### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Fe br ua ry 22, 200 6 S es sio n
ANTHONY FRANKLI N v. SW IFT T RANSPORTATI ON CO., INC.

A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-006832-02 The Honorable Kay S. Robilio, Jud ge

No. W2005-01062-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 12, 2006

Th is i s a re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e c a se . T he fo rm e r e mpl oy e e of a truc kin g c omp a ny

fi le d s uit a g a ins t the truc kin g c omp a ny

fo r s tat ut ory

a ndc omm on la w r e ta liatory dis c ha rg e , a lle g ing that hi s e mpl oyme nt w a s te rm inate d d ue to h is r efus al to violate a Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f S a fe ty reg ulation that require d the t ruck to car ry an orig inal “ca

b car d” showing reg istration. The employ er ha d d ir e c te d th e e mpl oy e e truc k d river to d e liv e r m e rc ha nd ise to a c us tom e r, a ssi g nin g him a particula r truck. T he orig inal cab c ard f or the truc k could not be found, so the e mp l o y er g ave the
e m p l o ye e a

p h o t o c o p y o f

t h e c ab c ar d

. T h e e m p l o ye e r e f u s e d t o d r i v e t h e tru c k w i t h o n l y a photocopy , and anothe r truck c ould not be located. T he next day , the employ ee tr uck d ri ver w as fired. T he truc k driver sued the employ er trucking company for retaliatory discharg e, alleg ing that his e mpl oyme nt wa s disc ha rg e d for re fu sin g to part ic ipate in an ill e g a l a c tiv ity . T he She lby Cou nty Circuit Court entere d judgme nt on a jury verdic t in favor of the e mploy ee. We r ever se, finding that the employ ee’ s ref

usal to pe rform the assig ned work ba sed on the re g ulation requiring the orig inal cab car d, as opposed to a photocopy , did not further important public policy conce rns, and ther efor e would not support a claim of r etaliatory discharg e. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , jo in e d

. W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., dissented.

Jef f We int ra ub , J. G re g ory

Grish a m a ndC. M ic ha e l B e c ke r o f M e mph is, Te nn e sse e fo r A pp e lla nt, Swift Transporta tion, I nc.

Do na ld A . D on a ti a ndWilli a m B . Ry a n o f M e mph is, Te nn e sse e fo r A pp e lle e , A nth on y F rank linFra nk l i n w as ori gi nal l y hi r ed by M

. S. Carr i er s

. I n t he s ummer of 200 1, Swi f

t T r ans po r t at i on Co

. , I nc. ac qui r ed 1
M

. S. Car r i er s

. M

. S. Car r i er s wa s v ol u n t ar i l y di s mi s s ed f r om t h i s a ct i on by O r der of t h e t r i al c ou r t on M ar ch 21, 2005. T h e e m p lo ye r w ill b e re fer re d to he re in a s “S w ift .”
-2- OP IN ION
Plaintiff/Appellee Anthony Fr anklin w a s h ire d

b y D e f e n d an t/ Appellant Swift Tra nsportation Co., I nc. (“ Swift”) in October 2000 as an ove r-the- ro ad d river. A fter c ompleting a thirty -day 1 training prog ram, Franklin wa s assig ned as a driver f or a de dicated a ccount f

o r the Dollar Tr ee sto re s, a c ha in o f c on ve nie nc e -t ype re ta il s tor e s. I n th is p os iti on , th e drive r d e livers mer c ha nd ise reg ionally

to store l ocations, m any in small towns. The assig nment require d a hig hly skilled or very
e xpe ri e nc e d d ri ve r. F or

a n a c c ou nt s uc h a s th is, a

drive r i n Me mph is wo uld be able to b e ho me wi th his family three to four nig hts a wee k, normally on the wee kends. This would g ive the drive r more time at home than a “ reg ular line haul,” for w hich a driver would ty pically be aw ay from home three
we e ks a t a

tim e . In th e no rm a l c ou rs e of his e mpl oyme nt a s a

de dic a te d D oll ar T re e drive r, F ra nk lin would rec eive a

dispatch call, and then g o to the Doll ar Tree distribution fac ility in Olive Br anch, Mississ ippi to pick up a trailer loaded with merc handise to be delivered to a D ollar Tre e store in the southeast re g ion of the Unit ed S tates. Gene rally , Fr anklin drove two shipments a we ek and g rossed betwee n $700 and $1,000 per wee k.

The Dollar

Tree acc ount was a luc rative, important acc ount for Swift. Dollar Tr ee ha d very high “ on time” re quirements for its merchandise deliverie s, and Swift would be pena liz ed if its ontim e pe rf orma nc e fe ll b e low nin e ty -f ive pe rc e nt. F a ilu re to m a int a in an o n- tim e de liv e ry sc he du le would also aff

ect Swift’s ability to ke ep the acc ount. I t w as important for a driver on an a cc o u nt such as this to pick up his trailer of merc handise by the appointed time so that he wo u l d get the require d eig ht-hour re st break to c omplete the run.

Swift at that time was a “fo rc ed d i s p atch” company , which mea nt that, once a driver w as a s s i g n e d t o d e l i v e r

a l o a d , h e c o u l d n o t r e f

u s e t o d o s o u n l e s s t h e r e w a s a n e m e r g e n c y. S p e c i f i c a l l y, dedicated driver s for Dollar Tree wer e not permitted to refuse to de liver a loa d.

On De c e mbe r 2 , 2 00 1, F rank lin re c e ive d a dis patc h c a ll a ndwe nt t o the Do lla r Tr e e fa c ili ty in Olive Br anch, Mississippi. There, Franklin wa s to pick up a trailer of merc handise a nd deliver it to a Dollar Tre e location in the Dallas, Texas are a by the next morning. Afte r picking up the trailer, Franklin we nt to the Swift terminal in Memp h i s , T en n essee , to ge t fuel and ha ve his truck inspected by

a maintena nce e mploy ee. When he arrived, Fr an k l i n was tol d by the maintenanc e employ ee that his truck neede d to be t aken out of ser vice f or routine maintenance that was due on the vehicle . Fr anklin then contacted the wee kend dis patche r, Kim Roge rs (“ Roge rs”) , to inform her that his truck had be en take n out of servic e. Consequently , Roge rs assig ned Franklin a loa ner truc k, truck #16064.

Fr anklin located truck #16064, and performed the mandatory pre- trip inspection of the truc k,
as re quired by

Swift. The inspection included c hecking all paperwo rk i n t he truc k, such as-3-

maintena n ce and reg istration permits kept in the truck’s pe rmit book. The truck c hecke d out satisfac torily , except that truck #16064' s I nterna tional Reg istration Plan card (“IRP ca b car d”) w as missing. The IRP cab ca rd is a pink-c olored motor re g istration car d issued b y the State of Tenne ssee, listing a ll of the states in which the ve hicle is reg istered to oper ate.

Fr anklin contac ted Rog ers a g ain to tell her that the origina l I RP cab ca rd wa s missi ng from truc k # 16 06 4. I n r e sp on se , Ro g e rs tol d Frank lin to “ ru n w ith [ th e tr uck ] a ny way .” F rank lin tol d Roge rs that he did not fe el comfortable driving t he truck without the original I RP cab ca rd. Rog ers told Fra nklin to contact the roa d maintenanc e re cords de partment to find out whethe r they had a back- up orig inal of the I RP ca b car d for truck #16064. Fr anklin contac ted th e r o ad m ai n tenanc e rec ords depa

rtment and wa s told that they only had a black and white photocopy of the I RP cab ca rd for truc k #16064. Fr anklin called Rog ers a nd told her that the road maintenanc e re cords de partment only had a phot o co p y

of the I RP cab ca

rd. Rog ers told Fr anklin to take truc k #16064 with the photocopy

of the I RP cab ca

rd. When Fr anklin expressed reluc tance , she assure d him that driving the truck w ith a photocopied ca b car d would not be a moving violation or a D .O.T. violation, that it would not go on his driving rec ord, and that if he we re stopped f or it and any

fine wa s assessed,
or a nythi ng e lse ha

pp e ne d a s a

re su lt o f o nly

ha vin g a c op y , th e c omp a ny

wo uldpa y

fo r i t. D e sp ite thi s, Frank lin re fu se d to drive the truc k w ith ou t th e orig ina l I RP c ab c arda nda sk e d Ro g e rs to l oc a te another loaner truck. Rog ers a cquiesc ed, and a ssigne d Fr anklin a sec ond loaner truck.

Considerable time ha d passed by this point . Fr anklin sear ched f or the sec ond loaner

truck, but was unable to locate it on the Swift lot. F inally , Fr anklin called the dispatch off ice to tell them that he could not f

ind the second loa ner truc k. Fr anklin was then infor med by the dispatch staf

f that the delivery

load had be en take n off of him, and that he nee ded to c ontact the acc ount manag er f or the Dollar Tr ee a ccount the next morning

. Be fore leaving the Swift terminal, Fr anklin discovere d that th e se c on d lo a ne r t

ru c k th a t he ha d b e e n trying to l oc a te on the Me mph is Sw if t lo t w a s a c tua lly in Brow nsville, Tennessee

. The ne x t morning, Monday , Dec ember 3, 2001, Fr anklin went to t he Swift offic es to meet with the acc ount manag er f o r t he Dollar

Tree acc ount, Montel Maners. When he a rrived at the office s, Franklin learne d that he had been terminated from his job. That morning , at 8:05 a.m., Debbie A shley , Fr anklin’s immediate supervisor, made a n entry into Swift’s c omputer sy stem that Fr anklin had been terminated for ref using a load. After

learning of

his termination, Fra nklin went to the Swi ft

Emplo y e e Re la tio ns de pa rt me nt. F rank lin wa s tol d to write a su mma ry of the e ve nts that occur

red, w hich he did. Fr an k l i n was then told that Swift employ ee Jerry Stairs (“Stairs”) neede d to review the appe al letter, an d that Fr anklin would be conta cted a fter Stairs’ revie w. On Dec ember

4, 2001, Fr anklin contac ted S tairs t o discuss his appeal. A me eting was set f or De cembe r 5, 2001. At the Dec ember 5, 2001 meeting , Stairs told Franklin that he ha d conta ct ed Montel Maner s, but nothing had be en re solved. On De cembe r 31, 2001, Franklin re cei v ed a separation notice fr om Swift, stating that he ha d quit his employ ment to take anothe r job.

On Dec ember 2, 2002, Fr anklin filed a lawsuit ag ainst Swift for statutory and common law
re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e , a lle g ing tha

t hi s emp loyme nt wa s te rm inate d d ue to h is r e fu sa l to vio la te sa fe tySwi f t ’ s bri ef ex pl ai ns t hat t he t r i al cour t l at er s t at ed t hat Fr ank l i n h ad es t abl i s hed t he exist enc e of a c l ear 2
pu bl i c po l i c y i n T e n n e s s e e t h a t i t w a s u n l a w f u l t o ope r a t e a c om me r c i a l mo t or v e h i c l e w i t h ou t t h e or i g i n a l of t h e I RP

c a b c a rd in the c a b

. F r o m o u r re v ie w o f t h e re c o rd , ho w e v e r, S w ift ’s cita tio n to the re c o rd fo r th is p ro p o sitio n is i nco rr ect

. T hi s C o urt was unable t o l o cat e any cl ari f i cat i o n f rom t he t ri al co urt exp l ai ni ng t he l egal ba ses fo r denyi ng S w ift ’s m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t ex c e p t f o r th e trial c o u rt’s sta te m e n t t h a t i t f e lt it w a s a “c o lo ra b le c la im .”
-4- provisions of Tenne ss ee M o t o r C arriers Ac t. Fra nklin sought bac k pay , front pay in lieu of reinstateme nt, and compensatory and punitiv ed ama g e s

. Swift answer ed and a sserted the aff irmative defe nses that Fr anklin failed to state a claim upon which r eli ef co u l d b e g rante d, that Fr anklin’s claims wer e pre -empted by the Surfac e Transportation Assistance A ct of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 31105, and that Franklin’s e mploy ment with Swift would have ended re gardless of his refusa l to drive a truc k th a t w a s a lle g e dly no t in c omp li ance wi th the Te nn e sse e Mo tor Carrie rs Ac t a ndits implementing r eg ulations.

On Oct ob er 15 , 2 00 4, Swi ft fi le d a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, arg uin g that Fra nk lin could not establish a ca

use of a ction for r etaliatory discharg e bec ause Franklin’ s refusal to drive loaner truck number

#16064 was a

lawful re ason for

Swift to terminate his employ ment

. Swift
asserted that Fr anklin did n o t have suf ficient re ason for

ref using to take the truck be cause he persona lly

did not know of any

inspectors who would not a cce pt a photocopy of the I RP cab ca

rd,
a s o pp os e d to the orig ina l I RP c ab c ard

. On Janu ary 28 , 2 00 5, the tr ia l c ou rt , a ft e r h e ari ng arg ume nts from counsel, denied Swift’s motion for summary judgme nt. On Fe bruary

8, 2005, the trial court enter ed an or der de ny ing Swift ’s m o t i on for summary judge ment; absent fr om the order was a ny explanation of the trial court’s leg al conclusions. On Marc h 14, 2005, Swift filed a motion for the tr ia l c ou rt ’s state me nt o f l e g a l g ro un ds fo r i ts d e nia l of Swi ft ’s mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. 2
The jury trial beg an on Mar ch 21, 2005. At the close of Franklin’s c ase, Swift made a motion for dire cted ve rdict pursua nt to Rul e 50 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civi l Procedur e. Swift arg ued that Tenne ssee law did not require the orig inal, as opposed to a c opy , of t h e I R P cab car d, and that driving a commer cial motor vehic le without an orig inal I RP cab car d did not rise to the leve l of clea r public policy

in Tennesse e re lat i n g t o h ealth, safety and public we lfare . The trial c ourt denied Swift’s mot i o n for directed ve rdict. At the c onclusion of the proof , Swift renew ed its motion for direc ted ver dict , b ased on the same ar g ument. The trial c ourt ag ain denied Swift’s motion for direc ted ver dict. Following closing arg uments, the jury returne d a ver dict in favor of Fr anklin, and
awa rded Franklin lost wag es in the amount of $51,878.00.
On April 27, 2005, Swift filed a motion for judg ment notwithstanding the ve rdict, or in the alternative, for a

new tria l. Swift arg ued that the tria l c ourt err ed in de ny ing its motion for summary jud g me nt, a s w e ll as its la te r mot ion s for dir e c te d v e rd ic t, s inc e the re qu ir e me nt t o k e e p th e orig ina l, as opposed t o a p h o to c o p y , o f th e I RP c ab c ar d in th e tr u c k c ab d id n o t c o n s ti tu te a c le ar a nd unambig uous public policy of the State of T en nessee rela ting to saf ety , health, or public w elfa re. For this reason, Swift a

rg ued, a termination based on a ref usal to drive a tr

uck without the orig inal I RP c ab c ar d d id n o t c o n s ti tu te a c ti o n ab le r e ta li a to r y d is c h ar g e o r w h is tl e b lo w in g u n d e r the Tenne ssee c ommon law or the Te nnessee Public Protection Act. On May 2, 2005, Fr anklin filed a motion for an orde r aw arding prejudg ment interest, which was denied by the t rial court. On M ay 25,-5-

2005, the trial court entere d an orde r denying Swift’s motion for judg ment n o t wi t h s tanding the
ve rd ic t, o r i n th e a lte rn a tiv e , f or a ne w t ri a l. Fro m th e se or de rs , Sw if t no w a pp e a ls.
On appe al, Swift asserts that the tria l court er red i n (1 ) fa iling to g rant Swift’s motion for summary judgme nt; (2) fa iling to direc t a ver dict in Swift’s favor; a nd, (3) deny ing Swift’s motion fo r j ud g me nt n otw ith sta nd ing the ve rd ic t. S wi ft make s th e sa me arg ume nt b e fo re thi s Co urt th a t it made to the tria l court, that is, that the termination of an at-will employ ee for ref using to opera te a
commerc ial motor vehicle w ith a photocopy of the I RP cab ca

rd, as oppose d to the orig inal, does not violate a c lear

and unambig uous public policy in the State of Tenne ssee r elated to health, safe ty , or welfa r e s u f f ic ie n t to s u p p o r t a c laim f o r r e ta li a to r y d is c h ar g e u n d e r th e c o mm o n law or the Tenne ssee Public Protection Ac t. I n response , Fr anklin arg ues that his ref usal to operate a
commerc ial motor vehicle w ithout the origina l of the I RP cab ca rd as r equire d by

Tenne ssee law was the e qu iva le nt o f r e fu sin g to p a rt ic ipate in i lle g a l ac tiv iti e s, a nd , w a s th e re fo re su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh
a c la im for ret ali atory

dis c ha rg e un de r the c omm on la w o r the Te nn e sse e Pub lic Pr ote c tio n A c t. Fr anklin also raise s an issue on appea l, a sserting that the trial court e rre d in deny ing his motion for pr e jud g me nt i nte re st.

As to Swi ft ’s a sse rt ion that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de nying its mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt, that is su e wi ll n ot b e re vie we d o n a pp e a l. “ A t

ri a l c ou rt ' s d e nia l of

a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, predic ated upon the exis tence of a g enuine issue of materia l f act, is not reviewa

ble on appe al when
a judgme nt is subsequently rende red afte r a tria l on the merits.” Bradford v. City of Clarksville, 885 S.W .2d 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). There fore , the denial of S wift’s sum mary judgme nt motion i s not
re vie wa ble on app e a l.

Swift assert s on appea l that the trial court e rre d in failing to direct a verdic t in its favor , at the close of

Fr anklin’s proof, and, ag ain, when Swift r enew ed its motion for direc ted verdic t at the
c on c l u s i o n o f t h e p r o o f, o n t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e r e g u l a t o r y i n f r a c t i o n b y S w i f

t w a s i n s u f

f i c i e n tto
su pp ort Frank lin ’s c la im o f r e ta liatory dis c ha rg e . A dir e c te d v e rd ic t un de r e ith e r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 50.01 or 50.02 is appropriate only when, after taking the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence fa vo ri ng the op po ne nt an d dra wi ng a ll re a so na ble inf e re nc e s in fa vo r of

tha t op po ne nt, re a so na

ble minds cannot differ

as to the conc lusions to be drawn fr om the evidenc e. Ale xa nde r v . Ar

mentr out , 24 S.W. 3d 26 7, 27 1 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Eat on v . M c La in, 89 1 S. W.2 d 5 87 , 5 90 (T e nn . 1 99 4) ; Ingram v. E arth man, 993 S.W .2d 611, 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Apost-trial motion for entry of judgme nt in accor dance with a motion f or a direc ted verdic t ma de during the trial is g aug ed by the same standa

rd. Hol mes v . W ils on, 551 S.W .2d 682, 685 (Tenn. 1977) (citing V aughan v . She lto n, 51 4 S.W. 2d 87 0, 87 4 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 74 ); Keller v. East Tennessee Production Credit As s'n, 501 S.W .2d 810, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)) . Under this standard of r eview, w e addr ess the substantive issue raised by

Swift on appea l, namely , whether Fr anklin can sustain a

cause of action for re taliatory discharg e for

his refusa l to drive Swift’s truck with a photoc opy of the I RP cab ca

rd, rather than the orig inal cab c ard.

Th e e mpl oyme nt- a t- wi ll d oc tr ine is a be dr oc k o f T e nn e sse e c om mo n la w. Un de r this doctrine, e mploy ment for a n indefinite term may be terminated by

either the employ er or

the-6-

employ ee at any time, f

or g ood cause , bad ca

use, or no c ause at all. Guy v . M utua l of Omaha Ins

. Co. , 79 S.W .3d 528, 534-35 (Te nn. 2002). This traditional rule, howeve r, is not absolute; restric tions have been impos ed on the right of the employ er to discha

rg e an e mploy ee. Id. at 535. I n Ch is m v . M

id

- So ut h M il ling Co. , 762 S. W.2 d 5 52 , 5 56 (T e nn . 1 98 8) , th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ind ic a te d it s wi lli ng ne ss to re c og nize a c la im f or re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e wh e re the e mpl oy e e is discharg ed in contra vention of public policy

. Se e als o G uy , 7 9 S. W.3 d at 53 5; Cl an to n v . Ca inSl o a n C o. , 677 S.W .2d 441 (Tenn. 1984) . I n Chis m , the plaintiff alleg ed that he w as dischar g ed beca use he insisted that his employ er comply with the I nterna l Re venue Code. Chis m , 762 S.W .2d at 554. The Chis m court discussed the para meters of a ca use of a ction for r etaliatory discharg e:

I t is obvious t hat the exception ca nnot be permitted to consume or eliminat e the g ener al rule. . . . To be liable for r etaliatory disch ar ge i n ca s es such as this, the employ er must violate a cl ea r public policy . Usually this poli cy

will be evidenc ed by an unambig uous constitutional, st atutory or re g ulatory

provision.

Id. at 556. The Chis m court we nt on to recite “ [e] x amples of c lear ly define d public policies which
war rant the pr otection provided by this cause of

action. . . .” Id. Th e se e xamp le s in c lud e d c a se s in which the e mploy ee w as dischar g ed for ref using to c ommit perjury , for insisting on obe y ing a lawful subpoena, f

or re fusing to seek to be e x cused f rom jury duty , for r efusing to falsely certify the require d testing of consumer products, and for reporting consumer f raud violations. Id. (citations omitted). The Chis m court c ommented: “I n eac h of these c ases . . . ve ry specific statutory

violations
wer e cha rg ed, and usua lly

the employ ee’ s persona l exp o s u re to civil or criminal sanc tions was emphasized.” Id. The c ourt found the plaintiff’s alleg ations in his complaint insufficient to support a cla im of retaliatory

discharg e, stating : “I n order to state a claim for relief f or this very

exceptional tort a c tio n, the ple a de r mus t sh ow c le ar vio la tio n of so me we ll- de fi ne d a nd e sta bli shed p ub lic policy .” Id.
Two y ear s afte r t he decision in Chis m , the Tenne ssee leg islature codif ied the common-la w cause of action for reta liatory discharg e by enac ting the Tenne ssee Public Protec tion Act , wh ich
c ur re ntl y pr ov ide s: (a ) N o e mpl oy e e sh a ll be dis c ha rg e d or te rm inate d sole ly

fo r r e fu sin g to p art ic ipate in, or fo r r e fu sin g to r e ma in s ile nt a bo ut, ill e g a l a c tiv iti e s. * * * (c) As used in this section , “i l l egal a ctivities” means a ctivities that are in violation of the c riminal or civil code of this state or the United States or anyreg ulation intended to protec t the public health, saf ety or we lfare

. (d)( 1) Any

employ ee te rminated in violation of Subsection (a) shall have a cause of action ag ainst the employ er f or re taliatory

discharg e and any

other da mag es to which the employ ee may

be entitled.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 1-304(a ), (c) and (d)( 1) (2005). By enac ting the Public Protec tion Act, the leg islature re cog nized the importance of encour ag ing employ ees to report violations “of those la ws-7-

and reg ulations ‘ intended to pr otect the public hea lth, safety or we lfare .’ ” Guy , 79 S.W .3d at 537. I n Guy , the court held that the Public Pr o t ec t i o n Act “is cumulative to, and does not pre empt, the common law tort re medy for r etaliatory

disc h arge claims wher e the e mploy ee w as dischar g ed for reporting illeg al or une thical conduc t.” Id.

I n this case, Franklin asse rts a cla im for re taliatory discharg e under both the c ommon law and the Te nn e sse e Pub lic Pr ote c tio n A c t. T o p re va il u nd e r the Pub lic Pr ote c tio n A c t, the plaint if f m us t establish (1) his status as an e mploy ee of the def endant e m p l o y er; (2) his refusal to participate in,
or re main silent about, “illeg al ac tiviti es” a s defined unde r the Ac t; (3) his termination; and (4) a n exclu sive causal relationship between his re fusal to participate in or re main silent about illega l activities and his termination. T

. C.A. § 50-1-304. The elements re quired in orde r to prove a
c omm on la w r e ta liatory dis c ha rg e c la im are sim ila

r; the plaint if

f mus t sh ow (1 ) that a n e mpl oy me ntat-will relationship ex isted; (2) that he w as discharg ed; (3) that the rea son for his dischar g e wa s that he a tte mpt e d to e xer c ise a statut ory or c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht, or fo r an y oth e r r e a so n w hic h v iol a te s a clea r publ ic pol icy evidenc ed by an unambiguous constit utional, statutory , or re g ulatory provision; and (4) that a substantial fa ctor in the e mploy er’ s decisio n t o d i s ch ar g e him was his exercise of p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s o r h i s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h c l e ar p u b l i c p o l i c y. Cre ws v . Buc kman L ab or ato rie s In t'l

, I nc., 78 S.W. 3da t 86 2; see also Guy, 79 S.W. 3da t 53 5; Mason v. Seaton, 9 4 2 S. W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997) ; Stein v. Davidson Hot el Co., 94 5 S.W.2 d 714 , 717 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 83 3 S. W.2 d 8 96 , 8 99 (T e nn . 1 99 2) ; Chism , 762 S.W .2d at 556.

On ap p eal, it is undisputed that Fra nklin was an e mploy ee of Swift and that he wa s discharg ed. The jury found a c ausal re lationship between his discha rg e and his re fusal to drive the loaner truck be cause it had a photocopy of the I RP cab ca

rd i nstead of the orig inal, and Swift does
n o tas s er to n ap p ea l th at t h er e w as i n s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce t o s u p p o rt t h i s fi n d i n g.
Th is a pp e a l tu rn s, the n, on the fi na l ele me nt, sim ila r und e r the c omm on la w a ndthe Pub lic Protection Act. Under the P ublic Protection Act, it must be found that the violation by the employ er c on sti tut e s a n “ ill e g a l act iv ity ,” de fi ne d a s “ a c tiv iti e s th a t are in v iol a tio n o f the c ri min a l or c ivi l
c od e of thi s st a te or the Un ite d Stat e s o r [a ] re g ulatio n in te nd e d to pr ote c t th e pu bli c he a lth , s a fe ty
o r w el fare

. ” T

. C

. A. § 5 1 -1 -3 0 4 (c ). Un d er t h e c o m m o n l aw , t h e m o t i v at i n g fa ct o r f o r t h e d i s ch ar ge must be the employ ee’ s compliancewith “a c lear public pol i cy

evidenc ed by

an unambig uous constitutional, statutory , o r re gu l at ory provision.” Cre ws , 78 S.W .3d at 862. The issue be comes wh e the r S wi ft ’s re g ulatory vio la tio n rise s to thi s le ve l.

A commer cial vehic le such a s th e S wi ft truck at issue in this case must be licensed a nd reg istered to oper ate in the State of Tenne ssee. Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 55- 4-101(a )(2) , the re g istration and fe es ar e a privilege tax which must be paid in orde r t o operate in Tenne ssee. O th e r s tate s a n d ju r is d ic ti o n s r e q u ir e r e g is tr a ti o n a s w e ll , w h ic h b e c o me s a p r a c ti c a l p r o b le m f or commerc ial vehicles ope rating in interstate commerc e, bec ause suc h vehicles w ould have to re g ister in numerous jurisdictions. Consequently , states of the U nited States and some provinc es in Canada adopted the International Reg istration Plan (“I RP”), a re g istration rec ipro c it y a g r e e me n t u n d e r

w hich the re g istration fee s for a n individual vehicle ar e allocated among the juris d i ct i o n s i n which the-8-

vehicle ope rate s. Under the I RP, t he vehic le is issued one li cense plate and one re g istration, called
a n I RP c ab c ard , w hic h s ho ws that th e ve hic le is pro perl y reg ist e re d to op e rate in mult ipl e jurisd ic tio ns

.
I n th is c a se , th e re is n o a lle g a tio n th a t th e truc k at is su e didno t me e t pr op e r s a fe ty sta nd ard s, that th e re qu ir e d f

e e s ha d no t be e n p a id, or

that th e ve hic le wa s n ot p ro pe rl y re g ist e re d. At

iss ue is the proof of

such re g istration that was to be c arried in the vehicle

.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 55-4- 108(a) s t at es that a ce rtificate of re g istration must be
car ried i n the vehicle , available to show to an employ ee of the Tenne ssee De partment of Transportation. Under this s tatute, t he owner of the vehicle is permitted to keep in the ve hicle either the orig inal certificate of

reg istration or a c opy

of it. T.C.A. § 55-4-108(a ) (1998)

. The require ment for proof of reg istration is narr owed, howeve r, by a re g ulation issued by

the Tenne ssee De partment of Saf ety . The re g ulation sta tes that the require d proof of reg istration under the I RP is “a Cab Card and Certificate of Reg istration for ea ch vehic le so proportionally reg istered.” Tenn. De pt. of Safety , Rule 1340-5-2-.01. T he r egulations addre ss the proof of reg istration to be
car ried in the ve hicle: “1340- 5-2- .02 Placement of Card. F or a ve hicle proportionally reg istered, it is required that t h e o rig inal of the Cab Car d be in the ca b of the ve hicle during its operation.” Thus, while the statute a

ppear s to allow a copy

of the proof

of re g istration, the reg ulation require s that the originalI RP cab ca rd be ke pt in the vehicle. This require ment is noted on the fac e of the pink-colore d cab c ard.

I n this case, whe n Fr anklin inspected truck #16064 and discovere d that the I RP cab ca rd wa s missing, he wa s g iven a blac k-and- white photocopy of the c ard a nd direc ted to make the Dollar Tre e run with the photocopied c ab ca rd. When Fr anklin expressed m isgiving s about t his, he was assured that operating the ve hicle with a photoc o p y o f t he ca rd wa s not a moving violation or a D.O.T. violation, that it wo uld not go on his driving rec ord, and that if he we re stopped be cause of the photocopied ca

rd, S wift would pay any fine a ssessed. Ne verthe less, Fr anklin ref used and a sked for another truck. Af

t er try ing to locate y et another truck, Swift finally

took Fra nklin off of the
a ssi g nme nt.

Swift no te s th a t th is in f

r a c ti o n , c arr y in g a

p h o to c o p y

o f th e I RP c ab c ar d in s te a d o f the orig inal cab car d, is not a “violation of the criminal or civil code” of Tenne ssee. See T.C.A. § 50-1- 304(c) (def

inition of “illega l activities”). Rathe r, it is a violation of a re g ulation which Swift contends doe s not impl icate “ the public hea lth, safety or welfare ” under

the Public Protection act a nd does not rise to the l evel of a cle ar public policy evidenc ed by

an unambig uous reg ulatory provision. Id. ; se e Guy , 79 S.W.3 d at 535

. Th e re fo re , it c a nn ot s up po rt

e ith e r a statut ory or c omm on la w c la im of re taliatory

discharg e.

I n response , Fr anklin arg ues t hat, pursuant to the Tennessee Supre me Court case of Mason
v . Se ato n, 94 2 S. W.2 d. 47 0, 47 2 (T e nn

. 19 97 ), a n e mpl oy e e c a n sa tis fy the se c on d e le me nt of a c la im under the Tenne ssee Public Protection Ac t (the require ment of proving his refusa l to participate in,-9-

or re main silent about, illega l activities) by showing that he had “re asonable cause to believe a law, reg ulation, or rule has been violated or will be violated.” Id. F rank lin ma int a ins that he re a so na bly be lie ve d th a t he ne e de d to c arry the orig ina l I RP c ab c ard wh e n o pe ratin g his truc k, a ndthat hi s b el i ef wa s j u s t i fi ed

. At tri al , Fr an k l i n re co u n t ed an o cc as i o n o n wh i ch h e wa s d et ai n ed at a w ei gh station in Kansas becau s e h e could not produce the orig inal I RP cab ca rd. Franklin conta cted the head of Swift’s permit department, Dora G riffin, who f axed a copy

of the I RP ca

b car d to the Kansa s inspector. The faxed copy was a cce pted and Franklin wa s allowed to proc eed w ith his load. Af ter that incident, Griff

in stressed to Fr anklin that the orig inal ca b car d should remain in the truc k, beca use t he Kansas officers did not have to acc ept a copy , and that he could be subjec ted to fines and penalties for

failing to have it. Griff

in, who had been t he head of Swift’s permit department for over ten y ear s, testified at trial that it wa s not “leg al to run in any state without a ca

b car d. . . . The law
on the reg istration, it say s y ou must have the orig inal in the permit book on the truck be cause copies
wer e not leg al.” Fr anklin notes as well that the face of the I RP cab ca

rd conta ins lang uag e re quiring that th e orig ina l I RP c ab c ard be ma int a ine d in the c ab d uring op e ratio n. F rank lin a sse rt s th a t hi s belief that he would be br eaking the law, subjec ting himself to fine s, penalties, and possible de lay if he ope rate d truck # 16064 without the orig inal I RP cab ca rd, is sufficie nt to satisfy the
re qu ir e me nts un de r the Pub lic Pr ote c tio n A c t.

As to F rank lin ’s c la im fo r c omm on la w re ta liatory dis c ha rg e , Frank lin a c kn ow le dg e s th a t, to be cog nizable, a claim of common law reta liatory discharg e must evidenc e a violation of “ a cle ar public policy evidenc ed by an unambig uous constitutional, statutory , or reg ulatory provision. . . .” Mason , 9 4 2 S

. W

. 2 d at 4 7 5 (c i t i n g Reynolds , 887 S.W .2d at 823). On a ppeal, Franklin does not arg ue that Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1340-5-2-.02, w hi ch requires the orig inal cab c ard, is a c lear
e xpre ssi on of

Te nn e sse e pu bli c po lic y ; r a the r, the c le ar andun a mbi g uo us pu bli c po lic y that Fra nk lin
a sse rt s is the ri g ht o f a Te nn e sse e e mpl oy e e to b e able to r e fu se to p art ic ipate in an il le g a l a c tiv ity in the wo rk

pla c e

. I n su pp ort of thi s arg ume nt, F rank lin c ite s Wa tso n v . Cle v e lan d Chair Compa ny , in which the Te nnessee Supreme Court stated “that a cause of action for reta liatory discharg e arises when an at-will employ ee is te rminated solely for ref using to pa

rticipate, continue to participate, or
rema in silent about ill eg al ac tiviti es.” Watson v. Cleve land C hair C o. , 789 S.W .2d 538, 544 (Tenn. 1989).

Fr anklin is, of course , corr ect in his assertion that the law of reta liatory

discharg e stems from Tenne ssee public policy

that an employ ee should no t b e p l ace d in the moral, ethica l and leg al dilemma of being forc ed to choose betwee n reporting or participating in illeg al ac tiviti es and ke e p ing his job. See Henderson v. Corr s . Co r p. of Am erica, 918 F.Supp. 204, 210 (E.D. T enn. 1996); Gr igg s v . Co c a- Col

a Emplo y e e s' C re dit Uni on, 909 F.Supp. 1059, 1064 (E.D. Te nn. 1995). That does not, howeve r, end the inquiry

. Under both the Public Protection Act and the c ommon law, the “illeg al ac tivity ” or violation by the employ er must implicate important public p o l i cy conce rns as we ll.

As noted above , the ea rliest Tenne ssee c ases rec og nizi ng reta liatory discharg e have emphasized that it is an important, but narrow, e x ception to the employ ment-at-w ill doctrine. See Chis m , 7 62 S.W. 2da t 55 6. Mo re re c e nt c a se s h a ve un de rs c or e d the qu a lif ie d natur e of

the c a us eT he p l ai nt i f f i n G uy di d n ot as s er t a cl ai m u n der t h e Publ i c Prot ec t i on Act , on l y u n der t h e common l aw

. 79 3
S. W

. 3d a t 535- 36.
-10- of ac tion, noting that re taliatory discharg e is applica

ble only “in limited circumstance s, [where]
c e rt a in w e ll- de fi ne d, un a mbi g uo us princ ipl e s o f pu bli c po lic y c on fe r up on e mpl oy e e s impli c it rig hts which must n o t b e ci rc u m s cribe d or chilled by the potential of termination. Stein v. Davidson Hot e l, 945 S.W .2d 714, 717 (Tenn. 1997)

.
I n Guy v . M

utual of Om ah a Ins ura nc e Compa ny , the court discussed at leng th the
re qu ir e me nt that th e dis c ha rg e d e mpl oy e e de mon str a te that hi s a c tio ns imp lic a te d impo rt a nt p ub lic policy conce rns. The plaintiff in Guy a lle g e d th a t he wa s d isc ha rg e d b e c a use he repo rte d to 3 authorities the fr audulent ac tions of an insuranc e ag ent wh o had misappropriated the f unds of a client. Guy , 79 S.W .3d at 531-33. He r elied on Te nnessee insurance statutes “as e vidence of a c lear expression of the public policy in this st ate with respect to protec ting the public from the fr audulent activity of insuranc e ag ents.” Id. at 537. Under the heading “The Public Policy I n t er es t of Protecting Consu m er s Fr o m I nsuranc e Fraud,” the court in Guy fra med the issue as “ whether the plaintiff has a sserted a

‘we ll defined a nd established’ public policy as the b as i s for his retaliatory discharg e cla im.” Id. at 537. I t obse rved that, under both the A ct and the c ommon law, the plaintiff must prove that h is a c ti o n s “ ‘ s e r v e [] a p u b li c p u rp o s e [t h a t] s h o u ldb e p r o te c te d

. So lo n g a s the employ ees’ actions . . . see k to further the publ i c go o d , t h e d ecision t o expose ill eg al or unsaf e prac tices should be enc ourag ed.’ ” Id. at 537 n.4. The Guy co u rt em p h as i z ed t h at i twa s n o ten o u gh for the pla intiff to simpl y

show that the employ er violate d a law or reg ulation, stating, “ Our inquiry

. . . is not li mited to whether a particula r law or reg ulation has bee n violated; rathe r, our inquiry focuse s on whether

some ‘ important public policy interest embodied in the law has bee n further ed by the whistleb l o wi ng activity .’ ” Id. at 5 3 8 (e m p h as i s ad d ed ) ( q u o t i n g Gutierrez v. Sun dancer Ind ian Je we lry , 868 P.2d 1266, 1273 (N.M. 1993)). The Guy Court rec og nized the public policy interest embodied in encour ag ing the reporting of the insuranc e ag ent’s fr audulent ac tions, quoti ng an earl y case which re c ou nte d “ pa inf ul c a se s .

. . wh e re

. . . p e op le ha ve g ive n u p th e ir sc a nty
earnings . . . because of unauthorized misrepre sentations by unscrupulous ag ents. . . .” Id. (quoting Ind e pe nde nt L if

e Ins . Co . v . Ro dg e rs , 55 S.W .2d 767, 770 (Tenn. 1933) ).

L ikewise, other

appellate d ec i s ions on retaliatory discharg e in this St ate ha ve involved
a c ti v it ie s w h ic h imp li c a te d a n imp o r tan t p u b li c p o li c y in te r e s t. See , e.g. , Mason v. Seaton , 942 S.W .2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997) (plaintiff discha rg ed for reporting hotel’ s fire c ode vi o l at i o n s and dang erous wor

kin g c o n ditions); Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, In c. , 887 S.W .2d 822 (Tenn. 1994) (plaintiff discha

rg ed bec ause he ref

used to violate re g ulation which re quir es t h at the driver of a
commerc ial motor vehicle inspec t the vehicle an d be satisfied that the vehicle is in saf e oper ating condition before it is operated o n a public roa d); Crews v. Buckm an Labs. In t’l, Inc. , 78 S.W .3d 8 5 2 , 8 6 5 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( p lain ti f f d is c h ar g e d f

o r r e p o r ti n g in

- h o u s e c o u n s e l p r a c ti c in g la w w ithout being proper ly

licensed; c ourt found “the exis tence of a clea r publ ic pol icy

evidenc ed by

the ethica l duty [u n d e r th e T e n n e s s e e Co d e o f

Pr o f e s s io n a l R e s p o n s ib il it y ] n o t t o a idin th e u n a uthorized prac tice of la w.”)

.T he D e S o to Cour t s t at ed, 4

W e em p hasi ze t hat t hi s i s no t a case of “ whi st l eb l o wi ng; ”’ rat her, i t i s a f l at

- o ut ref

usal t o wo rk and t herefo re we vi ew i t dif ferent l y

. . . . W e have i nst ead a cl ai m by an emp l o y ee who ref uses t o wo rk bas ed on hi s er r oneous bel i ef t hat wh at he was as ked t o do was a v i ol at i on of Cal i forn i a l aw.

9 5 7 F.2d at 65 8 (ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ).
-11- I n th is c a se , Frank lin a c kn ow le dg e d a t tr ia l that he wa s a wa re that the Do lla

r T re e a c c ou nt, for whic h he wa s a dedic ated driver, wa s important to Swift, and involved time-sensitive deliverie s requiring h ig h ly

- s k il le d d r iv e r s

. I t i s u n d is p u te d th a t th e e mp lo y e r a t th a t t im e h a d a

“ forc ed dis patc h” po lic y

un de r wh ic h a dri ve r as sig ne d a loa d wa s not p e rm itt e d to re fu se to d o s o u nle ss i t
was a n emer g ency , and that in particular, de dicated drivers for the Dollar Tr ee a ccount c ould not ref use to deliver a load. Fr anklin was assure d that driving the truck with a photocopy of the I RP cab
car d would not be a moving violation or a D.O.T. violation, that it would not go on his driving
rec ord, and that if he we re stopped, Swift would pa y any fines assessed. Despite a ll of this, when Swift could not rea dily locate the orig inal I RP cab car d and gave Fr anklin a photocopy of the c ard to put in the cab of the truck, Franklin re fused to use th e t ru ck to deliver the D ollar Tre e merc handise.

Under the re asoning urg ed by

Fr anklin, any reg ulatory

infrac tion by

an employ er, no matter ho w m ino r, c a n ju sti fy

a n e mpl oy e e ’s re fu sa l to pe rf orm hi s ass igned dutie s. I nd e e d, it i s h ardto imag ine a more de minimus re g ulato ry vio la tio n th a n th e inf ra c tio n o n w hic h Frank lin ba se s h is claim of re taliatory

discharg e in this case, namely , having a photocopie d cab c ard instea d of the orig inal. The Court in Guy v . M utua l of Omaha stated cle arly

that we do not simply

look at whether a law or reg ulation has been violated, but “rather, our inquiry focuse s on whether some important public policy

interest embodied in the la w has be en furthere d” by the employ ee’ s actions. 79 S.W.3d at 538.

F ind ing that any reg ulatory inf ra c tio n by a n e mpl oy e r, no ma tte r h ow min or , c a n s up po rt a claim of re taliatory discharg e would be a clea r extension of the law, well bey ond the boundaries of any prior Te nnessee decision. Such an e x tension of the law ha s been reje cted by at least one othe r state. I n a simil ar c ase, DeSoto v. Yellow F reight S ystems, I nc. , 957 F.2d 655 ( 9 Cir. 1992), a th plaint if f t ru c k d ri ver mistake nly

tho ug ht that he c ou ld n ot o pe rate his e mpl oy e r’ s tr uc k le g a lly beca use it had expired re g istration paper s an d an ex p i re d vehicle ta g . The e mploy er a ssured the plaint if f that it wo ulda c c e pt r e sp on sib ili ty fo r the c on se qu e nc e s o f any la c k of re g ist ratio n. De sp ite thi s, the tr uc k d ri v e r

r e f u s e d t o u s e t h e v e h i c l e t o d e l i v e r a l o a d , s o t h e e m p l o y e r

d i s c h ar g e d h i m. The truc k driver the n sued for wrong ful dischar g e. Id. at 656.

The De Sot

o Cou rt fo un d th a t, u nd e r the se fa c ts, the truc k d ri ve r c ou ld n ot m ake ou t a c la im for r etaliatory

discharg e. I t determined, int e r a lia , that “no funda mental public policy conce rn wa s 4 involved. . . .” Id. at 659. The De Sot o C o u rt ex p l ai n ed i t s re as o n i n g:-12-

Th e a c t D e Sot o th ou g ht w a s il le g a l, op erat ing a tr a ile r w ith ou t r e g ist

ratio n p ape rs , does not imp licate f

undamental public policy conce rns, such a s health, saf ety , or c ri me pr e ve nti on , f

or wh ic h w ro ng fu l dis c ha

rg e a c tio ns ha ve be e n r e c og nize d to da te in Ca l i fo rn i a. DeSoto was not aske d to perform an ac t hazardous to his health or safe ty . I nstead, we view the f ailure to c arry

reg istration paper s simply as one of the

“ [m]an y statut e s [th a t] im po se r e qu ir e me nts wh os e fu lf ill me nt d oe s n ot i mpl ic a te fundame ntal public policy conce rns.”

Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted). As in De Sot o , in thi s c a se , op e ratin g a c omm e rc ia l ve hic le wi th a photocopied cab card doe s not impl icate “ important public policy ” conc erns f or which r etaliatory discharg e ac tions h ave here tofore be en re cog nized in Tennessee

. Se e Guy , 79 S.W .2d at 538. Fr anklin was “not asked to pe rform an act hazardous to his health or safe ty .” De Sot o , 957 F.2d at 659. Much like the pe rce ived infra ction in De Sot o , Tenn. Com p. R. & Reg s. 1340-5-2-.02, r equiring
a commer cial vehic le to car ry the orig inal cab c ard a s opposed to a photocopy , can only be char acte rized as one of

the m any reg ulations that impose “re quirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundame ntal public policy conce rns.” Id. (q u o t i n g Foley v. Int eractive Data Corp. , 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988)).

There fore , we must conc lud e t h at under both the Tenne ssee Public Protection Ac t and the
c omm on la w, the re g ulatory in fract io n by Swi ft on wh ic h Frank lin re lie s d oe s n ot i mpl ic a te “funda mental public policy conce rns” and Fr anklin’s re fusal to drive the truck with a photoc opy of the ca b card d i d not serve to f

urther an important public policy interest embodied in the la w. See De Sot o , 9 57 F .2 d a t 65 9; Guy , 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 3 8

. C o n s eq u en t l y , h i s cl ai mfo r r et al i at o ryd i s ch ar ge must fail, and the trial c ourt’s judg ment in favor of Fr anklin must be reve rsed.

Th is h old ing pr e te rm its a ll o the r i ssu e s r a ise d o n a pp e a l.

The de cision of the trial c ourt is reve rsed a n d t h e claim of Plaintiff/Appellee Anthony Fr anklin is dismi ssed. Costs on appeal a re a ssessed against P laintiff/Appellee Anthony Fr anklin, for
w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

__________________________________________

H O LL Y M

. K I R B Y , J.