A Panel Report of the 

Defense Science Board 

2007 Summer Study on Challenges 

to Military Operations in Support 

of U.S. Interests 

Unconventional 

Operational Concepts 

and the Homeland 

 

 

March 2009 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide 

independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily 

represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The DSB Task Force on Challenges to Military Operations in Support 

of U.S. Interests completed its information gathering in August 2007. 

 

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I i

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary.........................................................................................................iii

Chapter 1. One Game: Defending the Homeland..........................................................1

War on the Domestic Front.................................................................................... 1

Consequences of Catastrophe................................................................................. 4

Implications for DOD ............................................................................................. 7

Chapter 2. DOD Roles and Responsibilities................................................................8

DOD: Support versus Lead .................................................................................... 8

Legislation and Directives ..................................................................................... 10

DOD Capabilities for Homeland Security and Defense .................................. 12

DOD Capacities for Homeland Security and Defense..................................... 14

Chapter 3. Assuring Deployment and Supply............................................................18

Critical Functions and Infrastructure................................................................... 18

Logistics.................................................................................................................... 26

Military Installation Protection ............................................................................. 26

Family and Individual Preparedness .................................................................... 29

Chapter 4. Building the National Team ......................................................................37

“One Team” ............................................................................................................ 37

The Homeland Security Team.............................................................................. 37

Plans and Exercises ................................................................................................ 48

Why Can’t We Learn? ............................................................................................ 51

Crisis Communications.......................................................................................... 56

Appendix A. Relevant Legislation and Directives for DOD in Homeland 

Security and Defense...............................................................................................61

Appendix B. Selected Excerpts from the “Strategy for Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support,” June 2005 ...............................................................................66

Terms of Reference........................................................................................................71

Panel Participants............................................................................................................77

Presentations to the Panels ...........................................................................................79

Glossary............................................................................................................................83
ii I TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I iii

Executive Summary 

This report on unconventional operational concepts and the homeland was 

prepared as part of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on 

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests. The summer 

study recognized that asymmetric tools of war in the hands of potential 

adversaries may well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. 

Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions afar, but may 

include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well confront the possibility 

of going to war abroad in the face of significant devastation in the homeland—

dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief operations and combat 

abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of U.S. military 

forces could be delayed and disrupted. 

The capable adversary of the future will execute “one game”— attacking U.S. 

interests wherever the nation is most vulnerable, and that could mean the 

homeland. When a determined adversary succeeds in attacking the homeland at 

the scale imagined in this study, the nation will call on the Department of 

Defense (DOD) to “provide for the common defense” through both defense at 

home and offense abroad. DOD has, in fact, acknowledged such a future in its 

2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense, which states unequivocally that DOD must 

be prepared to defend the homeland: 

The Department of Defense must change its conceptual approach to homeland 

defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the “home” game 

and the “away” game. There is only one game. ... Defending the US 

homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is our most fundamental duty. 

Failure is not an option. 

How well has the department progressed in turning that strategy into reality? 

This can be broken into three more specific questions as follows: 

How well do DOD and others understand what’s expected of them? 

How well prepared is DOD to execute across a range of homeland 

defense missions? 

Given the “one game” nature of the capable adversary, can DOD have 

high confidence that it will be able to ensure deployment and supply in 

whatever set of missions it undertakes, within and from the homeland? 
iv I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Success, in both the current scope of homeland security and defense and 

the more stressing environment of the future, depends on teaming and 

integration unprecedented in recent history: across and among all levels 

of government, with and across the private sector, as well as individual 

actions for preparedness. Where does the nation, and especially DOD, 

stand in building the “one team” needed for success? 

DOD Roles and Responsibilities 

Overseas deployment, simultaneous with responding to a significant scale of 

attacks in the homeland, will stress DOD capabilities. The public expects that 

DOD will defend the homeland. DOD will be ordered to participate in 

homeland incident prevention, mitigation, and remediation through the U.S. 

domestic political process, regardless of the intentions of pre-incident military 

leadership. Legislation and directives support this approach. 

However, at the next level, many responsibilities and missions are not so 

clearly acknowledged within DOD, resulting in the application of inadequate 

resources to the homeland defense mission. The problem extends beyond DOD 

to the interagency and response communities, where the handoffs and roles are 

not well understood—in part because they are not effectively exercised. 

Scope of Roles and Responsibilities 

Defending the homeland includes a range of activities, most often discussed 

in terms of support to the civil authorities. But these activities can also progress 

to include a leadership role in response and consequence management efforts if 

or when the scope of an attack is severe enough. Even in a more limited support 

role, DOD leadership, both civilian and military, has been slow to accept this 

apparently expanded scope of responsibilities. A principle reason is that these 

responsibilities come with significant resource demands and financial costs that 

are not likely to be adequately supported. As a result, the resources and 

capabilities that DOD has to offer have not yet been effectively applied. DOD 

does not really know what is expected of it and the homeland security 

community does not know what to expect from DOD. The transition of 

responsibility across the various supporting and leading roles—and the handing 

off of these roles from one agency to another—are not well understood among 

the interagency and response communities. 

A focus on specifics helps to better assess progress and gaps—the approach 

taken in this study. Reasonable roles for DOD in homeland defense include 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I v

sharing intelligence, sharing infrastructure assurance standards (to support their 

mission), sharing operational doctrine and training, and providing consequence 

management support in case of an isolated terrorist attack or a natural disaster, 

such as Hurricane Katrina. Clearly DOD has lead responsibility for defense 

against air, missile, and maritime (with the Coast Guard) attack and for 

protection of its bases. DOD is in a lead role to assure the protection and 

resiliency of the defense industrial base, but it also must take a strong supporting 

role to assure protection and resiliency of other infrastructure that supports its 

missions (at least until a first significant attack(s) where it may be called upon to 

assume the lead). Roles that are not appropriate for DOD include protection of 

the country from internal threats like isolated terrorist attacks, production of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or border monitoring for smuggling or 

illegal immigration. 

To assure seamlessness among response elements and DOD, the 

Department must expand its concept of “jointness” to include other federal, 

state, regional, local, and tribal entities. This can best happen through leadership 

and practice. But homeland security and defense leaders, both within DOD and 

other agencies, need to be developed, just as DOD has so carefully developed its 

leaders for the “away game.” Planning, exercises, and training have yet to be 

conducted among all actors at all levels in any meaningful way. 

Force Capabilities and Capacities 

The study’s assessment of DOD’s capabilities to execute its homeland 

defense roles is not a positive one. In the more traditional roles of air defense, 

missile defense, and maritime defense, DOD has or is developing a capability for 

these roles, but is far from having a well-exercised national set of capabilities. For 

example, while DOD maintains the best air superiority force in the world, its 

capabilities are not well suited to protect the nation from general aviation or 

unmanned aerial vehicle threats. Protection of DOD installations has been a 

focus of force protection programs for some time, but addressing cyber threats 

and WMD remain major shortfalls. In too many other cases, DOD preparedness 

falls woefully short. Combatant commanders, especially U.S. Northern 

Command, have made many of these capability requirements known, but 

priorities within the Department have placed resources elsewhere. 

The situation is even more serious when the panel looked into force 

capacities that might be required to deal with a major event or adversary 

campaign in the homeland while also prosecuting offensive actions abroad. This 
vi I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

dual mission alone infers a change in the estimates of total force requirements, 

and only worsens when the “double counting” of the reserve component, who 

might also be first responders, is added to the equation. As a benchmark, 

~80,000 troops were deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina, a large fraction 

of which were National Guardsmen. Another 33 percent of the guard was 

deployed simultaneously in Iraq. Further, the National Guard is counted on to 

support their states, other states through mutual aid agreements, and to meet 

federal requirements. 

Currently there is no ability to track the “double counting” or the “day job” 

skills of guardsmen and reservists. Many are first responders. Many have critical 

skills from their civilian jobs that would be useful in consequence 

management—skills such as telecommunications and utilities. Databases with 

such information could help tremendously in understanding how scarce assets 

are being allocated or help to identify the personnel with the best skill sets in 

response to emergency needs. 

RECOMMENDATION: DOD FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR HOMELAND 

DEFENSE

Addressing the shortfalls will require significant resources, sustained 

commitment, and greater involvement with other agencies, especially the 

Department of Homeland Security. As first steps: 

The Secretary of Defense should task the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (ASD 

[HD&ASA]) to revise and implement DOD policies and procedures 

covering homeland defense requirements. 

This tasking should include clarifying relationships, roles, and missions of all 

elements of homeland defense (federal agencies, civilian and private sectors, state 

and local responders, law enforcement, and others). This information would go 

far to eliminate the uncertainty and/or confusion about what is expected of 

DOD and what others can indeed expect of DOD. The scope should expand to 

include the contingency where DOD assumes the lead response role in the 

homeland. Only those policies and procedures that lower the barriers to 

planning, exercising, information sharing, cooperation, and coordination across 

the entire homeland defense community should be approved. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I vii

Service Chiefs and the National Guard Bureau assess force 

requirement and adjust/adapt/expand force structure to meet the “one 

game” demands of the future. 

Force structure should be built not just to support the regional command 

war plans for overseas contingencies, but also for those being developed by U.S. 

Northern Command. The effort will involve the development of accurate 

databases to understand the civilian skills and job commitments of the reserve 

components in order to assess and address the “double counting” issue. It will 

also require close planning and coordination with the service secretaries across 

the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 

spectrum in order to ensure that shortfalls are addressed. 

Assuring Deployment and Supply 

This study considered two critical warfighting aspects occurring simultaneously 

in the homeland: defending against domestic catastrophe and ensuring deployment 

and supply. Domestic catastrophes can occur in an environment of large, 

undisciplined populations, which, can result in the destabilizing effect of violent 

attacks on society. On the other hand, military deployment and supply take place 

in a disciplined organization, trained to accomplish the mission. Yet the two are 

linked—military deployment and supply is critically dependent on infrastructure 

elements that may be destroyed or severely compromised in a domestic 

catastrophe. Three areas seemed most important for DOD attention: (1) critical 

infrastructure protection and/or resiliency, (2) logistics, and (3) family and 

individual preparedness. A fourth area, military installation protection and 

preparedness, was the subject of a recent DSB task force. 

Critical Infrastructure 

DOD has responsibility for not only the protection and assurance of its own 

military installations and facilities, but it is also the lead agency for assuring the 

protection and resiliency of the defense industrial base infrastructure sector. In 

addition, DOD has a supporting role for 14 other critical infrastructures/key 

resources: transportation; information technology; telecommunications; energy; 

chemical; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; government 

facilities; emergency services; public health and healthcare; drinking water and 

water treatment systems; dams; postal and shipping; food and agriculture; and 

national monuments and icons. 
viii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

DOD is starting to make progress in identifying what is critical through the 

leadership of ASD (HD&ASA)/Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), 

supported by the Naval Systems Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia. Together 

with the combatant commanders, they have developed and are implementing a 

“mission assurance” process that incorporates many of the recommendations of a 

prior DSB study regarding risk management and mitigation.1

 The process focuses 

first on identifying critical functions and capabilities—command and control; 

ballistic missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and power 

projection, for example. This step is followed by identification and assessment of 

those few assets or facilities necessary to ensure the functions or capabilities. 

The process also provides guidance to assess a number of critical 

infrastructures “outside the fence” on which DOD might depend and/ or need 

to defend. The (classified) list of mission-critical assets appeared logical, but not 

complete or consistent in the application of the criteria against which criticality 

was judged. Further, it does not capture cascading effects and infrastructure 

interdependencies. Recognizing that it is still a process getting started, this study 

concludes that more effort must be applied to get it right and complete. The 

biggest gap, however, is that no one is charged with the responsibility or 

authority to ensure that corrective actions are taken. 

Despite nearly six years since September 11, 2001, many U.S. critical 

infrastructures remain vulnerable. For the DOD, many critical supply chains—

meals ready to eat, missiles, munitions, and fuel, for example—are not as resilient 

as they should be. Critical infrastructure and sources of supply are owned largely 

by the private sector—security and assurance is their responsibility, which is 

monitored by other parts of the government. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the broader mission to 

lead infrastructure protection across all the agencies and sectors involved. While 

DHS has led the interagency and the private sector councils in developing a riskbased protection approach, so much remains to be done that it is not possible to 

say with confidence that the nation’s infrastructure vulnerabilities have been 

adequately addressed. In general, the department lacks the regulatory or legislated 

clout to direct the private sector to consistent levels of security and/or resiliency. 

 

1. Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I ix

DHS has, however, done a good job at leading the national planning and grant 

processes, as well as overseeing lead agency activities with their sectors, in order to 

spotlight progress and gaps. At this point, DHS has identified 36 highest priority 

infrastructure assets and over 2,500 next level assets on which to focus attention, 

and, where appropriate, investment—under the constraint that much of the 

infrastructure is owned privately and therefore not eligible for public funds. 

Of particular concern, however, is the difficult job of information assurance. 

There appears to be no national improvement plan in spite of countless 

admonitions to, and within, the government that such a plan and its 

implementation is a must. An important consideration for each federal sector 

owner is the fact that improvements in resiliency of the infrastructure will come 

about largely by its private owners. Developing a public-private partnership is no 

more important than in this area, and some attention to incentives to the private 

sector for improving its posture is warranted. 

Logistics 

The study was pleased to learn that a number of the problems plaguing the 

DOD logistics community for years appear on their way to being solved—at 

least those within the domains of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and U.S. 

Transportation Command. Enabled by the introduction of modern information 

systems, the two agencies are now able to understand inventories in their depots, 

and track supplies in transit to the warfighter and their delivery to transfer points 

to the services. Redundancy and/or alternatives exist for movement of supplies 

within and out of the United States. 

The weak links in the system are at the start and end points, with respect to 

the information system “glue” that integrates it end-to-end. Strategies are not yet 

developed to assure the availability of materials from the private sector within the 

homeland and of transportation routes required for their delivery from industry 

to DOD facilities in the event of attacks on the homeland. In addition, many 

spare parts for critical weapon systems are produced either by sole source 

companies or by companies with limited competition. Protection of critical 

sources of supply has not been planned. Diversion of supplies and materiel to 

civil priorities has also not been planned as a contingency in the event of major 

incidents at home. 

On the other end of the supply chain, there has not been a coordinated 

effort to implement a single asset visibility system for the “last tactical mile” that 
x I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

would allow for tracking and reporting consumption to the DOD national 

provider or the end-user. The visibility inherent in the upstream steps is, at this 

point, lost, so that the individual requestor often does not see what has been 

ordered in a timely fashion, or sometimes not at all. 

Cross-cutting the entire enterprise is the information management system. 

DLA is paying considerable attention to its network defense, but has further to 

go in addressing a wider spectrum of cyber threats. 

Military Installation Protection 

In addition to ensuring that DOD can get material for warfighters from a 

robust private supply and internal distribution system, DOD must also assure 

the security of the forces it expects to deploy. The first step is assuring the 

inherent security of the installation itself. Each of the military services 

approaches base security and force protection differently, but almost all of 

them plan on the support of the local community emergency response 

resources in a serious incident. 

For example, in the Army, mission commanders establish what is missioncritical. All garrison commanders have memoranda of understanding with the 

local community for first response capabilities. Both garrison and mission 

commanders coordinate plans for deployment under catastrophic scenarios. 

Annual exercises and training test commanders’ ability to respond to incidents. 

The civilian capabilities, on which military installations rely, will not be 

available if the incident is an attack of a serious scale, such as an attack using 

weapons of mass destruction—a particular concern of this study. Consequence 

management is the biggest gap in dealing with weapons of mass destruction. 

Project Guardian provides basic response capabilities to installations—chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear—but is not scoped for anything of major 

consequences to the installation or surrounding community. 

The DSB Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection 

assessed best practices for protecting U.S. homeland installations and 

recommended various approaches to enhance security and protection of these 

facilities. This task force determined that DOD has many facilities that are 

vulnerable to the threats considered in this study, but that a rational focus should 

be on protecting its critical military mission capabilities and functions. It also 

found that the degree to which DOD facilities are dependent on non-DOD 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xi

infrastructure is not entirely known. Further, until recently DOD lacked policies 

and standards to guide installation commanders in securing or creating 

contingencies around the infrastructure on which they depend. 

The critical infrastructure protection task force made many recommendations to improve DOD capabilities. This study agrees with and endorses those 

recommendations and, as a result, did not revisit the issue in its deliberations. 

But through information gathering related to installation risk assessments and 

management, the study believes that while progress is being made, resources 

remain limited and priority remains highly dependent on the installation 

commander. 

Family and Individual Preparedness 

There are many examples where individual preparedness proved pivotal in 

mitigating the consequences of a natural disaster (Florida’s resiliency to 

numerous hurricanes since Hurricane Andrew versus Louisiana’s response to 

Hurricane Katrina), and also how strong a role it played in the early days of the 

Cold War. In the event of coordinated asymmetric attacks in many parts of the 

country and/or simultaneously with a natural disaster or avian flu pandemic, 

emergency responders and relief organizations may not be able to move across 

local or state borders. Resources will be severely strained and responders will be 

busy dealing with or preparing to deal with disaster on their home turf. 

The situation with military families deserves special attention. DOD must 

recognize that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines will not likely be effective 

warfighters if they are simultaneously worried about the security of their families. 

While obvious steps, such as increased base protection, can be implemented, too 

many families live outside the installation. Instilling and promoting a culture of 

preparedness can provide both physical and psychological benefits to members 

and their families. There is much that can be done without great expense or 

effort to better prepare for both natural and man-made disasters.2

 Greater hazard 

awareness, training, home storage, and family communication/evacuation plans 

can provide greater peace of mind, strengthen mental resiliency, and empower 

DOD families to carry on through a disaster. Preparedness also reduces the 

impact of a crisis and likelihood that these families will have to depend only upon 

 

2. Events include such things as floods, mudslides, hurricanes, tornados, fires, severe snow or ice storms, 

earthquakes, volcanoes, infectious disease outbreaks, severe power and fuel outages, hazardous chemical 

releases, nuclear or radiological incidents, and acts of terrorism and/or civil disturbance. 
xii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

the emergency relief infrastructure. Self-sufficiency also empowers members and 

families to help others and set an example the community can follow. 

RECOMMENDATION: ENSURING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY

Recommendations in this section are limited to those that affect DOD, 

although there are many related items that DHS should address, as well. 

To better ensure deployment and supply, the Secretary of Defense 

should direct: 

ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to extend the mission assurance process to the 

defense industrial base and recommend approaches for addressing 

shortfalls 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(USD (AT&L)) to work with defense industrial base owners to develop 

and implement corrective action plans 

ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to develop a prioritized action plan for 

addressing identified risks to DOD-owned assets 

U.S. Northern Command to lead implementation of actions identified by 

ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP for critical function assurance 

Service secretaries to fund actions for mission assurance in owned 

functions 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 

to ensure resourcing of logistics shortfalls: 

- to assure sources of supply and movement to DOD depots 

- to eliminate the last tactical mile issues 

- to make the information management system interoperable, robust, 

and resilient to attack, from both within and outside 

Service Chiefs should actively promote the ability of military families to 

shelter at home for two weeks, or evacuate on short notice. They should: 

Reinforce the message via noncommissioned officer leadership 

academies, on-base medical community, Armed Forces Network, unit 

town-hall meetings, movie/TV celebrities, veterans organizations 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xiii

Assure base commanders export this capability to adjacent civilian 

communities. 

Building the National Team 

The third dimension of this assessment of homeland defense addressed the 

status of the “national team” and DOD’s involvement. This is not a good news 

story. Homeland security organizations responsible for dealing with national 

calamities are a diverse lot: federal agencies, state and local authorities, and 

private firms. DHS, as the lead agency for creating that level of response, is still 

in its infancy. At the state and local level, there appears to be little that is positive 

about the relationship with federal “partners.” 

DHS continues to reorganize, changes points of contact frequently, and 

brings to the table too much of a “we’re in charge” attitude. This judgment is 

shared by the private sector, although DOD’s relationship with the defense 

industrial base seems to be better than between many other sectors and their 

federal agency lead. U.S. Northern Command, DOD’s principal operating “face” 

to the homeland security community, has been restrained by DOD leadership’s 

view that the priority is—and should be—the “away game.” Its low profile start 

has produced serious perception problems that must be overcome among the 

partners with whom it will be called upon to work. 

The Team Members and Relationships 

Interagency. In the interagency arena, a positive example of how things 

should work can be found in the Joint Interagency Task Force – South.3

 This 

pairing of military and civilian government agencies under a unified command 

structure provides for routine interaction between the entities that will need to 

work together effectively during a crisis. The DSB believes that the complex 

network of interdependent roles, responsibilities, and relationships demands a 

full-time integrated approach to homeland security and homeland defense 

activities through a number of similar standing operational task forces. 

 

3. Joint Interagency Task Force – South has the mission of monitoring and interdiction of illicit trafficking 

from Latin America. Membership includes Customs and Border Patrol, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug 

Enforcement Agency, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Security Agency, and the National 

Geospatial Agency. 
xiv I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Federal-State-Local. In the case of a point attack, the first manifestation—

and response—will occur locally. If or when those resources are overwhelmed, 

requests to the state will be made, and the governor can call out the National 

Guard, as well as exercise mutual aid agreements with other states for additional 

response resources. When those avenues of response are tapped out, appeals for 

federal help can and will be made. However, during its investigation, the study 

team heard from several state and regional response leaders that federal support 

can be slow in coming and what they can expect is largely unknown. 

With respect to prevention, state and local response leaders noted how much 

they can contribute, provided they have adequate threat information on what 

they should be anticipating. In other words, a strong partnership with their 

federal counterparts can contribute significantly to threat mitigation and/or 

apprehension. Positive examples of preparation and monitoring for Y2K and 

state/local threat assessment centers bear out the power of such partnerships. 

Public-Private. Possibly the most neglected member of the homeland 

security/defense team is the private sector. The private sector owns most of the 

infrastructure and will be the most effective in protecting (given timely and 

adequate threat information) and restoring its function after an attack. As such, it 

must be an integral member of the team alongside government actors in federal 

planning and information-sharing activities. 

Relationships between sector owners and operators and their federal agency 

interfaces are uneven—a striking condition that emerged during the course of 

this study. In some cases, especially where there is a history of a non-regulatory 

partnership, like the defense industrial base and energy sectors, relationships 

were positive, characterized by open and frequent communication and 

information sharing. Others were more one-way, with the federal “partner” more 

controlling and didactic. The realization that the sectors have more intimate 

knowledge of not only their own sectors, but their ties to other sectors, has yet to 

be well understood and embraced at the federal level. 

Leadership. Forming a truly joint homeland security and defense team starts 

with developing leaders with a joint perspective—both through education and 

career experiences—building an interagency cadre of leaders, whose 

understanding of homeland defense transcends their immediate position. 

Homeland security and defense, regardless of agency, level of government, or 

public or private sector, must be seen as a professional opportunity for those 

seeking to lead in this critical field. However, there is no recognition of the need 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xv

to develop homeland security leadership in the same manner as the nation has 

invested in developing national security leadership. 

Plans and Exercises 

While numerous doctrinal and operational plans exist, most with embedded 

processes for review and revision, there are no processes to ensure that the plans 

are practiced and capabilities measured against readiness metrics. While there are 

many exercises (possibly too many), the exercises are highly scripted, 

unconnected to each other, and typically focus on a top-down approach (where 

the supporting organizations are “training aids” to the senior-level players) 

instead of bottom-up approach (focusing on an integrated and layered response 

beginning with the initial event). Even the national level exercises have not been 

effective—more often broad than deep, where the real lessons get learned. 

Furthermore, these exercises often stop before the more difficult issues—

transfer of command, employment of specialized assets, or unknowns such as 

public panic—come into play. Even more worrisome than the disjointed nature 

of the exercises is the lack of any process for effectively “learning from” the 

lessons of these exercises. This gap extends to DOD, where the numerous 

exercise programs do not appear to be effectively linked to national objectives. 

Crisis Communications 

Communications is almost always at the top of the list of recurring issues in a 

crisis. It can make or break a successful response. It starts with the basics of 

compatible equipment and language among response communities. It extends to 

the public-private linkage, where both the pre-emptive and response actions by 

private sector owners of critical infrastructure can mitigate significant problems, 

yet they are, more often than not, kept in the dark or not allowed access. (This 

was an acute problem in recovery and restoration post-Katrina.) It covers also 

communications to the public. Too often it is developed “real time” without 

benefit of factual vetting and without coordination, such that what is 

communicated to the public can be misleading or just outright wrong (as 

example, the anthrax attacks in 2001). The DSB believes that if there is only one 

thing that DHS and DOD ought to improve among the national team, it should 

be crisis communication. 
xvi I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

RECOMMENDATION: BUILDING A NATIONAL TEAM FOR HOMELAND 

DEFENSE

Secretary of Defense leadership in the interagency is needed to address 

current deficiencies in national plans and strategies and support for 

domestic threat assessment. DOD needs to step up to its preparedness 

responsibilities in the broad set of communications issues. 

 To address deficiencies in plans and communications, the Secretary 

of Defense should: 

Promote the combination of the National Security Council/Homeland 

Security Council to coordinate and integrate a national strategy and 

response for global asymmetric engagement 

Request a national intelligence estimate on the scope of the projected threat. 

- direct the Office of Net Assessment to conduct a capabilities-based 

net assessment 

Request that DHS work with DOD to codify the transition from DOD 

support to DOD lead for a war at home 

Direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive 

DOD communication system and public affairs strategy for homeland 

defense preparedness and crisis/consequence management. 

- develop an equipment and concept of operations architecture 

compliant with the National Incident Management System 

- ensure availability of DOD communication assets compatible with 

civilian responder community 

- work with DHS to develop messages, and coordinate and educate 

those who deliver them, appropriate to the full range of contingencies 

The Secretary of Defense should direct U.S. Northern Command to 

work with the National Exercise Program at DHS to design and execute 

more effective exercise programs that address: 

Unified management of national capabilities 

Communication and information sharing across public and private 

boundaries 

Regional planning and coordination 

Interoperable and response capability shortfalls 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xvii

Transition from DOD support to DOD lead scenarios 

In the layered approach to DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support, one of the layers—“Enable”—is directly focused on improving domestic 

capabilities through sharing DOD expertise and technology. The military is 

recognized for its unsurpassed training, exercise, and doctrinal programs. 

ASD (HD&ASA) should take the initiative to help establish a 

strategically-managed, interagency homeland defense/homeland security 

leader development program with the following attributes: 

Graduate-level, senior service DHS-sponsored “war” college developed 

in conjunction with the National Defense University 

An Executive Exchange Program modeled on the President’s Executive 

Exchange Program 

Recognition as credit equivalent to senior service schools and for 

flag/senior executive service promotions in DOD 

Training expanded to state and local levels 

DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 1

Chapter 1. One Game: Defending the Homeland 

The capable adversary of the future will execute “one game”: attacking U.S. 

interests wherever and however the nation is most vulnerable, and that could 

mean the homeland. The Department of Defense (DOD) has, in fact, 

acknowledged such a future: 

The Department of Defense must change its conceptual approach to 

homeland defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the 

“home” game and the “away” game. There is only one game. ... Defending the 

U.S. homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is our most fundamental 

duty. Failure is not an option.4 

This volume, prepared as part of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer 

Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interest, focuses 

on the implications to DOD of adversary attacks on the homeland, as an 

instrument of war, with an eye toward the particular challenges that can arise if 

an “away” game is in progress as well. 

War on the Domestic Front 

The United States has long postured itself for wars to be won by assertion of 

its national strength—large force size and/or technological advantage. But current 

conflicts and the rise of asymmetric strategies and tactics are making clear the 

weakness of this assumption. Future adversaries, either by choice or necessity, will 

not follow the path leading to a conflict of strength against strength. 

A series of interviews on the Chinese book No Limit Warfare quotes one of 

its authors, Senior Colonel Qiao Liang, as saying “If we were to try to use high 

technology to counter U.S. high technology, that would in fact land us in the U.S. 

trap. We could never catch up to them on that track. So for a poor and weak 

 

4. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Department of Defense, June 2005. See also Appendix 

B for relevant excerpts of this strategy. 
2 I CHAPTER 1

country to try to use high technology to counter the United States would in fact 

be like throwing eggs against a rock.”5

The refusal to adopt a symmetric approach to war also goes beyond the basic 

issues of military strength and operational doctrine. The nations and non-state 

actors of the world are observing, through the current era of terrorism, that the 

most lucrative potential approach to war with the United States could well be 

through operations outside the nation’s moral framework and anticipated 

behavioral norms. They have been able to observe the effectiveness of this 

approach when the conditions involve a disparity of interest. Therefore, when an 

adversary has a vital interest that conflicts with the non-vital interest of a strong 

state, the former has the greatest incentive to use asymmetric approaches. 

Many scenarios come to mind where U.S. adversaries view an issue as 

threatening life and/or state, while the United States has relatively little at stake. 

Under those circumstances, adversaries will often attempt to influence U.S. 

foreign-based activities.6

 Simply put, they could execute innovative asymmetric 

approaches to shape U.S. national will in order to: 

Deter U.S. entry into any foreign affair of no perceived immediate 

national security impact or no perceived threat to national sovereignty by 

threatening disproportionate asymmetric damage to the United States. 

Halt U.S. entry or accelerate a withdrawal if the nation decides to employ 

forces in a foreign action. 

Delay any U.S. decision to act by executing a range of asymmetric 

approaches. Many unconventional homeland approaches, particularly 

information operations, will also be very difficult to trace. Since the U.S. 

political process requires a high degree of certainty for legislated action, 

the nation’s response could be delayed and diffused until it is simply too 

late to act effectively. 

Moreover, U.S. military leadership has had difficulty embracing the concept of 

a two-front war, with one of the fronts being the homeland battlefield. Since the 

end of the Indian Wars in 1891, the United States has treated warfare as an “away 

 

5. Sha Lin, “Two Senior Colonels and No-Limit War,” Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian Bao in Chinese, Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service translation, June 28, 1999. 

6. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Where Are Our Asymmetric Vulnerabilities,” The Revenge of the Melians: 

Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, McNair Paper 62, 2000, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University, page 3. 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 3

game.” Attacks on the U.S. homeland (except by symmetric capabilities of ballistic 

missiles and long-range bombers) have been unthinkable due to the geographical 

isolation of the Americas and the strength of U.S. naval and air forces. The rise of 

global travel, commerce, and information flows has radically changed traditional 

American isolation. America’s sea and air power still make conventional mass 

invasion unlikely, but as military modes shift from concentrated industrial 

warfare to distributed wars among populations, domestic disruption is 

likely. Effects-based targeting, used with great success by U.S. forces to inflict 

maximum impact with minimum force, is similarly useful to aggressors seeking to 

distract the U.S. population; disrupt infrastructure, commerce, and government; 

and delay support to U.S. military forces operating abroad. 

The homeland could be subjected to a wide range of attacks. In addition to the 

possibility of a serial or parallel accumulation of clearly feasible attack modes 

(improvised explosive devices [IEDs] and vehicle-borne IEDs, suicide bombers, and 

sniper attacks, for example), the attacks could employ nuclear explosives (including 

those designed to cause electromagnetic pulse effects), toxic chemicals, biological 

agents, radiological materials, and cyber means. The attacks could be from terrorists 

or disguised as such. They could move from isolated events to “war” campaigns. 

There is a distinct possibility of large loss of life and significant economic hardship. 

Destruction and degradation of national or local infrastructure is also possible. 

Military consequences of such actions on the U.S. logistics base can be severe. 

Civilian consequences of such actions can only be imagined but would be of major 

importance. While such attacks will be (initially) a Department of Homeland 

Security concern, they drastically affect DOD’s ability to defend the 

homeland and carry out military missions abroad.

In light of these potential consequences, the United States should expect future 

asymmetric attacks to focus on manipulating its populace—by attacking either 

critical infrastructure targets or the populace directly. The attacks would generally be 

tactical, but with strategic effect. If the population internalizes the terror associated 

with future attacks and begins to believe they are at risk in the normal course of their 

daily lives, then the will of the nation could be shaped. Additionally, if the threat 

involves weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the resulting image of massive 

casualties would elevate the effect to even higher levels of fear. If terror is reinforced 

by successive events, the American people could come to believe that they have no 

control. Then the real intent of these attacks would surface. A perception could 

emerge that personal security would only be regained by a decision to withdraw 

from a distant conflict (with no clear connectivity to the United States). The result 

would be achieved. Figure 1 captures these factors. 
4 I CHAPTER 1

Figure 1. The “One Game” Approach of Future Capable Adversaries 

As a foundation for its assessment of homeland defense, the DSB established 

the following assumptions. A future adversary will engage in coordinated attacks 

both in the U.S. homeland and in foreign theaters. With a high degree of 

resources and sponsorship, the attacks at home will most likely be at a scale 

beyond those envisioned in most current homeland defense planning, which is 

focused primarily on terrorist attacks. Moreover, adversaries will likely act at 

multiple points nearly simultaneously, or a carefully orchestrated sequence of 

attacks—a campaign. The openness of the U.S. society, its size, the geographical 

extent of its infrastructure, and its diversity will make it practically impossible to 

avoid all assaults. In addition, DOD will be divided between protecting the 

homeland from further attacks and prosecuting forward offensive operations 

against the adversary. 

Consequences of Catastrophe 

Disasters brought about by enemy action in the homeland cannot be 

precisely predicted, although conditions leading up to them may be generally 

evident. In any event, surprise should be an expected element of an attack(s). 

Dealing with the consequences of the attack(s) will have as much or more to do 

with addressing common issues as with the specific nature or cause of an attack. 

Planners should anticipate the breakdown of orderly society, manifested by: 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 5

Failure of critical infrastructure—lack of essential goods and services 

(Table 1). 

Insufficient professional resources to deal with multiple 

catastrophes—response forces (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

National Guard, DOD, DHS, police, fire, American Red Cross, and 

others) sized to handle only one or two crises at a time. 

National will hard to focus—public anger manifested through 

misguided, vigilante-style attacks. 

Impaired ability of national, state, and local governments to 

govern—lack of, or confusing, communications; fractured local 

authority; insufficient, disorganized emergency response. 

Without adequate preparedness at all levels of government, across the private 

sector, and among the populace, the post-attack results could indeed become 

catastrophic. Some outcomes might include: 

Flight. Remaining in place would prove untenable for many people for 

actual or perceived reasons. 

Breakdown of mutual aid agreements. Resource-intensive incidents 

are typically handled through mutual aid agreements within the National 

Guard, first responder, and medical communities. When under attack, 

however, leaders in unaffected regions might opt not to support 

interregional common aid agreements and to conserve their resources 

in case they are needed locally. 

Breakdown of civil order. Looting, vigilante actions, gang violence, 

riots, and civil disobedience would further stress first responders. 

Failure of quarantine. Many will be reluctant to stay confined. 

Hoarding. People will rush to amass excess goods to stock up after 

the attack. 

“Shoot your neighbor.” As people perceive the social and civil situation 

deteriorating, they will escalate the force they use as a first resort to protect 

home and family from interlopers (“shoot first, ask questions later”). 

Rampant rumors. Media will promulgate messages from many sources 

without confirmation. 
6 I CHAPTER 1

Population center “meltdowns.” Many U.S. population centers are 

located where life without infrastructure services will be difficult to sustain, 

such as in the desert southwest in summer and northern cities in winter. 

Table 1. Examples of Consequences of Attacks on the Infrastructure

Infrastructure targets Examples of consequences if attacked

Transportation Disruption of air traffic flow 

Mass transit contamination 

Hazmat releases from freight carrier 

Breakdown of supply chain essential to provide life sustaining 

goods and services (e.g. food, medical) 

Oil and gas production and 

storage

System (storage, refining, and pipeline) intrusion and degradation 

Water storage and delivery Water supply contamination 

Interruption of availability (dams, deep public wells, etc.) 

Banking and finance Data corruption 

Effective freezing of assets 

Massive stolen identity 

Electrical power generation 

and distribution 

Damage to generating stations and operating systems 

Disruption of transmission, distribution systems, and associated 

fuel supply 

Information and 

communications

Lost and damaged data and information 

Degraded computing and telecommunications 

Breakdown of processing, storage, and transmission of data 

Government services Loss of essential government services 

Overload on critical emergency services 

Defense Lack of ability to execute missions from installations within the 

continental United States 

Population Casualties and injuries at schools, malls, and other places of 

population/community massing 

Mass casualties in the event of WMD use 

Responses will be further exacerbated because of the evolution of U.S. society. 

Dependence on “just-in-time” centrally managed, networked supplies of water, 

power, food, communications, and transportation leaves the United States 

extremely vulnerable to an effects-based attack. Additionally, over time, mobility of 

the American population has resulted in a breakdown of extended family and 

community-based societal structures that once provided informal local leadership 

and community organization and support. In twenty-first century society, many do 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 7

not know their neighbors, let alone have the capability or capacity to form effective 

support networks for long periods of time. Skepticism of authority makes 

governance in a disaster difficult, while the public nevertheless expects 

governmental assistance to mitigate the aftermath. 

Implications for DOD 

When a determined adversary succeeds in attacking the homeland at the scale 

imagined in this study, the nation will call on DOD to “provide for the common 

defense” through both defense at home and offense abroad. That fact is 

recognized in the Department’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense, as noted at 

the outset of this chapter. The question, then, is how well the department has 

progressed in turning that strategy into reality. The study broke this larger 

question into three more specific questions, each of which is discussed in 

subsequent chapters: 

1. How well does DOD (and others) understand what is expected of it? 

How well prepared is DOD to execute across a range of homeland 

defense missions? 

2. Given the “one game” nature of the capable adversary, can DOD have 

high confidence that it will be able to ensure deployment and supply in 

whatever set of missions it undertakes within and from the homeland? 

3. Success in both the current scope of homeland security and defense, and 

the more stressing environment of the future, depends on teaming and 

integration unprecedented in recent history: across and among all levels 

of government; with and across the private sector; down to individual 

actions for preparedness. Where does the nation, and especially DOD, 

stand in building the “one team” needed for success? 
8 I CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2. DOD Roles and Responsibilities 

This chapter addresses whether or not DOD roles in homeland security and 

defense are well understood, and how good DOD might be at executing them. 

Definitions taken from DOD’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support set the stage for this discussion: 

Homeland security. “Concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 

attacks within the U.S., reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 

minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” DHS is 

the lead agency to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. The 

Attorney General leads law enforcement to detect, prevent, and 

investigate terrorist activity with the United States. 

Homeland defense. “Protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression.” DOD is responsible for homeland defense. 

Defense support to civil authorities (civil support). “DOD support for 

domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other 

activities.” This occurs by direction of the President or Secretary of 

Defense. 

The establishment of U.S. Northern Command and the Assistant Secretary 

for Homeland Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy has provided focal points within and outside the DOD to address the 

Department’s responsibilities within the homeland. These two organizations 

have done a lot to sort through the many issues for DOD in the homeland. But 

they have largely been on their own, given the consuming demands in the 

Department, on both leadership and resources, for prosecuting the “away game” 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both organizations also have to engage in an 

interagency effort led by DHS, which is still experiencing its own growing pains 

and has seen its priorities shift from prevention to preparedness in the wake of 

federal shortcomings in responding to Hurricane Katrina. 

DOD: Support versus Lead 

Engaging in an overseas deployment, while at the same time responding to a 

significant scale of attacks in the homeland, will stress DOD capabilities. The 

public will expect DOD to defend the homeland and DOD will be ordered to 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 9

participate, regardless of the intentions of the military leadership prior to the 

incident—engaging in incident prevention, mitigation, and remediation through 

the U.S. domestic political process. Legislation and directives support this 

approach. Further, the 2005 National Defense Strategy clearly directs the military 

leadership to properly shape, size, and globally posture to: 1) defend the U.S. 

homeland and 2) operate in and from the forward regions. 

Homeland defense currently includes a range of activities in the continental 

United States (CONUS). Often, DOD will be called on to provide support to the 

civil government, but its activities can also progress to a leadership role in 

response, and consequence management efforts if and when the scope of attack is 

sufficiently severe. The concept described is notionally depicted in Figure 2, in 

which the transition from a supporting role by principally DOD reserve 

component forces shifts to one of leadership at significant attack levels involving 

reserve and active duty forces. 

Figure 2. Notional Transition of DOD Forces from Support to Lead 

Under coordinated global aggressive action from a capable adversary, the 

military response will involve actions that could be described as “at war within 

the homeland.” In other words, an active layered defense must stretch across the 

integrated global battle space—extending from the forward regions, to the 

approaches to the United States, and the homeland itself. 

When defense of the homeland transfers to the military, it implies a 

hardening of the target—which, in and of itself, can act as a deterrent to an 
10 I CHAPTER 2

adversary. At that time, an adversary has to recalculate the overall benefit of his 

actions. The U.S. Northern Command Homeland Defense Plan recognizes this 

potential deterrent effect and outlines a robust range of actions in CONUS—

ranging from sustained deterrence and enhanced deterrence, both targeted to 

deter threats and support civilian law enforcement agencies; to contingencies for 

the escalation of asymmetric activities at the severe end of the scale, described as 

decisive operations. 

Unfortunately, DOD has applied inadequate resources to these homeland 

defense missions. The first step to resolving this situation is to acknowledge and 

communicate the roles and missions throughout the chain of command. 

Additionally, the portion of the Homeland Defense Plan addressing “decisive 

operations” has not been integrated and coordinated with the appropriate range 

of agencies and government entities. Therefore, the resources and capabilities 

that DOD has to offer are not yet effectively applied. DOD does not really know 

what is expected of it and the homeland security community does not know what 

to expect from DOD. The transition of responsibility from supporting to leading 

roles among the various agencies involved—and the handoff of these roles from 

one agency to another—are not well understood among the interagency and 

response communities. Although improving, this confusion extends to deterrent 

operations due to the immaturity of the DOD/DHS interface, but certainly is 

not yet addressed under “decisive operations” scenarios. 

This interdependent and interactive problem is a difficult one to resolve and 

will need a great deal of attention. The relationships between all homeland 

partners, including state and local governments, will vary and depend on the type 

of asymmetric attack. The roles will be very different for ballistic, kinetic, WMD, 

and cyber approaches. Therefore, “jointness” beyond DOD must be pursued, 

with all the commensurate requirements in leadership, planning, training, and 

exercises fully resourced. 

Legislation and Directives 

The study found nothing in legislation, directives, or other documents to 

prevent a more aggressive posture and engagement by DOD. On the contrary, 

the documents set expectations for DOD preparedness, whether as supporting 

agency (expected in most situations) or supported agency (shift to homeland 

defense). Starting with the Constitution, the federal government is to “provide 

for the common defense.” The Stafford Act allows for use of the military for 

disaster relief operations at the request of the state governor, and further defines 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 11

three scales of involvement: essential assistance (up to 10 days), emergency, and 

major disaster. 

The Posse Comitatus Act is typically viewed as a restriction on DOD 

engagement since it punishes those who “...except in cases and under 

circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, 

willfully use any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or 

otherwise to execute the laws....” A statutory exception to posse comitatus 

allows the President or other key government officials special authorizations 

for engaging the military in domestic situations. That authority has been 

exercised sparingly; examples include granting the U.S. Coast Guard law 

enforcement authorities and allowing the military to share information and 

equipment with civilian law enforcement, while prohibiting its ability to make 

arrests or conduct searches and seizures. 

The Homeland Security Act gave DHS the lead for homeland security. DOD 

continues to maintain the lead for defense of the homeland. The Homeland 

Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), issued by the White House since the 

establishment of DHS, provide further guidance for DOD’s roles in civil support 

(HSPD 5), its lead responsibilities as the infrastructure sector “owner” for the 

defense industrial base (HSPD 7), and responsibilities for emergency preparedness 

(HSPD 8). 

DOD has also recognized its responsibilities, through formal directives, in 

which it should be prepared to take the lead and/or act pragmatically: 

in support of natural disasters (its immediate assignment of resources in 

the aftermath of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake; its immediate 

deployment (unrequested) of a hospital ship to New Orleans after Katrina) 

to preserve public order where other options are unavailable or 

overwhelmed in order to carry out governmental operations 

in sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or catastrophes 

when civil authorities can no longer maintain control 

to provide catastrophe relief without or before imposition of the Stafford 

Act, on a temporary basis 

to undertake some specific law enforcement activities 
12 I CHAPTER 2

The Board’s assessment is that there is sufficient breadth and flexibility in the 

relevant legislation to allow DOD to take on a wide range of roles. Those roles 

should be clearly understood at all levels so that all stakeholders can plan 

accordingly. 

DOD Capabilities for Homeland Security and Defense 

After the incidents on September 11, 2001, the nation was forced into a new 

level of national preparedness against attack on the homeland. The Department 

of Homeland Security was created to take the lead role in homeland security. As 

described previously in this chapter, DHS and DOD have either lead or support 

roles in protecting the homeland, depending on the type and scale of attack. The 

creation of DHS, while clearly adding to the preparation and focus of the 

country on improving homeland security, has also added some confusion 

regarding roles and missions for DOD in homeland defense. The Board believes 

this confusion comes from general statements about roles and responsibilities, in 

contrast to specific statements about DOD’s roles and missions that tend to 

alleviate disputes or uncertainties. 

Nonetheless, DOD leadership, both civilian and military, has been slow to 

accept this apparently expanded scope of responsibilities because with it comes 

significant resource demands and financial costs that are not likely to be 

adequately supported. The study determined that a focus on specifics was needed 

in order to motivate the Department’s leadership to focus on priorities. Table 2 

offers an illustrative list of those specific roles and missions that are generally 

accepted as DOD responsibility and those that are not. 

As the table notes, typical roles expected of DOD are sharing intelligence, 

sharing infrastructure assurance standards (to support their mission), sharing 

operational doctrine and training, and providing consequence management 

support in case of an isolated terrorist attack or a natural disaster such as 

Hurricane Katrina. Clearly, DOD has lead responsibility for defense against air, 

missile, and maritime (with the Coast Guard) attack and for protection of its 

bases. DOD is in a lead role to assure the protection and resiliency of the 

defense industrial base, but also must take a strong supporting role to assure 

protection and resiliency of other infrastructure that supports its missions (at 

least until a first significant attack(s) where it may be called upon to assume the 

lead). Roles that are not appropriate for DOD include protection of the country 

from internal threats like isolated terrorist attacks, production of WMD, or 

border monitoring for smuggling or illegal immigration. 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 13

Table 2. DOD Responsibilities for Homeland Defense

Reasonable Unreasonable

Share intelligence 

Protect against air, missile, and maritime threats 

Protect designated civil infrastructure after first 

attack

Provide consequence management after 

attacks

Meet infrastructure assurance standards for 

DOD facilities and contractors 

Prepare to protect U.S. homeland from large 

scale attack 

Develop doctrine and plans to assure supply 

during attack of U.S. homeland 

Train with federal agencies and state and local 

authorities

Protect against or detect in U.S. homeland 

Production of WMD 

Terrorists 

Protect civil infrastructure against initial attack 

Constant surveillance of land and maritime 

borders

Smuggling weapons, for example 

Table 3 provides a rough assessment of the key capabilities DOD should 

have in order to execute the responsibilities listed in Table 2. The assessment 

includes not only a “grade” and trend (in the far right column labeled “How 

Good”), but also a breakdown to better highlight progress (or lack thereof). 

The bottom line of this assessment is not a positive one. In the more 

traditional roles of air defense, missile defense, and maritime defense, DOD 

has or is developing a capability for these roles, but is far from having a wellexercised set of national capabilities. For example, while DOD maintains the 

best air superiority force in the world, its capabilities are not well suited to 

protecting the nation from general aviation or unmanned aerial vehicle threats. 

Protecting DOD installations has been a focus of force protection programs 

for some time, but addressing cyber threats and WMD remain major shortfalls. 

In too many other cases, DOD preparedness falls woefully short. Combatant 

commanders, especially U.S. Northern Command, have made many of these 

capability requirements known, but priorities within the Department have 

placed resources elsewhere. 
14 I CHAPTER 2

Table 3. Capability of DOD to Perform Expected Roles 

DOD Capacities for Homeland Security and Defense 

The study next turned to the issue of how chaos in the homeland would 

affect the military’s ability to deploy and effectively prosecute offensive actions 

abroad. One important concern is whether DOD has sufficient capacity to 

support the “one game” envisioned in this study—whether DOD’s role in the 

homeland and abroad implies a change in total force requirements. Lacking 

scenarios or plans for the “one game,” the study considered the level of DOD 

support to Hurricane Katrina as a surrogate for force sizing for a single major 

event. Katrina drew a total of nearly 80,000 troops plus equipment, principally 

through the National Guard, but also from specialized active components, as 

shown in Table 4. 

In a generic model of response to a catastrophic event, the initial response will 

come from traditional first responders—fire, police, and medical support. Based 

on the magnitude of the event, additional state resources could respond, including 

National Guard forces. Support from the National Guards in other states could be 

requested under Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 

arrangements. For catastrophic events, federal resources, including DOD forces, 

could be deployed to support the response. In addition, depending on the number 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 15

of incidents and the expectation of further attacks, DOD forces (active and reserve 

component) could support other homeland protection missions (for example, 

guarding critical infrastructure nodes to prevent follow-on attacks). 

Table 4. DOD Support to Hurricane Katrina

Support Logistics

Search, Rescue, and Evacuation 

Approximately 15,000 residents of the 

Gulf coast were rescued and 80,000 

others evacuated. 

Medical Assistance 

Ten thousand medical evacuations by 

ground and air; medical treatment of 

more than 5,000 patients; more than 

3,000 beds in field hospitals, 

installations, and aboard U.S. Navy 

ships.

Mosquito Abatement 

C-130s treated over 2 million acres. 

Mortuary Affairs 

Thirteen mortuary teams supported local 

authorities in the systematic search, 

recovery, and disposition of the 

deceased

Personnel

Over 72,000 title 10 and National Guard forces. 

Aviation

293 helicopters and 68 fixed-wing aircraft. 

Maritime

23 naval ships. 

Commodities

DOD delivered more than 30 million meals (24.5 million 

meals ready to eat) and 10,000 truckloads of ice and 

water.

Medical

Over 2,000 health care professionals deployed to the 

area.

Installations

Nine DOD installations in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 

Louisiana, and Mississippi served as mobilization centers 

or staging areas for the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA). 

The intended outcome is a layering or cascading of support to the homeland, 

which has the potential to involve significant numbers of military forces. This 

layering should ensure that the appropriate level of support is provided at each 

level. The situation will be further exacerbated in the case of multiple events in 

the homeland. At the same time, military forces (including active duty, National 

Guard, and reserve forces) will be deployed to conduct military operations 

outside the homeland. At each layer of support, in the homeland or abroad, 

individuals will be filling critical positions and functions—their availability will be 

essential to the successful conduct of these missions and functions. The same 

individual cannot support multiple critical functions at the same time. 

Despite the logic of this statement, the study came across several anecdotal 

indications (but not much hard data) that many individuals are filling multiple 

roles in the cascade. This is most apparent for the National Guard and reserves: 
16 I CHAPTER 2

Estimates suggest that 10–15 percent of the National Guard are also first 

responders. 

Fifty percent of forces in Iraq in 2006 were guardsmen. 

Thirty-three percent of the National Guard deployed in Iraq or for 

Katrina in September 2005. 

More accurate data were not available because the data are not collected on a 

systematic basis. Absent specific data, the full extent of the impact cannot be 

quantified. However, it is likely that local communities, state leaders and planners, 

and DOD planners could be counting on the same individuals to fill two or even 

three roles at the same time within a global asymmetric warfare situation. 

The “worst case” model would be the local first responder to a specific 

incident, who is then activated by the state governor as a member of a National 

Guard unit (to respond to the same incident, another incident in the state, or 

under EMAC to another state), and whose unit is subsequently called to federal 

status to provide homeland support or to engage in military operations overseas. 

Figure 3 illustrates the dilemma. As a result, it is critical to planning at every level 

that the extent of “double counting” be quantified at a higher level of resolution, 

and its effects on planning assumptions understood. 

Figure 3. Double and Triple Counting of the Reserve Components 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 17

RECOMMENDATIONS: DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Addressing the shortfalls identified in this chapter will require significant 

resources, sustained commitment, and greater involvement on the part of DOD 

with other agencies, especially with DHS. To begin the process, the Board 

recommends the following: 

1. The Secretary of Defense task the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD 

[HD&ASA]) to revise and implement DOD policies and 

procedures covering homeland defense requirements. This tasking 

should include the clarification of relationships, roles, and missions of all 

the elements (federal agencies, civilian and private sectors, state and local 

responders, and law enforcement) of homeland defense at a level of 

specificity highlighted in this chapter. Clarification of this sort would go 

far to eliminate the uncertainty and/or confusion about what is expected 

of DOD and what others can indeed expect of DOD. The scope should 

include contingencies where DOD assumes the lead response role in the 

homeland. Only those policies and procedures that lower the barriers to 

planning, exercising, information sharing, cooperation, and coordination 

across the entire homeland defense community should be approved. 

2. Service Chiefs and the National Guard Bureau assess force 

requirements and adjust, adapt, and/or expand force structure to 

meet the “one game” demands of the future. Force structure should 

be built not just on the regional command war plans for overseas 

operations, but also on those being developed by U.S. Northern 

Command for homeland operations. The effort will involve the 

development of accurate databases to understand the civilian skills and 

job commitments of the reserve components in order to assess and 

address the “double counting” issue. It will also require close planning 

and coordination with the Service Secretaries across the spectrum of 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities in order to ensure that shortfalls are addressed. 
18 I CHAPTER 3

Chapter 3. Assuring Deployment and Supply 

One of the critical issues facing the military in time of war is deploying forces 

to the battle site and providing supplies of all sorts (from meals to fuel to 

weapons). If the homeland is under attack, then the primary base of support and 

the supply chain may be significantly impacted. One concept for addressing this 

concern is “resilience.” 

Merriam-Webster's on-line dictionary defines resilience as: 1) the capability of 

a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation caused especially 

by compressive stress; 2) an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune 

or change. The concept of resiliency with respect to the nation’s critical 

infrastructure and DOD logistics supply chain goes beyond protection and 

hardening of potential targets to include redundancy as well as rapid response 

and recovery. 

This chapter examines how well the nation is prepared to meet the 

simultaneous demands of fighting a war both in the homeland and abroad. The 

assessment is based on the resiliency of the nation’s critical infrastructure and 

functions, DOD processes and status for ensuring resiliency, DHS processes and 

status for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, DOD preparedness 

(supply, logistics, installations), as well as family and individual preparedness.7

 

Critical Functions and Infrastructure 

The nation must be prepared for a future adversary who conducts clandestine 

and well-executed attacks on the U.S. homeland, while simultaneously executing 

overt military actions at great distance from the United States. Can DOD defend 

the homeland if required to deploy? Can DOD deploy if the homeland is under 

attack? Answering these questions must start with addressing more basic ones: 

What military missions and functions must be assured from the homeland? 

What assets and operations are critical to that assurance? 

How do we figure that out? 

 

7. Relevant excerpts from DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support can be found in 

Appendix B. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 19

Who is responsible for doing what (DOD, DHS, others with key 

infrastructure responsibilities), and do we understand how the system 

expects to function under stress? 

What will be the availability of critical national assets and capabilities? 

What competing demands will be made on the military and National 

Guard? 

How do DOD and the nation measure its preparedness—or readiness? 

The United States has transitioned to a global economic power with an agile, but 

fragile, set of interconnected and interdependent infrastructures. In the 1800s, the 

nation consisted primarily of a distributed collection of communities in rural areas, 

cities, and states with somewhat independent supply, social, and governing 

structures. In the 20th century, national networks emerged to unify these local 

systems, which became dependent upon each other. The consequence is a system 

that is economically focused on high performance at the lowest possible cost, which 

leads to a highly efficient system, but one with few redundancies. Lack of 

redundancy opens the structure to multiple vulnerabilities, especially single node 

failures, with large-scale (national and international) economic impact. 

For purposes of this discussion, the study assumed a multi-point attack on the 

United States that is severe enough for the President to declare the nation “under 

attack,” with federal authorities in overall control. Under such conditions, national 

resources will be stretched to the point where demands for national and international 

requests will go unmet. Local resources will also be overwhelmed and could face 

societal panic, if people feel localities are unable to provide law and order, medical 

care, municipal services (water, refuse), food, energy, trade, transportation, 

information system availability, and protection from the elements. 

Under such a scenario, two critical warfighting requirements occur 

simultaneously: defending against domestic catastrophe and ensuring deployment 

and supply. Domestic catastrophes occur in an environment of a large, undisciplined 

population, and these violent attacks can have a destabilizing effect on society. On 

the other hand, military deployment and supply take place in a disciplined 

organization, trained to accomplish the mission. Yet the two are linked—military 

deployment and supply is critically dependent on infrastructure elements that may be 

destroyed or severely compromised in a domestic catastrophe. Furthermore, both 

missions will draw on many of the same people and equipment, as discussed in the 

previous chapter. The protection challenge for the U.S infrastructure is significant, as 

illustrated in Table 5. 
20 I CHAPTER 3

Table 5. Size Indicators of Some Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 

Agriculture and food 1,912,000 farms; 87,000 food-processing plants 

Water 1,800 federal reservoirs; 1,600 municipal waste water facilities 

Public health 5,800 registered hospitals 

Emergency services 87,000 U.S. localities with 30,000 fire departments (80% volunteer); 

18,000 law enforcement agencies 

Defense industrial base 250,000 firms in 215 distinct industries 

Telecommunications 2 billion miles of cable 

Energy Electricity: 2,800 power plants 

Oil and natural gas: 300,000 producing sites 

Transportation Aviation: 5,000 public airports 

Passenger rail: 22,000 miles 

Freight rail: 120,000 miles of major railroads 

Highways, trucking, and busing: 590,000 highway bridges 

Pipelines: 2 million miles of pipelines 

Maritime: 300 inland/costal ports 

Mass transit: 500 major urban public transit operators 

Banking and finance 26,600 FDIC insured institutions 

Chemical industry and 

hazardous materials 

66,000 chemical plants 

Postal and shipping 137 million delivery sites 

Key assets National monuments and icons: 5,800 historic buildings 

Nuclear power plants: 104 commercial nuclear power plants 

Dams: 80,000 dams 

Government facilities: 3,000 government owned/operated facilities 

Commercial assets: 460 skyscrapers 

Source: National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 21

DHS has the interagency lead for critical infrastructure protection, and has 

assigned each infrastructure sector to its most logical federal “owner” or sectorspecific agency (SSA). An important consideration for each SSA is the fact that 

improvements in infrastructure resiliency will come about largely by the efforts 

of its private owners. The development of the public-private partnership is no 

more important than in this area. (The next chapter addresses the public-private 

partnership in more detail.) The SSA works with the private sector via its Sector 

Coordinating Council (SCC) to develop a sector-specific risk mitigation and 

resiliency improvement plan. That plan helps prioritize federal investments, as 

well as focus private efforts for business continuity. The SSA joins with other 

interested federal agencies to form a Government Coordinating Council (GCC) 

where cross-sector issues can be addressed. 

DOD has responsibility for not only the protection and assurance of its own 

military installations and facilities, but it is also the SSA for the defense industrial 

base infrastructure sector. In addition to leading the GCC for the defense 

industrial base sector, DOD has a presence on 14 Critical Infrastructure/Key 

Resource National Sector GCCs: transportation; information technology; 

telecommunications; energy; chemical; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and 

waste; government facilities; emergency services; public health and healthcare; 

drinking water and water treatment systems; dams; postal and shipping; food and 

agriculture; and national monuments and icons. 

DOD Approach and Progress for Assuring Defense Critical 

Functions 

DOD is beginning to make progress in identifying what is critical through 

the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) within ASD (HD&ASA), 

supported by the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia. Together 

with the combatant commanders, a “mission assurance” process is being 

developed and implemented—a process that incorporates many of the 

recommendations of a prior Defense Science Board (DSB) study regarding risk 

management and mitigation.8

 The process focuses first on identifying critical 

functions and capabilities, followed by identifying and assessing those few 

assets or facilities necessary to ensure the functions or capabilities. The process 

also provides guidance to assess a number of critical infrastructures “outside 

 

8. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007. 
22 I CHAPTER 3

the fence” on which the combatant commanders might depend and/or need to 

defend. Figure 4 illustrates the mission assurance process, which proceeds as 

follows: 

Combatant commanders identify critical capabilities, missions, and 

functional networks (41 have been identified as in the most critical tier 1 

category; several hundred are in the tier 2 category). 

The critical capabilities, missions, and functional networks are 

decomposed into defense critical assets that are assessed against threats, 

hazards, and vulnerabilities (risk assessment). Risk of loss is assessed and 

mitigation actions are proposed (protect/harden, duplicate/backup, relocate, and others). 

The Services then analyze the results and the proposed mitigation actions 

(N.B.: The Department is at this stage now). 

Finally a senior group (the Deputies Advisory Working Group or its 

equivalent) adjudicates differences and prioritizes for resource allocation. 

Figure 4. DOD Mission-Assurance Process for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 23

Specifics are classified, but examples of DOD mission critical functions and 

related assets include: 

command and control 

ballistic missile defense 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

power projection 

The study judged that the list appeared logical, but neither complete nor 

consistent in the application of the tier criteria.9

 Recognizing that it is a process 

in its early stages, the DSB nonetheless believes that more effort must be applied 

to get it right and complete. 

With respect to the defense industrial base, efforts led by ASD 

(HD&ASA)/DCIP are underway to work in a similar fashion with defense 

industrial base owners through National Guard assessment teams, but this too is 

a work in progress. Some initial positive outcomes (classified) are notable, but the 

process has not yet enjoyed widespread visibility. There is also the question of how 

far the private sector will go to meet what it may view as DOD special assurance 

needs over and above business continuity to support other customers. In that 

respect, DOD will have to address what incentives it might be able to offer. 

One factor contributing to the relatively slow progress at DOD is the recent 

reorganization in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which 

decimated the staff devoted to this area. This will make it extremely difficult to 

implement the inspired proposal to create a Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for “mission assurance,” which would consolidate policies, programs, 

and procedures for CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highexplosive), anti-terrorism, consequence management, critical infrastructure 

protection, and continuity of operations in one office. The biggest gap, however, 

is that no one is charged with the responsibility or authority to ensure that 

corrective actions are taken, either within DOD or nationally through DHS. 

 

9. Tier 1 Task Critical Asset (TCA), loss or disruption will cause failure of multiple assigned strategic 

missions (determined by combatant commander); Tier 2 (TCA), loss or disruption will cause failure of a 

single assigned strategic mission or cause severe disruption to mission accomplishment of several assigned 

missions (determined by combatant commander); Tier 3 (TCA), loss or disruption will cause severe 

disruption to mission accomplishment of a single assigned strategic mission (determined by combatant 

commander). These TCAs are then analyzed by the Joint Staff, and TCAs that support multiple combatant 

commanders are considered to be Defense Critical Assets (DCAs). 
24 I CHAPTER 3

The result is that despite nearly seven years since 9/11, many U.S. critical 

infrastructures remain vulnerable, and for DOD, many critical supply chains—to 

include meals ready to eat, missiles, munitions, and fuel—are not as resilient as 

they should be. 

DHS Process and Status for Critical Infrastructure Protection 

DHS has a related but different approach to identifying critical national 

functions. It focuses on 17 sectors called Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for DHS roles and 

responsibilities. HSPD-7 outlines the national approach. Other key documents 

and plans include the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National 

Strategy for Securing Cyberspace, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection 

of Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources, and several other HSPDs. 

With these strategies and directives as a basis, DHS has led the development 

of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP’s overarching 

goal is to “Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing 

protection of the Nation’s CI/KR (critical infrastructure/key resources) to 

prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists 

to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national 

preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, 

natural disaster, or other emergency.” The DHS approach for managing risk is 

that “Sectors that are primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical facilities 

may use a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach, while sectors (such as 

Telecommunications and Information Technology) with diverse and logical 

assets may use a top-down business or mission continuity approach.” 

Sector-specific plans (SSP) support the NIPP by establishing a coordinated 

approach to national priorities, goals, and requirements for critical infrastructure 

and key resource protection. The SSPs provide the means by which the NIPP is 

implemented across all critical infrastructure and key resource sectors, as well as 

a national framework within which each sector can address its unique 

characteristics and risk landscape. This coordinated approach allows federal 

funding and resources to be applied in the most effective manner to manage risk. 

DHS has focused, so far, on assets and facilities versus operations and functions. 

DHS coordinates and provides guidelines, but cannot edict standards for security 

across sectors (although it should be promulgating best practices). At this point, 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 25

the DHS has identified 36 “Tier 1” assets and over 2,500 “Tier 2” assets.10 These 

include several identified by DOD. How the tier criteria are developed and 

applied were not clear (to this study team, at least) nor were the processes by 

which the SSAs or SCCs influenced choices. 

The DSB discovered inconsistent involvement by private sector owners and 

operators in the DHS process. The DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection is 

redirecting the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center to provide 

analytical support to sectors and agencies, and to characterize interdependencies 

among sectors, so that a more consistent and carefully analyzed set of priorities 

can be established. Significant private sector engagement will be required to 

achieve a rigorous and robust analytic capability. In the view of the DSB, 

information assurance, highlighted in the accompanying side bar, is probably the 

most pervasive issue in infrastructure protection. 

Information Assurance

Pervasive to critical infrastructure/key resource assurance is information assurance (corroborated by both the 

technology and counterforce panels of this study, and explicitly highlighted in the following section on logistics). Two 

of the most significant recommendations of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on Information 

Management were to: 1) identify the DOD information management system as a weapon system and treat it with all 

the same processes as that implies for readiness assessments and for use in exercises and in training; and 2) 

develop and fund robust information assurance efforts to lessen the vulnerability of the system to attack, improve its 

resilience and assure ability to operate with a degraded system. In part II of this current study, concepts of testing and 

operations to improve information assurance are recommended. Yet, the DSB believes that more should be done to 

not only protect the military system but commercial cyberspace as well. All facets of the U.S. economy are critically 

linked to efficient transmission of information. Therefore, a whole new look is required. 

Finding. The number and complexity of cyber transactions on today’s Internet are well beyond those conceived at the 

initial design stages of ARPANET. A new look at network design, operation, and traffic flow protocols is needed with a 

fresh insight in light of the enormous information exchange impact of the Internet today. 

Recommendation. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency should assemble a small group of the 

brightest commercial and academic minds in the area of Internet operation to review current status and develop a 

plan for next generation Internet operation and protocols, building on, but not limited to, the National Science 

Foundation Genie Program. This group should recommend both short- and long-term enhancements to the Internet in 

all areas of operational effectiveness and security including recommendations for adequate development funding and 

realistic time scales for implementation. 

 

10. Criteria for Tier 2 are sector-specific. Criteria for Tier 1 are more severe: (1) make the Tier 2 list and (2) 

satisfy at least two of the following: prompt fatalities greater than 3000; economic impact of $50B or more; 

psychological impact requiring mass evacuations with prolonged absence; or loss of governance or mission 

execution that disrupts multiple regions for more than one week, resulting in loss of necessary public services. 
26 I CHAPTER 3

Logistics 

The DOD logistics system has shown significant improvement in its ability 

to produce a rapid and precise response (Figure 5). Examples include: 

improved materiel availability 

implemented state-of-the-art commercial logistics information 

technology (IT) systems 

improved asset visibility 

designation of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the 

distribution process owner 

The TRANSCOM designation has, in turn, facilitated planning and 

coordination of DOD’s supply chain. However, much more needs to be 

accomplished. 

Figure 5. Assessment of Robustness of DOD’s Supply Chain 

The U.S. industrial base produces the vast majority of the material required 

to support the Department of Defense. There are many critical commodities and 

items that are essential for DOD to accomplish its mission, both abroad and at 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 27

home. Examples include: meals ready to eat, subsistence, medical, fuel, and spare 

parts for critical weapon systems. Many of these items (especially critical spare 

parts) are produced by sole-source companies or by companies with limited 

competition. Strategies have yet to be developed to assure the availability of these 

materials in the event of attacks on the homeland. Such a strategy should include: 

a comprehensive list of critical commodities and items, updated and 

(re)prioritized on a routine basis 

assessment and assurance of transportation routes required for their 

delivery from industry to DOD facilities 

assessment and assurance of the sources of the critical commodities and 

items (for example, through developing alternative sources of supply for 

these items by contracting for the capability, but not necessarily the 

actual production) 

This strategy has been used successfully for a limited number of medical 

items, and should be expanded significantly. 

Each military service and the Defense Logistics Agency have either 

implemented or are in the process of implementing state-of-the-art commercial 

logistics information technology systems. However, no organization has been 

given the leadership role to ensure that these systems are interoperable and 

secure. These new logistics IT systems remain vulnerable to attacks because, by 

design, they must remain accessible to the commercial industrial base. DOD 

needs to develop a team of experts from both within DOD and the commercial 

sector to address this vulnerability. 

At a higher level, as the DOD supply chain becomes more and more joint, 

the roles and responsibilities of the military services, combatant commanders, 

Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense need to be reviewed and clarified. Additionally, the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 

(ODUSD (LM&R)) needs to develop common performance metrics for the 

entire supply chain. 

The weakest segment of the DOD supply chain is often described as the 

“last tactical mile.” In the logistics context, this represents the tactical movement 

and distribution of material once in-theater to its actual use by the warfighter. 

There has not been a coordinated effort to implement a single asset visibility 

system for the “last tactical mile” that would track and report consumption to 
28 I CHAPTER 3

the DOD national provider or to the end user. ODUSD (LM&R) should 

coordinate this effort. Visibility of material in the “last tactical mile” must be an 

element of a joint logistics enterprise-wide visibility system, which uses a 

common data architecture, has authoritative sources of data, and is available 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week. 

Military Installation Protection 

In addition to ensuring supplies from a robust private supply and internal 

distribution system, DOD must also assure the security of the forces it expects to 

deploy. The first step is assuring the inherent security of the installation itself. 

The military services each approach base security and force protection 

differently, but almost all of them plan on the support of local community 

emergency response resources in a serious incident (this being a consequence of 

outsourcing in this domain).11 These civilian capabilities will not be available if 

the incident is an attack of a serious-enough scale. In particular, the study worries 

about the consequences of a WMD attack in terms of both the technical and 

operational shortfalls in both military and civilian communities. 

A previous DSB task force assessed best practices for protecting U.S. military 

installations and recommended various approaches to enhancing security and 

protection of these facilities.12 Principal findings included: 

DOD has many facilities that are vulnerable to the threats considered 

in the study, but a rational focus should be on protecting its critical 

military mission capabilities and functions (as opposed to installations 

and facilities). 

Interdependencies of DOD facilities upon non-DOD infrastructure are 

not entirely known. 

DOD, until recently, lacked policies and standards to guide installation 

commanders in securing, or creating contingencies around, infrastructure 

on which they depend. 

 

11. For example, the Army has consolidated installation management under a single command, as did the 

Navy earlier. Mission commanders establish what is critical and each garrison commander takes measures 

within his/her resources to protect and/or assure the critical function; special needs are funded by the 

mission command. Garrison and mission commanders coordinate plans for deployment under 

catastrophic scenarios. All garrison commanders have memoranda of understanding with the local 

response community for mutual aid. Plans are tested through training and annual exercises. 

12. Report of the DSB Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 29

DOD Directive 3020.40, “Defense Critical Infrastructure Program,” 

signed August 2005, assigns DCIP responsibilities at all levels across 

the department. 

As a consequence of those findings, the task force recommended that: 

ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP lead efforts to characterize defense sector 

infrastructure dependencies, develop risk mitigation guidance, and 

establish uniform DCIP standards (which is now underway, as 

outlined previously in this chapter). 

Services develop and implement plans to mitigate risk across owned 

installations; provide annual update to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Installation commanders develop local assessment of dependencies and 

implement risk mitigation plans consistent with guidance and standards. 

Commander, U.S. Northern Command develop understanding of 

dependencies and risk mitigation by Services in the continental United 

States; other combatant commanders do the same in their respective 

areas of responsibility. 

DOD through ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP monitor, collect, and share 

examples for installation preparedness as a basis for judging risk 

mitigation decisions within the previously recommended risk 

management program. 

The study team was updated on some programs for installation risk 

assessments and management and came to believe that these prior findings and 

recommendations remain largely valid. With the exception of the start of the 

mission assurance process developed by ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP, little has been 

done beyond earlier force protection programs. 

Family and Individual Preparedness 

Every mission begins at home.

13

No amount of planning, training, and exercising can totally protect against 

homeland attacks. The second line of defense, as discussed in the previous 

sections of this chapter, must be to harden government and civil organizations 

 

13. Quantico Marine Corp Base, sign at entrance to military housing. 
30 I CHAPTER 3

and critical functions against the effects of an attack and/or to assure an orderly 

recovery. The third line must be preparation of individuals and their families to 

withstand the impacts of a national catastrophe. 

The study team was reminded of the many examples where individual 

preparedness proved pivotal in mitigating the consequences of a natural disaster, 

and the strong role it played in the early days of the Cold War. The effectiveness 

with which Florida is able to contend with hurricanes, having learned valuable 

lessons from Hurricane Andrew, especially when compared to Louisiana’s 

inability to deal with Katrina, shows how state and local preparation can blunt a 

disaster’s impact. The preparedness of the Swiss population to hunker in place 

during military emergencies is another good example of preparedness. More 

often, however, unless catastrophe is a near-term reality, most major domestic 

preparedness programs are likely to fail because of competing, short-term 

resource needs. Katrina was widely and credibly forecast for many years, yet 

Louisiana remained poorly prepared (Table 6). 

Whatever measures are taken to deal with domestic catastrophes, they all 

must have intrinsic value—improved efficiency, greater safety, better level of 

service, less cost. Government should not be the principal source of resources, 

but should lead in encouraging improvements, providing guidelines, and offering 

the venues for educating and practicing how well prepared communities are—or 

should be. DOD’s success in assuring the deployment and supply of 

expeditionary forces, or defense against domestic catastrophe, is utterly 

dependent upon the military community’s ability to function adequately in a 

post-attack or pandemic environment. Homeland security and the ability to 

continue military operations in a hostile environment at home is a capability 

supported by three pillars: government, private sector, and individuals and 

families. If any of these are weak, the system, like a three-legged stool, is 

unstable, and seriously degraded, at best. The sentiment was best summed up by 

Jim Schwartz, Arlington County Fire Chief, Incident Commander, Pentagon 

9/11: “A prepared society lessens the burden on DOD to do its warfighting job.”
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 31

Table 6. Progress Toward Preparedness 

In the aftermath of Katrina, President Bush demanded that “we find 

out the lessons, that we learn them, and that we fix the problems, 

that we take every action to make sure America is safer, stronger, 

and better prepared.” The lessons referenced were those 

enumerated in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Lessons Learned, 2006. These included planning, resource 

management, evacuation, situational awareness, communications, 

and coordination. These lessons are not new; in fact they have 

been repeatedly observed and stated: 

Hurricane Katrina, 2005 

Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often 

overlapping, roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed 

during this disaster ... This lack of coordination at the Federal 

headquarters-level reflected confusing organizational structures in 

the field. ... Furthermore, the Joint Field Office (JFO) staff and 

other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working 

knowledge of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or 

even a basic understanding of ICS. 

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 

2006:52

September 11, 2001 

It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City 

and Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and 

communications that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any 

emergency of similar scale. The task looking forward is to enable 

first responders to respond in a coordinated manner with the 

greatest possible awareness of the situation. .... Emergency 

response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command 

System. When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are 

involved, they should adopt a Unified Command. Both are proven 

frameworks for emergency response.

The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004:315,397 

Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995 

The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) and 

Incident Command System (ICS) were weakened early in the 

event due to the immediate response of numerous local, state and 

Federal agencies, three separate locations of the Incident 

Command Post (ICP), within the first few hours, and the 

deployment of many Mobile Command Posts (MCPs), representing 

support agencies.

After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, 

2003:3

Hurricane Andrew, 1992 

The Committee heard substantial testimony that 

the post-disaster response and recovery to 

Hurricane Andrew suffered from several problems, 

including:

Inadequate communication between levels of 

government concerning specific needs;

Lack of full awareness of supply inventories 

and agency capabilities;

Failure to have a single person in charge with 

a clear chain of command; and

Inability to cut through bureaucratic red tape. 

Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response 

Review Committee Final Report, 1993:60 

These shortfalls in communications are repeatedly 

identified in a multitude of after-action reports. 

Recent catastrophic events have resulted in many 

legislative actions and directives to address these 

problems:

Homeland Security Act of 2002 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 – 

Management Domestic Incidents 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 –

Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization & Protection

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 – 

National Preparedness 

Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of 2006 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007 

As evidenced by the enormous scope of the 

recent 9/11 legislation, it is widely perceived that 

little progress has been made in addressing these 

problems. Why don’t we learn? Why are these 

problems a challenge to military operations? 
32 I CHAPTER 3

Resiliency 

According to FEMA, there have been over 1,700 federal disaster declarations 

issued since 1953, with an annual average of 31 events per year. The number of 

events during the last decade has exceeded this average (Figure 6). A capable 

enemy could take advantage of any one of these annual events as an opportunity 

to launch an attack while U.S. resources are strained and leadership distracted. 

Americans have been conditioned over many decades to assume disaster 

relief assistance will come from communities adjacent to military installations and 

that other federal and state assets will be available. Firefighters and emergency 

medical technicians (EMT), for example, call for mutual aid when local systems 

are stretched beyond their limits, and major disasters routinely draw from 

resources across the nation including the National Guard. 

Source: FEMA, August 2007; http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema 

Figure 6. Number of U.S. Disaster Declarations 

In the event of coordinated asymmetric attacks in many parts of the country 

and/or simultaneously with a natural disaster or avian flu pandemic, emergency 

responders and relief organizations may not be able to move across local or state 

borders. Resources will be severely strained and responders will be busy dealing 

with or preparing to deal with disaster on their home turf. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 33

This reality has a sobering consequence. Even in the best of worlds, with all 

public and private emergency response and recovery systems operating as 

designed, help may not be there when military members and their families 

desperately need it. Evidence of this has been dramatically illustrated during 

countless disaster relief operations. To cite one example, in January 1998, the 

worst ice storm in New York State’s recorded history paralyzed an area in a 

northern region of the state the size of Vermont, affecting over 18 million 

acres.14 Twenty thousand utility poles had collapsed, the power grid was out of 

service for weeks, fallen trees made most roads impassable, and citizens were left 

to survive in the sub-freezing temperatures with only the food, water, and other 

supplies they had on hand. 

For most of them, especially those with children, the experience was a 

terrible ordeal. Tragically, some did not survive. But for a few, the experience 

was no more than an inconvenience. These were usually older people who had 

grown up in a time when self-reliance was an accepted way of life. They had 

stockpiles of water, food, fuel for woodstoves, and medicines. One elderly 

couple replied to a rescue team that came to their home to offer assistance, “Go 

help somebody else, we’re good here until Spring.” 

For military families, it comes down to one simple truth: the ability to 

function during or after a terrorist attack, pandemic, or natural disaster will 

reflect the quality of individual planning and preparations. Relying totally on 

traditional government responsive means of support in times of crisis is a 

strategic blunder with potentially dire outcomes. 

A Culture of Preparedness 

Instilling and promoting a culture of preparedness can provide both physical 

and psychological benefits to members and their families. There is much that can 

be done without great expense or effort to better prepare for both natural and 

man-made disasters.15 Greater hazard awareness, training, home storage, and 

family communication and evacuation plans can provide greater peace of mind, 

strengthen emotional resiliency and empower DOD families to carry on through 

 

14. Federal Emergency Management Agency. New York Ice Storm Final Report, January 1998. Retrieved on 

August 13, 2007 from http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=10489 

15. Events include such things as floods, mudslides, hurricanes, tornados, fires, severe snow or ice storms, 

earthquakes, volcanoes, infectious disease outbreaks, severe power and fuel outages, hazardous chemical 

releases, nuclear or radiological incidents, acts of terrorism and/or civil disturbance. 
34 I CHAPTER 3

a disaster. Preparedness also reduces the impact of a crisis and likelihood that 

these families will have to depend only upon the emergency relief infrastructure. 

Self-sufficiency also empowers members and families to help others and set an 

example the community can follow. 

Most emergency preparedness guidelines encourage a minimum of 72 hours 

worth of supplies per individual for use until authorities are able to restore order 

and marshal emergency services.16 However, experience has shown, and future 

disaster estimates (such as for a pandemic flu) indicate, that individuals should be 

prepared for much longer periods (two weeks to several months). Over time, 

individuals and families can build up their own home storage supply of food, 

water, medicines, and other necessary items including financial reserves and 

prudent debt avoidance. 

Fortunately, preparedness at the individual and family level is the cheapest 

and perhaps most achievable of strategies to enable the nation’s military 

community to continue operations during times of adversity. The idea of 

individual and family preparedness was reinforced by a group of 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with whom a part of the study team met: 

“We can’t protect our country if we can’t protect ourselves.” 

DOD must recognize that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines will not 

likely be effective warfighters if they are simultaneously worried about the 

security of their families. While obvious steps, such as increased base 

protection, can be implemented, too many families live outside the installation. 

Having them educated and prepared for self sufficiency for up to two weeks 

would have immense morale, as well as actual, impact. The idea is not new in 

the homeland security context, but DHS’s programs have been poorly funded 

and not well publicized. 

 

16. Helpful Resources: DHS Be Ready, http://www.ready.gov/; FEMA, 

http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab3.html; Citizens Corps, 

http://www.citizencorps.gov/; CDC, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/; Florida Division of Emergency 

Management, http://www.floridadisaster.org/bpr/family%20preparedness/ index.htm 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 35

RECOMMENDATIONS: ENSURING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY

The recommendations offered here are restricted to those that affect DOD, 

although there are many related items that DHS should address, as well. 

The first set of recommendations is associated with ensuring 

deployment and supply. Toward that end, the Secretary of Defense, 

should direct:

OSD ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to extend the mission assurance process 

to the defense industrial base and recommend approaches for addressing 

shortfalls. 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(USD (AT&L)) to work with defense industrial base owners to develop 

and implement corrective action plans. 

OSD ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to develop a prioritized action plan for 

addressing identified risks to DOD owned assets. 

U.S. Northern Command to lead the integration and analysis of defense 

agency critical functions, within the framework identified by ASD 

(HD&ASA)/DCIP, to enhance mission assurance, and to be the 

principal advocate for prioritized resource needs and shortfalls. 

Service secretaries to fund actions for mission assurance in owned functions. 

DUSD (LM&R) to ensure resourcing of logistics shortfalls: 

- to assure sources of supply and movement to DOD depots 

- to eliminate the last tactical mile issues 

- to make the information management system interoperable, robust, 

and resilient to attack, from both within and outside 

An important additional aspect, not highlighted in the recommendations 

above, is that DOD should also continue to carefully assess those parts of 

the infrastructure outside the defense industrial base on which it depends 

(telecomm, transportation, and others) to understand its robustness and 

availability in the environments characterized in this report.

In the area of family preparedness, the Service chiefs of staff should 

actively promote the ability of military families to shelter at home for two 

weeks, or evacuate on short notice. They should: 
36 I CHAPTER 3

Reinforce message via NCO leadership academies, on-base medical 

community, Armed Forces Network, unit town-hall meetings, movie/TV 

celebrities, veterans’ organizations, and other similar venues. 

Assure base commanders export this capability to adjacent civilian 

communities. 

These recommendations were crafted on the strong advice of the NCOs 

consulted. They stated that the most effective way to achieve this capacity is 

through leadership, rather than by an administrative order. Families should not be 

“ordered” to prepare since orders could be politely ignored or even 

counterproductive, and impossible to enforce. Instead, leadership should help 

them understand why it is important and how to do it. Leadership should help 

them want to do it by implementing an education and outreach campaign. This 

should cascade from the chiefs down through example and encouragement to the 

individual unit level. 

This message could be reinforced through NCO leadership academies, onbase medical community (pan-flu education), Armed Forces Network, unit townhall meetings, celebrity endorsements, motivational speakers, promotional sales 

(at cost) via commissaries, as well as veteran and community organization 

involvement. DOD could also partner with other organizations such as the 

DHS-sponsored Citizens Corps on how best to prepare and educate members 

and their families.17 According to FEMA, there are over 2,200 Citizens Corp 

Councils serving areas containing 75 percent of the total U.S. population.18

Commissary stocks of long shelf-life items should also be increased. A significant 

collateral benefit (according to the NCOs) would be enhanced morale for 

members serving in assignments that separate them from their families. 

 

17. American Red Cross, Center for Disease Control, Community Emergency Response Team, 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Medical Reserve Corps 

Program, Neighborhood Watch/USAonWatch, and Volunteers in Police Service. 

18. Citizens Corps, (2007). Retrieved on August 13, 2007 from http://www.citizencorps.gov/ 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 37

Chapter 4. Building the National Team 

“One Team” 

The third dimension of the study’s assessment of homeland defense 

addressed the status of the “national team” and DOD’s involvement. As stated 

in Chapter 1, success in both homeland security and defense, whether against 

terrorism or more stressing peer-generated environments, demands a level of 

partnership and integration between and among all levels of government as well 

as with the private sector. In its investigation, the study team found an almost 

exclusive focus in national strategy and plans on terrorist attacks, most 

often a single event, even if distributed in nature (as a bio or cyber attack might 

be), rather than on the more capable adversary envisioned in this study. 

In spite of the wake-up call provided by Katrina, progress toward an 

integrated national system is painfully slow, and the leaders who will have to act 

in those situations are choosing not to take full advantage of the training 

opportunities presented to them. Transitions in command from local to federal 

authorities, or from DHS to DOD, are not practiced. Most important, in the 

view of the DSB, is the lack of the homeland security/defense professional—

either civilian or military. Academic programs are starting in several universities, 

but the government professional development track in homeland security and 

homeland defense, akin to those of other accepted prime missions of federal 

departments, has not yet been created. 

The Homeland Security Team 

Homeland security organizations responsible for dealing with national 

calamities are a diverse group: federal agencies, state and local authorities, and 

private firms. Some are new, some long-standing, and many, with principal 

and/or historic missions elsewhere, are included because of their special 

expertise or location. This community, in its present form, was hastily assembled 

following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Its “pick-up” nature 

has meant that homeland security and defense leaders often lack sufficiently 

broad perspectives across the numerous capabilities and equities participating in 

the homeland security mission. Some of the organizations do not fully appreciate 

what other team members (such as private firms that operate critical 

infrastructures) can offer. Many homeland security leaders—police and fire, 
38 I CHAPTER 4

Coast Guard, FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Guard, 

and others—have extensive experience in organizations with long histories of 

disaster response, recovery, and relief, but little experience working in a unified 

command environment. In today’s threat environment, the planning and 

coordination needed for effective, timely response to national emergencies is 

greater than ever before in the nation’s history. However, DHS, as the lead 

agency for creating that level of response, is still in its infancy. 

At the state and local level, the DSB heard little that was positive about their 

federal “partners.” DHS continues to reorganize, changes points of contact 

frequently, and brings to the table too much of a “we’re in charge” attitude. This 

judgment is shared by the private sector, although the relationship between 

DOD and the defense industrial base seems to be better than with other sectors 

and their federal agency lead. With respect to U.S. Northern Command, DOD’s 

principal operating “face” to the homeland security community, the command 

has been restrained by the view among the Department’s leadership that the 

priority is—and should be—the “away game.” Its low profile start has produced 

some serious perception problems that must be overcome with the many 

partners it will need to work with in a national emergency. 

Possibly the most neglected member of the team is the private sector. The 

previous chapter discussed the importance to DOD (and of course, the nation) 

of critical infrastructure protection. The private sector owns most of the 

infrastructure and will be the most effective in restoring its function after an 

attack. As such, it must be as integral to the national team as government actors. 

The real challenge to the nation’s leaders is to ensure that the right agency, 

with the appropriate authorities and capabilities, is postured to lead a response at 

the appropriate time and with the necessary capabilities, from its own resources 

and/or from other supporting agencies and qualified contributors. 

Interagency 

The major departments of the federal government responsible for 

coordinating the elements of national power in the defense of the nation—the 

Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as the 

intelligence community—have varying degrees of authority and responsibility 

under different circumstances. Coordinating these efforts in remote theaters where 

roles and responsibilities are well understood is very difficult. The challenges are 

even more acute in the homeland. As the agency charged with protecting the 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 39

United States from terrorist attacks, DHS is responsible for leading the federal 

effort to prevent attacks and to respond to domestic events, whether man-made or 

natural. The Department of Justice, however, is the law enforcement agency with 

the lead for domestic terrorist incidents. The DOD has significant responsibilities 

in support of civil authorities and assurance of critical infrastructure, especially as it 

relates to the defense infrastructure base. 

Under the National Response Framework, DOD is a primary agency for urban 

search and rescue and a support agency for nearly every other identified emergency 

support function: transportation, communications, firefighting, emergency 

management, mass care, emergency assistance, housing and human services, public 

health and medical services, oil and hazardous materials response, agriculture and 

natural resources, energy, public safety, long-term community recovery, and 

external affairs. The Army Corps of Engineers is the coordinator and primary 

agency for public works and engineering. Furthermore, DOD is identified as the 

coordinating agency for cyber incidents and as a cooperating agency for every 

other identified incident, including biological, nuclear, radiological, and terrorism 

law enforcement investigation. As discussed in previous chapters, DOD may also 

find itself in the lead should events become serious enough. 

The 2005 DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognizes 

the importance of the interagency: “Given that we face an emerging global, 

multi-dimensional threat, how should we prepare ourselves to operate ‘jointly’ 

across the interagency in a way that increases our effectiveness and decreases our 

vulnerabilities along the seams?” 

An example of the effectiveness of a cooperative interagency construct is the 

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)–South. This organization offers a unique 

model for day-to-day interagency operations. JIATF-South conducts counterillicit trafficking interdiction operations, intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor 

correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets. It 

also promotes security cooperation, as well as country team and partner nation 

initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic. 

As a true interagency organization, membership in JIATF-South includes 

Customs and Border Patrol, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement 

Agency, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Security 

Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This pairing of military 

and civilian government agencies under a unified command structure provides 
40 I CHAPTER 4

for routine interaction between the entities that will need to work together 

effectively during a crisis. 

Taking a lesson from the success of JIATF–South, the panel believes that the 

complex network of interdependent roles, responsibilities, and relationships 

demands a full-time integrated approach to homeland security and homeland 

defense activities through a number of such standing operational task forces. Some 

specialized examples, such as the National Maritime Intelligence Center, operated 

jointly by the Coast Guard and Navy, or the FEMA-DLA memorandum of 

understanding for DLA logistics support in national emergencies, are a good, but 

incomplete, start. For DOD, this means that U.S. Northern Command must step 

up—and in some cases, be allowed to step up—to a more proactive role in the 

interagency forum. 

Federal-State-Local 

In the case of a point attack, the first manifestation—and response—will 

occur locally. If or when those resources are overwhelmed, requests to the state 

will be made. At that point, the governor can call out the National Guard, as well 

as exercise mutual aid agreements with other states for additional response 

resources. When those avenues of response are tapped out, appeals for federal 

help can and will be made. However, the study heard from several state and 

regional response leaders that federal support can be slow in coming and what 

they can count on is largely unknown. In fact, the leader of one of the largest 

state emergency response offices stated that he plans for no federal help at least 

for three days after a major event. Interesting, as well, were comments from local 

and state responders that, by and large, they didn’t need more “stuff” as provided 

by the DHS grant programs, but rather support for regional planning, training, 

and exercising. 

With respect to prevention, state and local response leaders noted how much 

they can contribute, provided they have adequate threat information to recognize a 

threat when observed. In other words, a strong partnership with their federal 

counterparts can contribute significantly to threat mitigation and/or apprehension. 

Several examples, positive and negative, highlight the power of effective 

federal-state-local partnerships. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 41

Y2K Information Reporting and Communications 

During Y2K, an Information Coordination Center was established by 

Executive Order 13073 and implemented through a system for reporting 

information from the local level to federal, as well as the provision of information 

of interest to state and local entities. The Information Coordination Center was the 

federally operated central point for gathering, analyzing, and summarizing 

information on systems operations during the Year 2000 date rollover. The guiding 

principles for its development and operation were: 

common, consistent operational picture to the President and decisionmakers 

owners to fix their own problems at the lowest level 

use of existing agencies and capabilities; supplement where needed 

federal assessment, assistance where national interest, life, and safety merit 

Federal Response Plan used as the model 

individual agencies required to validate data they supplied 

information content planned, templated, routinely transmitted; 

significant events transmitted on an exception basis 

one voice to the nation 

The model for the operation of the Information Coordinating Center is 

captured in Figure 7. The interagency and intergovernmental coordination and 

teamwork leading up to the rollover and immediately thereafter was commendable, 

and could provide a valuable model for information-sharing in high alert and/or 

crises for today’s homeland security and homeland environment. 
42 I CHAPTER 4

Figure 7. Y2K Information Flow 

Response to Katrina 

The failings of government at every level in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina have been the subject of many studies and treatises, both within and 

outside the government. This study turned to the experience of its members as 

well as outside sources to better understand specifics of the response. Clearly, 

state and local agencies and officials had inadequate planning and preparation to 

deal with the scope and scale of the event, but problems occurred at every level. 

The federal-state-local shortcomings, as developed independently for the 

Homeland Security Council, are summarized as follows:19

Key decision-makers were unfamiliar with response plans. 

Federal agencies were slow to respond to the unprecedented 

requirements for federal support and coordination. 

Federal multi-agency coordination centers were not established in the 

field until after the height of the crisis. 

Critical public affairs structures were not operating at full capacity until 

weeks after landfall. 

 

19. GEN Dennis Reimer, USA (ret.), DFI International Government Services, Analysis for the Homeland 

Security Council. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 43

The delayed establishment of key federal coordination mechanisms (such 

as a joint field office) exacerbated management problems and confusion 

in the field. 

The joint field office should have been fully resourced and prepositioned prior to the event. 

Key federal, state, and local personnel, especially state National Guard 

leaders, should have been co-located to facilitate joint planning and 

decision-making. 

The military played a critical role in the response to Hurricane Katrina, 

but overall coordination was lacking. 

DOD’s mission assignment process proved cumbersome and delayed the 

delivery of some resources. 

Greater operational planning is needed for specific defense support to 

civil authorities missions. 

Greater integration between U.S. Northern Command and the National 

Guard would have enhanced coordination and response. 

Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected the National 

Guard response. 

DOD needs a greater understanding of the types of support that will be 

expected during a domestic disaster. 

DHS officials need greater awareness of the capabilities and authorities 

of DOD; conversely, key DOD personnel should be trained on the 

National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and 

the Incident Command System. 

State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers 

Since 9/11 many state and local jurisdictions have established “fusion” 

centers for the purpose of collecting information on terrorist threats from a wide 

range of sources—including criminal investigations, the media, and tips from the 

public. Major metropolitan areas like Los Angeles and New York City pioneered 

these efforts. In 1996, Los Angeles County established the Terrorism Early 

Warning Group as an interdisciplinary group in which local, state, and federal 

agencies work together to share information and combine resources to enhance 

the ability to identify and respond to acts and threats of terrorism. Today at least 
44 I CHAPTER 4

46 states and the District of Columbia have operating fusion centers to create a 

fuller picture of potential threats in their area. 

In December 2005, President Bush directed federal agencies to “develop a 

common framework” for sharing security information with other levels of 

government and the private sector. The Departments of Homeland Security and 

Justice grants have helped fund many of the centers. DHS contributions have 

amounted to $380 million so far. There are several examples of how these 

centers have proven effective in apprehending suspects wanted by the federal 

government. But there is growing concern that without a plan to identify and 

allocate state funding to keep these centers operating, they could be in jeopardy. 

Many of these centers are voluntary endeavors and funding profiles vary greatly 

from state to state. 

Public-Private 

As discussed previously, DHS has been tasked with significant leadership 

responsibilities for identifying and protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure 

and key resources. In addition to the Government and Sector Coordinating 

Councils (GCCs/SCCs) it has organized to facilitate the process, DHS has 

established the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) to 

support the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Through CIPAC, 

DHS coordinates federal infrastructure protection programs with infrastructure 

protection activities of the private sector and state, local, territorial, and tribal 

governments, and facilitates interaction among the stakeholders in each sector.20

Because CIPAC meetings are customarily closed to the public, participants can 

more comfortably share security-sensitive information about threats, 

vulnerabilities, and protective measures. 

During the course of this study, the DSB heard from representatives of the 

healthcare, defense industrial base, energy (electricity), information technology, 

communications, and emergency services sectors, and from three transportation 

sub-sectors (mass transit, oil and natural gas, and railroads). The consensus among 

these sectors suggested that the GCC/SCC “partnership” concept is good 

because it provides an opportunity to build trust among all stakeholders. 

However, the concept is not uniformly applied across all sectors. 

 

20. CIPAC is exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act [P.L. 92-463]. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 45

For example, DHS and other sector-specific federal government agencies 

(SSA) worked with SCCs to produce sector-specific plans (SSP) required by the 

NIPP.21 But the experience of the sectors was dependent upon the relationship 

with the SSA. The information technology sector, whose SSA is the cyber 

security component of DHS, was very satisfied with the experience, as was the 

oil and natural gas sector, whose SSA is the Department of Energy. Success was 

attributed to strong relationships and information sharing between the private 

and public principals. 

On the other hand, where the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

is the SSA, some transportation sub-sectors have reported unsatisfactory 

experiences. Some sector representatives said DHS has the classic “left 

hand/right hand” problem and the “partnership” concept is contradicted at 

times by the regulatory responsibility and mind-set of some of its agencies, 

especially TSA. DHS must institute a consistent approach across all its 

components, and persist with other SSAs in reinforcing the importance of sector 

“partnership.” To build trust, DHS must treat all sectors as full partners, not as 

subordinates. Rather than try to control the sector, DHS must facilitate security 

efforts of the sectors. 

In spite of these problems, critical infrastructure owners and operators 

independently have taken steps to protect their assets and enhance the resiliency 

of their systems based upon their own risk assessments.22 In many instances, 

however, they say they are not doing all they could be doing to protect their 

facilities and employees because of competing interests or issues.23 For example, 

companies are chartered to fulfill a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders 

for continuity of operations, but in some cases the activities needed for them to 

best protect their employees are counter to the activities to provide the best 

continuity of operations. Also, if they actually envisioned the kinds of scenarios 

contemplated in this study, it could put them on uncertain legal ground regarding 

risk disclosure and could result in a misperception on Wall Street that could 

negatively impact shareholders. 

Another problem voiced by the private sector is that it does not have a full 

understanding of the threat since it does not have access to the same level of 

 

21. Sector-specific plans appear to be programmatic plans to guide the DHS grant process vice operational 

plans for sectors. 

22. DHS grants legislatively are restricted to public entities. 

23. Comments by representatives of the defense industrial base sector. 
46 I CHAPTER 4

information DHS has. Intelligence flow, at an appropriate level, to the private 

sector is limited due to the more commonly held principle of “need to know” vice 

“need to share.” Therefore, business continuity plans are more often based upon 

a company’s own evaluation of risk, which may or may not be consistent with 

DHS’s assessment. A robust information flow from DHS and the responsible 

SSA would support effective deployment of limited private resources for business 

continuity and resiliency, and additional critical infrastructure protection that the 

government or military might require. Absent that, businesses are likely to limit 

security investment to the level judged prudent for business continuity. 

A related intelligence issue is the private sector’s view that even when DHS 

intentions are good, it does not always recognize when a sector has a “need to 

know” due to complex interdependencies with other sectors, unfamiliarity with 

sector operations, and co-location of infrastructures. As an example of this 

problem, DHS did not notify the railroad sector of the 2006 Iraq chlorine 

vehicle-borne IED incidents even though the industry has cleared personnel and 

a DOD-cleared facility.24 Although the attacks in Iraq involved chlorine trucks 

and not rail tank cars, detailed information about the Iraq attacks is very relevant 

because of the volume of chlorine transported by rail and because the railroad 

industry is in the process of designing the next-generation chlorine tank car. 

Perhaps the best example of this complex problem occurred in August 2004, 

when DHS raised the alert level to Orange for the financial services sector in 

New York City, Northern New Jersey, and Washington, D.C., and issued direct 

warnings to specific entities in those regions, including the Citigroup buildings in 

the New York City area; the New York Stock Exchange Building in New York 

City; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Buildings in 

Washington D.C.; and the Prudential Insurance Company of America in Newark, 

New Jersey. DHS did not, however, issue warnings to the owner and manager of 

the Citicorp Center, Boston Properties. At that time, Citicorp did not own, 

manage, or even occupy a majority of the Citicorp Center. Nor did DHS issue 

warnings to owners and operators of other critical infrastructure located adjacent 

to or under these buildings. This left mass transit operators, water, gas pipeline, 

 

24. After a similar incident in 2007 was reported in the press, the industry sought more information by 

submitting a list of Industry Information Requirements to DHS. As of this writing, DHS has not fully 

answered the industry’s information requirements. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 47

telecommunications, and electric companies unaware of the potential danger to 

their operations.25

The assignment of sector subject matter experts to the DHS intelligence unit 

(Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center [HITRAC]) would go 

a long way toward closing the intelligence sharing and analysis gap. However, the 

clearance process and the DHS requirement for full-time vice part-time 

personnel are impediments to progress. 

In the late 1990s, many sectors established Information Sharing and Analysis 

Centers (ISAC) at the urging of the federal government.26 ISACs were tailored to 

the needs of the individual sectors. Some sectors received federal funding for 

their ISACs; other ISACs were self-funded. But DHS ended federal support for 

sector-established ISACs and established the Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN), a “one-size-fits-all” approach. The level of satisfaction with 

HSIN depends upon the constituencies of the SCCs. For example, where the 

previous ISAC was not well supported, HSIN is a step forward. However, where 

SCCs are safety and security standard-setting organizations for their industries, 

and where sectors are network industries, more robust information sharing 

within the sector is traditional and indeed required for safety (such as the 

emergency management and railroad sectors). HSIN does not measure up to 

their standards for timely and useful information. The panel questions whether a 

single system could ever meet the diverse needs of the many sectors it is 

attempting to support. 

Leadership for the National Team 

Response to national catastrophes requires close cooperation among leaders 

and their organizations, which, in turn, depends on leaders with a sound vision 

of the team operation and relationships with other team members. This concept 

is the homeland defense equivalent of “jointness” as practiced within the DOD. 

The federal government is in the unique position to unite the homeland team. 

Forming a truly joint homeland security and defense team starts with 

developing leaders with a joint perspective—both through education and 

career experiences—building an interagency cadre of leaders, whose 

 

25. “Public-Private Sector Intelligence Coordination,” National Infrastructure Advisory Council, July 11, 2006. 

26. Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures. 
48 I CHAPTER 4

understanding of homeland defense transcends their immediate position. 

Carrying out homeland defense requires “joint operations” teamwork; leading such 

operations requires a truly joint leadership team. Homeland security and defense—

regardless of agency, level of government, or public or private sector—must be 

seen as a professional opportunity for those seeking to lead in this critical field. 

The DSB saw no such recognition of the need to develop homeland security 

leadership in the same manner as the nation has invested in developing national 

security leadership. The military and civil service education, training, and 

advancement processes for the latter could and should serve as a model for a 

parallel track for homeland security. 

Plans and Exercises 

There appear to be numerous doctrinal and operational plans, with 

embedded processes for review and revision of the plans. But processes to 

ensure that the plans are practiced and capabilities measured against 

readiness metrics are lacking. While there are many exercises (possibly too 

many), the exercises are highly scripted, unconnected to each other, and typically 

focus on a top-down approach (where the supporting organizations are “training 

aids” to the senior-level players) instead of bottom-up approach (focusing on an 

integrated and layered response beginning with the initial event). Even the 

national-level exercises have not been effective—more often broad than deep, 

where the real lessons get learned. They are often stopped before the more 

difficult issues of transfer of command, or employment of specialized assets, or 

unknowns (like public panic), come into play. Figure 8 is a compilation of the top 

two levels of national exercises planned for the next five years. Surprisingly, this 

chart represents the first time that all such exercises were captured in one place. 

The DSB, and the DHS program manager responsible, note the lack of 

connection and integration among them. 

More worrisome than the disjointed nature of the exercises is the lack of any 

process for effectively “learning from” the lessons of these exercises. While there 

are mechanisms for capturing observations and documenting problem areas 

identified during the exercises, there are no mechanisms to promulgate the 

lessons to the wider homeland security and homeland defense community, or to 

implement, track, and record corrective actions taken as a result of the lessons. 

DHS has recognized the problem and is standing up the “National Exercise 

Program” to put more discipline into their processes. But the discipline inherent 

in DOD is lacking in the homeland security community, so that promulgating 

lessons learned will be a much more difficult task. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 49

Figure 8. The Five Year National Exercise Schedule 

The gap extends to DOD, where relevant exercise programs do not appear 

to be effectively linked to national objectives. For example, the Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) Noble Resolve exercises, initiated in the current year, are an 

experimentation series designed to address homeland scenarios. These are not 

yet linked to DHS’ National Exercise Plan, nor do the JFCOM personnel 

involved seem aware of the official DHS scenarios or of existing tools and 

models already developed. The DSB was quite dismayed to learn that the 

maritime intercept scenario of Noble Resolve-1 was artificially limited to avoid 

interagency handoff or coordination issues. 

Northern Command’s Ardent Sentry exercise series is a move in the right 

direction to involve local and regional responders, but its objectives appear to be 

overly broad and shallow, in that there are too many players with disparate goals 
50 I CHAPTER 4

and exercise objectives. One reason appears to be that many of the players may 

be using the exercises as their primary means of training, rather than using the 

exercise as a “capstone” event to validate plans and training and to assess 

interactions with other participants. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and DHS experience from exercises 

such as BioNet (military-civilian response to a bio attack in the San Diego region) 

and with U.S. Pacific Command (military-civilian response to a nuclear event on 

Oahu) provide numerous pointers for military-civilian combined operations 

associated with WMD events. A key lesson learned from these experiences is the 

importance of exercising mutual aid responsibilities anticipated in plans, 

including coordinated approaches to public information and interoperable 

communications for response elements. The exercises also highlight operational 

and technical shortfalls in planning for WMD consequence management and 

multiple, major events. However, it is not clear what impact these exercises have 

had beyond the participants themselves—in other words, these lessons have not 

informed the homeland security and homeland defense community at large. 

Stepping back, the DSB concluded that most of the exercise examples lacked 

realistic design and planning, interagency integration, and application of lessons 

learned. Exercises appeared in many instances to be a collection of activities 

artificially aggregated into an exercise construct. It is difficult to conduct a good 

exercise, whereby “good” means: (1) provides answers to questions established 

prior to the exercise and (2) effectively meets objectives for all participants. If the 

homeland defense community is ever to run meaningful and useful tests that give 

answers as to the value and shortcomings of U.S. homeland defense operations, 

six rules, derived from work on design of experiments, should be followed: 

The exercise must have an objective. It must be designed to stress 

specific elements of the operations plan (in many homeland security and 

homeland defense cases, a unified operational plan) in ways that result in 

lessons that will improve the plan and participants’ actions. Exercises are 

learning (not training) opportunities. 

There must be a model for the exercise. If the objective of the exercise 

is to test operations in response to a specific event, there must be a model 

for that response beforehand against which to evaluate the results of the 

exercise. This model may or may not be a computer model, but it should 

be easy enough to understand that anyone involved in, or reviewing, the 

exercise can clearly understand the exercise. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 51

The exercise design should allow observation based on the model. If 

the exercise is designed to produce a given result, the result should be well 

understood, observable, and comparable to that from the model. 

The data obtained by early observations should be such that they 

can be analyzed quickly so that the model, which is bound to be wrong 

in some respects, and the modeling methods can be changed prior to the 

next phase of the exercise. 

Exercise design and execution must provide a comprehensive, objective, 

and accurate after-action reporting mechanism, coupled with a 

corrective action plan and a commitment to resource implementation 

by all parties. 

Regardless of the importance of the exercise in providing answers related 

to new operations, the exercise should also provide teaming 

opportunities for the participants to work together with other members 

of the homeland security/defense team. 

Why Can’t We Learn? 

With the current preparedness system and exercise program, the involved 

agencies at all levels of government unfortunately end up training on real world 

events. The history of major disasters shows the same lessons observed, over and 

over again. The list invariably includes: 

communications 

leadership 

logistics 

planning 

situational awareness 

operations 

resource management 

Learning from these lessons is much less evident. During each new event 

solutions found earlier are often re-invented. When asked about specific threats 

and exercises, a representative of the International Association of Fire Chiefs 

indicated little training to address enemy attacks on the homeland, but “I’m sure 

if it happens, we’ll find a way to get it done.” 
52 I CHAPTER 4

The Department of Homeland Security sponsored a workshop soon after 

Katrina to examine why the emergency response community finds it difficult to 

learn certain lessons. This workshop uncovered several barriers to learning and 

achieving change. These findings were echoed by many responders, homeland 

security professionals, and private sector representatives with whom the study 

met. In summary, they are:27 

lack of motivation for change 

ineffective review and reporting processes 

unproductive learning and teaching 

poorly planned and executed exercises 

resource constraints 

Motivation for Change 

Several barriers to effective resolution of these issues exist. First and 

foremost is motivating the sustained energy required to achieve lasting change. 

Organizational change is extremely difficult, especially in the emergency response 

area. Memory is short-lived and the ability to garner the political will to make 

well-thought out and rational changes in the national response system is often 

short-changed due to other pressing matters such as failing schools, high fuel 

prices, and other economic calamities. Even when important lessons do result in 

calls for change, the disparate emergency response community at all levels of 

government lacks a shared vision of what to do about those lessons. 

Another barrier to sustaining motivation for change is the irregular nature of 

significant events. In general, the longer lasting effects of even very large events 

are confined to a relatively small geographic region. To improve response on a 

national level, agencies and organizations must be willing to learn from events 

even if they were not directly affected. This calls for organizations to think 

collectively and be willing to learn from each other. The attitude that “it won’t 

happen here or it won’t happen again” is pervasive. When asked after her 

Katrina experience in Louisiana “What can the federal government do to help 

you the next time such an event occurs?,” a local emergency response director 

replied, “Hold me accountable.” The need for effective leadership and 

 

27. A more detailed report can be found in Homeland Security Affairs, The Journal of the Naval Postgraduate 

School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Volume II, Issue 2, July 2006. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 53

accountability at all levels of government is critical to motivate change and 

implement the necessary elements to sustain it. 

Review and Reporting Process 

The process of learning begins with identifying lessons. In the areas of 

emergency response, homeland security, and homeland defense, this is often 

achieved through after-action reports. Such reports could be of immense value 

to many emergency response agencies at all levels of government, but there is 

no universally accepted approach to the development or content of such 

reports. It is not uncommon for multiple reports to emerge from any given 

incident. These reports differ and often conflict because perspectives and 

experiences vary dramatically. 

Worse than conflicts and possible inaccuracies, concern about attribution 

and retribution often constrains an open and frank dialogue concerning lessons 

learned. Meaning is also confused by the lack of common terminology. Afteraction reports tend to focus on what went wrong with little to no attention on 

what went right. As a result, there is precious little documentation on good 

solutions and best practices or “near misses.” To achieve this kind of reporting 

requires an additional analytical step; those preparing the reports need to 

understand not only what happened, but also why it happened and what 

corrective action would have improved the circumstances. 

Given that such reports could be prepared, the next step is to assure effective 

distribution. Most dissemination is either tightly controlled or achieved through 

informal mechanisms. This is particularly true for state and local agencies that 

may not have access to controlled distributions and often do not have the 

necessary resources to establish their own repositories, such as the Center for 

Army Lessons Learned. 

Learning and Teaching 

There are many theories on organizational learning behaviors, and most 

agree on four essential phases, such as those described by Kolb in Figure 9. 
54 I CHAPTER 4

Figure 9. The Learning Cycle 

The scope of Kolb’s model applies to individuals and organizations who aim 

to learn from experience, which includes both working and training situations. 

There are four stages to the cycle: (1) active experience of some specific task and 

context; (2) reflective review to assess the significant events and relationships of 

that experience; (3) generalization of the lessons learned from the experience; 

and (4) prescription of how future activities will be modified given the lessons 

learned. These stages correspond with two dimensions: abstraction (from the 

concrete to the conceptual) and engagement (from active participation to 

reflection). The same dimensions underlie the “learning styles” inventory used to 

assess the individual approaches to problem solvers. Kolb’s model is particularly 

evident in techniques used to train collaborative decision-making—a key element 

of an effective unified incident command. 

In many cases, particularly in civilian emergency response, failure to learn is 

due, in part, to the lack of common and accessible systems to identify and 

disseminate lessons. Learning begins with analysis to identify the causal process 

that underlies the lesson. One workshop participant put it this way: “We don’t 

study lessons carefully enough and apply them in a serious way. We don’t drill down 

into the details of what changes are really required to address lessons.” This dilemma 

is intensified by the fact that civilian emergency response disciplines lack a common 

operating doctrine. Agencies often lack a systems view and will tend to consider 

individual incidents and/or particular lessons in isolation in much the same way as 

current exercise plans and objectives are developed in various stovepipes. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 55

After action reports often identify lessons and occasionally appropriate 

remedies, which can easily lead to a false sense of security that we have actually 

learned the lessons before they are properly included in a training program. 

Practice is often short-changed. In absence of an effective training program and 

opportunities to practice, change is not embedded in the system and often the 

same mistakes occur on the next exercise or incident. 

Planning and Executing Exercises 

One of the most important elements of the learning cycle is the inclusion of 

effective exercises to ensure that new behaviors are instilled in the organization. 

Unfortunately, the current process for design and execution of disaster exercises 

is woefully inadequate. Creating an exercise scenario that is believable, even for 

events that have a low probability of occurring but high consequence should an 

event transpire, is critical to engaging a level of play and experiential learning that 

will be long lasting. Lack of realism both with respect to scenarios and what can 

be expected of the response community exist at all levels of government. Often 

exercises are designed such that true complexities in actual response operations 

and incident management are never uncovered. Everything works nicely, no one 

makes mistakes, or if they do, it doesn’t really affect the outcome. Lastly, the fear 

of failure in our current exercise programs is a very real impediment to getting 

the right people to the table and the design of a realistic exercise environment. 

Often participants who have not been engaged in the planning, do not 

understand either the performance expectations or exercise objectives. As stated 

above, even in large “national-level” exercises many groups come together with 

their own exercise objectives, and while these groups play “in parallel,” they often 

do not integrate their exercise objectives into a single unified exercise scenario. 

The scenarios become unwieldy and result in exercises consisting of, for example, 

5000 players and 2000 exercise objectives (Ardent Sentry 2007). As a result, these 

exercises are grossly expensive and highly scripted and participants get “one shot” 

at their part and never get a chance to learn from their mistakes and try again. 

Resource Constraints 

Providing the necessary funding for sustaining corrective action and 

continued engagement, in a world of many distractions and competing priorities, 

is a challenge that must be overcome, especially in the large civilian response 

community critical to both homeland security and homeland defense missions. 

DOD has many resources that could support preparedness in the homeland 
56 I CHAPTER 4

security environment and enhance its effectiveness when the operational 

environment transitions from supporting civil authorities to homeland defense. 

Overcoming the fundamental challenges of long-term resource commitment and 

achieving the organizational discipline required to engage interagency, 

intergovernmental, and private sector communities will be necessary. The civilian 

emergency response community is very diverse, often fractured, and consists of a 

large volunteer force (especially in firefighting). Even when federal grant dollars 

are being spent, procurement decisions are often made at the local level, which 

makes adoption of a common operational doctrine, not to mention interoperable 

or incompatible equipment, a difficult task to achieve. 

Crisis Communications 

Communications is almost always at the top of the list of recurring issues. It 

can make or break a successful response. It starts with the basics of compatible 

equipment and language among response communities. There has been 

significant improvement across the United States in recent years, especially 

through the Urban Area Security Initiative and other DHS grant programs and 

through the efforts of DHS’s Office for Interoperability and Compatibility and 

its SAFECOM program. 

However, progress is inconsistent and slow, and seems to be hampered as 

much by the will to change as by resources. It extends to the public-private 

linkage, where both the pre-emptive and response actions by private sector 

owners of critical infrastructure can mitigate significant problems, yet they are 

more often than not kept in the dark or not allowed access. (This was an acute 

problem in recovery and restoration post-Katrina.) It also covers crisis 

communication to the public. Too often it is developed “real time” without 

benefit of factual vetting and without coordination, such that what is 

communicated to the public can be misleading or just outright wrong (e.g.,

anthrax attacks in 2001). The DSB came to believe that if there were only 

one thing that DHS and DOD ought to improve among the national 

team, it should be to develop a common doctrine and an enabling 

unified command with an interoperable, survivable communication 

infrastructure. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 57

RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM 

As with other recommendations in this study, the recommendations related to 

building the national team focus on what DOD should do. Secretary of Defense 

leadership is needed in the interagency to address current deficiencies in national 

plans and strategies and support for domestic threat assessment. DOD must step 

up to its preparedness responsibilities in the broad set of communications issues. 

To address deficiencies in plans and communications, the Secretary of 

Defense should: 

Promote the combination of the National Security Council/Homeland 

Security Council (NSC/HSC) to coordinate and integrate a national 

strategy and response for global asymmetric engagement. 

Request a National Intelligence Estimate on the scope of the projected 

threat. 

- Direct the Office of Net Assessment to conduct a capabilities-based 

net assessment. 

Request that DHS work with DOD to codify the transition from DOD 

support to DOD lead for a war at home. 

Direct the Deputy Secretary to develop a comprehensive DOD 

communication system and public affairs strategy for homeland defense 

preparedness and crisis/consequence management. 

Develop an equipment and concept of operations architecture compliant 

with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 

Ensure availability of DOD communication assets compatible with 

civilian responder community. 

Work with DHS to develop messages, and coordinate and educate those 

who deliver them, appropriate to the full range of contingencies. 

The one game nature expected from future adversaries will demand seamless 

decision-making, starting with the White House, hence, the recommendation for 

a joint HSC/NSC strategy. The request for a national intelligence estimate will 

illuminate the shortfalls in intelligence and therefore allow a better focus of 

effort. Recognizing that intelligence will always be limited, the estimate should be 

complemented with a capabilities-based net assessment to enable the DOD 

community to plan and hedge in a reasonable and balanced manner. National 
58 I CHAPTER 4

policy is necessary to better understand when and how a transition from DHS to 

DOD response leadership would occur. And the critical nature of timely, 

accurate communications during a crisis requires considerable preparation—

something that DOD understands and knows how to do better than any other 

agency. Thus, DOD may be called upon to lead, given the diversity of 

capabilities, resources, and generally fractured nature of the civilian emergency 

response community. 

The Secretary of Defense should direct U.S. Northern Command to 

work with the National Exercise Program at DHS to design and execute 

more effective exercise programs that address: 

unified management of national capabilities 

communication and information sharing across public and private 

boundaries 

regional planning and coordination 

interoperable and response capability shortfalls 

transition from DOD support to DOD lead scenarios 

In the layered approach to DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support, one of the layers—“Enable”—directly focused on improving domestic 

capabilities through sharing DOD expertise and technology. The military is 

recognized for its unsurpassed training, exercise, and doctrinal programs. An 

integrated National Exercise Program should: 

train and exercise to a common set of goals and objectives 

build from the bottom up—including all relevant players 

- maximize value of involvement: make it worthwhile 

- exercise what is important at the strategic and policy level 

- exercise what is important in sufficient depth 

- provide unified management of national capabilities 

follow through with effective corrective actions both in policy and practice 

structure to identify interoperable and response capability shortfalls 

address transition from homeland security to homeland defense 

operations (transition from DOD support to DOD lead scenarios) 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 59

aggressive red teaming to identify interoperable and response capability 

shortfalls 

As a part of this recommendation, DOD could enable a National Emergency 

Response Lessons Learned Institute. DOD has capabilities and expertise that can 

enable analysis and dissemination of lessons learned. The national civilian 

emergency response infrastructure lacks sufficient discipline and consistency in 

critical capabilities necessary to manage large-scale or simultaneous incidents. 

One of the challenges in achieving such a capability is the promulgation of an 

unbiased, standardized, and readily accessible reporting system. Leveraging 

capabilities such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Training and 

Doctrine Command, and the Lessons Learned Information Sharing web site, this 

institute could be at the foundation of a new national doctrinal institute. 

Engaging such an activity will also enable DOD to better understand what 

resources it may be required to provide in defense of asymmetric attacks on the 

homeland. Furthermore, these lessons learned should drive continuous 

improvement of the national training and exercise programs. 

To support regional planning and coordination, FEMA and DLA, as an 

aspect of their memorandum of understanding and in collaboration with state 

homeland SCCs, should jointly plan for and deploy pre-positioned materials in 

support of emergency response operations. These cached materials should be 

tailored to regional needs and could be coordinated with local private sector 

suppliers. These caches should include emergency communications equipment, 

specialized protective equipment, and medical supplies that may be needed for 

WMD events; they should also take into consideration the current capabilities 

and threat environment (including natural disasters) of the region they are 

intended to support. For example, regions subject to flooding events, will likely 

expect federal government support for water rescue. 

Other potential ideas could include FEMA working with other federal 

agencies, including DOD, to provide for more flexible and streamlined 

procurement and legal guidelines to obtain needed resources in real time, and 

standardizing credentialing capability for access of critical personnel to disaster 

areas. Delegation of authority in acquisition matters should be at the lowest level 

possible. DOD might also advocate for a one-stop shopping mechanism like 

GSA to enable and encourage state and local governments to work together for 

the purpose of making “bulk” purchases. This kind of arrangement will likely 

provide a powerful incentive for state and local regions to maintain interoperable 

and compatible equipment and concepts of operations. 
60 I CHAPTER 4

ASD (HD&ASA) should take the initiative to help establish a 

strategically-managed, interagency homeland defense/homeland security 

leader development program with the following attributes: 

graduate-level, senior service DHS-sponsored “war” college developed in 

conjunction with the National Defense University 

an Executive Exchange Program modeled on the President’s Executive 

Exchange Program 

recognition as credit equivalent to senior service schools and for 

promotion to flag officer rank and the senior executive service in DOD 

training expanded to state and local levels, and the private sector 

One of the most significant conclusions of this study is the realization 

that DOD’s success in prosecuting future wars against capable adversaries 

will likely depend on the success of other agencies of the government—at 

all levels—and on the private sector to succeed at their missions in the 

face of attacks on the homeland. As such, DOD must take much more 

seriously its own strategy statements that “failure (in the homeland) is not 

an option.” 

Success will require the department to step up to a much more active role in 

the interagency arena, to engage the local and regional communities on which 

they depend at home more consistently and deeply, and to carefully examine its 

own mission critical needs and ensure their availability in times of attack. Lots of 

homework and relationship-building outside the historic mainstream of DOD 

activities will be required. As with all new things, the ability to attract good 

people to this critical work must come with the incentives for career progression 

and recognition. 

While many of these activities are difficult to contemplate in the current and 

near future environment of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring 

Freedom, and the major recapitalization bills these campaigns will demand, a 

number of these activities require relatively inexpensive efforts in planning, 

training, and exercising. The key ingredient will be leadership commitment 

to chart and sustain the path.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES I 61

Appendix A. Relevant Legislation and 

Directives for DOD in Homeland Security 

and Defense 

There are numerous legislative and executive directives defining DOD’s roles 

and responsibilities with regard to homeland defense and support to civil 

authorities. 

Article II of Constitution 

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution specifies that “the President shall be 

commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 

militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United 

States.” In this role as Commander in Chief, he is authorized to utilize both the 

active duty military as well as the National Guard (militia) in support of the 

national defense. 

Stafford Act 

This act provides statutory authority for employing the U.S. armed forces for 

domestic disaster relief. Permitted operations include debris removal and road 

clearances; search and rescue; emergency medical care and shelter; provision of 

food, water, and other essential needs; dissemination of public information and 

assistance regarding health and safety measures; and the provision of technical 

advice to state and local governments on disaster management and control. The 

Stafford Act does not authorize the use of Federal military forces to maintain law 

and order. 

DOD doctrine (DOD 3025) allows commanders to provide resources and 

assistance to civil authorities without, or prior to, declaration under the Stafford 

Act when a disaster overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities and 

necessitates immediate action “to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate 

great property damage.” 
62 I APPENDIX A

Posse Comitatus Act 

The Constitution does not expressly bar the use of military forces in civilian 

situations or in matters of law enforcement, but the United States has traditionally 

refrained from employing troops to enforce the law except in cases of necessity. 

Congress has provided for a number of statutory exceptions to the Posse 

Comitatus Act explicitly by vesting law enforcement authority directly in a military 

branch, or indirectly by authorizing the President or another government official 

to call for assistance in enforcing certain laws. 

Homeland Security Directive #5. Management of 

Domestic Incidents 

The heads of federal departments and agencies shall adopt the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) within their departments and agencies, and shall 

provide support and assistance to the Secretary of Homeland Security in the 

development and maintenance of the NIMS. All Federal departments and agencies 

will use the NIMS in their domestic incident management and emergency 

prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as 

those actions taken in support of state or local entities. The heads of Federal 

departments and agencies shall participate in the National Response Plan (NRP), 

shall assist and support the Secretary of Homeland Security in the development and 

maintenance of the NRP, and shall participate in and use domestic incident 

reporting systems and protocols established by the Secretary. 

The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for 

domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military 

readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of 

Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support. The 

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish 

appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination 

between their two departments. 

Homeland Security Directive #8. National Preparedness 

The Department of Defense will provide to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security information describing the organizations and functions within the 

Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide support to civil authorities 

during a domestic crisis. 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES I 63

Homeland Security Presidential Directive #7. Critical 

Infrastructure, Identification, Prioritization & 

Protection; Department of Defense Directive 

3020.40, August 2005 

DOD is the sector-specific agency for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The 

term “sector-specific agency” means a Federal department or agency responsible 

for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector 

or key resource category. 

Federal departments and agencies will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the 

protection of critical infrastructure and key resources in order to prevent, deter, 

and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit 

them. Federal departments and agencies will work with state and local 

governments and the private sector to accomplish this objective. 

Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security 

programs do not diminish the overall economic security of the United States. 

 Federal departments and agencies will appropriately protect information 

associated with carrying out this directive, including handling voluntarily provided 

information and information that would facilitate terrorist targeting of critical 

infrastructure and key resources consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 and other applicable legal authorities. 

Federal departments and agencies shall implement this directive in a manner 

consistent with applicable provisions of law, including those protecting the rights 

of United States persons. 

NSPD 51, HSPD 20, National Continuity Policy 

The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, shall provide secure, integrated, continuity of government 

communications to the President, the Vice President, and, at a minimum, 

Category I executive departments and agencies. 
64 I APPENDIX A

Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order (aka 

“The Insurrection Act”) 

Congress has delegated authority to the President to call for the military 

during an insurrection or civil disturbance (10 U.S.C. 331-335). The Insurrection 

Act has been used to send the armed forces to quell civil disturbances a number 

of times during U.S. history, most recently during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. 

The 109th Congress included in the Defense authorization bill for FY2007 a 

provision that is intended to explicitly cover instances of “domestic violence” 

where public order is disrupted due to a national disaster, epidemic or other 

serious public health emergency, terrorist attack, or incident. This revision of 10 

U.S.C. 333 authorizes the President to employ Federal troops to “restore public 

order and enforce the laws of the United States without a request from the 

governor or legislature of the state involved, when he/she determines that local 

authorities are unable to maintain public order.” 

Military Support for Law Enforcement Agencies 

Congress has also authorized the armed forces to share information and 

equipment with civilian law enforcement agencies, although it has prohibited the 

use of armed forces personnel to make arrests or conduct search and seizures. 

DODD 5525.5 Cooperation with Civilian Law 

Enforcement Officials 

This directive defines DOD’s responsibilities to cooperate with civilian law 

enforcement officials consistent with the needs of national security and military 

preparedness. This directive applies to OSD, the military departments, the 

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the unified and specified 

commands, and the defense agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as DOD 

components). The term “military service,” as used herein, refers to the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. 

Responsibilities enumerated in this directive include, but are not limited to: 

Coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies on long-range policies 

to further DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials. 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES I 65

Provide information to civilian agencies and the National Narcotics Border 

Interdiction System (NNBIS) to facilitate access to DOD resources. 

Coordinate with the Department of Justice, the Department of 

Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard), and the Department of the Treasury 

(U.S. Customs Service) and represent DOD on interagency organizations 

regarding matters involving the interdiction of the flow of illegal drugs 

into the United States. 

Review training and operational programs to determine how and where 

assistance can best be provided to civilian law enforcement officials. 

Implement procedures for prompt transfer of relevant information to 

law enforcement agencies. 

Implement procedures for establishing local contact points in 

subordinate commands for purposes of coordination with Federal, state, 

and local civilian law enforcement officials. 

DODD 3025 Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 

This directive provides for DOD officials to take emergency action without 

prior authorization in cases where: “sudden and unexpected civil disturbances 

(including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such 

calamity endangering lives) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable 

to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization 

by the President.” 
66 I APPENDIX B

Appendix B. Selected Excerpts from the 

“Strategy for Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support,” June 2005 

The Department of Defense must change its conceptual approach to 

homeland defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the “home” 

game and the “away” game. There is only one game. The Strategy for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support is a significant step toward this strategic transformation. 

Defending the U.S. homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is our most 

fundamental duty. Failure is not an option. 

Key Definitions 

Homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 

United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 

damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” The Department of Homeland 

Security is the lead Federal agency for homeland security. In addition, its 

responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding 

to, and recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and other 

emergencies. It is the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security to 

prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. The Attorney General leads our 

nation’s law enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist activity 

within the United States. Accordingly, the Department of Defense does not have 

the assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming across our borders, to 

stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop terrorists from hijacking 

aircraft inside or outside the United States (these responsibilities belong to the 

Department of Homeland Security). Nor does DOD have the authority to seek 

out and arrest terrorists in the United States (these responsibilities belong to the 

Department of Justice). 

Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 
HOMELAND DEFENSE STRATEGY EXCERPTS I 67

aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.28 The Department of 

Defense is responsible for homeland defense. 

DOD Activities, Objectives, and Core Capabilities 

Lead Achieve Maximum Awareness of Threats 

Maintain agile and capable defense intelligence architecture 

Analyze and understand potential threats 

Detect, identify, and track emerging threats in all operational domains 

Ensure shared situational awareness within DOD and with domestic and foreign partners 

Deter, Intercept, and Defeat Threats at a Safe Distance 

Deter adversaries from attacking the U.S. homeland 

Intercept and defeat national security threats in the maritime and air approaches and 

within U.S. territory 

Achieve Mission Assurance 

Ensure force protection, to include DOD installations, especially against the threat of 

CBRNE attacks 

Prepare and protect defense critical infrastructure 

Ensure preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base 

Prepare to protect designated national critical infrastructure 

Ensure DOD crisis management and continuity preparedness

Support Support Consequence Management for CBRNE Mass Casualty Attacks 

Manage consequences of CBRNE mass casualty attacks 

Enable Improve National and International Capabilities for Homeland Defense and Homeland 

Security 

Effective interagency planning and interoperability 

Improved Federal, state, and local partnership capacity and effective domestic 

relationships 

Improved international partnership capacity and effective defense-to-defense relationships 

Defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, is 

DOD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian 

and contractor personnel, and DOD agency and component assets, for domestic 

emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. The 

 

28. Homeland defense includes missions such as domestic air defense. The Department recognizes that 

threats planned or inspired by “external” actors may materialize internally. The reference to “external 

threats” does not limit where or how attacks could be planned and executed. The Department is prepared 

to conduct homeland defense missions whenever the President, exercising his constitutional authority as 

Commander in Chief, authorizes military actions. 
68 I APPENDIX B

Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities when 

directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Related to its force protection responsibilities for DOD facilities, the 

Department of Defense has the responsibility to assure it has access to defensecritical infrastructure. This is defined as DOD and non-DOD cyber and physical 

assets and associated infrastructure essential to project and support military 

forces worldwide. When these infrastructures are located on Department of 

Defense installations, their protection is the responsibility of the installation 

commander or facility manager. In some instances, however, critical defense 

assets are located at public or private sites beyond the direct control of DOD. In 

either case, the protection of designated defense critical infrastructure must be 

assured on a priority basis. 

In some scenarios, assurance of non-DOD infrastructures might involve 

protection activities, in close coordination with other Federal, state, local, tribal, 

or private sector partners. This could include elements of the Defense Industrial 

Base, which is a worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform 

research and development and design, produce, and maintain military weapons 

systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements. These 

defense-related products and services are essential to mobilize, deploy, and 

sustain military operations. Moreover, defense critical infrastructure could also 

include selected civil and commercial infrastructures that provide the power, 

communications, transportation, and other utilities that military forces and DOD 

support organizations rely on to meet their operational needs. 

In addition, the President or the Secretary of Defense might direct U.S. 

military forces to protect non-DOD assets of national significance that are so 

vital to the nation that their incapacitation could have a debilitating effect on the 

security of the United States. 

Core Capability: Preparedness and protection of defense 

critical infrastructure 

Because resources are constrained, it is not possible to provide uniform 

protection of all defense-critical infrastructure. The Department must prioritize 

the protection of assets based on their criticality to executing the National 

Defense Strategy and seek to minimize the vulnerability of critical assets in 
HOMELAND DEFENSE STRATEGY EXCERPTS I 69

accordance with an integrated risk management approach. To this end, the 

Department will devise a strategy to: 

identify infrastructure critical to the accomplishment of DOD missions, 

based on a mission area analysis 

assess the potential effect of a loss or degradation of critical 

infrastructure on DOD operations to determine specific vulnerabilities, 

especially from terrorist attack 

manage the risk of loss, degradation, or disruption of critical assets 

through remediation or mitigation efforts, such as changes in tactics, 

techniques, and procedures; minimizing single points of service; and 

creating appropriate redundancies, where feasible 

protect infrastructure at the direction of the President or the Secretary of 

Defense where the nature of the threat exceeds the capabilities of an 

asset owner and civilian law enforcement is insufficient 

enable real-time incident management operations by integrating current 

threat data and relevant critical infrastructure requirements 

The military departments, defense agencies, and other DOD components are 

now implementing the Protective Risk Management Strategy through 

modifications to their programs and budgets. 

Core Capability: Preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base 

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 

Key Assets (2003) notes that, without the important contributions of the private 

sector, DOD cannot effectively execute core defense missions. Private industry 

manufactures and provides the majority of the equipment, materials, services, 

and weapons for the U.S. armed forces. The President recently designated DOD 

as the sector-specific agency for the DIB. In this role, DOD is responsible for 

national infrastructure protection activities for critical defense industries, as set 

forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7. 

To assure that mission-critical supplies and services are available, DOD 

contracts are being modified to ensure that protective measures are in place at 

key facilities and that DOD can assess the security of the DIB. In addition, the 

DLA and other DOD contracting activities are revising the contract process to 

ensure that civilian defense contractors are able to operate for the duration of a 

national emergency. Defense contractors must be able to maintain adequate 
70 I APPENDIX B

response times, ensure supply and labor availability, and provide direct logistic 

support in times of crisis. DOD program managers will be held accountable for 

ensuring the protection of supporting infrastructure, including key suppliers. 

DOD base and installation commanders, and those who contract for non-DOD 

infrastructure services and assets, will monitor assurance activities through 

compliance with contract language that clearly identifies reliable service 

availability, priority of restoration, and asset protection. 

Core Capability: Preparedness to Protect Designated 

National Critical Infrastructure 

The Department has historically focused on preventing unauthorized 

personnel from gaining access to DOD installations and protecting those 

installations from traditional military attacks. In the post-September 11, 2001 era, 

DOD is expanding the traditional concept of critical asset protection to include 

protection from acts of trans-national terrorism. Countering terrorist 

reconnaissance activity is central to the successful defense of critical infrastructure. 

As outlined in the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets (2003), DOD bears responsibility for protecting its 

own assets, infrastructure, and personnel. At the Department’s request, domestic 

law enforcement may protect DOD facilities. For non-DOD infrastructure, 

including private and public assets that are critical to the execution of the 

National Defense Strategy, DOD’s protection role is more limited. The initial 

responsibility for protection of non-DOD infrastructure rests with asset owners. 

Civilian law enforcement authorities augment and reinforce the efforts of asset 

owners, creating a second tier of protection. 

Should protection requirements exceed the capabilities of asset owners and 

civilian law enforcement, state authorities provide an additional layer of defense. 

In addition to a governor’s authority to employ National Guard forces in a state 

active duty status, recent changes to Title 32 of the U.S. Code may provide an 

additional, expeditious means to use National Guard forces under the control of 

the governor, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, using Federal 

funding to perform homeland defense activities. To achieve critical infrastructure 

protection in the most serious situations, the Department of Defense maintains 

trained and ready combat forces for homeland defense missions. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 71

Terms of Reference 





PARTICIPANTS I 77

Panel Participants 

DEFENDING AGAINST DOMESTIC CATASTROPHE IN WAR TIME PANEL 

Chairs 

Dr. Bill Howard Private Consultant 

Mr. Robert Nesbit MITRE 

Members 

Mr. Jerry Buckwalter Northrop Grumman 

Mr. Evan Wolff Hunton & Williams LLP 

Government Advisors 

COL Joseph Bassani U.S. Northern Command 

Mr. Jim Caverly Director, Partnership & Outreach Division 

Mr. John Humpton HQDA ODCS G-3/5/7 

ENSURING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY PANEL 

Chairs 

Dr. Miriam John Private Consultant 

Dr. Ronald Kerber Private Consultant 

Members 

Dr. John Cummings Sandia National Laboratories 

Maj Gen John Fenimore V, USAF (Ret) J.H. Fenimore & Assoc, LLC 

LtGen Rick Kelly USMC (Ret.) LMI 

Dr. Duane Lindner Sandia National Laboratories 

VADM Keith Lippert, USN (Ret.) Accenture National Security Service, LLC 

Ms. Nancy Suski Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

LTG David Teal USAF (Ret.) Accenture National Security Services 

Ms. Nancy Wilson Association of American RR 
78 I PARTICIPANTS 

Government Advisors 

COL Joe Bassani, USA NORTHCOM

Mr. Bill Bryan OSD(P)/ASD/HD

Mr. James Caverly DHS

Mr. G. Gurvais Grigg FBI

Mr. Lacey Hughes HQDA DCS G-4 

Mr. John Humpton Department of the Army, G3 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE 

Maj Charles Lominac, USAF Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

STAFF

Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Brian Keller Private Consultant 

Carla King Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Kelly Frere Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
PRESENTATIONS I 79

Presentations to the Panels 

Ensuring Deployment and Supply 

Defending Against Domestic Catastrophe in War Time 

Joint Panel Meetings 

Name Topic 

FEBRUARY 9, 2007 

Mr. Don Latham 2003 DSB SS on DOD Roles & Missions in 

Homeland Security 

Mr. Bob Stephan, DHS, Assistant Secretary 

for Infrastructure Protection DHS Critical Infrastructure Approach 

Dr. Miriam John/Dr. Ronald Kerber Report of the DSB Task Force on Critical 

Homeland Infrastructure Protection 

MARCH 20, 2007 

Mr. William Bryan, DCIP OASD (HD&ASA) Update on DOD Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Program

Mr. Bob Nesbit, MITRE DSB 2005 Summer Study on WMD 

Maj Gen Tim Lowenberg, TAG for the State 

of Washington National Guard Discussion 

Ms. Nancy Wilson, American Association of 

Railroads Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security 

GEN ( R ) Reimer, DFI International Katrina Lessons Learned 

APRIL 24, 2007 

Mr. Merrick Krause, DHS 

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 

Center and Critical Infrastructure ProtectionDecision Support System

Maj Gen Fenimore, Private Consultant and 

Dr. Nancy Suski, Sandia National 

Laboratory

Citizen Preparedness 

COL Joseph Bassani, USA, 

USNORTHCOM NORTHCOM

Mr. Jim Kish, DHS National Exercise Program 

AD Dr. Vahid Majidi, FBI FBI WMD Program 
80 I PRESENTATIONS 

MAY 24, 2007 

Gen (R) Mike Carns, USAF, Private 

Consultant DSB Energy Strategy Task Force 

MG (R) Barry Bates, NDIA Panel of Corporate Security Execs from 

Defense Industrial Base 

Ms. Alane Andreozzi, DTRA A Kele Exercise 

Mr. Carl Brown, DTRA BioNet 

Colonel Joseph Bassani, USNORTHCOM NORTHCOM 

JUNE 11, 2007 

LTG C. V.Christianson, J-4 

COL Ed Hatch, JFCOM 

Mr. Alan Banghart, DLA 

OCONUS Deployment & Sustainment Panel 

Mr. Ronald Krisak, IDA Noble Resolve 

Healthcare: Mr. Chris Lake, BLU-MED 

Response

Energy: Mr. Stan Johnson, Manager Situation 

Awareness & Infrastructure Security, North 

American Electric Reliability Corporation 

IT: Mr. Guy Copeland, CSC; Mr. Michael 

Aisenberg (EWA-IIT); Mr. Paul Nicholas 

(Microsoft); Liesyl Franz (ITAA). 

Emergency Services: Ms. Ann Davison, Int’l 

Assoc of Fire Chiefs & Mr. Tom Rhatigan, 

National Sheriff’s Assoc. Homeland Security 

Program Manager 

Sector Coordinating Council Representatives: 

PCIS Panel: Energy, IT, Commo, Healthcare, 

Emergency Services 

JUNE 12, 2007 

Dr. Til Jolly, Office of Health Affairs, DHS Pandemics: Community Mitigation and 

Implications to Planners 

Mr. Bill Bryan, Director, DCIP OASD 

(HD&ASA) Update on DOD 41 Critical Infrastructure 

Mr. Philip Sakowitz, Executive Director, US 

Army Installation Management Command 

(Accompanied by Mr. Clay Davis, Mr. Don 

Stout, Mr. Gordon Rogers) 

Installation Preparedness 

Oil & Natural Gas: Mr. Gary Forman, 

NiSource Inc. 

Highways & Motor Carriers: Martin Rojas, 

American Trucking Assoc. 

Railroads: Nancy Wilson, Assoc of American 

Railroads

Transit: Mr. Tom Yedinak, American Public 

Transportation Association 

PCIS Panel: Transportation Sectors 
PRESENTATIONS I 81

JUNE 19, 2007 

LTG (R) Peter Kind, USA Y2K Information Coordination Center 

Mr. Brandon Wales, DHS Tier 1 and 2 CI/KR Update 

BG Peter Aylward, J34 Antiterrorism and 

Homeland Defense WMD Insights

Mr. Jim Schwartz, Arlington County Fire Chief 

Mr. Marko Bourne, FEMA 

Dr. Helen Miller, OR-1 Disaster Medical 

Assistance Team (National Disaster Medical 

System)

Mr. Matt Bettenhausen,California Office of HLS 

Panel of State and Local Authorities 

JULY 17, 2007 

Mr. Allan Banghart, DLA 

Colonel Dennis D’Angelo, TRANSCOM 

Mr. Alan Estevez, OSD(LM&R) 

Logistics Panel: Ensuring Deployment and 

Supply

LtCol Stephen Hall, USAF, Joint Task Force 

Civil Support (JTF-CS) JTF-Civil Support 

GLOSSARY I 83

Glossary 

ASD (HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive 

CI/KR critical infrastructure/key resources 

CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 

CONUS continental United States 

DCA defense critical asset 

DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

EMT emergency medical technician 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GCC Government Coordinating Council 

HITRAC Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IED improvised explosive device 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 

JFCOM U.S. Joint Forces Command 

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

NSC National Security Council 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

ODUSD (LM&R) Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness 
84 I GLOSSARY 

SCC Sector Coordinating Council 

SSA sector-specific agency 

SSP sector-specific plans 

TCA task critical asset 

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

Y2K Year 2000