J-S30030-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: W.A., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.P., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 67 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree December 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans' Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000186-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 11, 2018

J.P. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered December 8, 2017, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated 

involuntarily his parental rights to his minor son, W.A. (“Child”), born in 

December 2006.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) has 

a lengthy history of involvement with this family dating back to September 

2011. N.T., 12/8/17, at 57. CYF received its most recent referral on 

November 28, 2014, which alleged housing issues, medical neglect, and poor 

parenting skills on the part of Mother. Id. at 60-61. CYF conducted an 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of W.A.’s mother, L.A. 

(“Mother”). Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights at Superior 

Court docket number 48 WDA 2018. We address her appeal in a separate 

memorandum. 
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investigation, which revealed that Mother was intellectually limited and 

appeared to be hoarding food. Id. at 61. In addition, Child’s younger halfbrother, J.A.A., had been hospitalized several times for reactive airway 

disease, and Mother was failing to administer his medication properly. Id. at 

61, 112. CYF referred Mother for in-home services. Id. at 62. 

CYF obtained an emergency custody authorization for Child on June 26, 

2015, after an incident during which J.A.A. “fell down and cut his lip open and 

chipped his tooth.” Id. at 63. CYF directed Mother to take J.A.A. to the 

hospital, but she failed to do so. Id. CYF was also concerned that Mother’s

home was cluttered and dirty, and that she was failing to provide adequate 

supervision for Child and ensure his safety. Id. at 63-64. 

Meanwhile, CYF made contact with Father. Id. at 65. Father was living 

separately from Mother with Child’s paternal grandmother. Id. However, CYF 

concluded that Father would not be an appropriate caregiver. Id. Father’s 

home had several safety issues, and a CYF parenting assessment revealed 

“that he would not be able to parent unless he had somebody within earshot 

of him.” Id. Child was adjudicated dependent on August 15, 2015. Id. at 

66. 

On October 20, 2016, CYF filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental 

rights to Child involuntarily. The trial court conducted a hearing on December 
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8, 2017, after which it entered a decree terminating Father’s parental rights.2

Father timely filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2018, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Father now raises the following question for our review: “Did the trial 

court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that CYF 

met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination 

of [Father’s] parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(b)?” Father’s Brief at 4. 

We review Father’s issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review: 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

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2

In a single sentence at the conclusion of his brief, Father alleges that the 

trial court erred by failing to appoint legal counsel for Child. To the contrary, 

Child had legal counsel during the termination hearing, and his counsel 

continues to represent him on appeal. 
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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis: 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provides as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

***

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, the 
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conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will 

not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

In his brief on appeal, Father concedes that CYF presented clear and 

convincing evidence that his parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 

Section 2511(a). Father’s Brief at 9 (“CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and 

convincingly establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 
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23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(a)(2).”). Moreover, Father failed to include Section 

2511(a) in his concise statement and in his statement of questions involved. 

See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that 

the appellant waived Section 2511(a) by failing to develop it in her brief, and 

that she waived Section 2511(b) by failing to include it in her concise 

statements and statement of questions involved). Therefore, we need only 

consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).3 The requisite analysis is as 

follows:

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

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3 We remind the trial court that Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) does not provide 

an appropriate basis to terminate Father’s parental rights, because Child was 

not removed from Father’s care as the statute requires. See In re C.S., 761 

A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (“Termination under subsection 

2511(a)(5) was not appropriate here because the record reflects that C.S. was 

never in Appellant’s care and, therefore, could not have been removed from 

his care.”).
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that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). 

Here, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

concluding that termination of his parental rights would best serve Child’s 

needs and welfare. Father’s Brief at 7-14. Father alleges that the court 

conducted an improper Section 2511(b) analysis, by focusing on his failings 

as a parent, and on the quality of Child’s foster parents, rather than the effect 

that terminating his parental rights would have on Child. Id. at 7, 12-14. 

In its opinion, the trial court found there is no possibility that Father will 

ever be able to care for Child, due to his significant intellectual limitations and 

inability to live independently, among other things. Trial Court Opinion, 

2/6/18, at 10-11. The court further found that Child has “a ‘relationship’ of 

sorts with . . . Father,” but that this relationship is not so substantial that 

severing it would subject Child to a negative psychological impact. Id. at 11. 

The court reasoned that Child has been in care for more than two and a half 

years, and that Father has had only sporadic contact with him during that 

time. Id. at 9. In addition, Child is benefiting from the care of his preadoptive foster parents, who can provide him with the loving and stable 

environment he needs. Id. at 11-12. 
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After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination hearing, 

CYF presented the testimony of psychologist, Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D. Dr. 

Rosenblum testified that he conducted a series of psychological evaluations 

involving Father, Child, and Child’s foster parents between August 2016 and 

November 2017. N.T., 12/8/17, at 8-9, 18, 21, 23. Based on these 

evaluations, Dr. Rosenblum opined that Father lacks the capacity to parent 

Child. Id. at 24. He emphasized Father’s “very definite limitations in his own 

personal functioning and continued dependency on other people to provide 

him with support and help in taking care of himself.” Id. Father exhibits a 

long-standing history of intellectual limitations. Id. at 23. Moreover, Father 

has no employment history and he has never been able to live independently.

Id. at 24. 

Concerning Child’s relationship with Father, Dr. Rosenblum testified that 

Child has a “familiarity” with Father, “more like a peer-to-peer relationship,” 

but not a parent/child bond. Id. at 23. He continued, “[I]t’s a peripheral 

relationship. In my opinion, [Child] can take it or leave it. It’s not been 

something that’s consistent in his life.” Id. Dr. Rosenblum did not believe 

that severing Child’s relationship with Father would cause him severe trauma.

Id. at 25-27. He described Father’s interactions with Child as follows: 

. . . . I mean, [Child] knows his dad. They seem to have some 

physical similarities and things in common with one another in 

terms of their looks and appearance.
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Father was also, you know, someone who was pretty flat, 

lacking in enthusiasm, very passive in his interaction with [Child].

When guided into certain activities by me during the 

session, he was able to follow through and play some games with 

[Child], but he seemed to know very little about his school, about 

his special education needs, about his therapy.

I got the impression that [F]ather comes and spends time 

with [Child], but, again, had very limited -- had definite limitations 

in his parenting capacity and his ability to really understand or 

respond effectively to [Child] and his developmental issues. 

Id. at 21-22.4

Dr. Rosenblum also praised Child’s foster parents. Id. at 10-11, 18-20, 

25. He testified that the foster parents “are very observant, very responsible 

and very attentive to [Child’s] needs. . . . [T]here’s no question that his 

current foster home placement has been extremely beneficial to [Child] and 

has helped him to improve his ability to function and respond to different 

portions of the environment more effectively.” Id. at 10-11. Dr. Rosenblum 

recommended that adoption by the foster parents would be consistent with 

Child’s needs and welfare. Id. at 25.

Thus, the record supports the trial court’s findings pursuant to Section 

2511(b). Father’s intellectual limitations and inability to live independently 

render him incapable of parenting Child. Moreover, while Child has a 

relationship with Father, this relationship is merely peripheral and is not a 

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4 The record indicates that Father missed many of his visits with Child. CYF 

caseworker, Vickie Naccarato, testified that Father attended only twenty-six

out of fifty-three scheduled visits. N.T., 12/8/17, at 101. 
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necessary and beneficial parent/child bond. Child is now in a pre-adoptive 

foster home, which has been extremely beneficial for him. Child’s foster 

parents are supportive of his needs, and can provide him a safe and stable 

environment. 

While Father contends that the trial court should not have focused on 

his parental incapacity and the quality of Child’s foster parents when

conducting its Section 2511(b) analysis, this argument is specious. As we 

stated above, Child’s relationship with Father was only one of many factors 

for the court to consider. C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219. The court was free to 

consider any other factors relevant to Child’s needs and welfare, including 

Father’s inability to provide appropriate care, and the love, comfort, security, 

and stability that Child will receive in his foster home. Id. at 1219-20.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s December 8, 2017 

decree terminating Father’s parental rights to Child involuntarily.

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/11/2018