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*********************************************** 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF

NEW LONDON v. BRUCE STEVENS

(AC 43471)

Alvord, Clark and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff housing authority sought, by way of summary process, to regain

possession of certain premises leased to the defendant tenant. The

plaintiff served on the defendant a notice to quit possession of the

premises alleging that the defendant’s conduct constituted a serious

nuisance under the applicable statute (§ 47a-15 (B) and (C)). Thereafter,

the plaintiff commenced this summary process action by serving on the

defendant a summons and complaint. The defendant filed an answer

and special defenses alleging, among other things, that he was entitled

to an accommodation because of his psychiatric disability. Subsequently,

the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had not issued a pretermination notice. The

trial court rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff on

the basis of the defendant’s violation of § 47a-15 (C) and denied the

defendant’s motion to dismiss, from which the defendant appealed to

this court. Held:

1. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process

action: the notice to quit issued by the plaintiff, which complied with

statutory requirements (§ 47a-23), provided the court with jurisdiction

over the plaintiff’s claims; moreover, given that the plaintiff alleged that

the defendant’s conduct constituted a serious nuisance, the plain and

unambiguous language of § 47a-15 made clear that the plaintiff was

not required to serve a pretermination notice on the defendant, and,

therefore, the lack thereof did not deprive the court of subject matter

jurisdiction; furthermore, the court did not need to reach the merits of

whether the defendant’s conduct did, in fact, constitute a serious nuisance in order to exercise jurisdiction over this action.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the court improperly

rendered judgment for the plaintiff because his acts or omissions did

not constitute a serious nuisance within the meaning of § 47a-15 (C):

although the defendant claimed that the court’s decision relied on a

subordinate, erroneous finding that the defendant had harassed another

resident, the court did not make that finding and, instead, made clear

that its decision in favor of the plaintiff was based on the condition of

the defendant’s apartment; moreover, the record supported the court’s

conclusion that the condition of the defendant’s apartment constituted

a serious nuisance because it presented an immediate and serious danger

to the safety of the other tenants.

3. The defendant’s claims that the trial court made clearly erroneous factual

findings regarding whether the plaintiff reasonably accommodated him

and that the court’s findings were the result of implicit bias were not

reviewable, the defendant having failed to brief the claims adequately:

the defendant’s briefs before this court were completely devoid of any

legal analysis, as his argument mostly restated portions of the record,

without providing any context or explanation of how those facts supported or related to his legal claims; moreover, the defendant failed to

explain why either of the two authorities that he cited, an Iowa criminal

case and an American Bar Association publication, were instructive in

light of the facts of this case, or how the specific findings he challenged

were relevant to the court’s judgment.

Argued September 21, 2021—officially released January 4, 2022

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New London, Housing

Session at Norwich, and tried to the court, Hon. Francis

J. Foley, judge trial referee; judgment for the plaintiff,
from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

John L. Giulietti, for the appellant (defendant).

Lloyd L. Langhammer, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CLARK, J. In this summary process action, the defendant, Bruce Stevens, appeals from the trial court’s judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff,

the Housing Authority of the City of New London. The

defendant claims that the court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to deliver to

the defendant a pretermination, or Kapa,

1 notice prior

to commencing its summary process action against him,

(2) improperly found that his conduct constituted a

serious nuisance within the meaning of General Statutes

§ 47a-15 (C), and (3) made certain factual findings that

are not supported by the evidentiary record. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history that are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. In 2013, the defendant entered into a

written lease with the plaintiff for an apartment in a

public housing complex for persons with disabilities

and the elderly. In 2019, the defendant, an individual

with psychiatric disabilities, was hospitalized on several

occasions. On March 26, 2019, the police escorted the

defendant from his apartment to an ambulance that

took him to the Pond House, which is a behavioral

health unit located within the Lawrence and Memorial

Hospital. An officer involved in that incident subsequently informed Avalon LeBlanc, the plaintiff’s property manager, that, given what the officer had observed

while escorting the defendant from the apartment, the

apartment should be condemned. Later that day,

LeBlanc and a maintenance worker entered the defendant’s apartment. LeBlanc took photographs of the hallway adjacent to the defendant’s apartment door and

the interior of his apartment.

The next day, March 27, 2019, the plaintiff served on

the defendant a notice to quit possession. The notice

to quit indicated, among other things, that the defendant

wilfully caused substantial destruction to his dwelling

unit by ripping up tiles from the floor, rendering appliances inoperable, clogging the sink and toilet, and filling

the apartment with trash and other debris that had left

the unit uninhabitable, constituting a serious nuisance

in violation of § 47a-15 (B). The notice to quit also

alleged that the defendant’s conduct presented an

immediate and serious danger to the safety of other

tenants, constituting a serious nuisance in violation of

§ 47a-15 (C), because the defendant had harassed

another resident and dragged bags of trash down the

stairs and through common areas, leaving behind a trail

of food and other refuse.2

On April 17, 2019, the plaintiff commenced this summary process action by serving on the defendant a summons and complaint. The complaint alleged two claims

sounding in serious nuisance, which were identical to
the allegations in the notice to quit.3 Thereafter, the

defendant filed an answer and special defenses and a

motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss asserted, inter

alia, that the acts alleged in the notice to quit did not

constitute a serious nuisance and that the trial court

consequently lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because the plaintiff had failed to issue the pretermination notice required in summary process actions when

an eviction is based upon grounds other than serious

nuisance or another exception set forth in § 47a-15.

The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the

defendant’s motion to dismiss. All matters, including the

defendant’s motion to dismiss challenging the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, were consolidated for trial,

which commenced on October 1, 2019.

At trial, Virginia Watrous, a resident in the building

and the head of the tenants association, testified that

she was sitting in her apartment at approximately 8

o’clock one evening when she heard an ‘‘ungodly noise

by [her] door.’’ When she got up to investigate the noise,

she noticed that someone had slipped a floor tile under

her apartment door. About forty-five minutes later, she

observed that another tile was being pushed under her

door. When she opened the door, she saw the defendant

standing against the wall across from her apartment.

She subsequently filed with the property manager a

written complaint in which she claimed that the defendant had scared her during that incident.

LeBlanc, the plaintiff’s property manager, testified

about what she observed when she inspected the defendant’s apartment. She also described thirteen photographs of the defendant’s apartment, which were

entered into evidence. LeBlanc stated that the defendant had thrown garbage in the hallway outside of his

apartment. The trash was strewn about, the floor was

wet, and bags of garbage impeded an exit, which presented a safety concern. According to LeBlanc, the interior of the apartment was filthy and had a very bad

odor; something had been smeared all over the walls;

dishes containing spoiled food were scattered throughout the apartment; there were piles of soggy bags of

trash; rotting food and grease covered the oven, stove

and kitchen walls, which presented a fire hazard; the

kitchen sink was clogged and full of greasy, dirty water

and dishes; the toilet was unusable because multiple

household items had been stuffed into the bowl; and

there was standing water on the bathroom floor.

LeBlanc further testified that she had to step over bags

of garbage and there was no clear pathway through the

apartment. The defendant’s personal belongings were

in disarray and were stacked four feet high in some

places, ‘‘similar to . . . a hoarding situation.’’ Additionally, the smoke alarms were inoperable because the

batteries had been removed, floor tiles had been ripped

up from the entryway to the kitchen, and the refrigerator was not working because the circuit breaker had
been tripped. LeBlanc also testified that the defendant

never submitted maintenance requests to report any of

these issues.

The defendant testified at length about his physical

and mental health issues. He claimed that he had picked

up tiles that had come loose from his floor because he

is diabetic and did not want to cut his feet. He only

placed the tiles under Watrous’ door to make a maintenance complaint.

On October 4, 2019, following the close of evidence,

the court issued its memorandum of decision. With

respect to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging

a serious nuisance in violation of § 47a-15 (B), the court

found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant

substantially or wilfully had destroyed part of his apartment and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.

With respect to the second count alleging a serious

nuisance in violation of § 47a-15 (C), the court found

that the condition of the apartment presented ‘‘an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants

of the building.’’ Accordingly, the court rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal

followed. Additional facts and procedural history will

be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant’s first claim is that, because his conduct did not constitute a serious nuisance within the

meaning of § 47a-15 (C), the plaintiff’s failure to serve

him with a pretermination notice deprived the court of

subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff counters that

no pretermination notice was required because the

plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had created a

serious nuisance within the meaning of § 47a-15 (C).4

We agree with the plaintiff.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and

a brief overview of the statutory scheme that governs

summary process actions. ‘‘[S]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay,

loss and expense to which, under the common-law

actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully

holding over their terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.

. . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 388, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).

‘‘Pursuant to § 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed

with a summary process action, except in those situations specifically excluded, the landlord must first

deliver a [pretermination] notice to the tenant specifying the alleged violations . . . .’’ (Emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Josephine Towers,
L.P. v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 836, 238 A.3d 732,

cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d 281 (2020). A

pretermination notice provides the tenant with an

opportunity to remedy the violations and avoid a summary eviction. St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728, 734–35, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010),

cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011). When

a ‘‘landlord elects to proceed under sections 47a-23 to

47a-23b, inclusive, to evict based on . . . conduct by

the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance’’; General Statutes § 47a-15; however, a pretermination notice

is not required.. Section 47a-15 defines ‘‘ ‘serious nuisance’ ’’ in relevant part as ‘‘(B) substantial and wilful

destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises [or]

(C) conduct which presents an immediate and serious

danger to the safety of other tenants . . . .’’

In the present case, the notice to quit alleged that

the plaintiff was terminating the defendant’s tenancy

because his conduct constituted a serious nuisance

under § 47a-15 (B) and (C). The plain and unambiguous

language of § 47a-15 makes clear that the plaintiff was

therefore not required to issue the defendant a pretermination notice. It unequivocally provides that a pretermination notice is not required when the landlord seeks

to evict, pursuant to §§ 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive,

based on circumstances constituting a serious nuisance. See Cardinal Realty Investors, LLC v. Bernasconi, 287 Conn. 136, 138 n.3, 946 A.2d 1242 (2008)

(‘‘[b]ecause the plaintiff alleged that the conditions in

the defendant’s room constituted a serious nuisance,

the provisions of § 47a-15 requiring . . . a [pretermination] notice . . . did not apply’’). When a landlord

seeks to recover possession of leased property on the

basis of a serious nuisance, ‘‘[a] landlord may simply

serve a notice to quit alleging serious nuisance and, if

appropriate, move to the next step.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly, supra, 199 Conn.

App. 837.

Notwithstanding the plain language of § 47a-15, the

defendant claims that, under the specific facts of this

case, he was entitled to a pretermination notice and

the lack thereof deprived the court of subject matter

jurisdiction. His claim is premised entirely upon his

contention that his conduct did not constitute a serious

nuisance within the meaning of § 47a-15. The defendant,

however, mistakenly conflates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction with the merits of the plaintiff’s summary process claim.

‘‘[B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our

review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Housing Authority v. Rodriguez, 178 Conn. App. 120,

126, 174 A.3d 844 (2017). ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction

involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the

type of controversy presented by the action before it.
. . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits

of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hlinka v. Michaels,

204 Conn. App. 537, 540–41, 254 A.3d 361 (2021).

‘‘There is no doubt that the Superior Court is authorized to hear summary process cases; the Superior Court

is authorized to hear all cases except those over which

the probate courts have original jurisdiction. . . . The

jurisdiction of the Superior Court in summary process

actions, however, is subject to [certain] condition[s]

precedent.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Presidential Village, LLC v. Perkins, 332

Conn. 45, 56, 209 A.3d 616 (2019). ‘‘Our Supreme Court

has stated that [a]s a condition precedent to a summary

process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional

necessity. . . . Simply put, before a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process, the landlord must prove compliance with all of the applicable

preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination of the lease.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Housing Authority v. Brown, 129 Conn. App. 313, 317,

19 A.3d 252 (2011).

In general, the conditions that must be met prior to

the commencement of a summary process action are

set forth in § 47a-23.5 To invoke the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction over a summary process action, a

landlord must therefore, at a minimum, prove compliance with § 47a-23, which requires a landlord seeking

to terminate a lease or rental agreement for serious

nuisance to deliver to the occupant or lessee a notice to

quit possession. In contrast to a pretermination notice,

which provides the tenant with an opportunity to remedy violations and does not terminate a tenancy, ‘‘service of a notice to quit possession pursuant to § 47a23 is typically an unequivocal act terminating a lease

agreement with a tenant.’’ St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-op v.

Johnson, supra, 124 Conn. App. 735. The notice to quit

must be in writing, notify the tenant that the tenant

must quit possession or occupancy of the premises on

a specified date, include the address of the property,

and state ‘‘the reason or reasons for the notice to quit

possession or occupancy using the statutory language

or words of similar import.’’ General Statutes § 47a23 (b).

It follows that, for purposes of determining whether

it had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s

summary process action, the court in the present case

needed to determine only whether the notice to quit

issued by the plaintiff complied with § 47a-23. The court

did not need to reach the merits of whether the defendant’s conduct did, in fact, constitute a serious nuisance

in order to exercise jurisdiction over this action.

‘‘[T]o establish subject matter jurisdiction, the court

must determine that it has the power to hear the general

class [of cases] to which the proceedings in question
belong.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 728, 553 A.2d 175, cert.

denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d

(1989). Although, in certain cases, ‘‘it is necessary to

examine the facts of the case to determine whether it

is within a general class that the court has power to

hear’’; id.; see, e.g., id., 730 (whether notice was proper

required inquiry into defendant’s status as resident of

mobile home park to determine which summary process provision controlled); Colonial Investors, LLC v.

Furbush, 175 Conn. App. 154, 165, 167 A.3d 987

(whether court lacked jurisdiction because notice to

quit was defective for failure to state properly total rent

owed required examination of facts), cert. denied, 327

Conn. 968, 173 A.3d 953 (2017); this is not such a case.

The plaintiff commenced this summary process action

on the grounds that the defendant’s conduct constituted

a serious nuisance within the meaning of § 47a-15 (B)

and (C). Its notice to quit included the requisite language set forth in § 47a-23 (b), and the defendant did

not claim that the notice to quit was otherwise defective

in form or delivery. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s undisputed compliance with the requirements of § 47a-23

provided the court with subject matter jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s claims.

II

The defendant also claims that the court improperly

rendered judgment for the plaintiff because his acts or

omissions did not constitute a serious nuisance within

the meaning of § 47a-15 (C). We disagree.

‘‘[T]he existence of a nuisance generally is a question

of fact, for which we invoke a clearly erroneous standard of review . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sproviero v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc., 108 Conn.

App. 454, 467, 948 A.2d 379, cert. denied, 289 Conn.

906, 957 A.2d 873 (2008). ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to

support it . . . or when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial

court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine

credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . .

In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the

record to determine whether the [court] could have

reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .

Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . .

in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 118

Conn. App. 163, 169, 983 A.2d 35 (2009), aff’d, 305 Conn.

488, 45 A.3d 627 (2012).

Additionally, the trial court, ‘‘as the sole arbiter of

credibility, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in

part, the testimony offered by either party.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v.
Brown, supra, 129 Conn. App. 316. It is ‘‘the court’s

exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence

[and] determine the credibility of witnesses . . . .

Thus, if the court’s dispositive finding . . . was not

clearly erroneous, then the judgment must be affirmed.

. . . The function of the appellate court is to review,

and not retry, the proceedings of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135

Conn. App. 831, 846, 43 A.3d 750, cert. denied, 305 Conn.

925, 47 A.3d 884 (2012).

The second count in the plaintiff’s complaint alleged

in relevant part that the defendant was ‘‘in violation of

. . . § 47a-15 (C), which defines ‘serious nuisance’ as

‘conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants . . . .’ Specifically

. . . the defendant harassed another resident; this

includes the defendant repeatedly placing a floor tile

under [Watrous’] door and then confronting her when

she questioned him about it. The defendant also dragged

bags of trash from his apartment down two flights of

stairs to the exterior of the building, trailing food and

other refuse the entire way. These actions displayed by

the defendant threaten the safety of other tenants

. . . .’’

The defendant claims that the court improperly found

that his conduct was ‘‘an immediate and serious danger

to the safety of the other tenants’’ because that finding

relied upon a subordinate, erroneous finding that the

defendant had harassed Watrous. The court never made

any findings about whether the defendant harassed

Watrous, however. Rather, in its memorandum of decision, the court merely summarized Watrous’ testimony

about the defendant placing tiles under her door. The

court did not conclude that the defendant, in fact, harassed Watrous or that this conduct was essential to its

finding that the defendant’s conduct amounted to a

serious nuisance under § 47a-15 (C). On the contrary,

the court’s decision makes clear that its finding in favor

of the plaintiff on count two was based on the condition

of the defendant’s apartment, not the defendant’s conduct toward Watrous.

The record supports the court’s conclusion that the

condition of the apartment constituted a serious nuisance because it presented an immediate and serious

danger to the safety of the other tenants. In addition

to the thirteen photographs of the defendant’s apartment that were entered into evidence, the court heard

from LeBlanc, who testified that there were piles of

garbage and dishes with rotten food scattered throughout the apartment, both the sink and toilet were inoperable because they were clogged, and the oven and stove

were covered in grease, which presented a fire hazard.

There was ample evidence, therefore, to support the

court’s conclusion that the condition of the apartment

was ‘‘squalid, unsanitary, and a public health threat to
the other tenants,’’ which presented an immediate and

serious danger to the safety of the other tenants. Consequently, the court’s finding that the defendant’s conduct

constituted a serious nuisance pursuant to § 47a-15 (C)

was not clearly erroneous.

III

Although difficult to discern from his brief, the defendant also appears to challenge certain factual findings

as clearly erroneous and claims, without support, that

two of the court’s findings indicate that the court was

implicitly biased against him. We decline to review

these claims because he did not adequately brief them.

The following additional procedural background provides the necessary context for consideration of the

defendant’s claims. After filing this appeal, the defendant filed a motion for articulation of the court’s decision. Specifically, he sought articulation of the court’s

finding that the plaintiff had reasonably accommodated

the defendant during the months of January through

May, 2019. The court’s finding in this respect apparently

related to the defendant’s special defense alleging that,

because of his disability, he was entitled to an accommodation by way of additional time to prepare for a

reinspection of his apartment.6 After the trial court

denied the motion for articulation, the defendant sought

review in this court. We granted review and ordered

the court to articulate the factual and legal basis for

its determination that the defendant was reasonably

accommodated. The court issued its articulation on

February 6, 2020, explaining that, although there was

no evidence in the record that the defendant ever had

requested a reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff

nonetheless had attempted to accommodate the defendant.

On appeal, the defendant has not raised a claim under

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq. (2018), or any other state or federal law

or regulation affording protections to an individual with

disabilities. Instead, he challenges as erroneous the

court’s finding that he was reasonably accommodated

and claims that the court engaged in implicit bias

against him as a person with disabilities. His briefs

before this court, however, are completely devoid of

any legal analysis. The defendant’s argument mostly

restates portions of the record, without providing any

context or explanation of how those facts support or

relate to his legal claims. The only authorities he cites

are an Iowa criminal case discussing a defendant’s

request for an implicit bias jury instruction and an American Bar Association publication about implicit biases

and disabilities. The defendant has failed to explain

why either authority is instructive in light of the facts

of this case or how the specific findings he challenges

are relevant to the court’s judgment.
Our appellate courts consistently have held that

‘‘[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is

required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure

to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection,

337 Conn. 781, 803, 256 A.3d 655 (2021); see also Kelib

v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 100 Conn.

App. 351, 353, 918 A.2d 288 (2007). Where a party cites

no law and provides no analysis in support of a claim,

we decline to review it. State v. Holmes, 176 Conn. App.

156, 185, 169 A.3d 264 (2017), aff’d, 334 Conn. 202,

221 A.3d 407 (2019). We therefore do not address the

defendant’s claims concerning whether he was reasonably accommodated or that the court’s findings were

the result of implicit bias.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Kapa Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn. Supp. 274, 408 A.2d 22 (1979).

2 General Statutes § 47a-15 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Prior to the commencement of a summary process action, except in the case in which the

landlord elects to proceed under sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, to

evict based . . . on conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance . . . the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying

the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement

shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the

notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the tenant or payment

of damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach is not so remedied

within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall terminate . . . .

For the purposes of this section, ‘serious nuisance’ means . . . (B) substantial and wilful destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises [or] (C)

conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of

other tenants or the landlord . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

3 The complaint also alleged five counts for breach of the lease agreement.

On the morning of trial, however, the plaintiff withdrew those counts.

4 The plaintiff did not cross appeal the court’s judgment against it on

count one of its complaint alleging a serious nuisance under § 47a-15 (B).

5 General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When the owner

or lessor . . . desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or

building, [or] any apartment in any building . . . and (1) when a rental

agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates for any of the following reasons . . . (G) nuisance, as defined in

section 47a-32, or serious nuisance, as defined in section 47a-15 . . . such

owner or lessor . . . shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit

possession or occupancy of such land, building, [or] apartment . . . at least

three days before the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any,

or before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit

possession or occupancy.’’

Section 47a-23 (b) prescribes the form of the notice to quit. It provides

in relevant part that the notice shall be in a writing that substantially follows

this template: ‘‘I (or we) hereby give you notice that you are to quit possession

or occupancy of the (land, building, apartment . . .), now occupied by you

at (here insert the address, including apartment number . . . as applicable),

on or before the (here insert the date) for the following reason (here insert

the reason or reasons for the notice to quit possession or occupancy using

the statutory language or words of similar import, also the date and place

of signing notice). . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Statutes § 47a-23 (b).

6 On April 2, 2019, six days after it served the defendant with the notice

to quit, the plaintiff apparently attempted to deliver to the defendant a letter

notifying the defendant that he had failed his apartment inspection on March

26, 2019, and that his apartment was scheduled for a reinspection on April

18, 2019.