[Cite as In re J.P., 2016-Ohio-7574.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In re: : 

J.P. n.k.a. K.P., : No. 16AP-61 

 (C.P.C. No. 14JU-8345)

(J.P., : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Appellant). : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 1, 2016 

 

On brief: Roger M. Koeck, for appellant. Argued: Roger M. 

Koeck. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, J.P., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, awarding permanent 

custody of his son, K.P., to foster parents. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 

judgment of the trial court. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} Appellant and his wife, A.P., are the biological parents of K.P., born 

June 20, 2014.1 A.P. is also the mother of A.M., a girl born November 15, 2013. S.R. is the 

biological father of A.M. On November 13, 2013, Franklin County Children Services 

 

1 Although the case caption and the complaint indicate that the initials of appellant's minor child are J.P., the 

record establishes that the child's initials are K.P. and that appellant is J.P. 
No. 16AP-61 2 

("FCCS") filed a complaint, pursuant to R.C. 2153.03(A)(2) and 2151.04(C), alleging that 

A.M. is a neglected and dependent child (case No. 13JU-15474). The complaint further 

alleges that A.M.'s mother, A.P., is homeless, her whereabouts unknown, and A.M. has 

been present during incidents of domestic violence involving A.P. and appellant. The 

magistrate issued an emergency care order. The juvenile court subsequently appointed a 

guardian ad litem for A.M., as well as legal counsel for both A.P. and A.M.'s biological 

father, S.R.2 On February 4, 2014, a magistrate conducted a hearing on the complaint in 

case No. 13JU-15474. As a result of the hearing, the magistrate found that A.M. was a 

dependent child and recommended that temporary custody be awarded to FCCS. FCCS 

subsequently placed A.M. with foster parents. 

{¶ 3} On June 24, 2014, FCCS filed a complaint, pursuant to R.C. 2153.03(A)(2) 

and 2151.04(C), alleging that newborn K.P. is a neglected and dependent child (case No. 

14JU-8345). The complaint further alleged that K.P.'s parents are homeless and that an 

order of temporary custody currently exists for A.P.'s other minor child, A.M. The 

magistrate issued an emergency care order. The juvenile court subsequently appointed a 

guardian ad litem for K.P. and legal counsel for A.P. 

{¶ 4} On September 14, 2014, a magistrate conducted a hearing on the complaint 

in case No. 14JU-8345. As a result of the hearing, the magistrate found that K.P. was a 

dependent child and recommended that temporary custody be awarded to FCCS.3 On 

September 19, 2014, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and approved the 

case plan. The case plan stated that appellant and A.P. planned to move to Wyoming 

where they would secure employment and housing. FCCS was to have custody of the 

children for the purpose of placing them temporarily with foster parents until such time 

as A.P.'s aunt and uncle, who also live in Wyoming, could obtain temporary custody. 

Thereafter, appellant and A.P. were to be reunited with A.M. and K.P. 

{¶ 5} FCCS placed K.P. with the same foster parents who were caring for A.M. In 

October 2014, appellant and A.P. moved to Wyoming. Evidence in the record shows that 

appellant returned to Ohio for a short time and then, in May 2015, he moved to Kentucky. 

 

2 S.R. has never personally appeared in this litigation. 

3 The issue of dependency was uncontested. 
No. 16AP-61 3 

{¶ 6} On May 21, 2015, FCCS filed a motion to terminate temporary custody and 

for an award of permanent custody to the foster parents. The juvenile court scheduled an 

evidentiary hearing for June 24, 2015. Notice of the hearing was served on A.P. in 

Wyoming, but appellant could not be located. The record shows that service on appellant 

was made by publication on June 4, 2015. 

{¶ 7} On June 24, 2015, the magistrate conducted a hearing on the motion. 

Appellant and A.P. were represented by counsel at the hearing but neither parent 

personally attended. Appellant's attorney moved the court for a continuance of the 

permanent custody hearing arguing that appellant was entitled to a contested hearing. 

The magistrate denied the motion and proceeded to determine custody "informally." 

(June 24, 2015 Tr. at 6.) As a result of the hearing, the magistrate announced his decision 

to award permanent custody of A.M. and K.P. to the foster parents. The magistrate 

subsequently issued a written decision memorializing his ruling on the motion for a 

continuance and his determination of permanent custody. 

{¶ 8} Both appellant and A.P. filed objections to the magistrate's decision. A.P. 

argued that "[d]enial of the continuance for a contested trial was a violation of Mother's 

right to due process, and an abuse of the trial court's discretion." (July 10, 2015 Obj. at 3.) 

Appellant filed objections to the magistrate's decision on July 13, 2015, contending that "it 

is contrary to law and violates the Constitution of the United States of America and the 

Constitution of the State of Ohio." (July 13, 2015 Obj. at 1.) In appellant's supplemental 

objections to the magistrate's decision filed September 14, 2015, appellant raises two 

additional objections: (1) "The Magistrate erred in granting legal custody to the foster 

family when FCCS had failed to provide any services to the parents," and (2) "The 

Magistrate erred in failing to allow a full formal contested hearing in order to afford the 

parents the opportunity to fully contest the misrepresentations of FCCS to the Court." 

(Sept. 14, 2015 Supp. Objs. at 1.) On October 13, 2015, A.P. filed a supplemental objection 

wherein she also requests a full and fair custody hearing, claiming that she has been 

employed in Wyoming since December 2014 and that she currently "rents and shares a 

home with roommates, but is saving up for a place of her own." (Oct. 13, 2015 Supp. Obj. 

at 3.) 
No. 16AP-61 4 

{¶ 9} The trial court scheduled a hearing on the objections for October 20, 2015. 

Appellant attended the hearing with counsel. A.P. did not appear. On December 30, 

2015, the juvenile court issued a decision and judgment entry overruling the objections, 

adopting the magistrate's decision as its own, and awarding permanent custody to the 

foster parents. Appellant timely appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial 

court.4

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 10} Appellant sets out a single assignment of error as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE 

INCORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW OF A 

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶ 11} "Appellate courts 'generally review a trial court's adoption, denial or 

modification of a magistrate's decision for an abuse of discretion.' " In re D.S., 10th Dist. 

No. 15AP-487, 2016-Ohio-2810, ¶ 9, quoting Brunetto v. Curtis, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-799, 

2011-Ohio-1610, ¶ 10. "However, where the appeal from the trial court's action on a 

magistrate's decision presents only a question of law, the standard of review is de novo." 

In re D.S. at ¶ 9. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶ 12} Appellant contends that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal 

standard in reviewing the magistrate's decision. Appellant seeks an order reversing the 

juvenile court order and remanding the case for the juvenile court to apply the correct 

legal standard in reviewing his objections. FCCS did not file a brief in this appeal. 

{¶ 13} Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) provides that "[i]n ruling on objections, the court shall 

undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the 

magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law." 

Thus, "[a] trial court considering a party's objections to a magistrate's decision must 

independently assess the facts and conclusions contained in the magistrate's decision, 

thereby undertaking the equivalent of a de novo determination in light of any filed 

 

4 A.P. dismissed her appeals in case Nos. 16AP-67 and 16AP-68 on March 29, 2016 by filing a notice of 

voluntary dismissal. Accordingly, this appeal involves the custody of K.P. only. 
No. 16AP-61 5 

objections." In re H.D.D., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-134, 2012-Ohio-6160, ¶ 90, citing former 

Juv.R. 40(E)(4)(b). "Ordinarily, it is presumed that the trial court performed an 

independent analysis in reviewing the magistrate's decision." Rowell v. Smith, 10th Dist. 

No. 12AP-802, 2013-Ohio-2216, ¶ 35, citing Arnold v. Arnold, 4th Dist. No. 04CA36, 

2005-Ohio-5272, ¶ 31, citing Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). Accordingly, the 

party asserting error bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's 

failure to perform the required independent analysis. Rowell at ¶ 35, citing Arnold at 

¶ 31, citing Inman v. Inman, 101 Ohio App.3d 115, 119 (2d Dist.1995); Huntington Natl. 

Bank v. Findlay Machine & Tool, Inc., 3d Dist. No. 5-11-27, 2012-Ohio-748. 

{¶ 14} In this case, under the heading "Standard of Review," the juvenile court 

references the correct standard of review as follows: 

When ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an 

independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain 

that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues 

and appropriately applied the law. Therefore, when reviewing 

objections to a magistrate's decision, the trial court must 

undertake the equivalent of a de novo determination and 

independently assess the facts and conclusions contained in 

the magistrate's decision. 

(Emphasis sic; citations omitted.) (Dec. 30, 2015 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 15} Appellant acknowledges that the juvenile court initially cited the 

appropriate standard of review. Appellant claims, however, that the juvenile court 

subsequently applied an incorrect legal standard when it ruled on appellant's objections. 

Appellant argues that the magistrate's repeated references to the abuse of discretion 

standard of review and the manifest weight standard overcomes the presumption that the 

juvenile court conducted an independent review of the matters raised by the objections. 

We agree. 

{¶ 16} The argument made by appellant is the same argument addressed by this 

court in the case of In re H.D.D. In that case, the mother argued that the juvenile court 

did not conduct the required de novo review of the magistrate's child custody 

determination but, instead, improperly deferred to the magistrate. In rejecting mother's 

argument, this court ruled as follows: 
No. 16AP-61 6 

In support, Mother points to certain statements in the court's 

decision, e.g., "the evidence was sufficient to support the 

Magistrate's findings, and thus he did not abuse his 

discretion"; "the Magistrate was on strong footing in finding 

[noncompliance with the case plan] by a preponderance of the 

evidence"; and "[t]he evidence presented at trial was sufficient 

to support the Magistrate's findings, and thus he did not 

abuse his discretion in finding that [H.D.D.] was an abused, 

neglected and dependent child." Accordingly, Mother argues 

that we should summarily reverse the trial court's judgment. 

* * * 

The excerpts quoted above from the trial court's written 

decision do not overcome the presumption of regularity to 

which the trial court is entitled. We read those excerpts not as 

statements of deference to the magistrate but, rather, as 

statements of concurrence with the magistrate. The court 

stated, for instance, that it "agree[d] that the Magistrate was 

on strong footing in finding, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the parents had failed to substantially comply 

with the objectives of the case plan"; and that the "evidence 

presented at trial was sufficient to support the Magistrate's 

findings." (Emphasis sic.) (Jan. 23, 2011 Entry at 4, 6.) 

Moreover, in the concluding paragraph of its decision, the 

trial court specifically stated that its rejection of the parents' 

objections was "[b]ased on the foregoing de novo review of 

facts and law." (Entry, at 9.) 

We therefore overrule Mother's argument contending that the 

trial court failed to conduct an independent de novo review. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 91, 94-95. 

{¶ 17} More recently, in Mattis v. Mattis, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-446, 2016-Ohio1084, this court affirmed the juvenile court's custody determination in the face of the 

mother's claim that the juvenile court applied an inappropriately deferential standard in 

reviewing the magistrate's decision. In Mattis, the juvenile court's decision stated: 

This Court FINDS that the magistrate properly considered the 

totality of the factors and did not abuse her discretion. 

Therefore the Magistrate's Decision as it pertains to the 

allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, except child 

support, shall be APPROVED AND ADOPTED by this Court. 
No. 16AP-61 7 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 18} In ruling that the juvenile court conducted the required independent review, 

this court stated: 

Although the trial court does reference the magistrate's 

discretion in this paragraph, it is clear from the overall 

decision that the trial court applied an independent review. 

The trial court referenced the correct standard of review by 

stating it was required to undertake an independent review as 

to the objected matters. (Decision, 3.) The trial court 

thoroughly discussed the best interest factors provided in R.C. 

3109.04(F) and did not merely reference the magistrate's 

decision. (Decision, 5-9.) The trial court referenced the 

transcript as justification for its decision. Moreover, the trial 

court stated it reviewed all the submitted evidence and "the 

entire file and the applicable law" in reaching its decision. 

(Decision, 9; 15.) Finally, the trial court modified the 

magistrate's decision in regards to child support. If the trial 

court had merely determined if the magistrate had abused her 

discretion, it would not have sustained in part Mother's 

objection and modified the decision accordingly. With a 

reading of the trial court's decision in its entire context, we 

conclude that the trial court did conduct an independent 

review and the trial court's semantic misstep in using "abuse 

of discretion" does not amount to prejudicial error. 

Id. at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 19} The juvenile court's decision in this case reveals that the court cited and 

applied both the abuse of discretion standard and the manifest weight standard. For 

example, on page five of the decision, the juvenile court announces its decision stating: 

"The Court does NOT FIND that the magistrate abused his discretion in denying the 

request for a continuance and granting legal custody to foster parents." (Emphasis sic.) 

(Decision at 5.) 

{¶ 20} In subsequently reviewing the magistrate's decision to deny the motion for a 

continuance, the juvenile court sets out the standard of review as follows: 

This Court is bound by the 10th District which held that a 

motion for a continuance will not be reversed unless the trial 

court abused its discretion. The term abuse of discretion 

connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies 

that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable. 
No. 16AP-61 8 

(Citations omitted.) (Decision at 5.) 

{¶ 21} Both of the cases cited by the juvenile court in support of the applicable 

standard of review are cases setting forth the standard applied by this court when 

reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a continuance. See Foley v. Foley, 10th Dist. No. 

05AP-242, 2006-Ohio-946; Fiocca v. Fiocca, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-962, 2005-Ohio-2199. 

A magistrate is a subordinate officer of the trial court, not an independent officer 

performing a separate function. Jones v. Smith, 187 Ohio App.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-131, ¶ 9 

(4th Dist.); Knauer v. Keener, 143 Ohio App.3d 789, 794 (2d Dist.2001). The application 

of Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) requires de novo review of any issue of fact or law that a magistrate 

has determined when an appropriate objection is timely filed. Id. The juvenile court may 

not defer to the magistrate in exercise of its de novo review. Id. Accordingly, when 

reviewing a magistrate's determination of a motion to continue a custody hearing, a trial 

court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the facts 

and circumstances warranted a continuance. Anderton v. Hatfield, 10th Dist. No. 07AP198, 2007-Ohio-7139. By applying the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court 

improperly deferred to the magistrate rather than conducting an independent review. In 

re H.D.D.5

{¶ 22} With regard to the magistrate's custody determination, the juvenile court 

again cited and applied the appellate standard of review rather than the standard required 

by Juv.R. 40. The juvenile court decision provides as follows: 

2. The Magistrate's Decision is NOT against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

A judgment will not be reversed being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence if it is supported by some competent, 

credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the 

case. In determining whether it is against the manifest weight 

 

5 " ' "The 'abuse of discretion' standard that the trial court applied to review the decision of its magistrate is 

an appellate standard of review. It is applicable to the review performed by a superior court of the 

judgments and orders of inferior courts. Inherent in the abuse of discretion standard are presumptions of 

validity and correctness, which acknowledge the independence of the inferior courts by deferring to the 

particular discretion they exercise in rendering their decisions." ' " Jones at ¶ 13, quoting Quick v. 

Kwiatkowski, 2d Dist. No. 18620 (Aug. 3, 2001), quoting Rammel v. Rammel, 2d Dist. No. 15887 (May 9, 

1997). 
No. 16AP-61 9 

of the evidence, the reviewing court is guided by the 

presumption that the findings of the trial court were correct. 

(Emphasis sic; citations omitted.) (Decision at 6.) 

{¶ 23} Both of the cases cited by the juvenile court in support of the applicable 

standard of review are cases setting forth this court's standard for the review of a juvenile 

court's child custody decision. In re Brofford, 83 Ohio App.3d 869 (10th Dist.1992); In re 

Abram, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-220, 2004-Ohio-5435. Contrary to the juvenile court's 

statement, a magistrate's findings of fact are not entitled to the presumption of 

correctness. Rather, the juvenile court, in considering the parties' objections to the 

magistrate's decision regarding child custody, is required to "independently assess the 

facts and conclusions contained in the magistrate's decision, thereby undertaking the 

equivalent of a de novo determination in light of any filed objections." In re H.D.D. at 

¶ 90; Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). The juvenile court decision in this case applied the appellate 

standard of review as follows: 

This Court's careful review of * * * all the records reveals that 

the trial court's Decision is corroborated by competent 

credible evidence. Therefore, the Magistrate's Decision WAS 

NOT against the manifest weight of the evidence to deny a 

continuance and grant legal custody to foster parents. 

(Emphasis sic.) (Decision at 7.) 

{¶ 24} As set out above, the juvenile court decision in this case contains numerous 

instances where the juvenile court unequivocally applied an appellate court standard of 

review. Unlike In re H.D.D., where other language in the juvenile court's decision 

permitted this court to reasonably construe the juvenile court's erroneous statements as 

expressions of agreement with the magistrate rather than deference, the juvenile court's 

erroneous statements in this case are not subject to a similar construction. The 

misstatements in the juvenile court decision in this case are unmistakably deferential. 

{¶ 25} Though the juvenile court decision does contain some language suggesting 

that the juvenile court did more than simply rubber stamp the magistrate's determination, 

unlike the juvenile court decision considered by this court in Mattis, the recurring 

references to the abuse of discretion standard in this case are more than just a "semantic 

misstep." Id. at ¶ 17. The juvenile court makes repeated references to the abuse of 
No. 16AP-61 10 

discretion standard as well as the manifest weight standard accompanied by statements 

indicating the juvenile court applied those deferential standards in reviewing the 

magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In our view, even though the juvenile 

court initially cited the correct standard of review in its decision, the juvenile court's 

clearly expressed application of the appellate standard of review in this case distinguishes 

it from the juvenile court decisions considered by this court in Mattis and In re H.D.D. 

and overcomes the presumption of regularity typically afforded to such decisions.

{¶ 26} Further examination of the relevant case law establishes that a juvenile 

court commits reversible error when it applies the appellate standard of review in ruling 

on objections to a magistrate's decision. For example, in Reese v. Reese, 3d Dist. No. 14-

03-42, 2004-Ohio-1395, the issue for the Third District Court of Appeals was whether the 

trial court applied the correct legal standard in reviewing a magistrate's decision. In that 

case, the concluding paragraphs of the trial court's judgment entry stated: 

If there is some competent, credible evidence to support the 

trial court's decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Matters 

not before the Magistrate at the time of hearing should not be 

the basis for objections. Judge Evans of the Third District 

* * * stated * * * that the statutory standard of review is to 

determine whether the decision is supported by evidence 

presented on the record. 

With the above case law in mind, we now must look at the 

transcript to see if there is competent, credible evidence to 

support the findings of the Magistrate. Finding evidence on 

each objection supporting the Magistrate's decision, it is 

affirmed and these objections are overruled. 

(Emphasis sic; citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 27} The court of appeals held that the trial court had not conducted the required 

independent review in overruling the objections. In so holding, the court stated: 

Based upon the above language, it appears that the trial court 

used the appellate standard of review when ruling on Sandra's 

objections to the magistrate's report. However, the other 

language in the judgment entry is ambiguous in that regard 

and we cannot affirmatively determine whether or not the 

trial court conducted an independent review of the 

magistrate's decision as required by Civ.R. 53. We recognize 

that the trial court did not "rubber stamp" the magistrate's 
No. 16AP-61 11 

decision as multiple references to the transcript were made; 

however, in the absence of language setting forth the proper 

standard of review, we are also unable to conclude with 

confidence that the trial court independently reviewed the 

evidence before it. 

Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 28} Similarly, in Jones, appellant mother challenged a juvenile court's decision 

adopting a magistrate's decision to grant the father's request to change the surname of the 

parties' child. The juvenile court decision provided in relevant part: 

The Court finds the Magistrate properly considered the issues 

before the Court and rendered a decision, which did not 

indicate an abuse of discretion. The Magistrate's Decision was 

not unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary as the focus on 

the decision was based upon the best interest of the child. 

Id. at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 29} The court of appeals held that the juvenile court erred when it reviewed the 

magistrate's decision using an appellate standard of review because such action "prevents 

an appellate court from conducting the appropriate review of the [juvenile] court's 

decision." Id. at ¶ 9, citing Francis v. McDermott, 2d Dist. No. 1744, 2008-Ohio-6723, 

¶14; Quick v. Kwiatkowski, 2d Dist. No. 18620 (Aug. 3, 2001). The court of appeals in 

Jones reversed the juvenile court's decision and remanded the matter for the trial court to 

"independently review the objections to the magistrate's decision or, if it has already 

undertaken such independent review, to enter a judgment entry devoid of language 

indicating that it employed a deferential review." Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 30} We find that the juvenile court order in this case contains errors in regard to 

the applicable standard of review that are similar to the errors which necessitated reversal 

of the trial court decisions in Reese and Jones. The juvenile court decision in this case 

contains the following as its "Conclusion": 

This Court has thoroughly, carefully, and independently 

reviewed the Objections, Magistrate's Decision, pleadings, 

transcripts, entire file, and applicable law. After ensuring that 

all the required procedures occurred, this Court FINDS that 

the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in denying a 

request for a continuance and granting legal custody to foster 

parents. 
No. 16AP-61 12 

(Emphasis sic.) (Decision at 8.) 

{¶ 31} Though the first sentence of the juvenile court's conclusion asserts that the 

juvenile court has undertaken an independent review of the evidence, in the second 

sentence the juvenile court applies the abuse of discretion standard to both the 

determination of the motion for a continuance and the determination of permanent 

custody. As noted above, this is an inappropriately deferential standard. Elsewhere in the 

decision, the juvenile court applied the manifest weight standard in reviewing both the 

magistrate's ruling on the motion to continue and the magistrate's conclusion regarding 

custody. Thus, the juvenile court decision is, at best, ambiguous with regard to the 

standard of review. 

{¶ 32} Given the juvenile court's inconsistent statements regarding the applicable 

standard of review, we cannot affirmatively determine whether the court conducted an 

independent review as required by Juv.R. 40 and Civ.R. 53. See Reese at ¶ 16; Jones at 

¶ 8. See also Kimmel v. Shaffer, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-05-015, 2009-Ohio-5279. ¶ 16 

("[I]t appears the trial court applied an appellate standard of review used when 

determining whether a civil judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. * * * 

Because the other language in the court's entry is ambiguous in that regard, we cannot 

affirmatively determine whether the court conducted an independent review as required 

by Civ.R. 53."). In our view, the juvenile court decision under review in this case is more 

akin to the trial court decisions discussed in Reese and Jones than it is to the decisions we 

reviewed in In re H.D.D. and Mattis. 

{¶ 33} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the juvenile court erred when it 

applied the appellate standard of review in ruling on objections to the magistrate's 

decision regarding child custody rather than conducting an independent review as to the 

objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual 

issues and appropriately applied the law. Accordingly, we sustain appellant's single 

assignment of error. The judgment of the juvenile court shall be reversed and the case 

remanded for the juvenile court to apply the correct standard of review in ruling on 

appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision. 

 
No. 16AP-61 13 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 34} Having sustained appellant's single assignment of error, we reverse the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, 

Juvenile Branch, and remand the case for the court to apply the correct standard of review 

in ruling on appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision. 

Judgment reversed;

cause remanded with instructions.

TYACK and KLATT, JJ., concur. 

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