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MOVING FORWARD AFTER THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REPORT: MAKING

METRO A SAFETY LEADER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 23, 2010

Serial No. 111–123

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE, POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

——— ———

WILLIAM MILES, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 23, 2010 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Hersman, Deborah A.P., chairman, National Transportation Safety

Board; Catherine Hudgins, Board of Directors, first vice chairman,

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Richard Sarles, interim general manager, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Matthew Bassett, Chair, Tri-State Oversight Committee; Anthony

W. Garland, recording secretary/Local 689 safety officer, Amalgamated

Transit Union, Local 689; and Francis DeBernardo, Chair, Riders’ Advisory Council ................................................................................................... 11

Bassett, Matthew ...................................................................................... 50

DeBernardo, Francis ................................................................................. 61

Garland, Anthony W. ................................................................................ 57

Hersman, Deborah A.P. ............................................................................ 11

Hudgins, Catherine ................................................................................... 19

Sarles, Richard .......................................................................................... 29

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Bassett, Matthew, Chair, Tri-State Oversight Committee, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 52

Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia, prepared statement of .............................................................. 86

DeBernardo, Francis, Chair, Riders’ Advisory Council, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 63

Garland, Anthony W., recording secretary/Local 689 safety officer, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689, prepared statement of ....................... 58

Hersman, Deborah A.P., chairman, National Transportation Safety

Board, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 14

Hudgins, Catherine, Board of Directors, first vice chairman, Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, prepared statement of .................. 21

Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 3

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the District

of Columbia, prepared statement of ............................................................ 6

Sarles, Richard, interim general manager, Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority, prepared statement of .................................................. 31

(1)

MOVING FORWARD AFTER THE NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REPORT:

MAKING METRO A SAFETY LEADER

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE, POSTAL

SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:25 p.m. in room

2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, and Bilbray.

Staff present: Aisha Elkheshin, clerk/legislative assistant; William Miles, staff director; and Dan Zeidman, deputy clerk/legislative assistant.

Mr. LYNCH. I would like to call this hearing to order. The Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia’s hearing will now come to order. I would like to

welcome those Members in attendance.

I know that Mr. Chaffetz was just with us at the earlier hearing,

so he is in transit right now. And I would like to thank all of our

witnesses and those in attendance this afternoon.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to explore the steps the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority has taken to address

the safety findings and recommendations contained in the recent

National Transportation Board’s issued Railroad Accident Report

on June 22, 2009, Metro rail collision. The Chair, the ranking

member, and the subcommittee members will each have 5 minutes

to make an opening statement, and all Members will have 3 days

to submit statements for the record.

Hearing no objections, so ordered.

As stated earlier today, our hearing has been called in order for

the subcommittee to once again receive an update on the steps the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is taking to ensure that the Metro rail, bus, and para-transit services are operating at the highest possible levels of safety and reliability.

Today’s hearing, which marks the third subcommittee hearing

held on the Washington Metro in the 111th Congress, will also entail a full discussion on the findings and recommendations contained in the National Transportation Safety Board’s recently

issued Railroad Accident Report on the June 22, 2009, Red Line

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collision, and the Washington Metro’s efforts to address the NTSB’s

conclusions in that report.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is the national capital area primary public transportation agency and provides service to a population of over 31⁄2 million people within a

1,500 square mile area. Considering the estimated 40 percent of

the Federal employees who utilize the Washington Metro on a daily

basis and the hundreds of thousands of D.C. area residents and

tourists who rely on the system to navigate the Nation’s Capital,

it is critical that America’s transit system, so-called, be at the highest level of dependability and safety.

Since the June 22, 2009, Red Line collision which left 9 people

dead and 76 injured, serious questions have been raised by the

Federal Transit Administration, the Tri-State Oversight Committee, and most recently the National Transportation Safety Board

regarding deficiencies in the Washington Metro safety culture. Notably, the National Transportation Safety Board concludes that

shortcomings in the Washington Metro’s internal communications,

in its recognition of hazards, its assessment of risk from those hazards, and its implementation of corrective actions are all evidence

of an ineffective safety culture within the organization.

In light of these concerns, I am particularly interested in hearing

about the specific actions that the Washington Metro has pursued

over the last several months to elevate and improve the organization’s safety record and performance.

I also look forward to discussing ongoing efforts to strengthen

and empower the Tri-State Oversight Committee, which serves as

the Washington Metro safety oversight agency in accordance with

FTA regulations. I understand that the Washington Metro is currently navigating a complex transition period, and while today’s

hearing is aimed at addressing the the transit system safety and

reliability challenges, we cannot ignore Washington Metro’s financial challenges which, whether we like it or not, impact the organization’s ability to achieve certain standards of safety.

Additionally, I would like to note that the Federal Government

has a role to play in promoting the safety and service of the Washington Metro, and I welcome the opportunity to hear more about

what we here in Congress can do to help the Washington Metro at

this time.

Again, I would like to thank each of you for your willingness to

be with us and to help the committee with its work, and I look forward to your participation in today’s important hearing.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. In light of my colleague and friend, Mr. Chaffetz s,

absence, and it is understandable. We were in two competing hearings. I ran a little faster than he did to get over here, and he will

be along directly. He is very diligent about that.

I would like to recognize Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congresswoman from the District of Columbia, for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank

you above all, as we come to the end of this session, for the way

that you have pressed this subcommittee and the leadership on

Metro matters. You indicated we have had three hearings. We even

had a hearing before the collision. But, Mr. Chairman, you have

taken the leadership in making sure that there was direct and

timely and constant oversight from the Congress. I particularly appreciate that you are holding this hearing on the NTSB recommendations before Congress adjourns so that work can begin on

them beyond what I am sure is already taking place.

I want to emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, that beyond the obvious interest of members of the committee who are from this region,

there is a strong Federal interest in what happens to Metro since,

indeed, almost of half of the riders on weekdays are Federal employees, which is why we subsidize them to get to work. Anyone

who doubts that need only think of the snow storms of the past

winter, when it became clear that if Metro shuts down, so must the

Government shut down.

So we have an interest in Metro beyond even the private sector

here, and particularly in the fact that it has for decades been

plagued by a series of safety issues. The NTSB, of course, has been

on top of these issues throughout, and this subcommittee has been

at pains to see that others with oversight are also as diligent.

Mr. Chairman, the most disturbing part of what we have known

from briefings from the NTSB is that this tragedy was preventable.

There was no signal that there was a train on the track, and yet

there were systems in the hands of Metro which could have, indeed, been in use. That has led the subcommittee to focus on safety, and the NTSB’s recommendations on safety culture is the recommendation that it be, in my view, at least, it has focused most

of my attention.

I hope this won’t be seen as a reflection on the workers, because,

as I questioned Ms. Hersman and others at NTSB, I learned that

NTSB was almost alone in not having a non-punitive safety culture. Apparently, other common carriers understand that the safety culture has to be non-punitive, so that if you report, that report

won’t result in punishment. Why would anybody report then

against their own personal interest? Yet, it appears that is the way

in which Metro has operated. That is not the way in which, according to NTSB, trains operate or airlines operate. They have long had

non-punitive cultures. I am sure if we had such a culture at Metro

much of the rest would take care of itself.

Mr. Chairman, I note that, even as we are in session, the subcommittee, the NTSB Reauthorization Act is going to be on the

floor today, and I am pleased to note that. I have a section of that

bill that is far less important than the reauthorization, itself, but

it would clarify that NTSB can make interim safety recommendations.

5

NTSB was on point in making all of the recommendations that

should have been followed. At the same time, we could hardly

blame Metro, which only got the first $150 million, this year it is

going to get another $150 million, for not having replaced the

trains and the tracks and the rest, although I do believe the track

matter did not require that the overhaul of the system that we now

know must take place, and Metro is certainly to be held accountable for that.

I regret that only after the tragedy did the first $150 million

come, but now they seem to be coming in regular order, and I will

be very, very interested to hear what progress Metro has made on

these recommendations, most of which they were aware of simply

by virtue of the trauma they have gone through even before the

NTSB has given them a virtual track record to follow. If they go

down that list, do what the NTSB says, I think all of us will feel

safer.

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. I thank you.

I am going to fully recognize my Republican colleagues when

they do arrive, but in the interest of time what I would like to do

is, first of all, ask all of our witnesses, it is the custom before this

committee that anyone who is offering testimony must be sworn,

so may I please ask you to rise. Raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. LYNCH. Let the record show that each of the witnesses has

answered in the affirmative.

I know that a few of you have been here before this committee

and you understand the lighting system we have here. That little

box in the middle of the table will flash green when you are to

begin your testimony, and then after it turns yellow you are to

wrap up your testimony, and then the red light indicates that your

time has expired.

What I would like to do is to first offer some brief introductions

of our panelists.

First of all, Deborah A.P. Hersman was sworn in as the 12th

chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board on July 28,

2009, following her nomination to the post by President Barack

Obama and confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Chairman Hersman

is also serving a second 5-year term as a board member on the National Transportation Safety Board.

While I think initially we had a conflict for time, I think we have

resolved that, which is important, and I appreciate your diligence

in being here in the important role that you have played not only

in identifying the causes of this accident, but also in the recommendations that you have made to make necessary corrections,

so I am very happy that you will be able to join us for the full hearing.

Ms. Catherine Hudgins is the first vice chairman of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Board of Directors. Ms.

Hudgins joined the Metro board in January 2004 as an alternate

director. She was appointed as principal director in 2008, representing Fairfax County, Virginia. Ms. Hudgins also was elected

to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors in November 1999 and

is currently serving her third term.

Richard Sarles was appointed interim general manager of the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority by the Metro

Board of Directors effective April 3, 2010. Notably, Mr. Sarles has

more than 40 years of experience in the transit industry with New

Jersey Transit, Amtrak, and the Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey. He most recently retired from New Jersey Transit,

where he served as Executive Director.

Matthew Bassett serves as chairman of the Tri-State Oversight

Committee, the joint organization that oversees Metro rail safety

and security programs. Mr. Bassett works for the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation. Prior to joining the Department of Rail and Public Transportation, he worked for the

Maryland Department of Transportation’s Rail Safety Oversight

Programs.

Anthony W. Garland is the recording secretary for the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689. Mr. Garland, originally a Metro

bus operator, has more than 25 years experience with Local 689.

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Prior to being elected recording secretary, Mr. Garland served as

a shop steward, executive board member, and assistant business

agent of Local 689.

Welcome, Mr. Garland.

Francis DeBernardo is the Chair of the Riders’ Advisory Council

for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, which

provides the Washington Metro Board with the riders’ perspective

on issues affecting Metro bus, Metro rail, and Metro access. Mr.

DeBernardo is also the Executive Director of the New Ways Ministry located in Mount Ranier, Maryland.

Welcome all.

What I would like to do then is to ask, Ms. Hersman, if you

would like to begin by offering your opening statement for 5 minutes. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; CATHERINE

HUDGINS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN,

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY;

RICHARD SARLES, INTERIM GENERAL MANAGER, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; MATTHEW

BASSETT, CHAIR, TRI-STATE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; ANTHONY W. GARLAND, RECORDING SECRETARY/LOCAL 689

SAFETY OFFICER, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL

689; AND FRANCIS DEBERNARDO, CHAIR, RIDERS’ ADVISORY

COUNCIL

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch,

Delegate Norton, members of the committee. The Safety Board is

pleased to return to brief you on the findings and the recommendations from our report on the June 22, 2009, collision that occurred

near Fort Totten. It resulted in 9 fatalities and 52 injuries.

About a month after the accident, actually, a couple weeks, July

13th, we issued two early recommendations. We testified before

your committee the day after that on July 14th. On September

22nd we issued nine additional recommendations. We held a public

hearing on February 23rd through 25th. We held our Board meeting, where we adopted the final report and 23 more recommendations on July 27, 2010. And on August 9th our Board, the five

members of the National Transportation Safety Board, met with

the Metro Board, all the members of their Board, to discuss our

findings.

We determined the probable cause of the accident was the failure

of the track circuit modules to cause the automatic train control

system to lose detection of the train, and thus transmit speed commands to the trailing train up to the point of impact. WMATA’s

failure to ensure that enhanced track circuit verification test was

institutionalized and used system-wide, which would have identified the faulty track circuit before the accident; the lack of a safety

culture within WMATA; WMATA’s failure to maintain and monitor

the performance of its automatic train control system; GRS and

Alstom Signal Inc.’s failure to provide a maintenance plan to detect

spurious signals that could cause its track modules to malfunction;

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ineffective oversight by the Metro Board; TOC’s ineffective oversight and lack of oversight authority; and FTA’s lack of statutory

authority.

With your permission, I would like to show a short animation of

the accident sequence for the committee. The motion of the struck

train, Train No. 214, was derived from data retrieved from event

recorders. The striking train, No. 112, did not have event recorders;

consequently, its motion is derived by simulation of speed commands that were transmitted from the train control system and the

train performance characteristics.

The animation is going to show two views of the train in real

time. The top of the screen shows an overhead view of both trains

as they travel inbound on the red line. The striking train is indicated by the blue arrow, and the struck train, 214, is shown by the

orange arrow. The yellow dots on the track delineate each segment

of the track, each circuit.

WMATA’s automatic train control system is designed to issue

speed commands to trains to ensure that at least one unoccupied

track circuit separates the trains. The middle section of the screen

shows the time of day, speed commands issued by the train control

system, and the actual speeds of each train. Finally, the bottom of

the screen shows a view riding along with the striking train up to

the point of the collision.

[Video shown.]

Ms. HERSMAN. The animation begins with Train 112’s departure

from Tacoma Station about 21⁄2 minutes before the collision. Train

112 is being operated in the automatic mode, where the train responds automatically to the speed commands from the train control

system.

At this time, Train 214 is approaching Fort Totten and is about

eight-tenths of a mile ahead of train 112. Train 214 is being operated in the manual mode, where the operator controls the motion

of the train according to the speed commands from the train control system. Notice that the speed command for Train 112 varies

with the position of the train ahead. Its actual speed lags behind

the speed command.

At this point the system has brought the speed command for

Train 112 to zero due to the presence of Train 214 ahead, and

Train 112 automatically begins to slow to a stop.

The lead train, 214, is on a faulty track circuit. The speed command displays zero, and the operator of 214 begins to manually

slow the train to a stop. Because the train control system cannot

detect Train 214, it responds as if the track ahead is clear and

transmits an errant speed command of 55 miles per hour. Train

112 automatically begins accelerating to 55 miles per hour, with

Train 214 stopped and undetected just ahead.

According to sight distance testing, at 470 feet apart the operator

of Train 112 had a full view of Train 214. Approximately 3 seconds

after the Train 112 operator had the full view of the stopped train,

she applies emergency braking. Braking action was normal, but

there was only enough time to slow the train a few miles per hour.

[Video concludes.]

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Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you for inviting me to testify and allowing

me to show the animation. I am ready to answer any questions

when it is time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]

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Mr. LYNCH. I know that they have just called for a vote, so that

is why the other Members are delayed, but I am going to ask the

gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Eleanor Holmes Norton,

to please take over the hearing, and I will run over and vote and

come right back.

Thank you.

Ms. NORTON [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ms. Hersman.

Ms. Hudgins.

STATEMENT OF CATHERINE HUDGINS

Ms. HUDGINS. Thank you, Chairman Norton. Madam Chairman

and members of the subcommittee, my name is Catherine Hudgins

and I am honored to appear here before you today as the first vice

chairman of the Board of Directors of the Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority, Metro.

I would like to speak first about improving safety, the top priority of Metro Board, and how we are currently addressing the NTSB

recommendations. I would also like to address our current significant financial challenges, which relates directly to enhancing our

state of good repair and operational reliability.

Above everything else, Metro must provide safe and reliable service. To this end, we have focused on three goals: build a new safety

culture throughout the organization, from the Board to the general

manager to the bus and rail operators, mechanics, and track walkers; two, invest in the equipment, facilities, and personnel needed

to enhance safety; and, three, create the policies and procedures

that enhance system safety. In doing so, we will restore public confidence in the safety and quality of our service and build trust

among policymakers, legislators, and our stakeholders.

I know that these goals will not be achieved overnight. We are

doing everything that we can to move Metro toward these goals.

On safety, safety is the top priority of Metro, for the Board, for

Metro management, for all our staff from top to bottom. The Board

intends to ensure that, to the best of our ability, each and every

NTSB recommendation to Metro associated with its review of the

June 22, 2009, accident is implemented.

Following the NTSB’s July 27th recommendations, the Metro

Board convened a special Board meeting in August, during which

we heard directly from the NTSB about what we could do, both as

a Board and Metro as a whole, to cultivate a safety culture. I greatly appreciate the thoroughness of the information that NTSB

Chairman Deborah Hersman and her colleagues shared with us

that day. Our Board heard what needs to be done, and has started

taking specific actions to respond.

One week ago Metro Board’s Customer Service Operations and

Safety Committee voted to approve a change to our Board governance to establish a distinct Safety and Security Committee. The

committee will be chaired by Mort Downey, who was appointed to

our Board earlier this year by Federal Government as a voting

member. The Customer Service, Operations, and Safety Committee

also moved a new mission statement that clearly places safety at

the forefront of the transit agency. The statement reads: Metro operates and maintains a safe, reliable, and effective transit system

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that enhances mobility, improves the quality of life, and stimulates

economic development in the metropolitan area.

Both actions taken in the committee last week must go to our

full Board for adoption on September 30th. I assure this committee

that my fellow Board members are wholeheartedly endorsing these

changes.

In addition to these actions, the Metro Board has taken other

steps to address NTSB recommendations. We have begun by dedicating $30 million from our capital budget to assist in responding

to NTSB’s recommendations. On July 22nd the Metro Board approved Metro’s revised whistleblower protection policy to encourage

employees to raise safety-related concerns. And, finally, in July the

Board approved a contract to replace the 1000 series cars, which

are the oldest rail cars in the fleet, with the new generation 7000

series rail cars.

On Metro s financial situation, Metro faces the same financial

issues which practically every other major transit system in the

United States faces. In this period of economic decline, many of our

revenue sources, such as advertising and fares, have decreased,

and the funds available for our subsidies have declined. Transit becomes one of a number of vital services competing for funding with

fewer resources available.

We are exceptionally pleased that our State and local partners

have demonstrated a long history of strong financial support for

this system. That strong support is continuing even in these tough

economic times, as our jurisdictional partners have provided over

half a billion dollars to support Metro operations in fiscal year

2011, an increase of 5 percent over fiscal year 2010, while many

other local services are taking cuts.

I would like to wrap up and say that we are committed as a

Board, and that as a Metro Board member, Madam Chairwoman,

I would like to conclude and want to make sure that you understand that we are committed to moving people safely and reliably

and comfortably. It is our mission, and it is the proud history of

Metro.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hudgins follows:]

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Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Ms. Hudgins.

Mr. Sarles.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD SARLES

Mr. SARLES. Madam Chair, I thank you for the opportunity to

testify before you today. I am Richard Sarles, general manager of

the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

In Metro there is no higher value than safety. I want this subcommittee and our riders to know that we recognize that our longterm success depends on our ability to build a safety culture that

is dedicated to prevention and continual improvement.

What is being done?

First, as outlined during my testimony on April 21st to the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I have developed and we

have made significant progress in implementing a 6-month action

plan to move Metro forward in addressing our greatest challenges,

which I see as safety, service, reliability, and financial stability.

These are the fundamental areas that Metro has focused on for

the past 5 months. A full update on each of them is in my written

testimony, but I want to take the time today to highlight our

progress to improve safety and our safety culture.

We have strengthened our safety department with a team that

has more than 230 years of experience. Chief Safety Officer James

Dougherty leads the team and reports directly to me, as well as

provides monthly updates to the Board of Directors on our safety

progress.

Metro has worked closely with the Tri-State Oversight Committee to develop corrective action plans in response to findings from

both external and internal audits and investigations. We have

closed 223 CAPs since 2004, currently 33 CAPs remain open. I

have communicated to Metro staff that continuing to close CAPs is

a top priority.

To give our employees the safety skills they need on the job, we

have expanded safety training throughout the organization.

Our commitment to a new safety culture cannot be accomplished

without a financial commitment. The WMATA Board anticipated

this by including $6.9 million in Metro’s operating budget to address audit FTA recommendations. The Board also established a $5

billion 6-year capital plan, the largest capital budget since the completion of the rail system, to ensure that we can make needed

equipment and infrastructure safety and state of good repair improvements.

While we work on reinforcing our safety culture, we have taken

action to comply with NTSB recommendations.

Now I would like to turn to the work we are doing to respond

to each of the recommendations associated with the June 22nd accident.

First, parasitic oscillation. We have already replaced track circuit

modules, at 34 of the 103 locations, and are developing plans to replace the remaining track circuit modules. We are increasing the

frequency of our inspections, and the loss of shunt review will continue twice daily until the testing is completed on the real-time

alert system.

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Next, improving internal communications. We initiated a crossfunctional committee to develop procedures for clear communication and to document receipt of all technical bulletins and other

safety-related information.

Next, wayside communications. We are identifying all locations

throughout the rail system where unnecessary wayside communication equipment exists, and are developing a plan to disable and/or

remove it.

Next, safety analysis. We have retained an independent firm to

perform a rigorous safety analysis of the automatic train control

system and provide recommendations. Once the analysis is complete, we will address the recommendations.

Next, cable installation resistance testing. Test procedures and

standards are in development and should be read in November

2010.

Next, Federal Transit Administration final report. All FTA findings related to Metro were addressed and the FTA has reviewed

and accepted the proposed actions. now we will complete those actions.

Next, operational data on onboard recorders. The review of operational data from onboard event recorders will be incorporated into

monthly senior staff meetings. Local 689 Union representatives will

be invited to participate.

Next, non-punitive safety reporting program. We established an

anonymous hotline, reinforced our whistleblower policy, and we

have started discussions with Local 689 on a non-punitive nearmiss reporting program.

Next, hazard identification, hazard management. Metro’s Executive Safety Committee has started reviewing safety audits and

open corrective action plans. Removal of 1000 series cars—on July

26th, we awarded a contract to replace the 1000 series cars.

Installation and maintenance of on-board event recorders. A plan

has been developed to equip and maintain the 4000 and 1000 series

cars with onboard event recorders.

In conclusion, Madam Chair, at Metro there is no higher value

than safety. We want riders to know that we recognize our longterm success depends on our ability to change our safety culture to

one dedicated to prevention and continuing improvement. Establishing a new safety culture in this fundamental way will require

enduring consistent commitment, from the top all the way through

the organization. The change will take years to become ingrained,

but we have begun putting the foundation in place.

In the last year, Metro has faced a number of challenges, and

there are more to come, but we have also forged better partnerships with the agencies that provide safety oversight, and with

their help and the leadership of our Board, we are on a path to continuing improvement of safety and service reliability.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sarles follows:]

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Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Sarles.

Mr. Bassett.

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BASSETT

Mr. BASSETT. Good afternoon, Chairman Norton. On behalf of the

Tri-State Oversight Committee, thank you for the opportunity to

discuss the ongoing challenges and recent improvements to the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s rail safety efforts.

Since our committee last testified on April 21st, both WMATA

and the TOC have made significant progress in addressing safety

shortcomings noted by Congress, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Transit Administration, and the riding public. These entities have been steadfast partners in making the system safer.

This May, the Governors of Maryland and Virginia and the

mayor of the District of Columbia committed to increasing TOC

funding, providing full-time staffing, and ensuring access for TOC

members to immediately raise safety concerns to State transportation leaders. This led to the creation of the TOC Executive Committee, a working group which meets regularly to provide guidance

and policy direction for the TOC.

In July, Maryland hired a full-time TOC member, Mr. James

Benton, who brings with him more than two decades of experience

in rail car maintenance and rail operations from the Maryland

Transit Administration. The District of Columbia is also in the hiring process for a full-time TOC member.

On July 27th, TOC received NTSB’s recommendation in response

to the June 22, 2009, Fort Totten collision to fully address the Federal Transit Administration’s March 2010 audit findings. We are

committed to doing so and continue to work with FTA on this task,

as well as WMATA.

This summer TOC completed our triennial safety and security review of WMATA’s rail operations. TOC members and consultants

spent 3 weeks working with WMATA staff inspecting facilities and

equipment, interviewing workers, and conducting an exhaustive

document review. We planned to publish this document on our recently revamped Web site, [Web page here] by October 9th.

On September 13th the TOC Executive Committee revised the

TOC memorandum of understanding, which provides our authority

and operating framework. The revised MOU responds to concerns

identified by FTA, the NTSB, and Congress by providing additional

authority to the TOC chair and allowing the Executive Committee

to take any action permitted by law, including suspending State

capital funding, in the unlikely event that all options to resolve

TOC safety concerns have been exhausted.

Since the arrival of WMATA interim general manager, Richard

Sarles, the TOC has been pleased to note that safety has been

placed not just at the forefront of WMATA’s rhetoric, but of their

efforts, as well. His regular presence at TOC meetings, safety performance metrics, and long overdue restructuring of the WMATA

Executive Safety Committee have guided a comprehensive response

to the system’s safety challenges. He has also hired several safety

experts, including James Dougherty as chief safety officer.

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The Safety Department is investing in new systems and processes to streamline their investigations, resolve open corrective actions, and improve their auditing capacity. A good example of this

new approach is the recent completion of WMATA’s roadway worker protection [RWP] Manual, which leadership recently signed into

effect. By bringing together safety, operations, labor, and management employees, as well as soliciting input from outside agencies

and experts, WMATA has created a comprehensive document that

will improve safety on the tracks.

WMATA also recently revised their rule book, complying with

longstanding TOC and NTSB recommendations, and acknowledged

the need to develop a non-punitive safety reporting system, although this essential step remains a work in progress.

Yet, despite advances, WMATA’s organizational culture must become willing to show their work. A recent example came July 4th

weekend, when WMATA removed all 4000 series rail cars after

technicians discovered a potential fault that could allow train doors

to open during movement. There is no question that WMATA’s immediate response was the safest course of action, but our attempts

to learn more were delayed.

On July 6th we asked for more information about this decision

and for any procedure for the door repairs, and received conflicting

answers. Twenty days later we received a copy of the full procedure, learning it had been in effect since 3 days after our original

request. Our request for information about the reasoning behind

this decision took even longer.

Our difficulty in obtaining information during the process just

demonstrates that our need for timely and accurate information

must become a high priority.

WMATA faces real challenges to the goal of becoming America’s

rail transit safety leader; however, they can promote transparency,

empower the safety department, hold managers accountable for

safety goals, and improve hazard communication, as has begun. It

will grow safer, smarter, and stronger as an agency.

Continued engagement on the part of the Congress, the FTA, the

NTSB, and the riding public, as well as the TOC in our State safety oversight role, will be crucial to their success in sustaining their

progress.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bassett follows:]

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Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Bassett.

Mr. Garland.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY W. GARLAND

Mr. GARLAND. Good afternoon, Congresswoman Norton, members

of the committee, and others. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton,

for inviting ATU Local 689, the largest transit workers’ union in

the Nation’s Capital, and the third largest transit union in the Nation, to testify before you.

I am here today to speak on behalf of the Union’s president,

Jackie Jeter, and our members. Over the past several years, we

have made several recommendations to WMATA that we expect

will improve management, employees’ preparedness, riders’ and

workers’ safety, and the safety of the public.

Please allow me to explain some of the most important. We believe that these are consistent with the proposed Federal leg.

One, development of comprehensive safety plans that mirror the

proposed national plan. The WMATA plan should result from a collaborative effort between WMATA and the Union and require all

parties to adhere to it.

Two, Union representatives should be members of the WMATA

Board of Directors and the Safety Inspection Team.

Three, retraining plans must be developed and implemented for

the entire work force, and likewise certification and recertification

of safety personnel should become routine and ongoing throughout

the workers’ career.

Four, equipment upgrades must meet safety performance criteria

and conform to minimum safety performance standards consistent

with national standards or set at a higher level by our jurisdictions, then those standards should be maintained.

Five, deferred maintenance must be given priority in a timely set

for completion.

Six, specific items, replacement parts or new mechanisms, new

procedures within the systems, must be addressed within a specified timeframe, then tested and evaluated immediately. Adjustments and revisions must be completed within a specified period,

and retest completed prior to any implementation.

Seven, the result of any equipment or process failure should be

made public promptly, and the report should be disseminated to affected divisions and personnel within the WMATA and the Union

work force.

Eight, we support the inclusion of oversight from external entities with enforcement powers.

Nine, we believe that noncompliance should be sanctioned and

that improvements should be funded by the Federal Government

and the three jurisdictions provided mass transit for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority going forward, with greater emphasis placed on awareness, disbursal of information, and

willingness to work collaboratively with the Union on behalf of its

employees.

Thank you for your time and attention this afternoon. I look forward to answering any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garland follows:]

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Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Garland.

Mr. DeBernardo.

STATEMENT OF FRANCIS DEBERNARDO

Mr. DEBERNARDO. Good afternoon, Chairman Norton. Thank you

for inviting me to testify today. My name is Francis DeBernardo,

and I serve as the 2010 Chair of the WMATA Riders’ Advisory

Council.

The Riders’ Advisory Council serves as the riders’ voice within

Metro. The Council provides feedback to the Board and customer

input to Metro staff. Members use Metro’s transit services, Metro

bus, Metro rail, and Metro access, and represent a diverse mix of

ages, backgrounds, and ways in which they use the system.

Your invitation letter noted that this hearing would focus on the

NTSB’s railroad accident report on the June 22, 2009, Metro rail

collision and the shortcomings in Metro’s internal communications

and its ineffective safety culture. Since the Riders’ Advisory Council is specifically composed of non-Metro employees, it will be difficult for me to comment on Metro’s internal workings. Instead, I

would like to focus my testimony today on how Metro’s communications with its external stakeholders, namely its riders, affect safety

and how, as it rebuilds its safety culture, Metro must include riders in that effort.

As the NTSB’s report noted, several factors, human and mechanical, contributed to the 2009 collision. The Council is confident that,

under the leadership of the interim general manager, Mr. Sarles,

Metro has been identifying and addressing the mechanical factors

that contributed to last year’s collision. However, in addressing

safety, Metro cannot only look inward for solutions. It must also

look to its 1.2 million daily customers about how to address safety.

In the wake of last year’s crash, the focus has been on the safety

of the train control system and the safety of employees working

within Metro’s right-of-way. I would also suggest that other aspects

of the rider experience are critical to create a safe Metro system.

Working to reduce crowding and improving service reliability,

along with ensuring clear and direct timely communications with

riders will all greatly improve safety. Crowded platforms, crumbling tiles, and broken elevators and escalators pose threats to customer safety that, while not as dramatic as last year’s crash, are

just as dangerous because of their ubiquity.

We are encouraged that Metro is taking steps to improve communications with riders in terms of safety and security. Earlier this

month Metro unveiled signage that preeminently featured the telephone number for the Metro Transit Police to help riders report

problems or safety concerns. This example of a rider-suggested

change will directly improve safety for Metro’s customers.

As it rebuilds its safety culture, Metro also needs to rebuild its

culture of customer service. Employees, especially those actively engaged with customers, will be better able to recognize and correct

potentially dangerous situations earlier.

In addition, an organization that listens to customers, addresses

their concerns, makes it more likely that those customers will identify and report safety concerns.

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Metro’s 1.2 million daily riders represent 1.2 million pairs of eyes

and ears on the system every day. This is a resource that cannot

be taken for granted if Metro truly wants to become safer.

The Council is also encouraged by Metro’s recent efforts in tracking and reporting service and safety. The new monthly vital signs

report provides a clear, timely snapshot of Metro’s performance.

Metro must make this available to all its stakeholders if they want

to improve performance.

Ensuring sufficient capital funding for Metro is necessary to im- prove safety. The Council appreciates Congress’ support of the $150

million annual Federal capital funding and hopes Congress will

continue to provide these funds, especially as they will be directed

toward safety. We are also encouraged by the Metro Board’s approving a $5 billion, 6-year capital funding agreement.

I thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony and will be

happy to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeBernardo follows:]

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Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. DeBernardo.

Could I ask a question of the entire panel? Since the June 22,

2009, tragedy, in your view is Metro safer than it was? I am not

asking for absolutes here, but is it safer than it was? And I would

like you to describe briefly, if you think it is safer, why; and if you

think it is not safer, why.

Ms. Hersman.

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes, ma’am. I think clearly Metro is in a much

safer position today than it was in June 2009. The reason I would

say that is because I think they are aware of many of the deficiencies that exist on the system, whether it is track circuits or

challenges that they have within their operation, communication,

making sure that maintenance procedures are clear. They have

done a lot of learning in the last year-plus, and I think that always

every organization is going to go through a difficult time after an

accident.

The question is how you react to that accident and what changes

you make, and I believe that the Metro Board was very willing to

listen to the Safety Board after our report was concluded, and they

have taken many of those lessons to heart, and I think that they

are beginning to make many improvements that have been long

overdue.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Hersman.

Ms. Hudgins.

Ms. HUDGINS. Ms Norton, yes, I believe that we are, as an Agency as well as our Board, a safer environment for our customers. I

think we most specifically have to talk about the fact that immediately after the accident that there has been a constant attention

to the testing that needs to be done for the trains to ensure that

the accident should not happen again.

But, more importantly, I think the Board has been focused. As

I noted in my opening point, we have already changed our committee so that we can make sure that safety and security are foremost

in the work that we are looking at, and that we can get the kind

of information that was brought out in the NTSB report that we

need to hear, as well as the whistleblower piece that allows our

workers to be willing to report information freely without punishment.

I think those are very important pieces to start us on what I

think is rebuilding the culture that is needed for safety in our organization, throughout the Board, and with our customers.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Sarles.

Mr. SARLES. I believe we are a safer organization, but we have

a long way to go. Some of the things that have been done include,

with regard to the specific incident, monitoring our system much

better than we did. We have started more training. We have improved communication. We have taken some actions such as ordering new cars.

One of the important actions, which I mentioned in my testimony, was the appointment of a chief safety officer with much experience and bringing other people into this organization that have

many, many years of experience in rail operations and safety, and

that person reports directly to me and has a lot more independence

and strength than occurred in the past in this organization.

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Those are some of the things, but I emphasize it is a start; it is

not an end.

Mr. BASSETT. Speaking on behalf of the oversight agency, I would

believe that yes, they have made significant progress. They are a

safer organization than they were on June 21st.

I think it is worth noting that the Metro is unequivocally the

safest way to get around the national capital region and has been

for a very long time, but I think they have made notable progress,

in particular in the areas of switching their focus from what I

would characterize as occupational safety, where they were primarily concerned with number such as slips, trips, and falls, workers compensation injuries which, while important, do not reflect an

approach to analyzing systemic, high-consequence threats to the

system such as June 22nd.

The addition of the expertise that Mr. Sarles mentioned has really permitted them to bring their safety office up to a very high level

of technical proficiency in the matters, in particular with rail safety, that will help them analyze such hazards in the future and prevent them before they ever pose a risk to passengers.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Bassett.

Mr. Garland.

Mr. GARLAND. I would have to answer that two-fold. I think in

a worker’s capacity, which is what I was hired as a bus operator,

the Agency is safer because of the awareness that the system gets

in the media or incidents that happen on a daily basis. But I would

say that, as far as the workers are concerned, the ones who do the

work, there is this element of the workers not being confident in

the Agency as far as being able to protect their safety and their

health.

The underlying issue is, when they are doing their daily operations in the system, there is that element of always looking over

your shoulder as to what else is out there. So in that sense you are

working under pressure as a worker.

I know the train system is in a manual mode and the train operators basically run the system through the manual mode, but there

is that element out there, what’s out there? That is a safety issue.

So until we address the work force and reconnect with the work

force as to training, as to recertifying, building the morale of the

work force and reconnecting with the work force, that element is

always going to be there.

We always talk about the funding of the system, but there is that

element of the human beings who do the work, and until that is

addressed the money portion really is like opening a window and

pouring it out of the window. If you have complacency with your

work force, you must get reconnected with the work force and reinstill in them what they are doing on a daily basis. So I would say

it is unsafe in that sense.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Garland.

Mr. DeBernardo.

Mr. DEBERNARDO. Yes, the Riders’ Advisory Council believes that

the Agency is safer in practice, in policy, and, most importantly, because of their willingness to be accountable and transparent.

Ms. NORTON. Metro is faced with a very difficult issue. in testimony from one of you, or perhaps this is just what I remember,

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there is something like $11 billion in funds that are needed in your

capital program. Now, the Congress has authorized only $11⁄2 billion over 10

years, and, as I understand it, the region would put in another

$11⁄2 billion. So let me begin at the micro level. You now have from the region $600 million last year and $600 million, we believe, this

year.

How should that money be spent? Anyone can answer that who

feels that they can, but we would like an answer to that because

somebody has to figure out, given the enormity of the need, I almost assure you are faced with a deficit in a recession, not much

hope that the Congress would pony up more money. We are aware

of your own difficulties, certainly not of your making but there they

are, and so you are not going to get more from the rider public

than you are already getting. Mr. DeBernardo will probably be the

first to tell you.

So in a climate of extreme scarcity and great need, somebody has

to figure out where these scarce resources go. Is anybody figuring

it out? One way to do so, since you have money in hand, is to say

where is that money going to go.

Ms. HUDGINS. Congresswoman Norton, I think when we look at

our approved capital budget and we look out over the 6-years that

we have, we have tried to focus those resources in many of the

areas that were raised by the NTSB.

If you recall, over 6 years ago the Metro Board developed a

Metro matters, and it was funded really from the jurisdictions, the

Metro Compact members. What we are acknowledging is that $11⁄2

billion over the 10-years is, indeed, a very important piece of what

we are doing.

We just have to admit that it is still not enough, and it is uncomfortable to say that when we recognize how much we need to do.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, and we don’t want to hear that because we

don’t want to raise hopes here, so we need to know how you are

going to spend that money. Have you budgeted the first 2 years of

money or the first year of money? Have you spent the first year of

money?

Ms. HUDGINS. We have budgeted, and Mr. Sarles can go over the

estimates that are part of the NTSB recommendations that I think

are very critical in addressing this problem.

Ms. NORTON. We recognize that you are dealing not only with

funds from Congress.

Ms. HUDGINS. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. I am asking about our funds. The appropriators

will want to know, for example, as we struggle—and it is a struggle

each year to get each $150 million out. Well, they are going to ask

for an accounting on their funds as if their funds were the only

funds in the whole world, when, as your own needs indicate, they

are a fairly small part of the funds you receive and need.

Mr. Sarles, if the appropriator were here he would say: how did you use the first $300 million and how will you use the $300 million for this year?

Mr. SARLES. All of it is devoted to safety and state of good repair

projects. An example of where a good chunk of money is going is

to purchase the cars to replace the 1000-series cars, which is our

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top priority and, of course, an NTSB recommendation of longstanding time period. So that is where it is going, safety, state of good

repair. In fact, if you look at our entire 6-year, $5 billion capital

program, it is all devoted to safety and state of good repair.

Now, we do have the NTSB recommendations. I outlined before

that we are going to move ahead on all of them. We know already

that there is roughly $150 million that wasn’t accounted for in our

budget, because obviously we didn’t know exactly what the recommendations were. We are going to have to deal with that and

reprogram because we are going to do it.

Ms. NORTON. I’m sorry. What was not accounted for in your

budget?

Mr. SARLES. About $150 million that will have to be spent as a

result of the NTSB recommendations.

Ms. NORTON. Above and beyond?

Mr. SARLES. What we had budgeted.

Ms. NORTON. For this year? For which years?

Mr. SARLES. Over the next 3 years or so. The entire program is

6 years, but it is really things that we want to accomplish in the

next 2 or 3 years.

So we are going to have to look at reprogramming that, and then

obviously if there are other funds that come available, that would

be very helpful.

Beyond that, there are certain recommendations that we are following through on, such as the systems safety testing and analysis

that, as a result of that, we may have other conclusions that come

out and other findings that say we have to spend additional money,

but that we will not yet be able to determine until we have completed those analyses.

Ms. NORTON. Ms. Hersman, your report is truly excellent and it

is the kind of road map that I believe will probably be used by

other systems, as well, particularly since you cautioned other systems early on, and we certainly thank you for your early discovery

and your announcement that other systems which had similar

tracking systems need be very cautious. That is very important national announcement that you made.

What it, of course, indicates to the subcommittee is that you have

the kind of knowledge of these systems around the country that

none of the rest of us, including, I am sure, many at Metro, have.

I would like to know, you have to forgive me, I still am a professor

at Georgetown and always mark on a curve, so I don’t want to compare my own students to the perfect. I look across the board and

I say, compared to what? It is the only fair way to judge, even

though we want people to reach beyond where the best are.

I would like to ask you today, with the improvements that have

been made as of now, how Metro would rank compared to the systems that we are most familiar with, like Chicago, New York, Boston, the kinds of systems. How would you rank our Metro system

today, given improvements that they have made, consciousness

they have, with these systems far older and apparently haven’t had

the same issues?

Ms. HERSMAN. You are kind of asking me to pick amongst my

children a little bit. Certainly Metro is a system that I and many

of our employees use every day to get to work, and so it is one that

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we are very familiar with. But I will say we investigate accidents

in transit properties all across the country, and so we do find failures and lapses. We find deteriorating equipment and challenges in

those systems.

It is very simple things sometimes, like distractions, like a train

operator that might be texting while they are operating a train and

they hit another train. Those are not always things that cost a lot

of money or have anything to do with the age of the system, but

they involve the human beings that are involved, so it is having

good procedures and good systems.

I will say that there are many other transit properties that are

learning a lot from this investigation on Metro.

Ms. NORTON. Ms. Hersman, would you make us understand. Perhaps we just don’t know. This was so dramatic and inflammatory.

Why haven’t we had such crashes in New York and in Boston? Is

it because they have a safety culture that we do not have?

Ms. HERSMAN. I think it is hard to say, but they have not had

certainly the overall number of accidents that Metro has had. Certainly the June accident in 2009 was very spectacular, but Metro

had three other events after that.

Ms. NORTON. Your report noted and we are talking about one

spectacular event, but how many events did you note over the

year?

Ms. HERSMAN. Well, over the year since the accident there were

four incidents that were investigated.

Ms. NORTON. Even since the accident?

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. Even since the accident?

Ms. HERSMAN. Three additional that we investigated on Metro

property.

Ms. NORTON. And before the accident there were about how

many?

Ms. HERSMAN. We investigated two track worker fatality events,

one on the yellow line, one on the red line. We also had the

Woodley Park accident where we had the train roll back. Fortunately, there were no fatalities on that. But the number of accidents that Metro has had is unusual compared to the other properties around the country.

Ms. NORTON. Are you satisfied with what you know that Metro

is spending the first of its funds in the right places?

Ms. HERSMAN. I think it is really up to Metro to prioritize what

they are ready to roll out.

Ms. NORTON. In terms of safety?

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes, in terms of safety. I think Mr. Sarles and his

team are in the best position to know what projects are ready to

go and what things are ready to roll out.

One of the things that doesn’t cost any money, and that is what

the Metro Board is moving forward with, is beginning to change

that safety culture from the top down, and I think this goes to Mr.

Garland’s comments. You have to involve the whole organization in

this process. You have to bring the employees to the table for this

to be effective.

Those are things that may not be very expensive, but they are

going to take a lot of work. I really did appreciate what Mr. Sarles

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said, that they have a lot of work yet to do, and I think that is exactly the right attitude.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Sarles, how will the workers be involved, more

involved with Metro, not as adversaries, apparently there has been

some adversarial feeling. Mr. Garland says that there should be a

member of the Board. Is there any system that you know where

workers are represented on the Board, not on the Board? How

would you make sure that workers have a buy-in into the system?

Mr. SARLES. I think there are a number of things that can be

done and, in fact, we have started on a number of them.

One is what we call safety conversations, where we are strongly

encouraging workers among themselves, as well as between supervisors and workers, to talk about safety issues when they arise.

I will give you a for instance of what that is. I was out one night

looking at construction work and I happened to step over some

tools, and one of the folks came up to me and said, You shouldn’t

have done that because you could have stepped on the shovel and

smacked yourself in the face. That is a safety conversation. It is

that kind of thing that we have to encourage.

In addition, at our facilities there are meetings that go on between the supervisors and the workers, there are safety committees that discuss what issues are coming up. Now, it is important

not just to have the conversations and talk about what the issues

are, but then to act on those issues and to give that kind of feedback to the workers. That is the direction we are moving in. I

wouldn’t say it happens all the time every place the way it should,

but that is the direction we are moving in.

We have established superintendent report-out committees,

where I go and listen once a month to what the issues are, and this

reflects the conversations that are going on in the safety committees as to where the trends are, where there are issues, and where

there are successes.

I think importantly, which I have some experience with at my

last job at New Jersey Transit, we were the first commuter railroad

to introduce the non-punitive reporting system. We did that last

year and we signed up that agreement with——

Ms. NORTON. Who did that? I am sorry.

Mr. SARLES. New Jersey Transit. First commuter railroad in the

United States to do that. We have discussed that we the leadership

at ATU Local 689. In fact, I shared with them that agreement, and

that is the kind of thing I would like to see happen, myself.

Ms. NORTON. This is what I would like to get to the bottom of.

We don’t think that there is a non-punitive culture at Metro now,

and the words are thrown around, and I am not sure what they

meant. In fact, the only understanding I have is what you, Ms.

Hersman, indicated. The way she gave me to understand it was not

simply talking in generalities about culture, but by describing

other forms of transportation.

I wish, Ms. Hersman, for the record you would tell us about nonpunitive systems in other modes of transportation. I do not think

the public understands it any more than I did before I heard what

I regarded as a very clear statement from you. I have not heard

any here today. It would elucidate our record to know by way of

example what a non-punitive culture is by reference to other forms

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of transportation that have such systems in place. How do they operate?

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you for that question. I would be happy to

explain because we think that they have been very successful in

other modes of transportation. The Close Call Reporting System is

being used in the rail industry, in the freight rail industry. Certainly Mr. Sarles has some experience with a commuter rail industry.

Ms. NORTON. Now, close call would mean, for example, if I am

Mr. Garland and I had a close call, and who knows it is Mr. Garland and maybe the other driver, they would just come forward and

say, I had a close call?

Ms. HERSMAN. Absolutely. Well, you need to set up a structure

where the employees feel comfortable reporting this. I can give you

a couple of examples in the aviation industry because we also have

a very mature non-punitive reporting system for pilots. We have

one in existence also for air traffic controllers. But when we talk

about pilots, the important thing is sometimes there are things

that go on that no one else might know besides the people who are

in that cockpit. Sometimes there are things that other people know

about. But what you need is you need more information really to

understand what happened and why it happened.

So it is not about letting people off. It is not about avoiding discipline. But it is really about the organization being able to learn

about mistakes or failures or systemic procedures that don’t work

or aren’t being applied.

So we can look at two aviation accidents and look at how they

might have been treated differently based on the circumstances.

One involves two pilots who overflew their destination, Northwest

188. These are real events. Last October they overflew Minneapolis

by about 100 miles. They did not respond to air traffic control hails

for over an hour and they didn’t realize that they had overflown

until they got a call from the flight attendant saying, Should we

begin preparing the cabin, and they realized we have overflown.

They had taken their laptops out and they were talking about

new scheduling procedures and they had gotten distracted from the

task at hand.

Around the same time, we had another airplane coming in from

South America on an overnight flight. They had a senior pilot, a

third pilot in the cockpit with them who got ill, had to leave the

cockpit. They were coming down to land in Atlanta Hartsfield

about 6 a.m. They had been flying all night. They got a change of

assignment and runway, some information as they were coming in.

They landed on a taxiway at Atlanta Hartsfield Airport, our Nation’s busiest airport, not on the runway but on a taxiway. They

were very fortunate that they didn’t have a major accident.

Those pilots, they made a mistake. They did not want to land on

that taxiway. What was really important about that event is that

we learned about why. Was the lighting good on the runway, on

the taxiway? What were their instructions? Were they unclear?

How did they line up?

Ms. NORTON. But what about the first one? As I recall, the first

pilots were not candid about having their laptops out.

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Ms. HERSMAN. They actually were. They were forthcoming with

the Safety Board investigators, but they did end up getting their

licenses suspended by the FAA.

Ms. NORTON. Yes. That is pretty severe.

Ms. HERSMAN. That was because they knowingly violated procedures. They had a prohibition in the flight deck by the company,

You can’t do this. So this would be like a bus driver texting and

hitting someone. That is a violation of procedures, a knowing violation. You don’t want to protect people who are violating rules.

But on the other situation with the pilots coming in to Atlanta,

you want to understand why that happened because they didn’t

mean to get in that situation. That report was accepted into the

system. They talked to the pilots, they counseled them, they

learned from that event.

So we say, how does this apply to a transit system? How would

this work in a transit environment? I visited some other operators

around the country, and I asked a system in another city how

would you use this system or how have you used this system, and

they said, we had a problem. We had some escalators that we had

an issue with, and one of them slipped and someone got hurt, and

we said, wow, this has never happened to us before. And a bunch

of their maintenance technicians said, yes, it actually has. It happens a lot. We see it happen all the time. And the management

team said, what do you mean you have seen it all the time? And

the employee said, ‘‘well, we have this form for reporting if we get

hurt, we have this form if we are reporting if a passenger gets

hurt,’’ but they didn’t really know how to put that information up

the chain that an escalator had slipped but nothing bad had happened. So the operator said, ‘‘wow, we really need to be able to get

this information. We need to be able to pull this information in before something bad happens.’’

That is exactly the kind of system that they need to have on

Metro, so if they have an escalator that is slipping at Woodley Park

they need to get employees who are calling up Management and

saying, we are having this problem and you need to help us figure

out how to address it. Let’s sit down and talk about this.

Ms. NORTON. Instead of feeling that the escalator slipped and the

first thing you are going to be asked is who did it.

Ms. HERSMAN. Well, and we actually saw that in our investigation of the Metro accident. What we saw is that there was a sense

that there was a punitive culture if mistakes were made.

We talked to the train operator of the standing train, the one

that was struck, and he shared with us the reason why he was operating in manual mode. He should have been in automatic mode,

but the reason why he was operating in manual mode is because

in the past he had been operating in automatic mode and the train

overran the place where it was supposed to go in the station and

he was disciplined for it when the train was running in automatic.

That made him not trust the system, not trust the train, and he

wanted to be in control and make sure that it didn’t overrun so he

wouldn’t get into trouble.

Ms. NORTON. That is a direct example.

Ms. HERSMAN. He was violating procedures because he was concerned about the discipline.

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Ms. NORTON. Yes.

Ms. HERSMAN. Rather than the company understanding we have

a problem with these overruns and we need to fix it.

Ms. NORTON. That certainly helped to cause the accident if he

was in manual mode.

Ms. HERSMAN. Well, it didn’t necessarily cause the accident. He

happened to be stopped on that track circuit that didn’t detect him.

Ms. NORTON. Yes.

Ms. HERSMAN. That was what caused the accident.

Ms. NORTON. Yes.

Ms. HERSMAN. But it was a symptom of not addressing problems

and employees feeling uncomfortable talking about them.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Sarles, did you look at what other modes of

transportation have done? You say you were the first system to

have——

Mr. SARLES. First commuter rail system to have close call where

we——

Ms. NORTON. Right.

Mr. SARLES. This involved an agreement between the operating

unions, the FRA, and ourselves that people could identify and report something that could be a hazard or could lead to an accident

in the future but hadn’t occurred in that particular incident, and

by doing it in a way that protected the employees so that the information was provided without them being subject to any retaliation.

It is way to get that information out that the Chair of the NTSB

just pointed out, and it is the way we should go, and that is the

way I would like to go.

Ms. NORTON. Have you initiated such discussions with the transit union here?

Mr. SARLES. Yes, we have. We meet monthly, and that is one of

the things we are talking about.

Ms. NORTON. Ms. Hudgins, I am interested in you and Mr. Sarles

that you have looked outside of the Agency. Any time, I think that

is always among the best practices, to assume that there may be

others who can be helpful.

I believe in your testimony you describe an external safety panel

that Metro has formed. I must say I was impressed with the composition. You formed it with help from the DOT, and I hope Metro

will recognize that DOT is right here with lots of expertise that can

be useful to Metro, but they apparently helped Metro form this

panel, and it has an impressive, across-the-board membership—

AFL–CIO, American Public Transportation Association—to develop

strategies for creating this safety culture.

Can you give us some information about what this panel is, how

this panel is advising you, and whether they have, in fact, been

able to move you toward a safety culture? And if so, when?

Ms. HUDGINS. Ms. Norton, the panel is working now and has

been working with our Metro staff and working in looking at our

organization, and they are to come back to our Board.

Ms. NORTON. When are they due back?

Ms. HUDGINS. I am not sure I have the final date back, but by

the end of the year we need to have that back, because there are

two aspects of this. We really were looking for outside help in order

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tion, and that starts with the general manager, and looking at a

general manager for the future we want to make sure that this

Board understands——

Ms. NORTON. Where are you on the general manager of the future?

Ms. HUDGINS. The general manager?

Ms. NORTON. And when is the future coming?

Ms. HUDGINS. Well, let me first say that we have a general manager in place, and Mr. Sarles has been outstanding in the work

that he has done, but he has indicated he is not a permanent candidate for this job so we are working toward the end of the year

of moving forward on a general manager.

Ms. NORTON. So you believe that by January 1st we will have a

new general manager for the Metro system?

Ms. HUDGINS. We hope that within that timeframe we are able

to do so. But the information that we are gathering is very critical

in trying to set some priorities for the organization about safety,

and that is what that group is doing in helping the Authority and

the general manager and his employees, but we are looking for expertise. We are looking for information from this task force that

will set forth some guidelines for us.

Ms. NORTON. I believe Mr. Sarles’ testimony, or it comes from

really the audit of March 2010 when 25 percent of the positions in

Metro’s safety department were vacant, and you have testified

about James Dougherty, the new chief safety officer, and an actual

increase of 12 positions. So we would like to know how many positions remain vacant?

Mr. SARLES. None.

Ms. NORTON. And how has that new safety operation been restructured? In what way is it different?

Mr. SARLES. There are no vacancies left. All those vacant positions that were talked about were filled, including people who have

worked on other railroads and have extensive experience in the

regulated environment.

In addition, as part of the FTA findings and recommendations,

we were to do a self-assessment of the safety organization. What

we have completed thus far is looking at the experience of all the

people in the organization, what we need in that organization, and

the additional training that has to be done so that everyone is fully

qualified in all their positions. There has been a lot of experience;

now we are just adjusting it to the Washington Metro organization.

Importantly, as I mentioned before, that organization, which had

sort of moved around, safety organization had moved around different places in the organization, not always reporting to the general manager, reports directly to the general manager, as well as

giving monthly reports to the Board.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Bassett, I appreciate the work that you have

done, particularly given the obvious handicaps under which you

labor. How many funded positions does TOC have?

Mr. BASSETT. We currently have two members who are assigned

full time, myself and Mr. Benton. The White Paper, as issued in

April, identifies the commitment from the three jurisdictions to allocate one full-time person, as well as one person who will provide

50 percent of a full-time equivalent, per jurisdiction. So once the

78

hiring process is complete for the District of Columbia, we will

have three full-time TOC members.

Ms. NORTON. Now, Mr. Bassett, you are having to struggle while

we in the Congress are trying to create an entirely new system

where the local jurisdictions would have to have a fully funded

oversight organization or depend upon the Federal Government,

and we are giving that option in our legislation, at least, to the

local jurisdictions. You can do it yourself, according to regulations

which will be at some level national, or the Federal Government

can help the local jurisdictions. That is just very rough notion of

the statute.

You are going to have to hobble along until we get this bill out.

Actually, I think it is today it is on the floor, or tomorrow it is on

the floor. I am going to go to speak to that bill. We hope to get the

bill out of the Senate.

So we are very concerned about the issues you have had. Why

did they have issues, after there have been hearings that Mr. Basset reported, Mr. Sarles?

Mr. SARLES. I think, as Mr. Bassett said, there has been a lot

of improvement. As I said, we are just at the start.

The one issue that Mr. Bassett brought up with regard to the

4000-series cars, there are two pieces to it.

Ms. NORTON. This was the 4000-series cars that were all taken

off line?

Mr. SARLES. Right.

Ms. NORTON. Which would lead any oversight body to want to

know why, and they got two or three different answers, and we are

left to believe that there were not real written procedures, correct

me if I am wrong, because the document you got was dated 3 days

ahead of when you got it, or some such. It indicates they kept getting answers one way or the other, which tended to show that the

procedures within Metro themselves were in disarray, and only because Mr. Bassett asked for a really common-sense explanation did

it become clear that the problem was not so much just tell us what

the answer is; it was that the procedures of Metro did not provide

for staff to do the appropriate documentation in order to render an

answer to Mr. Bassett or anybody else, so they had to quickly get

themselves together and get an answer to Mr. Bassett.

Mr. SARLES. Let me clarify something. Immediately upon the determination that there was a problem the TOC was notified. Immediately, they were invited in to see what the problem was and to

show what the solution was in the field, invited to the shops, I believe, and reviewed it and did not see an issue with what we were

doing.

Where we could have done a better job is that once we determined what the fix was and how to do it, which we shared with

the TOC, in terms of documenting that. In other words, you decide

how you are going to fix it, and then you have to write down how

you are going to fix it, as we were proceeding with the repairs.

So the focus of our folks was on identifying it, identifying the corrective action, getting the corrective action moving so we get the

cars back in service. What took more time than it should have and

could have been more clearly communicated was documenting what

had been done and what we were doing.

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So we recognize that and we will take steps to improve upon

that.

Mr. BASSETT. I think Mr. Sarles has accurately outlined the sequence of events. Our concern was never that they did the wrong

thing or that their procedures for actually correcting the problem

were inadequate.

Ms. NORTON. So they acted quickly. When that door didn’t open,

they knew to take those cars out?

Mr. BASSETT. Actually, I believe the concern was the door was

opening when it shouldn’t have.

Ms. NORTON. Yes. Just the opposite.

Mr. BASSETT. But the important thing to note is that, as Mr.

Sarles mentioned, they were on the phone with us at nine o’clock

on a Friday night on a holiday weekend. They were bringing our

contract engineer in in the immediate response, and that went very

well.

The issue was the followup.

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is a vast improvement if the first thing

you do is to notify TOC.

Mr. BASSETT. Yes. And I unfortunately was pressed for time putting together oral testimony, trying to get a whole bunch of stuff

into 5 minutes, but I believe the written testimony reflects that

their immediate reaction of notifying us and bringing our personnel

in was praiseworthy. But the concern is the followup.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Bassett, I really have to ask you about our concern. We don’t know when this bill will get out. Let’s assume our

bill gets out of the House and the Senate. It will take considerable

time for regulations to be drawn and the rest.

The subcommittee was very concerned the way TOC is funded.

Bad enough for it not to be independent in the usual sense of the

word, but are you not funded through the transportation departments of the various jurisdictions?

Mr. BASSETT. We are, and in the White Paper they made the

commitment to almost double the funding from the three jurisdictions on an annual basis.

Ms. NORTON. What was mystifying to us was, since all the money

comes from the legislatures in the first place, why use the transportation departments, who could be implicated, who knows, in

issues TOC finds? Why use them as a pass-through if the point is

not to in some ways control TOC? Why not at least make TOC

independent enough so that its funds come directly from the legislature or the county legislature, or in the District it would be the

City Council? They could appropriate it in their funds. We don’t

understand why you give the money to DOT and say, will you give

it, because we see that third party intermediary as either unnecessary or if not actually having a role. So we would like to know is

it?

Mr. BASSETT. The membership of the TOC, as well as the funding, does come from the three State jurisdiction level transportation.

Ms. NORTON. We are well aware of that. Yes.

Mr. BASSETT. And I think the only real additional comment I can

share on that is that this was an approach that was approved by

the Federal Transit Administration and, in terms of having State

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level agencies doing the State safety oversight for a major rail transit system, it is fairly common to use this approach nationally.

Ms. NORTON. Well, what role does the Department of Transportation of the various agencies play other than pass through? Do

they consult you? Do they advise you? Is their expertise necessary?

Mr. BASSETT. They are our employers. We are part of the team.

I think probably the most noteworthy thing, especially recently, is

that with the creation of the TOC Executive Committee, thanks to

the leadership of the two Governors and the mayor, we now have

access on a regular basis to the secretaries of transportation for

Maryland and Virginia and to the director of transportation for the

District of Columbia.

So our being a part of these transportation agencies has, especially since the White Paper, permitted us access to senior transportation leaders who previously might not have been available to

us as quickly.

Ms. NORTON. So you don’t perceive any interference from them

with respect to your independence or duties?

Mr. BASSETT. They are an integral part of our leadership, and I

would say their role is to help us perform our duties.

Ms. NORTON. They give you advice and counsel and technical expertise and the like? Is that what they do?

Mr. BASSETT. We have access to those things from both our leaders and other personnel within our agencies. So yes.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Garland, we have heard testimony here without much detail about the new whistleblower protection policy. The

Federal Government has an awful record on protecting whistleblowers except it might not be as vital if you are a functionary in

the Department of Education, but if you are a common carrier, it

would seem to me that whistleblower protection would be of the

highest order, which would mean that the worker could blow the

whistle on issues without facing punitive measures.

Have you any view on the new whistleblower protection policy

and the so-called safety hotline, I think that is the name that was

used, that has been initiated?

Mr. GARLAND. I am familiar with the Safety Hotline. The Safety

Hotline has always been there for the employees to report safety

issues and things of that sort. I think what we are dealing with is

a culture of workers that, over the years, were basically working

in a work force where the solution to everything was to increase

discipline on the work force, so they are more so reluctant to come

forward with information as far as, my coworker may be doing

something, or if I am doing something and I want to come out and

share that information with other workers so that no one has to

go through what I went through, and things of that sort. So to get

this workforce to buy into a new safety culture, it is going to take

more than just throwing that term out there.

There is a real disconnect in the Agency with the work force and

management, and it really has to be addressed before we can move

forward. Like I said before, we can throw the money at the infrastructure and the safety mechanisms in WMATA, but there is a

human element as to workers wanting to do their job and to feel

good about what they are doing, and more so being their brother’s

keeper, and that is their coworkers and things.

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Ms. NORTON. You seem to indicate that besides the safety culture

there is a whole workers culture or worker/management culture

that Metro needs to work on.

I would like to know from Mr. Sarles and Ms. Hersman in particular how a non-punitive safety culture fits in with the whistleblower and the hotline notion. I mean, do you need whistleblowers

as much if you have a non-punitive safety culture of the kind, for

example, that they have in the airlines and rail? Or would whistleblowers and hotlines be just as necessary if this non-punitive safety

culture were to evolve in Metro? How do the two fit?

Ms. HERSMAN. Well, I think it depends on how robust and positive the culture is, and so my question would be how many calls

do they get in to that hotline, and are they calls that effect change.

Do they use those calls to change what is going on?

I know that everyone throws around the term of safety culture,

and it is sometimes a little bit ambiguous to understand what the

point of a safety culture is, and if you don’t have trust within an

organization, if you don’t have confidence that things are going to

be acted on, it does create problems.

One of the things that we talk about with respect to a safety culture, some of the things that we saw at Metro about their ineffective safety culture was that they were focused on operations, that

they didn’t have adequate information about critical safety issues

within the organization; their organizational structure didn’t effectively communicate.

One of the things we knew after those two close calls in Rosslyn,

where we had the same problem occur but it wasn’t identified, we

had a train stop under the river, we had another train approach

in automatic, and the operator saw that they were getting too close.

They applied the emergency brakes. Very close call. They moved

forward. It happened again with another train.

I think the learning lesson there was that they tried to identify

what the problem was, they couldn’t quite figure it out, and so they

really wanted to get back into service quickly, so they just replaced

everything and moved on.

The engineering department did go further. They did take a look

at what happened, and they developed this test to make sure that

a track circuit worked, so you have the engineering department

that has identified the problem, but here is the maintenance department, and they don’t take this new procedure, throw it over the

wall, and apply it for the maintenance people. So when we went

onsite and we interviewed the maintenance personnel that had

done some of the work right there at Fort Totten in the days before

the accident, they weren’t familiar with this procedure, this procedure that existed for a long time.

Metro had requirements that employees had to sign and initial

procedures when they came out, but if you have multiple employees

who don’t understand a procedure and it is not being effectively implemented, that is a breakdown. That is a breakdown in the people

that are here supervising how do the engineering and maintenance

folks work together, and what do the maintenance people do and

what do they know every day.

So you have to be able to take those issues and break them down

and say what happened? What failed there? You want to have an

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informed culture so the people who are operating and managing

the system have knowledge about the factors that are affecting the

system. You want to have a reporting culture, and this is what we

are talking about when we talk about non-punitive reporting. People can report safety concerns. They can report errors that they

have made and near misses in a just culture so people are encouraged and rewarded for providing safety information without fear or

blame.

If you have an effective safety culture, it is flexible. It can

change. It can adapt. A learning culture. So you have to be able

to have the willingness and the competence to get those lessons

learned, to draw them, to change things.

It is not something that is going to happen overnight, and there

is going to have to be a lot of confidence-building measures to take

place with the employee work force so they are full participants in

this culture, so that they feel like they own it and they feel like

they are a partner. That is why our recommendations both to the

Federal Transit Administration to establish this system-wide

across the country and to Metro talk about all of the pieces that

really need to be involved to make this a success.

If you are not getting a lot of calls on your safety hotline, people

don’t have confidence in it and they are not using it. When we look

at an airline with a robust reporting culture for pilots, they get

10,000 reports a year. I wonder how many calls they get on the

safety hotline?

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Sarles may want to answer that. He also may

want to respond to Ms. Hersman’s notion of what sounds like a

classic stovepipe culture where the maintenance did not know

about the issue she described. Has that been remedied?

Mr. SARLES. Certainly there are a lot of silos in Metro. As I said

before, we have started on the path to remedying those things. I

will not sit here at this point and say it has all been remedied. We

have a long way to go.

I will agree that when that safety culture is in place and when

there is a trust that is referred to before, there will be actually, in

my view, less need for a safety hotline because if there is truly a

trust between the workers and the managers and the feeling that

information can be shared without retribution, then people will not

have to be a whistleblower and they will not have to use the safety

line. But it is going to take a long time to get there. In the meantime, with those tools available, at least if someone feels there is

going to be retribution they have a channel to do it, and if they call

the safety hotline the call is treated anonymously.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. DeBernardo, I have a question for you, but I

think I am going to defer to Mr. Bilbray now, who hasn’t had the

opportunity to ask any questions.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

What is the headways during the rush hour?

Mr. SARLES. It is around 3 minutes. Depends.

Mr. BILBRAY. Three minutes. Is every heavy rail in the country

operating with an automated system with a manual override?

Mr. SARLES. Generally most systems in this country are manual.

They do not have Automatic Train Operation. WMATA was more

advanced than that.

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Mr. BILBRAY. Well, let me answer that and come back, because

I know that BART, when I was involved in the transit system, I

ran into BART and a couple others that really questioned the automated system for a safety reason, mostly because of the relationship between humans, the attention span of humans, and when

they go down.

Are you saying that the majority of heavy rail operators in this

country are operating with a manual operation and then—let me

just say this and allow you to sort of counter it—I was told that

the safer system would have been a manual operation with electronic override, because the fact is the human, when they are not

engaged, will not have the attention span to engage. When you

need them, they are not going to be there, was basically the argument.

I want to open that up. I know this is an issue that all of us in

transit bounce back and forth, but I would love to hear your argument on the counterside on that issue.

Mr. SARLES. Well, my experience has always been with a manual

system, so it is a little hard to argue since I have only been here

for a few months.

The obvious advantage of an Automatic Train Operation is that

you can probably get a little bit more capacity and more reliability.

Mr. BILBRAY. In theory your headway is going to be smaller?

Mr. SARLES. A little bit. But, more importantly, just like when

you are driving a car down a highway, if one person slows down

a little bit more than the other, just for whatever reason, you will

tend to slow the rest of the traffic. The same thing can be when

you are in manual operation. One operator will operate just slightly

differently than the others, maybe slow down in one area that another one would not, so that will tend to reduce your capacity.

However, especially in my view here in regard to WMATA, before

you can return to an automatic train operation you have to do that

complete system safety analysis that the NTSB has recommended

and carefully review the results of that, and then the Board at that

time, with the expertise that we provide to it, will have to make

a decision on that.

Mr. BILBRAY. You remember in the 1970’s the big argument, the

engineer said the human didn’t even have to be on the car. The

lines I got while we were designing our systems was that you are

going to have to have them in the cars anyway, and if they are sitting there doing nothing you not only loose attention, you end up

having to pay them more for doing nothing, because the stress, basically the fatigue, is higher for doing nothing than actually engaging.

Do you have any experience in the relationship between that

automated system?

Let me just say this up front: I have to believe with modern technology that there is a way to integrate these two components and

get the advantage of the human being in there and tap more into

the advantage of the human, but still being able to utilize technology.

A good example is this configuration of how close the cars operate, or whatever. I think there are ways that technology, especially

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vantage of increasing efficiency still more, but having more safety,

and really tapping into the safety of having a human in the cab.

The oversight people at all even consider looking at that in this report?

Ms. HERSMAN. The Safety Board has looked at automation in all

modes of transportation, and you raise an excellent point, because

one of key issues is that you have to get the human in the loop,

and so, with respect to human-centered automation, the Safety

Board sees technology and automation as being a very powerful

tool to provide a safety redundancy to human beings in the event

that they have lapses, errors, failures, mistakes.

It is very important to keep the human in the loop when you are

designing a system. In fact, we made a recommendation to Metro

coming out of our 1996 investigation of a Shady Grove accident. At

the time Metro was operating in automatic all the time—it occurred on icy rails where there wasn’t good traction for the

wheels—the train over-sped, and the operator was not able to stop

as it came in at the end of the line and it hit another train.

We actually made a recommendation to Metro that they needed

to train their employees to operate in manual and not rely on automatic all the time, and to recognize that you can’t always rely on

the technology to operate the train.

So, based on that recommendation, Metro did change how they

operated their trains, and they operated them in automatic during

rush periods but in manual during other periods, and that was significant, because after this accident they went to all manual on all

lines all the time. They had a work force that was experienced operating in manual that might not have otherwise been if they

hadn’t changed the mix.

So we have found that automation can be a problem, whether it

is in aviation in the cockpit, on the trains. We do see technology

as a backup or redundant system for human failure.

Mr. BILBRAY. OK. Thank you.

I apologize, Madam Chair, but these things really are big questions. I know that it was openly debated in the 1970’s. I am old

enough to remember that. But there are still schools of thought

here. I just think there is a whole lot of difference between having

technology back up human and a human backing up technology,

because technology traditionally does not fatigue, does not text,

does not get distracted, and that can’t be said about human beings.

I know this seems like nit picking, but I think it can be a major

critical issue, and as soon as I saw this accident, as somebody who

comes from a transit background, that was the first question I had.

I appreciate the chance to be able to dialog here and I appreciate

the open and frank discussion on this.

I yield back, Madam Chair.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bilbray.

Final question for Mr. DeBernardo. Mr. DeBernardo, we have

spent this time exclusively discussing Metro rail because of the

NTSB report and the spectacular nature of that tragedy, not to

mention the other accidents where workers, for example, were

killed, but I believe the riding public that you represent, in terms

of the record of this hearing, would also want the riders’ perspective on safety challenges confronting Metro bus and Metro access

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riders. I say that not in the abstract. We have had serious accidents here involving Metro buses at the same time there were

Metro rail accidents. Could you comment on that for us?

Mr. DEBERNARDO. I think the concern in those areas in terms of

Metro access and in terms of Metro bus have to do not with technology but with human error, with problems with lack of attention.

Ms. NORTON. Traffic.

Mr. DEBERNARDO. Traffic, and not mechanical failure. And then

with Metro Access, in particular, the problems that we have seen

in the news with not transportation issues but the sexual assaults

that have occurred due to subcontracting out and not sufficient

oversight of employees in those areas because of subcontracting.

Ms. NORTON. Those have been very concerning to us all. We don’t

want to get off into another subject at this hearing, but we want

to note those matters for the record.

The chairman had indicated that he would make every effort to

be back. He has now sent word that it has become impossible for

him to come back and has asked me to thank all the witnesses and

Members who attended this hearing today.

There may be questions submitted to you in written form. Members will have 10 legislative days to do so.

The subcommittee and full committee look forward to continuing

this very important beginning dialog following the NTSB report.

Could I just say, with respect to the quality of testimony that we

have heard here today has been superb and invaluable, and we

thank you very much for your testimony.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly follows:]

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