RENDERED: FEBRUARY 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0788-MR

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PARIS, 

KENTUCKY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-00493

JASON EARLYWINE APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING IN PART,

REVERSING IN PART,

AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Board of Education of Paris, Kentucky (“Board”) appeals 

the trial court’s ruling that KRS1 45A.245 is a waiver of the Board’s governmental 

immunity from a suit for damages for breach of an employment contract. The 

1 Kentucky Revised Statute.
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Board additionally appeals the relocation of venue from the Bourbon Circuit Court 

to the Franklin Circuit Court. By order entered by this Court on December 16, 

2021, we are limited to those issues directly affected by the immunity 

determination. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the Bourbon 

Circuit Court for dismissal of this case. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Board employed the Appellee Jason Earlywine (“Earlywine”) as 

a teacher from August 2007 until June 2019. In 2011, a student accused Earlywine 

of inappropriate contact. The Board through its agents suspended Earlywine with 

pay from the time of the accusation until June 2012, when the Board altered the 

suspension to be without pay. This suspension ended in February 2015. 

In 2012, Earlywine was indicted for one count of first-degree sexual 

abuse in violation of KRS 510.110. The criminal case went to trial in January 

2015. The circuit court judge presiding over that trial directed a verdict for 

Earlywine on January 27, 2015. The criminal case was subsequently dismissed

with prejudice. Earlywine thereafter moved for expungement of the criminal case, 

which was granted in April 2015.2

2 While expungement has certain legal effects, it does not change the fact that, when Earlywine 

was suspended without pay, the Board was addressing a criminal charge for which probable 

cause was found as evidenced by the return of an indictment. 
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The Board reinstated Earlywine in February 2015. Earlywine then 

requested back wages for unpaid suspension time, which was denied due to his 

failure to have sought any hearing to contest the suspension without pay when it 

occurred. Earlywine continued teaching in the Board’s school district until June 

2019. In 2020, Earlywine filed this action for breach of contract and violation of 

statutory wage and hour provisions3in the Bourbon Circuit Court. 

The Board filed a motion to dismiss asserting that it benefited from 

governmental immunity. The Bourbon Circuit Court denied the motion by an 

order dated June 10, 2021. In its order, the circuit court agreed the Board was 

entitled to immunity from Earlywine’s claims, but the circuit court held the waiver 

of that immunity was provided by KRS 45A.245. The circuit court transferred 

venue to the Franklin Circuit Court, pursuant to the same statute. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to the defense of 

sovereign or governmental immunity is a question of law. Rowan Cnty. v. Sloas, 

201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. 

Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 

3 Neither the prehearing statements nor the briefs address the wage and hour claim. As a result, 

the claim is waived. Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(C)(2) (formerly Kentucky Rule 

of Civil Procedure 76.03(8)). Commonwealth v. Pollini, 437 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Ky. 2014). We 

need not address the claim here noting Earlywine previously advised the circuit court the claim 

was simply a claim to lost wages under the contract at issue. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to 

Dismiss at pg. 10. 
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647 (Ky. 2007). “[A]n order denying a substantial claim of absolute immunity is 

immediately appealable even in the absence of a final judgment.” Breathitt Cnty.

Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Ky. 2009).

ANALYSIS

The Board argues the circuit court erred when denying its claim of

governmental immunity by applying KRS 45A.245 to local boards of education. It 

contends that notwithstanding the language of KRS 45A.245, local boards of 

education retain their immunity from suits for damages for breach of contract. 

It is clear under Kentucky law that local boards of education are

agencies of state government exercising a state function in running schools and 

hiring teachers and have governmental immunity. Kentucky’s highest court has 

recognized this for over eighty years. Clevinger v. Bd. of Educ. of Pike Cnty., 789 

S.W.2d 5, 10 (Ky. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Cook v. Popplewell, 394 

S.W.3d 323 (Ky. 2011). The overruling of Clevinger applies only to liability for 

violations of federal civil rights violations. Cook, 394 S.W.3d at 327 n.3.

Boards of education have governmental immunity generally from 

liability on contracts. Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ. of Nicholas Cnty., 30 S.W.3d 

793, 797 (Ky. 2000). This does not mean this immunity has not been waived by 

the General Assembly, which has the authority to waive immunity and provide 
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limitations on the remedy provided. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523-24 (Ky. 

2001) (explaining the Board of Claims Act as a waiver of immunity).

 The Board argues KRS 45A.245 does not waive its governmental 

immunity. 

KRS 45A.245(1) reads as follows:

Any person, firm or corporation, having a lawfully 

authorized written contract with the Commonwealth at 

the time of or after June 21, 1974, may bring an action 

against the Commonwealth on the contract, including but 

not limited to actions either for breach of contracts or for 

enforcement of contracts or for both. Any such action 

shall be brought in the Franklin Circuit Court and shall 

be tried by the court sitting without a jury. All defenses 

in law or equity, except the defense of governmental 

immunity, shall be preserved to the Commonwealth.

This statement is an unqualified waiver of immunity on all contracts 

with the Commonwealth and its agencies, including employment contracts. Univ.

of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2017) (breach of contract 

claim by university professor). Pursuant to Rothstein, the Board as a state agency

does not have governmental immunity for Earlywine’s breach of contract claims. 

The analysis of the immunity for Earlywine’s contract claim cannot 

end there because the immunity for liability on a contract between the Board and 

Earlywine has been waived by a more specific and limiting statutory enactment by 

the General Assembly. The law requires the Board to have a contract with 

Earlywine. KRS 161.011. Such contracts are governed by the provisions of KRS 
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Chapter 161. A contract between a board of education and a teacher is infused 

with these statutory provisions such that it may be considered a legislative grant 

more than a contract. Bd. of Educ. of Harrodsburg v. Powell, 792 S.W.2d 376, 379

(Ky. App. 1990). Still, it is a contract, although a statutory contract. 

This record reveals Earlywine had a continuing service contract with 

the Board. KRS 161.720(4). Under the contract, the Board had the authority to 

suspend Earlywine without pay. KRS 161.790(10). When the Board chose this 

course, the governing statute then applied the same review process applied to 

termination. KRS 161.790(3)-(9). Earlywine could have sought review when he 

was suspended. He did not do so.

In providing a specific process and remedy in KRS 161.790, the 

General Assembly withheld subject matter jurisdiction from the circuit court to 

hear Earlywine’s breach of contract claim seeking the wages not paid during his 

suspension if the requirements of KRS 161.790 had not been satisfied. “The 

General Assembly has constructed this legislative scheme in order to provide 

teachers and school administrators with an effective and neutral means by which to 

resolve disputes arising from teacher discipline.” Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. 

Edwards, 434 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Ky. 2014). “However, a teacher’s election to not 

answer a charge and thereby forego the institution of administrative proceedings 
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does not entitle the teacher to instead challenge his disciplinary claims in circuit 

court.” Id. 

The Court in Edwards echoed the sentiment expressed in Board of 

Education of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards, 396 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Ky. 2013),

which stated that 

KRS 161.790 establishes the process for the adjudication 

of public school teacher disciplinary matters. KRS 

161.790(4)-(9) provides for the selection of an ad hoc

hearing Tribunal to conduct an administrative evidentiary 

hearing. The Tribunal makes findings of fact, determines 

whether grounds for termination have been proven, and 

renders a final order accordingly. The decision of the 

Tribunal is a final order, subject to judicial review by the 

circuit court “in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.” 

“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking 

judicial relief.” Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624, 625 (Ky. 2001). See 

also Frisby v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyle Cnty., 707 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky. App. 1986). 

As the Court in Edwards recognized, a teacher could have a breach of 

contract claim outside the strictures of KRS 161.790. Edwards, 434 S.W.3d at

478. While this is not such a case, our courts have recognized the right to proceed 

to seek damages in such cases. See Watkins v. Oldham, 731 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. App. 

1987). In effect, Rothstein confirms there is no immunity for liability for contracts 

entered into by the Board. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d at 651. But Rothstein did not 
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eliminate the applicable provisions in KRS Chapter 161 which overlay the specific 

contract at issue.

 It is undisputed in this case that Earlywine did not avail himself of the 

administrative hearing afforded him in KRS 161.790. Had Earlywine requested an 

administrative hearing on the unpaid suspension at the time it occurred or within 

ten days, he would have had the option to appeal the tribunal’s decision to the 

Bourbon Circuit Court, which could have granted relief relating to the unpaid 

suspension. Having failed to do that, Earlywine is not now able to ignore the 

procedures set out in KRS 161.790 and seek a remedy in the circuit court. The 

failure of Earlywine to exhaust the specific, applicable administrative process 

prevents any argument as to the impropriety of his suspension and thus removes 

any basis for his breach of contract claim. 

Regarding the question of venue, KRS 45A.245 is part of the Model 

Procurement Code (“MPC”). The General Assembly decided to place its general 

declaration of contract immunity waiver in that chapter. This does not mean all 

contract cases are sent to the Franklin Circuit Court under that statute. The MPC 

governs purchases, including those in the context of building projects. See KRS 

45A.010. We do not “procure” teachers as envisioned by the MPC. 

In Rothstein, the Court left open the question of whether other 
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provisions of the MPC apply. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d at 651. As this case 

illustrates, the other provisions of the MPC cannot be held to apply to a teacher 

contract dispute under KRS Chapter 161. This would be contrary to wellestablished law. Cases between a teacher and a school board should be in the 

county where the parties are. See Pendleton Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Simpson, 91 

S.W.2d 557, 560 (Ky. 1936). To apply the MPC and transfer all teacher contracts 

cases to Franklin Circuit Court would lead to an illogical result which could not 

have been the intention of the General Assembly. The proper venue for this action 

is in the Bourbon Circuit Court, as the county in which the Board of Education sits.

See KRS 161.790(9). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the determination the Board does

not have immunity for the breach of contract claim asserted by Earlywine. We 

reverse the order transferring this case to the Franklin Circuit Court. We remand 

this case for the Franklin Circuit Court to transfer this case back to the Bourbon 

Circuit Court. The Bourbon Circuit Court shall then dismiss the case because 

Earlywine’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided pursuant to his 

contract with the Board deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction of 

his claim. 
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ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Jonathan C. Shaw

Grant R. Chenoweth

Paintsville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Robert L. Roark

Tyler Z. Korus

Lexington, Kentucky