J-A22040-17

J-A22041-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: T.R.R. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: H.W.R., MOTHER :

: No. 918 EDA 2017

 

Appeal from the Decree February 15, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,

Orphans’ Court Division, at No. 2014-A9008. 

IN RE: T.R.R. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: L.R., JR., FATHER :

: No. 948 EDA 2017

 

Appeal from the Decree February 15, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,

Orphans’ Court Division, at No. 2014-A9008.

BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS, AND PLATT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2017

In these companion cases, H.W.R. (Mother) and L.R., Jr. (Father), 

appeal from the decrees of the Orphans’ Court, granting petitions for the 

involuntary termination of their respective parental rights (and duties) to their 

son, T.R.R. (Child) (born in May of 2008) and awarding custody to the Bucks 

 



 Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
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County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (CYS).

1

 We affirm on the 

basis of the trial court’s opinion.

2

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to 

restate them at length here. 

We note briefly for context and the convenience of the reader that this 

case has a complicated and convoluted history. Child has been in the care of 

CYS since December of 2010. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and 

placed him in the legal and physical custody of CYS at a shelter care hearing 

held in this matter on January 14, 2011. (See Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/17, 

at 1; see also N.T. Hearing, 5/16/16, at 16). The trial court confirms that on 

September 11, 2012, the permanency goal was formally changed, by 

agreement of the parents (who were represented by separate counsel at the 

hearing), from reunification to adoption. (See Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/17, at 2). 

Child had entered CYS’ care after he was removed from Father while 

Mother was away on a visit to California. It bears noting that Mother left Child 

(and two older siblings from a prior relationship) with Father even though he 

had previously attempted suicide. 

 

1 Child’s long-time foster parents plan to adopt him. 

2

 We address the appeals together in one unified decision (as did the trial 

court). We will refer to the cases in the singular, for simplicity.
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Father had also been convicted of arson. On an inspection visit, Father’s 

probation officer observed that Father’s home presented safety issues for Child 

because Father had left his psychiatric medication scattered all over the floor 

of the residence. At a hearing, a CYS caseworker testified that the probation 

officer observed, “Father did not seem concerned that a two-year old would 

pick them up.” (N.T. Hearing, 3/10/16, at 39). CYS observed that Child had 

rotted teeth, and displayed significant speech and physical delays; he also 

needed leg braces, and other early intervention services. (See id.).

After CYS assumed custody, and placed Child in foster care, both 

parents, separately, consented to the termination of their parental rights, but 

subsequently revoked their consents. The trial court vacated the orders of 

termination. CYS appealed from the orders vacating the terminations. This 

Court eventually quashed the appeal. The case returned to the Orphans’ 

Court. During the time of this appeal, Child continued to live with his foster 

parents. 

After remand, the court held eleven days of hearings. The testimony 

revealed many points of dispute.3 It bears noting that both parents have 

 

3 The relationship between Mother and Father, the biological parents, 

Appellants here, and CYS appears to have been somewhat contentious. For 

example, the question of both parents’ hygiene came up for discussion. 

Father’s hygiene appears to have been more of an issue than Mother’s, as

references to it recur repeatedly. Father denies there is an issue and claims 

to shower every day. However, CYS personnel maintained that Father actually 

reported taking a shower only every other day, and demanding that if CYS 

wanted him to shower more, it should pay his water bill. CYS appears to have 
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mental health issues in varying degrees. One point of dispute was whether 

the parents were sufficiently forthcoming in acknowledging their mental health 

issues, and related health issues (such as Father’s family history of epilepsy) 

or if they resisted CYS efforts at formal evaluation and treatment. 

Both Mother and Father completed parenting classes, but CYS 

maintained they failed to apply the skills they were taught. Child resisted 

supervised visits and often acted out. The foster parents blamed Mother and 

Father. Mother and Father blamed the foster parents. CYS faulted Mother 

and Father for failing to follow up on suggested parenting behaviors during 

supervised visits.

4

 

On February 15, 2017, after the conclusion of the hearings, the trial 

court granted the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights, 

accompanied by a lengthy joint opinion. In the opinion the court noted that:

[I]t is irrefutable that Parents attempted to improve their 

parenting skills and achieve some of [CYS’] objectives. However, 

it was repeatedly apparent, throughout their testimony as well as 

that of [CYS] witnesses, that Parents frequently did not 

comprehend, could not recall, failed to implement, or resisted 

compliance with [CYS’s] plan.

(Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/17, at 29). 

 

encouraged Child to refer to his foster parents as his “forever parents” and 

Appellants as his “visiting parents.” 

4 Eventually, CYS stopped the supervised visits altogether. 
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Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal and concise statements 

of errors complained of on appeal on March 16, 2017. The trial court filed a 

joint opinion which referenced its original opinion of February 15, 2017. (See 

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/03/17); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Mother raises the following claims on appeal:

1. The [t]rial [c]ourt erroneously granted [CYS’] petition to 

terminate the parental rights of [Mother] as [CYS] failed to prove 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse or neglect on the part 

of Mother as required [by] §2511(a)(2).

2. The [t]rial [c]ourt erroneously granted [CYS’] petition to 

terminate the parental rights of Mother as it failed to prove that 

the services or assistance reasonably available to her did not 

remedy the conditions which lead [sic] to the placement of [Child]. 

3. The [t]rial [c]ourt erroneously granted [CYS’] petition to 

terminate the parental rights of [Mother] under §2511(a)(8) as 

there is no competent evidence that the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of [Child] continue to exist as to Mother.

(Mother’s Brief, at 3).

Father raises the following questions on appeal:

1. Did the evidence presented at the hearing establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the existence of grounds sufficient to 

support the termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 2511(a)(2), (5) or (8)?

2. Did the trial court err in effectively requiring Father to carry the 

burden of proof with regard to his capacity to parent?

3. Did the trial court err in failing to consider and/or give weight 

to [CYS’] lack of reasonable efforts in its decision to terminate 

parental rights[?]

(Father’s Brief, at 3).
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Our standard of review for a challenge to the termination of parental 

rights is well-settled:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope 

of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

This Court has explained:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have 

adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not 

evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible 

evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we 

are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and deductions, we 

may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s sustainable 

findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

This Court has long recognized that the “best interests of the child is the 

paramount consideration is . . . beyond peradventure. . . . Indeed, even the 

rights of natural parents are subordinate to the child’s best interest.” 

Cardamone v. Elshoff, 659 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations 

omitted).
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As the party seeking involuntary termination of Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights, CYS bore the burden of establishing by 

clear and convincing evidence that the stated grounds for doing 

so existed. The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity 

that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. 

To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well 

as incapacity to perform parental duties. The Orphans’ court must 

examine the individual circumstances of each and every case and 

consider all explanations offered by the parent to determine if the 

evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). 

Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm 

the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 

Section 2511 provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.−The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

. . . 
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(b) Other considerations.−The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

It is well-settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations 

omitted).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude 
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that the issues Appellants have raised on appeal do not merit relief. The trial 

court explained the reason for its decision in this way:

Based upon the evidence, it is clear that the conditions which have 

caused Mother’s and Father’s incapacity have not been remedied 

over a reasonable period of time; nor will they be remedied in the 

reasonably near future. [Child] has been in the care of [CYS] for 

more than six [ ] years. During this time, various social workers 

and other personnel have attempted to work with Mother and 

Father to effectuate a change in their attitudes and behaviors. 

Essentially, the result has been the same; due to the parents’ 

incapacity, they are not reasonably capable of recognizing 

[Child’s] needs or their inability to meet those needs. The 

quantum of improvement as parents has not been sufficient.

(Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/17, at 32). 

On independent review we find that the trial court’s findings are 

supported by the record. Accordingly, under our standard of review, we 

affirm. However, we affirm with a measure of reluctance, because the 

evidence of record also confirms, as the trial court suggests, that the parents 

did make at least some effort to comply with CYS directives. (See id. at 29). 

We also recognize that parents’ counsel have identified instances where 

the conduct of certain CYS personnel either amounted to an abandonment of 

their efforts to assist the parents, as acknowledged by the trial court, (see id.

at 1), or provided such inconsistent direction that the parents were improperly 

inhibited from doing everything they were expected to do. 

Father also argues that the trial court erred by failing to take into 

account CYS’ lack of reasonable efforts to accommodate his mental handicap. 

(See Father’s Brief, at 53-55). However, these related arguments do not 
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merit relief. The trial court candidly acknowledges CYS’ deficiencies. (See

Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/17, at 1). Nevertheless, it concludes that parents lack the 

capacity to parent Child required for the award of custody.5 

Moreover, it is not our purpose to sit in judgment of the conduct of CYS 

personnel. Our paramount concern remains the best interest of the Child. 

Child has been “stuck in limbo,” (Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/17, at 1), for over six 

years. “Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while others provide 

the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.” K.Z.S., supra at 759. 

(citations omitted).

Whether the parents made sufficient effort to demonstrate their capacity 

to parent Child is a question of the weight of the evidence and the credibility

of witnesses, both of which are the province of the trial court. Where the 

Orphans court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we 

must affirm its decision even though the record could support an opposite 

result. See In re M.G., supra at 73-74. 

 

5 Furthermore, a change in goal from reunification to adoption, as occurred in 

this case, “ends any dispute that may exist between CYS and the parent 

as to the adequacy of CYS’ services aimed at reuniting the parent with 

his/her children and, of course, as to whether CYS had selected the 

most appropriate goal for this family.” In re A.L.D., supra at 339 

(citation omitted) (emphasis added in original). 
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Under our standard of review, the trial court properly disposes of the 

questions presented. (See Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/17, at 45) (concluding that 

involuntary termination of parental rights is warranted based on the entire 

record). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/18/17