### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te mb er 24, 200 8
GEOR GE A LLEN KING v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE Appeal from t he Criminal Court for Knox Coun ty Nos. 86923 Kenneth F. Irvine, Jud ge

No. E2008-00584-CC A-R3- PC- Filed February 11, 2009

Pe tit ion e r, Ge or g e Al le n K ing , p le d guil ty to on e c ount of ro bb e ry
. Pur su ant t o a ple a a g re e me nt, he wa s sentence d to eig ht y ear s as a Rang e I I m u l t i p l e o ff en der. H e wa s place d on enhanc ed probation. Afte r the re vocation of his probation within a y ear of his plea, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief

. Petitioner argued that he wa s aff orded ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel and that his plea w as not enter ed into voluntarily

. At the conclusion of a hear ing on the matter, the post-conviction cour

t denied the pe tition. On appeal, P etitioner arg ues that the post-c onviction court
err ed bec ause Petitioner wa s under the inf luence of drug s at the time he e ntere d the plea a nd that he believed he was to r ece ive a six-y ear sentenc e as oppose d to an eight-y ear sentenc e. B eca

use we find no cre dible evidenc e in t he record to support Petitioner’s claims, we affirm the de cision of the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and D A V ID H. W EL L ES , J ., joined.
Al b er tJ

. Ne wm an , J r. , Kn o x v i l l e, T en n es s ee , fo r t h e ap p el l an t , Ge o rge Al l en Ki n g.
Robe rt E

. Co o p e r , Jr

. , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l a

n d Re p o rte r ; R a c h e l W e s t H ar mo n , A s s is ta

n t A ttorney Gene ral; and Randa ll E. Nichols, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
On J une 29, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to simpl e robbe ry . The pa rties stipulate d to the fo l l o wi n g fa ct s at P et i t i o n er ’s gu i l t y p l eah ea ri n g:

Yo ur Ho no r, if

c a lle d to tr ia l in

thi s matter , th e State wo uld c a ll tho se witnesses listed on the indictment. The substance of their testimony would be that-2-

Mrs. Dorothy

I rwin wa s walking in the parking lot of O’Charley ’s Restaura nt at 3050 South Mall R oad.
An unindicted – or an unknown fe male suspec t got out of the car , g rabbe d her purse – g rabbe d t he purse from Mrs. Irwin and r an to the ca r that wa s driven by [Pet iti on e r]. Th e vic tim c ha se d he r purs e and thi s wo man to the ve hic le , r e a c he d in and g rabbe d the purse. [P etitioner] tried to drive awa y and ended up dr ag g ing the victim a number of fe e t th ro ug h th e pa

rk inglot . H e fi na lly sto pp e d the c ar, and sh e le t g o a

nd fe ll t o the g round.

Pur su ant t o th e ple a a g re e me nt, Pe tit ion e r wa s sen te nc e d to eig ht y e ars a s a Rang e I Imul tip le offe nder. At the conclusion of Petitioner’s sente ncing , the trial cour t placed Petitioner on e nhance d probation. In J anuar

y of 2007, Petitioner’s probation was revoke d. On May 29, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petit ion for Post-conviction Relief. In the petition, he argued that he a g ree d to a six -y ear sentenc e but was g iven an e ight- y ea r sentenc e. He argues that he wa s under tre atment at a me thadone c linic at the t i m e h e en tere d his plea; there fore , it was not enter ed knowing ly . The trial c ourt appointed counsel, and on Aug ust 23, 2007, Petitioner filed an
a me nd e d p e tit ion

arguin g that he wa s a ff

or de d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l.

P os t- c onv ic ti on H e ar ing
On Marc h 6, 2008, the post-conviction cour t held a hea

ring on the petition. Petiti oner w as the first witness. Petitioner t estified that his trial counsel tol d him that the S tate off ere d six y ear s on pr ob a tio n. Pe tit ion e r s tate d th a t he re fu se d th is of fe r. Ac c or din g to P e tit ion e r, tr ia l c ouns e l se nt h im to the probation off

ice to see if he would qua lify for probation. Petitioner testified that he informe d the per son he met with that he ha d been on me thadone f or over a y ear
. She told him he could not be on probation a n d b e o n m ethadone. She also told him he neede d a job. A fe w day s after the meeting with the probation off ice, tria l counsel met Petitioner with the pape rwork f or the plea ag ree ment. Petitioner said he did not want to ac cept t h e p l ea. Petitioner te stified that he wa s on methadone at the time acc epted the ple a. He stated at the post-c onviction hear ing that when he looks back o n t h e en t ry

of his g uilty

plea, he did not really

understand what was g oing on at the plea hear ing. Petitioner did not re alize he was a g ree ing to a n eig ht-y ear

sentenc e instead of

a six -y ear se nte nc e and

e nh anc e d p ro batio n in ste a d o f r e g ula r pr ob a tio n. Pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d that he ha d to ld trial counsel that he was innocent of the charg e. Also, Petiti oner state d that trial counsel kne w he was go in g to th e me th a d o n e c li n ic

. Pe ti ti o n e r s tate d th a t h is p le a

w a s c o e r c e d

b y tr ia l c o u nsel beca use t rial counsel told Petitioner that he would g et a twelve- y ear sentenc e to serve if he did not enter the g uilty

plea.
On cr oss-examination, P etitioner admitted that he had a criminal hi story dating back to 1980 that included convic tions for felony drugsales, fe lony

theft, attempted bur g lary , and ag g ravated-3-

burg lary . Wit h reg ard to the conviction at hand, Petitioner admitted that there wer e orig inally five counts ag ainst him. Petitioner ag ree d that he was arr ested sever al times while on probation bef ore having his probation revoke d on J anuar y 16, 2007.
Trial counse l also testified at the post-c onviction hear ing. H e testified that he repr esente d Petitioner for his g uilty plea. Trial counsel had no indication that Petitioner was under the influenc e of drug s or alcohol the day Petitioner enter ed his plea. Trial counsel also stated that Petitioner knew what wa s occur

ring

. On cr oss-examination, trial counsel stated that he w ent over the plea a g ree ment, waiver of jury trial and e ntry

of the plea . He state d that he we nt over the documents in de tail. T rial counse l ag ree d that he under lined var i o u s p hrase s and passa g es in the docume nts conce rning Petitioner’s plea. This is part of

his normal prac tice. Petitioner understood that he w as ag ree ing to a n eig ht-y ear sentenc e, but Pet i t i o ner w as conc erne d about g etting pr obation. There fore , trial counsel a nd the District Attorney

ag ree d to ha

ve a pre- plea repor

t c onducted. Trial counse l stated that he we nt over ever y thing with Petitioner, and Petitioner ag ree d to the plea a g ree ment as he ple d to it. P etitioner did not say

any thing to him about beingon drug s the nig ht before or the da y that t h e plea

was enter ed.
At the concl u s i o n of the post-c onviction hear ing, the post-conviction cour t denied the petition. On March 24, 2008, the post-conviction court enter ed an or der de nying the petition. The following fin d i n gs of fa ct and c onclusion of law a nnounced f

rom the benc h wer e incor porate d by ref ere nce:
Mr . Kin g, y ou ’r e he re tod ay on y our p os t- c on vic tio n c a se , a nd , a s I understand it, y ou’re saying that y ou didn’t enter a knowing , intelligent, a

nd voluntary plea be cause y ou thought it was a six -y ear sentenc e with probation rather than an e ight- y ear

sentenc e and pr obation.
The – the r ecor d doesn’t support y our re collection of that. I n the plea pa pe rw or k, it’ s c le arl y

mark e d a s an e ig ht- y e a

r se nte nc e
. Judg e Jenk ins , on a c ou ple of oc c a sio ns , s a id e ig ht ye ars to you . He ne ve r sa id six y e ars
. An d you g ot a n e ig hty ear sentenc e and w ere place d on probation.
You have some problems on probation. Y o u go t h ro ug h a couple of
revoc ation issues, and ultimately , y ou’re revoke d and now a re be ing r equire d to serve this sentence.

Icre dit the testimony

of [trial counsel] that y ou understood what y ou wer e doing. I cre dit the – the transcr ipts of t h ese pr ocee dings that show that it was
e xpla ine d t o y o u t h a t i t w a s an e i g h t

- y e ar s e n t e n c e
. S o y o u r r e qu e s t f o r po stconviction re lief will be denie d.-4- Every thing – the c redible e vidence say s that y ou understood what y ou wer e doing, that y o u enter ed a ple a for eig ht y ear s with an application for probation. Probation was g rante d. So I ’m g oing to f ind that y ou have f

ailed to prove that it was not a knowing, i ntellige nt, and voluntary plea; ther efor e, your re lief will be denie d.

Pe tit ion e r f

ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l.
AN AL YSI S

P ost-c onviction S tandard of Review The post-c onviction court’s finding s of fa ct are conclusive on a ppeal unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. See State v . Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). Duringour re view of the issues raised, we will a ffor d those finding s of fa ct the we ight of a jury verdic t, and this Court is bo u n d b y th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nc o u rt’ s f in d in g s u n le s s th e e v id e n c e in th e r e c o r d

p r e p o ndera tes ag ainst those finding s. Se e He nle yv . S tate , 9 60 S.W. 2d

57 2, 57 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Al le yv . S tate , 958 S.W .2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This Court may not r ewe igh or ree valuate the evidenc e, nor substitute its i nfer ence s for those dr awn by the post-conviction cour t. Se e Sta te v . H

on e y c utt , 54 S .W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001). How ever , the post-conviction cour t’s conclusions of laware revie wed unde r a pur ely

de novo standa

rd with no presumption of cor rec tness. Se e Fi e lds v . S

tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Ef fective Assistance of Cou nsel and Voluntariness of P lea When a petitioner seeks p ost-conviction re lief on the ba sis of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel, the petitioner bear s the burden of showing that (a) the servic es re ndere d by trial counsel
wer e def icient and ( b) that the de ficient pe rfor mance was pre

judi ci al

. Se e Po we rs v . S tate , 942 S.W .2d 5 5 1 , 5 5 8 ( T e n n
. Cr im

. A p p
. 1 9 9 6 )

. I no r d e r to d e mo n s tr a te d e f

ic ie n t p e r f

o r ma n c e , the petitioner must show that the servic es re ndere d or the a dvice g iven was be lo w “the r ang e of competenc e dema

nded of attorney s in criminal case s.” Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). “B eca

use a pe tit ioner must establish both prong s of the test to preva il on a claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, failure to prove either de ficient pe rfor mance or re sulting pre

judice provides a suf

ficient ba sis to deny

relief on the claim.” Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 580.
As no te d a

bo ve , th is C ourt

wi ll a ff or d th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa ctu al find ing s a presumption of cor

rec tness, renderi n g them conclusive on a ppeal unless the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ainst the court’ s findings. See id. at 578. Howeve r, our supreme court has “dete rmined t hat issues of def icient per formanc e by counsel a nd possible prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and fa ct . . .; thus, [ appellate ] revi ew of [these issues] i s de novo” w ith no presumption of
corr ectne ss. State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

.-5-

F ur the rm or e , o n c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, t

he pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to the bene fit of hindsight. Se e Ad k ins v . S tate , 9 11 S.W. 2d

33 4, 34 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Th is Court may not second- g uess a reasona bly based tria l strateg y , and we cannot g rant re lief base d on a sound, but unsu cc essful, tac tical dec ision made during the cour se of the pr ocee dings. See id. Ho we ve r, su c h d e fe re nc e to t he ta c tic a l deci si on s of c ouns e l a pp lie s o nly

if c ouns e l make s th os e decisions af

ter a dequate prepa

ration for the ca se. Se e Coo

pe r v . S tate , 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
Once a guilty

plea ha s been e nt er ed , eff ectivene ss of counsel is re levant only to the extent that it affe ct s t h e v o l untariness of the plea. In this respec t, such claims of inef fec tive assistance
nece ssarily

implicate the princ iple that g uilty pleas be voluntarily

and int ellige ntly

made. Se e Hi ll
v . Lo c k ha rt , 4 7 4 U. S

. 5 2 , 5 6 (1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g Nor th C ar oli na v . A lfo rd, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). A s state d a bo ve , in or de r t o s uc c e ssf

ull y c ha lle ng e the e ff

e c tiv e ne ss of

c ouns e l, t

he pe tit ion e r m

us t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a tc o u n s e l ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f e l l b e l o w t h e r an g e o f

c o mp e t e n c e d e m an d e d

o f a t t o r n e ys in c riminal case s. See B axter , 523 S.W .2d at 936. Under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), the pe titioner must establish: (1) deficie nt repre sent at i o n ; and (2) pr ejudice r esulting from the de ficienc y . Howeve r, in the conte x t of a guilty plea, to satisfy

the second prong of Strickland , t he petitioner must show that “the re is a r easona ble proba bility that, but for counse l’s
err ors, he would not have pleade d g uilty and would have insisted on goingto trial.” Hi ll , 4 74 U. S.
a t 59 ; se e als o W

alton v . S tate , 966 S.W .2d 54, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. When analy

zing a guilty

plea, we look to the fede ral standa rd announc ed in Bo

ykin v

. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the State standard se t out in State v. Mac key , 553 S.W .2d 337 (Tenn. 1977)

. S

ta te v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W .2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) . I n Bo y k in , the United States Supreme Court held that ther e must be an af firmative showingin the trial court that a g uilty plea wa s voluntarily

and knowing ly

g iven bef ore it ca n be ac cepte d. Bo

y k in , 395 U.S. at 242. Sim ilarly , our T en n essee Supreme Court in Mack ey r e qu ir e d an a f

f ir mati v e s h o w in g o f a v o lu n ta ry and knowledg eable g uilty

plea, na mely , that the def

endant ha s been made aw are of the sig nificant conseque nces of

such a ple a. Pettus , 986 S.W .2d at 542. A plea is not “volunta ry ” if it results from ig noranc e, misunderstanding , coer cion, inducements, or threats. Blan k e ns hip v . S

tate , 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt mus t de te rm ine if

the g uil ty ple a is “ kn ow ing ” by qu e sti on ing the de fe nd ant to make sure he fu lly understands the plea a

nd its consequenc es. Pettus , 98 6 S. W.2 d at 54 2; Blan k e ns hip , 858 S.W .2d at 90 4. Whe n e va luatin g the kn ow ingand vo lun tary natur e of a

g uil ty ple a , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court has h el d t h at “[ t ]he standard wa s and re mains whether the plea r epre sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative course s of ac tion open to the defe ndant.” North C arolina
v . A lfo rd , 4 00 U. S. 2 5 ( 19 70 ). Th e c ourt re vie wi ng the vo lun tari ne ss of a g uil ty ple a mus t lo ok

to the totality

of the c ircumstance s. S e e S ta te v. Turner , 191 S.W .2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95 ); se e als o Ch am be rla in v . S tate , 8 1 5 S

. W

. 2 d

5 3 4 , 5 4 2 ( T e n n
. C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 9 0 )

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, a re v i e w i n g c o u rtm u s t

c o n s i d e r “ t h e r e l a t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d an t ; t h e d e g r e e o f

h is familiarity with criminal proceeding s; whether he was repr esente d by competent c ounsel and ha d the opportunity t o confer with counse l about the options available to him; the extent of advice f rom-6-

counsel and the court conce rning the charg es aga inst him; and the rea sons for his decision to plead g uilty , including a desire to a void a g reater penalty that might result from a jury trial.” Blan k e ns hip , 858 S.W .2d at 904.

I n its findings of f

act, the post-c onviction court categ orica lly stated that i t accre dited the t es t i m o n y o f t ri al co u n s el

. T ri al co u n s el s t at edt h at P et i t i o n er wa s n o t u n d er t h e i n fl u en ce o f d ru gs when he acc epted the plea. Tr ial counsel a lso testified that he we nt over a ll documents relate d to the plea ag ree ment in detail prior to Petitioner acc epting the pl ea. The plea colloquy is included in the
rec ord on appe al. This colloquy , as st at ed b y t h e post-convic tion court, includes the tria l court’s
s tate me n t o nmo r e th ano n e o c c a sion th a t P e ti ti o n e r ’ s s e n te n c e w a s to b e f o r e ig h t ye ar s
. We
c on c lud e tha

t th e e vid e nc e do e s no t pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t the fi nd ing s o f t he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Petitioner has not shown that trial counse l was ineff ective. Petitioner’ s argument is that trial counsel wa s coer cive. Howeve r, t he evidence from the post-convic tion hearingshows the opposite. There fore , Petitioner cannot mee t the first prongset out in Strickland

. L i k ew i s e, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he did not knowingly , intelligently and voluntarily

enter his guilty plea. The re w as no evide nce othe r than Petitioner’s testimony that trial counsel c oerc ed him to acc ept the plea and that he was under the influence of drugs at the t ime. The post-conviction cour

t previously

deter mined that trial counsel’ s testimony was c re d ible and Petitioner’s was not. This i s a finding of fa ct that is conclusive on a ppeal. In addition, the plea
c oll oq uy demon st rat es th a t th e tr ia l c ourt qu e sti on e d Pe tit ion e r a

nd that Pe tit ion e r u

nd e rs too d h is plea. There fore , we find no evidenc e to preponde rate ag ainst the pos t-conviction court’s finding that the plea w as ente red into the plea voluntarily

. CO NC LU SION
For the re asons stated a

bove, we aff

irm the post-conviction cour t’s denial of the petition.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE