### The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District 1 

### Judge for the District of Nebraska. ___________ No. 96-2381

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Nebraska. Jeffery Kosiba, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 23, 1996 Filed: November 15, 1996

___________ Before MAGILL, BRIGHT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.
Jeffery Kosiba appeals from his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine within 1,000 feet from a school. Th e district court denied Kosiba’s motion to suppress evidence sei zed from his 1 apartm ent. Following that ruling, Kosiba pleaded guilty reserving th e right to appeal the district court's denial of h is suppression motion. We affirm.
I. Background On July 18, 1995, a confidential inf ormant told Officer Dawn McKain, a veteran of the Omaha, Nebraska police department, that

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Jeffery Kosiba possessed one-half ounce of methamphetamine. The informant said he s aw drugs and drug paraphernalia in the living room of Kosiba’ s apartment and that Kosiba was dealing drugs. Using standard language, McKain prepared an application and aff idavit (McKainaffidavit) for a "no-knock" search warrant pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-411 (Reissue 1989). McKain’s affidavit described the dru g paraphernalia seen in Kosiba's apartment, but fa iled to mention the amount of drugs in his possession. McKain requested a "No Knock Search Warrant

. . . bec ause officers know from past experience that if they were t o announce their presence and purpose the evidence being sought could easily be destroyed by flushing it down a toilet or sink, or by swallowing it." (Add. at 36a.) A county judge issued a search warrant authorizing a noknock entry. On July 27, 1995, before executing the search warrant, McKain l earned from the informant that Kosiba had replenished his drug supply wit h marijuana and approximately one and one-half ounces of methamphetamine
. Inaddition, the informant told McKain that Kosiba had several handguns, assault rifles and a shotgun in his small apartment.

Later that day, the police executed the search warrant withou t knockin g and announcing their presence. The search uncovere d metha mphetamine in various places throughout the apartment, dru g paraphernalia, three pounds of marijuana packaged for sale, a shotgun and ammunition for several types of guns.
The district court analyzed the search under the fourth amendment , determined that exigent circumstances justifying the no-knock entry existe d whenthe officers executed the search warrant and denied Kosiba’s motion to suppress the evidence. Kosiba pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal.

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II. Discussion
Kosib a argues that the issuance of the no-knock warrant resulte d in an unreasonable search and seizure because Mc Kain's affidavit consisted of "boilerplate langu age" relating to the destructibility of evidence and the officer's experience. Kosiba contends that the good faith exception recognized in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply because the issuing j udge merely rubber-stamped the officer's request and because the police failed to act in good faith. Kosiba does not dispute that probable cause existed to issue the warrant.

"Adistr ict court's decision to deny a motion to suppress evidenc e sei zedpursuant to a search warrant will not be reversed unless it i s `unsupported by the evidence, based on an errone ous view of the applicable law or we are left wi th a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" United States v. Phillips , 88 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Unite d States v. Edmiston , 46 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 1995)). The exclusionary rule d oes not apply to "evidence obtained in objectively reasonabl e reliance on a . . . search warrant . . . ." Leon , 468 U.S. at 922. If, however, the affidavit and application for the warrant were "’so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render offici al belief in its existence entire lyunreasonable[,]’" the exclusionary rule applies. Id. at 92 3 (quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)). "[T]he proper standard. . . is whether the state officials complied with Nebraska law and the Fourth Amendment, or, under Leon , had an objectively reasonabl e basis to b elieve they were complying with Nebraska law and the Fourt h Amendme nt, in applying for and issuing the no-knock warrant." Unite d States v. Moore , 956 F.2d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 1992).
Nebraska law authorizes no-knock war rants to prevent the destruction of drugs. Id. at 848; see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-411. In addition, th e Nebraska Supreme Court allows issuing judges to

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take judicial notice of the inherent destructibility of small quantities of drugs. Id. at 848-49 (citing State v. Meyer , 311 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Neb. 1981)).

In Moore , an officer requested a no-knock warrant relying "upon his gene ral experience in averring that a no-knock warrant was needed t o prevent d estruction of the suspected drugs." Id. at 848. The officer , however, "did not present particular information about the potential for rapid des truction . . . ." Id. at 848-49. This court held that th e officer a nd the judge who authorized the no-knock entry acted in a n obje ctivelyreasonable manner under Nebraska law because the affidavi t suggested the suspect possessed easily disposable quantities. Id. at 849 (noting that affidavit described drugs as packaged for sale).

As i n Moore , Officer McKain's affidavit neglected to presen t particular information about the destructibility of the drugs, but include d references suggesting easily disposable quantities of methamphetamine. Th e affida vit stated that the informant saw narcotics for sale, hypodermi c needles and scales. Search warrants such as this one have been approved by Nebraska case law. See State v. Eary , 454 N.W.2d 685 (Neb. 1990); Stat e v. Armendariz , 449 N. W.2d 555 (Neb. 1989); State v. Meyer , 311 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 1981 ). Thus the officers could reasonably rely on the Nebrask a warrant.
Additiona lly, the no-knock execution of the warrant did not violate the fourth amendment. Under the fourth amendment, exigent circumstances, such a s preventing the destruction of evidence and protecting office r safety, justify no-knock entries to execute a search warrant. Wilson v. Arkansas , 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918-19 (1995). Exigent circumstances existed when t he police executed the search warrant at Kosiba's apartment
. Officers believed Kosiba possessed several weapons and an easily disposabl e quant ityof drugs in a small apartment. Thus, the officers reasonabl y believed that knocking and announcing their presence before entering

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Kosiba's apartment could endanger their safety or result in the destructio n of evidence.

III. Conclusion

The district court properly denied the motion to suppress th e evidence. We affirm the conviction.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.