NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-483

ADOPTION OF HARRY (and a companion case1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother and father each appeal from decrees of the 

Juvenile Court terminating their parental rights to their two 

children, Harry and John, and approving the adoption plans of 

the Department of Children and Families (department). On 

appeal, the mother argues that the evidence did not clearly and 

convincingly establish that she was unfit, that her unfitness 

was not temporary, and that termination was in the children's 

best interests. The father does not contest the judge's finding 

of his current unfitness, but like the mother, argues that it 

was error to conclude that his unfitness was not temporary, and 

maintains that termination was not in the best interests of the 

children. Both parents also claim that the department failed to 

make reasonable efforts to reunify them with the children. We 

affirm. 

1 Adoption of John. The children's names are pseudonyms. 
2

Background. The mother and father are the parents of Harry

(born 2014) and John (born 2016). The children have two older 

half-siblings (half-siblings), who are the children of the 

mother and her former partner, Alan (a pseudonym).2 At the time 

of trial, the mother was in a relationship with Walter (a 

pseudonym). 

In May 2018, the department filed the underlying care and 

protection petition and obtained emergency custody of the 

children based on evidence of substance misuse and domestic 

violence in the mother's home. In April 2019, the department's

goal for the children changed from reunification to adoption. 

An eight-day trial was held between October and December 2021; 

the mother attended only the first four of those days and the 

father attended the first two days and the final day. After 

hearing testimony from five witnesses, including the mother and 

father, and admitting seventy-one exhibits, the judge found the 

mother and the father unfit, found that their unfitness was 

likely to continue, terminated their parental rights, and 

approved the department's proposed adoption plans for the 

children. The judge further found that a significant emotional 

2 Although all four of the mother's children were the subject of 

decrees terminating the mother's parental rights, a joint motion 

to dismiss that portion of the mother's appeal related to the 

two older children was allowed by this court. Alan is not a 

party to this appeal.
3

relationship existed between each parent and the children and 

separately ordered posttermination visitation between each 

parent and the children.3

Discussion. 1. Termination of mother's rights. a. 

Mother's current fitness. "In deciding whether to terminate a 

parent's rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the 

parent is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be 

served by terminating the legal relation between parent and 

child." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Clear and 

convincing evidence means that "[t]he requisite proof must be 

strong and positive; it must be 'full, clear and decisive.'" 

Adoption of Chad, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 838 (2019), quoting 

Adoption of Iris, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 105 (1997). "We review 

the judge's findings with substantial deference, recognizing her 

discretion to evaluate a witness's credibility and to weigh the 

evidence," Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 515 (2005), "and 

reverse only where the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or 

where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion." 

Adoption of Ilona, supra. 

"Parental unfitness is determined by considering a parent's 

character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to provide for the 

3 The judge also ordered sibling and postadoption visitation. 
4

child's particular needs, affections, and age." Care & 

Protection of Vick, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 706 (2016). 

"Although 'stale information cannot be the basis for a finding 

of current parental unfitness . . . [p]rior history . . . has 

prognostic value.'" Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 

607 (2012), quoting Adoption of George, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 265, 

268 (1989). Here, the judge's factual findings as to the 

mother's patterns of substance misuse, domestic violence, and 

police involvement were not clearly erroneous and supported the 

conclusion that she was unfit at the time of trial.

The mother's substance misuse began in the early 1990s and 

led to many episodes of neglect. The department first became 

involved with the mother in 2008 when a report was filed 

pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), alleging neglect 

of the half-siblings and drug use by the mother and Alan. 

Between 2008 and 2014, several more 51A reports were filed 

alleging drug use by the mother and Alan. The mother engaged in 

methadone treatment from 2003 to 2013, and began Suboxone 

treatment in 2013. However, despite the mother's being engaged 

in treatment during this timeframe, both children were born 

substance exposed; at least five 51A reports were filed between 

2014 and 2018 due to the mother's substance misuse or 

hospitalization. In March 2018, just prior to the children's 
5

removal, the mother was using heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, and 

Percocet.

The mother entered an inpatient drug treatment facility in 

April 2018, and, in compliance with the department's action 

plan, attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and completed an 

intensive outpatient program (IOP) around April 2019. The judge 

made specific and detailed findings supporting her conclusion 

that, although the mother was willing to engage in treatment 

services, she struggled to benefit or learn from such efforts. 

Notably, the judge found that, after completing the IOP, the 

mother was involved in two drug-related encounters with police 

between May and June 2019, leading to an arrest and charges of

possession of class B and class C controlled substances. 

Further, in June 2019, the mother continued to spend time with 

the father, a known drug user, despite acknowledging that 

associating with active drug users was a relapse trigger.4 The 

judge was "entitled to consider the evidence of [the mother's]

recent improvements within the context of her earlier and 

continuing deficits," Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 

608, and did not err in concluding that the mother lacked

4 The judge did not credit the mother's claim that she had been 

sober since 2018 and that she did not know the father was using

drugs in June 2019. This credibility determination was in the 

judge's discretion. See Care & Protection of Three Minors, 392 

Mass. 704, 711 (1984). 
6

insight into the impact of substance misuse on herself and the 

children. See Adoption of Garrett, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 673-

674 (2018) (finding of unfitness not clearly erroneous where 

mother substantially complied with, but did not benefit from, 

tasks outlined in service plan).

The mother also has a long history as the victim of 

domestic violence.5 She filed three restraining orders against 

Alan and three against the father for domestic violence, and, 

between October 2018 and May 2019, had at least five encounters 

with police because of calls related to Walter. The judge's 

determination that the mother failed to recognize the harm to 

the children from being exposed to violence in her intimate 

relationships was not clearly erroneous and was based on 

evidence of the mother's continuing violent relationship with 

Walter and the impact of domestic violence on the children. See 

Adoption of Zak, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 543 (2015) ("witnessing 

domestic violence, as well as being one of its victims, has a 

profound impact on children" [citation omitted]). See also

Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595 (1996) ("a child who has 

5 In April 2018, police responded to the mother's home because 

the father alleged that Alan was "beating" the mother while the 

children were home. In October 2018, Walter was arrested for 

domestic assault and battery after "slamming [the mother's] head 

into a door," and, two days later, was again arrested for 

violating the resulting G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order. 
7

been either the victim or the spectator of such abuse suffers a 

distinctly grievous kind of harm"). 

The mother has also demonstrated an inability to extricate 

herself from relationships punctuated by domestic violence. 

Although the mother's action plan tasked her with engaging in 

domestic violence support services and being open about the 

relationship with Walter, the mother attended support groups 

only inconsistently and attempted to conceal her ongoing 

relationship with Walter from the department. See Adoption of 

Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 126 (2005) ("Evidence of parents' 

refusal to cooperate with the department, including failure to 

maintain service plans . . . is relevant to the determination of 

unfitness"). In finding the mother unfit, the judge 

appropriately considered the mother's pattern of domestic 

violence with multiple partners and her attempts to conceal her 

ongoing relationship with Walter.

Finally, the judge properly considered the mother's 

extensive criminal history, which began in 1991 and included 

convictions of, among other things, prostitution and possession 

of class B and E controlled substances, in finding that she was 

unfit at the time of trial. See Care & Protection of Frank, 409 

Mass. 492, 495 (1991) ("evidence of prior convictions may be 

properly weighed in the balance [of parental fitness]"). 
8

b. Mother's future unfitness. In terminating parental 

rights, it is also "appropriate for a judge to consider whether, 

on the basis of credible evidence, there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the parent's unfitness at the time of trial may 

be only temporary" (citation omitted). Care & Protection of 

Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 788 (2022). "Because childhood is fleeting, 

a parent's unfitness is not temporary if it is reasonably likely 

to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate period." Adoption 

of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60. In light of the mother's 

longstanding struggles with substance misuse and domestic 

violence, the judge properly determined that the mother's

unfitness was likely to continue into the indefinite future.6 

While we commend the steps the mother took to comply with the 

department's action plan, there was ample support for the 

conclusion that she lacked insight into her substance misuse and 

domestic violence. She continued to misuse drugs and engaged in 

6 The mother claims that it was error to admit, over objection, 

Walter's CARI in evidence. When relevant to parental unfitness, 

a parent's criminal record is admissible, and judges may

"consider the widest range of permissible evidence, including 

. . . evidence of each parent's present home environment." 

Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 231 n.21 (1998), cert. denied 

sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999), quoting 

Ardizoni v. Raymond, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 734, 738 (1996). Given 

the judge's findings that Walter and the mother lived together, 

had been in a relationship since 2018, and, at one point, were 

engaged to be married, the judge did not abuse her "broad 

discretion" in determining that Walter's criminal record was 

relevant to the home environment. See Nunes v. Duffy, 101 Mass. 

App. Ct. 460, 462 (2022).
9

a series of relationships with violent men. See Adoption of 

Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 168-169 (2012), quoting Care & 

Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998) ("These 

patterns of behavior would place [the children] 'at serious risk 

of peril' from neglect by [the mother] were [they] returned to 

[her] custody"). Further, because a "condition which is 

reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period, such as alcohol or drug addiction . . . [that] makes the 

parent . . . unlikely to provide minimally acceptable care of 

the child is not a temporary condition," the judge did not err 

in considering the mother's substance use disorder in 

determining that her unfitness was likely to continue 

indefinitely7 (citation omitted). Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 

24, 31 (2006).

7 The mother argues that the judge erred in drawing a negative 

inference from her absence from trial, but not from the 

father's. "[A] trial judge has discretion to determine whether 

to draw an adverse inference from a parent's absence. . . . In 

determining whether to exercise that discretion, 'the judge as 

fact finder' is to consider whether such an inference is 'fair 

and reasonable based on all the circumstances and evidence 

before' her." Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 372 

(2017), quoting Singh v. Capuano, 468 Mass. 328, 334 (2014). 

Here, the mother failed to offer explanations for her absences 

from the fourth, fifth, and sixth days of trial. Although the 

mother claimed to be ill on the final day, the judge requested 

her appearance on Zoom to assess the credibility of her excuse,

and the mother did not respond to the request. See Care & 

Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 711 (1984) ("It is 

within the judge's discretion to evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses and to make his findings of fact accordingly"). 
10

In light of the foregoing, we see no error in the judge's 

conclusion that the mother had "'grievous shortcomings or 

handicaps' that put the [children's] welfare 'much at hazard'" 

were they returned to her care. Adoption of Uday, 91 Mass. App. 

Ct. 51, 55 (2017), quoting Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. 

Ct. 25, 28 (1997).

c. Best interests of the children. "[T]he best interests

analysis . . . requires a court to focus on the various factors 

unique to the situation of the individual[s] for whom it must

act." Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 753 (1978). "The 

standard for parental unfitness and the standard for termination 

are not separate and distinct, but 'reflect different degrees of 

emphasis on the same factors.'" Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. at

515, quoting Petition of the New England Home for Little 

Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 

641 (1975). "In determining whether the best interests of the 

child will be served by issuing a decree . . . the court . . .

shall also consider the plan proposed by the department or other 

agency initiating the petition." G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c). Here, 

the judge's findings as to the mother's future unfitness 

provided evidentiary support for the determination that 

termination was in the best interests of the children due to (1) 

the mother's inability to provide a safe environment, and (2)
11

her lack of insight regarding her actions. See Adoption of 

Lisette, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 296-297 (2018). 

"Stability in the lives of children is important, 

particularly in a case that has continued for a long period of 

time in the hope that the [parents] could and would successfully 

rehabilitate [themselves]." Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. at 

517. At the time of trial, the department's plan for John was 

adoption by his preadoptive family, where he was currently 

living. Harry was living in a separate foster home, and that 

family was considering whether to adopt him. The department's 

plan was adoption by his foster family or recruitment for 

adoption. The judge found that both children were doing well in 

their placements, with Harry improving in the care of his foster 

family. The judge also considered that the children would 

maintain consistent contact with their half-siblings, with whom 

they share a strong emotional bond. We see no abuse of 

discretion.

2. Termination of father's parental rights. a. Father's 

future unfitness. On appeal, the father does not challenge his 

fitness at the time of trial but argues that the judge erred in 

finding that his unfitness would likely continue. We are not 

persuaded. The judge had ample evidence to support her finding

that the father's extensive history of substance misuse, his 

criminal history, pattern of perpetuating domestic violence, 
12

mental health struggles, and inability to regulate his emotions

indicated that his unfitness would continue indefinitely. 

The father began abusing prescription medication in 2009, 

and at the time of the children's removal, was "dabbling" in 

methamphetamine. Although his drug screens presented "no 

concerns" in the year after the removal, the father relapsed in 

the spring of 2019. He tested positive for cocaine in May 2019, 

purchased methamphetamine in the mother's home in May 2019, had 

"glassy eyes" during a family visit in June 2019, and admitted 

to having relapsed on cocaine and fentanyl in June 2019. 

Despite numerous stays in residential drug treatment facilities

between June 2020 and February 2021, the father continued to use

drugs in April 2021 and during trial. Accordingly, there was 

ample support for the finding that the father lacked insight 

into his substance misuse and that his unfitness was likely to 

continue. See Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. at 31.

The father's criminal history dates to 1987 and includes 

convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 

weapon, possession and distribution of controlled substances, 

larceny, criminal harassment, trespassing, and resisting arrest. 

As a result of his criminal activity, the father's life has been 

punctuated by periods of incarceration during which he did not 

visit with or speak to the children, including from August 2019 

to October 2019, February 2020 to March 2020, and June 2021 to 
13

September 2021.8 See Care & Protection of Frank, 409 Mass. at 

495; Adoption of Frederick, 405 Mass. 1, 7 (1989) (judge may 

consider "lengthy separation between a parent and child" in 

making best interests determination). The judge's findings 

illustrated that the father's criminal history affected his 

ability to be present in the children's lives and supported the 

determination that his unfitness would likely continue

indefinitely. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60.

The judge also correctly considered the father's pattern of 

domestic violence against women, including the mother. Between 

1993 and 2018, the father was the subject of restraining orders 

filed by at least five different women. During June and August 

2019, the father was involved in a domestic dispute and was 

reported for knocking a woman unconscious, sexually assaulting, 

and threatening her. Cf. Adoption of Carlos, 413 Mass. 339, 350 

(1992) (in determining whether unfitness is temporary, judge may 

consider evidence that provides "reason to believe that a parent 

will correct a condition or weakness that currently disables the 

parent from serving his or her child's best interests"). 

8 The evidence amply supported the judge's findings that the 

father had not seen the children in person in two years, that 

Harry was "triggered" by video calls with the father, and that 

the father made "inappropriate" comments to the children. In 

making the best interests determination, the judge was entitled 

to weigh the evidence as she saw fit, and "[w]e do not sit as a 

trial court to review de novo the evidence presented by the 

parties." Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. 71, 730 (1995). 
14

In addition, the judge identified concerns about the 

father's ability to manage his emotional and mental health. The 

father testified that, despite his efforts at anger management, 

his temper sometimes got the best of him. The father yelled at, 

swore at, and hung up on the social worker, and was described as 

"combative" and "argumentative" during phone calls with the 

department.

Despite having been diagnosed with attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder and bipolar disorder, the father had been 

inconsistent with his mental health services since his 2019 

relapse. See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 146-147 (2020). 

Here, the concern was "not that the [father] has mental health 

challenges, but that those challenges remained largely 

unaddressed," to the children's detriment. Id. at 146 n.17. 

See Adoption of Frederick, 405 Mass. at 9 (parent's mental 

disorder relevant to extent it affects parent's capacity to 

assume parental responsibility). Although the father made 

positive efforts with respect to his action plan prior to the 

department's goal change, he was unable to verify that he was 

seeing a psychiatrist at the time of trial. Especially when 

considered in combination with the judge's findings that the 

father "fail[ed] . . . to take responsibility for his behaviors" 

and "blam[ed] others," this evidence further supports the 
15

judge's conclusion that the father's unfitness was likely to 

continue.

b. Best interests of children. In finding that 

termination of the father's parental rights was in the best 

interests of the children, the judge properly considered the 

father's "ability, capacity, fitness, and readiness," as well as 

the department's plans for the children. G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c). 

We see no error in the judge's conclusion that the children's

best interests would be served by terminating the father's 

parental rights. The judge found that the father was unable to 

maintain consistency, stability, and safety for the children 

based on evidence that the father relapsed and was arrested on 

multiple occasions during the pendency of this action; was 

untruthful with the department about his treatment and housing; 

had multiple periods of noncontact with the department and his 

children; and continued to blame the department for the lack of 

reunification with the children. The judge also found that both 

children were improving in their placements. See Adoption of 

Oren, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 842, 846-847 (2020). The judge was not 

required to grant the father an "indefinite opportunity to 

reform," and considering the evidence that this unfitness was

not temporary, "the judge . . . properly determine[d] that the 

child's welfare would be best served by ending all legal 
16

relations between parent and child." Adoption of Cadence, 81

Mass. App. Ct. at 169. 

The father contends that Harry's behavioral problems 

worsened in the department's care and that, because the 

department had not identified a preadoptive home for him, it was 

not in his best interests to terminate the father's parental 

rights. This argument is at odds with the judge's finding that 

Harry was doing well and was in a potential preadoptive 

placement. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59 (appellate 

courts give "substantial deference" to decision that termination 

of parent's rights is in child's best interests, and "reverse 

only where findings of fact are clearly erroneous"). A fully 

formed adoption plan need not be developed before a parent's 

rights are terminated, so long as there is "sufficient 

information about the prospective adoptive placement so that the 

judge may properly evaluate the suitability of the department's 

proposal" (quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of Willow, 

433 Mass. 636, 652 (2001).

3. Reasonable efforts. In deciding whether a parent's 

unfitness is merely temporary, "[a] judge may consider the 

department's failure to make reasonable efforts [to reunify the 

parent and child]." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61. On 

appeal, both parents argue that the department failed to make 

reasonable efforts at reunification. "It is well-established 
17

that a parent must raise a claim of inadequate services in a 

timely manner." Adoption of Daisy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 781 

(2010), S.C., 460 Mass. 72 (2011). "The parent should assert 

the claim 'either when the parenting plan is adopted, when [s]he 

receives those services, or shortly thereafter.'" Adoption of 

West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020), quoting Adoption of 

Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 124 (2001). "A parent cannot raise a 

claim of inadequate services for the first time on appeal, as 

the department would not have had the opportunity to address 

it." Adoption of West, supra at 242. Because the mother did 

not raise her reasonable efforts claim before trial, it is 

waived on appeal. Even were the mother's claim not waived, 

there was ample evidence supporting the judge's determination

that the department met its obligations and "complied with its 

duty to make 'reasonable efforts . . . to prevent or eliminate 

the need for removal [of the child] from the home.'" Adoption 

of Ilona, supra, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 29C.

We will treat the father's claim as having been raised in 

the trial court because the judge explicitly found that the 

father raised concerns that the department was not doing 

anything to support him and or reunify the children with him. 

For approximately one year, the department's goal was 

reunification of the children with the mother and father. The 

department provided the father with referrals to therapy and to
18

group programs and assigned him a parent partner for support 

with his substance misuse and mental health issues. The father 

was progressing on his action plan but failed to meet with the 

department regularly for home visits, and he tested positive for 

substances in 2019. 

Despite being willing to engage in services, both parents 

struggled to benefit from those services or show insight into

their behavior and its effect on the children. Based on both 

the mother's and the father's failure to demonstrate lasting

benefits from the services the department provided them, we see 

no abuse of discretion in the judge's conclusion that reasonable 

efforts had been made at reunification. See Adoption of Mario, 

43 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 774 (1997) (department's duty to 

"preserve the biological ties between [a parent] and child" but 

that duty is "contingent upon [a parent's] fulfillment of [his]

own parental responsibilities"). 

Decrees affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, Walsh & 

Hershfang, JJ.9),

Clerk

Entered: August 2, 2023.

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.