United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10178 

Summary Calendar

____________

Dare Matthews, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Detective E. Green, Individually; Stephanie Springer, 

Individually, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CV-471

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Dare Matthews appealsthe district court’s dismissal of her civil rights 

and state law claims against Detective E. Green and Stephanie Springer. 

Because Matthews fails to plead facts sufficient to allege that Green or 

Springer violated her rights, we AFFIRM. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 6, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

2

I. Background

A. Matthews & Springer’s Troubles

Springer owns and operates a gym, Texas Fitt, where Matthews 

trained for roughly one month. During this period, she states that she had

only limited interactions with Springer, having only exchanged “courtesy 

hellos” on one occasion. 

Matthews and Springer’s relationship quickly changed from limited 

and pleasant to frequent and aggressive as the parties bickered with each 

other on numerous occasions from September 2019 to May 2020. These 

exchanges included: (1) phone calls to the Pantego Police Department and 

Arlington Police Department (“APD”), (2) a flurry of harassing phone calls 

and threatening emails, (3) harassment on social media, (4) a cease-anddesist letter “instructing [Springer] to stop” bothering Matthews, and (5) 

discussions of potential physical altercations. 

In April 2020, Springer contacted APD and her case was assigned to 

Green. Springer told Green that Matthews had engaged in a string of 

harassing and intimidating conduct over the last year. Specifically, she 

accused Matthews of: (1) sabotaging her businesses by leaving hundreds of 

one-star reviews on Google and Yelp; (2) following Springer and her husband 

around town; (3) repeatedly sending her derogatory, profane emails; and (4) 

taking pictures of her minor daughter and emailing them to her.

Green decided that he had enough information to seek an arrest 

warrant for Matthews, completed an affidavit, and provided it to a magistrate 

judge. In the affidavit, he testified that Matthews sent several obscene and 

sexually provocative emails in violation of Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(1).

The magistrate judge signed the warrant and Matthews was eventually 

arrested for “18 hours.” During her arrest, she claims that she was “subject 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

3

to excessive physical searches, injection with an unknown substance, extreme 

unsanitary conditions, and confinement in a bathroom.” 

Matthews was released the next day. As a condition of her release, she 

agreed to not possess any firearms or consume alcohol. This restriction lasted 

for two years, ending after the prosecution dropped all charges against her.

Matthews sued Green, Springer, and the State of Texas1 under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.

B. District Court Proceedings

At the district court, Matthews alleged that Green violated her Fourth 

Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause and triggering her 

prosecution without probable cause. She also claimed that Springer and 

Green conspired to cause her malicious prosecution. She coupled her federal 

claims with numerous state law claims, including: (1) false imprisonment; (2) 

false arrest; (3) assault; and (4) malicious prosecution. Finally, she sought a 

declaratory judgment “that the Texas harassment statute [was] 

[u]nconstitutional both facially and as applied to [Matthews].” Springer and 

Green moved to dismiss all of Matthews’s claims. 

The district court granted Springer and Green’s motions. As to 

Springer, it first held that Matthews did not plead sufficient facts alleging that 

she was a state actor for the purposes of a § 1983 claim. It then grappled with 

the many state law claims against Springer. Beginning with Matthews’s false 

imprisonment claim, the district court held that Matthews failed to plead 

facts demonstrating that she caused her false imprisonment under Texas’s 

_____________________

1 The State of Texas was dismissed without prejudice due to Matthews’s failure to 

serve the State as a defendant as required by Rule 4(m). Matthews does not challenge the 

district court’s decision, leaving only Green and Springer as Appellees properly before us 

now.

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

4

“instigation standard.” It then held that Matthews failed to establish the 

requisite intent for an assault charge. Finally, it rejected the malicious 

prosecution claim because Matthews did not plead facts showing that

“Springer’s desire to pursue prosecution was the determining factor in the 

official’s decision to commence the prosecution.” 

The district court addressed Green next, granting him qualified 

immunity on each of Matthews’s claims. It began with federal conspiracy, 

holding that Matthews had not pleaded that Green and Springer ever came 

to an agreement to violate her Fourth Amendment rights. It moved on to false 

arrest, rejecting the claim because Matthews did not “assert facts that Green 

knew that” Springer’s complaints were baseless. Finally, it rejected 

Matthews’s malicious prosecution claims against Green because she offered 

no caselaw establishing Green’s conduct as violative of clearly established 

law. Matthews timely appealed.

On appeal, Matthews asks us to reverse the district court’s dismissal 

of her: (1) § 1983 claims against Green for allegedly arresting and forcing the 

prosecution of her without probable cause; and (2) § 1983 and state law 

claims against Springer.

2

_____________________

2 Notably, Matthews has considerably narrowed the number of claims advanced on 

appeal. “Our court routinely dismisses arguments as abandoned when parties fail to brief 

them.” Faciane v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 931 F.3d 412, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). We 

do so here, as well.

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

5

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Bass 

v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012). While we accept a 

plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true at this stage, she must allege “more than 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Her complaint must contain “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

III. Discussion

A. Green

Matthews argues that Green violated her Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by subjecting her to an arrest and subsequent prosecution 

without probable cause. She further avers that Green is not entitled to 

qualified immunity because his conduct is a clearly established violation of 

her constitutional rights. We disagree.

Qualified immunity protects public officials from civil liability when 

they lack notice that their conduct is unlawful. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 

739 (2002). “When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on 

the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Ramirez v. 

Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation 

omitted). This requires a plaintiff to allege: “(1) the violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right was clearly established 

at the time.” Id. (citation omitted).

“The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be 

secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures and that 

no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 

F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Thus, “[a] constitutional claim 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

6

for false arrest . . . ‘requires a showing of no probable cause.’” Id. (quoting 

Club Retro, LLC v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009).

A claim of malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 

that: (1) “the suit or proceeding was ‘instituted without any probable 

cause’”; (2) “the ‘motive in instituting’ the suit ‘was malicious,’”; and (3) 

“the prosecution” terminated in favor of the accused.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 

60 F.4th 262, 278 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 

1338 (2022)).

Probable cause is established by the “facts and circumstances within 

the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or 

one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the 

suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”

Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation and citation 

omitted). The probable cause analysis “‘does not demand any showing that 

the belief that an offense was committed be correct or more likely true than 

false.’” Id. at 246 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) 

(alteration omitted)). Rather, it requires us to “find a basis for an officer to 

believe to a ‘fair probability’ that a violation occurred.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

Matthews’s arguments regarding Green turn on whether the 

detective violated her constitutional right to be free from false arrests and 

malicious prosecution. Each contention requires Green to have acted in the 

absence of probable cause. Accordingly, our first and only inquiry is whether 

Green had probable cause when seeking and obtaining a warrant for 

Matthews’s arrest. We hold that he did, so he is entitled to qualified 

immunity.

Matthews primarily asserts that Green did not have probable cause

supporting a warrant for her arrest because he “did no corroboration or 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

7

independent policework whatsoever to validate his warrant affidavit.” She 

insists that Green’s decision to simply trust Springer’s side of the story when 

drafting and submitting his affidavit disqualifies him from having probable 

cause. But whether Green investigated Springer’s claims to her satisfaction

is not the standard. The probable cause standard sounds in reasonableness 

and is entirely objective. United States v. Walden, 707 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 

1983) (“Probable cause is an objective standard.”). In other words, our task 

is not evaluating whether Green could have gathered more facts to 

Matthews’s liking. Instead, it is simply to gauge whether he had enough facts, 

from any source, to reasonably conclude that Matthews violated Texas Penal 

Code § 42.07(a)(1).

3

Here, the record is replete with more than enough facts to seek a 

warrant for Matthews’s allegedly “obscene” emails, phone calls, and social 

media messaging exchanges.

4 For example, Springer brought Green emails 

indisputably from Matthews that were vulgar, offensive, and sexual-innature, repeatedly referring to Springer’s genitalia and posing sexually 

provocative questions to her. That fact, along with the others contained in 

Green’s affidavit, was enough for any reasonable officer to believe that a 

crime occurred.

Matthews takes issue with the fact that Green didn’t ask if she 

“initiate[d]” the communication, as required by § 42.07(a)(1). But she offers 

_____________________

3 Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(1) provides that a “person commits an offense if, 

with intent to harass, annoy, . . . torment, or embarrass another, the person . . . initiates 

communication and in the course of the communication makes a comment . . . that is 

obscene.”

4 Texas Penal Code § 42.07(b)(3) defines “obscene” “as [a] patently offensive 

description of or a solicitation to commit an ultimate sex act, including sexual intercourse, 

masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus, or a description of an excretory function.”

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

8

no caselaw supporting her position that Green was required to do so before 

seeking a warrant. And given the sheer number of emails, texts, and social 

media messages, we agree that it was reasonable for Green to proceed on the 

information he obtained from Springer at the time. At bottom, Green 

“believe[d] to a fair probability that a violation occurred.” Piazza, 217 F.3d 

at 246. Because Matthews pleaded facts establishing Green’s probable cause 

for arresting her under state law, he did not violate her Fourth or Fourteenth 

Amendment rights and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity from 

Matthews’s suit. See Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133 (explaining that a plaintiff must 

plead a constitutional or statutory violation to overcome a public official’s 

qualified immunity defense).

B. Springer

1. Section 1983 Claims

Despite Matthews’s arguments to the contrary, the district court 

determined that Springer could not be liable in a § 1983 suit under wellestablished state-action principles. We agree.

“To plead a constitutional claim under § 1983, [Matthews] must 

allege that a state actor violated a constitutional right.” Torres v. Livingston, 

972 F.3d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 2020). We have repeatedly explained that private 

parties do not qualify as state actors in § 1983 suits absent allegations that the 

“the challenged conduct may be fairly attributable to the State.” Bass v. 

Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999); Rundus v. Dall., 634 F.3d 

309, 312 (5th Cir. 2011). Moreover, this court has consistently held that 

merely communicating with police officers, without something more, hardly 

brings an otherwise private actor into the State’s orbit for § 1983 purposes. 

Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Police reliance in 

making an arrest on information given by a private party does not make the 

private party a state actor.”). 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

9

Here, Matthews fails to allege that Springer’s conduct is in any way 

attributable to Green or any other State entity. At best, Matthews alleges that 

Springer provided Green with misleading, potentially false information in 

hopes that he would arrest her. But, as the district court explained, she fails 

to allege facts demonstrating that Springer acted “under color of state law.” 

James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). Absent some 

“fairly attributable” conduct, Springer is not a state actor and thus cannot be 

the subject of a § 1983 suit. Bass, 180 F.3d at 312. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Matthews’s conspiracy claim against Springer.5

2. Texas Tort Law Claims

Matthews also maintains her argument that Springer is independently

liable for a bevy of tort violations under Texas law, including: (1) false 

imprisonment; (2) assault; (3) malicious prosecution; and (4) conspiracy. We 

address each claim in turn.

i. False Imprisonment & Assault

Matthews asserts that Springer caused her false arrest by Green, 

which she insists amounts to false imprisonment and assault under Texas 

law. We disagree.

False imprisonment has three “essential” elements: “(1) willful 

detention; (2) without consent; (3) without authority of law.” Rodriguez, 92 

S.W.3d at 506. The Texas Supreme Court has explained that “liability for 

false imprisonment extends beyond those who willfully participate in 

detaining the complaining party to those who request or direct the 

detention.” Id. at 507 (footnote omitted). This theory is commonly referred 

_____________________

5 It is unclear whether Matthews also attempts to advance her state law claims and 

theories against Springer under § 1983. To the extent that she endeavors to do so, our 

holding that Springer is not a proper defendant similarly applies to those efforts. 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

10

to as the “instigation of the false imprisonment.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Under instigation theory, the willful detention element may be satisfied “by 

conduct that is intended to cause one to be detained, and in fact causes the 

detention, even when the actor does not participate in the detention.” Id. 

(footnote omitted).

Regarding assault, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that “an 

assault occurs if a person . . . intentionally or knowingly causes physical 

contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe 

that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Loaisiga v. 

Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. 2012) (citation omitted). Relevantly, false 

imprisonment and assault share a common element: intent. 

Here, Matthews failed to provide facts demonstrating that Springer 

intended for Green to falsely imprison or assault her. True, she repeatedly 

stated that Springer caused her arrest, assault, and imprisonment by going to 

Green and complaining about her conduct. But the instigation standard 

requires more than just that to establish causation. For her instigation theory 

to be successful, Matthews had to plead that Springer’s conduct was the 

equivalent of her exclaiming “Officer, arrest that man!” Rodriguez, 92 

S.W.3d at 507 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A 

cmt. c.). Matthews’s pleadings do not clear this high standard, so she has not 

demonstrated the requisite intent for false imprisonment. Id. 

The intent element is also lacking from Matthews’s assault claim. Her 

alleged assault directly stems from her arrest. Because we have determined 

that Matthews failed to plead facts establishing that Springer intended for her 

to be falsely imprisoned, we must also conclude that those same facts fail to 

demonstrate that Springer intended that the police officers assault her. Put 

differently, Springer did not control, direct, or influence the police officers to 

do anything—Green and APD used their own professional discretion in 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

11

deciding to arrest Matthews. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of both 

claims.

ii. Malicious Prosecution

Matthews also asserts that Springer is liable for malicious prosecution 

under Texas law. Not so. To prevail in a malicious prosecution claim, a 

plaintiff must establish seven elements: 

(1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution 

against the plaintiff; (2) causation (initiation or 

procurement) of the action by the defendant; (3) 

termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor; 

(4) the plaintiff’s innocence; (5) the absence of 

probable cause for the proceedings; (6) malice in filing 

the charge; and (7) damage to the plaintiff.

Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997). Causation 

is particularly difficult to establish, like the “instigation” standard in false 

imprisonment cases. See Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910–11 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008) (comparing instigation under false 

imprisonment to causation or procurement in malicious prosecution). 

Essentially, “the procurement of criminal proceedings requires a direction or 

request for the action taken.” Id. And “merely reporting a crime and the 

suspected criminal to law enforcement authorities does not constitute 

procurement of criminal proceedings when the authorities exercise 

discretion in deciding whether to prosecute.” Id.

Matthews fails here for the same reasons that she did at the district 

court—she has provided no facts demonstrating that Springer caused or 

procured her prosecution. She merely asserts, in conclusory fashion, that 

Springer robbed Green of his independent decision to obtain the warrant that 

led to her eventual arrest and prosecution. But, by her own words, she never 

pleads that Springer did anything more than “wish[]” for her prosecution. 

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/06/2024
No. 23-10178

12

Simply wishing for someone’s prosecution does not equate to directly

procuring the same. Dangerfield, 264 S.W.3d at 910 (explaining that the 

defendant’s explicit direction to prosecute an individual must be “the 

determining factor in the official’s decision to commence the prosecution”).

Because Springer did not procure Matthews’s prosecution, Matthewsfails to 

establish causation, and her malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal 

of Matthews’s claims in full.

Case: 23-10178 Document: 00517057599 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/06/2024