Report to the Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

MARITIME SECURITY

Vessel Tracking 

Systems Provide Key 

Information, but the 

Need for Duplicate 

Data Should Be 

Reviewed 

March 2009 

GAO-09-337 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

MARITIME SECURITY

Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, 

but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed 

Highlights of GAO-09-337, a report to the 

Committee on Homeland Security, House 

of Representatives 

U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal 

approaches are part of a system 

handling more than $700 billion in 

merchandise annually. With the 

many possible threats—including 

transportation and detonation of 

weapons of mass destruction, 

suicide attacks against vessels, and 

others—in the maritime domain, 

awareness of such threats could 

give the Coast Guard advance 

notice to help detect, deter, 

interdict, and defeat them and 

protect the U.S. homeland and 

economy. GAO was asked to 

review the Coast Guard’s efforts to 

achieve awareness about activity in 

the maritime domain. This report 

addresses: the extent to which the 

Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking 

systems in place, (2) can use these 

systems to track vessels that may 

be threats, and (3) has coordinated 

the development and 

implementation of these systems. 

To answer these questions, GAO 

analyzed relevant statutes, 

regulations, and plans for vessel 

tracking systems, compared the 

roles of the planned systems, and 

interviewed appropriate officials. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure efficient use of 

resources, GAO recommends that 

the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard determine the extent to 

which duplicate vessel tracking 

information from LRIT and 

commercially provided long-range 

AIS is needed to accomplish Coast 

Guard missions, particularly in 

light of information already 

available through national 

technical means. DHS agreed with 

this recommendation. 

At sea or in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard 

is currently relying on a diverse array of vessel tracking systems operated by 

various entities, but its attempts to develop systems to track vessels at sea are 

facing delays. For tracking vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses existing 

national technical means—classified methods of tracking vessels—and plans 

to obtain vessel identification and tracking information from two more 

sources, long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), and 

commercially provided long-range automatic identification system (AIS). 

However, one source of this information has just become available and the 

other has been delayed due to technical and operational difficulties. 

International LRIT requirements generally came into effect on January 1, 2009. 

The Coast Guard estimates that commercially provided long-range AIS will be 

operational in 2014. For tracking vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland 

waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based AIS, and also 

either operates, or has access to, radar and cameras in some ports. 

The existing and planned sources of vessel tracking information may allow 

the Coast Guard to track larger vessels at sea, but systems and other 

equipment that track smaller and noncommercial vessels in coastal areas, 

inland waterways, and ports may prove ineffective in thwarting an attack 

without advance knowledge. The means of tracking vessels at sea—national 

technical means, LRIT, and commercially provided long-range AIS—are 

potentially effective, but each has features that could impede its effectiveness. 

The systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports—AIS, 

radar, and video cameras—have more difficulty tracking smaller and 

noncommercial vessels because they are not required to carry AIS equipment 

and because of the technical limitations of radar and cameras. In studies GAO 

reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders, there was widespread 

agreement that vessel tracking systems and equipment will be challenged to 

provide a warning if a small vessel is moving in a threatening manner. 

The Coast Guard has not coordinated its plans for obtaining vessel tracking 

information at sea, and is planning on obtaining potentially duplicative 

information, but in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the various 

tracking methods complement each other. Once operational, the two new 

planned means for tracking vessels at sea—LRIT and commercially provided 

long-range AIS—will both provide vessel identification and position 

information for almost all the same vessels. Commercially provided longrange AIS provides additional information about each vessel and its voyage, 

but almost all of that information is available through reports filed by vessel 

operators. The primary need cited by the Coast Guard to develop both 

systems—to detect anomalies—can be met by the national technical means 

already operational, combined with information from the reports filed by 

vessel operators and LRIT. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has not coordinated 

or analyzed the information each source can provide and the need for 

information from both. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-337. 

For more information, contact Stephen L. 

Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 

caldwells@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 8

Background 13 

Multiple Systems Track Vessels at Sea and in U.S. Coastal Areas, 

Inland Waterways, and Ports, but Delays Could Affect the 

Implementation of Planned Systems with Greater Tracking 

Ability 21 

Existing and Planned Technology Can Track Most Larger Vessels 

at Sea, but Tracking of Smaller Vessels in U.S. Coastal Areas, 

Inland Waterways, and Ports Is Often Limited and May Present 

Challenges in Preventing an Attack 30 

Long-Range Tracking Systems Are Potentially Duplicative, While 

Systems for Vessel Tracking in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland 

Waterways, and Ports Provide Complementary Information That 

Covers Additional Vessels 38 

Conclusions 42 

Recommendation for Executive Action 43 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43 

Appendix I Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 46 

Appendix II Automatic Identification System (AIS) 48 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49 

Related GAO Products 50 

Tables 

Table 1: Maritime Stakeholders and Their Roles in Maritime 

Security and Domain Awareness 19 

Table 2: Information to Be Provided by Two Planned Long-Range 

Vessel Tracking Systems Combined with Information 

Provided by Notices of Arrival for Vessels Traveling to a 

U.S. Port 40 

Page i GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
Figures 

Figure 1: Vessel Traffic Service Watch Stander and AIS Screen 

View 4 

Figure 2: AIS Coverage Prior to Implementation of NAIS 

Increment 1 27 

Figure 3: AIS Coverage after Implementation of NAIS Increment 1 28 

Figure 4: Small Vessels Operating among Large Commercial 

Vessels 35 

Figure 5: Brochures for New Jersey State Police’s Maritime 

Security Initiative and Coast Guard’s America’s 

Waterways Watch Outreach Efforts 37 

Abbreviations 

AIS automatic identification system 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

HSPD-13 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 

IMO International Maritime Organization 

LRIT long-range identification and tracking 

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness 

MISNA Maritime Information Service of North America 

MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 

NAIS Nationwide Automatic Identification System 

RFP Request for Proposal 

SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 

 2006 

SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at 

 Sea, 1974 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 17, 2009 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The U.S. maritime transportation system is one of the nation’s most 

valuable infrastructures and is a potential target for terrorists. Because 

U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of an economic 

engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, an attack 

on this system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, 

international trade, and the world economy. Protecting this system is a 

daunting undertaking, in part because it is so vast: the United States has 

over 95,000 miles of coastline, 361 ports (including 8 of the world’s 50 

highest-volume ports), and 10,000 miles of navigable waterways. Nearly 

700 vessels arrive from overseas in U.S. ports daily, while domestic vessels 

include fleets of tugs, barges, and cargo vessels, along with 110,000 

commercial fishing vessels and over 70 million recreational boats. To 

protect the nation’s ports and waterways, the Coast Guard must be able to 

identify those who intend to do harm while at the same time minimize 

disruption to the maritime transportation system. To gain a better 

understanding and knowledge of vessels, the companies that own and 

operate them, the cargo they carry, and the people who travel on them, the 

U.S. government, largely through the U.S. Coast Guard, has enacted 

programs and systems for gathering information about the maritime 

transportation system. This effort is called Maritime Domain Awareness 

(MDA). 

The U.S. maritime transportation system is one of the nation’s most 

valuable infrastructures and is a potential target for terrorists. Because 

U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of an economic 

engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, an attack 

on this system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, 

international trade, and the world economy. Protecting this system is a 

daunting undertaking, in part because it is so vast: the United States has 

over 95,000 miles of coastline, 361 ports (including 8 of the world’s 50 

highest-volume ports), and 10,000 miles of navigable waterways. Nearly 

700 vessels arrive from overseas in U.S. ports daily, while domestic vessels 

include fleets of tugs, barges, and cargo vessels, along with 110,000 

commercial fishing vessels and over 70 million recreational boats. To 

protect the nation’s ports and waterways, the Coast Guard must be able to 

identify those who intend to do harm while at the same time minimize 

disruption to the maritime transportation system. To gain a better 

understanding and knowledge of vessels, the companies that own and 

operate them, the cargo they carry, and the people who travel on them, the 

U.S. government, largely through the U.S. Coast Guard, has enacted 

programs and systems for gathering information about the maritime 

transportation system. This effort is called Maritime Domain Awareness 

(MDA). 

The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness—a part of The 

National Strategy for Maritime Security—lays out the need for MDA. The 

plan states that the maritime domain provides an expansive pathway 

around the world that terrorist organizations have recognized. Such 

organizations realize the importance of exploiting the maritime domain for 

the movement of equipment and personnel, as well as a medium for 

launching attacks. The Coast Guard needs timely awareness of the 

maritime domain and knowledge of threats in order to detect, deter, 

interdict, and defeat adversaries. 

The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness—a part of The 

National Strategy for Maritime Security—lays out the need for MDA. The 

plan states that the maritime domain provides an expansive pathway 

around the world that terrorist organizations have recognized. Such 

organizations realize the importance of exploiting the maritime domain for 

the movement of equipment and personnel, as well as a medium for 

launching attacks. The Coast Guard needs timely awareness of the 

maritime domain and knowledge of threats in order to detect, deter, 

interdict, and defeat adversaries. 

Page 1 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

The threats to the United States and its economy from the maritime 

domain are many and varied. Rogue governments and terrorist groups 

could use large merchant vessels to move weapons of mass destruction or 

powerful conventional explosives for detonation in a port or alongside an 

offshore facility. Terrorists have shown that they have the capability to use 

explosives-laden suicide boats as weapons. This capability could easily be 

used to attack other vessels, port facilities, or offshore platforms. Modern 

day pirates and other criminals are well organized and equipped to 

conduct smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband. 

Vessel tracking is vital to the MDA effort, both when vessels are at sea and 

when they are in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports. Vessel 

tracking at sea involves either using national technical means or requiring 

vessels to carry equipment that broadcasts radio signals with information 

about their identity, position, speed, and course.1

 When radio signalbroadcasting systems were originally developed, however, they were used 

primarily for such purposes as search and rescue or improved navigation 

safety, not homeland security. The Maritime Transportation Security Act 

of 2002 (MTSA) enacted the first federal vessel tracking requirements to 

improve the nation’s security.2

 It mandated that certain vessels operate an 

automatic identification system (AIS) while in U.S. waters. On board 

vessels, AIS equipment transmits information such as the name of the 

vessel, its position, speed, course, and destination to receivers within 

range of its broadcast, allowing these vessels to be tracked when they are 

operating in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports. Receivers may be 

installed on other vessels, land stations, or other locations. Coast Guard 

personnel, known as watch standers, monitor screens transmitting 

information on the tracked vessels. 

MTSA also allowed the development of a long-range automated vessel 

tracking system that would track vessels at sea, based on existing onboard 

radio equipment and data communication systems that can currently 

transmit the vessel’s identity and position to rescue forces in the case of 

an emergency. Later, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 

2004 amended MTSA to require, rather than just allow, the development of 

 

1

National technical means is an unclassified term used to describe vessel tracking through 

classified means. The specific capabilities and methods of tracking using national technical 

means involve the use of national security assets, are classified, and cannot be discussed in 

this report. 

2

Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).

Page 2 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

a long-range tracking system.3 Current laws and implementing regulations 

for AIS apply in general to larger commercial vessels, such as those 300 

gross tons or more, not to smaller vessels, such as most commercial 

fishing boats or recreational boats. Coast Guard regulations on long-range 

tracking generally apply to passenger ships and cargo ships 300 gross tons 

or more and to mobile offshore drilling rigs. The Coast Guard uses other 

means to track smaller vessels, ranging from cameras and radar to 

partnerships with marine operators who can act as “eyes and ears” to help 

identify suspicious or unusual behavior. To identify and track vessels, it is 

crucial that the Coast Guard coordinate the various systems to maximize 

coverage and eliminate unnecessary duplication. The Coast Guard and 

Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 recognized the need for the 

coordination of maritime information collection, including vessel-tracking 

information, and the avoidance of unwanted redundancy—or 

duplication—in these efforts. 

Since the enactment of MTSA, the use of AIS has evolved. At the time 

MTSA was enacted, only certain areas—known as Vessel Traffic Service or 

Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas—as well as the St. Lawrence 

Seaway operated or planned AIS land stations.4

 These services used vessel 

position information reported by AIS to improve navigation safety and 

warn vessels of potential navigation hazards. Coast Guard regulations 

implementing MTSA required vessels in these areas, and those on 

international voyages to operate AIS equipment. See figure 1 for a Vessel 

Traffic Service watch stander and an example of an AIS screen view. 

 

3

Pub. L. No. 108-293, 118 Stat. 1028 (2004). 

4

Vessel Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas are waterways where 

due to their confined or busy circumstances and the probability of maritime accidents the 

Coast Guard provides monitoring and navigational advice. Coast Guard regulations list the 

following areas as Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas: the 

waters around Houston-Galveston, Texas; Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; Louisville, 

Kentucky during high water; Morgan City, Louisiana; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, 

New York; Port Arthur, Texas; Prince William Sound, Alaska; Puget Sound, Washington; 

San Francisco, California; and St. Mary’s River, Michigan. 

Page 3 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Figure 1: Vessel Traffic Service Watch Stander and AIS Screen View 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

The U.S. and Canadian governments and maritime industry groups, such 

as maritime exchanges that represent private sector stakeholders in ports, 

also realized that AIS information could be used for the efficient 

Page 4 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

scheduling of maritime operations along waterways and in ports. For 

example, with accurate vessel position information, St. Lawrence Seaway 

operators could minimize waiting time at locks located along the seaway 

by scheduling vessels to arrive when the locks’ gates were open and the 

water in the locks was at the same level as the vessel. Similarly, maritime 

exchange members could schedule tugs and longshore workers to be 

ready as the vessels arrived. To help develop their vessel tracking efforts, a 

group of maritime exchanges formed the Maritime Information Service of 

North America (MISNA). More recently, the Coast Guard expanded its AIS 

monitoring capabilities to cover 55 critical ports and 9 coastal areas. The 

Coast Guard is further expanding AIS through a major acquisition program 

called the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS), which will 

be carried out in three contracting increments. Even as NAIS expands the 

area that can be monitored using AIS, the primary means of tracking 

vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports is still AIS, 

which can only track vessels that carry and operate AIS equipment. 

Currently, only larger vessels, such as commercial cargo vessels, are 

required to carry this equipment, but the Coast Guard issued a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking in December 2008 that would increase the types of 

vessels required to carry AIS equipment and the locations where they must 

do so. While larger vessels can possibly carry terrorists as passengers or 

crew and contraband or weapons of mass destruction as cargo, they can 

also be the target of attacks by smaller vessels such as recreational boats. 

AIS cannot track these smaller vessels unless they carry and operate AIS 

equipment, which they are currently not required to do. 

Achieving MDA is particularly challenging because it requires working 

with many nations with differing maritime standards and levels of 

technology. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), an agency of 

the United Nations to which the United States belongs, is the international 

body responsible for improving maritime safety, including combating acts 

of violence or crime at sea. The organization primarily regulates maritime 

safety and security through the International Convention for the Safety of 

Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), as amended, an international treaty with 159 

contracting, or signatory, states. In 2006, amendments to the treaty were 

adopted that mandated the creation of an international long-range 

identification and tracking (LRIT) system that requires vessels on 

international voyages to report their locations; the creation of data centers 

that will, among other roles, receive LRIT information from the vessels; 

and an information exchange network, centered on an international data 

Page 5 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

exchange, for receiving and transmitting LRIT information to authorized 

nations.5

As acknowledged by such groups as the 9/11 Commission, no amount of 

money or effort can totally insulate seaports from attack by a well-funded 

and determined enemy. Because the United States cannot afford to protect 

itself against all risks, Congress has charged the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) with coordinating homeland security programs through 

the application of a risk management framework. Broadly defined, risk 

management is a process that helps policymakers assess the risks that 

exist, strategically allocate finite resources, and take actions under 

conditions of uncertainty. For vessel tracking, this effort requires 

identifying high-risk vessels as a priority and developing a layered system 

of security to reduce the risks associated with them. An example of the 

use of risk management is the Coast Guard’s effort to determine which 

vessels bound for the United States may pose the greatest threat to the 

United States and which, given the limited resources available to the Coast 

Guard, should be boarded to determine if they pose an undue risk. 

You requested that we evaluate efforts to improve MDA by assessing the 

Coast Guard’s vessel tracking efforts. This report answers three questions: 

• What are the Coast Guard’s vessel tracking systems and to what extent 

does the Coast Guard have these systems in place? 

• To what extent will the Coast Guard be able to use these systems to 

track vessels that may prove to be threats? 

• To what extent has the Coast Guard coordinated the development and 

implementation of its vessel tracking systems to maximize coverage 

and minimize unnecessary duplication? 

 

5

Under the IMO regulation only certain countries are allowed to receive LRIT information. 

A vessel’s position information is always available to the country that registered the vessel. 

A country can typically receive position information from vessels that sail within 1,000 

nautical miles of its coastline, even if it is not the destination of the vessel. The destination 

country of a vessel can receive position information when a vessel states its intention to 

enter a port or place within that country. For example, vessels sailing to the United States 

are typically required to report their intention to enter a U.S. port 96 hours prior to arrival. 

At typical speeds of ocean-going vessels, this is approximately 2,000 nautical miles off the 

U.S. coastline. 

Page 6 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

This is a public version of a classified report we issued in March 2009 that 

contained information related to efforts to track vessels and prevent 

attacks. The Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS deemed specific 

details regarding methods used by the Coast Guard and others for longrange tracking of vessels at sea, as well as information on the difficulties 

involved in detecting threatening activities by vessels in U.S. coastal areas, 

inland waterways, and ports, as confidential or for official use only, which 

must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits 

those details. Although information provided in this report is more limited 

in scope, it addresses the same questions as the classified report. Also, the 

overall methodology used for both reports is the same. The conclusions 

and recommendation contained in our March 2009 classified version of 

this report remain generally unchanged. 

To determine the Coast Guard’s vessel tracking systems and the extent to 

which the Coast Guard has them in place as well as the extent to which 

these systems are able to track vessels that may prove to be threats, we 

reviewed relevant federal statutes and regulations including MTSA, the 

Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, and the Security and 

Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act). We analyzed 

relevant international regulations regarding vessel tracking developed 

through the IMO. We also analyzed descriptive and analytic information 

and reports regarding the overall plans for vessel tracking system 

infrastructure, studies of coverage areas, progress reports, and any 

information regarding delays of the implementation of the systems. In 

addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for the tracking 

systems and Coast Guard personnel with MDA intelligence-gathering 

responsibilities. We also conducted site visits to a non-probability sample 

of Coast Guard field units. We selected these field units based on their 

current vessel tracking capability considering their assets, technology, and 

missions. While the information we obtained at the locations we visited 

cannot be generalized across the United States, the stakeholders in these 

locations provided us with a general overview and perspective on vessel 

tracking activities and capabilities at the selected locations. In addition to 

interviewing Coast Guard officials, we also interviewed officials at federal, 

state, and local agencies that have a role in MDA and vessel tracking, such 

as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Maritime Liaison Agents, and state 

and local police officials. Finally, we interviewed representatives from the 

maritime industry, such as officials from commercial maritime exchanges 

that represent the commercial interests at ports, to gain private sector 

perspectives. 

Page 7 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

To determine to what extent the Coast Guard coordinated the 

development and implementation of its vessel tracking systems, we 

conducted a comparative analysis on the performance and roles of LRIT, 

commercially provided long-range AIS, and national technical means. We 

reviewed relevant technical documentation regarding all three tracking 

systems, and interviewed knowledgeable Coast Guard officials responsible 

for the development and implementation of the tracking system to 

determine the progress and capabilities of each tracking system to date. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

At sea or in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast 

Guard is currently relying on a diverse array of vessel tracking systems 

operated by various entities, but its efforts to use newer, more 

comprehensive systems are facing delays. 

Results in Brief 

• For tracking vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses existing national 

technical means and plans to utilize two additional sources of offshore 

vessel identification and tracking information. The Coast Guard 

anticipated that the first of these new sources, LRIT, would be able to 

track more than 40,000 vessels worldwide by December 2008. Due to 

preexisting IMO requirements, most of these vessels already have the 

necessary equipment to allow tracking by the Coast Guard and others 

once LRIT becomes operational. Although the Coast Guard expected to 

begin to receive some LRIT reports on schedule, it acknowledged that 

not all countries would be ready to participate. An additional source of 

offshore vessel identification and tracking information, commercially 

provided long-range AIS, is expected to provide more information than 

the LRIT system. Once available, the Coast Guard expects 

commercially provided long-range AIS to be able to track vessels up to 

2,000 nautical miles at sea. However, the contractor working on the 

project for the Coast Guard experienced a number of delays. As 

currently scheduled, the Coast Guard does not expect commercially 

provided long-range AIS to be fully operational until 2014. 

• In U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard 

operates a land-based AIS system as the primary means of tracking 

Page 8 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

AIS-equipped vessels, and also either operates, or has access to, other 

tracking systems in various locations. The Coast Guard can track AISequipped vessels in 55 critical ports and 9 coastal areas around the 

country, out to approximately 24 nautical miles from the coast using 

the land-based AIS system currently in place. The Coast Guard plans to 

expand land-based AIS tracking coverage to 50 nautical miles from the 

coast nationwide, but has experienced several delays in the contracting 

process for the project due to the need to revise the Request for 

Proposal. In some ports, the Coast Guard also uses camera or radar 

networks operated either by Coast Guard personnel or by other entities 

which allow some tracking of vessels that do not operate AIS 

equipment. Additionally, in some ports and river systems the Coast 

Guard has access to tracking systems installed by other maritime 

stakeholders. For example, local Coast Guard units have access to 

information from AIS systems operated by maritime organizations on 

the Delaware and Columbia Rivers, access to cameras and radar 

installed by the Navy at its major home ports, and access to some state 

transportation department cameras located near bridges and other 

critical infrastructure. 

The existing and planned tracking systems may allow the Coast Guard to 

track larger vessels traveling at sea. However, given the number of 

potential threats in many areas and short period of time in which to 

respond to a threat, thwarting an attack by a smaller vessel without 

advance knowledge of the threat may prove challenging even with 

available systems and other equipment that track smaller and 

noncommercial vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports. 

• The three existing and planned sources of offshore vessel identification 

and tracking information—national technical means, LRIT, and 

commercially provided long-range AIS—if implemented as planned, are 

potentially effective, but each has features that could impede its 

effectiveness. Each system’s ability to track vessels has been 

demonstrated. National technical means, for example, have performed 

this function for many years. Similarly, although information from both 

LRIT and the commercially provided long-range AIS systems is not yet 

fully available to the Coast Guard, both have been demonstrated as 

effective in tracking vessels. LRIT’s effectiveness in tracking vessels 

offshore has been demonstrated by the Maritime Information Service 

of North America which, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, tracked 

vessels in the North Pacific and off the coast of Alaska. AIS, while not 

yet tested at sea, is a proven technology where installed in coastal 

areas, inland waterways and ports. However, the Coast Guard 

acknowledges that the deployment of commercially provided longPage 9 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

range AIS is not far enough along to know whether the technology will 

work as planned or what it will ultimately cost. In addition, both the 

LRIT and AIS systems are dependent on the good will of the vessels’ 

owners and operators: vessel operators can turn off AIS and LRIT 

systems. National technical means are capable of tracking vessels, but 

the classified tracking information cannot be passed to staff of other 

agencies without proper clearances. 

• The systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports—

primarily AIS, but also radar and video cameras in some ports—are less 

effective in tracking smaller and noncommercial vessel traffic in these 

locations because these vessels are generally not required to carry AIS 

equipment and because of the technical limitations of radar and 

cameras. Although most large commercial vessels arriving from 

overseas should still be transmitting AIS information and the Coast 

Guard can readily track them, noncommercial vessels of any size, 

commercial vessels on domestic voyages in many locations, and 

vessels smaller than 65 feet generally do not need to carry AIS 

equipment or transmit AIS information. A Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking issued by the Coast Guard in December 2008, however, 

would require AIS to be carried by more commercial vessels in all 

navigable waterways of the United States.6

 Although some ports have 

video cameras and radar, these systems have limitations: radar has 

difficulty detecting small vessels, especially when the vessels are 

sailing in high seas, and cameras may not cover the entire port or may 

not work in bad weather or at night. 

• In studies we reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders, 

there was widespread agreement that detecting threatening activity by 

vessels is very difficult without prior knowledge. The Coast Guard is 

developing software programs for tracking the expected activity of a 

port over time and warning the Coast Guard when unexpected activity 

occurs, but according to Coast Guard officials, such programs will take 

years to be fully operational. In part because of the need for advance 

knowledge of a threat, officials representing all the Coast Guard 

sectors we visited, as well as members of the intelligence community 

and local law enforcement in locations we visited, said they have 

developed cooperative relationships and mechanisms to share 

information about potential threats. In addition, DHS’s April 2008 Small 

Vessel Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of developing and 

 

6

73 Fed. Reg. 76295 (Dec. 16, 2008). 

Page 10 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

leveraging strong partnerships with the small-vessel community and 

public and private sectors to enhance MDA with respect to small 

vessels. 

The Coast Guard has not coordinated the planning for the use of LRIT and 

commercially provided long-range AIS, resulting in potential duplication of 

information provided, but in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, 

the various tracking methods complement each other. 

• Once fully operational, the two sources of offshore vessel identification 

and tracking information—LRIT and commercially provided long-range 

AIS—will largely duplicate each other both in terms of the vessels they 

can track and the information they provide. LRIT will be a global 

system, while commercially provided long-range AIS is intended to 

cover an area extending 2,000 nautical miles from U.S. shores. Both 

will report vessel location and name, although the use of commercially 

provided long-range AIS will provide additional information on speed, 

course, and cargo. However, for most vessels traveling to a U.S. port, 

most of this information is also available through the advance Notice of 

Arrival that vessels, other than U.S. registered recreational vessels, 

must typically provide the Coast Guard 96 hours prior to their arrival.7

Coast Guard officials said they are planning to use commercially 

provided long-range AIS because it will provide another useful way to 

uncover anomalies in information received from offshore vessels. 

• As of September 2008, the Coast Guard had not coordinated or 

analyzed the information LRIT and commercially provided long-range 

AIS can provide and the need for information from both. Coast Guard 

officials we spoke with said coordination of the development of the 

different vessel tracking systems to meet MDA should take place at an 

interagency level, rather than program, level. However, officials at the 

interagency body referred to by the Coast Guard—the Office of Global 

Maritime Situational Awareness—said that their role is to facilitate 

cross-government coordination of requirements and that they did not 

see coordination of programs within the Coast Guard as part of that 

role. The documents that currently act as the road map for MDA needs, 

the National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness 

and National MDA Study Interagency Investment Strategy Document, 

do not mention any coordination in tracking system development. 

 

7

The Coast Guard requires that most vessels 300 gross tons or more notify the Coast Guard 

of their intent to call on a U.S. port and submit a broad range of information about the 

vessel and persons on board typically 96 hours prior to their entering port. 

Page 11 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

However, Coast Guard and Navy officials said that other federal 

agencies have vessel tracking needs and that a national strategy for AIS 

was being developed. Additionally, Coast Guard officials said that they 

plan to analyze the information they receive from the concept 

demonstration of commercially provided long-range AIS. However, 

they also said that they will not be able to determine the cost to utilize 

commercially provided long-range AIS data until it is more commonly 

available. While a certain amount of redundancy can be beneficial if it 

occurs by design, our previous work has found that unintended 

duplication indicates the potential for inefficiency and waste.8

• By contrast, while the development of multiple tracking systems—such 

as AIS, cameras, and radar—in coastal areas, inland waterways, and 

ports was not coordinated, the complementary capabilities of these 

different systems mean that one system may be able to address what 

the others cannot. For example, AIS tracks large commercial vessels, 

but cannot track vessels that are not AIS-equipped, such as 

noncommercial vessels that are not required to install AIS equipment. 

Cameras and radar provide some coverage of these vessels when they 

are installed in a port. 

To ensure efficient and effective use of Coast Guard resources available 

for long-range vessel tracking, we are recommending that—upon 

completion of the commercially provided long-range AIS concept 

demonstration and the national AIS strategy, and after the cost of 

obtaining long-range AIS information from commercial providers becomes 

known—the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to 

which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially 

provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, 

particularly in light of information already available through national 

technical means. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of 

Defense and Homeland Security and the Attorney General or their 

designees. DHS agreed with our recommendation. DHS further 

commented that, in addition to the cost and duplication concerns we 

expressed, the Coast Guard’s review of the need for the two systems 

would also include factors such as the Coast Guard’s statutory 

 

8

GAO, Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation 

and Program Overlap, GAO/AIMD-97-146 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 1997). 

Page 12 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

requirements, risk assessments, MDA objectives, and the United States’ 

obligations under international agreements. 

DHS also said, however, that LRIT and commercially provided long-range 

AIS are two complementary systems that provide different information, 

apply to different classes and sizes of vessels, and are being developed and 

operated under separate statutory and international obligations. DHS 

commented that LRIT does not presently, nor will it when fully 

implemented, meet all the Coast Guard’s requirements for identification 

and tracking of vessels either in navigable waters or off shore areas of the 

United States. While we acknowledge that as a stand-alone system, 

commercially provided long-range AIS is to provide more information on 

vessels traveling to the United States than LRIT, when the information 

from each is combined with other readily available sources, the 

information will be duplicative. Also, current rules for AIS and LRIT apply, 

in general, to similar classes and sizes of vessels. We agree that LRIT and 

the Coast Guard’s use of commercially provided long-range AIS are being 

developed under separate statutory and international obligations, but the 

Coast Guard is not specifically required to use commercially provided 

long-range AIS under any U.S. law or international agreement. 

Department of Homeland Security officials also provided technical 

comments on the draft that have been incorporated, as appropriate. 

The Departments of Defense and Justice responded that they did not have 

any comments on the report. 

Background 

Maritime Domain 

Awareness: National 

Requirements 

According to the Coast Guard, MDA is an effort to achieve an 

understanding of anything in the global maritime environment that can 

affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 

The process of achieving MDA includes: (1) collection of information, 

(2) fusion of information from different sources, (3) analysis through the 

evaluation and interpretation of information, and (4) dissemination of 

information to decision makers, with the goal of identifying risks and 

threats before they turn into catastrophic events. One of the important 

tasks needed to achieve MDA is vessel tracking. Through the collection of 

vessel position information, comparison of that information with historical 

movements of the same and similar vessels, and additional information 

Page 13 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

related to the vessel—such as its ownership and history—the Coast Guard 

attempts to determine the degree of risk presented by each vessel. 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a number of improvements 

in maritime security and MDA have been provided for in three main 

statutory enactments. 

• MTSA. MTSA provides for a wide range of security improvements to 

maritime systems, ports, and vessels. Among its provisions, MTSA 

requires the implementation of a system to collect, integrate, and 

analyze information concerning vessels operating on, or bound for, 

waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. To help meet 

this requirement, MTSA initially authorized the development and 

implementation of a long-range automated vessel tracking system for 

all vessels in U.S. waters equipped with a Global Maritime Distress and 

Safety System or equivalent satellite technology.9

 MTSA requires the 

system to be capable of receiving information on vessel positions at 

intervals appropriate to deter security incidents. MTSA further allows 

the use of existing maritime organizations, such as IMO, to collect and 

monitor tracking information under the system. In addition, MTSA 

requires that certain vessels, including commercial vessels over 65 feet 

in length, carry AIS technology that broadcasts information, such as the 

vessel’s name, location, course, and speed while operating in U.S. 

waters. 

• Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004. This act 

includes a provision that amended MTSA to mandate the development 

and implementation of the long-range automated vessel tracking 

system for all vessels in U.S. waters. The act also calls for the Secretary 

of Homeland Security to submit to specific congressional committees a 

plan that, among other things, (1) establishes a lead agency within DHS 

to coordinate the efforts of other agencies within DHS in the collection 

of maritime information and to identify and avoid unwanted 

redundancy of those efforts, (2) identifies redundancy in the collection 

and analysis of maritime information by agencies within DHS, and 

(3) establishes a timeline for incorporating information on vessel 

movements derived through the newly required long-range tracking 

 

9

Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment was already required by the IMO 

for many larger vessels and was originally intended to provide for automatic distress 

alerting and locating in cases where a radio operator does not have time to send an SOS or 

MAYDAY call. 

Page 14 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

system and AIS into the system for collecting and analyzing maritime 

information. DHS delivered this plan on June 28, 2005. 

• Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE 

Port Act).

10 This act further amends the MTSA provisions for a longrange vessel tracking system. It sets a deadline of April 1, 2007, for the 

development of the tracking system. The SAFE Port Act also allows the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a voluntary long-range 

vessel tracking system for the period before regulations are issued for 

the mandated system. 

To help implement these laws, the Coast Guard has issued rules relating to 

both long-range tracking and AIS. In October 2007, the Coast Guard issued 

a proposed rule, entitled Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships, 

and in April 2008 issued a final rule that requires certain vessels, including 

U.S.-registered vessels and foreign-registered vessels traveling to or from 

the United States, to report identifying and position data electronically 

through a long-range vessel tracking system.11 These vessels consist of 

passenger vessels, including high-speed passenger craft; cargo vessels, 

including high-speed craft, of 300 gross tons or more; and mobile offshore 

drilling units while underway and not engaged in drilling operations. The 

Coast Guard also issued an interim rule in July 2003 and a final rule in 

October 2003 delineating AIS requirements. The vessels covered depend 

on whether they are on an international voyage or operating in a Vessel 

Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service area. The 

requirements to carry and operate AIS equipment for vessels on 

international voyages generally apply to (1) all self-propelled vessels 

65 feet or more in length, other than passenger and fishing vessels, 

engaged in commercial service; (2) passenger vessels of 150 gross tons or 

more; (3) tankers, regardless of tonnage; and (4) other vessels of 300 gross 

tons or more on international voyages. The requirements for vessels 

operating in Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service 

areas generally cover self-propelled vessels engaged in commercial service 

of 65 feet or more in length, but do not include fishing vessels and 

passenger vessels certified to carry less than 151 passengers. However, 

towing vessels in commercial service that are 26 feet or more in length 

 

10Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 

1173 Fed. Reg. 23310 (Apr. 29, 2008). 

Page 15 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

with more than 600 horsepower engines and passenger vessels certificated 

to carry more than 150 passengers are also covered. 

The Coast Guard issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in December 

2008 that would substantially change these requirements. If the final rule is 

implemented as proposed, more commercial vessels will be required to 

carry and operate AIS equipment in all navigable waterways of the United 

States. The vessels that are covered under the proposed rule include, 

(1) self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in commercial service, 

(2) towing vessels of 26 feet or more and more than 600 horsepower in 

commercial service, (3) self-propelled vessels carrying 50 or more 

passengers in commercial service, (4) vessels carrying more than 12 

passengers for hire and capable of speeds greater than 30 knots, 

(5) certain dredges and floating plants, and (6) self-propelled vessels 

carrying certain dangerous cargos. 

The Administration has also called for improvements to maritime security, 

primarily through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, 

also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41), issued on 

December 21, 2004. HSPD-13 directs the coordination of maritime security 

policy through the creation of a National Strategy for Maritime 

Security.

12 The directive required the Secretaries of Defense and 

Homeland Security to lead a joint effort to draft the strategy, which was 

issued in September 2005. Additionally, HSPD-13 directed relevant federal 

departments and agencies to develop eight supporting implementation 

plans to address the specific threats and challenges in the maritime 

environment. One of these supporting plans was the National Plan to 

Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, developed by the Department of 

Defense and DHS and issued in October 2005. This plan provides an 

approach for improving information collection and sharing in the maritime 

domain to identify threats as early and as distant from U.S. shores as 

possible. For example, in terms of enhancing information collections, the 

plan calls for coordinating with international organizations to expand 

information requirements for data such as the Notice of Arrival. The plan 

also recommends expanding the application of AIS to improve the 

identification and tracking of marine vessels and leveraging national and 

 

12For our evaluation of this strategy, see GAO, Maritime Security: National Strategy and 

Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented, 

GAO-08-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008). 

Page 16 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

international commercial and governmental relationships to produce 

dependable AIS and other vessel tracking. 

Maritime Domain 

Awareness: International 

Requirements 

The IMO is an agency of the United Nations whose main task is to develop 

and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping. Under 

its purview are vessel safety, environmental concerns, maritime legal 

matters, technical cooperation, and maritime security. Amendments to 

SOLAS, to which the United States is a party, contain two provisions that 

relate specifically to MDA. 

Chapter V, Regulation 19-1, which generally became effective January 1, 

2009, has phased-in implementation for vessels requires cargo vessels of 

300 gross tons or more, passenger vessels, and self-propelled mobile 

offshore drilling units, to be equipped with technology enabling the 

automatic transmission of the identity of the vessel, its position, and the 

time and date the position was transmitted. The regulation also lays out 

what countries are authorized to receive this information and when. This 

SOLAS regulation is the basis for the Coast Guard’s LRIT rule. 

• IMO also set performance standards and functional requirements for 

LRIT in a resolution of its Maritime Safety Committee.13 This resolution 

establishes the role of LRIT data centers and the international data 

exchange, which are central to the distribution of LRIT information. 

These data centers, which can represent a single country or multiple 

countries, have three primary roles. 

• Data centers will forward LRIT information from vessels at sea to the 

international data exchange for transmission to authorized countries. 

• When LRIT information is forwarded by the international data 

exchange to an authorized country, the data center representing that 

country receives the information. 

• Data centers make requests for LRIT information through the 

international data exchange. 

The international data exchange acts as a facilitator for the exchange of 

LRIT between vessels and countries. As discussed above, when a vessel 

 

13Resolution MSC.210(81) (adopted on May 19, 2006). 

Page 17 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

transmits LRIT information to its data center, that data center will forward 

the information to the international data exchange. The international data 

exchange then forwards the vessel’s LRIT information to the data centers 

representing the countries that are authorized to receive the LRIT 

information from that vessel. 

Another regulation contained in SOLAS deals with AIS. In general, 

Chapter V, Regulation 19, requires certain vessels of 300 gross tons or 

more on international voyages, passenger vessels regardless of size, and 

cargo vessels of 500 gross tons or more not engaged on international 

voyages to be equipped with AIS. According to the regulation AIS shall 

provide information, such as identity and position, and monitor and track 

vessels. 

Evolution of Long-Range 

Tracking Systems 

The United States’ history of using national technical means for remote 

tracking of vessels on the high seas goes back many years, but at the time 

Soviet warships—rather than commercial vessels—were the target of this 

tracking. Such means have been continually in place since that time, but 

their mission has grown from tracking potential military adversaries to 

tracking a wide variety of vessels, both military and nonmilitary, that are 

of interest to the United States. The actual vessels tracked are not 

necessarily limited by size. 

Similarly, the capabilities of LRIT and AIS have been expanded as their 

purposes have changed. LRIT was primarily envisioned to utilize longrange technology to facilitate search and rescue operations and assist 

oceangoing vessels in distress. In order to respond to such an emergency 

at sea, the technology automatically transmits the identity, position, and 

time of position of a vessel in distress. To increase the likelihood of 

assistance to vessels in distress at sea, in 1988 IMO adopted phased-in 

requirements for vessels to install specific satellite and radio-telephone 

equipment capable of automatic distress alerting. The same equipment and 

technology can be used for LRIT; however, in addition to reporting 

information on vessels in distress, vessels would send periodic position 

reports that would permit them to be tracked by authorized governments. 

AIS technology was originally designed to improve maritime safety, 

including the prevention of collisions among vessels. The system was 

originally designed to transmit identification, location, and maneuvering 

information (1) between vessels and (2) between vessels and land-based 

stations that are typically within 20 to 30 miles of one another. IMO 

requirements for the installation of AIS equipment include passenger 

Page 18 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

vessels irrespective of size, vessels that weigh 300 gross tons or more on 

international voyages, and cargo vessels of 500 gross tons or more not on 

international voyages. By using commercially provided long-range AIS, the 

Coast Guard hopes to greatly expand the distance it can receive AIS 

signals, up to 2,000 nautical miles from the coast. 

Numerous Stakeholders 

Are Involved in Maritime 

Security and Maritime 

Domain Awareness 

Although numerous entities are responsible for maritime security and 

MDA within the United States, the federal government has primary 

responsibility and shares this role with numerous other stakeholders in 

the state, local, and private sectors. For example, DHS—with its 

component agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, acting as executive agent—has 

the lead role in maritime homeland security, while the Department of 

Defense leads efforts to further integrate maritime intelligence and 

increase MDA. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a lead 

role in investigating domestic maritime terrorism incidents. As shown in 

table 1, state and local governments and the private sector, as well as the 

federal government, have responsibilities for maritime security and 

domain awareness. 

Table 1: Maritime Stakeholders and Their Roles in Maritime Security and Domain Awareness 

Stakeholders Selected mission-related activities 

Federal government: Department of Homeland Security 

U.S. Coast Guard • Conducts vessel escorts, boardings of selected vessels, and security patrols of key 

port areas. 

• Ensures vessels in U.S. waters comply with domestic and international maritime 

security standards. 

• Reviews U.S. vessel and facility security plans and oversees compliance with 

these plans. 

• Meets with foreign governments and visits foreign port facilities to observe security 

conditions. 

• Shares responsibility for implementation and operationalization of MDA with U.S. 

Navy. 

Customs and Border Protection • Has principal responsibility for inspecting cargo, including cargo containers that 

commercial vessels bring into U.S. ports. 

• Detects and prevents the illegal entry of persons and goods into the country. 

Page 19 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Stakeholders Selected mission-related activities 

Federal government: Department of Defense 

U.S. Navy • Provides support to Department of Homeland Security as requested for maritime 

homeland security operations. 

• Maintains a credible maritime interdiction capability to deal with identified hostile 

vessels at any location when authorized to do so. 

• Builds relationships with partner nations’ navies to enhance cooperation and 

information sharing. 

• Shares responsibility for implementation and operationalization of MDA with U.S. 

Coast Guard. 

Federal government: Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of Investigation • Federal Bureau of Investigation Maritime Liaison Agents, stationed at key ports in 

the U.S., help disseminate maritime intelligence to port stakeholders. 

• Leads Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 

• Leads investigations of maritime terrorism incidents. 

State and local governments 

Law enforcement agencies • Conducts land-based patrols of port facilities. 

• If the agency operates a marine unit, it typically conducts water patrols and 

sometimes escorts larger vessels. 

Private sector 

Facility and commercial vessel operators • Develops and implements facility or vessel security plans that meet MTSA 

standards. 

• Provides security for the facility or vessel. 

The public 

General public, recreational vessel 

operators, and marina employees 

• Reports suspicious activity. 

• Respects security rules regulations, such as those governing security zones. 

Source: GAO. 

Risk Management The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can 

fully protect against every type of threat. Rather, a risk management 

approach is often used that considers, among other things, the relative 

risks various threats pose in determining how best to use limited 

resources to prevent threats, where possible, and to respond effectively if 

they occur. While the Homeland Security Act of 200214 and Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 7 call for the use of risk management in 

homeland security, little specific federal guidance or direction exists as to 

how risk management should be implemented. In previous work 

examining risk management efforts for homeland security and other 

functions, we developed a framework summarizing the findings of 

 

14Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

Page 20 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

industry experts and best practices.15 For tracking vessels, this effort 

requires identifying high-risk vessels as a priority and developing a layered 

system of security to reduce the risks associated with them. For example, 

the Coast Guard uses a risk management approach in its effort to 

determine which vessels bound for the United States may pose the 

greatest threat to the United States and which, given the limited resources 

available to the Coast Guard, should be boarded to determine if they pose 

an undue risk. 

The Coast Guard currently relies on a variety of systems to provide MDA 

and is also working on additional systems to provide additional 

capabilities, but these systems have been delayed by various factors. To 

track vessels at sea, the Coast Guard currently has access to data provided 

by national technical means with some limitations. However, the Coast 

Guard, as well as other federal agencies, has determined that it needs to 

expand its knowledge of vessel movements up to 2,000 nautical miles from 

the United States. To do so, the Coast Guard is leading the U.S. 

implementation of the IMO-mandated LRIT system and is pursuing the use 

of commercially provided long-range AIS capabilities. In U.S. coastal 

areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard uses a network of 

land-based AIS and, in selected areas, additional sensors such as radar and 

video cameras. 

Multiple Systems 

Track Vessels at Sea 

and in U.S. Coastal 

Areas, Inland 

Waterways, and Ports, 

but Delays Could 

Affect the 

Implementation of 

Planned Systems with 

Greater Tracking 

Ability 

To Track Vessels at Sea, 

the Coast Guard Is 

Planning to Use National 

Technical Means, LRIT, 

and Commercially 

Provided Long-Range AIS 

To track vessels up to 2,000 nautical miles from U.S. shores, the Coast 

Guard is currently using classified national technical means and 

developing the use of two additional unclassified technologies—LRIT and 

commercially provided long-range AIS. Coast Guard officials told us that 

they cannot depend on full time access to information provided by 

national technical means. The Coast Guard does not control the tasking of 

these resources, and they may be redirected to priorities greater than 

 

15For more detailed information on risk management and GAO’s framework for risk 

management, see GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks 

and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005), and Highlights of a Forum Convened by the 

Comptroller General of the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management 

Principles in Homeland Security, GAO-08-627SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2008). 

Page 21 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Coast Guard or DHS missions. While we cannot provide more details on 

national technical means because of their classified nature, the 

information below describes the Coast Guard’s plans for LRIT and AIS. 

LRIT is an international system that uses onboard radio equipment to 

transmit identification and position information to satellites. From the 

satellites, the information is forwarded to ground stations and then on to 

recipient countries, including the United States. While the a system 

requires cooperation from the vessel—the radio equipment must be turned 

on—it is a closed system in that only countries with rights to the 

information can receive it.16 The Coast Guard expects the LRIT program to 

cost approximately $5.3 million in fiscal year 2009 and about $4.2 million 

per year thereafter. See appendix I for a full description of LRIT. 

To Ensure Its Widespread Use 

Domestically and 

Internationally, the Coast 

Guard Has Taken Substantial 

Responsibility for the 

International Implementation 

of LRIT 

The regulatory framework for the LRIT system is in place. As previously 

mentioned, the Coast Guard issued a final rule on April 29, 2008, setting 

requirements for many U.S.-registered vessels to transmit their identity 

and location with LRIT equipment wherever they are located. This rule 

implemented domestic requirements set forth in MTSA, as amended by 

both the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, and the 

SAFE Port Act; and IMO’s international requirements laid out in SOLAS. 

As well as implementing requirements for most U.S vessels subject to the 

SOLAS regulation, the rule also sets specific requirements for foreign 

vessels traveling to or near the United States to broadcast their 

identification and location. For example, under the rule, foreign vessels 

bound for a U.S. port must transmit their identity and location once they 

have announced their intention to enter a U.S. port, typically 96 hours 

prior to their arrival (which equates to approximately 2,000 nautical miles 

from the U.S. coastline at speeds traveled by typical ocean-going vessels). 

It also calls for foreign vessels on international voyages to typically 

transmit their identity and location when they are within 1,000 nautical 

miles of the U.S. coast, even if they are not calling on a U.S. port. The 

 

16As laid out by IMO in SOLAS, access to LRIT information varies by the country’s 

relationship to the vessel or status as a flag, port, or coastal state. As a flag state, the 

contracting government may purchase LRIT information on a vessel anywhere in the world 

as long as the vessel is entitled to fly its flag. As a port state, a contracting government may 

purchase LRIT information on a vessel calling at its port after the vessel has indicated its 

intention to do so unless the vessel is within the internal waters of another contracting 

government. As a coastal state, the contracting government may purchase LRIT 

information on a vessel that is within a specified distance–not more than 1,000 nautical 

miles–off the coastal state’s baseline unless the vessel is within its territorial sea or the 

internal waters of another contracting government. 

Page 22 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

requirements for both foreign and domestic vessels include the specific 

data items to be transmitted, the timetable for reporting, the types of 

equipment that can be used to report the information, and the capabilities 

of the reporting equipment. The rule has phased-in implementation dates 

beginning on December 31, 2008, depending on factors such as when a 

vessel was built and where it operates. The rule exempts certain vessels 

such as those that will be traveling exclusively within 20 nautical miles of 

the U.S. coastline and are equipped with operating AIS. 

In addition to setting U.S. requirements for LRIT, the Coast Guard is also 

taking on international responsibilities to help ensure that LRIT position 

information is available on schedule. To ensure the appropriate 

distribution of LRIT information, the IMO mandated the creation of an 

international data exchange to facilitate the distribution of this 

information to authorized countries. For example, if a vessel registered in 

China is sailing to a U.S. port, the Chinese data center would have to begin 

to send the LRIT information to the U.S. data center through the 

international data exchange when the vessel announces it intention to 

enter a U.S. port. However, the mandate did not address which country or 

international organization would be responsible for developing, operating, 

and maintaining the international data exchange or how it would be 

funded. Because the United States and other SOLAS signatories were 

concerned that the data exchange would not be operational when the rule 

took effect, and because no other country had agreed to set up the 

exchange, the Coast Guard has agreed to develop and operate the data 

exchange for an interim period from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 

2010. As of February 2009, it was unclear who would operate the 

international data exchange following this 2-year period. 

Although the Coast Guard expected to begin receiving some countries’ 

LRIT reports on schedule, it acknowledged that not all countries would be 

ready to participate. Coast Guard officials told us that the international 

data exchange and the U.S. national data center (the facility that will 

receive all LRIT transmissions from U.S.-registered vessels and forward 

them on to the data exchange) are operational. The Coast Guard also 

expected very few U.S.-registered vessels will need new equipment to 

transmit LRIT information because existing requirements already mandate 

the installation of radio equipment capable of the required transmissions. 

In contrast, the Coast Guard recognized that not all countries may have 

operational national or multinational data centers to forward information 

to the international data exchange by the time the rule goes into effect. 

The final rule states that the Coast Guard will still hold vessels coming to 

the United States responsible for providing LRIT information at that time. 

Page 23 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

If the Coast Guard does not receive LRIT information from a vessel 

covered by the rule, it has a range of enforcement options available. In 

general, the Coast Guard plans to leave the response up to their local 

Captains of the Port—the Coast Guard official responsible for maritime 

safety and security in a port area—to decide how to address these 

situations on a case-by-case basis. Under their regulatory authorities, these 

officials have the authority to, among other things, level civil penalties for 

noncompliance as well as refer knowing and willful violations to the 

Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. The Captain of the Port 

will make a risk-based decision given the information he or she has 

available from existing sources, and, depending on his or her finding, will 

decide on a response ranging from taking no action, boarding the vessel at 

sea, setting fines, or denying entry. 

To have an additional means to receive vessel information that includes 

identification and location of vessels at sea, the Coast Guard is 

demonstrating another tracking system that uses commercially provided 

long-range AIS. AIS receivers take in a set of radio signals from equipment 

on board vessels and then forward them to the Coast Guard via the 

commercial provider. AIS is an open system, and anyone who has an AIS 

receiver can track vessels using AIS signals. See appendix II for a full 

description of AIS. The Coast Guard’s use of commercially provided longrange AIS is part of the NAIS, a comprehensive effort to track AISequipped vessels17 in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, and 

those as far as 2,000 nautical miles from the U.S. shore. 

The Coast Guard Is Planning on 

Full Capability of Commercially 

Provided Long-Range AIS by 

2014, Despite a 

2-Year Delay 

While the Coast Guard has made development of commercially provided 

long-range AIS a substantial part of its long-range vessel tracking efforts, 

the program has fallen behind schedule. In 2004, the Coast Guard signed a 

contract with a commercial communications company to demonstrate the 

ability of commercial AIS to receive and forward AIS broadcasts from 

vessels at sea. This demonstration was originally scheduled for mid-2006, 

but did not occur until June 19, 2008. Coast Guard officials said the delays 

were primarily caused by difficulties the contractor experienced in 

 

17IMO requirements provide that all passenger vessels, regardless of size, all vessels of 300 

gross tons and larger on international voyages, and all cargo vessels of 500 gross tons not 

on international voyages shall be fitted with AIS equipment. The Coast Guard refined these 

requirements to generally include commercial vessels 65 feet or longer, passenger vessels 

of 150 tons or more, and all tankers, either on international voyages or in Vessel Tracking 

Service areas. 

Page 24 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

obtaining needed services for the Coast Guard demonstration as well as 

technical issues. 

As a concession for the delays, the contractor provided the Coast Guard 

access to vessel position data sent via AIS through other means. According 

to Coast Guard officials and to a filing made by the contractor to the 

Securities and Exchange Commission, terms of the contract state that 

once operational testing is completed, the Coast Guard will receive 90 

days of AIS data to determine the characteristics of commercially provided 

long-range AIS, such as the amount of data that would flow from each 

source. The Coast Guard can also receive data from the concept 

demonstration for an additional 2 years, based on original contract options 

and pricing. If the Coast Guard wishes to continue to receive these data it 

will have to pay additional fees to the contractor. 

In spite of the 2-year delay in the demonstration, the Coast Guard does not 

believe that its use of commercially provided long-range AIS will delay the 

full implementation of NAIS. Coast Guard officials stated that there were 

development issues related to using these AIS receivers that are different 

from those related to developing a land-based AIS network that will cover 

the U.S. coastline. According to the Coast Guard, the completion of its 

assessment of the commercially provided long-range AIS demonstration, 

including coverage areas, potential interference, and data rates, will allow 

it to compare commercially provided long-range AIS with other long-range 

tracking methods or, as they become available, among different 

commercial providers of long-range AIS services. 

To Track Vessels in Coastal 

Areas, Inland Waterways, 

and Ports, Land-Based AIS 

Is the Primary National 

Tracking System but Other 

Systems Provide Coverage 

in Limited Areas 

To track AIS-equipped vessels in 55 major U.S. ports and 9 coastal areas, 

the Coast Guard has installed a widespread network of ground-based AIS 

receivers it uses to monitor those areas. In some of these locations, the 

Coast Guard also makes use of radar and cameras, installed by the Coast 

Guard and other maritime security stakeholders, to help track vessels not 

equipped with AIS. 

Page 25 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

The Coast Guard installed ground-based AIS equipment in 55 ports and 9 

coastal areas as the first increment of NAIS. Before Increment 1, AIS 

coverage in the United States was very limited. AIS-covered areas included 

Vessel Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas, AIS 

prototyping and testing locations, and the St. Lawrence Seaway. This level 

of coverage, however, left out some major ports. As of September 2007, 

this first NAIS increment reached full operating capability, allowing near 

real-time tracking of vessels carrying and operating AIS equipment in all 55 

covered ports and 9 coastal areas. In the coastal areas, the system 

generally provides coverage to within 24 nautical miles of shore. This 

tracking is performed by the local Coast Guard sector. 

Coast Guard’s GroundBased AIS Is the Primary 

Means to Track AISEquipped Vessels in and 

around U.S. Ports 

See figure 2 for a map of AIS coverage prior to NAIS Increment 1 and 

figure 3 for a map of AIS coverage after the implementation of NAIS 

Increment 1. 

Page 26 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Figure 2: AIS Coverage Prior to Implementation of NAIS Increment 1 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

Pre-NAIS Legacy Coverage October 1, 2006

Hawaii

Alaska

Puerto Rico

Page 27 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Figure 3: AIS Coverage after Implementation of NAIS Increment 1 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

Note: Coverage gaps between port coastal areas that exist that are not discernable in this figure due 

to its scale. 

NAIS Increment 2 will further expand the coverage area of ground-based 

AIS. However there have been repeated delays in awarding the initial 

Increment 2 contract. Increment 2 is to provide the Coast Guard the 

capability to (1) receive AIS signals from up to 50 nautical miles from 

shore and (2) transmit information to vessels with AIS up to 24 nautical 

Page 28 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

miles from the U.S. coastline. Sensitive areas on inland rivers, such as 

locks and dams, will also be covered. The Coast Guard plans to implement 

Increment 2 in two phases. In the first phase, coverage will expand in the 

areas of responsibility for three Coast Guard field units—Sectors 

Delaware Bay, Hampton Roads, and Mobile. This will serve as a test for 

the expanded system. Once the capability of the system is established, the 

second phase will bring coverage to the rest of the United States. The 

Coast Guard, however, has repeatedly delayed the contracting process for 

Increment 2 to make modifications in the contract’s Request for Proposal 

(RFP). After the release of draft contract solicitation documents for the 

first phase in December 2006, the expected release date of the final RFP 

was pushed back from July 2007 to November 2007, and the RFP was 

finally released in December 2007. The Coast Guard continued to make 

amendments to the RFP through February 2008 and the expected date to 

award the contract for the first phase of Increment 2 was delayed from 

March 2008 to September 2008. 

While AIS is capable of tracking AIS-equipped vessels in many ports 

around the United States, as previously stated, many vessels in U.S. waters 

are not required to install or operate AIS equipment. According to Coast 

Guard regulations in effect on February 1, 2009, outside of the Vessel 

Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas only vessels 

that arrive from a foreign port are required to operate AIS equipment, 

regardless of size or cargo. Outside of the Vessel Traffic Service and Vessel 

Movement Reporting Service areas, all vessels less than 65 feet in length 

and all noncommercial vessels less than 300 gross tons—except for 

tankers and certain passenger vessels—are never required to operate AIS 

equipment in U.S. waters. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the 

Coast Guard in December 2008 demonstrates the Coast Guard’s intention 

to expand these requirements. 

At 8 of the 10 sectors we visited, the Coast Guard can use additional 

sensors, such as radar and video cameras, to complement AIS. In 4 of the 8 

sectors where these additional sensors are available, the local Coast Guard 

works directly with other port security stakeholders in the sector 

command center. For example, in some ports the Coast Guard has access 

to sensor feeds provided by the Navy. Similarly, in other ports, the Coast 

Guard has access to cameras installed by local governments and private 

industry. These were installed to monitor conditions at specific locations 

such as bridge abutments or entrances to secure facilities. Other Coast 

Guard locations are far less equipped. In some ports, local Coast Guard 

units are dependent solely on AIS technology to track vessels. 

The Coast Guard Can Track 

Vessels Not Equipped with AIS 

with Other Sensors in Some 

Ports 

Page 29 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

The three primary means for vessel tracking at sea are proven 

technologies and can track most larger vessels sailing to the United States. 

Two of these systems, however, are dependent on cooperation on the part 

of vessel operators. In U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, 

AIS, the primary means of tracking AIS-equipped vessels is capable of 

detecting only a fraction of vessels operating in these locations. Other 

means, such as radar and video cameras, can enhance tracking to a 

degree. However, even if multiple systems are in place for tracking vessels 

in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, tracking small vessels 

such as potential suicide attack boats is difficult. 

Existing and Planned 

Technology Can Track 

Most Larger Vessels at 

Sea, but Tracking of 

Smaller Vessels in 

U.S. Coastal Areas, 

Inland Waterways, 

and Ports Is Often 

Limited and May 

Present Challenges in 

Preventing an Attack 

At Sea, Where Most 

Vessels Are Larger and 

Equipped with AIS or 

Other Radio-Based 

Equipment, Tracking and 

Response Can Be 

Effective, but Tracking 

Systems Have Limitations 

As long as vessel operators comply with international and U.S. 

requirements to properly operate LRIT and AIS equipment, these systems 

should be able to accurately track vessel movements up to 2,000 nautical 

miles from the U.S. coastline. Given the distance from the U.S. coastline 

that such vessels will first begin to be tracked, the Coast Guard and the 

Navy have approximately 4 days to investigate and respond to potential 

vessel-borne threats. When vessel operators do not comply with 

requirements, the Coast Guard can use national technical means. 

National technical means have been used by the United States to track 

vessels at sea for many years. We cannot, however, discuss the technology 

these means use. These assets are available to the Coast Guard and can be 

used to increase MDA. In April 2007, for example, the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard announced that it was meeting the SAFE Port Act mandate to 

track all large commercial vessels within U.S. waters, using, in part, 

classified information. However, information gathered through the use of 

national technical means cannot usually be shared with other government 

agencies and port partners, which, according to the Coast Guard, may 

complicate a multiagency response to a potential threat. 

National Technical Means Can 

Support the Coast Guard in 

Meeting Its MDA Goals 

The effectiveness of Global Maritime Distress and Safety System-based 

LRIT to track vessels at sea has already been demonstrated. According to 

officials from MISNA, their organization has satellite-based tracking 

LRIT Is a Proven Technology 

for Tracking Vessels at Sea 

Page 30 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

capability that it has used to track vessels at sea, including the North 

Pacific and off the coast of Alaska. Using in part the on-board Global 

Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment, available software, and 

organizational infrastructure and databases, MISNA has provided 

information to the Coast Guard for tracking vessels at sea and aiding MDA. 

Since it became operational, the Global Maritime Distress and Safety 

System has, as originally envisioned, provided position information and 

communications capability to search and rescue efforts for vessels in 

distress. 

The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System coverage includes most of 

the earth with the exception of the polar regions. This is not an issue in the 

Southern Hemisphere because the area without satellite coverage is on 

land. In the Northern Hemisphere, however, some areas, including parts of 

the Arctic Ocean north of the Canadian mainland, around the Canadian 

Arctic Archipelago, and north of the Russian mainland that are at least 

seasonally navigable are out of range of the satellites. 

The Coast Guard’s final rule requires vessels to broadcast their 

identification and position information every 6 hours, but the Coast Guard 

can obtain information on their position more frequently. This rule is 

based on IMO’s standards for LRIT. Again, the Coast Guard rule requires, 

and IMO’s standards direct, that installed LRIT equipment automatically 

respond to a remote request for a position report. This allows the Coast 

Guard to establish the location of vessels coming to the United States at 

least every 6 hours. A Coast Guard official said the system will be capable 

of handling such polling up to four times per hour per vessel. 

While shipboard LRIT equipment must be able to transmit position 

information, as discussed earlier in this report, the Coast Guard’s ability to 

receive it depends on the establishment of national or multinational data 

centers which serve as information conduits between the vessels and the 

international data exchange. If, for example, a foreign-registered vessel 

was sailing to the United States and the nation registering that vessel had 

not either established or participated in an LRIT data center, there would 

be no approved way for that vessel to transmit its position report to the 

international data exchange and then on to the Coast Guard. As of 

August 27, 2008, seven countries are participating in data center prototype 

testing and the Coast Guard reported that four additional countries have 

requested to commence testing of their centers. 

Page 31 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

While the Coast Guard is working toward a solution that will provide AIS 

coverage for certain vessels at sea up to 2,000 nautical miles from the U.S. 

coastline, its efforts are in the initial stages. 

Commercially Provided LongRange AIS Is in Early Stages of 

Development 

The extent of the commercial system needed to provide long-range AIS 

data and its costs are unclear. Coast Guard officials are uncertain about 

how much commercially provided long-range equipment they will need 

because they are still developing the operational objectives for the system. 

For example, Coast Guard officials said the ability of the equipment to 

provide the data as frequently as desired depends to some extent on the 

how much equipment is in place. The greater amount in place, the greater 

the probability of receiving the AIS data once every hour—but the Coast 

Guard is not yet ready to commit to a specific amount. Coast Guard 

officials said the price of the data set by the provider will help them 

determine the amount of data they are willing to contract for. Further, 

Coast Guard officials said they may not necessarily adopt the system 

currently being considered if the results from the system’s demonstration 

and tests are not promising. They said there are other companies and 

equipment they plan to consider as they determine the best means to meet 

their offshore AIS needs. 

The major systems the Coast Guard envisioned for tracking vessels at sea 

depend on the compliance of vessel operators. Both LRIT and AIS 

equipment onboard vessels can be easily turned off if the vessel operator 

does not want to be tracked. IMO requirements even allow both types of 

equipment to be turned off in certain conditions, such as when the vessel’s 

master believes the operation of the LRIT equipment will compromise the 

vessel’s safety or security.18 If the equipment is turned off, such vessels will 

be invisible to these systems. Additionally, for AIS, some information that 

is transmitted must be programmed by the vessel operator. If that 

information is improperly programmed, either intentionally or not, the 

Coast Guard will not receive accurate information about the vessel. This 

has already happened with shore-based AIS. According to Coast Guard 

officials, in these cases, some AIS users were not updating their equipment 

to accurately reflect voyage-related information such as destination and 

estimated time of arrival. Further, the Coast Guard had encountered AIS 

equipment that either did not transmit at all or improperly transmitted the 

Tracking with LRIT and 

Commercially Provided LongRange AIS Depends on Vessel 

Operator Compliance and 

Correctly Operating Equipment 

 

18For example, a vessel’s master is allowed to turn off the vessel’s AIS equipment while it is 

sailing in waters known to be frequented by pirates. Since AIS is an open system, pirates 

can use AIS signals to track their targets. 

Page 32 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

vessel’s dynamic data, such as position, course, speed, and heading. While 

the causes of the problems were not clear, the Coast Guard noted that 

such problems could have been due to lack of diligence on the part of the 

vessel operator, improper installation, or problems with the operation of 

external sensors with input into the AIS. 

A Wider Variety of 

Tracking Systems Are 

Used in Coastal Areas, 

Inland Waterways, and 

Ports, but Providing 

Needed Information in 

Time to Stop an Attack Is 

Difficult 

While tracking systems for coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports are 

more fully developed, preventing attacks can prove difficult in spite of 

effective tracking systems. 

AIS technology relies upon proven global positioning systems, shipboard 

sensors, and radio communication equipment that allow the exchange of 

navigation information between vessels and shore-side receiving stations. 

The ability to track vessels has been demonstrated since its earliest 

installations. For example, the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 

Corporation and the Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway Management 

Corporation implemented a comprehensive vessel communications and 

tracking network to identify and track all commercial vessels navigating 

on the seaway. This system included the first fully operational AIS 

network in North America and enabled automatic vessel position reporting 

from vessels equipped with AIS transponders from Montreal to eastern 

Lake Erie. 

AIS Is a Proven Mechanism 

That Can Track Vessels with 

Necessary Equipment Properly 

Installed and Operating 

While AIS can track vessels with installed and operating equipment, many 

vessels that are common in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports are 

not currently required by current U.S. laws or regulations to operate AIS 

equipment. These vessels include 

• most vessels not in commercial service, including recreational boats, 

• most fishing vessels, 

• most commercial vessels less than 65 feet long, and 

Page 33 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

• vessels not on international voyages and not navigating designated 

Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas.19

The proposed rule issued by the Coast Guard would substantially expand 

the types of vessels required to use AIS equipment and the locations where 

the operation of AIS equipment is required in the United States. The 

proposed rule would require the following types of vessels install and 

operate AIS: (1) self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in commercial 

service, (2) towing vessels of 26 feet or more and more than 600 

horsepower in commercial service, (3) self-propelled vessels carrying 50 

or more passengers in commercial service, (4) vessels carrying more than 

12 passengers for hire and capable of speeds greater than 30 knots, 

(5) certain dredges and floating plants, and (6) self-propelled vessels 

carrying certain dangerous cargos. A major change included in this 

proposed rule was the inclusion of commercial fishing vessels that were 

not previously required to carry AIS equipment. Most noncommercial 

vessels, such as small recreational speed boats are not covered under the 

proposed rule. Besides adding new classes of vessels under AIS 

requirements, the geographic areas covered would also be greatly 

expanded. Under the proposed rule the specified vessel categories would 

have to operate AIS on all United States navigable waters. 

Radar and video cameras are used in some ports to detect the many 

vessels that are not required to operate AIS equipment, but these sensors 

have their own limitations. Radar is an effective means to track many 

vessels, but has difficulty detecting smaller vessels. Given their size, small 

vessels do not produce strong radar reflections. Also, waves can produce 

reflections that may be mistaken for vessels. In addition, if a large vessel 

sails between radar and a smaller vessel, the smaller vessel may be 

masked from detection. Finally, radar, unlike AIS, has no ability to identify 

a vessel. Different types of video cameras have also been installed in ports, 

and each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Some cameras have 

the capability to move and follow targets and zoom in to get a more 

magnified view of the target. Other cameras are fixed in place to cover 

specific locations, such as specific facilities or bridge abutments, and can 

Radar and Cameras in Ports 

Have Their Own Limitations 

 

19The following vessels navigating in Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting 

Service areas are required to operate AIS equipment: commercial vessels 65 feet or more in 

length except for fishing boats or passenger vessels certified to carry less than 150 persons, 

commercial towing vessels 26 feet or more in length and more than 600 horsepower, and 

passenger vessels certified to carry more than 150 passengers for hire. 

Page 34 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

only see vessels as they pass within the line of sight of the camera. Other 

installed cameras cannot zoom. Certain cameras, such as some in place in 

one port, also have the ability to operate in low light or use infrared 

images that distinguish objects by the heat they emanate. These 

capabilities allow them to be effective when cameras using visible light 

prove ineffective, such as at night or in bad weather. These, however, can 

still be affected by atmospheric or surf conditions. 

In studies we reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders, there 

was widespread agreement that detecting threatening activity by vessels is 

very difficult without prior knowledge. See figure 4 for small vessels 

operating in main shipping lanes of New York harbor. 

Even with All Sensors in Place, 

the Coast Guard May Be 

Challenged in Preventing 

Attacks without Prior 

Knowledge 

Figure 4: Small Vessels Operating among Large Commercial Vessels 

Source: Sandy Hook Pilots.

The Coast Guard is trying to develop means to detect suspicious behaviors 

that do not require human input. For example, the Coast Guard is testing 

software in one port to develop the ability to determine suspicious 

behavior without human intervention. Sensors would be monitored by 

software that learns the expected activity of the port and would sound an 

alarm when unexpected activity occurs. According to Coast Guard 

Page 35 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

officials, it takes years for the software to learn the normal behavior at the 

port. 

The Coast Guard and 

Other Stakeholders Rely 

on Relationships to 

Increase Their Awareness 

of Activities on the Water, 

and DHS Has Developed a 

Small Vessel Security 

Strategy That Emphasizes 

the Importance of These 

Relationships 

In part to help obtain this intelligence and expand their awareness of 

activities on the water, the Coast Guard and other port security 

stakeholders have engaged in outreach efforts with the port community. 

All of the Coast Guard locations we visited had long-standing relationships 

with local professional mariners, such as pilots and tug operators. The 

Coast Guard officials we spoke with thought these relationships were 

beneficial in enhancing MDA. For example, several Delaware River Pilots 

alerted Sector Delaware Bay of two small armed vessels traveling at high 

speed from the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal into the Delaware River. 

Coast Guard boats responded to these craft on the basis of this 

information, and the suspect craft turned out to be Navy Seals on an 

unannounced exercise, but the pilots provided the only notice to the Coast 

Guard. The Coast Guard has also implemented a nationwide program 

called America’s Waterways Watch to engage all those who work, live, or 

recreate on or near the water to be aware and report suspicious activity 

that may indicate possible threats. This type of effort is a major 

recommendation in the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy. The strategy 

considers the small vessel community as the single largest asset in 

addressing the threat from small boat attacks. Coast Guard sectors have 

also developed information-sharing agreements with state, local, and law 

enforcement agencies that are intended to increase awareness and 

cooperation. Some state and local outreach efforts are especially active. 

For example, the New Jersey State Police’s program, the Maritime Security 

Initiative, follows the America’s Waterways Watch model, but goes even 

further. State Police officers make regular—sometimes weekly—proactive 

visits to locations such as marinas, boat ramps, and waterfront properties 

to ask individuals in these areas about any suspicious or out of place 

behavior they may have witnessed. See figure 5 for brochures on state and 

federal outreach efforts. 

Page 36 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Figure 5: Brochures for New Jersey State Police’s Maritime Security Initiative and 

Coast Guard’s America’s Waterways Watch Outreach Efforts 

Sources: New Jersey State Police; U.S. Coast Guard.

Page 37 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

While current plans for vessel tracking systems lead to potential 

duplication in vessels tracked and information received, systems that track 

vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports are complementary 

in that they track different types of vessels and vary in their capabilities. 

The long range systems—LRIT, commercially provided long-range AIS, 

and national technical means—were initially developed independently of 

each other and for different purposes, but the Coast Guard was unable to 

provide evidence that the planning for the current and future use of LRIT 

and commercially provided long-range AIS was coordinated. Furthermore, 

the Coast Guard has yet to consider the costs and benefits of obtaining 

offshore vessel identification and tracking information from the multiple 

sources currently, or soon to be, available to the Coast Guard. In coastal 

areas, inland waterways, and ports, there are greater differences among 

the tracking systems. AIS provides extensive information but its use is 

limited to larger vessels while radar and video cameras, sensors that are 

located in some ports, provide limited information but can pick up varied 

vessels. Additionally, cameras can be affected by environmental 

conditions, unlike AIS and radar. 

Long-Range Tracking 

Systems Are 

Potentially 

Duplicative, While 

Systems for Vessel 

Tracking in U.S. 

Coastal Areas, Inland 

Waterways, and Ports 

Provide 

Complementary 

Information That 

Covers Additional 

Vessels 

Plans for Use of 

Commercially Provided 

Long-Range AIS and LRIT 

Were Not Coordinated 

Despite the likelihood that the multiple sources of offshore vessel 

identification and tracking information would produce duplicative 

information, the Coast Guard was unable to provide evidence that its 

efforts to obtain this information were coordinated. Coast Guard officials 

we spoke with said the coordination of the development of LRIT and NAIS 

should take place not at the Coast Guard, but at an interagency level. 

When we met with officials at one of the interagency bodies with a role in 

MDA mentioned by the Coast Guard officials—the Office of Global 

Maritime Situational Awareness—they said that their role is to facilitate 

cross government coordination of requirements and that they did not see 

coordination of programs within the Coast Guard as part of that role. The 

documents that are the planning guides for MDA, the National Concept of 

Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness and National MDA Study 

Interagency Investment Strategy Document do not mention any 

coordination being done in tracking system development or why both 

systems are necessary. Similarly, the plan DHS developed in response to 

the requirement in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 

2004 for a plan to address unwanted redundancy in the collection and 

analysis of maritime information by agencies within DHS did not address 

coordination of the two systems or the need for both. In addition, while 

NAIS was regularly mentioned in the issues of the MDA Director’s 

Newsletter we obtained, no mention was made of LRIT. In the Maritime 

Page 38 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

Domain Awareness Business Plan, Year End Summary for April 2006 to 

May 2007, NAIS and LRIT are listed as separate projects, and there is no 

mention of commercially provided long-range AIS. Similarly, the Coast 

Guard did not analyze the costs and benefits of using multiple sources to 

obtain similar information. Coast Guard officials said that when they 

complete their assessment of the results of the commercially provided 

long-range AIS demonstration they will be able to compare its capabilities 

to other long-range tracking capabilities. However, they also said that they 

will not be able to determine the cost for commercially provided longrange AIS data until more AIS-equipped commercial equipment is 

available. In the meantime, according to Navy and Coast Guard officials, 

there is a growing awareness of the need for offshore vessel identification 

and tracking among other agencies of the federal government, such as the 

Navy and DHS’s Office of Customs and Border Protection. In recognition 

of this need, these officials said the federal government is developing a 

national strategy for AIS. While a certain amount of redundancy can be 

beneficial if it occurs by design, as part of a management strategy, our 

previous work has found that unintended duplication indicates the 

potential for inefficiency and waste.20 In addition, our prior work at DOD 

has shown that the absence of an integrated management approach can 

contribute to duplication in programs and equipment that do not operate 

effectively together.21

Other Data Sources Are 

Available to Provide 

Commercially Provided 

Long-Range AIS’s 

Expanded Information 

As a stand-alone system, commercially provided long-range AIS is to 

provide more information on vessels traveling to the United States than 

LRIT, but when the information from each is combined with other readily 

available sources, the information will be duplicative. Current plans have 

both commercially provided long-range AIS and LRIT providing 

information about vessels bound for a U.S. destination at 2000 nautical 

miles from the U.S. coastline. At approximately this location, vessels 

bound for the United States are typically required to send an advance 

Notice of Arrival to the Coast Guard, providing detailed information about 

the vessel, its voyage, its cargo, and its crew. When AIS or LRIT 

information is combined with the information provided in the Notice of 

Arrival, the Coast Guard will have available much the same information 

 

20GAO/AIMD-97-146. 

21GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 30, 2007). 

Page 39 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

regardless of whether it is using commercially provided long-range AIS or 

LRIT to track a vessel. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Information to Be Provided by Two Planned Long-Range Vessel Tracking 

Systems Combined with Information Provided by Notices of Arrival for Vessels 

Traveling to a U.S. Port 

AIS with Notice of Arrival LRIT with Notice of Arrival 

Vessel nameaVessel nameb

Identification numbersaIdentification numbersb

Radio call signa, c Radio call signc

Vessel typea

Vessel dimensionsa

Name of registered ownercName of registered ownerc

Name of operatorcName of operatorc

Static information: 

information that rarely 

changes over the 

operational life of the 

vessel 

Country of registrationc

Country of registrationc

Port destination in U.Sa, c Port Destination in U.Sc

Specific facility and port 

destination in U.S.c

Specific port and facility 

destination in U.S.c

Estimated time of arrivala, c Estimated time of arrivalc

Estimated time of departurecEstimated time of departurec

Cargo typea, c Cargo typec

Name and date of last five 

ports visitedc

Name and date of last five 

ports visitedc

Voyage-specific 

information: information 

that changes with each 

sailing 

Name, date of birth, 

nationality, and passport 

number of everyone on 

boardc

Name, date of birth, 

nationality, and passport 

number of everyone on 

boardc

LocationaLocationb

Coursea

Speeda

Dynamic information: 

information that changes 

continuously 

Rate of turna

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

Information supplied through AIS signals. 

b

Information provided through LRIT signals. 

c

Information supplied by the Notice of Arrival. 

Other characteristics of the two planned systems vary. Ordinarily, 

commercially provided long-range AIS will transmit information much 

more often (from every 2 seconds to every 6 minutes depending on the 

information) than LRIT (every 6 hours). However, if the Coast Guard 

needs location information more frequently, LRIT will allow it to remotely 

Page 40 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

poll inbound vessels and receive an automatic reply for location reports up 

to every 15 minutes. However, since vessels are being tracked while they 

are several days from port, the Coast Guard is unlikely to need this 

information more frequently. Additionally, while the vessel transmitters 

for both tracking systems can be turned off by the crew, Coast Guard 

officials we spoke with said it is easier to change the programming of 

onboard AIS equipment to transmit false position reports than it is for 

LRIT. 

Although the Coast Guard says it wants both commercially provided longrange AIS and LRIT to detect anomalies, such as vessels broadcasting false 

position reports or not broadcasting position reports at all, the Coast 

Guard has other sources to corroborate such information. For example, 

the Coast Guard can use national technical means along with either LRIT 

or NAIS to detect anomalies. While the capabilities and information 

provided by national technical means are classified, the Coast Guard is 

able to obtain important benefits from the use of these means. According 

to the Coast Guard, to obtain the full benefit provided by national 

technical means, Coast Guard analysts track that information over time 

and combine it with information provided by other sources, such as 

Notices of Arrival and commercial reporting. Through analysis of the 

information available from national technical means, the Coast Guard 

should be able to provide sufficient information to verify the identification 

and location of vessels provided through LRIT or commercially provided 

long-range AIS. 

Complementary 

Capabilities of Systems in 

Coastal Areas, Inland 

Waterways, and Ports 

Provide the Potential That 

Vessels Missed by One 

System Can Be Picked Up 

by Others 

As explained earlier in this report, each system in place in coastal areas, 

inland waterways, and ports has limitations, but these limitations can be 

mitigated with different sensors. In locations where all these sensors are 

available, their complementary nature allows for almost a complete 

picture of the port and surrounding area. For example, in one port, Navy, 

and local agencies have installed a wide array of sensors that cover 90 

percent of the port and much of the coastal area. There, radar can detect 

larger noncommercial vessels that do not carry AIS. Cameras that can 

operate in daylight, dusk, and at night can follow smaller vessels that do 

not carry AIS and are difficult to pick up on radar. For vessels that do 

carry AIS equipment, the land-based AIS receivers can provide a wide 

range of information that neither radar nor cameras can. As stated earlier 

in this report, we saw similar capabilities in other locations where the 

Coast Guard worked directly with other maritime security stakeholders to 

track vessels in ports and multiple sensors were installed. While the 

presence of multiple sensors allows this broad coverage, these sensors are 

Page 41 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

only available where other agencies have installed them. In other 

locations, few sensors beyond AIS are available. In these locations, 

tracking is limited to those vessels transmitting via AIS equipment. 

Threats to the maritime transportation system include the use of large 

merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction; explosive 

laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle people, drugs, 

weapons, and other contraband. The importance and vulnerabilities of the 

maritime transportation system require that efforts be made to reduce the 

risk of a terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has acknowledged that it needs 

to close the gaps in maritime security, including long-range tracking of 

vessels and threats presented by small vessels. Knowledge of activities, 

such as vessel movements that take place within the system, is vital to 

reducing the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system. 

Classified national technical means to do so have been operational for 

many years and LRIT—a statutorily required long-range tracking system—

is now available to the Coast Guard to monitor the movements of larger 

commercial vessels at sea. Along with the Notice of Arrival, these systems 

provide a complete picture of larger commercial vessel movements and 

other pertinent information. Furthermore, these three sources of 

information provide the necessary overlap for the Coast Guard to be able 

to detect anomalies. In the longer term, the Coast Guard is also planning 

on obtaining offshore vessel identification and tracking information 

through commercially provided long-range AIS, which, according to Coast 

Guard plans, will not be fully operational until 2014, at an unknown final 

cost. At this point, the Coast Guard has not determined whether the 

concept will work as planned. However, beyond the Coast Guard, some 

other federal agencies may have a need for commercially provided longrange AIS and a national strategy for the use of commercially provided 

long-range AIS is to consider these needs. Still, the Coast Guard has not 

coordinated its programs to obtain offshore vessel-tracking information or 

analyzed the costs and benefits of using the multiple sources. As a result, 

the Coast Guard could potentially invest its limited resources to procure 

additional information that may not be necessary for its MDA mission. 

Given the limited resources available, the Coast Guard needs to determine 

how to best spend those resources for offshore vessel identification and 

tracking. 

Conclusions 

Page 42 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

To ensure efficient and effective use of Coast Guard resources available 

for long-range vessel tracking, we recommend that—upon completion of 

the commercially provided long-range AIS concept demonstration and the 

national AIS strategy and after the cost of commercially provided longrange AIS information becomes known —the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel-tracking information 

from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to 

accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information 

already available through national technical means. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland 

Security, Defense, and Justice for their review and comment. The 

Departments of Defense and Justice responded that they did not have any 

comments on the report. In an October 31, 2008, letter, the Department of 

Homeland Security provided written comments, which are summarized 

below. However, we were unable to include the full text of the written 

comments in this report because they contain sensitive information. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DHS agreed with our recommendation that—upon completion of the 

commercially provided long-range AIS concept demonstration and the 

national AIS strategy and after the cost of commercially provided longrange AIS information becomes known—the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel-tracking information 

from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to 

accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information 

already available through national technical means. Further, DHS 

commented that, in addition to the cost and duplication concerns we 

expressed, the Coast Guard’s review of the need for the two systems 

would also include factors such as the Coast Guard’s statutory 

requirements, risk assessments, Maritime Domain Awareness objectives, 

and the United States’ obligations under international agreements. 

DHS also said, however, that LRIT and commercially provided long-range 

AIS are two complementary systems that provide different information, 

apply to different classes and sizes of vessels, and are being developed and 

operated under separate statutory and international obligations. 

Furthermore, DHS commented that LRIT does not presently, nor will it 

when fully implemented, meet all the Coast Guard’s requirements for 

identification and tracking of vessels either in navigable waters or off 

shore areas of the United States. While we acknowledge that as a standalone system, commercially provided long-range AIS is to provide more 

information on vessels traveling to the United States than LRIT, when the 

Page 43 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

information from each is combined with other readily available sources, 

the information will be duplicative. For example, at approximately 

2,000 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline—the same distance at which 

AIS and LRIT will provide information about vessels bound for a U.S. 

destination—vessels are typically required to send an advance Notice of 

Arrival to the Coast Guard providing detailed information about the vessel, 

its voyage, its cargo, and its crew. When AIS or LRIT information is 

combined with this information, the Coast Guard will have available much 

the same information regardless of whether it is using commercially 

provided long-range AIS or LRIT to track a vessel. Furthermore, current 

rules for AIS and LRIT apply, in general, to similar classes and sizes of 

vessels. For example, under SOLAS, AIS covers larger commercial vessels, 

such as those 300 gross tons or more on international voyages, cargo 

vessels 500 gross tons or more not on international voyages, and passenger 

vessels regardless of size. LRIT regulations in SOLAS apply to cargo 

vessels of 300 gross tons or more, as well as to passenger ships and mobile 

offshore drilling rigs. We agree that LRIT and commercially provided longrange AIS are being developed under separate statutory and international 

obligations. However, the Coast Guard is not specifically required to 

implement commercially provided long-range AIS under any U.S. law or 

international agreement. In addition, we did not find evidence that the 

Coast Guard had gone through a deliberative process to identify 

requirements and determine the optimal assets or asset mix to meet them. 

Department of Homeland Security officials also provided technical 

comments on the draft that have been incorporated, as appropriate. 

As arranged with your offices we plan no further distribution until 30 days 

after the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report 

to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice; and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report will be available on GAO's Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 44 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Stephen L. Caldwell 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 45 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
Appendix I: Long-Range Identification and Appendix I: Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 

Tracking (LRIT) 

This appendix provides additional information on long-range identification 

and tracking (LRIT). In 2002, the Maritime Transportation Security Act 

authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement 

an automated long-range identification and tracking program for certain 

vessels in U.S. waters.1

 In turn, the Secretary delegated the authority to the 

Coast Guard which subsequently pursued the implementation of such a 

system with International Maritime Organization (IMO) to achieve the full 

benefits of LRIT. From 2002 to 2006, the Coast Guard worked with IMO to 

establish a legal mechanism whereby governments can access vessel 

position information while on international voyages. A 2006 amendment to 

the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) 

required vessels on international travel to report their identity, position, 

and the date and time of the report, which are collectively called LRIT 

information. The amendment applies to passenger vessels carrying more 

than 12 passengers, cargo vessels of 300 tons or more and self-propelled 

mobile offshore drilling units. 

The LRIT system primarily consists of the vessel-borne equipment,2

maritime communication satellites, satellite ground stations, LRIT data 

centers, and an international data exchange. The vessel-borne equipment 

consists of radio equipment capable meeting the following requirements: 

• transmitting and receiving data information to and from maritime 

communication satellites, 

• obtaining vessel position information from onboard global navigation 

satellite system equipment or its own internal positioning capability, 

• automatically transmitting the vessel’s LRIT information at 6-hour 

intervals to an LRIT data center, 

• being remotely configured to transmit LRIT information at variable 

intervals up to every 15 minutes, and 

• transmitting LRIT information upon request. 

 

1

These vessels include all those that are equipped with the Global Maritime Distress and 

Safety System, which includes vessel-borne equipment and the International Maritime 

Satellite (INMARSAT-C) or equivalent satellite technology. 

2

According to the Coast Guard, Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment that 

is already onboard U.S. vessels due to preexisting SOLAS requirements meets the IMO 

performance standards for transmitting the required LRIT data. 

Page 46 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
Appendix I: Long-Range Identification and 

Tracking (LRIT) 

The LRIT information from a vessel (vessel identity and position) is picked 

up by the satellites, retransmitted to the ground stations, and routed to a 

data center that serves the country where the vessel is registered. LRIT 

data centers are the conduits for LRIT information to and from vessels at 

sea. They can serve individual countries, regional groups of countries, or a 

broad collection of various countries. For example, the United States will 

operate its own data center and LRIT information from U.S. registered 

vessels will be routed to the U.S. data center. Requests from nations for 

more frequent position information from U.S. vessels are also made to the 

U.S. data center. After receiving LRIT information from a vessel, the data 

center sends it to the international data exchange. The international data 

exchange is the clearinghouse for LRIT information and distributes the 

information to data centers serving countries entitled to receive the 

information. To continue the previous example, the U.S. data center sends 

the position and identification information from the U.S. vessel to the 

international data exchange. Because in this example the U.S. vessel is 

sailing to China, the international data exchange will send the vessel’s 

LRIT information to the data center serving China when the vessel 

announce its intention to enter a Chinese port. Because the U.S. vessel is 

also within 1,000 nautical miles of the Japanese coastline, the international 

data exchange will also send the vessel’s LRIT information to the data 

center serving Japan. 

The LRIT system is intended to provide secure communication. All data 

transmissions are to be made in secure formats and all data centers are to 

establish and maintain systems to ensure that LRIT data users are only 

provided with information for which they are entitled. To ensure data 

security, the international data exchange is required to be configured in a 

way that prevents it from viewing or accessing the LRIT data. Rather, it 

will only have access to the information stating where the LRIT data are to 

be sent. 

The SOLAS amendment place the financial responsibility for the 

transmission of LRIT information on the country that receives the 

information. For example, information from a vessel that is sailing to the 

United States would be sent to the United States starting when the vessel 

was 2,000 nautical miles from the coastline. When the United States starts 

receiving that information, it would be liable for paying for the information 

from that point. The Coast Guard estimated in the final rule implementing 

the SOLAS amendment that the charges would be approximately $.25 per 

message. 

Page 47 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
Appendix II: Automatic Identification System 

(AIS) 

Page 48 GAO-09-337 

Appendix II: Automatic Identification System 

(AIS) 

This appendix provides additional information on the automated 

identification system (AIS). As a tool to improve navigation safety, AIS has 

been under development worldwide since the early 1990s. As a safety aid, 

AIS equipment allows a vessel’s crew to “see” and track the movements of 

similarly equipped vessels and to receive pertinent navigational 

information from shore. The enactment of the Maritime Transportation 

and Security Act of 2002 and its implementing regulations gave AIS an 

added homeland security mission. To fulfill this mission, the Coast Guard 

is in the process of constructing a nationwide network of shore-based and 

other receiving stations to allow it to track the position and movements of 

AIS-equipped vessels. 

An AIS unit onboard a vessel consists of a global navigation satellite 

system; computer hardware and software; three radio receivers; and one 

radio transmitter-receiver, or transceiver. The information to be 

transmitted by the AIS unit is obtained in different ways. Some 

information that does not change during a voyage is manually entered by 

the vessel’s crew. Examples of this type of information include the vessel’s 

name, identification number, dimensions, and cargo. Information that 

changes as the vessel proceeds on its voyage is entered by instruments 

onboard the vessel, including the navigation satellite receiver and the 

vessel’s compass. This type of information includes position, course, 

speed, and rate of turn. The unit transmits the information on designated 

radio frequencies at rates ranging from every 2 seconds to every 6 minutes. 

Once transmitted, the AIS signals are received by AIS stations within 

range. Typically, these stations are installed on other vessels or on shore, 

but the Coast Guard is working to expand its network of receiving stations 

to include offshore platforms, ocean buoys, and other locations. The landbased AIS stations require considerable infrastructure on shore—including 

antennas and base stations equipped with electric power, transceivers, 

computers, and displays—to monitor vessel activity and transmit 

information or instructions back to vessels. In locations where Coast 

Guard vessel traffic services are operational or where existing AIS 

capabilities existed, AIS signals received on local antennas are routed 

directly to the local vessel traffic center or Coast Guard sector command 

center. AIS signals received in other locations are first routed to the Coast 

Guard’s Operations System Center in West Virginia and then distributed 

throughout the Coast Guard, and to other authorized agencies, as part of 

the Coast Guard’s aggregated information system that includes vesseltracking information from all unclassified sources known as the Common 

Operating Picture. 

 Maritime Security 
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 49 GAO-09-337 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Susan Quinlan, Assistant Director, 

and Jonathan Bachman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. R.E. 

Canjar, Odilon Cuero, Erin Henderson, and Daniel Kaneshiro made 

significant contributions to the work. Stanley Kostyla assisted with design 

and methodology. Geoffrey Hamilton provided legal support. Stan 

Stenersen and Adam Vogt provided assistance in report preparation. Josh 

Ormond developed the report’s graphics. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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(440773) Page 53 GAO-09-337 Maritime Security 
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