UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

RUTH MULLINS, Widow of Kermon

No. 97-2194

Mullins, Deceased; DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Benefits Review Board.

(96-1359-BLA)

Submitted: December 22, 1998

Decided: January 20, 1999

Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Timothy W. Gresham, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon,

Virginia, for Petitioner. Vincent J. Carroll, Richlands, Virginia, for

Respondents.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Clinchfield Coal Company (Clinchfield) appeals the award of survivor's benefits to Ruth Mullins, the widow of Kermon Mullins (Mullins), pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits provisions of the Mine

Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp.

1998). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded benefits upon

finding that Mullins suffered from pneumoconiosis and that the pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing factor leading to his

death. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2) (1998). Clinchfield appealed, and

the Benefits Review Board (Board) affirmed. Because we find that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual findings, we affirm.

Ruth and Kermon K. Mullins were married for forty-eight years,

until Kermon's death in 1994. Mullins worked in the coal mining

industry for thirty-six years between 1941 and 1982. Most of his work

was in or around coal preparation plants; he generally worked as a

table floor operator, and was subject to sporadic exposure to heavy

volumes of coal dust as well as constant exposure to moderate

amounts of dust. He retired in 1981 because of his pulmonary health,

and was treated regularly until his death for his pulmonary condition.

An autopsy was performed following Mullins's death on January 11,

1994.

Clinchfield does not dispute that it is the responsible operator or

that Mullins worked thirty-six years in the industry. The company

does dispute that pneumoconiosis contributed significantly to Mullins's death. The ALJ found that Ruth Mullins had sustained her burden of proving the causal connection between Mullins's death and a

pulmonary impairment related to coal dust exposure. The Board

rejected Clinchfield's arguments on appeal and affirmed the award of

benefits.

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This Court reviews a decision awarding or denying benefits to

determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual

findings. Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir.

1998). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,

229 (1938). In assessing whether there is evidence to support the

ALJ's factual findings, we must address whether the ALJ has analyzed all relevant evidence and explained his rationale in accepting

certain evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438,

439 (4th Cir. 1997). The legal conclusions of the ALJ and the Board

are reviewed de novo. Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard , 65 F.3d 1189, 1193

(4th Cir. 1995).

Because Ruth Mullins filed her claim for survivors benefits in

1994, her claim is adjudicated under 20 C.F.R. § 718.205 (1998).

Under the provisions of the regulation relevant in this case, death is

considered to be due to pneumoconiosis where pneumoconiosis was

a substantial contributing cause of death or death resulted from complications of pneumoconiosis. § 718.205(c)(2).

Clinchfield first argues that the ALJ did not adequately discuss or

give sufficient weight to the report and deposition of Dr. Caffrey.

Dr. Caffrey's opinion, expressed by report and deposition, was that

the amount of coal worker's pneumoconiosis from which Mullins suffered did not contribute to or cause his death.

An ALJ hearing a black lung claim has the power to make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence presented. Underwood v.

Elkay Mining, Inc., 105 F.3d 946, 949 (4th Cir. 1997). The ALJ can

disregard an opinion that is not supported by a sufficient rationale.

Milburn Colliery Co., 138 F.3d at 533 n.9. Although he did not specifically mention Dr. Caffrey's deposition, the ALJ did discuss

Dr. Caffrey's opinion that Mullins's pneumoconiosis was too mild to

have caused his death, which Dr. Caffrey stated was caused by diffuse

interstitial fibrosis of the lungs with superimposed acute bronchopneumonia. The ALJ found the pathology report and opinion of

Dr. Jones more persuasive.

Dr. Jones concurred with other pathologists that Mullins suffered

from pneumoconiosis at his death. He concluded that the pneumoco-

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niosis "significantly complicated" Mullins's coronary artery disease

and weakened his cardiac capacity. Based on the interrelationship of

the cardiovascular and pulmonary systems and his examination of the

pathologists' tissue specimens, Dr. Jones diagnosed simple coal worker's pneumoconiosis (cwp), emphysema, diffuse interstitial pneumonitis, and cytomegalovirus pneumonitis. As Dr. Jones reported, all

the pathologists agreed that Mullins had cwp with enough exposure

to coal dust to cause pneumoconiosis, that he had an obstructive lung

disease that was not caused by smoking, and that acute pneumonitis

had led to his respiratory failure and subsequent death. The attending

physicians, Drs. Tholpady and Smiddy, agreed that Mullins suffered

from coronary artery disease. Both the attending physicians and

Dr. Kahn, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

pathologist, agreed that pneumoconiosis contributed significantly to

Mullins's death. Dr. Jones discounted the opinions of the physicians

employed by Clinchfield as failing to account for Mullins's long

exposure to coal dust, the cwp lesions in his lungs, and the absence

of a smoking history. He noted that the attending doctors had failed

to find any other cause for the pulmonary problems, despite their

efforts to do so. Jones reasoned that Mullins's pneumoconiosis and

the associated chronic lung disease so weakened Mullins's pulmonary

capacity that he could not fend off the cytomegalovirus found in the

autopsy, which normally only invades "severely compromised or

weakened individuals." We conclude that the ALJ acted properly in

weighing the detailed, reasoned report of Dr. Jones against the more

conclusory opinion of Dr. Caffrey, contained in his report and deposition testimony.

Clinchfield next argues that the ALJ substituted his judgment for

Dr. Tomashefski's medical opinion that Mullins's death was due to

idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, with pneumoconiosis playing no role.

The ALJ concluded that Dr. Tomashefski ignored Mullins's long history of exposure to coal dust in finding the disease to be idiopathic,

or of unknown origin. Clinchfield asserts that, in fact,

Dr. Tomashefski did opine with reasonable medical certainty that the

fibrosis was not consistent with pneumoconiosis or caused by exposure to coal dust. The company also argues that"idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis" is a specific medical disease and that, contrary to the

ALJ's assertion, Dr. Tomashefski did acknowledge Mullins's coal

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work and exposure to dust, by noting that he had worked for thirtyfive years in and around coal mines.

The qualifications of experts are significant indicators of the reliability of their opinions. Milburn Colliery Co. , 138 F.3d at 536. The

ALJ noted that Dr. Tomashefski is not an internist. In addition, the

ALJ concluded that Dr. Tomashefski's opinion was less persuasive

because he did not assess how Mullins's thirty-six year exposure to

coal dust related to the fibrosis that led to his death. Both are permissible considerations for the ALJ, and do not amount to substitution of

his opinion for a medical opinion. Therefore, the Board was correct

in holding that this argument lacks merit.

Finally, Clinchfield asserts the ALJ erred in giving little weight to

the opinions of the doctors who did not discuss the effect of Mullins's

cardiac problems on his death: Doctors Adelson, Tomashefski,

Naeye, and Caffrey. Clinchfield charges that the ALJ did not hold the

doctors who found a relationship between pneumoconiosis and Mullins's death to the same standard.

Clinchfield's argument entitles it to no relief. The ALJ gave less

weight to Dr. Tomashefski's report because he was not an internist

and did not take into account the effect of Mullins's long exposure to

coal dust in explaining the fibrosis of his lungs. Dr. Naeye's opinion

was somewhat discounted because of the tentative nature of his conclusion that a cytomegalovirus might have caused the fibrosis. The

ALJ was entitled to accept the opinion of Dr. Jones over that of

Dr. Caffrey as being a better reasoned assessment that considered and

accounted for all the relevant medical evidence. As for Dr. Adelson,

his autopsy report found pneumoconiosis as well as interstitial pneumonitis compatible with cytomegalovirus pneumonitis. Dr. Adelson

did not identify either of these conditions as the cause or substantially

contributing cause leading to Mullins's death. Therefore, his report is

not contrary to the ALJ's findings.

The ALJ analyzed all relevant evidence and explained his rationale

in assessing the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co., 131 F.3d at

439. The legal conclusions of both the ALJ and the Board are rational

and consistent with relevant law. Dehue Coal Co. , 65 F.3d at 1193.

 Therefore, we affirm the award of benefits to Ruth Mullins. We dis-

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pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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