COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 8, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP1874-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF1710

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

COLLIN D. REIMER,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County: 

JENNIFER DOROW, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2022AP1874-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Collin D. Reimer appeals from a judgment of the 

circuit court entered after his plea of no contest. He contends the court erred when 

it denied his motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement and 

evidence law enforcement found on his laptop, concluding Reimer voluntarily made 

the statements and voluntarily turned over and consented to the search of his laptop. 

He also challenges his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background

¶2 After being charged with possession of child pornography in relation 

to images found on his laptop, Reimer brought a motion to suppress statements he 

made to two detectives at his residence and incriminating evidence found on his 

laptop. Following the hearing on his motion, the circuit court found and ruled as 

follows.1

¶3 On November 27, 2019, acting on a cyber tip that then-nineteen-yearold Reimer may be in possession of child pornography, two plain-clothed armed 

detectives made contact at the home of Reimer’s parents, where Reimer resided. 

Reimer’s brother permitted the officers to enter the home; the detectives did not 

employ any force, threats or coercion to gain entry.

 

1

 Reimer and one of the detectives testified at the suppression hearing. For his appeal, 

however, Reimer only provided the transcript of his testimony, arguments by counsel for the 

parties, and the circuit court’s oral ruling; he did not provide the transcript of the detective’s

testimony. An appellant has the responsibility to ensure the record is sufficient to address the issues 

presented on appeal, and where the appellant does not, like Reimer here, we assume missing 

sections of the record support the circuit court’s ruling. See Fiumefreddo v. McLean, 174 Wis. 2d 

10, 26-7, 496 N.W.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, we focus on the circuit court’s findings, because 

even if they conflict with Reimer’s testimony at the hearing, we have to assume they are supported 

by the detective’s testimony. We also accept the findings as correct because Reimer does not

challenge them on appeal.
No. 2022AP1874-CR

3

¶4 While the detectives waited downstairs, the brother went upstairs and 

informed Reimer of the detectives’ presence and desire to speak with him. When 

Reimer came down to meet with them, the detectives were “upfront” in informing 

him they were investigating a cyber tip and wanted to search his “computer or 

devices that might still have this suspected child porn on it.” Reimer had had some 

prior “exposure and experience with law enforcement on the very same issue that

these detectives were investigating”—when he was fourteen years old, he had been 

“taken out of his home, to a police department where he was interviewed or 

interrogated by two female detectives ... about very graphic images.”

¶5 Reimer was very cooperative, and the “conversation” between him 

and the detectives was “very cordial.” While at the home, one of the detectives 

asked Reimer if he had any computers, and Reimer retrieved his laptop from a 

backpack and provided it and the password to the detectives. Reimer also signed a 

“consent to search” form, giving the detectives written permission to search his 

computer and acknowledging he was giving his permission voluntarily and with no 

promises or threats made by the detectives. 

¶6 Reimer cooperated with the detectives and “readily” permitted them 

to search his laptop “in part because he wanted to, and he didn’t think he had 

anything to hide,” because he “thought none of this stuff would be there, given the 

circumstances of when he apparently originally downloaded it and tried to get rid 

of it.” When speaking with Reimer, the detectives did not raise their voices, never 

touched him or made any threats or promises, and did not place him in handcuffs or 

otherwise in custody. The detectives were at Reimer’s residence for no more than 

twenty-five minutes.
No. 2022AP1874-CR

4

¶7 The circuit court acknowledged that the detectives did “play on 

[Reimer’s] emotions,” but added that “[i]t’s a lawful police tactic.” The court found 

that nothing at the hearing conflicted with the written permission Reimer provided 

the detectives “other than a statement by him that he felt he could not do anything 

else.” It recognized he “had an internal ... pressure to cooperate,” noting that “[h]e 

grew up with respect for law enforcement,” but found that his “feeling” that he was 

compelled to cooperate was “a product more to do with maybe his own regret, 

remorse, maybe getting it off his chest.” The court concluded that “none of those 

internal pressures amount to coercion and make his statements involuntary,” “[w]e 

don’t have ... anything on this record to suggest that [the detectives] forced, that 

they coerced this consent out of Mr Reimer,” and the consent he gave the detectives 

to search his laptop “was freely and voluntarily given.”

¶8 Following the denial of his suppression motion, Reimer pled no 

contest to one count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to three 

years of initial confinement followed by two years of extended supervision. Reimer 

appeals.

Discussion

¶9 Reimer contends his statements to the detectives were not voluntarily 

made and his consent for them to search his laptop was not voluntarily given. His 

statements were voluntarily made if they were “the product of a free and 

unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a 

conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the 

defendant by ... the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist.” See State v. 

Vice, 2021 WI 63, ¶29, 397 Wis. 2d 682, 961 N.W.2d 1 (citation omitted). The 

State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that Reimer made his 
No. 2022AP1874-CR

5

statements voluntarily. See State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶55, 363 Wis. 2d 376, 864 

N.W.2d 827. Reimer’s consent for the detectives to search his laptop was 

voluntarily given if it “was given in the absence of duress or coercion, either express 

or implied.” See State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶30, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 

560 (citation omitted). The State must show by clear and convincing evidence that 

Reimer’s consent to search was voluntarily given. See id.

¶10 “Voluntariness is evaluated in light of all the circumstances 

surrounding interrogation and decided under a totality of the circumstances, 

weighing the suspect’s personal characteristics against the actions of the police.” 

Moore, 363 Wis. 2d 376, ¶56 (footnote omitted). “[T]o justify a finding of 

involuntariness, there must be some affirmative evidence” that improper police 

practices were employed. Id. We consider the length of the police engagement with 

the defendant, general conditions and circumstances, “whether any excessive 

physical or psychological pressure was used, and whether any inducements, threats, 

methods, or strategies were utilized” by the police. Id., ¶57 (citation omitted). 

“The question of voluntariness involves the application of 

constitutional principles to historical facts.” We uphold a 

circuit court’s findings of historical fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous. A finding of historical fact is not clearly 

erroneous unless “it is against the great weight and clear 

preponderance of the evidence.” We independently review 

the application of constitutional principles to those facts. 

State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236 (citations 

omitted). 

¶11 In his appeal, Reimer specifically claims “his statements and 

surrender of his computer [were] non-voluntary” because he “felt ... he had no 

choice but to cooperate with law enforcement.” Although his arguments are not 

clear and he has insufficiently developed them, he appears to assert that his 
No. 2022AP1874-CR

6

statements and his consent for the detectives to search his laptop were involuntary 

because he was not read his Miranda2rights; he was separated from his siblings 

when the detectives spoke with him at his home; his parents were not contacted; the 

detectives “st[oo]d over him while questioning him”; and the detectives suggested 

to him that they were there “merely to have a conversation to ‘clear’ some things 

up,” “the matter was not as serious as it was,” and “he could help himself by 

cooperating.” Reimer fails to persuade.

¶12 We first note that the detectives were not obligated to read Reimer his 

Miranda rights as he was not in custody when they engaged with him at his 

residence. See State v. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, ¶9, 294 Wis. 2d 780, 720 

N.W.2d 459 (“[T]he Miranda safeguards apply only to custodial interrogations.” 

(citation omitted)). Moreover, when the detectives went over the “consent to 

search” form with Reimer, he was informed, as the form stated, “of [his] right[] to 

refuse to consent to [the] search, and ... that evidence and/or contraband found as a 

result of such may be seized and used against [him] in a court of law.” Additionally, 

Reimer acknowledged in his own testimony at the suppression hearing that when he 

had been previously interrogated, at age fourteen, regarding his possible possession 

of child pornography, he was read his Miranda rights. He also conceded he was 

otherwise familiar with those rights from crime shows. Reimer knew he had the 

right to choose not to speak with the detectives and not to consent to the search of 

his laptop; he just chose to cooperate instead. 

¶13 We see no concerns with the detectives speaking with Reimer in a 

separate room from his siblings. The detectives were questioning him about an 

extremely sensitive and embarrassing topic—his possession of child pornography—

 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
No. 2022AP1874-CR

7

so having that discussion away from his siblings makes sense. Moreover, according 

to Reimer’s own testimony, he was the one who directed the detectives to the 

specific living area where the discussion took place.

¶14 As to Reimer’s parents not being contacted, we note that when 

considering the questioning of a fifteen-year-old for five and one-half hours, with 

the juvenile being with police for eleven hours, the Moore court stated that while it 

considered the lack of a parental presence during questioning “as a part of the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding Moore’s confession,” it “d[id] not change 

the outcome.” Moore, 363 Wis. 2d 376, ¶¶62, 65 n.19. Here, Reimer was a 

nineteen-year-old adult, and the interaction with the detectives in his own home 

lasted no more than twenty-five minutes. We see no problem, and Reimer has failed 

to direct us to any law indicating there might be one.

¶15 In his briefing on appeal, Reimer also criticizes that the detectives 

“st[oo]d over him while questioning him.” His actual testimony at the hearing, 

however, makes the situation sound less menacing—he testified that after he led the 

detectives to the living room area out of earshot of his brother and sister, he “was 

sitting on the couch, talking to them, and they were standing”; no imagery of the 

detectives standing “over him.” We see nothing coercive about the circumstances 

as Reimer described them, nor has he directed us to case law indicating a legal 

concern here. 

¶16 Reimer also complains that the detectives “suggest[ed] to [him] that 

their presence in the home was merely to have a conversation to ‘clear’ some things 

up,” “the matter was not as serious as it was,” and he could “help himself by 

cooperating.” First, it is simply the truth that the detectives were there to “clear 

some things up.” Before the detectives spoke with Reimer and searched his laptop, 
No. 2022AP1874-CR

8

they only had a “tip” that he may be in possession of child pornography—they could 

not have known whether or not such images would be found on any device in his 

possession or what statements he might make related to the same. Had Reimer 

allowed them to search his laptop and it did not contain child pornography that 

certainly would have “cleared things up” also—in Reimer’s favor. Instead, the 

detectives were able to clear things up by concluding he was, in fact, in possession 

of child pornography, as the cyber tip suggested. Second, Reimer’s first two 

complaints here are that the detectives minimized the situation. Our supreme court 

has confirmed, however, that the use of minimizing tactics by law enforcement is 

“commonly accept[ed]” by the courts. See id., ¶64. 

¶17 As to Reimer’s statement that the detectives suggested he could “help 

himself by cooperating,” he develops no argument that particular statements by the 

detectives amounted to an improper police tactic. The circuit court specifically 

found that the detectives made no promises or threats to Reimer, which finding is 

consistent with some of Reimer’s own testimony at the hearing as well as the 

consent to search form he signed indicating the detectives made no promises or 

threats to him. He develops no challenge to the circuit court’s finding in this regard.

¶18 According to Reimer’s own testimony, the detectives certainly were 

not attempting to trick him; at his house, they frankly told him “they wanted to ... 

check out any computer that I might have ... just to make sure I wasn’t in possession 

of [child pornography].” And, as Reimer further testified, he “said yes,” allowing 

them to check his laptop because he thought he had nothing to hide, and he “just ...

thought it was the right thing to do.” He thought he had nothing to hide because he 

believed he had previously deleted all of the child pornography. Reimer also 

testified he felt he “had” to talk to the officers because “that was just like the natural 

next step” and he thought he “had” to give them the laptop because “they asked if I 
No. 2022AP1874-CR

9

had any computers or stuff like that ... to give them.” But, as the circuit court 

recognized, Reimer’s cooperation was due to his own “internal ... pressure to 

cooperate,” noting that he “grew up with respect for law enforcement” and that this 

pressure was “a product more to do with maybe his own regret, remorse, maybe 

getting it off his chest.”

¶19 We see no improper tactics utilized by the detectives in the first 

instance, and we conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining that 

Reimer’s statements to the detectives and his consent to search his laptop were 

voluntary in every respect. Thus, we also conclude the court did not err in denying 

Reimer’s suppression motion. 

¶20 As to his sentence, Reimer challenges it on two bases. At sentencing, 

the circuit court informed him that because his conviction was for the possession of 

child pornography, it did not have the discretion to impose a sentence with less than 

three years of initial confinement. On appeal, he claims the court did have said 

discretion, but he also concedes we have already decided this issue in a manner 

contrary to his position in State v. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70, 371 Wis. 2d 647, 

886 N.W.2d 100, and he further concedes that under Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 

166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), we “may not overrule, modify or withdraw 

language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals.” Because of 

his concessions, we discuss this no further.

¶21 As to Reimer’s second sentencing challenge, he claims “the Circuit 

Court should have had the discretion to sentence [him] to less than the mandatory 

minimum” because, he claims, “at the time he knowingly possessed the images he 

was within 48 months of the child depicted in the images.” Because Reimer 
No. 2022AP1874-CR

10

forfeited this issue due to failing to raise it before the circuit court and because he 

has insufficiently developed it on appeal, we do not consider it. 

By the Court.––Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2021-22).