UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4967

GREGORY ALLEN SCHNEIDER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4968

GREGORY ALLEN SCHNEIDER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-98-522, CR-98-1116)

Submitted: May 20, 2003

Decided: July 7, 2003

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,

South Carolina, for Appellant. Dean Arthur Eichelberger, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

In these consolidated appeals, Gregory Allen Schneider appeals

concurrent eight-month sentences he received for his second violation

of two terms of supervised release imposed for two separate offenses

to which he pled guilty in 1999. Schneider’s attorney has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which she

certifies there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Schneider,

informed of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief, has not done

so. Because we find no plain error in Schneider’s sentence, for the

following reasons, we affirm. 

Although not asserted by counsel, our review of the record pursuant to Anders indicates Schneider should not have received a sentence

for again violating a term of supervised release predicated on his conviction for impersonating a federal officer, which is a Class E felony.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 912, 3559(a)(5) (2000) (imposing a maximum of

three years’ incarceration for impersonating a federal officer and classifying offenses with less than five years maximum incarceration as

Class E felonies, respectively). When Schneider violated the initial

term of supervised release imposed for that conviction, a ten-month

custodial sentence was imposed. His service of that period of confinement limited any subsequent term of supervised release to two

months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (2000); see also United States v.

Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 2002). Consequently, because

the activity underlying Schneider’s most recent supervised release

violation occurred approximately six to eight months after any additional supervised release related to his § 912 conviction should have

2 UNITED STATES v. SCHNEIDER
concluded, Schneider should not have received an additional eight

months’ incarceration with respect to that conviction. 

Nevertheless, we conclude there was no plain error, as Schneider

would have received an eight-month custodial sentence in any event.

We find no error in the district court’s imposition of a concurrent

eight-month post-revocation sentence related to Schneider’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) for mail fraud, as Schneider stipulated to violating the conditions of his supervised release for that

conviction, and the district court was apprised of the recommended

sentencing ranges in fixing Schneider’s sentence. See United States v.

Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). Because the foregoing error

did not in fact increase the term of incarceration imposed, the error

did not affect his substantial rights, and thus does not amount to plain

error. See United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir.) (en

banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 937 (2001). 

We have reviewed the entire record in this case in accordance with

Anders and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore

affirm Schneider’s sentences. This court requires that counsel inform

his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the

United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served

on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. SCHNEIDER 3