U.S. ElEction ASSiStAncE commiSSion

ElEction mAnAGEmEnt GUiDElinES
ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Election Management Guidelines  3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 1

Certification

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Program Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Chapter 2

System Security

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Software Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Policies and Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Password Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Chapter 3

Physical Security

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Conducting a Security Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Security—Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Security—Paper Ballots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Security—Voting Equipment and Peripheral Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Security—Election Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chapter 4

Acceptance Testing

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Request for Proposal and Contract Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Acceptance Tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Acceptance Tests for Optical Scan Ballot Scanners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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Acceptance Test for Touch-screen Voting Stations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

End-to-end Voting System Acceptance Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chapter 5

Ballot Building

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

General Ballot Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Touch Screen Ballots Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Optical Scan Ballots Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Audio Ballot Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Verifying the Ballot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Chapter 6

Pre-Election and Parallel Testing

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Pre-Election/Logic and Accuracy Tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Parallel Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Post-Election Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Chapter 7

Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Ballot Preparation and Mailing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Ballot Reception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Ballot Processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Managing Absentee Ballots at the Polls on Election Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Storage and Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Voter Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Chapter 8

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Definitions and Forms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Communication Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Resources for Local Election Officials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Chapter 9

Polling Place and Vote Center Management

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Locating Polling Place and Vote Center Sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Inspection Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Getting Started. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Getting to the Polling Place—Typical Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Voting Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Summary of Suggested Polling Place Supplies to Assist Voters with Disabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

10 Steps to Achieve Accessible Polling Places. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Facility Management:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Determining the Right Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Exterior and Interior Signage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Well-trained Check-in Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Setup and Layout of a Vote Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Managing Parking and Traffic Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Preparation and Distribution of Supplies and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Staffing, Training, and Support:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Voter Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Chapter 10

Developing an Audit Trail

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Types of Documentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Pre-Election Audit Trail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Absentee and Early Voting Audit Trail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Polling Place Supplies and Equipment Audit Trail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Post-Election Audit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Chapter 11

Contingency Planning and Change Management

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Identifying and Assessing Contingencies and Change Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Developing and Implementing Contingency Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Organizing Response Teams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Organizational Planning for Catastrophic Disasters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Contingency Planning for Unexpected Events during Early Voting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Contingency Planning for Unexpected Events on Election Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Developing a Continuity of Operations Plan for Internal Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Staff and Poll Worker Training and Supplies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

S.W.O.T Analysis Sample Worksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Election Management Guidelines  7

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) established 

the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to 

“assist in the administration of Federal elections and to 

otherwise provide assistance with the administration of 

certain Federal election laws and programs, to establish 

minimum election administration standards for States 

and units of local government with responsibility for 

the administration of Federal elections, and for other 

purposes.” Section 202 of HAVA directs the EAC to 

serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the 

compilation of information and review of procedures 

with respect to the administration of Federal elections 

by adopting voluntary voting systems guidelines; by 

providing for the testing, certification, decertification, 

and recertification of voting system hardware and software; and by conducting research and activities that 

promote the effective administration of elections.

In December 2005, the EAC unanimously adopted 

the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), 

which significantly increased security requirements 

for voting systems and expanded access, including 

opportunities to vote privately and independently, 

for individuals with disabilities. The VVSG provide a 

set of specifications and requirements against which 

voting systems can be tested to determine if the systems provide all the basic functionality, accessibility, 

and security capabilities required of these systems. In 

addition, the VVSG establish evaluation criteria for 

the national certification of voting systems. As required 

by HAVA, they also update and augment the 2002 

VSSG to address advancements in election practices 

and computer technologies. 

Purpose

Having adopted and published the 2005 VVSG, the 

EAC considered and approved the development of a 

set of election management guidelines to complement 

the technical standards for voting equipment. It is 

the first time that election administration resources 

are consolidated into one document and made readily 

accessible to election officials at all levels. Before this 

effort, election officials depended on materials developed and shared almost exclusively at the State and 

local levels. The National Association of State Election 

Directors (NASED) has long recognized the need for 

national guidelines, but it is only now that a Federal 

agency is able to devote the time and resources needed 

for the development and distribution of such guidelines. 

The EAC and NASED have agreed to cooperatively 

undertake this effort over the next few years.

The creation of the Election Management Guidelines (EMG) is a priority activity under the EAC’s 

national clearinghouse role to promote the effective 

administration of elections. The long-term goal of the 

EMG is to provide a comprehensive set of election 

management guidelines (consolidated into one document) to assist State and local election officials in 

effectively managing and administering elections. 

The EAC expects the full set of guidelines to be completed over the next few years. Because of the urgency 

for resources to assist election officials, however, the 

EMG have been divided into subject matter modules 

so that chapters on particular topics can be completed 

on a priority basis and be distributed to the election 

community as soon as they are completed. In addition, 

a series of Quick Start Management Guides has been 

developed to highlight and summarize information 

contained in the EMG chapters. They also introduce 

readers to subject matter modules that will be expanded 

in future chapters of the EMG. 

The EMG subject matter modules cover a wide 

spectrum of election administration topics ranging 

from procedures prior to conducting an election to postelection activities and management. Some particular 
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areas to be covered are absentee voting, statewide 

voter registration systems, voting system management, 

information technology, precinct definition, poll workers, polling places, military and overseas voters, facility 

management, office administration, voter outreach, 

and Election Day procedures and practices. 

Important These guidelines do not endorse one method 

of election administration over another, and they are not 

intended as “one size fits all.” States and local election 

jurisdictions are not required to consider or implement 

the recommendations or practices contained in the EMG. 

These guidelines are solely designed to serve as a source 

of information for election officials and not as requirements 

by which they must abide. Election jurisdictions reserve the 

right to consider and implement any of the recommendations contained in the EMG in consultation with the appropriate State and local election authorities.

To make the EMG reflective of the realities faced 

by election officials across the United States, the EAC 

has sought input and recommendations from State 

and local election officials and other election professionals and experts who have first-hand experience 

managing elections. Their input has been invaluable 

to the development of the EMG. Readers and users of 

these guidelines are encouraged to provide feedback 

and recommendations to the EAC regarding the usability 

and feasibility of the EMG and the practices contained 

within. The EMG, as a work in progress, can be sustained only by their utility and applicability to the 

administration of elections.

Comments or questions should be sent to 

the following:

Mail

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20005

Attn: Election Management Guidelines

Telephone

202.566.3100

Toll Free: 866.747.1471

Fax

202.566.3127

E-mail

HAVAinfo@eac.gov

Copies of the Election Management Guidelines and 

the Quick Start Management Guide series brochures 

are available on the EAC Web site at www.eac.gov

or by contacting the EAC at the telephone number 

or e-mail address listed above.
Election Management Guidelines  9

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission thanks the election officials in the following jurisdictions for their time, 

energy, and experience in making this document both meaningful and usable by the election community in the 

United States.

LOCAL ELECTION JUrISDICTIONS

Arlington County, VA Clark County, NV halifax, VA Montgomery County, MD 

Augusta County, VA Comal County, TX harris County, TX New Castle County, DE 

Bexar County, TX County of henrico, VA hinds County, MS New york City, Ny 

Boone County, MO Cumberland County, NC Lane County, Or Okaloosa County, FL

Cerro Gordo County, IA Dallas County, TX Larimer County, CO Orange County, NC 

Chelan County, WA Denver County, CO Linn County, IA richmond County, GA 

Chesterfield County, VA District of Columbia Los Angeles County, CA Sacramento County, CA 

Citrus County, FL Fairfax County, VA Marion County, Oh Santa Ana, CA 

City of Charlottesville, VA Forsyth County, GA Marshall County, IA Santa Fe, NM 

City of Danville, VA Franklin County, Oh Mecklenberg County, NC Travis County, TX

City of richmond, VA Guilford County, NC Miami-Dade County, FL Wake County, NC

STATE ELECTION OFFICES

State of Arizona State of Kansas State of Missouri

State of Florida State of Louisiana State of North Dakota

State of Georgia State of Maryland State of South Carolina

State of Iowa State of Michigan State of Wisconsin

OrGANIzATIONS

EAC Advisory Board The International Association of Clerks, recorders, Election Officials, and Treasurers

EAC Standards Board The National Association of Secretaries of States

The Election Center The National Association of State Election Directors

Federal Voting Voting Systems Consultants, LLC Assistance Program

MIT/CalTech Voting Project

Election Management Guidelines  11

C h A P T E r 1 

CErTIFICATION

Introduction

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) adopted the 

first formal set of voluntary Federal standards for 

computer-based voting systems in January 1990. No 

national program or organization existed to test and 

certify such systems to the standards. However, in 

1994, the National Association of State Election 

Directors (NASED) stepped up to fill this void. NASED 

is an independent, nongovernmental organization of 

State election officials. This organization formed the 

Nation’s first national program to test and qualify 

voting systems to the new Federal standards. The 

organization worked, on a strictly voluntary basis, 

for more than a decade to help ensure the reliability, 

consistency, and accuracy of voting systems fielded 

in the United States. In late 2002, Congress passed 

the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA 

created the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 

and assigned to this Commission the responsibility 

for both setting voting system standards and providing for the testing and certification of voting systems. 

This mandate represented the first time the Federal 

government provided for the voluntary testing, 

certification, and decertification of voting systems 

nationwide. In response to this HAVA requirement, 

the EAC developed the Voting System Testing and 

Certification Program (Certification Program).

HAVA requires that the EAC certify and decertify voting systems. Section 231(a)(1) of HAVA specifically requires the EAC to “... provide for the testing, 

certification, decertification and recertification of 

voting system hardware and software by accredited 

laboratories.” The EAC has the sole authority to 

grant certification or withdraw certification at the 

Federal level, including the authority to grant, maintain, extend, suspend, and withdraw the right to 

retain or use any certificates, marks, or other indicators of certification. 

Pursuant to the authority granted under HAVA, 

the EAC has developed and promulgated the EAC 

Voting System Testing and Certification Program 

Manual which provides the procedural requirements 

of the EAC Certification Program. Although participation in the program is voluntary, adherence to the 

program’s procedural requirements is mandatory 

for participants. 

The primary purpose of the EAC Testing and 

Certification Program Manual is to provide clear 

procedures to Manufacturers for the testing and 

certification of voting systems to specified Federal 

standards consistent with the requirements of HAVA 

Section 231(a)(1). The program, however, also serves 

to do the following:

		Support State certification programs.

 Support local election officials in the areas 

of acceptance testing and pre-election system 

verification.

 Increase quality control in voting system 

manufacturing.

	Increase voter confidence in the use of voting 

systems.

EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual

The Testing and Certification Program Manual is a 

comprehensive presentation of the EAC Certification 

Program. It is intended to establish all of the program’s administrative requirements. (The manual 

may be accessed in its entirety at http://www.eac.

gov/docs/Voting%20System%20Testing%20and%20

Certification%20Program%20Manual–Final%20

–120506.pdf)
12  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

The contents of the manual serve as an overview of the 

program itself and contain the following chapters:

 Manufacturer Registration. Manufacturer registration 

is the process by which voting system Manufacturers make initial contact with the EAC and provide 

information essential to participate in the EAC 

Certification Program. Before a Manufacturer of a 

voting system can submit an application to have a 

voting system certified by the EAC, the Manufacturer must be registered. This process requires the 

Manufacturer to provide certain contact information and agree to certain requirements of the Certification Program. After successfully registering, 

the Manufacturer receives an identification code.

When Voting Systems Must Be Submitted for Testing and 

Certification. An EAC certification signifies that a 

voting system has been successfully tested to identified voting system standards adopted by the EAC. 

Only the EAC can issue a Federal certification. Ultimately, to receive this certification, systems must be 

submitted for testing and certification under this 

program. Systems will usually be submitted when 

(1) they are new to the marketplace, (2) they have 

never before received an EAC certification, (3) they 

are modified, or (4) the Manufacturer wishes to test 

a previously certified system to a different (newer) 

standard. This chapter also discusses the submission 

of de minimis changes, which may not require additional testing and certification, and provisional, preelection emergency modifications, which provide for 

pre-election, emergency waivers.

 Certification Testing and Review. This chapter discusses 

the procedural requirements for submitting a voting 

system to the EAC for testing and review. The testing and review process requires an application, 

employment of an EAC-accredited testing laboratory, and technical analysis of the laboratory test 

report by the EAC. The result of this process is an 

Initial Decision on Certification by the Decision 

Authority, the EAC Executive Director. 

 Grant of Certification. The grant of certification 

is the formal process through which the EAC 

acknowledges that a voting system has successfully 

completed conformance testing to an appropriate 

set of standards or guidelines. The grant of certification begins with the Initial Decision on Certification 

by the Decision Authority. This decision becomes 

final after the Manufacturer confirms that the final 

version of the software, which was certified and 

will be delivered with the certified system, has 

been subject to a trusted build, placed in an EACapproved repository, and can be verified using the 

Manufacturer’s system identification tools. After a 

certification is issued, the Manufacturer is provided 

a Certificate of Conformance, and relevant information about the system is added to the EAC Web site. 

Manufacturers with certified voting systems are 

responsible for ensuring that each system they produce is properly labeled as certified.

 Denial of Certification. If the Decision Authority issues 

an Initial Decision denying certification, the Manufacturer has certain rights and responsibilities. The 

Manufacturer may request an opportunity to cure 

the defects identified by the Decision Authority. In 

addition, the Manufacturer may request that the 

Decision Authority reconsider the Initial Decision 

after the Manufacturer has had the opportunity to 

review the record and submit supporting written 

materials, data, and the rationale for its position. 

Finally, in the event reconsideration is denied, 

the Manufacturer may appeal the decision to the 

Appeal Authority. 

 Decertification. Decertification is the process by which 

the EAC revokes a certification previously granted 

to a voting system. It is an important part of the 

Certification Program because it ensures that the 

program requirements are followed and that certified voting systems fielded for use in Federal elections maintain the same level of quality as those 

presented for testing. Decertification is a serious 

matter and will significantly affect Manufacturers, 

State and local governments, the public, and the 

administration of elections. As such, the process 

for Decertification is complex. It is initiated when 

the EAC receives information that a voting system 

may not be in compliance with the applicable 

voting system standards or the procedural requirements of this manual. Upon receipt of such information, the program director may initiate an Informal 

Inquiry to determine the credibility of the information. If the information is credible and suggests the 

system is non-compliant, a Formal Investigation will 

be initiated. If the Formal Investigation results demonstrate non-compliance, the Manufacturer will be 

given a Notice of Non-Compliance. Before a Final 

Decision on Decertification is made, the Manufac-
Election Management Guidelines  13

turer will have the opportunity to remedy any 

defects identified in the voting system and present 

information for consideration by the Decertification 

Authority. A decertification of a voting system may 

be appealed in a timely manner.

 Quality Monitoring Program. The quality of any product, including a voting system, depends on two 

specific elements: (1) the design of the product or 

system and (2) the care and consistency of the 

manufacturing process. The EAC testing and certification process focuses on voting system design by 

ensuring that a representative sample of a system 

meets the technical specifications of the applicable 

EAC voting system standards. This process, commonly called “type acceptance,” determines whether 

the representative sample submitted for testing 

meets the requirements. Type acceptance does not 

explore whether variations in manufacturing may 

allow production of non-compliant systems. Generally, manufacturing quality is the responsibility of 

the Manufacturer. After a system is certified, the 

vendor assumes primary responsibility for compliance of the products produced. This level of compliance is accomplished by the Manufacturer’s 

configuration management and quality control 

processes. The EAC’s Certification Quality Monitoring Program, as outlined in this chapter, however, 

provides an additional layer of quality control by 

allowing the EAC to perform manufacturing site 

reviews, carry out fielded system reviews, and 

gather information on voting system anomalies 

from election officials. These additional tools help 

ensure that voting systems continue to meet the 

requirements of EAC’s voting system standards as 

the systems are manufactured, delivered, and used 

in Federal elections. These aspects of the program 

enable the EAC to independently monitor continued 

compliance of fielded voting systems.

 Requests for Interpretations. A Request for Interpretation 

is a means by which a registered Manufacturer or 

Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) may seek clarification on a specific EAC voting system standard 

(VVSG or VSS). An Interpretation is a clarification of 

the voting system standards and guidance so Manufacturers or VSTL can properly evaluate conformance 

to it. Suggestions or requests for modifications to 

the standards are provided by other processes. This 

chapter outlines the policy, requirements, and procedures for submitting a Request for Interpretation.

 Release of Certification Program Information. Manufacturers participating in the Certification Program are 

required to provide a variety of documents to the 

EAC. Generally, these documents are releasable to 

the public. Moreover, in many cases, the information provided is affirmatively published by the EAC. 

In limited cases, however, documents may not be 

released if they include trade secrets, confidential 

commercial information, or personal information. 

Although the EAC is ultimately responsible for determining which documents Federal law protects from 

release, Manufacturers must identify the information they believe is protected and ultimately provide 

substantiation and a legal basis for withholding. 

This chapter discusses EAC’s general policy on the 

release of information and provides Manufacturers 

with standards, procedures, and requirements for 

identifying documents as trade secrets or confidential commercial information.

Program Methodology

The EAC Certification Program is but one part of the 

overall conformity assessment process; the Certification Program includes companion efforts at the State 

and local levels. 

Federal and State Roles. The process to ensure that 

voting equipment meets technical requirements is a 

distributed, cooperative effort by Federal, State, and 

local officials in the United States. Working with voting 

equipment Manufacturers, these officials each have 

unique responsibility for ensuring that the equipment a voter uses on Election Day meets specific 

requirements.

 The EAC Certification Program has primary responsibility for ensuring that voting systems submitted 

under this program meet Federal standards established for voting systems.

 State officials are responsible for testing voting 

systems to ensure that they support the specific 

requirements of each individual State. States may 

use EAC VSTLs to perform testing of voting systems 

that are unique to State requirements while the 

systems are being tested to Federal standards. The 

EAC will not, however, certify voting systems to 

State requirements. 

 State or local officials are responsible for making the 

final purchase choice of voting equipment. They 
14  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

are responsible for deciding which system offers the 

best fit and total value for their specific State or 

local jurisdiction.

 State or local officials are also responsible for acceptance testing to ensure that the equipment delivered 

is identical to the equipment certified at the Federal 

and State levels, is fully operational, and meets the 

contractual requirements of the purchase.

 State or local officials should perform pre-election 

logic and accuracy testing to confirm that equipment is operating properly and is unmodified from 

its certified state. 

Conformity Assessment, Generally. Conformity 

assessment is a system to ensure that a product or 

service meets the requirements that apply to it. Many 

conformity assessment systems exist to protect the 

quality and ensure compliance with requirements of 

products and services. All conformity assessment systems attempt to answer the following questions:

What specifications are required of an acceptable 

system? For voting systems, the EAC VVSG and 

VSS address this issue. States and local jurisdictions also have supplementing standards.

 How are systems tested against required specifications? 

The EAC Certification Program is a central element 

of the larger conformity assessment system. The 

program, as set forth in the manual, provides for 

the testing and certification of voting systems to 

identified versions of the VVSG. The Certification 

Program’s purpose is to ensure that State and local 

jurisdictions receive voting systems that meet the 

requirements of the VVSG. 

 Are the testing authorities qualified to make an accurate evaluation? The EAC accredits VSTLs, after 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) National Voluntary Lab Accreditation 

Program (NVLAP) has reviewed their technical 

competence and lab practices, to ensure these test 

authorities are fully qualified. Furthermore, EAC 

technical experts review all test reports from accredited laboratories to ensure an accurate and complete 

evaluation. Many States provide similar reviews of 

laboratory reports.

Will Manufacturers deliver units within manufacturing 

tolerances to those tested? The VVSG and this manual 

require that vendors have appropriate change 

management and quality control processes to control the quality and configuration of their products. 

The Certification Program provides mechanisms 

for the EAC to verify Manufacturer quality processes 

through field system testing and manufacturing 

site visits. States have implemented policies for 

acceptance of delivered units.
Election Management Guidelines  15

C h apte r 2

SYSTEM SECURITY

Introduction

Overall security of a computer-based voting system is 

enhanced by a combination of four factors working in 

concert together: 

 Use of software should be limited to the very basic 

functions required to perform in the voting system’s 

processes. In addition, the software should provide 

audit scripting to track sequence of events that 

occur on the system and, to the extent possible, 

identify person(s) that initiated the events. The 

software should also employ a sufficient level of 

encryption or validation protocol to limit changes 

made without proper authorization.

 Use well-defined, strictly enforced policies and procedures to control access to the voting system, the circumstances under which users can access the system, 

and functions users are allowed to perform on the 

system. Maintain strong custody control of all 

equipment, software, and key or control materials 

at all times. 

 Use physical security and access logs. Physical security, including fences, walls, doors, locks, seals, 

and so forth, control and limit access to the 

system. 

 Use a two-person accountability and control system. 

Access, control, and custody should always involve 

two or more personnel. This accountability independently verifies the honesty and integrity of the 

election procedures under any scrutiny.

There is no “one size fits all” for each of these factors. Appropriate policies and procedures for a large 

election office with over a dozen staff members may 

be overly burdensome for a small, two-person election 

office. The following sections provide guidelines for 

implementing these four factors within the election 

environment. Factors that are considered important 

will be clearly indicated. A range of acceptable 

factors are presented where possible.

Software Security

Initial Installation. The first step in securing voting 

system software is ensuring that the software installed 

on the system is the exact software version that has 

been certified by your State or the Federal certification program. The most straightforward way to accomplish this task is to obtain the software directly from 

your State elections office or the Voting System Test 

Laboratory (VSTL) that performed the tests for EAC 

certification. 

It is not uncommon to find an election office 

in which the voting system has been installed for 

a considerable length of time, during which the 

vendor has had access the system unsupervised by 

an election official. In circumstances such as this, 

strongly consider the following recommendation:

 If you suspect that the voting system software has 

been compromised, reinstall the voting system 

software with a copy of the software obtained directly 

from your State elections office or the VSTL that 

performed the tests for EAC certification. 

As the last act, a VSTL produces a “final build” 

or “trusted build” of the system. The output of this 

final build is a CD that contains the system source 

code, the object code, and various documents. In addition, they also produce a self-loading disk that can 

install the system on your computer.

 A copy of the self-loading disk is required to 

reinstall the system. If the State election office 

does not have the disk, it can obtain the disk by 

requesting that your vendor authorize the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) that performed 

the certification tests on the system to send the 
16  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

disk to the State office or directly to you. If 

you are unsure about how to install the disk, 

contact your State election office for instructions 

and help.

 The self-loading CD installs the election management system on the central election computer. If 

the firmware in the voting stations or ballot scanners needs to be reinstalled, ask your vendor what 

you need from your State election office or the ITA. 

The device will probably be a PCMCIA (Personal 

Computer Memory Card International Association)

card or a similar device. 

Although it is important for the voting software 

to be complete and correct, it is equally important 

that the voting system software is the only software 

on the vote-tabulating computer. 

 Do not allow any software on the vote-tabulating 

computer except for the voting system software 

itself. Specifically, do not allow office automation 

software such as Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, 

Excel, and so forth, or networking software such 

as e-mail, network browsers, and so forth.

Periodic Monitoring. After the voting system is correctly installed, processes and procedures need to 

be implemented to keep the software secure.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) offers a secure software repository, the 

National Secure Reference Library (NSRL). This service 

enables election personnel to check periodically that the 

installed software has not been altered. 

NIST obtains a copy of each voting system from 

the EAC VSTL and computes a digital signature of 

the system. NSRL can create the same digital signature for your system and compare it to the signature 

in the NIST library. This comparison will reveal any 

alteration to the system. 

 The Web site for this service is www.nsrl.nist.gov/

votedata.html. On this Web site is a list of voting 

systems that have been submitted to NIST for 

inclusion in the NSRL. If the version of the voting 

system you are running is not on this list, request 

that your vendor submit the system or system version to NSRL. 

 Even if your voting system is on this list, it is unlikely 

that you will be able to complete the comparison 

without help. The EAC office can provide you with a 

contact at NIST that can assist you.

Founded in 1901, NIST is a nonregulatory Federal 

agency within the U.S. Commerce Department’s 

Technology Administration. NIST’s mission is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness 

by advancing measurement science, standards, and 

technology in ways that enhance economic security 

and improve quality of life. For more information 

about NIST, visit their Web site at www.nist.gov or call 

them at 301.975.NIST (6478). 

Networking. The possibility of fraudulently altering 

voting system software is based on the assumption 

that hackers have access to the system. This type of 

voting system attack can be avoided by never connecting the voting system to any network not under 

your complete control. This includes the Internet 

and any local network unless the network is wholly 

contained within your facility and is controlled by 

a trusted organization. 

 Never connect a voting system component to any 

network not under your direct control. All unused 

connections on the permanent systems should be 

sealed, precluding unapproved network, modem, 

USB, parallel, or other port connectivity.

Modem Transmission of Unofficial Results. The caution about not permitting network access does not 

apply to the use of modems on election night to transmit unofficial polling place results to the central office. 

The technical expertise required to intercept and 

alter a telephone communication without detection 

is extremely complex. Therefore, it is unlikely that 

anyone will be able to intercept and alter these results 

without detection. Even if the unofficial results are 

intercepted, it would make no difference in the final, 

official results since these should never be sent via 

modem. The official results should always be computed 

from the media that is physically transported from the 

polling place to the central office.

 If modems are used to transmit polling place results 

to the central office, consider these results to be 

unofficial, and always verify them against the results 

on the media that is physically transported to the 

central office.

Audit Data. A voting system has several different 

audit logs. These logs contain a record of each 

event that occurs on the system from the time 

used to initially begin an election until the final 
Election Management Guidelines  17

vote tally is completed. Audit logs on precinctbased voting equipment begin at the time the election media is inserted into the device until the 

election is closed. 

 Review the audit log documentation or obtain from 

your vendor a complete description of the audit 

logs that are available on the voting system. Familiarize yourself with the content of these logs and 

learn to print them out.

 As part of pre- and post-election activities routine, 

print and examine these audit logs. 

Policies and Procedures

A well-defined procedure for monitoring each person 

with access to the voting system should exist.

Examples of criteria to apply to voters who have 

access to the voting system are as follows: 

 A clear definition exists of who exactly qualifies 

as a voter.

 A system exists for maintaining a record of each 

voter (i.e., the registration system). 

 A record is maintained of each time the voter uses 

the voting system. 

 The voter can use the voting system only at a specified, well-defined time (i.e., in-person absentee 

voting, in-precinct voting, early voting, etc.). 

 The voter must follow a well-defined and rigorously 

enforced procedure before he or she can use the 

voting system.

 The voter’s use of the voting system is restricted to 

only one function on the voting system: casting 

a ballot. 

Equally specific procedures should be developed 

for each person that has access to the voting system. 

This includes elections office staff, vendor personnel, 

and visitors. 

 Require positive identification of each person that 

requests access to the voting system.

 Keep a log of everyone that accesses the voting 

system. This should include the person’s name, 

the date and time the access begins, the purpose 

of the access, and the time the access ends. 

 Access log entries should be written by someone 

other than the person accessing the system. The 

entries in this log must be complete and detailed. 

For example, “System Maintenance” is not an 

acceptable entry. The entry should state the exact 

maintenance performed and the reasons why it 

was performed.

Elections Office Staff. Elections office staff should 

only be allowed the level of access to the voting 

system that is necessary for them to perform specific 

tasks related to their job description. Do not issue a 

staff member a password that will allow him or her to 

perform functions on the voting system that he or she 

is not authorized to perform. It is highly recommended 

that whenever possible, elections staff work in pairs. 

This procedure will greatly reduce the potential for 

accidental errors and virtually eliminate any opportunity for deliberate mischief or fraud. 

Vendor Personnel. There is no such thing as “routine 

system maintenance.” The vendor can void the voting 

system’s Certification by making a change to the 

system that has not been approved by the State or 

the EAC. 

 Never allow vendor personnel access to your 

system until you are absolutely certain that any 

change, upgrade, or maintenance they intend to 

perform has been approved by the State or the 

EAC. All approved modifications or upgrades to an 

EAC certified voting system are documented with 

a certificate. If the vendor cannot produce a copy 

of this certificate do not allow him or her to access 

the voting system. When in doubt, call the EAC 

for clarification.

 Never allow vendor personnel to access the voting 

system unless a member of the election staff is 

present. Although it is recommended that election 

office staff work in pairs, it is essential that the 

vendor never be allowed access to the voting system 

without a member of the election office staff present. Emphasize to the vendor that this requirement 

is as much for their protection as it is for yours. 

Everyone else. There is absolutely no reason—Never, 

Under Any Circumstances—to ever allow anyone other 

than election office staff or vendor personnel access 

to the voting system. A consultant working under 

contract to the election office is considered election 

office staff; however, consultants should be monitored as closely as vendor personnel.
18  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Password Maintenance

Effective use of passwords is essential to the overall 

security of a voting system. The first step in managing 

passwords is to know exactly what password capability is available on the voting system. The EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Section 7.2.1 General 

Access Control Policies states, “...the vendor shall provide a description of recommended policies for effective 

password management.” Obtain this description from 

the vendor and provide a copy to every employee 

authorized to access the voting system.

The following sections provide guidelines for 

effective password management.

Password Administrator. Designate someone in the 

election office as the password administrator, either 

the Chief Election Officer or a senior member of 

the staff. The password administrator’s duties are 

as follows:

 Issue passwords.

 Maintain a master list of all passwords issued.

 Reissue all passwords periodically.

 Monitor password usage.

Issuing Passwords. Passwords issued to employees 

should only allow them access to the portion of 

the system required to do their job. The password 

administrator or the individual employee can make 

up these passwords. Passwords should have the following characteristics:

 Passwords should be at least six characters long, 

preferably eight.

 At least one character should be an uppercase letter.

 At least one character should be a lower case letter.

 At least one character should be numeral.

 At least one character should be a special symbol.

Remember that passwords are case sensitive. 

For example, ABC*123# and Abc*123# are different 

passwords.

Passwords should be easily remembered (so there 

will be no need to write them down) yet sufficiently 

vague that they cannot be easily guessed. It is best to 

avoid the use of personal information (name, date of 

birth, anniversaries, pet’s names, etc.) and the use of 

real words (certain technology enables individuals 

trying to predict passwords the capability of trying 

every word in the dictionary). It is best to use a mix 

of different character types (uppercase, lower case, 

numbers, and symbols).

Never issue a system password to anyone other 

than an election office employee, not even vendor 

representatives. If someone other than an election 

official needs to access the system, either have an 

election official log in for him or her or create a 

dummy password and then delete it as soon as the session is over. (Remember, someone from the elections 

office staff should monitor all vendor and consultant 

access to the system and log this activity, including 

date, time, names, and reason for access.)

Maintaining a Master List of Passwords Issued. It 

is OK to allow individual employees to make up their 

own passwords; however, they must submit their 

passwords to the password administrator for inclusion 

in the master list. The password administrator should 

verify that the passwords comply with the requirements above. The password administrator should 

compose a master list of all passwords issued. A printed 

copy of this list must be kept in a safe and secure place 

and should only be used in the event of an office emergency. Even in the event of an emergency, use of the 

list should be restricted to the Chief Election Official 

and the password administrator.

“Safe” and “secure” do not mean the same thing. 

A fireproof filing cabinet may be safe, but it is not 

secure unless it is locked and access to the key is 

restricted to the Chief Election Official and the password administrator. Similarly, an encrypted file as 

a backup on a disk drive may be secure, but it is not 

safe. Disk drives can fail.

Reissuing Passwords on a Periodic Basis. Password 

protection is good but not infallible. All passwords 

should be changed on a periodic basis. A recommended 

period is one election cycle or at least once a year.

Monitoring Password Usage. Election employees’ 

password usage should be monitored. Devise monitoring activities that are appropriate for your office, but 

consider things such as the following:

Watch for passwords on post-it notes posted on 

the side of monitors or in desk drawers. To avoid 

this, choose passwords that are easy to remember. 

Remind staff that if they do forget their password 

they can get it from the password administrator.

 Review audit logs to verify that employees are 

working only within their assigned responsibilities.
Election Management Guidelines  19

Most systems allow employees to change their 

password at any time. Require that employees obtain 

prior permission from the password administrator 

before changing their password. Perform random 

checks to verify that passwords are changed with the 

password administrator’s approval. One verification 

option is for the password administrator to attempt 

to log in with each employee’s password in the master 

list. If the password has been changed, the password 

in the master list will be invalid.

Election Management Guidelines  21

C h apte r 3

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Introduction

In elections, physical security refers to standards, procedures, and actions taken to protect voting systems 

and related facilities and equipment from natural and 

environmental hazards, tampering, vandalism, and 

theft. Physical security safeguards are required for 

voting systems in storage, in transit, in the polling 

place, and in use on Election Day through the postelection certified canvass.

Documentation of the election process, from election setup proofing documents to logic and accuracy 

testing, is the foundation for security in elections. 

This documentation, required by full-time staff during 

the pre-election stages and by poll workers on Election 

Day, provides the audit trail for the election and establishes proof that all components of managing the election were secure at all times. This documentation may 

also serve as the official court record in the event of a 

recount or contested election. 

This section documents plans, policies, and 

procedures to manage the various election administration processes and voting system security vulnerabilities. State and county election commissions and 

municipalities should review these plans, policies, 

and procedures and consider incorporating them into 

their local processes. 

Conducting a Security Review

One of the most important proactive steps election officials can take is to conduct an election security review. 

By walking through procedures, performing physical 

inspections, and considering all aspects of security, 

including local information systems security practices, 

possible threats and vulnerabilities can be identified. 

An election security review identifies key areas where 

election officials should take steps to ensure the security and integrity of election administration. 

The following activities should be part of an 

election security review: 

 Review overall policies to ensure proper separation 

of job duties throughout the election administration process.

 Perform an election administration risk assessment. 

Identify potential opportunities in the election 

administration process where election security 

and integrity is vulnerable to destruction, disruption, tampering, or corruption from internal or 

external sources. Examples include building fire, 

power failure, after-hours theft, malfunctioning 

sprinkler system, misprinted ballots, paper ballots 

counted twice, bomb scares or terrorist acts, failure 

of election boards to report for duty, disruptions by 

voters or poll agents, and so forth. List the potential security exposure and the impact on the election 

from each threat. Consider whether the likelihood 

of each threat is high, medium, or low, and develop 

plans to mitigate or eliminate each threat starting 

with those considered high. 

 Review the audit trail from the last election in its 

entirety. Analyze whether sufficient documentation exists to validate the integrity of the election. 

 Conduct a debriefing to identify lessons learned 

about issues and problems encountered in previous 

elections. This activity should become a regular 

part of closing out each and every election. 

 Inventory the list of procedures used throughout 

the election administration process. Evaluate each 

procedure to determine whether it needs to be 

updated based on the security review. 

 Evaluate the security of the computer systems used 

in election administration by conducting an information systems security assessment. 

 Perform a physical security review to assess access 

and controls of all office and storage facilities used 
22  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

in the election administration process. Consider 

the relative security of other agencies sharing the 

facilities. Evaluate disaster recovery, terrorism, and 

weather-related considerations, and develop a plan 

to mitigate such risks. Also consider involving local 

or State law enforcement agencies.

At no point in the security review allow a person 

to validate their own security procedures and functions. 

Use the two-person accountability principle and have 

the procedures reviewed by someone other than the 

person who does the work. This objectivity will enhance 

faith in the integrity and honesty of the review.

Engage County and Municipal IT Staff. Elections 

are, at their core, an information system comprised 

of processes, people, technology, and data. Engage 

county and municipal IT staff or local community 

college or technical school staff to assist in the security 

review and to help establish and implement applicable election management system security measures. 

They should be familiar with many of the vulnerabilities and risk management steps related to information 

systems and can be of valuable assistance. Include 

county or municipal IT staff or local community college or technical school staff early on in the process 

and on a continuing basis. 

Review Equipment Storage, Logistics, and 

Maintenance. The election administration security 

risks associated with voting systems equipment go 

beyond the obvious concerns of theft and destruction. 

Everything from building security, access control, 

and configuration management of the voting system 

equipment is an important component in the overall 

election security. 

 Perform a physical security review to assess access 

and controls of the facility in which the voting 

systems equipment is stored and maintained. 

Maintain a key control list of all personnel with 

keys and access to the facilities. Maintain an access 

log including sign in and sign out dates and times 

of all personnel, including visitors. 

 Implement two-person integrity security measures 

when setting up the voting system equipment for 

an election. Never allow a voting system vendor or 

employee to have uncontrolled access of county election equipment storage and maintenance facilities. 

 Take into consideration long-term storage and security needs when designing storage and workspace.

 Implement an effective asset management and 

inventory control system for all components of the 

voting system. Consider testing procedures and 

sign off on all equipment returned from the vendor 

after maintenance to ensure proper versions of the 

equipment hardware, software, and firmware. 

 Nongovernment officials should never be allowed to 

have unattended or unmonitored access to stored 

voting equipment. Government election officials 

should be responsible for maintaining the access log 

and supervising the activity.

Steps to take when conducting an election 

security review:

 Create or update the master election audit trail 

checklist to ensure it identifies all required audit 

trail documents for an election. 

 Review all election audit trail checklists to ensure 

they incorporate two-person integrity security measures such as dual sign-off. 

 Review election commission work areas to ensure 

office space is appropriately isolated and undetected access by unauthorized individuals is not 

possible. 

 Review voting equipment storage and work areas to 

ensure only authorized personnel have access. 

 Review the list of personnel who have keys to election office work areas and voting equipment storage to ensure all keys are accounted for and only 

authorized personnel have keys. Eliminate the 

distribution of master keys or key cards. Instead, 

issue access keys or key cards to personnel based 

on job duties and responsibilities, ensuring that 

individual staff members do not have the ability 

to enter the office and access the voting system 

undetected. 

 Review chain-of-custody procedures, the use of 

tamper-evident seals, and inventory control/asset 

management processes to ensure voting units and 

associated equipment are properly and securely 

controlled and are accounted for throughout the 

election administration process. 

Steps to follow for reviewing equipment storage, 

logistics, maintenance, and security procedures:

 Ensure physical, tamper-evident seals are employed 

throughout the election administration process. 
Election Management Guidelines  2 3

 Review storage and maintenance facility property 

insurance to ensure coverage is appropriate and 

adequate. 

 Review inventory control/asset management 

processes. 

 Create or update appropriate procedures to ensure 

absentee and emergency ballot blank paper stock 

are controlled at all times. 

 Review other facilities shared with voting equipment storage, logistics, and maintenance for 

potential security vulnerabilities. 

 Develop physical security procedures and safeguards 

to document the controlled physical access to voting 

systems and the facility or facilities where they 

are housed.

 Document all security related repairs and modifications to the physical components of the facility 

where voting systems are stored (i.e., walls, doors, 

locks, cameras, alarm systems, etc.).

Security—Personnel

Another important factor in determining the vulnerability of a system is the people involved; it is they 

who must implement security policies and procedures 

and defend against any attacks. 

 Qualification guidelines should be established for 

choosing the person(s) for operating and administrating (creating databases, defining ballots, testing, 

and maintaining equipment) the voting system.

 Perform background checks on election officials 

authorized to define and configure elections and 

maintain voting devices to minimize the risk of 

election tampering. 

 Custodians of voting machines must be fully competent, thoroughly trained, and sworn to perform 

their duties honestly and faithfully. 

 Develop a detailed “Rules of Security Behavior” 

sign-off sheet for all levels of personnel responsible 

for using the voting system (election director, chief 

judges, poll workers, rovers, field technicians, etc.) 

and maintain a copy of the signed forms on file.

 Establish policies and procedures for visitors and 

observers. At minimum, these procedures should 

include employee-monitored entrances and exits 

with a sign-in/sign-out log and issuance of a numbered visitor badge to be worn at all times. 

To effectively manage a polling location on Election Day, establish the number of personnel needed 

and their duties.

 Maintain separation of duties for poll managers to 

provide “checks and balances” during the election 

process. 

 Incorporate two-person integrity security measures 

to polling place procedures.

 Provide adequate security of election equipment 

at the polling place at all times. 

Security—Paper Ballots

Protecting the security of paper ballots is also a 

component of providing physical security. Election 

administrators should have a documented plan in 

place to provide for the management of optical scan 

or paper ballots, ballot-on-demand ballots, and all 

ballot stock. This plan should include details pertaining 

to the audit trail and chain of custody for the ballots 

with strict control over the ballots and ballot stock 

at all time.

 The security of paper ballots includes security in 

the election office facility and at the polling place 

on Election Day. At least two election officials 

should oversee all processes, including the transfer 

of ballots and other election materials from the 

polling place to the central office.

 Two or more staff members should receive the 

ballot order and verify the accuracy and quantity 

of ballots against the ballot order request. Once 

validated, the ballots should be stored in a secure 

building with restricted access in a secure area.

 Ballot-on-demand is often used to supplement 

printed ballot stock. If used, election officials 

should implement internal controls to safeguard 

ballot stock from fraudulent or inappropriate use. 

For example:

• Two or more election officials should monitor, 

record, and balance daily ballot-on-demand 

activity.

• Election officials should reconcile the number of

blank ballots received from the vendor, the 

number printed or spoiled, and the number 

of unused ballots.
24  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Security—Voting Equipment and 

Peripheral Devices

Voting Equipment Storage (Warehousing/Staging 

Facility) and Inventory Control

Physical security of all voting system equipment and 

peripheral devices must be maintained at all times. 

The security measures should include the following: 

 Maintain complete and accurate inventory of all 

voting system equipment. This includes voting 

devices, optical scanners, communication equipment, supervisor or administrator devices, ballot 

activation devices, and storage media.

 Assign personnel the responsibility of maintaining 

accurate inventory. 

 Provide physical access control to the storage facility 

only to authorized personnel. Following is a list of 

recommendations:

• Make sure all personnel have signed security 

agreements on file. 

• Each staff member should be issued a unique 

code for entry and exit tracking. Staff members 

should wear identification badges at all times. 

• All visitors, vendors, and maintenance personnel should be authenticated through the use of 

appointments and identification checks in order 

to gain access to the voting system equipment.

 If video cameras are used, schedule regular checks 

to verify they are fully operational. 

 Change keys or combinations on locks as necessary 

for each election. 

It is recommended that the following information 

regarding the voting system equipment be tracked: 

 Equipment—Maintain a list of equipment, serial 

numbers, and quantity in the storage facility. 

 Machine Checkout—Maintain a list of voting system 

equipment that has been released from the storage 

facility.

 Usage History—Maintain a history of elections 

for which each voting device has been used. 

 Repair History—Maintain a history of repairs to 

individual voting devices. 

Inventory control should consist of tracking the 

voting system equipment when it is being—

 Released and returned for any official election. 

 Released and returned for any demonstration 

of an election. 

 Accepted from or returned to the vendor (including 

warranty and maintenance repairs).

A barcoding system should be explored as a 

method for tracking the location of voting system 

equipment. All electronic media, regardless of type 

(memory packs, compact flash cards, PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card International Association) cards, voter card encoders, supervisor cards, and 

key cards) should be permanently identified with a 

unique serial number. The serial numbers should be 

recorded as part of the internal inventory audit trail.

A “Voting Equipment Delivery Sheet” should be 

used to record and track equipment delivery information, description of equipment (including serial 

numbers), and signatures of equipment handlers 

or recipients. 

Voting Equipment Storage (Warehousing/Staging 

Facility)—Access Control 

 Voting devices must be kept in a locked (secured) 

facility. 

 Access to the storage facility should be restricted 

to only authorized personnel. Access should be 

restricted through the use of badges, door entry 

access devices, and monitoring systems. The best 

method of access control is one that uniquely 

identifies the person, authorizes entry, and logs 

the date and time of access. 

 The storage facility should be equipped with monitored security and fire alarm protection. 

 For additional security, the facility could be monitored by video cameras. 

Consider the following questions:

What procedures are in place to assure the physical security of voting machines and paper ballots 

before an election?

 How and where are equipment, ballots, and ballot 

stock stored? How is the facility secured against 

theft, tampering, and vandalism?

What protections are in place to assure access is permitted only for authorized personnel?

Who installs equipment upgrades, a county official 

or a vendor?
Election Management Guidelines  25

 Do vendors ever handle any voting equipment?

 If vendors are allowed to handle voting equipment 

pre-election, are county officials required to be 

present?

 Has the physical security of the voting equipment, 

ballots, and other election material been protected 

against terrorism and other “Homeland Security” 

issues?

Security—Election Process

Securing the Voting Devices During Preparation 

and Transport to Precinct 

 The voting devices should be secured with tamperproof numbered seals. Access to the voting devices’ 

power control and election results storage media 

should be secured (controlled) within the voting 

device. The serial number of all seals should be 

recorded for verification during precinct setup. 

 It is recommended that for each voting device, 

records are kept of the following: 

• The serial number of the voting device. 

• The serial number of all seals used to secure the 

voting device for delivery. 

• The number registered on the protective counter.

• The serial number of the seal used to secure the 

voting device after the polls have closed. 

 Develop an operational plan defining what will be 

delivered, where, by whom, and when. Use delivery 

sheets to keep track of the exact polling place each 

voting device is delivered to. 

 It is strongly recommended that the auxiliary voting 

equipment and supplies (ballot activation devices, 

administrator devices, communication equipment, 

seals for poll closing, etc.) remain in the possession 

of election officials until the opening of the polls on 

Election Day. If the voting devices are delivered to 

the polling location before Election Day, they must 

be secured at the polling location (e.g., cabled 

together and locked or secured in a locked room). 

Any other voting equipment or supplies should also 

be secured. Designated poll manager(s) should verify 

receipt and sign-off on the delivery of voting devices 

and necessary election supplies (ballot activation 

devices, administrator devices, communication 

equipment, closing seals, etc). 

 Voting systems should be moved in a controlled 

transportation mode. In other words, they are 

locked and sealed in any vehicle or container at 

the beginning of the transportation and unsealed 

at the delivery point. Sealing and unsealing 

should be logged and completed only by election 

officials.

Consider the following questions:

 Are voting equipment and ballots transported to 

polling places by county officials or poll workers?

 How and when are voting equipment and ballots 

transported to the polling places?

 If poll workers transport voting equipment and ballots, when do they receive the equipment and ballots? If poll workers receive the voting equipment 

and ballots significantly in advance of the election, 

how and where are the materials stored until the 

election?

 Are detailed logs kept of who takes custody of 

equipment and ballots and those person(s) contact 

information?

 How are voting equipment and ballots secured 

from tampering from the time they leave election 

office custody to the time they are delivered to the 

polling places?

 Are serial numbers or other secure, tamper-proof 

devices or seals placed on all ports where memory 

cards are inserted? 

Securing the Voting Devices During Walk-In 

Absentee/Early Voting 

Walk-in absentee voting devices should be prepared, 

tested, delivered, and set-up in the same manner as 

voting devices used on Election Day. 

 The same walk-in absentee voting storage media 

should be placed in the same voting device every 

morning and removed every night. 

 The voting storage media should be secured each 

night in a tamper-proof location, preferably within 

the election office.

 Voting devices should be closed, sealed, and secured 

at the end of each day. The number on all protective 

seals and public counters should be recorded. In addition, seals and counters should be verified before the 

voting devices are used for voting the next morning. 
26  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Securing the Voting Devices During Mobile 

Absentee/Early Voting

 Mobile absentee voting devices should be prepared, 

tested, delivered, and set up in the same manner 

as voting devices used on Election Day.

 Voting devices should be closed, sealed, and 

secured at the end of each day. The number on 

all protective seals and public counters should be 

recorded. In addition, seals and counters should 

be verified before the voting devices are used for 

voting the next morning.

 The mobile unit containing all voting devices 

should be returned to the Election Office every 

evening and stored within a secured facility.

Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—

Precinct Setup 

 If voting devices and election supplies are delivered 

to the polling place by anyone other than poll managers, the poll manager(s) should verify the serial 

numbers of all voting devices and necessary election 

supplies (ballot activation devices, administrator 

devices, communication equipment, closing seals, etc.).

 Designated poll managers should verify voting 

device numbers and the numbers of all seals and 

tamper-resistant tape on all voting devices and 

inspect the voting devices for evidence of tampering. This should be a two-person integrity security 

process and all poll managers should sign-off on 

this validation. 

 Voting devices setup should be as follows: 

• Access to the voting devices’ power control, 

counter controls, and election results storage 

media must be controlled within the voting 

device and inaccessible to the voter. 

• Voting devices exterior should be in plain view 

of the poll managers at all times. 

 Poll managers should maintain control of all 

administrator and ballot activation devices. 

Consider the following questions:

 How are poll workers trained to be alert for signs of 

pre-election tampering?

 How are poll workers trained to respond if tampering is suspected or discovered?

Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—

Opening the Polls 

 Poll managers should activate each voting device, 

including the following: 

• Verify date and time and precinct on the voting 

devices. 

• Verify the protective seals and public counters 

on the voting devices. 

• Verify that the electronic paper audit trail 

is functioning.

 Poll managers should secure administrator devices 

and communication equipment during the day. 

 The poll manager and all poll workers should signoff on a checklist to verify all opening procedures 

were followed. 

Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—Voting 

 The area around the voting devices must be secure 

at all times. Only poll managers, legally authorized 

personnel, and registered voters should be allowed 

in the voting device area. A voter should not be 

allowed to enter this area until a voting device is 

available for his or her use. 

 Each poll worker should have a clearly defined role so 

voters are able to clearly identify them and their 

particular responsibilities as they move through 

the polling place. 

 Provisional voters should be directed to a separate 

check-in table or area. This assures that provisional 

ballots are handled uniformly and also establishes 

ballot accountability for auditing purposes.

 The poll manager must maintain control of the 

ballot style identification device (card, slip, tag, 

label, ticket) and the ballot activation device.

 Poll managers should periodically inspect the voting 

devices for any damage or tampering and to ensure 

the device is powered by electricity. 

 Poll managers should perform periodic verification 

of the number of voters processed to the number 

of votes recorded (public counter) on the voting 

devices and balance that number to the total 

number of signatures in the poll book. 

Consider the following questions:

 Are poll workers trained to ensure that voter lines 

form at the registration table and not at the voting 
Election Management Guidelines  27

devices, especially during periods of heavy volume?

 Are poll workers trained to issue a voting activation 

card to a voter only when a voting station is available for use?

 Are “troubleshooters” available to visit and roam 

polling places on Election Day to provide support 

to poll workers?

Securing the Voting Devices on Election Day—

Poll Closing 

 Poll managers should validate that the number 

of ballot activation devices and voter activation 

cards issued to the polling place are collected and 

secured in a transport case for return to the local 

election office. 

 The voting devices should be secured using the 

numbered “closing” seal. The signed affidavit 

should be returned by a poll manager to the local 

election office with the number of the closing 

seal, number voting devices, number of the public 

and protective counter, and the voting precinct 

recorded on the envelope. 

Securing the Voting Devices During Tallying 

 At the end of the day, print out end-of-day vote 

totals from each individual voting device and deliver 

the printed tapes to the local election office in a 

secure manner. 

 The election result storage media from all voting 

devices within the polling location should be 

accounted for and reconciled. 

 The election result storage media and printed tape(s) 

should be secured in a numbered, sealed pouch 

and transported from the polling place to the local 

election office or designated collection point. 

 If transmitting unofficial election results by modem, 

(1) print end-of-day vote totals from each device, 

(2) limit access control to the telecommunication 

devices, (3) enable modem access only when uploads 

are expected, and (4) apply sufficient encryption 

and verification of data to protect the transmission 

of vote tallies. 

 Establish procedures to securely transport election 

results from optical scanners to vote tabulation 

computers if the optical scanners are located in a 

different location from where the vote tabulation 

takes place.

Security the Voting Devices During Tabulation at the 

Election Office

 Election officials should perform a verification of 

results transmitted by modem to the county election 

office through a separate count of the election result 

storage media containing the original votes cast. 

 The offices where the vote tabulation is being conducted must be secure. Do not allow unauthorized 

and unescorted personnel to be in contact with 

the tabulation equipment. Only authorized election 

officials should be allowed in the tabulation equipment room.

 Consider the use of video monitoring to secure the 

vote tabulation area.

 Consider uniformed security or police officers to 

secure the ballot room and voting equipment. 

Consider the following questions:

 Are all paper ballots and electronic election media 

in the possession of at least two election officials 

or poll workers (using the two-person accountability principle) during its transport to the central or 

remote count locations?

 Is the election tabulation process secure by protecting the premises where the vote tabulation is 

being conducted? Are unauthorized and unescorted 

personnel allowed to be in contact with the tabulation equipment?

What physical security measures have been implemented for the room containing the computer 

running the tabulation software?

 Are printed result tapes and a backup copy of the 

tabulations in locked storage in a secure location?

 Is there a complete chain of custody with twoperson integrity security measures for all election 

materials?

Securing the Voting Devices During Transport 

to Storage 

 Only designated personnel should transport voting 

devices to the local storage facility. Custodians of the 

voting devices should verify receipt of all devices, 

confirm that the devices have not been tampered 

with during transport, and sign-off on the receipt 

of the voting devices. 
28  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

 Only designated personnel should transport election supplies (administrator devices, ballot activation devices, communication equipment, etc.) to 

the local election office. A local election official 

should verify receipt and sign-off on the delivery 

of the election supplies. 

Securing the Voting Devices During Storage 

and Post-Election 

 Local election officials should maintain an inventory of election materials. These materials should 

be securely stored until the period of election protest and appeals has ended. 

Election materials include the following: 

• Voting devices (including memory cards where 

applicable).

• Administrator and ballot activation devices. 

• Seal envelopes. 

• Voter registration (poll) lists. 

• Election result tapes and printouts. 

• Field supervisor and rover reports.

• Poll worker daily logs.

• Reconciliation reports.

• Audit data (includes retention of the completed 

master election audit trail checklist mentioned 

on page 16.

• Voting Equipment Delivery Sheets (mentioned 

on page 29). 

 Two copies of the inventory list should exist; one 

list should remain stored with the election materials and one list should be kept at the local election 

office. The local election official should verify and 

sign the inventory list.
Election Management Guidelines  29

C h apte r 4

ACCEPTANCE TESTING

Introduction 

Acceptance testing of voting systems is perhaps the 

most important function that local election jurisdictions undertake in order to ensure the security and 

accuracy of their elections. Acceptance tests must be 

conducted under the strict control of the chief election official of the jurisdiction. Under no circumstance should acceptance tests be conducted by 

a manufacturer.

An acceptance test is defined as a test that is performed on an individual unit of a voting system in 

order to verify that the unit is physically, electronically, mechanically, and functionally correct. Correct, in this sense, means that the unit is identical in 

every respect, including software/firmware to the unit 

that was originally purchased.

Acceptance testing provides assurance that the 

voting system is functioning correctly, that the 

voting system complies with the conditions of the 

product acquisition document, and that the voting 

system is correctly configured for use in an election. 

If initial acceptance testing is successful, the test 

documentation becomes the first item in the chain 

of custody for the elements that comprise the voting 

system. Later, if a component of the voting system 

leaves the election officials direct control for any 

reason (i.e. repair, upgrade, etc.) a repeat of the initial 

acceptance test serves to re-establish your chain of 

custody for the component. 

It is extremely important that election officials 

maintain a complete record of every acceptance test 

conducted on your voting system. These records should 

contain the device identification including software/

firmware version, the date of the test, the name of 

the tester(s), and the outcome of the test. If the device 

passes the test no further information is necessary. If 

the device fails the acceptance test, the test documentation should contain a detailed description of the reason 

for the failure. If the failed device is returned to the 

manufacturer for repair, it is recommended that a copy 

of the test documentation be returned with the device.

Keeping all documentation on your election system 

in a single, easily accessible place can aid your management decisions. Ideally, you should build a database 

that can track the components of your system throughout their life. In it you would store the results from 

every acceptance test conducted, all election-related 

performance data, all chain-of-custody data, etc. This 

database becomes a single place to track each component of the voting system by serial number.

Request for Proposal and Contract 

Considerations

Planning for acceptance testing begins with the 

development of the Request for Proposal (RFP). The 

RFP should require that the vendor’s bid proposals 

contain a recommended acceptance test script for 

each device contained in the proposal and an acceptance script for the overall voting system. 

The RFP should specify that the proposed scripts 

must apply equally to all devices of a given type. 

For example, if the script is for a DRE voting station 

it must apply uniformly to all DRE voting stations. 

Do not accept a script that calls for a rigorous test of 

some subset of the DREs and only a cursory inspection of the rest. 

important reminder

A certified voting system consists of a specific set of 

hardware/software/firmware, the specific version of the 

operating system, and the specific versions of any support 

software In order to conduct acceptance tests you must 

know the version levels of each of these components.
30  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

The manufacturer’s proposed acceptance test 

scripts will generally not be entirely satisfactory, but 

they will provide election officials with a solid basis 

for developing their own scripts. 

Contracts for voting systems usually include a 

progressive payment schedule that calls for the total 

value of the contract to be paid in a series of payments 

based on measurable deliverables, such as hardware 

delivery, software installation and testing, etc. One of 

these payments should be based on completion of successful acceptance testing of all devices that make up 

the voting system and a successful acceptance test of 

the overall system.

recommendation The final payment should be based 

on the successful completion of the first election held using 

the voting system.

Acceptance Tests

There are three distinct parts to an acceptance test: 

a test for physical integrity, a diagnostic test of the 

various hardware features, and a test for functional 

characteristics. This last test includes a test of the various 

software/hardware modules that control the unit. 

Acceptance tests must be conducted on every

unit of your voting system every time a unit leaves 

your control and is returned. For example, if you 

loan a voting station to a civic club for a demonstration 

or send a unit of the voting system out for repair. Note 

that this does not include functions under the control of staff of the elections office. If you have a large 

number of devices this may be a tedious and time 

consuming task. Fortunately, as with most tedious and 

time consuming tasks, acceptance testing usually proceeds more quickly as the testers gain experience 

with the voting system. In some instances, an experienced tester can perform an acceptance test on 

a touch screen voting station or a ballot scanner in 

less than fifteen minutes.

In the course of an acceptance test, the tester may 

experience problems that can be easily corrected by the 

tester such as an incorrect time or date or a poorly 

calibrated touch screen. This is not a cause for terminating the test. In these cases, the tester should correct the problem and continue the test. However, the 

problem should be noted in the unit documentation.

Physical Analysis: This portion of the acceptance 

test is performed to assure that the voting unit is not 

physically damaged and that all physical components 

are working properly. The specific tests will vary based 

on the particular voting system; however, some typical 

items will include:

 Examine the outer shell or case for any sign of 

damage such as dents or cracks.

 Check that the top and bottom of the shell mate 

easily, that all doors open and shut easily, etc.

 Inspect all latches and hinges. Latches should open 

and shut without binding.

 Hinges should operate smoothly and be inspected 

to insure that hinge pins are not easily removed.

 All locks should open and close without binding.

 Inspect all electrical wires and connectors for 

damage or signs of wear.

Diagnostic Analysis: This portion of the acceptance 

test is performed to assure that all of the mechanical 

and electronic components of the voting unit are 

operating correctly. Again, the specific tests will vary 

based on the particular voting system; however, some 

typical items will include:

 Test all input/output devices. This will include any 

voter card readers, printers, PC card slots, etc. 

 Test the connections that support any accessibility 

devices. If accessibility devices use a serial port, use 

a loop-back connector to test this port.

 On ballot scanners verify that the ballot feed path 

is properly set and that ballots will feed without 

binding.

 On touch screen devices verify that the screen is 

calibrated correctly.

 If there are controls that the voter can use to 

change brightness or intensity, verify that these 

controls are working properly.

 If the device is a commercial computer, verify that 

the floppy disk drives, CD/DVD drives, PC Slots, 

etc. are working properly.

 If the devices record date and time, verify that the 

date and time are correct.

Functional Analysis: This test is performed to assure 

that the correct Federal and State certified version(s) 

of the software/firmware are installed in the voting 

unit and that the system will perform correctly 
Election Management Guidelines  31

during an election. This test consists of loading a 

mock election onto the unit, casting a known pattern of votes, closing the election, printing the reports, 

and then comparing the test results with the known 

vote pattern.

The following sections provide a generic outline for 

developing an acceptance test for the most common 

devices found in an electronic voting system. In each 

of the tests described below, you will need to setup a 

mock election. This mock election does not need to 

be long; however, it should exercise the features of the 

voting unit being tested. If your jurisdiction allows 

straight party voting, straight party voting with 

cross-over, multiple representative districts (i.e. vote 

for n of m), etc. then these types of contests should be 

included in your mock election.

Acceptance Tests for Optical Scan 

Ballot Scanners

This section describes an acceptance test for a standalone ballot scanner. The scanner should be set up for 

this test the way it will be set up for use in a precinct.

Materials Required: In addition to the following, you 

must know the version of the operating system and/or 

firmware that was certified for your ballot scanner.

 A memory card or other device that is used to 

configure the ballot scanner for an election. This 

device must contain the election setup for the mock 

election that you will be using to test the scanner.

 The password, manager card, or other device that 

is used to gain manager/administrator privilege on 

the scanner.

 A test deck of pre-marked optical scan ballots for 

the mock election. This test deck typically contains 

one ballot with a vote for the first candidate in each 

race, two ballots with votes for the second candidate, three ballots with votes for the third candidate, 

etc. For ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions, vote ‘yes’ on the first 

ballot and ‘no’ on the next two ballots. Do not vote 

this question on subsequent ballots. Although 

most ballot printers can supply you with this test 

deck; it is recommended that these ballots be hand 

prepared using the marking device noted by the 

system manufacturer.

Physical Analysis: This analysis is conducted with 

the scanner turned off.

1. Examine the case and/or cover for cracks or dents.

2. Inspect latches, hinges, carrying case, wheels, etc.

3. Examine the legs and/or stand. The legs and/or 

stand must operate smoothly without binding.

4. Inspect the power cord and plug for any frayed 

insulation or damaged connectors.

5. Verify that there is sufficient paper in the printer 

to complete the test.

Diagnostic Analysis: This analysis is conducted with 

the scanner turned on. Some of these tests may require 

manager/administrator privilege.

1. Turn on the ballot scanner and, as it boots up, 

verify that the correct Federal and State certified 

version of the operating system and software are 

installed. This information may only display on 

the screen briefly. If you miss it, turn the scanner 

off and then re-boot.

2. Verify that the date and time set in the scanner are 

correct and, if not, correct them.

3. Be aware of time changes due to daylight savings 

time. If the daylight savings time will change 

between the time of this test and the next election, 

set the time on the scanner to compensate for 

this change.

4. Print a test pattern to verify that the printer is 

operating correctly. If your scanner does not have 

the ability to print a test pattern, the printer can 

be tested during the Functional Analysis.

5. Unplug the ballot scanner and verify that it will 

operate on the battery. If the scanner will not 

operate on the battery check to be sure the battery 

is fully charged before failing the scanner.

6. Verify that the battery charger will charge the battery.

7. Test all ports and card slots. If the scanner uses a 

serial port to communicate with the election management system, use a loop-back connector to test 

this port.

Functional Analysis: This analysis is conducted with 

the scanner loaded with the mock election and set for 

election mode. Turn the scanner on, load the mock 

election, and then set the scanner in election mode.

1. Be sure all vote totals are set to zero.

2. Print a zero tape.

3. Use the pre-marked test deck to accumulate a significant number of ballots (at least 25) on the scanner.
32  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

4. Close the election on the ballot scanner.

5. Print the results tape.

6. Verify that the vote counts on the result tape match 

the known results of the test deck.

7. Zero the vote counters and remove the mock election from the scanner.

Documentation: If the scanner experiences a failure 

during any of the above steps that cannot be corrected 

by the tester, terminate the test. Prepare documentation that lists the serial number of the scanner, the 

persons conducting the tests, the date, and a description of the failure. Make two copies of this documentation; one copy for your permanent record and 

another copy that stays with the scanner to assist the 

persons making any required repairs. Attach all printouts to the copy retained for your permanent record. 

If the scanner passes all of the above tests, prepare documentation for your permanent record that 

lists the serial number of the scanner, the persons 

conduction the tests, and the date. Attach all printouts to this documentation.

recommendation It is important to be able to look at 

a scanner and determine whether or not it has passed 

acceptance testing. One way to accomplish this is to 

attach a permanent, non-removable label to the back 

or underside of the scanner. This label should contain the 

serial number of the scanner, the date, and the name or 

initials of the testers.

Acceptance Test for Touch-screen 

Voting Stations

This section describes a typical acceptance test for a 

touch-screen voting station. The voting station should 

be set up for this test the way it will be set up for use 

in a precinct.

Material Required: In order to conduct an acceptance 

test, you will need the following materials. You will 

also need to know the version of the operating system 

and the software/firmware on your voting stations.

 A memory card or other device that contains 

the mock election to be used for the test. This 

will be used to load the mock election into the 

voting station.

 If the voting station uses a serial port to connect disability devices, you will need a loop-back connector.

 A voter card or other device required to activate the 

voting station for a voter.

 The password, manager card, or other device 

required for gaining manager/administrator privilege 

on the voting station.

Physical Analysis: This analysis is conducted with the 

voting station turned off.

1. Examine the case and/or cover for cracks or dents.

2. Inspect latches, hinges, carrying case, wheels, etc.

3. Examine the legs and/or stand. The legs and/or 

stand must operate smoothly without binding.

4. Inspect the power cord and plug for any frayed 

insulation or damaged connectors.

5. Verify that there is sufficient paper in the printer 

to complete the test.

Diagnostic Analysis: This test is conducted with the 

voting station turned on. Some parts of the test may 

require manager/administrator privilege.

1. Turn the voting station on and as it boots up verify 

that the correct Federal and State certified version of 

the operating system and firmware are installed. 

This information may only appear briefly on the 

screen. If you miss it, turn the voting station off 

and then turn it back on.

2. Verify that the date and time are correct and correct 

them if necessary. 

3. Be aware of time changes due to daylight savings 

time. If the daylight savings time will change 

between the time of this test and the next election, 

set the time on the scanner to compensate for this 

change.

4. Check the calibration on the screen and re-calibrate 

the screen if necessary.

5. Print a test pattern to verify that the printer is 

operating correctly. If your voting station does not 

have the ability to print a test pattern, the printer 

can be tested during the Functional Analysis.

6. Examine the screen for condition and clarity.

7. Unplug the voting station and verify that it will 

operate on the battery. If the battery is dead, charge 

the battery and repeat this test.

8. Verify that the battery charger will charge the 
Election Management Guidelines  3 3

battery and that any indicators that display charging condition and level of battery charge are functioning properly.

9. Test all card slots and input/output ports. If the 

voting station uses a serial port to connect the 

accessibility devices, test this port using a loopback connector.

Functional Analysis: For this test the voting station is 

turned on and the mock election is loaded. 

1. Verify that the mock election loaded correctly and 

that the ballot(s) contain all contests and candidates.

2. Set the voting station in election mode.

3. Print the Zero Totals tape.

4. Manually enter ballots that contain one vote for 

each candidate and issue. Continue to manually 

enter ballots until each candidate on the ballot 

has received exactly one vote and each issue has 

received one ‘yes’ and one ‘no’ vote.

5. Verify that each candidate has received exactly one 

vote and each issue has received one ‘yes’ and one 

‘no’ vote.

6. If the voting station has the ability to automatically 

generate Logic and Accuracy ballots, use this feature 

to enter a total number of ballots that exceeds the 

number of ballots expected to be cast on a typical 

election day (usually about 150).

7. Close the election on the voting station.

8. Print the results.

9. Verify that the printed results exactly match the 

known number of votes cast for each candidate 

and issue.

10. Zero the totals and close the voting station.

Documentation: If during any of the above steps the 

voting station experiences a failure that cannot be 

corrected by the tester, terminate the test. Prepare 

documentation that lists the serial number of the 

touch screen unit, the persons conducting the tests, 

the date, and a description of the failure. Make two 

copies of this documentation; one copy for your permanent record and another copy that stays with the 

touch screen unit to assist the persons making any 

required repairs. Attach all printouts to the copy 

retained for your permanent record. 

If the touch screen unit passes all of the above 

tests, prepare documentation for your permanent 

record that lists the serial number of the unit, the 

persons conducting the tests, and the date. Attach all 

printouts to this documentation.

recommendation It is important to be able to look at a 

voting station and determine whether or not it has successfully passed acceptance testing. One way to accomplish 

this is to attach a permanent, non-removable label to the 

back of the screen or underside of the voting station. This 

label should contain the serial number of the voting station, 

the date, and the name or initials of the testers.

End-to-end Voting System Acceptance Test

This test is sometimes referred to as a test of the 

election management system. In reality, it not only 

tests the election management system but also tests 

the ability of the election management system to 

interface correctly with the voting devices and to 

correctly count the votes and print reports. This test 

should be conducted on all newly acquired voting 

systems, and also after any event that has the potential to alter the voting system. Such events include 

replacing a disk drive or other component in the 

election computer and any time the election computer leaves your direct control and is returned.

Important If you use a ‘blended system’, for example 

optical scan and touch screen for ADA, all components 

of the system must be included in this test.

Materials Required: You must know the correct 

Federal and State certified versions of the operating 

systems and software/firmware for your election 

management system and your vote gathering devices, 

scanners and voting stations. In addition, you will 

need the following:

1. An election management computer with your voting 

system installed.

2. If Touch Screen units are used:

 One Touch Screen voting unit,

 One blank Touch Screen Memory Card or other 

device used to load the election definition into 

the voting unit,

 One Touch Screen manager/supervisor card or 

other device used to obtain manager/supervisor 

access to the voting unit,
34  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

 One Touch Screen voter card or other device used 

to initiate a voting session for a voter.

3. If Optical Scan Ballot Scanners are used:

 One Ballot Scanner,

 One blank memory card or other device used 

to load the election definition into the ballot 

scanner,

 One set of pre-marked Optical Scan test ballots 

with known results. This can be the same test 

deck used to conduct acceptance tests on the 

ballot scanner.

4. All communications cables and devices necessary 

to connect the voting units and ballot scanners to 

the election management computer.

5. One blank disk or other device used by your system 

to record and store the election results.

6. One disk or other device containing your mock 

acceptance test election setup.

Prerequisite: The election management system consisting of items 1 through 4 above must be set up 

and tested before beginning this acceptance test. 

Note It is acceptable to allow your IT staff or the manufacturer to do this setup because in the course of conducting the end-to-end test you will verify that everything has 

been set up correctly. 

The Touch Screen voting unit and the ballot scanner should have previously completed acceptance 

testing. If not, run the Touch Screen voting station 

acceptance test and the ballot scanner acceptance test 

on these units prior to beginning this test.

Verify Correct Operating System and Election Management Software: Turn on the election management 

computer. As the computer boots up, verify that the 

correct Federal and State certified version of the 

operating system is installed. After the boot up is 

complete, verify that the correct Federal and State 

certified version of the election management system is 

installed. This can be accomplished by comparing the 

hash values of the installed voting system software with 

the hash values contained in the Web site of the 

National Software Reference Library maintained by 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/votedata.html).

Verify the Election Management System Hardware:

Verify that all components of the election management 

computer are turned on and functioning properly. 

This includes such components as printers, communication devices, disk drives, etc.

Verify Voting System Functionality: This test will 

verify that the overall voting system is functioning 

properly. It will verify that the election management 

system will format media to setup the TS voting stations and OS ballot scanners, that votes cast on these 

devices can be uploaded to the election management 

system, and that these votes will be counted correctly. 

1. Load the acceptance test database (election setup) 

on the election management computer.

2. Verify that the election management system will 

support the Touch Screen voting unit (If your 

voting system does not include Touch Screen units 

go to Step 3). 

 Use the election management system to prepare 

the memory card or other device that is used to 

load the acceptance test mock election into the TS 

voting unit.

 Load the mock election into the voting unit.

 Open the election on the unit.

 Manually enter one vote for each candidate and 

one ‘yes’ and one ‘no’ vote for each issue on the 

ballot. 

 If the Touch Screen voting unit has the facility to 

produce Logic and Accuracy ballots, use this feature to cast one set of Logic and Accuracy ballots.

 Close the election on the Touch Screen 

voting unit.

 Print the vote totals on the voting station 

printer.

 Use your standard method for transferring votes 

from the voting station to the election management computer to upload the votes from the 

voting unit to the election management system.

3. Verify that the election management system will 

support the Optical Scan ballot scanner.

 Use the election management system to prepare 

the memory card or other device that is used to 

load the acceptance test mock election into the 

ballot scanner.
Election Management Guidelines  35

 Load the mock election into the ballot scanner.

 Open the election on the ballot scanner.

 Use the pre-marked set of optical scan test ballots 

to cast votes on the ballot scanner.

 Close the election on the ballot scanner.

 Print the vote totals on the ballot scanner.

 Use your standard method for transferring votes 

from the ballot scanner to the election management computer to upload the votes from the ballot 

scanner to the election management system.

4. Verify Printed Outputs.

 Close the election on the election management 

system.

 Print the standard reports that contain the 

vote totals.

 Compare the results printed from the election 

management system with the results printed from 

the voting station and ballot scanner.

Documentation: If the voting system experiences a 

failure during any of the above steps that cannot be 

corrected by the tester, terminate the test. Prepare 

documentation that lists the serial number of the 

election computer and the serial number or other 

identifying information for any other component 

that failed, the persons conducting the tests, the date, 

and a description of the failure. Make two copies of 

this documentation; one copy for your permanent 

record and another copy that stays with the touch 

screen unit to assist the persons making any required 

repairs. Attach all printouts to the copy retained for 

your permanent record. 

If the voting system passes all of the above tests, 

prepare documentation for your permanent record 

that lists the serial number of the voting system computer, the serial number of the Touch Screen voting 

unit, the serial number of the Optical Scan ballot 

scanner, the persons conducting the tests, and the 

date. Attach all printouts to this documentation.

recommendation It is important to be able to look at a 

voting system computer and determine whether or not it 

has successfully passed acceptance testing. One way to 

accomplish this is to attach a permanent, non-removable 

label to the case of the voting system computer. This label 

should contain the serial number of the computer, the date, 

and the name or initials of the testers.

Conclusion

Acceptance testing on each machine delivered to a 

voting jurisdiction by a manufacturer is a critical 

step in the process of ensuring that electronic voting 

units used by voters on Election Day will function as 

intended. Although each manufacturer has internal 

quality control procedures, and although quality 

control should be guaranteed to some degree in the 

contractual agreement between the manufacturer and 

the voting jurisdiction, these procedures and guarantees are worthless unless the jurisdiction can proactively detect failures or non-functional systems at the 

time the product is delivered. Rigorous acceptance 

testing provides this detection mechanism.

recommendation Your agreement with the vendor 

should include an understanding that the warranty on 

a unit of the voting system will not begin until the initial 

acceptance testing has been successfully completed.
36  U.S. Election lection Assistance ssistance Commission ommission

SAMPLE FORM 4.1: TSX TOUCH SCREEN ACCEPTANCE TESTING PROCEDURES (Johnson CO. Kansas)

SERIAL NUMBER: 

(Left side of unit)

204404

Check off as 

completed. Note 

any discrepancies.

Inspect for physical damage, such as cracks.

Write to the right the number of keys received with unit (if new).

Unfold legs and stand unit up.

Plug TS unit into electrical source. 

Plug polarity checker into “daisy chain” outlet only far enough for lights to come on. Confirm electrical. Remove 

polarity checker.

Unlock PC card compartment on top left side. (turn key 3:00 to 6:00)

Make sure that the nut on the inside of the key assembly is tight.

Make sure that there is a red cover on the On/Off button. Power On by holding red button to count of 3. Open doors.

Confirm that Boot Loader Release Build Date is April 19, 2004. If not, record the build date to the right. 

Confirm that Windows CE 4.10 Build Date is February 5, 2004. If not, record the build date to the right.

Confirm that the ballot station is version 4.5.2 (lower right hand corner of screen). 

If not, record ballot station version to the right.

Unlock printer compartment and bring forward. (turn key 12:00 to 3:00)

Feed printer paper, if necessary.

Insert Manager card. Enter (the password) and “OK.”

Confirm AC Online and write battery percentage to right.

Touch “System Setup.”

Confirm Serial Number on Setup screen. Write on this sheet at top if necessary.

Touch “Set Date.”

Touch the arrows to set the correct month, year, and time. Be careful of AM & PM. Touch the correct date on the 

calendar. 

Select Central Time from the drop-down list. Uncheck “Automatically adjust clock for daylight saving.”

Touch “Apply” after setting date, time, and/or time zone. 

Touch “OK” if no changes made or “X” to exit.

Touch “Diagnostics.” Touch “Test Printer.”

If printer does not print, push the whole printer to the right to confirm that there is a solid connection. You may also need to 

open the lid by pushing down on the gray lever—make sure that the hinges are seated correctly, tighten the paper roll, 

feed the paper, and snap the lid shut.

After test finishes, touch “OK” for “Printer test PASSED.”

Attach loop back connector (slightly wider at top) to serial port located on the back of the unit. 

Touch “Test Serial Port.” 

continued next page...
Election lection Management anagement Guidelines uidelines  37

SERIAL NUMBER: 

(Left side of unit)

204404

Check off as 

completed. Note 

any discrepancies.

On the Serial Port Test window, use the dropdowns to change the Baud Rate to 115200 and make sure “Flow Control” 

reads “Software.” Touch “Test.”

When done, touch “OK.” Touch “Done” to exit test. 

Remove loop back connector.

Touch “Test Card Reader.” Manager card is ejected.

Remove the Manager card as requested. 

(DO NOT TEST THE MANAGER CARD. IT WILL BE ERASED.) 

Insert a voter card when prompted.

Remove voter card when prompted. Re-insert Manager Card.

Touch “Test Sound”—Touch “Play.”

After sound is heard, Touch “Close.”

Touch “Test Modem.”

On the Test Modem window, use the dropdown to change the Baud Rate to 115200 and make sure “Flow Control” 

reads “Hardware.” Touch “Test.”

After test finishes touch “OK” for “Modem test PASSED.”

Touch “Done” to return to the Diagnostics screen.

Touch “Done” to get out of Diagnostics screen.

Touch “Calibrate.” 

Touch the center of each target with your stylus. There are 3 targets for 2 passes. 

(Calibration is best if using something small enough to hit exact center of target.)

After calibration is finished. Touch “OK” to exit System Setup.

Touch “Exit Supervisor” to remove Manager Card.

Hold red button to count of 3 to turn TS unit Off.

Tear off printer tape. Fold in half and tape to the back of this form facing out.

Close and lock both compartments.

If needed, clean screen with nonabrasive, dry cloth (optical cloth).

Return protective Styrofoam sheet to cover screen.

Close side panels and lock with padlock specific to that machine.

Unplug unit and fold up legs. 

Return unit to its location on the tables in the warehouse and plug in.

TECHNICIAN: DATE:
38  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

SAMPLE FORM 4.2: TSX DIAGNOSTICS (Johnson County Kansas)

ELECTION: 

Summer 2005 

SERIAL NUMBER: 

216879

Check off as 

completed. Move 

unit to repair 

bench if it fails.

Inspect for physical damage, such as cracks. 

Flip machine over and extend legs (double first, then single). Twist gently to align bullets. 

Make sure “Property of” sticker is on back. Fold legs down & turn machine back over.

Plug TS unit into electrical source. Unlock machine padlock.

Examine padlock label. Take key & padlock to printer and make new label if needed.

Make sure that AC light is yellow. 

Unlock PC card compartment on left side of unit. (Turn key from 12:00 to 3:00) 

Insert Tech PC card with tech label on top of card.

Power On by pressing red button and holding to the count of 3. 

Confirm that the Boot Loader Release Build Date is April 19, 2004.

Confirm that the Windows CE 4.10 Build Date is February 5, 2004.

Confirm in lower right-hand corner that Ballot Station Version is 4.5.2.

Unlock printer cover & raise printer. Make sure there is enough paper for diagnostics. 

Use yellow tape to tape printer around the bottom so that it is firmly against connection.

Confirm that the touch screen says “AC Online” in the Power field.

Insert Manager card. Touch (the password) and “OK.” Touch “System Setup.”

Confirm that the number on the screen and the sticker on the left side of machine match. Write Serial number on this 

sheet if needed.

Touch “Set Date.” Select “Central Time” from the drop-down list if not already selected. Touch “Apply.”

If date/time is still not correct (daylight saving), reset by touching date and/or using arrows to set time, year or month. 

(Be careful of AM & PM.) Touch “Apply” if you reset anything. 

Uncheck “Automatically adjust clock for daylight saving time.” Touch “Apply.”

Touch “OK” if no changes made or “X” to exit Date/Time Properties window.

Record today’s date and time here for proofing purposes.

Touch “Diagnostics.” Touch “Test Card Reader.”

Manager card is ejected. Remove the Manager card. Do not respond to Warning.

Insert a smart card. (Do Not Test The Manager Card. It Will Be Erased.) 

Remove smart card when prompted after test. 

Reinsert Manager card. Touch “Done.”

Touch large “OK” at bottom of screen to save settings.

38  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

continued next page...
Election Management Guidelines  39

ELECTION: 

Summer 2005 

SERIAL NUMBER: 

216879

Check off as 

completed. Move 

unit to repair 

bench if it fails.

Touch “Exit Supervisor.” Remove Manager card.

Touch “Clear Totals.” Answer “OK” to message.

Touch “Test Count.” Check “Not Using Voter Card.”

Touch “Count Test.” Touch “Vote.” Touch “Next.” 

Vote for Red, White, & Blue and then one time for the first candidate in every race, 

except write in “yam” for favorite food.

Touch “Cast Ballot.” Touch “Close” on the “Select Precinct and Party” screen.

Touch “Close” on the “Pre-Election Testing Mode” screen.

Touch “Reporting.” Answer “Yes” to “Print write-in candidates?” 

“PRINT LONG REPORT?”—answer “No.” 

“NEED ANOTHER COPY?”—answer “No,” unless printer did not print successfully.

Tear off printer tape. Confirm machine number and 1 vote for Red, White, Blue, first candidate 

in each race & yam. Fold printout facing out. Paper clip to back of this form.

Push red button & hold to count of 3 to turn unit Off. Use eject button to remove PC card.

Make sure there is enough paper for manual L&A. Close and lock both compartments.

Clean screen with dry optical cloth. Replace protective Styrofoam sheet over screen.

Examine hinges & fold privacy panels in. Relock machine at top with its specific padlock. 

Put a plastic tie through the lower holes in the privacy panels as a marker that it is done.

Remove colored dot from “foot” of machine.

TECHNICIAN:

Revised 5/31/05

DATE:

Election Management Guidelines  39

Election Management Guidelines  41

C h apte r 5

BALLOT BUILDING

Introduction

Correct and easily understood ballots are the foundation of a successful election. Building a ballot 

is part science and part art. The science is rather 

straightforward and will be presented in this chapter. 

The art is learned through experience.

A document such as this must be general in 

nature and cannot account for all of the differences 

in State and local election laws and regulations. You 

should seek, whenever possible, written clarification 

from the appropriate authority when implementing 

suggestions or recommendations contained in this 

chapter when a relevant law and/or regulation on 

point is ambiguous or inconsistent with that suggestion or recommendation, or its implementation.

This chapter is organized in five major sections. 

The first section discusses those issues that are common 

to all ballots. The next three sections discuss issues 

that are specific to touch screen ballots, optical scan 

ballots, and audio ballots. The final section addresses 

the testing and validation of the completed ballots.

General Ballot Considerations

Schedule Considerations: As you approach an election there are various time dependent events that 

have to occur. Some of these events are specified by 

law, such as the deadline for mailing absentee ballots, 

and others are dictated by necessity, such as the time 

it will take your printer to produce the printed ballots. 

Some events are dependent upon other events. For 

example, you cannot conduct Logic and Accuracy Tests 

until the printed ballots are available. 

Your election supervisor will build and publish a 

schedule that contains all of the events leading up to 

the election. As a ballot builder you need to be very 

familiar with the dates on this schedule that affect 

the ballot building process.

 Find out from your printer(s) the earliest and 

latest dates that they can accommodate receiving 

and printing your ballots. Note that the latest date 

must be sufficiently after the close of qualifying to 

allow you ample time to proof the finished ballots. 

Allow time to re-print any ballots that contain necessary revisions or errors. Be sure that these dates allow 

you to meet the requirements for public review and 

mailing absentee ballots.

Include in your schedule the dates that you will 

receive resolutions for Federal and State contests and 

the opening and closing of qualifying for local, State, 

and Federal offices. 

Verify that the jurisdiction election database is up 

to date and update it if necessary. As soon as possible, 

you want to prepare the specific election database 

that contains everything except the names of the 

candidates and the specific wording of the questions 

and/or referendums. This database will contain the 

type of election, all precincts, districts, races, number 

to vote for, and method of voting (at large, etc.).

Jurisdiction Election Database: Almost all of the 

currently available computer-based election management systems have a provision for building a jurisdiction election database. This data base can be built 

well in advance of any specific election. It contains 

all of the political districts in your jurisdiction (precincts, county commission districts, school board 

districts, State legislative districts, congressional districts, etc.) and all of the offices that may be elected 

(county commissioners, State senators, State representative, US representatives). Once this database is 

built it remains fairly static; however, it can change 

as a result of re-districting; adding, deleting, or changing precincts; legislation; or court cases and should be 

reviewed before each election.
42  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Specific Election Database: To plan for a specific 

election, the districts and offices to be included in the 

election are selected from the jurisdiction election 

database to create an election database. This database 

will contain the precincts, districts, and races that will 

form the election. This information in turn defines 

the ballot styles that you need to prepare and which 

ballot styles are assigned to which precincts.

Type fonts and sizes: The Guidelines presented 

below give recommendations for type fonts and sizes. 

However, your State may have laws and/or regulations that govern type font and sizes. Follow your 

State laws and/or regulations if there is a discrepancy 

between the Guidelines and your State laws and/or 

regulations.

Chain of custody for ballots: In the context of ballot 

building, chain of custody is the device that demonstrates that progression and integrity of the ballot 

from its original creation to its final destination. This 

includes a document that reflects the precise chain 

in the transmission, receipt, custody, control, transfer and eventual distribution of the ballots from its 

originating point; and the parties responsible for each 

step in the chain. The chain of custody should begin 

when the ballot is designed and continue to the final 

disposition of the voted ballots. The chain of custody 

should cover the printing of the ballots at the printing facility, during transportation, in the office before 

mailing, and when received. When developing your 

chain of custody assume that you are going to have a 

court challenge and that you will have to prove that 

your ballots were constantly in the possession of an 

election official or a sworn officer and that there was 

absolutely no time when anyone could alter any ballot, 

either before it was cast or afterwards.

General Considerations: When an instruction is 

based on a condition, state the condition first, and 

then the action to be performed. For instance, use “In 

order to change your vote, do X”, rather than “Do X, 

in order to change your vote.”

Use familiar, common words and avoid technical or 

specialized words that voters are not likely to understand. For instance, “... there are more contests and 

races on the other side ...” or “... vote both sides of 

the ballot ...” rather than “...additional contests are 

presented on the reverse ...”

Issue instructions on the correct way to perform 

actions, rather than telling voters what not to do. For 

example, “Fill in the oval for your write-in vote to 

count,” rather than “If the oval is not marked, your 

write-in vote cannot be counted.”

Address the voter directly rather than use passive 

voice constructions. For example, “remove and retain 

this ballot stub” rather than “this ballot stub must 

be removed and retained by the voter.”

Avoid the use of gender-based pronouns. For 

example, “...write in your choice directly on the 

ballot...” rather than “... write in his name directly 

on the ballot...”

Consistent with election law, support a process 

that does not introduce bias for or against any of the 

contest choices to be presented to the voter. In both 

visual and aural formats, the choices shall be presented in an equivalent manner. Certain differences 

in presentation are mandated by State law, such as 

the order in which candidates are listed and provisions 

for voting for write-in candidates. However, comparable characteristics such as font size or voice volume 

and speed must be the same for all choices.

Whenever possible, do not visually present a single 

contest spread over two pages or two columns. Such 

a visual separation poses the risk that the voter may 

perceive one contest as two, or fail to see additional 

choices. If a contest has a large number of candidates, 

it may be infeasible to observe this guideline.

Clearly indicate the maximum number of candidates for which one can vote within a single contest.

The relationship between the name of a candidate 

and the mechanism used to vote for that candidate 

should be consistent throughout the ballot. For 

example, the response field where voters indicate 

their votes must not be located to the left of some 

candidates’ names, and to the right of others’.

Display instructions near to where they are 

needed. For instance, only general instructions 

should be grouped at the beginning of the ballot; 

those pertaining to specific situations should be presented where and when needed.

Touch Screen Ballots Considerations

Provide clear and unambiguous instructions for navigating the ballot. Include instructions for any ancillary input devices such as ‘sip-and-puff’, paddles, etc. 

Provide the voter with clear and unambiguous 
Election Management Guidelines  4 3

instructions for completing the voting process and 

casting the ballot. Use color to distinguish the 

instructions from the ballot content. If your touch 

screen voting station does not allow the voter to 

return to the instruction page, you should print 

these instructions and post them on the voting 

station in addition to providing the instructions 

on the touch screen. 

If possible, keep all of the candidates for a given 

race in a single column on a single page. Avoid 

mixing races with a large number of candidates 

and races with a small number of candidates on a 

single screen. Whenever practical, limit each screen 

to a single race.

recommendation Do not use over three columns 

on a touch screen. 

If your voting system produces a Voter Verifiable 

Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) maintain a chain of custody 

for the VVPATs. The handling of this chain of custody 

has the potential to become the object of severe criticism from candidates and activists. Impress on your 

poll workers the importance of adhering to and documenting the VVPAT chain of custody.

Optical Scan Ballots Considerations

General considerations for optical scan ballots: If 

possible, use a printer that has been certified by your 

voting system vendor. If this is not possible, be sure 

that the printer is able to meet your voting vendor’s 

specifications. If you use multiple printers verify 

the consistency of the ballots among the printers. 

Require the printer(s) to send a ‘test deck’ of ballots to 

use to conduct logic and accuracy testing prior to all 

ballots being printed. If you hand mark your test deck 

you can use the printer supplied test deck to check the 

accuracy of your hand marked deck. 

Have the ballots shrink wrapped in quantities 

small enough for you to verify the number of ballots 

in a pack (100 or less is recommended). If possible, 

review the ballots in all packets. Do not assume that 

because one (or several) packet of ballots is correct 

that all the other packets will also be correct.

If you prefer to send the ballots to the precincts 

in the original packaging, then review at least one 

packet of each ballot style. 

When reviewing the ballots check for:

 Text relative to fold,

 Timing mark positions,

 Bleed through,

 Poor print quality,

 Ink density,

 Smudging, 

 Paper opaqueness, and

 Verify that the folds do not interfere with the 

timing mark positions or the voting locations 

(ovals, arrows, etc.).

If the ballot is double sided, print clear instructions to the voter, on both sides of the ballot, to 

turn the ballot over. Print the words “VOTE BOTH 

SIDES” or a similar instruction at the bottom of both 

sides of the ballot.

If you use ballot-on-demand, it is advisable to test 

scan the ballot prior to issuing it to the voter. This is 

to insure that the paper was correctly aligned in the 

printer and that the scanner will recognize the timing 

marks. If scanning each ballot causes unacceptable 

delays, then, as a minimum, each time you change 

the paper or add paper to the printer scan the first few 

ballots to be sure the paper is correctly aligned.

Important Maintain and document a chain of custody 

for all blank ballots. Some election officials tell their staff 

to pretend that the ballots are five dollar bills and treat 

them accordingly.

Audio Ballot Considerations

General Considerations for audio ballots: Do not 

begin to build your audio ballots until you have 

completed and verified your touch screen ballot. 

For audio ballots it is important that each section of the ballot be in the same voice. For example, 

one voice can present the title and another voice 

can present the instructions. However, all candidate 

names on the ballot must be in the same voice. As stated 

in Guidelines section 3.2.4-D (see above), it is important for the volume and speed to be the same for all 

choices on the ballot. A recording of the candidates 

saying their names can be useful as a guide to pronouncing the name; however, this recording should 

not be used on the ballot. Some voting systems have 
44  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

a provision for using synthesized voices. Select between 

natural voices and synthesized voices based on the 

preference of your disabled and/or language community. Partner with disability and language minority 

groups to asses which audio voice would best suit the 

needs of your voters; for example, contact the American 

Association of People with Disabilities (http://www.

aapd-dc.org/index.php) for information regarding 

local organizations in your area that serve voters with 

disabilities. If you use natural voices, consider using 

trained voices, such as actors, radio announcers, 

pastors, etc. or members of the target community. 

The latter is very important to consider in particular 

when providing audio ballots in other languages 

than English. 

recommendation Use natural voices to the 

extent possible. 

If you have to prepare the audio ballots in one or 

more languages other than English, make every effort 

to use persons for whom the language(s) are their first 

language. If possible, make the audio dialect neutral; 

however, if a language has more than one dialect, determine which dialect is used by a majority of your voters.

Translations from English to another language 

should maintain the spirit of the original text, particularly where literal translations are unavoidable or 

would not make sense.

Verifying the Ballot

Every ballot style must be reviewed and verified against 

the official ballot certification documents for correctness in every format (touch screen, optical scan, and 

audio) and every language. This should be done 

before the ballots are sent to the printers for printing. 

Verifying a ballot style requires that the ballot 

style is loaded onto a touch screen voting station and 

a copy of the optical scan ballot style is available for 

comparison. You can use the photo-ready copies of 

the ballot styles for this verification. 

The persons who review and verify the ballots 

should not be the same persons that built the ballots.

One person should read the information from the 

official ballot certification document and the second 

person should verify that the information is identical 

on the touch screen, the optical scan ballot and the 

audio ballot. When testing the audio ballot, it is recommended that the ballot be played on a speaker so that 

both reviewers can hear and check the audio. 

If possible, have a visually impaired person 

review the audio ballot. Also, if possible, have native 

language speakers review the alternate language 

audio ballots.

reminder

Remember the two person rule when verifying ballots.
Election Management Guidelines  45

C h apte r 6

PRE-ELECTION AND PARALLEL TESTING

Introduction

Pre-election testing, also called Logic and Accuracy 

testing (L&A testing), is the act of testing every ballot 

style and every component of the voting system prior to 

the election. If you represent a large jurisdiction with 

thousands of voting stations and dozens of ballot 

styles, this will appear to be a daunting task. It is. 

However, documenting pre-election testing is a critical component of the election’s audit trail, which 

ensures the election was administered in a fair, accurate, and transparent manner.

Parallel testing is the act of duplicating, as 

nearly as possible, a portion of the election under 

conditions that are identical to the conditions that 

occur in a polling place. Parallel testing came about 

in response to the contention that it is impossible 

to detect with 100 % certainty the presence of so 

called Trojan Horses that may be present in the 

voting system. 

The contention is that these Trojan Horses would 

contain malicious code that would only become active 

after the polls are opened and would disappear immediately after the polls are closed. This being the case, 

their malicious activity would be impossible to detect. 

Thus, the idea behind parallel testing is that we can 

fool these Trojan Horses into thinking that the polls 

are open and then detect their malicious activity 

with a carefully controlled test.

Pre-Election/Logic and Accuracy Tests

Pre-test planning: Pre-election testing involves setting up the voting system for each of your precincts 

and early voting locations, loading the election definition, opening the election, casting a known pattern 

of votes on each ballot style, closing the election, 

printing the vote totals for the precinct, and then 

comparing the printed vote totals with the known 

pattern of votes. In short, you are going to set up and 

test your entire election. 

Planning for the pre-election testing should 

begin several weeks before the actual tests begin. 

This planning should include identifying the space 

required to house the tests, the staff required to conduct the tests, and the time required for the tests. If 

you represent a large jurisdiction, time requirements 

may dictate that tests for several voting locations 

must be conducted simultaneously. 

Staff restrictions may require that you use contractors to assist you with the pre-election testing. If 

at all possible, a member of the election staff should 

be in charge of each contractor test team. One staff 

person can supervise two or three test teams provided the tests are conducted in the same location. 

Under no circumstances should a test team be composed entirely of contractor personnel. Each team 

should consist of at least two individuals. The EAC 

recommends that representatives from voting system 

manufacturers do not assist jurisdictions with preelection testing. 

As part of your pre-test planning prepare the test 

scripts that are to be voted on each ballot style. Be 

sure that each test script includes at least one vote for 

each candidate on the ballot and one ‘yes’ and one 

‘no’ vote for each issue or question on the ballot. Be 

sure to include audio ballots in your test scripts.

Any testing that requires printed ballots (i.e. optical scan ballots) cannot actually begin until these ballots 

are available. This can be as little as 45 days prior to the 

election. However, if early voting locations and election-day precincts only use electronic voting stations 

and do not require paper ballots this testing can be 

scheduled to begin as soon as the election definition 

is completed.

As part of the pre-planning activities review 

your jurisdiction’s requirements as they relate to 
46  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

open access to the pre-election tests. Many State 

election codes require that these tests must be open 

to the public and advertised in your official record 

(newspaper) a specified number of days before the 

tests begin. 

recommendation If your State or local laws and regulations allow make the pre-election testing a media event. 

About a week before the pre-election tests are to 

begin invite the media to a briefing. At this briefing 

provide them with the dates and times of the tests. 

Show diagrams of the test locations and point out 

where the media personnel can be during the tests. 

Provide written copies of any rules and procedures 

that apply to media personnel attendance and/or 

participation in the tests.

recommendation At the test locations separate the 

test area from the public and media area with a physical 

barrier; for example, a low wall or a rope. Ensure this barrier 

is located so that the public and media can observe the test 

but cannot touch the testers or any of the test materials. 

Pre-election testing: Before beginning a test, be sure 

that all required supplies are on hand, including the 

test deck of optical scan ballots. Although your ballot 

printer can provide you with a ‘Logic and Accuracy 

Test Deck’, the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines recommend that the optical scan test deck consist of handmarked ballots. For a very large election hand marking 

a test deck may not be feasible.

recommendation Include a fully voted ballot (every 

voting location marked), a blank ballot, and a ballot from 

a previous election in the test deck.

Conduct the pre-election test from beginning to 

end on one precinct/voting location at a time. Set up 

all of the equipment for the precinct/voting location 

and load the election setup on each device. Open the 

election and cast the test scripts for each ballot style. 

If DRE voting stations are used in the precinct/voting 

location, manually enter the test script for every ballot 

style on every voting station. If it is not feasible to 

vote every ballot on every voting station, the minimum recommendation is to vote every ballot style on 

at least one voting station and then visually inspect 

every ballot style on each of the other voting stations.

If audio ballots are used on either DRE voting 

stations or ballot marking voting stations such as the 

AutoMark device, enter the test script for every ballot 

style on every voting station. Again, if it is not feasible to 

vote every ballot on every voting station, the minimum recommendation is to vote every ballot style on 

at least one voting station and then visually inspect 

every ballot style on the screen of each of the other 

voting stations.

If optical scan ballots are used in the precinct/

voting location, run the test deck for every ballot style 

used in the precinct/voting location.

If central count optical scan is used, run the test 

deck for every ballot style used in the election through 

each central scanner that will be used in the election.

When all testing has been completed, zero out 

all vote totals and close and seal all devices with 

a tamper proof seal. Record the seal numbers on a 

transmittal sheet that will be used in the polling 

place to verify that the devices have not been tampered 

with during transit.

Repeat the above pre-election test for every precinct/voting location.

When the tests in all of the precincts/voting locations have been completed and uploaded to the 

election management system, close the election and 

print the overall jurisdiction reports. Compare the 

vote totals on the jurisdiction reports with the known 

results from the test scripts.

Parallel Testing

Parallel testing is the act of duplicating, as nearly as 

possible, a portion of the election under conditions 

that are identical to the time and conditions that 

occur in a polling place. The rational for parallel 

testing is that malicious code may have been introduced into the voting system software at some point, 

tip

When time is of the essence, you can begin pre-election tests for voting locations that use only DRE voting 

stations prior to receiving the optical scan ballots 

from the printer.

remember

Test the absentee precincts!
Election Management Guidelines  47

and is lying dormant until the voting station is 

setup for an election. Parallel testing is an attempt to 

deceive this code into becoming active by simulating 

the exact conditions of an election. 

Note Parallel testing is not recommended for optical 

scan systems. In this case, the paper ballots can be used 

to resolve any challenge to the election. 

Successful parallel testing must take place during 

the hours of the election, using software and hardware that was prepared to be used in the election.

The mechanics of conducting a parallel test are 

as follows:

 Conduct all of your pre-election testing in the 

normal manner,

 Determine how many precincts and voting stations 

you are going to include in the parallel test,

 Randomly select precincts/voting locations to be 

included in the parallel test,

 Randomly select voting stations that have been 

prepared and sealed for use in the selected precincts/voting locations,

 During the hours that the precinct/voting location 

is open, cast a known script on the selected voting 

stations,

 Compare the resulting vote totals with the vote 

totals for the known script.

When selecting voting locations to be included 

in your parallel test, stratify your sample so that the 

number of large, medium, and small voting locations 

to be used in your test are in the same proportions as 

the number of large, medium, and small voting locations in your jurisdiction. Also, prepare voting scripts 

that reflect the demographics of the voting locations 

used in the test. This includes the number of ballots 

usually cast on a single voting station at that location 

and the distribution of those ballots by political party 

affiliation and language choice. 

Note Audio is a language choice. 

If possible select voting stations to be used in the 

parallel test that were prepared and sealed to be used 

in the voting location. If this will cause a shortage 

of voting stations in the precinct or voting location, 

use voting stations from your inventory—preferably 

voting stations that have been prepared and sealed 

for the election as ‘back up’ or ‘spare machines.’

important On Election Day, conduct the parallel test in 

‘Official Election Mode’ and cast the test voting scripts 

during the times that the voting location is open for voting. 

Observe the “two person rule” when casting votes 

on a DRE voting station; have one person enter the 

votes while the other person calls out the votes and 

verifies the votes on the screen. 

If optical scan ballots or VVPATs are used, manually count the optical scan ballots or the VVPATs 

and compare the results with both the electronic 

vote totals and the known results of the voting script.

important Be aware that the ballots used for the parallel 

test are identical to the ballots used in the actual election. 

Use extreme care to keep the test ballots seperated from 

the actual ballots so that the test ballots do not become 

included in the official election results.

Unless the parallel test is conducted rigorously, 

the results are not conclusive. That is to say, that 

without extreme rigor the malicious code may be 

clever enough to detect that you are running a test 

and remain dormant.

Post-Election Testing

Post-election testing consists of repeating a portion 

or all of the Pre-Election (Logic and Accuracy) tests. 

Many election officials feel that post-election Logic 

and Accuracy tests can be as effective at detecting an 

election anomaly as parallel tests, unless the parallel 

test is rigorous: uses voting stations prepared for the 

voting location, uses a significant number of voting 

locations and voting stations, and has a video record 

for backup. Post-election tests should be routinely 

suggestion

Make a video record of all voting. This record can be 

used in the event of a discrepancy in the results to 

determine whether or not a data entry error caused 

the discrepancy.
48  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

conducted a percentage of your precincts and particularly on any precinct that experienced an event that 

casts suspicion on the results.

recommendation Even is you do parallel testing, it is 

recommended that you conduct post election Logic and 

Accuracy tests on at least 10 % of your precincts.

Conclusion

Parallel testing and post-election testing will only 

detect problems in an election after they occur. At this 

point, as the saying goes, “The horse is already out 

of the barn.” Certainly, if a problem occurs during 

an election you want to detect it so that you can take 

remedial action.

The best way to detect a potential problem before

it occurs is with comprehensive, extensive pre-election 

(Logic and Accuracy) testing.
Election Management Guidelines  4 9

C h apte r 7

ABSENTEE VOTING AND VOTE BY MAIL

Introduction

Ballots are cast by mail in every State, however, the 

management of absentee voting and vote by mail 

varies throughout the nation, based on State law. 

There are many similarities between the two since 

both involve transmitting paper ballots to voters and 

receiving voted ballots at a central election office 

by a specified date. Many of the internal procedures 

for preparation and mailing of ballots, ballot reception, ballot tabulation and security are similar when 

applied to all ballots cast by mail.

The differences relate to State laws, rules and 

regulations that control which voters can request a 

ballot by mail and specific procedures that must be 

followed to request a ballot by mail. Rules for when 

ballot requests must be received, when ballots are 

mailed to voters, and when voted ballots must be 

returned to the election official—all defer according 

to State law.

Listed below are the various types of voting 

by mail:

 Permanent absentee—usually, but not always, 

reserved for the elderly and/or those voters with 

disabilities. These voters automatically receive a 

ballot in the mail for every election. Some State 

laws provide for periodic review of the “permanent” 

status, specifically if the voter does not cast a ballot 

after several elections.

 Absentee (Voter must provide a reason or excuse)—

requires voters to certify that they meet certain 

criteria, i.e. absent from the jurisdiction on Election Day, temporarily ill or disabled, etc. Some 

States require that the application to request a 

ballot must be notarized.

 Early Voting/Absentee (Voter does not have to 

provide a reason or excuse)—based on State law, 

voters may submit a request to vote by mail. In 

some States the request is valid for one or more 

years. In other States, an application must be completed and submitted for each election.

 Vote by Mail—all votes are cast by mail. Currently, 

Oregon is the only vote by mail State; however, 

several States allow all-mail ballot voting options 

for ballot initiatives. 

Ballot Preparation and Mailing

One of the first steps in preparing to issue ballots 

by mail is to determine personnel and facility and 

supply needs. 

Facility Needs: 

Adequate secure space for packaging the outgoing 

ballot envelopes should be reviewed prior to every 

election, based on the expected quantity of ballots 

to be processed. Depending upon the number of ballot 

styles and quantity of ballots, adequate shelving and 

a security-controlled storage area must be in place. 

NOte If inserting is performed at a mailing service, extra 

space may not be as critical. 

Space will be required for sorting undeliverable ballots, since they should be reviewed immediately. Space 

will also be required for processing returned voted ballots: 

 Signature Verification

 Challenged Ballots

 Envelopes

 Separating Ballots from Envelopes

 Duplication, if required 

Staffing Needs:

If ballot insertion is done in-house, part-time and/

or regular employees, working in teams of two, are 
50  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

assigned and managed in a staged work flow area. 

Various teams should be set up to help control the 

flow of materials and expedite the overall procedures:

 Control Team

 Labeling Team

 Packet Assembly Team

 Support Team

 Sort Team 

NOte If outgoing mail ballot preparations are to be done 

off-site at a mailing house service, election office staff 

supervision is recommended.

If the election returned ballot processing is 

done in-house, review State law and regulations to 

determine if a sworn election worker board must be 

in place, or whether supervisors can be regular staff, 

whose only duty is to oversee the process. It is important to plan for peak periods which will require either 

more personnel, staggered shifts, or overtime. 

Equipment and Supplies:

Equipment and supply needs must also be evaluated 

as it relates to space needs. These may include: 

 Ability to run data exports/labels for mailing 

companies

 Software that provides CASS certification 

(postal barcode)

 Insertion, folding and sealing machines 

 Printers

 Postage meter and envelope sealer machine

 Automatic letter openers

 Computers and bar code devices

 Storage shelves

 Mail trays

 File storage boxes

 Tamper-evident tape

Ballot Preparation and Printing

The first step in preparation for printing and distribution of ballots is to develop a timeline detailing each 

step in the process. Examples of dates to be included 

on a timeline are:

 Filing deadline

 Close of registration

 Deadline for public review of ballot design 

and content

 Developing the ballot order and finalizing 

contract negotiation with the ballot printer

 Date that ballot file is due at the printer

 Delivery date for printed ballots 

 Logic and accuracy testing

 Deadline for mailing of military and 

overseas ballots

 Date for initial mailing of absentee ballots

 Last date that absentee ballots can be mailed

 Last day for receipt of voted absentee ballots

Once the timeline has been developed, staff 

assignments and deadlines can be incorporated. 

Determining the number of ballots to order is 

often stipulated by State law or State administrative 

policies and procedures. If not, the ballot order can 

be developed by use of a spreadsheet containing the 

number of voters in each precinct multiplied by the 

percentage of ballots expected to be requested and/or 

reviewing the prior election turn-out by precinct. 

NOte It is important to increase the ballot order to provide 

for extra ballots needed to develop necessary logic and 

accuracy testing and to provide for provisional, spoiled 

and/or replacement ballots. 

Before meeting with your ballot printer, make 

decisions regarding the following: 

 Quantities and different variations (ballot styles).

 Consider possible weight limitations (printing 

instructions back-to-back will reduce the amount of 

paper and overall weight of the mail).

 Consider different colors for different ballot types 

or districts.

 Review any specific State requirements for ballots, 

i.e. numbered, detachable stub on each ballot. 

 Include required statutory information per 

ballot type.

 For Primary Elections, remember to analyze the 

number of non-affiliated voters (consider buffering ballot quantities to accommodate for party 

changes or parties opening their Primary).
Election Management Guidelines  51

Prior to every election, election officials should 

also contact the local post office to review all policies 

and procedures relating to mailing, tracking and 

receiving the ballots. If you plan to use an outside mail 

service, you should also include a review of election 

office internal policies and procedures and contract 

requirements with the mail service vendor. Listed below 

are possible items to review and consider:

 Identify timelines and scheduling (may want to 

allow for possible delays).

 Identify staffing needs at all stages of the process 

(on-site supervision may be required).

 Identify staging requirements (work areas for 

barcoding, tray assembly, zipping/sorting, etc.).

 Consider quality control and security issues. Indicate how ballot transportation security needs are to 

be met (i.e. from office or vendor to mailing house 

or from mailing house to Post Office).

 Specify various quality control issues (tracking 

and audit trails). 

 Establish method for addressing/labeling envelopes. 

 For inserts that may be needed, check with vendor 

on insert capability. Examples include:

•	 Secrecy envelopes 

•	Return envelopes 

•	Ballot (one or more) 

•	 Local Voters’ Pamphlet, if applicable 

•	Drop site information, if applicable 

Remember to review outgoing and return ballot 

envelopes before placing new orders. New technology and postal policies/procedures can improve the 

management of packaging outgoing envelopes and 

receiving voted ballots. 

The Post Office can review or help you design 

outgoing and return envelopes to ensure they meet 

the necessary postal standards for automated handling. This includes review and assistance with the 

proper wording and placement of endorsements on 

your envelopes as they apply to the Post Office. They 

will also provide a camera-ready copy of the front 

side of both outgoing and return envelopes for the 

printer. This will include, for the return envelope, 

the 11-digit barcode for your return address. 

Other examples include:

 Eliminate the use of labels by printing voter names 

directly onto the outgoing ballot envelope. 

NOte Print these envelopes in ballot order instead of 

alphabetically to improve accuracy and efficiency when 

pulling and inserting ballots into outgoing envelopes.

 Implement bar code technology for easy updating 

of voter history when return ballot envelopes are 

received in the mail.

 Utilize the official election postal indicia on all 

outgoing and return ballot envelopes. Remember to 

review any envelope design changes with your local 

postal authority. It is recommended that you 

request their written approval on any changes. 

 Discuss options for the return mailing address 

for voted ballots with your local post office. 

Options include:

•	Your office address and zip plus 4

•	 Post Office assigns a special “plus 4” for the elections office only

•	 Establish a specific Post Office box for returned 

ballot envelopes.

Ballot Mailing 

important As soon as printed ballots are delivered, 

conduct routine logic and accuracy testing on all ballot 

styles. This logic and accuracy test MUST be completed 

prior to mailing or issuing any ballots to voters.

It is important to track the number of envelopes 

printed each day and balance that number to the 

number of voter records flagged in the voter file that 

were issued mail ballots on each day. Print a master 

listing of voter names issued absentee ballots as a 

part of your audit trail for each election. Each day that 

envelopes are printed, a master listing of voter names 

should also be printed and balanced to the number 

of envelopes printed, inserted, and delivered to the 

post office every day. This audit trail will also provide 

the necessary tool for your use in tracking and verifying your printed ballot inventory. 

Coordinate delivery of the outgoing ballots with 

your local post office. They will schedule a time frame 

that allows for the immediate distribution of ballots. 

NOte Larger post offices sometimes require delivery to a 

specific dock area. If delivery is by truck, the Post Office 

may require the truck to be weighed before the mailing is 

loaded and again before off-loading the ballots.
52  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Ballot Reception

The most common delivery method of absentee ballots 

is by mail. Other methods include drop site locations, 

often including a location at your local election office. 

The local election office may wish to consider coordinating a time with the Post Office to pick up the 

mail each morning. Even if the return address is the 

election office, you can arrange with the Post Office 

to pick up the voted/returned ballots each day. This 

will allow for earlier ballot processing. If ballots are 

returned to a P.O. Box number, the election office 

should consider establishing a written procedure for 

collecting these ballot envelopes. 

NOte Remember to coordinate with the Post Office 

for the latest pick-up time for last minute returns on 

Election Night. 

If you plan to use drop site locations, be sure to 

refer to State Law and State administrative policies and 

procedures. You will want to determine drop site locations based on population, geographic areas, security 

and available funding. Consider using city and/or 

county facilities, public assistance offices, senior and 

community centers, secure locations in areas with significant minority or traditionally disenfranchised communities as drop off locations when applicable. 

When determining locations, be sure to consider 

where the ballot box will be placed. Items to consider 

include: 

 security

 voter convenience

 access for the physically disabled 

 parking

Remember that the ballot boxes must be locked 

and secure at all times. They should be located in an 

area that can be viewed and monitored by authorized 

personnel.

If you plan to use outdoor mailboxes for drive-by 

or walking traffic, the ballot drop site mailboxes 

should be accessible only by a key that is in the 

possession of two authorized election staff members. 

A predetermined collection schedule should be established. A team of two election staff should transfer the 

voted ballots to a locked or sealed ballot box, bag or 

pouch and deliver same to the election office. 

Be sure to communicate the location and hours 

of operation for all drop sites in your jurisdiction. On 

Election Day, the drop site locations must be monitored throughout the day until the close of the polls or 

deadline for ballot receipt. 

If State law allows the voter to drop off voted 

absentee ballots at early voting locations and/or the 

polling places on Election Day, be sure to include 

instructions and procedures for poll workers to use 

in returning these voted ballot envelopes to the central 

election office. 

There must be an audit trail throughout the 

ballot reception process. Consider maintaining logs 

for processing the ballots through different steps. 

Maintain all statistical information for each precinct.

This may include:

 number of ballots issued 

 number of ballots received 

 number of ballots counted 

 name, team number or person 

 date and time processed 

 number of challenged ballots 

 number of write-ins and duplicated ballots 

 number of envelopes that do not contain a ballot

 number of envelopes containing more than one 

ballot 

 number of provisional ballots counted and 

not counted 

The audit trail begins when the first ballot envelopes are returned from voters. On a daily basis, staff 

at the elections office counts and logs the number of:

 ballots returned by the Post Office

 ballots received over the counter

 ballots received from drop sites, if applicable

 ballots forwarded to other counties

 ballots returned undeliverable 

tip

Take the return ballot envelope package (containing 

the return ballot and all envelopes) to the post office 

to confirm the return postage amount. Include this 

information as an insert message to the voter.
Election Management Guidelines  5 3

Initial Envelope Sort:

The ballot envelopes are then sorted into categories. 

Examples include:

 Signature and address match

 Challenged Ballots 

• No signature on ballot envelope

• Address or name does not match voter record

• Ballot has markings that could identify the voter

• Signature does not match signature on file

Based on State law, jurisdictions establish internal procedures for managing returned ballot envelopes with no signatures. These options may include 

automatically re-mailing (if time permits) the 

unsigned and unopened envelope back to the voter in 

a separate outgoing envelope. Often the election staff 

is required to notify the voter that the ballot cannot 

be processed unless the envelope is signed by the 

close of polls on Election Day. The voter can be provided several options, including:

 Request a replacement ballot be mailed (if time 

permits)

 Sign the return identification ballot envelope at 

the elections office

 Request that the original unsigned envelope be 

re-mailed to the voter for a signature (if time permits) 

If signature verification is required by State law, it 

is important to provide your staff with signature verification training; training should include a section on 

how physical and cognitive impairments may cause 

signatures to not match . Implement a three-step process for reviewing all rejected signatures—first check 

is done by part time and/or regular staff; second check 

is done by more experienced staff; and the third check 

is conducted by the canvass board. Consider utilizing 

the following criteria as an example when comparing to 

the signature on file: 

 Capital letters match 

 Letters tail off alike 

 Letter spacing is the same 

 Space between signature and the line is the same 

 Beginning and ending of signature and the slant 

are consistent 

 Unique letters match

 Overall appearances match

NOte If it is determined that the signature does not match 

the voter registration card or digitized signature, notify the 

voter and take other action that is required by your State 

law, policy and/or regulations. 

NOte Review State law and/or regulations regarding signatures of voters who are, physically or otherwise, unable to 

sign their name.

Data Entry of Returned Ballot Envelopes:

For all ballots that fall into the category of “signature 

and address match”, the envelope is recorded as 

“returned” and data entry is completed. The number of 

envelopes in this category is recorded on a data entry 

log on a daily basis. This number should balance to 

the number of envelopes stored and flagged as “ready 

to open and process” (see Sample Form 7.1).

SAMPLE FORM 7.1: RETURNED BALLOT ENVELOPES DATA ENTRY LOG

Ballots returned—Summary of Data Entry

Election

Date # Data Entered Accumulative Total Entered
54  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

For purposes of balancing ballots received to ballots 

counted, you may want to bundle these envelopes 

into batches, number the batches for auditing 

purposes, and label the bundles (see sample data 

entry log strip below).

Replacement Ballots (if permitted by State law)

A replacement ballot is issued when a voter requests 

by phone, in writing or in person a second ballot 

because the original ballot was destroyed, spoiled, 

lost or not received. If required, the voter must complete and sign a replacement ballot request form. 

Once a request for a replacement ballot has been 

received, the election official must:

	Verify that the voter has not voted another ballot

	Record that the voter has been issued a replacement ballot

	Issue the replacement ballot by mail or other means 

Ballot Processing

Based on State law and/or local policies and procedures, ballot envelopes are authorized to be opened. 

This process is done in several stages and is managed 

by separate teams of staff. 

	The first stage is opening the ballot envelopes and 

verifying that the batch contains the number of 

envelopes as noted on the data entry log strip. If 

the envelopes have been stored in batches, the 

opening team must keep the envelopes within 

their batches through the opening process.

NOte It is recommended that envelopes opened each day 

be processed completely and securely stored at the end of 

the day. 

	The second stage is separating the ballot from the 

envelope. During this stage the ballots are pulled 

Data Entry Log Strip

Date Entered Batch Number

Total Number Entered

Staff Initials

from envelopes and the envelopes are immediately 

placed into storage containers. 

	The third stage is the review stage (depending 

upon State law). During the review stage, ballots 

are analyzed for possible duplication, i.e. damaged 

ballots, identifying marks, etc. 

	The last stage is tabulation. The ballots move to the 

scanners, remaining in their original batches—

and the total number of ballots scanned is validated 

at the time of tabulation. All scanned ballots are 

stored in batched in secured and/or tamper-evident sealed containers.

Ballot Review Process

Ballot review teams determine whether ballots should 

be counted, rejected or duplicated. The object of ballot 

review is to ensure that all ballots are machine-readable 

and that the voter’s actual vote will be recorded accurately. If the ballot has damage or defects that would 

cause problems in tallying, the ballot may be duplicated, if provided by State law. 

Based on State law, determine whether your 

jurisdiction is responsible for determining voter 

intent and at what stage of the process this is to be 

done (before tabulation or after attempted tabulation). If so, establish teams of two board members of 

differing political party affiliation to work together 

to determine voter intent. 

important reminder

Before storing ballot envelopes, recheck that all envelopes 

are empty.
Election Management Guidelines  55

The ballot review teams should also be trained 

to check for questionable marks and write-in votes at 

the same inspection.

Questionable marks are:

	marks that cannot be read by the ballot counting 

equipment 

	a checkmark or an “X” in the voting area 

	voting area completed too lightly 

	voter’s choice not marked in the voting area, such 

as a write-in with an unmarked arrow or circle 

	marks that could identify the voter

	marks indicating the voter’s change of mind and/or 

	comments marked in the voting area 

Determining Voter Intent

If the inspection board agrees on the voter’s intent, 

the ballot should be duplicated to reflect the voter’s 

intent and the duplicated ballot counted. If the 

inspection board does not agree on the voter’s intent, 

the ballot should be challenged and forwarded to 

the canvass board. 

NOte Jurisdictions should follow their State’s definition of 

what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote 

(Section 301(a)(6) of the Help America Vote Act).

Examples of the ballot review are noted below 

for reference only:

		The arrow or oval has been completed for one 

response and a dot or partially completed arrow 

or oval is marked for the other.

 Yes

 No

	The arrow or oval has not been marked, but the 

response is circled. 

 Yes

 No

	The arrow or oval has not been marked but there 

is a connective line between the response and the 

arrow or oval to indicate the vote. 

—Yes 

	More than one arrow or oval has been completed, but 

a word or mark is used to indicate the correct vote. 

 

	A word has been used to indicate the vote instead 

of completing the arrow or the oval. 

 

 

Duplication boards, regardless of the vote tally 

system used, process ballots requiring duplication, 

making a duplicate ballot that is machine-readable 

and reflects the voter’s intent. Duplicating and proofing 

SAMPLE FORM 7.2: DUPLICATE BALLOT LOG

Duplicate Ballot Log

Date

Election

Batch 

Number

Ballot 

Style and/

or precinct

Assigned 

Duplicate 

Number

Reason (Be Specific)

Ex: Torn—letter opener, from mail, etc.

Check Mark—pencil, black ink, red ink, etc

Staff 

Initial

Board 

Initial

Date
56  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

must be done by at least two election personnel each 

with a different party affiliation. Each worker should 

initial both ballots and complete a duplicate ballot log 

(see Sample Form 7.2). A unique duplicate number is 

assigned to each ballot to be duplicated for tracking 

and auditing purposes.

NOte The original ballot is retained and is uniquely numbered to be easily identified with its duplicated ballot.

Ballot Tabulation

When the review teams have verified ballots for 

scanning, it is recommended that a form be prepared 

for each batch of ballots to be counted (see Sample 

Form 7.3). 

The form should include the originally assigned 

batch number and the number of ballots sent to the 

scanner, including any exceptions. Types of exceptions 

include: (1) no ballot in the envelope; (2) more than 

one ballot in the envelope; (3) ballot from wrong 

election in the envelope, etc. 

By developing and maintaining an audit trail 

from the time that ballot envelopes are returned from 

the post office, through the initial sort, into the opening/separating and review process, at tabulation the 

audit team can verify that all ballots returned are 

accounted for—and have been either challenged or 

tabulated. 

A sample ballot log transfer sheet is below.

It is recommended that ballots being counted 

in a centralized location on scanners be handled 

in batches. Each batch should be validated to the 

cumulative counter on the scanner. A central scanner log should be maintained detailing the batch 

numbers and total number of ballots scanned per 

batch. If the scanner uses a memory card, the memory 

card should be appropriately labeled and identified on 

the scanner log sheet. Refer to Sample Form 7.4 for an 

example of a scanner log sheet.

BALLOT LOG TrANSFEr ShEET

Election

Opening and Ballot removal Team report

 (Team Initials)

Batch Number

Batch Date

Total in Batch

Exceptions 

Total Ballots Sent to Scanner

Scanning Team report

 (Team Initials)

Number received To Be Scanned

 Scanner # 

 Memory Card Assigned

Number Scanned (Count)

Number of Overvotes

Number of Blank Votes

Form is filed in master log book in batch number order and balanced to return Mail Ballots by Batch Number Log assuring that 

all batches have been scanned.

SAMPLE FORM 7.3: BALLOT LOG TRANSFER SHEET
Election Management Guidelines  57

Managing Absentee Ballots 

at the Polls on Election Day

Depending upon State law, internal procedures must 

be established for managing the return of absentee 

ballots at the polls on Election Day. These procedures 

must be incorporated within your poll worker training 

guidelines. 

To assist poll workers on Election Day, prepare a 

visual flow chart detailing the steps to follow, based 

on the specific voter scenario. On the next page is an 

example of a flow chart for this purpose based on a 

sample provided by an election jurisdiction.

Storage and Security

Storage:

All ballots and empty ballot envelopes should be 

boxed and sealed in tamper evident containers. Store 

all other records—ballot return logs, duplicate logs, 

scanner logs, etc. according to Federal and your 

State’s retention rules.

All challenged and/or provisional ballots that are 

not eligible to be counted should be stored separately. 

Security

Prepare a written security plan on the processing of 

absentee/vote by mail ballots. The plan should include 

the following details: 

	Security at the printing facility

	Security for periods of ballot transportation (e.g. 

from print shop to location of insertion; from mailing house to Post Office and from Post Office to 

election office other than regular mail delivery)

	Security for ballots during processing

	Security for ballot drop sites

	Guidelines for security involving observers 

	Document the security of your office work area, 

building and ballot storage (alarms, cameras, special 

keys, limited keys)

	Document security for vote tally systems, computer 

access security and off-site storage for system backups.

At all times, ballots must be maintained in a 

secure location in accordance with your written 

security plan. Adequate supervision must be provided 

during all processing activities. 

Establish and maintain a log of who has access 

(keys, electronic codes, etc.) to secure areas. To prevent 

unauthorized access, consider installing secondary 

locks accessible only to authorized Elections Officials 

on election-specific dates. 

Voter Education

It is important that election officials take extra efforts 

to inform voters of the proper way to vote their ballot 

and all other procedures required for returning the 

ballot envelope to ensure that their vote is counted.

Scanner Log Sheet

Election 

Scanner # Batch # Count # Blanks Overvotes

SAMPLE FORM 7.4: SCANNER LOG SHEET

tip

Consider storing ballots by precinct for recount and/or 

auditing purposes.

reminder

Use of motion detectors, video cameras, alarm systems 

and other technology may be appropriate supplements 

to locks. 
58  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

ABSENTEE VOTER FLOW CHART

VOTER ABSENTEE BALLOT

Returned by voter Returned by 

someone other 

than the voter

Signed by voter

Signed by 

Returnee

Check for Signature and Address

Returned voted 

ballot without 

envelope

1. Use Absentee 

Ballot Envelope 

in supply kit

2. Add precinct 

number

3. Have voter 

complete 

envelope

4. Voter signs and 

seals Ballot in 

envelope

VOTER WANTS TO VOTE AT THE POLLS

(Voter’s name is in the Roster)

Voter has No Absentee Ballot 

but wants to vote at polls

Voter has Absentee Ballot but 

wants to vote at polls

1. Complete blue provisional page 

located in the inactive/

Provisional Roster

2. Add Preinct Number and Ballot 

Type (Add Party for Primary 

Elections)

3. Mark reason why voter is 

voting a provisional ballot. 

Note time if voter arrives 

after 8:00 p.m.

4. Instruct Voter to read “Voter 

Information “on back of 

Provisional Envelope and 

to complete “Declaration 

of Voter” on right side of 

envelope

5. Issue voter ballot in Blue 

Secracy Folder and Provisional 

Envelope

6. Receive ballot in sealed 

envelope, check for 

completeness

7. Give voter blue provisional 

phone card

1. Write “Surrendered” on 

Envelope and/or Ballot. Do 

not open envelope if sealed.

2. Place Surrendered Ballot in 

Spoiled/Surrendered AV’s Bag

3. Write “Surrendered or “Surr” 

on signature line

4. Voter signs roster

5. Issue voter a ballot in secrecy 

sleeve

Votes Provisional Voter surrenders Ballot

THE BALLOT WILL NOT BE 

COUNTED UNLESS THE 

DECLARATIN IS COMPLETED 

AND SIGNED

PLACE INTO BLACK BALLOT BAG PLACE IN SCANNER

SAMPLE FORM 7.5: ABSENTEE VOTER FLOW CHART
Election Management Guidelines  59

Be sure to print clear concise instructions on the 

ballot with simple visual aids indicating how to fill in 

the oval or connect the lines to select their choices. 

The outside of the ballot envelope should contain a 

quick checklist and/or instructions to remind voters 

of common problems encountered, i.e. “Signature is 

required in order to count your ballot”, postage 

amount required, etc.

In order to ensure that all voters have access to 

information about voting absentee by mail, establish 

a variety of communication methods. 

Listed below are examples:

	Create an informational brochure with instructions on how to vote absentee by mail. If permitted, 

include a copy of the vote by mail ballot application 

form as a “tear off return mail page” on the brochure. 

Make these brochures available at area city hall, 

libraries, etc. Distribute them at “Get Out the Vote” 

speaking engagements, community events, registration drives, etc. 

Example Be sure to include information about all aspects 

of voting by mail, including how to request a replacement 

ballot, and how to qualify to become a “permanent” vote 

by mail voter, if permitted by State law.

	Post information about absentee vote by mail procedures on your jurisdiction’s web site. Information on 

all deadlines should be posted along with dates that 

voters can expect the ballots to be mailed. If voted 

ballots must be received in your office by a certain 

date, be sure to include that date in BOLD. If possible, 

include a downloadable copy of the vote by mail 

ballot application form, if required. 

	Provide this information to high schools, community colleges, and universities. Partner with these 

learning institutions to distribute voter registration 

and absentee voting instructions with enrollment 

packets. Encourage them to communicate Election 

Day deadlines for voter registration and absentee 

voting through the use of email, pod casting, and 

text messaging. 

	Encourage candidates to provide information to 

voters about how to vote absentee by mail. 

	Distribute absentee voting procedures brochure 

to special interest groups: nursing homes, assisted 

living centers, hospitals, military installations, etc.

	Utilize brochures, flyers, and your jurisdiction’s web 

site to inform the voter about how to ensure that the 

ballot will be counted. Provide answers to “frequently 

asked questions” such as: “Can I drop my voted 

absentee ballot at the polls on Election Day?”; “Will 

my ballot be counted if I mail it on Election Day?”; 

“I made a mistake while voting my ballot. How do 

I get a new ballot?”

	Provide your local and State media with any deadlines and requirements specific to absentee voting.

	Provide all of this information in the appropriate 

alternate language(s) if your jurisdiction is covered 

for language assistance under the Voting Rights Act.

	Materials should also be developed in formats 

accessible to voters with disabilities. For resources 

and information on how to develop brochures, 

flyers, websites, and other materials that are accessible visit the Access Board at http://www.accessboard.gov/ or contact them at 202.272.0080 (v) 

or at 202.272.0082 (TTY). You may also find the 

following resource useful: Accessibility of State and 

Local Government Websites to People with Disabilities: http://www.ada.gov/websites2.htm. 

tip

Provide a scripted handout to all candidates and 

encourage them to use it for all campaign literature to 

ensure consistency in all printed material.

tip

If permitted, consider including a link that allows 

voters to confirm their voter registration status and to 

request an early/absentee ballot from your web site. 

If their information needs to be updated, provide another 

link to a voter registration form, allowing the voter to 

manage their own updates at their convenience.

Election Management Guidelines  61

C h apte r 8

uniformed and overseas citizens

Introduction

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act (UOCAVA) of 1986 [42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1], as 

modified by the National Defense Authorization Act 

of 2005, ensures the rights of absent Uniformed Services voters and overseas voters to register to vote and 

cast absentee ballots for Federal offices. The Secretary 

of Defense, as the Presidential designee has primary 

responsibility for Federal functions under UOCAVA. 

He is also authorized to delegate any or all of the 

functions, responsibilities, powers, authority, or discretion devolving upon him to any person or persons 

within the Department of Defense (DoD) [Executive 

Order 12642]. As such, DoD has assigned to the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) the responsibility of administering the Federal responsibilities of 

the Presidential designee (Secretary of Defense) under 

UOCAVA and the National Voter Registration Act 

(NVRA) of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 1973gg-7(a)]. FVAP provides 

services to over 6 million potential voters, including 

over 3 million overseas civilians; 1.4 million military 

members; 1.3 million military family members; and 

100,000 Federal civilian overseas employees.

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) amended 

the UOCAVA by prohibiting States from refusing to 

process registration and/or absentee ballot requests 

from these voters because the form was received too 

early during the election year. UOCAVA, as amended, 

also allows these voters to use one application to 

request ballots for two subsequent general elections.

In addition, UOCAVA Section 102(c), as amended 

by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, requires 

each State and unit of local government which administered the election to, no later than 90 days after 

the date of each regularly scheduled general election 

for Federal office, submit a report to the EAC on the 

combined number of absentee ballots transmitted to 

absent Uniformed Services voters and overseas voters 

for the election and the combined number of such 

ballots that were returned by such voters and cast 

in the election. They are also required to make this 

report available to the general public.

Definitions and Forms

Who is an absent Uniformed Services voter? An 

absent Uniformed Services voter is:

	A member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 

Corps, Coast Guard, the commissioned corps of the 

Public Health Service, and the commissioned corps 

of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration who, by reason of active duty, is absent 

from the place of residence where the member is 

otherwise qualified to vote.

	A member of the Merchant Marine who, by reason 

of service in the Merchant Marine, is absent from 

the place of residence where the member is otherwise qualified to vote.

	A member of any State National Guard or a Reserve 

member deployed or on assignment away from his/

her residence while in Federal service. 

	A spouse or dependent of a uniformed services 

member who, by reason of the active duty or service 

of the member, is absent from the place of residence 

where the spouse or dependent is otherwise qualified to vote.

What is the legal State of residence for a Uniformed 

Services member? The State where the Uniformed 

Services member has, or has had, physical presence 

at the location and where there is the intent to remain 

or return.

Who is an overseas citizen? An overseas citizen is 

a person who resides outside the United States and 

is qualified to vote in the last place in which the 

person was domiciled before leaving the United States 
62  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

or a person who resides outside the United States and, 

but for such residence, would be qualified to vote 

in the last place in which the person was domiciled 

before leaving the United States. Eligibility to vote and 

residency requirements are determined by each State.

What is the legal State of residence for an overseas 

citizen? The State or territory where the voter last resided 

immediately prior to departure from the United States, 

even if many years have elapsed, and the voter maintains no residence in the State or territory, and the voter’s intent to return to that State or territory may not 

be certain. 

NOTE Currently 16 States allow eligible U.S. citizens who 

have never resided in the United States to register and 

vote where a U.S citizen parent would be eligible to vote. 

Below are some questions that may be helpful 

in determining a voter’s legal State of residence:

	Where was the voter registered to vote?

	What State issued the voter a driver’s license?

	Where is the voter’s automobile registered?

	Where does the voter’s family live?

	Where does the voter own property?

What ballots will UOCAVA voters receive?

UOCAVA requires States and territories to allow the 

covered groups listed above to register and vote absentee ballots in elections for Federal office. In addition, 

laws in many States and territories also allow citizens 

covered by UOCAVA to register and vote absentee 

ballots in State and local elections.

The Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) Standard 

Form 76. This is a postage-paid postcard for use by 

UOCAVA voters. The form is designed as a single postcard to serve the States both as an absentee voter registration application and an absentee ballot request. 

An online version of this form is available at 

www.fvap.gov. Voters using the online FPCA must 

print the completed form, place it in an envelope and 

affix postage to the mailing envelope or use the postage-free envelope that may be printed using the link 

available at www.fvap.gov. The form can be filled 

in on-line, printed, signed, dated, and placed in an 

envelope with the correct postage and mailed to the 

appropriate local election official. Other instructions 

are available on the FVAP’s web site. 

See page 65 for a sample of the FPCA form. 

The Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) Standard Form 186. This is an emergency “back-up” ballot 

available for citizens covered under the UOCAVA. It is 

used to vote for Federal offices in general elections or 

as otherwise permitted by State law. 

The following criteria must be met: 

	The citizen must be a member of the Uniformed 

Services or Merchant Marines (or eligible family 

member), or a United States citizen overseas who is 

absent from his/her place of residence where he or 

she is otherwise qualified to vote, and

	apply for a regular ballot, using the FPCA, or other 

form as permitted by the State, early enough so that 

the local election official receives the request at least 

30 days before the election or before the ballot 

request deadline established by the State, whichever 

is later, and

	not have received the requested regular absentee 

ballot from the State.

See page 66 for samples from a FWAB form.

Communication Techniques

Military and overseas voters face unique challenges in 

registering to vote, requesting and receiving the blank 

ballot, and returning the voted ballots. Communication 

is the key ingredient for ensuring that these voters are 

able to participate in the democratic process.

In 2005, the FPCA and the FWAB forms were 

updated to include an area for the voter to provide 

his or her email address. By collecting and storing 

these email addresses on each voter’s record, you can 

quickly contact the voter to confirm his or her registration status, let the voter know when you are sending out the ballot, email a blank ballot to a voter, and 

ask the voter to acknowledge receipt of the absentee 

ballot. By establishing an email connection with your 

UOCAVA voters, the voter has a staff member and email 

address to get quick answers to his or her questions.

Election officials can also find a postcard acknowledgment form on the FVAP’s website (sample of the 

front and back of card is provided below. You can use 

this form to notify the voter that the FPCA has been 

received and accepted, or that more information is 

tip

Consider sending out periodic news “updates” to all of 

your UOCAVA voters by using this email connection.
Election Management Guidelines  6 3

required to process the form.

If for some reason your office receives returned 

undeliverable UOCAVA absentee ballots, it is recommended that you take every step possible to obtain 

the correct mailing address for the voter.

	Utilize telephone, fax, or email contact information provided on the FPCA. 

NOTE Faxes to voters are toll-free to any location in the 

world by using the FVAP’s Election Transmission Service, 

1.800.368.8683.

	Double check the mailing address on the return 

envelope and compare it to the address provided 

by the voter on the absentee ballot request.

	Contact a local family member of the voter.

	Request an updated address through the FVAP’s 

Department of Defense’s database, by sending an 

email to vote@fvap.ncr.gov with the subject 

“Address Update” or by faxing to 703.696.1352. Be 

sure to include the name of the voter, date of birth, 

and if possible, the full social security number 

if available. 

NOTE This service is only available for Uniformed Service 

Member voters.

For UOCAVA voters, often the Internet is their 

best source of information. It is available to them 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week. If your office maintains 

a website, it is recommended that you create a special 

resource area devoted to these voters. Consider including 

the following types of information on your website:

	Provide a link to the Federal Voting Assistance 

Program website—www.fvap.gov

	Display information on State-specific rules and 

regulations for UOCAVA voters. Be sure to include 

a link to the FPCA online version—www.fvap.gov/

pubs/onlinefpca.html

	Post a direct email link and/or toll-free phone 

number to encourage UOCAVA voters to contact 

your office with any questions. Be sure that your 

staff is trained to monitor and respond promptly to 

any email inquiries. Tip: Consider creating and listing, on your website, a unique email address specific 

for UOCAVA voters so that emails coming in from 

these voters can be directed to specific staff trained 

to respond to UOCAVA voter concerns. 

	Provide an online voter status search tool for UOCAVA 

voters, allowing them to verify their voter registration status. Include a link to the online FPCA form 

to assist them in registering to vote and requesting 

their absentee ballot.

NOTE The United States Postal Service has introduced 

a new tag that can be placed on outgoing trays, bundled 

mail, pallets, etc. to specifically identify and differentiate 

domestic and overseas absentee ballots from political 

mailings. Check the USPS web site for details at www.

usps.com/electionmail

Because transmitting voting material through 

the mail may delay receipt and return, there are 

currently three alternative transmission methods 

allowed by various States:

	Send the FPCA for registration and ballot request 

by fax or email as permitted by the State.

	Receive the blank ballot by fax or email as permitted 

by the State.

	Return the voted ballot by fax or email as permitted 

by the State.

NOTE Be sure that the voter always mails the original 

FPCA and voted ballot after faxing or emailing.

Resources for Local Election Officials

The Voting Assistance Guide is the official and primary 

source of UOCAVA absentee voting information. The 

Guide provides information about FVAP products and 

services and includes State instructions and guidelines. 

It is available on line at www.fvap.gov

The Guide helps local election officials understand 

the information provided to military and overseas voters. 

The FVAP’s ombudsman service is available toll-free 

at 1.800.438.VOTE (8683), by email at vote@fvap.

ncr.gov, or by fax at 703.696.1352. This service is very 

useful for locating active duty military voters when 

the address that you have on file is no longer valid. It 

is also available to you for ordering additional FPCA 

forms or to answer basic questions about military 

and overseas voters.

The Voting Information News (VIN) is a monthly 

newsletter published by FVAP that contains timely 

information for Voting Assistance Officers. The Election 
64  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Official News is a monthly newsletter published by 

FVAP that contains information for election officials 

regarding military and overseas voting. All local and 

State election officials should subscribe to these newsletters by sending an email to vote@fvap.ncr.gov.

Local election officials should log onto the FVAP’s 

“Resources for Election Officials” at www.fvap.gov/

leo/leo.html. At this site you will have access to useful 

information on providing services to UOCAVA voters.

The following is contact information for the Department of Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance Program:

Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

1155 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-1155

1.800.438.8683 (Toll free)

703.588.1584

703.696.1352 (Fax)

www.fvap.gov

vote@fvap.ncr.gov

The next pages contain the following: 

	sample Federal Post Card Application (FPCA)

	sample Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB)

	sample ballot transmission envelope

	sample ballot return envelope (back and front) 

	sample local election official acknowledgement card

	USPS Domestic Mail Manual 703: Nonprofit Standard Mail & Other Unique Eligibility - Absentee 

Balloting Materials

	FVAP’s Envelope Design Guidelines

EAC RESOURCES AVAILABLE AT WWW.EAC.GOV

 EAC’s Best Practices on Military and Overseas Voters (2004)

 2004 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act Survey

 2006 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act Survey

 UOCAVA Voters and the Electronic Transmission of Voting Materials in Four States (2007)

 Voting from Abroad: A Survey of UOCAVA Voters (2007)

 Also visit the EAC’s specific webpage for uniformed and overseas voters at http://www.eac.gov/voter/overseas-citizensand-military-voters for additional organizations and resources that can be of assistance to election officials and voters.
Election Management Guidelines  65

SAMPLE FORM 8.1: FEDERAL POST CARD APPLICATION (FPCA)
66  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

SAMPLE FORM 8.2: FEDERAL WRITE-IN ABSENTEE BALLOT (FWAB)
Election Management Guidelines  67

SAMPLE FORM 8.2: FEDERAL WRITE-IN ABSENTEE BALLOT (FWAB)
68  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

SAMPLE FORM 8.3: BALLOT TRANSMISSION ENVELOPE

NO POSTAGE NECESSARY IN THE U.S. MAIL-DMM 703.8.0

SAMPLE FORM 8.4: BALLOT RETURN ENVELOPE

(""%

%-"('&"% 4-

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!UTHORIZEDBYTHE530OSTAL3ERVICE

Name and complete address

MAX

Height 6 1/8 inches

Length 11 1/2 inches

MIN

Height 3 1/2 inches

Length 5 1/2 inches

Use Black Ink

BALLOT RETURN ENVELOPE

(Sample)

If mailed in non U.S. Postal System - Voter must pay postage

NO POSTAGE NECESSARY IN THE U.S. MAIL-DMM 703.8.0
Election Management Guidelines  69

SAMPLE FORM 8.5: BALLOT RETURN ENVELOPE (BACK STANDARD OATH)

Standard Oath

I swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury, that I am:

1. A member of the Uniformed Services or merchant marine on active duty; or an eligible spouse or dependent of such a member; or,

 A U.S. citizen temporarily residing outside the U.S.; or,

 Other U.S. citizen residing outside the U.S.; and

2. I am a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age (or will be by the date of the election), and I am eligible to vote in the requested jurisdiction; and

3. I have not been convicted of a felony, or other disqualifying offense, or been adjudicated mentally incompetent, or, if so, my voting rights have been reinstated; and

4. I am not registering, requesting a ballot, or voting in any other jurisdiction in the U.S., except the jurisdiction cited in this voting form.

In voting, I have marked and sealed my ballot in private and have not allowed any person to observe the marking of the ballot, except for those authorized to assist 

voters under state or Federal law. I have not been influenced.

My signature and date below indicate when I completed this document.

The information on this form is true, accurate, and complete to the best of my knowledge. I understand that a material misstatement of fact in completion of this 

document may constitute grounds for conviction of perjury.

Signed:____________________________________ Date:__________________

 Month/Day/Year

Witness(es) or Notary signature and date:

Signed:____________________________________ Date:__________________

 Month/Day/Year

BALLOT RETURN ENVELOPE - BACK (Sample)

For States Requiring the Oath be Witness or Notarized

SAMPLE FORM 8.6: LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CARD
70  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

USPS DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL 703
Election Management Guidelines  71

USPS DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL 703
72  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

FVAP’S ENVELOPE DESIGN GUIDELINES

Federal Voting Assistance Program 

Department of Defense 

Washington, DC 20301-1155 

ENVELOPE DESIGN GUIDELINES 

The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) administers the Uniformed and Overseas 

Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which covers the voting rights of all members of the 

Uniformed Services, the merchant marine and their family members, and all U.S. citizens who 

reside outside the United States. 

The most common barrier that Uniformed Service members and overseas citizens encounter 

when voting absentee is insufficient ballot transit time. Many of these citizens are located in 

remote areas around the world where regular mail delivery is unpredictable or difficult to obtain. 

The FVAP works with the United States Postal Service (USPS) on a continuing basis to 

determine the most effective way to timely deliver voting materials to our citizens worldwide. 

The USPS suggests the following guidelines to expedite mail through the automatic mail 

processing system. Please disseminate this information to the local election officials in your 

state.

x Use black ink on white paper. 

x Place the Facing Identification Marks (FIM), at the top and near the right hand corner of the 

mail piece. Generally, FIM C is used for business reply mail with a preprinted barcode, FIM 

B is used without a preprinted barcode. Consult with a mail piece design analyst for 

assistance if needed. 

x Place the U.S. Postage Paid 39 USC 3406 in the upper right hand corner with the words PAR 

AVION printed below. 

x The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act is now reflected under section 

703.8.0 of the Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) and should read:

“Official Absentee Balloting Material – First Class Mail 

 No Postage Necessary In The U.S. Mails-DMM 703.8.0” 

x The new Official Election Mail logo can also be used on the envelope to quickly and easily 

identify voting-related mail. The logo cannot be resized or altered. However, FVAP has been 

advised by the USPS that the small application originally slated to be used on postcards only 

can be used on any size ballot transmission and return voting materials. 

Your current supplies of voting materials may still be used. We suggest that upon depletion of 

your current stock of voting materials, the above recommendations be considered when 

designing new materials for printing in order to expedite mail processing. Consult with a mail 

piece design analyst at the USPS to assist with the design of your new mail piece. 

If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact the FVAP at

1-800-438-VOTE (8683).

Last updated on July 1, 2005. 
Election Management Guidelines  73

C h apte r 9

Polling Place and Vote

Center Management

Introduction

Depending upon State law, every registered voter has 

the opportunity to participate in democracy by voting 

at an in-person early voting location during a designated 

time period prior to Election Day, voting at their polling place on Election Day, or by requesting an absentee 

ballot in the mail. 

Note Absentee by mail voting requirements are covered 

in Chapter 7) 

The various types of polling places/vote centers 

can be defined, as follows:

	Election Day Precinct-Specific Polling Place—Each 

voting precinct is assigned to a unique polling place.

	Election Day Consolidated Precinct Polling Place—

Two or more voting precincts are assigned to a unique 

polling place. This is often based on several factors, 

including the number of voters in each precinct, 

size/location of the polling place facilities and the 

expected voter turnout for each polling place.

	Election Day Vote Center (jurisdiction-wide)—

Several polling place/vote centers strategically 

located throughout the jurisdiction where any voter 

in the entire jurisdiction can vote on Election Day.

	Election Day Vote Center (regional)—Several 

polling place/vote centers strategically located by 

region where any voter within a specific region can 

vote on Election Day.

	Early Voting Vote Center (jurisdiction-wide)—

Several early voting vote centers strategically located 

throughout the jurisdiction where any voter in the 

entire jurisdiction can vote during the designated 

early voting time period.

	Early Voting Vote Center (regional)—Various 

early voting vote centers strategically located by 

region where any voter within a specific region 

can vote during the designated early voting 

time period.

A variety of polling place management requirements apply to all of the above types of voting locations, and likewise, other requirements are specific and 

unique, based upon which polling place method(s) is 

utilized in your jurisdiction.

The following types of management requirements 

apply to all polling places:

	Buildings should be located in close proximity to 

the voters who are served by the location.

	Property owner(s) must grant permission for the use 

of their building for voting purposes on Election Day.

	The buildings selected for use as polling places must 

meet Federal and State accessibility requirements.

	Buildings must have an adequate-sized room or 

hallway sufficient to meet the needs for setting up 

equipment and voter check-in stations, including 

adequate space for voters to wait in line.

	Property owner(s) may be requested to open the 

building for poll worker use the evening prior to 

Election Day, and must be willing to open the 

building in the early morning hours of Election 

Day until after the close of the polls.

	The property must have sufficient parking available 

for voters’ use on Election Day.

	Traffic ingress/egress must be evaluated, based on 

the number of expected voters on Election Day.

Requirements for a vote center polling place 

model include:

	Secure real-time communication line between Vote 

Center(s) and the central election office voter registration computer software.

	Ability to display all ballot styles on DRE equipment, 

or ability to store and secure large quantities of 

paper ballots for every ballot style.
74  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

	A team of skilled, trained, computer-literate poll 

workers that can commit to working a designated 

number of early voting days.

	Large centrally-located facilities equipped to handle 

large quantities of voters over an extended period 

of time.

	Large parking area with easy ingress/egress.

	Potential need for security guards during voting hours.

	Runners available to monitor and respond to supply 

needs during early voting hours.

	Cooperative agreement with area law enforcement 

agencies to provide traffic control during peak 

voting hours.

Locating Polling Place and Vote 

Center Sites

Depending upon State law, election officials are 

responsible for determining the number of polling 

places, their location, hours of operation, and which 

precincts to assign to each location.

Vote center locations should be selected in order 

to serve both the heavily populated urban cities as well 

as rural towns within your jurisdiction. In urban areas, 

they should be located near heavy traffic areas, large 

residential areas, major employers and public transportation routes. In rural areas, choose locations that 

are easily recognized within the community. If possible, choose locations that have served as polling 

places in the past. 

Types of buildings to consider using as Vote 

Centers include:

	Shopping Malls

	Grocery Stores

	Community Centers

	Large meeting rooms, i.e. public library, city/county 

government buildings, etc.

	Gymnasiums 

Election Day polling places should be selected 

based on location within the neighborhood served 

by the polling place. 

Types of buildings to consider for possible use 

as precinct-specific or consolidated polling places 

include:

	Church activity and/or community rooms

	School meeting rooms and gymnasiums, etc.

	VFW, American Legion and/or Masonic Lodge 

activity rooms

	City/county government meeting rooms

	Apartment clubhouses

	Country Club meeting rooms

	National Guard and other training centers

	Retirement building meeting rooms

	Area business meeting rooms

	Individual homes—often garages are used 

If the polling place is located in a building which 

is privately owned, the election jurisdiction must be 

granted permission to use the facilities to process 

voters. Election officials rely on community support 

to provide this much needed space. By building 

partnerships within your city/county government 

and within the community, you can begin to build 

a data base of all possible polling places that meet 

your criteria. 

Resources available, include, but are not 

limited to:

	City/ County Planning and Building Departments—contact the staff and request that they place 

you on an email mailing list to be notified of any new 

permits issued for large buildings in your jurisdiction.

	Area telephone directories—locate listings of 

churches, schools, apartment complexes, etc.

	County GIS/Mapping Department—partner with 

their staff to assist your office with building a layer 

of data including location of the building, size, parking, ingress/egress, contact information, etc.

	Area Chamber of Commerce—partner with them 

to develop an outreach program to all area businesses. 

Many businesses have large meeting rooms that would 

be suitable as a polling place on Election Day.

	Disabled community organizations—these groups 

often will volunteer to provide assistance to your office 

in locating and securing accessible polling places.

Continue to build upon your data base of possible 

polling places. In the event of last minute emergency 

polling place cancellations, you will be prepared with 

possible alternative locations.

The process begins by making the initial contact 

with the property/building owner to request a site 

visit of the facility and premises for possible use of 

their facility on Election Day. This provides an opportunity for your staff to begin to develop a long-term 
Election Management Guidelines  75

commitment and relationship with each property 

owner to help ensure that polling place locations 

stay as consistent as possible. 

At the initial meeting, provide detailed information about upcoming election dates, voting hours of 

operation, expected vehicle/people traffic capacity, and 

other expectations, i.e. pre-Election and post-Election 

Day equipment delivery and pickup, and night before 

Election Day voting area setup requirements, and other 

accessibility needs. It is a good idea to leave an informational fact sheet at the end of your initial on-site 

meeting. Be sure to leave your business card or contact 

information and to follow up a few days later with a 

letter or phone call to answer any new questions. If 

approval is granted, immediately send out a commitment agreement confirming the use of the facility. 

NOTE Be sure to check with your Legal Department to 

determine if a contract is required (see Sample Letter 

9.2 on next page).

Inspection Requirements

Before finalizing acceptance of any building for use 

as a polling place, you must conduct an accessibility 

survey and needs assessment. 

NOTE Portions of the following information are provided 

as excerpts from the Department of Justice’s ADA Checklist for Polling Places, dated February 2004. 

The following information is provided to help 

voting officials determine whether a polling place 

has basic accessible features needed by most voters 

with disabilities. It may be used when evaluating the 

accessibility of potential new polling places and when 

identifying physical barriers in existing polling places 

before temporary or permanent modifications are 

made to improve accessibility for elections.

Getting Started

An evaluation of polling place accessibility should focus 

on those areas of a facility that are important to voting. 

These often include parking for voters, a drop off or 

loading area, the entrance to the polling place, and 

the pedestrian routes (both exterior and interior) that 

voters use to get to the voter check-in and voting area.

Before a polling place is evaluated, it is useful for 

staff or volunteers to review instructions for completion 

of the facility checklist and become familiar with the 

questions. It is also helpful to practice taking measurements and recording information before beginning 

the evaluation.

When staff arrives at a polling place, it is best to 

first determine the location of parking, including 

accessible parking (if any is provided), the entrance 

that will be used on Election Day, and the location of 

the voting area. If the survey is being done to determine the accessibility of a new location for a polling 

place, then the walk-through should look for areas 

that provide the best accessibility, where simple 

modifications may provide accessibility, or where it 

may be easiest to improve accessibility by adding 

temporary features.

Using the Polling Place Checklist

A few simple tools may be used to measure the sizes 

and the slope of specific elements and spaces:

	A metal tape measure at least 15 feet long

	A level with a bubble measure or a digital measure 

at least 24 inches long for measuring slope, and

	A clipboard, copy of the checklist (one copy per 

polling place), and pens or pencils...

NOTE It is also a good idea to have a film or digital 

camera to document important areas that may need to 

be reviewed later.

One person can complete a survey of a polling 

place but it is often quicker and easier for two people 

to work together. One can be responsible for taking 

the measurements and the other for recording the 

information and taking any photographs. 

Image 9.1: Sample of effective polling place accessibility 

signage.
76  U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

SAMPLE LETTER 9.2: SELECTION OF POLLING PLACE FACILITY (Sacramento County, CA)
ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES  77

Taking Measurements

Sloped Surfaces—One way to measure slope is to use 

a 24-inch level with leveling bubble and a tape measure. Place the level on the incline in the direction 

you wish to measure. Rest one end of the level at the 

highest point of the sloped surface and lift the other 

end (as shown in the illustration) until the bubble is 

in the middle of the tube. This is the “level” position. 

While the level is in this position, measure the distance 

between the end of the level and the sloped surface 

below. If the distance is 2 inches or less, then the slope 

is 1:12 or less. When the distance is greater than 2 inches, 

record the distance on the checklist so the exact slope 

may be calculated later if needed.

Slopes may also be measured using a digital level. 

The digital display replaces the bubble and typically 

gives a reading that may be shown as a digital bubble, 

degrees, or a percent. Before using a digital level make 

sure to familiarize yourself with the directions. Many 

digital levels need to be calibrated each time they are 

used. If you can set the digital display to percent or 

degrees, the maximum slope generally allowed is 

8.33% or 4.76 degrees (for a 1:12 slope).

Using the Tape Measure—When measuring the width 

of a parking space or access aisle, the width of an accessible route or the height of an object above the floor, 

for example, try to keep the tape from sagging or bending. If the tape is not straight, try to support the tape 

in the middle or pull it tight and take the measurement again.

Measuring Door Openings—Measuring the clear opening of an accessible door requires special care. To measure the opening of a standard hinged door, open the 

door to 90 degrees. Place the end of the tape measure 

on the side of the door frame next to the clear opening 

(as shown in the drawing). Stretch the tape across the 

door opening to the face of the door. This measurement 

equals the clear open width of the door, which is typically less than the width of the door.

Completing the Checklist

A recommended checklist is based on requirements 

from the ADA Standards for Accessible Design (Standards). Election officials can find a copy on the web 

at: http://www .usdoj .gov/crt/ada/votingchecklist .

htm. Each item includes a reference to the technical 

requirements in the Standards from 28 C.F.R. Part 36, 

Appendix A. This reference is provided to assist users 

tip

Complete the survey by drawing a floor plan of the polling place, including the voting area. Attach this diagram 

to the signed polling place agreement.

Image 9.3: Measuring slope using a 24-inch level and tape measure.

Image 9.4: Using a tape measure to measure the width of a 

parking space.

Image 9.5: Measuring the clear opening from the face of the 

doorstop on the frame to the face of the open door.”
78  U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

in looking up the requirement or related requirements 

when necessary. An electronic copy of the Standards is 

available on the ADA Website at www .ada .gov. Printed 

copies are also available from the ADA Information 

Line at 800.514.0301 (voice) or 800.514.0383 (TTY).

After Completing the Survey

Completed polling place surveys will provide the information needed to determine which sites are accessible 

and which may become accessible with permanent or 

temporary modifications. Checklists where most answers 

are “yes” will usually indicate an accessible polling place. 

Others, where some answers are “no,” may become 

accessible if permanent or temporary modifications are 

done to remove barriers. Polling places in older buildings may have few accessible features but some of 

these voting facilities may be able to be made accessible with temporary modifications, such as portable 

ramps at the entrance and accessible parking spaces 

marked off by traffic cones. There may also be some 

sites that cannot be made accessible so plans will be 

needed to offer accessible voting in some other way.

getting to the polling place—typical Issues

When parking is provided for voters, staff and volunteers, accessible parking must be provided for people 

with disabilities. Voters with disabilities who arrive by 

car need a parking space close to an accessible entrance. 

The accessible parking space has an adjacent access 

aisle that provides needed room for a person to open 

the car door fully and then stand with the aid of a 

walker, to transfer to a wheelchair, or to lower a wheelchair lift. The access aisle connects directly to an 

accessible route that leads to an accessible building 

entrance. In order to be usable, the access aisle must 

be relatively level, clear of gravel or mud, and the surface must be in good condition without wide cracks 

or broken pavement.

An accessible route connects the access aisle of each 

accessible parking space with the accessible entrance 

to the polling place. When an accessible route crosses 

a curb, a curb ramp must be provided. If the accessible 

route connects the access aisle to the accessible entrance 

using the parking lot surface, a marked crosswalk 

should be provided on the vehicular route.

Image 9.6: Van-accessible parking spaces serve both cars and 

vans. A wide access aisle is needed so a wheelchair lift may be 

lowered from the van onto the level surface.

Image 9.7: Temporary Solutions for Election Day Parking.

Image 9.8: By placing an orange cone in the adjacent parking 

stall, this polling place now meets van accessibility parking 

requirements.
Election Management Guidelines  79

Temporary Solutions for Election Day—Parking

Problem One: Parking is available, but no accessible 

parking is provided or there is not enough accessible 

parking or van-accessible spaces. 

suggestion Find a relatively level parking area near the 

accessible entrance and then designate the area for 

accessible parking spaces and adjacent access aisles. 

Use three parking spaces to make two accessible parking 

spaces with an access aisle. Traffic cones or other temporary elements may be used to mark the spaces and access 

aisles. Provide a sign designating each accessible parking 

space and make sure the access aisle of each space is 

connected to the accessible route to the accessible entrance.

Problem Two: Accessible parking is provided, but 

it does not have a marked access aisle next to each 

accessible space.

suggestion Re-stripe the accessible parking spaces 

to provide an access aisle. As a temporary solution for 

Election Day, use traffic cones to mark off the access aisle 

and curb ramp area. The first accessible parking space 

provided should be a van accessible parking space with an 

access aisle that is at least 96 inches wide.

Problem Three: Accessible parking spaces or access 

aisles are on a sloped surface.

suggestion Find a parking area that is close to the 

accessible entrance and more level. Provide accessible 

parking spaces and access aisles in that area. Make 

sure the accessible parking spaces connect to an accessible route to the entrance. Provide a sign designating 

each accessible parking space.

Problem Four: No sign with the international 

symbol of accessibility is installed at each accessible 

parking space.

suggestion Provide a temporary sign in front of each 

accessible parking space.

Temporary Solutions for Election Day—Passenger 

Drop-Off Areas

Problem: A passenger drop-off and loading zone is 

provided but there is no curb ramp between the vehicle 

area and the sidewalk leading to the accessible polling 

place entrance.

suggestion Provide a portable ramp with edge protection 

in an area where the vehicle area and the sidewalk are 

relatively level. The curb ramp must connect to an accessible route to the accessible polling place entrance.

If the drop-off and loading zone is not relatively 

level, consider relocating the accessible drop-off area 

and using one parking space next to the area where 

accessible parking is located to provide an accessible 

drop-off and loading zone. Cones or another temporary 

barrier may be needed to keep the parking space clear.

Image 9.9: Laminated accessible signs mounted on a wood 

stand provide accessibility requirements for this polling place 

parking area.

Image 9.10: Three standard parking spaces are converted into 

an accessible parking space with an access aisle. Cones mark 

the access aisle and a temporary curb ramp with edge protection 

connects to an accessible route to the polling place.
80  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Sidewalks and Walkways—Typical Issues for Voters 

Who Use Wheelchairs, Scooters or Other Mobility Aids

There must be at least one exterior accessible route that 

connects accessible passenger drop-off areas, accessible 

parking spaces, and other accessible elements, for example a route from a bus stop to an accessible building 

entrance. The accessible route is essential for people 

who have difficulty walking or who use wheelchairs 

or other mobility aids to get to the accessible entrance 

of the polling place. 

An accessible route is at least 36 inches wide and 

may narrow briefly to 32 inches wide where utility poles, 

post-mounted signs, furniture, and doorways are located 

along an accessible route. Abrupt level changes, steps, 

or steeply sloped sidewalks cannot be part of an accessible route. Where ramps are used, they cannot be 

steeper than 1:12. Ramps with a vertical rise of more 

than 6 inches must have handrails on both sides. Ramps 

must also have edge protection to stop wheelchairs 

from falling off the sides, and level landings at the 

top and bottom of each segment and where a ramp 

changes direction.

NOTES Refer to Image 9.12 for examples of accessible 

entrance, parking, and drop-off area at polling place. 

1. Accessible route.

2. Accessible drop-off area.

3. Accessible parking with van accessible parking space.

4. Accessible entrance to polling place.

Temporary Solutions for Election Day—Sidewalks and 

Walkways—Voters with Mobility Disabilities

Problem One: The sidewalk connecting parking to the 

polling place entrance is too steep to be accessible.

suggestion Check to see if there is another sidewalk that 

provides an accessible route to the accessible entrance. 

Sometimes there is a less direct route that can serve as 

the accessible route. (see image 9.11)

Problem Two: The accessible route crosses a curb and 

no curb ramp is provided.

suggestion Install a portable ramp with edge protection. 

(see image 9.12) 

Image 9.11: A portable ramp with edge protection is installed 

over a curb to provide an accessible route. 

Image 9.12: An accessible entrance to a polling place with 

accessible parking and an accessible drop-off area.

Image 9.13: Accessible polling place entrance.
Election Management Guidelines  81

NOTES Refer to Image 9.13 for examples of accessible 

entrance to a polling place. 

1. Accessible entrance to the polling place.

2. Accessible route connecting accessible parking and 

 drop-off area (if provided) to the accessible entrance.

Problem Three: One or two steps are part of the walkway leading to the accessible entrance.

suggestion Install a portable ramp no steeper than 

1:12 slope with edge protection and handrails. (see 

image 9.13)

Entering the Polling Place—Building Entrance

Typical Issues

An accessible polling place must have at least one 

accessible entrance. The accessible entrance must be 

connected to an accessible route. An accessible entrance 

must provide at least one accessible door with maneuvering space, accessible door hardware, and enough 

clear width to allow people who use crutches, a cane, 

walker, scooter or wheelchair to use it.

If the accessible entrance is not the main entrance 

to the polling place, then signs must be located at 

inaccessible entrances to the polling place to direct 

voters to the accessible entrance. The accessible entrance 

must remain open when the polling place is open.

Temporary Solutions for Election Day—Accessible 

Entrance to Polling Place

Problem One: One or two steps at the entrance 

prevent access.

suggestion If another entrance is accessible and on 

an accessible route from accessible parking, designate it 

as the accessible entrance and install a directional sign 

at the main entrance directing voters to the accessible 

entrance. Keep the accessible entrance unlocked during 

voting hours. (see image 9.14)

If another accessible entrance is not available, install 

a temporary ramp with edge protection and handrails. 

(see image 9.17)

Problem Two: There is a small step at the entrance.

Image 9.14: EAC sample of effective polling place accessible 

entrance signage.

Image 9.15: Example of polling place location.

Image 9.16: Example of polling place entryway made accessible 

by placement of wooden ramp over the entry threshold.
82  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

suggestion Install a short temporary ramp to provide 

a smooth transition. (see image 9.15)

Problem Three: Entrance door threshold has an 

abrupt change in level of more than 1/4 inch and 

no beveled sides.

suggestion If the threshold is not more than 3/4 inches 

high, add beveled surfaces to both sides of the threshold 

or replace with a new threshold that is no more than 1/2 inch 

high and that has beveled sides.

Problem Four: Entrance door to the building is heavy 

and difficult to open.

suggestion Keep the door propped open or station volunteers near the door to open it for voters.

Problem Five: Door handle and/or latch at the entry 

door is not accessible.

suggestion These are three typical solutions: add an 

accessible pull or handle to the outside of the door and 

leave the door unlatched, or install an accessible door 

handle and hardware, or leave the door propped in an 

open position.

Voting Area

Typical Issues

The accessible voting area must be on an accessible 

route and have an accessible entrance and adequate 

circulation and maneuvering space for voters who use 

wheelchairs or scooters or who walk with mobility aids. 

An accessible route must connect the accessible 

building entrance to the accessible voting area, which 

includes voter check-in and the location of the accessible voting machines. The survey should also identify 

any protruding objects (wall-mounted or overhead) 

along the circulation route to voter check-in and the 

voting area.

NOTES Refer to Image 9.20 for sample layout of an 

accessible voting area. 

1. Accessible route connects the building entrance with 

 the voting area, including voter check-in and accessible 

 voting machine.

2. Accessible door or doorway to voting area

Image 9.18: Include an Exam wooden block inside your poll worker 

ADA supply kits for use in propping open the doorway to the 

polling place.

Image 9.19: Include duct tape in your poll worker ADA supply kit. 

Instruct them to use the tape on the door plunger on outside door.

Plunger

Duct 

Tape

Image 9.17: A portable ramp with handrails and edge protection is 

installed over a step(s) at the entrance of a polling place. 
Election Management Guidelines  8 3

3. Turning space at accessible voting machine

4. Blinds closed on windows behind check-in so voters 

 who read lips can communicate with the voting staff.

Summary of Suggested Polling Place Supplies to 

Assist Voters with Disabilities

	Voting Supplies—Provide pen and pencil attachments to make the writing utensils easier to grasp. 

Print voting instructions in large type. Include magnifying glasses for use by the visually impaired 

and a voting booth that has been modified for use 

by voters who use wheelchairs or who prefer to sit 

while voting.

	Facility Modification Supplies. Provide a temporary 

threshold ramp to make doorway entrances accessible.

	Signage—Deliver “Accessible Parking” signs to polling places to reserve parking for disabled voters. Place 

directional signs to indicate the location of these parking spaces. Instruct poll workers to post “Accessible 

Entrance” signs to direct voters to an alternate 

entrance when the main entrance is not accessible.

	Provide large orange cones to designate a van-accessible parking spot. Instruct poll workers to identify 

the closest parking to the polling place entrance that 

is on an accessible route of travel, and block off the 

space to the right with the cones to create an access 

aisle and place a sign in front of the parking designating it as “Accessible Parking.”

	Provide rubber mats to cover gratings along the 

path of travel that may be hazardous to voters with 

disabilities.

	Provide wooden door stops to hold the doors open 

and mitigate potential barriers. Include duct tape 

and instructions on how to temporarily resolve 

inaccessible door hardware such as round knobs or 

thumb latches.

10 Steps to Achieve Accessible Polling Places

1. Outline a timeline for surveying sites and categorize 

them into three different categories: (a) compliant; 

(b) compliant with mitigation; and (c) non-compliant. Notify owners of non-compliant facilities and 

ask about any plans to remove architectural barriers. 

If these sites are owned by the County, meet with 

appropriate county departments to identify a schedule 

for improvements.

2. Document your Polling Place Selection Plan, including details on how you identify and select the most 

accessible locations.

3. Conduct surveys of polling locations, using the guidelines/survey tool provided by your State election office.

4. Obtain training on how to use the various survey 

tools and become familiar with the requirements of 

Title 24 and ADA.

5. Mitigate barriers where possible. Purchase temporary 

door thresholds, temporary ramps, cones to create 

van accessible parking spots and to block protruding 

objects, signs to direct voters to accessible parking 

and entrances, and other items to improve accessibility at the polls.

6. Consolidate voting precincts into sites that provide 

maximum accessibility.

Image 9.21: Example of accessible interior voting area.

Image 9.20: Voting area accessibility.
84  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

7. Establish a county Voter Accessibility Advisory Committee and meet at least quarterly with the committee 

to review and update your program.

8.		Work with disability rights groups in your community, such as Independent Living Centers, Commission on Disabilities, etc., to obtain their input and 

keep them updated on your efforts.

9.		Provide poll workers with written materials and training to serve voters with specific needs, including a 

check list of proper set-up of a polling site to meet 

accessibility requirements.

10. Provide a guide to voters outlining services provided 

to voters with specific needs.

Facility Management:

Management of polling place/vote center facilities incorporates all facets of opening/operating a business that 

provides a service to the general public. As in every business operation, your success depends upon:

	Having the right location

	Easy and accessible ingress/egress to your building 

and parking area

	Signage that is easy to read and identifies your 

building as a vote center/polling place

	Plenty of nearby parking

	Friendly, courteous and well-trained staff and 

support staff

	Easy to follow voter instructions

	Sufficient quantity of supplies, i.e. ballots, pens, 

envelopes, etc.

	Line management techniques

	Assistance in finding answers to your questions

	Appreciation for participating in the voting process

	Opportunities to provide feedback and recommendations to improve the process

Polling place management is a unique business 

because locations are located throughout the jurisdiction and are open for a 12–13 hour period of time on 

one specific day, Election Day. All other days of the 

year, the buildings are used for other purposes. Voters 

(customers) can choose to vote at any time during the 

12–13 hour period, however, in most jurisdictions, there 

is a peak voter turnout period in the early morning 

and again in the early evening hours—before and 

after work. 

Jurisdiction-wide vote center management incorporates all of the techniques used to manage Election 

Day polling places, and more. Locations where any voter 

in the jurisdiction can vote at any time require proper 

planning to ensure that voters do not encounter traffic 

congestion, lack of parking, and long wait lines. Vote 

centers require the use of electronic poll books with 

credit for voting automatically updated in real time, 

ensuring that no voter can vote twice in an election.

Determining the Right Location

Election officials must rely on a variety of resources 

in order to select the right locations for use as polling 

places or vote centers. Factors that influence those 

decisions include:

	State law permitting consolidation of several precincts 

into one polling place and/or the use of regional or 

jurisdiction-wide Election Day vote centers. 

	Accessibility requirements, as noted above

	Expected voter turnout for each election

	Building occupancy limits and parking availability

	Proximity of building location to voters being served

Based on this information, a simple spreadsheet can 

be prepared for each election and would include:

	Number of registered voters in every precinct multiplied by the expected voter turnout

	New “expected to vote” number per precinct

The above information can be merged with polling 

place data to determine the best location for use as a 

polling place. Based on the capacity of the building and 

parking, it is possible that several precincts can be served 

in one building. An example of a “mega” consolidated 

polling place is on the next page.

In this example, there are several check-in stations, 

arranged alphabetically. The master registration list is 

printed alphabetically, rather than by precinct. Voters 

simply choose the correct check-in table, obtain the 

correct precinct ballot style, and proceed to any of the 

available voting booths. Poll workers are stationed at 

the exit door with ballot containers and/or optical 

ballot scanners. 

The type of voting system or number of paper 

ballot styles will determine the number of precincts 

best served by this model.

After polling places have been assigned, it is recommended that election officials assign experienced 

poll workers to the polling place locations expecting 
Election Management Guidelines  85

MEGA CONSOLIDATED POLLING PLACE

Ash St. 

EXIT

West St. 

EXIT

Ash St. - West EXIT EXIT East - Elm St.

West Entrance >>

Against North Wall

EXIT

<< East Entrance

BALLOT CAN

BW 

Lunch Table

Public

Provisional or 

Unaffiliated 

Voters

5 Voting 

Booths

5 Voting 

Booths

5 Voting 

Booths

5 Voting 

Booths

20 

Voting 

Booths

Provisional 

Table

A–E

Handicapped Handicapped

F–K L–R S–Z

Image 9.22: Sample layout of a mega consolidated polling place (based on sample from McPherson County, KS).
86  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Image 9.24: Example of polling place/vote center exterior signage

Image 9.25: Sample of effective interior polling place signage. 

Vote Center Layout—Larimer County, Colorado

the largest number of voters and/or locations that are 

being utilized as consolidated polling places and/or 

regional or jurisdiction-wide Election Day vote centers.

Exterior and Interior Signage

All voting locations must be visible and easily identifiable from the street. Examples of exterior and interior 

signage include:

Well-trained check-in staff

The use of vote centers can reduce the total number of 

election workers required; however, the election workers must have the skill sets necessary to access computer 

terminals for voter check-in. 

Types of election workers required include: 

	Computer check-in judges who manage the computer 

terminals and/or electronic poll books; 

	Greeters who greet the voter and manage the exit 

station (often “I Voted” stickers are issued as voters 

exit the polling place); 

	Ballot Judges who issue the correct ballot style or 

escort voters to a voting machine; and

	Provisional Judges who manage the issuance of 

provisional ballots.

Image 9.23: Sample vote center layout (Larimer County, CO).
Election Management Guidelines  87

Specialized training sessions on how to use the electronic poll book or computer check-in stations are 

required. It is a common practice to train certain workers on a specific task and to train only a few workers 

on all positions.

Setup and Layout of a Vote Center

Depending upon the type of facility selected for 

use as a Vote Center, the internal design layout is critical to success of the location (see Images 9.22 – 9.23 

for samples of a vote center layout).

It is important to consider several factors when 

developing the layout of each vote center:

	Number and size of rooms to be used;

	Computer network capacity;

	Number of staging areas required for voter processing;

•	 Examples include: Completion of forms, computer 

check-in, ballot distribution, voting area, and 

exit area

	Security measures; and

	Voter privacy

Managing parking and traffic control

Vote center locations are selected based on easy access 

and sufficient parking. It is important to develop a 

contingency plan for managing peak voter turnout 

days and times. For example, the days preceding a 

Presidential election are peak voting days at vote 

center locations. 

Management of voter traffic and parking as well 

as internal line management are all factors leading 

up to a successful election.

A contingency plan for managing these peak 

turnout days would include:

	Additional staff and/or poll workers;

	Parking attendants; and 

	Traffic control officers

Preparation and Distribution of Supplies and 

Equipment

Equipment and supply delivery is handled in a variety 

of ways, depending upon State law and local jurisdiction 

practices and procedures. Voting equipment can be 

delivered by the county staff members, by a delivery 

company, or distributed to Judges for delivery on Election Day. If you are delivering the equipment yourself, 

Image 9:26: Check-in staffs are assigned to greet and direct voters.

Image 9.28: Line management techniques in place at a vote 

center location.

Image 9.27: Adequate signage and ballot box security is required.
88  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

you will need to develop a routing schedule, based on 

delivery requirements for each of your polling places. 

It is a good practice to develop a data base that contains all of your polling place information to enable 

you to print a polling place delivery form for each 

location and to schedule delivery routes. This information would include special requirements such as 

specific delivery dates and times, and whether a key is 

provided to the election staff prior to Election Day. If 

you are contracting the services of a delivery company, 

consider awarding the bid to a company that can no 

its own delivery routing schedule. Be sure to include 

the following in your delivery contract specifications:

 Deadlines for delivery

 Handling requirements, such as padding the 

machines, stacking or not stacking the machines, etc.

Many jurisdictions have implemented bar code 

tracking systems to confirm the delivery and location 

of each piece of equipment. Request the delivery staff 

person and the person receiving the equipment at the 

polling place to sign the delivery form (see Sample 

Form 9.31). 

Polling place supplies include everything from 

the precinct registration list to pencils, pens, ballot 

boxes, portable booths, outdoor/indoor signage and 

“I Voted” stickers.

Certain supplies are distributed to poll worker 

Judges in the days leading up to Election Day, while 

other supplies that are generic in nature are often 

delivered to the polling place along with the voting 

equipment. Poll worker training should incorporate 

specific guidelines on confirming receipt of correct 

supplies prior to Election morning. 

Methods used for packaging the supplies have 

been found to impact the successful setup of a polling place. For example, some jurisdictions package 

the supplies based on the area to be setup:

 Supplies for the registration check-in table are packaged in one container; 

 Supplies for the provisional ballot table are packaged together; 

 Indoor and outdoor signage is packaged separately, etc. 

This allows the poll workers to quickly separate 

supplies and duties on Election morning in order to 

efficiently set up the location.

Color coding the supplies also helps poll worker 

quickly identify which supplies need to be delivered 

back to election headquarter on election night. 

Laminated reminders packaged within the supplies 

also serve as visual aids for poll workers. Consider 

strategically placing these reminders in areas of critical 

importance.

Image 9.29: Example of a vote center located in a grocery store.

Image 9.30: Example of a vote center located in a shopping mall area.
Election Management Guidelines  89

SAMPLE FORM 9.31: VOTING MACHINE DELIVERY SHEET (Johnson County, KS).

VOTING MACHINE DELIVERY INFORMATION

2008 Kansas Primary Election - Tuesday, August 05, 2008

ROELAND PARK COMMUNITY CTR - 2325

4850 ROSEWOOD DR

ROELAND PARK KS 66205

Contact Persons:

JANE HURST, CENTER DIRECTOR

JOHN CARTER, CITY ADMINISTRATOR

JOHN TAYLOR, CUSTODIAN

Location:

PHONE: 826-3130

FAX: 826-3136

HOURS: M-F 8-5

Day: Residence:

826-3131 555-1584

722-2600 555-4859

826-3133

ROOM # 4 . ENTER FRONT, TURN LEFT, SECOND DOOR ON RIGHT. HANDICAP ENTRANCE SAME.

Delivery Instructions

CONTACT JANE HURST (826-3131) FOR TIME AND LOCATION IN BUILDING FOR DELIVERY

Comments:

CALL ON WAY & ASK FOR JOHN TAYLOR. 12@ SET UP TEAM TO COME BY AS LATE AS POSSIBLE ON

MONDAY 02@ FRI 8/1 AUG08

EP218 MACHINES DELIVERED: 5 F/S 01

Machines received by: ________________________________________________________

Machine location: ____________________________________________________________

Portable booth delivered: __________

Green suitcase # 218 delivered: __________

Machine numbers delivered:

206876

206879

206881

206882

206883 Encoder

Johnson County Election Office, 2101 E. Kansas City Road, Olathe, KS 66061 (913) 782-3441
90  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

1

5

4 6

7

2

Registration 

Book

Election Worker 

Opening

Manual

Closing

3

8

Encoder

Machine

1. Registration Book

2. Ruler

3. Flag

4. Election Worker Manual

5. Voter Receipts

6. Party Affiliation Declaration Forms

 (partisan elections only)

7. Voter Information Forms

8. Touch screen in booth on table for 

 encoding voter cards

Voter checks in here and 

receives Voter Receipt

Voter takes Voter Receipt to Card Encoder to obtain Voter Card

ELECTION TABLE LAYOUT

ROOM LAYOUT—PERFECT VOTER

Provisional

booth

Voting

Machine

Voting

Machine

Voting

Machine

Encoder

Machine

Voting

Machine

Voter enters here

Voter checks in

Perfect Voter 

receives Voter 

Receipt

Perfect Voter 

receives plastic 

Voter Card encoded 

according to receipt

Perfect Voter 

votes and exits 

machine

Perfect Voter returns 

deactivated Voter Card 

to election worker for 

“I Voted” sticker

Election worker 

admits Perfect 

Voter to voting 

machine and 

confirms 

precinct split & 

party affiliation 

(in partisan 

election)

EW

EW

Image 9.32: Sample election table layout (Johnson County, KS).

Image 9.33: Sample room layout – perfect voter (Johnson County, KS).

1

5

4 6

7

2

Registration 

Book

Election Worker 

Opening

Manual

Closing

3

8

Encoder

Machine

1. Registration Book

2. Ruler

3. Flag

4. Election Worker Manual

5. Voter Receipts

6. Party Affiliation Declaration Forms

 (partisan elections only)

7. Voter Information Forms

8. Touch screen in booth on table for 

 encoding voter cards

Voter checks in here and 

receives Voter Receipt

Voter takes Voter Receipt to Card Encoder to obtain Voter Card

ELECTION TABLE LAYOUT

ROOM LAYOUT—PERFECT VOTER

Provisional

booth

Voting

Machine

Voting

Machine

Voting

Machine

Encoder

Machine

Voting

Machine

Voter enters here

Voter checks in

Perfect Voter 

receives Voter 

Receipt

Perfect Voter 

receives plastic 

Voter Card encoded 

according to receipt

Perfect Voter 

votes and exits 

machine

Perfect Voter returns 

deactivated Voter Card 

to election worker for 

“I Voted” sticker

Election worker 

admits Perfect 

Voter to voting 

machine and 

confirms 

precinct split & 

party affiliation 

(in partisan 

election)

EW

EW
Election Management Guidelines  91

Some jurisdictions provide interior layout diagrams 

for each polling place (see Images 9.32 – 9.33). This 

is very helpful for poll workers to follow and also 

ensures the election official that the location is set up 

according to their requirements.

Forms and procedures must also be easy to follow 

and simply to complete. Opening and closing certification forms should be designed to collect required 

data, but should also be easy to understand (see 

Sample Form 9.34).

Checklists should be developed for use in opening and closing the polls. Poll workers should be trained 

to always work in teams of two when managing the 

voting equipment and/or distributing ballots. It is 

important for poll workers to understand the importance of each policy and/or procedure. Take time 

during your training sessions to explain why each 

procedure is in place. For example if absentee ballots 

cannot be turned in at the polling place, be sure that 

the poll workers understand that this is a State law, 

and is not an option.

Flow charts help poll workers remember the steps 

to follow when processing voters. Consider developing 

several flow charts for use at check-in tables (see Sample 

Form 9.35).

Election Day technicians and/or rovers can also be 

used to verify and confirm that all polling places are 

open to the public and set up according to election 

office policies and procedures. Provide a checklist for 

each polling place and ask the rover and the polling 

place poll worker Judge to complete the checklist and 

sign for return to the Election Office. These signed 

checklists become a part of your official election 

audit trail. (see Sample Form 9.36).

Staffing, Training, and Support

Support for Election Day activities begins in the early 

morning hours and continues until all of the polling 

places are closed and election results are reported to 

the public. This support is provided through the use 

of rovers/technicians who are assigned to a region which 

includes a certain number of polling places. The supplies 

issued to rovers include a cell phone and additional 

polling place supplies in the event of a shortage occurring at any location in their region.

Back at the election office, staff is on hand to answer 

telephone calls beginning an hour before the polls 

open. These calls range from poll workers absences...

to assistance with opening voting equipment...to answering basic questions about where to find supplies and 

how to set up the voting location.

It is important to routinely review the capacity of your telephone system and monitor its usage 

on Election Day. Election officials often set up 

dedicated telephone lines to respond to poll worker 

questions, with separate lines devoted to answering 

voter questions.

Return this form in your forms carrying case. List the terminal and seal numbers (seal # on the machines when delivered, seal # when machines 

are opened election morning, seal # when machines resealed on election night). If there are discrepancies between the seal numbers on a 

machine, contact the office immediately at 641-3836. If another machine is delivered to you during the day, do not forget to list that machine. 

All voting terminals have already been opened, with zero tapes printed. Record the public count prior to 6:30 am on Election Day in the 

appropriate column. The public count on the terminals should be zero. If any machine has a public count other than zero, contact the 

office immediately at 641-3836.

Precinct Number of Machines Chief Judge Signature

Terminal 

Number 

Seal # Applied 

at Warehouse#

Monday—Seal 

# Delivered

Tuesday—Seal 

# Election 

Morning

Public Count 

Election 

Morning

Seal # 

Election Night

Zero Tape Printed

Machine Technician Initials

SAMPLE FORM 9.34: VOTING MACHINE CHECKLIST (BASED ON SAMPLE FROM GUILFORD COUNTY, NC)
92  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

REGULAR AND PROVISIONAL VOTER FLOW CHART

H.A.V.A. Voter that 

does not provide acceptable 

identification

Votes Provisional

THE BALLOT WILL NOT BE COUNTED UNLESS THE DECLARATIN IS 

COMPLETED and SIGNED

VOTER INSERTS BALLOT INTO SCANNER PLACE INTO BLACK BALLOT BAG

Supplemental 

Roster

Inactive 

Roster

Voter signs 

Supplemental 

Roster if 

address is 

correct

Line out 

address on the 

Supplemental 

Street index

Add Voter’s name 

and address to 

end of regular 

roster and have 

voter sign

Voter 

Completes 

registration 

card

Voter 

takes and 

signs Oath 

delcaring 

residency

Stated address 

matches address 

in roster

Voter signs roster

REGULAR BALLOT

Stated address is not in roster 

or address is incorrect. 

Check the following: 

Voter has 

Authorization 

Letter

Voter 

Moved

Voter 

signs 

roster

Greet and ask voter to state 

name and address

Issue Voter Ballot in Secrecy Sleeve

PROVISIONAL BALLOT

Voter is not in Roster and/or 

does not have Authorization 

Letter

1. Complete blue provisional page located 

in the Inactive/Provisional Roster

2. Add Precinct Nmber and Ballot Type 

(Add Party for Primary Eletions) 

3. Mark reason why voer is voting a provisional ballot. Note time if 

voter arrives after 8:00 pm.

4. Instruct Voter to read “Voter information” 

on back of Provisional Envelope and to complete “Declaration of 

Voter” on right side of envelope. 

5. Issue voter ballot in Blue Secrecy Folder and 

Provisional Envelope

6. Receive ballot in sealed envelope, check for completeness

7. Give voter blue provisional phone card

Issue polling place lookup card 

to locate their polling place

If Voter insists or time is an 

issue, use the provisional 

process

SAMPLE FORM 9.35: SAMPLE VOTER PROCESSING FLOW CHART (based on sample from Sacramento County, CA)
Election Management Guidelines  9 3

SAMPLE FORM 9.36: POLLING PLACE CHECKLIST (Johnson County, KS).

FIELD SUPERVISOR POLLING PLACE REPORT

POLLING PLACE:

EP CODE: Tech Area:

ELECTION: August 3, 2004 Primary Election

VISUAL POLL CHECKS

! Outdoor signs posted

! No campaigning signs within 250 ft.

! “Vote here if you live here” map and pink sample ballots are posted

! Machines are plugged in and electrical cords are out of the way and taped down, if necessary, so that voters do

not trip

! All voting machines read “AC Online” and top light in upper left hand corner of unit is yellow

! Please be sure to check that the encoder machine says “Charging.” You will have to touch “Close,” then touch

“Create Voter Cards” after verifying that the machine is charging

! Voters’ backs are to the wall or situated in another manner that prevents their ballots from being seen

! Brown Envelopes are attached to the side of the machines with a binder clip for voter receipts

! All voters are stopping at the check-in table and receiving either a White receipt or a provisional ballot envelope

! Voters are signing in Registration book or worker is writing letter “P” for paper ballot voters

! Writing the first letter of last name and the line number, the precinct part number, and the party affiliation (August

only) on the voter receipts

! Not using anything other than their fingers or a Q-tip to touch the screens

! Giving Voter Receipt and Voter Card directly to Machine Judge

! Machine judge is inserting Voter Card and verifying precinct number and party affiliation (August only) with voter

before placing receipt in brown envelope

! An election worker is collecting Voter Cards

! Payroll sheet (Attendance Roster) is complete and turned in

! Opening/Closing Report has been signed (use left column at bottom of page for morning – right column for

evening)

! The red Official Ballot Bag is sealed and cabled to the Provisional Ballot table

! The Portable Provisional Booth is set up

! VIBS keypad is installed on a voting machine and earphones are positioned at encoder machine

! Supervising Judge knows how to complete the Mid Day Tally Sheet

PROCEDURAL CHECKS

! Remind the Supervising Judge that the Encoder PC Card should be left in the Encoder Machine

! Show the designated driver the Clear PC Card Bag and the number of PC Cards to return on the insert

! The designated driver and Supervising Judge both know the location of the drop-off site

! REMIND SUPERVISING JUDGE TO REMOVE ALL PC CARDS FROM ALL VOTING MACHINES, PUT IN

CLEAR PC CARD BAG, & GIVE TO DRIVER TO RETURN TO DROP-OFF SITE

Signature of Supervising Judge: _______________________________

Signature of Field Supervisor: _________________________________
94  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Election office web sites can handle large quantities of inquiries on Election Day and provide needed 

relief for staff and an overloaded telephone system. 

Providing voters the ability to verify their registration 

status and find their polling place is an excellent tool 

to include on your web site. This tool can also be linked 

to an Internet mapping service and can also provide 

necessary accessibility information regarding where 

the accessible entrance is located at each polling place 

in your jurisdiction (see Image 9.37). 

Many jurisdictions also provide a tool on their 

web sites for voters to view and print a listing of races 

and questions that will appear on their ballot. This 

serves as an excellent voter education tool at little 

or no cost to the local jurisdiction. 

Voter Education

Remember that public relations are a key component 

of managing elections. Your office must communicate 

on a regular basis with voters to confirm their registration status and to inform them of election dates and 

hours of operation.

A routine mailing of voter registration certificates 

can easily incorporate information about upcoming 

election dates. Informational brochures describing 

how to register to vote can also include details about 

absentee voting and vote center locations. 

Partnering with your media representatives is a 

valuable tool for educating the public about elections 

and the voting process. Any change in polling places 

must be communicated to the voters and the general 

public. Utilize mailings, press releases, and your office 

web site to be sure that everyone is informed. It is a good 

practice to also post a notice at the old polling place 

location informing voters of their new polling place. 

Most importantly, be sure to provide feedback 

and/or comment forms for use by the poll workers 

and the voters at all polling places and vote centers. 

Their suggestions are key components to managing 

a successful election.

POLLING PLACE SUMMARY

POLL LOCATION VOTER INSTRUCTIONS

Wheatridge Middle School Lobby. 

Disabled Entrance: Main Entrance

POLL ADDRESS

318 E Washington St

Gardner, KS 66030

 Show Map

SAMPLE FORM 9.37: SAMPLE WEB SITE POLLING PLACE LOCATOR (JOHNSON COUNTY, KS)
Election Management Guidelines  95

C h apte r 10

DEVELOPING AN AUDIT TRAIL

Introduction

Ensuring elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently requires creating 

documentation of each component involved in the 

development and conduct of an election. These components include all pre-election, Election Day, and 

post-election activities; examples include, but are not 

limited to, candidate filing forms, voter registration 

lists, verification of voting systems, poll workers, etc. 

Documentation of these processes may also serve 

to prove the accuracy and validity of an election in 

a court of law and resolve questions regarding the 

integrity of the election.

Furthermore, developing a formal record (audit 

trail) of an election’s components is an essential tool 

for election administrators to accurately evaluate 

the strengths and weaknesses of the processes established to conduct an election. It is therefore important to establish accurate methods and procedures 

for documenting and reviewing an election’s audit 

trail. This chapter focuses on the documentation of 

election supplies, documents, and procedures. Audits 

of election results are discussed in a separate chapter.

In the business of election administration, there 

is no such thing as too much documentation. From 

job descriptions and written procedures, to workflow 

diagrams and charts, to timelines and checklists, 

the documentation that supports the conduct of an 

election can resolve questions regarding separation 

of duties, two person (opposite parties) integrity and 

chain of custody. It can also prove the accuracy of an 

election in a court of law.

By routinely collecting detailed documentation 

of each process, election officials are developing standards for achieving excellence in the management of 

elections. The collection of documentation (audit 

trail) is ongoing within election offices nationwide. 

Example Each voter record has its own unique audit trail. 

From the moment a citizen registers to vote in a jurisdiction, 

a record or file is created. Think of each voter’s record 

as a legal file folder which contains the history of that 

voter—when they registered to vote; when they changed 

their address and/or their party affiliation; whether they 

voted absentee or early, in-person or by mail and at which 

location; their voter history and if they voted a provisional 

ballot, whether that ballot was counted or not; whether 

they have run for office; whether they were elected to office 

and for what position, whether they have served as a poll 

worker and if so, at which polling place and in what position, 

etc. All of this information and more is contained in each 

voter’s record (audit trail). Therefore, the voter record audit 

trail is an important tool for determining a voter’s eligibility 

to vote, and provides documentation for processing and 

qualifying provisional ballots.

The above example is just one of many processes 

within an election office that requires the development, maintenance and archiving of documentation 

(audit trail). 

Types of Documentation

By reviewing and analyzing all paperwork mailed 

in, delivered at the front counter, generated by staff, 

processed by poll workers, and collected from outside 

sources (e.g. Secretary of State office, county and city 

agencies, vendors, etc.), election officials can start the 

process of determining the retention cycle for election-related documentation.

This documentation, i.e. records/audit trail, represents the records of the business of elections. Whether 

each record or document is of short-term, long-term, 

or archival value, it contains useful and sometimes 

essential information. Think of each document managed 
96  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

in your office as your office’s official documentation—

it can contain legally binding decisions, ranging from 

contracts, purchase agreements, to voted paper ballots. Consideration must also be given to storage 

requirements and methods for retaining documents. 

Space issues are dependent upon whether the documentation is stored electronically or on paper.

These records also reflect the memory of your 

office—how many voters were registered ten years 

ago compared to today; what type of voting system 

was used then and now; what was the cost of managing elections then compared to now? Records in an 

election office document a citizen’s most important 

right—their right to vote. 

Government agencies also have a responsibility 

to comply with open records rules and regulations. 

Documents involved in the election administration 

audit trail may be subject to State and/or local Open 

Records Request or Freedom of Information laws. It 

is through the availability of information that the 

general public can develop an understanding of the 

administration of elections, and perhaps become 

more involved in the democratic process.

Documentation, records (audit trails) can be 

categorized as follows:

 Nonessential/inactive records—documents that are 

routine and would be discarded within a designated 

period of time. Examples would include routine correspondence and memorandums, etc.

 Active records—those that are mandated by Federal 

and /or State law to be retained for a specific period 

of time. Examples would include signed contracts, 

voted ballots, candidate filing forms, etc.

 Archival records—documents that are stored on a 

permanent basis. Examples include voting district 

maps, voter registration records, etc.

Each of the above categories is regulated by local, 

State and Federal records retention laws. Election 

officials are encouraged to verify these retention 

requirements prior to developing your office records 

retention policies and procedures.

Examples of types of documentation managed 

within an election office include, but are not limited to:

 Candidate filing forms

 District and precinct boundary maps

 Voter registration applications

 Absentee ballot applications

 Publications and legal notices

 Equipment inventory and acceptance testing forms

 Ballots

 Logic and accuracy testing documentation

 Equipment and supply checklists

 Poll worker training materials

 Poll worker assignment forms and oath of office

 Employee timesheets and payroll documentation

 Election Day opening and closing certifications

 Post-election reconciliation forms

Pre-Election Audit Trail

The beginning of a new election cycle is a unique 

opportunity to catalog the types of documents 

that are generated from beginning to end. Begin 

by assigning a core group of full time staff the task 

of developing a master checklist containing every 

document that is collected, generated, or created 

during the pre-election/set up of an election. If such 

a checklist already exists, continue to evaluate and 

re-evaluate the items on the checklist and add new 

documents as needed.

An added benefit is that you are empowering a 

team of employees to develop a thorough understanding of all components involved in managing an election. 

The end result is a cross-trained team of employees, who 

are collecting the internal documentation, which also 

becomes the checklist and/or timeline for managing 

elections in your office. When completed, your office 

will have developed a checklist of permanent and archival election records required for each election. As these 

documents/records are approved and authorized, they 

can be stored in consecutive order for storage. Should 

the need arise, your office will be prepared and ready to 

provide all legal documents, should they be requested.

Each election begins with a specific number of 

races and/or questions. The first deadline is the filing 

deadline. This date becomes the first date on your 

timeline and also represents the beginning of docureMEMBER

Before you begin—remember—there is no such thing as 

too much documentation!!
Election Management Guidelines  97

mentation that creates the election. 

Before the election can be set up in your election management and/or voter registration software, 

you must reaffirm and validate that all precincts and 

districts are correct and that addresses are correctly 

assigned to their unique districts/precincts. It is 

important to understand the overall management of 

your voter registration software, i.e. who has authority to update precincts and districts and who manages updating the address file within the software. 

Confirm with your database administrator how user 

rights are assigned and develop a general understanding about which fields in your voter registration software are “locked” and require “administrative rights” 

for managing the data. Ask questions such as:

When are new addresses added to the system? Are 

they added when a new subdivision is platted or 

after the new home building occupancy permit 

has been issued? If addresses are added before the 

building is constructed, there is an opportunity for 

a voter to be added to an address that is actually an 

empty lot.

 Does your address file contain only residential 

addresses? Do you have addresses that are post office 

repositories flagged in your system? Based on your 

State law, confirm that voters are assigned to residential addresses only.

 Are certain precincts in your jurisdiction split 

by local school or special district boundaries? 

Remember that these “split precincts” can cause 

voter confusion on Election Day. Neighbors in the 

same precinct could be voting on different school 

races and/or questions if the precinct is split by 

school boundaries.

If possible, print a listing of precincts and associated districts prior to the set up of each election. A 

team of two staff members should proof this listing, 

using district maps for comparison purposes. If your 

office maintains GIS mapping software, merge the precincts/districts maintained in your voter registration 

software with the GIS mapping software to visually 

verify that all precincts are assigned to the correct 

districts. By utilizing a map point assigned to each residential address, you have the ability to visually verify 

that every residential address within your voter registration software is assigned to the correct precinct. 

In summary:

 Confirm that addresses are assigned to the correct 

precinct and/or split precinct, then

 Confirm that the precincts are assigned to the 

correct districts; and finally

 Confirm that the correct districts are set up 

correctly for each election.

The next components of the pre-election audit 

trail are the candidate filing forms and/or questions 

submitted for the ballot. Based on State law, the candidate filing forms for each race must meet certain 

requirements to qualify for placement on the ballot. 

Therefore, each form becomes a part of the records 

for each election. The candidate filing forms and any 

questions certified for the ballot are the official documents that are used to set up the election. The original filing forms are also the documents that all data 

entry is proofed back to. Make a listing of all documents that are generated from the original candidate 

and question filing forms. This listing may include:

 Election set up/ballot generation software 

candidate report

 Legal candidate publications

 Candidate listing for public distribution

Web site candidate information

Each document, if created by a different staff person 

or different software, must be handled and proofed back 

to the original filing forms. This proofing documentation audit trail for each election should be initialed by 

two staff members. The proofing team must be staff 

members who were not involved in creating the initial 

documents or doing the data entry. 

Once the addresses, precincts, and districts have 

been verified and proofed; the candidate and question 

filing forms have been processed and all associated 

documentation and data entry has been proofed; the 

next step is the development of unique ballot styles.

NOTE Refer to State law for specific ballot requirements 

(e.g. rotation of candidate names, partisan and /or straight 

party ballots, etc.)..

After the initial ballot styles have been generated, they should be proofed back to the precinct/

district printout and the original candidate/question 

filing forms. A team of staff members not involved 

in the data entry of the election/ballot generation 

software proofs and signs off on the official ballot 
98  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

file. The proofed ballot deck becomes a part of the 

pre-election audit trail.

Once the ballot proofs are returned from the 

printer, they are once again re-proofed back to the official proofed ballot deck which is already a component 

of the audit trail.

important At each point of the proofing and archiving 

of the pre-election audit trail, it is imperative that ballot generation and voter registration software be backed up and 

stored off-site. Each of these steps marks a “lock down” 

point in the preparation of an election.

Once ballots are received from the printer, staff 

must verify and confirm that the requested number 

of each ballot style has been received. Again, this 

document becomes a part of the audit trail, and becomes 

the control for managing distribution of the printed 

ballot stock.

Depending upon the type of voting system used, 

the tabulation software must generate memory cartridges for use in optical scan or voting machines. 

Logic and accuracy testing is performed to confirm 

the accuracy of the election setup. All checklists and 

printouts relating to the logic and accuracy testing 

are key components of the pre-election audit trail. 

Examples of the logic and accuracy trail include:

 Opening L&A zero proofs from all voting 

equipment and optical scanners

 Logic and accuracy marked ballot decks and 

associated documentation

 Checklists generated for each piece of voting 

equipment

 Closing L&A total proofs form all equipment 

and scanners

 Final L&A results report 

All of the above documentation should be proofed 

and initialed by at least two staff persons, or others 

as required by State law, and stored as part of the 

pre-election logic and accuracy audit trail. 

Absentee and Early Voting Audit Trail

Based on State law, early voting jurisdictions must 

be prepared to process voters prior to Election Day. 

In some instances, voters are allowed to vote either 

in-person or by mail; and in other jurisdictions, voters 

are only allowed to vote early based on special requirements/circumstances, i.e. disabled and/or out of the 

jurisdiction on Election Day. 

Regardless of the State and local laws and requirements, early voting documentation becomes another 

component of the audit trail for each election. 

Early voting/absentee voting by mail usually begins 

with an application form, completed by the voter. Based 

on State law, these forms must be submitted within 

the designated time frame. Each form should be date 

stamped for processing. Again, based on State law, 

there may be requirements on when the ballot must 

be sent after the application is received in your office. 

There may be other requirements regarding how the 

application for the ballot may be received by your office, 

and who may turn in the application for a ballot. All 

of these unique laws set the stage for internal policies 

and procedures for managing the documentation 

(application forms). These forms, in turn, become a 

part of the official audit trail for each election.

The requests for absentee ballots must be data 

entered and are used to validate the voter’s right to 

receive a ballot. The voter registration software is 

the key control for managing the voter’s eligibility 

to receive and/or request an absentee ballot. Once 

issued, the voter registration software becomes the 

control for managing that voter’s ability to only 

vote once in that election. 

One example that must be monitored as a part 

of the audit trail is a voter’s request for a replacement 

ballot. Questions to ask your database administrator 

include:

 If the voter has already been issued a ballot for that 

election, how does your software control the issuance 

of replacement ballots?

Which ballot can be counted when it is returned? 

What happens if the original ballot is returned and 

the replacement ballot? Which ballot is counted?

 How are user rights restricted for issuance of absentee 

ballots? Is the data field “locked down”? If a user has 

a data entry error, how is the error corrected?

These questions are important because each cycle 

of ballot requests processed will generate a subsequent 

set of printed ballot envelopes and/or labels. Each of 

tip

Consider printing an alphabetical listing of applications 

processed to be a part of your audit trail. 
Election Management Guidelines  9 9

these print “jobs” should be balanced back to the 

number of absentee application data entered to verify 

that ballots requested equals ballot envelopes printed. 

If ballot envelopes are stuffed by hand, a team of 

two people should verify that the correct ballot style 

has been inserted in each envelope. The envelopes 

should be processed in groups, representing a print 

“job” that has already been balanced to the number 

of applications data entered. 

After each group of ballot envelopes has been 

sealed, the total number should once again be confirmed and balanced back to the initial number 

proofed from the initial print “job.” 

Applications Processed = Envelopes/Labels Printed = 

Envelopes Stuffed and Sealed = Total Envelopes Delivered 

to the Post Office on Each Day.

The daily log of print jobs, initialed by different 

staff members, represents another key component of 

the absentee and early voting audit trail.

The returned ballot audit trail should be managed 

in the same fashion as the outgoing ballot audit trail. 

Again, the voter registration software contains 

the history of all returned ballot envelopes. Once 

the voter’s record has indicated a ballot has been 

returned, that voter cannot vote again in that election. It is critical to understand user rights to the 

software and to confirm that the voter history data 

fields are in fact “locked down”. Any need to correct 

a user’s mistake in recording voter history must be 

documented and signed off by at least two administrative staff members.

All ballot envelopes returned must be stored 

in a secure, controlled environment with restricted 

access. Log sheets, computer or hand generated, must 

be created and updated on a daily basis. Returned 

ballot envelopes should be bundled in batches and 

recorded on a log sheet. This process assures that all 

batches have been accounted for and processed at the 

end of the election.

The final audit trail for absentee and early voting 

should support and validate that:

 Total number of ballot envelopes returned = the 

total voters with voter history recorded

 Total ballot envelopes returned MINUS ballots challenged = ballot envelopes authorized to be opened

 Total ballot envelopes authorized to be opened = 

total ballots scanned for unofficial results

 PLUS total number of provisional/challenged ballots 

MINUS total number of provisional/challenged ballots 

NOT authorized to be counted

 EQUALS total number of all ballots scanned for official results

Each step of the outgoing and incoming absentee/early voting audit trail should be recorded, balanced and initialed by two staff members. 

Polling Place Supplies and Equipment 

Audit Trail

Preparing for voting on Election Day at polling places 

located throughout your jurisdiction requires paperwork to support and verify that the proper supplies 

and equipment has been prepared and distributed to 

the correct polling place location.

Preparation of supplies is done in a variety of 

ways throughout the country. Generic Election Day 

supplies are often pre-packaged for distribution to 

polling places and are often locked, sealed and delivered with equipment prior to Election Day. Other 

offices may distribute all supplies and equipment to 

supervisory poll workers whose job includes verifying the supplies and bringing them to the polling 

place on Election morning. Other offices may deliver 

some supplies and equipment; and distribute other 

unique election supplies to the supervisory poll 

workers on the day prior to Election Day.

Regardless of the distribution method, packaging of supplies is a critical component for success on 

Election Day. Imagine an Election Day where different 

supplies are missing from different supply bags at 

polling places all over your jurisdiction. From managing the phone calls from frustrated poll workers...

to dispatching missing supplies to polling places all 

tip

Train your staff to think of each returned ballot envelope 

as a dollar bill—they must be counted individually, 

sorted, bundled, and balanced at the end of each day.

remember

All “dollar bills” returned must be counted, balanced, 

and tabulated. The audit logs become the official 

documentation for each election.
100  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

over the county, a routine election can quickly turn 

into a disaster. 

Each polling place supply kit/bag should be 

packaged according to a supply checklist. Each bag 

and checklist should be numbered. The contents 

of the bag should be itemized and proofed and the 

checklist signed off by two staff members. Mission 

critical supplies, i.e. paper ballots and voter registration lists, should be proofed by key administrative 

staff. Each of these supply bag checklists becomes 

part of the election audit trail. 

NOTE If you receive calls reporting missing supplies, you 

can quickly refer to the supply checklists to determine who 

was responsible for packaging that supply bag.

Voting equipment checklists and delivery sheets, 

including the serial number for each machine, protective counter numbers, and any tamper-evident 

seals and/or tamper resistant tape numbers should 

be recorded and confirmed by staff, by delivery staff, 

and again by the poll workers on Election morning.

On Election morning, protective and public 

counter numbers of all equipment should be verified 

by poll workers. The opening zero tape printout 

should be signed by poll workers. All of these documents begin to build the audit trail for each polling 

place on Election Day. 

Field technicians/rovers can serve as additional 

verifiers on Election Day. By completing a polling 

place operational checklist, the rover and supervisory 

poll workers can both sign and confirm that each 

polling place has been set up according to diagram 

layouts and operational procedures.

Throughout the day, poll workers can complete 

verification reports to confirm that the number of 

voters checked in equals the number of ballots issued 

and the number of ballots scanned or recorded on 

public counters on all voting equipment.

When the polls close, closing verification forms 

are completed by poll workers, documenting the 

protective and public counter numbers on all voting 

equipment, and all tamper-evident seals and tape 

securing the equipment. The end of day result tapes 

are printed from each voting machine and signed 

by poll workers. These total votes collected from all 

voting machines should balance to the number of 

total voters processed at each polling place.

Post-Election Audit

Once all ballots have been scanned and all voting 

machine cartridges have been returned and unofficial 

results reported, your office should secure all supplies 

and documentation from each polling place.

NOTE A post election audit can be accomplished in many 

different ways, and is often required based on specific 

State law. A separate Election Management chapter has 

been developed to discuss recounts and random auditing 

of election results. This chapter will address auditing of 

supplies, documents, and procedures.

The purpose of conducting a post-election audit 

of supplies and documentation is two fold: 

 First, you want to ensure that all supplies have been 

accounted for and returned from each polling place. 

 Second, you need to audit the work completed by 

the poll workers to verify that all paperwork has 

been completed correctly. 

If possible, consider utilizing other county staff 

members to assist your office in accomplishing the 

post-election audit. Assign the staff to work in teams 

of two, with each team assigned a separate work area 

and table. A checklist of all supplies to be accounted 

for should be prepared for each polling place supply 

bag/kit. (Examples of checklists are included at the 

end of this chapter.) In order to streamline the audit, 

develop the teams to work in an assembly-line fashion. An example of the way to organize the teams is 

as follows:

tip

Bar code technology provides simply inventory control 

for equipment and mission-critical supplies.

tip

Consider providing an incentive program to encourage 

poll workers to return all supplies and properly complete all paperwork.
Election Management Guidelines  101

 The first team uses a checklist to locate specific supplies, and hands them to the second team. Team one 

continues to process all remaining supplies.

 Team two locates any provisional ballots and hands 

them to team three. Team two continues to utilize 

their checklist and verify that all forms are accounted 

for and completed correctly.

 Team three counts all provisional ballot envelopes 

and balances the number to the signature roster 

for each polling place. The provisional ballot 

envelopes are then forwarded to a review team 

for research.

When all forms and supplies have been 

accounted for, finalize the post-election audit by 

organizing and filing all documents in the same 

order for each polling place. These documents 

should be stored, sealed and archived according 

to State law.
102  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

ALLEN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Election Date Precinct

Summary Sheet Report

 Correct Comments

Ballots Received

Total Ballots Counted 

Provisional Ballots

17 Yr Old Ballots

Unprocessed Ballots

Soiled Ballots

Ballots Issued

Line 1-5 Math

Ballots Used from Pad

Line 6/7 Match

Signatures

Summary Sheet Excellent Good Fair Checked By 

SAMPLE FORM 10.1: POST-ELECTION SUMMARY SHEET REPORT (Allen County, OH)
Election Management Guidelines  103

ALLEN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Election Date Precinct

Poll Book Report

 Correct Comments

Oath Signed

Certification signed

Signature

Address

Votes Cast

Stub Numbers

Provisional

Yellow Last Page

Highlighter

Absentee

MISC

Summary Book Excellent Good Fair Checked By 

SAMPLE FORM 10.2: POST-ELECTION POLL BOOK REPORT (Allen County, OH)

Election Management Guidelines  105

C h apte r 11

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND 

CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Change in a voter registration and elections office is 

inevitable, and effective management requires election 

administrators to develop contingency and change 

management plans to respond to situations in a timely 

and effective manner. The goal of this chapter is to 

provide election officials general guidelines on how to 

identify, assess, and respond to events that may disrupt 

election and voter registration services in their local 

jurisdictions. The chapter addresses both contingency 

planning and change management as they are inextricably linked to each other and may at times be developed concurrently with each other. The goal of both 

these management plans is to prevent or minimize the 

impact of change (expected or unexpected) on election 

and voter registration processes, while preserving the 

integrity of the electoral system. The recommendations 

contained in this chapter should be vetted with Federal, 

State, and local laws, regulations, and relevant case law 

to ensure they are properly and lawfully implemented; 

election officials should contact their State officials when 

there is a question as to whether a practice is permitted 

or prohibited under State law.

For purposes of this discussion, contingency planning refers to the development of a management plan 

that addresses an election office’s response to emergency and crisis situations that might arise unexpectedly. Examples of contingencies include, but are not 

limited to, natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, severe 

snow and rain storms, fires, etc.), technology disasters 

(e.g. power outages), political and social events (e.g. 

war, civil unrest, medical emergencies, etc.), and election-related emergencies (e.g. lack of poll workers or 

polling places, shortage of ballots or voting systems, 

charges of voter intimidation, etc.). Change management, on the other hand, refers to how an election 

office handles situations that impact how the office 

functions in its capacity as an election and voter 

registration agency; for example: changes in Federal 

and State laws, budget fluctuations, relocation of 

election office, staffing changes, agency reorganization, etc. Unlike contingencies, change management 

focuses on events the office is already aware of and do 

not rise unexpectedly. 

Identifying and assessing contingencies and 

change factors

The first step in developing contingency and change 

management plans is to identify the contingencies 

and change factors that can impact election and voter 

registration practices and procedures in your particular 

community. This process is useful for several reasons. 

First, it will help you define the goal of either your 

contingency or change management plans. Second, it 

will help you to objectively assess situations and their 

potential impact. Finally, it provides the framework 

for developing and prioritizing the actions required to 

address a given situation.

To ensure a thorough evaluation, approach the 

identification and assessment process from a group 

perspective; for example, incorporate these topics into 

staff meetings or conduct regularly scheduled meetings to review existing policies and procedures. For 

contingency planning sessions, have the election office 

staff members come up with a list of worst case scenarios. Do not limit worst case scenarios to just Election 

Day situations; ask staff to also include contingencies 

that can occur during both pre and post election 

timeframes. Try to identify every possible irregularity 

that can occur in your jurisdiction. When brainstorming about change factors, consider both internal and 

external sources of change. For example, an internal 

source could be a change in staff and an external source 

can be a change in State law that affects current policies 

and practices. 
106  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Table 11.1 lists several examples of possible contingencies and change factors; review the list and 

see what other examples you can think of for each 

category. In addition, when you list the contingencies and change factors, begin to think of them as 

“goals.” A goal is the general end result you would 

like a contingency or change management plan to 

achieve. It conveys the message in general, broad 

terms and does not specify strategies or outcomes. 

This will begin to provide the framework for developing your contingency and change management 

plans. For example: 

Contingency = fire in voting system warehouse one 

week before Election Day

Goal = prevent fires in voting system warehouse and 

mitigate impact of fires on warehouse and voting 

system equipment

Change factor = election office is relocated

Goal = ensure all office functions continue to operate 

smoothly during relocation process

Once you have identified all contingencies and 

change factors, proceed with assessing the magnitude of impact these events can have on your office 

and the election and voter registration processes. 

This will help uncover vulnerabilities in the current system and assist in developing contingency 

and change management plans that may prevent an 

event from occurring or mitigate its impact. 

To ensure consistency in the assessment process, 

establish basic criteria for the magnitude of impact 

for each contingency or change factor. A basic format 

to follow initially would be to use “low impact,” 

“medium impact,” and “high impact” categories, and 

for each of these levels develop an explanation or 

definition of what each one entails. For example:

 LOW = impact of event does not significantly disrupt the election process; does not require significant 

resources (internal or external); does not require immediate attention; does not require revision of existing policies or procedures

 MEDIUM = requires attention of the election office; 

response needed within a reasonable timeframe; can be 

handled internally or with minimal external resources; 

may require revision of existing policies or procedures

 HIGH = event causes a state of emergency; requires 

immediate attention; threatens the integrity of the 

election process; significant resources required, both 

internal and external; requires revision of existing 

policies or procedures

tip

CHANGE MANANGEMENT TIP: Do not wait for 

situations to come up before you address them. Be 

proactive and learn to regularly evaluate the need 

for change; involve staff, election workers, and other 

stakeholders in this process.

tip

CONTINGENCY PLANNING TIP: Do not wait for 

situations to come up before you address them. Be 

proactive and learn to regularly identify and assess 

contingencies; involve staff, election workers, and 

other stakeholders in this process.

Contingencies Change Factors

Fire in voting system warehouse Election office is relocated

Severe snow storm (blizzard) on Election Day Reduction in number of staff members

Electrical damage to office computers during peak voter registration 

weeks prior to election

Purchase of new voting system

Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place New State law requires poll workers receive 8 hours of training prior 

to an election

Polling place runs out of provisional ballots Office budget is reduced by 7%

TABLE 11.1: EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCIES AND CHANGE FACTORS
Election Management Guidelines  107

The above model is generic and meant to serve as 

a source of ideas for how to assess the level of impact 

changes can have in elections.1 However, using this 

model as an example, one can begin to understand 

the level of risk a contingency poses to an election 

office and how a change factor may impact the current environment. Most contingencies will fall in 

the medium to high categories by their nature, while 

change factors can vary from low to high. In order to 

determine the level of impact, begin by asking questions to clarify the situation (Table 11.2) and then 

determine the level of impact. These will also become 

the building blocks for the action steps you develop 

later in your contingency plan.

In contingency planning there is an additional 

step in the assessment process that needs to be taken 

into account – determining the likelihood of an 

event happening. For example, if earthquakes are 

listed as a contingency one would need to evaluate 

the probability of such an event occurring in one’s 

local jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction has no history 

of earthquakes, then the likelihood of the event is 

low and the priority for developing a contingency 

plan would rank low as well. However, if the jurisdiction does have a history of earthquakes then a contingency plan for such an event would be considered 

a high priority. Determining the likelihood of an 

event is important because it helps agencies prioritize 

contingencies and the resources they require. 

Following the example for assessing the magnitude of impact, develop definitions for the likelihood of an event occurring. We have used the “low,” 

“medium,” and “high” categories once more to simplify the process:

Contingencies Factors to Consider Magnitude of Impact

Fire in voting system warehouse What was the extent of the damage? How many voting systems are 

not functional as a result of the fire? What backup systems do we 

have that can be immediately put on the field?

Medium to High

Severe snow storm (blizzard) on 

Election Day

How accessible are the roads leading to the polling places? How 

long will the severe weather last? Can polling places be relocated 

to more accessible locations? Has a state of emergency been 

declared by the State? 

High

Change Factors Factors to Consider Magnitude of Impact

Election office is relocated Is the new facility accessible by public transportation? Is the space 

small, large, or the same in size to the previous location? Where 

and how will supplies be stored?

Low to Medium

Reduction in number of staff 

members

Is the reduction permanent? How will responsibilities be divided 

among the remaining staff?

Low to Medium

1

 The concepts for “magnitude of impact” and “likelihood of event” are 

modeled on risk assessment strategies found in the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology’s Risk Management Guide for Information 

Technology Systems (special publication 800-30). See Resources section 

at the end of this chapter for full citation.

TABLE 11.2: ASSESSING MAGNITUDE OF IMPACT
108  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

 LOW = likelihood of event occurring is low, threat is 

negligible; policies and procedures are in place to prevent 

the event or mitigate the magnitude of impact

 MEDIUM = likelihood of event is likely but uncertain; 

policies and procedures are in place that may prevent 

the event or mitigate the magnitude of the impact

 HIGH = event is highly probable; policies and procedure 

are not in place to prevent the event or mitigate the 

magnitude of impact

For example:

 Identifying and assessing the contingencies and 

change factors that can or will impact your election 

office are the initial steps required to develop sound 

contingency and change management plans. They 

provide the foundation for determining the resources 

and plan of actions required to address situations in 

a timely and effective manner. The following two 

sections will separately address how to develop and 

implement contingency and change management 

plans for your election office, and they will address 

some of the ideas already explored in this chapter.

Developing and implementing 

contingency plans

The following five steps describe the general process 

for developing and implementing a contingency plan:

1. Set a goal

2. Define the purpose

3. Specify objectives

4. Develop an action plan

5. Implement action plan

1. Set a goal

In the previous section of this chapter, the concept of 

developing a goal was briefly mentioned. The following example was given:

 Contingency = fire in voting system warehouse 

 Goals = prevent fires in voting system warehouse 

and mitigate impact of fires on warehouse and 

voting system equipment

As you can see, a goal is the general end result 

you would like a contingency plan to achieve. It conveys the message in general, broad terms and does 

not specify strategies or outcomes. In addition, the 

goal of the contingency plan should be in alignment 

with the overall mission and goal(s) of the agency. 

In other words, the outcome(s) of the contingency 

plan help support and achieve the agency’s strategic 

plan.2 It is also important to note that agencies may 

develop a strategic plan for their contingency planning program in general, which would include its 

own goal(s) and objectives. If so, contingency-specific 

plans would help support and achieve the mission 

and goal(s) of both the program and the agency’s 

strategic plans. 

Contingency Likelihood Factors to consider Magnitude of impact

Polling place runs out of 

provisional ballots

Medium Voter turnout is not predictable; 

evaluate public interest in contests and 

issues on the ballots; availability of 

backup provisional ballots; time it takes 

to deliver new supply of ballots to each 

polling place

Medium to High

tip

Another tool you can use during the identification 

and assessment process to supplement (not replace) 

the evaluation, in either contingency or change 

management planning, is to conduct an analysis 

of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 

Threats (S.W.O.T. analysis) that can assist or impede 

the successful development and implementation of 

the identified change or contingency plan. A sample 

S.W.O.T. analysis worksheet can be found at the end 

of this chapter.
Election Management Guidelines  109

Some examples of a contingency planning 

program’s goals could be:

 To provide prompt and effective responses to emergencies and crisis situations while preserving the 

integrity, transparency, and accessibility of the 

election process.

 The prevention or minimization of any interruption in the election processes during emergency 

and crisis situations.

 To ensure rapid and complete recovery of the election processes to normal conditions following 

emergencies/disasters.

 Serve as a model agency in the area of emergency 

and crisis recovery.

Here is another example of a goal for a contingency-specific plan:

 Contingency = poll workers do not show up at their 

assigned polling place

 Goal = ensure polling places are fully staffed 

throughout Election Day

2. Define the purpose

Now that you have set a general goal, define the purpose of the contingency plan. The purpose refers to 

the scope (i.e. parameters, authority) of the contingency plan. It gives the plan a specific framework in 

which to operate, giving it focus. For example:

 Contingency = fire in voting system warehouse 

 Goals = prevent fires in voting system warehouse 

and mitigate impact of fires on warehouse and 

voting system equipment

 Purpose of contingency plan = establish policies and procedures for preventing and mitigating 

the effects of fire on the voting system warehouse 

through proper fire safety practices and community collaboration

As you may note in the example above, the purpose focuses the plan on fires that occur only in the 

voting system warehouse; fires that occur in other 

places (e.g. other storage facilities, polling places, 

election office, etc) fall outside the scope of this contingency plan. The latter would have to be addressed 

in a separate contingency plan.

3. Specify objectives

Objectives refer to the specific outcomes that support 

and help achieve the goal(s) of the contingency plan; 

these should be clear, measurable, achievable, realistic, and be time-bound.

Here are some examples of possible objectives for 

the example we have been using regarding fires in 

the voting system warehouse:

 Contingency = fire in voting system warehouse 

 Goals = prevent fires in voting system warehouse 

and mitigate impact of fires on warehouse and 

voting system equipment

 Purpose of contingency plan = establish policies and procedures for preventing and mitigating 

the effects of fire on the voting system warehouse 

through proper fire safety practices and community collaboration

 Objectives:

1. reduce probability of fire occurrence at least 50% 

by the next scheduled State/local election

2. ensure smoke detectors are operational 100% of 

the time 

3. ensure sprinkler system is operational 100% of 

the time 

4. mitigate impact of fires on voting system 

equipment 

5. develop fire safety measures in collaboration 

with local firemen and police

6. have backup voting system in case fire destroys 

equipment in warehouse

7. establish policies and procedures for conducting 

an election with the backup voting system

2

 Strategic planning refers to the process of comprehensive, integrative 

program planning that considers, at a minimum, the future of current 

decisions, overall policy, organizational development, and links to operational plans. [Definition from the Center for Program Evaluation, which 

is part of the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the U.S. Department of 

Justice’s Office of Justice Programs - http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/

evaluation/index.html]. 

In addition, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) states that 

strategic plans “are intended to be the starting point for each agency’s 

performance measurement efforts. Each plan must include a comprehensive mission statement based on the agency’s statutory requirements, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a description of 

how the agency intends to achieve these goals. The mission statement 

brings the agency into focus. It explains why the agency exists, tells 

what it does, and describes how it does it. The strategic goals that 

follow are an outgrowth of this clearly stated mission. The strategic 

goals explain the purposes of the agency’s programs and the results 

they are intended to achieve.” [GAO. Executive Guide: Effectively 

Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act. June 1996. 

http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gg96118.pdf] 
110  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

8. train staff and poll workers in both regular and 

backup voting systems

4. Develop an action plan

You have the defined the goal, purpose, and objectives of the contingency plan – now, turn that information into an action plan. The action plan should 

speak to the goal and objectives you have established; 

each action step should relate back to a particular 

objective(s). The plan should also define the staff, 

budget, time, training needs, and resources needed 

to accomplish the tasks and achieve the goal. Not all 

action plans will look the same, some will be more 

complex than other according to the needs of the particular contingency being considered. In addition, if 

you have not brought in staff and/or outside resources 

to participate in the contingency planning process 

up to this point this is the time to do so. Establishing community partners is essential to the success of 

many contingency plans. The role of taskforces and 

community groups is discussed more in depth in 

Discussion Box 11.4, “Community Collaborations.”

Example:

 Contingency = fire in voting system warehouse 

 Goals = prevent fires in voting system warehouse 

and mitigate impact of fires on warehouse and 

voting system equipment

 Purpose of contingency plan = establish policies and procedures for preventing and mitigating 

the effects of fire on the voting system warehouse 

through proper fire safety practices and community 

collaboration

 Objectives:

1. reduce probability of fire occurrence at least 50% 

by the next scheduled State/local election

2. ensure smoke detectors are operational 100%

of the time 

3. ensure sprinkler system is operational 100% 

of the time 

4. mitigate impact of fires on voting system 

equipment

5. develop fire safety measures in collaboration 

with local firemen and police

6. have backup voting system in case fire destroys 

equipment in warehouse

7. establish policies and procedures for conducting 

an election with the backup voting system

8. train staff and poll workers in both regular and 

backup voting systems

 Action steps:

1. within 15 days of adoption of the contingency 

plan, meet with local fire department to assess 

safety of warehouse and develop policies and 

procedures for preventing and reducing incidents of fire and the damage caused by them 

(objective #5)

2. install smoke detectors in warehouse within 15 

days of adoption of the contingency plan (objectives #1 and #2)

3. schedule and conduct monthly visits to the 

warehouse to ensure smoke detectors are operational 100% of the time (objectives #1 and #2)

4. schedule and conduct monthly visits to the 

warehouse to ensure sprinkler system is operational 100% of the time (objectives #1 and #3)

5.monitor smoke detectors and sprinklers once a 

week during the last 30 days prior to a scheduled election (objectives #1, #2, and #3)

6.within 30 days of adoption of the contingency 

plan, cover voting equipment with nonflammable material during storage at warehouse to 

reduce impact of fire (objective #4)

7. within 30 days of adoption of the contingency 

plan, prevent sprinkler water damage by keeping voting equipment at least 12 inches off the 

warehouse floor (objective #4)

8. within 30 days of adoption of the contingency 

plan, designate backup facility to store voting 

system equipment in case current facility 

becomes unsafe as result of a fire (objective #5)

You may find it useful to display the action steps 

in the form of a table to help you visualize the information and present it to others (see Table 11.3). 
Election Management Guidelines  111

Objective: #2 = ensure smoke detectors are operational 100% of the time 

Action step Timeline Labor 

categories 

(Staff)

Labor units 

(staff time 

for this task)

Labor 

Cost

Other 

Costs

Specific activities

consult with 

local firemen 

to determine 

the number and 

location of smoke 

detectors required 

for warehouse

within 5 days 

of adoption of 

plan

Director 8 hours $20/hr mileage to 

and from 

warehouse

contact local firemen, 

conduct site visit to 

warehouse (identify 

quantity, type, 

and placement), 

communicate findings 

to staff for purchase of 

smoke detectors

purchase smoke 

detectors

within 7 days 

of adoption of 

plan

Administrative 

Assistant

3 hours $12/hr 0 purchase smoke 

detectors per 

specifications, inspect 

and accept purchased 

smoke detectors, store 

smoke detectors until 

installation

install smoke 

detectors

within 15 days 

of adoption 

of the 

contingency 

plan

Director 4 hours $20/hr mileage to 

and from 

warehouse

provide smoke detectors 

to technicians, 

provide placement 

instructions and other 

necessary information 

for installation, 

inspect and approve 

installation, maintain 

record of installation, 

train staff responsible 

for monitoring smoke 

detectors

Technician 

(installer)

8 hours $50/hr 0 receive smoke 

detectors, install smoke 

detectors, ensure all 

smoke detectors are 

operational by end of 

installation

monitor smoke 

detectors and 

sprinklers once a 

week during the 

last 30 days prior 

to a scheduled 

election

once a week 

during the last 

30 days prior 

to a scheduled 

election

2 Office Staff not to exceed 2 

hours per visit

$14/hr mileage to 

and from 

warehouse

warehouse site visit, 

perform evaluation of 

smoke detectors, record 

and communicate 

results of visit, replace 

nonfunctioning smoke 

detectors

continued next page...

TABLE 11.3: SAMPLE VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF ACTION STEPS
112  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Additional things to consider when developing the 

action plan:

Coordinate a team meeting with other election officials within your own State to work together to develop 

a State disaster/contingency plan for local election 

offices. Include the following team members:

 Election officials from small, medium and large 

jurisdictions, including at least one jurisdiction 

that manages each type of voting system deployed 

within your State

 State Election Director and staff members

 State Emergency Preparedness Director and 

staff members

 Representatives from local police and fire departments

 Media and public relations outreach representatives

 Political party representatives

 Agencies and groups that conduct voter education 

and registration efforts

 Representatives from elderly, disabled, and language 

minority groups should be included to ensure contingency plans are effectively communicated and implemented in regards to these groups

 Legal staff/representatives from the election offices 

and other legal organizations vested in elections to 

ensure contingency plans are consistent with applicable Federal, State, and local laws

Review your State election code and regulations 

to determine how these guidelines and laws will 

regulate your actions. 

Example In some States the Secretary of State has 

the authority to declare an Election Day emergency, thus 

permitting your office to implement approved “emergency 

election procedures”. 

Objective: #2 = ensure smoke detectors are operational 100% of the time 

Action step Timeline Labor 

categories 

(Staff)

Labor units 

(staff time for 

this task)

Labor 

Cost

Other 

Costs

Specific activities

monitor smoke 

detectors and 

sprinklers once a 

week during the 

last 30 days prior 

to a scheduled 

election

once a week 

during the last 

30 days prior 

to a scheduled 

election

2 Office Staff not to exceed 2 

hours per visit

$14/hr mileage to 

and from 

warehouse

warehouse site visit, 

perform evaluation of 

smoke detectors, record 

and communicate 

results of visit, replace 

nonfunctioning smoke 

detectors

schedule and 

conduct monthly 

visits to the 

warehouse to 

monitor smoke 

detectors during 

other times

monthly (other 

than the 30 

days prior to 

an election)

2 Office Staff not to exceed 2 

hours per visit

$14/hr mileage to 

and from 

warehouse

warehouse site visit, 

perform evaluation of 

smoke detectors, record 

and communicate 

results of visit, replace 

nonfunctioning smoke 

detectors

tip

Contact your State and local Department of Emergency Preparedness and request copies of existing 

action plans and information on available resources. 

These plans and resources can provide the template 

for developing a specific operational plan as it relates 

to elections, including pre-election, early voting, 

Election Day, and post election activities.

TABLE 11.3 (cont.)
Election Management Guidelines  113

Within your county, it is important to understand the chain of authority for local disasters. 

Contact your local Emergency Management Department to gather information on your countywide 

procedures, including powers and responsibilities of 

county officials, as well as procedures for managing 

media operations.

Once your State Plan has been drafted, each 

local election official should establish and meet with 

a local task force to include:

 County department representatives

 Area law enforcement and fire district agencies

 Area school district representatives

 Area utility staff members, etc.

The local area task force provides your office 

access to resources available throughout your jurisdiction in the event of an emergency. With their input 

and the assistance of your Emergency Management 

Director, begin by developing a chain of authority and 

decision tree, including a contact list of these individuals, with home and cell telephone numbers.

Throughout the development of your plan, 

consider the following questions:

 Are there any gaps, overlaps, or other problem areas?

 Is it detailed enough? Too detailed?

 Does the Plan reflect lessons learned (from actual 

disasters or tests)?

 Does the Plan reflect changes in the facilities or 

internal processes?

 Have the types of situations changed?

 Are names and phone numbers current?

 Are disaster supplies stocked and ready for 

distribution?

5. Implement the plan

Now it is time to implement the action steps that you 

have laid out for your contingency plan. A key activity 

during the implementation of the plan is to EVALUATE. Once the plan has been implemented, it is important to assess how effective the action plan was and 

how it can be improved for the next time. It is useful 

to involve the staff and other teams of people involved 

in carrying out the steps of the action plan; they will 

be able to better tell you how the plan worked in actual 

practice. It is also as important to communicate the 

results of this assessment with your team and interested 

stakeholders; engaging them in the process will help 

them better understand the successes and challenges 

election officials face during moments of crisis.

Organizing Response Teams

A response team is comprised of designated individuals, and can include county management officials, 

election staff members, area police and fire staff, and 

specific polling place supervisors. 

Example A disaster response team is comparable to a 

volunteer Fire Department. The volunteer firemen are regular citizens with other jobs. They are trained as firemen 

and have a central meeting location (fire station), which 

contains all of their equipment. When a fire occurs, the 

alarm sounds and they leave their regular jobs, go to the 

central meeting location and perform firefighting duties 

until the fire is extinguished. 

The duties of the response team can include:

 Implement the procedures as detailed in the 

Disaster/Contingency Plan

 Initiate the phone tree

 Serve as a liaison between the response team, 

management, and other employees

 Direct and supervise operations

 Maintain and distribute disaster supplies, etc.

Each type of disaster/contingency plan should 

have its own unique response team. As an example, 

a shortage of provisional ballots in one area of the 

county would require the deployment of a preassigned team of runners who are trained to respond 

to specific polling places with additional ballots. 

tip

It is also strongly recommended that the Plan be 

tested on a regular basis – no less than twice a year. 

This helps all employees to become familiar with the 

procedures and reduces your risks in the event of an 

actual disaster. 
114  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

These runners must be “on call” and be prepared to 

respond at a moment’s notice. Supplies must be readied and may include polling place directional maps, 

names of polling place supervisors, official response 

team name tags, checklists, instructions, etc.

Organizational Planning for Catastrophic Disasters

A catastrophic disaster is an event that causes the cancellation and subsequent rescheduling of an election. 

This includes terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attack 

in New York and natural disasters such as the Katrina 

hurricane in New Orleans.

 Be sure to understand your State election law 

regarding declaration of emergencies, especially 

who has the authority to make decisions relating to 

the election process. Examples can include:

•	 Closing and relocation of polling places

•	 Consolidation of polling locations

•	 Cancellation and rescheduling of an election

 In your plan, be sure to establish a procedure for 

notifying all polling place supervisors that the election has been cancelled. Your action plan should 

also provide instructions on how to close the polling locations and return supplies. In the event that 

an election is cancelled, the Plan should also give 

guidance for the disposition of ballots and electronic media. 

Community Collaborations

The success of a contingency plan does not rely solely on the internal resources the election office has. Many 

emergencies and crisis situations will require the election office to reach out to other agencies and groups 

in the community for assistance in managing the situation and ensuring interruptions to the election processes are prevented and/or minimized. As such, it is best to involve key stakeholders from the beginning, i.e. 

during the development phase of the contingency plan. There are many benefits to this, including:

 They can be a resource of fresh and innovative ideas. 

 They can provide volunteers, materials, and services.

 They can provide technical expertise in areas outside the scope of the election office’s functions, knowledge, and capabilities.

 It helps educate non-election staff about the roles and responsibilities of the election offices and its importance in the community. 

Whom do you decide to involve? The response to this question will vary according to the particular 

issue being considered. A good way to identify stakeholders is to determine who will be impacted by the 

contingency plan – for example:

 Staff from other county offices/department

 Poll workers

 Voters

 Local police and fire departments

 Emergency medical services

 Representatives from groups serving the elderly, individuals with disabilities, and minority groups

 Representatives from political parties

 Voter education and outreach groups

 Legal staff/representatives from the election offices and other legal organizations vested in elections

 Staff from the State’s election office

 Other counties’ election directors

DISCUSSION BOX 11.4: COMMUNITY COLLABORATIONS
Election Management Guidelines  115

 It is important to provide a complete listing of 

polling places to all area law enforcement and 

firefighting personnel prior to every election. 

Through a designated response team, area police 

departments can implement increased patrols 

and/or place law enforcement officers at specific 

polling place locations should they deem it necessary in order to protect public safety and the 

integrity of the election process. 

Example Should the national threat level be increased to 

orange or red on Election Day, local area police and sheriff 

departments would immediately implement their response 

team procedures.

Contingency Planning for Unexpected Events 

during Early Voting

Early voting activities can include distribution of ballots by mail or voting in person at satellite locations 

prior to Election Day. As with all other election operations, any possible unexpected event during early 

voting must be identified, an action plan developed, 

and staff trained on how to respond to the issue. Evaluate all aspects of the operation, from the moment 

the doors open, until they close.

Note Satellite early voting in-person locations are similar 

to polling places on Election Day. They are staffed by temporary staff, managed by a supervisor, and are open for 

voting during a designated period of time.

Following is a list of possible situations that can 

arise unexpectedly during the early voting period 

and some of the factors to consider when developing 

a contingency plan:

Creating a Media Action Plan

In order to protect and enhance the Election Office’s credibility and to communicate effectively with the 

media, the election director should consider the following suggestions:

 Designate an election staff member to be the central media contact person.

 Instruct all employees to refer all questions from the media to the election director or to the County’s 

Public Information Officer.

 Educate your employees that news reporters are under constant deadlines, but no deadline is worth anyone 

releasing an inaccurate statement to the media.

 Be aware that media reporters often frame their questions to bring out the conflict or emotion in a story. 

 Educate your polling place supervisors on proper ways to handle media questions.

 Never allow anyone to provide a “personal” or “off the record” opinion to the media.

 Press releases should be developed and disseminated in an expeditious fashion regarding changes in election times, polling place locations, expected release of election results, etc. 

 Be sure to take time to explain to the media and the public the nature of the emergency and all procedures 

as you work toward managing the issue. Perceived problems can be just as damaging as actual problems. 

Remember to provide thorough explanations. By taking the time to inform the public as things progress, 

an Election Day emergency, large or small, will be thought of and reported as a problem that you accurately and efficiently handled, not an Election Day disaster.

 The designated election PIO staff should maintain a media contact list, including office and cell telephone 

numbers and email addresses for all first line media personnel.

DISCUSSION BOX 11.5: CREATING A MEDIA ACTION PLAN
116  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Computer network failure

 If voters are processed on the main election software system, how will you check voters in if the computers stop working? 

 How will you verify their eligibility? 

 How will you know which ballot style to provide the voter?

Power outage

 How will you process voters? 

 Do you have a UPS device or battery powered laptop for emergency use? 

Staff shortage

 Do you have designated staff identified to fill positions until replacement temporary staff can be recruited?

Ballot shortage

 Do you have a temporary backup supply of all ballots on site at each location? 

 Are temporary staff members trained to call for additional ballots once they access the backup supply? 

Long lines

 Do you have a Plan B for managing large quantities of voters?

 Are temporary staff members trained in line management procedures?

Incorrect ballot styles mailed to voters

 How will you determine which voters received the wrong ballot?

 What is your method for issuing replacement ballots?

 How will your office respond to media questions? 
Election Management Guidelines  117

Relocation or consolidation of polling places

 Maintain a listing of all available polling place locations within your jurisdiction, along with contact person name and phone number. 

 Consider using satellite early voting locations as emergency polling places on Election Day. These locations usually have 

computer network lines in place to allow for any voter in the jurisdiction to be validated.

 If it is necessary to relocate polling places at the last minute, be sure to post notices at the old location to inform voters 

of the location of the new polling place.

 Notify the media of any polling place changes and remember to also post this information on your office web site.

 Use your office automated telephone system to provide updated information to voters about last minute polling place changes.

Shortage of poll workers

 As part of your normal operating procedures, assign a certain percentage of poll workers to a “stand by” status. Require that 

these poll workers report to the central election office instead of a polling place on Election morning. These poll workers can 

be deployed to any polling place in the county in the event of “no shows” or absences. 

 Implement a county/city employee “stand by” poll worker program. These employees should receive full training and be 

authorized for immediate re-assignment on Election Day, if needed.

 If not needed at the polling places, utilize this pool of “stand by” poll workers to serve other needs on Election Day, i.e. 

runners, in-house telephone bank staff, etc.

Shortage of ballots and/or supplies

 Poll workers should be trained to inspect their supply kits on the day before Election Day. They are the final set of eyes to 

determine if all mission critical supplies have been packaged correctly. 

 Provide a checklist of all mission critical supplies. Place this checklist on the top of their supply kit and train them to check this 

list immediately upon receipt of their supplies. If something is missing, poll workers must be trained to immediately telephone 

the central election office on the night prior to Election Day. 

 Be sure that your office has an action plan in place to monitor telephone calls from poll workers on the night before Election 

Day, and to dispatch response teams to deliver any missing supplies.

Contingency Planning for Unexpected Events 

on Election Day

Unexpected events occur in every business operation, every day throughout the year. On Election Day, 

any unexpected event can have a significant impact, 

i.e. polling places don’t open on time, poll workers 

don’t report for work, mission critical supplies were 

not delivered, road closures, power failure, etc. Each 

scenario must be evaluated, and an action plan developed, including the assignment of a response team for 

each type of unexpected event.

Following is a list of possible situations that can 

arise unexpectedly on Election Day and some of the factors to consider when developing a contingency plan:

continued next page...
118  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Equipment issues

 Provide poll workers with easy to follow, step by step instructions for opening and closing voting equipment. Make these 

instructions as simple as possible, placing the opening instructions on one side and the closing on the reverse side. Laminate 

this one page of instructions and place it in an easy to use location. 

 Note Consider attaching the laminated instructions to the handle of the voting equipment, making it easy to find 

on Election morning.

 Maintain a support help desk to answer questions from poll workers regarding any problem they have with opening or closing 

the voting equipment. Be sure to document each call and use this information for future debriefing sessions.

 Provide cell phones to all rovers in the field and establish an action plan to enable the central election office to know which 

rovers have been dispatched to which polling place locations. 

 Require the rovers to complete a daily log documenting their visits to assigned polling locations throughout the day.

Polling place not open

 Provide the supervisory poll worker with current contact information for the manager of the facility they are assigned to 

on Election Day.

 Train poll workers to immediately contact the facility manager by phone if the location is locked and they are not able to 

gain access. If they are not able to reach the facility manager, they should immediately contact the central election 

office for assistance.

 In the event that access to the location is not available by the time that the polls are scheduled to open, poll workers should 

be trained on how to implement Plan B for processing voters until the building is opened. 

 Note Plan B can include utilizing the trunks of automobiles as check in locations for voters.

Inclement weather after the polls open

 Develop an emergency action plan in the event that roads in your jurisdiction become either somewhat or completely 

impassable due to ice or snow. 

 Contact county/city employees to request use of four-wheel drive vehicles for use in collecting voting equipment and voted 

ballots from pre-established emergency collection sites or from individual polling place locations.

 Utilize your established polling place notification plan to inform supervisory poll workers that the Election night emergency 

action plan is now in place. 

 Note Consider implementing a central text messaging service to provide immediate notification to all poll 

workers through their cell phone.

Bomb threat

 Provide a “Bomb Threat Protocol” laminated card in all polling place supply kits. Instruct your poll workers to follow the 

guidelines on the card and to call 911 immediately.
Election Management Guidelines  119

Power failure at polling places

 Include instructions on how to manage a power failure in your poll worker training program and manual. These instructions 

should be laminated and placed in an easy to find location in their Election Day supply kit.

 Poll workers should be trained in how to calmly continue the voting process in the event of power failure. 

 Train your staff to establish and send a response team to these polling place locations. The response team should be prepared 

to transport needed supplies and equipment, i.e. food, water, space heaters, fans, etc.

Electioneering or protesting

 Train poll workers on State law regarding electioneering at the polls on Election Day. Provide poll workers with simple solutions 

for dealing with this issue, i.e. request voters to remove campaign buttons or stickers from their clothing, conduct periodic 

visual checks outside the entrance of the polling place to check for campaign signs, etc.

 If poll workers experience difficult in managing electioneering activity, they should be trained to immediately call 911 to 

request police assistance.

Traffic control

 Poll workers should be trained to be aware of potential traffic issues and be prepared to request police assistance, 

if necessary.

Long lines

 In the event of long lines of voters, poll workers should be trained to follow the guidelines for line management in their 

training manual. Tip: Consider developing and incorporating line management guidelines into the poll worker training session 

and materials if you do not currently have one. Reach out to other community groups, agencies, and businesses that have 

experience coordinating and managing large events for their input on how they would manage a polling place.

 Provide various scenarios as solutions to this issue, i.e. break up the line into two or more check in locations; station a poll 

worker at the end of the line to encourage voters to review the sample ballot and be prepared to vote in order to keep the 

line moving; confirm that voters are in the correct polling place location; and consider setting up a separate line to manage 

provisional voters.

 Develop a plan for deploying additional personnel, voting equipment, and other supplies to polling places experiencing long lines. 

 Tip As a first step on Election Day, have poll workers and/or roaming technicians first explain the cause of the long 

lines before deploying resources; this will help you identify which personnel or materials need to be sent out or if the problem only requires a modification within the polling place.
120  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Developing a Continuity of Operations Plan for 

Internal Operations

On Election Day, the central election office becomes 

the command post for all polling place activities 

throughout the jurisdiction. It is imperative to 

review your internal continuity of operations plan 

with a mindset of “It’s now Election Day. What will 

we do if?” Consider every conceivable scenario from 

bomb threats to power outage to telephone malfunction. Ask yourself:

Power failure

 What are the mission critical operations that will need electricity from an emergency source in the event of a power failure 

at your main office? 

 Do you have an emergency generator on stand-by on Election Day? 

 Do you have UPS devices connected to mission critical computer systems should the main power supply be interrupted 

for any reason? 

 Have you contacted your area utility companies to request that they limit work in your vicinity on Election Day?

Computer system issues

 Who will you call if the main computer system crashes on Election morning?

 How will you direct voters to the correct polling place without a computer available to lookup the information? 

 Do you have a county computer staff member on call to your office 24/7 during election mode?

Telephone system issues

 How will you communicate to the polling places, the voters, and the media if the main telephone system malfunctions on 

Election morning? 

 Do you know which polling places have cell phones available to them? 

 Do you have access to all cell phones within the county organization? 

 Do you have a listing of personal cell phone numbers for your staff? 

 Have you collected cell phone numbers for your poll workers in the field? 

 Do your poll workers have an emergency contact phone number for their use on Election Day? 

 Have you made arrangements with your emergency dispatch department to manage phone calls in the event of an emergency? 

 Does your local phone company know where to reroute your calls in the event of an emergency? 

Election night activities

 Do you have an alternative location to tally votes on Election night? 

 Do you have a backup of all computer data both onsite in a fire proof safe and in an offsite secure location? 
Election Management Guidelines  121

Election office needs

 Do you have an alternative location for use as backup “main election office” on Election Day if your phone, computers and the 

overall facility become unusable for any reason? 

 Does your staff know where to report in order to answer the incoming phone calls? 

 Do you have an area designated for media in the alternative location? What about security needs? 

 Do you have a plan in place for police officers to provide extra services to your office?

It is also recommended that there be a system 

and process for how poll workers and voters will 

communicate with the election office during the 

voting period in case of emergencies and other 

election-related events. For example: do you have 

dedicated telephone lines for poll workers, voters, 

media, etc; do you have the necessary telecommunications equipment and staffing to manage the phone 

lines; how have you communicated these numbers 

to each group; how will poll workers contact the 

office (agency issued cell phones, telephones already 

located on polling site, personal phones, etc.); etc.

Staff and Poll Worker Training and Supplies

Polling Places become mini-branch offices on Election 

Day. Each one is stand-alone and must be prepared 

to handle any situation that may arise. Many types 

of situations can occur during the day. Often poll 

workers face the challenge of managing electioneering activities, other types of protests, accidents and 

illnesses impacting poll workers and/or voters, traffic 

control needs, bomb threats, along with weatherrelated issues and supplies and equipment issues.

Specific Emergencies:

 Fire – Poll workers should be trained to review the 

procedures for reporting fires and evacuating the 

facility with their polling place facility manager. 

If possible, they should collect the designated election supplies prior to leaving the building. 

 Medical - For any medical emergencies, poll workers should be instructed to call 911 immediately, 

and to also report the emergency to the central 

election office.

 Tornado – Poll workers should seek shelter immediately if a warning is issued for their area. They 

should follow instructions posted in the facility 

and go immediately to the designated shelter 

area. If no shelter area is available, they should 

seek shelter in an interior room that does not 

have windows.

 Flood – In the event of flooding, poll workers 

should immediately notify the central election 

office and then move the polling place supplies and 

voting area to a higher location. 

Note Include large garbage bags with each polling place’s 

supplies. In the event of heavy rain, they can be used to protect the ballot boxes and precinct supplies from moisture.

 Severe Ice/Snow Storm – If poll workers are concerned about severe weather related to ice or snow, 

they should immediately notify the central election office.

 Power Failure – Should the power fail at a polling 

place location, the poll workers should follow the 

instructions provided in their election supplies. 

They should also be trained to notify the central 

election office as soon as possible.

Other things to consider:

 Full time election staff should be responsible for 

preparing and packaging all polling place supply 

kits. These kits should contain a checklist to be 

tip

Document each of these scenarios and its specific 

action plan. Publish and distribute your office’s Internal 

Continuity of Operations Plan to all agencies responsible for providing assistance in the event of a disaster/

emergency. You should also release the final Plan to all 

area television, radio, and newspaper media.
122  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

signed by two staff members as a final proof that all 

supplies for each location are in place. 

 Develop a listing of all mission-critical polling place 

supplies. Again, this list should be double-proofed 

by two separate full time staff members prior to distribution to the poll workers.

 On Election Day, poll workers should be trained to 

immediately notify the central election office in the 

event of an expected shortage of mission-critical supplies, i.e. provisional ballots, etc. 

 Runners should be available and a response team 

should be assigned to deliver additional supplies. 

The response team should be provided with driving 

maps and instructions on how to provide additional 

support to the poll workers. One member of the 

response team should have a cell phone to report 

back to election central when all supplies have 

been delivered.

 Provide additional support to poll workers by assigning rovers to pre-established regions on Election 

Day. Each region should contain 7-10 polling places. 

The rovers should visit these locations before the 

polls open and immediately after the polls close to 

provide additional support and assistance to the 

poll workers. 
Election Management Guidelines  123

RESOURCES

• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention – Emergency Preparedness and Response: 

http://emergency.cdc.gov/

• Disability Preparedness Resource Center: 

http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/

• Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

http://www.fema.gov/

• Ready Campaign: 

www.ready.gov

• List of State offices and agencies of emergency management:

http://www.fema.gov/about/contact/statedr.shtm

• Disaster Help: 

https://www.disasterhelp.gov/index.shtm

• Making Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible to People with Disabilities: 

http://www.ada.gov/emergencyprep.htm

• Stoneburner, Gary, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa. Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 

Systems, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Special publication 800-30). 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. 

July 2002. (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf)

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm

• U.S. Department of the Interior – Emergency Management 

(http://www.doi.gov/emergency/index.html)

• U.S. Department of Justice, Americans with Disability Act: 

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/adahom1.htm

• An ADA Guide for Local Governments: Making Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible to People with Disabilities. (An 11-page illustrated publication that provides guidance on preparing for 

and carrying out emergency response programs in a manner that results in the services being accessible to 

people with disabilities.) 

(http://www.ada.gov/emergencyprepguide.htm) 

• U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Disability Rights Section. An ADA Guide for Local Governments: Making Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible for People with Disabilities.

(http://www.ada.gov/emergencyprep.htm) 

• U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Center for Program Evaluation: 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/evaluation/index.html

• U.S. General Accounting Office. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act. June 1996. 

http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gg96118.pdf
124  U.S. Election Assistance Commission

S.W.O.T Analysis Sample Worksheet

Example A county is considering the use of vote centers 

on Election Day and have decided to conduct an analysis of 

the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that 

can assist or impede the successful development and implementation of this change. They are conducting the S.W.O.T. 

analysis as part of the overall identification and assessment 

process in preparation for developing and implement a contingency or change management plan.

Strengths and Weaknesses = internal factors (factors 

inside the office that can be an asset or an obstacle to 

achieving desired end result)

Example budget, number of staff members, organizational structure, etc.

Opportunities and Threats = external factors (factors 

outside the office that can be an asset or an obstacle to 

achieving desired end result)

Example community interest, public perception, changes 

in Federal/State laws, etc.

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSESS

 Office has the appropriate budget to make the change

 Current staff is well trained and invested in the process

 No current policies or procedures exist in the county 

regarding the use of vote centers

 Current staffing level is already below what is needed 

– how will this change impact current staff’s roles and 

responsibilities

OPPORTUNITIES THREATS

 Strong community approval of vote centers

 Several locations for vote centers have been identified 

that: are centrally located = accessible by public 

transportation, easily identifiable buildings, accessible by 

major routes, parking space accommodates large amounts 

of cars, etc.have the required space (inside and outside) 

 Identified locations do not agree to participate as 

vote centers

 Difficulty in recruiting qualified poll workers
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

1225 New York Avenue, NW

Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20005

1.866.747.1471 (toll free)

HAVAinfo@eac.gov

www.eac.gov