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*********************************************** 
LORNA J. DICKER v. MICHAEL DICKER

(AC 40644)

DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

denying the parties’ motions for contempt and issuing a remedial order

regarding certain prior court-ordered payments. In her motion for contempt, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had wilfully underpaid

the fees he owed for their children’s extracurricular activities, and in

his motion for contempt, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff failed

to pay her share of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses. Thereafter, the trial court held hearings on the motions for contempt and

various other pending motions, during which it determined that neither

party could be held in contempt because they both believed that pursuant

to certain prior court orders they were entitled to withhold payment

from each other when and to the extent that the other party had failed

to make a required payment to the other. The court also issued a remedial

order that set forth a detailed procedure that the defendant was required

to follow in the future for presenting proof of unreimbursed medical

expenses to the plaintiff and calculating any amounts that he claimed

the plaintiff owed him under prior court orders. The trial court then

held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amounts that the parties

currently owed each other related to the subject fees and expenses and

ordered the parties to submit proposed orders. Following the hearing,

the court found that the defendant owed the plaintiff $3742.08 for unpaid

extracurricular activities fees and the plaintiff owed the defendant

$2303.59 for unpaid unreimbursed medical expenses, and, therefore, it

ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $1438.49, which was the net

difference between the unpaid sums. Thereafter, the trial court denied

in part the plaintiff’s motion to reargue. On the plaintiff’s amended

appeal to this court, held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in

finding that she had violated its medical reimbursement order and in

finding, on that basis, that she owed the defendant $2303.59 in unpaid

unreimbursed medical expenses, as she failed to establish that the

court’s findings were clearly erroneous: despite the plaintiff’s claim that

the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s accounting summaries

as to the amounts he had paid for the children’s medical expenses were

credible, the record revealed that the court credited the defendant’s

testimony that he had, in fact, paid what he claimed to have paid for

the children’s medical expenses and that his testimony explained why

there were discrepancies between the summaries and the documentation

he had presented to the court; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s

assertions that the defendant’s medical expense summaries were unsubstantiated and irreconcilable with the record, and that the court erred

in its method of calculation of the amounts that the parties owed to

each other, the court sought and received proposed orders from both

parties, which included suggested methods of calculation and summaries

of the expenses they wanted the court to consider, it heard lengthy

testimony as to the amounts allegedly owed and it was well aware of

the parties’ differing accounting approaches and methods of calculating

those amounts, which it clearly indicated and discussed in its memorandum of decision.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion

for contempt on the basis of its finding that the defendant was not in

contempt for withholding from her payment of the amount he owed for

the children’s extracurricular activities, as the plaintiff failed to advance

any compelling argument as to why the court’s determination was not

supported by the record, and this court was not left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake had been made; although the plaintiff

contended that because the defendant’s actions were knowing and voluntary, they must have constituted wilful contempt, the court’s refusal to
find the defendant in contempt was not predicated on a finding that the

defendant’s actions were not knowing or voluntary but, rather, was

based on its finding that the parties withheld payments from each other

because of their common belief that it was proper to do so.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendant

unilaterally to deduct the amount of undisputed unpaid unreimbursed

medical expenses owed by the plaintiff from future payments that the

defendant owed the plaintiff for the children’s extracurricular activities,

as that court’s remedial order, when viewed in the context of the court’s

prior orders and in light of the fact that the court was in the best position

to give effect to those orders, was not manifestly unreasonable.

4. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying her motion to reargue, which was based on

her claim that the court incorrectly concluded that she had ample opportunity to submit any relevant evidence prior to the final hearing on the

parties’ various motions but had chosen not to do so; despite the plaintiff’s contention that the trial court, without explanation, denied her

request to present additional new evidence during the subject hearing,

the record was clear that the court provided the plaintiff with a sufficient

explanation as to why it denied her motion for contempt, and a review

of the hearing transcripts indicated that the parties’ counsel agreed in

advance to prioritize certain issues before the court with respect to

their various motions.

5. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court violated

her due process right to be heard when it denied her motion for contempt

before she had rested her case-in-chief, which she claimed deprived her

of a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the defendant or to present

evidence in support of that motion: the record revealed that the plaintiff

had a sufficient opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence of

the defendant’s contempt during the subject hearing and that at no point

during the remainder of the hearing did she request to submit additional

evidence, and although the plaintiff claimed that she was unable to bring

certain relevant evidence to the court’s attention, nothing in the record

suggested that, had she been allowed even greater latitude and more

time, she would have presented evidence with respect to the wilfulness

of the defendant’s actions that was not already before the court; moreover, although the plaintiff claimed that the trial court ignored evidence

that the defendant knowingly made deductions from court-ordered payments to her, which she claimed constituted acts of wilful contempt,

noncompliance alone was not sufficient to support a judgment of contempt, as it was within the sound discretion of the court to deny her

claim for contempt because there was an adequate factual basis to

explain the defendant’s failure to honor the court’s prior orders.

Argued December 6, 2018—officially released April 16, 2019

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex and tried to the court, Abrams, J.;

judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain

other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation

agreement; thereafter, the court, Albis, J., denied the

parties’ motions for contempt and issued a remedial

order; subsequently, the court, Albis, J., issued an order

regarding certain unreimbursed medical expenses;

thereafter, the court, Albis, J., denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, and the plaintiff appealed to

this court; subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amended

appeal. Affirmed.

Lorna J. Dicker, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Michael Dicker, self-represented, the appellee

(defendant).
Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The plaintiff, Lorna J. Dicker,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court, resolving

several of the parties’ postjudgment motions. On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) found

that the plaintiff owed sums to the defendant, Michael

Dicker, for unreimbursed medical expenses for the parties’ minor children, (2) found that the defendant was

not in contempt of existing court orders, (3) concluded

that the defendant could deduct unreimbursed medical

costs from future quarterly activity fee payments that

he owed to the plaintiff, and (4) denied the plaintiff’s

motion to reargue. The plaintiff also claims that the

court violated her due process right to be heard on her

motion for contempt. For the reasons set forth in this

opinion, we disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. On March 29, 2012, the trial court,

Abrams, J., dissolved the parties’ marriage, incorporating into its judgment of dissolution the parties’

agreement dated February 17, 2012. The agreement provided, inter alia, that the defendant would be responsible for the first $3720 incurred for their children’s

unreimbursed medical and dental expenses each year

and that the parties would share equally in any such

expenses that exceeded that amount.1 As for the children’s extracurricular activities, the agreement provided that the plaintiff would pay for such activities

up to the sum of $1200 per year and that the parties,

thereafter, would share any expenses in excess of that

amount equally.2

Thereafter, the parties filed numerous motions for

contempt against each other for alleged failures to comply with the terms of their agreement. In an effort to

resolve their disputes, the parties entered into two additional agreements. In an agreement dated May 27, 2014,

the parties decided, inter alia, that they would reconcile,

on a quarterly basis, their respective payments for the

children’s unreimbursed medical expenses. In a second

agreement dated August 18, 2014, the parties settled

their dispute with respect to various prior unreimbursed

medical expenses. Each of these agreements was

approved by the court and made an order of the court.

On June 9, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the defendant had wilfully underpaid the fees he owed for the children’s extracurricular

activities. See footnote 2 of this opinion. On September

23, 2016, the defendant also filed a motion for contempt,

claiming that the plaintiff had failed to pay her agreed

upon share of the children’s unreimbursed medical

expenses. The court, Albis, J., held hearings on November 3 and 23, 2016, with respect to the parties’ motions.3

On November 23, 2016, the court ruled that neither
party could be held in contempt because each of them

believed that he or she was entitled, under the court’s

previous orders, to withhold payment from the other

as a result and to the extent of the other party’s nonpayment of sums due to him or her.

During that hearing, the court also issued a remedial

order requiring, inter alia, that in the future the defendant provide the plaintiff with calculations sufficient

to explain any amounts he claimed that she owed him

under the previous orders. The order further provided

that if the plaintiff disputed any amount so claimed and

documented by the defendant, she was obligated to

notify him of that dispute. The order finally provided

that if any undisputed expense had not been paid to

the defendant by the next due date, he could deduct

that undisputed amount from a future installment of

the children’s extracurricular activity expenses that he

then owed to the plaintiff. Critically, if the plaintiff

disputed any amount, so claimed and documented by

the defendant, she was prohibited from deducting that

amount from any future payments she then owed to

him until the dispute was resolved by the parties themselves or by the court. At the conclusion of that hearing,

the court ordered the parties to attempt to reconcile

the amounts they currently owed to one another, but

also stated that a subsequent evidentiary hearing would

be scheduled to determine those amounts if they were

unable to reach an agreement.

The parties could not reach an agreement regarding

the amounts they owed one another for their children’s

extracurricular activities and medical expenses, and,

therefore, the court held an evidentiary hearing to

resolve those issues on March 28, 2017. At that hearing,

the court ordered the parties to submit proposed orders

by April 12, 2017. On May 9, 2017, the court filed a

written memorandum of decision in which it found that

for the period from August 18, 2014 to November 23,

2016, the defendant owed the plaintiff $3742.08 for

extracurricular activity fees, while the plaintiff owed

the defendant $2303.59 for unreimbursed medical

expenses. As a result, the court ordered the defendant

to pay the plaintiff $1438.49, the net difference between

those unpaid sums.

On June 7, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue,

asking the court to reconsider many of its findings and

rulings on the parties’ motions for contempt, including

its decision not to hold the defendant in contempt and

its method of calculating the amounts the parties owed

to one another for their children’s expenses. On June

28, 2017, the court issued its memorandum of decision

denying the plaintiff’s motion to reargue with respect

to all issues except that of reimbursement for additional

orthodontic expenses.4 This appeal followed. Additional

facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in finding

that she had violated its medical reimbursement order

and in finding, on that basis, that she owed the defendant $2303.59. She further argues that the court erred

in finding that the defendant’s accounting summaries,

as to amounts he had paid for the children’s medical

expenses, were credible. Specifically, the plaintiff

argues that the numerical values listed by the defendant

on his quarterly spreadsheets, which were submitted

as evidence on the issue of unreimbursed medical

expenses, were unsubstantiated by proper documentation. We disagree.

‘‘At the outset, we note that the court’s factual determinations will not be overturned on appeal unless they

are clearly erroneous. . . . As a reviewing court, we

may not retry the case or pass on the credibility of

witnesses. . . . Our review of factual determinations

is limited to whether those findings are clearly erroneous. . . . We must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses that is made on

the basis of its firsthand observation of their conduct,

demeanor and attitude. . . . A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to

support it . . . or when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Chowdhury v. Masiat, 161 Conn. App. 314,

324, 128 A.3d 545 (2015).

During the evidentiary hearing on March 28, 2017,

the court heard lengthy testimony as to the amounts

allegedly owed by each party to the other. The defendant testified that he had incurred medical expenses

for his children’s health care that had been paid directly

either from his health savings account or by his insurance provider. He claimed that his health savings

account, his insurance payment history and his spreadsheets summarizing his children’s medical expenses

corroborated one another. The plaintiff, who appeared

with counsel, was able to cross-examine the defendant

at length as to his accounting methods. Moreover, the

court questioned the defendant on multiple occasions

with respect to his accounting summaries and the other

evidence of payments he had presented to the court.

Before issuing its memorandum of decision, the court

sought and received proposed orders from each party,

which included suggested methods of calculation and

summaries of expenses they wanted to have considered. In its revised memorandum of decision, the court

addressed the discrepancies between the plaintiff’s and

the defendant’s calculations, noting that many of those

discrepancies arose from the parties’ different accounting methods.5 The court stated that the plaintiff interpre-
ted its August 18, 2014 order, which provided that all

unreimbursed payments owed at the time of the order

had been reconciled, as an indication that the period

for determining if the minimum annual threshold had

been reached had been restarted. The court explained,

however, that ‘‘the August 18, 2014 order does not preclude such prior expenses from being included in the

calculation of the $3720 threshold for the calendar year

2014 . . . [and] [t]herefore, the expenses found to be

incurred by the defendant during the remainder of 2014

were in excess of the . . . threshold [amount].’’ The

court also concluded that the language of its May, 2014

order supported the plaintiff’s method of accounting,

however, ‘‘[o]nly for the purpose of finding the amounts

due at this time, the court adopts the approach of the

defendant. It does so primarily because it finds, based

on the credible testimony of the defendant, that all of

his claimed expenses had been paid by him by the time

of the [March 28, 2017] hearing.’’6

(Emphasis added.)

Despite the plaintiff’s repeated claim that the court

erred in finding that the defendant’s medical expense

spreadsheet summaries were credible, our review of

the record reveals that the court, instead, credited the

defendant’s testimony that he had, in fact, paid what

he claimed to have paid before the March 28, 2017

hearing.7 Because the court deduced that a number of

the defendant’s quarterly summaries included expenses

that had been incurred and claimed in one quarter, but

paid in another quarter, the defendant’s testimony was

found to have explained why there were discrepancies

between his summaries and the documentation he presented to the court. Our review of the record indicates

that during the March 28, 2017 hearing and on appeal,

these discrepancies provided the basis for many of the

plaintiff’s claims that the defendant’s accounting summaries were inaccurate.

The plaintiff also argues, in addition to claiming that

the court erred in its method of calculation, that

expenses were listed in the defendant’s medical

expense summaries that are irreconcilable with the

record. As proof of such a contradiction, the plaintiff

directed the court’s attention to the defendant’s medical

expense summary sheet and, specifically, to the entry

labeled ‘‘[Daughter’s] Root Canal’’ for $506.30. The

plaintiff claims that this entry is inaccurate, arguing

that the reason the defendant could not provide any

documentation of any payment or subsequent repayment of the expense was because she had paid for it.

We do not agree with the plaintiff’s resulting claim that

the defendant’s medical expense summaries are irreconcilable with the trial court record.

Moreover, at the time the court issued its memorandum of decision, it was in possession of the parties’

proposed orders relating to the amounts owed, along

with explanations of how the parties believed the
expenses should be calculated. It is clear that the court

was well aware of the differing accounting approaches

with respect to the calculation of amounts owed by

both parties, which is clearly indicated and discussed

in the court’s memoranda of decision. After a thorough

review of the record, including the parties’ proposed

calculations, the exhibits, and the hearing transcripts,

we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to establish

that the court’s determinations as to the amounts the

parties owed one another for their children’s expenses

were clearly erroneous.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its

discretion in not finding the defendant in contempt for

withholding payment from her. Specifically, the plaintiff

argues that the court order requiring the payment in

question was clear and unambiguous and that there

was no evidence before the court suggesting that the

defendant’s violation of the order was anything other

than wilful. We disagree.

The following legal principles guide our resolution

of the plaintiff’s claim. ‘‘Contempt is a disobedience to

the rules and orders of a court which has power to

punish for such an offense.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 196, 802 A.2d

772 (2002). ‘‘A finding of contempt is a question of fact,

and our standard of review is to determine whether the

court abused its discretion in failing to find that the

actions or inactions of the [defendant] were in contempt

of a court order. . . . To constitute contempt, a party’s

conduct must be wilful. . . . Noncompliance alone will

not support a judgment of contempt. . . . A finding

that a person is or is not in contempt of a court order

depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding

the conduct. The fact that an order has not been complied with fully does not dictate that a finding of contempt must enter. . . . [It] is within the sound

discretion of the court to deny a claim for contempt

when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the

failure to honor the court’s order. . . .

‘‘It is therefore necessary, in reviewing the propriety

of the court’s decision to deny the motion for contempt,

that we review the factual findings of the court that led

to its determination. The clearly erroneous standard is

the well settled standard for reviewing a trial court’s

factual findings. A factual finding is clearly erroneous

when it is not supported by any evidence in the record

or when there is evidence to support it, but the

reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Auerbach v. Auerbach, 113 Conn. App. 318, 326–27, 966 A.2d 292, cert.

denied, 292 Conn. 901, 971 A.2d 40 (2009).

In the present case, the plaintiff argues simply that
because the defendant’s actions were knowing and voluntary, they must have constituted wilful contempt.

The court’s refusal to find the defendant in contempt,

however, was not predicated on a finding that the defendant’s actions were not knowing or voluntary, but was

based on its finding that each party withheld payments

from the other because of their common belief that it

was proper to do so. The court explained this conclusion as follows in its oral decision on the parties’ contempt motions: ‘‘[G]iven the period of time covered and

the number of bills, it would not be possible today to

hear all the evidence the court would have to hear in

order to make a specific finding as to how much was

due with respect to each of those and an ultimate finding

as to who owed what to whom. . . . But it is clear to

the court based on the evidence presented so far that

both parties acted in a way that they believed was

permitted by the court order. I don’t say that it was

appropriate for them to do so and there are principles

of Connecticut law against self-help, but I don’t believe

that there would be grounds for a finding by clear and

convincing evidence that either party had wilfully violated the court order.’’

Because the plaintiff fails to advance any compelling

argument as to why the court’s determination was not

supported by the record and we are not left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for

contempt.

III

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its

discretion when it allowed the defendant to withhold

money unilaterally from her in the future if he believed

that she owed him money for unreimbursed medical

expenses. The plaintiff further claims that the court

unnecessarily combined two unrelated orders to provide the defendant with the option of self-help, whereas

she had to file a motion for contempt if the defendant

failed to make the correct payments. We disagree.

It is well settled that ‘‘[c]ourts have continuing jurisdiction . . . to fashion a remedy appropriate to the

vindication of a prior . . . judgment . . . pursuant to

[their] inherent powers . . . . When an ambiguity in

the language of a prior judgment has arisen as a result

of postjudgment events, therefore, a trial court may, at

any time, exercise its continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior [judgment] . . . by interpreting [the]

ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate

the judgment as interpreted . . . . Accordingly, we

will not disturb a trial court’s clarification of an ambiguity in its own order unless the court’s interpretation of

that order is manifestly unreasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Cords, 159 Conn. App.

194, 198–99, 122 A.3d 713, (2015).
In the present case, contrary to the plaintiff’s claim,

the court’s remedial order lays out a detailed rule of

future application that the defendant was to follow

when presenting proof of unreimbursed medical

expenses to the plaintiff. The court’s order provided:

‘‘If and when the accumulated receipts for the year

reach the threshold so that the plaintiff, under the current orders of the court, would be responsible to reimburse a percentage of those to the defendant, he shall

include his calculation of what that amount is. And if

the plaintiff disputes that calculation, she shall notify

the defendant in writing within thirty days after she’s

received those receipts. If she doesn’t dispute it, then

she shall make payment of her share within sixty days

after her receipt of those receipts. If her undisputed

portion of those expenses has not been paid to the

defendant by the due date of the next quarterly installment of the activity fee, he shall then be entitled to

deduct from that quarterly installment the amount of

the unpaid share of unreimbursed expenses for medical

[costs] owed by the plaintiff. If any amount is in dispute

as notified properly by the plaintiff, there shall be no

deduction until that dispute has been resolved either

by agreement of the parties or by court order.’’

The order clearly provides that if the plaintiff disputed a future expense claimed by the defendant, then

the defendant was not permitted ‘‘to deduct from that

quarterly installment the amount of the unpaid share

of unreimbursed expenses for medical [costs] owed by

the plaintiff.’’ Only when the plaintiff did not dispute

the expense and it was overdue by an entire quarter,

did the order allow for the defendant to make a deduction. After viewing the court’s remedial order in the

context of its previous orders, and acknowledging that

the court, being intimately familiar with the details of

the present case, was in the best position to give effect

to the prior orders, we conclude that the court’s remedial order was not manifestly unreasonable. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the

court abused its discretion by allowing the defendant

to deduct undisputed unpaid medical expenses from

subsequent payments.

IV

The plaintiff also claims that the court abused its

discretion when it denied her motion to reargue.8 Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court incorrectly

concluded that she had ample opportunity to submit

evidence prior to the final hearing but had chosen not

to do so. We disagree.

‘‘[T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some

principle of law which would have a controlling effect,

and which has been overlooked, or that there has been

a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used
to address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed

were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to

reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity

to have a second bite of the apple . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Liberti v. Liberti, 132 Conn.

App. 869, 874, 37 A.3d 166 (2012). ‘‘The standard of

review for a court’s denial of a motion to reargue is

abuse of discretion. . . . When reviewing a decision

for an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . .

As with any discretionary action of the trial court . . .

the ultimate [question for appellate review] is whether

the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it

did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mengwall v.

Rutkowski, 152 Conn. App. 459, 465–66, 102 A.3d 710

(2014).

In her motion to reargue, the plaintiff argued that

she had not been given a meaningful opportunity to

present evidence on her motion for contempt. Specifically, she argued that the court had used an improper

method in calculating what unreimbursed medical

expenses were owed and that representations made by

the defendant were not supported by the record.9 She

further argued that an additional hearing was warranted

because she had acquired relevant evidence on the issue

of contempt that arose after the court made its oral

order of November 23, 2016, but before it issued its

written memorandum of decision.10

In its memorandum of decision on the motion to

reargue, the court stated: ‘‘The plaintiff seeks, among

other things, a further opportunity to present evidence

in support of a finding of contempt against the defendant. . . . The record will reflect that on November 3,

2016, a hearing commenced with regard to multiple

motions filed by the parties, including each party’s contempt motion against the other. It was made clear at the

outset, and agreed by the parties, that a single combined

hearing would be held on all of the pending motions.

The hearing lasted essentially the entire afternoon of

November 2, 2016, resuming on November 23, 2016,

and continuing for most of that day. Both parties testified, with the plaintiff giving testimony for several hours

spanning both dates. . . .

‘‘By the end of the second day of the hearing on

multiple motions, the court had heard sufficient credible evidence to conclude that while the activity fee and

medical reimbursement orders had not been followed,

there was also sufficient credible evidence to preclude

it from finding contempt on the part of either party

under the Brody standard.11 For the reasons of judicial

efficiency, and after hours of testimony which was

sometimes repetitive, the court issued remedial orders

at the end of the day on November 23, 2016. . . .

‘‘The bulk of the remainder of the plaintiff’s motion

requests either the court’s reconsideration of evidence
presented at the hearing, or its allowance of additional

evidence that might have been submitted at the hearing

or that relates to events occurring after the conclusion

of the hearing. With the exception of one issue,12 the

court denies those requests.’’ (Footnotes added.)

Despite the plaintiff’s assertions that the ‘‘court, without explanation, denied the plaintiff’s request to present

additional and new evidence, other than related to the

orthodontia payments,’’ the record is clear that the

court provided the plaintiff with a sufficient explanation

as to why it denied her motion. Furthermore, a review

of the hearing transcripts indicates that counsel for the

parties agreed in advance to prioritize certain issues

before the court with respect to their various motions.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that

the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her

motion to reargue.

V

Lastly, the plaintiff claims that the court violated her

due process right to be heard when it denied her motion

for contempt before she rested her case-in-chief on that

motion. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that she was

not afforded a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine

the defendant or to present evidence in support of her

motion for contempt. She further argues that it is

unclear how the court could make a credibility finding

without the plaintiff’s testimony in support of that

motion. We disagree.

‘‘It is a fundamental tenet of due process . . . that

persons whose property rights will be affected by a

court’s decision are entitled to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner. . . . Where a party

is not afforded an opportunity to subject the factual

determinations underlying the trial court’s decision to

the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing, an order

cannot be sustained. . . . [A] party’s constitutionally

protected right to present evidence [however] is not

unbounded. . . . To the contrary, we previously have

determined that the court reasonably may limit the time

allowed for an evidentiary hearing.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Hamilton,

141 Conn. App. 208, 215 n.5, 61 A.3d 542 (2013), citing

Szot v. Szot, 41 Conn. App. 238, 241–42, 674 A.2d

1384 (1996).

‘‘In determining whether a defendant’s right of crossexamination has been unduly restricted, we consider

the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field

of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions

that were allowed, and the overall quality of the crossexamination viewed in relation to the issues actually

litigated at trial. . . . Although it is axiomatic that the

scope of cross-examination generally rests within the

discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate area of inquiry
constitutes an abuse of discretion.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubreuil v. Witt, 65

Conn. App. 35, 42, 781 A.2d 503 (2001).

The plaintiff argues that our decision in Szot applies

with equal force in the present case. ‘‘In Szot, the court,

despite the protests of the plaintiff’s counsel that she

still had additional evidence to present, ended not only

cross-examination but also the entire presentation of

evidence. . . . This court held that the trial court’s termination of the proceedings violated the plaintiff’s due

process right to be heard.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Corriveau v.

Corriveau, 126 Conn. App. 231, 237, 11 A.3d 176, cert.

denied, 300 Conn. 940, 17 A.3d 476 (2011). Here, unlike

in Szot, the court’s oral decision with respect to the

issue of contempt did not terminate the entire presentation of evidence; nor did the court make the order in

spite of the plaintiff’s express protest that she still had

evidence to present with respect to contempt. Rather,

near the end of the second day of the evidentiary hearing

on November 23, 2016, during a short recess, the trial

court met with counsel for both parties in chambers to

address the contempt issue; upon resuming the hearing,

the court made its ruling with respect to the parties’

motions for contempt.13

In the court’s ruling, it explained the need to make

two sets of remedial orders to properly effectuate its

previous orders. It stated: ‘‘One [set] is a remedial order

to make a finding as to exactly what is owed by whom

to whom. . . . The other set concerns the future and

how we can avoid the situation where these parties are

again operating at cross purposes and wind up back

in court over the same issues.’’ Thereafter, the court

described the basis for its decision not to hold either

party in contempt, how it wanted to approach the disputed amounts that were claimed under the court’s

previous orders, and how it was going to craft the remedial order so as to create a more workable situation in

the future. The court then asked counsel: ‘‘Any questions or need for clarification of any of those orders?

Counsel?’’ In response, both counsel raised issues concerning the manner in which the parties would reconcile

amounts owed to one another, the manner in which

they should present proof of their expenses to one

another, and whether there was a need for a further

order expressly stating that the parties must act in good

faith when disputing amounts claimed by one another.

None of the issues raised with the court, however, concerned the court’s announced intention not to hold

either party in contempt.

Thereafter, before proceeding to closing argument,

the court asked counsel again: ‘‘[Are there] [a]ny other

questions?’’ Hearing none, the court stated: ‘‘Then that

will dispose [of], for the time being, the motions for

contempt subject to [a] further hearing if the parties
aren’t able to resolve the issue of the amounts that, as

of this date, are due from either party to the other for

unreimbursed medicals or activity fees. If the parties

aren’t able to reach an agreement, the court will have

further hearing for the purpose of those remedial

orders . . . .’’

At no point during the remainder of the hearing did

the plaintiff ask to submit additional evidence. Although

the plaintiff continues to argue on appeal that she was

unable to bring several pieces of relevant evidence to

the court’s attention, nothing in the record suggests

that, had the plaintiff been allowed even greater latitude

and more time, she would have presented evidence with

respect to wilfulness that was not already before the

court. The record indicates that the evidence that the

plaintiff repeatedly claimed the court ignored largely

dealt with the fact that the defendant knowingly made

deductions from amounts he was ordered to pay to the

plaintiff, which she, therefore, claims to have constituted acts of wilful contempt. As discussed previously

in this opinion, however, ‘‘[n]oncompliance alone will

not support a judgment of contempt. . . . [It] is within

the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim for

contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to

explain the failure to honor the court’s order.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spencer

v. Spencer, supra, 177 Conn. App. 542.

Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff

had a sufficient opportunity to provide the court with

evidence of contempt during the November, 2016 hearings. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to show that

her constitutional rights were violated or that she was

deprived of a fair hearing as a result of the court’s

decision.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Unreimbursed medical expenses refer to expenses not covered by the

defendant’s insurance policies.

2 The parties entered into a postjudgment agreement, dated July 11, 2013,

which modified their original agreement to require that the defendant pay

the plaintiff, on a quarterly basis, $1200 per year, per child, for the children’s

extracurricular activities, otherwise, the terms of the 2012 agreement were

to remain in full force and effect. The July, 2013 agreement was made a

court order on July 15, 2013.

3

In addition to the parties’ contempt motions, the court also heard various

other motions filed by the parties. The court’s rulings on those motions are

not at issue in the present appeal.

4 See footnote 10 of this opinion.

5 The two approaches differed in that they calculated what was owed on

the basis of when the expense was incurred versus when the expense

was actually paid. In the present case, the defendant argued that expenses

incurred during any relevant quarter could be included in the accounting

for that quarter. Conversely, the plaintiff argued that only expenses paid in

a relevant quarter should be reimbursed in that quarter.

6 The memorandum of decision also provided that, ‘‘because the plaintiff’s

proposed findings and orders highlight an issue likely to recur in the reconciliation of future unreimbursed medical expenses, the court makes a remedial

order regarding expenses incurred and paid after November 23, 2016 . . . .

Going forward, consistent with the terms of the judgement as modified

by the May 27, 2014 order, the quarterly unreimbursed medical expense
reconciliations shall be based on actual payments made during the quarter,

and shall not include expenses to be paid in the future for services rendered

during the quarter.’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 The following exchange occurred on the record:

‘‘The Court: All right. Sir, now, you were asked before about when

expenses were accrued as opposed to when they were paid. Is it your

testimony now that every expense that you’re claiming to have paid for the

children, except the ones that your former wife paid herself, any unreimbursed medical expense, that you’ve paid them all as of now?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: So, you might not have paid it as of the time you

requested reimbursement?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: But you’ve paid it by now?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.’’

8 The motion filed with the court was titled ‘‘Motion to open, to submit

additional and new evidence, to reargue and for reconsideration [of] the

court’s decision dated May 18, 2017.’’ The court correctly treated the plaintiff’s motion as a motion to reargue. See Practice Book § 11–12. For the

purpose of our analysis, we adopt the court’s characterization and refer to

the plaintiff’s motion as her motion to reargue.

9 The plaintiff also argued that the court incorrectly included orthodontic

costs with medical and dental costs, despite each being covered by different

orders and subject to different calculations. She further argued that she

was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to address the issue of the

orthodontic costs because they were not previously in dispute. The court

granted the plaintiff’s motion with respect to this issue and permitted both

parties to submit to the court any relevant evidence with respect to orthodontic expenses. The court’s order provided: ‘‘[U]nder all the circumstances,

the court concludes that the plaintiff did not understand or expect that

orthodontia expenses would be taken into account. In the interest of justice,

the court wishes to afford both parties the opportunity to provide evidence

of such expenses.’’

10 The court restricted the March 28, 2017 hearing to the presentation of

evidence with respect to specific amounts owed by either party. In her

motion to reargue, the plaintiff claimed that she possessed additional evidence of wilful contempt that occurred after the November 23, 2016 hearing.

The court’s decision, however, related specifically to the period from August

18, 2014 to November 23, 2016. The court correctly denied the plaintiff’s

motion with respect to this evidence because it concerned conduct that

was outside of the relevant time frame.

11 See Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 319, 105 A.3d 887 (2015) (finding

of civil contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, not by

preponderance of evidence).

12 See footnote 11 of this opinion.

13 The court made the following statement: ‘‘I would ask [the court] monitor

to prepare a transcript of the remarks and the interim orders that I’m about

to make following a discussion I had in chambers with counsel during

the recess.’’