IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-14-00324-CR

LEONARD ALLEN HENNARD,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 40th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 39293CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Leonard Hennard was indicted on two counts of assault family violence. Count 1 

alleged assault family violence by occlusion and Count 2 alleged assault family violence 

enhanced with a prior conviction. The jury convicted Hennard on both counts, found the 

enhancement paragraph to be true, and assessed punishment at 20 years confinement 

and a $10,000 fine for each count. We affirm.
Hennard v. State Page 2

Judgment

In the first issue, Hennard complains that the judgment should be modified to 

reflect the proper sections of the Texas Penal Code that he was found to have violated. 

The judgment reflects that Hennard was convicted of “Assault Family Violence/Two 

Counts (Count One: Assault Family Violence by Occlusion and Count Two: Assault 

Family Violence – Enhanced)” and references Texas Penal Code Section 22.01. The 

judgment further states that the offense is a third degree felony enhanced to a second 

degree felony. Hennard argues that the proper statute for Assault Family Violence by 

Occlusion is TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (a) (1) and 22.01 (b) (2) (B) and the proper 

statute for Assault Family Violence - Enhanced is TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (a) (1) 

and 22.01 (b) (2 (A). Hennard asks this Court to modify the judgment to reflect the proper 

statute. 

The judgment shall reflect “the offense or offenses for which the defendant was 

convicted” and “the date of the offense or offenses and degree of offense for which the 

defendant was convicted.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 42.01 § 1 (13), (14) (West Supp. 

2014). The judgment accurately reflects the offenses for which Hennard was convicted 

and the degree of offense for which he was convicted. We overrule the first issue. 

Prosecuting Attorney

In the second issue, Hennard complains that the judgment should be modified to 

reflect the correct name of both prosecuting attorneys who represented the State. 

Hennard states that the judgment incorrectly identifies Patrick Wilson as the prosecuting 

attorney in the case, but that the record reflects that Ricky Sipes and Habon Mohamed 
Hennard v. State Page 3

were actually the prosecuting attorneys at trial. Hennard, however, cites nothing to show 

that the elected State’s attorney cannot be named in the judgment if he did not participate 

in the proceeding resulting in the judgment. The Code of Criminal Procedure states that 

a judgment shall reflect “[t]hat the case was called and the parties appeared, naming the 

attorney for the state, the defendant, and the attorney for the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 42.01, § 1(2) (West Supp. 2014). The elected district attorney for Ellis 

County is the attorney for the State in this case. Hennard’s second issue is overruled. 

Sufficiency of Evidence

In the third and fourth issues, Hennard argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction for the offense of assault family violence by occlusion and that the 

trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 

13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This "familiar standard gives full play to the 

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, 

to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. "Each fact need not point directly 

and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative 

force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the 

conviction." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert den’d , 132 S.Ct. 2712, 183 

L.Ed.2d 71 (2012). 
Hennard v. State Page 4

The Court of Criminal Appeals has also explained that our review of "all of the 

evidence" includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 

67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). And if the record supports conflicting 

inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Further, direct and circumstantial evidence 

are treated equally: "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in 

establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to 

establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Finally, it is well 

established that the factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and can 

choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers 

v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Hennard argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he caused injury to 

Tamra Colvin by “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing 

or circulation of the blood of the person by applying pressure to the person's throat or 

neck or by blocking the person's nose or mouth.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (b1) (3) (West Supp. 2014). 

Officer Jason Esquibel, with the Red Oak Police Department, testified that on April 

1, 2013, he responded to an assault call. When he arrived, Tamra Colvin approached him 

and said that she had gotten into a fight with her brother, Hennard. Colvin was 

screaming and crying. Colvin told Officer Esquibel that Hennard slapped and choked 

her in the living room of their home, and then the fight continued in the bedroom where 
Hennard v. State Page 5

he hit her again and stomped on her. Officer Esquibel testified that Colvin had redness 

on her neck that was consistent with being choked. Sergeant Marc Schroeder testified 

that he responded to the assault call to assist Officer Esquibel. Sergeant Schroeder also 

observed red discoloration on Colvin’s neck. Colvin told the officers that she did not 

want to press charges; however, she later came to the police station and stated that she 

did want to pursue charges against Hennard. 

Katherine Young testified that on April 2, 2013, Colvin knocked on her door. 

Young stated that Colvin was crying and hysterical and she was yelling that Hennard 

beat her up. Colvin told Young that Hennard threw her out of the bedroom window and 

that he kicked her with his boots. Young testified that Colvin had marks around her neck 

that were not there earlier that day. Colvin asked Young to call the police, and Young 

called 9-1-1. 

Colvin testified at trial, but stated that she did not want to be there. Colvin testified 

that on the day of the offense she had taken prescription medication and that she does 

not remember anything that happened that day. Colvin said that she does not remember 

talking to the police and that she does not remember giving a statement. When asked 

about the bruising on her neck on the night of the offense, Colvin stated that she had 

previously tried to choke herself. Colvin could not say whether or not the bruising on 

her neck was self-inflicted. Colvin signed an affidavit of non-prosecution three months 

after the offense. She testified that Hennard has never touched her and that he would not 

hurt her. 
Hennard v. State Page 6

Officer Esquibel testified at trial that Colvin told him Hennard choked her and that 

Colvin had injuries consistent with being choked. Sergeant Schroeder also observed red 

discoloration on Colvin’s neck consistent with being choked. Young also testified that 

Colvin had marks on her neck. The State introduced pictures showing the injuries to 

Colvin’s neck. Colvin testified at trial that she could not remember what happened on 

the day of the offense. The factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and 

can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. 

Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We find that the evidence 

is sufficient to support Hennard’s conviction for assault family violence by occlusion. We 

overrule the third and fourth issues. 

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 17, 2015

Do not publish 

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