Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NNSA and DOD Need 

to More Effectively 

Manage the Stockpile 

Life Extension 

Program 

March 2009 

GAO-09-385 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the 

Stockpile Life Extension Program 

Highlights of GAO-09-385, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

As a separately organized agency

within the Department of Energy, 

the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) administers 

the Stockpile Life Extension 

Program, whose purpose is to

extend, through refurbishment, the 

operational lives of the weapons in

the nuclear stockpile. NNSA 

encountered significant 

management problems with its first 

refurbishment for the W87 

warhead. GAO was asked to assess 

the extent to which NNSA and the

Department of Defense (DOD) 

have effectively managed the 

refurbishment of two other

weapons—the B61 bomb and the 

W76 warhead. 

This report summarizes the 

findings of GAO’s classified report 

on the refurbishment of the B61 

bomb and W76 warhead 

(GAO-09-152C). 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA and 

DOD take several actions to

improve the management of the life 

extension program, including,

among other things, (1) developing

and using consistent budget 

assumptions and criteria for the 

baseline to track costs over time, 

(2) comprehensively reviewing 

military requirements for a

weapons system before beginning a 

life extension program, and (3) 

assessing the cost and schedule 

implications for meeting each

military requirement. NNSA and 

DOD generally agreed with GAO’s

recommendations. 

NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical 

risks for either the B61 or W76 life extension program. Regarding the B61 

program, although NNSA completed the refurbishment of the strategic 

variants of the B61 bomb—the Mods 7 and 11—on schedule in November 

2008, the refurbished weapons do not meet all refurbishment objectives. 

According to NNSA and DOD officials, NNSA established an unrealistic 

schedule and failed to fully implement its refurbishment guidance, known as 

the Phase 6.X process. NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule 

and avoid significant cost overruns for the B61 program only because (1) 

some of the refurbishment objectives were changed, (2) NNSA was able to 

reuse, rather than manufacture, a critical component when B61 bombs were 

decommissioned, and (3) the Nuclear Weapons Council significantly reduced 

the number of B61 bombs in the stockpile. Despite DOD concerns about the 

adequacy of NNSA testing of the B61 bombs under certain conditions, NNSA 

continued refurbishing the weapons. Some of the B61 refurbishment 

problems could have been avoided if DOD had fulfilled its roles and 

responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life extension program activities. For 

example, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA’s design, engineering,

and testing activities—a review that would have alerted DOD that NNSA was 

missing some of its refurbishment objectives. 

Regarding the W76 program, NNSA did not effectively manage a high risk 

associated with manufacturing an essential material, known as Fogbank, 

needed to refurbish the W76 warhead. NNSA had developed a risk mitigation 

strategy to avoid potential cost overruns and schedule delays related to the 

manufacture of this key material but failed to effectively implement this 

strategy. As a result, NNSA’s original plans to produce the first refurbished 

W76 weapon in September 2007 slipped to September 2008; NNSA spent $69 

million to address Fogbank production problems; and the Navy faced 

logistical challenges owing to the delay. Furthermore, NNSA did not have a

consistent approach to developing a cost baseline for the W76 program, which 

makes it difficult to track refurbishment costs over time and to know the 

actual cost of the program. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-385.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-6870 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 7

NNSA Met the B61 Program Schedule, but Did Not Meet All 

Refurbishment Objectives 11 

NNSA Did Not Adequately Address One of the Highest Risks to the 

W76 Program, Which Led to Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, 

and an Unrealistic Production Schedule 15 

Conclusions 21

Recommendations 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 

Appendix I Comments from the National Nuclear Security 

Administration 26 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30 

Figures 

Figure 1: Life Extension Program Refurbishment Process for B61 

Bombs and W76 Warheads 9 

Figure 2: W76 Cost Baseline 20 

Page i GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NWC Nuclear Weapons Council 

NWCSSC Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee 

STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 2, 2009

The Honorable Ellen Tauscher 

Chairman 

The Honorable Michael Turner 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ellen Tauscher 

Chairman 

The Honorable Michael Turner 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation’s defense strategy. 

However, the end of the Cold War caused a dramatic shift in how the 

nation maintains these weapons. Instead of designing, testing, and 

producing new nuclear weapons, the strategy has shifted to maintaining 

the existing nuclear weapons stockpile indefinitely. To implement this 

strategy, in January 1996, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the

Stockpile Life Extension Program (life extension program). Now 

administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 

which is a separately organized agency within DOE, this program is 

designed to extend the weapons’ operational life for an additional 20 to 30 

years and to certify the weapons’ military performance requirements 

without underground nuclear testing. As the weapons age, however, 

certain nuclear weapons components must be replaced or they will begin

to undermine the reliability and performance of the weapon. While NNSA 

does not have complete cost data on the life extension program, it 

estimates that it spent approximately $2.1 billion on program activities 

from fiscal years 2003 to 2008. 

Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation’s defense strategy. 

However, the end of the Cold War caused a dramatic shift in how the 

nation maintains these weapons. Instead of designing, testing, and 

producing new nuclear weapons, the strategy has shifted to maintaining 

the existing nuclear weapons stockpile indefinitely. To implement this 

strategy, in January 1996, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the

Stockpile Life Extension Program (life extension program). Now 

administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 

which is a separately organized agency within DOE, this program is 

designed to extend the weapons’ operational life for an additional 20 to 30 

years and to certify the weapons’ military performance requirements 

without underground nuclear testing. As the weapons age, however, 

certain nuclear weapons components must be replaced or they will begin

to undermine the reliability and performance of the weapon. While NNSA 

does not have complete cost data on the life extension program, it 

estimates that it spent approximately $2.1 billion on program activities 

from fiscal years 2003 to 2008. 

Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Programs is responsible for 

administering the life extension program. For those nuclear weapons that 

are refurbished, this office oversees the activities of the design

laboratories and production facilities that (1) determine which 

components, such as the nuclear explosives package, will need 

refurbishment to extend each weapon’s life; (2) design and produce the 

necessary components; (3) install the components in the weapons; and 

(4) certify that the changes do not adversely affect the yield, safety, and 

reliability of the weapons. Because research and development is needed to 

refurbish the nuclear weapons, the life extension program requires a 

coordinated effort among NNSA’s three design laboratories and four 

production facilities—collectively known as the nation’s nuclear weapons 

complex. NNSA also coordinates its life extension activities with the 

Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Programs is responsible for 

administering the life extension program. For those nuclear weapons that 

are refurbished, this office oversees the activities of the design

laboratories and production facilities that (1) determine which 

components, such as the nuclear explosives package, will need 

refurbishment to extend each weapon’s life; (2) design and produce the 

necessary components; (3) install the components in the weapons; and 

(4) certify that the changes do not adversely affect the yield, safety, and 

reliability of the weapons. Because research and development is needed to 

refurbish the nuclear weapons, the life extension program requires a 

coordinated effort among NNSA’s three design laboratories and four 

production facilities—collectively known as the nation’s nuclear weapons 

complex. NNSA also coordinates its life extension activities with the 

Page 1 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that refurbished weapons meet 

all military performance requirements. 

NNSA manages the refurbishment of nuclear warheads and bombs 

according to a process called Phase 6.X, which was jointly developed with 

DOD in 2000. NNSA’s process consists of seven steps, which involve,

among other things, establishing a cost and schedule baseline; conducting

experiments, tests, and analyses to validate design options and assess 

production capabilities; preparing production facilities for manufacturing 

parts and components; and entering full-scale production of refurbished 

weapons. In addition, under the Phase 6.X process, DOD, including the 

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), is responsible for developing,

reviewing, and updating the military requirements that specify the 

performance characteristics for each warhead type and the environments 

in which the warhead must perform or remain safe. As NNSA designs the 

warhead or bomb and conducts tests to ensure that they meet these 

requirements, DOD reviews NNSA’s actions in each phase of the 

refurbishment. NNSA plans to use this same management process for the 

design of a new warhead, known as the reliable replacement warhead, 

which NNSA states is a way to replace the nation’s aging stockpile with 

warheads that are safer, provide longer-term reliability, and are less 

expensive to maintain than those currently in the stockpile. 

In December 2000, we reported that the W87 warhead, which was 

designed to be carried on the land-based Peacekeeper missile,1

 had 

experienced significant design and production problems that increased its

refurbishment costs by over $300 million and caused schedule delays of 

about 2 years.2

 As we reported, at the heart of many of the problems that 

contributed to this outcome were an inadequate Office of Defense 

Programs management process and unclear leadership, which prevented

the Office from adequately anticipating and mitigating the problems that 

arose. In 2005, NNSA completed the refurbishment of the W87. This was 

the first weapon to be refurbished under the life extension program. 

 1

With the decommissioning of the Peacekeeper missiles, a large fraction of the W87

warheads are now mounted on Minuteman III missiles. 

2

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Implement Stockpile 

Stewardship Program Effectively, GAO-01-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2000). 

Page 2 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

In a follow-up study in July 2003,3 we reported that NNSA had not 

adequately addressed the budgetary, cost accounting, and other 

management issues that contributed to problems with the W87 as it began

research and development activities for refurbishing the B61 bomb and 

W76 warhead. As of December 15, 2008, two nuclear weapons were being 

refurbished—the B61 bomb and the W76 warhead. The B61 bomb is 

designed to be carried on the B-52 or B-2 bomber by the Air Force. There 

are two different types of strategic B61 bombs—the Mod 7 and the Mod 11. 

The Mod 11 is used exclusively as an earth penetrator in free-fall mode to 

destroy deeply buried targets. NNSA began refurbishment production in 

June 2006 for the Mod 7 and January 2007 for the Mod 11 and completed 

production for both weapons in November 2008. In addition to the 

strategic variants of the B61, the Air Force maintains tactical B61 bombs—

the Mods 3, 4, and 10. Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent 

references to the B61 bomb in this report refer to the strategic variants—

the Mods 7 and 11. The W76 is a submarine-launched warhead and the 

refurbished W76 will be carried on the Trident II missile by the Navy. The 

first refurbished W76 warhead was completed in September 2008. The W76 

warhead is a significant part of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. 

NNSA has continued to face management challenges during the 

refurbishment of the B61 bomb and W76 warhead. Specifically, while the 

refurbished B61 entered full-scale production in 2006, NNSA still had not 

met all its refurbishment objectives. In addition, the W76 warhead faced a

schedule delay and cost overruns related to manufacturing problems with 

a critical material used in the W76.

In this context, you asked us to determine the extent to which NNSA and 

DOD have effectively managed the B61 and W76 life extension programs. 

While NNSA has faced numerous technical challenges in refurbishing the 

B61 bomb and W76 warhead, this report focuses on two of the most 

significant technical challenges that have had an impact on cost, schedule, 

and meeting refurbishment objectives—the decision to reuse or 

manufacture a new material for a critical component in the B61 bomb and 

the manufacture of Fogbank for the W76. In January 2009, we reported to

you on the results of our work in a classified report.4

 Subsequently, we 

 3

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Budgeting, Cost Accounting, 

and Management Associated with the Stockpile Life Extension Program, GAO-03-583 

(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2003). 

4

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the Stockpile 

Life Extension Program, GAO-09-152C (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2009).

Page 3 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

worked with NNSA and DOD to produce an unclassified version of our 

report. This report summarizes the results of our classified report. 

To assess the extent to which NNSA and DOD have effectively managed

the B61 and W76 life extension programs, we first analyzed NNSA’s 

congressional budget requests, project plans, and acquisition reports to 

determine whether the life extension activities for the B61 bomb and W76

warhead were within budget or facing cost overruns. We then reviewed 

NNSA’s project plans for the B61 bomb and W76 warhead, life extension 

guidance documents, risk management practices, briefing slides, and 

strategic weapons directives to determine whether NNSA reached critical

milestones on time. To assess the technical challenges NNSA was facing in

refurbishing the B61 bomb and W76 warhead and the steps it was taking to

minimize technical risk, we interviewed officials from the Office of 

Defense Programs at DOE in Washington, D.C.; the nuclear weapons 

design laboratories, including Lawrence Livermore (LLNL) in California 

and Los Alamos (LANL) and Sandia in New Mexico; and the weapons 

production plants, including Y-12 in Tennessee, Pantex in Texas, and 

Kansas City in Missouri. We also interviewed officials from the 

Departments of the Air Force and the Navy, STRATCOM, and the Nuclear

Weapons Council to determine NNSA’s ability to meet military 

performance requirements for the B61 bomb and W76 warhead and the 

impact of any schedule delays on DOD’s mission requirements. Finally, we

toured the Y-12, Pantex, and Kansas City plants to observe the 

manufacturing processes for nuclear and non-nuclear components for the 

B61 bomb and W76 warhead. To assess the extent to which DOD fulfilled 

its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life extension activities, 

we reviewed guidance documents and project plans to determine DOD’s 

roles and responsibilities. We also interviewed officials from NNSA, the 

Departments of the Air Force and the Navy, STRATCOM, and the Nuclear

Weapons Council to determine how effective communication has been 

between DOD and NNSA and who has authority to make decisions, such 

as proceeding with full-scale production. 

We conducted the work for the classified report between December 2007 

and January 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards, and we conducted our work for the unclassified report 

between January 2009 and February 2009. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

Page 4 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and 

technical risks for either the B61 or W76 life extension program. Regarding 

the B61 program, although NNSA completed the refurbishment of the B61 

bombs on schedule in November 2008, the refurbished weapons do not 

meet all refurbishment objectives. According to DOD and NNSA 

laboratory and production plant officials, NNSA established an unrealistic 

schedule and failed to fully implement its Phase 6.X process. To meet an 

aggressive production schedule, NNSA adopted a modified Phase 6.X 

process that compressed and overlapped the development and production 

engineering phases, leaving little time to develop and manufacture critical

materials and evaluate test results before full-scale production. In 

addition, NNSA did not include any cost or schedule contingencies in its 

baseline to address unforeseen technical challenges. NNSA assumed that it 

would not need time for development and production engineering because 

it would reuse, rather than manufacture, critical materials. Before fully 

determining whether a critical material could be reused for the B61 bomb,

NNSA developed a production schedule with fixed delivery dates. 

However, after additional tests showed that NNSA could not reuse this 

material, NNSA decided to develop an alternative material, which led to an

$11 million cost overrun. When NNSA was unable to produce this 

substitute, it faced significant schedule delays and additional cost 

overruns. 

Results in Brief 

NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid significant

cost overruns for the B61 bomb only because (1) some of the 

refurbishment objectives changed, thereby allowing NNSA to use the 

original material in the weapon design, (2) tactical B61 bombs that were 

decommissioned had material that NNSA could use, and (3) the Nuclear

Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the 

stockpile and thus the number that NNSA had to refurbish. Even though

these events allowed NNSA to meet its schedule, it refurbished less than 

one-third of the weapons in the original baseline for almost twice the unit 

cost. The cost of manufacturing each B61 bomb almost doubled. 

Furthermore, the refurbished B61 bombs still do not meet all of the 

refurbishment objectives. 

Many of the B61 refurbishment problems might have been avoided if DOD 

had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life 

extension program activities. First, STRATCOM did not comprehensively 

review military requirements for the B61 bomb before NNSA started 

refurbishment activities, which might have avoided unnecessary testing 

and manufacturing of the alternative material. Second, the Air Force did 

not adequately review NNSA’s design, engineering, and testing activities—

Page 5 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

a review that would have alerted DOD that NNSA was not meeting all 

refurbishment objectives. According to Air Force officials, the Lead 

Project Officer failed to provide the necessary oversight and alert the Air 

Force to changes in testing that NNSA conducted of refurbished B61 

bombs. 

Regarding the W76 warhead, NNSA did not effectively manage one of the 

highest risks of the program—the manufacture of a key material known as 

Fogbank—resulting in $69 million in cost overruns and a schedule delay of 

at least 1 year that presented significant logistical challenges for the Navy. 

Recognizing that the manufacture of Fogbank was one of the highest risks 

to the program and that it lacked the knowledge, expertise, and facilities 

to manufacture Fogbank, NNSA developed a risk mitigation strategy. This 

strategy included three primary components: (1) build a new Fogbank 

production facility early enough to allow time to resolve any 

manufacturing problems before starting full production; (2) use the 

existing pilot plant to test the Fogbank manufacturing process while the 

new facility was under construction; and (3) consider the development of 

an alternate material for Fogbank. However, NNSA started operations of 

the new facility about 1 year late because the schedule for constructing the 

new facility was unrealistic, disagreements on the implementation of 

safety guidelines emerged, and the W76 program manager lacked authority 

to manage the construction schedule. In addition, NNSA did not use the 

pilot plant as planned, missing opportunities to improve the manufacturing 

process before full-scale production began. Finally, NNSA did not develop 

an alternate material that was less costly and easier to produce than 

Fogbank until a late stage. If NNSA had effectively implemented its risk 

management strategy, schedule delays and cost increases might have been

avoided. Compounding these problems, NNSA did not have a consistent 

approach for developing a cost baseline for the W76 life extension 

program. The lack of a consistent baseline approach with similar cost 

assumptions and criteria makes it difficult to know the actual cost of 

refurbishing nuclear bombs and warheads and to track the costs of the 

program over time. 

To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, in 

our classified January 2009 report, we recommended, among other things,

that the Administrator of NNSA direct the Deputy Administrator for 

Defense Programs to develop a realistic schedule for the W76 and future 

life extension programs. This schedule should allow NNSA to (1) address 

technical challenges while meeting all military requirements; (2) build in 

time for unexpected technical challenges that may delay the program; (3) 

assess the cost and include funding in the baseline for risk mitigation 

Page 6 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

activities that address the highest risks to the W76 and future life 

extension programs; and (4) before beginning a life extension program, 

assess the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for each military requirement 

established by DOD. 

To improve DOD’s oversight over NNSA’s life extension activities and 

ensure that refurbished weapons meet all military requirements, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct (1) STRATCOM and the 

Secretary of the responsible service to comprehensively review military 

requirements for a weapons system before beginning a life extension 

program and work with NNSA to assess the cost and schedule 

implications for meeting each military requirement, and (2) the Secretaries 

of the Air Force and the Navy to ensure that the respective Lead Project 

Officers have the technical and managerial expertise and resources to 

review NNSA’s progress and technical challenges throughout the life 

extension program. 

We provided a draft of our classified report to NNSA and DOD for their 

review and comment. As discussed in our classified report, NNSA agreed 

with our recommendations and plans to take a number of steps to 

implement them. DOD partially agreed with our recommendations. DOD 

agreed with our two recommendations directed at the department, but 

asked us to make modifications to the language of the recommendations 

to better target the responsible service or agency that has authority to 

implement them. We made the requested changes. NNSA and DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

The nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile remains a cornerstone of U.S. 

national security policy. As a result of changes in arms control, arms 

reduction, and nonproliferation policies, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994 required that DOE develop a 

science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the stockpile 

without nuclear testing.5

 After this program was established, DOE, in 

January 1996, initiated the Stockpile Life Extension Program. The purpose 

of this program is to develop a standard approach for planning nuclear 

weapons refurbishment activities so that the nuclear weapons complex 

can extend the operational lives of the weapons in the stockpile by 

another 20 to 30 years. 

Background 

 5

Pub. L. No. 103-160, section 3138, 107 Stat. 1547, 1946. 

Page 7 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Programs is responsible for the 

warheads and bombs in the stockpile. This responsibility encompasses 

many different tasks, including the manufacture, maintenance, 

refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement of weapons in the 

stockpile; activities associated with the research, design, development, 

simulation, modeling, and nonnuclear testing of nuclear weapons; and the 

planning, assessment, and certification of the weapons’ safety and 

reliability. A national complex of nuclear weapons design laboratories and 

production facilities carries out the Office of Defense Programs’ mission. 

Three national laboratories in this complex design nuclear weapons: 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los Alamos 

National Laboratory in New Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories in 

New Mexico and California. 

For the B61 and W76 life extension programs, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory is responsible for designing and developing these weapons’ 

nuclear explosives package. Sandia National Laboratories design nonnuclear components, such as arming, fuzing, and firing systems, foams, 

and electrical cables, and test the weapons’ non-nuclear components to 

certify safety and reliability. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

peer reviews design and production activities. Los Alamos and Sandia 

National Laboratories work closely with the production plants to ensure 

that components meet design specifications. The complex’s four 

production sites include the Y-12 National Security Complex plant in 

Tennessee, the Kansas City Plant in Missouri, the Savannah River Site 

plant in South Carolina, and the Pantex Plant in Texas. The Y-12 plant 

manufactures critical nuclear components, such as parts made from 

enriched uranium, for the nuclear explosives package. The Kansas City 

plant produces and procures nonnuclear parts and electronic components 

and manufactures the new arming, fuzing, and firing system for the W76 

warhead. The Savannah River Site plant fills gas bottles it receives from 

Kansas City with tritium and deuterium, which are used to facilitate the 

nuclear explosion. Last, the Pantex plant assembles all components 

supplied by other production plants to produce a weapon for the 

stockpile. See figure 1 for a summary of this process. 

Page 8 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

Figure 1: Life Extension Program Refurbishment Process for B61 Bombs and W76 Warheads 

Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory

Los Alamos

National Laboratory

Y-12 Plant

Sandia

National Laboratories Pantex Plant

Savannah

River Plant

Kansas City

Plant

Independent 

peer reviews of 

Los Almos’ 

weapons design 

and its ability to 

meet military 

requirements

Designs nuclear 

components for 

the B61 and W76

Manufactures

nuclear 

components and 

materials

essential for the 

functioning of the 

weapon

Manufactures

non-nuclear 

components, such 

as foams, pads, 

electrical wires, 

and gas canisters

Fills canisters

with a gas that 

aids in the 

nuclear explosion

Assembles all 

parts to build a

refurbished 

weapon

Air Force

Receives

refurbished B61 

bombs ready for 

deployment

Navy

Receives

refurbished W76 

warheads ready 

for deployment

Designs

non-nuclear 

components for 

the B61 and W76

Design laboratories Production plants Nuclear weapons

stockpile

Sources: GAO and Clip Art.

An end to underground nuclear testing in 1992 in the United States 

suspended the development of weapons with new, untested designs. This

Page 9 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

suspension created a shift away from the strategy of replacing older 

warheads with newer designs to a new strategy of retaining and 

refurbishing previously produced warheads indefinitely, without nuclear 

testing, and with no plans to replace the weapons. To manage this new 

strategy of refurbishing nuclear weapons, NNSA uses a process called 

Phase 6.X, which it jointly developed with DOD. This process consists of 

the following elements: 

• Phase 6.1, concept assessment—conducting studies to provide planning

guidance and to develop information so that a decision can be made on 

whether or not to proceed to phase 6.2. 

• Phase 6.2, feasibility study—developing design options and studying their 

feasibility. 

• Phase 6.2A, design definition and cost study—completing definition of 

selected design option(s) from phase 6.2 and determining the cost of 

pursuing the design option(s). 

• Phase 6.3, development engineering—conducting experiments, tests, and 

analyses to validate the design option and assess its potential for 

production.

• Phase 6.4, production engineering—making a strong commitment of 

resources to the production facilities to prepare for stockpile production.

• Phase 6.5, first production—producing a limited number of refurbished 

weapons and then disassembling and examining some of them for final 

qualification of the production process. 

• Phase 6.6, full-scale production—ramping up to full production rates at 

required levels. 

DOD oversees NNSA’s refurbishment activities through the military 

services’ Lead Project Officer and the Nuclear Weapons Council’s Standing

and Safety Committee. The Air Force or the Navy appoint a Lead Project 

Officer to provide day-to-day oversight over NNSA’s activities. The Lead 

Project Officer meets regularly with officials from NNSA, the national 

laboratories, and production facilities to monitor progress and understand 

the technical challenges. The Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and 

Safety Committee (NWCSSC) advises and assists the Nuclear Weapons 

Council, which provides policy guidance and oversight of nuclear weapons 

stockpile activities and is required to report regularly to the President on 

the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile. Representatives from the 

Page 10 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

following organizations make up the NWCSSC: NNSA; the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; the 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological

Programs; the Joint Staff; STRATCOM; the Army; the Navy; the Air Force;

and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. According to DOD officials, the 

Lead Project Officer regularly updates the NWCSSC on the status of 

refurbishment activities and proposes recommendations to the NWCSSC 

on whether NNSA should proceed to the next phase. NNSA needs 

approval from the NWC to proceed to Phases 6.2, 6.3, and 6.6.

As of December 15, 2008, two nuclear weapons were undergoing phase 6.X 

refurbishment activities. The W76 warhead was in phase 6.5, first 

production unit, and the B61 bomb was in phase 6.6, full-scale production.6

NNSA originally planned to refurbish the W80 warhead and began phase

6.3, development engineering, but in 2007, NNSA cancelled refurbishment 

activities for the W80 warhead because DOD planned to reduce the 

number of W80 warheads in the nuclear stockpile. While complete cost 

data on the W80 warhead do not exist, NNSA spent about $480 million 

from fiscal years 2003 to 2007 on refurbishment activities for it. 

NNSA completed the refurbishment of the B61 bomb on schedule in 

November 2008. However, according to NNSA and DOD officials, NNSA 

was not able to meet all the refurbishment objectives because it 

established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its Phase 

6.X process. NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid

significant cost overruns for the B61 only because (1) DOD changed some 

of the refurbishment objectives, (2) NNSA was able to reuse, rather than 

manufacture, a critical component for the B61, and (3) the Nuclear 

Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the 

stockpile. However, the refurbished B61 bombs still do not meet all 

refurbishment objectives. Some of the B61 refurbishment problems could 

have been avoided if DOD had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in 

overseeing NNSA’s life extension program activities. 

NNSA Met the B61 

Program Schedule, 

but Did Not Meet All 

Refurbishment 

Objectives 

 6

Currently, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of eight types of bombs and missile 

warheads, numbering in the thousands, which are either stored at strategic military 

locations or deployed on military aircraft, missiles, or submarines. 

Page 11 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

Since parts of the B61 bomb were beginning to age, NNSA proposed, in 

1999, to refurbish the first B61 by September 2004, with full-scale 

production ending in 2008. However, an NNSA study completed in 2001 by

the national laboratories and production facilities found that they could 

not meet the September 2004 date given the requirements, production 

capabilities, risk assessments, and Phase 6.X guidelines. Instead, the 

national laboratories and production facilities concluded that they would 

need until September 2008—4 years later than the September 2004 date

proposed by NNSA—to refurbish the first weapon. This proposed 

schedule was considered low risk because it allowed NNSA to follow the 

steps in the Phase 6.X process and included contingencies to address 

technical challenges. NNSA did not approve this schedule, however. It was 

concerned that the proposed production schedule for the B61 bomb would 

conflict with the refurbishment of the W76 warhead, which was originally 

scheduled for September 2007 and considered a DOD priority. NNSA 

wanted to complete production of the refurbished B61 bomb before 

beginning full-scale production of the W76 warhead because the 

production facilities, such as the Y-12 plant, had limited capacity. To allow

the national laboratories and production facilities more time for design, 

engineering, and production activities while avoiding conflicts with the 

W76 life extension program, NNSA set a June 2006 date for the first 

refurbished B61 bomb. 

To meet this more aggressive and, as stated in NNSA’s program plan, 

“success-oriented” schedule, NNSA adopted a modified Phase 6.X process 

that compressed and overlapped the development engineering and 

production engineering phases, leaving little time to conduct the 

experiments, tests, and analyses needed to validate design options and to

certify that production facilities that manufacture and assemble parts 

could meet design requirements. NNSA assumed that it would not need 

time for development and production engineering because it would reuse 

rather than manufacture critical materials—one of the most critical of 

which was a plastic. Before fully determining whether the plastic could be 

reused, NNSA developed a production schedule with fixed delivery dates.

However, additional tests showed that NNSA could not reuse this material 

because it did not function properly under certain conditions. NNSA 

therefore decided to develop an alternative material with superior 

properties that would work under all conditions. Since NNSA did not 

include any cost or schedule contingencies in its baseline to address 

unforeseen technical challenges, development work on an alternative 

material posed a significant risk to meeting the program’s milestones and 

added $11 million to the program’s cost. NNSA was unable to produce a 

substitute that could retain the shape needed for the B61 bomb and would

NNSA’s Aggressive 

Schedule Did Not Leave 

Time to Address 

Significant Technical 

Challenges and Increased 

Costs 

Page 12 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

perform under all delivery conditions. NNSA’s effort to manufacture this 

alternative material resulted in significant schedule delays and cost 

overruns. 

In addition to a lack of sufficient time for development and production 

engineering work, NNSA’s B61 life extension program schedule did not 

include contingencies for testing failures. NNSA assumed that modeling 

and computational analysis would be sufficient to properly design a 

component and a physical test of the design would be successful, avoiding 

the need for follow-up tests. If a test revealed a problem with the design, 

NNSA would have had to conduct additional tests or change the design, 

which would have potentially increased cost and delayed the program. 

As it turned out, NNSA’s tests were not all successful, and the Air Force 

and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory peer reviewers 

recommended delaying production and conducting additional tests to test 

the refurbished weapon. Nevertheless, NNSA proceeded with full-scale 

production to meet its schedule milestones. The Air Force’s most 

significant concern was that the testing of refurbished B61 bombs deviated

substantially from the original testing plan that NNSA designed and DOD 

approved. NNSA subsequently conducted follow-on tests to address Air 

Force concerns. 

NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule for the B61 only

because the following occurred: 

A Reduction in the 

Stockpile Allowed 

NNSA to Meet Its B61 

Refurbishment Schedule, 

but It Did Not Achieve 

All Refurbishment 

Objectives 

• NNSA sought and received a change in refurbishment objectives. In 

response to NNSA’s request, STRATCOM, which is responsible for 

developing and reviewing military mission requirements, reviewed the 

military needs for the B61. After STRATCOM reviewed its needs, NNSA 

was then able to abandon its attempt to develop an alternative material, 

which it could not successfully manufacture to meet requirements, and 

was able to reuse the original material in the B61 bomb. 

• Dismantlement of decommissioned B61 bombs allowed NNSA to obtain 

the necessary material for the refurbished B61 bombs. Even though 

NNSA abandoned its attempt to develop an alternative material after 

refurbishment objectives changed, it still did not have the material it 

needed because NNSA no longer manufactured it. However, NNSA found 

material it could use in refurbished B61 bombs when it began dismantling 

Page 13 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

tactical B61 bombs.7 As a result, NNSA was able to extract the material, 

which is used in both strategic and tactical B61 bombs. 

• The Nuclear Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61s 

in the stockpile. Between 2003 and 2007, the Nuclear Weapons Council, 

which reviews the size of the nation’s stockpile, directed NNSA to reduce 

the total stockpile of nuclear weapons. Following the council’s stockpile 

plan, NNSA reduced the number of B61s that needed refurbishment by 

about two-thirds. According to officials from production facilities, NNSA 

would not have been able to meet its November 2008 completion date if it

still had to refurbish the originally planned number of weapons. Moreover, 

NNSA would not have been able to meet its cost baseline because the cost 

of manufacturing each B61 had almost doubled. 

Even though these events allowed NNSA to meet its schedule, the 

refurbished B61 bombs do not meet all refurbishment objectives. To 

address DOD concerns, in December 2007, NNSA agreed to conduct 

additional tests. According to DOD officials, the additional tests NNSA 

planned should resolve these concerns if successful in meeting the test 

objectives. 

Some of the B61 refurbishment problems could have been avoided if DOD 

had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life 

extension program activities. First, DOD did not comprehensively review 

military requirements for the B61 bomb before starting refurbishment 

activities, which would have avoided unnecessary testing and 

manufacturing of the alternative material. Specifically, NNSA tested the 

B61 in conditions that it later learned were no longer used by DOD. In 

conducting its tests, NNSA was following DOD’s specifications to meet all 

of the weapon’s original requirements established in the 1960s. According

to the Phase 6.X process, a critical military requirement, which NNSA 

relied on for its tests, should have been reviewed during the Phase 6.2/2A 

study during 2001 and 2002. Instead, 2 years elapsed before STRATCOM 

notified NNSA that the requirement was no longer necessary, and it took 

another 2 years—until March 2006—to finally change the requirement. As 

a result, NNSA dedicated time and resources to develop an alternative 

material and conducted tests following the requirement, which 

STRATCOM later criticized as being operationally unrealistic testing. 

DOD Failed to Adequately 

Oversee Critical NNSA Life 

Extension Activities for 

the B61 

 7

In addition to the strategic variants of the B61, the Air Force also maintains tactical B61 

bombs—the Mods 3, 4, and 10. 

Page 14 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

Second, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA’s design, 

engineering, and testing activities—a review that would have alerted it to 

the fact that NNSA was unable to meet all refurbishment objectives. 

According to Air Force officials, the Lead Project Officer failed to provide 

the necessary oversight because he lacked the technical and managerial 

expertise to do so. He did not alert the Air Force to significant concerns 

with the testing of the refurbished B61. In particular, the Air Force did not 

raise concerns about NNSA’s failure to complete all agreed-upon tests 

until NNSA had completed a majority of its tests and was preparing for 

full-scale production. After NNSA entered production, the Air Force 

required NNSA to conduct additional tests to provide a greater level of 

assurance that the refurbished B61 would perform as intended and last in 

the stockpile for at least another 20 years. As we noted, NNSA agreed to 

conduct additional tests and plans to complete them by the end of 2009. 

Importantly, these tests will be completed after all the B61 bombs now 

being refurbished are back in the stockpile. 

NNSA developed a risk mitigation strategy to avoid potential cost overruns 

and schedule delays related to the manufacture of Fogbank but failed to 

effectively implement it. As a result, NNSA’s original plans to produce the

first refurbished W76 weapon in September 2007 slipped to September 

2008. In addition, NNSA spent $69 million to address Fogbank production 

problems, and the Navy faced logistical challenges in replacing old W76 

warheads with refurbished ones on submarines owing to the delay. 

Furthermore, NNSA did not use the same criteria and accounting practices 

each fiscal year to develop a cost baseline for the W76 program, which 

makes it difficult to track refurbishment costs over time. 

At the beginning of the W76 life extension program in 2000, NNSA 

identified key technical challenges that would potentially cause schedule

delays or cost overruns. One of the highest risks was manufacturing 

Fogbank because it is difficult to manufacture. In addition, NNSA had lost 

knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few 

records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s and 

almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency.

Finally, NNSA had to build a new facility at the Y-12 plant because the 

facilities that produced Fogbank ceased operation in the 1990s and had 

NNSA Did Not 

Adequately Address 

One of the Highest 

Risks to the W76 

Program, Which Led 

to Cost Increases, 

Schedule Delays, and 

an Unrealistic 

Production Schedule 

NNSA Failed to Address 

One of Its Highest Risks to 

the Program 

Page 15 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

since been dismantled, except for a pilot plant used to produce small 

quantities of Fogbank for test purposes. 

To address these concerns, NNSA developed a risk management strategy 

for Fogbank with three key components: (1) building a new Fogbank 

production facility early enough to allow time to re-learn the 

manufacturing process and resolve any problems before starting full 

production; (2) using the existing pilot plant to test the Fogbank 

manufacturing process while the new facility was under construction; and 

(3) developing an alternate material that was easier to produce than 

Fogbank. However, NNSA failed to effectively implement these three key 

components. As a result, it had little time to address unexpected technical 

challenges and no guaranteed source of funding to support risk mitigation 

activities. 

After determining that 2 years was sufficient time to test and perfect the 

Fogbank manufacturing process, NNSA set March 2005 as the target date

to begin operations of the new facility at the Y-12 plant and worked 

backward from that date to establish a design, build, and test schedule for 

the new facility, according to the official in charge of the project. Working 

from lessons learned from the W87 life extension program, NNSA strove to 

achieve an early operations start date to allow sufficient time to address 

any potential problems in manufacturing Fogbank. In 2000, we reported 

that production problems resulting from such factors as restarting an 

atrophied production complex and addressing safety and technician 

training issues led directly to slippage in the W87 life extension program 

schedule and contributed to increased costs.8

 In addition, NNSA’s own 

lessons learned report on the W87 program identified the need to 

demonstrate processes early and often and stated that, with limited 

resources, assumptions such as “we did it before so we can do it again” are 

often wrong. 

NNSA started the new facility’s operations about 1 year late because the 

schedule for building the facility was unrealistic, disagreements on the 

implementation of safety guidelines emerged, and the W76 program 

manager lacked authority to control the schedule. Focused on meeting an

operations start date of March 2005, NNSA developed an aggressive 

construction and operation start schedule with no contingency for cost 

NNSA Started the New Facility 

Late 

 8

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Implement Stockpile 

Stewardship Program Effectively, GAO-01-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2000). 

Page 16 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

overruns or schedule delays. This schedule increased risk to meeting the 

program schedule because any delay would leave less than 2 years to 

conduct test production runs, which NNSA determined were necessary for 

perfecting the process. In addition, the Fogank facility was the first new 

manufacturing facility to be built at Y-12 in 30 years; therefore, a lack of 

recent experience with construction project management and 

implementing safety guidelines heightened the potential for problems. In 

fact, the contractor building the facility underestimated the time needed to

complete preparations for start-up, including training and certifying staff 

to use the equipment and calibrating instruments. 

In addition, NNSA and the contractor disagreed on the interpretation and 

implementation of safety guidelines. A lack of clarity about which 

guidelines would apply and the proper interpretation of the guidelines 

caused confusion over the course of the project. At a late stage, NNSA 

directed the contractor to apply more conservative nuclear facility safety

requirements. As a result, the contractor needed additional time to address 

safety concerns by, for example, installing weather- and earthquake-proof 

equipment. 

When these issues emerged, the W76 NNSA program manager did not have 

the authority to manage the construction of the project or resolve the 

dispute over safety guidelines even though a key risk mitigation strategy 

was the timely start of facility operations. Construction and start-up of the 

facility was managed by Y-12, which reported to the Y-12 Site Office, a 

separate organization not under the authority of the program manager. As 

soon as the March 2005 new facility start date was missed, the program 

manager raised concerns and elevated them to the Deputy Administrator 

for Defense Programs, the cognizant management organization at NNSA 

headquarters, but the issues remained unresolved. Ultimately, start-up of

the new facility was postponed by approximately 1 year, leaving NNSA 

with half the time originally planned to re-learn the Fogbank production 

process. 

NNSA planned to use the Y-12 pilot plant to gain a better understanding of

Fogbank properties and to test the production process on a small scale 

while the new facility was under construction. The pilot facility could only 

produce a small amount of Fogbank for the W76 program because it had 

only a few machines. Although NNSA used the pilot plant from 2000 to 

2003, it did not have funds to continue the effort because it shifted money 

from the W76 program to support higher priority programs at the time, 

such as the W87 and B61 life extension programs. 

NNSA Did Not Make Full Use 

of the Pilot Plant 

Page 17 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

However, in 2004, anticipating delays in starting operations at the new 

facility and recognizing the importance of continuing work at the pilot 

plant, NNSA provided funding to pay for additional work at the pilot plant.

By completing this work, NNSA learned that certain techniques 

significantly affected the quality of the end product and made adjustments 

to meet requirements. However, NNSA did not conduct as much work as 

originally planned and missed opportunities to learn more about the 

manufacturing process before starting operations. 

In 2000, NNSA considered replacing Fogbank with an alternate material 

that was less costly and easier to produce but abandoned the idea because

NNSA was confident that it could produce Fogbank since it had done so 

before. In addition, LANL’s computer models and simulations were not 

sophisticated enough to provide conclusive evidence that the alternate 

material would function exactly the same as Fogbank. Still further, the 

Navy, the ultimate customer, had expressed a strong preference for 

Fogbank because of its proven nuclear test record. In response to the 

Navy’s preference and the lack of sufficient test data on the alternate 

material, NNSA did not pursue the development of an alternate material 

until 2007. 

In March 2007, however, NNSA again considered producing an alternative 

material when it was unable to produce usable Fogbank and was facing 

the prospect of significant schedule delays. Computer models and 

simulations had improved since 2001, enabling greater confidence in the 

analysis of alternate materials. Thus, NNSA began a $23 million initiative 

to develop an alternate material. LANL officials told us that NNSA plans to 

certify the use of the alternative material by the end of 2009 for the W76 

warhead and if NNSA faced additional Fogbank manufacturing problems 

during full-scale production, the alternate material could then be used 

instead of Fogbank. Had NNSA continued research and development of an 

alternate material during the program, it would have had more information 

on the viability of using the alternate material in the weapon before March 

2007. This additional information also might have provided the Navy 

greater assurance that an alternate material performed as well as Fogbank. 

A failure to implement the three components of NNSA’s risk management 

strategy for Fogbank led to a 1-year schedule delay and a $69 million cost 

overrun. This cost overrun included $22 million to resolve Fogbank 

production problems, $23 million to develop the alternate material, and 

$24 million to maintain Pantex’s production capabilities. Regarding 

Fogbank production problems, in March 2007, NNSA discovered that final 

NNSA Delayed the 

Development of an Alternate 

Material until Fogbank 

Manufacturing Problems Arose 

Ineffective Risk 

Management Led to 

Schedule Delays and Cost 

Increases 

Page 18 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

batches of the material had problems. To address the problems and try to 

meet its September 2007 date for producing the first refurbished weapon, 

NNSA launched a major effort—“Code Blue”—that made the manufacture 

of Fogbank a priority for the design laboratories and production facilities.

However, this effort failed, and, as a result, NNSA delayed producing the

first refurbished weapon from September 2007 to September 2008, and it 

began its efforts to develop an alternate material to Fogbank. Finally, 

while Pantex was unable to begin assembling refurbished units in 

September 2007 as planned, it still spent $24 million in fiscal year 2008 to 

remain in “stand-by” mode, which includes maintaining the skills of the 

technicians who will assemble refurbished W76 weapons. 

The 1-year delay led to logistical challenges for the Navy and an aggressive 

production schedule of refurbished W76 warheads to make up time. The 

Navy originally planned to start replacing old W76 warheads with 

refurbished ones on submarines in April 2008. However, owing to W76

production delays, the Navy had to replace aging parts of W76 warheads in 

its current arsenal and has had to delay replacing old warheads with newly 

refurbished weapons until April 2009. Furthermore, to make up for initial

schedule setbacks caused by Fogbank production problems, NNSA has 

increased the rate at which it plans to produce refurbished W76 weapons.

NNSA will produce more weapons per year than originally planned, an 

annual increment that over time will enable it to still finish production at 

the originally planned end date. However, a higher rate of production 

requires more resources and leaves less room for error because any 

slowdown will have a greater impact on the larger number needed to be 

produced. NNSA production officials have indicated that they may not be 

able to meet this more compressed schedule if they do not receive extra 

resources or if they encounter any production problems, both considered 

realistic possibilities. 

Page 19 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

NNSA does not have a consistent approach for developing a cost baseline for 

the W76 program. NNSA has changed its baseline almost every year since 

2001 to reflect changes in the number of warheads needed in the stockpile 

and changes in NNSA reporting guidelines. For example, in fiscal year 2004,

the cost estimate for the W76 program was $2.1 billion;9

 in fiscal year 2005, it 

was $6.2 billion; and in fiscal year 2006, it was $2.7 billion (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: W76 Cost Baseline 

Changes in the baseline were the result of changes in the percent of the

stockpile to be refurbished, which ranged from 25 percent to 86 percent. 

As the number of weapons to be refurbished changed, the baseline moved 

correspondingly because it costs more to refurbish more weapons. For 

example, NNSA planned to refurbish significantly more weapons in 2005 

than 2004, based on official guidance, accounting for part of the $4.1 

billion differential between those years. 

Significant changes in the baseline were also driven by inconsistent NNSA 

accounting practices. For example, in fiscal year 2005, NNSA required 

program managers to include all indirect costs, such as the overhead costs 

NNSA Lacks a Consistent 

Approach to Developing 

the W76 Cost Baseline 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Dollars in millions for W76 baseline

Fiscal year

 9

This estimate excludes construction costs. 

Page 20 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

of operating facilities, as well as direct costs in the baseline. The next year 

it dropped this requirement. Prior to fiscal year 2005, NNSA did not tie 

overhead costs to specific weapon systems. However, in an attempt to 

provide a more accurate estimate of total costs by weapon, NNSA created

accounts for the W76 warhead that captured a pro-rated portion of general 

costs, such as research and production support at the laboratories and 

production facilities. For example, NNSA included the pro-rated cost of 

forklift operators, who load and unload trucks for all weapon systems. 

Thus, a portion of these overhead costs was added to the 2005 baseline to

better account for the full the costs of the program. However, NNSA 

discovered that this approach constrained flexibility. If priorities shifted 

and changes needed to be made to overhead activities, resources could 

not be easily redirected to different weapon systems. Any change would 

require congressional approval because such overhead costs were tied to a 

specific weapon system as a budget line item. Consequently, in fiscal year 

2006, NNSA reported the production and research support accounts 

separately. While this change restored some flexibility for overall NNSA 

complex management, the transition reduced clarity about the total cost of 

a weapon system. Accounting changes have persisted, with, for example, 

some baseline years including large expense items, such as employee 

benefits, and other baseline years excluding such costs. A lack of a 

consistent baseline approach with similar cost assumptions and criteria 

makes it difficult to track the costs of the program over time and 

determine how well NNSA develops cost estimates. 

Refurbishing the nuclear weapons stockpile is a difficult task. NNSA must 

draw on the scientific expertise of the nuclear weapons laboratories and 

the manufacturing and engineering expertise of the nuclear weapons 

production facilities. Recognizing this challenge, NNSA and DOD have 

developed multiple tools for managing the refurbishment effort: Phase 6.X, 

risk management strategies, test and evaluation plans, and a lessons 

learned document from the W87 life extension program. 

By selectively using these guidance documents, however, NNSA has 

incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays that it could have

avoided. In addition, NNSA did not include any cost or schedule 

contingencies in its baseline to address the unforeseen technical 

challenges that arose. If NNSA had more carefully followed the Phase 6.X 

process, it might have had sufficient time in its schedule to develop and 

test key materials that it had not manufactured in decades and address 

unforeseen technical issues. 

Conclusions 

Page 21 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

Moreover, NNSA did not fully implement its risk management strategy to 

address one of the highest risks to the W76 life extension program—the 

manufacturing of Fogbank. If NNSA had effectively implemented its risk 

management strategies, schedule delays and cost increases might have

been avoided or mitigated. Most importantly, if NNSA had started 

operations of the new facility on schedule, it would have had more time to

address manufacturing challenges. In fact, the 1-year delay in the startup 

of the new Fogbank facility corresponded almost exactly to the 1-year 

program delay. In addition, without the authority to control the 

construction and start of operations of the new facility, the W76 program 

manager could not help resolve the disagreement over the safety 

regulations needed at the facility. Potentially compounding these 

problems, NNSA committed to an ambitious production schedule to make

up for delays related to Fogbank—a schedule that does not leave time to 

address any future production problems. Furthermore, NNSA cannot be

held accountable to meeting its cost targets without a consistent approach 

in developing a cost baseline for the W76 program. The ability to track 

cost over time and assess how well an agency holds to a cost baseline is 

fundamental for proper management and oversight. 

Finally, because DOD failed to adequately oversee the B61 refurbishment 

program, as Phase 6.X requires, NNSA spent unnecessary time and money

trying to find an alternative material. In addition, because the Lead Project

Officer for the B61 bomb did not adequately monitor NNSA’s activities 

during critical phases or have the technical expertise to do so, the Air 

Force did not have sufficient time to ask NNSA to conduct additional tests 

before NNSA entered full-scale production. 

All of these management issues raise significant questions about NNSA’s

ability not only to complete life extension programs on time and on budget

that meet all refurbishment objectives, but also its ability to manage the

design and production of new weapons, such as the proposed reliable

replacement warhead. NNSA and DOD state that the reliable replacement 

warhead is a way to replace the nation’s aging stockpile with a safer, more

reliable, and more secure warhead than those currently in our stockpile, and 

plan to use the Phase 6.X process to design and manufacture this warhead.

Because NNSA did not properly follow the Phase 6.X process, meet all 

refurbishment objectives for the B61 bomb, and conduct all planned tests, it

raises questions about NNSA’s ability to design a new weapon that meets

DOD’s needs and also provides sufficient confidence to DOD that a new 

weapon will perform as expected without conducting underground nuclear 

tests. In addition, NNSA’s failure to implement its risk mitigation strategy for 

the highest risk to the program and implement lessons learned from prior life 

Page 22 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

extensions, like the W87 warhead, does not inspire confidence in its ability to 

achieve the program’s goals on time and on budget. 

To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, we 

recommend that the Administrator of NNSA direct the Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Programs to take the following six actions: 

Recommendations 

• Develop a realistic schedule for the W76 warhead and future life extension 

programs that allows NNSA to (1) address technical challenges while 

meeting all military requirements and (2) build in time for unexpected 

technical challenges that may delay the program. 

• Assess the cost and include funding in the baseline for risk mitigation activities 

that address the highest risks to the W76 and future life extension programs. 

• Before beginning a life extension program, assess the risks, costs, and 

scheduling needs for each military requirement established by DOD. 

• Ensure that the program managers responsible for overseeing the 

construction of new facilities directly related to future life extension 

programs coordinate with the program managers of such future programs 

to avoid the types of delays and problems faced with the construction and 

operation of the Fogbank manufacturing facility for the W76 program. 

• Ensure that program managers for the construction of new facilities for 

future life extensions base their schedule for the construction and start-up

of a facility on the life extension program managers’ needs identified in 

their risk mitigation strategies. 

• Develop and use consistent budget assumptions and criteria for the 

baseline to track costs over time. 

To improve DOD’s oversight over NNSA’s life extension activities and 

ensure that refurbished weapons meet all military requirements, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: 

• Direct STRATCOM and the Secretary of the responsible Service to 

comprehensively review military requirements for a weapons system prior 

to entering Phase 6.2A of a life extension program. 

• Direct STRATCOM and the Secretary of the responsible Service to work 

with NNSA to assess the cost and schedule implications for meeting each 

military requirement prior to entering Phase 6.3. 

Page 23 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

• Direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy to ensure that their 

respective Lead Project Officers have the technical and managerial 

expertise and resources to review NNSA’s progress and technical 

challenges throughout the life extension program. 

We provided NNSA and DOD with draft copies of our classified report for

their review and comment. In addition to their official comments, which are

reprinted in appendixes I and II, NNSA and DOD provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As discussed in our 

classified report, NNSA agreed with our recommendations and plans to take a

number of steps to implement them. First, NNSA plans to assess the risks, 

costs, and scheduling needs for each military requirement DOD establishes

during the early phases of a life extension program. NNSA will consult 

officials from the production facilities to better understand the potential 

impact on cost and schedule of manufacturing critical nuclear and nonnuclear materials. In addition, NNSA plans to adopt an Integrated Phase Gate

process that establishes well-defined milestones, or gates, throughout the 

Phase 6.X process. Before proceeding to the next gate, NNSA and DOD

officials must identify any risks to cost and schedule and can opt to delay the

life extension program if the risks are too high and additional actions, such as

testing, should be taken. Second, NNSA will include funding needs for risk 

mitigation activities that address the highest risks to future life extension 

programs in budget reports to Congress. Third, NNSA plans to better 

coordinate construction activities at the production facilities with the needs 

of life extension program activities. Last, according to NNSA, it developed a

methodology to establish a baseline with consistent budget assumptions and

criteria to track costs over time. We believe that these actions could 

significantly improve the management of the life extension program. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendations. DOD agreed with our two 

recommendations directed at the department, but asked us to make 

modifications to the language of the recommendations to better target the 

responsible service or agency that has authority to implement them. We 

modified our recommendations by (1) including the Department of the Navy 

because it is responsible for reviewing NNSA’s refurbishment activities for 

certain nuclear weapons, such as the W76, and (2) specifying during which 

phase of the phase 6.X process DOD should comprehensively review its 

military requirements and assess the cost and schedule implications for 

meeting each military requirement. DOD also expressed concern that the report 

placed an undue burden of responsibility for program delays for the B61 life 

extension program on DOD and that there were other technical issues NNSA 

faced that were not discussed in this report that led to program delays. We 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 24 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
 

believe that our report fairly attributes management problems with the B61 life

extension program to both NNSA and DOD. As we state in the report, NNSA 

did not include any cost or schedule contingencies in its baseline to address 

unforeseen technical challenges in refurbishing the B61 bomb, and its 

aggressive schedule posed a significant risk to meeting the program’s 

milestones. This report did not address all of the technical challenges that 

NNSA faced in refurbishing the B61 bomb because some did not have an 

impact on cost and schedule and others were additional examples of problems 

NNSA faced by compressing the development and engineering schedule. As we 

noted on page 3 of this report, the scope of our discussion of the B61 was 

limited to the most significant technical challenge that had an impact on cost, 

schedule, and weapon performance and reliability—the decision to reuse or 

manufacture a new material for a critical component. NNSA had the burden of

completing the refurbishment on time and on schedule, but DOD failed to 

provide the necessary oversight. Last, we recognize that the Air Force has taken 

steps to strengthen the management and oversight of nuclear activities, such as

consolidating nuclear activities under a newly established Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Center. However, it is too early to assess the impact these actions 

have had on the Air Force’s oversight of the life extension program. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the 

Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Defense, and interested 

congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 25 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix I: Comments from the National Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 26 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 27 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 28 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 30 GAO-09-385 Nuclear Weapons

Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Marc Castellano, Leland Cogliani, 

Jonathan Gill, Marie Mak, James Noel, Omari Norman, Tim Persons, Carol 

Herrnstadt Shulman, and John Smale made significant contributions to 

this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361045) 
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