T EX . P EN AL . C ODE §1 9. 03 (a ); T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art . 3 7. 07 1. Unl ess o the rw ise 1 (continued...) 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 75, 707

C H R I STO PH ER D EV O N JAC K SO N , A ppe l l ant

v. THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON DI RE CT AP P EA L F ROM CAUS E N O. 1 0 5 6 3 7 2 I N T HE 2 3 0 t h DI S TR I CT COURT HA RRI S CO UNTY

K ELLER , P .J., delivered the opinion of the Court in w hich M E YE RS , J OHN S ON , K EASLER , H E R V EY , H O L C O MB , and C OCH RAN , JJ., joined. W OM ACK , J . , j o in e d e x c e pt a s t o po ints of err or one and tw o. P RI CE , J. , c onc ur r e d.

On Dec ember

5 , 2005, appellant shot and killed Er ic S mith afte r st ealingSmit h’s common- th law wife ’s SUV. Smith was kill ed by a sing le shotg un blast to the back of the hea d. Appellant wa s

arr e ste d th e nex t day . In Ap ri l 20 07 , a pp e lla nt w a s c on vic te d o f c a

pit a l murd e r a

nd se nte nc e d to death. Direc t appea l to this Court is automatic. Appellant raises nine points of error. Finding no

1 2Jackson — 2

(...continued) indicated, a ll future re fer ence s to articles re fer to the Code of Criminal Procedur e. Art. 37.071, §2(h)

. 2 T EX . R. E V ID . 4 03 pr ov ide s: 3 Al tho ug h re le va

nt, e vid e nc e may be e xclu de d if its pr ob a tiv e va lue is s ub sta nti a lly outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair prejudice , confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or by considerations of undue delay , or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative evidenc e. Appellant ref

ers to e x hibit number s and quotes fr om the rec ord, but he doe s not provide 4 the a c tua l reco rd r e fe re nc e s. Al tho ug h a pp e lla nt h a s p ro ba

bly c on ve y e d e no ug h in fo rm a tio n to enable this Court to locate the portions of the rec ord re lied upon, the provision of re cord r efe renc es wo uld make su c h a

n e ff or t e a sie r. F or

tun a te ly , the State pr ov ide d the re le va nt re c or d re fe re nc e s in its brief. We nee d n o t d ecide whether appellant ha s failed to comply with his duty

to provide “citations . . . to the re cord” under T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8. 1( h) in t his ins tanc e , b ut w e c a

uti on that a

pa rt y should alway s provide the volume a nd pag e number s for any

materia l from the re cord upon w hich the par ty relies. reve rsible er

ror, we aff

irm the conviction and se ntence

.

I. G UI LT A. P hot og r aphs I n point o f e r

r o r s ix, a p p e ll an t c o n te n d s th a t th e a d mi s s io n o f p h o to g r a p h s d e p ic ti n g the victim at the crime sc ene and during the autopsy violated Texas Rule of Evidenc e 403. He 3 complains that the photog raphs de picted bra in tissue, blood f l o w patterns, bloody

clothes, and exposed lim bs and that some of the photogr aphs depic ting br ain tissue wer e “ve ry g raphic .” 4 A trial cour

t may consider se vera l f

actor s when de termining whether the probative value of the evidenc e is substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, including the number of photogr aph s , th e ir g r

u e s o me n e s s , th e ir s iz e , w h e th e r th e y ar e c o lo r o r b la c k an d w h it e , theJackson — 3

So nn ie r v . S

tat e , 913 S.W .2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 5 Chamberlain v. State, 99 8 S. W.2 d 2 30 , 2 37 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 937 6 S.W .2d 479, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Sonnier , 913 S.W .2d at 519. 7 Eraz o v . S

tat e , 144 S.W .3d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 8 Re ese v . S

tat e , 33 S.W .3d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 9 Se e Pr ibl e v . S

tat e , 1 7 5 S

. W

. 3 d 7 2 4 , 7 3 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 5 )( ci t i n g Eraz o ); Eraz o , 10 144 S.W .3d at 494 (distinguishing photogr aphs discussed in other ca s es “be cause they showed wounds suffe red by

the victim (or victims) for w hose death the def en d ants wer e on trial or demonstrated el em en t s that the State or plaintiff w as re quired to prove to obtain a conviction or judgme nt”).

Se e Cha mb e rla in , 998 S.W .2d at 236-37 (photog raphs de picting g ruesome he ad injuries 11 not unfairly

prejudicia l under Rule 403). availability

of other me an s o f p roof, and other c ircumstance s unique to the individual case. 5 Photogra phs are neither c umulative nor lac king in sig nificant probative value simply beca use they

mere ly corr oborate other kinds of e vidence

. Also, the g ruesomene ss of the subject matter de picted 6 in a photog raph doe s not render the photog raph ina dmissibl e if it mere ly ref lects the re ality

of the brutal cr ime committed. Appellant re lies heavily on Eraz o v

Sta te and Re ese v . S

tat e , bu t th os e 7 8 9

ca s e s ar e d is ti n g u is h a

b le b e c a u s e th e y inv o lv e d p h o to g r a p h s o f v ic ti ms n o t n a me d in the indictment, which is not at issue here

.

10 The photo g r a

p h s in th e in s ta n t c a s e r e late d

s o le ly to th e v ic ti m o f

th e c h ar g e d

o f f e nse. Al tho ug h s ome of

the ph oto g ra

ph s c o nt a i n e d

gr u e s o m e d e pic tio ns of

the vic tim ’s he a d in

jur ie s, the se

and the oth e r p ho tog ra

ph s si mpl y

re fl e c te d th e bru tal it y of the of fe ns e . Poi nt o f e rr or

six is 11

overr uled. B. “Volun tariness” Jury InstructionJackson — 4

This small passag e quoted by appellant occurs within a larg er colloquy that sheds furthe r 12 light on the nature of Serg eant Har ris’s testimony

. We ne ed not discuss that larg er c olloquy beca use, as will be explained below, the portion of t he record that is rele vant t o appellant’ s claim occ urs later , d u r i n g t h e p r e s e n t a t i o no f

e v i d e n c e t o t h e j u r

y. I n p oin t of

e rr or thr e e , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it

re fu se d to su

bmi t a jury instruction on the issue of voluntariness unde r ar ticle 38.22, §6. He argues that the testimony of Se r g e a nt B r i a n H a r r i s s h o w e d

t h a t a pp e lla nt’ s c on fe ssi on

wa s in vo lun tary

be c a us e Se rg e ant H a rr is promised appe llant that he would be a ble to avoid the death p en al t y i f he ga ve inculpator

y statements. Ap pe lla nt r e lie s u po n th e fo llo wi ngte sti mony a t th e he ari ngon

the mot ion

to s up pr e ss: Q: So, y ou are telling him on the tape that if he will be honest with y ou and tell y ou a bo ut t his sh oo tin g , th a t th a t is the on ly wa y he c an g e t me rc y

to w or k r ig ht? A: That would be the only way for mer cy

to possibly

have a chanc e to work. Q: Okay . Well, if he did what y ou asked him and told y ou what happe ned duringthe sh oo tin g , it ’s no t ve ry

me rc if ul t hat y ou tur n a ro un d a nd se e k th e de a th pen alt y , is it? 12 Appellant’s bri ef ci t es only to the motion-to-suppress hea ring and does not discuss, or pr ovide a citation to, any

testimony

befor e the jury . Article 38.22, §6, contemplates that evidence contesting the voluntariness of a s tatement be introduced in front of the jury befor e a voluntar iness instructionJackson — 5

Ou rsbo ur n v. Sta te , 259 S.W .3d 159, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)(“a party may offe r 13 evidenc e bef

ore the jury

sug g esting that the conf

ession was not in fac t voluntary

. . . if such evide nce is o ff e re d b e fo re the jur

y , th e tr ia l ju dg e sh a ll g ive the jur y a vo lun tari ne ss i ns tr

uc tio n” ); Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W .3d 541, 545 (T ex . C ri m . App. 2007)(“ the def ense is still required to introduce evidenc e at tria l from which a re asonable jury could conc lude that the stateme nt was not voluntary ”); art. 38.22, §6 (“ evidenc e per taining to suc h matter may be submitted to the j u ry an d it shall be instructed . . . .”)

. T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8

. 1 (h )( “T h e brie f must contain . . . appr opriate c itations . . . to t he 14 rec ord.”)

. is require d. An appe aling party has the duty

to cite to t h e re l ev an t portions of the re cord. 13 14 Appellant’s c laim is inadequately briefe d and subjec t to rejec tion on that gr ound alone. Neve rtheless, since the State has c ited to the pertine n t p o rt i o n of the testimony befor e the jury , we will, in the i ntere st of justice, addr ess appe llant’s claim in light of that testimony . We set out the rele vant portions of the re cord: Q: What was it that y ou spoke t o t h e defenda nt about, the theme of

justice and m e r c y? A: Okay . Ba sically , the conve rsation about my portion in the conver sation of justice and mer cy , Itell the person, what is the definition of justice? And when I hear that person’ s definition, Ithen come ba ck and ref er to them my definition of justice. And that definition being : Justice equals pe ople g etting w hat they deser ve. Ag ain, then Italk to some people (sic ) conf use it with reveng e and other things like that. But that justice was pe ople g etting w hat they deser ved. And then that lea ds into a portion of my conver sation where Isay , I don’t believe that we live in a soc iety of justice, that we don’ t ge t what we de serve . And then I thank y ou God eve ry

day that we don’ t liv e in a so c ie ty of jus tic e be c a

us e thi s w ou ld b e a ve ry ha rd pla c e to l ive if

we a ll g ot what we de serve d for thing s that we have done, thought, or said to pe ople. And t h a tl e a d s i n t o t h e n e x tp o rt i o no f m e r c y. * * * Q : A n d w h a td o yo ut a l k

t o h i m a b o u tm e r c y? * * * A: Ishare with them t h at m er cy is not so much giving people wha t they want butJackson — 6

pe op le what th ey need , and the n I g o in to a – at th a t ti me or

wh a t I tho ug ht w a s a popular movie a

conver sation about a movie to demonstrate wh at merc y is and we talk about the movie Br uc e Al mi gh ty an d a c h ar a c t e r n a m e d J i m C ar e y. Q: I ’v e ne ve r s e e n th a t mo vie

. Te ll the me mbe rs of the jur y wh a t it is that y ou

ta lk about in that movie. A: I n the movie Br uc e Al

mi gh ty , the charac ter J im Carey is g iven t he powers of God. An d a po rt ion of tha t c on ve rs a tio n th a t I

sh are wi th t

he m is that he ha s p ow e r t o answe r eve ry one’s pr ay ers. And so, he say s he is g oing to g ive eve ry one what they wa n t

. An d

t h er e i s a c o mp u t er

wh er e a l l t h e p ra y er s ar e, an d h e h i t s a b u t t o ns ay i n g, y es, t o ever

y body ’s pra

y er. A nd in one par

ticular pra y er, w e discuss about how the re are thousands of people that pray to win the l ottery and they all win the l ottery . But the da y the y ’r e wa lki ng aro un d wi th a mis e ra ble bu c k 17 , y ou

kn ow , a nd so me loo se chang e in their poc ket

. An d t h en I stress to them, they all g ot what they

wanted. They won the lottery

. But what was it that they neede d? And then the point is made that many times as people we may think we know what we want, but we don’ t know how to ask for

what we need. * * * Q: Di d y ou

tell him tha t w ho le sp ie l y ou

have on jus tic e and

me rc y and e ve n ta lk a bo ut Br uc e Al

mi gh ty ? A: Ye s, and

the n s ome oth e r t

hin g s. Q: Ok ay . What we re so me of the oth e r thi ng s tha t y ou sp ok e to t he de fe nd ant a

bo ut? A: Ye s. On c e Isp ok e to h im a bo ut w hat me rc y wa s, Ithe n e xpla ine d to him that in order for him to g et what he neede d, which wa s not to be looked upon as a vicious anim a l, b ut r a the r a

pe rs on , h e ne e de d s ome bo dy that c ou ld h e lp e xpla in that. Ia lso told him t hat in order

for mer cy

to work, it stands on truth, a hundred pe rce nt truth. That merc y

can’ t work, it’s like a c hair with four leg s. I t’s solid, and it’s sturdy . And merc y can only work whe n all four leg s are like truth. That i f t here is one lie, then merc y can’ t work. Ther e will be no balanc e. I t will fall apar t. And when somebody tries to abuse or

manipulate mer cy , then there is only one choic e lef

t and that’s for justice to kick in and justice being , people g etting w hat they deser ve. * * * Q: What w e re so me of

the a dd iti on a l th ing s th a t y ou e xpla ine d to him ? A: Va ri ou s e le me nts of

c ri me s. * * *Jackson — 7

Ou rsb ou rn , 259 S.W .3d at 172-73. 15 Bi blev . S

tate , 162 S.W .3d 234, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 16 Ne nn o v . S

tat e , 970 S.W .2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 17 Q: Di d y ou

make him

a ny pr omi se ? Di d y ou

thr e a te n h im in a

ny wa y to g e t hi m to d o th a t [ ta lk

o nta p e ]? A: No and no. A claim under

article 38.22, section 6 foc uses on whethe r the acc u s ed ’s s t atement wa s actua lly involuntary , and such a

n inquiry may include conside ration of police overr eac hing, youth, i n t o x i ca tion, ill ness or medic ation, mental incapa citation, or other disa biliti es. A promise ca

n 15

re nd e r a c on fe ssi on

in vo lu nt ary if th e pr omi se is “ po sit ive , ma de or sanc tio ne d b y

so me on e in authority , and of suc h an influential nature that it would ca use a de fenda

nt to speak untruthfully .” 16 There is no evidenc e that Serg eant Ha rris made a positive promise to appe llant. At most, t he evidenc e shows that the se rg eant indicated that appe llant could not hope to obtain merc y if he wa s not truthful, but Serg eant Ha rris spoke of mer cy

in philosophi cal ter

ms and neve r told appellant that

m e r c y w o u l d e n t a i l l e n i e n tt r e a t m e n tf r o m t h e a u t h o r i t i e s . R a t h e r , t h e s e r g e an t ’ s u s e o f t h e “ m e r c y” the me se e me d to be mor e fo c us e d o n th e mor a lity of te lling th e tr ut h. Al tho ug h it is a fa c tor to

c o n s i d e r , “ m o r a l u r g i n g d o e s n o ti ni t s e l f r e n d e r an a c c u s e d ’ s s t a t e m e n ti n v o l u n t ar y. ” F i n a l l y, 17 g iven Serg eant Ha

rris’s emphasis on appellant be ing 100 pe rce nt truthful, the interrog ation was not of the ty pe that would ca

use a de fenda

nt to speak untruthfully

. A p p e l l an tp o i n t s t o n o t h i n g e l s e i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u g g e s tt h a th i s c o n f e s s i o nw a s i n v o l u n t a r

y. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the trial judge did not err in refusingto submit a jury instruction on the voluntariness of his tape -re corde d statement. Point of error three is overrule d.Jackson — 8

Ha wk ins v . S tat e , 135 S.W .3d 72, 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 18 Archie v

. Sta te , 221 S.W .3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 19 Ma rti ne

z v . S tat e , 17 S.W. 3d 67 7, 69 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Gu idr yv . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 20 (continued...) C. Cl os ing Ar gum e nt I n point of err or five, a

ppellant complains that the prose cutor’s inter jecti o n o f her

opinion during closing arguments require d the trial cour t to declar e a mistrial. The following occur red: [P ROSECUTOR] : It c ould ha ve been a drug deal g one bad. I f the de fenda nt robbed Er ic Smith a

nd int e nti on a lly

kil le d h im e ve n if

it w a s a dr ugde a l go ne ba d, it’ s st ill capi t al m urder . Idon’t happe n to personally believe it wa s a drugdeal g one bad c on sid e ri nga ll o f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s th at I

kn owfr om th e witne sse s th a t I sp ok e to and witnesses -

- [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Objection to the argument that’s inserting a p ersonal opinion -- THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: We ask for a jury instruction. THE COURT: The jury

will disreg ard the last statement of the pr osecutor. [DE F EN SE C OU

NSE L ]: We mov e fo r a

mis tr ia l. THE COURT: Denie d. I n deter mining whe ther a

trial court e rre d in refusing to g rant a mistrial at the g uilt st ag e of trial on the basis of imprope r ar g ument, we ba lance three fac tors: ( 1) the sever ity of the misconduct (p r e ju d ic ia l e f

f e c t) , ( 2 ) c u r a ti v e me a s u r e s , an d ( 3 ) th e c e rta in ty o f th e c o n v ic ti o n a b s e nt the mis c on du c t. An ins tr

uc tio n to dis re g ard wi ll be su ff ic ie nt to c ur e e rr or e xce pt in t he mos t e xtre me 18 of circ umstances. An instruction to disreg ard w ill gene rally cure err or eve n when the pr osecutor 19 argues fa cts outside the re cord or interjec ts his personal opinion. 20 21Jackson — 9

(...continued) 133, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Se e Bo y d v . S tat e , 643 S.W .2d 700, 706-07 (Te x . Crim. App. 1982). 21 “ I n all c ri min a l pro se c uti on s, the a c c us e d sha ll en joy the ri g ht .

. . to b e c on fr on te d w ith 22 the wi tne sse s a g a ins t hi m.” U. S. C O N ST ., Am e nd . 6 . D e fe ns e c ouns e l c la ime d th a t th e bu sine ss rec ords exception to the hear say rule was not met, but he never said on the rec ord that admission of the evidenc e would violate the Confr ontation Clause, though he did make a g ener al statement a bout “re cent Court of Criminal Appe als case s.” I n its ruling , the trial court re fer red to Ru sse au v . S

tat e , (continued...) The misconduct in this case was not seve re. The complained of comment was br ief a

nd

occur red only on the one occa sion mentioned above. The prose cutor did g ive her persona l opinion, but it is not clear whether her allusion w as to evidence the jury had hea rd at trial, or

to fac ts outside the record. The iss ue on which the prosec utor spoke was collater al; the prosecutor explained that char acte rizin g the incident as “ a drugdeal g one bad” would not exculpate the def endant of the of fe ns e of c a pit a l murd e r. I mme diate ly a ft e r t he c omm e nt, the tr ia l ju dg e in st ructe d th e jur y to dis re g ard . T he fi rs t tw o f

a c tor s su ff

ic ie ntl y fa vo r t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of a mis tr ia l in

thi s c a se , s o

we ne ed not deter

mine the streng th of the evide nce suppor ting the c onviction. Under the circ umstances, we find that the trial cour t’s instruction to disreg ard w as sufficie nt to cure the er ror. Point of error f

ive is overr

uled. II. P UNISHMENT A. Te xa s Y out h Co m m iss ion Infr ac ti ons I n p oin ts o f e rr or

on e and tw o, a

pp e lla nt co nte nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti ngint o evidenc e a summar

y of disci p linary

infrac tions that he committed while he wa s incarc erated in Texas Yo uth Com mis sio n ( TY C) fa c ili tie s in 20 03 and 20 04 . App e lla

nt a rgue s th a t a dmi ssi on

of thi s evidenc e violated his Six th Amendment rig ht to confrontation. 22Jackson — 10

(...continued) 171 S.W .3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) and to Fo rd v . S tat e , 179 S.W .3d 203 (Tex. App.– Houston [14t h Dis t

. ] 2 0 0 5, pet. re f’d) , both of which we re Confr ontation Clause case s involving the admission of prison discipli n a r y r e cords. We will assume arguendo that e rr or wa s p re se rv e d b e c a

us e the spec ific g round for

appellant’ s complaint was “a ppare nt from the conte x t.” See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a) (1)( A). Ea c h o f t

he se c a te g or ie s w a s in

its ow n c olumn. Tw o o the r c olumns we re c on ta ine d in 23 the summary

that wer e not explained at trial: “Sec /Comm Det/J ail,” and “ L ev I ISched.” N o e ntr ie s w e re c on ta ine d in

the “ L e v I ISc he d” c olumn. B oxe s in the “ Se c /Co mm D e t/Ja il” c olumn wer e either

blank or c ontained the e ntry “REF” or “SEC.” Th e su mma

ry c on ta ine d a

lis t of 26 7 d isc ipl ina

ry infract ion s a lle g e dly

c omm itt e d w hil e appellant wa s incarc erated. The infr actions listed the l ocation, incident number, date, the date a ny abscondingended, w hether the incident wa s the subject o f a l evel thre e hea ring , and a br ief descr iptive labe l. B y

w ay of illustration, we obser

ve that the de scriptive labe ls included “disruption 23 of pr og ra m,” “ a ssa ult of stu de nt/ oth e r, ” “ re fu sa l to fo llo w s ta ff ins tr uc tio ns ,” “ fa ilure to co mpl y wi th

rea so n ab l e re quest,” “ dang er to other s,” and “ failure to abide by dress c ode.” N o commentar y or further detail was g iven about the nature of the incidents. A level three hear ing was he ld on 114 of the se inc ide nts

. The T YC re co rd s cu s t o d i an ac kn o wl ed gedt h at a v ar i et y o f t h e d es cr i p t i v e l ab el s co u l d at tach to misconduct that was ver y minor. An assault could include throwing water on someone. Sexual contac t could simply

mean a n inappropriate sexual comment. Dis ruption of prog ram c ould be being disrespec tful to staff. Many violations are addre ssed throug h a proc ess in which the TY C inmate’s pee rs conf ront the violator and make him awa re that he nee ds to corre ct his behavior. O ther violations may require a leve l three he ar i n g, a m o re f ormal proc ess of holding the y outh acc ountable. In a leve l three he ari ng , a sta ff me mbe r w ri te s u

p a n inc ide nt re po rt , the a lle g a tio n is re a d to the y ou th, and the y ou thJackson — 11

541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 24 171 S.W .3d at 880. 25 Id. at 880-81. 26 270 S.W .3d 79, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 27 is g ive n the op po rt

un ity to re sp on d re g ard ing wh e the r the a lle g a tio n is true or no t tru e . Th e y ou th can call wit nesses and offe r evidence on his behalf at t his hear ing. I f the a lleg ation is found to be true, the youth is given the opportunity to a ppeal, which entails another staff me mber re viewing the incident and de termining whether the hea ring office r’s findingwas c orre ct. I n Crawf ord v. W ashington , the United States Supreme Court he ld that out-of-c ourt “testimonial” statements of a non-testifying decla rant could not be admitted unless the decla rant wa s

u n a v a i l a b l e a s a w i t n e s s an d

t h e d e f e n d an th a d

a p r i o r o p p o rtu n i t y

f o r c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . In 24 Ru sse au v . S

tat e , we found that disciplinary repor ts that de scribed in g raphic detail the conduct of an inmate we re “ testimonial.” We held that the admission of such re ports into evidence without 25 aff ording the defe ndant the opportunity to cross-e x amine those who a lleg edly observe d his conduct violated the Confrontation Cl ause. 26 Howeve r, in Se

gu nd o v . S tat e , w e he ld t

hat “ bo ile rp la te ” pa

ro le re vo c a tio n c e rt if

ic a te s “ did not contain any such t estimonial statements, narr atives of spe cific e vents, or wr itten observations.” 27 We observed that “Te x as courts have rec og nized this distinction between off icial re cords that se t out

a ste ri le and

ro uti ne re c itatio n o f a

n o ff ic ia l f ind ing or un a mbi g uo us fact ual mat ter su c h a s a jud g me nt o f convi cti on or a ba re -b on e s d isc ipl ina

ry fi nd ingand

a fa c tua l de sc ri pti on

of sp e c if icJackson — 12

Id. 28 Id. at 1 0 7 n . 9 (c i t i n g Fo rd , 179 S.W .3d at 208-09). 29 Se e W olf f v . M c Do nn e ll , 418 U.S. 539, 563-68 (1974). 30 See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 44 .2 (a )( “ I f t

he a pp e llate re c or d in

a c ri min a l c a se re ve als 31 constitutional error that is subject to harmless err or re view, the c o u rt o f ap peals must reve rse a judgme nt of conviction or punishment unless the c ourt deter mines bey ond a re asonable doubt that the er ror did not contribute to the c onviction or punishment.”). o b s er v at i o n s o r e v en t s t h at i s ak i nt o t es t i m o n y . ” I ns ay i n g t h at “ab ar e- b o n es d i s ci p l i n ary fi n d i n g” 28 was not testimonial, we cited to the Four teenth Court of Appea ls’s decision in Fo rd v . S tat e , which upheld the admission of inmate disciplinary rec ords “that c ontain ed o n l y a st erile r ecitation of offe nses and the punishments re ceive d.” 29 L ike Fo rd , the pre sent ca se involves only the sterile rec itation of disciplinary offe nses. At least for the incidents t hat wer e the subjec t of level thre e hea ring s, under whic h at least rudimenta ry due proc ess protec tions appea r t o have been affor ded, we hold that the conclusion that appellant 30

c omm itt e d d isc ipl ina

ry vio la tio ns and

the ve ry br ie f d e sc ri pti on s o f t

ho se v i o l a tio ns do no t c on sti tut e testimonial evidence within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Wit h respe ct t o the re maining incidents, we find any err or to be ha rmless bec ause w e ar e convinc ed beyond a re asonable doubt that those incidents would not c reate any appre ciably

g reater impac t on the jury than would have alre ady been c aused by

the jury ’s awa

rene ss of the 114 violations for which level thre e hea ring s were held. 31 But e ven if a

Confrontation Clause violation oc curr ed with re spect to the 114 incide nts that

we re su bje c t to le ve l th re e he ari ng s, we wo uld ne ve rt he le ss f ind the erro r wi th re sp e c t to tho se inc ide nts to b e ha

rm le ss. Th os e inc ide nts sh ow e d a pp e lla nt’ s v io len t nature and

his ina bil ity to follow rules, but other e vidence at trial indisputably established those c hara cter istics.Jackson — 13

Sanders wa s approximately eig ht weeks pr eg nant at the time. 32 Wenshariba Ga g e, a former g irlfriend of appellant, testified that he point ed a g un at her when sh e tr ie d to e nd

the ir re la tio ns hip

. Jose ph John so n te sti fi e d th a t a pp e lla nt w a s o ne of

thr e e pe op le that would “pick f

un” and “ mess” with him, until one day appellant punc hed him three or f our times in the fac e. S herr

y Menifee , a tea

m leader at a home f

or troubled or

delinquent kids, testified about an incident in which appellant hit a female y outh with his fist and pushed Me nifee in the chest whe n she interve ned. To subdue a ppellant during that incident, the staff had to thr ow him to the floor and handcuf f his hands behind his bac k. Tashar a Sander s, another f ormer g irlfriend of appellant, testified that she bec ame pr eg nant with a ppellant’s child. He told he r that he wanted her to g et an abortion. L ater , knowing Sanders

wa s p re g na

nt, a pp e lla nt d ra g g e d h e r o ff

a c ou c h a nd kic ke d he r in the sto ma c h two to t hr e e tim e s. 32 On another

occa sion, appellant broke the windows in Sanders’ s car . Another time, a ppellant punched he r three times in the face , causingher to f all to the floor. During that incident, he told her that she “be tter not call the police.” Sande rs also testified that a ppellant was a

member of

the B loods g ang . On November 26, 2005, an incident occur red w ith Roy

Caldwell. Caldwell testified that he

was a pproac hed by

appellant a

nd another

individual. He did not know appellant, but appellant aske d him fo r a ci g are tte . A ft e r h e be g an h and inga pp e lla nt a c ig are tte , Ca ldw e ll b e c a me un c on sc iou s. He awoke in a hospi tal six day s later, his fa ce he avily damag ed by

a g unshot wound. He lost an ey e, los t fe e lin g in a po rt ion of his fa c e , and c ou ld b re a the thr ou g h o nly on e no str il. Ca ldw e ll w a s st ill taking pain medication for this injury at the time of trial. Appe llant had bee n standing by the side of Caldwell’s f

ace that was injured.Jackson — 14

Dr. Gold define d “maling ering ” as a person who for his ow n purposes wants t o ap p ear 33 psy choti c an d

o u t o f to u c h w it

h r e a li ty , b u t w h o r e a ll y

is n o t. D r . G o ld

s a id th a t i t t a k e s a

person wh o is qu ite int e lli g e nt a

nd c le ve r t o tr

y to d o th a t. Th e State a lso int

ro du c e d e vid e nc e that a

pp e lla nt h a d f ig ur e d o ut how to es c a

pe fr om h is c e ll while beingheld in “s u p er -max” confineme nt at the Har ris County

J ail. He ha d used a pie ce of a milk ca rton to de feat the locking mecha nism. And while appellant wa s on trial for c apital murder , h e to ld a f e ll o w inmate in

th e ja il th a t h e w a s g o in g to ta k e th e b a il if

f ’ s g u nan d

“ s h o o t h e r , s h o ot his wa y ou t.” Th e inm a te tol d th e ba ili ff a bo ut t his c on ve rs a tio n s ho rt ly

be fo re sh e wa s a

bo ut t o open the door

to appellant’s holdover

cell, bec ause he saw appellant running towards the door and

was a fra id appellant wa s about to a ct on his words. And Dr. Willard Gold, a Me ntal Hea lth/Mental Retardation (MHMR) psy chiatrist, testified that appe llant attempted to convince per sonnel that he had a se rious mental illness that involved hear ing voi ce s. Dr. Gold found that appellant wa s “maling ering .” 33 Def ense w itnesses confir

med appellant’ s violent and antisocial be havior. Tommie Walter, appellant’ s g randmother , testified that appellant’ s behavior problems “esc alated” when her si s t er, appellant’ s primary

car egiv er, died. Appellant then we nt to live with W alter, but she c ould not handle his beha

vior. She tried sendinghim to counseling, but it did n o t wo rk

. Appellant wa s dis re sp e c tf

ul t o he r, so me tim e s ta lke d to he r in te rr ibl e wa y s, and so me tim e s d id h or

ri ble thi ng s to her that she did not deserve . Walter cha rac terized his behavior towa rds other pe ople as “ constant fig hting.” She acknow ledg ed that appe llant had assaulted othe rs at school and in the neig hborhood. At so me po int , h e thr e a te ne d h e r, a nd sh e be c a me a fr aid of hi m and c a lle d th e po lic e . T hat c a ll

c a us e d a pp e lla nt t o b e take n f

ro m he r h ome . L a te r, du e to a ssa ult c ha rg e s, a pp e lla nt w a s ta ke n to TYC.Jackson — 15

Th rou gh the d e fe ns e ’s ow n e xpe rt wi tne ss, B e tti na

Wri g ht, the State wa s a

ble to r e ve a l to the jury a number

of TYC docume nts that showed appe llant’ s v i o lent and antisocia l behavior. A notat io n ma d e o n Ja n u a r y 4, 1999, showed that staf

f member s repe atedly

discussed appe llant “testing the limits ,” m ak ing thr eats to TYC staff members, a

nd throwing chair s. A J anuar y 5 notation sh ow e d a pp e lla nt h a d “ a g g re ssi ve ly

tr ie d to c los e his do or again st sta ff to b loc k e ntr

y fo r a sa fe ty chec k” and w as “ve rbally

abusive.” I n another

document, the notation wa s made that a ppellant “ha s [a] h ist or y of ho mic ida l id e a tio n, fi g hti nga t pl ace me nt h ome s. ” A n otatio n in the pe diatr ic admissions nursing notes state d that appellant had “homicidal ideation, no one spec ific, just when

s o m eo n e m ak es m e m ad

. ” A n o t h er n o t at i o n i n t h e n u rs i n g n o t es ch ar ac t er i z ed ap p el l an tas s ay i n g,

“ Ilik e to f

ig ht a nd de str oy thi ng s, ” and

c omm e nte d th a t it

“ a pp e ars a s th ou g h h e is try ingto intimi date t h o se ar ound him.” Another notation stated that appellant “ has diffic ulty taking responsibility

for his own be havior.” And another note said that appe llant’s “b eh av i or has be en provocative, such as phy sically blocking people g oing dow n the hall.” Anothe r note c hara cter ized appellant a s “manipulative” in his behavior. Var ious notes showed numerous instanc es of misconduc t. A ppellant deliber ately

knocked down a pe er’ s toy s. He kicke d the walls in the hallwa y and ba n ged o n the cha ir in his room. He

re fu se d to fo llo w d ir e c tio ns duri nga fi re a larm , and whe n s ta ff tr ie d to re dir e c t hi m, h e be c a me “combative” and w as “fighting , cursing , and thre atening .” B eca use anothe r re sident “wa s picking on” appe llant and broke his nose, appel l an t said, “I ’m g oing to use my friend’ s g un to kill hi m.” Ap pe lla nt o ft e n s angra

p s on g s w ithina

pp ro pr ia te ly

ri c s tha t gl or if

y dr ug s. He re fu se d to c omp le te a homewor

k assig nment b ec au se he “ ref used to participate in school.” He threw books, use d profa nity , and then thre w cha irs down the hall, ca using a “code y ellow” to be c alled.Jackson — 16

T EX . R. E V ID . 401. 34 We conclude that the purpose f or which the TYC disciplinary rec ords was offe red – to show appellant’ s violent nature a nd inability

to follow rules – was amply demonstrated by other e vidence , inc lud ingfr om d e fe ns e wi tne sse s. We c on c lud e be y on d a rea so na ble do ub t th a t any

e rr or wi th respe ct to the introduction of the TY C disciplinary rec ords did not contribute to appe llant’s conviction or punishment. Points of error one and two a

re ove rruled. B. Jail E scortEvid ence I n point of error f

our, appe llant contends that the trial c ourt err ed in admitting e vidence that the use of a

n “eme rg ency

respon s e t ea m ” t o p rovide a n escor t to the courthouse f

or trial wa s an

oc c a sio na l b u t n o t c o m m o n o c c u r r e n c e f o r p r i s o n e r s an d w a s b a s e d u p o n t h e r i s k t h e y p o s e d to the mse lve s and

oth e rs . App e lla

nt a rgue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s ir re le va nt. L onnie Tullis, a deputy

with the Har

ris County

S h er i ff’s Depar

tment and a pa

rt of the

emer g ency

response team, explained that an unde rg round tunnel sy ste m connec ts the jail and the

c o u rt h o u s e an d t h a t p r i s o n e r s w a l k t h e tu n n e l an d t a k e s e c u r e e l e v a t o r s t o t h e c o u rt r o o m . U s u a l l y, pr iso ne rs are no t ph y sic a lly e sc or te d, bu t the y are mon ito re d by a c los e d- c ir c uit c a me ra . So me tim e s, ho we ve r, a

pr iso ne r p oses eno ugh of a ri sk tha t he is e sc or

te d b y the e me rg e nc y

re sp on se te a m. De pu ty Tu lli s te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt w a s p ro vid e d s uc h a

n e sc or t f or his tr ia l. Evidence is “r el evant” if it has “any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba ble or less probab l e t h an i t would be without th e e v id e n c e . ” O n e f a c t o f c o n s e qu e n c e a t t

h e p u n is h me n t s ta g e o f

a c a p it a l mur der 34 prosec ution i s “whe ther ther e is a proba bility that the def

endant would c ommit criminal acts ofJackson — 17

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 37.071, §2(b) (1). 35 Se e Tre v ino v . S

tat e , 9 91 S.W. 2d

84 9, 85 3- 54 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 )( place me nt i n 36 administrative seg reg ation cited as e vidence of def endant’ s future da

ng erousne ss). Se e W ile yv . S tat e , 74 S.W .3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 200 2 )( re ci t i n g the two 37 scena rios). vio le nc e tha

t w ou ld c on sti tut e a

c on tin uin g thr e a t to so c ie ty .” Th a t the a uth or iti e s d o n ot u su a lly 35 assig n a per sonal escor

t but believed that appe llant neede d one has some te ndency to make more pr o b a b le th a t a p p e ll an t is th e ty

p e o f p e r s o n w h o w o u ld c o mm it c r im in a l a c ts o f v io le nce in the future. Point of error f

our is overr

uled. 36 C. Child Prot ect ive Service s and Hospi tal Rec ord s I n points of error

seven throug h nine, appe llant contends that the t rial cour t erre d in excluding from evide nce r ecor ds from Child Protective Service s (CPS) a nd from Twelve Oaks Hospital. He

conce des that the trial c ourt was within i ts discretion to find that the evide nce w as hea rsay , but he

argue s th a t th e e xclu sio n of t he e vid e nc e vio la te d h is F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt d

ue pr oc e ss r ig ht t o pr e se nt a de fe ns e and

his Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o p re se nt m iti g a tin g e vid e nc e in a de a th p e na lty

case . He claims that his c ase fits unde r the first scena rio of two scena

rios outlined by this Court for wh e n th e e xclu sio n o f evi de nc e ri se s to the le ve l of a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n: w he n a state

e vid e nti a ry ru le c a te gori cal ly

andarbi tr ari ly

pro hi bi ts th e def

end ant fro m o fferi ng oth e rw ise re le va nt, reliable evidenc e that is vital to his defense. 37 “[T] he exclusion of a def

endant’ s evidenc e will be constit utional err or onl y if the evide nce forms such a

vital portion of the ca se that exclusion effe ctively prec ludes t he def

endant f romJackson — 18

Po tie r v . S

tat e , 68 S.W .3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 38 T EX . R. A PP . P. 38 .1 (f )( “ Th e br ie f m

us t st a te c on c ise ly

and wi tho ut a

rgume nt t he fa c ts 39 pertinent to the issues or points presented for review .”), ( h)(“ The brie f must contain a clear and concise argument for the c ontentions made, with appropr iate citations to authorities and to the re c or d .”)( emphasis adde d). prese nting a

defe nse.” Appellant claims that the C PS rec ords i n particula r were vital bec ause the y 38 documented his “ trag ic childhood bac kg round” a nd there wer e no ava ilable wit n es s es t o testify

re g ard ingthe inf

or ma tio n co nta ine d in th e re c or ds . App e lla nt d oe s n ot e xpla in i n w hat ma nn e r h is childhood backg round wa s trag ic, nor doe s he explain what information the rec ords provide that he wished to have admitted into evidence , much less explain why this information could not have been g leane d from other

source s. And appe llant provides no re cord ci t at i o n s fo r this argument. An appea ling pa

rty has an obligation to set out the fac ts r eleva nt to his complaints, as we ll as to cite the pertinent portions of the rec ord. Appellant’s c laim is inadequately briefe d and subjec t to rejec tion 39 on that g round alone

. Neve rtheless, a s with a previous c omplaint, the State appea rs to have supplied the missing information, so we w ill, in t he intere st of justice, addre ss appellant’s c l ai m i n l ight of that inf or ma tio n. Th e CPS r eco rd s c on ta ine d h e ars ay state me nts fr om a

pp e lla nt’ s mo the r t

hat sh e did not want appellant, she has never wanted him, appellant was the produc t of date r ape, a nd she had relinquished her

rig hts to appellant. These statements wer e excluded by the trial cour

t. The CPS and h o s p i t al re cords a lso contained re fer ence s to various medications. The trial court a ppear s to have be en conc erne d whether cer tain of the drug s mentioned wer e ac tually being taken by appellant: “Well, this looks li ke just a list of differ ent kinds of drug s. I f there is information that he wa s on those drug s, then fine; but if it’s some thing that just ha ppened to g et stuck in here –”Jackson — 19

Re y na v . S tat e , 168 S.W .3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 40 Id. at 179. 41 Id. 42 An de rso n v . S

tat e , 2009 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1612 at 1, 9-11 (Nove mber 18). 43 then the trial court was g oing to sustain the objection. The trial court was a war e that appe llant was taking Z y prexa and rule d the re fer ence s to that medication to be admissible. But the co u rt invited defe nse counsel to show the rele vance of other medications, or else the trial court would sustain the State’s objection. De fense counsel then r ead f rom a doc ument that, among other thing s, said, “Dr

. Buttar would like [appellant] t o continue on Zy prexa, Depakote, P axil and have Ativan, if ne eded fo r ag itati on .” Ap pa

re ntl y dis tr a c te d b y

the pr os e c uto r p la c ingthe do c ume nt f ro m w hic h d e fe ns e

c ouns e l wa s re a din g in fr on t of he r fa c e , the tr ia l c ourt a sk e d, “ Z y pr e xa and wh a t e lse? ” Def e ns e counsel re sponded, “D epakote , Ativan” a nd expressed unce rtainty reg ardinga diffe rent name for Ativan. The tria l court then sustained the State’s objection to re fer ence s to Benzodiazopine and Pax il, but allowed the re fer ence s to Zy prexa and De pakote. T o p re s er v e e rr o r r ega rd i n g t h e e x cl u s i o no f e v i d en c e , a p ar t y m u s tn o to n l y

t el l t h e j u d ge that the evidenc e is admissible, but he must also explain why the evidenc e is admissible. And the 40 explanation given a

t trial must match the one urg ed on appe al. For example , an ex planation for 41 admissibili ty

based upon the Rules of Evidence does not prese rve a cla i m t h at ad m i ssion of the

e vid e nc e is r e qu ir e d b y

the Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e . Mo re ov e r, a

defend ant ’s r ig ht t o p re se nt a 42 de fe ns e is the ty

pe of c la im that is fo rf

e ite d if it i s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly ur g e d at tr ia l. 43 I n the pre sent ca se, the State a rg ued that the evidenc e was hear say , while the def ense a rg uedJackson — 20

See T EX . R. E V ID . 801, 802, 803(4). 44 Se e Lor e do v . S

tat e , 159 S.W. 3d 92 0, 92 3- 24 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 )( c omp la ini ngpa rt y 45 has an oblig ation to corr ec t a trial judg e’s e rrone ous rec ollection of the fa cts when the err oneous rec ollection is what motivated the trial cour t’s adver se ruling ). that the e v id e n c e f

e ll w it h in th e h e ar s ay e xc e p ti o n f o r me d ic a l d ia g n o s is an d tr e a tm e n t. The 44 defe nse neve r ar g ued that admission was required by any provision of the United States or Te x as Con sti tut ion s. No r d id t he de fe ns e argue that the e vid e nc e wa s c ru c ia l to a pp e lla nt’ s a bil ity to prese nt a def

ense. With respec t to the statements made by ap p ellant’s mother, de fense counsel

argue d just

the op po sit e : “ Th e thi rd

re a so n is that vi rt

ua lly e ve ry thi ngthat th e State ob

je c te d to is alre ady in the rec ord any

way by the witnesses that have testified.” And with respe ct to the drug evidenc e, anothe r pre servation problem arises: The trial judg e’s exclusion of refe renc es to one of the drug s – Pax i l

– m ay h av e been ba sed on an e rrone ous

rec ollection of the re cord. Thoug h Pax il was listed as one of the drug s appellant wa s taking in a 45 pa ssa g e that w a s in iti a lly re a d to the tr ial court , w he n a sk e d to re pe a t th e re le va nt d ru g s, de fe ns e counsel re peate d only

“De pakote a

nd Ativan.” Appe llant has failed to pr eser ve er ror f or re view. Even if err or had be en pre serve d, howeve r, appe llant’s claims would fail. Thoug h appellant

was una ble to introduce his mother ’s statements about ne ver w anting him, his gra ndmother, sec ond cousin, and unc le testified that his mother did not want her child and had re linquished her par ental rig hts. I n addition, the defe nse expert testified that appe llant’s mo ther’s pa renta l rig hts had bee n termi n at ed . And as e x plained above , the trial cour t did allow evidence of most (if not all) of the

me dic a tio ns a

pp e lla nt w a s ta kin g . In a dd iti on , th e defe ns e ex per t r e a d f ro m on e of

the re c or ds a detailed list of some the medications appellant had re ceive d and re ad a notation that appellant was on a “r ecor d-bre aking number of psychiatric medications.” Ap pellant was a ble to prese nt theJackson — 21

Se e Va llev . S

tat e , 10 9 S.W. 3d 50 0, 50 6- 07 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 )( Ap pe lla nt w a s a ble 46 to present h i s d ef

ensi ve theor

y throug h other e vidence that contained most of the inf ormation contained in the e x cluded e vidence ).

Id. at 507. 47 substance of

the mitigating -circ umstances c ase to w hich the excluded evidenc e re lated. The fa ct 46 that he was “not able to pr esent his c ase in the form he desired does not a mount to c o n s t i t u t i o nal

err or.” Points of er

ror se ven throug h nine ar e over ruled. 47 We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Deliver ed: J anuar

y 13, 2010 Do no t pu bli sh