1The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Jonathan G.

Lebedoff, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 97-4285

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Carol Walker, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * District of Minnesota 

Social Security, *

 *

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: September 17, 1998

 Filed: November 30, 1999

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Before McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MORRIS SHEPPARD

ARNOLD, Circuit Judges. 

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McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Carol L. Walker appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court1

for the District of Minnesota affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s decision to

deny her application for supplemental security income (SSI). For reversal, Walker
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argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) was collaterally estopped from finding

she could perform her past relevant work by a prior finding that she could not, and that

the ALJ erred in determining she was not disabled under the Vocational Guidelines (the

“grid”). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Walker first applied for SSI in October 1989. After an October 1991 hearing,

the ALJ found Walker was severely impaired by degenerative joint disease in her back

and knees and by hypertension, and her impairments precluded her from performing her

past relevant work of motel cleaner and sewing machine operator. The ALJ then found

that given Walker’s residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and work

experience, she could perform such jobs as office helper, packager, and inspector, and

thus was not disabled. In making this finding, the ALJ relied on the report of a

vocational expert (VE), which shows the VE had originally listed motel cleaner, sewing

machine operator, assembler, and clerk as Walker’s past relevant work but had crossed

out assembler and clerk. The Appeals Council denied review, and Walker did not

appeal further.

In May 1993, Walker filed the instant SSI application, alleging disability due to

depression, high blood pressure, and arthritis. At a February 1995 hearing, the same

ALJ who had presided over the October 1991 hearing explained that he was not

admitting exhibits from the prior hearing on the merits, but only on the issue of whether

to reopen the prior decision; and that if he decided to reopen, he would include those

exhibits as well. Walker then testified as to her daily activities and her past work as

a clerk-typist; and a VE testified that, from an exertional perspective, Walker could

perform clerk-typist work. After also considering Walker’s medical records from

November 1992 to April 1995, the ALJ concluded Walker could return to her past

relevant work as a clerk-typist; alternatively, could perform other jobs such as office

helper and cashier II; and was not disabled.
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We conclude the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his decision.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992). The

ALJ was not collaterally estopped from finding that Walker could return to her past

relevant work as a clerk-typist. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(f) (1998) (collateral

estoppel in SSI determinations). First, at the February 1995 hearing, the ALJ relied

only on new evidence, such as Walker’s November 1992 to April 1995 medical records

and her testimony regarding her past work as a clerk-typist. Cf. Gavin v. Heckler, 811

F.2d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding ALJ was collaterally estopped from

reevaluating evidence pre-dating first hearing). Second, the ALJ had not made a

specific finding in the 1991 decision that Walker was unable to perform the work of a

clerk-typist, and the fact that the VE listed and crossed out “clerk” in her report does

not conclusively show the VE had considered that position as Walker’s past relevant

work. Cf. Hardy v. Chater, 64 F.3d 405, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding collateral

estoppel did not apply where ALJ had found in prior application that claimant could not

return to past relevant medium work but could perform full range of light work, and

different ALJ found in later application that claimant could return to past relevant work

after considering additional evidence that led him to reclassify past relevant work as

light work). Last, the ALJ’s 1995 decision did not contradict his previous ultimate

finding that Walker was not disabled. See id. at 407. 

We reject Walker’s argument that the ALJ should have found her disabled under

the grid based on his findings regarding her RFC. Because the ALJ relied on VE

testimony regarding Walker’s particular limitations, he did not need to rely on the grid.

Cf. Mackinaw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir. 1989) (where claimant’s

relevant characteristics differ from those contemplated by grid, Commissioner must

produce VE testimony or similar evidence to establish jobs available in economy for

claimant). The ALJ properly called a VE to testify after determining that Walker’s

limitations fell between the sedentary and light ranges of work. See Social Security

Ruling 83-12(2)(c) (1983) (where limitations place claimant in middle of two

categories, VE assistance is advisable).
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.