UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO.: 2:22-cv-14350 

JOHN MCCARTHY, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

LASHERI BAKER and ST. LUCIE COUNTY 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 

 Defendants. 

/ 

DEFENDANTS ST. LUCIE COUNTY AND LASHERI BAKER’S MOTION FOR FINAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

Defendants, ST. LUCIE COUNTY (“the COUNTY”) and LASHERI BAKER 

(“BAKER”), pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

Local Rule 56.1, request this Court enter Final Summary Judgment in their favor as to: (1) Count 

III of the Amended Complaint, a civil rights claim based on a failure-to-train theory of Monell

liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; and (2) Counts II and IV, Florida state-law false arrest claims 

against Defendants BAKER and ST. LUCIE COUNTY, respectively. 1

As the following arguments and citations of authority demonstrate, along with the 

contemporaneously filed Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute, no liability can be imposed 

against Defendant ST. LUCIE COUNTY on a §1983 failure to train theory of liability for the 

1

 These are the only counts remaining in the Amended Complaint following this Court’s 

partial grant of a Motion to Dismiss that determined BAKER was entitled to qualified immunity 

on the individual §1983 claim, Count I, and limited the scope of Count III to the second arrest on 

a failure-to-train theory. (D.E. 36) 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 1 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

2 

Plaintiff’s second arrest on January 3, 2020 because: (1) the COUNTY supervised and trained all 

pre-trial service officers on drug testing procedures; (2) on December 19, 2019, the COUNTY 

instituted and trained drug lab and pre-trial services personnel following the Plaintiff’s release 

after his first arrest on a newly instituted “two negative test approach” system for detecting new 

marijuana usage; and (3) the Plaintiff’s second arrest was based on well-established scientific 

principles that new usage had to have occurred given the Plaintiff continued to test positive at or 

about the same THC levels as when he was initially tested on October 28, 2019. 

With regard to the state-law false arrest claims, there exist no genuine issues of material 

fact in dispute that probable cause existed for both the first and second arrests. Additionally, as to 

Defendant BAKER, pursuant to the provisions of §768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. she is immune from suit 

because there was nothing she did in submitting pre-trial release violations that was done in bad 

faith, with a malicious purpose, or in a willful or wanton manner. 

Based upon the foregoing, therefore, Defendants ST. LUCIE COUNTY and BAKER are 

entitled to final summary judgment in their favor on all remaining claims, the §1983 claim, Count 

III of the Amended Complaint, as well as Counts II and IV, the state-law false arrest claims. If the 

Court grants summary judgment on the §1983 claim and does not elect to consider disposition of 

the state-law false arrest counts, given there would then exist no independent basis for federal 

jurisdiction, this court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law false arrest claims 

and remand those claims to state court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s two arrests when he violated the terms and conditions of 

his pre-trial release on state-law criminal charges. 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 2 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

3 

Plaintiff, MCCARTHY was initially arrested in October 2019 and charged with battery 

and battery on an elderly person. On October 30, 2019, the Plaintiff was placed on pre-trial release 

by a state-court judge with a requirement, inter alia, that he use no drugs or alcohol and submit to 

random drug screens. During his initial intake drug screen he tested positive for cannabinoids 

(THC) and admitted that he had last used marijuana on October 28, 2019. Thereafter, Plaintiff 

underwent drug screening tests on November 5 and 13, 2019 through the St. Lucie County’s drug 

lab and tested positive. These results based upon well-established toxicology principles indicated 

new drug usage. On November 21, 2019 a pre-trial services officer, Defendant BAKER, 

reasonably relying on the drug lab’s conclusions, sought the arrest of Plaintiff for violating the 

conditions of his pretrial release. 

The Plaintiff’s criminal counsel, in an effort to secure the Plaintiff’s release from pretrial 

detention, communicated with a private drug testing lab and the State Attorney’s office regarding 

the bona fides of the test results. Plaintiff then filed an unopposed Motion to reinstate Plaintiff 

MCCARTHY’s bond and to be released from the St. Lucie County Jail. ST. LUCIE COUNTY 

was not requested to nor did it participate in the arguments regarding the unopposed Motion and 

the Motion was granted. 

On December 19, 2019, based partly upon these developments, which had never been 

encountered previously with any other individual on pre-trial release, the ST. LUCIE COUNTY 

drug lab and pretrial services instituted a revised testing procedure, the “two negative test 

approach”, to determine new drug usage. This new approach to the determination of new drug 

usage was based upon the recommendation of Paul Cary, a well-respected scholar and the 

Scientific Director for the Toxicology Laboratory, University of Missouri. Mr. Cary recommended 

that two consecutive negative test results separated by a seven-day interval be utilized to determine 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 3 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

4 

when an individual has reached his or her abstinence baseline. This approach provides that after 

30 days continued cannabinoid positive urine drug tests “almost certainly indicate marijuana usage 

at some point during the detoxification period.” 

The Plaintiff was again tested on December 26, 2019 pursuant to the terms of his release. 

Given that he claimed he had not used marijuana since October 28, 2019, almost two months prior, 

under well-established scientific guidelines only the most minimal trace amounts should have been 

detected. In fact, however, this was not the case and the Plaintiff was re-arrested. The Judge for 

this second arrest was advised prior to revoking pretrial release that Plaintiff wanted confirmation 

of the drug lab’s conclusions but the Judge still revoked release. 

Plaintiff was incarcerated from January 3, 2020 through January 8, 2020, when he again 

secured his release. It is from this second arrest that the remaining component of the §1983 Monell

claim in the Amended Complaint emanates. 

Summary judgment on Count III in favor of the COUNTY is appropriate because the 

COUNTY drug lab and pre-trial services employees were in fact adequately trained, the issues 

attendant with the first arrest were addressed, and a deliberate choice was made to provide training 

and modification of the training and standards. There was absolutely no actionable deliberate 

indifference to the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As to Counts II and IV, the state-law false 

arrest claims, probable cause existed for both arrests. Additionally, as to Defendant BAKER, she 

is immune from suit because there was nothing willful or wanton about her seeking revocation of 

the pretrial release. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff’s initial Complaint named LASHERI BAKER and ST. LUCIE COUNTY as 

Defendants and asserted state-law false arrest and §1983 claims against each Defendant based on 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 4 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

5 

both the first and second pretrial release arrests. (D.E. 1) Both Defendants moved the dismiss the 

§1983 claims. (D.E. 6) Defendant BAKER’s Motion was based on qualified immunity. As to 

Defendant ST. LUCIE COUNTY the Motion was based on the failure to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted given insufficient allegations to support a Monell theory of liability on 

custom and practice, or failure to train, in addition to the lack of any unreasonable search and 

seizure. (D.E. 6) 

This Court granted the motions to dismiss the two §1983 claims and provided Plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend. (D.E. 13) An Amended Complaint was then filed containing identical 

claims and counts as the initial Complaint. (D.E. 14) 

Defendant BAKER again moved to dismiss the §1983 claim in the Amended Complaint 

against her, individually on the basis of qualified immunity. (D.E. 15) That motion was granted 

and Count I of the Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. (D.E. 36) Defendant ST. 

LUCIE COUNTY moved to dismiss the §1983 Monell claim in the Amended Complaint and that 

Motion was denied but only to the extent of a Monell failure-to-trial claim based on Plaintiff’s 

second arrest. (D.E. 15, 36) 

The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate on the Motion to Dismiss the Amended 

Complaint (D.E. 19) found that the allegations related to Plaintiff’s first arrest and subsequent 

exonerations potentially served to put the COUNTY on notice of a need to train its probation 

officers as to the limited value of successive, close-in-time drug screening test results and their 

inability to determine new drug usage, without first obtaining confirmation testing. Therefore, as 

to the Plaintiff’s second arrest, the arrest on January 3, 2020, the Motion was denied as to Count 

III to the extent it alleged a Monell failure-to-train claim. The Report and Recommendation, 

however, noted this ruling does not preclude a different result at summary judgment based on the 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 5 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

6 

facts and circumstances developed during discovery. (D.E. 19, p. 12) It is this remaining portion 

of the Monell claim the to which the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is directed. 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. As to the §1983 Claim County Employees Were Trained, and Relied on the Drug 

Lab Who Revised its Procedures - No Constitutional Violations Occurred 

The strictures of Monell liability are well established. The Supreme Court recognizes 

“limited circumstances” under which “failure to train” can give rise to Monell liability. City of 

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). Specifically, inadequate training “may serve as the basis 

for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of 

persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. 

To show ‘“deliberate indifference,’ a plaintiff must present some evidence that the 

municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and that the municipality 

made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th 

Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that, without notice of a need to train or 

supervise in a particular area, a municipality cannot be liable as a matter of law under a failure-totrain theory. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted, and the Magistrate quoted in total in the Report and 

Recommendation directed to the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, the following pattern 

jury instructions to describe the elements of a Monell failure-to-train claim:

To succeed on this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove each of the 

following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

First: That [name of officer] violated [name of plaintiff]’s [describe 

constitutional right];

Second: That [name of officer] was not adequately [trained, supervised] 

in [describe relevant area, e.g., the use of deadly force];

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 6 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

7 

Third: That [name of official policy-maker] knew based on at least one 

earlier instance of unconstitutional conduct materially similar to [name of 

officer]’s violation of [name of plaintiff]’s constitutional rights that 

[additional] [training/supervision] was needed to avoid [describe alleged 

constitutional violation] likely recurring in the future; and

Fourth: That [name of official policy-maker] made a deliberate choice not 

to provide [additional] [training/supervision] to [name of officer].

Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil) No. 5.11, Government Entity Liability for Failure 

to Train or Supervise. 

The pattern jury instruction on the failure to train or supervise, extensively relied upon by 

the Magistrate in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint demonstrates 

Defendant ST. LUCIE COUNTY’s entitlement to summary judgment in its favor on Count III of 

the Amended Complaint. 

First, as the Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute conclusively establishes, Defendant 

BAKER was in fact trained and supervised and was provided an extensive training on drug 

screening, including the Creatinine-Normalized Cannabinoid results to be utilized in a forensic 

context for the determination of new drug exposure and usage. She was trained to rely on the Drug 

Lab results. In fact, it is undisputed that the COUNTY relied on Paul Cary, the Scientific Director 

of the Toxicology and Drug Monitoring Laboratory at the University of Missouri Hospital and 

Health Care System in Columbia, Missouri, for the scientific principles on which the drug lab was 

trained and operated and on which pretrial services would rely to establish whether new drug usage 

had occurred. Mr. Cary was involved in the management of nationally-recognized toxicology 

laboratories, and was a resource to drug court teams throughout the Nation. This was the 

methodology utilized regarding the first arrest. 

As outlined above, Gold requires a political subdivision make a deliberate choice not to 

train. In the instant case, the County trained its pretrial services employees to rely on drug testing 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 7 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

8 

results using methodology by nationally recognized toxicology experts. This is not deliberate 

indifference, but constitutionally proper training. 

Regarding the second arrest, the COUNTY revised its policies and procedures on 

December 19, 2019 by utilizing the two negative test approach to determine new usage. Again, 

this was based on nationally recognized toxicology drug court expert methodology. However, 

given that the Plaintiff himself advised the COUNTY that he had not engaged in any new usage 

since October 28, 2019 well-established scientific principles indicated that his THC levels should 

have been virtually non-existent. In fact, after 60 days of claimed non-usage he was still testing 

positive. 

Given the foregoing, it is eminently clear ST. LUCIE COUNTY made an absolute choice 

to revise its policies and procedures and trained its employees appropriately. There was nothing 

done to even remotely evidence deliberate indifference regarding training or in any other manner 

for that matter. Furthermore, it should be noted that this situation had never presented itself except 

for the one prior arrest of the Plaintiff, the first arrest. 

Moreover, it is patently absurd to expect that between December 21, 2019 and January 3, 

2020, issues attendant with the first arrest should have been analyzed, training implemented, and 

revised. This was a period less than two-weeks and over a Christmas and New Year’s holiday. 

Again, there is no evidence of deliberate indifference nor lack of training on which any jury could 

possibly find in favor of Plaintiff on a Monell failure to train theory. 

B. Probable Cause Existed for Both Arrests. 

With regard to the state-law false arrest claims, Count II against Defendant BAKER, 

individually, and Count IV against the COUNTY, both Defendants are entitled to summary 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 8 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

9 

judgment in their favor. Probable cause existed for the Plaintiff’s two pretrial release arrests. This 

is an absolute defense to a state-law false arrest claim. 

Under Florida law, probable cause is an affirmative defense to a tort claim of false arrest. 

Battiste v. Lamberti, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (S.E. Fla. 2008). Where an officer has “probable cause” 

to engage in acts resulting in a detention, a claim for false arrest and false imprisonment is 

precluded. Grix v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 821 So.2d 315 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2002). Moreover, probable cause exists when the circumstances are sufficient to cause a 

reasonably cautious person to believe that the person arrested is guilty of a criminal offense. Daniel 

v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 889 So.2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 

Application of the foregoing principles to the material facts not in dispute conclusively 

establish that both probable cause existed for the first and second rearrests. The drug lab conducted 

testing and based upon the “gold standard” for confirming new marijuana usage and the 

scientifically viable toxicology principles utilized by the ST. LUCIE COUNTY Drug Lab, 

probable cause existed as a matter of law for both arrests. Any reasonable officer when presented 

with this information from the Drug Lab would conclude probable cause existed that plaintiff 

continued to use marijuana. 

Moreover, the fact that the state criminal court released the Plaintiff after both arrests is 

absolutely immaterial to the determination of whether probable cause initially existed. Thomas v. 

Beary, 770 So.2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). An officer who arrests someone with probable cause 

is not liable for false arrest simply because the “innocence” of the suspect is later proved, despite 

there has been no determination in this case whether new usage in fact occurred. Boca Raton v. 

Coughlin, 299 So.2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 9 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

10 

Furthermore, regarding the second arrest, the Judge was advised the Plaintiff had requested 

confirmation testing yet decided to revoke the release. This decision by the Judge broke the claim 

of causation for a false arrest claim. Drudge v. City of Kissimmee, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (M.D. 

Fla. 2008). 

C. Defendant Baker is Immune From Suit in Her Individual Capacity 

Second, with regard to the claim against BAKER, individually, for false arrest the 

provisions of §768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. preclude the claim against her in an individual capacity as 

there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding the absence of bad faith, malicious 

purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. 

There is simply nothing in the facts and circumstances surrounding Defendant BAKER’s 

directive from the supervisor of pre-trial services based upon the Drug Lab’s testing, analysis, and 

confirmation that Defendant BAKER knew or reasonably should have known in light of the 

surrounding circumstances that her conduct would probably result in injury and, with such 

knowledge, disregarded the foreseeable in juris consequences. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F. 

Supp. 2d (S.D. Fla. 2009) 

It is clear that Defendant BAKER was acting within the course and scope of her 

employment and evidenced no malice or willful misconduct whatsoever. She reasonably relied 

upon information provided by the drug lab and would have no basis to even question the legitimacy 

of the test results. 

In conclusion, Defendant ST. LUCIE COUNTY is entitled to summary judgment in its 

favor on Count III of the Amended Complaint, the §1983 Monell claim based on the second arrest. 

Defendants ST. LUCIE COUNTY and BAKER are entitled to summary judgment in their favor 

on Counts II and IV, the state-law false arrest claims. 

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 10 of 11
CASE NO. 2:22-CV-14350 

11 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was electronically filed with 

the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF and served on all counsel of record on the attached service list in 

the manner specified either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF 

or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive 

electronically Notices of Electronic Filing on this 8th day of April, 2023. 

CONROY SIMBERG 

Attorney for St. Lucie County 

1801 Centrepark Drive East, Suite 200 

West Palm Beach, FL 33401 

Telephone: (561) 697-8088 

Facsimile: (561) 697-8664 

Primary Email: eservicewpb@conroysimberg.com 

Secondary Email: jblaker@conroysimberg.com

By: /s/ Jeffrey A. Blaker 

Jeffrey A. Blaker, Esquire 

Florida Bar No. 443913 

SERVICE LIST 

JOHN MCCARTHY v. LASHERI BAKER, AND ST. LUCIE COUNTY BOARD 

OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

CASE NO: 2:22-cv-14350 

Jordan R. Wagner, Esq. 

KIBBEY | WAGNER 

73 SW Flagler Avenue 

Stuart, FL 34994 

Email designation: 

jwagner@kibbeylaw.com 

diana@kibbeylaw.com 

Phone: (772) 444-7000

Case 2:22-cv-14350-AMC Document 46 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2024 Page 11 of 11