J-S03002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TIMOTHY J. MAILLIARD AND 

SABRINA L. MAILLIARD

v.

EDGEWOOD DEVELOPMENT, LLC 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 833 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered June 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County Civil Division at No(s): 

No. AD 2016-722

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: MAY 26, 2022

Edgewood Development, LLC (Edgewood) appeals from the order, 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, granting summary 

judgment in favor of Appellees, Timothy J. Mailliard and Sabrina L. Mailliard 

(the Mailliards). The court’s order corrects the description of a 16-acre parcel 

of real estate conveyed to Edgewood via a sheriff’s deed and quitclaim deed 

and directs the Mailliards to reimburse Edgewood for any taxes it may have 

paid on the land, less any amounts received or to be received by Edgewood 

for the sale of any timber harvested from the real estate. After careful review, 

we reverse and remand.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On September 1, 2011, the Mailliards entered into a land installment 

contract (Contract) in which they agreed to sell Carl Sterling (Sterling) “16 

Acres along State Highway Route 198 between Blooming Valley and Guys 

Mills, PA” (the Property/Parcel 1) for $35,000.00. Contract for Deed, 9/1/11, 

at 1. The Contract was not publicly recorded. In December 2012, the 

Mailliards instituted a foreclosure action against Sterling when he defaulted on 

the Contract. The lawsuit alleged that the Mailliards “entered into a ‘Contract 

for Deed’ dated September 1, 2011, by which [Sterling] agreed to purchase 

the below described real estate for $35,000.00.” Foreclosure Complaint, 

12/7/12, at ¶ 3. The complaint describes the land purchased under the 

Contract as follows:

5. The property commonly known as 13251 State Highway 198, 

Guys Mills, Pennsylvania[,] 16327 (Crawford County tax index 

number 4001-023) is described as follows:

All that certain piece or parcel of land situate in the 

Township of Randolph, County of Crawford, and 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, bounded and described as 

follows, to wit: Beginning in Randolph Township, on the 

north by the public road leading from Blooming Valley to 

Guys Mills; on the east by a public road leading south to 

Guys Mills; on the south by lands now or formerly of Kelly 

and Kendall; and on the west by land now or formerly of 

Kightlinger, containing thirty-three (33) acres of land, 

more or less, and being the same land conveyed to Ben N. 

Kelly by Deed of Lloyd H. Mullen, et ux,, dated April 4, 1957, 

and recorded in the Recorder’s Office of Crawford County, 

Pennsylvania in Deed Book 355, page 163.

Excepting and reserving therefrom three parcels of land 

conveyed as follows, first, by Deed of Lloyd H. Mullen, et 

ux., dated July 14, 1045, recorded in the Recorder’s Office 

of Crawford County, Pennsylvania[,] in Deed book 374, page 
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40; and third, by Deed of Ben N. Kelly to William Grosser, 

et ux., dated September 8, 1955[,] and recorded in the 

Recorder’s Office of Crawford County, Pennsylvania[,] in 

Deed book 377, page 131.

Including also, that certain piece or parcel bounded 

and described as follows, beginning on the north by land 

formerly of J. Seymour Johnson; on the east by a public 

road; on the south by land formerly of Negley; and on the 

west by land formerly of Negley, containing Sixty (60) 

acres of land, more or less, and being the same land 

conveyed to Ben N. Kelly by Deed of Emma H. Grundy, 

widow, and Clarence G. Grundy, a single man, dated 

December 21, 1945, and recorded in the Recorder’s Office 

of Crawford County, Pennsylvania[,] in Deed book 385, page 

45, conveyed to Frank T. Lamb and Audrey F. Lamb.

Excepting and Reserving from both parcels that certain 

parcel approximately two acres conveyed . . . by Deed dated 

October 28, 1983[,] and recorded[.]

Further excepting and reserving unto the Grantor herein, 

her heirs and assigns, all timber standing and fallen, 

measured fourteen inches and more in diameter one foot 

from the ground for the term of one year from date hereof.

Action in Mortgage Foreclosure, 12/7/12, at ¶ 5 (emphasis added).

Ultimately, the Mailliards obtained an in rem judgment against Sterling 

in the foreclosure action; a writ of execution was issued to the sheriff on the 

judgment. However, because Sterling subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the 

foreclosure proceedings were stayed. On June 3, 2016, Edgewood1

successfully bid upon and purchased the real estate at a second sheriff’s sale. 

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1 Edgewood was formed on November 2, 2015, by John W. Gizzie, the 

company’s manager. See Deposition of John W. Gizzie, 4/8/19, at 8-9. The 

company was formed to invest in real estate, id. at 9, and, at the time of the 

current matter, Edgewood had invested in three properties. Id. at 9-10.
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The deed was recorded on June 21, 2016. However, an error in the metes 

and bounds description of the real estate incorrectly listed both the Property 

and a 54-acre parcel of land (Parcel 2) owned by the Mailliards as the land 

being conveyed in the sheriff’s deed.

2

 The two different parcels were also 

identified in the deed with two tax index numbers. See Sheriff’s Deed, 

6/21/16, at [2] (“The above[-]described premises are commonly referred to 

by Crawford County Tax Index Numbers 4001-023-70001 and 4001-041-

7001.”).

After the sheriff’s sale, Edgewood approached the Mailliards’ attorney 

and requested the Mailliards execute a quitclaim deed in order to: (1) confirm 

that the sheriff’s sale also released all of the Mailliards’ interest in and to the 

real estate; and (2) clarify the recorder of deeds’ indexing of the Mailliards’ 

names because they had an interest in the property that was conveyed via 

the sheriff’s deed. See Deposition of John W. Gizzie, 4/8/19, at 34. The 

quitclaim deed was recorded on July 5, 2016. Again, the same incorrect 

description of both parcels of land was included in the quitclaim deed 

exchanged between the Mailliards and Edgewood for consideration ($1). See 

Quitclaim Deed, 7/5/16, at 2 (“The above[-]described premises are commonly 

referred to by Crawford County Tax Index Numbers 4001-023-70001 and 

4001-041-70001.”). The quitclaim deed also included language that “[t]his 

deed is being given to supplement a sheriff’s deed dated June 21, 2016[,] and 

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2

It is undisputed that Sterling had no interest in the 54-acre parcel.
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recorded on June 21, 2016[,] at Crawford Country Instrument Number 

201600004395 to convey any remaining interest in the property as the 

sheriff[’]s sale was on an interest in a land contract.” Id. at [2] (emphasis 

added).

No exceptions to the sheriff’s sale or petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale 

were timely filed. When the Mailliards were unsuccessful in resolving the 

mistake in the deeds’ land descriptions, they filed the instant lawsuit against 

Edgewood on November 3, 2016, seeking reformation of the deeds by 

“remov[ing] the references to the 54-acre parcel and to convey only the 

interest in the 16-acre parcel.” Mailliards’ Complaint, 11/3/16, at [5]. 

Edgewood filed preliminary objections to the complaint alleging that, in order 

to require Edgewood to convey Parcel 2 back to the Mailliards, the Mailliards 

should have filed a petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale prior to the delivery 

of the deed to Edgewood. See Pa.R.C.P. 3132.3 

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3 Pursuant to Rule 3132:

Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the 

personal property or of the sheriff’s deed to real property, 

the court may, upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and 

order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and 

proper under the circumstances.

Pa.R.C.P. 3132 (emphasis added).
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On December 28, 2016, the Mailliards filed a petition to set aside the 

sheriff’s sale.4 Edgewood filed preliminary objections to the petition to set 

aside the sheriff’s sale. In an amended complaint, filed on February 14, 2017, 

the Mailliards included counts for unjust enrichment (Count I), rescission 

(Count II), fraud (Count III), and reformation (Count IV). The Mailliards 

asserted that the sheriff’s sale could only contractually convey interest in the 

Property/Parcel 1 (16-acre parcel) that was identified by a specific Crawford 

County tax index number and that the sheriff did not have the jurisdiction to 

convey any interest in the 54-acre parcel—a conveyance that was beyond the 

interest in the contract that was foreclosed upon. The Mailliards attached the 

deposition of John W. Gizzie, Edgewood’s designated corporate representative 

and manager who bid on and purchased the Mailliards’ land at the sheriff’s 

sale, as an exhibit to their complaint. Edgewood filed an answer and new 

matter to the Mailliards’ first amended complaint. On May 2, 2017, the 

Mailliards filed an answer to Edgewood’s new matter.

For almost two years the case remained inactive. As a result of the docket 

inactivity, on March 1, 2021, the court filed a notice of its proposed 

termination of the matter. See Pa.R.J.A. 1901. On March 5, 2021, the 

Mailliards filed a statement of their intention to proceed with the case. On 

April 8, 2021, the Mailliards filed a summary judgment motion averring that 

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4

Instantly, the trial court specifically indicated that it was not setting aside 

the sheriff’s sale. See Trial Court Memorandum, 6/17/21, at 4 n.4.
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“there is no dispute of material fact that [Edgewood], by its manager, had 

actual knowledge that only the interests of [] Sterling and only 16 acres

in which Sterling had an interest as addressed in the [] Contract [that] was 

foreclosed [upon] have been exposed for sale by Sheriff’s [Sale] and 

the only property [Edgewood] could claim by Sheriff’s Sale Deed by 

law where he admits he actually read the ‘contract for Deed.’” Plaintiffs’ 

Summary Judgment Motion, 4/8/21, at ¶ 8 (emphasis in original). On June 

17, 2021, the trial court issued a memorandum and accompanying order 

granting the Mailliards’ summary judgment motion.

Edgewood filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Edgewood 

presents the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that [the] sheriff’s 

deed conveyed only one parcel instead of two[.]

(2) Whether the trial court erred in finding that Edgewood [] 

was unjustly enriched when the quitclaim deed conveyed 

two parcels[.]

(3) Whether the trial court erred in ordering reformation of both 

the sheriff’s deed and the quitclaim deed[.]

(4) Whether the trial court erred in determining that there are 

not genuine issues of material facts forming an element of 

the causes of action or defenses[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.

When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, our standard 

and scope of review are as follows:
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[A]n appellate court’s scope of review is plenary, and the standard 

of review is the same as that applied by the trial court. An 

appellate court may reverse the entry of [] summary judgment 

only where it finds that the [trial] court erred in concluding that 

the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law. In making this assessment, an appellate court 

views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving party. As the 

inquiry involves solely questions of law, an appellate court’s 

review is de novo. 

Reinoso v. Heritage Warminster SPE LLC, 108 A.3d 80, 84 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (en banc) (additional citations omitted)

Instantly, the trial court based its decision on two equitable principles, 

specifically the doctrines of unjust enrichment and reformation.5 

Where unjust enrichment is found, the law implies a contract, 

which requires the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the value of 

the benefit conferred. The elements necessary to prove unjust 

enrichment are:

(1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) 

appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) 

acceptance and retention of such benefits under such 

circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to 

retain the benefit without payment of value. The application 

of the doctrine depends on the particular factual 

circumstances of the case at issue. In determining if the 

doctrine applies, our focus is not on the intention of the 

parties, but rather on whether the defendant has been 

unjustly enriched.

Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis 

added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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5 The trial court, however, made no findings with regard to fraud and recission.
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Here, the trial court concluded that, because Edgewood “paid only 

nominal consideration for the [q]uit[c]laim [d]eed,” it “would be unjustly 

enriched if that deed conveyed title to both Parcels 1 and 2, because the 

[s]heriff’s [d]eed conveyed title to only Parcel 1[.]” Trial Court Memorandum, 

6/17/21, at 5. However, as Edgewood points out, just because it may have 

received title to two parcels at a price below market value, when the Mailliards 

claim they only intended to convey one piece of land, it does not automatically 

make any perceived enrichment unjust.6 There was no evidence to show that 

Edgewood realized a benefit where the foreclosure complaint described two 

parcels of land had been conveyed to Sterling, the sheriff’s deed described the 

subject real estate as two separate parcels, the Mailliards accepted 

Edgewood’s bid, and the Mailliards agreed to provide, and did provide, 

execute, and deliver a quitclaim deed to Edgewood describing and including 

both parcels. 

With regard to reformation, Pennsylvania courts have long held “that 

courts of equity have the power to reform a written instrument where there 

has been a showing of fraud, accident[,] or mistake.” Regions Mortg., Inc. 

v. Muthler, 889 A.2d 39, 41 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Kutsenkow v. Kutsenkow, 

202 A.2d 68, 68-69 (Pa. 1964)). Traditionally, when a party sought

reformation based upon mistake, the mistake alleged must have been a 

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6

In fact, it is common that third-party bids at sheriff’s sales are not based on 

fair market value, and that successful bidders often acquire property at below 

market value. 
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mutual mistake.7 Regions Mortg., Inc. v. Muthler, 889 A.2d 39, 41 (Pa. 

2005). However, “later decisions allowed unilateral mistakes to also serve as 

the basis for reformation,” id., where “the party against whom reformation is 

sought had such knowledge of the mistake as to justify an inference of fraud 

or bad faith.” Dudash v. Dudash, 460 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 1983). 

Finally, it is well-settled that while a court has the authority to reform a deed 

on the ground of unilateral mistake, “[i]t is necessary that the mistake as well 

as the actual intent of the parties be clearly shown.” Hassler v. Mummert, 

364 A.2d 402, 403 (Pa. Super. 1976), citing Rusciolelli v. Smith, 171 A.2d 

802 (Pa. Super. 1961).

Here, it is undisputed that the mistake—incorrectly listing Parcel 2 in the 

sheriff’s and quitclaim deeds—was one-sided and, admittedly, made by the 

Mailliards. Therefore, in order for the court to reform the deeds, the Mailliards 

had to show that Edgewood had “such knowledge of the mistake as to justify 

an inference of fraud of bad faith.” Dudash, supra at 327. 

Instantly, the trial court and the Mailliards rely upon testimony in 

Gizzie’s deposition to conclude that Edgewood “had reason to know that only 

Parcel 1 was being offered for sale, because [Gizzie] performed due diligence 

by examining the foreclosure and execution files, and [by] reading the 

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7 “[M]istakes are the exception rather than the rule[,] Step Plan Services, 

Inc. v. Koresko, 12 A.3d 401, 410 (Pa. Super. 2010), and [] without [clear 

and convincing] proof, reformation must fail.” Muthler, 844 A.2d at 582.
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Contract for Deed.”8 Trial Court Memorandum, 6/17/21, at 4, citing 

Deposition of John W. Gizzie, 4/8/19, at 14, 27 (“I went in and looked at the 

Writ of Execution), Appellants’ Brief, at 20 (“The actual knowledge admitted 

to by [Gizzie] makes it probable that he knew there was property in which 

[] Sterling did not have an interest included in the [deed’s] description.”)

(emphasis added). Based on that conclusion, the court found, as a matter of 

law, that “[t]he Sheriff’s Deed[,] thus[,] conveyed title only to Parcel 1, 

regardless of the description therein provided.” Trial Court Memorandum, 

6/17/21, at 4. A closer look at the record and relevant law, however, compels 

a different result.

In his deposition, Gizzie stated that he performed his own title search 

prior to the sheriff’s sale, which included looking at legal advertisements in 

the Crawford County Legal Journal, the Meadville Tribune, the sheriff’s 

handbills, the docket, the actual pleadings in the Mailliard-Sterling foreclosure 

action, tax records, a county geographic information system (GIS), and a writ 

of execution. Deposition of John W. Gizzie, 4/8/19, at 14, 27, 40. At the 

sheriff’s sale, Gizzie bid $40,000.00, plus costs and transfer taxes, for the 

land. Id. at 31. Subsequent to the sheriff’s sale, Gizzie approached the 

Mailliards’ attorney and requested the Mailliards execute a quitclaim deed in 

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8 See also Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/21, at 5 (“Reformation is an available 

remedy when the deed fails to conform to the parties’ intentions [and, i]n 

setting forth the description of both Parcels 1 and 2, the [q]uit[c]laim 

[d]eed[,] thus[,] did not conform to the parties’ stated intentions.”). 
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order to confirm that the sheriff’s sale also released all of their interest in and 

to the conveyed real estate. The Mailliards’ attorney included not just the 

Property (16-acres), but also the additional 54-acre parcel, Parcel 2, that the 

Mailliards owned, but in which Sterling never had an interest—just as Plaintiffs’ 

attorney had done in the sheriff’s deed.

Just because Gizzie testified he reviewed the foreclosure complaint

(which attached the Contract) and the writ of execution does not mean that 

Gizzie knew that the Mailliards had mistakenly included a second parcel in the 

deeds, and, critically, that it can be inferred that he acted fraudulently or in 

bad faith by bidding on both parcels. Hassler, supra; Rusciolelli, supra. 

As Edgewood correctly notes, this was not a typical foreclosure action on a 

recorded mortgage where a bank is the foreclosing party. Rather, the 

adjacent parcels referenced in the deeds were both owned by the Mailliards, 

and, thus, they had the legal authority to convey them via deed. Moreover, 

the original foreclosure complaint filed by the Mailliards against Sterling also 

incorrectly described the subject land as two separate parcels—a 33-acre 

parcel and a 60-acre parcel. See Action in Mortgage Foreclosure, 12/7/12, at 

¶ 5. In fact, Gizzie testified that “[t]he [c]omplaint described the 70 acres.” 

Deposition of John W. Gizzie, 4/8/19, at 41. This fact makes the Mailliards’ 

mistake even less apparent to a third-party like Edgewood.

Procedurally, the trial court was required to review the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, Edgewood. Reinoso, supra. 

After a thorough review of the record, it is apparent that disputed questions
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of fact exist regarding whether Edgewood had actual knowledge that the 

Mailliards only intended to sell their interest in Parcel 1 and whether it was 

proper to infer that it acted fraudulently or in bad faith—especially where the 

court clearly did not make any finding with regard to fraud. Thus, we conclude 

that the trial court committed an error of law by reforming the deeds based 

on the doctrine of unjust enrichment and granting summary judgment in the 

Mailliards’ favor. See Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 883 A.2d 562, 566-

67 (Pa. 2005) (trial court may grant summary judgment only when right to 

such judgment is clear and free from doubt).

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Sullivan, J., Joins the Memorandum. 

Pellegrini, J., Files a Dissenting Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/26/2022