

opinion affirming the Workers' Compensation Court's 

determination that retroactive application of the discounting 

provisions of § 39-71-741, MCA, is unconstitutional. 

I have set forth the basis for this dissent in my 

dissent filed in Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hospital and 

State Compensation Insurance Fund, filed simultaneously with 

this opinion. 

Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage: 

I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Gulbrandson.