THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Arcadia Conference: December 1941–January 1942 

Two weeks after the United States entered World War II, the Arcadia Conference (also known as 

the First Washington Conference) was held in Washington, DC, from December 24, 1941 to 

January 14, 1942. Working together with senior military leaders from the United States and 

Great Britain, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill made 

the initial crucial decisions for the combined war effort at this important meeting. One of these 

established the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), comprising the high-ranking officers who 

would become the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and their British counterparts. It was this consultative 

body of top military leaders that would refine the Allied military strategy and approve all 

significant military decisions for the duration of conflict. The political leaders also drafted and 

signed the Declaration of the United Nations at the conference, collectively stating the Allies’ 

wartime objectives. The most consequential decision reached at Arcadia was that of “Germany 

first,” making the defeat of Germany the prime Allied objective. Additionally, plans to invade 

North Africa, which would come to fruition in November 1942 with Operation Torch, were 

extensively studied and discussed. 

Arcadia was the first in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British 

leaders in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to 

formulate the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet 

leader Joseph Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, 

memorandums, position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and 

minutes were taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents 

address virtually every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates 
about the location and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation 

boundaries. Thus, they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an 

indispensable primary source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Arcadia, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and 

PDF formats: 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 

Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 
Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART I 

MINUTES OF CONFERENCES 

NOTE 

The Minutes of each Conference 

with Annexes are considered as 

Separate Documents and the pages 

are numbered accordingly. The 

titles are abbreviated by the 

symbols JGCSs 1 to 12 Inclusive. 
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LIST OF DAPERS 

JCCSs-1 DECEMBER 24, 1941 

1. Defense of the BriOish Isles. 

2. Hedvy Bombers. 

3. Relief of British Troops in Northern Ireland and Iceland. 

4. Greenland. 

5. Anti-submarine Measures and Escorts. 

6. Portuguese and Spanish Islands in the Atlantic. 

7. Occupation of Africa. 

8. Brazil. 

9. The Curacao-Aruba Area. 

10. The Pacific Area. 

11. Bombardment of Japan. 

12. Russian Situation. 

13. Spain and Portugal. 

14. Airplane Carriers. 

16. PBY's for the British 

16. British Crews for American Ships. 

17. Guns for Merchant Ships.

1s. Naval Dispositions in the Atlantic. 

19. Priurities in Expeditions. 

20. West Africa. 

21. BriCish Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (Annex 1) 

22. Brikish Estimate of Attack on hest Coast of No~thAmerica. 

ANNEX I: American-British Strategy. 

BriCtsh WW-1 (U.S. Revised) 

ANNEX 2: Probable Maximum Scale of Enemy Attack on West Coast of 

North America. 

Appendix A to ANNEX 2: Distance Chart. 

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JCCSs-2 DECEMBER 25, 1941 

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED 

1. Program of Planning (Joint Planning Committee). 

2. Disposition of the MOUNT VERNON. 

3. Dfversion of Reinforcements (intended for the Philippines). 

4. Unified Command. 

5. Disposition of Forces Destined for the Far East. 

ANNEX 1: Memorandum for the President: Utilization of United States 

Forces in Australia. 

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JCCSs-3 DECEMBER 26, 1941 

SUBJECTS nIscussm 

1. Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. (ABC-4/1). 

2. Northwest Africa Project. 

ANNEX 1: Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. (Report by Joint Planning Committee) 

U.S. Serial ABC-4/1 

British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 1 

ANNEX 2: Project - Gymnast. (Report by Joint Planning Committee) 

U.S. Serial ABC-4/2 

British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 2 

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JCCSs-4 DECEMBER 27, 1941 

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED 

1. ADC-4/1 -- Priorities for United States - United Kingdom Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. 

2. ABC-4/2 Plan for Expedition to Northwest Africa. 

3. American - British Strategy. 

4. Program of Work of the Joint Planning Committee. 

5. Unity of Command. 

6. Utilization of the United States Transports now being used in 

the Indian Ocean. 

ANNEX -1 Proposed Draft of Instructions to the Supreme Comiander,

Southwestern Pacific Theater. 

ABC-4. C/S USA. 

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JCCSs-5 DECEMBER 29. 194\ 

SUBJECTS DISCUSSEQ 

1. Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas 

Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. 

2. American-British Strategy (British WW-1). (Action deferred). 

3. Northwest Africa Project (U.S. ABC-4/2), 

(British Vv'W (J.P.C.) 2). 

(Action deferred). 

4. Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific. 

(U.S. ABC-4/3), 

(British WW (J.P.C.) 3). 

(Action deferred). 

5. Unity of Conunand in the Southwestern Pacific Theater. 

6. Proposed Communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-.Shek. 

ANNEX 1: Friorit.ies for I.'t.ited Stales and United Kingdoin Overseas

b:upditions in t1.e Atlantic (nceaii. (Rc>ort - by Join1 I'lanning 

C'omniir.tee) 

ABC-4/1 APPROVED DOCUhENT 

British WV-5 

British WW (J.P.C.) 1 

ANNEX 2: Proposed Method of Handling Matters Concernine: the Southwest 

Pacific Theater. 

ANNEX 3: Memorandum for the President: Draft of Messare to Generalia-~ 

simo Chiang Kai-Shek. 
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JCCSs-6 DECEMBER 30, 1944 

I. 

2. 

3. 

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ANNEX 1:

ANNEX 2: 

ANNEX 3: 

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED 

Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area. 

Draft Directive to the Suprrme Commander in the ABDA Area. 

Next Meeting, to considef: 

a. Northwest Africa Project (U.S. ABC-4/2), 

(British MW (J.P.C.) 2) 

b_. Supporting Measures for the Southwestern Pacific 

(1I.S. ABC-4/3), 

(British HM' (J.P.C.) 3) 

Letter (Mr. Hopkins to Admiral Stark) en- I?rnnos& 

Method of Handline Matters concerning the Southwest 

Pacific Theater. 

In Two Parts.: 

Part I - Memorandum for the President: Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area. 

Part I1 - Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area. 

Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. 

U.S. ABC-4/5 

British WW-3 

Annex 1 to ANNEX 3_: Boundaries of ABDA Area. 

Annex 2 to ANNEX 3: Higher Direction of War in 

the ABDA Area. 

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JCCSs-7 DECEMBER 31, 1941 

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED 

1. Withdrawal of United States Marines from Iceland. 

2. American-Bribish Strategy. 

3. Supporting Mensures for the Southwest Pacific. 

4. Northwest Africa Project. 

5. Relief of the Bribish Garrison in Northern Ireland. 

6. Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. 

7. Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee. 

8. Naval Dispositions. 

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ANNEX 1: American-British Grand Strategy.

U.S. ABC-$/CS 1 APPROVED DOCUMENT 

British WW-1 (Final) 

AN’NFX 2: Supporting Measures fur the Southwest Pacific (thc Far bast 

Area and Adjacent ReKiOnS) until Establishment of Lnified 

Command. (Approved Report of Joint Plannine Commlttet) 

U.S. ABC-4/3 APPROVED DOCUMENT 

British WW-4 

British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 3 

Annex I to ANNEX 2: -: Far East Forces and 

Reinforcements Therefor, 

United States. 

Annex I1 to ANNEX 2: C 2 : Far East FReinf orrrments The-ef o-, 

British Commonwealth. 

Annex I11 to AN- : Chart: Forces Now in the Far 

East Dutrh and 

Austra-. 

ANNEX 3: Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. 

U.S. ABC-4/5 (Final) 

British WW-3 

Annex 1 to ANNEX 3: Boundaries of ABDA Area. 

Annex 2 to ANNEX 3: Higher Direction of War in the 

ABDA Area. 

ANNEX 4: Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee. 

U.S. ABC-4/4 (Final) APPROVED DOCUMEU 

British WW (J.P.C.) 4 

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JCCSs-6 JANUARY 

2. 

1. 

Directive 

Super-Gymnast. 

10, 1942 

for 

-

the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area -- Attitude of the Dutch. 

3. Procedure for the Assumption of Command by General Wavell 

4. Immediate Assistance to China. 

5. Post-Arcadia Collaboration. 

ANNEX 1: Oirective to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area (A&­

proved by the President and the Prime Minister). 

""ABc-4/5 (Approved) APPROVBD DOCUMENT 

British WW-6 

(Supersedes ABC-4/5, WW-3, Final, Annex 3 to JCCSs-7) 

Annex 1 to ANNEX 1: Boundaries of ABDA Area. 

Annex 2 to ANNEX 1: Higher Direction of War in 

the ABDA Area. 

ANNEX 2: Procedure for Assumption of Command by General Wavell. 

U.S. ABc-4/cs 3 APPROVED DOCUMENT 

British WV-9 (Revised) 

Annex A to ANNEX 2: Draft Telegram from His Maiesty's Government to United 

States, The Netherlands, 

A-, 

-

India.

.Innex tl 10 ANh1:X 2: Drufr Telegrkni f'rom His Maicscy*s Government to General 

\-. 

Annex C to ANNEX 2: Draft Telegram from Brim 

Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of 

Staff Committee in London. 

ANNEX 3: Immediate Assistance to China. (Approved Joint Planning 

Committee Reaort) 

U.S. ABC-4/9 APPROVED DOCUMENT 

British WW-10 

British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 9 

ANNEX +: Post-Arcadia -. 

British WW-8. 

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JCCSs-9

- JANUARY 11, 1942 

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED 

1. Establishment of Command in the ABDA Area. 

2. Situation in the ABDA Area. 

3. Establishment of United States forces in Northern relan 

(ABC-4/7, WW (J.P.C.) 7). 

4. Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia. 

(ABC-4/8, WW (J.P.C.) 8). 

5. Inclusion of Port Darwin in the ABDA Area. 

ANNEX 1: Establishment of United States Forces in North Ireland. 

U.S. Serial ABC-4/7 APPROVJEI DOCUW 

British Serial W-12 

BriOish Serial WW (J.P.C.) 7 

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SUBJECTS DISCUSSED 

1. Shipping for United States Reinforcements for the Far East. 

2. Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia. 

(ABC-4/8, W (J.P.C.) 8). 

ANNEX 1: Memorandum of Proposed Shipping Adjustments. 

ANNEX 2: DJa. 

U.S. Serial ABC-4/8 APPROVED DOCUMENT 

British Serial WW-13 

British Serial WH (J.P.C.) S 

Annex to ANNEX 2: Table showing Defense of Island 

Bases between Hawaii and Aus trali q. 

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JCCSs-11 ,IANUARY 13. 1942 

SUBJECTS IlISCUSSED 

1. Post-Arcadia Collaboration 

2. Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater - First Half 

of 1942. 

3. Operation Super-Gymnast. 

ANNEX I: Post-Arcadia Coll8boration. 

British WW-8. 

Minute to : Body to Allocate Eauiam&. 

ANNEX 2: Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater -­

of 1942, 

U.S. ABC-4/6 APPROVED DOCUMENT 

British WW-14 

British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 6. 

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JCCSs-12 JANUARY 14, 1942 

SUBJECTS DISCUSsFg 

1. Move of United States Reinforcements to the Far East. 

2. Super-Gymnast. 

3. Post-Arcadia Collaboration. 

ANNEX I: Operation Super-Gymnast. 

U.S. ABC-4/’2A 

British WW-17 

British WW (J.P.C.) 2A. 

ANNEX 2: Po6 t-Arcadia Collaboratioq. 

U.S. ABC-4/CS 4 

British WW-16 

APPROVED DOCUMENT 

APPROVED DOCUMENT 

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ABC-4 

JCCSs-1 

December 24, 1941. 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUIUING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

10:30 A.M., DECEMBER 24, 1941 

Present 

British Officers 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval 

Staff 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

U. S. Naval Officers 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President of the General Board 

Rear Admiral R. 3. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 

U. S. Army Officers 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and 

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army 

Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief 

of Staff, U. S. Army 

Brigadier General L. 'I.Gerow, Chief of War Plans Dfvision 

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Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R. M. 

Colonel E. 1. C. Jacob 

Commander Coleridge, R. N. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy 

Lieut. Colonel R. M. Robinett, G-2, General Headquarters, U.S.A. 

Major W. 'l.Sexton, Asst. Secretary, War Department General Staff 

The substance of the conference consisted of informal discussions of 

various points which had been brought up at a conference the previous evening at the White House, at which the President and Mr. Winston Churchill 

had been present. 

1. DEFENSE OF THE BRITISH ISLES. -

ADMIRAL 'STARK opened the discussion with the remark that he believed it apparent to all that the Br.itisb Isles was the fortress which 

must be protected at all cost, and that~inthis there was no serious differ. 

ence of opinion. He remarked that he was wondering as to the effectiveness 

of the United Kingdom defenses as regards invasion from the Continent, remarking that at least two Marine Corps obsefvers, after an inspection of the 

Island defenses, had come.to the conclusion that they left much to be desired. ADMIRAL STARK stated that the comments of these officers would b.: 

transmitted to the British for such use as they might care to make of them. 

MARSHAL DILL remarked that the defenses were constantly being 

improved 

ADMIRAL POUND welcomed Admiral Stark's proposal. 

2. HEAVY BOMBERS. -

ADMIRAL STARK made the point that in the future, heavy bombers 

sent to Great Britain would be manned by American crews; that some would be 

sent as units. 

AIR CHFEF MARSHAL PORTAL remarked that this had not been the original agreement. GENERAL ARNOLD stated that the R.A.E. was not to be deprlved 

of any hedvy bombers previously agreed to, hut that units would be sent in 

addition. Details to be worked out later. 

GENERAL MARSHALL remarked that Mr. Churchill had mentionen L ht the 

presence of American bombers, even in small numbers, in England would hnve an 

important influence on the French and the Germans. 

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3. RELIEF OF BRITISH TROOPS IN NORTHERN IREIAND AND ICELAND. 

THE PRIME MINISTER had request.ed that three British div.isions .in 

Northern Ireland be relieved at, the earliest practicable date. 

kLARSHAL DILL remarked that it was his understanding that the relieving force was to consist of three divisions plus one armored division. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed. ADMIRAL POUND asked at what time the troops in ire^ 

land could he relieved. GENERAL MIARSHALZ. replied t,hat the troops are avail-~ 

able now; the question is the availability of tonnage. 

ADMIRAL POUND asked with whom he rould get in touch on the tonnage 

matter, and was told that his representatives should see Colonel Gross of the 

G-4 Division, War Department General Staff. 

ADMIRAL STARK stated that the United States was ready to take Over 

the defense of Iceland, following which, howdver, base facilities would still 

be available to Great Britain. He also stated that the Marines in 'Iceland 

are an,important element of the United States amphibious force, and that it 

was desired that they be relieved prior to beginning the relief of the British 

troops there. 

MARSHAL DILL remarked that this would have to he worked out, and 

asked when the relief of the British could be accomplished. GENERAL GEROW 

replied that .it could be completed by March, 1942. 

ADMIRBL STARK added that, the whole question of relief was largely a 

matter of shipping, and added that United States production.is behind in 

ankiaircraft weapons, and that the British might he able to help out. 

THE CONFERENCE agreed that the programs for,these reliefs should he 

studied by the Joint Committee. 

4. GREENLAND. -

ADMIRAL STARK brought up the question of Greenland and asked General Arnold the status of air fields there. GENERAL ARNOLD stated that the 

United States now has a small force in Greenland; that two fields are projected; one field is ready now, but in the fog belb; another field, farther 

.to the north, will be ready'very soon. Xe stated that Greenland will be used 

essentially as a staging area between the United States and Europe. He added 

that he could furnish more details later. 

5. ANTI-.SUBMARINE MEASURES AND ESCORTS. -

ADMIRAL STARK stated that these would continue, in collaboration 

with the British; that the Prime Minister had mentioned the possibility of 

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getting additional United States destroyers. ADMIRAL STAFLK continued, "We 

just don't have any destroyers to spare, and in fact have far fewer than we 

require for our own needs." The construction program, he stated, was farthest behind in destroyers, battleships, and patrol vessels. He said that 

the situation along American seacoasts, with regard to the need for cotvettes 

and other small patrol craft, is critical. In fact, it is desired that the 

British lend to the United States my available vessels suitable for coastal 

patrol work. 

ADMIRAL WUND then suggested that the whole question of general 

Naval disposiCions of the two Navies be discussed. 

6. PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH ISLANDS IN THE ATLANTIC. -

ADMIRAL STARK asked Admiral Pound what importance he attached to 

the Azores. ADMIRAL POUND stated that the British attached tremendous importance to these Islands, particularly if Gibralter should become untenable. 

He said, "We need the Azores very much; they have great importance from every 

point of view." ADMIRAL POUND went on to say that the Canaries also are importanb; that they might be illvited to go in there. 

ADMIRAL STARK then asked what importance the British attach to the 

Cape Verde Islands. ADMIRAL WUND replied that it was only a quesbion of 

denying them to the enemy, rather than their actual use by the British. 

ADMIRAL KING then remarked that United States interest in the Cape Verde 

Islands is strategic, because of their location between Dakar and Brazil. 

He went on to say that "we can not do all these things"; the British should 

take the responsibility for the Azores, and the United States for the Cape 

Verde Islands. 

ADMIRAL STARK suggested that further study be given to this question, to which ADMIRAL POUND agreed. 

7. OCCUPATION OF AFRICA. -

ADMIRAL STARK said that he felt it undesirable for the United 

States to consider sending troops to Egypt or Libya. If the British can 

continue there and clean up, it would automatically protect Dakar, and at 

the same time Iran and Iraq would be of no great concern. So far as West 

Africa is concerned, the United States should fall in Iine with British action. 

GENERAL MARSHALL read notes taken from a memorandum made at the 

White House conference yesterday, to the effect that if the British should 

reach Tunis there was the possibility of a French invitation to occupy 

North Africa. 

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MARSHALDILL pointed out that the British had available to move on 

23 days' notice, an expeditionary force of 55,000 men which could be reinforced from Malta; that the Prime Minister had thought that if this occasion 

arose, it would be desirable for United States forces to land in Morocco, 

possibly to precede the British. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that at the present tlme a Corps Commander is 

planning an expedition to Africa which would include an emphibious corps. 

That this would he a task force, ready for any action that might present it 

self; and that if an opportunity existed to occupy North Africa without dif 

ficulty, the United States should take advantage of it. That United States 

troops for this purpose are available, but that there is a shortage in antiaircraft guns, .50 caliber ammunition and 37 mm. ammunition for both antiaircraft and anti-tank guns, also a shortage of planes. However, if the initial 

move could be made without fighting, the United States has already organized 

a sufficient number of squadrons to take care of the operation; that time is 

of greatest importance, and that while the American force could not complete 

its movement within 23 clays, it could within approximately 30 days at the 

earliest, contingent on the availability of tonnage. 

ADMIRAL KING asked as to the possibility of furnishing an American 

token force, such as a regiment. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that a token force as part of the British 

forces would be feasible, but that he could not put a lone regiment on the 

coast of Africa. The question was asked as to whether the Marines now in 

Iceland could be ready for this move. GENERAL HOLCOMB agreed that they 

could be. 

THE CONFERENCE agreed that this question should be studied by the 

Joint Planning Committee. 

8. BRAZIL. -

ADMIRAL KING said that the political situation in Brazil made the 

United States Marine-Naval position of a "touch and go" nature; that the 

Germans are well organized in Brazil and have followers among important members of the Government If it becomes necessary to occupy Brazil, such a 

move might meet with armed resistance 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that after prolonged negotiations, the 

United States has been able to place only a small number of unarmed Marines 

in Brazil 

9. THE CURACAO-ARUBA AREA. -

ADMIRAL STARK brought up the question of the critical situation 

in the Curacao-Aruba area with respect to Allied oil supply, pointing out 

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that 95% of the oil used on the eastern coast comes from that area; and that 

one-half of the Lend-lease oil for Britain comes from that area. He stated 

that the troops on these Islands should be placed on the strictest alert; 

that bime was of the greatest importance; and suggested that the Bribish 

Chiefs of Staff do everything they could with their own authorihies In London to expedite Amepican entry into these Islands, parbicularly Bviabion 

units. 

ADMIRAL POUND agreed to take the matter up that afternoon. 

10. PACIFIC AREA. -

ADMiRAL STARK listed the joint aims in the Pacific, as follows: 

Protechion of the Burma Road 

Aid to China 

Aid to the Netherlands East Indies 

To hold Singapore 

To hold the Philippine Islands 

Use of Australia as a base. 

ADMIRAL STARK then reviewed the Nrlval situabion in the Far East as 

pertains to the Asiatic Fleet. GENERAL MARSHALL reviewed the arrangements 

which had been made to get planes to the Philippines, not only from Australia, but by corlvoys; also by flying by way of the eastern route. GENERAL 

MARSHALL stated that the critical feature of assistance to the Philippines 

from Australia was the existence of fields in Borneo; and that the present 

issue is to elaborate our plans for building up bases in Australia. 

ADMIRAL POUND then reviewed what ships the BFibish Navy has around 

Singapore. 

The question was asked MARSHAL DILL as to his opinion of the situation at Singapore, to which he replied that, with reinforcements, the British 

would be able to hold Johore State. 

11. BOMBARDMENT OF JAPAN. -

ADMIRAL STARK asked as to the situation in China for air fields to 

be used as bases for bombing attacks against Japan. 

GENERAL ARNOLD stated that General Brett had written for air transport planes for use in reconnaissance work and for supply. He stated that 

no bombing operations should be undertaken against Japan unless they are 

strong enough to create substantial damage; that the minimum number of 

bombers should be 50; that unsustained attacks would only tend to solidify 

the Japanese people. 

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12. RUSSIAN SITUATION.-

It was stated that it is not practicable at this time for Russia to 

begin operations in the Far East, as it might jeopardize her efforts in the 

west, and that Stalin should not be urged. The Prime Minister had quoted 

Stalin as saying that Russia was not ready to enter the war in the Far East 

now, but perhaps would be able do so in the spring. 

13. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.-

ADMIRAL STARK brought up the question of German intentions in the 

Iberian Peninsula. and expressed fear of German action through that area. 

He asked Admiral Pound for his views, who replied that British Joint Intelligence reports no signs of concentration of German troops in the south of 

France. ADMIRAL STARK remarked that, nevertheless, everyone should be on 

guard. He then asked Marshal Dill as to the significance of the change in 

the German high command. MARSHAL DILL stated that it probably concerned a 

difference of opinion on future operations. 

14. AIRPLANE CARRIERS.-

ADMIRAL STARK said that the United States situation with respect 

to airplane carriers was bery bad, and that while the Navy was making plans 

to convert passenger ships and tankers into ariplane carriers, in view of 

possible troop transport requirements, he had agreed to discuss proposed 

conversions with General Marshall. ADMIRAL STARK stated that.with respect 

to flying boats for the British, the situation was such that the United 

St,ates could not furnish any. 

15. P.B.Y's FOR THE BRITISH.-

The conversation then was directed to the supply of heavy bombers 

and P.B.Y's for the British. ADMIRAL TOWERS remarked that our present productiun of F.B.Y's was 46 per month, and that this was being stepped up to 

150 of all types. ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the bottleneck was really 

one of personnel rather than anything else. ADMIRAL STARK remarked that all 

possible help has been given the British in the matter of aircraft. REAR 

ADMIRAL TOWERS pointed out that the four-engine bomber program can not but 

interfere with the Naval aircraft progress for at least the next eight months. 

To emphasize his statement, he remarked that some American Naval aircraft 

fait,orirs. because of the four-engine bomber program, can only obtain material enough for an eight hour, five-day week. 

16. BRITISH CREWS FOR AMERICAN SHIPS. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that available personnel for American merchant 

ships is so limited that he would like the British to consider the possibility of having British crews man American ships. ADMIRAL POUND said the 

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matter was questionable and that it should be discussed with Admiral Little. 

17. GUNS FOR MERCHANT SHIPS. -

The question of guns for American ships was brought up. The United 

States Navy has furnished the British with 400 guns for arming merchant vessels. ADMIRAL STARK inquired if any of these could be returned, as there was 

a shortage. 

ADMIRAL POUND stated that he would have the matter examined and do 

the best he could to meet the American requirements, which were to be made 

known to him. 

18. NAVAL DISPOSITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC. -

ADMIRAL STARK proposed that the British take over capital ship responsibility in the Atlantic, and listed fleet elements that would be required in that ocean. 

19. PRIORITIES IN EXPEDITIONS. -

GENERAL MARSHALL brought up the question of priorities in expeditions, and asked Marshal Dill if he had set up any such priorities. MARSHAL 

DILL said that the priorities were in the following order: 

Africa 

Ice land 

North Ireland. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked if the French do not irlvite an occupation, what disposition will be made of the expeditionary force of 55,000. 

MARSHAL DILL said that if the Germans go through Spain, the British 

hope to take the Canaries, whether invited or not. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked how many troops would be required, and 

MARSHAL DILL replied only a small force of a few battalions. The British do 

not want any more than that down there. The question was then asked, if the 

British take the offensive and occupy the Canary Islands, what cooperation 

would be expected of the United States. ADMIRAL POUND, by nodded consent, 

indicated that the United States should take action in the Cape Verde Islands. 

20. WEST AFRICA. -

GENERAL NLARSHALL brought up the question of what was to be done at 

Freetown and Bathurst. This question was not settled. 

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ADMIRAL POUND then asked about Dakar. ADMIRAL TURNER stated that 

the United States is getting up a plan for its occupahion. 

ADMIRAL STARK asked Marshal Dill if he agreed that Dakar couId be 

taken by direct attack. MARSHAL DILL stated that it could be done. 

21. BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM. -

ADMIRAL POUND then read a memorandum signed by the British Chiefs 

of Staff', which was amended in minor points. (See Annex 1 for Revised Version). During the discussion, the following points were brought out: 

MARSHAL DILL was asked what is the maximum estimated need in 

United States troops for an offenslve against Germany. The answer *as 15 to 

17 divisions in 1942, or early 1943, including armored divisions. ADMIRAL 

TURNER then stated that 45 divisions was the maximum which could be transported and supplied by available shipping in sight. 

ADMIRALKING pointed out that the most mischievous naval operabions which the Germans could make at this time would be a mass surface and 

submarine attack on convoy routes in the Atlantic. ADMIRAL STARK then stated 

that a most important target for the bombing operations against Germany 

should be shipyards where submarines and airplane carriers are being built. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL agreed. 

ADMIRAL POUND was given a copy of the American N&val building program. He stated to General Marshall that the United States Army should look 

into the matter of putting a force into North Africa if' the British do, under 

either of the following conditions: 

8. If Invited by the French. 

B. If Germany makes a mdve through the 

Iberian Peninsula. 

In either case the attack should be a surprise. 

22. BRITISH ESTIMATE OF ATTACK ON WEST COAST OF NOHTH AMERICA. -

In response to a request from Admiral Stark, ADMIRALPOUND read to 

the Conference a note which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff 

on the probable scale of attack on the West Coast of North America. 

In 'view of the short Cime which the United States Chiefs of Staff 

had had to study the British Chi.efs of Staff memorandufo, further discusslon 

on it was deferred. (See Annex a) 

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The meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m., with instructions given that 

the Planning Committee would meet in the afternoon and that the Chiefs of 

Staff Conference would recorivene at 10:30 a.m., December 25th. 

2 ENCLOSURES: 

Annex 1. - American-British Strategy HW-I. 

Annex 2. - Probable maximum scale of Enemy Attack on West Coast of 

North America. 

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ANNEX 1 

To 

ABC-4 

JCCSs-1 

TO BE KEPT UNDER MCX AND KEY 

W.W.-1. (U.S. Revised) 

It is requested that special 

care may be taken to ensure the 

secrecy of this document. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

AMERICAN -BRITISH STRATEGY. 

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF. 

REVISED BY U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF. 

1. GRAND STRATEGY 

1 At the A-B’: Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agrped 

that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequrntly 

the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre 

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the 

entry of Japan into the Mar, our view remains that Germany is still the prime 

enemy and her defeat is the key to victory Once Germany is defeated, the 

collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow. 

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from ope.rations against Germany 

I1 ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY 

4. The essential features of the abdve grand strategy are as follows. 

Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper. 

-a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, whi<h 

first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry. 

Note: ­ * For brevity the abbreviated 

A B is used to denote 

American-British 

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Q. The maintenance of essential communications. 

c. Closing and tightening the ring round Germany. 

@. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive actj.vities, and propaganda. 

g. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany. 

-f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will 

safeguard vital interests and deny to Japan access to raw materials 

vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the rtefea.t of Germany. 

111. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1042 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE 

GENERAL POLICY,. 

THE SEClJRITY OF ABERS OF WAR PRODUCTION. 

5. In so far as these are 1ikel.y to be att,acked, the main areas of 

war industry are situated in:­

&. The United Kingdom. 

p. Continental United States, particular1.y the West Coast. 

c. Russia. 

6. THE UNITED KINGDOM. To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be 

necessary to maintain at all ti.mes the minimum forces required to defeat 

invasion. 

7. THE UNITED STATES. The maj~ncentres of production on or near the 

West Coast of United St,ates must be prot,ected from .Japanese sea-borne attack. 

This will be facilitated by holding I!awaii and. Alaska. We consider that a 

Japanese invasion of the United StaI,cs on a large scale is hj.ghly improbable, 

whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not. 

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nat,ure of the forces 

required for the defense of the United States are matters for LIE Unit,ed 

States Chiefs of Staff to assess. 

9. RUSSIA. It will be essential to afford the liussians material assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the 

oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue thriy war effort,. 
U.S. SECRET 

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MAINTENANCE OF COWNICATIONB. 

10. The main set4 router whlch nut be recured we!­

@. From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom. 

Q. From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia. 

9. The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape. 

d. The routes in the Indian Ocean t.0 the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, 

to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia. 

e. The route through the Panama Canal, and U.S. coastal traffic 

f. The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to 

Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East. In addition to the above 

routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route. 

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:­

-a. From the U.S. to South America, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo. 

b. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, 

Australasia. 

E. From the U.S. to Australla via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia. 

a. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via 

the Netherlands East Indies. 

8. From the U.S. to the U.K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland 

and Iceland. 

f. From the U.S. to the U.K. via the Azores. 

g. From the U.S. to Vladivostok via Alaska. 

12. The security of these routes involves:­

8.. Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions. 

P. Holding and capturing essential sea bases. The main sea 

bases which are, or may be, required, apart from the terminal points 

to the various routes, are:­

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Bermuda 

Iceland 

Gibraltar or the Canaries 

The Azores 

Cape Verdes 

Free town 

Dakar 

Madagascar 

Ceylon 

Hawaii 

Samoa 

c. Holding and capturing essential air bases. The main air bases 

which are or may be required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:-

Mewf oundland 

Greenland 

Iceland 

Azores 

Bermuda 

Trinidad 

Belem 

Natal 

Free town 

Ascension Island 

Takoradi 

Lagos 

Kano 

Ft. Lamy 

Khartoum 

Massaua 

Cairo 

Habbaniya 

CLOSING AND TIGHTENING THE RING AROUND 

Basra 

Teheran 

Kuibyshev 

Dakar 

Karachi 

Calcutta 

Hawaii 

Christmas Island 

Palmyra 

Canton 

Samoa 

Fiji 

New Caledonia 

TownSville 

Darwin 

Glencurry 

Koepang (Timor) 

Soerabaj a 

GERMANY. 

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: 

ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTZIERN SEABOARD OF TIiE 

MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE. 

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps 

in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by 

increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the 

whole North African coast. 

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14. If this ring can be closed, the blockade of Germany and Italy will 

be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the 

Atlantic seaboard of Africa, will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of 

the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to corivoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape. 

THE UNDERMINING AND WEARING DOWN OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE 

16. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance 

will be:­

a Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces 

b Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means 

C. The blockade. 

d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements. 

DEVELOPMENT OF LAND OFFENSIVES ON THE CONTINENT 

16 It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany, except on the Russian front, will he possible. We 

must, however, he ready to take advantage of any opening that may result 

from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited 

land offensives. 

17 In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, via 

the Scandinavian Peninsula, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the 

Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of 

Northwestern Europe Such operations will be the prelude to the final. as 

sault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be 

such as to provide means by which they can be carried out. 

THE SAFEGUARDING OF'VITAL INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN THEATW 

18 The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained and Chinese resistance supported. Secondly, points of 'vantage from 

which an offensive against Japan can eventually he developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:­

a. Hawaii and Alaska. 

b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines 

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c. Rangoon and the route to China. 

d. The Maritime Provinces of Russia. 

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have 

to be a matter of mutual discussion. 

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PROBABLE MAXIMUM SCALE OF EMeMY ATTACK ON WEST 

COAST OF NORTH AhIERICA 

EXAMINATION OF PROBAEILE FORM OF ENEMY ATTACK. 

1. Enemy attack on the western seaboard of North America might. be 

undertaken with the object of reducing United States offensive power in th? 

Pacific through material destruction at shipyards and bases and also with 

the object of containing forces in America. 

2. The following forms of attack have been considered: ­

a. Seaborne expeditions; 

b. Naval bombardment; 

c Carrier borne air attacks; 

d Mine-laying in ports and their approaches and attacks by 

human torpedoes. 

SEABORNE EXPEDITIONS. 

3. So long as a United States capital ship force is retained in the 

Pacific, it is extremely improbable that the Japanese would venture to 

launch a large scale expedition against a North American objective without. 

battleship cdver. It must also be assumed that apart from the destroyer 

escorts for the convoys, destroyers would be essential for A/A and A/S 

protection for the battleships. 

4 The diagram attached* to this Annex illustrates the large distances to be covered and shows that even if the enemy secured Dutch Harbour 

and Ilawaii, it would be necessary to carry out the refueling of destroyers 

at sea 

n’hile the refueling of an expedition at sea in hostile waters ran 

not be ruled out positlvely, the complications and risks of such an operation on a large scale are sufficiently great to make it extremely unlikely. 

Added to this factor is the problem of maintaining a large scale expedition 

over 4,000 miles from its base. 

* APPENDIX A 

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5. These difficulties do not apply so strongly to a small scale raiding force escorted by cruisers and aircraft carriers which hdve much greater 

endurance. For this reason it is necessary to take into account the possibility that a force comprising 10-15 fast merchant ships carrying up to 2 

brigades on a low scale of transport might undertake a destructive raid. 

NAVAL BOMBARDMENT. 

6. For the reasons given abdve, the employment of enemy battleships 

any great distance to the eastward of Hawaii is improbable. Naval bombardment of important objectives on the west coast of North America is therefore 

likely to be restricted to bombardment by armoured ships other than ships of 

the line and cruisers. 

CARRIER-BORNE AIR ATTACKS. 

7. The employment of a carrier force escorted by cruisers for the air 

attack of important naval and industrial objectives is the most probable 

threat which has to be met. It is considered that the Japanese could make 

available a force of from 2-3 aircraft carriers escorted by 4 cruisers. with. 

out interfering with her dispositions for the other operations upon which she 

is now engaged. This would involve an attack by some 80-100 dive and/or torpedo bombers, with ship escort of approximately 24 fighters. 

MINE-LAYING IN PORTS AND THEIR APPROACHES AND ATTACKS BY HUMAN TORPEDOES. 

6. Mine-laying by raiders and submarines in coastal waters must be expected. The enemy's ability to carry out attacks by human torpedoes has, it 

is understood, been demonstrated at Hawaii. It cannot therefore be ignored. 

CONCLUSIONS 

So long as the United States maintains a battle fleet in the Pacific, large scale seaborne expeditions against the western seaboard cE North 

America and the employment of capital ship forces in this area are considered 

impracticable. The most probable enemy threat is carrier-borne air attacks 

and sporadic naval bombardment, but a small scale destructive raid cannot be 

ignored. In view of the great distances over which these operations would 

have to be undertaken, it is probably not necessary to provide a strong scale 

of defense except at selected points of great importance, which can be covered by the normal form of coast and air defense supplemented by mobile land 

and air striking forces. 

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APPENDIX A TO 

ANNEX 2 

Dutch Harbour 

Vancouver 

Tokyo 

3, 

2,300 

Panama ialuit 2,500 

X 

Sydney 

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ABC 4 

JCCSs 2 December 25, 1941 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

4 F.M., DECEMBER 25, 1941 

Present 

British Officers 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval 

Staff 

Fiel'd Marshal Sir John Dill 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff 

U. 5. Naval Officers 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief, Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

U. S. Army Officers 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and 

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army 

Lieut. General �I.H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief 

of Staff, U. S. Army 

Hrig. General D. D. Eisenhower, War Plans Division, W.D.G.S. 

Joint Secretaries 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations 

Lieut. Col. P. M. Robinett, G-2, General Headquarters, U.S.A. 

Major W. T. Sexton, Asst. Secretary, General Staff, W.D.G.S. 

1. PROGRAM OF PLANNING.. 

HEAR ADMIRAL TURNER said that the Planning Committee had been work 

ing on t,wo projects which were nearly completed:­

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a. Outline plan proposed for peaceful occupation of North 

Africa. 

p. Program of priorities in the Atlantic. 

It was anticipated that they would be ready for presentation shortly. 

2. DISPOSITION OF THE MOUNT VERNON.-

GENEFUL MARSHALL said that he had been given to understand that it 

was desired to alter the destination of the MOUNT VERNON. 

ADMIFLAL STARK stated that orders had been issued for the MOUNT VERNON 

to proceed to Singapore or any other place the British Admiralty desired, but 

stated that these instructions did not involve escort being furnished for the 

MOUNT VERNON by the United States. ADMIRAL POUND indicated that the British 

had no intention of asking the United States to furnish escort, and stated that 

he regarded such escort as being a responsibility of the Royal Navy. 

3. DIVERSION OF REINFORCE?4ENTS.-

GENERAL MARSHALL discussed the possible diversion of reinforcements 

to the Philippines. He stated that up to the present moment, he had had no 

opportunity to consult with Admiral Stark on the matter,-but he had been called 

on to submit a list of troop and equipment departures and anticipation of arrivals in Australia. He read this data, a copy of which was furnished to the 

British Chiefs of Staff, (See Annex 1). He also stated that General Brett had 

been ordered to proceed immediately to Australia and place himself under the 

direction of General MacArthur, and to forward his recommendations as to the 

situation in the Philippine Islands. He stated that the question of his (General Brett's) continued subordinotion to General MacArthur would be determined 

later. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL mentioned that the Australian representatives in Washington had stated that unless ten million gallons of 100-octane 

gasoline could be forwarded to Australia immediately, the planes there would 

shortly be immobilized. GENERAL ARNOLD said that this is no problem so long 

as we can keep contact with Sumatra, as Sumatra furnishes this gasoline. AIR 

CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL said that it was his understanding that the Sumatra gasoline was not satisfactory and that American-produced gasoline was involved. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the only difficulty involved in the Sumatra 

gasoline was the aromatics in it, which affected adversely the self-sealing 

tanks. This difficulty had been anticipated and extra tanks for replacements 

were being forwarded to Australia. The new tanks would not be so affected by 

aromatics. 

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With reference to the diversion of reinforcements intended for the 

Philippine Islands, GENERAL MAFSHALL said, "We do not have enough information 

at this time from General MacArthur to make a decision on this matter. However, we must not stand idle while waiting to know what he proposes. Until 

we how what the local situation is, we can not cut off reinforcements from 

him. We will know in 24 hours whether or not it is a fast withdrawal and 

where it goes, and whether or not pursuit planes can get to him." 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL asked if General MacArthur has any instructions 

relative to the disposal of airplanes if he can not operate in the Philippine 

Islands. GENERAL ARNOLD replied that the bombers are already operating from 

Australia. He further stated that it must be assumed that the man on the 

ground will do the right thing. He said that General MacArthur has a good 

air officer who can be counted on to dispose properly of the remaining pursuit planes. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL asked if General MacArthur would send his pura 

suit to Singapore. He added further that it was difficult for any man on the 

spot to make a decision relative to the disposal of his own means; that the 

decision should be made here by the responsible group. 

4. UNIFIED COMMAND.-

GENERAL MARSHALL then brought up the question of command. He said, 

'I express these as my personal views and not those as a result of consultation with the Navy or with my own War Plans Division. As a result of what I 

saw in France and from following our own experience, I feel very strongly 

that the most important consideration is the question of unity of command. 

The matters being settled here are mere details which will continuously reocrur unless settled in a broader way. With differences between groups and 

between services, the situation is impossible unless we operate on a frank 

and direct basis. I am convinced that there must be one man in command of 

the entire theater - air, ground, and ships. We can not manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to 

place portions of troops under another service. If we make a plan for unified 

command now, it will solve, nine-tenths of our troubles. 

"There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they 

are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not achieve this, 

We never think alike - there are the opinions of those on this side of the 

table and of the people on the other side; but as for myself, I am willing to 

go the limit to accomplish this. We must decide on a line of action here and 

not expect it to be done out there. I favor one man being in control, but operating under a controlled directive from here. We had to come to thjs in the 

first World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much 

valuable time, blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If we could 

decide on A unified command now, it would be a great advance over what was accomplished during the World War.'' 

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AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that the experience in London has been that 

the highest authority is the only one that can decide as to the allocation of 

forces; and when the allocation is decided upon, the directive has been formulated, and the forces allotted, everything else moves smoothly. If allocations are controlled from Washington, there should be no difficulty. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the British and Americans are in complete 

agreement as to allocations; what he was speaking of was operations in the 

field. 

5. DISPOSITION OF FORCES DESTIND FOR THE FAR EAST.-

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that the disposition of our forces must be 

planned first. This can be considered a Staff study, without commitments, 

based on ultimate dispositions under the following two conditions: 

a. The Philippine Islands holding. 

b. In case the Philippine Islands can not hold. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt this study should probably have first 

priority. 

ADMIRAL POUND inquired as to whether or not a study could be made of 

this entire problem, stating that it was of such an urgent nature that other 

things should be set aside, and inquired as to the proper directive. The consensus was that this should be done, and the senior members of the Planning 

Committee were called in and so informed. 

ADMIRAL STllRK requested Rear Admiral Turner to give hls opinion as 

to the question of allocations of aircraft reinforcements now going to the 

Far East. REBR ADMIRAL TURNER replied that responsibility should be given to 

General MacArthur if he is in a position to acrept it where the planes are to 

be delivered; otherwise to General Brett. 

There followed a discussion as to the proper directive, and several 

preliminary directives were drafted by various members of the Chiefs of Staff 

group. 

As the American officers were due at the White House for a meeting, 

the conference adjourned at 5:20 p.m. 

After the main conference adjourned, ADMIRAL POUND called into consultation Colonel Jacob, Commander Coleridge, and Colonel Robinett, and discussed the various phases of proposed directives. A directive for submission 

to the senior members of the Planning Committee was drawn up and submitted to 

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Rear Admiral Turner, who at the time was presiding at another meeting in the 

Federal Reserve Building. It was understood that Rear Admiral Turner and 

Hrlgadier General Gerow were not to accept the directive unless it was entirely agreeable to them, and Brigadier General Gerow was so informed by 

Colonel Robinett. 

1 ENCLQSURE: 

Annex 1 Utilization of U. S. Forces 

in Australia. 

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ANNEX I 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: 

Subject: Utilization of U. S. Forces in Australia. 

1. U. S. combat troops now in Australia and expected there at approximate dntes indicated: 

a. Now present: 

18 pursuit planes 

52 dive bombers 

Elements of 2 regiments of 75 mm. artillery, (28 of its 

48 guns are present. The 20 others are on a slow 

boat which left Samoa December 18). Only 500 round~s 

of 75 mm. ammunition available until about January 8, 

when 5,0@0 rounds will arrive at Brisbane. 

b_. Expected soon: 

(1) 55 pursuit pl-anes and crews (about January 8). 

(2) To begin arriving in theater on or a.bout January 3; three 

heavy bombers per d.ay until a total of eighty is assembled. These planes are now directed to report to 

General MacArthur for orders upon arrival at Bangalore 

For operations of the immediate future, there is an 

adequate number of 500 lb. and smaller bombs, as well 

as 56 - 1000 lb. bombs on the convoy now proceeding 

from Brisba.ne to Port Darwin. Already at Darwin are 

560 of the 500 lh. type, H'ith 260 at Port Moresby. 

(3) 55 pursuit and crews, about January 16. 

(4) 70 pursuit planes and crews, about January 18. (It is 

possible th8.t capacity of ship will be found to be 40 

planes). 

(5) A pursuit group, complete as to materiel, including 80 

planes, will leave San Diego on the KITTY HAWK about 

January 10. Additional ships will be necessary for 

the personnel. 

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NOTE: Dates at which there can arrive in Australia necessary ground crews 

and maintenance facilities for all the planes listed in the first three 

shipments are still uncertain. But, including the pilots sent from the 

Philippine Islands to Australia, and with maximum help from Australian 

sources, all planes can temporarily operate usefully, pending the arrival of necessary maintenance units. Including planes already arrived 

or en route, the U. S. Air Corps has already allocated a grand total of 

333 pursuit planes for shipment to Australia. The above represents the 

maximum capacity of ships now available. 

2. All U. S. forces in Australia are to be commanded by Major General 

George H. Brett General Brett has been under orders to take his instructions from General MacArthur. However, the situation in the Philippines apparently has changed to an extent that makes it improbable that pursuit 

plane reinforcements can be forwarded to General MacArthur. Therefore, the 

following instructions were sent General Brett at Chungking December 24th 

A.M.: 

PROCEED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO AUSTRALIA TO ASSUME COMMAND OF U. S. 

ARMY INTERESTS IN THAT REGION. BJPORT ARRIVAL AND FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY 

WITH A PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATION OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN VIEW OF 

SITUATION IN PHrLIPPINES AT THAT TIME. MARSHALL. 

3. It is intended that General Brett's status with regard to subordination to General MacArthur will be settled in the light of the situation in 

the Philippines at the time of his arrival in Australia. 

4. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff jointly recommend: 

&. That immediate request be made upon Australian, British, and 

Dutch authorities to render maximum assistance to the U. S. Commander 

in Australia in the preparation of his air elements for combat, and in 

the establishment and protection of the necessary bases, with a view 

to the immediate entry of these air forces into action. 

b. That the responsible British and American Commanders be directed to make preliminary arrangements for effective combat cooperation between other forces of the Associated Powers and the U S. Air 

Force in the Southwestern Pacific. Preliminary plans for. early sup 

port of Singapore to be initiated at once. 

5. The current U. S. Air Corps objective in the Southwestern Pacific, 

exclusive of China and Russia, is: 

2 Heavy Groups SO planes 

2 Medium Groups --114 planes 

6 Pursuit Groups --480 planes 

Necessary base and auxiliary units. 

This strength canbe attained RS rapidly as shipping facilities permit. 

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ABC-4 

JCCSs-3 December 26, 1941 

THE CBIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

3 P.M., DECEMBER 26, 1941 

Present 

British Officers 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval 

Staff 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

U. S. Naval Officers 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. 5. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 

U. S. Army Officers 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and 

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army 

Lleut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief 

of Staff, U. S. Army 

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division 

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Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R. M. 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Lieut. Colonel Paul McD. Robinett, G-2, GIIQ 

Mador W. T. Sexton, G. S. C., Assistant Secretary K.D.G.S. 

1. PRIORITIES FOR U.S. AND U.X. OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN TIlE ATLANTIC 

OCEAN - (ABC-4/1) 

ADMIRAL STARK read the proposed plan and there followed a general 

discussion. 

ADMIRAL TURNER said that the Joint Planning Committee recognized 

the importance of the North African project (operation GYhiNAST), but were 

not at this stage prepared to make recommendations on the relative priority 

of this and the other projects mentioned ir; paragraph l(b) of tiieir Report. 

The limitations on shipping and naval escort forces made it impossible to 

carry nut the North African plan, and simultaneously relieve the British 

forces in Ireland and Iceland. If the North African .project were carried 

out as envisaged, each power would produce the requisite amount of shipping 

for its own forces, but would have none extra avallable to lend to the 

other power. In addition, shipping required for the British part of “GYMNAST“ would seriously interfere with Eritisn reinforcements to the Middle 

East. 

The British delegation considered two Tossible moments at which 

the North African project would have to be put into effect as rapidly as 

possible; either (a) when British forces, moving from th~eeastward, had 

occupied Tripoli, or (b) when Marshal Petain resigned, as had been thought 

possible. The second occasion now seemed unlikely to occur, though the 

first remained; and it was felt that the Chiefs of Staff should obtain a 

decision from the President and the Prime Minister as to whether or not it 

had been decided to make a political approach to the French authorities in 

order to obtain an invitation to enter French lVorth Bfrica. The British 

forces for “GYXNAST” were ready but their removal from the United Kingdom 

would leave the defense of the British Isles weak unless the United States 

took over the Iceland and Ireland Commitments. Nevertheless, the British 

view was that the North African pro.ject would have to go forward if an 

invitation were received. 

It was generally agreed that, for the purposes of paragraph 3 of 

the Joint Planning Committee‘s Report, the inaJor operations in the Atlantic area, only one of which could be carried nut at one time, could be 

stated to be:­

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Northwest Africa. 

West Africa. 

Northeast Brazil and the Cape Verdf Islands. 

Northern Ireland and Iceland. 

The occupation of the Canaries (by invitation), the Azores, and of Aruba 

and Curacao, fell into the category of minor operations. Further consideration would have to be given to the status of the Madagascar operation. 

It appeared that the British Chiefs of Staff understood that this 

report (see Annex l), was accepted. However, the understanding of the United 

States Chiefs of Staff was that it was accepted in principle but should be 

restudied and resubmitted for further consideration. 

2. NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT 

The British delegation was of the opinion that it would take German 

forces six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, and, without Spanish cooperation, 

a further six weeks to become firmly established in the South of Spain. It 

was pointed out that this estimate was based on the best information available 

to the British, and took account of the fact that the Germans at the present 

time had no forces readily available to undertake the operation. It was 

realized that with Spanish help the date of arrival in South Spain could be 

considerably accelerated. 

ADMIRAL TURNER explained that the Joint Planning Committee felt that 

only Casablanca should be used, in the first instance, as the minor ports were 

difficult to protect from submarine attack and effective anti-air protection 

could only be given to one port. He pointed out that the size of the North 

African expedition as envisaged by the Joint Planning Committee was greatly in 

excess of anything previously considered, and the implications on shipping 

were therefore enormous. Was this increase in size essential - particularly 

with regard to air? The British view was that the German Air Force was already 

stretched almost to its limit. It was decided that consideration of the size 

of the forces required should be deferred. 

It was also pointed out that one reason why large forces had to be 

envisaged was that the French authorities would in all probability only issue. 

the invitation if the bait were, in their opinion, adequate. It was suggested 

that the French air force in North Africa might, in the early stages, prove of 

some value in spite of its known lack of spares, but GENERAL ARNOLD said that 

from a recent conversation he had had with a French officer who had recently 

left North Africa, he understood that only 40 of the French aircraft were 

capable of taking the air. 

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The U. S.-British Chiefs of Staff gave general approval to the 

Report, Annex 2, subject to certain amendments, and subject to further 

consideration of the strength of the forces required for the expedition. 

2 Enclosures: 

Annex 1 - Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas 

Expedition in Atlantic Ocean - ABC-4/1; W.W. (J.P.C.) 1 

Annex 2 - Northwest Africa Project (Super-GYMNAST) - ABC-4/2; W.W. 

(J.P.C.)2 

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ANNEX 1 

This paper was not approved but was returned to the Joint Planning 

Committee for reconsideration and re-submission for further consideration. 

U. S SERIAL ABC-4/1 

BRITISH SERIAL W.W. (JPC) 1 

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND 

UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS 

IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAEi 

REPORT BY THE U.S.-BRITIS11 JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by 

the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as 

follows: 

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of 

United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance: 

a, The relief by United States troops of British troops 

in Iceland and North Ireland. 

Q The occupation by invitation of the following positions: 

The Azores. 

The Cape Verde Islands. 

The Canary Islands. 

French West Africa. 

French North Africa 

Diepo Suarez in Madagascar. 

Curacao and Aruba. 

Northeast Brazil. 

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial 

occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the 

directive should be allocated as follows: 

-a To the United States - the occupation of the Cape 

Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and 

Aruba, Northeast Brazil. 

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b To the United Kingdom - the occupation of the 

Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez 

in Madagascar. 

c To the United States and the United Kingdom acting 

jointly - the occupation of French North Africa. 

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan 

(U.S. Serial ABC--4/2, British Serial W.W. (J.P.C.)2) is undertaken, we see 

no prospect of any major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area 

for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from 

the United Kinpdom will be severely curtailed. 

4. No ma.jor overseas operations can be performed by the United States 

unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as 

troop transports. 

Washington, D. C. 

25th December, 1941. 

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ANNEX 2 

This paper was not approved but was returned to the Joint Planning 

Committee for reconsideration and resubmission for further consideration. 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/2 

BRITIS�I SERIAL R.W. (J.P.C.)Z 

PROJECT - GYMNAST 

Ke submit below a provisional examination of the project for loin$ 

operations in Northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following 

hypotheses: ­

-a That we receive an actual invitation or reasonable 

assurance there will be only token resistance. 

k That owing to their pre-occupations on the Eastern 

front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade 

Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that with 

out Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six 

weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in 

the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. N'e 

therefore anticipate a period of about three months before a 

heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North 

Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effectiv 

resistance on the mainland to e German invasion, 'but would not 

give the Germans free entry and full facillties. Once the 

mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted 

freely into Spanish Morocco. 

-c That the Germans are not established in French North 

Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the 

occupation of French Xorocco. 

OBJECTIVE. 

We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern 

French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from 

which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block 

Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base 

from which Allied control of all North Africa could be extended. 

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BASE. 

The only suitable ma n base in the area 3 Casablanca. This port is 

well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies outside the Straits 

of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside 

the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be 

liable to interruption once the Germsns reached South Spain. Initially, 

owing to scarcity of anti-aircraft defenses and air forces, a single main 

base must be used for the whole force in North Africa. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE. 

There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces 

at Casablanca, which has a considerable garrison and coast defenses. The 

first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States 

Marine Eivision is eminently suitable for this task, and there would be 

much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American 

forces rather than British. 

SUPPORT TO FRENCH IN TUNISIA. 

The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Xestern Morocco, or perhaps a condition of their entry, would be a demand from the 

French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, 

have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an 

Armored Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two Anti-aircraft Regiments, and 

three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through 

by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrfval of the advance guard at Casablanca. 

DEFENSE OF MOROCCAN AREA. 

It will be essential to get sufficient forces into t,he Casablanca 

area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being 

driven out by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points 

to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and anti-aircraft 

defenses. 

The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential 

in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco. 

The joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first 

three months are estimated at:­

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1 Marine (combat loaded) Amphibious Division 

3 Infantry Divisions 

2 Armored Divisions 

320 First line fighter aircraft 

57 First line medium bomber aircraft 

57 First line light bomber aircraft 

63 First line observation aircraft 

120 Heavy anti-aircraft guns 

216 Light anti-aircraft guns 

Base and L. of C. units 

As further forces become available, all points of entry along the coast 

will be secured. 

TOTAL FORCES REQUIRED. 

The total forces ULTIMATELY required to hold French North Africa against 

possible German attacks through Spain and Italy, and to open the Mediterranean 

route by providing air cover along the coast, will depend on the assistance 

that may be furnished by the French and Spanish. The combined British and 

United States forces might amount to about: 

2s - 2 Armored Divisions 

5 - 3 Infantry Divisions 

Anti-aircraft weapons (350 heavy and 700 light) 

First line aircraft: 

800 Pursuit 

105 Heavy Bombardment 

228 Medium Bombardment 

171 Light Bombardment 

100 Naval Patrol 

JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH EFFORT NECESSARY. 

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole 

commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint 

expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility, 

as defined in ABC-1 As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it 

will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detailed 

planning can proceed. 

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NAVAL FORCES 

BRITISH. 

Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in 

the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft 

carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet 

watching the northern passages and by Force I3 in the Gibraltar area should be 

sufficient . 

There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and 

slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. 

This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal United Kingdom to 

Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade 

protection for a considerable period. 

UNITED STATES. 

The U. S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support 

for the transit and landin8 of U. S. Expeditionary Forces. 

MEHICAN CONVOY ESCORTS. 

-a Advance American Division - One Marine Division embarked in 15 vessels 

escorted by units from Task Force Three. 

b_ Remainder of initial U. S. forces -

Three convoys at about one month intervals, 

escorted by units withdrawn from Task Forces 3:liree 

and Four. Successive logistic convoys require 

escorts withdrawn from Task Force Four. 

TIMINGS. 

D-1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition. 

-a G. S. FORCES 

The 1J. S. Marine Division could reach Casablanca on 0-20. 

b_ BRITISH FORCES 

The first British convoy could reach Algiers 

on D----, or Casablanca on D---- . Subsequently 

the despatch of the remaining British forces, 

totalling 1 armored and 2 infantry divisions with 

ancillary troops would take about another--_-- weeks. 

Its movement would therefore be complete about D----. 

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SUMMARY OF PLAN 

a U. S. Marine Division, combat loaded and closely supported by United 

States Naval forces, to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic 

opposition if necessary. 

b A British force consisting of:­

1 Armored Brigade, 

1 Infantry Brigade Group, 

2 Anti-aircraft Regiments, 

3 Fighter Squadrons, 

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with _a to Tunisia in case 

the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support 

of the advance guard. 

Main body to follow a and h:­

1 American Army Division. 

1 American Armored Division. 

2 British Divisions. 

1 British Armored Division (less detachments 

Air Forces: 

320 First line fighter aircraft 

57 First line medium bomber aircraft 

57 First line light bomber aircraft 

63 First line observation aircraft. 

a Base and L. of C. organizations. Air defenses of 

be found by the British initially. 

in 9). 

the base area to 

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities. 

U. S. to provide as high a proportion of engineer, technical, 

stevedore, and labor units for development of static base Installations, 

aerodromes, etc. 

The ultimate force to be built up as rapidly as possible. 

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ABC-4 

JCCSS-4 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

3 P.M., DECEMBER 27, 1941. 

Present 

British Officers 

Admiral of the Fleet,Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval 

Staff 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office 

Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, Director of Plans, Air Ministry 

Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N., Deputy Director of Plans, Admiralty 

U. S. Naval Officers 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief, Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. I[. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 

U. S. Army Officers 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and 

Chief of Staff. 

Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief 

of Staff 

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division. 

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Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R. M. 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ, U. S. Army 

Major W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. AEK 4/1 -- PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES - UNITED KINGDOM EXPFDDITIONS 

IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.-

ADMIRAL STARK presented a revised draft of ABC 4/1 to the Conference. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that he understood the Report of the Joint Planning 

Committee had already been approved, and that he could not understand why a 

new draft was being submitted. 

WAR ADMIRAL TURNER explained the changes. He said that copies of the 

changes had been furnished the British Section, but that apparently they had 

not been able to see them before the meeting. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that there were few changes. The greater part of the 

paper had been previously agreed to. 

After some further discussion, it was agreed that the paper should be 

referred to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration by both sections’ 

and then resubmitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting. 

2. ABC 4/2 -- PLAN FOR EXPEDITION TO NORTHWEST AFRICA.-

ADMIRAL STARK brought up ABC 4/2, copies of which were distributed. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that, with reference to the airplane allocations 

under this operation, he was horrified at the large number of planes contemplated; he thought it would be a mistake to send such a large number of planes 

to a theater of operations where they might not be utilized. He pointed out 

that in allocating planes, the large strategy must be the primary considera 

tion, rather than local requirements; that in the matter of Greece it WRS realized that there was an insufficient number of troops and planes, yet those 

available were allocated despite the expectation that this force would be 

hocked down. Although this happened, the strategic importance of this opera 

tion was great because it delnyed the attack on Russia for two months. He 

urged that in making allocations, the figures be viewed in the spirit of econo 

my, that is, the minimum number that it would be safe to have. 

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GENERAL ARNOLD said that he had also objected to the large number of 

planes allocated, and thought the paper should be again referred to the Joint 

Planning Committee for further consideration. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the paper should be referred back to 

the Planning Committee. He pointed out, however, that this operation might 

result in the first contact between American and German troops. Success should 

not be jeopardized by failure to provide adequate means. A failure in this 

first venture would have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the 

American people. In summing up, he said that this first operation, although 

in some respects a minor one, could not be treated in a routine manner. 

It was agreed that the paper would be referred back to the Joint 

Planning Committee for reconsideration, in the light of the discussion which 

had taken place, and revised draft submitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the 

next meeting. 

3. AMERICAN - BRITISH STRATEGY.-

ADMIRAL STARK brought up W/1, Joint American - British Strategy, 

which had been discussed previously. 

REAR ADMIRAL TURNER sctid thRt the original British memorandum had 

not been fully agreed to. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that the papers had been agreed to as the basis 

forour joint strategy, subject to some amendments which had been agreed to 

and to the inclusion of a revised paragraph on air routes as proposed by 

General Arnold. 

ADMIRAL STARK agreed with Admiral Pound. 

It was agreed thet the paper would be referred back to the Joint 

Planning Committee and a revised draft incorporating the agreed amendments 

and the revised paragraph on routes should be submitted to the Chiefs of 

Staff at the next meeting. 

4. PROGRAM OF WORK OF THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.-

REAR ADMIRAL TURNER listed the various papers now in th? hands of 

the Jolnt Planning Committee as follows: 

8. WW/l Grand Strategy. 

12. ABd-4/2 -- Expedition to Northwest Africa. 

0. Diversion of Reinforcements in the Far East. 

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It was suggested that a definite statement of priorities should be 

presented to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting. In the meantime, the 

Joint Planning Committee was to concentrate on the directive concerning the 

disposal of reinforcements en route to the Far East. 

5. UNITY OF COMMAND.-

ADMIRAL STARK asked Admiral Pound if he cared to discuss the matter 

of unity of command for the Far East as proposed by General Marshall. 

ADMIRAL POUND stated that he would like to get it clear in his mind 

what the United States means by unity of command, particularly how Naval matters would be dealt with. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it would be impossible to choose anyone 

for supreme command who would have full technical knowledge of all services. 

He felt, however, that the matter of appointing a supreme commander would be 

bound up in the assumption that a man of good judgment would be selected; 

otherwise the whole project would be a failure. He felt that a man with good 

judgment and unity of command has a distinct advantage over a man with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation. 

The whole matter, he said, rests on the consideration as to whether 

a directive could be drawn which would leave the Supreme Commander with enough 

power to improve the situation and still not give him power to destroy national 

interests or to exploit one theater without due consideration to another. 

He then read a suggested form of letter, (See Annex 1,) copies of 

which were distributed, of instructions to the Supreme Commander, which he 

stated was purely a form and a basis for further discussion concerning the Far 

Eastern area. Similar directives might be possible for other areas. 

In urging the adoption of unity of command in the Far East, GENERAL 

MARSHALL said that the Associated Powers are opposed in that area by an enemy 

who has unity of command in its highest sense; that in light of the present 

conditions out there, any action whatsoever along this line would be an improvement. The situation in this respect could not be made worse than it exists at present. 

ADMIRAL POUND asked, on the assumption that four countries were involved, and a Supreme Commander were chosen for instance, from Power X, who 

would be on his Staff? 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that, personally, he envisaged a small 

staff, one representative from each Government possibly, who would act as a 

sort of liaison officer with local forces. The commander would possess two 

mobile elements one, sea-going vessels and the other, bombardment aviation. 

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He said that at the present time the situation in the Far East is tragio; that 

Qeneral Brereton, who was the air offieer in the Philippines, had left the 

Philippines with heavy bombers and had been able to establish some contact 

with local commanders in Borneo and had ended up in Surabaya, Java. The information from General Brereton has been the most heartening from the Far East 

in the past few days. 

MARSHAL DILL obsepved, with regard to General Marshall's draft, that 

the restrictions on the commander were too great; that the proposition formed 

a good basis to work on, but the restrictions would make it very difficult for 

the Commander-in-Chief to exeraise command. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the restrictions were great, but stated 

that if the Supreme Commander ended up with no more authority than to tell 

Washington what he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an 

imprdvement over the present situation. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL FORTAL commended the paper for its realism; 'he obsewed that it Separated a.comander's resources in air defense and air offense, which indicated some of the problems of such a proposition. .He stated 

that the primary consideration should be what is sound from a military point 

of'view; that what might be gained by the military aspect of uniflied command 

might be lost by the necessity of political considerations. 'He asked if it 

would not be posstble to give the commander a free hand, and to have all the 

political questions resolved, say, in Washington, or, as an alternative suggesbion, by a representatdve in the area, rather along the lines adopted by 

the Bribish in the Middle East. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that political questions could be settled in 

Washington. 'He agreed that his paper had.been drawn on realistic lines. 'Be 

thought Air Marshal Portal was talking more in terms of idealism; that what 

he desired to do was to start something. 

ADMIRAL STARK pointed out that under the prdvisions of the draft directive, troops of one nation could not be moved out of its own possessions 

rrithout approval of the home gdvernment. He felt that the restrictions were 

-herivy, but realisbio; and that it was better to have restrictions first and 

then remove them, than to fail in estahlishing the principle. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL pointed out that if the Supreme Commander desired 

to mdve the air forces of one of the elements of the command, he shmld know the 

capabilities of these forces, and that could only be accomplished by having a 

suiteble liaison element. 

ADMIRAL KING thought that it would be impossible to get the idea of 8 

single Commander-in-Chief accepted by the gdvernments concerned unless the limitabions were imposed. 'He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff Conference prepare an outline plan for presentation to the Prime Minister and the President. 

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ADMIRAL POUND stated that he realized the urgency of coming to a decision in the matter, whatever it might be; and asked, on the assumption that 

unified command was recommended, how would the many details be worked out? He 

pointed out that there are a large number of details involved. He thought that 

it would be difficult to keep the staff of the Commander-in-Chief small for he 

would have to have representatives of the services of each nation to advise him. 

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed as to the urgency of getting to a conclusion 

on the question immediately. 

During the discussion it was suggested that the broad outline be prepared and the details worked out later. 

6. UTILIZATION OF THE U. S. TRANSPORTS NOW BEING USED IN THE INDIAN 

OCEAN. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that it might prove advantageous to the general 

scheme for reinforcing the Far East if these transports, when they had delivered the 18th British Division at its destination, could be used for carrying 

additional reinforcements from the Middle East to the Far East. He asked 

whether such a proposal would be approved by the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that these ships would be available for use as 

seemed best in the joint cause. 

ADMIRAL POTJND said that he did not ask for an immediate decision in 

the matter, but thought it best to draw attention to the possibility that such 

a request might be made. 

The Conference adjourned at 4:30 p.m. 

ENCLOSURE 

Annex 1 - Draft of Instructions 

to the Supreme Commander, 

Southwestern Pacific 

Theater. 

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ANNEX 1 

TO 

JCCSs-4 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 Proposed draft of instructions to the 

C/S USA Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific 

Theater, submitted by United States Chiefs 

of Staff for the consideration of the Joint 

United States-British Chiefs of Staff Conference. 

Letter of Instructions to be signed by the government of the country from 

which the Supreme Commander is chosen, and countersigned by representatives of 

each of the other powers in the group, Australia, Dutch East Indies, British 

and the United States. 

To: Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater. 

(Letters, similar in content, will be sent by 

each of the ADBU governments to its highest 

Army, Navy and Air Commander in the Southwestern 

Pacific Theater.) 

Subject: Letter of Instructions. 

1. By agreement among the Governments of Australia, The Netherlands, 

the United Kingdom and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ADBU 

governments, the Southwestern Pacific Theater has been constituted, to comprise all land and sea areas included in the region Malaya - Australia - Philippine Islands, all inclusive. 

2. You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the Southwestern 

Theater and of all armed forces afloat, ashore and in the air of the ADBU governments stationed therein and allotted by their respective governments for 

service in that theater, except that you are not authorized to transfer.from 

the territory of any of the ADBU governments land troops of that government except with the consent of the local commander or his government. You are authorized to employ naval and air forces in general support of operations in the 

theater assigned you. However, during the period of initial air reinforcement, 

it being the view of all the associated governments that air superiority over 

the enemy should be attained as soon as possible, each government reserves the 

right to assign and employ its pursuit and fighter airplanes at its own discretion. All accumulations of pursuit and fighter airplanes beyond the minimum requirements fixed by each government, will pass to your general reserve, 

for use under your direction. 

3. The ADBU governments have further agreed as follows: 

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6. The mission of the armed forces in the Southwestern Pacific 

is immediately to: 

(1) Prevent further Japanese penetratlon of the Southwestern 

Pacific Theater. 

(2) Establish security of essential land, air and sea communications within the theater. At this time essential communications in the Southwest Pacific theater are: 

(a) The approaches from India and to East Australia; and 

(b) Extending from such approaches to Singapore, and, 

through the Dutch East Indies, to the Philippines. 

(3) Eventually defeat the Japanese forces in the theater and 

expel them therefrom. 

b_. Your duties, responsibilities and authority are defined as 

follows: 

(1) To coordinate in Southwestern Pacific theater the tactical 

and strategic operations of all armed forces of the ADBU governments 

to assign them strategic and/or tactical missions and objectives, 

and, where desirable, to organize task forces for the execution of 

specific operations. 

(2) To submit recommendations to the Associated Governments in 

all matters pertaining to that theater, regarding which specific authority is not hereill delegated to you. 

(3) To require, from the Commanders of the Armed Forces of 

each of the ADBU governments, such reports as you deem necessary in 

the determination of tactical strength and effectiveness, and/or in 

the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander. 

e_. The following specific limitations are placed by the ADEU governments upon your authority as Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific 

Theater: 

(1) You may not relieve from duty the Commander of any of the 

Armed Forces of any of the ADBU governments, or any subordinate of 

such commander. 

(2) You may not destroy, revise or alter the major tactical 

organization of the armed forces of any ADBU government. Each national component of a task force will operate under its own conrmander 

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and will not be distributed into small units attached to the other 

national components of the task force. 

(3) You may not take over for general use the supplies, munitions or other material resources belonging to any one of the 

ADBU governments without the consent of the appropriate commander, 

nor may you interfere in the administrative and/or disciplinary 

control of such Commander over his own forces. 

(4) You may not prevent or interfere in direct communication 

between the Commander of the Armed Forces of any one of the ADBU 

governments with his home government. 

(9) You may not prevent the Commander of the Armed Forces of 

any ADBU government from obeying the orders of his own government 

in detaching troops, individuafs or material to any other theater. 

(6) You may not assume direct commnnd of any portion or part 

of the force$ assigned to the theater or of any particular portion 

or section of such theater, but will exercise your authority through 

the duly designated commanders of the ADBU governments. 

(7) You may not, at any time, locate your headquarters within 

the limits of any critical tnctical zone, but will so situate such 

headquarters as to facilitate establishment and maintenance of communications with all tactical zones and 66 as to provide you with a 

balanced perspective of the complete theater. 

4. The ADBU governments have also agreed that they will jointly and 

severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as 

above defined, and in the exercise of the authority as above defined, and in 

the exercise of the authority as above delegated and limited. Commanders of 

all naval, air and ground forces within your theater will be immediately informed by their respective governments that all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this letter will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments. 

No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to 

your theater nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in 

your theater except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely 

information pertaining thereto. 

5. As Supreme Commander of the Southwestern Pacific Theater, you are 

directly responsible to this government, and all instructions to you will 

follow established methods. Any recommendation, report, request, or other 

communication between you and any of the other governments of the ADBU Powers 

will be processed through this government. 

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6. Your headquarters will be established, initially, in Java. 

Signed 

(By Power furnishing 

Supreme Commander) 

Countersigned: 

Other ADBU representatives. 

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ABC-4 

JCCSs-5 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

4 P.M., DECEMBER 29, 1941 

Present 

British Officers 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval 

Staff 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Lieut. General Sir Colville H’emyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

U. S. Naval Officers 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief, Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. 9. Marine Corps 

Lieut. Commander R. E. Libby, U. 9. Navy 

U. S. Army Officers 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and 

Chief of Staff 

Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief 

of Staff 

Bripadter General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

War Department 

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U. S. SECRET 

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Joint Secretaries 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Lieut. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHC!, U. S. Army 

Mador W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS 

EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. 

THE CONFERENCE approved a final draft of the Joint Planning 

Committee's Report on Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas 

Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. (U. S. Serial ABC-4/1, British Serial WW 

(J.P.C.)l). (See Annex 1) 

2. AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY (WW-1). 

At the request of REAR ADXIRAL TURNER, action on this paper was 

deferred. 

3. NORTHKEST AFRICA PROJECT, U. S. ABC-4/2, BRITISH WH'(J.P.C.)Z. 

Action on this paper was deferred at the request of the British. 

4. SUPPORTING NEASURES FOR TEE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. 

Action on U. S. ABC-4/3, British W(J.P.C.)3, was deferred by 

common consent. 

At this time, the following officers withdrew from the Conference: 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, U. S. N.; Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N.; 

Rear Admiral J. Ii. Towers, U. S. N.; Major General Thomas Holcomb, U. S. M. C.; 

Captain J. L. McCrea, U. S. N.; Brigadier General Raymond Lee, U. S. A.; and 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, R. N. 

5. UNITY OF COMMAND IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC THEATER. 

& METHOD OF HANDLING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THAT THEATER. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that the proposal for the establishment of 

unity of command in the Southwestern Pacific Theater had been referred by the 

Prime Ninister to London, for consideration by the War Cabinet. In his telegram he had included the following sentence, "He (General Wavell) would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body, who will be responsible to 

him as Minister of Defense, and to the President of the United States, who is 

also Commander-in-Chief of all U. S. forces." 

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The Prime Minister had received an immediate reply, asking for 

information as to the nature of this joint body. He had been asked to defer 

giving his views to London on this point until the Chiefs of Staff had had 

an opportunity of putting forward their views. 

One of the main objects in Setting up a,Supreme Commander was 

to achieve rapidity of decision on important matters. It would be difficult 

to attain this object if a cumbersome machine were erected to deal with 

important matters arising from the Southwestern Pacific Theater. The right 

course would be to utilize existing machinery, and the British Chiefs of 

Staff had formulated certain proposals which they hoped would prove acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL POUND then read his proposals to the Conference. (See

Annex 2) . ADMIRAL KING said that he had been asked to consider this 

matter, and advise the President at very short notice. He had set down on 

paper an outline of a solution which he thought would achieve the object in 

view, namely, rapid decision through the use of existing machinery. His 

proposal was that the Prime Minister should appoint a deputy in Washington, 

who would act with the President on recommendations to be made by a Southwestern Pacific Council, which would be a military body composed of one 

representative from each of the following:- U. S. Joint Board, the British 

Joint Staff Mission, the Dutch military representatives in Washington, 

together with one Anzac representative. The members of this Council would 

be instructed as necessary by the military bodies which they represented. 

GENERAL MARSAALL suggested that it might be better not to 

introduce at this stage the complicated question of machinery into the 

business of setting up unity of command. He thought that an amendment 

might be made to the documents establishing the unified command, which 

would include a phrase to the effect that "matters would be dealt with by 

such Joint machinery as the Associated Powers may hereafter set up". 

ADMIRAL KING thought that the establishment of machinery was 

an indispensable part of the establishment of unity of command, if the 

latter were to start operating at once. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if such were the case, he was prepared to accept the proposals put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL KING and ADMIRAL STARK signified their agreement to 

these proposals 

ADMIRAL HORNE suggested that in order to achieve unity of 

command without delay, it should be agreed upon and established by the 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

British and United States Governments forthwith ".the other Governments concerned being presented with a fait accompli, and being asked to notify their 

acceptance 

ADMIFUL POUND said that the Prime Minister had already sent off 

telegrams to the New Zealand and Australian Governments, so that there was 

unlikely to be much delay The British Chiefs of Staff proposed to telegraph 

their proposals to the Prime Minister forthwith for his approval. 

ADMIRAI, STARK said that he would also submit them forthwith to 

the President 

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff approved 

the proposals for handling matters concerning the Southwestern Pacific Theater, 8s set out in the Memorandum as 

Annex 2, and agreed to submit them forthwith to the 

President and the Prime Minister, for approval. 

31 LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SUPFIEME COKMANDER. 

THE CONFERENCE was informed that a draft Letter of Instructions, prepared by the Joint Planning Committee, would be circulated to 

them that evening. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed to telegraph its 

contents to London for comment, 

THE CONFERENCE took note of this, and agreed to meet 

at 11'30 the following morning to consider the Draft 

Letter. 

8. PROPOSED COMMUNICATION TO GENERdLISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK. 

GENERAL MAXSHALL said that the President was very anxious to send 

a message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, so as to reach him before the 

public announcement of the setting up of unified command in the Southwestern 

Pacific Theater. General Magruder had reported that the Generalissimo was 

considerably upset by events in Burma, and particularly by the diversion to 

the British there of Lend..Lease materiel destined for China. It would 

therefore be desirable to send him an encouraging message, which would make 

clear that the other Associated Powers considered that he had an important 

part to play on the world's stage. This would obviate any danger which 

might exist of his resenting the fact that he had not been consulted about 

the setting up of the Southwestern Pacific Command. He (General Marshall) 

had accordingly drafted a message, which he read to the Conference. 

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In the course of discussion, two minor amendments were agreed to, 

to meet the following points: 

-a That it would be unwise to define at this stage the 

Southwestern Pacific Theater. 

b That in view of the controversial problem presented 

by Burma, it would be inadvisable to include any part of Burma 

in the Chinese theater. It would be best, in defining the 

latter theater, to make clear that it was an initial definition 

only 

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff 

approved the draft message to Generalissimo 

Chiang Kai-Shek, as amended in discussion, and 

agreed to submit it to the President and to 

the Prime Minister, for their approval. (See 

Annex 3). 

The Conference adjourned at 5:30 P.M. to meet at 11:30 A.M., December 

30, 1941-

ENCLOSURES: 

Annex 1 Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas 

Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean (U. S. ABC-4/1 - British WW-5) 

Annex 2 Proposed Method of Handling Matters Concerning the Southwest Pacific Theater. 

Annex 3 . Proposed Message to Chianp Kai-Shek. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. ABC-4/1 

BRITISH WW-5 December 29, 1941 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSs-5 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED 

REPOHT ay THE u. s. - BRITISH JOINT 

PLANNIEiG COMMITTEE 

U.S. ABC-4/1, BRITISH WW(JPC) 1 

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND 

UNITED R I N ODOM OVFRSEAS EXPEDITIONS 

IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAh 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U S SERIAL ABC-4/1 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C.) I 

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED 

KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE 

ATLANTIC OCEAN 

REPORT BY THE U. S. - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the 

Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment 

of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, 

indicating recommended relative priorities of importance: 

& The relief by United States troops of British troops 

in Iceland and North Ireland. 

b_ The occupation by invitation of the following positions: 

(1) The Azores. 

(2) The Cape Verde Islands. 

(3) The Canary Islands. 

(4) French West Africa. 

(5) French North Africa. 

(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar. 

(7) Curacao and Aruba. 

(8) Northeast Brazil. 

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation 

by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be 

allocated as follows: 

To the United States - the occupation of the Cape Verde 

Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil. 

b To the United ICingdom - the occupation of the Azores, the 

Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar. 

c To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointlythe occuoation of French North Africa. 

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3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan 

(U. S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial WW) is undertaken, we see no prospect of 

any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least 

three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Xingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of 

troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, 

Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying 

United States and United Kingdom field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. 

Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval 

communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the 

trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States 

unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as 

troop transports. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET December 29, 1941 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSs-5 

PROFOSKU METHOD OF HANDLING MATTERS 

CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC TREATER 

1. It is assumed that the chief matters on which decisions would have 

to be given would be: 

-a The provision of reinforcements. 

b A major change in policy. 

-c Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive. 

2. It is suggested that no special body should be set up for this 

purpose because it would tend to clog the machine for the following reasons: 

-a It would be necessary to have Dutch, Australian, and New 

Zealand representatives on this body. 

b_ Each representative in _a would probably wish for time to 

consult his government before giving an opinion. 

3. It is proposed, therefore, that existing machinery should 'be used 

in the following manner: 

B The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee, both in London and in Washington, his proposal, whatever 

it might be. 

I? The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London would immediately 

telegraph to the British Mission in Washington to say whether or 

not they would be telegraphing any opinions. 

G On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of 

Staff and the Representatives in bashinaton of the British Chiefs 

of Staff would meet and consider the problem and would submit their 

recommendations to the President and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister would then inform 

the President whether he was in agreement with their recommendations 

4. As the Dutch Government is in London, and as the principal representatives of the New Zealand and Australian Governments are also in London, 

it is proposed that the agreement of these Governments to any proposal 

should be obtqined by the British Government and this would be included in 

the final telegram to Washington. 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. Agreement having been reached between London and Washington, the 

orders to the Supreme Commander would then be dispatched from Washington. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET December 29, 1941 

ANNEX 3 

to 

JCCSs-5 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: 

It is suggested that as soon as R preliminary decision is reached 

as to the delimitation of the Southwest Pacific theater, and in agreement 

with the British and Dutch authorities, a communication in substance as 

follows be dispatched to Chiang Kai-Shelt: 

1. In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation 

in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established 

a Supreme Comander for all British, Dutch. and American forces in 

the Southwest Pacific theater. 

2. The advisability of a similar command of activities of 

the Associated Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This 

theater we suggest should initially include such portion of Thailand 

and Indo-China as may become accessible to troops of the Associated 

Powers. In agreement with the representatfves of the British and 

Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you should undertake to 

exercise such command Over all forces of the Associated Powers whic.h 

are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater. 

3. It is our thought that, in order to make such command 

effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consistIng of representatives of the BrJtish, Dutch, American, and Chinese 

governments. If you consider it practirable, and Russia agrees, a 

Russian representabive might be included. This staff should function 

under your supreme command. 

4. The commander of the Southwest, Pacific theater and the 

commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain 

the closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of 

liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable. 

5. Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence 

to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the 

conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will 

he greatly appreciated by me. 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 

JCCSS-6 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

3 P.M., DECEMBER 30, 1941. 

Present 

British Officers 

Navy 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of 

Naval Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Captain Charles E. Lambe, R.N., Deputy Director of Plans, Admiralty 

Army 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office 

Air Force 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

Air Commodore W. h. Dickson, Director of Plans, Air Ministry 

United States Officers 

Navy 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (Presiding) 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral R. J. Horne, Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomh, Major General Commandant, U.S.M.C. 

Lieut. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Admiral E. J. King. 

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Army 

General G. C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces 

and Chief of Staff 

Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces and Deputy 

Chief of Staff 

Brigadier General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD 

Brigadier General D. D. Eisenhower, G.S.C. 

Joint Secretaries 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, R.N. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations 

Lt Col. P. M. Robinett, G-2, GIIQ, U S A. 

Major W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G S. 

1. HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA. -

THE COMMITTEE gave further consideration to their Memorandum on 

the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area, which had been telegraphed to 

Ottawa, and had received the approval of the Prime Minister, together with 

a redraft of this paper, which had been forwarded by Mr. Hopkins for their 

attention, (Annex 1, Memorandum of Mr. Hopkins, December 30, 1941.) 

In the course of discussion, the following points were made: ­

-a. It did not appear desirahle to set up a special body to deal 

with ABDA problems, as only the United States Chiefs of Staff and the 

British Chiefs of Staff, through their representatives in Washington, 

could weigh the needs of the ABDA Area in relation to those of other 

theatres. 

b. As the Dutch Government was in London. and as the machinery 

for consultation with the Dominions Governments already existed there, 

it seemed proper that consultation with these Governments should take 

place in London, and that the British Government should be responsible 

for ohtaining the views and agreements of these Governments, and for 

submitting them to the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff. While the representatives of the Dutch and Dominions Governments in Washington 

could, if thought desirable, be kept informed of developments, official consultation could only take place in London. 

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U. S. SECRET 

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c. In order to avoid delay, communications from the Supreme Commander should be telegraphed to London and Washington simultaneously 

the telegram for Washington being for action, and that to London to furnish a basis for immediate comment to Washington. 

In view of the above considerations, it was felt that while some of 

the suggestions in the redraft forwarded by Mi-. Hopkins could he accepted, 

the main principles contained in their original Memorandum should be retained. 

The Committee accordingly prepared a revised version of their Memorandum, in 

two parts. (See Annex 2). 

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed that the revised Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area should be 

submitted to the President for his approval under a covering Memorandum setting out the reasons for the machinery proposed. 

2. DRAFI! DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE K3DA AREA. -

The Committee had before them a Report by the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW (J.P.C.)5). 

Discussion took place on the extent of the ABDA Area. 

ADMIRAL STARK reminded the Committee that a telegram had been sent 

to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, in which it had been suggested that IndoChina and Thailand should be included in the Chinese theatre, and his comments on this arrangement had been requested. He felt, therefore, that, for 

political reasons, it would be necessary to exclude Indo-China and Thailand 

from the ABDA Area. 

ADMIRAL POUND and MARSHAL DILL agreed with this view, and explained 

that they felt that Burma should be included in the ABDA Area as an essential 

supply route to China. Burma had recently been transferred from the Far 

Eastern Command to the Indian Comand, as being an important outpost of the 

Indian defense, but the British Chiefs of Staff now agreed that it should he 

included in the ABDA Area. 

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed to a proposal put forward by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff that a paragraph should be included to the effect that the Deputy Supreme Connnander and, if required, a Commander of the 

combined Naval forces, should be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments. 

THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF accepted the Draft 

Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area, as amended by the Committee, and including the Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the 

AEXIA Area (Annex 2 to the Report), as an agreed report, for submission to 

the President and the Prime Minister. (See Annex 3, U.S. ABC-4/5, British 

WW 3,-December 30, 1941). 

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3. NEXT MEETING. -

The United States and Bribish Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet at 

2 p.m. the following day, Wednesday, December 31, 1941, to consider two reports by the Joint Planning Committee: ­

-a. Northwest Africa Project. 

(U.S. ABC-412; British WW (J.P.C.)2). 

Q. Supporting Measures for the Southwestern Pacific. 

(U.S. ABC-4/3; Bri'cish WW (J.F.C.)3) I 

ENOLOSURES : 

Annex 1 - Memorandum from Mr. Hopkins December 30, 1941. 

Annex 2 - Memorandum for the President, Higher Direction of War in 

ABDA Area (in 2 Parts). 

Annex 3 - Draft Directive to Supreme Commander in ABDA Area, US ABC4/5, British WW-3 (with 2 Annexes). 

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BRITISII MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSS-6 

The White House 

hashington 

December 30, 1941. 

Dear Betty: 

Here is the re-draft which the President did last night and which 

he would like to have the Joint Staffs chew dver. 

Cordially yours, 

/s/ HARRY L. HOPXINS 

Enclosure. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, 

Chief of Nrrval Operations, 

Navy Department. 

* * *.* * * * 

PROPOSED METHOD OF HANDLING MATTERS CONCERNING 

THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATRE. 

1. It is assumed that the chief matters on which decisions would have 

to be given would he: 

a. The provision of reinforcements. 

b. A major change in policy. 

c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive. 

2. It is suggested that a special body be set up for this purpose in 

Washington. 

a. Three Americans and three British. 

p. One Australian, one New Zealander and one Dutch, for consultation and advisory purposes. 

3. It is proposed, therefore, that the above machinery should be used 

in the following manner: 

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U. S. SECREP 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

8. The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the above Committee in 

Washington, his proposal, whatever it might be. 

b. The Committee in Washington would imediately telegraph to London to ask for any recommendations or opinions. 

c_. On receipt of these opinions, the Washington Committee would submit their recomendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime 

Minister. The Prime Minister would then inform the President whether he 

was in agreement with their recomendations. He could of course consult 

with Australia, New Zealand, and The Netherlands if advisable. 

4. Agreement, having been reached between the Prime Minister, and the 

President, the orders to the Supreme Commander would then be dispatched from 

Washington in the name of both of them. 

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U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Part I 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSS-6 

December 30. 1941 

mMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: 

HIGHER DIRECTION OF Wm IN THE AEIDA AREA 

The Chiefs of Staff have somewhat revised their original memorandum 

on the above subject, so as to incorporate certain of the President's suggestions With respect to those points where the revised memorandum, hereto attached, differs from the President's re-draft, the following explanation is 

submitted: 

a. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, 

through their representatives in Washington, are in an especially favorable position to weigh the needs of the AEIDA area in relation to those 

of other theaters of war. Recommendations to the President and to the 

Prime Minister emanating from the joint Chiefs of Staff would reflect 

this balanced perspective. 

b. Consultations with the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand governments can not well be carried out in several places without serious 

loss of time, and creation of confusion. For the reasons set out in paragraph 4 of the attached revised memorandum, London would appear to be 

the logical place for carrying on such consultations. The Chiefs of 

Staff committee in Washington can,of course, keep the representatives of 

the Dutch and Dominion governments informed, should this be considered 

desirable. 

c. The suggested duplication of messages from the Supreme Commander to London and Washington is for the purpose of saving time. The 

copy sent to Washington would be the action copy, but the one to London 

would furnish the basis for immediate comment to Washington. 

d. Admiral Pound feels that, in view of his coliversation with the 

Prime Minister this morning, the attached procedure will be entirely acceptable to the Prime Minister. 

Chief of Staff Chief of Naval Operations 

Commander-in- Chief Chief of Air Forces 

U S Fleet 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART I1 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSS-6 

December 30. 1941 

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA 

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of 

the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will Constitute the 

agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the 

President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister 

of Defense. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are: 

-a. The provision of reinforcements. 

b. A major change in policy. 

-C. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive. 

2. This agency will function as follows: 

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from 

any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee both in Washington and in London. 

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they 

will be telegraphing any opinions. 

G. On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff 

and the representattves in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff 

will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by 

telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The Prime 

Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with 

these recommendations. 

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Gdvernments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Gdvernment 

will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington. 

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime 

Minister and Minister of Defense, the orders to the Supreme Commander will 

be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/5 

BRITISH WW-3 

ANNEX 3 

to 

JCCSs-6 

December 30, 1941 

REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DRAFT DIRECIIVE TO THE SUPREME 

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET December 30, 1941 

ANNEX 3 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/5 to 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-3 JCCSS-6 

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF 

AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERUNDS, THE UNITED 

KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER 

REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS: 

1. AREA. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all 

land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - nether^. 

lands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. 

This area will be known as the ABDA Area. 

2. FORCES. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ApA Area 

and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are^ 

,a. Stationed in the Area; 

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of 

the AJ3DA Area 

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA 

Gijvernments, land forces of that government without the consent of the local 

commander or his gdvernment. 

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and/or, if required, a commander of 

the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be 

jointly designated by the ABDA Governments. 

4. No gdvernment will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to 

your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing .its forces in your 

Area except after glving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND POLICY. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct 

of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. 

The ABDA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. 

As additional forces become available, it will become possible to take the 

offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The 

first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible 

moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of eir forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the 

near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to 

further preparations for that offensive. 

6. THE GENERAL STRATEGId POLICY WILL THEREFORE BE:­

-a. To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of 

the ABDA Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as 

possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance. 

Q. To hold Burma and Australia 8s essential supporting positions 

for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to 

the defense of India. 

E. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies 

with Luzon, and to support the Philippines' Garrison. 

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area. 

7. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operritions of 

all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and 

objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; 

and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces. 

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal 

administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative 

facilities and the broad allocation of wRr materials. 

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be 

dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

10. You are authorized to require from the commanders of the armed forces 

under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your 

responsibilities as Supreme Commander. 

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concern­

:ing the forces under your command. 

12. Through the channels specified in paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission. 

13. LIMITATIONS. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of 

the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised 

through the commanders duly designated by their respective gdvernments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed 

forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communicaOion between 

them and their respectI've governments. No alteration or revision is to be 

made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each na.tiona1 component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will 

not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force. In general, your instructions and orders will. he 

limited to those necessary for effective coordinatio? of forcesin the execution of your mission. 

14. RELATIONS WITH ABDA GOVERNMENTS. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the 

execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, 

land and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will 

be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments. 

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representaCions to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize 

the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general 

situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to 

you. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

16. STAFF AND ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the AEIDA powers. You 

are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the 

Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be 

communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of 

communication described in Paragraph 18. 

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry 

out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of 

command may be promulgated to all concerned. 

18. SUPERIOR AUTHORITY. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2. 

Signed 

(By Power furnishing 

Supreme Commander) 

Counters igned : 

Other ABDA Representatives. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

(TO ANNEX 3, JCCSs-6) 

BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA 

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows: 

On the North: 

On the East: 

On the South: 

On the West: 

By the boundary between India and Burma, thence 

eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 300 North, thence along 

the parallel of 30' North to the meridian of 

140° East. 

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included 

in this area. 

By the meridian of 140' East from 30" North, to 

the equator, thence east to longitude 141' East, 

thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea 

on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143' 

East, then south down this meridian to the coast 

of Australia. 

By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143' East, westward to the meridian of 

114' East, thence northwestward to latitude 15' 

South, longitude 92' East. 

By the meridian of 92" East. 

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to 

extend their operations into other areas as may be required. 
U. S. SECRFT 

BRITISH MOST SECHJ3T 

ANNEX 2 

(TO ANNEX 3, JCCSS-6) 

December 30, 1941 

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA 

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of 

the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the 

agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of 

Defense. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are: 

a. The prdvision of reinforcements. 

b_. k major change in policy. 

c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive. 

2. This agency will functjon as follows: 

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from 

any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee both in Washington and in London. 

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in Lonclon will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they 

will be telegraphing any opinions. 

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the 

representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The Prime Minister 

will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these 

recommendations. 

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Gdvernment is in London, the British Gdvernment 

Will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington. 

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime 

Minister and Minister of Defense, the orders to the Supreme Commander will 

be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 

JCCSS-7 December 31, 1941 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

2 R.M., DECEMBER 31, 1941 

Present 

British Officers 

Navy 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of 

Naval Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Army 

Field Marshal 

Lieut. General 

Air Force 

Air Marshal A. 

United States Officers 

N (ivy 

Admiral H. R. 

Admiral E. J. 

Sir John Rill 

Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission. 

Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

(Present for only part of the Conference) 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rpar Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. M. C. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Army 

General George Marshall, Commanding General o 

and Chief of Staff 

the Field Forces 

Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division 

Brigadier General D. D. Eisenhower, General Staff Corps. 

Joint Secretaries 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob 

Captain J L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Lieut. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ, U.S.A. 

Major W T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES MARINES FROM ICELAND. -

ADMIRAL STARK said that he was 'very anxious to withdraw the 4,500 

U - S. Marines from.Iceland as soon as possible, as they were urgently needed 

for other tasks. 'He hoped that this could be arranged even at the risk of 

delay in the relief of British troops. 

MARSHAL DILL agreed as to the importance of withdrawing the Marines. 

He suggested that the local Commanders might be instructed to draw up the 

best possible plan for arranging this withdrawal as early as possible. 'He 

would telegraph to England to give the necessary instructions. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that the details of what was required could he 

furnished by Brigadier General Gerow. 

It, was agreed that the withdrawal of the 4,500 U. S. Marines now 

serving in Iceland should be arranged as soon as possible and SIR *JOHN DILL 

undertook to telegraph the necessary instructions to England on receipt of 

the details of what was required from Brigadier General Gerow. 

2. AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY. -

THE CONFERENCE considered a revised version, prepared by the U. S. 

Chiefs of Staff, of the Memorandum on American-British Strategy. (WW-1. 

U.S Revised). The various amendments proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff 

were considered, and with a few exceptions were agreed to. It was also decided that the lists of sea and air bases contained in Paragraph 12 should be 

omitted, It was further agreed that the paper should be circulated only to 

the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates, and that a note should be inserted in the paper to this effect. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

AIR MARSHAL HBRRIS said he would like to chkck with General Arnold 

the list of Air Routes which had been inserted. 

Subject to a final check by Air Marshal Harris with General Arnold 

of the Air Routes paragraph, the U. S. and BriOish Chiefs of Staff apprdved 

the memorandum (See Annex No. l), American-British Strategy, WW-1 (Final)), 

on American-British Strategy as amended in the discussion, and agreed that 

it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister. 

3. SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR TKE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. -

THE CONFERENCE considered a report (U.S. ABC-4/3, British WW 

(J.R.C.)3), by the Joint Planning Committee on supporting measures for the 

Southwest Pacific. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that as there would be an intepval before General Wave11 could take up his command, he thought it would be desirable to 

dispatch a telegram to the U. S. and British Comanders-In-Chief in the Far 

East to inform them of the general policy which had been agreed upon by the 

Chiefs of Staff. He handed across copies of a telegram which he had drafted 

for this purpose. The draft telegram was considered and a number of amendments were agreed upon. 

Later in the meeting, after Admiral King had entered, further consideration was given to the telegram, and some additional amendments made. 

A few minor amendments to the report were also accepted by the Joint Planning Committee. 

It was agreed: 

8. That the telegram, as amended in the discussion, should be 

dispatched forthwith to United States and British Comanders in the Far 

East. 

b_. That the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to 

the incorporation of the minor amendments agreed to in the discussion, 

should be approved. 

The report and the telegram in their final form were subsequently 

clrculated as U.S. ABC-4/3, British WW-4 (See Annex 2.) 

4. NORTAWEST AFRICA PROJECT. -

ADMIRAL STARK said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not 

ready to discuss the report by the Joint Planning Committee on this subject, 

(U.S. AEX-4/2, British WW (J.R.C.)Z). 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECFET 

ADMIRAL POUND said that certain officers bringing full information 

on reinforcements and shipping programs were expected to arrive from the United 

Kingdom on the following day. He thought that the Joint Planning Committee 

should then be in a position to examine the three main problems which were confronting us in the near future: namely, 

a. Northwest Africa Project. 

b. Relief of British Garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland. 

c_. Reinforcements for the Far East and consequent replacements in 

the Middle East. 

He thought that there were two cases which should be considered. 

First, one should assme that reinforcements to the Far East must be given priority; to what extent then must the gaps in the Middle East be filled, and 

could the Northwest Africa project be carried out? Alternatively, supposing 

the Northwest Africa project had to be carried out by invitation in the immediate future, what would happen to the rest of the program? 

ADMIRAL STARK said that with the Naval resources at present available, it did not appear possible to undertake anything which involved opening 

up a new convoy route. 

REAR ADMIRAl TURNER said that the Joint Planning Committee felt the 

Northwest Africa project should be considered under more realistic hypotheses. 

Guidance from the Chiefs of Staff was required on this point, It should be 

realized that entry into French North Africa was only possible through Casablanca, which was a good but small port. The maximum rate at which forces 

could be disembarked was that given in the report, and this would be inadequate if opposition was likely to be met. 

ADMIRAL STARK thought that the Joint Planning Committee should consider what could be done in French North Africa if the situation was different 

from that assumed in the present report. 

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Joint Planning COmmittee should be instructed to examine the questions m view of the discussion 

which had been raised. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked on the assumpbion that it would be impossible to enter Morocco under resistance and the Germans moved through Spain 

what would be the next move? 

ADMIRAL POUND replied, the occupaCion of the Canaries. 

(At this point Admiral King entered the meeting). 

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U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. RELIEF OF THE BRITISH GARRISON IN NORTHERN IRELAND. -

ADMIRAL KING said that it had been decided that for the present, 

U. S. forces destined for the relief of the British garrison in Northern 

Ireland should be transported in the 3. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON, which would 

shortly he fit for service, this 'vessel being used on a contjnuous shut,tle 

sefvice to and from Northern Ireland. In a few weeks' time? whm t,ho grnera1 trend in the Atlantic theatre could be judged, a decisj.on could br 

taken as to whether the transport of these troops should be accnlerated or 

not. 

THE CONFERENCE took note of this statement. 

6. DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AHEA. -

Thc conference gave further consideration to this clirtii'! I>.~~(I S. 

ABC-4/5, British Mil (J.P.C.)5). One minor verbal alteration was agr 

and it was also decided to bring the statement of the general strategic 

policy into line with that telegraphed out to Commanders-in-Chief iir thfy 

Far East, hy defining the Malay Barrier. (See Annex 2.) 

AUMIRAL KING said that he had reason to belicve that thi? di~rec-. 

tive would meet with the approval of the President, and this also npp1it:d 

to the statement on the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area ,.ontiiined 

in U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW-3 (Final), (See Annex 3.) He had also re-. 

celved a request that the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff should draft 

for consideration the public announcement setting up the unified command 

in the ABDA Area. He thought this should be completed on Friday. 

THE U. S. AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF gave final approval to 

the draft directive to the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area as amended 

in the discussion (U.S. ARC-4/5, British KW-3 (Final), (See Annex 31, and 

took note of Admiral King's statement. 

7. PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PUNNING COMMITTEE. -

The Conference considered the statement of tasks proposed for 

the Joint Planning Committee in U. S. Serial ABC-4/4, British WW (J.P.C.) 4, 

(See Annex 4.) At the suggestion of Admiral Stark, it was decided that the 

following note should be added to the end of the paper: 

"Consideration of the Southwest Pacific theatre, including the 

matter of unity of conunand therein, was treated as a first priority, and 

a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document." 

The U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the statement 

(Annex 4, U.S. ABC-4/4, British WW (J.P.C.)4), of the proposed tasks 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

for the Joint Planning Cornittee, subject to the insertion of the note recorded above. 

8. NAVAL DISPOSITIONS. -

SIR DUDLEY POUND suggested that one of the matters which might be 

discussed was the size of the Naval Forces available in the ABDA Area, and 

whether they were sufficient for the tasks they would encounter. 

There was some discussion on this point in the course of which 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that such a study would necessitate examination of 

the Naval resources in other theatres. 

It was stated that the Naval staffs were already at work on this, 

and it was finally agreed that this point should continue to be dealt with 

by them in direct consultation. 

The Conference adjourned at .4:15 P.M. 

ENCMSURES 

Annex 1 - American British Strategy.U.S.-ABC 4/CS1 British WW-1. 

Annex 2 - Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific, U.S.-AJX-4/3 

British WW-4, with Telegram and 3 Annexes. 

Annex 3 - Directive To Supreme Commander in ABDA Area,U.S.-ABC-4/5 

British NW-3, with 2 Annexes. 

Annex 4 - Proposed Tasks for the Joint, Planning Committee, U.S. ABC4/4 British WW (JPC)4. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/cs1 

BRITISH WW-1 (FINAL) December 31, 1941 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSs-7 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVID 

MEMORANDUM BY THE U. S. AND BRITISH CHIEFS 

OF STWF 

AMERICAN - BRITISH 

GRAND STRilTEGY 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECREP 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/CS-1 

BRITISH SERIAL h.w.-i (FINAL) 

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY 

It is requested that special 

care may be taken to ensure the 

secrecy of this document. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY 

MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

NOTE: The circulation of this paper should be restricted 

to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and 

their immediate subordinates. 

I. GRAND STRATEGY 

1. At. the A-B’: Staff coriversations in February, 1941, i~twas agreed 

that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently 

the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre. 

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the 

entry of .lapan into the War, our view remains that. Germany is still the prime 

ennmy and he? defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the 

collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow. 

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeg!iarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany. 

11. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY 

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. 

Each will he examined in greater detail later in this paper. 

-a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which 

first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry. 

Note:­

$: For brevity the abbreviated 

A-B is used to denote 

Am ric an-Br itish 

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I!. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOW SECRET 

b_. The maintenance of essential communications. 

E. Closing and tightening the ring around Germany. 

.a. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air.bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda. 

e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany. 

f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will 

safeguard'vital interests (see paragraph 18) and denying to Japan access 

to raw materials 'vital to.her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany. 

111. STEPS TO RE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE 

ABOVE GENERAI, POLJCY. 

THE SECURITY OF AREAS OF WAR PRODUCTION 

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of 

war industry are situated in:­

a. The United Kingdom. 

b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast. 

E. Russia. 

6. THE UNITED KINGDOM. - To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be 

necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat 

invasion. 

7. THE UNITED STATES. - The main centers of production on or near 

the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne 

attack. This will be facilitated by holding IIawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese irivasion of the United States on a large scale is 

highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not. 

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces 

required for the defense of the United States are matters for the IJnited 

States Chiefs of Staff to assess. 

9. RUSSIA. - It will be essential to afford the Russians assistance 

to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow, and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their nar effort. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS 

10. THE MAIN SEA ROUTES WHICH MUST BE SECURED ARE:­

-a. From the United States to the United Kingdom. 

b. From the United States and the United Kingdom to North Russia. 

9. The'various routes from the United Kingdom and the United 

States to Freetown, South America, and the Cape. 

a. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, 

to India and Burma, to the East Indies, and to Australasia. 

8. The route through the Panama Canal', and the United States 

coastal trafflc. 

f. Tho Pacific rout,es from the United States and the Panama Canal 

to Alaska, Hawait, Australia, and the Far East. 

In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to 

open up and secure the Mediterranean route. 

11. THE MAIN AIR ROUTES WHICH MUST BE SECURED ARE:­

&. From the United States to South America, Ascension, Freetown, 

Takoradi, and Cairo. 

P. From the United Kingdom to Gibraltar, Malta and Cairo. 

E. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, 

Ails tralasia. 

d. From the United States to Australia 'via Hawaii, Christmas 

Island, Cant,on, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia. 

e. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya'via 

the Netherlands East Indies. 

.­f. From the United States to the United Kingdom'via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. 

0. From the United States to the United Kingdom'via the Azores. 

b. From the United States to V1adivostok;via Alaska. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

12. THE SECURITY OF THESE ROUTES 1NVOLVES:­

a. Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions. 

b_. Holding and capturing essential sea and air bases. 

CLOSING AND TIGHTENING THE RING AROUND GERNANY 

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: 

ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN ,- THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE. 

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the 

gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast. 

14. If this ring can be closed, the blockade of Germany and Italy 

will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or 

to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa, will be prevented. Furthermore, the 

seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, 

thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long hml around the Cape. 

THE I3DERMINING AND WEARING DOWN OF THF; GERMAN RESISTANCE 

15. In 1942 the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance 

will be:­

p. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American 

Forces. 

b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means. 

c. The blockade. 

d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied 

countries, and the organization of subversive movements. 

DEVELOPMENT OF LAND OFFENSIVES ON TEE CONTINENT 

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We 

must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that, may result 

from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across 

the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings .in Western 

Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault. on Germany 

itself. and the scope of the victory program should be such as to prdvide 

means by which they can be carried out.. 

THE SAFEGUARDING OF VITAL INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE 

18. The sec.urit.y of Australia, New .Zealand, and India must be maintained, and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of 'vantage 

from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be 

secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:­

&. Hawaii and Alaska. 

b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines. 

c. Rangoon and the route to China. 

d. The Maritime Prdvinces of Siberia. 

The mlnimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a 

matter of mutual discussion. 

-5 -
December 31, 1941 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISA MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/3 

BRITISH )IW-4 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSs-7 

REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS) 

UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIED COMNAND. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/3 December 31, 1941 

BRITISH WW (J .P.C.,) 3 

The United States and Brihish Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint 

Planning Committee report of December 29, 1941, on "Supporting Measures for 

the Southwest Pacific" as appropriate action to be taken in the interim 

prior to the establishment of the unified command of the forces in that region. 

The United States and Brihish Chiefs of Staff agreed to send immediately to the United States and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far 

East Area the following telegram: 

"The general strategic policy for operations in the Far Eastern 

theatre which has been agreed upon by the United States and British Chiefs 

of Staff is as follows:­

-a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Jdva, and North Australia, as the basic defensive position in that theatre and to operate sea, Iand, and air forces in as 

great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the 

Japanese southward advance. 

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions 

for the theatre, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and 

to the defense of India. 

E. To reestablish comunieations through the Dutch East Indies 

nith Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison. 

a. To maintain essential communications within the theatre. 

In disposing of the reinforcements arriving in that theatre, you 

should be guided by the above policy and consider the needs of the theatre 

as a whole. To this end, close co-operation among the British, Dutch and 

United States Commanders Is essential, and you should conhinue to concert 

measures arcordingly. 

The British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, will inform the Dutch 

and request their cooperation." 

TELEGRAM 
Derember 28, 1941 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/3 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C.) 3. 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT 

TO 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS) 

DIRECTIVE 

1. CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE TO THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. 

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all 

available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to 

reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, 

to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective interven'nion of these reinforcements. 

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the 

Southwest Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as tc, the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, 

expected to be available in the Southwest Pacific Area on:­

-a. 15th January, 1942. 

h_. 1st February, 1942. 

on the following alternative assumpt,ions:­

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold. 

(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the 

Philippines do not. 

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines holds. 

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain init,ially the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific Theatre. The present st,rength 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position. 

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it Hill become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. 

Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for 

defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive. 

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:­

-a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, 

Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the 

Far East Area, and to operat,e air and sea forces in as great depth as 

possible forward of the narrier in order t,o oppose the Japanese southward advance. 

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supportin,? positions 

for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support. of China 

and to the defense of India. 

.-c. To reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the 

Philippines' Garrison. 

d. To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and 

within the Far East Area. 

e_. To obtain in the Par East, Area and Australasia all possible 

supplies to relieve shipping reqirii-ements . 

FORCES AND REINFORCENEWTS 

4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the 

reinforcements ordered or plannzd to he sent are shown in the attached 

tables (Annexes I, 11, and 111). Fut,u.re reinforcements should be planned 

in accordance with approTed strategic policy, 'having due regard to the es 

sentj.al requirements of other theatres. 

RECOMKENDATIONG 

5. It is recommended that, until such tjme as the wider problem of 

the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area 

is solved:-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

-a. Under the assumpBion that the Philippines and Singapore both 

hold. the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, as 

shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject 

to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned. 

12. Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East 

Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the total United States reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed'in 

furtherance of the defenses of key points on the Malay Barrier, and for 

protection of the 'vital lines of communication from the east. In the 

absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior United States Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. 

Under thls asswnption the planned disposition of British reinforcements 

remains unchanged. 

-c. Under' the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines 

holds, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, be 

used for the defense of the remainder of the Malay Barrier. Burma, and 

Australia, United States reinforcements being used to the eastward. and 

British reinforcements to the westward. 

NOTE:- The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being 

considered separately. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR 

UNITED STATES 

FORCES NOW DUE IN FAR EAST DUB IN FAR EAST TENTATIVELY PLANNED 

IN THE BY JANUARY 15, BETWEEN JAN. 16 OR UNDER ORDER 

FAR EAST 1942 AND FEBRUARY 1 FOR FAR EAST 

N U la1 

2 Cruisers 

18 Dest.royers 

13 damaged) 

27 Submarines 

Iless losses 1 

7 Patrol Bombers 

Phi ltpp. nes 

1-1 

40 000 as of 

12 Patrol Bombers 

lbl &m~ lbl 

Small Arms Ammunition None Supplies dr Gasoline 

Artillery Ammunit ion 

AA Ammunition 

Gas01 Ine 

December 22, 1941. 

Australia 

2 Regts Field Artillery 

Service Troops 

Icl &r ICI & 

Philippines IDec 251 55 Pursuit 

23 Heavy Bombers 

Few Pursuit planes for 

tec atma issaoce 

Aus t rsl ia 

18 Pursuit planes 

62 Dive bombers 

11 Heavy Bombers 

ANNEX I 

ICI & ICI & 

67 Pursuit To make total of. 

51 Heavy 

Bombers 4 Gps. Pursuit 18201 

2 Gps. Hesvy Bombers 

1701 

2 Gps Medium Bombers 

1114, 

1 Gp. Light. Bombers 

1571 

lplus certain reser~es1 

1. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR 

BRITISH COM~ION~ALTI-I 

FORCES IN THE DUE IN DUE IN FAR EAST TENTATIVELY PLANNED 

FAR EAST FAR EAST BY BETWEEN JANUARY 15 OR UNDER ORDER 

ON DECEMBER 7, 1941 JANUARY 15, 1942 AND FEBRUARY 1 FOR FAR EAST 

la1 1211 Naval la1 h'aval 

2 Cruisers 5 Additional Escort 2 Submrines 

8 Destroyers Vessels 

Ibl & (bl Army (to Malaya1 Ibl Army (to Malaya1 lbl Army IMalayal 

9 and 11 1nd.Divs. I One Me. Gp. 17 Ind. Diu. One Bde. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. Two AA Regts. llightl 

8 Aus. Div. lMalaya One Me. Gp. 18 Div. One Bde. Gp. 18 Div. One AA Regt. IheaYyl 

[less one Bde. I One AA Regt. llightl Drafts ior 9 and il Ind.3im. One Ede.Gp. 14 InLDiu. 

One Div. IBurmaI Gne AA Regt. (heavy1 One Sp iight Tank. 18 Div. (less two 

2 Inf. Bdes. ISingaporel One Antitank Regt. Me. Gpsl. 

ToUorma 

14 Lod. iliv. iless 

one Rde. Gp. I 

One Bde. Gp. l'llb 

Ind. Div. 

5th or 84th Ind.Div. 

ICI & (cI Air (cl & (CI & 

Malaya Malaya EQlaya 

2 Bder Sqns. 4 PAY'S 2 Fighter Scjns. Plans not 

2 Bcmber Recce Sqns. 1 Fighter Sq, 148 Hurricanes1 c oinp1e te 

6 Fighter Sqns 151 Hurricanes) 

2T B Sqns 1 Ember Sq. 

1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn. I Ble n he in I 

1 Somber Recce 

1 Hudsons I 

I Fighrer Sqn. 

Ihurricanesl 

ANNEX I1 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

AUSTRALIA 

Farces now in the Far East 

1.1 Naval 

2 Heavy Cruisers 

2 Light Cruisers 

4 Destroyers 

Ibl 

1 Brig Gp. of 8th 

Australian Div. 

5 Divisions IInfantryl 

2 Divisions ICavslryl 

1 Division IArmoredl 

(Not a8 yet equipped1 

160 First line planes 

300 - 400 Training planes 

15. 000 Air officers and men 

40, 000 In Training 

EU!! 

Forces now in the Par East 

(.I -1 

4 Craisers 

7 Destroyers 

15 Submarines 

2 - 8 Submarines IExpectedl 

I Lafer 

Ibl 

a DIT'S ~ava 

I En s Sumatra 

4 En's Borneo 

1 Bn Celebes 

1 En Timor 

1 Bn Moluccas 

6 Bomber Sqns. 

4 Fighter Sqns. 

108 Navy Aircraft 

40 Patrol Planes 

ANNEX 111 

I 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/5 

BRITISH WW-3 (FINAL) 

December 31, 1941 

ANNEX 3 

to 

JCCSs-7 

REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO TIIE SUPREME 

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA 

NOTE: 

Annex 2 To This Document 

Was Amended Later. 

(See Annex 1 To JCCSs-8) 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/6 December 31, 1941 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-3 (FINAL) 

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE 

SUPRENE COMMANDER 

BY GREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, 

THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER 

REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNlENTS: 

1. AREA.-

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all 

land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands 

East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area 

Rill be known as the ABDA Area. 

'2. FORCES. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area 

and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments, which are: 

5. Stationed in the Area; 

p. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for sellvices in or in support of the 

ABDA Area. 

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA GovRrnments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his gdvernment. 

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the 

combined ndval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments. 

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to 

your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your 

Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto. 

5. STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND POLICY. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic. defens1.w. The 

BOA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. AS 

additional forces become available, it will become possible to take the offenslve and ult,imately to conduct an all-out offensive against 'Japan. The first 

essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, 

through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of 

air forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the near future 

must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive. 

6. The general strategic policy will therefore be: ­

-a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, 

Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the 

ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and Air forces in as great depth as 

possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward 

advance. 

b_. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions 

for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the 

defense of India. 

-c. To re~-estahlishcommunications through the Dutch East Indies 

wit.h Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrlson. 

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area. 

7. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER. -

You will coordinate in'the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all 

armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives, where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether 

.national or int,ernational, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such 

task forces. 

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal 

administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized 

to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative fcrGiiit,ies and the broad alloca'cion of war materials. 

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may he dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments. 

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed 

forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge 

of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command. 

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission. 

13. LIMITATIONS. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of 

the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised 

through the commanders duly designated by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed 

forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between 

them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to he 

made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national 

component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and 

will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to t,he other national 

components of the task force. In general, your instructions and orders will 

be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission. 

14. RELATIONS WIT13 BDA GOVERNMENTS. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the 

execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the 

exercise of the authority nerein delegated and limited. Commanders of all 

sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be l.mmediately informed by 

their respective governments that, from a date to bc notified, all orders 

and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments. 

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representation to you, still considers that obedience to $our orders would jeopardize 

the national interests of his country t,o an extent unjustified by the general 

situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, suhject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals ail1 be made by the most, expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be comunicated simultaneously to 

you. 

16. STAFF AND ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You 

are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of 

communicabion described in Paragraph 18. 

17. You will report when you are In a position effectively to carry out 

the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned. 

18. SUPERIOR AUTHORITY. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2. 

Signed 

(By Power furnishing 

Supreme Commander) 

Countersigned: 

Other ABDA Representatives. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

BOUNDARIES OF AEDA AREA 

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows: 

On the Nortn: 

On the East: 

On the South: 

On the West, 

By the boundary between India and Burma, thence 

eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30' North, thence along 

the parallel of 30' North to the meridian of 

140" East. 

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included 

in this area. 

By the meridian of 140' East from 30' North, to 

the equator, thenre east to longitude 141' East, 

thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea 

on the south coast, thence east along the southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143' 

East, then south down this meridian to the coast 

of Australia. 

By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143" East. westward to the meridian of 

114' East, thence northwestward to latitude 15' 

South, longitude 92' East. 

By the meridian of 92' East. 

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to 

exterld thejr operations into other areas as may he required. 
U. S. SECRFP 

BRITISH MOST SECRET December 3i, 1941 

ANNEX 2 

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAH IN THE ABDA AReA 

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of 

the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the 

representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute 

the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the 

President, of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister 

of Defence, Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required arc!: 

-a. The provision of reinforcements. 

b. A major change in policy. 

-c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive. 

2. This agency will function as follows. 

-a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from 

any of the ABDA governments sill be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee both in Washington and in London. 

b_. The Chiefs of Staff Committ.ee in London will immediately teleg-aph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they 

will be telegraphing any opinions 

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and 

t,he representa0ives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will 

develop and submit their recornmendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence The PFime Minister will then Inform the President whether he fs in agreement with 

these recommendahions. 

3. Sinc:e London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since Lhe Dutch Government is in London, the British Gdvernment 

will he responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in t,he final telegram to Washington 

4. Agreement, having been reached between the President and the Prime 

Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will 

be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them. 
December 31, 1941 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL AEN-4/4 (FINAL) 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.R.C.)4 

ANNEX 4 

t,0 

JCCSs-7 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED 

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING 

COMMITTEE 
December 31, 1941 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/4 (FINAL) 

BRITISH SERIAL WH (J.P.C. )4 

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

1. A study of the relatfve importance and interrelation of the various 

military projects and movements which affect the Atlantic theatre and which may 

be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part 

of 1942. 

This report will include considerahion of the following: 

-a. MOVEMENTS 

(1) Relief of Iceland. 

(2) Mdvement of three Qivisions and one Armored Division from 

the United States to Northern Ireland. 

(3) Movement of United States air forces to the United Kingdom. 

(4) Relief of British in Aruba and Curacao. 

b. PROJECTS 

(1) Joint United States-British occupation of French North 

Afpica. 

(2) United States occupation of: 

(a) French Nest Africa and Cape Verde Islands. 

(b) Northeast Brazil. 

(3) British occupation of: 

(a) The Azores. 

(b) The Canaries and Madeira. 

(c) Diego Suarez. 

2. Coordination of the Victory Programs of the United States and the 

British Commonwealth and adjustment of their broad outlines in accordance 

with strategic considerations and production possibilities. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. A consideration of any steps that should be taken in the light of experience up to date to implement, improve, or extend the system of collaborakion between the United States-Bribish Staffs as laid down in ABC-1; the need 

for allocating joint resources on a strategic basis to be taken into account. 

NOTE: Consideration of the Southwest Pacific Theatre, including the 

matter of unity of command therein, was treated as a first 

priority and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of 

the foregoing document. 

-2-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC 4 

JCCSS-8 

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEXIERAI. RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

3:00 P.M., JANUARY 10, 1942 

Present 

British Officers 

Navy 

January 10, 1942. 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of 

Naval Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Captain G. D. Belben, R.N. 

Army 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office 

Air Force 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff 

Air Marshal A. T. Hnrris, Joint Staff Mission 

United States Offacers 

Navy 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Commander R. E. Libby, Aide t6 Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U.S.M.C. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Army 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces 

and Chief of Staff 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy 

Chief of Staff 

Brig. General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 

Brig. General D. D. Eisenhower, General Staff Corps 

Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M. 

Colonel .E-. I. C. Jacob 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ 

Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. SUl'bX GYMNAST.-

ADMIRAL POUND said that the British Chiefs of Staff had made a 

careful examination of the various factors which affected the timing of 

this operation, and the earliest dflte on which the first convoy could arrive 

at Casablanca. He explained these to the Conference and undertook to let the 

United States Chiefs of Staff have a note on the subject. So far as the 

British were concerned, it appeared that if January 7 were taken as the date 

on which planning really began, the earliest date for D-1 on which the decision to load the first convoy could be given would be February 4. In this 

event the first convoy would arrive at Algiers and Casablanca on D-28, that 

is, March 3, depending upon the avflilability of shipping on that date. He 

also pointed out that the whole undertaking would.depend upon the planning, 

the shipping, and the availability of troops and materiel. As to details at 

points of debarkation, ADMIRAL POUND said that he anticipated no difficulty 

in Algiers, and that in the British opinion, 29,000 men and 3,500 vehicles 

cbuld be unloaded at Casablanca in the fortnight. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked Admiral Pound if the British could undertake both Casablanca and Algiers. 

ADMIRAL POUND replied in the affirmative. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then expressed some concern about the availability of shipplng for the second convoy and undertook to confirm that January 7 

could be accepted, from the American point of view, as the date on which planning began. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2. DIRECTIVE FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ABDA AREA - ATTITUDE OF 

THE DUTCH.-

ADMIRAL STARK recalled that certain amendments to Annex 2 of the 

draft directive for General Wavell had been proposed by the British in order 

to meet certain points raised by the Dutch. These had not yet been accepted 

by the Dutch, but had been approved by the President and the Prime Minister. 

He confirmed that these proposed amendments were acceptable to the United 

States Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Dutch representative in Washington 

had come into the War Department a good deal over the question of the Dutch 

position. It appeared that the population of the Netherlands East Indies 

were feeling rather hurt at not having been consulted over the question of 

supreme command. They did not consider that the Dutch Government in London 

was fully representative of them Some trouble had also been caused through 

the omission from General Wavell's directive of any instruction to set up his 

Headquarters in Java. In the original communication to the Dutch Government, 

which proposed the setting up of a Supreme Commander, a passage to this effect 

had been included. 

Every endeavor had been made by BRIGADIER GENERAL GEROW to smooth 

down the feelings of the Dutch representative in Washington and to induce him 

to fall in with the agreed views of the United States and British Chiefs of 

Staff, but in view of the fact that negotiations with the Dutch Government 

were being conducted by the British, the position was somewhat embarrassing. 

ADMIRAL POUND expressed the appreciation of the British Chiefs of 

Staff for the way in which the United States Staffs were dealing with this 

matter. A telegram had been sent to General Wavell instructing him to set up 

his Headquarters in Java, and in fact, he was establishing himself at Batavia 

on January 10 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF took cognizance of the prior approval of ABC4/5, WW 6, with Annex 2 amended, and also of the fact that further amendments 

would possibly be made upon reply from the Dutch and Australian Governments. 

(See Annex 1) 

3. PROCEDURE FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL WAVELL.-

THE CONFERENCE had before it an amendment by the British Chiefs of 

Staff on the procedure for the assumption of command of General Wavell (USABC-4/CS-3, British WW-9). Various minor amendments were agreed to. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that it would be advisable to insert in the 

draft telegram to General Wavell a sentence to indicate that instructions 

were being sent to Admiral Hart and General Brett telling them to report to 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

him for duty in their respective posts. The fo.llowing addition to the draft 

telegram at Annex B was accordingly agreed to: 

"General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the United 

States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of the Combined Naval Forces in the ABDA area respectively." 

IT WAS AGREED: 

a. That the draft telegram in Annex C to the Memorandum by the 

British Chiefs of Staff should be dispatched forthwith. (See Annex 2) 

b_. That the procedure proposed in the Memorandum should be 

adopted and the Memorandum, subject to the amendments agreed upon in 

discussion, should be approved. (See Annex 2) 

4. IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA.-

THE CONFERElvCE had before it a memorandum received from the United 

States Chiefs of Staff on immediate assistance to China. (ABC-4/9, WW (J.P.C.) 

9) * 

ADMIRAL POUND said that the British Chiefs of Staff recognized the 

importance of doing everything possible to facilitate assistance to China, 

and were in general agreement with the proposals in the paper. They wished 

to suggest certain amendments to it, which were designed to make it conform 

to the idea of Unity of Command. 

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF proposed certain amendments, which were 

discussed at some length. 

At the suggestion of GENERAL MARSHALL the word "operate" in the 

fourth line of the first amendment was altered to "engage in joint operation". 

Similarly in the last line but one of the second amendment the words "General 

Wavell" were altered to "the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area". 

The following further amendment was agreed to. 

On page 3, paragraph 4, line 6, the words "General Drum" were amended 

to read, "the United States Representative". 

MARSHAL DILL suggested that the United States Representative in China 

might be informed of the existence and scope of the organization which hadbeen 

built up in China under General Dennys. He undertook to forward a note on this 

point to General Warshall. 

THE CONFERENCE approved the memorandum on immediate assistance to 

China as amended in discussion. (See Annex 3) 

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U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5 POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION.-

This paper was brought up by British Chiefs of Staff and discussed 

briefly. (See Annex 4) 

THE CONFERENCE adjourned at 5:30 I?.Mo, to meet at 4 00 I4 M , January 11, 1942. 

ENCLOSURES 

Annex 1 - Directive to Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area, US ABC-4/5, 

British MW-6. 

Annex 2 - Procedure for Assumption of Command by General Wave11 - USABC-4/CS-3, British WW--9. 

Annex 3 - Immediate Assistance to China, US-ABC-4/9, British WW-10. 

Annex 4 - Post-Arcadia Collaboration, British WW-8. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH h40ST SECRET 

U.8. ac-4/5 (APPROVED)

BRITISH WW-6 

(SUPERSEDES ABC-4/5, WW-3 FINAL) 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSs-8 

REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME 

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA 

January 10, 1942. 

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER 
January 10, 1942. 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/5 (APPROVED) 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-6 

SUPERSEDES ABC-4/57 BRITISH "-3 (FIN&) 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SWRERIE COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA 

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF 

AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED 

KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER 

REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS: 

1. AREA.-

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all 

land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands 

East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area 

will be known as the ABDA Area. 

2. FORCES.-

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area 

and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are or will be:­

&. Stationed in the Area; 

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the 

ABDA Area. 

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government. 

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the 

combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be 

jointly designated by the ABDA Governments. 

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to 

your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your 

Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND P0LICX.-

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct 

of the war in your Area is not only in the immedinte future to maintain as 

many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The 

first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible 

moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so con-~ 

ducted as to further preparations for the offensive. 

6. THE GENERAL STRATEGIC POLICY WILL THEREFORE BE:­

&. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, 

Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the 

ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as 

possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward 

advance. 

b_. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions 

for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the 

defense of India. 

-c. To reestablish communications through the Dutch East Indies 

with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison. 

a. To ms.intain essential communications within the Area 

7. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER.-

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of al.1 

armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether 

national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such 

task forces. 

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal 

administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized 

to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materia.ls. 

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments. 

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces 

under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your 

responsibilities as Supreme Commander. 

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U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command. 

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit 

recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the 

furtherance of your mission. 

13. LIMITATIONS.-

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of 

the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercjsed 

through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces 

of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and 

their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the 

basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a 

task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of 

the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission. 

14. RELATIONS WITH ABDA GOVERNMENTS.-

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the 

execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the 

exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all 

sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by 

their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders 

and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments 

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, 

after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to 

your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his rountry to tin 

extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the 

right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal 

will be communicated simultaneously to you. 

16. STAFF AND ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND.-

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You 

are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the 

Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be 

communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of 

communication described in Parngraph 18. 

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out 

the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command 

may be promulgated to all concerned. 

18. SUPERIOR AUTHORITY.-

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2. 

Signed 

(By Power furnishing 

Supreme Commander) 

Countersigned: 

Other ABDA Representatives. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

to 

us - ABC-4/5 

BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA 

1. THE ABDA AREA IS BOUNDED AS FOLLOWS: 

On the North: 

On the East: 

On the South: 

On the West: 

By the boundary between India and Burma, thence 

eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30' North, thence along 

the parallel of 30' North to the meridian of 

140' East. 

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included 

in this area. 

By the meridian of 140' East from 30' North, to 

the equator, thence east to longitude 141' East, 

thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea 

on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern 

New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143' East, 

then south down this meridian to the coast of 

Australia. 

By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143' East, westward to the meridian of 

114' East, thence northwestward to latitude 15' 

South, longitude 92O East. 

By the meridian of 92' East 

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 2 

to 

us - ABC-4/5 

IIIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA 

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of 

the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff and 

the representatives In Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submittjng recommendations for decision by 

the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and 

Minister of Defence, on behalf of ABDA Governments. Among the chief matters 

on which decisions will be required are: 

8. The provision of reinforcements. 

k. A major change in policy. 

c. Departure from the Supreme Commander’s directive. 

2. This agency will function as follows: 

g. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from 

any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee both in Washington and in London. 

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London having consulted the 

Dutch Staff, will immediately telegraph to their representatives in 

Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions. 

-c. On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs ofstaff 

and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will 

develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister 

will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these 

recommendations. 

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government 

will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement to every stage, 

and for including these in the final telegram to Washington. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime 

Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will 

be dispatched from Washington in the name of the ABDA Governments and the 

respective governments will be fully informed. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/cs-3 

BRITISH WW-9 (REVISED) January 10, 1942. 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSs-8 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED AS AMENDED - BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEMORANDUM 

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY 

GENERAL WAVELL 
U. S. SECWT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4 c/s 3 

BRITISH WW-9 (REVISED) January 10, 1942. 

It is requested that special 

care may be taken to insure 

the secrecy of thisdocument. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL WAVELL 

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff. 

1. General Wavell was informed on 29th December, 1941, by the Prime 

Minister that he was to be the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. He was 

told that his directive would be given to him shortly and that any observations which he might wish to make on its terms would be considered. 

2. When the directive was finally approved by the President and the 

Prime Minister, orders were sent to London (2nd January) that it should be 

telegraphed to General Wavell immediately - copies were also to be sent to 

General Pownall and all other British Commanders concerned. 

3. At the same time the terms of the directive were communicated to 

the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Governments. 

4. The Dutch Government has suggested certain amendments to Annex (ii) 

to the directive, and these are still under discussion. It is not known 

whether they have communicated the directive to the Dutch Commanders in the 

ABDA Area. 

5. The Australian Government has put forward views and opinions about 

the whole arrangement, and have not yet notified their agreement with the 

directive. It is presumed that they have not yet informed any of their Commanders. 

6. The New Zealand Government is only indirectly concerned. There 

has been no comment on the directive from them. 

7. On 2nd January General Wavell was told that much importance was 

attached to his taking over as soon RS possible, and he was asked to specify 

the earliest date on which he would be ready to assume command. He is now 

at Singapore, but is expected to be in Batavia today, 10th January. No observations have yet been received from him about his directive, nor has he 

yet specified a date for assuming com1k3nd. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

8. Neither the Dutch nor the Australian Government has yet agreed to 

the directive, though their objections are mainly to the machinery of control 

laid down in Annex (ii) rather than to the directive itself The discussions 

which are proceeding with those Governments may of course be successfully concluded before it becomes necessary to promulgate the date of Oeneral Wavell's 

appointment; but even if they are not, we do not think there need be any delay on that account. We suggest that General H'avell's appointment should be 

promulgated as soon as he reports he is ready, and that he should then be instructed to carry on, pending the final confirmation of his directive. 

9. We accordingly propose that the following action should be taken as 

soon as General Wavell reports the date on which he will be ready to assume 

command: ­

a. His Majesty's Government should make a communication in the 

terms of Annex A to the Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, 

Australia. New Zealand, India, and China 

b. His Majesty's Govermntin the United Kingdom should telegraph 

to General Wavell in the terms of Annex B. 

-c. On receipt of the communication mentioned in g above, the 

Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, and Australia should 

at once notify their local Commanders of the dAte of the assumption of 

command by General Wavell, and should give any necessary consequential 

instructions so that the system planned for the ABDA Area can become effective. 

d. The terms of the directive for General Wavell, including Annex 

(ii), should be settled as soon as possible, and the outcome notified to 

all concerned. 

10. We propose to telegraph home in the terms of Annex C to secure the 

assent of the Dutch and Australian Governments to this procedure 

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND 

J G, DILL. 

C a PORTAL. 

Washington, D. C. 

January 10, 1942. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX "A" 

Draft communication from His Majesty's Government in the United 

Kingdom to the Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, Australia, 

New Zealand, China, and India: 

Instructions are being sent today to General Wavell that 

he should assume command of the ABDA Area as from January 

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned 

on the terms of his directive and on the machinery for the higher 

direction of war in the ABDA Area, (Annex I1 to the Directive), 

General Wavell is being instructed to proceed in accordance with 

the directive as at present drafted and to communicate with Washington and London as laid down in Paragraph 18 thereof. 

Please inform all Commanders concerned, accordingly. 

ANNEX "B" 

Draft telegram from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 

to General Wavell: 

You are to assume supreme command in the ABDA Area on 

January 

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned 

on your directive, you should act in accordance with the directive 

sent to you in Telegram No.-, and you should address communications to superior authority in accordance with Paragraph 18 thereof. 

General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the 

United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of Combined Naval Forces, respectively, in the 

BBDA Area. 

Governments concerned are notifying their Commanders accordingly. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX "C" 

Draft telegram from British Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee, London: 

Please put following to Lord Privy Seal: 

It is of highest importance that General Wave11 should 

exercise supreme command without delay, as soon RS he reports himself ready to do so. 

Please propose to Dutch and Australian Governments that 

as soon as General H'avell reports himself as ready he should be authorized to assume command, pending the acceptance by those Governments of the AEIDA machinery as set out in Annex I1 of his directive. 

United States Chiefs of Staff agree. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/9 

BRITISH WW-10 January 10, 1942 

ANNEX 3 

to 

JCCSs-S 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED REPORT 

BY 

UNITlCl STATES - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/9, BRITISH SERIAL W'W(J.P.C.)9 

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/9 

BRITISH W-10 

January 10, 194.2 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT 

TO 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA 

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country s resources against Japnn Information, currently 

available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and 

materially, in China's war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with 

other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend 

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, 

aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete 

isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to 

delay and possible interception The long, poorly maintained, and insecure 

Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck tonnage, -- while 

air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the 

amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are 

indicated as necessary: 

&. Closer and more effertive liaison with the Generalissimo 

b_. Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and 

ground. 

c. Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the 

Burma Road. 

d. Increase in base facilities and technical services. 

e. Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures. 

-f. Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding 

General, ABDA Area. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps 

to meet the requirements listed in Paragraph 2: 

A_. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a United States Army 

officer of high rank as the United States Representative in China, and 

to agree to the following as his functions: 

(1) Supervise and control all United States Defense Aid affairs 

for China. 

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all United States forces 

in China, and such Chinese forces as may be assigned. Should it be 

necessary for any of these forces to engage in joint operations in 

Burma,they will come under the command of the Supreme Commander of 

the ABDA Area, who will issue the necessary directions for the cooperation of the United States Representative's forces with the forces 

under the British Commanders in Burma. 

(3) Represent the United States Government on any international 

War Council in China. 

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China. 

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that A_ is, 

in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.) 

Q. Dispatch to the South China - Burma area additional aviation 

strength, initially raising and maintaining the American Volunteer Group 

at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered 

possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the United States 

Representative. 

c. Arrange (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases 

in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the 

technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon 

facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of 

the Burma Road. 

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and 

agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood 

that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event 

that the Generalissimo accords to the United States Representatives the authority implied and indicated in Paragraph 3 5 above. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

POINTS ON WHICH BRITISH AGREEMENT IS SOUGH", UNDER 

CONDITIONS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 3 8 

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the United 

States Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, 

routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in 

and north of Burma. 

b_. The United States Representative to be authorized to make every 

effort to increase the capacity of the Burma route, throughout its length 

from Rangoon to Chungking. To do this he will probably be given complete 

executive control of the China Section of the route. On the British Section, control will still be exercised by the British authorities, both 

military and civil. To achieve the general aim, these British Ruthorities 

will be instructed to carry out every possible improvement to the route in 

accordance with the requirements of the United States Representative and 

will accept such American technicians and equipment as may be necessary 

for the improvement of facilities in the Port of Rangoon and along the 

route itself. 

-c. The United States Representative, by arrangement with the British 

Commanders in Burma, to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary 

airfields in Burma. 

d The United States Representative to be accepted as the principal liaison agency between the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

BRITISH WW-8 

ANNEX 4 

to 

JCCSS-8 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION 

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF 

January 10, 1942 

STAFF 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

January 10, 1942 

ANNEX 4 

to 

JCCSs-8 

It is requested that special care should be taken 

to insure the secrecy of this document. 

WW-8 

January 8, 1942. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION 

W3MORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFR. 

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know 

what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of 

Staff organization it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure 

of the Arcadia party. 

2. To avoid confusion, we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" 

should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration and the word "Combined" to 

collaboration between two or more allied nations. 

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE. 

3. Field Marshal Sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President and 

the Prime Minister. 

REPRGSENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF. 

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will continue to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped 

that a meeting between the United States Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be 

held weekly or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each meeting. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED PLANNING. 

5. For the time being the British representatives on the Planning Staff 

will be -

NRVr 

Captain C E. Lambe, R.N., Deputy Director of Plans, Admiralty 

Army 

Lieut. Colonel G. K. Bourne 

-

R.A.F.

Group Captain S. C. Strafford 

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE. 

6 The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve 

the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter 

should either be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting. 

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee 

in London and these are available to work in conjunction with any organization the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire. 

PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION. 

8. In our view, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad 

programme of requirements based on strategic policy. We suggest that it will 

be the duty of the Combined Planning Staffs, advised by appropriate Allocation Officers, to watch, on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the production programmes and to bring to notice instances where output does not conform to strategic policy. 

9. Similarly, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should from time to time 

issue general directives laying down policy to govern the distribution of 

available weapons of war. Effect should be given to these directives by appropriate Combined Allocation Committees. These would meet periodically and 

make both long-term allocations (on which planning and training of forces 

must be based), and short-term allocations to meet immediate military needs. 

10. The British representatives on the appropriate Combined Allocation 

Committees will for the present be ­

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

NRvy 

Rear Admiral J. W. S. Dorling, R.N. 

a 

Brigadier D. Campion 

w. 

Air Commodore B. B. C. Betts 

11. Allocation should be made as between the United States and the British 

Commonwealth, each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted 

responsibility . 

MILITARY MOVEMENTS. 

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would settle the broad issues of priority 

of overseas movement. In order to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to 

coordinate the movement of United States and British troops and equipment so 

that the shipping resources of both countries are put to the best use, it appears to us that a Combined Body is desirable. The British representatives for 

such a body are available under Brigadier H. R. Kerr. 

13. It is suggested that this Combined Body should work in close touch 

with the Combined Planning Staffs through whom their advice to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff would be submitted. 

SECRETARIAT. 

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve the 

above organizations and 

the United States Chiefs 

Washington, D. C., 

January 8, 1942. 

to work in with any similar Secretariat system which 

of Staff may establish. 

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND, 

J. G. DILL, 

A. T. HARRIS, 

(for Chief of Air Staff) 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 January 11, 1942 

JCCSs-9 

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

4:OO P.M., January 11, 1942 

Present 

British Officers 

Navy 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Cnief of 

Naval Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Captain G. D. Belben, R. N. 

Army 

Field Marshal Sir John Cill 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Remyss, Joint Staff Hission 

Air Force 

Air Chief Marsnsl Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff 

Air Marshal A. ‘I.Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

United States Officers 

Navy 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operaiions 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chiei, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Iiorne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. B. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Bolcomb, Commandant, U. S. Mariiie Corps 

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U. S. SECRET 

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Army 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces 

and Chief of Staff 

(Present for only part of the Conference). 

Lieut. General H. �1. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division 

(Present for only part of the Conference). 

Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office 

Colonel E. I. C. Jacob (Present for only part of the Conference) 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Captain F. C. Denebrinlc, U. S. havy 

Lieut. Colonel P. hi. Robinett, G-2, GEQ 

Lieut. Colonel R. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

Lieut. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF COWAND IN (rm AEDA AREA. 

ADMIRAL POUND read to the Conference Part I of a telegram which 

had been received from General Mavell, in wiiicii he gave an account of a 

Conference held on the afternoon of 10th January, with Admiral Hart, General 

Brett, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, and otkier commanders, and stated that 

he was establishing his Headquarters ten miles north of Eandoeng. Part I1 

of the telegram had not yet been received. 

TIIE CONFERENCE took note of the telegram. 

2. SITUATION IN TEE ABDA AREA. 

ADMIRAL.STARK said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had been 

giving thought to the situation in the ABDA Area, which apoeared to be 

critical. They felt that there was a good case for subordinating everything 

in the immediate future to the necessity for getting reinforcements quic1cl.y 

into that Area. Might it not be right, ror example, to cut down the flow of 

United States troops to Nortiiern Ireland and Iceland, if by so doing further 

assistance could be sent across the Pacific? 

GENERAL biARSIIALL said that it was not a question of diverting 

troops, since these were available for both purposes. The problem was to 

find the necessary tonnage. The immediate necessity was to convey to 

Australia anti-aircraft troops, ground staff and eqilipment for the aircraft 

arriving out there, and for personnel to organize and operate the bases 

which must be established in Australia. 

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THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF had considered whether additional 

shipping could be provided by cutting down the programme of reinforcements to 

Hawaii, but there was little to be obtained in that way, as urgent reinforcements had already been diverted to Christmas and Canton Islands, and to Samoa. 

The present programme of shipments of men and materiel across the Pacific 

would take three months, the situation being what it was. Should not the 

priorities over the next few weeks be weighed, with a view of deciding whether 

the reinforcement of ABDA could be accelerated by diverting ships from other 

projects, such as the mdves to Iceland and Northern Ireland, and operation 

Super-Gymnas t? 

MARSHAL DILL suggested that the best way of tackling the problem 

would be for the shipping experts to get together, consider total tonnage 

available, and see what sort of a programme could be drawn up. 

ADMIRAL STARK asked whether Singapore was in immediate danger, and 

how long It might be expected to hold out. 

MARSHAL DILL said that it would be a race between the arrival of 

reinforcements, and the progress of the Japanese. If the projected reinforcements arrived, there seemed no reason why Singapore should not hold out indefinitely. A risk had had to be taken in mdving the Australian Division from 

the Mersing Area over to the Northwestern front, but one Indian Brigade Group 

had already arrived, and a British Brigade Group and 51 Hurricanes were due to 

arrive on 13th January. 

ADMIRAL STARK thought that if there were a chance that the race 

could be won, it would be worth while doing anything possible to hasten the 

arrival of reinforcements, and to build up the position as quickly as possible. 

If Singapore and the Philippines were captured by the Japanese, they would be 

free to bring their whole weight to bear on the Netherlands East Indies 

GENERAL MARSHAIL said that already the Japanese could move troops 

from the Philippines and use them for other purposes, and, in his opinion, 

certain indications pointed to their already being in process of doing so. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL said that it would certainly be a great 

waste of materiel if aircraft reinforcements were poured into the ABDA Area 

without the necessary ground staff to operate and maintain them. He felt 

that before a decision was taken to sacrifice the North Atlantic move in 

order to provide ships for the Pacific moves, it would be well worth while 

holding a general review of the shipping situation. This might reveal other 

resources which would enable us to carry on with both projects. It should 

be borne in mind that the move of United States troops to Northern Ireland 

and Iceland was part of a chain of movements extending through the Middle 

East to the Far East; and he would be reluctant to see it abandoned. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he did not think it would be necessary to 

do more than cut down the strength of the convoy which was shortly due to sail 

for Magnet, to approximately 10,000 men. ‘The ships required for the Pacific 

move would have to be of a certain type in order to manage the long sea passage. 

ADMIRAL. KING inquired whether, if the North Atlantic convoy were cut 

so as to release personnel ships to carry 10,000 men, the urgent Pacific moves 

could then be accomplished. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it would accommodate three anti-aircraft 

regiments ‘badly needed in the ABDA Area; that it was not only a question of 

personnel ships; freight ships would also be required. That the basic problem 

was to accelerate movements requiring three months to consummate, into one 

month; those contemplated within the next few weeks to be undertaken within 

the next two weeks; that time - even days -is thepressing factor. 

After further discussion it was agreed that the problem should be 

put forthwith to the British and American shipping experts, and the following 

terms of reference were approved: ­

“To make proposals for providing shipping from United 

States and British resources to carry to the AEDA Area the 

urgent reinforcements of men and materiel which the United 

States Army wishes to send in the immediate future; and to 

show at what cost to other commitments this shipping can 

be found.“ 

The above terms of reference were conveyed without delay to General 

Somervell, U. S. Army, and to Brigadier Napier, British Army, for immediate 

action. 

GENERAL GEROW left the Conference in order to be present at the 

discussion. 

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATFS FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. 

THE CONFERENCE had before them a report by the Joint Planning 

Committee on the establishment of United States Forces in Northern Ireland. 

(U. S. ABC-4/7, British WW (J.P.C.)7) 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL referred to Paragraph 5 (c) (3) in which 

it was stated that it would be the responsibility of the British to provide 

adequate air protection and support for the United States field forces, 

establishments and installations in Northern Ireland. He explained that the 

British forces in Northern Ireland were generally protected by our own system 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of fighter defense, the local air forces in Northern Ireland for protection and 

support being one night fighter squadron, two day fighter squadrons, and one 

Army cooperation squadron. It was proposed to make no change in these forces 

so long as the United States forces were not engaged in active operations, 

except that in some emergency it might be necessary to make a temporary reduction in the British air forces in Northern Ireland, for example, if concentrated attacks were made on convoys on the Eastern coast of England. If 

active operations developed in Ireland, the present British plan was to send 

three bomber and two fighter squadrons in addition to the air forces already 

there. These additions were, of course, dependent on the general situation at 

the time. If the main attack on the United Kingdom was being put in at some 

other point and an attack on Ireland were only a feint, it might not be possible to send all these additional forces. On the other hand, if the main 

point of danger seemed to be in Ireland, they might well be increased. He 

inquired whether these arrangements would be satisfactory to the American 

Chiefs of Staff. lie did not wish them to expect a higher scale of air support 

than the British would be able to provide. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the scale proposed would be acceptable to 

him in the circumstances. 

ADMIRAL XIhG pointed out that since it was a matter of judgment 

whether the air protection and support would be "adequate", it would be more 

correct to change the word "adequate" to "appropriate." 

THE CONFERENCE approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee 

(U. S. Serial ABC-4/7, British Serial W (J.P.C.)7), subject to the substitution of the word "appropriate" for "adequate" in line 2 of paragraph 5 (c) 

(3). (See Annex 1.) 

GENERAL MARSHALL left the Conference at this point. 

4. DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES BETWEEN HAWAII AiVD AUSTRALIA. 

TIiE CONFERENCE had before them a report by the Joint Planuing 

Committee 011 the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia. (U. S. 

ABC-4/8, British WW (J.P.C.)8). 

GENERAL ARNOLD, referring to Paragraph 9 (d), questioned the advisability of sending air forces to New Caledonia "even if this has to be at the 

expense, initially, of the ABDA Area." Even if snipping were available there 

were not available a pursuit squadron and a medium bomber squadron to be sent 

immediately except at the expense of the ABDA Area. He did not think that 

New Caledonia should have priority over Fiji or Samoa. Samoa was of aarticular importance, since if it were lost the air route for the heavy boiriiiers 

from America to the ABDA Area would be cut. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that New Caledonia was of great importance 

to the mDA Area. Kot only were the nickel mines a tempting bait for the 

Japanese, but also if the Island was in Japanese possession, all reinforcements 

to the ABDA Area would have to take the long route south of New Zealand. 

GENERAL HOLCOMB said that the garrison proposed for Samoa (in the 

Annex to the paper) was already en route. There was no question of diverting 

any part of it. 

ADMIRAL POUND suggested that the shipping experts who were examining the possibility of providing additional shipping for reinforcing the 

ABDA Area should be instructed to take into account the needs of New Caledonia 

and see if it were not possible to send in the necessary reinforcements without taking anything away from what was proposed for the ABDA Area itself. 

General Gerow was notified of this. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that shipping was the limiting factor 

only for the land forces; in the case of air forces, it was availability. 

After some discussion it was agreed that the first sentence of 

Paragraph 9 (d) should be amended to read as follows:­

"That the defense of New Caledonia should, in principle, 

be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the 

United States should, as a temporary measure, furnish forces 

for the defense of the Island immediately after meeting the 

emergency in the ABDA Area." 

ADMIRAL KING said that the following addition should be made to 

Column (c) of the Annex under Item'3, Samoa:­

1 Fighter Squadron 

1 Dive Bomber Squadron 

ADMIRAL TURNER explained that reference had been made to the need 

for obtaining from Australia an opinion as to the priority for arming the 

Free French on the Island because there was some doubt whether, in view of 

the shortage of equipment and shipping, these troops were worth arming at 

the expense of other requirements in, say, Australia. It had not been 

intended by the Joint Planning Committee that these forces should never be 

armed at all. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISII MOST SECRET 

THE CONFERENCE:­

a Accepted, in rinciple, the report f the Joint Planning 

Committee (U. S. ABC-4 6, British 1IW (J.P.C. 3), subject to confirmation 

by General Marshall, and to the amendments agreed in the discussion. 

-b Invited the British Chiefs of Staff:­

(1) To obtain without delay from Australia an opinion 

as to the priority for arming the 3,700 Free French in New 

C a1edoni a; 

(2) To take up immediately with the Free French the 

question of the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces 

and power plant of the nickel mines, and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia. 

-c Agreed that the American and British shipping experts should be 

instructed to include in the examination which they had been ordered to 

carry out (vide Minute 2) the possibility of sending urgent reinforcements from America to New Caledonia, without retarding the rate of reinforcing the ABDA Area itself. 

5. INCLUSION OF PORT DARHIN IN THE ABDA AREA. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that a telegram had been received from General 

Wavell pointing out that it was not clear whether Port Darwin was included in 

the ABDA Area as defined in his directive or not. He felt that it should be, 

since it was linked up with the control of the Timor Sea, which was his responsibility. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that there was more to be 

considered than the mere local defense of the port, but Australia would, of 

course, have to be consulted. It appeared that since Port Darwin was an 

essential base of the ABDA Area, the case might be covered by Parazraph 2 of 

the directive, which placed General Wavell in command of forces "located in 

Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective 

Governments for services in or 1-N SUPPORT OF the ABDA Area." 

ADMIRAL STARK expressed, on behalf of the American Chiefs of Staff, 

the opinion that the defense of Port Darwin should be made the responsibility 

of General Wavell, in view of the fact that it was a necessary base for the 

ABDA Area. 

The Conference adjourned at 6:OO P.M., to meet at 2:OO P.M., January 12, 1942. 

ENCLOSURES 

Annex 1 - Establishment of United States Forces in Northern Ireland 

(U. S. ABC-4/7, British WW-12). 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX I 

to 

JCCSs-9 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/7 Washington, D. C 

(APPROVED) 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-12 January 11, 1942 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED 

REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES - BRITISE 

JOINT PLANNING COVIIITTEE 

u. s. ABC-4/7 British WW-12 

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/7 

BRITISH SERIAL WW (JPC)7 

Washington, D. C. 

January 10, 1942. 

ESTABLISEMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND 

1. MISSION. 

United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for 

the accomplishment of the following missions: 

To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North 

Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to 

defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers. 

b_ To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense 

thereof. 

2. FORCES. 

The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting 

of the 32d, 34th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the 

command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U. S. Army. The strength of the 

field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and anti-aircraft units, is 

approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 

ship tons are required. The strength of the anti-aircraft personnel (to be 

provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of 

aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. 

Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping 

is available. When the air and anti-aircraft support is assumed by the 

United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required. 

3. COWAND. 

Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the 

British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General 

James E. Chaney, who has been designated, "Commander United States Army 

Forces in the British Isles." The term "command" is defined as that control 

of individuals, Forces, functions, and establishments which is normally 

vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, regulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with 

appropriate British authorities for the employment: 

(1) of organizations of his command under British control, and 

(2) of Sritish organizations under United States control. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECMT 

4. STRATEGIC DIRECTION. 

The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the 

British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the 

Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles. 

b_ The term "stratezic direction" is defined to mean the function 

of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to 

carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that 

general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, 

without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative 

matters. 

-c It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States 

North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without 

prior consent of the Commanding General, Field Forces, United States 

Army. 

5. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OPERATION. 

The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at: 

-a Questions relative to despatch of United States Army Forces and 

materials from the United States that may require British collaboration 

will be handled through the British Mission in the United States. 

b_ Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accommodation and maintenance of the United States Army Forces in Northern 

Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will 

be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States 

Forces in the British Isles. 

-c WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 

(1) ANTI-AIRCRAFT. Initially all anti-aircraft protection 

for United States Field Forces, establishments and installations 

will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for United States �orces in Northern Ireland 

will be provided from United States personnel equipped and inaiiitained for armament and ammunition from Eritish sources. 

(2) FIELD ARTILLERY. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 

rounds per pun, will be delivered by the British to United States 

Forces in Northern Ireland. The 13ritish will supply addi tiorial 

ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles. 

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BRITISH UOST SECRET 

(3) AIR. It will he the responsibility of the British to provide 

appropriate air protection and support for the United States Field 

Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in 

their mission, until such time as the means are made available to 

the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles, to assume 

this responsibility. 

-d SHELTER. 

It will he the responsibility of the Eritish to provide shelter 

for the United States Army Forces in Northern Ireland. 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 January 12, 1942 

JCCSs-10 

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

4:OO R.M., JANUARY 12, 1942 

Present 

British Officers 

Navy 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of 

Naval Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Army 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Kemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Brigadier C. S. Napier, British War Office 

Air Force 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Port;ll, Chief of Air Staff 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

United States Officers 

Navy 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operatjons 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, IJ. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral &.R. Sexton, President, Gencral Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. Fi. Towers, Chief, Biirepu of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, \jar Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, L.S.M.C. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Army 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces 

and Chief of Staff 

Lt. General �I.H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy 

Chief of Staff 

Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division 

Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier V. Dykes, Director of Plans, War Office 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, U.S.N. 

Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Lt. Colonel P. M. Robinett, 0-2 GHQ 

Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. SHIPPING FOR UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE FAR EAST.-

GENERAL MARSHALL gave the Conference an outline of certain proposals 

which had been submitted by the United States Staffs for expediting the move 

of American reinforcements to the Pacific and ABDA Area. (See Annex 1) He 

explained that these proposals had been developed since the meeting of United 

States and British shipping experts on the previous evening. If the proposals 

were accepted, it would be possible to sail a convoy of 21,800 men from New 

York for the Far East on January 20. Of this, some 10,000 were earmarked for 

the defense of New Caledonia, the remainder being ground staffs for air squadrons. The effect would be to reduce the Iceland convoy sailing on January 5 

from 8,000 to 2,600, and the Northern Ireland convoy from 16,000 to 4,000. 

Certain additional American ships not at present scheduled for troop movements 

would also be employed, such as ships on the South American trade, and train 

ferries. 

BRIGADIER NAF'IER said that the proposal for the QUEEN MARY to take 

American troops to the United Kingdom and pick up a load there for the Middle 

East was a new idea which he had not yet had time to study. At the shipping 

conference the proposal had been that she should take troops from New York to 

South Africa for onward carriage in the United States ships WEST POINT and 

WAKEFIELD across the Indian Ocean. The proposal that the MOUNT VERNON, WAKEFIELD and WEST POINT should be left in the Indian Ocean for a second round 

trip from the Middle East to the Far East was also new. London had already 

arranged an Indian Ocean convoy program which excluded these ships, in order 

that they should revert to American use, and must be consulted as to their 

most useful employment. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL inquired whether the shipment of some 400 aircraft 

to the Far East would cut into American aircraft replacements to the Middle 

East. It seemed very probable that there would be intensive air operations in 

the near future in the Mediterranean, and the rate of attrition there was likely 

to be much more heavy than in the Pacific, where air operations were sporadic 

and on a comparatively light scale. In these circumstances, he would not be 

able to agree to any diversion from the Middle East. It was the P-40 and Martin 

187 Baltimores in which he was particularly interested. 

GENERAL ARNOLD, after inquiry, confirmed that the proposed program 

would not interfere with the dispatch of replacement aircraft of the P-40 and 

Martin 187 types to the Middle East. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the reinforcements proposed would 

involve a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia. This would 

be in addition to a certain deficiency which was already likely to arise on the 

program of supplies to Russia up to April 1, 1942. The ships involved in the 

United States reinforcement program would be diverted from carrying supplies to 

Russia for a period of up to four months. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that undoubtedly there would be considerable pressure on political grounds not to cut down Russian supplies in any way. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Russians 

could clear the full amount of supplies which were delivered to them. In so far 

as this was the case, therefore, a cut in deliveries would be of no consequence. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the effect of the proposed program, so far as 

Ireland was concerned, appeared to be a postponement of the arrival of some 

20,000 troops by one month. In the case of Iceland, the rate of relief of British troops and the United States Marines would be cut down to about 2,500 per 

month. He thought these reductions could be accepted in view of the urgent 

needs of the Far East. A token force of some 4,000, at least, would be going 

to Northern Ireland and that was of great political significance. 

BRIGADIER NAPIER inquired whether, if 21,800 men were sailed from New 

York on January 20 in the ships which were loading for Iceland and Ireland, 

they would not arrive in the Pacific Area before their equipment, which would 

have moved in slower freight ships. He had had this consideration in mind when 

suggesting that the QUEEN MARY should take United States personnel to South 

Africa for onward carriage after she had finished docking in New York. Under 

this arrangement the troops would have arrived about the same time as their 

equipment. 

GENERAL MBRSHALL said that it seemed important to rush in personnel 

in one convoy, if possible, in order to simplify the escort problem. Moreover, 

it was likely to be easier to get the troops through without enemy interference 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

if it weredone earlier rather than later. It might be necessary to accept the 

fact that the personnel would arrive without all of their equipment. At the 

present time the only American forces in Australia were the ground staff for 

one bomber group with a certain number of pilots, and an artillery brigade 

which had no ammunition. Ammunition and a certain amount of equipment for 

this brigade were due to arrive there almost immediately. 

In his view, the whole question was one of priorities. For example, 

was the dispatch of some 10,000 troops for New Caledonia of greater strategic 

importance than the relief of British troops in Northern Ireland, or supplies 

to Russia? An immediate decision was necessary on the Ireland and Iceland 

shipping, since ships already loading in New York would have to be unloaded 

and re-stowed if they were to get away on January 20. 

Admiral Stark summed up the effect of General Marshall's proposals 

as follows: 

a. They would set back the relief of Northern Ireland by one 

month. 

b. The Middle and Near East would not be affected. 

c. The supply and Lend-Lease materials to Russia would be reduced by 30% for a period of three to four months. 

a. The situation in the Far East would be immeasurably strengthened. 

After some discussion it was generally agreed that the postponement of the dispatch of some 20,000 troops to Northern Ireland by one month 

and the reduction in the rate of relief of the troops in Iceland could be 

accepted, but that there should be no interference with the supply of American aircraft to the Middle East. The crux of the position, therefore, was 

whether a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia could be 

accepted for a period probably of four months. 

THE CONFERENCE: 

a_. Agreed that the provisional program as outlined by General 

Marshall would have to be referred to the President and the Prime 

Minister for a ruling on the question of interruption of Russian supplies; 

b_. That, before the proposals for the use of the QUEEN MARY and 

the three United States ships in the Indian Ocean could be accepted, 

it would be necessary to consult the British Shipping Authorities in 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

London in order to insure that convoy programs already worked out were 

not upset, and that shipping was used in the most economical manner. 

2. DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA.-

GENEML MARSHALL signified his Rcceptance of the report of the Joint 

Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia 

(U.S. ABC-4/8, British B'W (J.F.C.)8) subject to the amendments which had been 

agreed to in discussion at the previous meeting. (See Annex 2) 

ENCLOSURES 

Annex 1 - Memorandum of Proposed Shipping Adjustments. 

Annex 2 - Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia (U.S. ABC4/8, British WW-13) 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

January 12, 1942 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSs-10 

MEMORANBUM OF PROPOSED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENTS 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSS-10 

MFMORANDUM OF PROPOSED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENTS 

IRELAND 

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 16,000 as follows: 

4,100 troops to sail January 15 

7,000 troops on QUEEN MARY to sail February 1 

9,000 troops on ANDES, ORONZAY, and ORION, to sail Februmy 

15-20 

4,400 troops on GEORGE WASHINGTON to sail February 24. 

Total .. 24,500 to sail January 15 to February 24. 

(Note: Cargo tonnage extremely short. British must provide-shelter, 

or lumber to winterize tents). 

ICELAND 

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 8,000 as follows: 

2,500 troops on January 15. 

(Note: Remainder as shipping becomes available. Probably about 

2,500 per month.) 

BRITISH TROOPS 

NEAR EAST AND FAR EAST 

7,000 on QUEEN MARY to load in England. 

5,100 from Cairo on MOUNT VERNON - now in Far East. 

11,200 from Cairo on second round trip of WEST POINT and WAKEFIELD - Now engaged in first round trip for Far East. 

Total .. 23,300 British troops for Near and Far East on United States 

ships and QUEEN MARX. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

UNITED STATES TROOPS 

FAR EAST 

21,800 troops, to sail from New York January 20. 

250 Pursuit planes 

86 Medium Bombers 

57 Light Bombers 

228,000 Cargo Tons. 

4-1/2 million gallons of gasoline. 

(&&: Troops are air and supporting services, except for R 

reinforced brigade for New Caledonia of 10,000 men). 

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January 13, 1942. 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL 'ABC-4/8 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-13 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSS-10 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED 

REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES 

BETWEEN HAWAII Ah'D AUSTRALIA 
January 10, 1942. 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL AEC-4/8 

BRITISH SFRIAL WW (J.R.C.18 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMITTEE 

DEFENSE OF ISLAND EASES 

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA 

1, There is under development and approaching completion, an air route 

suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from 

Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, 

American Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging 

points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the 

defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will 

serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces. 

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important 

Japanese objective, since it is the principal readily accessible source of 

supply for nickel, of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. 

In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some 

time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply, and limited loading facilities. 

3. It is planned .also to establish at Borabora, in the Society Islands, 

which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels 

and other shipping en route to and from the Southwest Pacific. 

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route, depends 

ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of 

forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The 

strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review. 

In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division, 

supported by strong naval and air forces. 

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out 

unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia 

is unknown. 

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of 

Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Borabora. 

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense 

of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron 

and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The 

remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed 

will be supplied in the near future. 

6. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home 

defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next 

six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and 

Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses 

in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the 

United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially 

be at the expense of the ABDA Area. An opinion should also he obtained from 

Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. 

A list has been received of their requirements. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

9, _a. That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, 

Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Borabora. This is now being accomplished. 

b_. That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local 

defense of the Fiji Islands. 

s.. That the United States assist in providing equipment and air de-­

fenses for the Fiji Islands. 

d. That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle he ac-~ 

cepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as 

a temporary measure, furnish forces as early as possib1.e for the defense of 

the island, immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area. The 

question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the 

United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from 

Australia as to the priority. 

g. Arrangements should be made immediately by the Brit,ish with the 

Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in 

New Caledonia. 

-f. That Australia and New Zealand afford a11 pracbicable logistic 

support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia. 

g. The attached t@ble shows forces present in the islands, or en 

route, and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and 

naval escorts become sivailqble. 

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U. S. SECWT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES 

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTMLIA 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

PLACE 

DEFENSES NOW THERE 

OR EN ROUTE 

AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT, 

AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AVAILABLE 

(Includes Cal, Ibi 1 

la1 Ibl ICI 

o NEW One Co. A. I. F, Army 

CALEDONIA Approximately 3,000 

Free French Forces 

1 Inf. Division 14 regimentsl 

linadequately e 14 Heavy A.A. guns. quipped1 

2 6" Fixed Defense Gun 

18 Light A.A. guns, 

14.50 Calibre A.A. l4.G.'~ 

(Free French1 L2A.A. Searchlights 

8 155 m.m C.A. guns 

1 Eng. Regt. IGen. Serv. I 

Air 

1 Pursuit Sq, I25 aircraft1 

1 Medium Bomb. Sq. 113 

aircraft) 

Air Warning Service,. 

Approximate Total Strength 

40, 000. 

See Notes (&Iand (bl in 

Col. (dl, 

REMARKS 

Note la). Does not in-. 

clude Free French Forces 

This island is 230 miles 

long and 30 miles wide. 

Farce envisages protection of the 3 to 4 

air fields, and, in the 

southern half of the 

island, the harbor of 

Naurnea. 

Note lbl. The size of 

the garrison is subject 

to review as a result 

of early reconnaissance 

and degree of assi.st.aace 

afforded by Free French; 

latter entails completing re-equipment of 

Free French. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

DEFENSES NOW THERE 

OR EN ROUTE 

Ibi 

Naval 

1 Minesweeper 

4 Motor Patrol Boats 

Army 

6 New Zealand Inf. Bns 

1 Regular Fiji Bn. (11 

European) 

1. Territorial Fiji .Bn. 

(lf3 European) 

28 Pield Guns 

2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 

2 6" C-A. guns at Suva 

2 4.7" C.A. guns at 

Suva 

2 60 Pounders 

2 6" Howitzers 

4 Bofors 

4 3" A.A. guns 

6 A.A. Searchlights 

Air 

9 Reconnaissance 

Bombers * 

9 Miscellaneous AirCP&It' 

4 Singapore Flying 

Boats 

,OO Men, Air Corps) 

25 Airplanes, 1 U.S 

Fighters 1 

2 sets RADAR 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

AS FORCES, NAYAL ESCORT, 

AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AVA ILAB LE 

(Includes Cal. (bl 1 

ava 1 

1 Minesweeper 

8 Motor Patrol Boats 

rmy 

8 Inf. Bns. 

6 Heavy A.A. guns 

18 Light A.A. guns 

2 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G.'s. 

2 A.A. Searchlights 

2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for 

Mom1 

4 6" C.A. guns at Mom1 

and Suva 

2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 

2 60 Pounders 

2 6" Howitzers 

!8 Field Guns 

1 Co. Tanks Ill 113 Tanks 

lir 

1 Pursuit 11) Squad. (25 

Aircraft I 

1 Medium Bombardment 

Squad. (16 Aircraft: 

1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 

Aircraft1 , 

4 Sets RADAR 

REMARKS 

Id 1 

Pir 

U.S. Army is supplying 

the pursuit sguadroi 

'Obsolete. Should be 

replaced by Hudsons 

dne to New Zealand 

under approved allocations. 

- 2,-
U. S. SECReT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

PLACE 

(a I 

I~ SAMOA 

~ CANTON 

DEFENSES NOW THERE 

OR EN ROUTE 

Ib 1 

4 6" guns 

18 3" A.A. guns 

42 .50 M.G's. 

42 .30 M.G's. 

415 Marines 

150 Samoan Marines 

1 Regiment of 

Marines 

12 75 m.m. guns 

1 Co. Light Tanks (1 

Tanks1 

Hq. Troops 

6 5" guns 

Total I 5,015 U.S. 

Marines 

6 Scout observation 

seaplanes (Navy1 

2 Sets RADAR 

45 Engineers 

10 Medical and Cammunicat ion 

10 Artillery Personnel 

2 15 m.m. guns 

12 Machine guns 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT, 

AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AYA ILABLE 

(Includes Col. Ibl 1 

ic I 

As in column Ibl 

1 Fighter Squadron (By 

1 Dive Bomber u. s. 

Squadron Ma ­

rines 

2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 

4 guns C.A. A.A. 190 

m.m. I 

8 guns C.A, A.A. (31 

m.m. I 

2 Cal. .60 A.A. M.G's. 

2 75 m.m. guns 

2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 

8 37 m.m. A/T guns 

2 5" Navy guns 

1 Pursuit Squadron (25 

Aircraft I 

2 RADAR 

REMARKS 

Id1 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

DEFENSES NOW THERE AS FORCES, NATAL ESCORT, PLACE OR EN ROUTE AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AVAILABLE 

(Includes Col. IbII 

(a1 lbl lC I 

8. CHRISTMAE 125 Engineers, Medical S Bn. Inf. 

ISLAND and Signal Person- 4 guns C.A. A.A. I90 

ne 1 m.m. 1 

SO Artillery Personne 8 guns C.A. A.A. 137 

12 Machine Guns m.m. 1 

4 3%'A.A. Guns 2 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 

2 15 m.m. Guns 2 15 m.m. guns 

2 155 m.m. Guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy 

guns 

5 searchlights 

1 Pursuit Sqdn. I25 

alrcraftl 

2 Sets, RADAR 

8. PALMYRA 419 Marines s in column Ibl 

4 5" guns 

4 3" A.A. guns Pursuit Squadn. I25 

8 .50 A.A. Machine aircraft I 

Guns 

8 "30 A.A. Machine 

Guns 

2 Sets, RADAR 

REMARKS 

2ertain other equip 

ment now installel 

details of which 

are not now ava11 

able. 

BORABORA NONE 1 Inf. Regt. I - 2 Bns.1 

2 guns A.A. I90 m.m.1 

4 guns A.A. I37 m.m.1 

4 Cal. .50 M.G's. 

8 guns 115 m.m.1 

2 CA Btrys. (Harbor 

Defense: 

6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy1 

Se? ice8 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 

JCCSs-11 

British Officers 

Navy 

Admiral 

Admiral 

Army 

January 13, 1942 

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

4:OO P.M., JANUARY 13, 1942 

Present 

of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, Eirst Sea Lord aim Chief 

of Naval Staff 

Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, Joint Staff Xission 

Air Force 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

United States Officers 

Navy 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. tiorne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, U. S. hfariiie Corps 

-1-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Army 

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of 

and Chief of Staff 

he Field Fo ces 

Lieut. General 11. 11. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division 

Joint Secretaries 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R. M. 

Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, U. S. N. 

Lieut. Commander R. E. Libby, Aide to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Lieut. Colonel P. M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ 

Lieut. Colonel N. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION. 

THE CONFERENCE had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of 

Staff on Post-Arcadia Collaboration (WW-8) . 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the arrangements for collaboration on the 

operational side proposed in the paper would be suitable not only for ABDA, 

but for all other operational matters as well. The question of intelligence 

was closely bound up with planning, and this aspect was also dealt with in the 

paper. As regards the allocation of war materiel, the British Chiefs of Staff 

felt that if we were to get the best use out of our resources, allocation must 

be made on stratepical grounds in accordance with general directives issued by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. America and Great Britain would each take on 

certain groups of Associated Nations and, after receiving bulk allocations 

from United States and British production, would sub-allocate them among their 

own groups. 

THE CONFERENCE then considered the paper paragraph by paragraph. 

It was agreed that Paragraph 2 would be better worded as follows: 

"2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the 

word 'Joint' should be applied to Inter-Service colla'boration 

of ONP. NATION and the word 'Combined' to collaboration between 

two or more UNITED NATIONS". 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL STARK, referring to Paragraph 3, said that the United States 

Chiefs of Staff felt that if anyone could carry out the duties laid down 

therein, they would rather have Sir John Dill than anyone else. They felt 

strongly, however, that there should be no Military Representative of the 

Eritish Government above the Chiefs of Staff level. They would not desire 

for a moment to have any similar arrangement in London whereby a Military 

Representative of the United States had direct access to higher political 

authority. He thought it only right to express the views of the United States 

Chiefs of Staff quite frankly on this matter, though he realized that the 

President and the Prime Minister might have come to some other agreement on 

the matter. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the Eritish Chiefs of Staff would have to 

refer the matter to the Prime Minister, as any decision on this point would 

have to be taken on a higher level. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted, 

without comment, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the paper, but in Paraprapn 6 would 

like to have the following amendments made: 

Line 4 - delete "either". 

Lines 3 and R - delete "or considered by the Comoirled Chief's 

of Staff at their next meeting". 

The principle that coordinated intelligence should be available for the 

Planning Staffs was fully accepted, but the details would have to be worked 

out by the Planning Staffs in collaboration. 

As regards Paragraphs 8 to 11 (Priorities and Allocation), the 

UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF entirely agreed with the principle enunciated 

in the first sentence of Paragraph 8. The United States organization for 

allocation was not, however, yet in final shape, and before accepting the 

remainder of these paragraphs, they would like to examine the matter further. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND suggested that the principle involved in this 

matter was so important that it would be desirable for the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff to submit their recommendations to the President arid the Prime 

Minister. 

A draft minute was handed round for discussion and agreed to, 

sub.ject to certain amendments. A copy of the agreed minute is attached to 

Annex 1. 

GENERAL MARSBALL in this discussion emphasized that there could be 

no question of having any duplication of the Combined CkliefS of Staff' organization in Washinpton arid in London. There could only be one Combined 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Chiefs of Staff who would give broad directions on the allocation of materiel. 

He saw no objection whatever to having parallel Allocation Committees in 

Washington and London, dealing with the allocation of American and British war 

materiel respectively. 

The discussion then turned on the control of shipping dealt with in 

Paragraph 12. 

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that the Chiefs of Staff should have control 

over shipping resources so that they could apply them to the best strategic 

purposes. It was hoped that something similar to the British system for the 

control of shipping would be set up in the United States; but the problem was 

more difficult since they were not a maritime nation like Great Britain, and 

the importance of shipping was not well realized in the United States. Many 

other interests clashed with strategic requirements when it came to dealing 

with shipping. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the British Chiefs of Staff had no 

control over the Ministry of War Transport in the matter of shipping, but 

they had access to all the facts and could make their case to the Prime 

Minister on military grounds if there was a clash of interests between 

strategical requirements and imports. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that the United States Chief's of Staff could not 

accept anything more than the first sentence of Paragraph 12, since their own 

organization for the control of shipping was not yet settled. It followed, 

therefore, that Paragraph 13 also could not be accepted at present. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff 

have a short memorandum on the British system for the control of shipping and 

raw materials. 

THE CONFERENCE ­

-a Took note of the proposals for Post-Arcadia Collaboration made 

by the British Chiefs of Staff in M'H-8, and of the extent to which these 

had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the discussion 

recorded above. 

4 Agreed that the minute on the principle for the allocation of 

finished war materiel, as amended in discussion, should be submitted by 

the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime 

Minister respectively. (See Annex 1. Portions in Annex 1 indicated as 

deleted are those indicated in the discussion above as subjects for 

further consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.) 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2. MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER - FIRST HALF OF 1942. 

THE CONFERENCE had before them a report by the Joint Planning 

Committee on movements and projects in the Atlantic theater for the first half 

of 1942 (U. S. Serial BBC-4/6, British Serial W'W (J.P.C.)6). 

SIR DUDLEY POUND welcomed the idea of United States forces being 

sent to the Freetown-Bathurst area in certain circumstances, a,s proposed in 

Paragraph 14. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the adverse effects on other operations of carrying out various projects had only been set out in the case of 

North Africa. It should be made clear that any of these projects would have 

repercussions on others. Some reference should also be made in the final 

paragraph to the Northeast Brazil project. 

THE CONFERENCE -

Approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to 

the following amendments: 

-a At the end of paragraph 6, add: 

"NOTE. If any of the other operations mentioned in this 

paper are undertaken, they will adversely 

tions in some or all of the above ways to 

ex tent 'I. 

b Paragraph 17, insert new subparagraph 

"(4) That the United States plans for 

Northeast Brazil should be kept active". 

Renumber existing Subparagraph (4) as 

(See Annex 2.) 

3. OPERATION SUPEF&GYMNAST. 

affect other operaa greater or less 

(4) a6 follows: 

the security of 

subparagraph (5) 

THE CONFERENCE agreed to postpone consideration of the Joint 

Planning Committee's reports on Super-Gymnast (U. S. ABC-4/2 and 4/2A and 

British WW (J.P.C.)2 and 2A) until the next meeting. 

ENCLOSURES 

Annex 1 - Post-Arcadia Collaboration, W-8 with Minute Submitted by 

Britlsh Chiefs of Staff Attached. 

Annex 2 - Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater (U.S. 

AEX-4/6, British WW-14). 

-5-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-8 January 8, 1942 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSs-11 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

POST-ARCBDIA COLLABORATION 

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 
IT IS REQUESTED THAT SPECIAL CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THE SECRECY OF 

THIS DOCUMENT 

U. 6. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

to 

w-8 JCCSs-11 

January 8, 1942. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION 

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know 

what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of 

Staff orpanisation it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure 

of the Arcadia party. 

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" 

should he applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one Nation and the word 

"Combined" to collaboration between two or more AkZi86 United Nations. 

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE. 

3. Field Xarshal sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such 

authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President 

and the Prime Minister. 

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF. 

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, 

General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will continue to 

represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped that a 

meeting between the United States Chiefs of Staff or their representatives 

and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be held weekly 

or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each 

meeting. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED PLANNING . 5. For the time being, the British representatives on the Planning 

Staff will be -

Captain C. E. Lambe 

Lieut. Colonel G. F. Bourne 

R. A. F. 

Group Captain S. C. Strafford 

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE. 

6. The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve 

the Planniiip Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter 

should ei&Ree be referred to the Combined Planninp Staffs for report e� 

eensideped By &he Cembined Chiefs ef S&aX� a& Rex.&mee&inp. 

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee 

in London, and these are availa'ble to work in conjunction with any organisation the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire. 

PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION. 

8. In our view the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad 

programme of requirements based on strategic policy. We sugge6& 4hak i& 

wi&l Be *he duly ef 4ke Cembined P4annlng S*a�fs, advified By app�ep�-iate 

Alleea&ien QEfiee~s, &e wakek BR Beha&� ef *he CemBined Chiefs e� =a�� &ke 

p+e&~-tien p�eg+%mmes and &e Bpiug &e nst.i.ee in6tans.e~whae eu+ut dees R& 

6eRfeFB kC3 S&�a&ei% pe&iey. 

9. S4mi&as&y&ke Cembi~edGkiefs ef Staff skeuld �*em time &e -Ume 

issue peneFal &�ee&iues &eyiRg &W?l pe&48y &e g9VePR &ke 446&�4bu&46X4ef 

avaQab&e weapens ef wap. Effee& skeu&d be piven &Q these di~ediuesBy 

appsepi%e&e CewBined A&&eea&ieRCemmitkees. These weuld mse& geeiedieaLly 

and make be&R &eng-tewn a&&eea&&ens -(en wkiek g&anniHg ad &Paining oE

fe�sefi musk be baeedh, and ske�&-&e~ma&&eea&ienske meek &mrereediake mi&i&aFy 

needs. 

48. The &i&isk ~ep~ese~&a&ives en *he app�epri&e GewBined A&&eea&ion 

Gemmi4keefi ~44%feq &he p�esen& Be ­

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ASP Geremedepe Er B, 6, Re66s 

4A. Alleca&ien skeuld be made 86 Be-tweeu &he %&a-tesand &he 

%i&ish Cemmenwetll-th, eaeh earing few 4ke needs eE &ke 4llie.s fer wheew 4t h%fi 

eeeep&ed ~efipensiBiii&y. 

MILITARY MOVEMENTS. 

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad issues of 

priority of overseas movement. TR esdes &e advise &he GesbiRed 6kieEs ef 

SkaEE and &e eeesdina&e &he meevemen& eE Uni&ed S&a&esad BPi&isk &.�QQ~s and 

equipmen-t 68 &ha&&he shipping seseu~eeseE Be&h eeun-tsies ape pu& &e tke 

Bee4 u6e, i&appea~s&e b16 &ha&a Sembined Bedy is desirable. The &i&ish 

rep�esen&a&iuesfer sweh a Bedy a�e available undep BFigedier- �4, #err. 

43. I&i 6 6uggee&ed &ha&4kis GemBined Bedy sheuld werk in elese %eU& 

wi4h &he Gembined Pl&ning $t.aXXs 4hreugh where &hei* aduiee &e &ke Eembined 

Skiefs eE %a$� weuld Be eubmikted. 

SECRETARIAT. 

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve 

the above organisations and to work jn any similar Secretariat system which 

the United States Chiefs of Staff may establish. 

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND, 

J. G. DILL, 

A. T. IIARRIS, 

(for Chief of Air Staff), 

Washington, D. C., 

January 8, 1942. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

DRAFT MINUTE FOR SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS 

OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND BY THE BRITISH 

CRIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRIME MINISTER 

‘“We, the combined United States - British Chiefs of 

Staff are agreed in principle that finished war equipment 

shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs. 

We accordingly submit that an appropriate body should 3e 

set up, under the authority of the combined Chiefs of 

Staff, in Washington, and a corresponding body in London, 

for the purpose of giving effect to this principle.“ 
U. S. SECRET 

BHITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. ABC-4/6 

BRITISH W-14 

January 13, 1942 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSs-11 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

'CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED AS AMENDED 

REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/6, BRITISH SERIAL WW (J.P.C.)6 

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER -

FIRST HALF OF 1942 
January 13, 1942 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. ABC-4/6 

BRITISH WW-14 

JOINT PLAKNING COMMITTEE REPORT 

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC 

THEATER - FOR FIRST HALF OF 1942 

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the 

Atlantic Theater and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand 

Strategy during the first part of 1942, and submit our conclusions below. 

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS. 

ICELAND AND IRELAND 

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern 

Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland garrison should proceed as 

expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces 

for operations in French North Africa. 

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom 

should uroceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available, so as 

to increase the weight of attack on Germany. 

RELIEF OF ARUBA AND CURACAO 

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is 

to be completed before the end of January. 

JOINT UNITED SlATES - BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. 

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in 

the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the 

period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We 

cannot, therefore,initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of 

the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are: 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

That, due to Spanish resistance, the Germans will require a 

period of three months before they can mount a land attack from Spain 

against Morocco; 

b That once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany, 

our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the 

Spanish there will not attack us; and 

That French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if 

any. 

During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and 

preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above 

(Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue. 

6. If we undertake the North Africa operation, it will have the following adverse effects on other projects: 

B Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and 

Far East by 25,000 men. 

b Suspension of major operations against the Canaries, Cape 

Verdes, and Uiego Suarez. 

-c Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland by 

United States troops. 

a Reduction in the rate of movement of United States troops 

to North Ireland. 

-e Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom. 

-f Inability to move sizable forces to Northeast Brazil if 

such action should become necessary. 

g Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to 

Russia. 

h Serious delay in the despatch of urgently needed United 

States reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and 

the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases. 

i Reduction in Atlantic convoys to the United Kingdom and 

Russia, due to diversions of shipping and escorts. 

(NOTE: If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper 

are undertaken, they will adverse1.y affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or 

less extent). -2-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS. 

7. A German idvaaion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of 

Qibraltar as a Naval Baae and in all probability the IllvoIvement of Portugal 

as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances, it will be essential to 

secure the Canar.ies as a Naval Base. It is possible that the Spaniards would 

themselves offer us facilities in these islands. On the other hand, the 

Spaniards may oppose our occupation of the Canaries. While a Spanish offer 

of faailities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, .it would 

be necessary to prdvide sufficient addihional air and anti-aircraft defenses 

to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa, as 

well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an air patrol of the 

sea. 

8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the 

Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain, we could not 

at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries. 

9. If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations does not 

occur, and the Germans mdve into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture 

of the Canaries, even against opposition, and the occupation of the Azores 

and Cape Verdes will become essential. 

10. It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of 

the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain 

Naval assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is 

already earmarked for this operation and should, we consider, be kept in 

being. 

11. Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a United States 

responsibility. A portion of the United States Army forces set up for North 

Africa would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would 

hrive to be provided by United States Naval Forces. 

12. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula,.it is 

almost certain that Portugal will admit Bribish forces into the Azores, and 

probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement 

uill 'be air and anbi-aircraft defenses and harbor protection. The provision 

of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should 

be earmarked. Considerable difficulty, however, will be found in prov.iding 

the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or 

the Canaries. 

13. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible, we 

are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape'Verdes.in 

order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured 

for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes uill be of considerable 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and 

are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date. 

OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA 

14. If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation appears 

imminent, then the capture of French West Africa will be essential. If we 

do not obtain French cooperation in French North Africa, it is unlikely that 

we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the 

capture of Dakar against opposition. With the joint resources available it 

is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an operation of this nature 

until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favorable. 

It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this 

operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put, in 

hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously 

with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, United States Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to the Freetown - Bathurst area. Their presence 

in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African Reinforcement 

Route and the naval base at Freetown. 

NORTHEAST BRAZIL 

15. The security of Northeast Brazil is of strategic importance as a 

link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement 

route. Germany established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the 

South American Continent, in addition to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis-inspired uprising in Crazil, which would interrupt the air route through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be dis-­

regarded. The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been 

prepared and formations set up for this task. 

DIEGO SUAREZ 

16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy 

IS Of considerable strategic importance, no British force will be available 

to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force 

for the Canaries operation is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were 

carried out in the near future it might pre.judice our chance of obtaining 

French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that 

we can not hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present. 

17. We therefore recommend that: 

The movement of United States Army and Air forces to Iceland, 

Ireland, and the United Kingdom should proceed as expeditiously as 

possible. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b_. That the perfection of a Joint United States - British Plan and 

preparations for operakions in French North Africa should proceed as 

rapidly as possible. 

f. That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the United 

States should prepare plans fop: 

(1) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands both 

against opposition and by invitation. 

(2) The capture of Dakar against opposition for the 

Autumn of 1942. 

d. That the United States plan for the security of Northeast 

Brazil should be kept achive. 

e. That under the h>potheses set out in this paper, the British 

should prepare or perfect plans for: 

(1) The capture of the Canaries. 

(2) The occupation of the Canaries by invitation. 

(3) The occupaCion of the Azores and Madeira by 

invitation. 

(4) The capture of Diego Suarez against opposition. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ABC-4 

JCCSS-12 

January 14, 1942 

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE 

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, D. 6. 

3:OO R.M., JANUARY 14, 1942 

Present 

British Officers 

Navy 

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of 

Naval Staff 

Admiral Sir Charles Little, Joint Staff Mission 

Army 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. General Sir CoIville Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission 

Brigadier C. S. Napier 

Lt. Colonel G. K. Bourne 

Air Force 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff 

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission 

United States Officers 

Navy 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet 

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton, President, General Board 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, ‘Air Plans Division 

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Comniandant, U.S.M.C. 

Lt. Commander R. E. Libby, U.S.N. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISN MOST SECRET 

Army 

General George - C. Marshall, Commanding Genert 0

and Chief-of Staff 

the Fie1 Forces 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy 

Chief of Staff 

Brig. General L. T. Gerow, Chief, War Plans Division 

Brig. General Brehon B. SomePfell, Chief, '2-4, W.D.G.S. 

Joint Secretaries 

Bpig. General R. E. Lee 

Captain J. L. hlcCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, U.S.N. 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M. 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Lt. Colonel P. hl. Robinett, G-2, GHQ 

Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S. 

1. MOVE OF UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENTS TO THE FAR EAST. -

BRIGADIER NAPIER, referring to the arrangements proposed for the 

move of urgent United States reinforcements to the Far East, said that information had now been received from London that the QUEEN MARY would take 

United States troops from New York via the Cape to Australia, sailing early 

in February. To make up for the loss of transportation from America to 

Northern Ireland thereby occasioned, it was proposed to allot addibional 

British personnel ships returning from the Middle East, to sail about February 10 for Northern Ireland. Their total carrying capacity would be 

qbout 15,000. The QUEEN ELIZABETH would sail early in February from San 

Francisco with United States troops for Australia, and the AQUITANIA would 

go into the Hawaiian run at the end of February. This program had been 

agreed to by General Somel'vell. 

2. SUPER-GYMNAST. -

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper prepared by the United 

States Planning Staff based upon a report by the Joint Planning Staff 

(U.S. ABC-4/2A, British hW (J.P.C.) 2A). 

This paper was discussed paragraph by paragraph, and a number of 

amendments agreed to. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked whether more United States ships could 

not be provided by further sacrifices, e.g., cutting into trade. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the whole range of United States shipping, both passenger-carrying and freight, had been reviewed and no further 

resources could be tapped. All passenger ships, including those on the South 

American lines, would be taken up. The only way of increasing the number of 

freight ships would be to use ships already earmarked for supplies to Russia 

and the Middle East. 

ADMIRAL TURNER confirmed that escorts could be provided for the 

last American convoy but one, shown in paragraph 9 on D-163 instead of D-178. 

(See Annexl) 

THE CONFERXNCE accepted the paper prepared by the United States 

Planning Staff, subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, as a basis 

on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the President and the 

Prime Minister regarding the time factor for Super-Gymnast. (See Annexl) 

3. POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION. -

TRE CONFERENCE had before them a draft prepared by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff on Post-Arcadia Collaboration (U.S. ABC-4/CS4). 

This draft was considered paragraph by paragraph and certain amendments agreed to. 

TAE CONFERENCE approved the draft as amended in discussion and 

agreed that it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister. 

(See Annex 2) 

ENCLQSURES: 

Annex 1 - Operation Super-Gymnast (U.S. ABC-4/2A, British W-17). 

Annex 2 - Post-Arcadia Collaboration (U.S. ABC/CS4, British WN'-16). 

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January 14, 1942 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISIi MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/2A 

BRITISH hW-17 

ANNEX 1 

to 

JCCSs-72 

UNITED STATES - BRITISR 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ACCEYTED AS AMENDED - JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPOHT, 

AS A BASIS ON WHICH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SHOULE INFORM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIKE MINISTER 

REGARDING TAE TIME FACTOR FOR SUPER-GYMNAST 

W.S. SERIAL @C-4/2A, 

BRITISH SERIAL WW (J.F.C.)2.\ 

OPERATION SLIPER-GYMNAST 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/2A 

BRITISH SERIAL WW (J.P.C.) 2A 

January 13, 1942 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION SUPER-GYMNAST 

1. The Joint United States - British Planning Comittee has been advised that the President and the Prime Minister hdve agreed to the immediate 

dispatch of addibional United States reinforcements from the east coast to 

Australia, the terms of the agreement being as follows: 

a. Approved the proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff that the United States convoy sailing on the 15th January 

should be reduced from 16,000 to 4,000 for Northern Ireland and from 

8,000 to 2,500 for Iceland, in order to permit of the dispatch to the 

Far East of 21,000 troops, with aircraft and other equipment. 

p. Agreed that the remainder of the proposed shipping adjustments set out in the Annex should be referred to London for confirmation. 

E. Invited Mr. Hopkins and Lord Benverbrook to investigate the 

effect of the above shipping adjustment on the delivery of United 

States supplies to Russia during the next three months and to coordinate the prdvision of shipping to make good any deficiency, it being 

understood that nothing must be done to interfere with the planned 

flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition from the United States to the 

Middle East. 

2. Based on the above terms of agreenent, the combined Chiefs of 

Staff hdve directed the Combined Planning Committee to examine and report 

on the following questions: 

a. The earliest date which could be fixed for D-1 of Operntfon 

Super-Gymnast, on the assumption that the shipping adjustments apprdved in 1 a_ above are carried out and that shipping to carry United 

States supplies to Russia is prdvided in full. 

b. To what extent Operation Super-Gymnast could be executed, on 

the assumption that the favorable opportunity arises at some date between the end of February and the date on which D-1 of the full operation could be fixed (vide 2 & above). 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION 

BRITISH 

1. The movement of United States Troops to Australia will not affect 

the readiness date of the British to carry out their part of Super-Gymnast. 

UNITED STATES 

2. The readiness of United States Troops to carry out Super-Gymnast 

will not be affected by the movement of reinforcements to the Far East. The 

delay to Super-Gymnast caused by the Far East movement will depend upon the 

date of return to Atlantic ports of the ships involved in that movement. 

3. he estimate that the vessels dfverted from the Atlantic to make 

the Far East move can be back in the Atlantic ports on the following dates: 

-a. Passenger vessels ..... April 10 - 20 

b. Cargo vessels ......... May 15 - 25 

(Capacity of the above group of vessels is 22,000 

troops and 230,000 tons of cargo). 

4. The execution of Super-Gymnast, as originally planned, is dependent upon the return of the Far East convoy, therefore the earliest date that 

could be fixed for D-1 is May 25. 

5. The May 25 date can not be accepted without certain resefvations, 

since no allowance has been made for ship losses and possible increased demands for shipping arising from enemy operations, accelerated production, 

and additional lend-least commitments. Furthermore, it seems probable that 

these vessels may continue to be needed in the Pacific for further movements 

to Australia. 

REPLY TO TRE SECOND QUESTION 

BRITISH AVAILABLE FORCES 

6. British land forces, i.e., one armored division and two divisions 

with antiaircraft units, will be ready for dispatch. The British air contingent of Gymnast coneisting of three fighter and two B.C. squadrons could 

also be made ready. This force is not alone sufficient, but could not be 

increased from British resources. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECREI 

UNITED STATES AVAILABLF: FORCES 

7. United States Forces, as originally planned for Super-Gymnast, will 

be avail&ble, but their participation will be limited by the withdrawal of 

shipping for the troop movements in the Pacific. Combat loaded ships for one 

Division (12,000) are being held in readiness. This shipping will permit the 

employment of that division. It can be supported by one carrier group of 

naval aircraft or equivalent, disembarked from an aircraft carrier. All 

anOiaircraPt troops would have to be found by the British, also base troops, 

until additional United States shipping could be made available, either from 

Pacific or from shipping now employed on other tasks. This latter shipping 

is more fully discussed in Paragraph 11 below. 

RATE OF MOVEMENT 

8. The rate at which the British force could be received would not be 

limited, as in the Super-Gymnast plan, by the capacity of Casablanca Port. 

It would depend upon the provision of shipping and naval escorts. The following table is based upon the assumption that the British could not afford to 

rgh the Middle and Far East reinforcements of more than 25,000 men from one 

reinforcement convoy. The United States program is based upon the repeated 

use of the combat loaded ships, and the use of no other troop transports until 

the return to the Atlantic Coast of the Far East cargo convoy, about 15 - 25 

May. For movements after the first one, S addikional cargo vessels will be 

required. Possible acceleration of the movement will be governed by the priority needs stated in Paragraph 11 below. 

9. The table below shows the earliest dates on which British and United 

States forces can arrive at Casablanca if D-1 falls on March 1st: 

CASABLANCA ALGIERS 

March 1 D-1 BRITISH 

Mar. 28 0-28 5,000 

D-43 6,000 1: 

D-73 22,000 

D-88 

D-103 22,000 

D-118 

July 21 D- 133 iz,oon Q 

D-148 

D-163 

Sept. 19 D-193 

Totals 67,oon 

Q See Paragraph 10. 

-3-

U.S. BRITISH 

12, on0 7, on0 

16,000 

12,000 

22,on0 

12, on0 

22, on0 

12,000 

92,no0 23,000 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISA MOST SECRET 

ACCELERATION OF MOVEMENT 

BRIT I SIT 

10. If the situation were such that we could afford to stop the flow of 

British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East completely for a time, the 

second British convoy could be increased from 6,000 to 18,000 capacity, thus 

eliminating the fifth British convoy shown above. 

UNITED STATES 

11. The priorities listed below will govern the availability of addit ional United States vessels for Super-Gymnast: 

1st Priority: Continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and 

Navy garrisons and the United States Fleets. 

2nd Priority: Continued delivery of supplies to Russia, and planned 

flow of tanks, aircraft, and ammunition to the Middle East. 

3rd Priority: Continuous movements and maintenance of United States 

forces in the Far East. 

12. All military requirements for shipping other than those listed above 

will have to be deferred, including: 

-a. Reinforcements to Ilawaii and other overseas possessions and 

bases. 

b. Movements to Iceland and North Ireland. 

13. If this is done, we estimate that additional passenger vessels up to 

an estimated capacity of 12,400 might be available after about four weeks' notice. 

14. Approximately 13 - 15 cargo vessels will be required in addition to 

the passenger vessels. The availability of the cargo ships will have to be 

determined by the Maritime Commission. 

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January 14, 1942 

U. S. SECRET 

BAITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. ABC-4/CS4 

BRITISIl WW-16 

ANNEX 2 

to 

JCCSs-I2 

UNITED STATES - BAITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED AS AMENDED - CNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEMORANDUM 

POST-ARCADIA COLLABOHATION 
January 14, 1942 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRIB! 

u. s. ABc-4/cs4 

BRITISH WW-16 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

POST-ARCAIIIA COLLABORATION 

MEMORANDUM BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. In order to prdvide for the.conbinuance of the necessary machinery 

to effect collaboration between the United NaClons after the departure from 

Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (formerly designated as "Joint Chiefs of Staff") propose the broad principles and 

basic organization herein outlined. 

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" be 

applied to Inter-SeI'vice collaborabion of ONE NATION, and the word "Combined" 

to collaborahion between two or more of the UXITED NATIONS. 

3. DEFINITIONS. ­

-a. The term "Combined Chiefs of Staff" is defined as the British 

Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington, their duly accredited representatives), and the United States opposite numbers of the 

BriSish Chiefs of Staff. 

b. The term "Colqbined Staff Planners" is defined as the body of office..s duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make such 

studies, draft such plans, and perform such other work as may from time 

to time be placed on the "Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda" by that Body, 

and duly delegated by them to the Combined Staff Planners. 

-c. The "Combined Secretariat'' is defined as the body of officers 

duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to maintain necessary records, prepare and distribute essential papers, and perform such other 

work as is delegated to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. PERSONNEL. ­

a. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Char1.e~Little, 

Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. I. Harris, will represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. 

b. The Joint Staff Planners will be: 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECPXC 

(1) FOR THE BRITISH (for the time being) : 

Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N. 

Lt. Col. 0. K. Bourne, British Army 

Group Captain S. C. Strafford, R.A.F. 

(2) FOR THE UNITED STATES, the principal members are: 

Rear Admiral R. X. Turner, U.S. Navy 

Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, U.S. Army 

Capt. R. E. Davisun, U.S. Navy 

Col. E. L. Naiden, U.S. Army 

c. COMBINED SECRETARIAT 

The British members of the Combined Secretariat will be headed 

by Brigadier Dykes. The United States members will be headed by Commander I. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy. 

5. TIlE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF shall develop and submit recommendations as follows: 

-a. For the AEIDA Area, specifically as set forth in the Directive, 

Annex 2 to U.S. ABC-4/5, Bribish WW-6, dated January 5, 1942. 

b_. For other areas in which the United Nfltions may decide to act 

in concert, along the same general lines as in B above, modified as necessary to meet the particular circumstances. 

6. TIlE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF shall accordingly: 

-a. Recommend the broad program of requirements based on strategic 

considerabions. 

h. Submit general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons of war. (It is agreed that finished 

war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs; 

to effectuate this principle, we recommend the utilization of appropriate bodies in london and hashington, under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff). 

G. Settle the broad issues of priority of overseas military movements. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

7. The question of the production and dissemination of complete Military Intelligence to sel've the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff 

Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it 

is contemplated that existing machinery will be largely continued. 

8. It is planned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet weekly, 

or more often if necessary; an agenda will be circulated before each meeting. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART I1 

APPROVED DOCUMENTS 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. ABC-4/1 

BRITISII W-5 December 29, 1941 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED 

REPORT BY THE U. S. - BRITISH JOINT 

PLANNING COMMITTEE 

U.S. ABC-4/1, BRITISH WW(JPC) 1 

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND 

UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS 

IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U S SERIAL ABC-4/1 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C )1 

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED 

KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE 

ATLANTIC OCEAN 

REPORT BY THE U. S. - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the 

Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:-

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment 

of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, 

indicating recommended relative priorities of importance: 

The relief by United States troops of British troops 

in Iceland and North Ireland. 

b The occupation by invitation of the following positions: 

(1) The Azores. 

(2) The Cape Verde Islands. 

(3) The Canary Islands. 

(4) French West Africa. 

(5) French North Africa. 

(6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar. 

(7) Curacao and Aruba. 

(8) Northeast Brazil. 

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation 

by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be 

allocated as follows: 

To the United States - the occupation of the Cape Verde 

Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil. 

b To the United Kingdom - the occupation of the Azores, the 

Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar. 

c To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointlythe occupation of French North Africa. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan 

(U. S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial hW) is undertaken, we see no prospect of 

any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least 

three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Xingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of 

troop transport, in view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, 

Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying 

United States and United Kingdom field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. 

Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval 

communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the 

trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States 

unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as 

troop transports. 

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U. S. SECRFP 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. AEK-4/2A 

BRITISH W-17 

ACCEPTFD 

AS A 

January 14, 1942 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AS AMENDED - JOINT PLANNIhG COMMITTEE REFORT. 

BASIS ON WHICH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

REGARDING ‘IRE TIME FACTOR FOR SUPER-GYMNAST 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/2A, 

BRITISH SERIAL WW (J.P.C.)2A 

OPERATIOh SUPER-GYMNAST 
.~ 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/2A 

BRITISH SERIAL WW (J.P.C.) 2A 

January 13, 1942 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION SUPER-GYMNAST 

1. The Joint United States - British Flanning Comlttee has been advised that the President and the Prime Minister have agreed to the immediate 

dispatch of addibional United States reinforcements from the east coast to 

Australia, the terms of the agreement being as follows: 

a. Apprdved the proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff that the United States convoy saillng on the 15th January 

should be reduced from 16,000 to 4,000 for Northern Ireland and from 

8,000 to 2,500 for Iceland, in order to permit of the dispatch to the 

Far East of 21,000 troops, with aircraft and other equipment. 

b. Agreed that the remainder of the proposed shipping vdjustments set out in the Annex should be referred to London for confirmstlon. 

c. Invited Mi-. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook to irivestigate the 

effect of the abdve shipping adjustment on the delivery of United 

States supplies to Russia during the next three months and to coordinate the prdvision of shipping to make good any deficiency, it being 

understood that.nothing must be done to interfere with the planned 

flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition from the United States to the 

Middle 'East. 

2. Based on the abdve terms of agreement, the combined Chiefs of 

Staff have directed the Combined Planning Committee to examhe and report 

on the following questions: 

a. The earliest date which could he fixed for D-1 of Operation 

Super-Gymnast, on the assumption that the shipping adjustments apprdved in 1 a~ abdve are carried out and that shipping to carry United 

States supplies to Russia is prdvided in full. 

b. To what extent Operation Super-Gymnast could be executed, on 

the assumption that the fiivorable opportunity arises at some date between the end of February and the date on which D-1 of the full operation could he fixed (vide 2 & above). 

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U. S. SECRET 

aRITISH MOST SECRET 

REPLY TO TFlE FIRST QUESTION 

BRITISH 

1. The movement of United States Troops to Australia will not affect 

the readiness date of the British to carry out their part of Super-Gymnast. 

UNITED STATES 

2. The readiness of United States Troops to carry out Super-Gymnast 

will not be affected by the movement of reinforcements to the Far East. The 

delay to Super-Gymnast caused by the Far East movement will depend upon the 

date of return to Atlantic ports of the ships involved in that movement. 

3. He estimate that the vessels diverted from the Atlantic to make 

the Far East move can be back in the Atlantic ports on the following dates: 

-a. Passenger vessels ..... April 10 - 20 

b. Cargo vessels ......... May 15 - 25 

(Capacity of the above group of vessels is 22,000 

troops and 230,000 tons of cargo). 

4. The execution of Super-Gymnast, as originally planned, is dependent upon the return of the Far East convoy, therefore the earliest date that 

could be fixed for D-1 is May 25. 

5. The May 25 date can not be accepted without certain reservations, 

since no allowance has been made for ship losses and possible increased demands for shipping arising from enemy operations, accelerated production, 

and additional lend-least commitments. Furthermore, it seems probable that 

these vessels may continue to be needed in the Pacific for further movements 

to Australia. 

REPLY TO TRE SECOND QUESTION 

BRITISII AVAIIABLE FORCES 

6. British land forces, i.e., one armored division and two divisions 

with antiaircraft units, will be ready for dispatch. The British air contingent of Gymnast consisting of three fighter and two A.C. squadrons could 

also be made ready. This force is not alone sufficient, but could not be 

increased from British resources. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

UNITED STATES AVAILABLE FORCES 

7. United States Forces, as originally planned for Super-Gymnast, will 

be available, but their parbicipation will be limited by the withdrawal of 

shipping for the troop movements in the Pacific. Combat loaded ships for one 

Division (12,000) are being held in readiness. This shipping will permit the 

employment of that division. It can be supported by one carrier group of 

naval aircraft or equlvalent, disembarked from an aircraft carrier. All 

antiaircraft troops would have to be found by the British, also base troops, 

until additional United States shipping could be made available, either from 

Pacific or from shipping now employed on other tasks. This latter shipping 

is more fully discussed in Paragraph 11 below. 

RATE OF MOVEMENT 

8. The rate at which the British force could be received would not be 

limited, as in the Super-Gymnast plan, by the capacity of Casablanca Port. 

It would depend upon the provision of shipping and naval escorts. The following table is based upon the assumption that the British could not afford to 

rob the Middle and Far East reinforcements of more than 25,000 men from one 

reinforcement convoy. The United States program is based upon the repeated 

use of the combat loaded ships, and the use of no other troop transports until 

the return to the Atlantic Coast of the Far East cargo corivoy, about 15 - 25 

May. For movements after the first one, 8 additional cargo vessels will be 

required. Possible acceleration of the movement will be governed by the priority needs stated in Paragraph 11 below. 

9. The table below shows the earliest dates on which British and United 

States forces can arrive at Casablanca if D-1 falls on March 1st: 

CASABLANCA ALGIERS 

March 1 D-1 BRIT ISN U.S. BRITISH 

Mar. 28 D-28 

D-43 

D-73 

D-88 

D-103 

D-118 

July 21 D-133 

D-148 

D-163 

Sept. 19 D-193 

5,000 12,000 7,000 

6,000 '! 16,000 

22,000 

22,000 

12,000 "* 

12,000 

22,000 

12,000 

22,000 

12,000 

Totals 67,000 92,000 23,000 

* See Paragraph 10. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISR MOST SECRET 

ACCELERATION OF MOVEMENT 

BRITISH 

10. If the situation were such that we could afford to stop the flow of 

British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East completely for a time, the 

second British convoy could be increased from 6,000 to 18,000 capacity, thus 

eliminating the fifth British convoy shown above. 

UNITED STATES 

11. The priorities listed below will govern the availability of additional United States vessels for Super-Gymnast: 

1st Priority: Continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and 

Navy garrisons and the United States Fleets. 

2nd Priority: Continued delivery of supplies to Russia, and planned 

flow of tanks, aircraft, and ammunition to the Middle East. 

3rd Friority: Continuous movements and maintenance of United States 

forces in the Far East. 

12. All military requirements for shipping other than those listed above 

will have to be deferred, including: 

-a. Reinforcements to Hawaii and other overseas possessions and 

bases. 

b. Movements to Iceland and North Ireland. 

13. If this is done, we estimate that additional passenger vessels up to 

an estimated capacity of 12,400 might he available after about four weeks' notice. 

14. Approximately 13 - 15 cargo vessels will be required in addition to 

the passenger vessels. The availability of the cargo ships will have to be 

determined by the hlaritime Commission. 

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U.S. ABC-4/3 

BRITISH WW-4 December 31, 1941 

REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWST PACIFIC 

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGION81 

UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIED COMMAND. 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/3 December 31, 1941 

BRITISH W (J .P.C.) 3 

The United States and Briaish Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint 

Planning Committee report of December 29, 1941, on "Supporting Measures for 

the Southwest Pacific" as appropriate action to be taken in the interim 

prior to the establishment of the unified command of the forces in that region. 

The United States and Brihish Chiefs of Staff agreed to send immediately to the United States and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far 

East Area the following telegram: 

"The general strategic policy for operations in the Far Eastern 

theatre which has been agreed upon by the United States and British Chiefs 

of Staff is as follows:­

-a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and North Australia, as the basic defensive position in that theatre and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as 

great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the 

Japanese southward advance. 

Q. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions 

for the theatre, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and 

to the defense of India. 

e. To reestablish cowunications through the Dutch East Indies 

with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison. 

d. To maintain essential communications within the theatre. 

In disposing of the reinforcements arriving in that theatre, you 

should be guided by the above policy and consider the needs of the theatre 

as a whole. To this end, close co-operation among the British, Dutch and 

United States Commanders is essential, and you should continue to concert 

measures accordingly. 

The British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, will inform the Dutch 

and request their cooperation." 

TELEGRAM 
December 28, 1941 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/3 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C.) 3. 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT 

TO 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS) 

DIRECTIVE 

1. CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE TO THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. 

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all 

available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area.is solved, the aim must be to 

reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the'Netherlands East Indies, 

to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effecbive intervention of these reinforcements. 

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the 

Southwest Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendat,ions as to the disposition of the reinforcements, pareicularly air forces, 

expected to be available in the Southwest Pacific Area on:­

a. 15th January, 1942. 

b. 1st February, 1942. 

on the FQIlQwingalternative assumptions:­

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold. 

f2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the 

Philippines do not. 

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines holds. 

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific Theatre. The present strength 

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of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position. 

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. 

Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primariIy for 

defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive. 

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:­

-a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, 

Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the 

Far East Area, wd to operate air and sea forces in as 2rea.t depth as 

possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the ,Japanese southward advance. 

b. To hold Burma and Australia as esseiii.jal supporting positions 

for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China 

and to the defense of India. 

-c. To reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the 

Philippines' Garrison. 

0. To maintain coiwunications to Burma and Australia, and to and 

within the Far East Area. 

8. To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible 

supplies to relieve shipping requirements. 

.FORCES AND REINFORCEMEENTS 

4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the 

reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached 

tables (Annexes I, 11, and 111). Future reinforcements should be planned 

in accordance with approved strategic pol.icy, .having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres. 

RECOMhLENDATJ ONS 

5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of 

the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area 

is soIved:­

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-a. Under the assumphion that the Philippines and Singapore both 

hold. the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, as 

shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject 

to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned. 

B. Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East 

Indies hold, but the Philippine6 do not, the total United States reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed in 

furtherance of the defenses of key points on the Malay Barrier, and for 

protection of the vital lines of communication from the east. In the 

absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior United States Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. 

Under this assumption the planned disposition of British reinforcements 

remains unchanged. 

-c. Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines 

holds, the total reinforcements kvailable up to 1st February, 1942, be 

used for the defense of the remainder of the Malay Barrier, Burma, and 

Australia, United States reinforcements being used to the eastward, and 

British reinforcements to the westward. 

NOTE:- The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being 

considered separately. 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR 

UNITED STATES 

FORCES NOW DUE IN FAR EAST DUB IN FAR EAST TENTATIVELY PLANNED 

IN THE BY JANUARY 16, BETWEEN JAN. 15 OR UNDER ORDER 

FAR EAST 1942 AND FEBRUARY 1 FOR FAR EAST 

la1 1-1 la1 Naval la1 N_gypJ 1.1 

2 Cruisers 12 Patrol Bombers None None 

13 Desrroyets 

(3 damagedl 

21 Submarines 

I less losses I 

7 Patrol Bombers 

lbl A 2 Ibl A 2 lbl & lbl a 

Ph 4.1ipp 4. nea Small Arms Ammunition None Supplies 6r Gasoline 

1-1 Artillery Ammunition 

AA Ammunition 

40,000 as of Gasoline 

December 22, 1941. 

Am t rslia 

2 Regts Field Artillery 

Service Troops 

ICI ICI & ICI & lcl & 

Philippines IDec. 251 55 Pursuit 

23 Heavy Bombers 

Few Pursuit planes far 

reconnaissance 

Australia 

18 Pursuit planes 

52 Dive bombers 

11 Heavy Bombers 

ANNEX I 

67 Pursuit To mke total of. 

51 Heavy 

Bombers 4 Gps. Pursuit I3201 

2 Gps. Heavy Bombers 

1701 

2 Gps Medium Bombers 

11141 

1 Gp. Light Bombers 

1571 

lplus certain reserves1 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

FORCES IN THE 

FAR EAST 

ON DECEMBER 7, 1941 

181 

2 Cruisers 

8 Destroyers 

lbl h y 

9 and 11 Ind.Divs. 1 

8 Aus. Div. lMalaya 

lless one Bde. I 

One Div. IBurmal 

2 Inf. Bdes. ISingaporel 

ICI 

Malaya 

2 Borrber Sqns. 

2 Bcmber Recce Sqns. 

6 Fighter Sqns 

2 T B. Sqns 

1 G.R. Flying Boat Sqn. 

-

Burma

t Bamber Sqn. 

h Fighter Sqn. 

FAR EAST FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS THEREFOR 

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 

DUE IN 

FAR EAST BY 

JANUARY 16, 1942 

la1 

5 Addirional Escort 

Vessels 

IbI Army Ito Malaya1 

One Me.Gp. 17 1nd.Div. 

One Me. Cp. 18 Div. 

One AA Regt. llightl 

One AA Rept. lheavyl 

One Antifank Rrgt. 

ICJ 

& M a 

4 PBK's 

1 Fighter Sq. 

151 Hurricanesl 

1 Bomber Sq. 

I Ble n he ms I 

1 Ember Recce 

IHudsonsl 

DUE IN FAR EAST 

BETWEEN JANUARY 15 

AND FEBRUARY 1 

la1 Naval 

2 Submarines 

lbl Army (to Malaya) 

One 6de. Gp. 17 Ind. Div. 

One Me. Gp. 18 Div. 

Drafrs far 9 and 11 Ind.Divs. 

One Sq. Light Tanb. 

ICI & 

Clalaya 

?. Fighter Sins. 

I48 Hurricanesl 

&gm-a 

1 Fighter Sqn. 

IHurricanes 1 

TENTATIVELY PLANNED 

OR UNDER ORDER 

FOR FAR EAST 

Ibl Army IMalayal 

Two AA Regts. llighti 

One AA Regt. lheavyl 

One Bde.Gp. 14 Ind.Div. 

18 Div. lless two 

Bde. Gpsl. 

14 Ind. Oiv. lless 

one Bde. Gp. I 

One Bde. Gp. 17th 

Ind. Div. 

5th or 34th Ind.Div. 

lcl & 

PhOS not 

c orilp1et e 

ANNEX I1 
AUSTRAL Id 

Farces now in the Far Bast 

2 Heavy Cruisers 

2 Light Craisers 

4 Destroyers 

Ibl drmy 

1 Brig Gp. of 8th 

Australian Div. 

5 Divisions llnfantryl 

2 Dirisions lCsrslryl 

1 Division IArmoredl 

(Not as yet equipped) 

160 First line planes 

300 - 400 Training planes 

15, 000 Air officers and men 

40,000 In Training 

uu!! 

Forces now in the Far East 

1. -1 

4 Creisers 

7 Destroyers 

1.5 Submarines 

2 - 3 Submarines IExpectedl 

I Later 

3 Div's Java 

7 BnZs Sumatra 

4 Bn's Borneo 

1 Bn Celebes 

1 Bn Timor 

1 Bn no1vccas 

6 Bomber Sqns. 

4 Fighter Sqns. 

108 Nary Aircraft 

40 Patrol Planes 

ANNEX 111 

1 
U. S. SECREX 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC4/4 (FINAL) 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C.)4 

UNITD STATES 

CHIEFS OF 

December 31, 1941 

- BRITISH 

STAFF 

APPROVED 

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING 

COMMITTEE 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-~/~ (FINAL) 

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C.)4 

Decelqber 31, 1941 

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

1. A study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various 

military projects and movements which affect the Atlantic theatre and which may 

be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part 

of 1942. 

This report will include conaiderahion of the following: 

-a. MOVEMENTS 

(1) Relief of Iceland. 

(2) Mdvement of three Divisions and one Armored Division from 

the United States to Northern Ireland, 

(3) Movement of United States air forces to the United Hingdom. 

(4) Relief of British in Aruba and Curacao. 

P. PROJECTS 

(1) Joint United States-British occupation of French North 

Africa. 

(2) United States occupation of: 

(a) French Nest Africa and Cape Verde Islands. 

(b) Northeast Brazil. 

(3) Brihish occupation of: 

(a) The Azores. 

(b) The Canapies and Madeira. 

(c) Diego Suarez. 

2. Coordination of the Victory Programs of the United States and the 

British Commonwealth and adjustment of their broad outlines in accordance 

with strategic considerations and production possibilities. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. A consideration of any steps that should be taken in the light of experience up to date to implement, improve, or extend the system of collaboration between the United States-British Staffs as laid down in ABC-1; the need 

for allocating joint resources on a strategic basis to be taken into account. 

NOTE: Consideration of the Southwest Pacific Theatre, including the 

matter of unity of command therein, was treated as a first 

priority and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of 

the foregoing document. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/5 

BRITISH WW-6 

January 10, 1942. 

REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIFIECTIVE TO THE SUPREME 

COMhlANDER IN THE AEIDA AREA 

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/5 (BPPROVED) January 10, 1942, 

BRITISH SERIAL W-6 

SUPERSEDES ABC-4/S9 BRITISH W-3 (FINAL) 

DIREXTIVE TO THE SUPREhIE COMNDER IN THE ABDA AREA 

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF 

AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED 

KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEFLEINAFTER 

REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS: 

1. AREA.-

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all 

land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands 

East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area 

will be known as the ABDA Area. 

2. FORCES.-

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area 

and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are or will be:­

-a. Stationed in the Area; 

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the 

ABDA Area 

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government. 

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the 

combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be 

jointly designated by the ABDA Governments. 

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to 

your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your 

Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND POLICY.-

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct 

of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as 

many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The 

first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible 

moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive. 

6. THE GENEFLAL STRATEGIC POLICP WILL THEREFORE BE:­

&. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, 

Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the 

mDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as 

possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward 

advance. 

b_. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions 

for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the 

defense of India. 

c. To reestablish communications through the Dutch East Indies 

with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison. 

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area. 

7. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER.-

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all 

armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether 

national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such 

task forces. 

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal 

administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized 

to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials. 

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments. 

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces 

under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your 

responsibilities as Supreme Commander. 

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U S SECFST 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command. 

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit 

recommendations to the ABDA Oovernments on any matters pertaining to the 

furtherance of your mission. 

13. LIMITATIONS.-

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of 

the ABDA Area and to the forcea assigned thereto will normally be exercised 

through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces 

of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and 

their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the 

basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a 

task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of 

the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission. 

14. RELATIONS WITH ABDA GOVERNMENTS.-

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the 

execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the 

exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all 

sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by 

their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders 

and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments 

19. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, 

after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to 

your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an 

extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the 

right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal 

will be communicated simultaneously to you. 

16. STAFF AND ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND.-

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You 

are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the 

Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be 

communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of 

communication described in Parngraph 18. 

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out 

the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command 

may be promulgated to all concerned. 

18. SUPERIOR AUTHORITY.-

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the Agency defined in Annex 2. 

Signed 

(By Power furnishing 

Supreme Commander) 

Countersigned: 

Other ABDA Representatives. 

-4-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 1 

to 

us - ABC-4/5 

BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA 

1. THE ABDA AREA IS BOUNDED AS FOLLOWS: 

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence 

eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30' North, thence along 

the parallel of 30' North to the meridian of 

140' East. 

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included 

in this area. 

On the East: By the meridian of 140' East from 30' North, to 

the equator, thence east to longitude 141' East, 

thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea 

on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern 

New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143' East, 

then south down this meridian to the coast of 

Australia. 

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143' East, westward to the meridian of 

114' East, thence northwestward to latitude 15' 

South, longitude 92' East. 

On the West: By the meridian of 92' East 

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 2 

to 

us - ABC-4/5 

January 5, 1942. 

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA 

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of 

the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff and 

the representatives in H’ashington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submittjng recommendations for decision by 

the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and 

Minister of Defence, on behalf of ABDA Governments. Among the chief matters 

on which decisions will be required are: 

-a. The provision of reinforcements. 

b,. A major chnnge in policy. 

-c. Departure from the Supreme Commander‘s directive. 

2. This agency will function as follows: 

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from 

any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee both in Washington and in London. 

11. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London having consulted the 

Dutch Stnff, will immediately telegraph to their representatives in 

Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions. 

-C. On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs ofstaff 

and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staffwill 

develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister 

will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these 

recommendations. 

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government 

will be responsible for obtaining their views and Rgreement to every stage, 

and for including these in the final telegram to Washington. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime 

Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will 

be dispatched from Washington in the name of the ABDA Governments and the 

respective governments will be fully informed. 

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U. 9. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. ABC-4/6 

BRITISH WW-14 January 13, 1942 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED AS A.ZIENDED 

REPORT BY TEE UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

JOINT PLANNING COHMITTEE 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/6, BHITISIi SERIAL WW (J.P.C.)6 

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC TEEATEH -

FIRST HALF OF 1942 
January 13, 1942 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. AEX-4/6 

BRITISH WW-14 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT 

MOVEMENTSAND PROJECTS IN TiiE ATLANTIC 

THEATER - M)R FIRST HALF OF 1942 

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the 

Atlantic Theater and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand 

Strategy during the first part of 1942, and submit our conclusions below. 

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS. 

ICELAND AND IRELAND 

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern 

Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland garrison should proceed as 

expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Xiddle East and to release forces 

for operations in French North Africa. 

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom 

should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available, so as 

to increase the weight of attack on Germany. 

RELIEF OF ARUBA AND CURACAO 

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is 

to be completed before the end of January. 

JOINT UNITED STATES - BRITISH OCCUPATIOEi OF FRENCIi NORTI! AFRICA. 

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in 

the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the 

period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We 

cannot, therefore,initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of 

the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are: 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

-a That, due to Spanish resistance, the Germans will require a 

period of three months before they can mount a land attack from Spain 

against Morocco; 

4 That once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany, 

our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the 

Spanish there will not attack us: and 

-c That French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if 

any. 

During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and 

preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above 

(Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue. 

6. If we undertake the Sortn Africa operation, it will have the following adverse effects on other projects: 

Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and 

Far East by 25,000 men. 

4 Suspension of ma.jor operations against the Canaries, Cape 

Verdes, and Diego Suarez. 

-c Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland by 

United States troops. 

r! Reduction in the rate of movement of United States troops 

to North Ireland. 

-e Keakening of British strength in the United Kingdom. 

-f Inability to move sizable forces to Eortheast Brazil if 

such action should become necessary. 

g Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to 

Hus si a. 

h Serious delay in the despatch of urgently needed United 

States reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and 

the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases. 

-i Heduction in Atlantic convoys io the United Kingdom and 

Russia, due to diversioiis of shipping and escorts. 

(NOTE: If' any of the other operations mentioned in this paper 

are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or 

less extent). -2-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS. 

7. A German iavasion of Spain rill lead to the immediate denial of 

Gibraltar as a Naval Base and in all probability the irlvolvement of Portugal 

as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances, it will be essential to 

secure the Canaries as a Naval Base. It Is possible that the Spaniards would 

themselves offer us facilities in these islands. On the other hand, the 

Spaniards may oppose our occupation of the Canaries. While a Spanish offer 

of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would 

be necessary to provide sufficient addibional air and anti-aircraft defenses 

to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa, as 

well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an air patrol of the 

sea. 

8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the 

Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain, we.could not 

at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries. 

9. If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations does not 

occur, and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture 

of the Canaries, even against opposition, and the occupation of the Azores 

and Cape Verdes will become essential. 

10. It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of 

the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain 

Na'val assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is 

already earmarked for this operation and should, we consider, be kept in 

being. 

11. Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a United States 

responsibility. A portion of the United States Army forces set up for North 

Africa would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would 

ha've to be provided by United States Naval Forces. 

12. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula, it is 

almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores, and 

probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement 

nil1,be air and anti-aircraft defenses and harbor protection. The provision 

of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should 

be earmarked. Considerable difficulty, however, will be found in providing 

the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or 

the Cananies. 

13. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible, we 

are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape'Verdes in 

order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured 

for future use. The occupation of the Cape'Verdes will be of considerable 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECFCYI 

importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and 

are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date. 

OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA 

14. If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation appears 

imminent, then the capture of French West, Africa will be essential. If we 

do not obtain French cooperation in French North Africa, it is unlikely that 

we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore necessary to plan the 

capture of Dakar against opposition. With the joint resources available it 

is not, in our opinion, possible to undertake an operation of this nature 

until the late Autumn of 1942 when the weather conditions become favorable. 

It has been agreed that the United States should be responsible for this 

operation and we suggest that the planning and training should be put, in 

hand. We propose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously 

with the occupation of the Cape Verdes, United States Air and other appropriate forces should be moved to the Freetown - Bat,hurst area. Their presence 

in this area will increase the security of the Trans-African Reinforcement 

Route and the naval base at Freetown. 

NORTHEAST BRAZIL 

15. The security of Northeast Brazil is of strategic importance as a 

link in the communications between America and the Trans-African reinforcement 

route. Germany established in West Africa immediately becomes a threat to the 

South American Continent, in addition to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis-inspired uprising in Erazil, which would interrupt the air route through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be dis-­

regarded. The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been 

prepared and formations set up for this task. 

DIEGO SUBREZ 

16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the enemy 

is of considerable strategic importance, no Sritish force will be available 

to undertake this operation within the period under consideration if the force 

for the Canaries operation is kept in being. Moreover, if this operation were 

carried out in the near future it might prejudice our chance of obtaining 

French collaboration in North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that 

we can not hold a force ready to undertake this operation at present,. 

17. We therefore recommend that: 

The movement of United States Army and Air forces to Iceland, 

Ireland, and the United Kingdom should proceed as expeditiously as 

possible. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b_. That the perfection of a Joint United States - British Plan and 

preparations for operations in French North Africa should proceed as 

rapidly as possible. 

E. That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the United 

States should prepare plans for: 

(1) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands both 

against opposition and by irivitation. 

(2) The capture of Dakar against opposition for the 

Autumn of 1942. 

a. That the United States plan for the security of Northeast 

Brazil should be kept active. 

e_. That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the British 

should prepare or perfect plans for: 

(1) The capture of the Canaries. 

(2) The occupation of the Canaries by invitation. 

(3) The occupation of the Azores and Madeira by 

irivitation. 

(4) The capture of Diego Suarez against opposition. 

-5-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECWT 

U. S. SERIlYL ABC-4/7 

(APPROVED) 

BRITISH SERIAL M-12 

UNITED STATES 

CHIEFS OF 

Washington, D. C. 

January 11, 1942. 

- BRITISH 

STAFF 

APPROVED 

REPORT BY TEE UNIThD STATES - BRITISH 

JOINT PLAhNING COM.IMITTEE 

U. S. ABC-4/7 British W-12 

ESTABLISHMhNT OF UNITEL! STATES FORCES Iii NORTH IRELAND 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/7 

BRITISH SERIAL H'W (JPC)7 

Washington, D. C. 

January 10, 1942. 

ESTABLISKMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND 

1. MISSION. 

United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for 

the accomplishment of the following missions: 

To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North 

Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to 

defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers. 

b_ To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense 

thereof. 

2. FORCES. 

The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting 

of the 32d, 34th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the 

command of Mafor General Edmund L. Daley, U. S. Army. The strength of the 

field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and anti-aircraft units, is 

approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 

ship tons are required. The strength of the anti-aircraft personnel (to be 

provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of 

aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. 

Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping 

is available. When the air and anti-aircraft support is assumed by the 

United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required. 

3. COMMAND. 

Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the 

British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General 

James E. Chaney, who has been designated, "Commander United States Army 

Forces in the British Isles." The term "command" is defined as that control 

of individuals, forces, functions, and establishments which is normally 

vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, repulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with 

appropriate British authorities for the employment: 

(1) of organizations of his command under British control, and 

(2) of Sritish orKanizations under United States control. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. STRATEGIC DIRECTION. 

The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the 

British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the 

Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles. 

b_ The term "strategic direction" is defined to mean the function 

of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to 

carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that 

general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, 

without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative 

matters. 

-c It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States 

North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without 

prior consent of the Commanding General, Field Forces, United States 

Army. 

5. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OPERATION. 

The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at: 

-a Questions relative to despatch of United States Army Forces and 

materials from the United States that may require British collaboration 

will be handled through the British Mission in the United States. 

b_ Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accommodation and maintenance of the United States Army Forces in Northern 

Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will 

be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States 

Forces in the British Isles. 

-c WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 

(1) ANTI-AIRCRAFT. Initially all anti-aircraft protection 

for United States Field Forces, establishments and installations 

will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for United States forces in Northern Ireland 

will be provided fron; United States person riel^ equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources. 

(2) FIELD ARTILLERY. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 

rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to United States 

Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional 

ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(3) AIR. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide 

appropriate air protection and support for the United States Field 

Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in 

their mission, until such time as the means are made available to 

the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles, to assume 

this responsibility. 

-d WELTER. 

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter 

for the United States Army Forces in Northern Ireland. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/8 (APPROVED) January 13, 1942. 

BRITISH SERIAL WW-13 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAF'F 

APPROVD 

REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

JOINT PLANNING COWITTEE 

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES 

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA 
January 10, 1942. 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/8 

BRITISH SERIAL WW (J.R.C.)S 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMITTEE 

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES 

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA 

1. There is under development and approaching completion, an air route 

suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from 

Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, 

American Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonla. In addition to their use as staging 

points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the 

defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will 

serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces. 

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important 

Japanese objective, since it is the principal readily accessible source of 

supply for nickel, of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. 

In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some 

time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply, and limited loading facilities. 

3. It is planned also to establish at Borabora, in the Society Islands, 

which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels 

and other shipping en route to and from the Southwest Pacific. 

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route, depends 

ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of 

forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The 

strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review. 

In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division, 

supported by strong naval and air forces. 

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out 

unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree 

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U. S . SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia 

is unknown. 

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of 

Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Borahora. 

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense 

of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron 

and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The 

remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed 

will he supplied in the near future. 

6. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home 

defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next 

six months. Australia is laying'minefields in the approaches to Noumea and 

Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses 

in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would he for the 

United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially 

be at the expense of the ABDA Area. An opinion should also he obtained from 

Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. 

A list has been received of their requirements. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

9. a. That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, 

Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Borabora. This is now being accomplished. 

b_. That the Dominion of New Zealand he responsible for the local 

defense of the Fiji Islands. 

c. That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands. 

d. That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle he accepted as an Australian responsibility, hut that the United States should as 

a temporary measure, furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of 

the island, immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area. The 

question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the 

United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from 

Australia as to the priority. 

9. Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the 

Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of the nickel mines and the loading facilihies for chrome and nickel ore in 

New Caledonia. 

-f. That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic 

support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia. 

g. The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en 

route, and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and 

naval escorts become available. 

-3-
U. S. SECWT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES 

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTMLIA 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

PLACE 

DEFENSES NOW THERE 

OR EN ROUTE 

AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT, 

AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AVAILABLE 

(Includes Cal, Ibi 1 

la1 Ibl ICI 

o NEW One Co. A. I. F, Army 

CALEDONIA Approximately 3,000 

Free French Forces 

1 Inf. Division 14 regimentsl 

linadequately e 14 Heavy A.A. guns. quipped1 

2 6" Fixed Defense Gun 

18 Light A.A. guns, 

14.50 Calibre A.A. l4.G.'~ 

(Free French1 L2A.A. Searchlights 

8 155 m.m C.A. guns 

1 Eng. Regt. IGen. Serv. I 

Air 

1 Pursuit Sq, I25 aircraft1 

1 Medium Bomb. Sq. 113 

aircraft) 

Air Warning Service,. 

Approximate Total Strength 

40, 000. 

See Notes (&Iand (bl in 

Col. (dl, 

REMARKS 

Note la). Does not in-. 

clude Free French Forces 

This island is 230 miles 

long and 30 miles wide. 

Farce envisages protection of the 3 to 4 

air fields, and, in the 

southern half of the 

island, the harbor of 

Naurnea. 

Note lbl. The size of 

the garrison is subject 

to review as a result 

of early reconnaissance 

and degree of assi.st.aace 

afforded by Free French; 

latter entails completing re-equipment of 

Free French. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

DEFENSES NOW THERE 

OR EN ROUTE 

Ibi 

Naval 

1 Minesweeper 

4 Motor Patrol Boats 

Army 

6 New Zealand Inf. Bns 

1 Regular Fiji Bn. (11 

European) 

1. Territorial Fiji .Bn. 

(lf3 European) 

28 Pield Guns 

2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 

2 6" C-A. guns at Suva 

2 4.7" C.A. guns at 

Suva 

2 60 Pounders 

2 6" Howitzers 

4 Bofors 

4 3" A.A. guns 

6 A.A. Searchlights 

Air 

9 Reconnaissance 

Bombers * 

9 Miscellaneous AirCP&It' 

4 Singapore Flying 

Boats 

,OO Men, Air Corps) 

25 Airplanes, 1 U.S 

Fighters 1 

2 sets RADAR 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

AS FORCES, NAYAL ESCORT, 

AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AVA ILAB LE 

(Includes Cal. (bl 1 

ava 1 

1 Minesweeper 

8 Motor Patrol Boats 

rmy 

8 Inf. Bns. 

6 Heavy A.A. guns 

18 Light A.A. guns 

2 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G.'s. 

2 A.A. Searchlights 

2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for 

Mom1 

4 6" C.A. guns at Mom1 

and Suva 

2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 

2 60 Pounders 

2 6" Howitzers 

!8 Field Guns 

1 Co. Tanks Ill 113 Tanks 

lir 

1 Pursuit 11) Squad. (25 

Aircraft I 

1 Medium Bombardment 

Squad. (16 Aircraft: 

1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 

Aircraft1 , 

4 Sets RADAR 

REMARKS 

Id 1 

Pir 

U.S. Army is supplying 

the pursuit sguadroi 

'Obsolete. Should be 

replaced by Hudsons 

dne to New Zealand 

under approved allocations. 

- 2,-
U. S. SECReT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

PLACE 

(a I 

I~ SAMOA 

~ CANTON 

DEFENSES NOW THERE 

OR EN ROUTE 

Ib 1 

4 6" guns 

18 3" A.A. guns 

42 .50 M.G's. 

42 .30 M.G's. 

415 Marines 

150 Samoan Marines 

1 Regiment of 

Marines 

12 75 m.m. guns 

1 Co. Light Tanks (1 

Tanks1 

Hq. Troops 

6 5" guns 

Total I 5,015 U.S. 

Marines 

6 Scout observation 

seaplanes (Navy1 

2 Sets RADAR 

45 Engineers 

10 Medical and Cammunicat ion 

10 Artillery Personnel 

2 15 m.m. guns 

12 Machine guns 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT, 

AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AYA ILABLE 

(Includes Col. Ibl 1 

ic I 

As in column Ibl 

1 Fighter Squadron (By 

1 Dive Bomber u. s. 

Squadron Ma ­

rines 

2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 

4 guns C.A. A.A. 190 

m.m. I 

8 guns C.A, A.A. (31 

m.m. I 

2 Cal. .60 A.A. M.G's. 

2 75 m.m. guns 

2 5" Cal. .51 Navy guns 

8 37 m.m. A/T guns 

2 5" Navy guns 

1 Pursuit Squadron (25 

Aircraft I 

2 RADAR 

REMARKS 

Id1 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8 

ESTIMATED DESIRABLE 

GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED 

DEFENSES NOW THERE AS FORCES, NATAL ESCORT, PLACE OR EN ROUTE AND SHIPPING BECOME 

AVAILABLE 

(Includes Col. IbII 

(a1 lbl lC I 

8. CHRISTMAE 125 Engineers, Medical S Bn. Inf. 

ISLAND and Signal Person- 4 guns C.A. A.A. I90 

ne 1 m.m. 1 

SO Artillery Personne 8 guns C.A. A.A. 137 

12 Machine Guns m.m. 1 

4 3%'A.A. Guns 2 Cal. .50 M.G's. A.A. 

2 15 m.m. Guns 2 15 m.m. guns 

2 155 m.m. Guns 2 5" Cal. .51 Navy 

guns 

5 searchlights 

1 Pursuit Sqdn. I25 

alrcraftl 

2 Sets, RADAR 

8. PALMYRA 419 Marines s in column Ibl 

4 5" guns 

4 3" A.A. guns Pursuit Squadn. I25 

8 .50 A.A. Machine aircraft I 

Guns 

8 "30 A.A. Machine 

Guns 

2 Sets, RADAR 

BORABORA NONE 1 Inf. Regt. I - 2 Bns.1 

2 guns A.A. I90 m.m.1 

4 guns A.A. I37 m.m.1 

4 Cal. .50 M.G's. 

8 guns 115 m.m.1 

2 CA Btrys. (Harbor 

Defense: 

6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy1 

Se? ice8 

-4-

REMARKS 

2ertain other equip 

ment now installel 

details of which 

are not now ava11 

able. 
January 10, 1942 

U, S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/9 

BRITISH WW-10 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED REPORT 

BY 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 

U. S. SERIAL ABC-4/9, BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.R.C.)9 

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/9 

BRITISH WW-10 

January 10, 1942 

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT 

TO 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA 

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country s resources against Japan Information, currently 

available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and 

materially, in China's war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with 

other commitments he promptly taken to reverse this trend 

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, 

aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete 

isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to 

delay and possible interception The long, poorly maintained, and insecure 

Burma R0a.d can, at the best, support only a limited truck tonnage, -- while 

air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the 

amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are 

indicated as necessary: 

a. Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo 

b_. Increased security for Rangoon md the Burma Road, by air and 

ground. 

c. Improvement in the control, maintenanre, and management of the 

Burma Road. 

d. Increase in base facilities and technical services. 

e. Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures. 

-f. Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding 

General, ABDA Area. 

-1-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps 

to meet the requirements listed in Paragraph 2: 

a_. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a United States Army 

officer of high rank as the United States Representative in China, and 

to agree to the following as his functions: 

(1) Supervise and control all United States Defense Aid affairs 

for China. 

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all United States forces 

in China, and such Chinese forces as may be assigned. Should it be 

necessary for any of these forces to engage in joint operations in 

Burma,they will come under the command of the Supreme Commander of 

the ABDA Area, who will issue the necessary directions for the cooperation of the United States Representative's forces with the forces 

under the British Commanders in Burma. 

(3) Represent the United States Government on any international 

War Council in China. 

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China. 

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that g is, 

in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.) 

b_. Dispatch to the South China - Burma area additional aviation 

strength, initially raising and maintaining the American Volunteer Group 

at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered 

possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the United States 

Representative. 

c. Arrange (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases 

in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the 

technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon 

facilities as are nllocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of 

the Burma Road. 

4. To make this project reasonably effective, Dritish cooperation and 

agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood 

that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event 

that the Generalissimo accords to the United States Representatives the authority implied and indicated in Paragraph 3 a_ above. 

-2-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

POINTS ON WHICH BRITISH AGREEMENT IS SOUGHT, UNDER 

CONDITIONS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 3 & 

&. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the United 

States Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, 

routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in 

and north of Burma. 

b_. The United States Representative to be authorized to make every 

effort to increase the capacity of the Burma route, throughout its length 

from Rangoon to Chungking. To do this he will probably be given complete 

executive control of the China Section of the route On the British Section, control will still be exercised by the British authorities, both 

military and civil. To achieve the general aim, these British authorities 

will be instructed to carry out every possible improvement to the route in 

accordance with the requirements of the United States Representative and 

will accept such American technicians and equipment as may be necessary 

for the improvement of facilities in the Port of Rangoon and along the 

route itself. 

-c. The United States Representative, by arrangement with the British 

Commanders in Burma, to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary 

airfields in Burma 

d The United States Representative to be accepted as the principal liaison agency between the Supreme Commnder of the ABDA Area and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

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c 

' BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4/CSl 

BRITISH WW-1 (FINAL) December 31, 1941 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVE0 

MEMOFUNDLW BY THE U. S. AND ERlTISH CHIEFS 

OP STAFF 

mR1c.u - BRITISH 

GRAND STRATEGY 
U.S. SERIAL ABC-4/Cs-1 

BRITISH SERIAL W.W.-1 (FINAL) 

TO BE gEpT UNDER MCX AND XEY 

It is requested that special 

care may be taken to ensure the 

secrecy of this document. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY 

MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

NOTE: The circulation of this paper should be restricted 

to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and 

their immediate subordinates. 

I. GRAND STRATEGY 

1. At, the A-Be Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed 

that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently 

the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre. 

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the 

entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime 

enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the 

collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow. 

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany. 

11. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY 

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. 

Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper. 

a. The realization of 

first. and foremost requires 

dustry. 

Note:­

’: For brevity the abbreviated 

A-B is used to denote 

American-British 

the victory programme of armaments, which 

the security of the main areas of war in­

-1-
b_. The maintenance of essential communications. 

,E. Closing and tightening the ring around Germany. 

p. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive actfvities and propaganda. 

9. The continuous ddvelopment of offensive action against Germany. 

f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will 

safeguard 'vital interests (see paragraph 18) and denying to Japan access 

to raw materials 'vital to.her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany. 

111. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE 

ABOVE GENERAL POLlCY. 

THE SECURITY OF AREAS OF WAR PRODUCTION 

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of 

war industry are situated in:­

&. The United Kingdom. 

b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast. 

c. Russia. 

6. THE UNITED KINGDOM. - To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be 

necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat 

invasion. 

7. THE UNITED STATES. - The main centers of production on ornear 

the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea--borne 

attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is 

highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not. 

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces 

required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United 

States Chiefs of Staff to assess. 

9. RUSSIA. - It will be essential to afford the Russians assistance 

to enable them to maintain theirhold on Leningrad, Moscow, and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort. 

-2-
' BRITISH MOST SECRET 

MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS 

10. THE MAIN SEA ROUTES WHICH MUST BE SECURED ARE:­

-a. From the United States to the United Kingdom. 

b. From the United States and the United Kingdom to North Russia. 

9. The'various routes from the United Kingdom and the United 

St,ates to Freetown, South America, and the Cape. 

d. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, 

to India and Burma, to the East Indies, and to Australasia. 

8. The route through the Panama Cana�, and the United States 

coastal traffic. 

f. The Pacific rout,es from the United States and the Panama Canal 

to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia, and the Far East. 

In addition to the abdve routes, we shall do everything possible to 

open up and secure the Mediterranean route. 

11. THE MAIN AIR ROUTES WHICH MUST BE SECURED ARE:­

&. From the United States to South America, Ascension, .Freet,own, 

Takoradi; and Cairo. 

b. From the United Kingdom to Gibraltar, Malta and Cairo. 

-c. From Cairo t,o Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, 

Ails tr a1as ia . 

a. From the United States to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas 

Island. Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia. 

-e. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya'via 

+.he Netherlands East Indies. 

-f. From the United States to the United Kingdom via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. 

g. From the United States to the United Kingdom'via the Azores. 

h. From the United States to Vladivostok, 'via Alaska. 

-3-
12. THE SECURITY OF THESE ROIPTES 1NVOIJVES:­

-a. Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions. 

b. Holding and capturing essential sea and air bases. 

CMSING AND TIGHTENING THE RING AROUND GERMANY 

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: 

ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE. 

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the 

gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast. 

14. If this ring can be closed, the blockade of Germany and Italy 

will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or 

to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa, will be prevented. Furthermore, the 

seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, 

thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape. 

THE LWDERXINING AND WEARING DOWN OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE 

15. In 1942 the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance 

will be:­

@. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American 

Forces. 

b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means. 

c_. The blockade. 

d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied 

countries, and the organization of suBversive movements. 

DEVELOPMENT OF LANn OFFENSIVES ON THE CONTINENT 

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive agalnst Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We 

must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result 

from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives. 

-4-
17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across 

the Nedit,erranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western 

Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault. on Germany 

itcelf, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide 

means by which they can be carried out.. 

THE SAFEGUAFIDING OF VITAL INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE 

18. The securi1.y of Australia, New Zealand, and India must he maint,ained, and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of 'vantage 

Prom which an offensi've against Japan can eventually be developed must be 

secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:­

-a. Hawaii and Alaska. 

b_. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines. 

E. Rangoon and the route to China. 

d. The Naritime Prdvinces of Siberia. 

The minimum forces required to hold the abcive will have to be a 

mat,ter of mutual discussion. 

-5 -
&f$;!\S+L+EC.Wp : 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABc-4/cs-3 

BRITISH W-9 (REVISED) January 10, 1942 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED AS AMENDED - BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEMORANDUM 

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY 

GENERAL WA'AVELL 
H MOST SECRET 

U.S. ABC-4 c/s 3 

BRITISH WW-9 (REVISED) January 10, 1942. 

It is requested that special 

care may be taken to insure 

the secrecy of thisdocument. 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE 

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COWD BY GENERAL WAVELL 

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff. 

1. General Wavell was informed on 29th December, 1941, by the Prime 

Minister that he was to be the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. He was 

told that his directive would be given to him shortly and that any observations which he might wish to make on its terms would be considered. 

2. When the directive was finally approved by the President and the 

Prime Minister, orders were sent to London (2nd January) that it should be 

telegraphed to General Wavell immediately - copies were also to be sent to 

General Pownall and all other British Commanders concerned. 

3. At the same time the terms of the directive were communicated to 

the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Governments. 

4. The Dutch Government has suggested certain amendments to Annex (ii) 

to the directive, and these are still under discussion. It is not known 

whether they have communicated the directive to the Dutch Commanders in the 

ABDA Area. 

5. The Australian Government has put forward views and opinions about 

the whole arrangement, and have not yet notified their agreement with the 

directive. It is presumed that they have not yet informed any of their Commanders. 

6. The New Zealand Government is only indirectly concerned. There 

has been no comment on the directive from them. 

7. On 2nd January General Wavell was told that much importance was 

attached to his taking over as soon as possible, and he was asked to specify 

the earliest date on which he would be ready to assume command. He is new 

at Singapore, but is expected to be in Batavia today, 10th January. No observations have yet been received from him about his directive, nor has he 

yet specified a date for assuming command. 

-1-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

8. Neither the Dutch nor the Australian Government has yet agreed to 

the directive, though their objections are mainly to the machinery of control 

laid down in Annex (ii) rather than to the directive itself The discussions 

which are proceeding with those Governments may of course be successfully concluded before it becomes necessary to promulgate the date of General Wavell's 

appointment; but even if they are not, we do not think there need be any delay on that account. We suggest that General Wavell's appointment should be 

promulgated as soon as he reports he is ready, and that he should then be instrurted to carry on, pending the final confirmation of his directive. 

9. We accordingly propose that the following action should be taken as 

soon as General Wavell reports the date on which he will be ready to assume 

command:­

a. His Majesty's Government should make a communication in the 

terms of Annex A to the Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, 

Australia. New Zealand, India, and China. 

k. His Majesty's Govermnt in'the United Kingdom should telegraph 

to General Wavell in the terms of Annex B. 

-c - On receipt of the communication mentioned in a above, the 

Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, and Australia should 

at once notify their local Commanders of the date of the assumption of 

command by General Wavell, and should give any nec.essary consequential 

instructions so that the system planned for the ABDA Area can become effective. 

d. The terms of the directive for General Wavell, including Annex 

(i.i), should be settled as soon as possible, and the outcome notified to 

all concerned. 

10. We propose to telegraph home in the terms of Annex C to secure the 

assent of the Dutrh and Australian Governments to this pror-edure 

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND 

J G DILL 

C. PORTAL 

Washington, D. C. 

January 10, 1942, 

-2-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Draft communication from His Majesty's Government in the United 

Kingdom to the Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, Australia, 

New Zealand, China, and India: 

Instructipns are being sent today to General Wavell that 

he should assume command of the ABDA Area as from January 

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned 

on the terms of his directive and on the machinery for the higher 

direction of war in the ABDA Area, (Annex I1 to the Directive), 

General Wavell is being instructed to proceed in accordance with 

the directive as at present drafted and to communicate with Washington and London as laid down in Paragraph 18 thereof. 

Please inform all Commanders concerned, accordingly. 

ANNEX "B" 

Draft telegram from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 

to General Wavell: 

You are to assume supreme command in the ABDA Area on 

January 

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned 

on your directive, you should act in accordance with the directive 

sent to you in Telegram No.-, and you should address communications to superior authority in accordance with Paragraph 18 thereof. 

General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the 

United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of Combined Naval Forces, respectively, in the 

ABDA Area. 

Governments concerned are notifying their Commanders accordingly. 

-3 -
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX "C" 

Draft telegram from British Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee, London: 

Please put following to Lord Privy Seal: 

It is of highest importance that General Wavell should 

exercise supreme command without delay, as soon as he reports himself ready to do so. 

Please propose to Dutch and Australian Governments that 

as soon as General Wavell reports himself as ready he should be authorized to assume command, pending the acceptance by those Governments of the ABDA machinery as set out in Annex I1 of his directive. 

United States Chiefs of Staff agree. 

-4 -
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

u. s. ABc-4/cs4 

BRITISH W-16 

January 14, 1942 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPROVED AS AMENDED - UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEMORANDUM 

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION 
January 14, 1992 

U. S. SIXRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

u. s. ABc-4/cs4 

BRITISH WW-16 

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERWCE 

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION 

MEMORANDUM BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. In order to prdvide for the conhinuance of the necessary machinery 

to effect collaboration between the United Nations after the departure from 

Washington of the Brihish Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (formerly designated as "Joint Chiefs of Staff") propose the broad principles and 

basic organizaOion herein outlined. 

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" be 

applied to Inter-SePvice collaboration of ONE NATION, and the word "Combined" 

to coll+boration between two or more of the UNITED NATIONS. 

3. DEFINITIONS. ­

-a. The term "Combined Chiefs of Staff" is defined as the British 

Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington, their duly accredited representatives), and the United States opposite numbers of the 

British Chiefs of Staff. 

Q. The term "Combined Staff Planners" is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make such 

studies, draft such plans, and perform such other work as may from bime 

to time be placed on the "Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda" by that Body, 

and duly delegated by them to the Combined Staff Planners. 

G. The "Combined Secretariat' is defined as the body of officers 

duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to maintain necessary records, prepare and distribute essential papers, and perform such other 

work as is delegated to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. PERSONNEL. ­

-a. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, 

Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. 

b_. The Joint Staff Planners will be: 

-1-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECm 

(1) FOR THE BRITISH (for the time being) : 

Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N. 

Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne, British Army 

Group Captain S. C. Strafford, R.A.F. 

(2) FOR THE UNITED STATES, the principal members are: 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy 

Brig. Gen. L. T. Cierow, U.S. Army 

Capt. R. E. Davison, U.S. Navy 

Col. E. L. Naiden, U.S. Army 

G. COMBINH) SECRETARIAT 

The British members of the Combined Secretariat will be headed 

by Brigadier Dykes. The United States members will be headed by Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy. 

5. THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF shall develop and sqbmit recommendations as follows: 

-a. For the ABDA Area, specifically as set forth in the Directive, 

Annex 2 to U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW-6, dated January 5, 1942. 

p. For other areas in which the United Nations may decide to act 

in concert, along the same general lines as in 8 above, modified as necessary to meet the particular circumstances. 

6. TAE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFI shall accordingly: 

-a. Recommend the broad program of requirements based an strategic 

considerabions. 

p. Submit general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons of war. (It is agreed that finished 

war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs; 

to effectuate this pninaiple, we recommend the utilization of appropriate bodies in London and Washington, under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff). 

c. Settle the broad issues of priority of overseas military movemen ts . 

-2-
u. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

7. The question of the production and dissemination of complete Hilitary Intelligence to se2ve the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff 

Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it 

is contemplated that existing machinery rill be largely continued. 

8. It is planned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet weekly, 

or more often if necessary; an agenda will be circulated before each meeting. 

-3-