[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10785

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONALDO GARFIELD GREEN, 

Defendant- Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cr-60313-AHS-3

____________________

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 1 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10785

Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Ronaldo Green appeals his conviction and 78-month prison 

sentence for conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud. He contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a simultaneous lottery scam in which he and his codefendants participated. Green also challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. All his claims fall short,

and we affirm accordingly. 

The facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here 

only as necessary to decide the case.

I. 

Green first contends that the district court erred in admitting 

evidence of an uncharged lottery scheme in which he took part

during the same time period as the wire and mail fraud counts for 

which he was convicted. When an appellant challenges an evidentiary ruling on appeal, we “will not disturb the [district] court’s 

judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the introduction 

of evidence of an uncharged crime to “prove a person’s character 

in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The rule

allows such evidence, however, for other purposes, “such as 

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 2 of 8
22-10785 Opinion of the Court 3

proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” Fed. 

R. Evid. 404(b)(2), at least so long as its probative value outweighs 

its potential prejudice, Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The evidence of the uncharged lottery scheme was admissible because it went to Green’s motive or intent to commit the 

charged offenses, an explicit Rule 404(b) exception. By pleading 

not guilty, Green made his intent a material issue in the case, so the 

government was entitled to prove his intent through evidence under Rule 404(b). United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1345

(11th Cir. 2007). The lottery scam evidence illustrated Green’s intent and motive to defraud the Social Security Administration and 

Veterans Administration because Green and his coconspirators executed the two schemes in factually similar manners. The two 

schemes had similar targets, they both were based on financial 

fraud committed by the same individuals, and the offenses occurred for similar durations and during similar timeframes. 

Based on those similarities, we agree with the district court 

that the probative value of the lottery scheme evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice. To make that determination, 

we consider: (1) the government’s incremental need for the evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the similarity 

of the extrinsic act and the charged offense; and (3) the closeness in 

time between the extrinsic act and the charged offense. United 

States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). All three of 

those considerations are present here. The government required

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 3 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 22-10785

the lottery scheme evidence to prove Green’s intent to commit the 

charged offenses, and the factual and temporal circumstances of 

both the charged and uncharged offenses are similar. 

Any residual prejudicial concern was ameliorated by the district court’s several admonitions to the jury that the evidence of the 

lottery scheme solely be considered for its legitimate uses under 

Rule 404(b). Thus, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in 

admitting evidence of the lottery scheme.

II. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We review a 

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo 

and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grant, 

397 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first consider whether the district court committed a procedural error, such as failing to calculate or improperly 

calculating the Guidelines range or failing to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Green first contends that the district 

court erroneously imposed a two-level increase because it mistakenly calculated the guidelines as if Green had harmed more than 

ten people. He alleges that he wasn’t eligible for the enhancement 

because only two of his victims had yet to be reimbursed for their 

losses. 

The Sentencing Guidelines require increasing a defendant’s 

offense level by two levels if the offense involved ten or more 

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 4 of 8
22-10785 Opinion of the Court 5

victims. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). A person is a “victim” if the 

individual “sustained any part of the actual loss” as determined by 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1). Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.1. The Guidelines define an “actual loss” as a “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted 

from the offense.” Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A)(i).

In United States v. Lee, we held that a person who was reimbursed for his losses still qualified as a victim under 

§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the Guidelines include reimbursed losses 

in related loss calculations. 427 F.3d 881, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2005). 

In other words, a victim who suffers losses is still a victim for 

Guidelines-calculation purposes even if she has been reimbursed. 

The district court didn’t err in imposing a two-level increase 

for the number of victims of Green’s offense. First, this Court’s 

precedent in Lee forecloses Green’s argument that the individual 

victims who were reimbursed weren’t victims under

§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A). See id. Second, to the extent that Green separately contends that the individual victims can’t count for 

§ 2B1.1(b)(2) purposes because the PSI listed only the VA and SSA 

as victims, the PSI specified that the VA and SSA were the only victims “for restitution purposes.” The definition of “victims” for 

§ 2B1.1(b)(2) and restitution purposes aren’t identical. Compare

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). While reimbursement renders the individual victims ineligible for restitution, 

it doesn’t negate their victim status under § 2B1.1(b)(2). SeeUnited 

States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 594 (11th Cir. 2015); Lee, 427 F.3d at 

894–95. Therefore, the district court properly calculated Green’s

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 5 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 22-10785

guidelines by applying a two-level increase for having harmed 

more than ten people. 

Next, Green contends that the district court committed procedural error because his sentence reflects an unwarranted disparity in comparison to his codefendants. A “well-founded claim” that 

the district court imposed a sentence with an unwarranted disparity “assumes that apples are being compared to apples,” meaning 

that the defendant actually is similarly situated to the codefendants 

to whom he wishes to be compared. United States v. Dougherty, 

754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, we have a case of apples 

and oranges. While Green’s codefendants received lower sentences than Green, all but one of them entered plea agreements. 

Green, by contrast, pleaded not guilty and went to trial. Green also 

conceded that the one coconspirator who didn’t enter a plea agreement played a less significant role in the offense than he did. Thus, 

Green’s sentence isn’t unduly disparate as compared to his codefendants because his codefendants weren’t similarly situated to 

him. 

Green further alleges that the district court improperly 

weighed the relevant factors in imposing his sentence because it 

overstated the seriousness of his offense. In particular, he points to 

the district court’s failure to consider his inability to pay restitution

while in prison, general statistics on recidivism, and his extensive 

employment history and family ties. This Court “commits to the 

sound discretion of the district court the weight to be accorded to 

each § 3553(a) factor,” United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 6 of 8
22-10785 Opinion of the Court 7

(11th Cir. 2015), and the district court is “permitted to attach great 

weight to one factor over others,” United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 

1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). This Court 

will vacate a district court’s sentence “only if [it is] left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear 

error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a 

sentence that is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case.” United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 

1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). The record shows

the district court carefully weighed several relevant sentencing factors. To the extent that the district court didn’t specifically name

the particular factors that Green now raises on appeal, it wasn’t required to. United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 

2007) (holding that the district judge needn’t “state on the record 

that [he] has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to 

discuss each of the[m]”). Thus, we are not left with the “definite 

and firm conviction” that the district court abused its considerable 

discretion. 

Finally, Green contends that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because it was “greater than necessary” to fulfill the 

purposes of § 3553(a). “Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ‘ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be 

reasonable.’” United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 

2008) (alteration in original). A sentence “at the lowest end of the 

applicable guidelines range” further supports the reasonableness of 

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 7 of 8
8 Opinion of the Court 22-10785

that sentence. United States v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th

Cir. 2016). Green was sentenced to the lowest possible sentence 

within his sentencing guidelines range. For all the foregoing reasons, we have no reason to conclude that the sentence is substantively unreasonable, especially given the magnitude of Green’s expansive mail and wire fraud scheme. Thus, the district court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence, and we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 8 of 8