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**TERRORIST SANCTUARY IN THE SAHARA:**

**A CASE STUDY**

**Joseph Guido**

**November 2017**

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vi

**FOREWORD**

Sanctuary is a concept not encompassed in military 

doctrine or government policy, yet denying sanctu-

ary has become the cornerstone of American counter-

terrorism efforts abroad and a pillar of U.S. defense 

strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Guido’s probing 

inquiry, exhaustive research, and innovative analysis 

on terrorist sanctuary in the Saharan Desert provides 

critical insights into this understudied idea underpin-

ning so much contemporary defense policy. 

History demonstrates the U.S. Army is no stranger 

to denying sanctuary. The recent surrender of the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, ending a 

conflict  lasting  more  than  50  years,  reveals  that  ter-

rorists and criminals using sanctuary can be defeated. 

Unfortunately, U.S. efforts to deny terrorist sanctu-

ary in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya 

have fallen short. Through a detailed case study of a 

group of al-Qaeda terrorists who found sanctuary in 

the Saharan deserts of Northern Mali, Lieutenant Col-

onel Guido develops a schema to better understand 

sanctuary, as well as the ways and means to control 

and ultimately defeat terrorists who use sanctuary for 

protection. 

Lieutenant Colonel Guido’s contribution helps 

commanders, staffs, strategic thinkers, and policymak-

ers understand and attack sanctuary. This monograph 

provides insight into the operational details, as well as 

the logic of sanctuary-seeking terrorists, which could 

be used to inform war games and staff exercises. Strate-

gic thinkers and policymakers, on the other hand, will 

find much to review here regarding the objectives for 

future counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strat-

egies and policies. Whether a practitioner or thinker, 

vii

Lieutenant Colonel Guido’s study is a needed addition 

to the contemporary literature on terrorism and insur-

gency, and his work is long overdue after 15 years of 

war focused on counterterrorism and counterinsur-

gency operations—much of the brunt of which the U.S. 

Army has borne. 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. 

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

viii

**SUMMARY**

Denying terrorists sanctuary has become a pillar 

of U.S. defense strategy since the September 11, 2001 

(9/11) attacks. Violent extremist organizations in 

North Africa, such as the group al-Qaeda in the Isla-

mic Maghreb (AQIM), have used remote and sparsely 

populated areas in the Sahara for protection from 

security forces to conduct a range of terrorist activities, 

such as training, planning, and logistics. 1 Despite the 

time elapsed since the 9/11 attacks, and the resources 

dedicated to denying sanctuary globally, the concept 

of sanctuary remains largely unexplored and poorly 

understood. This monograph proposes a functional 

understanding of sanctuary and offers fresh ideas to 

deny it using a detailed case study of the most noto-

rious of these North African terrorists, Mokhtar 

Belmokhtar, from his arrival in Mali in the late 1990s, 

until the French intervention in early 2013. This inter-

disciplinary inquiry uses a wide range of open-source 

documents, as well as anthropological, sociological, 

and political science research, including interviews 

with a former Belmokhtar hostage, Ambassador Robert 

Fowler, to construct a picture of what a day in the life 

of a Saharan sanctuary-seeking terrorist is like in order 

to provide further insight into terrorist sanctuary and 

explore ways and means to deny or control it. 

There are various actors involved in sanctuary, and 

understanding those actors and their relationships is 

central to a developing a method to deny sanctuary. 

There are those who own the space, sanctuary provid-

ers or owners, and those who seek to gain from provid-

ing the space, rent-seekers or landlords. The owners 

who control the space may not necessarily be the same 

as the landlords who are seeking rents to administer 

the space. The owners of the sanctuary in the region 

ix

being examined are the pastoral families who live in 

these areas. Rent-seekers, or landlords, whether chiefs, 

criminal kingpins, or political appointees from the gov-

ernment, are often imposed upon the owners. Finally, 

sanctuary-seekers require the space and are usually 

those paying for using it. While those using sanctu-

ary may not necessarily be the same as those who are 

paying, evidence indicates Belmokhtar funded his 

sanctuary—a tenant who paid his own bills. 

Geography and people matter. Terrorists, crimi-

nals, and insurgents use remote places in the Sahara 

because it offers protection. The operational effects 

of the size, scale, and diversity of Saharan geography 

cannot be overstated. Military operations across this 

vast expanse realize many elements of the failed Desert 

One rescue attempt in Iran: sandstorms, temperature, 

distance, communication, security, and interaction 

with local population. While the geography of this 

region is imposing, people matter more. Those in the 

Sahara live a difficult life but have a very keen sense of 

history, understanding of the terrain, and pride in their 

identity. Importantly, Saharan society is not inherently 

compatible  with  Wahhabism,  Salafism,  and  funda-

mentalist Islam. Quite the opposite: the complex social 

structure specifically adapted to the difficult environ-

mental and political conditions of desert life would 

be heretical to orthodox Islam. The variance and high 

degree of adaptability or flexibility in kinship relations 

means tribal politics are complex and dynamic. 

It is often assumed that sanctuary is cost-free: lack 

of central authority or poor governance is interpreted 

to mean terrorists can move in and establish their 

operations. These Saharan sanctuary areas have exist-

ing social structures, however, and local populations 

with needs seek to impose costs on sanctuary-seekers. 

These costs, called rent, could be expressed through 

x

cash transactions, through payment in providing ser-

vices, goods exchange, or even political capital. Mar-

riage and other social contracts could constitute a form 

of payment through alliance-building. 

Actions since the 9/11 attacks indicate the U.S. 

response to sanctuary is to concentrate operations 

against sanctuary-seekers. In other words, the focus 

has been upon finding and destroying enemy forces: 

Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR—the raid on the Osama 

bin Laden compound in Pakistan—is the most famous 

example. The present analysis suggests an alternative 

approach may be worth considering, an approach that 

focuses on the costs of creating and maintaining the 

sanctuary which terrorists require for protection. One 

solution to terrorist sanctuary may be to increase the 

costs of sanctuary to the sanctuary-seeker or to change 

the relationship of sanctuary supply and demand to a 

point where the costs of sanctuary to the terrorist are 

unsustainable or unacceptably high. In three words: 

raise the rent. 

**ENDNOTES- SUMMARY**

1. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Islamist 

militant organization founded in Algeria with the objective to 

overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. 

xi

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

JOSEPH GUIDO, Lieutenant Colonel, is a U.S. Army 

sub-Saharan Africa Foreign Area Officer (48J) current-

ly working at the U.S. Army Africa Command in Vi-

cenza, Italy. He has previously served as the Chief of 

Security Cooperation in Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well 

as  the  first  Director  of  Intelligence  for  the  Joint  Spe-

cial Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara. He executed 

the  first  Title  10  Section  1208  program  in  Africa,  es-

tablished the Foreign Area Officer In-Region Training 

site in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and played a key role 

in establishing the Defense Attaché Office in Djibou-

ti. Lieutenant Colonel Guido has worked as a defense 

contractor in Afghanistan, as well as a private security 

consultant, he served as an intelligence officer in Iraq, 

and as an infantry officer in Germany and Kosovo. He 

is a graduate of the French Army staff school  *Course*

*Superior des Officiers de Réserve Spécialistes d’Etat Major*

*at L’Ecole Militaire,* and he received a Master of Arts in 

African Studies from Yale University with a certificate 

in International Security Studies in addition to a Bach-

elor of Science in International and Strategic History 

from the U.S. Military Academy. 

xiii

**TERRORIST SANCTUARY IN THE SAHARA:**

**A CASE STUDY**

Sanctuary  as  a  military  idea  is  undefined  and 

remains poorly understood. Yet, denial of sanctuary 

has become a mainstay of defense strategy: The 2006 

*Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) described “the new 

strategic environment.”1 This QDR outlined a course 

for the United States to become proactive in address-

ing security threats in order to prevent fragile states 

from becoming failed states, as well as change the 

conditions in fragile states that help terrorists conduct 

operations. These objectives led to the development of 

the  *QDR Execution Roadmap*2 to “reduce the drivers of instability, prevent terrorist attacks, or disrupt their 

networks” as well as “deny sanctuary to terrorists” and 

“separate terrorists from host populations.”3 A decade 

later, the imperative to “deny sanctuary to terrorists” 

remains, but the questions “What is sanctuary?” “Who 

seeks sanctuary?” and “How can we deny sanctuary 

to terrorists?” heretofore remain not only unanswered, 

but also unasked. 

Sanctuary is defense through other means. The 

aim of sanctuary is protection, and sanctuary is not 

an operation but a place, sometimes a series of places, 

sometimes cognitive or virtual places: sanctuary is 

space. People inhabit physical spaces and access to 

these places requires one to deal with the inhabitants. 

Such actions can be social in nature, resulting from the 

interaction, and often manipulation, of local power 

structures  and  fluid  alliances.  Physical  sanctuary  is 

transactional in nature—everything is negotiable and 

money talks. However, interacting and manipulating 

local power structures requires understanding. Mili-

tary intelligence is necessary for locating the enemy, 

1

but deep cultural and social knowledge is critical to 

interacting and working successfully with the groups 

who own the sanctuary where the enemy resides. 

This monograph finds inspiration in Roger Trinqui-

er’s dictum, “To carry out a war effectively, to win it, 

it is indispensable to identify the adversary exactly.” 4

This monograph focuses on a specific segment of the 

al-Qaeda  affiliates  operating  in  Northern  Mali  until 

2013, concentrating on the activities of an Algerian 

named Mokhtar Belmokhtar—an experienced jihadist 

who came of age fighting the Soviet Army in Afghani-

stan and working with Osama bin Laden.5 Belmokhtar 

has many  *noms de guerre*: “one-eyed” after losing an 

eye to shrapnel; “Mr. Marlboro” from his regional cig-

arette-smuggling cartel; even “the Uncatchable” by 

French intelligence because of his ability to escape cap-

ture—he has escaped capture and been reported dead 

at least half a dozen times.6 Belmokhtar is of particular 

interest because of his many previous successful oper-

ations, notably the capture of Canadian diplomats, as 

well as a large-scale attack on an Algerian oil facility. 7

Finally, Belmokhtar is a good case because his prolific 

activities have left a trail for us to follow—important 

when examining the underbelly of shadowy, criminal 

organizations. 

A variety of sources indicate Belmokhtar used the 

area around the city of Aguelhok in Northern Mali for 

sanctuary until the arrival of French military forces 

in 2013.8 Notably, Aguelhok was the first city seized by al-Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb (AQIM) and other 

groups in January 2012 using “Al-Qaeda-style tac-

tics.”9  Aguelhok  is  significant  because  not  only  was it the opening battle between Belmokhtar and Malian 

government forces, but also because its geography, 

history, and local politics made it an ideal sanctuary 

2

for Belmokhtar’s group. Additionally, Aguelhok has 

struck an artistic chord: this tiny Saharan city was the 

dramatic spark for the film  *Timbuktu* that the director 

noted “a 2012 incident in which militants in Aguelhok 

in northern Mali stoned to death an unmarried couple 

who had two children” inspired him to make a movie 

set in the much more famous city Timbuktu.10

Mokhtar Belmokhtar needed sanctuary for specific 

operational requirements: protection from hot pursuit 

and refuge from intelligence services, logistics, plan-

ning, and training. Belmokhtar only had sanctuary, 

however, because his income generating activities 

provided capital to pay for it. Illicit activities, such 

as cocaine smuggling and hostage taking, funded his 

extremist operations, as well as expanding and rein-

forcing his base of local support. Thus, income gen-

eration and public affairs that constitute more than 

half, and perhaps almost all his allocation, of available 

resources are not functions sanctuary serves terror-

ists, but necessary activities to maintain the sanctuary. 

Furthermore, the kinds of illicit activities Belmokhtar 

engaged in are not constrained by social norms or local 

conventions, because these extremists feel justified in 

using any available means to further their ends includ-

ing unacceptable or forbidden activities. Finally, the 

markets for these illicit income generating activities 

are far away and generally in regions targeted by the 

extremists, principally Europe. 

Sanctuary and operational capacity are not equiva-

lent. Belmokhtar required sanctuary space but needed 

the means to pay for it. The functions which sanctuary 

served him as a terrorist did not include his fundrais-

ing activities, even though those activities enabled the 

sanctuary. Interdicting Belmokhtar’s logistics could 

neutralize his operational capability, but not neutralize 

3

his organization. Denying Belmokhtar sanctuary 

would neutralize his operational capability, as well as 

deny his ability to reconstitute that logistical system—

at least at that location. However, an alternative 

objective could seek to control the underlying mecha-

nisms that allow sanctuary—specifically Belmokhtar’s 

alliances with sanctuary-owners and rent-seekers. 

Increasing sanctuary rent provides alternatives other 

than destruction of enemy forces, such as decreasing 

resources for terrorist operations, coercing the group 

to move into a lower rent sanctuary area, bankrupt-

ing the group, transforming the terrorist group into a 

criminal enterprise, or fusing with the local society and 

becoming part of the local social landscape. Viewing 

sanctuary as a system of rents between sanctuary-space 

owner and sanctuary-seeker provides an innovative 

schema to understand, control, and deny sanctuary to 

terrorists. 

**ON SANCTUARY**

*Sanctuarium*, a Latin word for containers that pro-

tect holy objects or holy people, connotes spirituality 

and implies a degree of divine sanction. While this 

monograph focuses upon sanctuary, other popular 

terms such as safe haven and refuge all illustrate a rela-

tionship between a place and safety. 

The 2003  *National Strategy for Combating Terror-*

*ism* made denying sponsorship, support, and sanctu-

ary to terrorists a “second front” in the Global War 

on Terror. 11 The September 11, 2001  *9/11 Commission**Report* published in July 2004 paid particular attention 

to terrorist sanctuary and the methods to deny it. 12 A Congressional Research Service study noted, “U.S. 

efforts to deny terrorists sanctuary were substantially 

4

increased worldwide” after the 9/11 attacks.13 In turn, 

Congress has held numerous hearings to identify pol-

icies and methods for denying sanctuary, but in 2008, 

the Government Accountability Office concluded the 

United States lacked a comprehensive plan to destroy 

the terrorist sanctuary in Pakistan.14 What sanctuary 

is,  and  the  specific  functions  it  performs,  however, 

remained unspecified. 

**Sanctuary and the U.S. Army Experience**

The U.S. Army has a longstanding, if often over-

looked, relationship with sanctuary. The Continental 

Army under General George Washington effectively 

used sanctuary in areas like Valley Forge for protec-

tion from the British Army during the Revolutionary 

War. Washington selected Valley Forge because it was 

close enough to the British to keep their raiding and 

foraging parties out of the interior of Pennsylvania, yet 

far enough away to prevent British surprise attacks. 

This sanctuary area was easily defensible because of 

its  densely  forested  plateau  that  provided  firewood 

and timber to construct the thousands of log huts used 

for shelter. Politically relevant yet militarily secure, the 

Valley Forge encampment was the sanctuary the Con-

tinental Army needed to survive and prepare for the 

next campaign. 

Later, the U.S. Army pursued Poncho Villa into his 

sanctuary areas in Northern Mexico; the Philippine 

Constabulary sought to pacify the Moros in mountain 

sanctuary areas; and the Cuban Constabulary attacked 

sanctuary areas of indigenous insurgents in various 

small wars at the turn of the century.15 Throughout 

the Indian Wars, the U.S. Army pursued small bands 

of highly mobile Indian fighters, such as those under 

Geronimo, who used large expanses of the American 

5

West as sanctuary. Geronimo and his band of 38 men, 

women, and children evaded capture from thousands 

of Mexican and American soldiers in a form of mobile 

sanctuary. This small band was highly mobile, foraged 

for provisions, and possessed an intimate knowledge 

of the terrain across Northern Mexico, Arizona, and 

New Mexico. Local populations were sympathetic to 

the cause of Geronimo and provided support in the 

form of horses and supplies, while some items, partic-

ularly weapons, were captured from U.S. or Mexican 

forces. 16

The U.S. Army adopted a sanctuary denial strat-

egy of exhaustion against Geronimo. John Bigelow, 

an Indian war veteran, and later a tactics instructor at 

West Point, explained:

What decides the campaign [against the Indians] is not so 

much physical exhaustion from long marches or scanty 

nourishment as their mental weariness from constant 

watching  and  devising  and  planning  and  their  final 

despair of ever thoroughly resting or returning to wives, 

children, and sweethearts, unless it be as prisoners.17

General Nelson A. Miles, commander of the cam-

paign to find Geronimo, summarized that U.S. forces 

would  “find,  follow,  and  defeat”  the  enemy  wher-

ever they would go. 18 Small units also adapted their tactics to the nature of the fight. Logistics were highly 

streamlined to give cavalry squadrons and mounted 

infantry increased mobility and speed. The wagon 

was abandoned in favor of the pack mule that did not 

require  repairs  and  could  traverse  very  difficult  ter-

rain. Soldiers adopted the lifestyle of Indian fighters, 

performing armed reconnaissance patrols over great 

distances lasting weeks, sometimes months, carrying 

fewer supplies, and having the ability to live off the 

6

land. Units could be resupplied through a “hub-and-

spoke” system from fixed bases or forts, but could also 

self-sustain, procure provisions locally, or forage to 

gain greater operational flexibility. 

Command and control was highly decentralized 

and tactical decisions were made by commanders on 

the ground—often captains and lieutenants. Intelli-

gence—an essential element of the campaign—was 

provided through local agents such as the “Kit Carson 

Scouts” who spoke local languages, understood local 

customs, and could maintain the operational tempo 

while coping with the hardships and dangers of fron-

tier combat. Many of these scouts were former Indian 

fighters that the Army employed in tasks such as ques-

tioning the local population, man-tracking, and even 

as emissaries.19

U.S. Army operations to deny Geronimo sanctuary 

were successful because of a combination of factors 

including: tactical innovations like the use of mules, 

decentralization of command, speed or the pace of 

“find, follow, and defeat,” and removing material and 

moral support to Geronimo by resettling local popula-

tions. Denying water resupply by guarding watering 

holes also had a critical effect.20 Finally, the knowledge 

of terrain and local populations possessed by U.S. lead-

ers should not be overlooked. For example, Geronimo 

surrendered to First Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood 

who spoke Apache and honored Apache traditions 

and values. 21

Geronimo’s sanctuary provides several insights. 

First, the small scale of his force, a band of 38 people, 

indicates possible diminishing returns to scale for sanc-

tuary-seekers. Larger groups may have greater combat 

power and can disperse across a greater range of space, 

but they also require more support and are more 

7

difficult to control. Smaller groups are more cohesive, more mobile, and easier to hide. In sanctuary, size matters. Second, Geronimo initially used national bound-

aries to facilitate sanctuary—he would seek refuge 

from Mexican forces across the American border, and 

vice-versa. However, this was no longer effective once 

U.S. and Mexican military forces combined to search 

for Geronimo. This indicates an important concept for 

sanctuary—mobile sanctuary—where sanctuary-seek-

ers find sanctuary not in one place, but many different 

places across a wide region. Denying mobile sanctuary, 

as the American experience in the Southwest indicates, 

is  exceptionally  difficult,  and,  therefore,  can  be  an 

excellent form of sanctuary. Finally, if one is to believe 

the American accounts, the U.S. Army did not physi-

cally break Geronimo’s group or defeat it in combat, 

but broke their will and induced mental weariness, 

which alludes to another important form of sanctuary: 

cognitive sanctuary. 

**Sanctuary in the 20th Century**

Sanctuary in the 20th century has denoted guerilla 

rear areas, such as the countryside base areas of Mao 

in China. The 20th-century understanding, therefore, 

is closely aligned with the history of insurgencies and 

counterinsurgency campaigns. Sanctuary, as a term 

denoting rural refuge, was applied later to other peas-

ant-oriented, revolutionary, communist movements 

as in Cuba and Vietnam, 22 yet Mao referred to these 

zones not as sanctuary, but as “bases.”23 Mao’s key 

element remained not locations, however, but popu-

lar support, which was later echoed by the Vietnamese 

General Vo Nguyen Giap, who employed the concepts 

articulated in  *Inside the Viet Minh* against U.S. forces in 

8

South Vietnam. 24 The essential ingredient for success for these 20th-century social struggles, usually against 

a formidable state military, was local support regard-

less if their protective areas were called bases, sanctu-

aries, or safe havens. 

Mao and the Chinese Communists escaped Chi-

nese Nationalist forces in The Long March. Mao 

demonstrated a profound understanding of scale in 

choosing his sanctuary areas, since he knew exactly 

how far away to provide protection from the Chinese 

Nationalists, yet remain close enough to the Chinese 

population and Nationalist forces to be politically rel-

evant and militarily effective. Mao’s political competi-

tor, Zhang, on the other hand, proved true the maxim, 

“isolation, military and political, is the great enemy of 

guerrilla movements,”25 by conducting a retreat into 

the far and remote Northwest of China to the isolated 

high plateau of Qinghai and southern Ningxia. Zhang 

and his group were politically and militarily isolated 

and eventually became subsumed by the Soviet Union. 

Mao’s retreat to the near Northwest of China, on the 

other hand, was far enough from the reaches of the 

Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists to remain viable 

but close enough to remain relevant.26

Mao settled on sanctuary areas along common 

boundaries of two or more provinces in order to “mini-

mize the danger of attacks from provincial warlords or 

governors.”27 This positioned Mao in zones of weakest control by the local powerbrokers. Military parlance 

calls these seams boundaries that delineate the span 

of control from one organization to another. Interest-

ingly, these boundaries often are located on important 

terrain features like ridgelines, roads, or rivers to aid 

in demarcating the precise location of the boundary to 

everyday people and often facilitates movement from 

9

one area to another. Such boundaries often are more 

social than geographic, and social boundaries are par-

ticularly relevant regarding groups in Northern Mali 

when extended to ethnic and tribal identities, because 

communities are “ambiguous, anomalous, marginal 

societies that nestle in the interstices between normal 

societies and ethnicities.” 28

The U.S. Army experienced sanctuary in Vietnam 

where fighters had a variety sanctuaries ranging from 

sympathetic villages in South Vietnam, the interna-

tionally recognized territory of North Vietnam, and 

the remote border areas in Laos and Cambodia. This 

configuration of sanctuary areas—akin to Mao’s con-

cept of base areas (North Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-

bodia) and guerrilla areas (communist controlled or 

sympathetic areas in South Vietnam) made it difficult 

for U.S. forces either to encircle or isolate the enemy. 

One example that posed particular tactical difficulties 

for American forces were the tunnel systems the North 

Vietnamese Army constructed, which afforded protec-

tion and blurred the distinction between sanctuary and 

fortification. These tunnel systems combined fortified 

defenses in sanctuary areas, such as the tunnels of Cu 

Chi. 29 Fortifying sanctuary areas is common, such as the caves and tunnels in the Tora Bora in Afghanistan, 

but defensive fortifications and fixed structures are not 

sanctuary per se. 

**Sanctuary, Islam, and Africa**

The Islamic world in Africa has a rich history of 

sanctuary as well. The Mahdi revolt, or Madhya, of 

Sudan in the 19th century was a violent movement led 

by the mystical Sufi known as the Mahdi. The Madhi 

revolt rapidly gained in popularity and defeated British 

10

forces in 1885. The ability of the Mahdi army to move 

rapidly in the vast and harsh expanse of the Sudanese 

desert and the fanaticism of its fighters proved enor-

mously difficult for the Egyptian government or Brit-

ish regiments to destroy, isolate, or contain. The idea 

that a nomadic lifestyle, austerity, and simplicity pro-

moted virtues, such as honesty and courage, has a long 

tradition in Islam. 

The 14th-century North African historian and 

sociologist Ibn Khaldun describes sedentary people—

or city folk—as “colored with all kinds of blamewor-

thy and evil qualities . . . not deterred by any sense of 

restraint, because the bad custom of behaving openly 

in an improper manner in both words and deeds has 

taken hold of them.”30 Nomads, in contrast, “are closer 

to the first natural state [of man] and more remote from 

the evil habits that have been impressed upon the souls 

(of sedentary people) through numerous and ugly, 

blameworthy customs.” 31 These ideas led Ibn Khaldun to summarize that “Bedouins are closer to being good 

than sedentary people,” “Bedouins are more disposed 

to courage than sedentary people,” and “The reliance 

of sedentary people upon laws destroys their fortitude 

and power of resistance.” 32 Thus, Bedouins, or desert nomads who live in remote areas removed from civilization and government influence, are more free than 

those who live in cities and large social groupings. 33

Cities, civilizations, and populations by contrast are 

corrupting  influences  requiring  redemption.  In  other 

words, desert and wilderness sanctuary promotes 

freedom and redemption. 

Ibn Khaldun also theorized about the relationship 

between rural and urban, reasoning that states prog-

ress through five stages of development:

1.  Success through military domination by a lead-

er, normally from an armed revolution; 

11

2.  Consolidation of political power; 

3.  Consolidation of financial instruments, normal-

ly through the use of taxes; 

4.  Peace and productiveness; and, 

5.  Corruption and wastefulness resulting in griev-

ances that lead to a new leader overthrowing 

the established order. 

He also reasoned that states are weakest at their 

extremities, and the enemies of the state come from 

the regions furthest from state control. Scholars have 

found it “significant that all leaders of the jihad move-

ments in West Africa came from the countryside and 

not from commercial or capital towns.” 34 The Muqaddimah provides historical and theoretical credibility to 

Islamic revolutionaries and militants while harkening 

to cognitive sanctuary, space to think freely. Cognitive 

sanctuary could offer subtle clues to the ideology of 

terrorists and the techniques they use to convert others 

to their cause.35 Sanctuary in West Africa has deep cul-

tural, social, and historical roots. 

**Sanctuary and Governance**

The absence of governance often referred to 

as ungoverned space or poorly governed spaces, 

is imprecise and complicated because scholars and 

practitioners discuss governance in a variety of contra-

dictory and politically-charged ways. The concept of 

a failed state implies a recognized threshold of state-

hood below that constituting state failure, although 

there is no such consensus on what constitutes good 

governance, or even governance. There are a range of 

governance paradigms from the Westphalian Interna-

tional States System, “stateless” societies, 36 and even 12

state “disorder.” Some researchers list state functions as diverse as a monopoly on the legitimate means of 

violence, administrative control, public finances man-

agement, human capital investment, citizen rights cre-

ation through social policy, provision of infrastructure 

services, market formation, management of public 

assets, and effective public borrowing. 37 Sanctuary from these sophisticated elements of modern governance could include protection from any of these 

elements  such  as  economic  sanctuary,  finance  (tax) 

sanctuary, institutional sanctuary, or legal sanctuary. 

An unusual example of sanctuary-seeking to avoid 

state control and governance is the “nation” of Seal-

and. British citizen Roy Bates declared independence 

on September 2, 1967, on a World War II naval “sea 

fort” seven miles offshore of the English coastline. 38

While this sanctuary offers little physical refuge, it does 

host a “data haven,” its main income-generating activ-

ity, and questions traditional concepts of governance. 

The location of internet servers in Sealand alludes to 

another form of sanctuary—virtual sanctuary—shel-

ters from government and regulatory control in cyber-

space. Virtual sanctuary is a growing threat as terrorist 

groups are exploiting the accessibility, audience, and 

anonymity of the internet to raise money, communi-

cate, and recruit. For example, al-Qaeda’s publication 

*Al Battr* was a virtual terrorist training camp:

Edition nine of the publication was devoted to 

kidnappings. It suggests methods, potential targets, 

negotiating tactics, and even directions on how to 

videotape the beheading of victims and post the video on 

the Web. 39

13

The “media guy” was an important member of 

Belmokhtar’s group and was present for the major 

events during Ambassador Robert Fowler’s captivity. 

In the physical world, sanctuaries can be either 

stationary or mobile. Stationary sanctuaries can be 

supported by states, such as North Vietnam, or exist 

due to lack of state control in sanctuary areas such 

as in Mao’s case. State sanctuary requires the knowl-

edge and support of a state actor and the legal frame-

work and binding nature of international agreements. 

Nonstate sanctuaries, such as those in Northern Mali, 

are due to poor government control and security of 

those state-administered areas. Mobile sanctuaries, as 

Geronimo resorted to employing, are sanctuaries that 

cross a wide region but cannot be pinpointed to a spe-

cific place or delineated by a particular area or zone 

because the sanctuary-seeker constantly moves among 

different spaces. 

Like Mao, Belmokhtar used sanctuary in Northern 

Mali for the purposes of protection and as his oper-

ational base to conduct logistical activities, command 

and control, planning, and training. Unlike Mao, how-

ever, Belmokhtar also used sanctuary for a range of 

criminal enterprises, such as smuggling and hostage 

taking. Belmokhtar also engaged in civil affairs opera-

tions, such as providing support to local populations, 

but had to recruit new fighters in distant urban areas 

via  internet  messaging  and  the  influence  of  radical 

leaders rather than locals in the sanctuary area. 40

The price of utilizing one sanctuary area over 

another involves a variety of costs besides the finan-

cial burden of operational expenditures and includes 

the rent for the sanctuary paid by gifts to the local 

population, cash donations, or even loans. There is an 

opportunity cost in time to develop and maintain close 

14

relationships with the myriad of local power brokers, 

and even perhaps marriage, in order to solidify alli-

ances. These relationships and locations are likely to 

involve certain risk, a cost hidden from analysis, yet 

essential to determine the operational reach of the 

organization. To deny or control sanctuary requires 

an  understanding  of  what  benefits  the  terrorists  are 

receiving, as well as what the sanctuary costs them. 

Attacking the benefits will deny terrorists the under-

lying purpose of the sanctuary. Attacking the cost, or 

raising the rent, could make the price of using that 

sanctuary either unacceptable or untenable. 

**TERRAIN: GEOGRAPHIC AND HUMAN CHAR-**

**ACTERISTICS OF SAHARAN SANCTUARY**

The word “desert” connotes emptiness, absence, 

desertion, and is associated with extreme heat. It 

should come as no surprise that most people associate 

desert with a barren wasteland; the word desert, after 

all, is the root of deserted. At more than 3 1/2 million 

square miles—the largest desert on earth and almost 

big enough to swallow the territory of three continen-

tal United States—many imagine the Sahara as the 

world’s largest barren wasteland. This simplistic view 

is  reflected  in  the  cartography  of  American  military 

maps of Saharan regions: most 1:250,000 scale “Joint 

Operational Graphic” in this region use contour inter-

vals of 100 meters and are based upon hand-drawn data 

more than 50 years old. Some areas remain uncolored 

from the lack of certainty in the geographic informa-

tion portrayed. The lack of precision and accuracy in 

these representations of the Saharan landscape reflects 

the American military’s general lack of interest in the 

Sahara and serves to reinforce our conceptions that the 

15

barrenness of the desert and harsh climate equates to 

an abject lack of terrain—physical or human. 

These preconceived notions of the Sahara and asso-

ciations of emptiness are gross misrepresentations of 

the geology, ecology, and economy of the world’s larg-

est desert. The Sahara has open expanses of dunes tow-

ering more than 600 feet tall, huge dry lakebeds and 

salt flats, vast networks of dry washes or wadis, vol-

canic mountain ranges approaching 10,000 feet above 

sea level, high limestone plateaus, granite mountain 

ranges, and large plains covered with sharp gravel. 

Those who live in the desert have dozens of words to 

describe the different textures, colors, and even flavors 

of the sand and rock around them. The size and varia-

tion of the Sahara create large temperature and climatic 

variations as well as some of the largest sandstorms 

on Earth. The geologic history of the region gives the 

Sahara an enormous biodiversity, from migratory ele-

phants who roam the desert and grasslands in northern 

Mali, to desert crocodiles in Mauritania who borough 

deep in the desert sands. 

The inaccuracies of U.S. maps of the Sahara are 

reflections  of  the  errors  in  our  mental  maps  of  the 

region—how we perceive the terrain. These mental 

maps are important in how we see the world around 

us and hence respond to it. For example, Parisians 

often say that there is a tourist Paris and a real Paris. 

The geography is the same, but the human experience 

and impressions of the terrain are quite different for 

those influenced by prepackaged images of Paris and 

those who live in the complex human terrain. 41 Most existing American military maps do not differentiate 

between moving sand dunes, terrain elevation changes 

less than 300 feet, caves and ravines carved into the 

rocky  desert  floor,  flat  expanses  of  rocky  outcrops 

16

impassible by wheeled vehicles, and sinkhole-prone 

ancient  lakebeds.  More  significant  than  shortfalls  in 

physical geography, however, is that these maps do 

not aid planners to understand the layers and con-

nections of human terrain of the Sahara. Our mental 

maps largely are dominated by a western, temperate, 

and metropolitan experience with a poverty of knowl-

edge about the people who live in the Sahara. Most 

assume such barren landscapes are barren of people, 

and social groups in these places are therefore nonex-

istent or inconsequential. 

**Geographic Terrain**

The Adrar des Ifoghas is a large massif in Mali’s 

Kidal  Region,  characterized  by  wide,  shallow  val-

leys, and small mountains strewn with piles of sharp 

eroded granite blocks, covering about 100,000 square 

miles and extending into the Hoggar region of South-

ern Algeria. The massif’s valleys open to the Tamesna 

plain on the east, to the Telemsi fosse on the west, the 

western basin of the Azaouak valley on the south, and 

the Tanezrouft in the north. Settlements include Kidal, 

Aguelhok, Boghassa, Essouk, and Tessalit. 

Aguelhok, a city of approximately 8,000 inhabitants, 

is located about 70 miles north across a desert track from 

the city of Kidal, and about the same distance south of 

the city of Tessalit. Tessalit and Aguelhok both have 

airfields, but Kidal is the nearest paved airstrip. Aguel-

hok is in the northern end of the Tilemsi Valley that 

runs south from Tessalit into the Niger River at the city 

of Gao. The low but steep granite mountains and dry 

wash networks rise on both sides of the river valley, 

west and east of Aguelhok respectively. Aguelhok’s 

temperatures range from low 50 degrees Fahrenheit in 

17

the winter, to well over 110 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer, with extreme temperatures dropping below 

freezing and exceeding 120 degrees Fahrenheit. The 

desert winds can reach 40 miles an hour, and sand-

storms can last hours, making movement impossible. 

Dry riverbeds with their high rock walls, crags, over-

hangs, and caves offer a multitude of places to provide 

excellent cover and concealment for people and equip-

ment. In the words of AQIM: “That [Adrar des Ifoghas 

massif] is our Tora Bora.”42

Ageulhok receives an average of 4.5 inches of rain-

fall per year, the majority in August that normally 

sees 2 inches, while the driest months of February 

and March normally receive no rain. Rainfall patterns 

require an annual trek for those living in the Aguelhok 

area to lands closer to the Niger River, possibly as far 

south as the cities of Bourem or Gao, a distance more 

than 200 miles. These southwardly spring migrations 

burden people living in the Niger River basin and 

often  cause  conflicts  due  to  livestock  grazing  rights. 

Northern areas like Aguelhok are sparsely populated 

during these migrations, and there is little livestock 

or food available in the dry months. Weather causes 

these migrations so they can last an entire year during 

a drought, as in 2012, which may foment violence 

between groups converging on grazing pasture. 

The Sahara is also prone to large rainfall fluctua-

tions. More than a century of rainfall data from the 

Sahel and Sahara show an unusually wet period from 

1950 until 1970, followed by extremely dry years from 

1970 to 1990. From 1990 until the present day, rainfall 

returned to levels slightly below the 1898–1993 aver-

age, but year-to-year variability remains high. The 

most recent droughts occurred in 2012 after one of the 

most severe droughts on record in 2010. 43 The droughts 18

over the past 50 years have placed severe strain on 

the pastoral populations in the Sahara who normally 

migrate with their herds to the southern Sahel regions 

during dry periods, and climatic factors are significant 

elements in conflicts.44

The geologic structure of the Adrar des Ifoghas 

massif also plays an important role because the gran-

ite rock captures rainwater in underground channels 

and pools beneath the sand, allowing people to tap 

into these water sources through a network of wells. 

These wells are essential for life in the Sahara: daily 

life revolves around the well. Control of these wells, 

therefore, is a basic and essential security concern for 

landowners. Water sources are connected directly 

to livelihood, and defending these wells is a right of 

self-defense: “each hill and valley in it had a man who 

was its acknowledged owner and would quickly assert 

the right of his family or clan to it, against aggression. 

Even the wells and trees had their masters.” 45 A 1952 

study, commissioned by the U.S. Combat Studies Insti-

tute on desert warfare lessons learned by the German 

Army in World War II, forthrightly stated that avail-

ability of water is the decisive factor for desert opera-

tions. 46 During the same period, the British army used prepositioned water and ammunition stocks as one of 

the factors to determine their scheme of maneuver in 

operating against the German Army in North Africa.47

Belmokhtar understood the critical importance of 

water—washing is discretionary but drinking is not, 

even for his hostages. 48 Water was never to be wasted, and sand is used instead of water for washing purposes, to include ablutions before prayer. Ambassador 

Fowler observed his group performed a “water run” 

every 3 days, which would take 1 to 2 days to com-

plete. He recorded an example of such a water resupply 

19

when the group stopped in the “middle of a flat, fea-

tureless expanse of desert” at an “improved well” with 

a cement lip rising a meter from the ground. Sentries 

were posted, and the group manually retrieved water 

from the well, dumping buckets into containers one-

by-one, very alert and vigilant, as they understood 

their vulnerability when stopping to resupply water. 

This group avoided contact with local populations, 

and their choice for a watering hole was one that was 

clearly remote and unobserved. 49

**Human Terrain**

Adrar  is a Berber word signifying mountain, while 

Ifogha is the name of an aristocratic Tuareg clan, the 

Kel Ifoghas. Some historians have argued that the Kel 

Ifoghas date to the Roman Empire.50 It is commonly 

accepted that the Saharan desert was unpopulated 

before  the  first  century  after  the  Common  Era  (C.E.) 

when dromedaries were introduced into North Africa, 

enabling  long  distance  trans-Saharan  treks.  The  Kel 

Ifoghas are not the only Tuareg group in the Adrar 

region:  Kel  Afella,  Iredganaten,  Ibatanaten,  Che-

menammas,  Kel  Essuk,  Ifergumessen,  Idnan,  Taghat 

Melet,  Kel  Ghala,  Kel  Ouuzzeyn,  and  Kel  Taghlit 

are  distinct  ethnic  identities  identified  in  the  Tilemsi 

Valley. 51 Some ethnographers do not differentiate 

between the Adagh Tuaregs and the Ahaggar Tuaregs 

who live to the north in the Hoggar Mountain range 

of the Tamanrasset region in Southern Algeria. The 

term Adagh Tuareg is often used interchangeably with 

Azawagh Tuareg, a separate group locally known as 

the Iwllemmedan Tuareg, a group further divided into 

the Iwllemmeden Kel Dennek and the Iwllemmeden 

Kel  Ataram. 52 The use of the term Tuareg creates 

20

significant  confusion,  as  the  Tuareg  themselves  do not identify themselves as Tuareg, but by their tribe 

or clan name. The word Tuareg is actually a deroga-

tory term of Arabic origin, Tareq, allegedly meaning 

“those who have abandoned God.” The inherent chal-

lenge in categories like Tuareg leads most anthropolo-

gists to use tribe or clan names, such as Kel Adagh, or 

a much broader term encompassing all tribes such as 

Kel Tamasheq (“those who speak Tamasheq”53). This 

monograph focuses on the groups living in the Adrar 

des Ifoghas and will simply use the popular term 

Tuareg for the broader Kel Tamasheq people. 

Tuareg  class  structure  is  defined  by  social  roles. 

Nobles, the Ihaggaren, serve as protectors in exchange 

for payments by the Imghad, or the vassals. The rela-

tionship between the Ihaggaren and Imghad is more 

complex, however, because of the various roles each 

plays and the different types of payments or tribute. 

For example, Imghad can serve as warriors, and hence 

have noble status, but cannot exact tribute. The Iklan, 

or Bellah, constitute an indentured servant, or slave, 

class. 54 In addition, there are other ethnic groups in the region such as Arabs, like the Maurs and Berbeshe; 

but also black or African groups, such as the Songhai, 

Fulbe, Sonike, Dogon, Bamana, and Hausa. 

The Tuareg social system is significant because of 

its closed nature, often referred to as a caste system. 

A true caste system, however, requires socially ranked 

groups associated with particular occupations where 

membership is determined at birth, and marriage is 

restricted to members of the like caste.55 While often 

discussed in these terms, the reality of Tuareg social 

interactions  and  organizations  are  much  more  fluid, 

varied, and subject to interpretation. Some groups are 

matrilineal, while others are patrilineal; some groups 

21

have remained exclusive of others, while some have 

changed significantly over time. 56 These relationships are difficult to study, understand, and categorize since 

they are dynamic: individual and group identities are 

constantly changing within a framework of family 

identities, social segments, and alliances. 57

Linguistic studies indicate the Tuareg have been 

in North Africa for thousands of years. Tamasheq, 

the language of the Tuareg, is a family of very closely 

related languages and dialects, understood in large 

parts of Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Libya. These dia-

lects belong to the South Berber language group, and 

they are commonly regarded as a single language dis-

tinguished mainly by a few sound shifts. The Tuareg 

varieties are unusually conservative in some respects; 

they retain two short vowels where Northern-Berber 

languages have one or none and have a much lower 

proportion of Arabic loanwords than most Berber lan-

guages. 58 The word  *afri*, the Latin term for the Carthag-inian Berber speaking people who inhabited parts of 

modern-day Tunisia and Libya, is the root for the word 

Africa. While Tamasheq can be written with either 

Latin or Arabic script, it has its own alphabet resem-

bling ancient Syro-Phoenician script—the precursor 

of  the  first  modern  alphabet  system,  classical  Greek. 

Ethnographers largely agree that today’s Tuareg are 

descendants from Berber tribes who arrived in North 

Africa several thousand years Before the Common Era 

(B.C.E.). 

Therefore, categorical propositions about Tuareg 

society should be treated with suspicion. The flexibil-

ity of local narratives and social modes testify to the 

adaptability of the Tuareg, an adaptability that has 

often been interpreted as heresy or untrustworthiness:

22

The Tuareg, like their neighbors on all sides, are Moslem. 

They are noted, however, as infamous and unregenerate 

back-sliders who observe neither proper law nor custom, 

who misperform the ritual postures in prayer, fail to 

make ablutions, eat and drink during the fasting days 

of Ramadan, and who have few of the wise and holy in 

their ranks. Despite the best Tuareg efforts to simulate 

orthodoxy in the presence of their censorious neighbors, 

these charges are substantially true.59

The obstinate persistence and endurance of these desert 

nomads account for their value of independence and 

was a critical factor in their ability to conduct long-dis-

tance trade across the Sahara. Their pastoral life pat-

terns, overland routes, and trade networks, were built 

upon the desert well systems and watering holes, 

crisscrossing the length and breadth of the Sahara, and 

likely have remained largely unchanged for hundreds, 

possibly thousands of years. Historians have estab-

lished that this trade network included the North-

South route from the city of Gao, along the Niger River 

through the Tilemsi Valley, and then north across the 

desert into present day Algeria. This locates Ageulhok 

along well-established and historical trade routes for 

lucrative products like gold, salt, and slaves.60 Therefore, commerce has been the primary occupation for 

hundreds, even thousands, of years, and it gave rise to 

the banditry that reinforced the protector-vassal class 

distinctions.  The  rugged  and  difficult  terrain  offers 

countless locations for bandits, smugglers, and crimi-

nals to hide, while the geology provides limited water 

supplies. A former British soldier, traveling across the 

Sahara by foot in 1986, found that the Tuaregs of the 

lower Tilemsi Valley were suspicious of him. 61

The  Kel  Adagh  have  been  the  cornerstone  of 

the Tuareg rebellions in Mali since independence, 62

23

including: 1962–1964, 1990–1995, 2007–2009, and most 

recently  in  2012  with  the  Kel  Adagh  rebel  group, 

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 

(MNLA), operating simultaneously with Islamic mil-

itant groups, such as AQIM and Ansar Dine. After 

seizing Timbuktu and other cities in April 2012, the 

MNLA declared Azawad’s independence from Mali. 

However, after the French military intervention in 

February 2013, the MNLA renounced their claim of 

independence for Azawad. The perception by Malians 

that  the  Kel  Adagh  are  criminals  and  troublemakers 

persists: “It is evident that in the Adagh, the Ifoghas 

are the only tribal group still capable of creating ten-

sions between tribes.” 63

AQIM exists in an alien society: there were few, if 

any, Tuaregs in AQIM, Ambassador Fowler noting, 

“none of our captors appeared to be Tuareg.” 64 Also noteworthy were the racial divides within Belmokhtar’s 

fighters:  despite  Islam’s  unifying  message,  racism 

seemed to be a substantial problem in an organiza-

tion led mostly by white North Africans. Ambassador 

Fowler noted, “There was a big gulf between those 

who were black and those who were not,” which con-

stituted a distinct, if informal, hierarchy since “officers 

were almost all Algerian,” while “enlisted men were  

from sub-Saharan countries or very young Algeri-

ans.” 65 AQIM is racially mixed but ethnically divided, where “racism is a problem,” with very few local or 

indigenous members with the sanctuary-seekers.66

Belmokhtar and his group could not easily blend in  

with local nomadic tribesmen and may have had prob-

lems even communicating with them. Furthermore, 

their extremist activities and ideology are not com-

patible with traditional Tuareg practices. For exam-

ple, many groups are matrilineal—not congruent with 

24

Salafist preaching calling for an absolute return to the literal teachings of Mohammed. Tuareg rebels, such as 

the Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ), do not iden-

tify with the religious precepts of Islamic fundamental-

ists. 67 Two French journalists held captive by the MNJ 

in December 2007 asked about the MNJ’s identification 

with jihad and Islam. The MNJ rebels responded, “We 

have nothing to do with these extremists. Everyone 

practices their religions at their own convenience. My 

journeys have nothing to do with religion.” 68

**SANCTUARY SEEKERS IN THE SAHARA**

Mokhtar Belmokhtar is from a group of Algerian 

terrorists known as the Afghani who fought against 

the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Alge-

ria. From the perspective of Belmokhtar and the other 

Algerian Afghani, the tide was receding on secular 

and Western governments, and they founded a vio-

lent extremist organization named the Islamic Armed 

Group (GIA) after the 1992 secular military coup in 

Algeria. 69 This coup voided the democratically elected Islamist government of the Islamic Salvation Front, the 

largest Islamic opposition party in Algeria, after the 

first  round  of  legislative  elections  held  in  December 

1991. 

The GIA grew into a notoriously violent organi-

zation renowned for torturing and indiscriminately 

killing Muslim civilians. The GIA, like its famous 

predecessor from the Algerian war of independence 

against France, the National Liberation Front (FLN), 

operated in areas largely outside of government con-

trol, such as the difficult and mountainous terrain of 

the Algerian Atlas.70 These mountain sanctuary areas 

had  provided  protection  for  FLN  insurgents  fleeing 

25

from French forces, as well as places to train and equip fighters,  plan,  organize,  and  prepare  operations.  In 

addition to these operational functions, the FLN sanc-

tuary areas were an important political demonstration 

of Algerian solidarity against France and the establish-

ment of a legitimate Algerian government. They pro-

vided social services to Algerians, including Islamic 

marriages, legal processes such as settling of disputes 

and claims, and even charitable distribution. 

Many in the GIA, including Belmokhtar, worked 

with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and must have 

been aware of bin Laden’s activities to establish the 

al-Qaeda brand and organization in Sudan. This close 

relationship between bin Laden, the al-Qaeda franchise, 

and the GIA is made strikingly evident when the GIA 

hijacked Air France Flight 8969, from Algiers to Paris, 

in December 1994. 71 Algerian security services placed enormous pressure on the GIA, and the Algerian military became very adept at using helicopters to move 

troops rapidly to remote locations and raid sanctuary 

areas. The effectiveness of these operations, and fear 

of helicopters, is lasting and real. A Senegalese terror-

ist who kidnapped Ambassador Fowler remarked, “If 

the government helicopters find us before dark, we are 

all dead.” 72 The Algerian military’s successful tactics of pursuit and penetration, supported by intelligence 

activities and robust policing, pushed the GIA from 

loss to desperation, and then increased violence. This 

spiraling violence alienated the population, however, 

and isolated the GIA from local and foreign support. 

The success of the Algerian government and demise of 

the GIA gave birth to the Salafist Group for Preaching 

and Combat (GSPC); a new organization inspired more 

by contemporary transnational terrorism formulated 

26

by Osama bin Laden than the historical FLN freedom 

fighting.73

The GSPC formed in 1998 as a breakaway move-

ment of the GIA that had been neutralized by an 

amnesty and disarmament deal with the Algerian 

government. Throughout this period, however, 

Belmokhtar and other GIA fighters had been pushed 

south out of the Atlas Mountains by Algerian military 

pressure. Belmokhtar was likely well established in 

Northern Mali by the time GSPC was created, and his 

turn southward should have been expected. “One of 

the best known warlords of the Sahara,” Belmokhtar 

was raised in the United Nations Educational, Sci-

entific  and  Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO)  world 

heritage site of Ghardaia, a walled city which lies in 

the M’Zab Valley in Eastern Algeria, which provides 

clues to Belmokhtar’s logic. Ghardaia was founded by 

an Islamic sect of Berbers, known as the Ibadis, whose 

purist doctrine dominated part of the Maghreb during 

the 10th century. After their capital, Tahert, was 

destroyed by fire in 909 C.E., they settled first at Sedrata 

and finally in the M’Zab Valley. UNESCO notes that, 

under military pressure, the Ibadis built these fortified 

cities in the M’Zab because of the “defensive possibil-

ities that it offered a community that was concerned 

with its own protection and fiercely dedicated to the 

preservation of its identity, even at the expense of iso-

lation.”74 Ghardaia, in short, offered the Ibadis protec-

tion  because  of  its  isolation  and  fortification,  similar 

to the kind of sanctuary Belmokhtar sought from the 

Algerian security and military services in the 1990s. 

Throughout this period, Belmokhtar increasingly 

participated in criminal enterprises, including smug-

gling cigarettes, food, and fuel. In time, these activities 

expanded into schemes that were more lucrative, such 

27

as smuggling narcotics and kidnapping for ransom. 

The  first  significant  such  kidnapping  action  in  the 

Sahara was by a GIA member named El Para who kid-

napped 32 European tourists in Algeria in 2003 and 

eventually was chased and captured in Chad. He was 

extradited to Algeria where he remains in custody. El 

Para’s kidnap-for-ransom scheme established a model 

for Saharan terrorists to emulate later. 

GSPC changed their name to AQIM in early 2007 

and formalized their relationship and allegiance to 

Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda franchise. There 

have been many arguments regarding the significance 

of this name change. Some have reasoned that it was 

merely a tactic by GSPC to garner additional attention, 

notoriety, and support from al-Qaeda. 75 Others have made the case that GSPC and AQIM were actually 

tools of the Algerian security services to promote their 

security-focused agenda, clamp down on local opposi-

tion to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and gain addi-

tional U.S. support. 76 Still others have offered evidence that AQIM is not a terrorist organization, but opportunistic profiteering in the name of Islam. 77

Algerian journalist Mohamed Mokeddem has 

provided substantial evidence that AQIM is funda-

mentally  a  transnational  trafficking  network.78 This argument is very convincing, especially with the 

well-documented nexus between cocaine smuggling 

and AQIM. This thesis presumes, however, that AQIM 

is driven by profit motive and not ideology. The actions 

of Abu Zaid, and many AQIM fighters, who died fight-

ing in the opening stages of the French intervention, as 

well as the goals of AQIM and beliefs of its members, 

indicate they are true believers. Ambassador Fowler 

emphasizes the total commitment of Belmokhtar’s 

group to jihad and not personal gain.79 The fact that 28

cocaine smuggling generated vast sums of money, and 

that AQIM members admitted kidnapping was “all 

about ransom (about, that is, raising money for the 

cause) for jihad,” 80 indicate that these for-profit activities had specific, calculated purposes based upon mate-

rial requirements while grossly simplifying the term 

“banditry.”81 Mohamed Mokeddem’s argument begs 

the question, “Why does Belmokhtar’s group require 

so much cash (and, therefore, engage in so many mon-

ey-making schemes)?” The answer is most likely the 

most obvious and perhaps most mundane: Security 

concerns drove Belmokhtar into the deep desert, but 

criminal enterprise provided the means to pay for it, 

as well as future attacks. Belmokhtar had to engage in 

criminal enterprise to fund both AQIM terrorist opera-

tions, as well as pay the rent for sanctuary. 

**Sanctuary as Protection**

The FLN used mountain hideaways in the Atlas 

for a variety of purposes, including: operational and 

strategic planning, training, and hiding weapons and 

supplies. These locations were effectively outside the 

span of control of government forces, and French mil-

itary forces won the battle of Algiers due to superior 

firepower  and  technology—including  radio  commu-

nications, artillery, helicopters, and close air support 

aircraft—to dominate parts of Algeria, particularly 

metropolitan centers. Aggressive patrolling and intel-

ligence gathering—to include the famous use of tor-

ture—provided critical insight into FLN operations. 82

These early defeats forced the FLN to adapt their tac-

tics to seek sanctuary further from urban areas, but 

more importantly, to change their strategy to bring the 

war to domestic France and to seek wider international 

29

attention and condemnation of French human rights 

violations.83 The FLN’s strategic shift, and not better 

tactics or operational reach, ended the French Fourth 

Republic, and eventually gained independence for 

Algeria. 

Belmokhtar moved to the Sahara for similar rea-

sons his ancestors in the 11th century moved to M’Zab 

Valley, fleeing superior military force. Today, Algerian 

military forces use modern technology and combined 

arms maneuvers with air power to fight terrorists and 

insurgents like AQIM. 84 After traveling to make cell phone calls, Belmokhtar informed Ambassador Fowler 

that, “To make such calls from their satellite-phones 

would be to invite an Algerian air strike.” 85 In fact, Algeria used helicopters in response to the attack on 

the Algerian In Amenas oil facility in 2013. The attack-

ers clearly feared the aircraft, as they demanded the 

Algerians ground them.86 AQIM is well informed 

about the technical capabilities of Algerian military 

forces, such as electronic surveillance and air power. 87

The importance of air power in modern desert warfare 

is not new, however; Field Marshal Erwin Rommel 

remarked about “the paralyzing effect which air activ-

ity on such a scale had on motorized forces.” 88

The key reason why Belmokhtar moved his oper-

ation into Northern Mali was the inability of GIA, 

and later the GSPC and AQIM, to maintain secrecy 

or adequate operational security, from Algerian intel-

ligence services. Poor operational security rendered 

these groups defenseless when surprised and over-

whelmed by the capabilities of Algerian military and 

security forces, most notably air power. Aguelhok is 

outside the range of attack helicopters like the Russian 

Mi-35 “Hind D” which could operate from Southern 

Algeria. To reach Belmokhtar, Algeria would have to 

30

put troops into Mali, something they did in late 2011. 89

The nearest paved runway to Belmokhtar’s sanctuary 

is at Gao, which is outside the range of rotary-wing 

close air support. While much faster and higher-flying 

attack aircraft could strike locations around Aguelhok, 

these aircraft would need detailed target information 

normally provided by ground reconnaissance units or 

surveillance drones. Such information would be very 

difficult  for  the  Algerians  or  the  Malians  to  obtain 

with current reconnaissance resources, and it remains 

highly unlikely such surveillance could remain unde-

tected for long. Aguelhok provided a cloak from curi-

ous governments for Belmokhtar’s operations, refuge 

from hot pursuit, and safety from government security 

forces. 

**Sanctuary for Training and Planning**

Mobility requires competent drivers who are used 

to driving in these conditions. The ability to traverse 

the varied and difficult terrain in the region, as well as 

navigate using stars and landmarks, means good driv-

ers  are  essential—and  difficult  to  train  and  replace. 

Remote desert cache locations are useless if you cannot 

find them, and quick egresses are fatal if you get hope-

lessly lost in the desert and run out of fuel and water. 

Additionally,  AQIM  fighters  proved  to  be  deficient 

when using modern navigation technology.90 Compe-

tent and skilled drivers, who also maintain the vehicles 

and direct maintenance efforts, are critical ingredients 

to this logistics system. 

Belmokhtar’s group used a variety of communi-

cation security protocols, including moving locations 

and avoiding telecommunications altogether if possi-

ble. Vehicles would move a day’s distance to perform 

31

tasks such as communication. 91 It can be inferred that communicators either would move to use their satellite phones from a different location or connect to a 

local cell phone tower. It also seems likely AQIM used 

runners or messengers for communications, requiring 

large amounts of time and effort to facilitate commu-

nication. Other tactical communications are simple, 

however,  such  as  using  the  flashing  of  headlights  to 

meet at predetermined places or even small radios to 

guide into a secured area.92

Belmokhtar’s  core  group  of  fighters—referred  to 

as  *les frères*—accounted for approximately 60 fighters. 

This  many  fighters  required  at  least  12  vehicles,  12 

heavy weapons, and around 100 assorted small arms 

as well as all the fuel, water, and ammunition to sup-

port them. The number of facilitators, individuals who 

assist with logistic functions, as well as trained and 

loyal individuals in the immediate vicinity or even fur-

ther afield who could be called upon for larger opera-

tions, is unknown. These trained and loyal individuals 

could be equipped quickly with additional weapons 

and equipment hidden in the desert and mobilized for 

combat. Some studies indicate there are twice as many 

key  facilitators  as  core  fighters  and  three  times  the 

number of core fighters in an “operational reserve.” 93

Thus,  200  fighters  and  another  100  facilitators  com-

prised the entire Belmokhtar fighting organization at 

the time of Ambassador Fowler’s capture. 94 Fighters require training. Images available of posing AQIM 

fighters  portray  disciplined  jihadists  who  are  profi-

cient in tactical planning and basic fire and movement 

techniques. Ambassador Fowler noted that experi-

enced fighters would often perform opportunity train-

ing with the youngsters, which consisted primarily of 

basic  fire  and  movement  drills  or  small  unit  tactics, 

32

emphasizing  physical  fitness  and  utilizing  the  rocky 

desert terrain for tactical advantage.95 Belmokhtar and 

his  fighters  are  proficient  in  basic  defensive  security 

measures, such as the use of terrain for masking move-

ment or providing observation and 360-degree secu-

rity. 96 While there is no first-hand information available about other types of combat training, such as marks-manship  and  weapons  proficiency  training,  it  is  evi-

dent that both formal and informal weapons training 

is conducted—particularly because of the importance 

of accurately employing direct fire over long distances 

in the desert. Drivers are trained through a mentorship 

process, as well as on-the-job training. 97 Training and experimentation with explosives must be performed in 

order to construct the various devices that are used, 

ranging from truck bombs to suicide vests. 

Analysis of videos and historical information 

about events, such as the combined MNLA and AQIM 

assault on the Malian military garrison at Aguelhok, 

demonstrate that these groups understand tactical 

planning and the importance of rehearsals. This com-

posite  group  of  fighters  never  trained  or  operated 

together previously and successfully besieged the gar-

rison on January 18, 2012, 2 days later evading Malian 

air strikes, while establishing a blocking position that 

successfully defeated an armed relief column.98 Video 

from the dawn assault on the garrison on January 25 

shows an attacking force that was disciplined, well-

armed, well-coordinated, informed by intelligence or 

personal knowledge of the terrain, and may have con-

ducted rehearsals.99 The assault force moved quickly into assault positions and breach points based upon 

the garrison’s defensive weaknesses, while being 

covered by direct fire. This battle demonstrates, even 

though it was not exclusively Belmokhtar’s forces, that 

33

the violent groups operating in this region understand tactics  and  the  use  of  terrain  and  fires,  operational 

planning,  and  logistics.  Such  proficiency  has  been 

demonstrated numerous times, as in the kidnapping 

of Ambassador Fowler or the attack on the In Amenas 

oil facility in Southern Algeria. 

The dispersion of supplies over a wide area, lack 

of efficient communications, and reliance on a limited 

number of skilled drivers and vehicles requires plan-

ning and time in order to execute large operations. 

Belmokhtar’s logistical system offered a large amount 

of  short-term  tactical  flexibility  and  speed,  but  sacri-

ficed operational scale and reach. Belmokhtar’s oper-

ations remained limited in range and finite in scope, 

while requiring thorough planning and coordination. 

Belmokhtar probably only had enough manpower, 

equipment, and experience available to manage one 

major operation, while planning two to three others. 

Furthermore, his group could be overextended easily in 

resources and control when engaged in current opera-

tions. Fleeing hot pursuit would have likely consumed 

his readily available supplies and greatly constrained 

his freedom of action. It would take additional time and 

resources to resupply and refit. In sum, Belmokhtar’s 

operational reach was limited and largely constrained 

by his logistical system of dispersed cache sites and 

resources, such as fuel and water. 

Sanctuary provides protection from hot pur-

suit, but is not a fortress. Mobile sanctuary is a series 

of places covering a wide space, which allowed 

Belmokhtar to evade detection and capture through 

speed and unpredictability. The cost to pay for sanc-

tuary  comes  in  many  forms,  whether  financial  costs 

for supplies and equipment or social costs for access 

and influence to local decision makers. Payments may 

34

be distinct—sometimes cash, sometimes goods or ser-

vices, and sometimes social obligations like marriage. 

Social costs are important, but probably can be offset 

with other forms of payment—requiring cash. The lack 

of significant external sponsorship means these groups 

must finance their operations creatively by harnessing 

profitable criminal activities. Omar Ould Hamaha, the 

jihadist who captured and held Ambassador Fowler 

for Belmokhtar, publicly announced that AQIM did not 

receive external support or funding, claiming AQIM 

“has no need of Qatar and has not been financed by 

Qatar. God provides our funding.” 100 Yet the historical 

record is clear that it was crime, and not God, which 

provided funds to pay for operational and sanctuary 

rent costs, the nexus between crime and terrorism.101

**The Logistics of Saharan Sanctuary**

U.S. Army General Omar Bradley once remarked 

“Amateurs study tactics; professionals study logis-

tics.”102 The importance of logistics is not limited to military operations, however. The British expedition 

that summited Mount Everest, for example, was man-

aged and led by John Hunt, an experienced English 

military officer, who brought meticulous planning and 

robust logistical support, as well as new technology, 

(like closed-circuit oxygen) to an expedition lasting 

several months, numbering more than 400 personnel, 

and requiring more than 7 tons of equipment and sup-

plies.103 Deliberate planning and logistics rather than the physical abilities of the climbers themselves were 

decisive in reaching the summit after decades of failed 

attempts and lost climbers. 

The  first  motorized  expedition  to  cross  the  Saha-

ran desert demonstrated the utility of technological 

35

innovations to operate in the harsh and remote North-

ern Mali. On December 17, 1922, French mechani-

cal engineer and automotive pioneer André Citroën 

launched an expedition of half-tracks he designed 

to  traverse  the  difficult  terrain  from  Algeria  to  Tim-

buktu. This first motorized crossing of the Sahara took 

21 days and relied upon extensive maps and aerial 

reconnaissance provided by the French military. These 

half-tracked vehicles were the basis of the U.S. Army 

M2 and M3 half-tracks of World War II, and each car-

ried a heavy machine gun while team members were 

equipped with pistols and rifles for self-defense since 

the region had been dangerous for a long time. The 

team  was  self-sufficient  and  carried  almost  all  their 

supplies, including: food, water, and fuel, while mil-

itary  aircraft  occasionally  flew  overhead  to  provide 

observation and emergency communication. The 

team arrived in Timbuktu on January 7, 1923, to much 

fanfare. 104 Technical feats of mechanical engineering were repeated later in daring automobile endurance 

races such as the Paris-Dakar rally raid, which began 

trans-Saharan races in 1978 but stopped in Africa due 

to threats from AQIM in 2008. 

Instead  of  tracked  or  heavily  modified  race  vehi-

cles, groups in the Sahara today use the Toyota Land 

Cruiser or smaller Hilux models.105 These vehicles 

were used extensively in the “Toyota War,” the Lib-

yan-Chadian  conflict  from  1978  until  1987,  and  they 

continue to be used today by virtually everyone, such 

as tourists, nongovernmental organizations, embas-

sies,  and  traffickers.106 Toyotas are not unique to 

Africa, and American soldiers have encountered them 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. These trucks are exception-

ally reliable and have a well-established reputation 

36

for simplicity, robustness, functionality, and relatively cheap maintenance. 

AQIM has proven highly proficient in using these 

trucks in the desert, and insights about vehicular 

operations in this region can be gained by examining 

expeditions and rally races. Whether Citroën’s 1920s 

half-tracks or 1990s Paris-Dakar racers, carrying suf-

ficient supplies to traverse the myriad of Saharan sur-

faces, enough equipment to self-recover, and supplies 

to survive has proven critical. The logistical require-

ments for these expeditions and races across the Sahara 

are consistent with military experiences: German Army 

commanders in North Africa during World War II, for 

example, required troops to carry all supplies during 

combat operations, while fuel and ammunition was 

stored at widely scattered points—buried and camou-

flaged.107 These experiences reflect the techniques and procedures of smugglers, criminals, and groups like 

AQIM that must self-sustain to survive. 

The need to perform vehicle maintenance for 

self-sustainment poses its own challenges. Dust makes 

vehicle  maintenance  constant  but  difficult;  thorns 

puncture tires, and sharp stones shred them. Ambas-

sador Fowler noted changing tires was a routine 

affair, and AQIM fixed flat tires and repaired bent tire 

rims all night on one occasion.108 The average life of a light truck tire is approximately 30,000 miles, but the 

life expectancy of the same tires under the off-road 

driving conditions in this region is around 12,000 

miles. As such, AQIM maximizes tire life by driving 

on tires until they are destroyed completely. Toyota 

Land Cruisers can operate without a major overhaul 

for several 100,000 miles if maintained properly, but 

given the difficult conditions and hard driving, such 

trucks will not last more than 5 years, and groups who 

37

rely upon these vehicles for quick getaways need to 

replace their vehicles every year or so, probably selling 

older vehicles and purchasing new ones. 109 This practice minimizes larger vehicle maintenance tasks such 

as engine overhauls, gearbox and differential rebuilds, 

and changing hubs. These tasks would require mainte-

nance equipment that would be difficult, if not impos-

sible, for AQIM to move across the Sahara. 

Belmokhtar’s competent drivers were capable of 

performing basic maintenance tasks, such as changing 

fluids, filters, tires, and even suspension springs. They 

could not do shop maintenance in the field, like that of 

army units or race teams, however, because they did 

not have the skills, experience, or tools. These groups 

constantly had to replace used or destroyed vehicles 

and incurred substantial cost. Determining logistical 

requirements based upon vehicle capabilities and lim-

itations in this environment can illuminate that these 

operational costs are significant due to the wear-and-

tear of equipment. Belmokhtar operated vehicles day 

and night, sometimes at speeds over 130 kilometers per 

hour, for extended periods of time. He also traversed 

very  difficult  terrain,  including  difficult  rock  forma-

tions,  and  even  across  plowed  fields  if  necessary.110

Such operational costs, however, are not inclusive of 

the rents needed for sanctuary, but do detract from 

available funds. In other words, increasing operational 

costs  for  sanctuary-seekers  causes  further  difficulties 

in paying the rent. 

The U.S. Army employs a “push-pull” system of 

field logistics. Services and support are pushed to for-

ward locations from secure rear areas where equip-

ment and parts are consolidated. This is known as a 

hub and spoke system, where material is consolidated 

at a hub and then moved along lines of communication 

38

or spokes. Currently, tactical prepositioning is not 

used in the U.S. Army since units typically move for-

ward across potentially hostile terrain and generally 

seek to maintain a degree of freedom of maneuver, 

operational flexibility, and security. This occasionally 

requires air operations or other methods to “leap-

frog” requirements, such as fuel, to maintain forward 

momentum or conduct resupply operations through 

field  link-ups.  Commercial  desert  races,  such  as  the 

Paris-Dakar, on the other hand, use a series of base 

camps with extensive mobile maintenance services 

prepositioned at various stages of the race, while the 

race vehicles themselves often are trailed by support 

vehicles and staff. The locations are all predetermined 

and distances known so this method is practical for 

minimizing the cost and complexity of maintenance, 

rest, and refueling, while providing quick services and 

additional safety for stranded vehicles. 

Smugglers, such as Belmokhtar, cannot use a hub 

and spoke system of logistics because it would require 

having supporting infrastructure in place. This means 

they would need to stockpile and warehouse parts, 

keep mechanics and other technicians at hand, as well 

as move the quantities of fuel and other equipment 

rather  quickly  and  efficiently—also  requiring  excel-

lent communications. They cannot use the Paris-Dakar 

model of logistics because that would require signifi-

cant service and support capabilities, as well as restrict 

their operational freedom to predetermined sites. Both 

logistical models depend on secure and static areas 

where logistic functions can be performed. Instead 

of these relatively sophisticated logistics systems, 

Belmokhtar uses a simple system of caching or hiding 

needed material at many different predesignated loca-

tions spread across a wide area. The advantage of this 

39

system is that it allows Belmokhtar a great range of 

operational freedom and agility—enabling his unpre-

dictability and probably greatly contributing to his 

survivability. 

Belmokhtar’s vehicles carried two drums—one 

with fuel and the other with water—swapping as 

needed with filled drums hidden buried in the sand.111

All equipment was tied down in the vehicle, and 

AK-47s were carried by everyone, including children, 

at  all  times.  Other  small  arms,  such  as  PK  belt-fed 

machine guns, RPG-7s, and pistols were also readily 

available and carried on the vehicles. Every fighter had 

an ammo vest with 8 to 10 spare magazines kept close 

at hand, and any items not carried such as additional 

uniforms, weapons, and ammunition were buried 

in the sand at cache points. 112 Disadvantages of this system include: the expense of maintaining dispersed 

way stations throughout the region, the requirement 

for local acquiescence for those sites (security), and the 

inefficiency of dispersing equipment in many different 

locations  and  difficulty  to  access  (and  perhaps  find) 

the right equipment in a timely manner. 

The security for these caches was not free and 

required substantial enterprise by Belmokhtar. He 

married into local power hierarchies and furnished 

services that the government did not provide. Ambas-

sador Fowler noted at one friendly stop with locals:

These meet-and-greet interludes were obviously exercises 

in community relations, something our captors knew 

was important and unfailing good at. I suspect that the 

nomads  saw  far  more  of  and  received  more  support―

however  rudimentary―from  Al-Qaeda  warriors  than 

they ever got from government representatives.113

40

In this way, Belmokhtar sought to replace functions 

the state normally provides. These good-will ges-

tures and support required a significant investment of 

resources—time and money—by Belmokhtar. Fowler 

noted that Belmokhtar was:

very careful about maintaining good relations with the 

local population, sharing what little food and medicines 

they had and generally treating the nomads with openness 

and respect, a policy that clearly paid dividends.114

Belmokhtar’s group had to be self-reliant to recover 

from illness or injury—one fighter had to go to a city 

for several weeks to receive treatment from medicine 

women or traditional healers who hung him upside-

down and beat his feet with sticks.115 Basic supplies, 

such as medicine, were unavailable to Ambassador 

Fowler during his captivity, and the medical supplies 

he did have access to, such as vitamins, were specif-

ically provided by external agents, such as the Presi-

dent of Burkina Faso or the Canadian government. 

The diet of these groups is also austere. Ambas-

sador Fowler estimated that his daily intake was less 

than 1,000 calories and was largely based on dry foods, 

such as rice or pasta. One fighter informed Ambassa-

dor Fowler: “We eat out of necessity, not pleasure.”116

Access to water remains essential: “When the theatre 

of war is a desert with only a few scattered wells, water 

becomes a matter of supply. . . . A failure of the water 

supply means disaster, if not annihilation.” 117 While other supplies like food, ammunition, and even fuel 

can be variable, water is absolutely critical and requires 

constant resupply. 

An analogy for desert operations comes from the 

age of sailing, where relatively small ships crossed 

vast oceans carrying all essential supplies required to 

41

get to the destination, and oftentimes with little or no information about the outside world. The word  *Sahel*

is derived from the Arabic term for shore, as the desert 

nomads who crossed the Sahara referred to the green 

lands south of Gao and Timbuktu on the Niger River 

as the “shore” of the desert vis-à-vis the shores of the 

Mediterranean from an ocean of sand. The importance 

of logistics in the Sahara cannot be overstated.118

**The Financing of Saharan Sanctuary**

Sanctuary rent pays for popular support. 

Belmokhtar contributed by being a friend to local 

groups and by providing rent to the communities in 

his sanctuary, including: cash payments, fuel, food, 

even delivery of supplies for things like mosquito net-

ting. Due to the rather large area Belmokhtar traversed 

for operations and money-generating enterprises, it 

is likely this cost was financially very high, as well as 

in manpower and time consumed. This goodwill is 

absolutely critical, but probably not sought from every 

social group in this vast region. Instead, Belmokhtar 

selects  specific,  probably  small,  groups  who  would 

be most sympathetic to his cause—only support from 

certain groups is required. Therefore, mobile sanctu-

ary would appear as an archipelago of many distinct 

islands of sanctuary in the Sahara. 

Many of the traditional societies in the region dif-

ferentiate between illegal and illicit activities. Illegal 

smuggling,  for  example,  is  the  trafficking  of  items 

across borders without regulation or duty. Illegal 

smuggling ranges from pasta to cigarettes. Illicit 

smuggling includes trafficking in items that are widely 

accepted as amoral or haram, such as narcotics or hos-

tages. While essential items restricted from import 

42

and export, such as pasta, may arouse little interest, illegal narcotics are socially destructive and serve no 

beneficial purpose. They are actually banned in Islam. 

Therefore, trafficking in such illicit items is generally 

not accepted and (but was tolerated only under excep-

tional circumstances) even referred to in the region 

as   *al frud* or  *al-haram*. 119 While the transit networks across the Sahara, largely following ancient well systems unchanged for hundreds of years, are similar 

among illegal and illicit smuggling groups, the people 

involved and modes of trafficking are distinct. 

Hostages and narcotics movement techniques also 

differ from illegal but licit trafficking. Belmokhtar used 

a small number of heavily armed, light, and very fast 

vehicles to traverse long distances, sometimes at night 

with the headlights blacked out, conducting resupply 

operations at remote cache sites. Terrorists avoided 

contact  with  other  people  and  traffic.  By  contrast, 

smuggling and other commerce is conducted with 

heavy trucks, at much slower speeds, and usually only 

in the day. Drivers have social connections to families 

and other drivers along the route and stop often to visit 

friends and family.120 The merchants who smuggle to make a buck for their families are entirely different in 

social status, equipment, material to be smuggled, and 

techniques than the terrorists who are smuggling to 

fund their operations. 121

Money also needs to be moved. AQIM claims it is 

“all done with a few computer keystrokes—a simple 

bank transfer . . . finished in 30 seconds.”122 Such bra-

vado oversimplifies international banking and the lim-

itations on transactions—and access to such funds in 

the Saharan desert. Such money must be laundered 

and moved to the sanctuary, probably through various 

means including the hawala informal banking system 

43

and commodity exchanges such as new vehicles and 

weapons. However, the specific payment mechanisms 

for sanctuary, as well as methods for financing terror-

ist operations, require more study. 123

**DENIAL OF SANCTUARY: ENDS, WAYS, AND**

**MEANS**

Vagueness in operational terminology and under-

standing has hindered progress to deny sanctuary. To 

deny sanctuary suggests denial operations to dislocate, 

isolate, disrupt, or destroy sanctuary-seekers. Sanctu-

ary-seekers are assumed to be enemy forces, like ter-

rorists, but distinctions between sanctuary-seekers, 

sanctuary-owners, rent-seekers, enemy forces, and 

others in the sanctuary area remain unclear. Con-

temporary counterinsurgency doctrine seeks to deny 

sanctuary to insurgents and terrorists by establishing 

security, restoring essential services, supporting dem-

ocratic governance, and supporting economic and 

infrastructure development. Terrorist sanctuary could 

be denied by destroying terrorist forces or seizing key 

terrain to prevent terrorists from using these zones 

that would likely disrupt terrorist operations or dis-

locate them. This does not destroy the organization or 

the local support to the organization, however, as the 

French intervention in Mali has demonstrated. 

AQIM understands the importance of plans and 

alliances. “Alliances are essential,” wrote AQIM emir 

Abdelmalek Droukdel when he counseled Belmokhtar 

that his strategy should allow local groups to share 

the burden of management for the jihad as well as any 

blame for its failures. 124 “The aim of building these 

bridges,” Droukdel wrote, “is to make it so that our 

Mujahedeen are no longer isolated in society, and to 

44

integrate with the different factions, including the big tribes and main rebel movements and tribal chiefs.”125

The U.S. Army often uses the shorthand of ends-

ways-means for strategic discourse, 126 and Droukdel’s 

admonishment indicates a profound understanding of 

ends-ways-means: 

Experience has shown that the application of Shariah 

without calculating the consequences drives away local 

population and sparks hatred against the Mujahedeen 

and leads to the failure of any exercise. 127

Droukdel acknowledged that Belmokhtar lived on 

the fringes of Saharan society and urged him to make 

alliances and pay the rents necessary to maintain 

positive relationships with the local population, the 

sanctuary-owners. 

**Denial of Sanctuary: Ends in Controlling Saharan**

**Sanctuary**

Sun Tzu noted, “the highest realization of warfare 

is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their 

alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is 

to attack their fortified cities.” 128 Images of B-52 strikes in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan or U.S. 

soldiers fighting in the streets of Fallujah, Iraq, illus-

trate the difficulty in implementing Sun Tzu’s counsel. 

While the  *Art of War* is required reading for many stu-

dents of strategy, U.S. efforts to deny sanctuary have 

concentrated on attacking and destroying individuals 

or strongholds rather than the plans and alliances of 

terrorists. 

AQIM’s sanctuary-seeking strategy seeks to 

create alliances with groups having historical griev-

ances against the local government in order to gain 

45

protection from security forces so they can conduct terrorist operations outside those sanctuary areas. Drouk-

del concluded, as Mao and Giap had, that the support 

of the local population remains the center of gravity 

when conducting anti-government activities. Raising 

the rent seeks to control sanctuary areas by changing 

the dynamics between sanctuary-seekers, rent-seek-

ers, and sanctuary-suppliers as local popular support 

is more transactional than ideological. 

Planners  must  first  determine  what  the  object  of 

sanctuary is in order to determine the nature of the 

transaction. France’s actions in Northern Mali indi-

cate it determined the object of sanctuary was terrorist 

protection and support to overthrow the Malian gov-

ernment. In turn, France sought to support the gov-

ernment and deny such sanctuary in Northern Mali 

by eliminating the terrorists. This counterinsurgency 

strategy, known popularly as the ink spot strategy, 

was coined by British counterinsurgency thinkers and 

used by the British in campaigns from South Africa to 

Malaysia, although the term has been appropriated 

recently by the U.S. Army in Iraq. When enemy forces 

could not be located and isolated in South Africa and 

Malaysia because of their mobility, the ink-spot cam-

paign shifted focus to resettle local populations in 

order to deny insurgents local support—as the U.S. 

Army did with Geronimo. The U.S. applied the pop-

ulation resettlement scheme in Vietnam under the 

name “strategic hamlet,” where it failed because reset-

tlement only alienated the Vietnamese population.129

The center of gravity in the ink-spot scheme is neither 

terrain nor enemy forces; but instead, the support, or 

at least the acquiescence, of the local population. The 

object of control is the enemy force and the method of 

control is through the local population. 

46

The French campaign against AQIM did not actu-

ally deny terrorist sanctuary, but destroyed enemy 

forces in sanctuary areas using superior military force. 

Denying sanctuary is a nuanced objective revolv-

ing around control and requiring a practical under-

standing of the dimensions of control: the object, the 

purpose, the nature, the degree, the scheme, and the 

beginning and end of control. 130

**Denial of Sanctuary: Ways for Controlling Saharan**

**Sanctuary**

The purposes of controlling the enemy are to destroy, 

disrupt, or defeat enemy forces in the sanctuary area in 

order to prevent them from conducting terrorist activi-

ties outside sanctuary. The purposes of controlling the 

sanctuary rent would be to degrade, bankrupt, trans-

form, integrate, or displace the sanctuary-seekers. This 

scheme seeks to control sanctuary-seekers by attacking 

their weaknesses, their financial and logistical vulner-

abilities. The advantages to this scheme are numerous: 

lower costs to the United States, building alliances 

with local communities rather than alienating them 

through attacks, and a greater degree of control of the 

terrorist sanctuary-seekers themselves because sanctu-

ary-seekers can be contained by knowing their location 

and operational methodology. Controlling sanctuary 

by raising the rent could also herd or displace terror-

ists into other low rent sanctuary areas. The purpose 

of controlling Belmokhtar’s rent, therefore, would be 

either to bankrupt the terrorist organization so it can 

no longer function, or to displace them into a low rent 

zone where there is a decreased risk of terrorist attack 

due to decreased operational capability. 

47

*Degrade and Bankrupt*

Bankruptcy would raise rents to a level Belmokhtar 

could no longer afford while continuing his terrorist 

operations. This is the nature of control Algeria has 

employed against GSPC and now AQIM in Northern 

Algeria. AQIM in Algeria is no longer a functional ter-

rorist organization because the pressure from Algerian 

security  forces  have  made  it  too  difficult  to  conduct 

terrorist operations in Algeria. Direct control by secu-

rity forces has created an environment where the price 

for AQIM to operate is too high. However, increasing 

sanctuary rent to terrorists in places like Northern 

Algeria comes at a high cost for the government and 

is not feasible for the government to replicate in the 

remote reaches of the Sahara. Raising the rent through 

direct intervention would require engaging with com-

munity leaders and increasing the cost for the goods 

and services Belmokhtar offers to these communities. 

France has raised the rent through its military inter-

vention in Northern Mali, but has done this by attack-

ing terrorists directly rather than engaging with local 

communities to delegitimize terrorist activities and 

enable the government to support local populations. 

Raising the rent seeks to create the friction between 

landlords—those who profit from terrorist rents―and 

owners—those who live with the terrorists. The social 

disdain from illicit profits, such as drug smuggling and 

human trafficking, is one way to disrupt Belmokhtar’s 

existing alliance structure. Another would be to pre-

vent cognitive sanctuary by engaging with commu-

nity leaders on religious affairs—militant Islam is not 

the only alternative to redress grievances.131  A  final way would be to attack his virtual sanctuary and prevent him from communicating to include recruiting 

48

and promoting violence and anti-government mes-

sages through the internet. These actions would force 

Belmokhtar to reengage with the local communities 

where he uses sanctuary and raise the rent to continue 

to operate in those areas. 

*Transform and Integrate*

Transformation from a terrorist organization into 

a  for-profit  organization  is  possible.  The  Revolution-

ary Armed Forces of Colombia, for example, has trans-

formed from a revolutionary group to a terrorist group 

into a criminal group, and today seeks peaceful resolu-

tion rather than violence. Social integration for AQIM 

seems unlikely because they would need to transform 

into a fundamentally different organization or abjectly 

give up their jihadist identity to become integrated or 

fused into local communities. Belmokhtar has never 

demonstrated such an inclination, and the zeal of his 

followers indicate commitment to jihad. 132 AQIM actually mentions integration as a deception plan:

We should also take into consideration not to monopolize 

the political and military stage. We should not be at the 

forefront. . . . Better for you to be silent and pretend to 

be a ‘domestic’ movement that has its own causes and 

concerns. There is no reason for you to show that we 

have an expansionary, jihadi, al Qaeda, or any other sort 

of project.133

If anything, the pride of Belmokhtar and his fighters 

could offer an alternative weakness: hubris. Further-

more, transformation or integration of violent groups 

like Belmokhtar begs the question, “To what would it 

be transformed?” Such predictions would be specu-

lative, but the cure may be worse than the disease. A 

highly profitable and organized transnational criminal 

49

enterprise in Northwest Africa could pose larger secu-

rity concerns than the relatively small and dispersed 

AQIM affiliates at present—as unpleasant as they are. 

Transformation and integration do not seem viable 

objectives for individuals like Belmokhtar, and such 

objectives must be considered carefully. 

*Displace*

If rents were raised even moderately, it is most likely 

that Belmokhtar would seek new sanctuary areas with 

greater protection, but lower rents so he would have 

adequate funds to conduct terrorist operations. Thus, 

a scheme to control sanctuary through increasing sanc-

tuary rents in order to displace sanctuary-seekers pro-

vides a degree of indirect control over the terrorists by 

disrupting their operations, degrading their capabili-

ties, and potentially bankrupting them. 

The nature of the sanctuary control explains how 

the relevant actors are affected—understanding the 

environment. These principal actors are the landlords, 

or rent-seekers, and the tenants, or sanctuary-seek-

ers. The owners or sanctuary providers and rent-pay-

ers  are  also  important,  depending  upon  the  specific 

circumstances of the rent and space relationship. In 

Belmokhtar’s case, the sanctuary landlords are the 

established local hierarchy that is a combination of 

traditional leaders in ethnic groups, government offi-

cials exerting authority, and criminal networks or 

local kingpins. The owners are the groups and families 

who fall under the traditional leaders and could exert 

increased power under pressure, particularly to raise 

the rents as they see little direct benefits from the sanc-

tuary rent relationships. 

50

One dilemma when enemy forces are the object of 

control in sanctuaries is that friendly forces are elimi-

nating a source of income for both sanctuary landlords 

and owners—alienating both groups. Worse, landlords 

and owners suffer from the consequences of combat 

through the destruction of property and lives, further 

angering those groups against friendly activities. Sanc-

tuary-seekers cannot be destroyed completely because 

they are dispersed and, therefore, will continue ter-

rorist activities even if the high-value targets or per-

centage of terrorists are eliminated: one cannot “kill 

their way to victory.” Externally supported groups 

make destruction of terrorists even more difficult: new 

sanctuary tenants (i.e., terrorists) can be found and 

replace those destroyed. Conversely, using rent as an 

object of sanctuary control means that friendly forces 

have increased incomes for landlords, and potentially 

owners, by increasing the rent. The sanctuary-seeker 

must either respond to this new price or move out of 

the market and seek sanctuary elsewhere. If the tenant 

reacts violently to the increased rent, it may either cause 

additional frictions with the landlords and owners or 

may provide opportunities for the tenant to be more 

easily captured or killed—it would be easier to iden-

tify and isolate the enemy at this point due to increased 

alienation from the local population. 

The final consideration to control sanctuary is the 

duration of control. Raising the rent can begin once the 

determination is made to assert control over enemy 

groups and adequate funding is allocated—which 

should be substantially less than offensive military 

operations. This allows the duration to be affected over 

a longer period of time, as well as makes the scheme 

of  control  flexible  to  adapt  to  enemy  changes.  The 

duration of control will be until the desired effects of 

51

degrade, bankrupt, transform, integrate, or displace 

have been achieved. 

**Denial of Sanctuary: Means for Controlling Saharan**

**Sanctuary and the U.S. Army**

The U.S. Army has significant roles at the tactical 

and operational levels of war for controlling terrorist 

sanctuary  areas.  Key  considerations  for  Army  com-

manders and staffs when seeking to control sanc-

tuary in the Sahara include: the value and use of 

intelligence, decentralization of command and control, 

operational integration, mobility, and emphasis upon 

whole-of-government activities. 134

*Military Intelligence*

Knowledge  about  the  enemy  remains  paramount 

in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and sanctu-

ary control operations. Intelligence capabilities are as 

important as intelligence dissemination—getting the 

information to the people who can act upon it quickly. 

Commanders must ensure that critical information can 

flow quickly up and down the chain of command. Crit-

ical information in the Sahara includes the locations of 

wells and cache sites, because controlling these loca-

tions will deny enemy resupply. Another example of 

critical information includes the acquisition and move-

ment of new Toyota trucks that could be observed to 

provide information about who needs and can afford 

new vehicles. It will also be necessary for U.S. forces 

to collaborate with local security forces and employ 

“Kit Carson Scouts” to assist in identifying and locat-

ing individuals.135 Additionally, critical vulnerabilities, 

such as personnel required for navigating and cross-

ing these remote and difficult areas, including the best 

52

and  most  experienced  drivers,  should  be  identified, and targeted. Other vulnerabilities such as communication networks, including internet activities, could be 

monitored or attacked. Finally, local communities and 

the sanctuary owners must be identified and protected 

from sanctuary-seeking groups. 

*Decentralization of Command and Control*

Raising the rent to control sanctuary primarily 

requires influencing local actors to demand more from 

terrorists like Belmokhtar for sanctuary space. The 

ability to operate independently and communicate 

directly with various groups and cultures are critical 

skills in denying sanctuary. The milieu for such oper-

ations is diverse and complex; controlling sanctuary 

will result from team efforts uniting a range of indi-

viduals and organizations under the common goal of 

denying access to sanctuary areas and displacing sanc-

tuary-seekers. Dispersion in this terrain is important, 

and units will need to move in small teams instead 

of large formations. Due to the speed that small units 

can move in open desert terrain, air power is valuable 

because it can move rapidly and employ precision fire-

power, as well as collect information.136 Unity of effort is more important than unity of command, and effects 

will be achieved at lower levels of command, in turn 

requiring the knowledge, skills, and empowerment 

of subordinate leaders. 137 Decisive battle will remain elusive, if not impossible, 138 and the lessons of the U.S. Army campaign against Geronimo apply today; 

the  fight  to  control  sanctuary  will  involve  difficult, 

time-consuming pursuit, and it will ultimately be won 

by sergeants and lieutenants. 

53

*Operational Integration*

Combined and Joint operations are needed to 

combat the financing of sanctuary but are not the hall-

marks of Army units. Integration across the warfight-

ing  functions,  specifically  intelligence  and  aviation, 

as well as other types of organizations such as special 

operations will be essential; and integration was spe-

cifically  cited  by  the  French  as  being  critical  to  their 

successful operations in Northern Mali. 139 Direct con-

tact between aviation elements and ground elements, 

whether for close air support or intelligence purposes, 

is vital, and the integration of airpower with elements 

on the ground, particularly with partner nation forces, 

will be necessary. Thus, incorporating partner nation 

elements also will characterize sanctuary control oper-

ations and require superior communication and lead-

ership, particularly at the lowest levels of command.140

*Mobility*

Combat in this environment is characterized by 

speed and mobility. Soldiers will need to adapt to 

the environment and use non-tactical equipment or 

off-the-shelf technology, which is better suited and 

easier to maintain in such environments. Belmokhtar 

retained operational flexibility because AQIM carried a 

minimum amount of ammunition, enough to conduct 

a  hasty  ambush  or  fight  a  meeting  engagement  and 

then disengage. 141 Instead of overwhelming firepower, AQIM used relative superiority, or surprise with limited but concentrated firepower, to achieve success.142

Belmokhtar’s decentralized logistics system enabled 

his mobility and relative superiority but relied upon 

dispersed cache locations and a network of informants 

54

and facilitators. These sanctuary-seeker characteris-

tics, combined with difficult terrain and lack of infra-

structure, make unit-level resupply difficult and could 

require units to live off the land. Such operations will 

demand unpredictability, tactical flexibility, and iron 

but imaginative and adaptable leadership. 143

*Whole-of-Government Activities*

Raising sanctuary rents could be performed by part-

ners who pursue terrorist elements, as well as exploit-

ing vulnerabilities like racism in AQIM. 144 The terrorist groups are not representative of the cultures or values 

in their sanctuary areas: AQIM’s brand of religion and 

governance are incompatible with the local population. 

Army elements, like civil affairs, could provide essen-

tial services or bring critical assistance to marginalized 

groups. Units could partner with host nation forces to 

improve their capabilities, as well as leverage cultural 

advisors in the form of anthropologists to determine 

the relationships between sanctuary landlords, owners, 

and tenants to create frictions or leverage. Harmoniza-

tion of civil and military activities is the essence of suc-

cessful sanctuary control efforts because such efforts 

seek to find and exploit weaknesses in the relationship 

among the sanctuary-seeker, the sanctuary-payer, the 

sanctuary-owner, and the rent-seeker. 

**CONCLUSION**

Belmokhtar’s Saharan sanctuary was realized 

through a complex system of transactional relationships 

paid through rents. Altering this system by increas-

ing the cost of sanctuary and disrupting the alliances 

between sanctuary-owners and sanctuary-seekers 

55

will disrupt terrorist operations and neutralize their effectiveness. 

French efforts to deny terrorist sanctuary in North-

ern Mali, like U.S. operations elsewhere, focused upon 

the destruction of enemy forces, not the control of 

sanctuary areas. While destroying significant numbers 

of fighters and equipment, these operations ultimately 

have had limited effects upon terrorist organizations 

and the wider popular movements they exploited. 

Some estimates conclude the French military destroyed 

less than 20 percent of AQIM fighters in the region, and 

most survivors have simply moved to other terrorist 

sanctuary areas in southern Libya or Northern Niger. 

Thus, seeking to control or deny the functions of sanc-

tuary through the destruction of enemy forces is likely 

to have immediate and local effects on enemy person-

nel, but unlikely to eliminate those groups or have 

long-term positive effects on regional security. Several 

years after major French combat operations ended in 

Northern Mali, terrorist attacks in Mali continued, and 

“Malian patience with the negotiation process is run-

ning thin. Some are losing hope that the government 

will be able to achieve a lasting peace.”145 Furthermore, the French and American ways to deny sanctuary in 

Northern Mali have been and continue to be costly. 

France still has troops in Mali and recently announced 

a significant investment of $50 million of security assis-

tance146 for regional partners, while the United States 

continues to increase its regional posture147 and build partner nation capacity programs—although the long-term impacts of military capacity-building remain in 

dispute and controversial. 148 More worrisome is that 

terrorist attacks in domestic France have increased. In 

spite of the destruction of terrorists and their equip-

ment, continued international security investment, 

56

and increased military footprints, violent extremists 

seem more capable than ever of projecting terror from 

sanctuary areas in Northwest Africa. 

Denying terrorists sanctuary is not about killing 

terrorists in sanctuaries, but about controlling sanc-

tuary space to control the terrorists further and deny 

them the protection they require. Controlling terror-

ist sanctuary, therefore, does not require direct mili-

tary intervention, offensive military operations, or 

nation-building, but seeks instead to prevent terror-

ists from using their sanctuary to perform the key 

functions which sanctuary serves. Instead of denying 

sanctuary everywhere, as the ink-spot methodology 

presupposes, sanctuary could be controlled indirectly 

by raising the rent on terrorists and forcing them out of 

business or moving them to lower rent areas that offer 

fewer possibilities to conduct training, planning, and 

operations. 

**ENDNOTES**

1. Department of Defense (DoD),  *Quadrennial Defense Review*

*Report*,  Washington,  DC:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, February 2006, p. 13. 

2. DoD,  *QDR Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity*, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 22, 2006. 

3. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 

4. Roger Trinquier,  *Modern  Warfare:  A  French  View  of  Coun-*

*terinsurgency*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 23. 

5. Other authors already have focused on the history of 

al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations in the Sahara. For example, 

see Anneli Botha,  *Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation**of Domestic Terrorism*, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2008; Susanna D. Wing,  *Mali’s Precarious Democracy and*

57

*the Causes of Conflict*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013;  Khalifa Hajji,  *The Origins and Strategic Objectives of the**Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)*, Unpublished Manuscript, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 

6. Steven Erlanger and Adam Nossiter, “Jihad ‘Prince,’ a Kid-

napper, Is Tied to Raid,”  *The New York Times*, January 17, 2013. 

7. Statoil,  *The in Amenas Attack: Report of the Investigation into**the Terrorist Attack on in Amenas*, prepared for Statoil ASA’s Board of Directors, 2013, pp. 36-40. 

8. Mohamed Mokeddem,  *Al Qaida Au Maghreb Islamique: Con-*

*trebande Au Nom De L’islam (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Smug-*

*gling in the Name of Islam),* Algers, Algeria: Casbah-Editions, 2010, p. 56. 

9. Radio France International, “Tuareg Rebels Behind Jan-

uary  Killings,  confirms  Mali  army,”  RFI,  February  13,  2013, 

available from  *www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120213-tuareg-rebels-*

*behind-january-killings-confirms-mali-army*, February 13, 2012, accessed January 17, 2015. 

10. Christopher Torchia, “’Timbuktu,’ an Oscar Nominee, 

Explores Islamic Extremism,” Desert News, February 16, 2015, 

available from  *www.deseretnews.com/article/765668520/Timbuktu-*

*an-Oscar-nominee-explores-Islamic-extremism.html*, accessed August 28, 2017. 

11. The White House,  *National Strategy for Combating Terror-*

*ism*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 2003, pp. 17-21. 

12. U.S. Congress, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States,  *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 21, 2004. 

13. Francis T. Miko, “Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 

9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy,” CRS 

Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, August 10, 2004, p. 2. 

58

14.  U.S.  Government  Accountability  Office,  *Combating Terrorism:  The  United  States  Lacks  Comprehensive  Plan  to  Destroy  the**Terrorist  Threat  and  Close  the  Save  Haven  in  Pakistan’s  Federally**Administered Tribal Areas*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, April 17, 2008. 

15. C. E. Callwell,  *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd ed., London, United Kingdom (UK): General Staff-War College, 

1906. Such conflicts at that time were referred to as “small wars.” 

See also the U.S. Marine Corps,  *Small  Wars  Manual*, originally published in 1940 and reprinted in 1990 as FMFRP 12-15. 

16. Andrew J. Birtle,  *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contin-*

*gency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1998. 

17. John Bigelow,  *The Principles of Strategy, Illustrated Mainly*

*from American Campaigns*, New York: GP Putnam & Sons, 1891, pp. 149-151. 

18. Robert Marshall Utley,  *Frontier Regulars: The United States*

*Army  and  the  Indian,  1866-1891*, New York: Macmillan, 1973, p. 285. 

19. Birtle, pp. 55-92. 

20. Geronimo, in S. M. Barrett, and Frederick W. Turner, 

*Geronimo: His Own Story*, New York: Meridian, 1996, pp. 179-180. 

Geronimo admitted his band could not find water, were increas-

ingly starved, and had suffered from thirst at the end of the 

campaign. 

21. Benjamin Capps,  *The Great Chiefs*, New York: Time-Life 

Books, 1975. 

22. Mao Tse-tung,  *On Guerrilla Warfare*,  Samuel  B.  Griffith, trans., New York: Praeger, 1961. 

23. Ibid., pp. 108-109. Mao also distinguishes “base areas” 

from “guerrilla areas.” Bases are “areas completely surrounded 

by territory occupied by the enemy,” while guerrilla areas “can be 

controlled by guerrillas only while they physically occupy them.” 

59

24. Nguyen Giap Vo,  *Inside the Viet Minh*, Quantico, VA: U.S. 

Marine Corps Association, 1962. 

25. Robert Taber,  *The War of the Flea: A Study in Guerrilla War-*

*fare Theory and Practice*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002, p. 23. 

26. Philip Short,  *Mao: A Life*, London, UK: Hodder & Stough-ton, 1999, pp. 328-335. See also Stephen Kotkin,  *Stalin: Paradoxes**of Power, 1878-1928*, Vol. 1, New York: Penguin Press, 2014, pp. 

663-657. 

27. Scott A. Boorman,  *The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch’i Inter-*

*pretation  of  Maoist  Revolutionary  Strategy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 73. 

28.  Igor  Kopytoff,  *The  African  Frontier:  The  Reproduction  of**Traditional African Societies*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 4. 

29. See Tom Mangold and John Penycate,  *The Tunnels of Cu*

*Chi*, New York: Random House, 1985. 

30. Ibn Khaldun,  *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, 

Vol. 1, Franz Rosenthal, N. J. Dawood, and Bruce B. Lawrence, 

trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 254. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Ibid., pp. 253, 257, and 258, respectively. 

33. Several anthropologists have studied the relationships 

between nomadism, violence, and the state. See Gilles Deleuze 

and Felix Guattari,  *Nomadology: The War Machine*, Brian Massumi, trans., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968. 

34. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Lee Pouwels,  *The History*

*of Islam in Africa*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000, p. 17. 

35. Belmokhtar’s group constantly sought to convert their 

hostages to Islam. Ambassador Fowler notes, “The issue of reli-

gious conversion dominated our relationships with every one of 

our captors.” Robert R. Fowler,  *A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the**Sahara with Al Qaeda,* Toronto, Canada: HaperCollins Publishers, 60

2011, p. 146. This treatment was much more severe for their captive Muslim driver, Soumana, whom “after being summoned one 

evening to prayer, stumbling past us muttering to himself, ‘I’m 

going crazy . . . crazy’.” Ibid., p. 144. These are clear examples to 

deny cognitive sanctuary and overwhelm mental space with the 

extremist beliefs and values, preventing free thought and open 

exchange. 

36. See John Middleton and David Tait, eds.,  *Tribes without*

*Rules: Studies in African Segmentary Systems*, London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1958; also see the seminal E. E. Evans-

Pritchard,  *The  Nuer:  A  description  of  the  modes  of  livelihood  and**political institutions of a Nilotic people*, Oxford, MA: Claredon Press, 1940. 

37. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart,  *Fixing Failed States: A*

*Framework  for  Rebuilding  a  Fractured  World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 

38. Rose Eveleth, “I rule my own ocean micronation,” BBC, 

April 15, 2015, available from  *www.bbc.com/future/story/20150414-*

*i-rule-my-own-ocean-micronation*, accessed March 2, 2015. 

39. Emily Kumler, “Terrorists Rely on Tech Tools,”  *PC World*, 

July 7, 2004, available from  *www.pcworld.com/article/116822/article.*

*html*, accessed March 2, 2015. 

40. Mike McGovern,  *Understanding Conflict Drivers and Resil-*

*ience Factors in the Sahel: Desk Study*, Navanti publication, Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2013. 

41. Stanley Milgram,  *The Individual in a Social World: Essays*

*and Experiments*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977, pp. 68-90. 

42. Fowler, pp. 288-289. 

43. Thomas P. Higginbottom and Elias Symeonakis, “Assess-

ing  Land  Degradation  and  Desertification  Using  Vegetation 

Index Data: Current Frameworks and Future Directions,”  *Remote*

*Sensing*, Vol. 6, No. 10, 2014. 

44. Muna A. Abdalla,  *Understanding  of  the  Natural  Resource*

*Conflict  Dynamics:  The  Case  of  the  Tuareg  in  North  Africa  and  the* 61

*Sahel*, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2008, No. 194, 2009. 

45. T. E. Lawrence,  *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, New 

York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1935, p. 83. For example, the 

scene,  “Ali’s  Well”  in  the  1962  film   *Lawrence of Arabia* largely adapted from  *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, famously depicts the importance of these wells in everyday life for desert dwellers. Although 

the film scene is Hollywood fiction, Lawrence recorded several 

well confrontations in the desert, See pp. 80-85. 

46. Alfred Toppe,  *Desert Warfare German Experiences in World*

*War II*,  Fort  Leavenworth,  KS:  Combat  Studies  Institute,  1991, p. 78. 

47. Basil Henry Liddell Hart,  *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed., New York: Meridian, 1991, pp. 372-374. 

48. Fowler, p. 87. 

49. It is significant to note that the French-led battle in Feb-

ruary  2013  destroyed  600  fighters  who  were  in  the  Adrar  des 

Ifoghas defending well access from fortified positions. See Joshua 

Hammer,  *The  Bad-Ass  Librarians  of  Timbuktu  and  Their  Race  to**Save the World’s Most Precious Manuscripts*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016, pp. 218-227. 

50. Pierre Boilley,  *Les  Touaregs  Kel  Adagh,  Dépendances  Et*

*Révoltes:  Du  Soudan  Français  Au  Mali  Contemporain  (Kel  Adagh**Tuaregs, Dependencies and Revolts: From Colonial French West Africa**to Contemporary Mali)*, Paris, France: Éditions Karthala, 1999. 

51. Ibid., pp. 39-49. 

52. Jeremy Keenan,  *The Tuareg: People of Ahaggar*, New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1977, p. 5. 

53. McGovern, pp. 10, 19-23. 

54. Similar to the  *Haratin* groups in Mauritania. See El-Arby 

Ould Saleck,  *Les Haratins: Le Paysage Politique Mauritanien Haratins:**The  Mauritanian  Political  Landscape)*, Paris France: L’Harmattan, 2003; and Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais,  *Groupes  Serviles  Au*

*Sahara: Approche Comparative À Partir Du Cas Des Arabophones De*

62

*Mauritanie  (Servile  Groups  of  the  Sahara:  A  Comparative  Approach**from the Case of Mauritania’s Arab-speakers)*, Paris, France: CNRS, 2000. 

55. Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember,  *Cultural Anthropology*, 

14th ed., New York: Pearson, 2015, pp. 185-194. 

56. Jeremy Keenan,  *The Lesser Gods of the Sahara: Social Change*

*and Contested Terrain Amongst the Tuareg of Algeria*, London, UK: Frank Cass, 2004, pp. 156, 121-162. 

57. Jean-Loup Amselle,  *Mestizo Logics: Anthropology of Identity*

*in Africa and Elsewhere*, Claudia Royal, trans., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. 

58. Ramada Elghamis,  *Guide De Lecture Et D’écriture En Tifi-*

*nagh  Vocalisées  (Reading  and  Writing  Guide  for  Spoken  Tifinagh)*, Agadez, Niger: Association pour la promotion des tifinagh (APT), 

2004. 

59. R. F. Murphy, “Social Distance and the Veil,”  *American*

*Anthropologist*, Vol. 66, No. 6, 1964. 

60. Jacques Heers,  *Les Négriers En Terres D’islam: La Première*

*Traite  Des  Noirs,  Viie-Xvie  Siècle  (Slavers  in  the  Lands  of  Islam:**The First Slave-trade of Blacks, 7th—16th Centuries)*, Paris, France: Perrin, 2003, pp. 73-140. 

61. Michael Asher and Mariantonietta Peru,  *Impossible Jour-*

*ney: Two against the Sahara*, London, UK: Viking Penguin, 1988, p. 110. 

62. Anne Saint Girons,  *Les Rébellions Touarègues (The Tuareg*

*Rebellions)*, Paris, France: Ibis Press, 2008. 

63. McGovern, p. 23. 

64. Fowler, p. 16. 

65. Ibid., pp. 134-135. 

66. Ibid., p. 148. 

63

67. French for  *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice* [MNJ], or Nigerien’s Movement for Justice, was a primarily Tuareg ethnic 

group based in Northern Niger and fought a rebellion in Niger 

from 2006 until 2008. 

68. Pierre Creisson and Thomas Dandois,  *En Territoire Interdit*

*(In Forbidden Territory)*, Paris, France: Arthaud, 2008, p. 141. 

69. GIA—The French acronym for  *Groupe Islamique Armé*, or 

Armed Islamic Group. 

70. FLN—The French acronym for  *Front de Libération Natio-*

*nale*, or National Liberation Front. 

71. Information gathered by the police eventually uncovered 

the ultimate intention of the GIA was to crash Flight 8986 into the 

Eifel tower, a frightening predecessor to the 9/11 attacks, in order 

to scare the French population into preventing further French 

intervention in the Algerian conflict. 

72. Fowler, p. 13. 

73. GSPC—The French acronym for  *Groupe  Salafiste  pour*

*la  Prédication  et  le  Combat*,  or  Salafist  Group  for  Preaching  and Combat. GSPC changed its name to AQIM in January 2007. 

74. “M’zab Valley,” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, avail-

able from  *whc.unesco.org/en/list/188*, accessed February 23, 2015. 

75. Hajji. 

76. Jeremy Keenan,  *The Dark Sahara: America’s War on Terror*

*in Africa*, London, UK: Pluto Press, 2009; see also Jeremy Keenan, *The Dying Sahara: Us Imperialism and Terror in Africa*, London, UK: Pluto Press, 2013. 

77. Mokeddem. 

78. Ibid., pp. 37-136. 

79. Fowler, pp. 315-317, and author interviews. 

80. Ibid., p. 32. 

64

81. Eric J. Hobsbawm,  *Bandits*, New York: New Press, 2000. 

82. Paul Aussaresses, Jean-Charles Deniau, and Madeleine 

Sultan,  *Je  N’ai  Pas  Tout  Dit  (I  Didn’t  Tell  All)*, Monaco: Rocher, 2008; See Also Paul Aussaresses,  *The Battle of the Casbah*, New York: Gazelle, 2002. For an account in English, see Alistair Horne, 

*A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, New York: New York 

Review Books, 2006. 

83. Ali Haroun,  *La 7e Wilaya: La Guerre Du Fln En France 1954-*

*1962 (The 7th Wilaya: The FLN’s War in France 1954-1962)*, Algers, Algeria: Casbah Editions, 2005. 

84. For example, see “Algeria: Attack on Al Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb HQ,” ANSAmed, June 6, 2012, available from 

*www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/nations/algeria/2012/06/06/*

*Algeria-Attack-Al-Qaeda-the-Islamic-Maghreb-HQ_6989500.html*, 

accessed March 21, 2015. 

85. Fowler, p. 201. 

86. Statoil, pp. 13-33. 

87. Al-Qaeda has even published tactics to avoid aerial sur-

veillance. See “Al Qaeda Drone Guide: 22 Steps To Evading 

Unmanned Aircraft Strikes,” The World Post, February 22, 2013, 

available from  *www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/22/al-qaeda-drone-*

*guide-22-steps_n_2743867.html*, accessed March 23, 2015. 

88. Erwin Rommel and Basil Henry Liddell Hart,  *The Rommel*

*Papers*, 1st American ed., New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1953, p. 284. 

89.  “Algerian  troops  enter  Mali  to  fight  al-Qaeda,”  Mail  & Guardian, n.d., available from  *https://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-20-algerian-troops-enter-mali-to-fight-alqaeda*, accessed February 4, 2015. 

90. Fowler, pp. 39-41. 

91. Ibid., pp. 29-32. 

92. Ibid., pp. 32-33. 

65

93. Based upon social network analysis by Scott Helfstein and John Solomon,  *Risky Business: The Global Network and the Politics*

*of Contraband*, West Point, NY: The Combating Terrorism Center, 2014, pp. 34-48. 

94. For a detailed account of the French intervention and 

combat lessons learned including performance of Belmokhtar’s 

group, see Christopher S. Chivvis,  *The French War on Al Qa’ida in*

*Africa*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 

95. Fowler, pp. 90-97. 

96. Ibid., p. 51. 

97. Author interviews. 

98. Naharnet Newsdesk, “Mali Troops, Tuareg Rebels Battle 

for Second Day,” Naharnet, January 18, 2012, available from 

*www.naharnet.com/stories/en/26990-mali-troops-tuareg-rebels-battlefor-second-day*, accessed January 19, 2015. See also Agence France-Presse, “Mali says soldiers, civilians executed during Tuareg 

clashes,” The AFRAN Project, February 14, 2012, available from 

*www.afran.info/modules/news/article.php?storyid=9782*, accessed August 27, 2017. 

99. Alkaou Diarra,  *Mali:  La  Prière  Macabre  De  Iyad  Ag  Ghali**Pour Le Massacre De Aguelhok (Mali: The Macabre Prayer of Iyad Ag*

*Ghali to Massacre Aguelhok)*, Film, 2012, available from  *https://www.*

*youtube.com/watch?v=79NMs98-keI*, accessed February 12, 2015. 

100. Benjamin Roger, “Si on Nous Appelle Au Burkina Ou 

Au Sénégal, on Viendra” (“If Called to Burkina Faso or to Sen-

egal, we Will come”), Paris, France: Jeune Afrique, 2012,  *www.*

*jeuneafrique.com/174832/politique/vid-o-ould-hamaha-ansar-eddine-*

*si-on-nous-appelle-au-burkina-ou-au-s-n-gal-on-viendra/*,  available from accessed March 23, 2015. 

101. Louise I. Shelley,  *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime,*

*and Terrorism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 

102. Royal Geographical Society with The Institute of British 

Geographers, “Factsheet: Reaching the Top,” n.d., available from 

66

*www.unlockingthearchives.rgs.org/resources/documents/Reaching%20*

*the%20Top3.pdf*, accessed March 26, 2015. 

103. Ibid. 

104. Ariane Audouin-Dubreuil,  *La  Croisiere  Des  Sables:  Sur*

*Les  Pistes  De  Tombouctou  (Crossing  of  the  Sands:  In  The  Tracks  of**Timbuktu)*, Paris, France: Edition Glenat, 2005. 

105. According to internet images and reports, AQIM only 

uses Toyota trucks for their operations. Ambassador Fowler 

recounted he only saw AQIM using Toyota Land Cruiser full 

size pick-up trucks (HZJ-79). He did see another AQIM leader, 

Abu Zaid, driving a new, blue Toyota Hilux—still with the plastic 

shipping covers on the seats. 

106. Called the Toyota War from the change in tactics by 

the Chadian Armed Forces in 1987 to use unarmored but swift 

Toyota pick-ups with heavy weapons mounted, now referred to 

as “Technicals.” These tactics used speed and all-terrain mobility 

to outflank and outmaneuver heavy or dug-in Libyan forces. The 

Toyota War demonstrates the importance of speed and maneu-

verability in the Sahara, while serving as an example of the effec-

tiveness and lethality of light forces against a more heavily armed 

but slower and less maneuverable opponent in such terrain. 

107. Toppe, pp. 72-100. 

108. Fowler, p. 238, and author interviews. 

109. Furthermore, payments in these remote areas, especially 

for criminal activities, often are made with goods rather than cash. 

Vehicles, weapons, and supplies make excellent forms of pay-

ment or currency. See Judith Scheele,  *Smugglers and Saints of the*

*Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 

110. Fowler, pp. 13-15. It is noteworthy that Belmokhtar only 

seems to do destructive activities like this outside the sanctu-

ary area. Destroying crops or livestock would likely anger local 

people and incur additional rents. 

111. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 

67

112. Ibid., pp. 70-73, 181-182. 

113. Ibid., p. 23. 

114. Ibid., p. 99. 

115. Ibid., pp. 124-125. Belmokhtar actually seized two of 

Zeid’s hostages and released them with Ambassador Fowler in 

order to save their lives. These two European women, Marianne 

Petzold and Gabriella Greitner, were likely only days away from 

dying in captivity due to their illnesses and injuries. 

116. Ibid., p. 90. 

117. Callwell, p. 61. 

118. Martin Van Creveld,  *Supplying War: Logistics from Wal-*

*lenstein to Patton*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 1-2. 

It may be that this requires not any great strategic genius, 

but only plain hard work and cold calculation. While 

absolutely basic, this kind of calculation does not appeal to 

the imagination, which may be one reason it is often ignored 

. . . [and] armies frequently seem capable of moving in any 

direction at almost any speed and to almost any distance 

once their commanders have made up their minds to do so. 

In reality, they cannot, and failure to take cognizance of the 

fact has probably led to many more campaigns being ruined 

than ever were by enemy action. 

119. Scheele, pp. 1-18. 

120. Ibid *.*, pp. 95-124. 

121. Ibid., pp. 100-102. 

122. Fowler, p. 32. 

123.  Terrorist  financing  is  the  subject  of  ongoing  study  but 

needs additional attention. See Colin P. Clarke,  *Terrorism,  Inc.,**The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015. See also Walter Enders and Todd 

68

Sandler,  *The Political Economy of Terrorism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2012. 

124. Radio France International, “AQIM Leader Condemns 

Destruction of Mali Mausoleums in Secret Papers Found by 

RFI Journalist,” RFI, February 25, 2013, available from  *www.*

*english.rfi.fr/africa/20130225-aqim-leader-condemns-destruction-mali-mausoleums-secret-papers-found-rfi-journalist*, accessed April 3, 2015. 

125. Mark Doyle, “Mali Islamists Warned about Sharia in 

Al-Qaeda ‘Manifesto’,” BBC, February 26, 2013, available from 

*www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21587055*, accessed April 1, 2015. 

126. For a recent discussion on strategy, see Tami Davis 

Biddle,  *Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners**Need to Know*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2015. 

127. Henry Samuel, “Head of Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb 

Rages against His Own Troops in Document,”  *The Telegraph*, October 7, 2013, available from  *www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/*

*al-qaeda/10360629/Head-of-al-Qaeda-in-Islamic-Maghreb-rages-*

*against-his-own-troops-in-document.html*, accessed April 1, 2015. 

128. Sun Tzu,  *The Art of War*, Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., 

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 177. 

129. Although the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong 

retained their state sanctuaries outside South Vietnam, the stra-

tegic hamlet program had no impact on sanctuary areas in North 

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This monograph will not consider 

resettlement schemes because they do not seem politically feasible 

or sustainable. Some have challenged this assumption like Martin 

Van Creveld,  *The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, From*

*the Marne to Iraq*, New York: Ballentine Books, 2006. Van Creveld acknowledges that both counterinsurgency resettlement schemes 

as well as strategies of annihilation (destroy the population) his-

torically have proven successful in some cases and should not 

be excluded from analysis. See also Russell W. Glenn,  *Rethinking*

*Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from post-colonial**conflict*, New York: Routledge, 2015. 

69

130. Scott A. Boorman, “Fundamentals of Strategy: The 

Legacy of Henry Eccles,”  *Naval War College Review*, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Vol. 62, No. 2, Spring 2009. 

131. For example, see Lamin Sanneh,  *Beyond Jihad: The Paci-*

*fist Tradition in West African Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 

132. Author interviews. 

133. Rukmimi Callimachi, Associated Press, “In Timbuktu, Al 

Qaida Left Behind a Manifesto,”  *The Boston Globe*, February 15, 2013, available from  *https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/02/15/*

*timbuktu-qaeda-left-behind-manifesto/Z3LaPkhWY5dJRgsRo373yK/*

*story.html*, accessed March 21, 2016. 

134.  Recent  analysis  has  offered  specific  recommendations 

and lessons learned from the French experience in Mali for the 

U.S. Army. See Michael Shurkin,  *France’s War in Mali: Lessons for*

*an Expeditionary Army*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 

135. For analysis for Army units working with foreign secu-

rity forces, see Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Justin 

Beck, Derek Eaton, Scott Hiromoto, David R. Howell, Janet Lewis, 

Charlotte Lynch, Michael J. Neumann, and Cathryn Quantic 

Thurston,  *Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity**for Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. See also Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-22,  *Army*

*Support to Security Cooperation*, Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, June 21, 2013. 

136. Douglas A. Macgregor,  *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design*

*for Landpower in the 21st Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 

Increasingly lethal weapons lead to greater dispersion of 

combat forces and to increases in individual unit mobility. 

The necessity for command, control, and sustainment of 

dispersed formation increases reliance on subordinate 

officers’ and soldiers’ judgement, intelligence and character. 

137.  Terrence  K.  Kelly,  *Security Cooperation Organizations in*

*the Country Team: Options for Success*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Arroyo Center, 2010. 

70

138. See Stephen L. Melton,  *The Clausewitz Delusion: How the**American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way*

*Forward)*, Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009. 

139. See Shurkin. 

140. These elements are consistent with the conclusions from 

the Carlisle Scholars Program,  *Elihu Root Study: The Total Army*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2016. 

141. Author interviews. 

142. William H. McRaven,  *Spec  Ops:  Case  Studies  in  Special*

*Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, New York: Presidio, 1996. 

143.  See  Christopher  Kolenda,  *Leadership:  A  Warrior’s  Art*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Foundation Press, 2001; and 

Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, ed.,  *The Future of the Army*

*Profession*, New York: McGraw and Hill, 2002. The need for out-

standing leadership at the lowest levels in such circumstances is 

not new, however. See General Sir Andrew Skeen,  *Passing It On:*

*Short  Talks  on  Tribal  Fighting  on  the  North-West  Frontier  of  India*, Quetta, Pakistan: Nisa Traders, 1978 (1st ed. published in 1932), 

“because  in  frontier  fighting  the  junior  officer’s  problems  are many and varied, and their correct solution far more important in 

immediate results than in any other form of war,” preface. 

144. See McGovern; see also Stephen Brown, “Al-Qaeda’s 

Anti-Black Racism,”  *Front  Page  Magazine*, 2013, available from *www.frontpagemag.com/2013/stephenbrown/al-qaedas-anti-black-racism*, accessed April 4, 2015. 

145. Kristen Dennison, “Some Malians See Little Progress in 

their Fragile Peace,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State 

Office of Opinion Research, OPN-181-16, October 6, 2016. 

146.  Emma  Farge,  “France  to  Invest  $47M  in  Sahel  Count-

er-Terror Training,” Reuters, October 7, 2016, available from 

*uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-africa-security/france-to-invest-47-million-in-sahel-counter-terror-training-idUKKCN1272I2*, accessed September 1, 2017. 

71

147.  Nick  Turse,  “U.S.  Military  is  Building  a  $100  Million Drone Base in Africa,”  *The Intercept*, September 29, 2016, available from   *https://theintercept.com/2016/09/29/u-s-military-is-building-a-100-million-drone-base-in-africa/*, accessed October 1, 2016. 

148. For example, see Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Ma-

hony, Thomas Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. 

Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, 

Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth,  *Assess-*

*ing Security Cooperation as a Preventative Tool*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014; Christopher Paul, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth 

Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, and 

Brian J. Gordon,  *What  Works  Best  When  Building  Partner  Nation**Capacity in Challenging Contexts?* Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015; and Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel,  *Security Cooperation &*

*Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment*, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, August 2015. 

72

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**Major General John S. Kem**

**Commandant**

∗∗∗∗∗

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE**

**AND**

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS**

**Director**

**Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**

**Director of Research**

**Dr. Steven K. Metz**

**Author**

**Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Guido**

**Editor for Production**

**Dr. James G. Pierce**

**Publications Assistant**

**Ms. Denise J. Kersting**

∗∗∗∗∗

**Composition**

**Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil**

This Publication 

SSI Website

USAWC Website

Document Outline- TERRORIST SANCTUARY IN THE SAHARA: A CASE STUDY
- Foreword
- Summary    - Endnotes- Summary 
- About the Author
- Terrorist Sanctuary in the Sahara: a Case Study
- On Sanctuary    - Sanctuary and the U.S. Army Experience
  - Sanctuary in the 20th Century
  - Sanctuary, Islam, and Africa
  - Sanctuary and Governance 
- Terrain: Geographic and Human Characteristics of Saharan Sanctuary    - Geographic Terrain
  - Human Terrain 
- Sanctuary Seekers in the Sahara    - Sanctuary as Protection
  - Sanctuary for Training and Planning
  - The Logistics of Saharan Sanctuary
  - The Financing of Saharan Sanctuary 
- Denial of Sanctuary: Ends, Ways, and Means    - Denial of Sanctuary: Ends in Controlling Saharan Sanctuary
  - Denial of Sanctuary: Ways for Controlling Saharan Sanctuary      - Degrade and Bankrupt
    - Transform and Integrate
    - Displace 
  - Denial of Sanctuary: Means for Controlling Saharan Sanctuary and the U.S. Army      - Military Intelligence
    - Decentralization of Command and Control
    - Operational Integration
    - Mobility
    - Whole-of-Government Activities 
- Conclusion
- Endnotes

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