alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Cassandra Gautier, Plaintiff,

v.

Martin Monta, and others, 

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 22-23296-Civ-Scola

Order Denying Motion to Remand

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s second motion to remand. 

(ECF No. 12.) The Defendants have responded (ECF No. 7), and the Plaintiff has 

timely replied (ECF No. 17). After careful consideration of the briefing, the record, 

and the relevant legal authorities, the Court denies the motion. (ECF No. 7.) 

To support removal of a case from state court based on diversity 

jurisdiction, a defendant must prove the existence of diversity of citizenship and 

the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 1332;

Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2010). Crucially, 

“a removing defendant is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond 

all doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. 

Here, the Plaintiff challenges only whether the Defendants have adequately 

proven the amounts in controversy. (Mot. ¶ 7.) The Court is satisfied from its own 

review of the removal notice and its exhibits that the parties are completely 

diverse. (Not. of Removal, ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 1.) The Plaintiff argues that its pre-suit 

“demand letter asking for $400,000 and medical bills at $335,167.15” is 

insufficient to clear the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000 for the amount in 

controversy. (Mot. at 3.) The Defendants respond that, even if the demand letter 

itself can be ignored as too vague to support jurisdiction, the specificity of the 

$335,167.15 in medical bills attached to the demand letter adequately support 

diversity jurisdiction. (Resp. at 4-5, ECF No. 12.) 

The Defendants have provided the Court with sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 

is greater than $75,000. The demand letter itself is likely sufficient on its own 

because, as the Defendants point out, it delineates damages into particular 

categories, each making up a specified part of the $400,000 demand. (Id. at 4.) 

But the key here is the $335,167.15 in medical bills, which the Plaintiff attached 

to the demand letter and the Defendants included as an exhibit in the removal 

notice. (ECF No. 1-6); Collazo v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 20-25032-CIV, 2021 WL 

81666, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2021) (finding that the defendant established the 

amount in controversy cleared the jurisdictional threshold where the defendant 

Case 1:22-cv-23296-RNS Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/06/2022 Page 1 of 2
had provided as support a pre-suit demand letter that “was supported by medical 

bills totaling $116,593.40, at least $87,878.67 of which remains outstanding.”).

For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the motion to remand. (ECF 

No. 7.) 

Done and Ordered in Miami, Florida, on December 6, 2022.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:22-cv-23296-RNS Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/06/2022 Page 2 of 2
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 19, 2014

No. 04-14-00175-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.J.P., A Child,

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-PA-02469

Honorable Janet P. Littlejohn, Judge Presiding

ORDER

On February 14, 2014, the trial court signed an order in cause number 2012-PA-02469

that terminated Appellant’s parental rights to A.J.P. No motion for new trial was filed. A notice 

of appeal was due on March 6, 2014. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). A motion for extension of 

time to file a late notice of appeal is due on March 21, 2014. See id. R. 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 

959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). 

On March 14, 2014, Appellant filed a motion for extension of time to file (1) a notice of 

appeal, (2) requests for the records, and (3) a docketing statement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b). 

Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal, records requests, and 

docketing statement is GRANTED; the notice of appeal is deemed timely filed. See id. R. 26.3; 

Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617. 

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 19th day of March, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Exhibit 11(a)


                            ACCESS CORPORATION
                CALCULATION OF NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE
                       AND COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENT


                                           Three Months Ended
                                                 July 31,

                                                   1997               1996

NET EARNINGS APPLICABLE TO COMMON SHARES AND
COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENTS:                     
       Net Earnings                           $  67,756         $  (139,657)

       Preferred Dividend                          -                   -   

       Net Earnings Applicable to Common
       Shares and Common Share Equivalents    $  67,756         $  (139,657)


CALCULATION OF PRIMARY NET EARNINGS PER
 COMMON SHARE AND COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENTS:
       Average Number of Common Shares and
       Common Share Equivalents Outstanding   4,865,559           4,865,559 


PRIMARY NET EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE AND
  COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENT:                   
     Net Earnings per Common Share
     and Common Share Equivalents            $    0.01         $     (0.03)



  a)  Common Share Equivalents have not been included as their inclusion
  would be anti-dilutive or dilution is less than 3%
EXHIBIT 32.1  CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT TARA GOLD RESOURCES CORP. Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 18 U.S.C. Section 1350   In connection with the Annual Report of Tara Gold Resources Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), Francis R. Biscan, Jr., the Principal Executive Officer and Lynda R. Keeton-Cardno, the Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of their knowledge:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects the financial condition and results of the Company.   April 18, 2011  By: /s/Francis R. Biscan, Jr. Francis R. Biscan, Jr., Principal Executive Officer   By: /s/Lynda R. Keeton-Cardno Lynda R. Keeton-Cardno, Principal Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION  PURSUANT  TO
                             18  U.S.C.  SECTION  1350,
                             AS  ADOPTED  PURSUANT  TO
                  SECTION  906  OF  THE  SARBANES-OXLEY  ACT  OF  2002

     In  connection  with  the  Annual  Report  of  Security  Biometrics,  Inc.
(the
"Company")  on  Form  10-KSB for the year ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof  (the "Report"), I,
Michel  Berty,
Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the  Company,  certify,  pursuant  to  18
U.S.C.  section  1350,  as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act  of  2002,  that;

     (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     (2)     The  information  contained  in  the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and  result of operations of the
Company.

     A  signed  original  of  this written statement required by Section 906 has
been  provided  to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or  its  staff  upon  request.

/s/  Michel  Berty
----------------------
Chief  Executive  Officer

November  14,  2003



                                       25
<PAGE>
§ 83.22 Visibility of lights (Rule 22). The lights prescribed in these Rules (Subpart C) shall have an intensity as specified in Annex I to these Rules (33 CFR part 84), so as to be visible at the following minimum ranges: ( a ) In a vessel of 50 meters or more in length: ( i ) A masthead light, 6 miles;
( ii ) A sidelight, 3 miles;
( iii ) A sternlight, 3 miles;
( iv ) A towing light, 3 miles;
( v ) A white, red, green or yellow all-round light, 3 miles; and
( vi ) A special flashing light, 2 miles.
( b ) In a vessel of 12 meters or more in length but less than 50 meters in length: ( i ) A masthead light, 5 miles; except that where the length of the vessel is less than 20 meters, 3 miles;
( ii ) A sidelight, 2 miles;
( iii ) A sternlight, 2 miles;
( iv ) A towing light, 2 miles;
( v ) A white, red, green or yellow all-round light, 2 miles; and
( vi ) A special flashing light, 2 miles.
( c ) In a vessel of less than 12 meters in length: ( i ) A masthead light, 2 miles;
( ii ) A sidelight, 1 mile;
( iii ) A sternlight, 2 miles;
( iv ) A towing light, 2 miles;
( v ) A white, red, green or yellow all-round light, 2 miles; and
( vi ) A special flashing light, 2 miles.
( d ) In an inconspicuous, partly submerged vessel or objects being towed: ( i ) A white all-round light, 3 miles.
( ii ) [Reserved]
[USCG-2012-0102, 79 FR 37912, July 2, 2014, as amended by USCG-2012-0102, 79 FR 68621, Nov. 18, 2014; USCG-2020-0304, 85 FR 58277, Sept. 18, 2020]
EXHIBIT
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Alaska Airlines, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Glenn S. Johnson,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to my knowledge,





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











By    /s/Glenn S.
Johnson


Glenn S.
Johnson


Chief
Financial Officer


May 11,
2009
I

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 5134

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at

219 South Church Street in Odum, Georgia, as the ‘‘Ruth Coleman

Post Office Building’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 7, 2000

Mr. KINGSTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform

A BILL

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service

located at 219 South Church Street in Odum, Georgia,

as the ‘‘Ruth Coleman Post Office Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. RUTH COLEMAN POST OFFICE BUILDING.

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States

5 Postal Service located at 219 South Church Street in

6 Odum, Georgia, shall be known and designated as the

7 ‘‘Ruth Coleman Post Office Building’’.

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United
2

•HR 5134 IH

1 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall

2 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Ruth Coleman Post

3 Office Building’’.

Æ
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

DEVIN G. NUNES, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

RYAN LIZZA and HEARST MAGAZINE 

MEDIA, INC.,

 Defendants.

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Related Case No. 5:19-cv-04064-CJWMAR (N.D. Iowa)

RYAN LIZZA and HEARST MAGAZINE 

MEDIA, INC.,

 Petitioners,

v.

TRUMP MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY 

GROUP CORP.,

 Respondents.

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)

)

Case No. 9:22-mc-81070-DMM

NOTICE OF STRIKING

Pursuant to the Clerk’s Notice, DE 8, notice is hereby given of striking Docket Entry No. 

7. A corrected affidavit of service will be filed.

 Dated: July 28, 2022. Respectfully Submitted,

SHULLMAN FUGATE PLLC

/s/ Deanna K. Shullman 

Deanna K. Shullman

 dshullman@shullmanfugate.com

 Florida Bar No. 514462

Rachel E. Fugate 

 rfugate@shullmanfugate.com

 Florida Bar No. 144029 

2101 Vista Parkway, Suite 4006 

Case 9:22-mc-81070-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/28/2022 Page 1 of 2
2

West Palm Beach, Florida 33411 

Tel: (844) 554-1354

Nathaniel S. Boyer*

 nathaniel.boyer@hearst.com

THE HEARST CORPORATION

Office of General Counsel

300 West 57th Street

New York, New York 10019

Telephone: (212) 649-2030

Facsimile: (212) 554-7000

*Admitted pro hac vice

Attorneys for Petitioners Ryan Lizza and

Hearst Magazine Media, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 28, 2022, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to

be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify the foregoing

document is being served this day on Brendan H. Little, Esq., counsel for TMTG, Lippes

Mathias LLP, 50 Fountain Plaza, Suite 1700; Buffalo, NY 14202; 716-218-7570 at the following

email address: blittle@lippes.com.

Deanna K. Shullman 

Deanna K. Shullman (FBN 514462)

Case 9:22-mc-81070-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/28/2022 Page 2 of 2
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
JAVIER ABREU-PEREZ, DOC #526775, ) ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-4088 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed March 21, 2018. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Michelle Sisco, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 15, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-31019 Summary Calendar

DERRICK JEROME ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus THEODORE JOHNSON; JIM WILKINSON; MONA HEYSE; EDUCATION DEPARTMENT WINN CORRECTION CENTER; CORRECTION CORPORATION OF AMERICA; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS; PONTIAC BUSINESS INSTITUTE, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 02-CV-884

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Derrick Jerome Allen, Louisiana prisoner #295151, appeals the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit. The district court’s dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Norton v. Dimazana , 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997).No. 02-31019 -2- Allen argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims of retaliation and sexual abuse. He briefs no argument regarding his claims of excessive force or discrimination, and those claims are therefore waived. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Although he conclusionally asserts that the district court erred in denying him class certification, Allen fails to brief any argument challenging the district court’s determination that he had not met any of the requirements for certification under F ED . R. C IV . P. 23, and he has thus waived the argument. See Yohey , 985 F.2d at 224-25. Allen’s claim of sexual abuse was properly dismissed because, even if it is assumed that Theodore Johnson touched him in a sexual manner during routine pat-down searches, Allen has not alleged sufficiently serious assaultive behavior or resulting injury to show a constitutional deprivation. See Farmer v.
Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833-34, 847 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992); see also Boddie v. Schneider , 105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The retaliation similarly fails because Allen has not presented direct evidence of a retaliatory motive, nor has he sufficiently alleged a chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred. See Jones v. Greninger , 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999); Woods v. Smith , 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995).No. 02-31019 -3- Allen has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion on the district court’s part. Its judgment is therefore AFFIRMED. Allen’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
Document

Exhibit 10.1
Deciphera Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Non-Employee Director Compensation Policy
The purpose of this Non-Employee Director Compensation Policy (this “Policy”) of Deciphera Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), is to provide a total compensation package that enables the Company to attract and retain, on a long-term basis, high-caliber directors who are not employees or officers of the Company.  In furtherance of this purpose, effective as of the effective time of the registration statement for the Company’s initial firm commitment underwritten public offering of equity securities (the “Effective Date”), all non-employee directors shall be paid compensation for services provided to the Company as set forth below:
Cash Retainers
Annual Retainer for Board Membership:  $50,000 for general availability and participation in meetings and conference calls of our Board of Directors (the “Board”).  No additional compensation for attending individual Board meetings.  
Additional Annual Retainer for Non-Executive Chairperson of the Board: $30,000
Additional Annual Retainers for Committee Membership:
Audit Committee Chairperson:      $15,000
Audit Committee member:       $7,500 
Compensation Committee Chairperson:     $10,000
Compensation Committee member:      $5,000 
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Chairperson:  $7,500
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee member:  $3,750  
Science Committee Chairperson:      $10,000
Science Committee member:       $5,000
No additional compensation for attending individual compensation meetings.
All cash retainers will be paid quarterly, in arrears, or upon the earlier resignation or removal of the non-employee director.  Cash retainers owing to non-employee directors shall be annualized, meaning that non-employee directors who join the Board during the calendar year, and with respect to all non-employee directors for 2017, such amounts shall be pro-rated based on the number of calendar days served by such director. 
Equity Retainers
Initial Equity Grant: One-time option grant to each new non-employee director upon his/her election to the Board after the Effective Date to purchase shares of the Company’s common stock, par value $0.01 per share (“Common Stock”) in such amount and on such terms as authorized by the Board, or by a committee appointed by the Board. 









On the date of each Annual Meeting of Stockholders:  Annual option grant to each non-employee director serving on the Board immediately following the Company’s annual meeting of stockholders to purchase shares of Common Stock in such amount and on such terms as authorized by the Board, or by a committee appointed by the Board.   
All of the foregoing option grants will have an exercise price equal to the fair market value of a share of Common Stock on the date of grant. 


Expenses
The Company shall reimburse all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by non-employee directors in attending Board and committee meetings.
ADOPTED: September 21, 2017
EFFECTIVE: September 26, 2017
AMENDED AND RESTATED:  September 11, 2019
U NITED STATESDISTRICT COU RT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OFFLORIDA

CASENO.22-80144-CR-Smith/Ma>ard(s)(s)

UNITED STATESO FAM ERICA

JOFFSTENN W ROY PHILOSSM NT,

Defendant.

W RDIG

W e,thejury,unanimouslyfindasfollows:

Astothechargeofprocuringnam ralization contrarytolaw,wefindtheDefendant:

tK GUILTY L NOT GUILTY

SO SAY W EM Lthis o 7 dayofFebruars2023.

(Forepersonpleasesign) (Forepersonpleaseprint)

Case 9:22-cr-80144-RS Document 198 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 1 of 1
#### Maxwell *vs*Goodrum.

Appeal from the Marshall Circuit.

*Petition and Summons. Sealed Instruments.*

*June 17.*

Case stated.

The words “or order” in a promissory note are not an essential part of such note and not important to its validity. It is assignable with, or without such words.

*A*seal, since the statute of 1812, (1 *Stat. Law,*343) is not an essential part of *287a note, and therefore it is not a fatal defect in a pet. *&*sum. to omit placing the seal to the copy in. the pet., though it be to the note —setting out the note in substance is sufficient.

*286Judge Simpson

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Goodrum brought a suit against Maxwell by petition and summons on a promissory note executed on the 14th December, 1846, and obtained a judgment by default.

The defendant then appeared and moved to arrest the judgment, because, first, the words “or order,” contained in the note, were omitted in the copy of it, set forth in the petition; and secondly, because the note itself had a seal appended to it, which was not shown by the copy inserted in the petition.

The motion in arrest of judgment was overruled, and the defendant has appealed.

A'mere promissory note, for the payment of money, has the same effect under our statute and the law which operates in this State upon such writings, with or without the words “or order” following the name of the payee. These words are not necessary to render it assignable, nor do they impart any additional validity to the writing. They are, therefore, an immaterial and not a substantial part of the note.

The statute of 1812, (1 *Stat. Law,*343,) abolished the common law distinction between sealed and unsealed writings for the payment of money; and as this note was executed since the passage of that act, it has, in *287our State, the same effect and dignity without the seal that it has with it.

*Williams*for appellant; *Palmer*for appellee.

The petition in a suit of this kind, only professes to set out the substance of the note sued on. The alleged omissions being merely of immaterial parts of the note do not show that the petition did not contain a substantial copy of the note upon which the suit was founded.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.