United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Committee on

Appropriations, House of

Representatives

April 1997 MILITARY AIRLIFT

Savings Achievable by

Eliminating Support

Operations at Torrejon

Air Base, Spain

GAO/NSIAD-97-96

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276305 

April 21, 1997

The Honorable C.W. (Bill) Young

Chairman, Subcommittee on

 National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies on its global network

of en route bases1

 to provide logistical support to military airlift aircraft

during contingencies. According to Air Mobility Command documents,

two en route bases in Spain—Torrejon and Zaragoza—supported about

50 percent of the Air Mobility Command’s airlift missions during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, according to

Spanish government officials, Torrejon Air Base’s proximity to Madrid, the

capital of Spain, makes its use by the U.S. military highly visible and

politically sensitive.

This report addresses (1) the future use of Torrejon Air Base in Spain for

airlift operations, (2) the cost savings that would be realized if the Air

Mobility Command’s presence at that base was ended, and (3) alternatives

the Air Mobility Command is considering to the current use of Torrejon

Air Base. We conducted this review under our basic legislative

responsibilities and are addressing the report to you because it addresses

key issues under your Subcommittee’s jurisdiction.

Background Global airlift operations use a network of 13 key en route locations to

support the peacetime flow of U.S.-based strategic airlift aircraft. An

additional 18 bases provide support through terminal service contract

operations and Navy-operated terminals. Long-range strategic airlift

aircraft—such as the C-5, C-141, and C-17—generally land, approximately

every 3,500 miles, at one of these bases for refueling, maintenance, crew

changes, and/or cargo handling. These locations also serve as bases from

which to expand operations rapidly during contingencies and war.

DOD will spend about $1.9 billion in fiscal year 1997 to operate and

maintain the network of en route bases used by the Air Mobility

1

The en route basing system is a global network of manpower, materiel, and facilities that provides

command and control, logistics, and aerial port services to air mobility forces performing U.S.

Transportation Command worldwide missions.

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Command.2 DOD has also identified about $1 billion in construction

projects and infrastructure upgrades that need to be completed in fiscal

years 1997-2001 to enhance this network of en route bases. (See apps. I

and II, respectively, for more details about the operation and maintenance

costs and the construction and upgrade costs.)

The airlift operations are managed by the Air Mobility Command, a

component of the U.S. Transportation Command, located at Scott Air

Force Base, Illinois. Figure 1 shows the 13 key peacetime en route bases

and highlights 4 other en route bases discussed in this report.

2

These costs represent the annual operating costs of the bases; the majority of these costs relate to

activities other than airlift operations.

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Figure 1: En Route Bases Used by the Air Mobility Command

12

13

11 6

9

8

. 10

7

. 1

2

14

3

4

15

16

17

5

13 Key Peacetime Bases

1 - Lajes, Azores

2 - Mildenhall, England

3 - Rhein Main, Germany

4 - Ramstein, Germany

5 - Rota, Spain

6 - Incirlik, Turkey

7 - Osan, Korea

8 - Kadena, Okinawa

9 - Yokota, Japan

10- Andersen, Guam

11- Howard, Panama

12- Hickam, Hawaii

13- Elmendorf, Alaska 

Other Bases Discussed

14 - Fairford, England

15 - Zaragoza, Spain

16 - Torrejon, Spain

17 - Moron, Spain

Note: Bases shown in BOLD

are those addressed in this 

report

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The Air Mobility Command currently has access to three en route bases in

Spain: Rota Naval Air Station, Moron Air Base, and Torrejon Air Base.

Since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. presence in

Spain has decreased significantly. The U.S. Air Force has relinquished use

of its designated facilities at Zaragoza Air Base and turned them over to

Spanish authorities. At Torrejon Air Base, DOD transferred the

headquarters, 16th Air Force, including the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, to

Italy and relocated the remaining personnel to other DOD installations

except for a small Air Mobility Command caretaker staff.

Torrejon Air Base primarily supports military airlift. During Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, it handled about 31 percent of Air

Mobility Command’s airlift missions. Rota Naval Air Station serves as the

Air Mobility Command’s primary peacetime base in Spain for military

airlift aircraft and provides a limited crisis response capability during

buildup for a contingency at the other two bases. It also provides refueling

and weapons support to the Navy’s Sixth Fleet ships and aircraft. Moron

Air Base is the headquarters for the 496th Air Base Squadron; administers

the Spain base maintenance contract, which provides civil engineering,

supply, and transportation services; and provides support to military airlift

for contingencies and deployment exercises.

U.S. military activities in Spain are governed by the Agreement on Defense

Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States, signed

on December 1, 1988. The agreement entered into force on May 4, 1989,

and is in effect for 8 years. It is extended for 1-year periods unless one of

the parties notifies the other in writing of its intent not to extend the

agreement.

Results in Brief The future use of Torrejon Air Base by the Air Mobility Command is

questionable. DOD, State Department, and U.S. Embassy officials

acknowledge that the government of Spain does not want the Command to

use Torrejon Air Base to support future airlift missions. The Spanish

government suggested that the Command relocate its personnel stationed

at Torrejon Air Base to another base in Spain. Although the Air Mobility

Command did not relocate its civilian and military personnel, in July 1996

the U.S. Transportation Command terminated a planned fuel system

upgrade at the base for which it had already spent $800,000 and

reprogrammed the remaining $2.5 million for other needs.

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Discontinuing operations at Torrejon Air Base and eliminating both

civilian and military positions would result in an annual savings of

$515,000. The Air Mobility Command could also save about $200,000

annually in operations and maintenance costs by discontinuing its

operations at Torrejon Air Base and eliminating its civilian positions.

These savings would continue to accrue, at a minimum, until an alternative

location is selected to fill the capacity viewed as lost by discontinuing

operations at Torrejon Air Base. The Command could save an additional

$315,000 in military personnel costs if it eliminated the military positions

from the force structure.

The Air Mobility Command has short-term alternatives to the use of

Torrejon Air Base. These alternatives include relying on the four key

European bases—Mildenhall Air Base, England; Moron Air Base, Spain;

and Rhein Main and Ramstein Air Bases, Germany—to the maximum

extent possible and using other locations, as necessary. Additionally, the

Air Mobility Command, in conjunction with officials from the U.S.

Transportation Command and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, is considering

three long-term alternatives to make the en route system capable of

carrying out its peacetime and wartime missions and replace the capability

provided by Torrejon Air Base. These alternatives include (1) adding

limited capability to Rota Naval Air Station and reopening and enhancing

Zaragoza Air Base, Spain; (2) significantly enhancing Rota Naval Air

Station, Spain, and adding limited capability to Fairford Air Base, England;

and (3) reopening and enhancing Zaragoza Air Base and adding limited

capability to Fairford Air Base. However, the Spanish government, which

has final approval over all activities at the bases in Spain, delayed the

approval of site surveys at Rota Naval Air Station and Zaragoza Air Base

because of political issues. As of April 1997, the Air Force had completed

the site survey at Rota Naval Air Station but had not completed the survey

at Zaragoza Air Base.

Air Mobility

Command’s

Continued Use of

Torrejon Air Base Is

Questionable

According to Department of State and U.S. Embassy officials, senior

Spanish military officials have indicated that political sensitivities will

severely complicate U.S. use of Torrejon Air Base during future

contingencies. On several occasions, the Spanish government has

suggested that the Air Mobility Command relocate its military personnel

permanently stationed at the base to Moron Air Base, Rota Naval Air

Station, or Zaragoza Air Base. Air Mobility Command officials stated that

since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Spain has been

increasingly sensitive about allowing the U.S. military to use Torrejon Air

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
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Base for contingency operations. The primary reason for this position is

that any U.S. military activity at the base is highly visible to the Spanish

population because the base is located near the capital city of Madrid.

The Spanish government’s sensitivities have led to a general consensus

among Department of State, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Transportation

Command, and Air Mobility Command officials that the Air Mobility

Command should consider alternative bases for peacetime use and

contingency operations. As a result, the U.S. Transportation Command

ceased its upgrade of the fuel system at Torrejon Air Base, after spending

approximately $800,000 of the $3.3 million it had planned to spend on this

upgrade. The Command has since reprogrammed the remaining

$2.5 million for projects at other DOD installations.

Termination of Air

Mobility Command

Operations at

Torrejon Air Base

Could Result in

Savings

Despite the Spanish government’s sensitivities, the Air Mobility Command

continues to station 14 personnel (9 military and 5 civilian staff) at

Torrejon Air Base. Our analysis showed that the Air Mobility Command

could save about $200,000 annually in operations and maintenance3

 costs

by simply ceasing operations at Torrejon Air Base and eliminating the

civilian positions. These savings include $175,000 in civilian personnel

costs and $25,000 in other support costs. The Air Mobility Command could

save an additional $315,000 in military personnel costs if it eliminated the

military positions from the force structure. Discontinuing operations at

Torrejon Air Base and eliminating both civilian and military positions

would result in an annual savings of $515,000.

DOD officials told us they believe the Air Mobility Command should

continue to maintain its small presence at Torrejon Air Base. They stated

that the $515,000 is a minimal investment to retain possible future access

to a large infrastructure that can be expanded rapidly during a

contingency. Nevertheless, the Air Mobility Command is evaluating

alternatives to maintaining a presence at the base.

Alternatives to

Torrejon Air Base

The Air Mobility Command has both short-term and long-term alternatives

to the continued use of Torrejon Air Base.

3

Operations and maintenance funds are used by the services to carry out day-to-day activities, such as

the recruitment and fielding of a trained and ready force, equipment maintenance and repair, child

care and family centers, transportation services, civilian personnel management and pay, and

maintenance of the infrastructure to support the services.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
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Short-term Alternatives If Spain does not allow U.S. use of Torrejon Air Base and a contingency

occurs, the Air Mobility Command could use other en route bases while it

identifies and implements a long-term alternative. In the short term, the

Air Mobility Command could use, to the maximum extent possible, four

key European bases—Mildenhall Air Base, England; Moron Air Base,

Spain; and Rhein Main and Ramstein Air Bases, Germany—plus the limited

capability available at Rota Naval Air Station, Spain. In addition, the Air

Mobility Command could supplement the key locations by using other air

bases, including Lajes, Azores; Incirlik, Turkey; and Fairford, England.

Long-term Alternatives Air Mobility Command officials believe that the United States continues to

need another major en route base in Spain to replace Torrejon Air Base.

They cite the following factors as favoring a base in Spain over other

European locations: (1) better weather, particularly in winter months;

(2) shorter flights from the continental United States, resulting in lower

fuel consumption and bigger payloads; and (3) ease in obtaining overflight

permission.

The European Working Group, established in early 1996, assessed the

adequacy of the infrastructure at the en route bases in Europe to support

peacetime and contingency operations.4

 The Group concluded that the

current en route basing infrastructure does not meet the theater

commander’s airlift requirements and recommended relying on the four

main European air bases we cited previously. The Group further

recommended that the United States establish another base, preferably a

large base in either Spain or Portugal, to meet requirements. In the past,

that base would have been Torrejon Air Base.

Based on the European Working Group’s assessment, as of January 1997,

the Air Mobility Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S.

Air Forces, Europe, officials developed three alternatives to replace the

capacity that would be lost if the Air Mobility Command loses access to

Torrejon Air Base. The three alternatives are

(1) reopening and enhancing the capacity of Zaragoza Air Base, Spain, and

adding limited additional capacity to Rota Naval Air Station, Spain;

4

The European Working Group was formed to develop long-term strategy options for ensuring

adequate en route support in Europe for strategic air mobility operations. The Group includes

representatives from the Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. European Command, U.S.

Central Command, air component staffs, service staffs, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense

Fuel Supply Center.

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(2) significantly enhancing the capacity of Rota Naval Air Station, Spain,

and adding limited additional capacity to Fairford Air Base, England; or

(3) reopening and enhancing the capacity of Zaragoza Air Base and adding

limited capacity to Fairford Air Base.

Under alternative 1, the additional enhancements needed at Zaragoza Air

Base would be, at a minimum, a fuel hydrant system, fuel storage tank,

fuel pipeline improvements, and runway resurfacing. The limited

enhancement of capacity needed at Rota Naval Air Station includes an

ongoing upgrade of Rota Naval Air Station’s fuel system to a five-hydrant

operation and another fuel storage tank.

Under alternative 2, the significant capacity enhancement needed at Rota

Naval Air Station includes the enhancement described in alternative 1 plus

seven additional fuel hydrants, an additional fuel storage tank, a

resurfaced runway, and expanded ramp areas. Fairford Air Base would

require an additional fuel storage tank, upgraded fuel hydrant system,

some runway refurbishment, and ramp improvements. Under alternative 3,

Zaragoza Air Base would be enhanced as described in alternative 1, and

Fairford Air Base would be improved as described in alternative 2.

According to Air Mobility Command officials, alternative 1 takes more

advantage of the factors favoring Spanish bases, but alternatives 2 and 3

reduce the risk of being denied base access during a contingency by

locating only two bases in a single country. Within Spain, there are

trade-offs between Zaragoza Air Base and Rota Naval Air Station. Zaragoza

Air Base has greater capacity and expansion potential, but Rota Naval Air

Station is a seaport with easy access to fuel, and the Navy funds normal

base operating support costs. Air Mobility Command officials believe that

with a significantly increased Air Mobility Command presence at Rota

Naval Air Station, the Navy may not be willing to fund all the base

operating costs. The Air Mobility Command plans to evaluate these three

alternatives and provide detailed cost estimates for the improvements

needed after completing the site surveys.

As of April 1997, the Air Mobility Command was still considering

alternatives for replacing Torrejon Air Base. Air Mobility Command

officials said they had not decided on a long-term alternative, primarily

because the current political climate in Spain has caused the Spanish

government to delay the proposed site surveys at Zaragoza Air Base and

Rota Naval Air Station. The Air Force completed the site survey at Rota

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
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Naval Air Station in March 1997 but has not completed the site survey at

Zaragoza Air Base.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Political sensitivities in Spain have made the future use of Torrejon Air

Base questionable for the support of future contingency operations and

have delayed site surveys at the alternative Spanish bases being

considered. Given the political sensitivities and the potential savings if the

Air Mobility Command ceases operations at the base, we recommend that

the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the Air Mobility

Command to devise a plan to eliminate in a timely manner its military

support operations at Torrejon Air Base. We also recommend that the

Secretary of Defense use this plan, if necessary, as part of a strategy in

negotiating with Spain on other installations.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the overall

thrust of our recommendation to eliminate the military support operations

at Torrejon Air Base in a timely manner and stated that the Air Mobility

Command planned to terminate operations at Torrejon Air Base by the end

of fiscal year 1997. DOD did not believe that net cost savings would result

from eliminating the Air Mobility Command’s presence at Torrejon Air

Base because any cost savings realized by eliminating the Air Mobility

Command’s presence at Torrejon Air Base would be offset by the

investment and manpower required to replace the en route capability lost

at the base. We agree that the cost of operations at an alternative base

need to be considered but believe that, depending on the alternative

selected, DOD could realize some net savings. For example, if the Air

Mobility Command chooses Rota Naval Air Station, where it already has a

large contingent of personnel, additional operating expense would be

minimal. If other alternatives are chosen, the Air Mobility Command could

use DOD personnel already stationed at the bases, as it currently does at

many bases in the en route system. According to DOD, a realistic estimate

of the operations and maintenance costs attributable to en route

operations would be very small for bases with other ongoing operations.

DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated

where appropriate. (DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in 

app. III.) The Department of State reviewed a draft of this report and

advised us that it had no objection to the findings as they relate to the

Department’s operations and had no suggested changes to the language of

the report.

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Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information on the future use of Torrejon Air Base for airlift

operations, we examined the Agreement on Defense Cooperation with

Spain and reviewed documents on the Spanish government’s position on

U.S. bases in Spain and the political climate in Spain. We discussed these

documents and related issues with officials from the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, Air Force Headquarters,

the U.S. Transportation Command, the Air Mobility Command, and the U.S

Embassy in Spain.

To identify the potential savings that would be realized by eliminating the

Air Mobility Command’s operations at Torrejon Air Base, we reviewed

documents and reports relevant to the costs of supporting the military and

civilian personnel assigned to the base. We discussed these costs and

potential savings with Air Mobility Command officials.

To obtain information on alternatives to the current use of Torrejon Air

Base, we reviewed the U.S. Air Forces, Europe, and Air Mobility

Command’s analyses of alternative en route bases and Department of State

assessments of these alternatives. We also reviewed DOD, U.S.

Transportation Command, and Air Mobility Command reports and studies

on current and future airlift requirements and basing capacities. At each of

these agencies, we interviewed officials concerning the alternative bases,

basing capacities, and airlift requirements.

We conducted our review between April 1996 and April 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force and other interested congressional committees. Copies will also

be made available to others upon request.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
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Please contact me at (202) 512-3961 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Costs to Operate and

Maintain Bases Used

by the En Route

System

14

Appendix II 

Costs to Improve

Infrastructure at En

Route Bases

17

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

20

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

21

Tables Table I.1: Costs to Operate and Maintain the Bases Used by the

Air Mobility Command’s En Route System

14

Table II.1: Costs to Improve Infrastructure at En Route Bases

Used by the Air Mobility Command

17

Figure Figure 1: En Route Bases Used by the Air Mobility Command 3

Abbreviations

DBOF-T Defense Business Operations Fund-Transportation

DOD Department of Defense

MILCON military construction

O&M operations and maintenance

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix I 

Costs to Operate and Maintain Bases Used

by the En Route System

The Department of Defense (DOD) spent about $2 billion in fiscal year 1996

to operate and maintain the network of en route bases used by the Air

Mobility Command. Table I.1 shows the projected costs associated with

operating and maintaining the bases for fiscal year 1997. U.S. operations at

the en route bases are funded from the Air Force’s operations and

maintenance (O&M) account, Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency’s

military construction (MILCON) accounts, host nation support,1

 and the

Defense Business Operations Fund for Transportation (DBOF-T).2

 Because

these costs include various types of peacetime and wartime missions, we

could not separate the costs of the Air Mobility Command’s airlift

operations from costs for other purposes.3

 For example, Misawa Air Base,

Japan, is home to the 35th Fighter Wing (F-16 aircraft). Accordingly, the

vast majority of the $42 million we identified in Air Force O&M costs likely

relates to fighter rather than airlift operations.

Table I.1: Costs to Operate and Maintain the Bases Used by the Air Mobility Command’s En Route System (Projected for

Fiscal Year 1997)

Funding sourcea

Dollars in millions

En route base O&Mb MILCON

Defense

Logistics

Agencyc U.S. total Host nation Base totald

13 key peacetime bases shown in figure 1

Yokota, Japan $58.8 0 $0.7 $59.5 $296.1 $355.6

Elmendorf, Alaska 264.4 $21.5 20.1 306.1 0 306.1

Kadena, Japan 178.9 0 0.5 179.4 1.7 181.1

Hickam, Hawaii 164.2 0 1.1 165.3 0 165.3

Ramstein, Germany 143.0 5.4 0.2 148.6 0 148.6

Osan, Korea 104.6 9.8 0.4 114.8 21.3 136.1

Incirlik, Turkey 83.1 7.2 0.4 90.6 0 90.6

Mildenhall, England 77.0 6.2 0.3 83.5 0 83.5

Anderson, Guam 56.8 0 2.3 59.1 0 59.1

(continued)

1

Host nation support includes the host government’s contributions for foreign national direct and

indirect hires, utilities, fuel, ramp rent, and landing fees at various locations. It also includes in-kind

support for war reserve and depot maintenance in Korea.

2

Air Mobility Command customers pay the DBOF-T (now called the Defense Working Capital Fund)

from their appropriated funds for transportation services they receive. DBOF-T funds daily operational

expenses for Air Mobility Command DBOF-T units at the en route bases, aerial port operations,

aircraft maintenance, command post, DBOF-T civilian pay, major repair, and minor construction.

3

During our review, the U.S. Air Force was unable to provide us with costs specifically related to airlift

operations.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix I 

Costs to Operate and Maintain Bases Used

by the En Route System

Funding sourcea

Dollars in millions

En route base O&Mb MILCON

Defense

Logistics

Agencyc U.S. total Host nation Base totald

Rhein Main, Germany $23.0 0 0 $23.0 $8.0 $31.0

Rota, Spain 0 0 $1.7 1.7 0 1.7

Howard, Panama 0.1 0 1.5 1.6 0 1.6

Lajes, Azores 0.2 0 1.1 1.3 0 1.3

Subtotal $1,154.1 $50.1 $30.0 $1,234.2 $327.1 $1,561.3

Other bases shown in figure 1

Moron, Spain $15.9 0 $12.9 $28.8 0 $28.8

Torrejon, Spain 0.2 0 0.3 0.5 0 0.5

Zaragoza, Spaine

Fairford, Englandf

Subtotal $16.1 0 $13.2 $29.3 0 $29.3

Bases not shown in figure 1

Aviano, Italy $81.9 $10.1 $0.2 $92.2 0 $92.2

Eielson, Alaska 82.0 0 1.9 83.9 0 83.9

Kunsan, Korea 65.9 0 0.4 66.3 0 66.3

Misawa, Japan 42.5 0 0.5 43.0 0 43.0

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 $7.0 7.0

Sigonella, Italy 0 0 6.5 6.5 0 6.5

Diego Garcia, Indian Ocean 0 0 3.8 3.8 0 3.8

Bahrain, Bahrain 0 0 0 0 3.4 3.4

Guantanamo, Cuba 0 0 1.5 1.5 0 1.5

Souda Bay, Crete 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5

Subtotal $272.3 $10.1 $15.3 $297.6 $10.4 $308.0

Totalg $1442.5 $60.1 $58.4 $1,561.1 $337.5 $1,898.6

(Table notes on next page)

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix I 

Costs to Operate and Maintain Bases Used

by the En Route System

Note: We did not validate the costs for operating and maintaining the en route bases. The 

en route bases are used for various types of missions, and the costs provided by DOD include

those related to airlift and other types of operations. We could not separate the airlift-related

costs.

aDBOF-T funding is not included.

bThe amounts shown are Air Force O&M funding only.

cDefense Logistics Agency includes Defense Fuel Supply Center funding.

dDoes not include costs for medical, housing, and contingencies.

eZaragoza Air Base is not occupied by the United States.

f

Costs were not obtained for Fairford Air Base.

gTotals may not add due to rounding.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by the U.S. Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix II 

Costs to Improve Infrastructure at En Route

Bases

The Air Mobility Command has conducted site surveys of bases in Europe

and the Pacific and identified over $1 billion in construction projects and

infrastructure repair upgrades that need to be completed during fiscal

years 1997-2011 to ensure that the Command can carry out its peacetime

and wartime missions. The site surveys identified deficiencies in airfield

runways and ramps, fuel systems, maintenance and aerial port facilities,

and base support facilities such as dormitories and dining halls.

The U.S. Transportation Command and Air Mobility Command are

working with the Joint Staff, the services, the Defense Logistics Agency,

the Defense Fuel Supply Center, and the overseas service commands to

program for immediate funding of those projects that could have a

significant impact on the ability of the U.S. military to carry out its

wartime and peacetime missions. However, the Defense Logistics Agency

has already reported a significant shortfall in funding for these projects

and is seeking additional funding during the next 5 fiscal years. Table II.1

shows the costs to upgrade the network of en route bases.

Table II.1: Costs to Improve Infrastructure at En Route Bases Used by the Air Mobility Command (Projected for Fiscal Years

1997-2011)

Funding sourcea

Dollars in millions

En route base O&Mb MILCON

Defense

Logistics

Agency Otherc U.S. total Host nation Base total

13 key peacetime bases shown in

figure 1

Ramstein, Germany $7.5 $3.0 0 $16.5 $27.1 $170.6 $197.6

Anderson, Guam 3.0 0 $143.2 0.3 146.5 0 146.5

Elmendorf, Alaska 6.3 8.0 122.3 3.8 140.4 0 140.4

Yokota, Japan 10.3 0 18.8 3.1 32.1 98.0 130.1

Hickam, Hawaii 7.1 15.0 50.3 2.5 74.8 0 74.8

Osan, Korea 3.5 0 8.3 0.5 12.3 48.4 60.8

Kadena, Japan 4.8 0 3.0 11.0 18.7 25.9 44.6

Lajes, Azores 12.6 0 23.9 3.6 40.2 0 40.2

Mildenhall, England 6.9 0 2.8 2.3 12.0 0 12.0

Rhein Main, Germany 7.0 0 2.2 0.2 9.4 0 9.4

Rota, Spain 3.2 0 0 0 3.2 0 3.2

Incirlik, Turkey 0.3 0 0.8 0 1.1 0 1.1

Howard, Panamad

Subtotal $72.6 $26.0 $375.5 $43.7 $517.8 $342.9 $860.7

(continued)

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix II 

Costs to Improve Infrastructure at En Route

Bases

Funding sourcea

Dollars in millions

En route base O&Mb MILCON

Defense

Logistics

Agency Otherc U.S. total Host nation Base total

Other bases shown in figure 1

Fairford, England 0 0 0 $5.0 $5.0 $35.0 $40.0

Iberian Basee $4.5 0 $25.0 0 39.5 0 39.5

Moron, Spain 0.3 0 27.4 0.3 28.0 0 28.0

Zaragoza, Spaind

Subtotal $4.8 0 $62.4 $5.3 $72.5 $35.0 $107.5

Bases not shown in figure 1

Misawa, Japan $2.8 0 $60.0 $0.2 $63.0 $5.4 $68.4

Eielson, Alaska 2.6 0 28.0 0.6 31.1 0 31.1

Iwakuni, Japan 0.3 0 18.0 0.3 18.6 7.5 26.1

Sigonella, Italy 3.3 0 6.0 0 9.3 0 9.3

Kinsan, Korea 2.5 0 0 0 2.5 6.3 8.8

Aviano, Italy 2.6 0 1.9 0.5 5.0 0.3 5.3

Diego Garcia, Indian Ocean 0 $2.0 0 0 2.0 0 2.0

Paya Lebar, Singapore 1.2 0 0 0.3 1.5 0 1.5

Kimhae, Korea 0.7 0 0 0.8 1.0 0 1.0

Naples, Italy 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8

U Taphao, Thailand 0 0 0.7 0 0.7 0 0.7

Suwon, Korea 0.6 0 0 0.2 0.6 0 0.6

Kwang Ju, Korea 0.4 0 0 0 0.6 0 0.6

Pohang, Korea 0.4 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.4

Chong Ju, Korea 0.4 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.4

Cairo, Egypt 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.3

Fukuoka, Japan 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.3

Taegu, Korea 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1

Pisa, Italy 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1

Subtotalf $18.5 $2.0 $114.6 $3.2 $138.3 $19.5 $157.8

Totalf $95.9 $28.0 $552.5 $52.1 $728.5 $397.3 $1,125.9

(Table notes on next page)

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix II 

Costs to Improve Infrastructure at En Route

Bases

Note: We did not validate the estimated costs provided by the Air Mobility Command for

projected infrastructure improvements at the en route bases or the justifications for those

improvements.

aThe amounts shown are Air Force O&M and DBOF-T funding.

bDefense Logistics Agency includes Defense Fuel Supply Center funding.

cIncludes Air Force Materiel Command and U.S.Transportation Command’s mobility enhancement

funds.

dBase not surveyed; no cost estimate available.

eIberian Base (such as Torrejon or Zaragoza Air Base) represents a place holder until an

alternative is identified for Torrejon Air Base.

f

Totals may not add due to rounding.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by the Air Mobility Command.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Elliott C. Smith

Jane D. Trahan

W. Bennett Quade

Kansas City Field

Office

Gregory J. Symons

William H. Gansler

(703132) Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-96 Military Airlift
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