Th e Ho no ra ble JohnR. G ibs on , o f t

he Un ite d St a te s Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the Ei g hth * Circuit, sitt ing by

desig nation. 1 08
- 10 65
- cr U S A v. W i l l i am s (Le w i s) 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

_____________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: May

9, 2008 Dec ided: J anuar y 7, 2009) Docke t No. 08-1065-c r

_____________________ United States of Amer ica, Appellee ,

-v.- Van D. Williams, Tiege Wil liams, Mack Gr aham, Curt Cook, also known as Country , J amar L ove, also known as Sea led Def t #6, L amar

J amison, also known as Nathan L amar J amison, also known as Skeet, also known a s Sealed De ft #7, J amal Peter son, also known as Scra tch, also known a s Sealed Def t #8, Bruc e Stephens, De fe nd an ts , Saquan L ewis, also known a s “S”, also known a s Esco, Defendant-

Appellant
.

_______________________ BEF ORE: HAL L , L I VI NGSTON, a

nd GI BSON Circuit Judges
. *

______________________ Appellant appe als from a denial of a

motion seeking a re duced se ntence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following the amendme nt to the SentencingGuidelines applica ble to cra ck coca ine violations. I n denying the motion for rese ntencing , the District Court for the N orthern District of Ne w York ( Mordue, J.), found that bec ause A ppellant’s orig inal sentenc e wa s a nonGuidelines sentenc e re sulting fr om a depa rture f rom the statutory

minimum sentenc e pursua nt to 182

U
. S. C. § 3 5 5 3 ( e ) , h e w a s n o t e li g ib le f o r a r e d u c e d s e n te n c e un d e r

th e ame n d e d

G u id e li n e s . We ag ree with the district court’s interpr etation of § 3582(c )(2) and find that Appe llant is not eligible for a new sentenc e under

the re vised Guidelines bec ause the Guidelines provision underly ing the sentenc e that wa s finally

imposed on the Appellant wa s not a provision aff ecte d by the subsequent amendment to the Guide lines. AFF I RMED.

______________________ Alexander B unin, Fede ral Public Def ender , L isa A. Peeble s, Assistant Fede ral Public Def ender and J ames P. Eg an ( on brief

), Albany , NY, for Appellant
. Br enda K . Sannes, L isa M. Fletc her ( on brief ), Assistant United States Attorney s, for Glenn T. Suddaby , United States Attorney for the N orthern D istrict of NewYork, Sy rac use, NY, for Appellee
.

______________________ HAL L , Circuit Judge : Def endant- Appellant Saquan L ewis appe als from a n order of the District Court for

the Norther n District of Ne w York ( Mordue, J.) denying L ewis’s F ebrua ry 15, 2008 motion for
rese ntencing , pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 2), under the amendme nt to Section 2D1.1(c) of the United States SentencingGuidelines (“ Guidelines”) for of fense s involving cr ack c ocaine . The district court found that since L ewis’s orig inal sentenc e wa s a non-Guide lines sentence resulting fr om a de pa rt ur e fr om t he statut or

y min imum pu

rs ua nt t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (e ), he wa s n ot e lig ibl e for a reduc ed sente nce unde r the amended Guide lines beca use the Guide lines provisions underlying the se nte nc e that ha d b e e n im po se d w e re no t a ff

e c te d b y the su bs e qu e nt a

me ndme nts . L e wi s a lso
a pp e a ls f ro m th e de nia l of

his mot ion

to r e c on sid e r i n w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt re ite ra te d it s r a tio na le fo r d en yi n g re s en t en ci n g. On appe al, L ewis conte nds that the district court er red in not findinghim eligible f or
rese ntencingbeca

use the orig inal Guidelines ra ng e applica

ble to his offense of convic tion, i.e., the Guidelines ca lculation based on the quantity of cr ack c ocaine involved in his offense, w as af fec ted3

by the amendme nt to the Guidelines. L ewis asse rts that althoug h the statutory minimum sentenc e for his offense of convic tion was g reater than the applicable Guidelines ra ng e, bec ause he was g rante d a downwar d depar

ture fr om the statutory

minimum following the g overnme nt’s motion pursuant to § 3553(e) , the applica

ble cr ack c ocaine Guidelines ra ng e wa s theref

ore r evived. He points out t hat the sentenc e he ultimately

rec eived f

ell within that Guidelines rang e. Thus, he c ontends, the district
c ourt e rr e d w he n it

ru le d th e late r Guid e lin e s ame ndme nt d id n ot a ff e c t th e ba sis un de rl yinghis
se nte nc e and

that he wa s, the re fo re , in e lig ibl e fo r r e se nte nc ingun de r § 35 82 (c )( 2) . We dis a g re e wi th L ewis’s a rguments, and we aff

irm the dec ision of the district court findingL ewis inelig ible for
rese ntencingunder § 3582( c)( 2). BACK GR OUND On May 16, 2002, a super sedingindictment was issued cha rg ing D efe ndant-Appe llant Sa qu an L e wi s and

e ig ht c o- de fe nd ants wi th c on sp ir ingto d ist ri bute and

po sse ss w ithint e nt t o distribute more than five kilogr ams of coc aine, more than 50 g rams of c ocaine base, a nd an
un sp e c if ie d q ua nti ty of mari jua na , in vio latio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § § 8 41 (a )( 1) , 8 46 . T he ind ic tme nt a lso char g ed L ewis with various fir ear ms offense s, including a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924. On Se pte mbe r 6 , 2 00 2, purs ua nt t o a ple a and c oo pe ra tio n a g re e me nt, L e wi s p le a de d guil ty to
c on sp ir a c y

to d istri bute and

po sse ss w ithint e nt t o d istri bute c oc a ine ba se , in vio latio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. §§ 841(a) (1), 846, a

nd possession of a fir ear

m in furthera

nce of a drugtraff

icking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1)(A)
. At sentenc ing, the parties stipulated that L ewis wa s responsible for betwee n 50 and 150 g rams of c rac k coca ine, which, a ccor ding to the pr esente nce r eport (“ PSR ”), r esulted in a Guide lines of fe ns e le ve l of

32 un de r t

he ve rs ion

of U. S.S. G. § 2 D1 .1 (c )( 4) that w a s th e n in e ff e c t. T he PSR4

state d th a t L e wi s w a s e lig ibl e fo r a re du c tio n o f t

hr e e of fe ns e le ve ls f

or a c c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty and for notifying the g overnme nt of his intent to enter a guilty plea. The resulting offe nse leve l thus beca me 29, which c ombined with L ewis’s c ateg ory I Icriminal history , yielded a se ntencingrang e of 97 to 121 months. As a result of a pr ior drugconviction, howeve r, L ewis wa s subject to a statutory minimum sentenc e of 240 months on the cr ack c ocaine conspirac y char g e, with an a dditional 60- month term to be serve d consec utively on the fire arms cha

rg e. B ased on the g overnme nt’s motion for a downwar d depar

ture pursua

nt to U.S.S .G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U .S.C. § 3553(e), the district cour t depar ted below the ma

ndatory minimum . On J anuar

y 21, 2003, the district court imposed a 100- month sentence , 50 months each on the conspirac y and fire arms cha

rg es to run conse cutively . There is no evidence that the Guidelines ra ng e ca lculated unde r U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) play ed any role in the district court’s de termination of his sentenc e, and the district court so found. On No ve mbe r 1 , 2 00 7, the Se nte nc ingCommis sio n’ s ame ndme nt o f t he Dr ugQu anti ty

Ta ble in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) with re spect to off ense le vels for c rac k coca ine offe nses bec ame e ffe ctive. U.S.S.G. Supp. t o App. C, amend. 706 (2007) . On Dec ember 11, 2007, the SentencingCommi ssion
vo te d to make the ame ndme nt r e tr oa c tiv e . U nd e r t he ame nd e d G uid e lin e s, if a pp lic a ble , th e qu anti ty of cr ack c ocaine involved in L ewis’s off enses would r esult in a base of fense level of 30, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c ) (2007) , and af ter takinginto consideration the thre e-le vel re duction for L ewis’s
acc eptanc e of r esponsibility would yield an off

ense le vel of 27. On Fe bruar

y 15, 2008, L ewis filed a

Rule 35 motion requesting rese ntencingunder the revised c rac k coca ine Guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 2), which provides for

limit ed cir cumstance s when a n imposed sentence may

be modified. (e .g ., in the case of a
re tr oa c tiv e ame ndme nt t o th e Gu ide lin e s th a t w ou ld a ff e c t th e te rm s o f t

he or ig ina l se nte nc e ). In h is5

§ 3582(c) (2) motion, L ewis asse rted that his orig inal base of fense level of 32 w ould be re duced to a base of fense level of 30 unde r the amended Guide lines with a resultingsentenc ing r ang e of 78 to 97 months im prisonment. L ewis noted that he has bee n in fede ral c ustody since his ar

rest on June 28, 20 01 and that if his re qu e st f

or a re du c tio n w e re g ra

nte d, he wo uld

be e lig ibl e fo r i mme diate re le a se as of Ma rch 3, 2008. In a Memora

ndum-Dec ision and Order filed on F ebrua

ry 26, 2008, the district court de nied the motion. The district court found that L ewis wa s not eligible f or a r educe d sentenc e bec ause: (1) his origina l sentence was ba sed on a de parture from the statutory minimum under 18 U .S.C. § 3553(e) , and “the sentenc ing r ang e in the Guidelines ha d no bearing on de fenda nt’s sentenc e”; ( 2) he was inelig ible for a

revised se ntence beca

use “de fenda

nt has not been ‘ sentenc ed to a ter m of imprisonment based on a se ntencingrang e that has subse quently been lowe red by

the Sentencing Commi ssion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o)’” ( quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2)) ; and (3) the decision not to lower the sente nce ba sed on the re vised Guidelines wa s in acc ordanc e with the Guidelines policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, which states that a re duction is not authorized when “the
ame ndme nt d oe s n ot h ave the e ff e c t of low e ri ngthe de fe nd a

nt’ s a pp lic a ble g uid e lin e ra

ng e be c a us e of anothe r guideline or statutory provision ( e.g. , a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Un ite d S tates v . Le wis , No. 01-c r-280, 2008 WL545008, at *1 (N.D .N.Y. F eb. 26, 2008) (e mphasis in origina l). L ewis filed a

timely motion for rec onsideration, ar g uing that: (1) the district cour t had conflated the ter

ms “guidelines rang e” a

nd “guidelines sentenc e”; ( 2) once the district court de parte d below the mandatory

minimum sentenc e, the mandatory minimum was “ waived,” see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, application note 7, such that the orig inal “guidelines rang e” be comes the ba sis on which a6

se nte nc e is i mpo se d; a

nd (3 ) t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re tatio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 82 (c )( 2) wa s o ve rl y restric tive and contr ary

to the plain meaningof the statute be cause even where a mandatory minimum become s the Guidelines sente nce, the court must consider the “guidelines rang e.” T he district court denie d the motion for re consideration, reiterating its ea rlier r easoningand re

jecting L e wi s’ s argume nt r e g ard ing“ wa ive r” of the statut or

y min imum. It a lso fo un d L e wi s’ s a rgume nts in conflict with this Court’s ruling in United States v. Richardson , 521 F.3d 149 ( 2d Cir. 2008). Le wis , 2008 WL591944 at *1.

DI SCU SSIO N The issue be fore us is whether L ewis’s orig inal sentenc e wa s based on a sentenc ing r ang e that was subseque ntly

lowere d by

the SentencingCommi ssion. The underpinningof the district cour t’s
ru lin g be ingstatut or

y int e rp re tatio n, we re vie w i t de novo
. United States v. Pe ttus , 303 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 2002). Congr ess has a

uthorized courts to modify a ter m of imprisonment only

in limi ted
c ir c ums tanc e s. Ti tle 18 , § 35 82 (c )( 2) pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : The c ourt may

not modify

a ter m of imprisonment once it has bee n imposed except that

. . . (2) in the c ase of

a def endant who ha s been se ntence d to a term of imprisonment based on a sentenc ing r ang e that has subsequently

been lowe red by

the SentencingCommi ssion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the def endant or the Dire ctor of the Bur eau of Prisons, or on its own mot ion, the court may reduc e the ter

m of imprisonment, after

considering the fa ctors set for

th in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are a pp lic a ble , if su c h a re du c tio n is c on sis te nt w itha pp lic a ble7 policy statements issued by

the SentencingCommi ssion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
. At sentenc ing, the DrugQuantity table in the then- applicable U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)( 4), which was the star

ting point for c alculatingL ewis’s Guide lines sentence , yielded a se ntencingrang e of 97 to 121 months. Having be en convic ted of a prior nar cotics fe lony , howeve r, L ewis wa s subject to a statutory mandatory

minimum sentenc e of 240 months imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). There fore , pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), be cause L ewis’s “ statutorily require d minimum sentenc e [was] g reater than the maxi mum of the applica ble guideline ra

ng e, the statutorily

require d minimum sentenc e [was] the guide line sentenc e.” On appe al, L ewis ar g ues that the district cour t’s analy sis of whether

L ewis wa s elig ible for modification of his sentenc e er roneously confuse d the term ‘Guidelines rang e’ w ith the term ‘Guideline se ntence .’ We do not ag ree . The orig inal Guidelines ra ng e of 97 to 121 months had no bear ing on what bec ame L ewis’s Guide line sentenc e bec ause the 240-month mandatory minimum “subsume[d] and displace [d] the otherw ise applica ble guideline ra

ng e.” Un ite d S

tates v . Co rd

e ro , 313 F.3d 161, 166 ( 3rd Cir. 2002). Onc e the mandatory minimum applied, L ewis’s sente nce w as no longe r “ba sed on a se ntencingrang e that has subse quently been lowe red by

the Sentencing Commis sio n. ” 18 U. S.C. § 3 58 2( c )( 2) . T his same c on c lus ion wa s a lso re a c he d b y

the El e ve nth Circuit in Un ite d S

tates v . M oo re , which found that a def endant is not elig ible for r esente ncingunder § 3582(c) (2) whe re “ the ra ng e upon which [the def

endant’ s] s entenc e wa s based is unaf fec ted by the
c ha ng e in h e r b a se of

fe ns e le ve l.” 54 1 F .3 d 1 32 3, 13 30 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 8) (f

ind ingse ve ra l de fe nd ants ineligible f

or sentenc ing r eduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on a mendment to cra ck
c oc a ine se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s b e c a us e de fe nd ants we re se nte nc e d a s c are e r o ff e nd e rs , s o8

Amendment 706 had no e ffe ct on the sente ncingrang e that the district cour t relied on in dete rmining the sentenc es). Th a t L e wi s is ine lig ibl e fo r a mod if ic a tio n o f h is s e nte nc e un de r § 35 82 (c )( 2) be c a us e his sentenc e wa s based on the statutory mandatory

minimum is further suppor ted by the policy

statement of the Se nte nc ingCommis sio n w hic h p ro vid e s th a t:

a re duction in the defe ndant' s term of imprisonment is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and is not consistent with this pol icy statement if: . . . an amendment [to the Guidelines ra ng e] . . . is applicable to the def endant but the ame ndme nt d oe s n ot h ave the e ff e c t of low e ri ngthe de fe nd a

nt' s a pp lic a ble g uideline ra

ng e bec ause of

the oper ation of anothe r guideline or statutory provision (e.g ., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment). U.S.S.G. §1B1.10, application note 1, subsection 1(A) ( emphasis adde d). We are bound by the languag e of this policy

statement bec ause Cong ress ha s made it clea r that a c ourt may

reduc e the terms of imprisonment under § 3582( c) only if doing so is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by

the SentencingCommi ssion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
. Whil e L ewis’s c riminal activity , standing alone, mer ited a 240-month mandatory minimum sentenc e, this was not the fina l sentence imposed. Pursuant to the g overnme nt’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) a

nd U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, the district court depa rted be low the mandator

y minimum
. L ewis conte nds that in determining the extent of the § 3553(e) depar ture, the district c ourt must have
re lie d u po n th e or ig ina l G uid e lin e s r ang e de ri ve d f ro m th e qu anti ty

of c ra c k c oc a ine inv olv e d in his offe nse under

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)( 4) (“ the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) sentenc ing r ang e”) . But this is not true. The district court has state d as a matter of f act that “ the sentenc ing r ang e in the Guidelines ha d
no be ari ngon

the de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e .” Th is f ind ing , mo re ov e r, wa s c on sis te nt w iththe re su lt
rea ched by

the Eleve nth Circuit in Mo or e , wher e the c ourt found Amendme nt 706 inapplicable to a9

defe ndant who re ceive d a downwa rd depa rture pur suant to a § 5K1.1 motion, noting that ther e wa s no “indication that the c ourt based Moor e’s se ntence on the [crac k coca ine] guideline r ang e that would have a

pplied absent [his] car eer offe nder de signation.” Mo or e , 541 F.3d at 1330. Our re cent de cision in United States v. Richardson is also instructive. 521 F.3d 149 ( 2d Cir. 2008). “When, a s here , the Guidelines sente nce e nds up as the statutory minimum , both the decision to depar t and the maximum permissible extent of this departure below the statutory minimum may be base d only

on substantial assistance to the g overnme nt and on no other mitig ating considerations.” Id. at 159. We further explained that “[i] n arr iving at a final sente nce, of course , the district court may

consider othe r fa ctors in deter mining whe ther to g rant the f ull ex tent of the depar ture pe rmitted by

§ 3553(e) .” Id. Richardson makes c lear that the only

fac tor the sentenc ing court may consider in de ciding the maxim um ext ent of the downwar d depar ture pursua

nt to a § 3553(e) motion is the nature and extent of the def endant’ s substantial assistance. The n, only afte r the cour t has deter

mined the full extent of the downwar d depar ture it would awa

rd base d on that substantial assistance doe s the court c onsider other fac tors, including those in § 3553(a), to de cide whether to depar t to that full ex tent. That is, the cour t could ref

rain fr om gr anting the full extent of the substantial assistance depar ture be cause of the nature a nd circ umstances of

the cr ime, the
c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f t

he de fe nd ant o r a

ny oth e r a pp lic a ble re le va nt f a c tor s th a t ha

ve be e n p re se nte d to the se nte nc ingc ourt . We kn owbo th f ro m Richardson and

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s sp e c if ic fi nd ingin t

his
case that the orig inal cra ck coc aine Guide lines should not have and did not play a role in determining the maxim um ext ent of a

substantial assistance de parture under § 3553( e). Se e id
. L ewis also ar g ues that once the district court g rante d the g overnme nt’s motion to depart for substantial assistance, the mandatory minimum was “ waived” and the or igina l U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)10

sentenc ing r ang e ther efor e contr olled. This argument too, is refuted by our holding in United States v. Richardson –the statutory minimum sentenc e is the depa rture point for

the cour t’s § 3553(e) considerations. See R ichardson , 521 F.3d at 159. As such, in consideringthe applica bility of § 3582(c) (2) to the Guide lines determination under lying the orig inal sentenc e, we must look t o the Guidelines sentenc e, i.e., the statutory mandatory

minimum sentenc e, fr om which the sente ncing court de parte d pursuant to § 3553(e ). See U nited States v. Johnson , 517 F.3d 1020, 1024 ( 8th Cir. 2008) (f inding on dire ct appe al that a de fenda nt was not entitled to a re mand for r esente ncingunder § 3582 beca

use “the district court used the 120 month mandatory minimum as its point of departur e” under § 3553( e))
. We h ave c on sid e re d d e fe nd ant’ s o the r a rgume nts and

fi nd the m to be wi tho ut m e ri t. Duringthe pende ncy

of this appea l, post argument, the appe llant moved to withdraw the appea l. Be cause our disposition of the appea l does not aff ect the te rms of the a

ppellant’s inc arc e ratio n a

nd wi ll n ot r e qu ir e futur e he ari ng s in the dis tr ic t c ourt

that mi g ht i n tu

rn a ff e c t hi s prog rammingwithin the Bure au of Prisons, the motion to withdraw the a ppeal is denie d.

CO NC LU SION For the re asons stated a

bove, the judg ment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.