T en n. R

. C t

. A p p . 1 0 st ates: 1

T h i s Cour t , w i t h t h e con cu r r en ce of a l l j u dg es pa r t i ci pat i n g i n t h e ca s e, ma y a f f i r m, r ev er s e or m o d i f y t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n when a fo rma l op i ni o n wo ul d have no pre ceden t i al va l ue. W hen a c as e i s deci ded b y memo r andum opi ni on i t s hal l be des i gn at ed “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N , ” shal l not b e p ub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 6, 200 4 S es sio n FREDERICK TODD SMI TH, ET AL 

### . v. J IM CROS SMAN, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 02C-1308 C arol Solom an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 01108-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 2, 2004
This appea l involves the interpre tation of the attorne y ’s fe e provision in a lea se ag ree ment. The trial court a war ded L andlord attorney ’s fe es, and T en ants appe al. We reve rse the a war d of attorne y ’s fee s, finding no c ontrac tual basis exis ts for the a war d.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d.
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.
Ba rry L . Gar dner, B rentwood, T en n es s ee, for the a ppellants Fr ederick Todd Smith, J ames E. Newton, and Heritag e Gr oceries, I nc. Ra y mon d G . Princ e , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , for the app e lle e , J im Cro ssm a n, I nd ivi du a lly , andd/b /a J i mC r o s s m a n R e a l t y. M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1 Plaintiffs, Fre deric k T. Smit h, J ames Ne wton, and He ritag e Gr oceries, I nc. (“ Tenants”) op e rate a CB F oo d St or e on pr e mis e s le a se d in19 95 fr om d e fe nd a nt Jim Cr os sman a ndhis re a lty company (“L andlord” ). The le ase c ontained a pr otective c ovenant whic h stated:
P RO TEC TIV E C OV EN AN T. I n order to induce Tenant to enter into this L ease , L andlord a g ree s for itself, its he irs, succe ssors and assig ns, that none of the f oreg oingT ena nt s r e- f i l ed t he i dent i cal ca s e a mo nt h l at er . D ol l ar G ene r al ’ s l eas e h ad ex pi r ed dur i ng t he pendenc y 2
o f t h is li tiga tio n , an d L a n d lo rd a lleg e d ly fa iled to p u t an y kin d o f re stric tive c la u se into the ne w lea se it sign e d w ith D o llar G e n e ra l. 2 shall use, suffe r, permit or c onsent to the use or oc cupanc y as a supe rmarke t or for the sale of food or food produc ts intended for of f-pr emises consumption of any of the fo l l o wi n g: (a) any other premises now or here afte r owned or controlled by L andlord or any of the above described parties adjac ent to demised Premises, or (b) any premises now or

here afte r owne d or controlled by L andlord or any

of the above de scri b ed p ar t i es within a ra dius of one (1) mile of the perimeter of the De mis e d Pr e mis e s. A Doll ar Gener al S tore had been operating in the s ame strip mall since 1976. After 1995, the Do llar G e n e r a l S t o r e b e g a n c arry i n g i t s o w n l i n e s o f f o o d f o r s a l e i n d i r e c t c o m p e t i t i o n w ith Tenants. Tenants f

iled suit a g ainst L andlord on the theory that Dollar Gene ral’s actions constituted a bre ach of the protec tive covenant. I n addition, T enants named Dollar Gene ral and moved for an injunction to prevent Dollar G en er al from selling food f or off -pre mises consumption. Dollar Gene ral wa s later non- suited. L andlord answere d and argu ed t h at T enants kne w or should have known that L andlord ha d no power to restrain Dollar Ge nera l f rom selling f

ood. The Answe r contained a

counter -claim for attorne y ’s fe es as pr ovided for in the le ase pr ovision that stated:
AT TOR NE Y F EES. T en ant shall pay rea sonable attorney s fee s incurre d by L andlord in the e nforc ement of any terms, cove nants, or provisions of this lease, and the L andlord a lso ag ree s to reimb u rs e t en ant for reasona ble attorne y

fee s in the enfor ceme nt of any

terms, cove nants, or provisions of this lease.
Ontheday

of tria l, T e nants no n- su ite d the la ws uit

. Se ve ral mo nth s late r, thetria l c ou rt he ld 2 a h ea ring on L andlord’s c ounterc laim for attorne y ’s fe es incurr ed def ending the first lawsuit and found that L andlord wa s entitled to attorney ’s fe es in the amount of $14,320. The trial court found that based on its interpre tation of the lease , the awa rd wa s for “ attorney

fee s expended by

counsel fo r the Cou nte r- plaintif

f i n th e e nf

or c e me nt o f the te rm s, c ov enan ts , and pr ov isi on s o f the le a se exis ting be tween the parties.”
Te nn e sse e fo llo ws theAm e ri c a n Ru le re qu iring lit ig a nts to p a y the ir ow n atto rn e y ’s fe e s in the abse nce of

a statute or c ontrac tual provision otherwise. Sta te v . B ro wn & W illiamson T

obacco Cor p . , 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d1 8 6 , 1 9 4 (T en n . 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 977 S.W .2d 528, 534 (Tenn. 1998)). Unless a statutory or contra ctual fe e-shifting provision applies, such fe es arenot rec overa

ble. Mo rro w v . B ob bit t , 9 43 S.W. 2d38 4, 39 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) ; Pinney v

. Tarpley , 686 S.W .2d 574, 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).3

Court s may

enfor ce pr ovisions in contracts that expressly allow a pr evailing party , or otherwise de scribed party , to rec over its attorne y fee s incurre d in disputes over the c ontrac t. Pullman Standard, Inc. v. A bex Corp. , 6 93 S.W. 2d33 6, 33 8 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) ; Pinney , 686 S.W .2d at 581. The aw ar do f f

ee s , h o we v er , i s l i m i t ed t o t h e s i t u at i o n agr ee dt o b y t h e p ar t i es as s eto u ti n t h e l an gu age of the provision. Such provisions aresubject to the usual rule s of contra ct interpre tation.
Her e, the lea se ag ree ment provided for reimburse ment of attorney ’s fees i ncurr ed by either p arty “ inthe e nfor c e m e nt

of any terms, cove nants, or provisions of the lea se.”( emphasis adde d). Th e so le qu e sti on a t tria l a ndhe re , th e n, is w he the r L a nd lor d’s fees in cur re d inde fe nd ing a g a ins t Te nants ’ l a ws uit

wa s tantamou nt t o an e nf or c e me nt a c tio n c ov e re d b y thepa rtie s’ le a se a g re e me nt.
I nterpre tation of contracts is a question of law

. Guiliano v. CLEO, Inc ., 995 S.W .2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999) . There fore , the trial court’s interpre tation of the ag ree ment here in is not entitled to a presumption of cor

rec tness on appeal. Id. ; Angus v. W estern He ritage Ins. Co. , 48 S.W .3d 728, 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Th i s co u rt must review the doc ument ourselves and make our own determination r eg arding its meaning and leg al import. Hillsboro Plaza Ent ers. v. M oon , 860 S.W .2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
“The centr al tenet of c ontrac t construction is that the intent of the contr acting parties at the time of executing the ag ree ment should gove rn.” Pl an te rs G in Co. v . Fe d. Com pre ss &W

are ho us e Co., Inc. , 7 8 S. W.3 d 8 85 , 8 90 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T he pu rp os e of int e rp retin g a

writt e n c on tr a c t is to asce rtain and g ive ef

fec t to the contra cting parties’ intentions, and wherethe parties have r educe d their ag ree ment to writing, the ir intentions are r efle cted in the contract i tself. Id. ; Fr izz e ll Co ns tr. Co. v . G atl inb ur

g, L.L. C. , 9 S. W. 3 d7 9 , 8 5 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 9 )

. T h e r e f o r e , th e c o u rt’ s r o leinr esolving disputes reg arding the interpre tation of a c ontrac t is to ascertain the intention of the parties based upon the usual, natural, and ordinary meaning of the lang uag e used. Guiliano , 995 S.W .2d at 95; Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Re gal Chrysler-Plymouth Inc ., 521 S.W .2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975)

. Th e la ng ua g e of the fe e pr ov isi on de te rm ine s wh e the r fe e s c a n b e a wa rd e d u nd e r the fa c ts prese nt. Se e Pu llm an Sta nd ar d , 693 S.W .2d at 338 (holding that fee s ar e re co v erable under an express indemnitycontra ct if the lang uag e is broad eno u gh t o cover such expenses). We have r e v i e w e da

n u mb e r o f o p i n i o n s i n v o l v i n g f e e - s h i f t i n g c o n tr a c tp r o v i s i o n s , a n dt h e i r t e r m s v ar y, sometimes making r ecove ry available to a prevailing party or from a bre aching party . L andlord a nd Tenants herein c ould have a g ree d that the prevailing party in any dispute arising from the L easewas entitled to attorney ’s fe es. They did not. I nstead, they

ag ree d to a provision only for fee s incurre d in the enfor ceme nt of any terms of the L ease . Te nants br ou g ht an a c tio n f or br e a c h o f the pr ote c tiv e c ov e nant s e e kin g to enfo rce it. L andlord defe nded on the basis it ha d no power , beca use of its lease with Dollar Ge nera l, to prevent Do lla r G e ne ral’ s sale of

fo od . L a nd lor d a lso raise d a ff irmativ e de fe ns e s o f l a c he s, waive r, e sto pp e l, comparative fault, and consent. In its counterclaim, L andlord mer ely invoked the attorne y ’s fe es provision and alleg ed that it was “ incurring attorney s fee s in the defe nse of this ac tion. . . .” At no4

time did L andlord counter that Tenants were in brea ch of the lease or see k to enforc e any term of the ag ree ment.
L andlord did not attempt to en force any term, cove nant or provision of the le ase. Con se qu e ntl y , w e re verse thede c isi on of thetria l c ou rt

a wa rd ing a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Cos ts o f this ap p e a l ar e t a x e dt o t h e ap p e l l e e s , J i mC r o s s m a n a n dJ i mC r o s s m a n R e a l t y.

___________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE