UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 21-cv-23103-BLOOM/Torres

CASA EXPRESS CORP, as Trustee

of Casa Express Trust,

Judgment Creditor, 

v. 

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA,

 Judgment Debtor. 

________________________________________/ 

OMNIBUS ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND APPEAL

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon United States Magistrate Judge Alicia OtazoReyes’ Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. [262], on three Motions: Respondent 

Raul Gorrin Belisario’s (“Gorrin”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Gorrin’s Motion”), 

ECF No. [231]; Respondents’1 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Respondents’ Motion”), 

ECF No. [232]; and Judgment Creditor Casa Express Corporation’s (“Casa”) Response in 

Opposition to [ECF No. 231] or Alternatively, Cross-Motion to Serve Raul Gorrin Belisario via 

Email (“Cross-Motion”), ECF Nos. [252], [253]. All post-judgment matters, including the instant 

Motions, were referred to Magistrate Judge Alicia Otazo-Reyes. ECF No. [148]. Judge OtazoReyes held a hearing on the matters pertaining to these three Motions on November 13, 2023, 

(“Hearing”), ECF No. [261]. Thereafter, Judge Otazo-Reyes issued her “R&R.” Casa filed an 

Objection, ECF No. [276], and Respondents filed a Response, ECF No. [281]. 

Before the Court is also Casa’s Appeal and Objections to Order ECF No. [241], ("Appeal"), 

1 The “Respondents” are Raul Gorrin Belisario (“Gorrin”), and the “Respondent Entities” or 

“Entities” are RIM Group Investments Corp., RIM Group Investments I Corp., RIM Group Investments II 

Corp., RIM Group Investments III Corp., Posh 8 Dynamic Inc., and Planet 2 Reaching Inc. 

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ECF No. [257]. Casa earlier filed a Motion to Extend Notices of Lis Pendens, (“Motion to 

Extend”), ECF No. [222]. Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Extend,

ECF No. [268], and the matter was referred to Judge Otazo-Reyes. ECF No. [148]. Judge OtazoReyes thereafter denied the Motion in Order Re: D.E. 222, (“Order”), ECF No. [241]. 

The Court has reviewed the Motions, the Appeal, the supporting and opposing submissions, 

the record in the case, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the R&R is

adopted in part, and the Appeal is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case and adopts the 

procedural history contained in the R&R.

On August 27, 2021, Casa commenced this action by registering an Amended Final 

Judgment (“Judgment”) issued by the Southern District of New York awarding judgment in favor 

of Casa and against Judgment Debtor Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (“Venezuela”) for nonpayment of two dollar-denominated sovereign bonds beneficially owned by Casa, ECF No. [1]. 

After registering the Judgment, Casa filed its Ex Parte Expedited Motion to Commence 

Proceedings Supplementary, to Implead Defendants, and for Issuance of Statutory Notices to 

Appear, (“Ex Parte Motion”) ECF No. [3], which this Court granted, ECF No. [4].

2 Upon filing 

the Ex Parte Motion, the Judgment (including post-judgment interest) totaled $43,342,865.52. 

ECF No. [3] at 4. On June 7, 2022, Casa filed its First Motion to Amend, which was granted. ECF 

Nos. [42], [59]. Casa thereafter filed its Amended Ex Parte Expedited Motion to Commence 

Proceedings Supplementary, (“Amended Motion”), ECF No. [60]. Casa seeks to execute on the 

2 In the Court’s order, Casa was permitted to implead Alejandro Andrade Cedeno, Raul Gorrin 

Belisario, RIM Group Investments Corp., RIM Group Investments I Corp., RIM Group Investments II 

Corp., RIM Group Investments III Corp., Posh 8 Dynamic Inc., and Planet 2 Reaching Inc. in proceedings 

supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution, ECF No. [4] at 3. 

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Judgment pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c), 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), Florida Statutes, § 56.29, and Southern District of Florida 

Local Rule 7.1(d)(2). ECF No. [60] at 1.

Statutory Notices to Appear were again issued to Respondents. ECF Nos. [63]-[71]. Eight 

properties (“Properties”)3 are identified in the Amended Motion; Casa seeks to satisfy its Judgment

through the Properties, and the Entities4 hold title to all eight Properties. ECF No. [60,] ¶¶ 27, 29. 

Casa argued that an independent investigation conducted by its Certified Fraud Examiner and 

Certified Forensic Interviewer, Nelson Luis (“Luis”), established that the Entities purchased the 

Properties with misappropriated Venezuelan funds (“Funds”), and that “Casa Express, as a 

Judgment Creditor of Venezuela, is entitled to execute against the Properties in partial satisfaction 

of its judgment.” Id. ¶ 39.

On July 11, 2023 and July 17, 2023, this Court issued default final judgments against two 

former National Treasurers of Venezuela, Claudia Patricia Diaz Guillen (“Guillen”), Alejandro 

Andrade Cedeno (“Cedeno”), and a partial default against Venezuela. ECF Nos. [215], [218]. In 

the default final judgments against Guillen and Cedeno, the Court determined that these former 

National Treasurers of Venezuela breached their fiduciary duties in accepting bribes related to the 

misappropriated Venezuelan funds.

5 Id. Additionally, this Court declared that Venezuela waived 

3 The Properties are: 144 Isla Dorada Boulevard, Coral Gables, Florida 33143; 4100 Salzedo Street,

Unit 1010, Coral Gables, Florida 33146; 4100 Salzedo Street, Unit 608, Coral Gables, Florida 33146; 4100 

Salzedo Street, Unit 807, Coral Gables, Florida 33146; 4100 Salzedo Street, Unit 813, Coral Gables, Florida 

33146; 4100 Salzedo Street, Unit 913, Coral Gables, Florida 33146; 18555 Collins Avenue, Unit 4401, 

Sunny lsles Beach, Florida 33160; and 7043 Fisher Island Dr., Unit 7043, Fisher Island, Florida 33109. 

ECF No. [60] at 9.

4 The Entities are: RIM Group Investments Corp., RIM Group Investments I Corp., RIM Group 

Investments II Corp., RIM Group Investments III Corp., Posh 8 Dynamic Inc., and Planet 2 Reaching Inc. 

ECF No. [4] at 3.

5 Additional declarations against Guillen and Cedeno included a valid unjust enrichment claim was 

established against them, and their conduct satisfied the elements necessary to impose a constructive trust.

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its sovereign immunity to suit through the fiscal agency agreements (“FAA”) controlling the bond

agreement. ECF No. [218] at 2. 

Gorrin thereafter filed his Motion seeking a ruling that Casa failed to both properly serve

him and establish personal jurisdiction over him. ECF No. [231]. Additionally, Gorrin joined 

Respondent Entities and filed a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings as to the following 

affirmative defenses: (1) Casa lacks standing to impose a third-party constructive trust on their 

Properties on behalf of Venezuela; (2) Casa’s claims are barred by the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609, which provides a presumption of sovereign 

immunity from attachment of property or suit; (3) the Properties are blocked by the United States 

Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) and Casa lacks the requisite 

OFAC license to proceed; (4) Casa failed to establish ancillary jurisdiction; and (5) Casa has failed 

to allege and cannot establish the elements of a constructive trust remedy. ECF No. [232] at 2. 

Casa filed its Cross-Motion, which included its Response to Gorrin’s Motion, contending 

that the Hague Convention is unavailable to serve Gorrin because Venezuela has no central 

authority to process international service pursuant to the Hague Convention. ECF No. [252] at 2.

Further, as Venezuela is a derecognized regime, compelling Casa to serve Gorrin in Venezuela

through existing authorities raises political and separation of powers issues. Id. Therefore Casa 

moved to serve Gorrin by email. Id. at 6. Casa further argues personal jurisdiction exists over 

Gorrin pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(2).6 since Gorrin committed tortious acts in Florida 

by making bribe payments to Cedeno and Guillen with knowledge and in furtherance of its breach 

6

 The Florida long-arm statute for the assertion of personal jurisdiction provides, as pertinent here, 

“[a] person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any 

of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural 

person, . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the 

following acts (1) operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this 

state or having and office or agency in this state; (2) committing a tortious act within this state.” 

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of trust. Id. at 8-9. Casa points to Gorrin’s Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) detailing tortious 

acts, including wire transfers of millions of dollars to accounts owned by or for the benefit of 

Cedeno and Guillen, satisfying specific personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute, 

§ 48.193(1)(a)(2). Casa also provides a table of Gorrin’s real property in Florida to establish that

Gorrin conducts business in Florida through real estate ventures related to the Properties.

A. The R&R’s Findings

In the R & R, Judge Otazo-Reyes concluded that Gorrin should be entitled to judgment in 

part: while substitute service on Gorrin should be permitted, Gorrin should be dismissed from this 

case for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. [262] at 9. Consequently, Judge Otazo-Reyes 

recommends that Casa’s Cross Motion should be granted as to service on Gorrin but denied as to 

personal jurisdiction over Gorrin. Id. 8-12.

i. Gorrin’s Motion and Casa’s Cross-Motion

As to Gorrin’s Motion, Judge Otazo-Reyes recommended the Court find Casa has failed to 

establish personal jurisdiction over Gorrin. However, should Casa sufficiently supplement the 

record to indicate its efforts to serve Gorrin pursuant to the Hague Convention, Casa should be 

permitted to serve Gorrin through email, even if “such service would be moot, due to lack of 

personal jurisdiction.” ECF No. [262] at 21. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction 

The R&R analyzed the following two prongs of Florida’s long-arm statute relied upon by 

Casa in its assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over Gorrin based upon his conduct in state:

1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business 

venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.

2. Committing a tortious act within this state.

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(2); see ECF No. [262] a 9.

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i. Specific Personal Jurisdiction: Conducting a Business in Florida Analysis

Judge Otazo-Reyes determined the allegations that Gorrin conducted business in Florida 

due to applications for condominium associations and various quit claim deeds between the 

Properties and Entities were insufficient to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. The R&R relied 

upon Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothesteing-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2005), 

providing the relevant factors courts should use when considering whether business has been 

conducted in Florida sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction: the presence and operation of an 

office in Florida; possession and maintenance of a license permitting the defendant to do business 

in Florida; the quantity of clients the business serves in Florida; and the percentage of the 

defendant’s overall revenue earned in Florida. Id. at 1167. The R&R found that none of those 

factors were present based upon the allegations against Gorrin.

ii. Specific Personal Jurisdiction: Tortious Acts in Florida

The R&R determined allegations that Gorrin engaged in tortious acts within Florida were

insufficient to exercise specific personal jurisdiction because the necessary “connection or 

connexity” between his alleged acts and the Properties Casa seeks to impose a constructive trust 

over has not been linked. ECF No. [262] at 10. Judge Otazo-Reyes determined that Casa cannot 

establish personal jurisdiction under a “disjointed theory” whereby personal jurisdiction exists

based on acts related to a tort, but unrelated to the relief sought for that tort. Id. Judge Otazo-Reyes

pointed out that the allegations taken as true must be linked to the constructive trust Casa seeks as 

that is the reason the proceedings supplementary were initiated and how Casa seeks to execute on 

its Judgment against Venezuela. Id. Additionally, the R&R noted Casa failed to provide any 

authority supporting personal jurisdiction on that basis.

The R&R also found that, although Florida’s long-arm statute does not apply to Gorrin, the 

required constitutional minimum contacts analysis also fails. ECF No. [262] at 1; See Future Tech. 

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Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2000) (due process requires 

“(1) purposeful availment of the forum state; (2) the cause of action arises out of the activities 

which you purposefully availed yourself . . . and (3) reasonable foreseeability that [a defendant] 

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”)

C. Respondents’ Motion

a. Constructive Trust 

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ Motion be granted with respect to Casa’s 

request for the imposition of a constructive trust on the Properties on behalf of Venezuela. ECF 

No. [262] at 14. Judge Otazo-Reyes determined Casa lacks a sufficient link between the Funds and 

the Properties to establish the constructive trust it seeks over the Properties and the sources Casa 

relied on were insufficient. First, Casa’s reliance on OFAC’s findings that Gorrin invested the 

Funds into “ʻreal properties [] located in Florida through a network of corporate entities to 

obfuscate his ownership in the properties’” failed because there was no mention of the specific 

properties over which Casa seeks to impose the constructive trust. See ECF No. [257] at 7; ECF 

No. [60-5] at 6. Second, Judge Otazo-Reyes determined the Luis Report is flawed for listing the 

substitute properties in the forfeiture section of the Indictment against Gorrin; listing a property as 

substitute is insufficient to render a property tainted. ECF No. [262] at 13. Third, Casa’s reliance 

on the chart published by OFAC, “Venezuela Currency Exchange Network Scheme,” was also 

insufficient to support a link between the Funds and the Properties because “the chart makes no 

specific mention of the Properties.” Id. at 14. Thus, the R&R found each of Casa’s proffers failed 

“to provide a factual basis for the necessary link between the misappropriated Venezuelan funds

and the Properties.” Id. For those reasons, the R&R concluded Respondents are entitled to 

judgment on the pleadings with respect to the constructive trust Casa seeks to impose over the 

Properties on behalf of Venezuela. Id.

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b. Standing Analysis

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ Motion be granted with respect to the 

affirmative defense that Casa lacks standing in these proceedings. ECF No. [262] at 16. The R&R 

pointed out that Casa has not alleged Article III standing and analyzes Casa’s alternative arguments

that it has standing by stepping in the shoes of its judgment debtor, and because Venezuela 

assigned its litigation rights to Casa.

Casa argues it has standing because Florida law permits judgment creditors “to step into 

the shoes of its judgment debtor” to impose a constructive trust over property owned by a thirdparty. The R&R found instead that Casa is asserting against Respondents a “personal chose of 

action” of Venezuela. ECF No. [262] at 15. Casa claims that the highest-ranking officials 

defrauded its nation and “absconded with ill-gotten gains” are so “sensitively sovereign in nature” 

it is unsurprising “no case. . . has ever been allowed for a private judgment creditor to obtain title 

to such a ‘chose in action’ and pursue a lawsuit on behalf of a sovereign.” Id.; see ECF No. [256] 

at 7-8. Accordingly, Judge Otazo-Reyes found Casa lacks support that is has standing in this novel 

manner. Id.

Judge Otazo-Reyes also found Venezuela did not assign its litigation rights to Casa through 

a special law enacted by Venezuela (“VZ Law”) incentivizing its creditors to sue “holders of 

Venezuelan assets obtained through acts of corruption.” Id. n.1. The R&R reasoned this purported 

authorization post-dates Casa’s registration of its Judgment, giving rise to these proceedings, and 

thus fails to establish standing existed at the commencement of an action, which is fatal. Id. n. 11. 

Additionally, Casa conceded at the Hearing that it failed to consider what the necessary legal 

requirements are to establish the purported assignment of litigation rights and whether the VZ Law 

met those requirements. Id. Accordingly Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents are entitled 

to judgment on the pleadings with respect to their affirmative defense of Casa’s lack of standing.

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c. FSIA Immunity 

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ Motion with respect to their affirmative 

defense of FSIA immunity be granted. In the R&R, Judge Otazo-Reyes found that taking Casa’s 

allegations as true the Properties belong to Venezuela, the Properties are still immune from 

attachment pursuant to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq. Judge Otazo-Reyes determined 

28 U.S.C. § 1610, whereby a foreign sovereign state loses immunity to attachment or execution of 

its property within the United States if that property was used for “commercial activity,” fails in 

this matter. See § 1610(a)(1)-(2). The R&R rejected Casa’s assertion that Venezuela waived its 

FSIA immunity from both suit and execution in the FAAs which allowed Casa to pursue its 

Judgment in the district court of the Southern District of New York, and that the same waiver is 

valid here. ECF No. [262] at 16. Instead, the R&R determined this Court’s Partial Default 

Judgment against Venezuela, pursuant to the Judgment entered in New York, was limited to waiver 

from suit. Id. at 17; see ECF No. [218]. Accordingly, only Venezuela’s waiver to suit in relation 

to its non-payment of the bond agreement was recognized by this Court.

Next, Judge Otazo-Reyes determined the authorization from Venezuela’s Attorney General 

was issued after these proceedings commenced, the Properties are not mentioned in the VZ Law, 

and the purported agreement from Venezuela is not “use” of the Properties by Venezuela triggering 

the commercial exception in the FSIA. Id. at 17. The R&R cites to U.S v. M/Y Galactica Star, 13 

F.4th 448 (5th Cir. 2021) where the Fifth Circuit determined a foreign sovereign’s participation in 

the sale of a yacht was not commercial activity such that it waived its sovereign immunity under 

the FSIA. Id. at 459. 

Finally, Judge Otazo-Reyes determined that § 1610(a) does not permit a foreign state to 

lose or waive its immunity from attachment or execution of its property in the United States

through purported commercial activity of another entity or person. ECF No. [262] at 17. The R&R 

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found Casa’s argument lacked merit that “because § U.S.C. 1610(a)(1) does not explicitly require 

that the commercial activity. . . be actually carried out by the foreign state” means actions of a 

third-party could trigger the section 1610(a) exception. Id. Casa argues that other sections of the 

FSIA expressly refer to commercial activity conducted by the foreign state, but Judge Otazo-Reyes 

rejected that argument as violating well-established canons of statutory construction “that context 

must be take into account.” Id. (citing Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)). As 

such, the R&R determined only commercial activity by the foreign state as to their property could 

result in the foreign sovereign losing its FSIA immunity from attachment and execution of its

property in the United States. Consequently, Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ 

Motion be granted as to the FSIA affirmative defense.

d. OFAC Regulations

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommended Respondents’ Motion be denied with respect to their 

OFAC Regulations affirmative defense. ECF No. [262] at 19. There is no dispute OFAC blocked 

the Properties, and OFAC requires a license for “entry into settlement agreement or the 

enforcement of any lien, judgment, arbitral award . . . through execution, garnishment, or other 

judicial process.” Id. During the Hearing, Casa proffered a letter from OFAC’s Deputy Assistant 

Director for Licensing, Mary P. Rasmussen, to support Casa’s contention that it did not need a 

license to proceed with the litigation. Judge Otazo-Reyes determined that the letter was insufficient 

to authorize the imposition of a constructive trust but recognized the letter “alluded to the potential 

issuance of such a license.” Id. at 19. As such, Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ 

Motion be denied on the OFAC regulations affirmative defense raised. Id.

e. Act of State Doctrine

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ Motion be granted with respect to their act 

of state doctrine affirmative defense. Citing Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 

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(1964), Judge Otazo-Reyes notes the doctrine “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring 

into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign power committed within its own territory.” 

Id. at 401; ECF No. [262] at 19. Further, the doctrine “operates as a preclusive force, foreclosing 

judicial inquiry into the validity or propriety of such acts in litigation between any set of parties.” 

Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 365 F. Supp.2d 1263, 1271 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2005); ECF No. 

[262] at 19. As Casa argues Gorrin’s bribes were in furtherance of an illicit and illegal scheme 

conducted by two Venezuelan Treasurers, the R&R found the Court must necessarily determine 

whether the acts of those Venezuelan Treasurers were a breach of trust and illegitimate for Casa 

to obtain the relief it seeks through imposition of a constructive trust. Id. at 20. Judge Otazo-Reyes 

concluded such a determination is precluded by the act of state doctrine, and Respondents are 

entitled to judgment on the pleading with respect to their act of state doctrine affirmative defense.

f. Ancillary Jurisdiction 

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ Motion be granted with respect to their 

affirmative defense that the Court lacks ancillary jurisdiction because “[a]ncillary jurisdiction does 

not extend to ‘a new lawsuit to impose liability for a judgment on a third party.’” Nat’l Mar. Servs., 

Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783, 787 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 

(1996)); see ECF No. [262] at 20. 

Relying on Peacock, Judge Otazo-Reyes concluded that jurisdiction in this district to 

enforce the Judgment obtained in New York is limited to Venezuela and does not extend to 

Respondents. ECF No. [262] at 21. Similarly, Judge Otazo-Reyes found Casa’s argument 

distinguishing Peacock because it does not intend to hold Respondents personally liable for the 

Judgment is “a distinction without a difference” as Casa seeks to impose a constructive trust over 

Respondents’ Properties to collect on the Judgment obtained in New York. Id. at 20. Additionally, 

Judge Otazo-Reyes found Casa’s contention that subject matter jurisdiction exists under the FSIA 

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fails because such jurisdiction applies to Venezuela as judgment creditor, not to the third-party 

Respondents. Id. at 21. Moreover, Judge Otazo-Reyes found Casa’s alternative argument that 

FSIA jurisdiction applies under an “immovable property” exception fails as the imposition of a 

constructive trust has been found legally deficient, thus, no relevant property exists to trigger this

exception. Id. Judge Otazo-Reyes recommended that Respondents’ Motion be granted on the 

affirmative defense that the Court lacks ancillary jurisdiction over these proceedings 

supplementary.

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommended that Respondents’ Motion be granted on all grounds, 

except on the OFAC regulations affirmative defense, voiding Casa’s claims. Additionally, Judge 

Otazo-Reyes recommended that Gorrin’s Motion be granted in part and denied in part, and Casa’s 

Cross-Motion be granted.

D. The Appeal

Judge Otazo-Reyes denied Casa’s Motion to Extend Notices of Lis Pendens. ECF No. 

[241] at 1. Casa sought to extend the Notices of Lis Pendens “until a final disposition on the merits 

of the case.” ECF No. [222] at 1. In her Order, Judge Otazo-Reyes found that (1) Casa lacked 

standing to assert the constructive trust claim upon which the Notices of Lis Pendens are 

predicated; (2) Casa failed to show it had a “good faith, viable [constructive trust] claim” consistent 

with prevailing Florida law and (3) the existence of prior Notices of Lis Pendens does not make 

an order extending them to “fall outside the ambit of protected acts” precluded by OFAC based 

upon the block against the Properties. See generally ECF No. [241].

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Report and Recommendations

“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, a party 

must file written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings 

and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. 

Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 

(11th Cir. 1989). The objections must also present “supporting legal authority.” S.D. Fla. L. Mag. 

J.R. 4(b). The portions of the report and recommendation to which an objection is made are 

reviewed de novo only if those objections “pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees 

with.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3). If a party fails to object to any portion of the magistrate judge’s report, those portions are 

reviewed for clear error. Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 

F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Liberty Am. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. WestPoint Underwriters, 

L.L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 

“It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit [ ] papers to a district court which are 

nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers 

submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the 

apple’ when they file objections to an R & R.” Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 

WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (quotation omitted). A court, in its discretion, need 

not consider arguments that were not, in the first instance, presented to the magistrate judge. 

Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). A district court may accept, reject, or 

modify a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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B. Appeal of a Magistrate Order

A “magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive matter must be affirmed unless ‘it has 

been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Sun Cap. 

Partners, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., Inc., No. 12-CV-81397-KAM, 2015 WL 11921411, at 

*1 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2015). The “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review is 

“extremely deferential.” Martinez v. Miami Children's Health Sys., Inc., No. 21-CV-22700, 2023 

WL 1954529, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2023). A finding is clearly erroneous only if “the reviewing 

court, after assessing the evidence in its entirety, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.” Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1523 (11th 

Cir.1997). “With respect to the ‘contrary to law’ variant of the test, an order is contrary to law 

when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Sun Capital 

Partners, 2015 WL 11921411, at *1.

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court highlights that Casa’s Objections are generally improper 

because they largely reframe arguments already made and thoroughly considered by Judge OtazoReyes or they simply disagree with Judge Otazo-Reyes’s conclusions. “It is improper for an 

objecting party to . . . submit [ ] papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing 

of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. 

Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple’ when they file objections[.]” 

Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) 

(quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 

(W.D.N.Y. 1992)). 

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A. Gorrin’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Casa’s Cross-Motion

i. This Court Does Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Gorrin

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Gorrin’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for lack 

of personal jurisdiction be granted. ECF No. [262] at 9. The R&R correctly finds Casa failed to 

satisfy either asserted prong of Florida’s long arm statute upon which it relies, and Casa fails to 

show connexity to the constructive trust it seeks. 

a. Casa Failed to Establish a Real Estate Business was Conducted to Assert 

Personal Jurisdiction

The R&R finds Casa failed to establish Gorrin conducted business in Florida based on an

application for ownership within a condominium association, and the exercise of quit-claim deeds. 

Id. at 11.

Casa objects to the findings in the R&R and argues it sufficiently alleged Gorrin operated 

a real estate business venture in Florida, including the sale and rent of the Properties for profit, that 

was uncontested in the affidavits filed by Gorrin and his Entities.’ ECF No. [276] at 25. Casa 

reasons its uncontroverted allegations must be accepted as fact, and in failing to do so, the R&R 

constitutes clear error. ECF No. [276] at 26. Casa therefore argues it established that the Properties 

were bought to generate monthly cashflow and listed for sale to realize profits and references an 

exhibit it attached to its Amended Motion. Id. at 26; See ECF No. [60-1] (certain Properties listed 

on “Zillow”); see ECF Nos. [127-1], [127-2]. Casa cites to Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So. 2d 679 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2005) which held the renting and sale of an investment property is a business venture 

for purposes of the Florida long-arm statute. Id. at 683. Casa argues Gorrin operated a business 

venture in Florida sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction and its Objections should be 

sustained. ECF No. [276] at 29. 

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Respondents argue Casa misstates the denials in the affidavits as Gorrin and the Entities 

provided specific denials beyond Casa’s contentions. ECF No. [281] n. 14. Respondents reason

Casa bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Gorrin, and instead “objects by 

simply disagreeing with the ruling.” Id. at 20. Finally, Respondents argue Casa’s reliance on quit 

claim deeds and applications to homeowner associations to establish Gorrin conducted business in 

Florida fails to satisfy the “conducting business” analysis under the prevailing Eleventh Circuit 

factors set forth in Horizon Aggressive growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162 (11th 

Cir. 2005) as indicated in the R&R. 421 F.2d at 1167; see ECF No. [281] at 20.

The Court agrees with the R&R’s determination and finds the Objections are without merit. 

Casa fails to analyze the Eleventh Circuit factors set forth in Horizon Aggressive growth, L.P. v. 

Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) to determine whether a defendant conducted 

a business in Florida such that specific personal jurisdiction can be established. Id. at 1167. The 

Horizon factors, while not exhaustive, include: “the presence and operation of an office in Florida; 

the possession and maintenance of a license to do business in Florida; the number of Florida clients 

served; and the percentage of overall revenue gleaned from Florida clients.” Id. As Judge OtazoReyes correctly pointed out, “[n]one of these factors are present here with respect to Gorrin.” ECF 

No. [262] at 11. Not only did Casa fail to address those factors directly, its allegations and the 

exhibits provided fail to support a finding that these factors are met.

Casa instead relies on Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) for 

support that Respondents rented and sold the Properties for gain so as to satisfy the “conducting 

business” portion of the Florida long-arm statute. ECF No. [276] at 27. In Labbee, the plaintiff 

alleged a particular property was rented for twenty years, prior to the plaintiff purchasing that 

property, such that the defendant was “dealing in property in anticipation of economic gain” and 

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conducted a business venture under the Florida long-arm statute. 913 So. 2d at 683. Labbee points 

out that Florida Supreme Court has held that “doing business is doing a series of similar acts for 

the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit.” Id. (citing Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619, 

621 (Fla. 1953) (quotations omitted)). The Florida Supreme Court determined that because the 

defendant “owned real estate for the purpose of renting it to others for profit and that he 

subsequently sold it” was sufficient to find the defendant engaged in a business venture warranting 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute. Id. at 683 (emphasis 

added).

Here, Casa offers an exhibit with several listings from one commercial real estate website

indicating certain properties were listed for sale or rent. ECF No. [60-1]. Notably, these are listings 

and not contracts. However, Casa fails to acknowledge most listings in its exhibit were

intermittently listed and delisted, with no indication a sale or a rental ever occurred, and most show 

a final delisting.

7 Of the one rental unit where a transaction is indicated, the information in the 

exhibit is inconsistent with Labbee; 4100 Salzedo Street, Unit 807 was rented in 2017, but does 

not indicate what price it was rented for or the duration, thus precluding a conclusion it was rented 

for a profit or over time consistent with Labbee. Id. at 4. Therefore, Casa’s Exhibit fails to support 

its argument. Id. See Llauro v. Tony, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“[W]hen 

7 144 Isla Dorada, Miami, Fl 33143 was listed for sale on January 7, 2010, then the listing for sale 

was removed on June 18, 2010. Six years later, this property was relisted for sale in September 2016, and 

the listing was again removed in January 2019. The property was relisted in October 2019, and removed in 

January 2020. The exhibit never shows a final sale occurred. ECF No. [60-1] at 2. Similarly, the Exhibit 

shows 18555 Collins Avenue, Apt. 4401, Sunny Isles Beach, FL 33160 was listed for sale on January 12, 

2018, a price reduction is noted on September 28, 2018, and the property listing was removed on December 

4, 2018; no indication of a sale is in the record. Id. at 7. Regarding rental units, the Exhibit shows 4100 

Salzedo Street, Unit 807, Coral Gables, FL 33146, was listed for sale in October 2017, then listed as 

“Rented” with no indication at what price (i.e., if for profit). Additionally, the Exhibit shows 4100 Salzedo 

Street, Apt. 913 was listed for rent in October 2017, the price was reduced in November 2017, and the 

listing was removed on December 17, 2017, with not additional information provided. Id. at 6. The record 

does not support Casa’s allegations that the Properties were used for profit, such that a business venture is 

sufficiently alleged under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1).

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exhibits attached to a complaint ‘contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, 

the exhibits govern.’”). Accordingly, Casa’s allegations are insufficient to invoke specific personal 

jurisdiction based upon Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1). The Court adopts the R&R with respect to this 

point and the Objections are overruled.

b. Casa Failed to Establish Connexity Between the Tortious Acts in Florida

and the Constructive Trust it Seeks to Assert Personal Jurisdiction over 

Gorrin

Casa objects to the R&R and contends it imposes an improper, “additional jurisdictional 

requirement” in determining Casa failed to establish a link between Gorrin’s conduct and the 

constructive trust Casa seeks to impose under § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Additionally, Casa cites Knepfle 

v. J-Tech, Corp. 48 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2022) for the proposition it need only allege facts 

sufficient to establish “a connexity between the enumerated activity in Florida and the cause of 

action.” Id. at 1292. Here, Casa argues the cause of action is “the wrongful participation in a breach 

of trust” by Gorrin, and the enumerated activity is “committing a tortious act.” ECF No. [276] at 

23. Casa contends the Indictment “links the wrongful participation breach of trust tort committed 

by Gorrin [] to the Southern District of Florida” detailing various bribe payments sent to bank 

accounts in the Southern District of Florida. Id. at 24. Casa reasons this establishes sufficient 

connexity between Casa’s cause of action and Gorrin’s tortious activity in Florida to satisfy 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Casa argues that is enough, and any requirement that it must establish 

connexity to its desired relief sought, the creation of a constructive trust consisting of the 

Properties, is clear error. Id. at 23. 

Respondents argue that Casa fails to establish connexity between the cause of action and 

Florida contacts and impermissibly attempts to “parse out” the connection to the constructive trust 

to establish jurisdiction. ECF No. [281] at 19. Respondents contend Casa’s observation that its 

allegations must be accepted as true fails to show those allegations provide a sufficient link 

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between the forum and Gorrin’s tortious conduct, and the Court accordingly cannot exercise 

personal jurisdiction over Gorrin. 

The Court agrees that Casa fails to establish connexity between the bribe-related acts to the 

Properties as required under Knepfle. This action is a proceeding supplementary pursuant and was 

filed invoking the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), and Florida Statutes 

§ 56.29 with a single purpose — the imposition of a constructive trust over Properties so that Casa 

can execute on its Judgment. See ECF No. [60]. The constructive trust is both the sole cause of 

action and the sole relief sought. Casa has conceded this issue, referring to these proceedings as “a 

constructive trust action” and discussing the way Casa must establish its “constructive trust claim.” 

ECF No. [222] at 2. Casa even concedes as much in its Objection by arguing that Venezuela 

waived its sovereign immunity and the FAAs permit attachment to the Properties, “this proceeding. 

. . is an action ‘brought solely [] for the purpose of enforcing or executing a [] Related Judgment.’” 

ECF No. [276] at 14. Accordingly, Casa must demonstrate connexity between the acts it has 

alleged and the Properties. See Schwartzberg v. Knobloch, 98 So. 3d 173, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

The taking of bribes in Florida and the imposition of the constructive trust are inextricable for 

Casa’s claim, and their connexity is required to satisfy the Florida long-arm statute. It has not done 

so here.

Accordingly, the Court finds the R&R correctly analyzed the connexity requirement to 

warrant specific jurisdiction over Gorrin due to alleged tortious acts in Florida and agrees that was 

not satisfied here. As already adopted in this Order, Casa’s proffers of the OFAC findings and 

chart, and its own expert Luis Report, have failed to establish the necessary link to the Properties.

The Court adopts this portion of the R&R, and the Objections on this issue are overruled.

8

8 As personal jurisdiction has not been established through the statutory provision, the Court need 

not reach the analysis whether exercise of personal jurisdiction also comports with due process. However, 

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ii. Casa May Not Serve Gorrin by Email

Casa objects to the conclusion in the R&R that it needs to re-serve Gorrin and contends its 

substitute service on Gorrin was proper pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181. Casa argues the Hague 

Service Convention was unavailable in Venezuela, and as Gorrin has actively litigated this action 

for two years, there is no need to reserve him. ECF No. [276] at 31. Nevertheless, per Judge OtazoReyes request, Casa filed a declaration from Helen Caracas, “the Venezuelan attorney who 

undertook the service attempt under the Hague Convention.” Id.; ECF No. [276-7] Ex. G. Although 

Casa maintains that it has already properly served Gorrin, Casa asks the Court to adopt the R&R 

on this issue and grant Casa’s Cross-Motion on this issue.

Respondents did not respond to the issue of service via email.

The Court has determined it does not have personal jurisdiction over Gorrin. Consequently, 

the Court declines to adopt the R&R on this point and denies Casa’s Motion to re-serve Gorrin 

through email. 

B. Respondents’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

i. Casa Failed to Establish a Viable Constructive Trust Over the Properties

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends that the Court finds Casa fails to establish a viable 

constructive trust. ECF No. [262] at 14.

Casa contends the R&R incorrectly read the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

Respondents, and it is only required to sufficiently allege a link exists between the Funds and the 

the Court also adopts the portion of the R&R which determined the general weakness of statutory personal 

jurisdiction over Gorrin and inconsistent with due process because Gorrin lacks sufficient minimum 

contacts with Florida. The R&R correctly observed that showing a defendant has minimum contacts with 

the forum requires demonstrating (1) purposeful availment of the forum state; (2) the cause of action arises 

out of the activities of which you purposefully availed yourself. . . and (3) reasonable foreseeability that [a 

defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id. at 10-11 (citing Future Tech. 

Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). ECF No. [262] 

at 12. 

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Properties to impose a constructive trust. ECF No. [276] at 4. Casa asserts it sufficiently alleged 

the Properties “ʻwere purchased with misappropriated Venezuelan funds’” by providing the 

addresses, legal descriptions, and dates of purchase. Id. Casa argues the R&R failed to consider 

that when this Court issued the Notices to Appear, it stated “Casa Express sufficiently identifies 

eight (8) real properties of Defendant purchased with misappropriated Venezuelan funds in the 

hands of the proposed impleaded parties.” ECF No. [4] at 3. Casa reasons if the allegations were 

sufficient for this Court to issue notices to appear and implead third parties, its allegations are 

therefore sufficient to allege a link between the Funds and the Properties to impose a constructive 

trust. ECF No. [276] at 5. Additionally, Casa objects that the R&R improperly discredits the Luis 

Report and incorrectly assumes that, because some of the Properties are listed as substitute 

properties in the Indictment, a traceability issue exists between the misappropriated Funds and all 

the Properties. Id. at 6. Moreover, Casa argues the government routinely reclassifies substitute 

property as tainted in “subsequent civil forfeiture actions.” U.S. v. Lazarenko, No. 21-10225, 2022 

WL 4127712, *2 (9th Cir. 2022). Therefore, Casa argues it is “legally incorrect” to assume the 

classification of a property as “substitute” indicates a lack of traceability. ECF No. [276] at 6.

Respondents argue Casa failed to meet its burden to sufficiently allege a link between the 

Funds and the Properties to warrant a constructive trust, noting Judge Otazo-Reyes already 

determined on three occasions that a link either “directly or indirectly” traceable to the Funds does 

not exist. ECF No. [281] at 4.

9 Additionally, Respondents contend Casa’s assertion that the 

Properties were purchased with the Funds are “‘vague and conclusory allegations’ [which] do not 

satisfy Casa Express’ initial pleading burden.” Catalyst Pharms., Inc. v. Fullerton, 748 F. App’x 

944, 946 (11th Cir. 2018); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). 

9 See ECF No. [241] at 8 (quoting ECF No. [180] at 6 “a necessary link in the chain between the 

Properties and the alleged use of Venezuelan misappropriated funds to purchase them remains open.”).

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Regarding Casa’s Objections that the government “routinely reclassifies substitute 

property” as tainted, Respondents argue that is an insufficient basis to establish traceability of the 

Funds to the Properties. ECF No. [281] at 6. Respondents contend Casa failed to overcome Judge 

Otazo-Reyes’ determination that the Luis Report does not provide the “necessary link” between 

the Funds and the Properties. ECF No. [281] at 6-7. Respondents maintain Casa’s reliance on the 

Luis Report to show traceability between the Funds and the Fisher Island Property also fails

because a determination that the Fisher Island Property was acquired in 2009, coupled with 

OFAC’s general findings, does not establish the necessary link with the Funds warranting a 

constructive trust. ECF No. [281] at 6-7.

The Court agrees with the R & R’s conclusion that Casa’s allegations are insufficient to 

demonstrate a causal link between the Funds and Properties. The OFAC block does not establish

that the Funds were used to buy these Properties specifically; there is only a reference to properties 

generally. In Bender v. CenTrust Mort. Corp., 51 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit 

affirmed dismissal of a constructive trust claim, holding the “specific property must be the subject 

of the inequitable transaction.” Id. at 1030. In its Motion, Casa provided the address, legal 

description, and date of acquisition for each of the Properties, and rests on the findings that the 

Funds were funneled into the Entities. However, the Motion and all supporting documents, 

including the OFAC findings, are devoid of allegations connecting the Funds to the specific 

Properties. As in Bender, specific property must be the basis of a constructive trust, not general

property. Casa asks the Court to accept a conclusory allegation that because the Entities own the 

Properties, the misappropriated Venezuelan Funds have necessarily been used to buy each of the 

Properties in question.

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The Court also finds that the Luis Report fails to cure the deficiency. As Casa concedes, 

“Mr. Luis opines that the Properties ‘were acquired using misappropriated Venezuelan funds,’ 

relying on OFAC’s factual findings and the results of his firm’s independent investigation.” ECF 

No. [276] at 5; ECF No. [60-14] ¶¶ 26, 27, 30. The Luis Report indicates its independent 

“methodological asset search” included uncovering data available online, pulling public 

information on the Properties including deeds, liens, property tax records, and Notices of Lis

Pendens. ECF No. [60-14] ¶¶ 31, 32. Luis’ team also pulled data proving title to the Properties is

held by the Entities. Id. However, at most, the Luis Report revealed Respondents acquired property 

in South Florida and the Properties are either owned or controlled by Respondents who continue 

to hold title to them. Thus, the Luis Report fails to support Casa’s claim that a link exists between 

the Funds and the Properties. As Casa’s attached exhibit contradicts its general and conclusory 

allegations, the exhibit governs. Llauro v. Tony, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2020). 

Moreover, this Court’s Order issuing Notices to Appear and commence proceedings 

supplementary has no bearing on the sufficiency of Casa’s constructive trust claim. As Casa offers 

no supporting legal authority, the Objection is without merit. S.D. Fla. L. Mag. J.R. 4(b). 

Accordingly, the R&R correctly found that Casa fails to sufficiently allege a link between the 

Funds and the Properties to establish a constructive trust over the Properties, and the Objections

are overruled on this issue.

ii. Casa Failed to Establish Standing

Judge Otazo-Reyes recommends Respondents’ Motion be granted on the affirmative 

defense that Casa lacks standing. ECF No. [262] at 16. The R&R notes Casa has not pled Article 

III standing. Casa’s argument that it has standing because Florida law permits judgment creditors 

“to step into the shoes of its judgment debtor” is an improper “chose in action” of Venezuela and 

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Casa lacks standing based on this theory. Finally, the R&R determined Venezuela did not assign 

its litigation rights to Casa.

a. Casa Does Not Have Article III Standing

Casa failed to object to the portion of the R&R indicating it lacks Article III or prudential 

standing. Although Casa argues it objects “to the entire section of the standing analysis” in the 

R&R, Casa failed to provide specific objections. Therefore, this general objection is improper, and 

the Court reviews for clear error. S.D. Fla. L. Mag. L.R. 4(b); see Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784.

The reviewing district court “must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (citing Diamond v. 

Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.2005) (quotations omitted)).

The R&R notes Respondents’ “thorough analysis” of constitutional and prudential 

standing. ECF No. [262] at 14. Respondents argue Casa has not suffered an injury in fact traceable 

to conduct by Respondents. ECF No. [232] at 8. The underlying injury, Venezuela’s failure to 

repay the bonds, is not traceable to any conduct by Respondents. Moreover, Casa’s injury is not 

particularized, it only has a generalized grievance regarding the currency schemes, and there is no 

claim the currency schemes caused the bonds to go unpaid. Id. Redressability fails as the OFAC 

block over the Entities and thus the Properties requires Casa to obtain a license through OFAC to 

reach the Properties. Id. Thus, redressability requires an action beyond this Court. Accordingly, 

the Court agrees that Article III standing is absent and adopts this portion of the R&R.

b. Casa Does Not Have Standing Through Its Judgment Debtor Nor a 

“Chose in Action” of Venezuela

Casa objects to the finding in the R&R that it lacks standing as a judgment creditor to step 

“into the shoes of its judgment debtor.” Casa contends supplemental proceedings are equitable and 

“should be interpreted liberally to ensure judgment creditors get the most complete relief possible.”

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Ortiz v. Sanniuli Corp., No. -CIV, 2010 WL 2926517, at*1 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2010). Casa argues 

Florida law has long recognized the right of judgment creditors to step into the shoes of its 

judgment debtor to impose a constructive trust over property held by a third party. ECF No. [276] 

at 7. 

For support, Casa cites to a 1935 Florida Supreme Court case, Hillsborough Cnty. v. 

Dickenson, 125 Fla. 181 (Fla. 1935), which held a judgment creditor “may pursue in a court of 

equity any equitable interest . . . in whosesoever hands it may be found . . . including in a 

constructive trust.” Id. 186-87. Casa also relies on Puzzo v. Ray, 386 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1980) to argue Florida routinely permits judgment creditors to prosecute claims of judgment 

debtors against third parties in supplementary proceedings. See generally, Id.; ECF No. [276] at 7. 

Finally, Casa relies on Allen v. Hinson, 560 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) to argue Florida courts

broadly construe the term “any property” in supplemental proceedings “to encompass all property 

and property rights of the defendant” which can be reached by a judgment creditor. Id. at 412. 

Casa also objects that the R&R misapplied Puzzo v. Ray and reasons a chose in action is 

permissible here. Casa contends Puzzo is sufficient to overrule the finding in the R&R that a 

personal chose in action of Venezuela is inappropriate as Puzzo established a “ʻchose in action’ 

includes claims ʻfor a tort or omission of a duty’” which Casa alleges exists, notwithstanding the 

sensitive nature of a sovereign. Id., 386 So. 2d at 50.

Respondents argue Casa lacks standing “to assert Venezuela’s cause of action against 

Respondents.” ECF No. [281] at 12. Respondents contend the Florida proceedings supplementary 

statute, Fla. Stat. § 56.29, does not confer standing that permits Casa to “usurp the foreign 

sovereign, seize its potential cause of action, and file suit against its debtors” without Venezuela’s 

approval. Id. Respondents also point out that none of the cases Casa relies on involves a private 

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judgment creditor obtaining title to the foreign sovereign’s “chose in action”, and involving 

allegations of corruption perpetrated by the sovereign’s government officials. Id.

The Court finds Casa’s arguments do not disturb Judge Otazo-Reyes conclusion that Casa 

lacks standing based on an argument it may stand in the shoes of its judgment creditor or through 

asserting a “personal chose in action” of Venezuela to impose the constructive trust. The cases 

Casa relies on do not support the issues presented here. In Hillsborough Cnty., the county 

commissioners sought to recover fees collected and usurped by a former clerk. 125 Fla. at 183 

(Fla. 1935). The clerk no longer had the funds, as he used them to buy real property and equities 

placed into a trust for his daughter. Id. The Florida Supreme Court noted the case was strictly at 

law “to establish the amount of the claim alleged to be due.” Id. at 185. Whether or not certain 

funds were reachable in equity once all legal remedies were exhausted required a separate action. 

Id. Therefore, while Hillsborough Ctny. held “a judgment creditor may pursue in a court of equity 

any equitable interest, trust, or demand of his debtor, in whosesoever hands it may be found [] 

including a constructive trust,” the court constrained itself to a determination of the amount due 

the creditors at law. Id. at 186. Moreover, as Hillsborough Cnty. pertained to a local county issue, 

and the trust in question held by the debtor’s daughter, the case does not provide support that Casa 

may stand in the shoes of Venezuela as a sovereign and seek imposition of the constructive trust 

it seeks against third-party Respondents.

Nor does Puzzo support Casa’s argument that a chose of action is appropriate. In Puzzo, 

the plaintiff converted specific property (furniture and goods) of a judgment debtor by physically 

taking and storing it in Puzzo’s warehouse. 386 So. 2d 49. There was “substantial competent 

evidence” the property was converted by him in that manner. Id. at 50. The converted items became 

the subject of a debt, and the judgment creditor sought a chose of action. Id. The court relied on 

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Fla. Stat. § 56.29(5) providing “[t]he judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, not 

exempt from execution, in the hands of any person or due to the judgment debtor to be applied 

toward the satisfaction of the judgment debt.” Id. at 50 (emphasis added). While the court held a 

judgment creditor may reach a judgment debtor’s right of action against the judgment debtor’s 

tortfeasor, Puzzo does not address the sensitive sovereign issues the R&R determined exist here, 

and its holding is limited to property does not exempt from execution which is contested here. 

Accordingly, Judge Otazo-Reyes correctly found that Casa failed to demonstrate that it 

may step into the shoes of Venezuela to seek imposition of a constructive trust, or that it may

obtain title to the chose in action of Venezuela to alternatively confer standing. The Court adopts 

the recommendation of the R&R, overrules the Objection, and Respondents are entitled to 

judgment on the pleadings on this issue.

c. Venezuela Did Not Assign Litigation Rights to Casa Through its Letter of 

No Objection to Pursue an OFAC License

Casa objects to the R & R’s conclusion that it was not assigned litigation rights by 

Venezuela, and that it failed to analyze the legal requirements to make an assignment of litigation 

rights. Casa argues it has standing to pursue its claims “because Venezuela assigned its litigation 

rights to Casa Express pursuant to a Venezuelan law” (“VZ Law”). ECF No. [276] at 9.10 Casa 

submitted its proposal to Venezuela (“Proposal”) on March 2, 2022, and notes the Special Attorney 

General of Venezuela issued an approval (“VZ Approval”) on March 17, 2022. Id. at 12.

11 Casa 

agues Venezuela approved Casa’s proposal to execute against the Properties and expressed

Venezuela’s “willingness to grant the requested Letter of No Objection to be addressed to OFAC.” 

ECF No. [276] at 12.

10 Casa filed a copy of the VZ Law at ECF No. [276-1].

11 Casa filed a copy of the VZ Approval at ECF No. [276-5].

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Next, Casa provides a declaration from its expert, 

Oscar I. Silva Guzman, (“Silva Declaration”). ECF No. [276-2]. Silva is a “lawyer authorized to 

practice law in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” and opined the Letter of No Objection 

constitutes an assignment of litigation rights because the “approval of a proposal submitted by an 

interested creditor pursuant to the VZ law constitutes an assignment of Venezuela’s litigation 

rights. . . given Venezuela expressly guarantees that the assets, if recovered, will be used to repay 

the interested creditor’s judgment and the surplus, if any, must be delivered to Venezuela.” ECF 

No. [276-2] at ¶ 10. Casa adds that this assignment “is an act of state that cannot be second guessed 

by this Court.” ECF No. [276] at 13. Therefore, Casa argues Venezuela assigned Casa its litigation 

rights to execute on the Judgment through the Properties.

Respondents argue the Silva Declaration is procedurally flawed and should be rejected as

it is a new document outside of the pleadings in violation of the Federal Rules; standing based on 

an assignment of rights by Venezuela was not alleged in the Amended Motion and is therefore 

beyond the pleadings; the declaration was not made available to Judge Otazo-Reyes and this Court 

has broad discretion whether or not to even consider it; the declaration provides dates inconsistent 

with prior filings regarding this issue; and the Silva Declaration is inadmissible pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1746(1) because it is undated. Id.

Substantively, Respondents argue the Silva Declaration is unavailing as it fails to solve the 

issue identified in the R&R, that Casa has not considered the legal requirements to establish 

Venezuela made an assignment of litigation rights and whether the VZ Law sufficiently meets 

those requirements. ECF No. [281] at 13, 15-16. Finally, Respondents contend the March 17, 2022 

letter from the Venezuelan Attorney General postdates the August 27, 2021 commencement of 

this action, and therefore cannot be used to show standing exists. Id. at 16; see ECF No. [1].

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The Court agrees that Casa failed to establish it has been assigned litigation rights by 

Venezuela and therefore has standing in this matter. As Casa conceded at the Hearing, 

I realize the hesitance from the court to accept the [VZ Law] as an assignment. It is 

an authorization to sue under Venezuelan law . . . In my opinion, your Honor, that 

was an assignment. Maybe there are other legal things that have not been 

established that would not make it an assignment . . . but at a minimum, 

authorization to sue. 

Hearing, ECF No. [267] at 47.

The Silva Declaration does not demonstrate Casa satisfied the legal requirements to obtain 

a valid an assignment of rights from Venezuela under Venezuelan law. The Silva Declaration 

simply rehashes Casa’s prior arguments that Casa received a Letter of No Objection as already

indicated at the Hearing and in its written Objection. See ECF No. [251] at 4, 6. Moreover, the 

Silva Declaration provides no explanation how a Letter of No Objection, requiring Casa to apply 

for a license with OFAC, is equal to an assignment of rights. Silva simply concludes “it is my 

opinion that Venezuela assigned to Casa Express its litigation rights against Gorrin and his 

controlled entities relating to its ownership interest in the Subject Properties.” ECF No. [276-2] at 

6. That opinion fails “to consider the legal requirements for making an assignment of litigation 

rights” as noted in the R&R.

Objections to an R&R are improper when they “are nothing more than a rehashing of the 

same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge.”

Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012). 

The Silva Declaration restates the same argument Casa provided, that the Letter of No Objection 

is an assignment without explaining the law supporting such an assertion. Additionally, the Silva 

Declaration is legally deficient because it is undated. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, any matter 

which may be supported by a sworn declaration must be in writing “and dated.” Id. 

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Further, the Court notes that, even accepting Casa’s claim that the Letter of No Objection

is an assignment of litigation rights, reliance on the VZ Law still fails because “standing must be 

determined as of the commencement of the suit.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

570-71, n.5 (1992). This action was initiation on August 7, 2021. ECF No. [1]. The VZ Law was 

enacted on February 21, 2022, and the Letter of No Objection was issued even later, on March 17, 

2022. ECF No. [276-1] at 5. Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to judgment on the pleadings 

with respect to their affirmative defense that Casa lacks standing through the purported assignment 

of litigation rights by Venezuela, and the Objections are overruled on this issue.

iii. FSIA Immunity Was Not Waived 

In the R&R, Judge Otazo-Reyes determined that if the Properties belong to Venezuela, 

they are immune from attachment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610 as “commercial activity” was not 

found here. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1-2).

Casa objects that Venezuela “expressly and irrevocably waived its foreign immunity” in 

the FAA, therefore the conclusion in the R&R is clearly erroneous. ECF No. [276] at 14. Next, 

Casa objects that the R&R failed to address whether Venezuela owns the Properties in its 

28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) analysis, which was error. Id. at 15. Casa asserts there is a genuine issue of 

fact regarding who owns the Properties, and judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate. Id.

Finally, Casa maintains Venezuela assigned its litigation rights by accepting Casa’s Proposal and 

used the Properties for commercial activity by doing so. Id. Each of these Objections is analyzed 

below.

a. The FAA Cannot Independently Waive FSIA Immunity

Casa concedes the Partial Default Judgment issued against Venezuela was limited to 

waiver from suit. ECF No. [276] at 14. However, Casa objects that the R&R failed to consider the 

allegations in its Amended Motion that Venezuela did waive sovereign immunity from suit and 

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execution in the FAA. Id. Casa argues the “Waiver of Immunity” provision in the FAA is “plain 

and irrevocable,” written as follows:

To the extent that the Issuer [Venezuela] or any of its revenues, assets or properties 

shall be entitled, . . . with respect to any suit, action or proceeding at any time 

brought solely for the purpose of enforcing or executing any Related Judgment in 

any jurisdiction in which any Specified Court or Other Court is located, to any 

immunity from suit, from the jurisdiction of any such court, from attachment prior 

to judgment, from attachment in aid of execution of judgment, from execution of a 

judgment or from any other legal or judicial process or remedy, and to the extent 

that in any such jurisdiction there shall be attributed such an immunity, the Issuer 

irrevocably agrees not to claim and irrevocably waives such immunity to the fullest 

extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction (including, without limitation, the 

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States) 

ECF No. [60-24], [60-25] at § 14(d) (emphasis added).

Casa objects to the R&R’s conclusion that the FAA is expressly limited to Venezuela’s 

waiver of immunity to suit, arguing that the conclusion is “clearly erroneous,” and the waiver in 

its entirety migrated into this proceeding which was “brought solely for the purpose of enforcing 

or executing a [] Related Judgment.” See ECF No. [60-24] at § 14(d); ECF No. [276] at 14.

Respondents note Casa’s concession and respond that Judge Otazo-Reyes’s holding is 

consistent with the established statutory requirement that a waiver requires actual commercial use 

by the foreign sovereign, and reliance on language in an FAA is insufficient for a finding that 

immunity was waived under the FSIA pursuant to Section 1610(a). ECF No. [281] at 11. For

support, Respondents cite to both the plain language of Section 1610(a) and Bainbridge Fund Ltd. 

v. Republic of Argentina, 2023 WL 5747299 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2023). Respondents therefore 

argue the R&R is correctly reasoned, and Casa’s reading of the FAA fails. 

As Judge Otazo-Reyes correctly points out, waiver from attachment and execution is not 

present here. Pursuant to the FSIA limitations, “property in the United States of a foreign state 

shall be immune from attachment, arrest, and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 

1611.” 28 U.S.C. § 1609. Section 1610(a) provides: 

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The property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial 

activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of 

execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United 

States . . . if (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of 

execution . . . or, (2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon 

which the claim is based.

28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)

Bainbridge determined when an agreement, like the FAAs controlling the bond agreement 

here, is written waiving sovereign immunity to the “extent permitted by the laws of the jurisdiction’ 

. . . the statutory requirements of the FSIA remained intact.” 2023 WL 5747299, at *5. Therefore,

Bainbridge held the statutory requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) applies, requiring an asset be 

“used for a commercial activity in the United States” and such assets remain “immune from 

execution unless they satisfy this requirement.” Id. 

The plain language of Section 1610(a) and the guidance from persuasive case law makes 

clear that a sovereign’s waiver of immunity with respect to attachment of property is insufficient

on its own and remains constrained by the FSIA. A plaintiff is required to show the underlying 

property was used for a commercial activity in the United States before waiver from attachment 

or execution can be effective. Here, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Properties were 

used for a commercial activity within the meaning of Section 1610(a). Moreover, the waiver as 

written into the FAA is expressly limited to laws of the jurisdiction and “the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States.” ECF Nos. [60-24], [60-25] § 14(d). Accordingly, 

the Court finds the R&R correctly interprets the relevant provisions within 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a),

and the Objections are overruled on this issue. 

b. Ownership of the Properties as a Necessary Element Under

28 U.S.C. § 1610

Casa objects to the R & R’s failure to address the ownership element under

28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) and whether the Properties belong to Venezuela. ECF No. [276] at 15. Casa

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additionally objects that judgment on the pleadings as to this element of the FSIA is inappropriate 

because the pleadings reveal a genuine issue of fact: Casa alleges the Properties are “property of 

Venezuela” and Respondents answer “the properties do not belong to Venezuela.” Compare ECF 

No. [60] at 13 with ECF No. [127] at 5. Casa argues such “comparison of the averments [means] 

judgment on the pleadings must be denied.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th 

Cir. 2014).

Respondents argue the ownership issue was properly considered by Judge Otazo-Reyes in 

the R&R, which reads “assuming arguendo Casa’s claim the Properties belong to Venezuela, they 

would be immune from attachment. . . under the FSIA.” ECF No. [262] at 16. According to 

Respondents, the conditional statement “assuming arguendo” plainly means the R&R analyzed 

ownership as alleged by Casa.

The Court finds Judge Otazo-Reyes’ analysis on FSIA immunity was based on the premise 

that the Properties belong to Venezuela. Id. The analysis also includes reference to the FSIA 

providing it is “property in the United States of a foreign state” in citing to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et 

seq; 1610. Thus, the ownership of the Properties was sufficiently addressed in the R&R, and Judge

Otazo-Reyes correctly incorporated that ownership into the R&R’s analysis, and concluded the 

Properties remain immune from attachment and execution under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).

Based upon the plain language in Judge Otazo-Reyes’ analysis, the Court does not find error, and 

the Objections are overruled on this issue.

c. The Properties Were Not Used for a Commercial Activity 

Casa objects that the R&R incorrectly concluded Venezuela did not use the Properties in a 

commercial activity. Casa argues Venezuela assigned its litigation rights by accepting Casa’s 

Proposal pursuant to the VZ Law which constitutes commercial activity. ECF No. [276] at 15.

Casa contends it is immaterial whether the VZ Law identifies the Properties because its Proposal 

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clearly did so. Id. Further, when the Attorney General of Venezuela accepted the Proposal, it was 

an act of state that this Court cannot “second guess.” Id. Finally, Casa contends it is irrelevant 

whether the alleged FSIA commercial activity occurred after initiation of these proceedings.

Casa also objects that the R&R erred in concluding Venezuela’s “guarantee does not 

constitute use of Properties for commercial activities.” Id. at 15-16. Casa argues the R&R 

incorrectly relied on United States v. M/Y Galactica Star, 13 F.5th 448 (4th Cir. 2021) which held 

a nation’s participation in the sale of its property does not rise to commercial activity warranting 

a waiver of its FSIA sovereign immunity. Id. at 459. Instead, Casa contends guaranteeing the 

repayment of debt with specific property is recognized commercial activity and relies on three 

cases for support: Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 616 (1992), Honduras 

Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov't of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 1997), and Guevara v. 

Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Finally, Casa argues for purposes of pleading standards, the movant must establish there is 

no unresolved issue of material fact to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ECF No. [276] 

at 17. Casa argues Venezuela’s use of the Properties creates such an issue because Respondents 

“deny the Proposal ever occurred” warranting denial of Respondents’ Motion on this issue. Id.

Respondents reason they do not deny a Proposal exists but simply argue “there is no 

agreement between Venezuela and anyone regarding the sale of the Properties.” ECF No. [281] at 

11. Next, Respondents argue commercial activity for purposes of FSIA immunity must be 

established at the time the suit was filed, such as standing, and cite to TIG Ins. Co. v. Rep. of 

Argentina, 967 F.3d 778 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In TIG Ins., the D.C. Circuit held “time of filing 

approach best accords with the text and purpose of the FSIA.” Id. at 782.

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Respondents argue Casa fails to distinguish this matter from Galactica Star, and the case 

law Casa introduced fails to interpret Section 1610(a). ECF No. [281] at 11. In Guevara and 

Weltover, the disputes pertained to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a) and 1605(a)(2), respectively, which is 

not at issue here. Thus, the cases are “entirely distinguishable” and do not disturb the reasoning in 

the R&R.12 ECF No. [281] at 11.

As adopted earlier in this Order, the Court agrees that Venezuela did not assign its litigation 

rights to Casa. As such, Casa’s argument that commercial activity occurred because of an 

assignment of litigation rights fails. Casa objects to the finding in the R&R that the alleged 

commercial use (Venezuela’s acceptance of Casa’s Proposal) occurred after this action was filed, 

by merely disagreeing with the conclusion in the R&R. Casa’s unsupported assertion provides no 

authority for its argument in violation of S.D. Fla. L.R. Mag. R. 4(b). Therefore, Casa failed to 

provide a basis to sustain its objection.

Moreover, the persuasive holding in Galactica Star that “only the foreign state itself can 

waive its sovereign immunity through its own actions” is instructive. 13 F.5th at 459. An act 

encouraging another entity to sell or engage in commercial activity of sovereign property is 

insufficient to waive FSIA immunity. Id. In Galactica Star, the judgment creditor, Enron Nigeria, 

appealed a district court’s denial of its motion for turnover relief upon discovery of an interlocutory 

sale of a yacht it sought to attach to satisfy its judgment. 13 F.5th at 458. On appeal, Nigeria argued 

the FSIA “provides the sole, comprehensive scheme for enforcing judgments against foreign 

sovereigns in civil litigation” and as Nigeria did not waive its sovereign immunity, the court lacked 

jurisdiction. Id. (citing Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 428 (5th Cir. 2006)). The 

12 Respondents did not cite Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543 

(11th Cir. 1997) in this portion of its Response, however, Honduras Aircraft is similarly a dispute regarding 

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) and did not mention § 1610(a), which is in dispute here. 

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judgment creditor seeking attachment argued Nigeria used its claims to ask for and to participate 

in the sale of the yacht in the United States, which was sufficient commercial activity under Section 

1610(a) of the FSIA. Id. at 459. The Fifth Circuit held such acts were insufficient, and referenced 

its prior holdings that it is “only the foreign sovereign that can waive its sovereign immunity.” Id. 

Participation in a sale of property and discussions on price or manner of a sale conducted by a nonsovereign are insufficient to trigger a waiver of immunity by the sovereign. Id. Therefore, taking 

Casa’s allegations as true that Venezuela is the true owner of the Properties, there was no

commercial activity based upon a proposal or use of a claim that triggered waiver of Venezuela’s 

FSIA Section 1610(a) sovereign immunity from attachment here.

Moreover, the legal authorities Casa offered are not pertinent. Casa failed to provide 

supporting authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). Id. Guevara, Honduras Aircraft, and 

Weltover are based on 28 U.S.C. § 1605 which provides “general exceptions to the jurisdictional 

immunity of a foreign state.” Casa’s Amended Motion was brought under 28 § U.S.C. 1610, not 

§ 1605. ECF No. [60] at 1. Therefore, Casa failed to provide a basis for sustaining an objection to 

this portion of the R&R. 

Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to the 

affirmative defense of FSIA immunity, and the Objections are overruled on this issue.

iv. OFAC Regulations

Judge Otazo-Reyes did not recommend Respondents’ Motion be granted with respect to 

their affirmative defense based on OFAC regulations. ECF No. [262] at 19.

Casa asks this Court to adopt the R&R’s conclusion that Respondents should not be entitled 

to judgment on the pleadings with respect to the affirmative defense on OFAC regulations. ECF 

No. [276] at 22. However, Casa objects to the finding that all of the Properties are blocked by 

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OFAC. Casa argues that the Fisher Island and Collins Avenue Properties13 are held by entities with 

no OFAC designation. Id.

Respondents argue the Fisher Island and Collins Avenue Properties are blocked by OFAC,

and OFAC, the sole entity that can unblock these properties, has not done so. ECF No. [281] n. 4. 

Furthermore, efforts by a different creditor to reach those two properties failed, citing Caballero 

v. FARC, 2023 WL 5437222 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2023).

The Court finds Judge Otazo-Reyes has correctly pointed out that, although the letter 

proffered by Casa from OFAC does not support the imposition of a constructive trust, it does

“encourage” Casa to “submit a license application.” ECF No. [257-1] at 3. As Respondents 

concede, blocked assets can be reached with an appropriate OFAC license. Here, the OFAC

Interpretive Guidance Letter written by OFAC’s Deputy Assistant Director for Licensing

demonstrates Casa may be able to obtain an OFAC license permitting Casa to seek settlement, 

enforcement of a lien, judgment, “or otherwise alter property interests in property blocked.” ECF 

No. [257-1] at 3. As such, the Court finds the R&R correctly interprets the OFAC communication

indicating there is a potential of a license being issued to Casa from OFAC. Accordingly, the Court 

adopts this portion of the R&R, and Respondents are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings 

with respect to the affirmative defense that Casa lacks an OFAC license. However, even if Casa 

were to be successful and obtain an OFAC license, the other affirmative defenses are still present 

and would prevent Casa from reaching the Properties.

v. Act of State Doctrine Precludes this Court from Addressing the Claims

Casa objects that this Court has already “conclusively adjudicated” the acts of two former 

Venezuelan Treasurers were in breach of their fiduciary duties to Venezuela by issuing Default 

13 “Collins Avenue Property” is located at 18555 Collins Avenue, Unit 44401, Sunny Isles Beach, 

FL 33161.

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Judgments against them. ECF No. [262] at 18-19; see ECF Nos. [216], [219]. Casa maintains this 

shows “the act of state doctrine is inapplicable to this proceeding.” ECF No. [276] at 19.

For support, Casa cites to Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 

(1990), which held the act of state doctrine only arises “when the outcome of the case turns on. . . 

the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406. In Kirkpatrick, an unsuccessful 

bidder for a Nigerian state contract sued its competitor upon learning bribes were made to secure 

the state contract. Id. at 400. The Supreme Court determined the act of state doctrine did not apply 

because the legality of the Nigerian contract was not at issue. Id. at 406. Casa argues that, like in 

Kirkpatrick, it only seeks to establish that bribes were contemporaneously paid to the Venezuelan 

National Treasurers, allowing Gorrin to misappropriate the Funds through compromised foreign 

currency exchange schemes. ECF No. [276] at 19. Casa argues this does not implicate the act of 

state doctrine, nor does any act by Gorrin because he is not an official of a state. Id.

Respondents argue Kirkpatrick is distinguishable as a suit between civilians over a single 

government contract. ECF No. [281] at 7. The Supreme Court found the “factual predicate for the 

application of the act of state doctrine [did] not exist” because the Court did not need to investigate

the acts of the state, it merely reviewed whether a bribe occurred. 493 U.S. at 405. In contrast, 

Casa alleges the Properties are derived from Funds obtained through an “illicit and corrupt foreign 

currency exchange scheme” implicating the acts of a foreign sovereign. ECF No. [60] at 2. 

Additionally, Respondents contend Casa seeks to impose a constructive trust which

requires a finding of unjust enrichment and invalidation of the currency exchange contracts issued 

by the National Treasurers. Team Servs. Inc. v. Securitas Electronic Sec., Inc., 2023 WL 6890660, 

at *11 (11th Cir. 2023) (“the existence of an express contract . . . precluded its unjust enrichment 

claim.”). Respondents argue as this “unjust enrichment claim necessarily hinges on the asserted 

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invalidity of an act of state and the act of state doctrine precludes this court from addressing these 

claims.” Glen v. Club Med. S.A., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2005), aff’d 450 

F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). 

As Judge Otazo-Reyes determined, the act of state doctrine precludes this Court from 

deciding whether the acts of two former Venezuelan Treasurers were illegitimate. As Casa has 

predicated its constructive trust theory on the underlying, purported breach of trust, Casa cannot 

obtain the constructive trust on the Properties it seeks. This Court’s prior default judgments against 

Guillen and Andrade were limited, uncontested determinations and fail to show the act of state 

doctrine is inapplicable. The act of state doctrine “is not some vague doctrine of abstention, but a 

‘principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike.’” Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. As 

the Supreme Court noted, a “factual predicate for the application of the act of state doctrine [must] 

exist” because the doctrine arises “when a court must decide — that is, when the outcome of the 

case turns upon — the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406-05. Here, the 

outcome of this case, the imposition of the constructive trust to satisfy the Judgment, turns upon 

whether the Venezuelan contracts can be invalidated to support Casa’s unjust enrichment theory 

and therefore execute on the Properties. Consequently, the act of state doctrine applies and 

precludes this necessary determination regarding the Venezuelan contracts. Accordingly, the 

Court adopts this portion of the R&R with respect to the affirmative defense of the act of state 

doctrine, and the Objections in the R&R are overruled.

vi. Ancillary Jurisdiction Does Not Extend to Respondents

Judge Otazo-Reyes found ancillary jurisdiction does not exist here because “[a]ncillary 

jurisdiction does not extend to ‘a new lawsuit to impose liability for a judgment on a third party.’” 

Nat’l Mar. Servs., Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783, 787 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Peacock v. Thomas, 

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516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996)). Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA does not exist as 

such jurisdiction applies to a sovereign and not to Respondents. ECF No. [262] at 21.

Casa objects and argues it is clear error that the R&R fails to accept as true Casa’s

allegation that the Properties belong to Venezuela. ECF No. [276] at 19; ECF No. [60] at 13. Casa 

argues the Properties are merely in the hands of the third parties who hold title to the Properties. 

Casa contends only Venezuela as true owner would be liable upon execution of the Properties, 

therefore ancillary jurisdiction exists. ECF No. [276] at 19. For support, Casa relies on Nat’l Mar. 

Servs. where the Eleventh Circuit held the defendant was not “personally liable” for an underlying 

judgment when liability was limited to proceeds from a fraudulent transfer, nor was the claim

considered a new lawsuit imposing a new liability on that defendant. 776 F.3d at 359. Casa also 

objects that the R&R incorrectly distinguished Nat’l Mar. Servs. because it involved a fraudulent 

transfer claim. ECF No. [276] at 20. Nevertheless, Casa argues these proceedings are akin to a 

fraudulent transfer because it seeks to recover assets in the hands of a third party. Id. at 21. 

Finally, Casa argues this Court possesses federal question jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, through the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), the immovable property exception 

in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4), and the FAA waiver in the bond agreements. ECF No. [276] at 22.

Respondents argue Casa’s conclusory allegations regarding ownership of the Properties 

are not entitled to an assumption of truth and are contradicted by its own expert in the Luis Report.

ECF No. [281] at 18. Respondents contend Casa’s reliance on Nat’l Mar. Servs. is unavailing as 

the decision was based upon a fraudulent transfer claim and is distinguishable from a constructive 

trust claim. Id. Regarding alternate means to establish jurisdiction, Respondents argue Casa’s 

Amended Motion did not assert 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction, nor 28 

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USC § 1605, and therefore cannot be asserted now. Id. Moreover, as a constructive trust has failed 

in this action, the immovable property exception is not applicable.

As Judge Otazo-Reyes correctly points out, Casa’s reliance on Nat’l Mar. Servs., Inc. v. 

Straub, 776 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2015) is unavailing. In Nat’l Mar. Servs., the plaintiff filed a 

complaint against the defendant, Glen Straub, and his entity, Burrell Shipping. While the case was 

pending, Burrell Shipping sold a valuable vessel, and transferred the proceeds to Straub. Id. at 785.

Plaintiff obtained a final judgment against Burrell Shipping, which was left with no assets. Plaintiff 

initiated a supplemental proceeding against Straub pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) and Fla. 

Stat. § 56.29(6)(b); Section 56.29 permits a trial court to void a transfer of property made “by the 

judgment debtor to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.” Id. at 785. The district court voided the 

transfer pursuant to the Fraudulent Transfer Act, Fla. Stat. § 726.105. On appeal, the Eleventh 

Circuit affirmed, noting ancillary jurisdiction existed because the plaintiff “sought to disgorge 

Straub of a fraudulently transferred asset, not to impose liability for a judgment on a third party.” 

Id. at 787-88. Here, there is no property transferred during pendency of a trial, no indication 

property liability can be limited in the same manner, nor has Casa sought a legal determination 

pursuant to the Fraudulent Transfer Act, as in Nat’l Mar. Servs. Therefore, Nat’l Mar. Servs. does 

not support Casa’s argument.

In Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996), a plaintiff was awarded a money judgment in 

district court against his former employer for ERISA violations. Id. at 351. During appeal, an 

officer of the company settled other similar claims, while the district court entered judgment 

against the employer only. Id. The Supreme Court pointed out that the allegations against the 

officer as respondent were independent from those in the initial suit against its employer. Id. at 

355-56. The Supreme Court also noted it has “approved the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over 

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a broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third parties . . . [but] never authorized the 

exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing 

federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment.” Id. at 356-57. Here, in contrast, 

Casa seeks to attach properties under legal theories unrelated to its initial suit for non-payment of 

bonds against Venezuela. However, Respondents are not “already liable” for the Judgment for 

unpaid bonds awarded to Casa in the Southern District of New York. It is this posture that led the 

Supreme Court to deny ancillary jurisdiction in Peacock. The court in Nat’l Mar. Servs. pointed 

out the distinction with Peacock:

In contrast with Peacock, the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over this 

supplementary proceeding because National Maritime sought to disgorge Straub of a 

fraudulently transferred asset, not to impose liability for a judgment on a third party.

Nat’l Mar. Servs. 776 F.3d at 787.

Casa is incorrect its claims here are “akin” to a fraudulent transfer to avoid application of 

Peacock. In Nat’l Mar. Servs., the court ruled a fraudulent transfer occurred based upon a statutory 

finding, applying Fla. Stat. § 736.105(1)(a) and § 726.106(2), which does not exist here. 776 F.3d 

at 786. Therefore, the Court finds that the R&R is correct. Peacock applies which limits jurisdiction 

to Venezuela. 

The whole basis of these proceedings supplementary is to establish a link to the Properties 

such that a constructive trust can be imposed. Respondents are not currently liable for the Judgment 

against Venezuela for the unpaid proceeds of the Bonds. Moreover, different legal theories are 

involved in these proceedings, in violation of Peacock and longstanding Supreme Court 

jurisprudence. Id. at 358 (“In determining the reach of the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction, we 

have cautioned against the exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that are ‘entirely new and 

original’”) (citing Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 285 (1884)).

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Additionally, the Court does not address the new jurisdictional arguments set forth by Casa 

in its Objection. Casa did not argue jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor 

28 U.S.C.§ 1605 in its Amended Motion, nor at the Hearing. See ECF No. [60]; ECF No. [267]. 

This Court need not consider arguments that were not in the first instance, presented to the 

magistrate judge. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). Regarding the FSIA 

immunity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not pertain to non-sovereign Respondents, 

and this Court has adopted that portion of the R&R. Accordingly, the Court adopts the portion of 

the R&R concluding that ancillary jurisdiction is lacking in these proceedings supplementary, and 

the Objections are overruled on this issue.

C. The Appeal Is Not Clearly Erroneous or Contrary to Law

Casa filed a Motion seeking an extension of the Notices of Lis Pendens on the Properties 

until a final disposition on the merits of this case. ECF No. [222]. Judge Otazo-Reyes issued an 

Order denying the Motion. ECF No. [241], which Casa appealed, ECF No. [257]. Respondents 

filed a Response, ECF No. [268]. Given the determinations in this Omnibus Order, the Appeal is 

set to be denied. Nevertheless, an analysis of Casa’s Appeal follows. 

Casa argues the Order is clearly erroneous and contrary to law. ECF No. [257] at 3. Casa 

raises three issues: (1) the Order incorrectly requires Casa to establish a link to the Properties rather 

than provide a good faith basis to support its allegations to extend the Notices of Lis Pendens; (2) 

the Order incorrectly concludes that extending the Notices of Lis Pendens would violate OFAC’s 

regulations; and (3) the Order should have applied the injunction standard required to discharge a 

Notice of Lis Pendens. Id. at 3, 8.

In Response, Respondents argue it is “undisputed” that Casa must sufficiently allege a link 

between the Funds allegedly misappropriated from Venezuela and the Properties upon which it 

seeks to impose a constructive trust. ECF No. [268] at 5. Respondents contend a party seeking to 

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extend a Notice of Lis Pendens must show “a fair nexus” and “set forth a basis both for the 

underlying claim. . . and a good faith basis.” Id.; see Drummond v. Alsaloussi, No. 23-cv-21379, 

2023 WL 3970958 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2023). Id. at *5. This requires proof that “the property at 

issue is directly connected to the proponent’s claim” which Casa failed to do. Id. Next, 

Respondents argue Casa not only lacks standing, but that the correct standard was applied in the 

Order. Respondent points out the injunction standard only applies to a motion to discharge a lis 

pendens pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.23(3), while Casa sought an extension under Fla. 

Stat. § 48.23(2), which has no injunction requirement. ECF No. [268] at 11-12. Finally, 

Respondents contend that extending the lis pendens “until a final disposition of the case” is an 

indefinite amount of time and therefore is a “judicial process” precluded by OFAC. ECF No. [268] 

at 15. Casa did not file a Reply.

The Court agrees with Judge Otazo-Reyes’ findings. The magistrate judges’s ruling on a 

non-dispositive matter “must be affirmed unless ‘it has been shown to be clearly erroneous or 

contrary to law.’” Sun Cap. Partners, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., Inc., No. 12-CV-81397-

KAM, 2015 WL 11921411, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2015). This is an “extremely deferential” 

standard of review. Martinez v. Miami Children's Health Sys., Inc., No. 21-CV-22700, 2023 WL 

1954529, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2023).

Under prevailing Florida, the proponent of a lis pendens must establish a good faith basis 

for its claim which “requires some proof, even if minimal, that supports the proponent’s allegations 

that the property at issue is directly connected to the proponent’s claim.” Alsaloussi, 2023 WL 

3790956, at *5 (citing Chiuloso v. Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993)). In Alsaloussi, as in these 

proceedings supplementary, the plaintiff failed to offer proof that monies the plaintiff provided to 

the defendants were used to purchase the specific properties at issue. Id. This Court held “absent 

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such proof, plaintiff must not be allowed to tie up the properties with a lis pendens.” Id. (cleaned 

up). Similarly, in Nu-Vision, LLC v. Corp. Convenience, Inc., 965 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), 

the court stated that “it would ... be contrary to sound public policy to allow a lis pendens proponent 

to tie up real property belonging to another person when the proponent cannot even make a 

minimal showing that there is at least some basis for the underlying claim.” Id. at 232. As already 

determined, Casa’s allegations fail to demonstrate a link between the misappropriated Venezuelan 

funds and the Properties that are the subject of the lis pendens.

14 Accordingly, the Court finds Casa 

has failed to demonstrate Judge Otazo-Reyes’ Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law on this 

issue.

The Court also agrees with Judge Otazo-Reyes’ finding that an extension of the lis pendens

would be in contravention of OFAC regulations. Casa failed to argue why the Order is clearly 

erroneous. The Order determined OFAC’s sanctions specific to Venezuela provide “unless 

licensed. . . any attachment, judgment, decree, lien. . . or other judicial process is null and void 

with respect to any property and interests in property blocked pursuant to § 591.201.”

31 C.F.R. § 591.202(a), (e). Casa did not engage with these findings or the sanctions. Instead, Casa 

argued the Order was clearly erroneous because a notice of lis pendens is not a lien, nor can it 

operate as one. ECF No. [257] at 11. That might be sufficient if the sanctions were limited to liens;

however the OFAC sanctions at issue are broad. Without an OFAC license, any “judicial process 

is null and void” with respect to the Properties or any interest therein. Moreover, Casa’s request to 

extend the lis pendens to two of the subject Properties which Casa alleges are not blocked by 

OFAC is without merit as there is no indication in the record that either property has been 

14 Casa relies on the allegations in the OFAC findings, OFAC chart, and its expert Luis Report. 

ECF No. [257] at 8. The Court has determined neither the OFAC findings nor OFAC chart address the 

Properties, and the findings in the Luis Report failed to provide a necessary link between the 

misappropriated Funds and the Properties.

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unblocked by OFAC. Consequently, Casa has failed to demonstrate that the Order was clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law on this issue.

Finally, the Court finds Casa’s argument that the injunction standard to discharge a notice 

of lis pendens must apply is without merit. Casa moved for the extension of lis pendens pursuant 

to Fla. Stat. § 48.23(2). ECF No. [222] at 2, 4. In its Response, Casa argued Fla. Stat. § 48.23(3) 

applies to the discharge of notices of lis pendens not “founded on a duly recorded instrument or 

on a lien” such that “the court shall control and discharge the recorded notice of lis pendens as the 

court would grant and dissolve injunctions.” ECF No. [257] at 11-12.15 Notwithstanding the other 

deficiencies already addressed in Casa’s appeal, this argument requires Casa to satisfy all elements 

of a preliminary injunction. Based on this Omnibus Order, Casa cannot demonstrate “a substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits” and fails to meet the first necessary element of a preliminary 

injunction. Frank v. Ocean 4660, LLC, et al., No. 11-62004-CIV, 2011 WL 5082137, at *4 (S.D. 

Fla. Oct. 26, 2011) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds Casa has failed to demonstrate 

that Judge Otazo-Reyes’ Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law on this and all issues in its 

Appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The R&R, ECF No. [262], is ADOPTED IN PART.

2. Casa’s Objections, ECF No. [276], are OVERRULED.

3. Gorrin’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. [231], is GRANTED IN 

PART.

15 In the Order, Judge Otazo-Reyes noted Casa’s argument that the injunction standard 

pursuant to Section 48.23(3) was absent from any written submission and only brought forth during 

the Hearing on this Motion. ECF No. [241] n.6. 

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4. Respondents’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. [232], is GRANTED 

IN PART.

5. Casa’s Cross-Motion to Serve Gorrin, ECF No. [252, 253], is GRANTED IN PART.

6. Casa’s Appeal, ECF No. [257], is DENIED.

7. Order Re: D.E. 222, ECF No. [241], is AFFIRMED.

8. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

9. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are CANCELED, all 

pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and all deadlines are TERMINATED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on April 23, 2024.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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