(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 15–628. Argued October 5, 2016—Decided December 6, 2016 

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities 

and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5 prohibit undisclosed trading

on inside corporate information by persons bound by a duty of trust 

and confidence not to exploit that information for their personal advantage. These persons are also forbidden from tipping inside information to others for trading. A tippee who receives such information

with the knowledge that its disclosure breached the tipper’s duty acquires that duty and may be liable for securities fraud for any undisclosed trading on the information. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 

this Court explained that tippee liability hinges on whether the tipper’s disclosure breaches a fiduciary duty, which occurs when the tipper discloses the information for a personal benefit. The Court also 

held that a personal benefit may be inferred where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of

confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Id., at 664. 

Petitioner Salman was indicted for federal securities-fraud crimes 

for trading on inside information he received from a friend and relative-by-marriage, Michael Kara, who, in turn, received the information from his brother, Maher Kara, a former investment banker at 

Citigroup. Maher testified at Salman’s trial that he shared inside information with his brother Michael to benefit him and expected him

to trade on it, and Michael testified to sharing that information with

Salman, who knew that it was from Maher. Salman was convicted. 

While Salman’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, the Second Circuit decided that Dirks does not permit a factfinder to infer a 

personal benefit to the tipper from a gift of confidential information

to a trading relative or friend, unless there is “proof of a meaningfully 

close personal relationship” between tipper and tippee “that gener-
2 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

 

Syllabus 

ates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at 

least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” 

United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 438, 452, cert. denied, 577 U. S. 

___. The Ninth Circuit declined to follow Newman so far, holding 

that Dirks allowed Salman’s jury to infer that the tipper breached a 

duty because he made “ ‘a gift of confidential information to a trading relative.’ ” 792 F. 3d 1087, 1092 (quoting Dirks, 463 U. S., at 

664). 

Held: The Ninth Circuit properly applied Dirks to affirm Salman’s conviction. Under Dirks, the jury could infer that the tipper here personally benefited from making a gift of confidential information to a 

trading relative. Pp. 6–12. 

 (a) Salman contends that a gift of confidential information to a 

friend or family member alone is insufficient to establish the personal 

benefit required for tippee liability, claiming that a tipper does not 

personally benefit unless the tipper’s goal in disclosing information is 

to obtain money, property, or something of tangible value. The Government counters that a gift of confidential information to anyone, 

not just a “trading relative or friend,” is enough to prove securities 

fraud because a tipper personally benefits through any disclosure of 

confidential trading information for a personal (non-corporate) purpose. The Government argues that any concerns raised by permitting such an inference are significantly alleviated by other statutory 

elements prosecutors must satisfy. Pp. 6–8. 

 (b) This Court adheres to the holding in Dirks, which easily resolves the case at hand: “when an insider makes a gift of confidential 

information to a trading relative or friend . . . [t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits 

to the recipient,” 463 U. S., at 664. In these situations, the tipper 

personally benefits because giving a gift of trading information to a 

trading relative is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by 

a gift of the proceeds. Here, by disclosing confidential information as 

a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it, 

Maher breached his duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its 

clients—a duty acquired and breached by Salman when he traded on 

the information with full knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed. To the extent that the Second Circuit in Newman held that 

the tipper must also receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly 

valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to a trading relative, that rule 

is inconsistent with Dirks. Pp. 8–10. 

(c) Salman’s arguments to the contrary are rejected. Salman has 

cited nothing in this Court’s precedents that undermines the giftgiving principle this Court announced in Dirks. Nor has he demonstrated that either §10(b) itself or Dirks’s gift-giving standard “leav[e] 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Syllabus 

grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” or

are plagued by “hopeless indeterminacy.” Johnson v. United States, 

576 U. S. ___, ___, ___. Salman also has shown “no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty that would trigger” the rule of lenity. Barber v. 

Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 492 (internal quotation marks omitted). To 

the contrary, his conduct is in the heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts of confidential information to trading relatives. Pp. 10–12. 

792 F. 3d 1087, affirmed. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 15–628 

BASSAM YACOUB SALMAN, PETITIONER v.
 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[December 6, 2016]

 JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and

the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5

prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are under a duty of trust and 

confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such 

information for their personal advantage. 48 Stat. 891, as 

amended, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b) (prohibiting the use, “in 

connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” of 

“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in

contravention of such rules as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe”); 17 CFR §240.10b–5 

(2016) (forbidding the use, “in connection with the sale or 

purchase of any security,” of “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,” or any “act, practice, or course of business

which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit”); see United States 

v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 642, 650–652 (1997). Individuals 

under this duty may face criminal and civil liability for 

trading on inside information (unless they make appropriate disclosures ahead of time). 

These persons also may not tip inside information to 
 

 

 

2 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

others for trading. The tippee acquires the tipper’s duty to 

disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the

information was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty,

and the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in

disregard of that knowledge. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 

646 (1983), this Court explained that a tippee’s liability for

trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, we held, 

when the tipper discloses the inside information for a

personal benefit. And, we went on to say, a jury can infer 

a personal benefit—and thus a breach of the tipper’s

duty—where the tipper receives something of value in 

exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Id., at 664. 

Petitioner Bassam Salman challenges his convictions for 

conspiracy and insider trading. Salman received lucrative

trading tips from an extended family member, who had 

received the information from Salman’s brother-in-law. 

Salman then traded on the information. He argues that

he cannot be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his 

brother-in-law) did not personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips and thus did not personally 

benefit from them. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Dirks allowed the jury to infer that the tipper

here breached a duty because he made a “‘gift of confidential information to a trading relative.’” 792 F. 3d 1087, 

1092 (CA9 2015) (quoting Dirks, supra, at 664). Because 

the Court of Appeals properly applied Dirks, we affirm the 

judgment below. 

I 

Maher Kara was an investment banker in Citigroup’s

healthcare investment banking group. He dealt with 

highly confidential information about mergers and acquisitions involving Citigroup’s clients. Maher enjoyed a 
 

 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

close relationship with his older brother, Mounir Kara

(known as Michael). After Maher started at Citigroup, he

began discussing aspects of his job with Michael. At first 

he relied on Michael’s chemistry background to help him

grasp scientific concepts relevant to his new job. Then, 

while their father was battling cancer, the brothers discussed companies that dealt with innovative cancer

treatment and pain management techniques. Michael 

began to trade on the information Maher shared with him.

At first, Maher was unaware of his brother’s trading activity, but eventually he began to suspect that it was taking

place.

Ultimately, Maher began to assist Michael’s trading by

sharing inside information with his brother about pending

mergers and acquisitions. Maher sometimes used code 

words to communicate corporate information to his brother.

Other times, he shared inside information about deals 

he was not working on in order to avoid detection. See, 

e.g., App. 118, 124–125. Without his younger brother’s

knowledge, Michael fed the information to others— 

including Salman, Michael’s friend and Maher’s brotherin-law. By the time the authorities caught on, Salman 

had made over $1.5 million in profits that he split with 

another relative who executed trades via a brokerage

account on Salman’s behalf. 

Salman was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, see 18 U. S. C. §371, and four counts

of securities fraud, see 15 U. S. C. §§78j(b), 78ff; 18

U. S. C. §2; 17 CFR §240.10b–5. Facing charges of their 

own, both Maher and Michael pleaded guilty and testified

at Salman’s trial. 

The evidence at trial established that Maher and Michael enjoyed a “very close relationship.” App. 215. Maher “love[d] [his] brother very much,” Michael was like “a

second father to Maher,” and Michael was the best man at 

Maher’s wedding to Salman’s sister. Id., at 158, 195, 104– 
 

 

 

4 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

107. Maher testified that he shared inside information 

with his brother to benefit him and with the expectation 

that his brother would trade on it. While Maher explained

that he disclosed the information in large part to appease 

Michael (who pestered him incessantly for it), he also

testified that he tipped his brother to “help him” and to

“fulfil[l] whatever needs he had.” Id., at 118, 82. For 

instance, Michael once called Maher and told him that “he 

needed a favor.” Id., at 124. Maher offered his brother 

money but Michael asked for information instead. Maher 

then disclosed an upcoming acquisition. Ibid. Although

he instantly regretted the tip and called his brother back 

to implore him not to trade, Maher expected his brother to

do so anyway. Id., at 125. 

For his part, Michael told the jury that his brother’s tips

gave him “timely information that the average person does

not have access to” and “access to stocks, options, and

what have you, that I can capitalize on, that the average

person would never have or dream of.” Id., at 251. Michael testified that he became friends with Salman when 

Maher was courting Salman’s sister and later began sharing Maher’s tips with Salman. As he explained at trial,

“any time a major deal came in, [Salman] was the first on 

my phone list.” Id., at 258. Michael also testified that he 

told Salman that the information was coming from Maher.

See, e.g., id., at 286 (“‘Maher is the source of all this 

information’”).

After a jury trial in the Northern District of California,

Salman was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 

36 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised

release, and over $730,000 in restitution. After his motion 

for a new trial was denied, Salman appealed to the Ninth 

Circuit. While his appeal was pending, the Second Circuit

issued its opinion in United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 

438 (2014), cert. denied, 577 U. S. ___ (2015). There, the 

Second Circuit reversed the convictions of two portfolio 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

managers who traded on inside information. The Newman 

defendants were “several steps removed from the corporate insiders” and the court found that “there was no 

evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside 

information.” 773 F. 3d, at 443. The court acknowledged 

that Dirks and Second Circuit case law allow a factfinder 

to infer a personal benefit to the tipper from a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. 773 

F. 3d, at 452. But the court concluded that, “[t]o the extent” Dirks permits “such an inference,” the inference “is

impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully 

close personal relationship that generates an exchange

that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a

potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” 

773 F. 3d, at 452.1

 Pointing to Newman, Salman argued that his conviction 

should be reversed. While the evidence established that 

Maher made a gift of trading information to Michael and

that Salman knew it, there was no evidence that Maher 

received anything of “a pecuniary or similarly valuable 

nature” in exchange—or that Salman knew of any such 

benefit. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed Salman’s conviction. 792 F. 3d 1087. The court reasoned 

that the case was governed by Dirks’s holding that a tipper benefits personally by making a gift of confidential 

information to a trading relative or friend. Indeed, Maher’s disclosures to Michael were “precisely the gift of

confidential information to a trading relative that Dirks 

envisioned.” 792 F. 3d, at 1092 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To the extent Newman went further and required additional gain to the tipper in cases involving gifts 

—————— 

1The Second Circuit also reversed the Newman defendants’ convictions because the Government introduced no evidence that the defendants knew the information they traded on came from insiders or that 

the insiders received a personal benefit in exchange for the tips. 773 

F. 3d, at 453–454. This case does not implicate those issues. 
 

 

6 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

of confidential information to family and friends, the 

Ninth Circuit “decline[d] to follow it.” 792 F. 3d, at 1093. 

We granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the

Second Circuit’s Newman decision and the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in this case.2 577 U. S. ___ (2016). 

II
 

A 

In this case, Salman contends that an insider’s “gift of

confidential information to a trading relative or friend,” 

Dirks, 463 U. S., at 664, is not enough to establish securities fraud. Instead, Salman argues, a tipper does not 

personally benefit unless the tipper’s goal in disclosing 

inside information is to obtain money, property, or something of tangible value. He claims that our insider-trading

precedents, and the cases those precedents cite, involve

situations in which the insider exploited confidential

information for the insider’s own “tangible monetary

profit.” Brief for Petitioner 31. He suggests that his 

—————— 

2 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983), established the personal-benefit

framework in a case brought under the classical theory of insidertrading liability, which applies “when a corporate insider” or his tippee 

“trades in the securities of [the tipper’s] corporation on the basis of

material, nonpublic information.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 

642, 651–652 (1997). In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to,

and takes advantage of, the shareholders of his corporation. By contrast, the misappropriation theory holds that a person commits securities fraud “when he misappropriates confidential information for 

securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of

the information” such as an employer or client. Id., at 652. In such a 

case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and defrauds, the source of the 

information, as opposed to the shareholders of his corporation. The 

Court of Appeals observed that this is a misappropriation case, 792

F. 3d, 1087, 1092, n. 4 (CA9 2015), while the Government represents 

that both theories apply on the facts of this case, Brief for United States

15, n. 1. We need not resolve the question. The parties do not dispute 

that Dirks’s personal-benefit analysis applies in both classical and 

misappropriation cases, so we will proceed on the assumption that it

does. 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

position is reinforced by our criminal-fraud precedents 

outside of the insider-trading context, because those cases 

confirm that a fraudster must personally obtain money or 

property. Id., at 33–34. More broadly, Salman urges that

defining a gift as a personal benefit renders the insidertrading offense indeterminate and overbroad: indeterminate, because liability may turn on facts such as the closeness of the relationship between tipper and tippee and the 

tipper’s purpose for disclosure; and overbroad, because the 

Government may avoid having to prove a concrete personal benefit by simply arguing that the tipper meant to give 

a gift to the tippee. He also argues that we should interpret Dirks’s standard narrowly so as to avoid constitutional 

concerns. Brief for Petitioner 36–37. Finally, Salman

contends that gift situations create especially troubling 

problems for remote tippees—that is, tippees who receive 

inside information from another tippee, rather than the 

tipper—who may have no knowledge of the relationship

between the original tipper and tippee and thus may not 

know why the tipper made the disclosure. Id., at 43, 48, 

50. 

The Government disagrees and argues that a gift of

confidential information to anyone, not just a “trading

relative or friend,” is enough to prove securities fraud. See 

Brief for United States 27 (“Dirks’s personal-benefit test 

encompasses a gift to any person with the expectation that

the information will be used for trading, not just to ‘a 

trading relative or friend’” (quoting 463 U. S., at 664; 

emphasis in original)). Under the Government’s view, a 

tipper personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses

confidential trading information for a noncorporate purpose. Accordingly, a gift to a friend, a family member, or 

anyone else would support the inference that the tipper

exploited the trading value of inside information for personal purposes and thus personally benefited from the

disclosure. The Government claims to find support for 
 

 

 

 

8 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

this reading in Dirks and the precedents on which Dirks 

relied. See, e.g., id., at 654 (“fraud” in an insider-trading

case “derives ‘from the inherent unfairness involved where 

one takes advantage’ of ‘information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal 

benefit of anyone’” (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 

Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968))). 

The Government also argues that Salman’s concerns

about unlimited and indeterminate liability for remote 

tippees are significantly alleviated by other statutory 

elements that prosecutors must satisfy to convict a tippee 

for insider trading. The Government observes that, in 

order to establish a defendant’s criminal liability as a 

tippee, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

tipper expected that the information being disclosed would 

be used in securities trading. Brief for United States 23– 

24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Government also notes that, 

to establish a defendant’s criminal liability as a tippee, it 

must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached

a duty—in other words, that the tippee knew that the

tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and 

that the tipper expected trading to ensue. Brief for United 

States 43; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37, 39. 

B 

We adhere to Dirks, which easily resolves the narrow

issue presented here. 

In Dirks, we explained that a tippee is exposed to liability for trading on inside information only if the tippee

participates in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty.

Whether the tipper breached that duty depends “in large

part on the purpose of the disclosure” to the tippee. 463 

U. S., at 662. “[T]he test,” we explained, “is whether the 

insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from

his disclosure.” Ibid. Thus, the disclosure of confidential 

information without personal benefit is not enough. In 
 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

determining whether a tipper derived a personal benefit, 

we instructed courts to “focus on objective criteria, i.e., 

whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal

benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a

reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.” Id., at 663. This personal benefit can “often” be

inferred “from objective facts and circumstances,” we 

explained, such as “a relationship between the insider and

the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, 

or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.” Id., at 

664. In particular, we held that “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also

exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Ibid. (emphasis

added). In such cases, “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the

recipient.” Ibid. We then applied this gift-giving principle 

to resolve Dirks itself, finding it dispositive that the tippers “received no monetary or personal benefit” from their 

tips to Dirks, “nor was their purpose to make a gift of 

valuable information to Dirks.” Id., at 667 (emphasis 

added).

Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case. Maher, 

the tipper, provided inside information to a close relative, 

his brother Michael. Dirks makes clear that a tipper

breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential 

information to “a trading relative,” and that rule is sufficient to resolve the case at hand. As Salman’s counsel 

acknowledged at oral argument, Maher would have 

breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself then given the proceeds as a gift to

his brother. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3–4. It is obvious that Maher 

would personally benefit in that situation. But Maher 

effectively achieved the same result by disclosing the 

information to Michael, and allowing him to trade on it. 

Dirks appropriately prohibits that approach, as well. Cf. 
 

10 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

463 U. S., at 659 (holding that “insiders [are] forbidden” 

both “from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage” and from “giv[ing] such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of 

exploiting the information for their personal gain”). Dirks 

specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to “a 

trading relative or friend,” the jury can infer that the 

tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift. In 

such situations, the tipper benefits personally because

giving a gift of trading information is the same thing as 

trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds. 

Here, by disclosing confidential information as a gift to his

brother with the expectation that he would trade on it,

Maher breached his duty of trust and confidence to

Citigroup and its clients—a duty Salman acquired, and 

breached himself, by trading on the information with full 

knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed. 

To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper

must also receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly 

valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to family or friends, 

Newman, 773 F. 3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth

Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks. 

C 

Salman points out that many insider-trading cases—

including several that Dirks cited—involved insiders who 

personally profited through the misuse of trading information. But this observation does not undermine the test 

Dirks articulated and applied. Salman also cites a sampling of our criminal-fraud decisions construing other 

federal fraud statutes, suggesting that they stand for the 

proposition that fraud is not consummated unless the 

defendant obtains money or property. Sekhar v. United 

States, 570 U. S. ___ (2013) (Hobbs Act); Skilling v. United 

States, 561 U. S. 358 (2010) (honest-services mail and wire

fraud); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12 (2000) 
 

 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

(wire fraud); McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350 

(1987) (mail fraud). Assuming that these cases are relevant to our construction of §10(b) (a proposition the Government forcefully disputes), nothing in them undermines

the commonsense point we made in Dirks. Making a gift 

of inside information to a relative like Michael is little 

different from trading on the information, obtaining the

profits, and doling them out to the trading relative. The 

tipper benefits either way. The facts of this case illustrate 

the point: In one of their tipper-tippee interactions, Michael asked Maher for a favor, declined Maher’s offer of 

money, and instead requested and received lucrative 

trading information.

We reject Salman’s argument that Dirks’s gift-giving 

standard is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this 

case. Dirks created a simple and clear “guiding principle”

for determining tippee liability, 463 U. S., at 664, and 

Salman has not demonstrated that either §10(b) itself or 

the Dirks gift-giving standard “leav[e] grave uncertainty

about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” or are 

plagued by “hopeless indeterminacy,” Johnson v. United 

States, 576 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 5, 7). At 

most, Salman shows that in some factual circumstances 

assessing liability for gift-giving will be difficult. That 

alone cannot render “shapeless” a federal criminal prohibition, for even clear rules “produce close cases.” Id., at ___, 

___ (slip op., at 9, 10). We also reject Salman’s appeal to 

the rule of lenity, as he has shown “no grievous ambiguity 

or uncertainty that would trigger the rule’s application.” 

Barber v. Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 492 (2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, Salman’s 

conduct is in the heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts.

It remains the case that “[d]etermining whether an insider 

personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question 

of fact, will not always be easy for courts.” 463 U. S., at 

664. But there is no need for us to address those difficult 
 

 

12 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

cases today, because this case involves “precisely the ‘gift 

of confidential information to a trading relative’ that Dirks 

envisioned.” 792 F. 3d, at 1092 (quoting 463 U. S., at 664). 

III 

Salman’s jury was properly instructed that a personal

benefit includes “the benefit one would obtain from simply 

making a gift of confidential information to a trading 

relative.” App. 398–399. As the Court of Appeals noted, 

“the Government presented direct evidence that the disclosure was intended as a gift of market-sensitive information.” 792 F. 3d, at 1094. And, as Salman conceded 

below, this evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction 

under our reading of Dirks. Appellant’s Supplemental 

Brief in No. 14–10204 (CA9), p. 6 (“Maher made a gift of

confidential information to a trading relative [Michael] . . . 

and, if [Michael’s] testimony is accepted as true (as it must 

be for purposes of sufficiency review), Salman knew that 

Maher had made such a gift” (internal quotation marks,

brackets, and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Ninth 

Circuit’s judgment is affirmed. 

It is so ordered.