1 Rule 10(b) (Court of Appeals). MEMO RANDUM OPINI ON. The Court, with the

concurren ce of all judges participating in t he case, mayaffirm, rever se or modify the actio ns of t

he tr ial court by memoran dum opinion when a formal op ini on wou ld have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memora ndum opi nion it shall be designat

ed “MEMORANDUM OP INION,” shall not be published, an d sh all not cit ed or relied on for any reason in a subsequent relate case. 

# FILED July 30, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT

OF APPEA LS OF TEN NESSEE WESTER N SECTION AT J ACKSON

______________________________________________________________________________ ELIZABETH O. SOUTH, Shelby Circuit No. 15189 8 R.D. C.A. No. 02A0

1-9703-CV-0

0054 Plaintiff, Hon. D’Army Bailey, Judge v. ELWIN N. SO UTH, SR., Defe nda nt. DONNA HARKNESS, Memphis Legal Services, Inc ., Memphis, Atto rney for Plaintiff. ELWIN N. S

OUTH, SR., PR O SE AFFIRMED Opinion filed:

______________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 TOMLIN, Sr. J. This a divor ce case, in which Elwin N. South, Sr. (hereaf ter “Husband”) , Pro Se, appeals f rom a judgment of the Cir cuit Court of Shelby County that grant ed a divorc e and other r elie f to Eli zabeth O. South (hereaf ter “Wife”) , the plaintiff herein. He raises three i ssues i n this appeal: W hether the tri al court erred i n (1) In the divis ion of marit al property; (2) In denying Husband’ s Motion to Set Asi de the Judgment or i n the Alternative fora New Trial; and ( 3) Denying Husband’s Motion f or the Appointment of Cou ns el fo r the purpos es of th e tri al be lo w. For

th e r ea so ns he re in af

te r s ta te d, we af fi r m. This court

has been fur nished with no trans cript or sta tement of the evidence a s to any of the proceed ings below . Accord ingly, we h ave on ly the technical reco rd bef ore us. F or th e sa ke o f clar ity w e w ill rec ite th e pr oce dur al his tory of th is ca se. W ife filed su it for divo rce ag ainst H usba nd o n the g roun ds of irre conc ilable2

diff erences. She alle ged thatthe parties were marri ed and li ved together unti l Husband was convicte d of a fel ony and incar cerat ed in 1993. At the ti me of trialHusband was resi ding in the Lake County Regional Prison. Husband fil ed a cross -complaintin which he aske d the trial c ourt t o award a divorce to both parties and t o equitably divide the marital property. Husband also moved the court bel ow to appoint c ounsel f rom the local bar to r epresent him in the divorce pr oceedings a s he was then i ncarcer ated. This motion was denie d. Foll owing a bench tri al, the trial c ourt ent ered an orde r grant ing Wife a divor ce. In a dditi on, the tri al court

awarded her a 50% inter est i n Husband’s pensi on, ina smuch as it f ound that her interest

had accrued during the course of the parties’ marriage. The court als o found that

the marit al res idence of the parties had bee n in the be ginning titl ed in the name of W ife, and was owned by her priorto the parti es’ marri age. The court found that this was her s ole and separate pr operty and a warded the re sidence t o her. Husband therea fterfil ed a Motion to Set Asi de the Judgment or i n the Alte rnati ve for a New Trial, w hich m otion w as de nied b y the tria l court. As to the first issu e con cernin g the d ivision of the p arties’ m arital pro perty, in the absenc e of a tr anscri pt we must assume that the record, had it be en preser ved,
wo uld hav e co ntain ed s uffic ient e vid enc e to s upp ort th e tria l cou rt’s fa ctua l find ing s. W ord v. W ord , 937 S.W.2d 931, 932 ( Tenn. App. 1996). W e there fore must re solve this issue i n favor of

W ife. As for the s econd iss ue rais ed by Husband, the technical record i ndicat es that Hu sban d sou ght relie f und er bo th T.R .C.P. 5 9 and 60.02 . A trial ju dges ’ decis ion to gran t or den y a m otion fo r a new trial purs uant to T.R .C.P. 5 9.02 ( in a no n-jury case it is a m otio n to alter or a m end the ju dgm ent) is dis creti ona ry. Esstman v. Boyd , 605 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. App. 1979). As for any rel ief pur suant t o T.R.C.P. 60. 02, agai n the
m atter rests in the so und discre tion of th e trial jud ge. In b oth ins tance s, the bu rden is upo n the m ovan t to sho w th e abu se of d iscretion , and in sofar a s a 60 .02 m otion is concerned, one must show that by cl ear and convi ncing evi dence that reli ef fr om the jud gm ent is wa rran ted. See Davidson v. Davids on , 916 S.W.2d 918, 923 ( Tenn. App. 199 5).3 Lastly, we find no merit t o Husband’s conte ntion that the tri al court erred i n not appo inting c oun sel to rep resen t him in the d ivorce proc eedin gs be low . It is well establ ished l aw in this stat e, that an i ndigent c onvict ha s no consti tuti onal ri ght to the app oin tm ent o f co uns el in a civil cas e. Lyon v. Lyon , 765 S.W.2d 759, 763 ( Tenn. App. 1988). Accordi ngly, the judgment of the tri al court is af fir med. Costs in this caus e on appeal ar e taxed t o Husband, for whic h executi on may issue if necessary.

________________________________________ TOMLIN, Sr. J.

________________________________________ FARMER, J. (CONC URS)

________________________________________ LILLARD, J. (CONC URS)