J. S47045/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ERIC R. WILLIAMS, : No. 310 EDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 4, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0001773-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2017

Eric R. Williams appeals, pro se, from the order of January 4, 2017, 

dismissing his PCRA1 petition without a hearing. We affirm.

The PCRA court has set forth the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On November 24, 2014, a Stipulated Non-Jury 

Trial commenced. On November 25, 2014, the court 

found the Appellant Guilty of Possession of a Firearm 

Prohibited[Footnote 1], [and] Firearms Not to be 

Carried Without a License.[Footnote 2] In summary, 

the facts consist of the following: Appellant was 

arrested on December 24, 2013 at approximately 

8:00 p.m. by Trooper Sergio Colon of the 

Pennsylvania State Police. The Appellant was 

arraigned in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware 

County, Pennsylvania on April 16, 2014. On May 19, 

2014, Appellant, through counsel, filed an “Omnibus 

Pre-trial Motion,” seeking to suppress all evidence 

 

1

Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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seized prior to the Appellant’s arrest. A Suppression 

Hearing was held on July 25, 2014 and September 

16, 2014. Trooper Sergio Colon, a four-and-a-halfyear Patrol Trooper for Troop K Media Barracks of 

the Pennsylvania State Police, testified at the 

Suppression Hearing. Trooper Colon testified that he 

has received approximately 100 hours of formalized 

training in the interdiction of drugs. Trooper Colon 

testified to conducting numerous stops on interstates 

that have led to drug arrests. On December 24, 

2013, Trooper Colon was in full police uniform and 

driving a marked patrol unit, which was equipped 

with an audio and video motor vehicle recording 

system (MVR). At the Suppression Hearing, the 

Commonwealth played the video of the MVR for the 

Court.

[Footnote 1] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105(a)(1)[.]

[Footnote 2] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a)(1)[.]

Trooper Colon testified that, at approximately 

8:00 p.m. on Christmas Eve, he was on duty alone 

travelling on I-95 southbound. Trooper Colon 

observed a burgundy Chevrolet Suburban SUV also 

travelling southbound. After running a registration 

check on NCIC, Trooper Colon testified that the 

check showed the registration on the SUV was 

expired. Trooper Colon then initiated a traffic stop, 

pulling the Appellant over on the right side of the 

Exit 8 ramp of I-95 southbound. Trooper Colon 

approached the vehicle from the passenger side, and 

observed that the Appellant was the driver of the 

vehicle and the sole occupant. As the Appellant was 

handing over documents, Trooper Colon noticed that 

the Appellant was visibly nervous and his hands were 

shaking. The Trooper noted: “His nervousness 

continued throughout our conversation and his 

demeanor was one as I mentioned earlier of which 

he wanted to get away and leave . . .” 

Further, Trooper Colon noted that throughout 

their interaction, the Appellant continued to give the 

Trooper unsolicited information. The Appellant 

provided him with unsolicited information about the 
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dog food in the back of the vehicle. The Appellant 

also gave Trooper Colon information about where he 

lived and why it was different from the address on 

his license. The Appellant also stated that he was 

unaware that his registration for the vehicle was 

expired. During their exchange, the Appellant asked 

Trooper Colon if he could light a cigarette; 

Trooper Colon permitted the Appellant to do so. 

[Trooper] Colon observed this behavior as another 

sign that the Appellant was nervous. 

Upon returning to his patrol car, Trooper Colon 

ran a check of the Appellant’s license. The query 

showed that the Appellant was driving with a 

suspended driver’s license. Further, the vehicle was 

not registered to the Appellant. Trooper Colon also 

discovered that the Appellant had an extensive 

criminal history. Trooper Colon testified that he 

observed on the criminal history, inter alia, 

numerous Possession with Intent to Deliver charges, 

a Robbery charge, and several gun charges, etc.

[Trooper] Colon was preparing a citation for 

driving with an expired inspection and a warning for 

the expired registration while conducting a criminal 

history check of the Appellant. While he was writing 

out the citation and the warning in his patrol vehicle, 

Trooper Colon noticed that the Appellant was 

continuously staring back at him in the driver’s-side 

rearview mirror and the interior rearview mirror. 

Trooper Colon believed that this was another event 

that raised his suspicion. Trooper Colon, as per 

standard practice, requested the Appellant to exit his 

vehicle and meet him at the front of the patrol car, 

so that Trooper Colon could issue the Appellant his 

citation for an expired inspection and a warning for 

an expired registration. Trooper Colon conducted an 

officer safety pat-down of the Appellant to make sure 

he was not armed. Trooper Colon then began a 

conversation with the Appellant.

The Appellant asked Trooper Colon several 

questions regarding how to remedy the expired 

registration and where to take the citation, and how 
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to take care of paying for it. The Appellant also told 

Trooper Colon that he was on a payment plan, and 

that is why his license was suspended, which 

conflicted with what the Appellant had said earlier in 

the encounter about not knowing about the 

suspension. Trooper Colon found all of the 

unsolicited information that the Appellant provided 

about how and why he was going to pay for the 

citation and the payment plan to get his license back 

as odd and suspicious.

Trooper Colon then issued the Appellant his 

citation and warning, and the two men shook hands. 

Trooper Colon told the Appellant he was free to go, 

and both men began to walk back to their respective 

vehicles. Before either man reached their vehicle, 

Trooper Colon re-engaged the Appellant, and asked 

the [Appellant] about his travel plans for the day. 

Trooper Colon also asked the Appellant, “to come 

back to where [Trooper Colon] was and [the 

Appellant] freely and voluntarily did.”

Trooper Colon then asked the Appellant if he 

had ever been arrested before. The Appellant gave 

an answer that was inconsistent with what his 

criminal history had revealed to Trooper Colon. The 

Appellant told Trooper Colon that he had been 

arrested in 2008 arising from a domestic incident in 

which he had been shot five times. Trooper Colon 

indicated that this story was another sign of 

suspicion. The Trooper testified:

He contradicted what was revealed to me 

on the earlier query of his RAP sheet by 

relating that he had only been -- his 

most recent arrest was in 2008, which as 

we saw earlier was not true. In fact[,] I 

believe his most recent arrest had been 

2012. I’m not exactly sure. 

Furthermore, he related that arrest 

specifically in 2008 was for a domestic 

charge, to -- which again contradicted 

what was revealed in that query.
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Trooper Colon asked the Appellant if there 

were any guns or drugs in the vehicle, to which the 

Appellant answered in the negative. Trooper Colon 

asked the Appellant verbally if he would consent to a 

search of the vehicle. The Appellant verbally

consented. Trooper Colon then gave the Appellant a 

written Waiver of Rights Form that provided 

Trooper Colon written permission to search the 

vehicle. The Appellant signed the waiver.

The Trooper’s search of the vehicle yielded a 

Glock .40 caliber magazine containing eleven rounds 

of .40 caliber ammunition underneath the driver’s 

seat. In the center console, Trooper Colon found a 

black Glock .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun, in 

addition to an extended magazine containing thirty 

rounds of .40 caliber ammunition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Appellant was arrested on December 24, 2013 

after a motor vehicle stop conducted by the 

Pennsylvania State Police. The Appellant was 

arraigned in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware 

County, Pennsylvania on April 16, 2014 and charged 

with the aforementioned crimes.

On May 19, 2014, Michael J. Malloy, Esquire 

entered his appearance on behalf of the Appellant. 

Also on May 19, 2014, Appellant, through counsel, 

filed an “Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion[,”] seeking to 

suppress all physical evidence seized. A Suppression 

Hearing was held on July 25, 2014 and 

September 16, 2014. On October 15, 2014, an 

Order denying Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion 

was filed with detailed Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law.

On November 24, 2014, a Stipulated Non-Jury 

Trial commenced and on November 25, 2014, the 

court found the Appellant Guilty of Possession of a 

Firearm Prohibited, [and] Firearms Not to be Carried 

Without a License. On November 25, 2014, the 

Appellant was sentenced to: Count 1, Persons 
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Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm, 5 to 10 years 

SCI, no [R]RRI eligibility, provide a DNA sample, 

credit for the time period from 12/25/13 to 

11/25/14, SCI Chester is recommended, payment of 

court costs, forfeit the weapon for destruction; 

Count 2, Firearms Carried Without a License, 7 

years[’] state probation consecutive to Count 1 and 

payment of court costs. On December 4, 2014, the 

Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

On December 22, 2015, the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court affirmed the trial court in a 

Non-Precedential Decision docketed at No. 3495 EDA 

2014. There was no further appeal.

On January 19, 2016, the [Appellant] filed a 

pro se PCRA Petition. On January 21, 2016 it was 

dismissed, without prejudice, the court concluding 

that it was prematurely filed as Appellant’s direct 

appeal was still pending. Appellant filed his second, 

timely pro se PCRA petition on February 1, 2016. 

Mr. Scott Galloway, Esquire was appointed to 

represent the Appellant. On October 6, 2016, 

Mr. Galloway, Esquire, filed a “No Merit” Letter 

pursuant to Finley and Turner, infra.[2] On or 

about October 7, 2016, the court entered an Order 

permitting Mr. Galloway, Esquire, to withdraw from 

the case.

On October 19, 2016, the court issued a 

“Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition without a 

Hearing.” On October 21, 2016, the pro se

[Appellant] filed a Response to Counsel’s Finley

Letter, and on November 7, 2016 filed a pro se

response to the court’s Notice of Intention to 

Dismiss. On January 4, 2017, the court issued an 

Order denying PCRA relief.

On January 17, 2017, the Appellant filed a 

timely Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior 

 

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Court. The undersigned did not desire clarification of 

the errors complained of on appeal and as such, no 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order was entered. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

PCRA court opinion, 3/9/17 at 1-7 (citations to record omitted) (additional 

footnotes omitted).

Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:

A. Whether Appellant’s constitutional right to due 

process was violated when the PCRA court 

dismissed his petition as untimely filed?

B. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing 

to protect Appellant’s jury trial rights?

C. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing 

to file [a] Post Sentence Motion to reconsider 

the sentence?

D. Whether Appellant[’s] counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge the sufficiency of 

firearm possession?

E. Whether Appellant[’s] counsel was ineffective 

by filing an inadequate brief?

F. Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective in filing 

a no-merit letter when the pro se claims 

possessed merit?

G. Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing 

to investigate fraud on the Court?

Appellant’s brief at 3 (emphasis added).

“When reviewing an order [granting or] denying PCRA relief, we must 

determine whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 
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record and is free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 

A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a 

post-conviction petition is not absolute. 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 

(Pa.Super. 2001). It is within the PCRA court’s 

discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the 

petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no 

support either in the record or other evidence. Id. 

It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on 

appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA 

petition in light of the record certified before it in 

order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of 

material fact in controversy and in denying relief 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 454, 

701 A.2d 541, 542-543 (1997).

Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 882 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Khalifah, 852 A.2d 1238, 1239-1240 (Pa.Super. 2004).

To prevail on a claim that counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective, the appellant must 

overcome the presumption of competence by 

showing that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable 

merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued 

by counsel did not have some reasonable basis 

designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for 

counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the challenged 

proceeding would have been different. A failure to 

satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will 

require rejection of the claim.

Commonwealth v. Malloy, 856 A.2d 767, 781 (Pa. 2004) (citations 

omitted). “We presume counsel is effective and place upon Appellant the 
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burden of proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing 

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Poplawski, 852 A.2d at 327 

(citations omitted).

In his first issue on appeal, appellant claims that the PCRA court erred 

in dismissing his January 19, 2016 petition as untimely. (Appellant’s brief at 

8-9.) Appellant’s January 19, 2016 petition was not dismissed as untimely; 

rather, it was dismissed without prejudice as prematurely filed because the 

30-day period in which to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court from this court’s December 22, 2015 decision 

affirming the judgment of sentence had not yet expired. Subsequently, 

appellant filed a “petition to reinstate pro se PCRA petition” on February 1, 

2016, which was granted and counsel was appointed. (PCRA court opinion, 

3/9/17 at 6-7.)

In his second issue on appeal, appellant claims that trial counsel, 

Michael Malloy, Esq., was ineffective for failing to protect his right to a jury 

trial. According to appellant, Attorney Malloy did not properly advise him in 

connection with his waiver of his right to a jury trial. (Appellant’s brief at 

9-10.) Appellant argues that his jury waiver was invalid. (Id.) The record 

belies appellant’s claim.

On November 24, 2014, the trial court conducted an extensive waiver 

colloquy during which appellant repeatedly expressed his desire to waive his 

right to a jury trial and proceed with a stipulated non-jury trial. (Notes of 
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testimony, 11/24/14 at 4-28.) Appellant testified that Attorney Malloy had 

answered all of his questions and that the decision was his own. (Id. at 

26-27.) Appellant testified that he had thoroughly discussed the issue with 

Attorney Malloy and required no further consultation with counsel. (Id. at 5, 

25.) Appellant also executed a written jury waiver form which he reviewed 

with Attorney Malloy. (Id. at 19-20.) Appellant testified that no one had 

coerced or threatened him in any way. (Id. at 27.)

This issue is patently meritless. Appellant is bound by the statements 

he made during his waiver colloquy and cannot now obtain relief by 

contradicting those same statements. Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 

A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 693 A.2d 585 (Pa. 

1997); see also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 645 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa.Super. 

1994) (holding an appellant cannot obtain relief by claiming he lied during 

his waiver colloquy); Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 

(Pa.Super. 2002) (holding an appellant was not entitled to relief based on 

the claim that his attorney coerced him to plead guilty when he stated in his 

plea colloquy that he was not being forced or threatened).

Next, appellant argues that Attorney Malloy was ineffective for failing 

to file a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence. Appellant 

contends that the 5 to 10-year sentence imposed on Count 1, possession of 

firearms prohibited, was excessive and unduly harsh and that 

Attorney Malloy disregarded his request to file a motion for reconsideration. 
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(Appellant’s brief at 11-12.) As the PCRA court observed, the sentencing 

transcript indicates that the issue of filing a timely appeal was raised and 

Attorney Malloy stated that he would file an appeal on appellant’s behalf if 

appellant did not have other counsel within the 30-day appeal deadline. 

(PCRA court opinion, 3/9/17 at 12; notes of testimony, sentencing, 11/25/14 

at 16-17.) There is no record of any request by appellant to file a 

post-sentence motion for reconsideration. (Id.)

3

Furthermore, appellant cannot show how he was prejudiced by trial 

counsel’s alleged deficient performance. In Commonwealth v. Reaves, 

923 A.2d 1119, 1128-1129 (Pa. 2007), our supreme court held that 

counsel’s failure to file post-sentence motions at most “narrowed the ambit” 

of the subsequent appeal and did not constitute prejudice per se. 

Cf. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (failing to file a 

requested direct appeal denies the accused the assistance of counsel and the 

constitutional right to a direct appeal, and the accused is entitled to 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights). Rather, the petitioner must 

satisfy the three-prong actual prejudice standard. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 

1129.

Whether VOP [(violation of probation)] counsel can 

be deemed ineffective, then, depends upon whether 

appellee has proven that a motion to reconsider 

 

3 We acknowledge that appellant did file an untimely pro se motion for 

sentencing reconsideration which was denied on December 10, 2014, on the 

basis of untimeliness and also because appellant had counsel. (Docket 

#27.)
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sentence, if filed . . . would have led to a different 

and more favorable outcome at VOP sentencing. In 

this context, the only way the proceeding would have 

been more favorable would be if counsel’s objection 

secured a reduction in the sentence.

Id. at 1131-1132. Ultimately, the Reaves court found that the petitioner 

failed to prove actual prejudice where the PCRA judge, who was the same 

judge who initially sentenced the petitioner and then revoked probation and 

imposed the VOP sentence, made clear during PCRA proceedings that he 

would have imposed the same sentence. Id. at 1132.

Here, there is nothing to support a contention that filing a motion for 

reconsideration would have resulted in a reduced sentence. Appellant 

received a probationary sentence on Count 2, firearms not to be carried 

without a license, and his sentence on Count 1, possession of firearms 

prohibited, appeared to be a guideline sentence. (Notes of testimony, 

11/25/14 at 11-13.) Therefore, appellant has failed to demonstrate actual 

prejudice.

In his fourth issue on appeal, appellant claims that direct appeal 

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support the firearms convictions. (Appellant’s brief at 13-19.) However, 

appellant’s entire argument relates to the suppression issue. (Id.) 

Appellant argues that Trooper Colon did not have reasonable suspicion for an 

investigative detention or articulable suspicion that appellant was armed and 

dangerous justifying a search. (Id.) In fact, the suppression issue was fully 
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litigated in the court below, and this court addressed it on appeal. This 

claim fails.

Next, appellant complains that direct appeal counsel filed an 

inadequate brief, resulting in waiver of certain issues. (Id. at 19.) 

However, appellant does not set forth what particular issues were waived or 

why they had merit and would have compelled a different result on appeal. 

(Id.) From our review of this court’s December 22, 2015 memorandum, the 

only issue that was waived was issue three. Commonwealth v. Williams, 

No. 3495 EDA 2014, unpublished memorandum at 5 n.6 (Pa.Super. filed 

Dec. 22, 2015).4 This issue was not addressed in appellant’s brief and was 

deemed to have been abandoned on appeal. Id. However, appellant did 

not contest the validity of the initial traffic stop where his registration was 

expired and it was undisputed that appellant gave Trooper Colon both verbal 

and written consent to search his vehicle. Although this court did note that 

appellant failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), we still addressed the 

primary issues on appeal on the merits, i.e., whether Trooper Colon had 

reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigation and re-engage 

appellant after the initial encounter had concluded, and whether he was 

illegally detained after having been told he was free to leave. Id. at 5 n.7. 

A unanimous panel of this court concluded that based upon the totality of 

 

4

“Did [sic] trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion to Suppress when 

after an illegal and unlawful seizure and detention of [A]ppellant, [A]ppellant 

was searched?” Id. at 5 (brackets in original).
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the circumstances, Trooper Colon had reasonable suspicion to justify the 

search of appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 12-13. Therefore, appellant has failed 

to show how he was prejudiced by direct appeal counsel’s allegedly 

inadequate brief. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1226 (Pa. 

2009) (“the filing of an appellate brief, deficient in some aspect or another, 

does not constitute a complete failure to function as a client’s advocate so as 

to warrant a presumption of prejudice under [U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 

(1984)].”).

Next, appellant complains that PCRA counsel, Attorney Galloway, was 

ineffective for filing a petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley no-merit letter 

instead of an amended PCRA petition on appellant’s behalf. (Appellant’s 

brief at 20-23.) Appellant insists that the issues raised in his petition had 

merit and warranted PCRA relief. (Id.)

5

 For the reasons already discussed 

supra, we disagree. In petitioning to withdraw, Attorney Galloway complied 

with Turner/Finley practice, and the issues raised in appellant’s pro se

PCRA petition were entirely frivolous and without merit. Counsel complied 

with the requirements for withdrawal as set forth in Turner/Finley, and the 

PCRA court determined that there were no potentially meritorious issues 

 

5 This allegation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness was raised in appellant’s 

pro se response to Rule 907 notice. As such, it is preserved for appeal. 

(“Answer to court’s notice of intention to dismiss,” 11/7/16 at 9-10; Docket 

#11.) Cf. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009) (an appellant 

cannot raise allegations of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness for the first time on 

appeal and is required to raise them within 20 days following Rule 907 

notice).
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which could be raised in a counseled amended PCRA petition. (See

“application to withdraw appearance,” 10/6/16, Docket #8; Rule 907 notice, 

10/19/16, Docket #10.)

Finally, appellant argues that Attorney Malloy perpetrated a “fraud on 

the court” when he conceded that the vehicle stop and subsequent search 

were lawful. (Appellant’s brief at 25.) Appellant then argues that the 

prosecuting attorney also “lied by omission to the Court” when he failed to 

correct Attorney Malloy’s purported misrepresentations. (Id. at 25-26.) 

Appellant also claims that a video of the traffic stop would have revealed 

that a second trooper, not Trooper Colon, discovered the firearm. (Id. at 

26.) In his brief, appellant couches this issue in terms of PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to investigate the claim. (Id. at 23.)

It is difficult to discern the nature of appellant’s argument. First, it 

does not appear that this argument was raised in appellant’s pro se petition 

and therefore it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 

1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“It is well-settled that issues not raised in a PCRA 

petition cannot be considered on appeal.” (quotation marks and citations 

omitted)); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). While appellant did raise it in his pro se

response to Rule 907 notice, he did not request to amend his petition to 

include the issue. (Docket #11, “Answer to court’s notice of intention to 

dismiss,” 11/7/16 at 6-7.) Appellant only requested an evidentiary hearing. 

See Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa.Super. 2014) 
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(“Where the petitioner does not seek leave to amend his petition after 

counsel has filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, the PCRA court is under 

no obligation to address new issues.”), citing Commonwealth v. Rykard, 

55 A.3d 1177, 1192 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 

2013) (a petitioner must request leave to amend his petition in his Rule 907 

response to raise new trial counsel ineffectiveness claims); Commonwealth 

v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1191 (Pa. 1999) (a response to Rule 907 

notice is not, itself, considered a serial petition and the raising of a new 

(non-PCRA counsel ineffectiveness) claim after the PCRA court has issued 

notice of dismissal still requires a PCRA court to grant the petitioner leave to 

amend his petition). Since appellant did not seek permission to amend his 

petition to raise this new claim, the PCRA court was not required to address 

the issue and it did not. Therefore, appellant's final claim does not entitle 

him to relief. Rykard, 55 A.3d at 1192.6

Order affirmed.

 

6 To the extent appellant attempted to layer the issue as a PCRA counsel 

ineffectiveness claim for failure to raise it in an amended petition, it clearly 

lacks merit. The suppression matter was fully litigated. As discussed above, 

there was no dispute that the initial traffic stop was lawful and that appellant 

gave both verbal and written consent to search his vehicle. The only issue 

was whether Trooper Colon had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 

after the initial investigation into the Vehicle Code violations was concluded 

and appellant was told he was free to leave, to re-engage appellant and 

detain him for further questioning. In addition, the MVR of Trooper Colon’s 

interaction with appellant was played for the trial court, and appellant 

presents no evidence that a different trooper recovered the firearm. (Notes 

of testimony, 7/25/14 at 21-34; Commonwealth Exhibit CS-1.) 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/18/2017