CRITICAL LAPSES IN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY 

OVERSIGHT OF AIRLINES: ABUSES 

OF REGULATORY ‘‘PARTNERSHIP 

PROGRAMS’’ 

(110–109) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 3, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

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CRITICAL LAPSES IN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF 

AIRLINES: ABUSES OF REGULATORY ‘‘PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS’’ 

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CRITICAL LAPSES IN FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY 

OVERSIGHT OF AIRLINES: ABUSES 

OF REGULATORY ‘‘PARTNERSHIP 

PROGRAMS’’ 

(110–109) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 3, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

(II) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... v 

TESTIMONY 

Andrews, Richard A., Aviation Safety Inspector, American Eagle Operations 

Unit, AMR CMO, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists .............................. 126 

Ballough, James J., Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Administration .......................................................................................................... 60 

Bassler, John, Principal Avionics Inspector, Dallas Fort Worth Flight Standards District Office ............................................................................................... 100 

Bloch, Hon. Scott J., Special Counsel, U.S. Office of the Special Counsel .......... 60 

Boutris, Charalambe ‘‘Bobby,’’ Aviation Safety Inspector and Boeing 737- 

700 Partial Program Manager for Aircraft Maintenance, Southwest Airlines 

Certificate Management Office ........................................................................... 10 

Brantley, Tom, President, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, accompanied by Linda Goodrich, Region IV Vice President, Professional Aviation 

Safety Specialists ................................................................................................. 126 

Collamore, Vincent Larry, Aviation Safety Inspector, Southwest Airlines 

CMO ...................................................................................................................... 100 

Cotti, Paul E., Supervisor, American Eagle Airworthiness Unit, AMR CMO .... 10 

Kelleher, Herb, Executive Chairman, Southwest Airlines Company .................. 100 

Kelly, Gary, Chief Executive Officer, Southwest Airlines Company ................... 100 

Lambert, Terry D., Manager, Safety and Analysis Group, Flight Standards 

Division, FAA Southwest Region ........................................................................ 10 

McNease, Bill, Retired Aviation Safety Inspector, FedEx CMO .......................... 126 

Mills, Michael C., Assistant Manager, Dallas Fort Worth Flight Standards 

District Office ....................................................................................................... 10 

Naccache, Robert A., Ret. Assistant Manager, SWA CMO .................................. 10 

Peters, Douglas E., Aviation Safety Inspector and Boeing 757 Partial Program 

Manager, American Airlines Certification Unit, AMR CMO ........................... 10 

Sabatini, Nicholas A., Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal 

Aviation Administration ...................................................................................... 60 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 60 

Stuckey, Thomas, Manager, Flight Standards Division, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region .......................................................................... 60 

Thrash, Joseph P., Retired Aviation Safety Inspector, Continental Airlines 

CMO ...................................................................................................................... 126 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Altmire, Hon. Jason, of Pennsylvania .................................................................... 262 

Brown, Hon. Corrine, of Florida ............................................................................. 263 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 266 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 267 

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland ............................................................... 272 

Filner, Hon. Bob, of California ............................................................................... 275 

Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas .................................................................. 277 

Matsui, Hon. Doris O., of California ...................................................................... 283 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 286 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 288 

Walz, Hon. Timothy J., of Minnesota ..................................................................... 304 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Andrews, Richard .................................................................................................... 306 

Bassler, John ............................................................................................................ 310 

Bloch, Hon. Scott J. ................................................................................................. 352 

Page

IV 

Boutris, Charalambe ‘‘Bobby’’ ................................................................................. 360 

Brantley, Tom .......................................................................................................... 375 

Collamore, Vincent L. .............................................................................................. 387 

Cotti, Paul E. ........................................................................................................... 388 

Kelleher, Herbert D. ................................................................................................ 393 

Lambert, Terry D. .................................................................................................... 429 

McNease, William L. ............................................................................................... 437 

Mills, Michael C. ...................................................................................................... 439 

Naccache, Robert A. ................................................................................................. 452 

Peters, Douglas E. ................................................................................................... 459 

Sabatini, Nicholas A. ............................................................................................... 466 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L. ...................................................................................... 543 

Thrash, Joseph P. .................................................................................................... 573 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 

Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular, Aviation Safety Action 

Program, November 15, 2002 .......................................................................... 142 

Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular, Voluntary Disclosure 

Reporting Program, September 8, 2006 .......................................................... 174 

Federal Aviation Administration, Airworthiness Directive, 14 CFR Part 

39; Docket No. 2001-NM-246-AD; Amendment 39-13784; AD 2004-18- 

06; Federal Register: September 8, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 173) ........... 189 

Federal Aviation Administration, Notice 8900.36, Special Emphasis Validation of Airworthiness Directives Oversight, Effective Date: March 13, 

2008, Cancellation Date: June 30, 2008 ......................................................... 202 

Federal Aviation Administration, Order 8000.82, Designation of Aviation 

Safety Action Program (ASAP) Information as Protected from Public Disclosure Under 14 CFR Part 193, Spetember 3, 2003 ..................................... 205 

Federal Aviation Administration, Order 8900.1, Volume 11: Flight Standards Programs, Chapter 2: Voluntary Safety Programs, Section 1: Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), November 8, 2007 ............................... 216 

Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheets, FAA Customer Service Initiative, April 2003 ............................................................................................. 248 

Federal Aviation Administration, letter to Colleen Barrett, President, 

Southwest Airlines Co., March 6, 2008 .......................................................... 251 

Federal Aviation Administration, FAA News, FAA Aviation Safety Action 

Plan, April 2, 2008 ............................................................................................ 257 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Minnesota, Chairman, Committee on Transporation and Infrastructure, 

Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, Jerry F. Costello, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, letter to Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, James J. 

Ballough, Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Thomas Stuckey, Federal Aviation Administration .......................... 298 

Sabatini, Nicholas A., Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal 

Aviation Administration, and James J. Ballough, Director, Flight Standards 

Service, Federal Aviation Administration, responses to questions from the 

Committee ............................................................................................................. 478 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

Bruno, Gabriel D., Retired Federal Aviation Administration Manager, ‘‘An 

Insider’s Analysis of the FAA’s Failure to Protect the Skies,’’ written statement ...................................................................................................................... 704 

Diefenderfer, Mary Rose, Ex-FAA POI, Alaska Airlines Section, written statement ...................................................................................................................... 712 

Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association, written statment .................................... 718 

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(1) 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS HEARING 

ON CRITICAL LAPSES IN FAA SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF AIRLINES: ABUSES OF REGULATORY ‘‘PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS’’ 

Thursday, April 3, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable James Oberstar [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will come to order. 

Before we begin the hearing which is the subject of today’s session, I have a housekeeping item to attend to, to welcome the newest Member of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires, who replaces our 

former colleague from Indiana, the late Julia Carson. Mr. Sires, unfortunately, is still in New Jersey because they have a filing deadline for the November election, and he has to be there in person 

to do that. But he assured me that he will be an active, vigorous 

participant in all the work of the Committee as we continue our 

work. 

Ms. Carson’s untimely death created vacancies on the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit and on the Subcommittee on 

Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. The Democratic 

Caucus of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

unanimously recommended Mr. Sires fill these positions. So, pursuant to the rules of the Committee, I ask unanimous consent that 

Mr. Sires be appointed to the Subcommittee on Highways and 

Transit and to the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. Is there objection? 

[No response.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Chair hears none. So ordered. 

At the outset, I want to observe that we will have, as I have notified Members, only four opening statements, in order to expedite 

the business of the day and to assure that we hear all witnesses 

in timely fashion. So we will have four opening statements: mine; 

the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica; Mr. Costello; and Mr. Petri. 

Mr. Miller, will you close the door? 

Today’s hearing is a continuation of the long-established practice 

and precedent of this Committee of overseeing the work of the government agencies and the programs under the jurisdiction of this 

2 

Committee. The Special Investigating Committee on the FederalAid Highway Program was established at the direction of Speaker 

Sam Rayburn in 1959, three years after enactment of the Highway 

Trust Fund and the Interstate Highway Program. 

My predecessor, John Blatnik, whose portrait hangs in the corner 

of this room, was selected to head that Special Committee to inquire into fraud, corruption, abuse, and right-of-way acquisition 

practices, construction practices at a time when the Interstate 

Highway Program was just beginning, when unprecedented 

amounts of money were flowing from the Federal Government to 

State Departments of Transportation, which our Subcommittee investigative staff found had no internal audit and review procedures; where money was flowing out fraudulently to contractors; 

where Federal and State and local government officials were being 

paid off by contractors to sign off on shoddy or non-existent practices. Thirty-six people went to Federal and State prison as a result 

of those hearings over a period of six years. 

The work of the Special Investigating Committee continued as 

the Committee was then restructured as a standing Subcommittee 

on Investigations and Oversight of the Full Committee on Public 

Works. It was a great privilege for me, years later, beginning in 

1985, to Chair that Subcommittee through 1989, and later as Chair 

of the Aviation Authorizing Committee, and to continue the work 

of oversight, inquiry into issues of importance to the broad spectrum of activities of our Committee on Public Works, and then Public Works and Transportation. 

Aviation has been a major focus of our oversight activities. Practically the first hearing I chaired as Chair of the Investigations and 

Oversight was an inquiry into the crash of Galaxy Airlines in January 1985 in Reno, Nevada, when 93 people died. Other hearings inquired into an uprising, a rash of near mid-airs. 

At a time when the FAA was reporting that near mid-air incidents, aircraft coming too close to one another in the air, was down 

by 50 percent, we learned, through the AIMs reporting system, 

that, in fact, near mid-airs had doubled throughout 1984 and that 

there was a rising incidence of aircraft coming too close to one another and the FAA did not even have a standard for measuring 

near mid-air incidents of aircraft coming too close to each other. 

Whistleblowers in the form of air traffic controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, pilots, came to the Committee with information 

about failures to uphold the highest standards of safety in aviation. 

With my Committee colleague, Newt Gingrich, first, and later Bill 

Klinger, Republican from Pennsylvania, we followed up on all those 

leads and we conducted intensive hearings and inquiries into aviation safety issues. As a result of those hearings, first of Galaxy Airlines, the FAA transformed its oversight into a holistic view; not 

looking at one piece here and one piece there, but requiring a holistic overall overview of aviation safety as conducted by the airlines 

and their maintenance practices. 

The near mid-air series of hearings led to establishment and requirement of MTSI transponders in the terminal control area. After 

the tragic crash of two aircraft over Cerritos, California, our Committee colleague Ron Packard, Republican of California, and our 

Committee leadership moved to, by law, require establishment of 

3 

ground proximity warning systems and traffic collision avoidance 

systems on board aircraft, because the FAA either was not moving 

fast enough or, as they told us, that the regulatory process will 

take much too long. We did it, bipartisan spirit, through legislation. 

And then there were incidents of, again, whistleblowers coming 

to the Committee, saying a foreign airline has a 747 at Boeing’s 

headquarters in Seattle, where they are removing the over-wing 

exits in order to save weight and accommodate more passengers 

and fuel, and we think that is a serious safety violation. Flight attendants and mechanics brought it to our attention. In this very 

Committee hearing room we held a hearing on that subject with 

then FAA Administrator Don Engen waiting in the audience to testify. 

We had testimony from Joan Jackson, the lead flight attendant 

in civil aviation’s worst accident at Tenor Reef in the Canary Islands, testifying how, shrouded in fog, with two 747s crashing into 

one another, one after another flight attendant tried to get their 

passengers out the exit, only to one be decapitated, another see the 

chute melt in flames; and Joan Jackson led her 60 passengers out 

to safety through the over-wing exit. We had testimony from other 

flight attendants in other 747 tragedies where lives were saved because of the over-wing exits. 

To his great credit, Administrator Engen, sitting right there in 

that front row, wrote out a note, sent it to the Seattle administrator’s office—it was a regional administrator at the time—directing 

that the work be suspended on over-wing exit removals. 

In the aftermath of Aloha Airlines, where 18 feet of an aircraft 

ripped off in flight, something that was not supposed to happen, 

had never happened, could not happen, did happen. The result of 

that tragedy in which the flight attendant was pulled to her death, 

the flight crew, remarkably, was able to safely land the aircraft. 

I, working with FAA, called a worldwide conference on aging aircraft. The result of that was the Aging Aircraft Safety Act, in 

which Congress directed in-depth oversight of and maintenance on 

high-time aircraft; complete tear-down at 35,000 cycles and every 

4500 cycles thereafter. Significant because in this incident, in this 

instant case with Southwest Airlines, violation of that airworthiness directive was the cause of the whistleblowing that we will 

hear about shortly. 

Subsequently, the mysterious crash of 737 at Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, 132 fatalities. Again, the NTSB investigation ultimately 

found that it was an uncommanded rudder movement that caused 

that aircraft to crash. Because of that finding, the NTSB went back 

into its records and looked at other crashes and other incidents 

short of crash in which there was a movement they could not account for and attributed it back to the uncommanded rudder control and the power control unit within that. Significant because 

here again was an airworthiness directive compliance with which 

was avoided by Southwest in compliance with and in concert with 

FAA inspectors. 

Other oversight hearings which we conducted resulted in 

changes in airport runway oversight by FAA and air traffic controllers dealing with runway incursions, and air traffic control staffing 

standards. In nearly every case of our oversight hearings we have 

4 

seen changes in practice, changes in airworthiness directives driven by a need to adhere to the highest standards of safety. 

And I will say it and I will say it again, the opening paragraph 

of the FAA Act of 1958 directs the newly established agency ‘‘to 

maintain safety at the highest possible level.’’ Not the level the airlines want to spend money on, not the level that they think is okay, 

but the highest possible level. That is the gold standard of aviation 

safety worldwide. That is what we expect the FAA to live up to, 

not some international standards organization, not something that 

RKO does, but that FAA is the gold standard for the world. 

I made it clear when I took the Chairmanship of the Full Committee that oversight would be an important part of our work, and 

so it has become. 

We are going to hear this morning from another generation of 

whistleblowers, dedicated professionals who have put their careers 

on the line in the interest of safety, willing to risk what is necessary in the interest of the safety of the traveling public. They will 

present testimony that Southwest Airlines, with FAA complicity, 

allowed at least 117 aircraft to fly with passengers in revenue service in violation of Federal aviation regulations. Documents they 

presented to our Committee, which I reviewed last summer and 

continuing through the fall, set in motion an inquiry into the most 

egregious lapse of safety I have seen in 23 years. The details will 

be forthcoming from the witnesses. 

They suggest to me that the voluntary disclosure initiative instituted with good intentions by FAA, has migrated into complacency 

at the highest levels of FAA management, reflecting a pendulum 

swing away from a culture of vigorous enforcement of compliance 

toward a carrier-favorable cozy relationship. This shift from vigilance occurred at the very time that airline maintenance has been 

massively outsourced by airlines, by specifically network carriers 

except for American Airlines, with less FAA enforcement, less airline management involvement, and outsourcing to both domestic 

and foreign repair stations. 

I understand full well from many years of doing this work that 

FAA probably could not hire enough. Maybe they have some 3,000 

inspectors. Ten times that many might not be enough to conduct 

the in-depth, vigorous surveillance that is needed. But certainly 

more than we have now are necessary. And, yet, the partnership 

program FAA initiated with the airlines, that can be beneficial to 

safety, has drifted into a system that is inimical to safety. FAA 

needs to rethink its relationship with the airlines and with the 

other aviation entities which it regulates. 

I was astonished to read off the FAA website their mission statement: ‘‘Our customers are people and companies requesting certification, other aviation services or information related to the products and mission of flight standards.’’ The only customer, if you are 

going to use that term, of the FAA is the air traveling public. Airlines are not customers. FAA is not providing a service to them. 

Bedrock responsibility of the FAA is to ensure safety for the traveling public. FAA needs to clean house from top to bottom, take 

corrective action, hire more inspectors and give them a safety mission. 

5 

Congress should, and following these hearings will—I will—draft 

legislation—I hope we can have bipartisan concurrence on it—to establish a long post-service cooling off period for FAA inspectors before they are allowed to go to work for the airlines. This is something that FAA could do by regulation, but it would take them way 

too long to do it. Just as we do with other Executive Branch personnel, we should do it for FAA. 

Senior management at FAA has to develop a better way to monitor local airline oversight offices and avoid lapses in compliance 

such as we saw with Southwest. 

It is no mere coincidence that FAA’s recently initiated audit 

began just after news of our hearing was revealed to the public. We 

are going to look in-depth at the factors that brought us to this 

point in the course of this hearing. 

With that point, I yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you for yielding and also thank you for convening a very important hearing this morning. 

Probably one of the most important responsibilities we have as 

a Member of this Committee, whether it is Mr. Oberstar, myself, 

or any other Members here is making certain that we do conduct 

thorough oversight, and, particularly when it comes to aviation, 

that we ensure, as is the charter set forth for FAA, the highest 

standard of safety. 

I do want to, though, assure the Members of Congress and the 

American people that we have developed and maintained the safest 

system of passenger aviation in the history of the world. Last year, 

we had over 735 million people fly. In fact, two-thirds of all the air 

traffic in the world took place within the boundaries of the United 

States. Since 2001, November 12th, we have not had a single aviation fatality in a large aircraft in the United States of America. 

That record is unparalleled, again, in the history of aviation. 

But I think that today’s hearing is very important because we 

have had a couple of people step out at probably some great personal risk and bring information to the Committee that, as good as 

the system we developed and put in place, we can’t sit on our laurels; that, in fact, we have got to look at what we put in place. And, 

you know, I was a strong advocate of a risk-based inspections and 

also self-reporting system, and I think so far it has proven to work 

well. 

But what we have from the individuals that we will hear from 

today is a wake-up call, a wake-up call that you can never just accept a standard or a protocol or a routine in government, and particularly where it involves safety, that you have to be constantly 

vigilant of the system you put in place and then take corrective action. So we are going to hear about what went wrong with the system we had. 

We are going to hear about some relationships the Chairman described that probably are improper and that need to be corrected. 

We are going to hear about some revolving door relationships, too, 

that also need to be corrected. But what we have got to do is come 

up with positive changes that ensure that the record that we have 

had to date continues. 

6 

Now, again, I want to assure the American people the system is 

safe; we found some flaws, but this hearing is going to ensure that 

we continue that record and we correct the things that we found 

and we will hear today what has gone wrong. Just for example, last 

year, 43,000 people were killed in automobile accidents. Since the 

last major aircraft crash and deaths in 2001, over 200,000 people 

have died on our highways and millions injured. So just put all of 

this in perspective. But, again, we can’t rest on our laurels. 

I have tried to take a look at what went wrong, and I think that 

we have several problems, and at least three things need to be addressed. First of all, the system that we put in place was a selfreporting and risk-based system, which is a good system. What we 

didn’t put in place is somebody to check those who are doing the 

checking; and I think that is what is missing in the system. We 

can’t just rely on what we created to be, again, a self-policing, the 

fox guarding the hen house; we have got to have some independent 

check of the checkers. 

The second thing that concerns me in all of this is if you look 

at the number of employees, we have 3800 people in FAA and inspections. They do about 7,000 commercial aircraft. We probably 

have enough people to do the job if everybody was on the job. I 

think we are going to hear—and we need to ask questions of Mr. 

Sabatini about—who are the people we have doing the job and how 

many people we actually have in place. 

My observation is we have a serious problem with retirement, we 

have a serious problem with recruitment, we have a serious problem with replacement, and we also have a serious problem with 

looking at the number of people in administrative positions versus 

the people who are actually online conducting these inspections. So 

it is not always how many people you have, it is how you use the 

people that you have and if the positions are filled or will become 

vacant and then finding a way to replace them. 

My third and last concern is we are here today, we are on our 

third extension of FAA reauthorization. Congress sets the policy; 

we have basically failed in our responsibility to pass FAA legislation reauthorization. We have not had an administrator at the 

FAA, a confirmed administrator since September of last year. This 

is particularly a very difficult return to what we experienced in the 

past. 

I have been on the Committee for 16 years. When I came on at 

one point, we had five administrators in a very short period of 

time, and then we had no administrators or acting administrators 

for almost the same period of time. You cannot run a Federal Aviation Administration without someone at the helm. 

And I have written every Member of the Senate before this hearing was convened or announced and asked them to take action on 

that. We have no deputy. It took us years to get a COO. The COO 

left. We have a new COO. So I am not a happy camper as far as 

the way FAA is rudderless, and, again, Congress has abdicated its 

responsibility to confirm or reject the President’s nominee. 

Out of all this, in closing, there is some good news, and the public and you can take confidence when you have an incident like 

this, as you have heard already, the planes are being pulled out of 

the sky, there are re-inspections, there are audits, there are reVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
7 

views. Everyone is going to ‘‘dot’’ there ‘‘I’’s and cross their ‘‘T’’s as 

far as safety is concerned, so in a bad situation some good things 

will happen. 

But again, finally, the public has to be also assured in a time 

when airlines are being forced. I mean, they are really feeling the 

pinch. We had another one go down today. But the public has to 

be reassured that even when there is cost-cutting by airlines and 

cost attention to expenses, that safety will not be compromised by 

the Federal Government, which has that important responsibility. 

So I look forward to working with the Chairman, Members of the 

Committee, those that are left at FAA, the industry, and others to 

make certain we restore confidence and correct problems with the 

system. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I appreciate the gentleman’s affirmative statement in favor of safety and concur on the points that he has made. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee, Mr. Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I 

think you have given a very good summary of why we are here 

today and the issues before us. Therefore, I will submit my statement into the record and make some brief comments. But before 

I do, I want to follow up on Mr. Mica’s comments. I think he has 

made very good points concerning the lack of an administrator and, 

secondly, the fact that the legislation that we passed through the 

House is pending in the other body. 

So the two points that I would make is that we on this side, this 

Committee and the Subcommittee, as well as the House of Representatives, we have not failed in our duties. We have passed a 

reauthorization bill. It passed the House with bipartisan support 

on September 20th of last year. It is pending in the other body. 

On the other issue of you have to have someone at the helm, an 

administrator, I agree with Mr. Mica, but I would also point out 

that many of these violations, when the inspectors were reporting 

these violations to their supervisors, we did have an administrator 

in office at the time. So I just want to, for the record, point that 

out. 

First, Mr. Chairman, let me thank Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters 

for being here, but for their persistence and dedication. We would 

not be holding this hearing today had it not been for their determination and their courage and their persistence. They were the 

ones who exposed the violations, and they should be commended 

for their actions. 

It is a pretty sad day when employees of any agencies here in 

the Federal Government, when they have to seek whistleblower 

protections in order to do their job, let alone safety inspectors from 

an agency whose number one responsibility is protecting the flying 

public. The fact that Southwest failed to ground planes that should 

have been grounded is inexcusable, and they should pay a hefty 

fine. 

However, this hearing today is not about Southwest Airlines; it 

is about the total failure by the FAA to perform sufficient oversight 

of its maintenance program. While Southwest’s failure is inexcusable, the fact that FAA supervisors prevented FAA inspectors from 

8 

doing their job, preventing them from enforcing serious safety violations, is nothing more or nothing less than outrageous. 

We need to know, this Committee needs to know, the American 

people need to know who at the FAA knew about these violations, 

when they learned about the violations, and why the FAA waited 

so long to impose a fine on Southwest. We also need to know what 

action will be taken by the FAA to prevent this from happening 

again in the future. 

Mr. Chairman, we have seen a pattern at the FAA of being an 

agency that is reactive, and not proactive. Since I became Chairman of the Subcommittee in January of last year, I can tell you 

that sometimes you get the feeling that the agency is on autopilot 

until they are pushed into action, either by this Committee, the 

Aviation Subcommittee, the media, or, in this case, whistleblowers. 

I can give many examples, but just to give you a few, the issue 

of runway incursions. The FAA acted when we were at the height 

of runway incursions back in 1999, 2000, and 2001. They put together a committee. The administrator and the secretary interacted 

with that committee, all of the stakeholders. They created an Office 

of Director of Runway Safety. But then, when the numbers started 

coming down, the FAA left the problem, walked away from it, and 

left the office vacant; and no more input or contact with the stakeholders. 

Secondly, the issue of hazardous conditions in towers at the FAA. 

We have had reports and the FAA has had reports from air traffic 

controllers and their employees about the hazardous conditions at 

the air traffic control towers, the TRACONs and other facilities. 

They didn’t act until the Subcommittee started to take action. In 

fact, they didn’t even put together a list as to which facilities were 

in the worst condition in order to address the problem. In my judgment, they ignored the problem until we at the Subcommittee level 

held a hearing. 

The issue of congestion and delays. It was when the Subcommittee held a hearing. We pushed the FAA, in my judgment, 

to addressing the issue by having the secretary and the President 

of the United States issue a directive to the secretary and the administrator to do something about congestion and delays. 

And last—and there are many other examples—consumer issues 

like holiday travel and emergency contingency plans. You know, 

only after my call to the Secretary of Transportation saying, look, 

we anticipate, over Thanksgiving and the Christmas holiday, more 

people flying than ever before, do we have a plan to address this; 

are we going to bring airport operators and the airlines together to 

put a plan together? And I was told, boy, that is a great idea, we 

should do that. And I said, well, let’s begin meeting and we will 

do it around your schedule. 

The next call I got was, well, I am not going to be able to participate because I am working over at the White House to try to address the issue. And on the very morning that we held our Subcommittee hearing on the issue of holiday travel and congestion 

during that period the Secretary and the President made an announcement that he was directing the Secretary to come up with 

a plan. 

9 

It is very clear that the agency acts when they are pushed to act. 

You know, it is not enough to have safety regulations in place. We 

in this Committee, the Subcommittee on Aviation, and the American people expect the FAA to enforce these regulations. 

As has been pointed out by the Chairman and others, we have 

the safest air transport system in the world here in the United 

States, but we can’t become complacent and rely on the past. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I have said it before and 

I will said it again, I have said it at Aviation Subcommittee hearings and I have said it over and over again, and I will say it again 

today: I want the FAA to know, I want the industry to know this 

Committee is not going away, the Aviation Subcommittee is not 

going away. We are going to fulfill our responsibilities of aggressive 

oversight on this issue and every issue. We owe it to the American 

people. That is our responsibility and we are going to live up to our 

responsibility. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I thank you for calling this hearing. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for his comments and for 

his superb work as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee. 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Aviation, distinguished 

gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. I thank my Chairman from Minnesota. And I would 

like to thank you for having this important hearing on the FAA’s 

airline maintenance oversight and how they have discharged that 

responsibility. I will summarize my remarks and ask that the full 

remarks be made a part of the record. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Without objection, it will be included in the 

record. 

Mr. PETRI. The roughly 6,900 employees of the FAA’s Office of 

Aviation Safety, including some 3,800 aviation safety inspectors, 

oversee approximately 19,000 aircraft, including about 7,000 aircraft that make up the U.S. commercial airline fleet; over 500,000 

pilots and approximately 5,000 repair stations. Their charge is as 

important as it is obviously large. 

While it is true that we are enjoying the safest period in aviation 

history, due in no small part to the hard work of many at the FAA 

and at the airlines, we must keep a vigilant guard to protect safety 

because lives, as has been pointed out, depend on it. 

Clearly, there were serious problems at the FAA’s Southwest 

Certificate Management Office. The dysfunctional make-up of the 

office got in the way of proper safety oversight, and we are fortunate that no lives were lost. 

As we listen to today’s witnesses, we need to pay special attention to proposed recommendations to prevent such a situation from 

happening again. Our emphasis today also should focus on the future of aviation safety, on the ‘‘how it happened’’ so that we can 

fix the problem, not just on ‘‘what happened.’’ 

To this end, I am interested in hearing the Inspector General’s 

recommendations after having fully investigated the events that occurred at the FAA’s Southwest Certificate Management Office, as 

well as recommendations from our other witnesses. 

Fundamental to this Committee’s responsibility to safety is to ensure that the FAA has the proper number of inspectors to carry out 

10 

the mission of the Office of Aviation Safety. The FAA’s Aviation 

Safety Workforce Plan, released Monday, indicates that 14 percent 

of the engineers and up to 35 percent of its inspector corps will be 

eligible to retire in budget year 2009, compared to 4 percent that 

actually retired in budget year 2007. 

This Committee’s FAA reauthorization bill included language requiring the Administration to develop an aviation safety inspector 

staffing model to account for retirement trends and ensure adequate staffing. For this reason, along with many others, I urge our 

Senate counterparts to move forward on their bill so that we can 

address these important aviation safety issues. 

I thank the Chairman again for calling this important hearing 

and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I concur in the gentleman’s appeal to the other 

body and to Mr. Mica’s vigilant efforts with the other body, as we 

have all done, and hope that we can come to a point where we have 

a conference with the Senate and move the FAA reauthorization 

act. 

We will now move to our first panel, ask members to rise, raise 

your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you 

will give before this Committee in the matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you God? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You may be seated. 

Mr. Boutris, we will begin with you, but, at the outset, I want 

to express my great appreciation to all of the members of this panel 

for the public-spirited courage it took when you ran the length of 

administrative procedures to call to account the failing practices 

and came to no avail, that you had the courage to step forward and 

come to our Committee and say something serious is amiss. And 

I regret that a death threat ensued in that process, but I am greatly relieved that it is under investigation by law enforcement authorities. You deserve the gratitude of the flying public and of the 

Members of this Committee. 

Mr. Boutris. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARALAMBE ‘‘BOBBY’’ BOUTRIS, AVIATION 

SAFETY INSPECTOR AND BOEING 737-700 PARTIAL PROGRAM MANAGER FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT OFFICE; DOUGLAS E. PETERS, AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR AND BOEING 

757 PARTIAL PROGRAM MANAGER, AMERICAN AIRLINES 

CERTIFICATION UNIT, AMR CMO; MICHAEL C. MILLS, ASSISTANT MANAGER, DALLAS FORT WORTH FLIGHT STANDARDS 

DISTRICT OFFICE; PAUL E. COTTI, SUPERVISOR, AMERICAN 

EAGLE AIRWORTHINESS UNIT, AMR CMO; ROBERT A. 

NACCACHE, RET. ASSISTANT MANAGER, SWA CMO; AND 

TERRY D. LAMBERT, MANAGER, SAFETY AND ANALYSIS 

GROUP, FLIGHT STANDARDS DIVISION, FAA SOUTHWEST REGION 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. 

Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is 

Charalambe Boutris. I go by Bobby for obvious reasons. I have a 

11 

lot to say this morning, so if I speak too quickly and it sounds 

Greek to you, more than likely it probably is. However, I will do 

my best to ensure that everyone understands me. 

For 20 years I worked in the aviation industry, performing aircraft maintenance and inspections for several U.S. major airlines 

and U.S. major cargo carriers. I also held several management positions, including Director of Maintenance. 

In February of 1998, I was hired by the Federal Aviation Administration as an Aviation Safety Inspector. I am currently assigned 

to Southwest Airlines Certificate Management Office as the maintenance Partial Program Manager for the Boeing 737-700 aircraft. 

For me, safety comes first and my job second. I am not a disgruntled employee; I am a person with integrity and I do believe that 

we should cooperate and collaborate with the airlines, but not to 

the point that we go outside our guidance and break the law. I 

have followed the chain of command, without any results. 

I am here today because I am concerned for the safety of the flying public, which has been jeopardized by the abuse of authority 

and violations of the Federal regulations. I have summarized the 

information for my verbal testimony; however, I would like to inform you that details for this information which I am about to 

present were originally submitted to the Division Management 

Team at the Southwest Regional Office and, six months later, to 

the Office of Special Counsel. In addition, I have provided the Committee with a detailed written testimony. 

Since 2003, I have been raising safety concerns regarding my Supervisor/Principal Maintenance Inspector Douglas Gawadzinski 

suppressing my inspection findings and his refusal to follow FAA 

guidance regarding chronic and systemic non-compliance maintenance issues that affect air safety. 

The FAA issues Airworthiness Directives—we call them ADs for 

short—in order to address unsafe conditions for aircraft and their 

components. AD requirements are mandatory and by Federal regulations. 

In December 2003, I was the Partial Program Manager for engines for Southwest Airlines. After reviewing the Southwest Airlines AD compliance records for several aircraft engines, I discovered the required AD compliance information was inconsistent and 

was difficult to track the AD compliance. This was contrary to Title 

14 CFR Part 121.380. 

After long talks with my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, on January 23rd, 2004, he allowed me to send Southwest Airlines a letter 

of concern, not a letter of investigation, as I wanted to and was required in accordance with our guidance. Southwest Airlines agreed 

with my findings and took one year to complete the project and 

bring the AD information into compliance. 

In January of 2006, I became the PPM for the Boeing 737-700 

aircraft. In reviewing the AD compliance records, I found similar 

discrepancies to the ones I had found with the engines two years 

earlier. I immediately informed my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, of 

my findings and told him I wanted to send Southwest Airlines a 

letter of investigation, but Mr. Gawadzinski refused. 

After going to him several times and insisting that we had to address the AD problem, Mr. Gawadzinski, in January 2007, assigned 

12 

me to perform the AD Management Safety Attribute Inspection— 

SAI for short. This inspection evaluates the content of the airline’s 

manual system and procedures in meeting the regulatory and FAA 

policy requirements for AD management. 

When Southwest Airlines found out that I was the assigned inspector for this inspection, for the SAI, the Southwest Airlines Director of Quality Assurance, Mr. Mats Sabel, and the AD compliance team leader, Mr. Bill Krivanek, had a meeting with my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, and requested my removal from doing the 

inspection. Mr. Gawadzinski called me into his office and told me 

of this meeting. I went to the office manager, Mr. Mike Mills, and 

complained to him that it was obvious that Southwest Airlines 

wanted to cherry-pick the inspector for this inspection. Mr. Mills 

talked to my supervisor who then informed me to go ahead and do 

the inspection. 

On February 26th, 2007, I informed the Southwest Airlines AD 

compliance team leader, Mr. Krivanek, that due to the fact that 

both of us already knew that Southwest Airlines did not have all 

the required procedures in place for the AD management, I was 

also going to look and review some aircraft records to ensure AD 

compliance. 

Mr. Krivanek stated that he and my supervisor, Mr. 

Gawadzinski, had discussed what my assignment was, and reviewing aircraft records for AD compliance was not part of my inspection. I told Mr. Krivanek he was correct; however, due to my 

knowledge of the previous history with AD issues, I felt that reviewing some of the Southwest Airlines aircraft records for compliance was appropriate. Mr. Krivanek was not happy about that, but 

he agreed to meet with me on March 15th and start the inspection. 

On March 15th, 2007, I went to Southwest Airlines and met with 

Mr. Chris Roth. Mr. Chris Roth informed me that Mr. Krivanek 

could not participate at the meeting because he was working on a 

project. I went to my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, and told him 

that Mr. Krivanek could not participate with AD management inspection because he was working on a project. Before I had the 

chance to say anything else to my supervisor, he stated, ‘‘Yeah, 

they had some airplanes over-fly an AD and they are going through 

the records to find out how many.’’ 

At this point, it was obvious to me that since I had told Mr. 

Krivanek that, along with the AD management SAI, I was going 

to review some aircraft records for AD compliance, Mr. Krivanek 

had decided to have the aircraft records reviewed prior to my inspection and had discovered the AD over-fly discrepancies. 

On March 22nd, 2007, while I was performing night surveillance 

inspections at Southwest Airline maintenance facility at Chicago 

Midway Airport, I witnessed a Southwest Airlines aircraft being repaired due to a crack that was found on the fuselage. After returning back to my office and talking with another inspector, I discovered that this aircraft was flying in revenue service with overdue 

AD inspections, with the knowledge of my supervisor, Mr. 

Gawadzinski. I immediately reported this serious safety issue to 

my office manager, Mr. Mills. 

Due to my ongoing safety concerns with Southwest Airlines and 

the inadequate procedures for tracking and complying with AD reVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
13 

quirements, I preformed a review of the aircraft records and I discovered the following: On March 15th—that was the date I was 

supposed to start my inspection for the ADs—2007, Southwest Airlines informed my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, that they had discovered that some of their aircraft had overflown the inspection requirements of Airworthiness Directive 2004-18-06. At the time, 

Southwest Airlines were not sure of how many aircraft were affected and estimated that the number could have been up to 100 

aircraft. 

The AD requirements that Southwest reported that were not 

being accomplished require inspections of the fuselage on their Boeing 737-300 and-500. On the first page of the AD it states: ‘‘This 

action is necessary to find and fix fatigue cracking of the skin panels, which could result in sudden fracture and failure of the skin 

panels of the fuselage and consequent rapid decompression of the 

airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe 

condition.’’ 

FAA records show that besides the March 15 verbal notification, 

on March 19, also, Southwest Airlines, via the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, reported the AD non-compliance again, 

but this time they informed Mr. Gawadzinski that their investigation had determined that there were 47 aircraft affected, not 100 

as was originally reported to him on March 15. Even though Mr. 

Gawadzinski was aware of this unsafe condition on March 15th, 

2007, he did not document anything until March 19th, when Southwest submitted the self-disclosure in writing. 

In reading the VDRP report that was prepared by Southwest Airlines and accepted by Mr. Gawadzinski, under the Initial Notification, ‘‘Did Non-compliance Cease After Detection?’’ Southwest reported ‘‘Yes.’’ However, this is not the truth. The aircraft records 

show that Southwest continued to operate the affected aircraft in 

a known unsafe condition and fly passengers until March 23rd, 

2007. 

From March 15th, 2007, the date that Mr. Gawadzinski was initially informed for this non-compliance, to March 23rd, 2007, while 

Southwest Airlines was performing the overdue inspections on 

these aircraft, and while these aircraft were still operating in revenue service, records show that six aircraft had cracks on their fuselage. Maintenance records show that one of these aircraft had 

multiple cracks, ranging from one inch to three and a half inches 

long. 

This is enough evidence of a serious safety issue. When it comes 

to ADs, our guidance is crystal clear, and had Mr. Gawadzinski followed the FAA guidance, he should have notified Southwest Airlines that the affected aircraft could not be used in air transportation past the date that this non-compliance was discovered and 

initially reported to him on March 15th, 2007. What is also aggravating and brings this unsafe condition to the highest level of concern is the fact that, according to the VDRP report, at the time of 

discovery, the violation for compliance with the AD inspections had 

remained undetected for 30 months. 

What is interesting here is that in reading the VDRP report, 

under the ‘‘Information of the Person Preparing the Comprehensive 

Fix’’ for Southwest Airlines is the name Paul Comeau. Mr. Comeau 

14 

is an ex-FAA inspector who was performing oversight inspections 

for regulatory compliance issues for the Southwest Airlines certificate at the Southwest Airlines CMO with Mr. Gawadzinski. 

While working for the FAA, Mr. Comeau accepted a job offer 

from Southwest Airlines as the Manager for Regulatory Compliance. I believe that Southwest Airlines knowingly hired Mr. 

Comeau for his FAA connections with inspectors in our office and, 

to their advantage, placed him in the position that directly interfaces with our office on a daily basis in regards to Regulatory Compliance issues in dealing with aircraft maintenance. 

I questioned Mr. Comeau’s hiring by Southwest Airlines and I 

was told by my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, that his hiring was 

cleared through our Regional Office. However, there is an ethics 

issue here and, as proven, a conflict of interest. In addition, in 

March of 2007, during an FAA security investigation, I gave Special Agent Dave Friant a statement regarding my concerns with 

the relationship of my supervisor, Mr. Gawadzinski, and Mr. 

Comeau. I stated that since Mr. Comeau was hired with Southwest 

Airlines, my supervisor was working directly with him, and I was 

being bypassed and kept out of the loop on reported safety concerns 

regarding my fleet. 

I believe that this cozy relationship between Mr. Gawadzinski 

and Mr. Comeau played a contributing factor and allowed the 47 

aircraft to remain in service and operate in a manner that would 

provide relief to schedule the AD overdue inspections at the Southwest Airlines’ convenience while flying paying passengers. Mr. 

Comeau, being an ex-FAA inspector, should have known AD inspection requirements are mandatory and address unsafe conditions. They teach that to the FAA inspectors at the Academy. 

Southwest Airlines is reporting that they are the ones that blew 

the whistle on themselves. That is correct. What they are not reporting is that at the time of discovery of the non-compliance, back 

on March 15th, 2007, Southwest Airlines was required by Federal 

law to immediately remove the 47 aircraft from service and comply 

with the AD requirements. But Southwest Airlines did not take immediate corrective action and kept the affected aircraft flying passengers with a known unsafe condition until March 23rd, 2007. 

At the time of discovery, by not taking the 47 aircraft out of service and by not complying with the inspection requirements of the 

Airworthiness Directive 2004-18-06, Southwest Airlines failed to resolve an unsafe condition and, therefore, violated the requirements 

of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 39.11, which clearly 

states: ‘‘Airworthiness Directives specify inspections you must carry 

out, conditions and limitations you must comply with, and any actions you must take to resolve an unsafe condition.’’ 

As it is stated in the AD, due to the past events pertaining to 

the Boeing 737, the skin fatigue and cracks could have resulted in 

a sudden fracture and failure of the skin panels of the fuselage, 

and consequently cause a rapid decompression which would have 

had a catastrophic impact during flight. This inspection requirements are the result of the Aloha Airlines accident in which a Boeing 737 aircraft, during flight, lost the top of its fuselage due to undetected cracks. 

15 

The requirements of the AD are stated on its first page as follows: ‘‘Airworthiness Directives affect aviation safety and are regulations which require immediate attention. You are cautioned that 

no person may operate an aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements of the Airworthiness Directive.’’ 

There is no excuse for the actions of Southwest Airlines and FAA 

personnel. Mr. Gawadzinski did not have the authority to allow 

these aircraft to operate with a known unsafe condition past the 

date at which time the AD non-compliance was discovered and reported to him, March 15th, 2007. In addition, it was his responsibility to ensure that Southwest Airlines had taken immediate corrective action in taking these aircraft out of service. 

FAA Order 8300.10 under Inspector Responsibility states: ‘‘An inspector who becomes aware of an unsafe condition in an aircraft 

that is being operated or about to be operated and fails to act 

under the provisions of Section 605(b) FA Act of 1958, as amended, 

is in dereliction of duty. This duty is placed specifically by Congress upon the inspector, rather than on the Administrator. If the 

inspector, after due consideration, still has any doubts regarding 

whether or not to ground the aircraft, the grounding notice should 

be issued.’’ 

Also, there is a similar statement under Title 49 of the U.S. 

Transportation law in the Air Commerce and Safety Section. 

FAA inspectors are hired by the taxpayers to ensure airlines conduct their business with safety as the utmost consideration at all 

times. Allowing an airline to fly passengers on an aircraft with a 

known unsafe condition puts the lives of the flying public in jeopardy and, in my opinion, it is dereliction of duty and should be 

criminal. 

The 47 aircraft with the overdue AD inspections were not the 

only ones that kept flying in revenue service and out of compliance. 

On March 20th, 2007, via the VDRP, Southwest Airlines reported 

to Mr. Gawadzinski that 70 of their aircraft had overflow the requirements of their maintenance program for the functional check 

of the rudder standby hydraulic system. 

This required maintenance task is a very detailed and in-depth 

functional check which ensures the integrity of the hydraulic system for the standby rudder and its components. The hydraulic 

standby system provides hydraulic fluid under pressure to operate 

the rudder, among other components, in the event of a main hydraulic system failure. In the past, several catastrophic accidents 

have occurred with other airlines due to the malfunction of the rudder control system. 

Even though the 70 aircraft had been flying out of compliance for 

over a year, at the time of discovery of the non-compliance, again, 

Southwest Airlines and Mr. Gawadzinski took no action and the 70 

aircraft remained in service and operated in a matter that would 

provide relief to schedule the overdue inspections at the Southwest 

Airlines’ convenience while flying passengers. In the VDRP report, 

Southwest Airlines, in part, states: ‘‘Due to availability of the 

equipment and man-hours needed for each aircraft, it will take approximately 14 days to complete this task on all affected aircraft.’’ 

16 

But in reading the VDRP report that was prepared by Southwest 

Airlines and accepted by Mr. Gawadzinski, under the Initial Notification question ‘‘Did the Non-compliance Cease after Detection?,’’ 

Southwest reported ‘‘Yes.’’ However, this is not the truth. As I stated earlier, the records show that the non-compliance did not cease 

after detection, and the affected aircraft were allowed to fly in revenue service and out of compliance for an additional 10 days past 

the date of detection. 

These 70 aircraft were part of my fleet, but my supervisor, Mr. 

Gawadzinski, kept me in the dark and worked this VDRP directly 

with Mr. Comeau. 

In one of the statements that were made by the FAA regarding 

the operation of the Southwest Airlines aircraft in revenue service 

with the overdue AD inspections, it was stated that one FAA inspector looked the other way. I am here to report that more than 

one FAA inspector along the FAA management have been looking 

the other way for years. No supervisor can do what my supervisor 

was doing without the support from fellow inspectors, the support 

of the Division Management Team, who were fully aware of what 

was going on; and I believe the support of some people in Washington. 

This should have been obvious. I was the only maintenance inspector that kept finding and raising the safety concerns since 

2003. And when they were elevated to the Division Management 

Team, nothing was done. Every time I pointed out to Mr. 

Gawadzinski that he was not following our mandated guidance regarding safety violations in the presence of the office manager, Mr. 

Mills, Mr. Gawadzinski would respond that our guidance was outdated and that he was talking with Mr. Ballough, the Director of 

Flight Standards, who always informed him of the ups and comings. According to Mr. Gawadzinski, he spent a lot of time with Mr. 

Ballough at the Eastern Region during his executive leadership 

program. 

Mr. Mills always looked into my safety concerns and supported 

my findings; however, every time he elevated them to the Division 

Management Team, he received no support. Under the circumstances that I just described, no matter how good of a manager 

a person is, without upper management support, the system makes 

him ineffective. 

The FAA is a great organization with many good inspectors and 

managers, and I am proud to be part of it. However, there is no 

accountability throughout the ranks. As FAA inspectors, we have 

taken an oath to uphold the rules and regulations outlined in our 

mandated guidance, and we are told that safety is our job. If that 

is the case, then how come the FAA does not hold accountable the 

management and inspectors who look the other way instead of ensuring that the airlines conduct their business with safety as the 

utmost consideration? After all, we owe this to the taxpayers who 

put their trust in us. To this date, other than moving some personnel around, the FAA has taken no action. 

The Southwest aircraft that I reported flying with the overdue 

AD inspections were not part of my fleet. The inspector, Mr. 

Collamore, who is the Partial Program Manager for those aircraft, 

had full knowledge of the serious safety issue seven days before I 

17 

did. He also had an obligation and responsibility to follow our guidance and the Federal Regulations and ensure that this unsafe condition was immediately addressed. But Inspector Collamore chose 

to take no action and went along with Mr. Gawadzinski’s decision. 

As for management accountability, after the removal of Mr. 

Gawadzinski from our office, the current office manager, Mr. Bobby 

Hedlund, promoted Inspector Collamore and gave him more authority by letting him act in Gawadzinski’s position as Supervisor/ 

Principal Maintenance inspector. I had a meeting with Mr. 

Hedlund and expressed my concerns, but he was not interested. 

I wrote several e-mails to the Division Manager, Mr. Stuckey, 

raising my concerns and stating that instead of holding inspectors 

accountable for their inactions, the management was rewarding 

them and giving them additional authority. I requested a meeting 

and his immediate attention. Mr. Stuckey never responded. However, I received an e-mail from the Assistant Division Manager, 

Mr. McGarry, who informed me that management has the right to 

assign acting personnel to temporary supervisory positions. 

We all hear statements that we have the safest air transportation system in the world. I believe that the safety we are enjoying today is the fruit of the aftermath of the Value Jet accident in 

the mid-1990s, which forced us to refocus and put in place new procedures. Unfortunately, that was done after the accident. I do not 

think that we should be taking credit for being reactive to accidents. 

What is alarming is the fact that even today we are still being 

reactive. This is proven by the notice that the FAA issued two 

weeks ago, ordering FAA inspections of the airlines in order to validate AD compliance because of this hearing. Despite the fact that 

our databases are full of positive findings, the current events are 

proving us wrong by having hundreds of aircraft taken out of service with AD compliance issues. Where are the ATOS risk indicators? 

Southwest Airlines is reporting that, according to Boeing, there 

was no safety issue regarding the 47 aircraft that were flying passengers with the overdue AD inspections in which six of them had 

cracks on the fuselage. It is nice of Boeing to offer an opinion for 

their largest customer; however, if aircraft manufacturers could 

predict accidents, we wouldn’t have the safety requirements of this 

AD today. 

In addition, consultants have been reporting that after reviewing 

the data, in their opinion, safety was not jeopardized. I am reporting to you that calling Boeing for an opinion or hiring a consultant 

is not an option, because neither one has the authority over the 

mandatory requirements of an AD, and that is the law. 

The majority of the ADs are the result of catastrophic accidents, 

and, as the industry saying goes, ‘‘ADs are written in blood.’’ I am 

very concerned because these safety issues affect the lives of the 

flying public, and, instead of being advocates for safety, some people are still trying to mud the water by down-playing this serious 

safety issue. 

It is very sad that an FAA inspector has to become a whistleblower in order to address safety issues. But I would like to set the 

record straight because, for some reason, the FAA Biweekly news 

18 

is stating the following: ‘‘In the Southwest Airlines case of noncompliance, an inspector repeatedly raised issues with his supervisors, but he felt he needed to use an anonymous FAA hot line in 

order to be heard.’’ 

That is not the truth. I did not use an anonymous FAA hot line. 

These are serious safety issues, and I wanted the people that received my concerns to be able to get in touch with me; this way 

I could answer any questions they might have. For the record, I 

have been raising safety concerns for AD compliance and maintenance issues since 2003 on record and openly. I have followed the 

chain of command from my manager all the way to the Regional 

Office and the Division Management Team. Every safety concern, 

every inspection finding has my name on it. 

What you will find interesting is that in late March of 2007, after 

I discovered that Southwest Airlines, along with the FAA, had allowed the operation of these aircraft with the overdue AD inspections in revenue service, and once everybody knew that I elevated 

this serious safety issue, I was removed from my position and was 

placed under investigation due to an anonymous complaint with allegations against me that was forwarded to our office through Mr. 

Gawadzinski from Southwest Airlines. 

Along with the anonymous complaint, my office manager, Mr. 

Mills, received an e-mail from the Director of Quality Assurance, 

Mr. Mats Sabel—the same person who had previously requested 

my removal from doing the AD SAI inspections—requesting my restriction from Southwest Airlines property until this investigation 

and any other official investigation had been contacted. That day, 

Mr. Gawadzinski came to my cube and told me, with that type of 

allegations against me, he did not see a reason for me to stay in 

the office. I questioned the timing of the anonymous complaint, but 

I got no response. 

From March 2007 to the end of August of 2007, I was hoping 

that the Division Management Team would do the right thing and 

look into my findings and safety concerns. However, they did not 

address anything. In July 2007, they closed the investigation regarding my documented safety concerns and they concentrated 

their efforts in silencing the messenger. By the end of August, I realized that the Division Management Team’s interest was damage 

control and covering up the serious safety concerns. 

By the end of August, I put a package together, the same package I had given to the Division Management Team six months earlier, and I sent it to the Office of Special Council, and again I went 

on record and openly identified myself. By the end of September 

2007, after the Division Management Team found out that I had 

elevated the safety issues to Washington, they reinstated me back 

to my original position and they reopened the investigation regarding my reported safety concerns. I am here to report to you that 

all my findings and safety concerns have been validated 100 percent. 

During the FAA town hall meeting in March 2008, Mr. Sabatini 

stated that the FAA is working on a solution to prevent this from 

happening again, and it is my understanding that the FAA is going 

to put in place a hot line process for inspectors to elevate safety 

concerns. But, with all due respect, I have a question here: If FAA 

19 

management did not respond when I openly, and on record, raised 

the serious safety concerns, how is the hot line process going to 

work? What we need is accountability throughout the ranks, and 

that will fix the problem. There is no need to burden the taxpayers 

with another hot line process. 

Additionally, I would like to inform you that for years we had a 

similar hot line system in place that inspectors do not trust, because hot line complaints and safety issues end up on the FAA Administrator’s desk, and then they are passed down to the local FAA 

Regional Office to be investigated. The Regional Office assigns the 

local FAA security, which reports to them, to conduct these investigations. FAA security does not have the technical background, 

and that is when the Regional Office controls the outcome by assigning the technical portion of the investigation to Regional FAA 

personnel that report to them also. 

From my experience, I believe the priority of the Regional Office 

is damage control, and I see no interest in accountability or doing 

the right thing. At the end of the investigation, no matter what the 

evidence shows, it is disregarded by the Division Management 

Team, who cherry-pick the information from the investigation reports and, without looking at the big picture, they apply Band Aids 

instead of fixing the root of the problem. 

I would also like to inform you that since the FAA put in place 

the customer service initiative, the partnership programs such as 

the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program and Aviation Safety 

Action Programs have become ineffective. We are told that the airlines are our customers, and if they do well we do well—more jobs 

for us. However, some of us have forgotten that we have another 

more important customer—the taxpayers—who put their trust in 

us to ensure that the airlines provide safe transportation for the 

flying public. 

The airlines take advantage of the customer service initiative 

and they constantly remind us that they are the customer. The 

best way to put this is like you are going down the highway committing traffic violations and jeopardizing the safety of others, and 

when the police officer stops you and informs you that you are 

breaking the law by endangering people’s lives and you tell the officer that he cannot document the violation because you are his customer. I know this sounds funny, but this is as close to an example 

as I can come up with. 

We also have the customer service feedback line for the airlines, 

which gives them the opportunity and the tool to cherry-pick the 

inspectors that manage their certificate by praising the inspectors 

that go along with their wishes. However, there is nothing in place 

to support the inspectors that are intimidated by the FAA management and by the airline because they do their job by the book. In 

the performance of my duties, I have been asked by Southwest Airlines management to make a violation go away. In addition, I have 

been threatened by Southwest Airlines management that they 

could have me removed from the certificate by picking up the 

phone. 

The airlines use the VDRP as a tool to circumvent the regulations and provide relief for themselves from maintenance and inspection requirements in order to keep their aircraft flying. A good 

20 

example of this is the Southwest Airlines VDRP report of the 70 

aircraft that were flying in revenue service with the functional 

check of the rudder, which were overdue for over a year, and they 

used the VDRP report to continue flying the aircraft in revenue 

service and out of compliance for an additional 10 days past the 

date of discovery due to the shortage of manpower and equipment. 

The ASAP program is also abused by maintenance personnel who 

are no longer held accountable. They are using the program for 

reasons other than its intent, and I will give you a couple of examples. In the past, Southwest Airlines mechanics were installing the 

wrong tire and wheel assemblies, B-737-300, wheel and tire assemblies, on the Boeing 737-700 aircraft. The first time this discrepancy was reported and accepted into the ASAP, the mechanic that 

was involved received human factors training and the tire and 

wheel assembly paperwork was revised for future installations by 

adding a paragraph as a note right above where the mechanic 

signs for changing the wheel and tire, questioning him or her to 

check that the proper wheel and tire assembly was installed. 

The second time another mechanic installed the wrong tire and 

wheel assembly on another aircraft, the ASAP accepted the report 

and the mechanic also got human factors training. In addition, a 

new safety net was put in place by writing on all the tires with big 

letters on the sidewall indicating to what type of aircraft they belong to. The third time another mechanic installed the wrong tire 

and wheel assembly on another aircraft. The FAA again accepted 

his ASAP report, at this point I see accepting the first mechanic’s 

report, but how can we say that by accepting the other two mechanics’ reports into the ASAP we contributed to safety? 

I can stand here and give you all kinds of similar examples, but 

the bottom line is that some mechanics are not as vigilant as they 

should be, and they do not worry about it because they know that 

they can always ASAP the performance of improper maintenance, 

even after an FAA inspector finds it. We need to refocus and ensure that these programs meet their intent, instead of being a get 

out of jail free card. 

I hope the information I have provided today will help bring 

some overdue changes and help inspectors like myself to continue 

serving the public and give hope to the inspectors that have lost 

faith in the system. 

Thank you for your time and for giving me the opportunity to 

raise my safety concerns in front of your honorable Committee. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Boutris. 

I will say to Committee colleagues that this is a lengthy, in-depth 

statement, but it was necessary to hear in every detail the journey 

of public interest and of safety that this panel made, and this witness in particular. You have to hear it all in its specific details. 

Mr. Peters has a somewhat shorter statement, and after him we 

will limit the other witnesses to five minutes. 

Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. My name is Douglas E. Peters, and I am an Aviation 

Safety Inspector employed by the FAA and am currently assigned 

to the American Airlines Certificate Management Office, or CMO. 

I am the Acting Boeing 757 Partial Program Manager. I have been 

21 

employed by the FAA for a total of seven years, all of which have 

been in the Flight Standards Service. Prior to my assignment to 

the AMR CMO, I was assigned to the Southwest Airlines CMO 

from April 2001 through October 2007, holding the positions of Inspector, Assistant Principal Maintenance Inspector, and Data Evaluation Program Manager. I have an untarnished career at the FAA 

and, in February 2004, was selected as the Southwest CMO Maintenance Inspector of the Year. 

Prior to my employment with the FAA, I worked for two major 

U.S. air carriers and I am a veteran of the United States Air Force. 

I have 27 years of experience in aircraft maintenance. 

I have provided detailed records to the Office of Special Council, 

the Office of Inspector General, and the FAA Security regarding 

FAA employees of the Southwest CMO’s participation and involvement in violation of Federal regulations, abuse of authority, and 

substantial and specific danger to public safety. I am not a disgruntled employee, nor do I wish to embarrass the FAA or ruin its reputation. I merely wish to truthfully describe the events that 

brought me here today. 

At this time, I would like to take the opportunity and explain the 

events surrounding the Southwest AD overflight issue and explain 

how that event became the catalyst that brought us before the 

Committee. 

In April 2007, the Southwest CMO conducted an internal investigation of the Voluntary Self-Disclosure that was submitted by 

Southwest Airlines to the FAA regarding an AD overflight that was 

accepted by PMI Douglas Gawadzinski. I was the lead inspector on 

that investigation. During the investigation, the Division Management Team instructed Office Manager Mike Mills to hand over the 

preliminary results of the investigation to an audit team who were 

on-site in our office. 

At that time, my investigation was ongoing and incomplete; however, I had discovered that several aircraft had been operated in 

an unsafe condition beyond the date of March 15th, 2007, three of 

which had cracks in the area inspection required by the AD. A 

fourth was found to have cracks at a location outside of the inspection area called out in the AD. 

The audit team was constructed of management personnel from 

other offices within the Southwest region. Following the audit 

team’s conclusion of the AD overflight investigation, a memo from 

FAA Managers Teppen and Whitrock, dated April 18th, was given 

to Manager Mills stating that Southwest Airlines had indeed operated 47 aircraft in an un-airworthy condition and that the PMI 

condoned such operation. Additionally, the memo stated ‘‘Southwest CMO has a relaxed culture in maintaining substantiating 

data as well as any documents that would support any decisions 

made by the airworthiness unit.’’ PMI Gawadzinski was the supervisor for that unit. 

Following the memo by FAA Managers Teppen and Whitrock, on 

May 8th, Mike Mills called the entire office to an all-hands meeting 

where the Assistant Division Manager for Flight Standards, Ron 

McGarry, temporarily removed both Manager and PMI pending an 

investigation and announced Bobby Hedlund as the Acting ManVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
22 

ager of the CMO. Neither Mills nor Gawadzinski attended that 

meeting. 

June 11th, 2007, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Acting Manager 

Bobby Hedlund stopped by my office. That was during the time 

frame of the FAA’s initial internal investigation of the AD overflight. I was typing my written statement to FAA Security Special 

Agent Jay LaFlair and I informed Hedlund that I would be sending 

him a memo regarding unethical actions taking place by inspectors 

in the Southwest CMO. He agreed to look into the matter once he 

received the memo. 

Before Hedlund left my office, I told him that I thought writing 

my concerns about unethical actions was the right thing to do. He 

stated and agreed that we should always do the right thing, and 

that is what his father had always told him to do. He got out of 

the chair and walked over to my bookcase, where I keep pictures 

in frames. He picked up a picture of my son that was taken next 

to an aircraft and said, ‘‘This is what’s important, family and flying.’’ He then pointed to a picture of my family and said, again, 

‘‘This is what is important.’’ On the way out the door, he made the 

following statement: ‘‘You have a good job here and your wife has 

a good job over at the Dallas FSDO. I’d hate to see you jeopardize 

yours and her’s career trying to take down a couple of losers.’’ 

June 14th I sent the previously described memo to Acting Manager Bobby Hedlund. As of today, I never received a formal response to that memo. 

On June 14th I submitted a 15-page written statement following 

a two-day interview where I was interviewed by FAA Security. Special Agent Jay LaFlair and Flight Standards Manager Terry Lambert conducted the interview. During my sworn statement, I described over two and a half years of PMI Gawadzinski’s improprieties, unethical actions, abuse of authority, and misuse of government resources along with relaxed oversight of Southwest Airlines. 

I also included in my statement several instances where his subordinates were engaged in unethical actions as well. 

In July 2007, I made my first contact with Congressional staff 

personnel at the T&I Committee. I informed them of the situation 

in the office and that I believed that Southwest Airlines was at risk 

due to the lax oversight that they had been under in the absence 

of accountability actions with regard to FAA personnel. I also informed them the conditions were basically the same following FAA 

Security investigation that had taken place in June. There was a 

serious divide within the office. The divide consisted of those who 

followed national policy and those who were loyal to Gawadzinski. 

I provided a copy of the AD overflight disclosure to substantiate my 

initial concern. 

After waiting nearly two months for corrective action to occur by 

either the Division Management Team or the Flight Standards Director, James Ballough, for the improprieties identified by the FAA 

security investigation, it was evident that no action was being considered by FAA senior management personnel, leaving a strong underlying tone that the happenings of the Southwest CMO were not 

only condoned, but possibly sanctioned. 

In August 2007, after gathering additional facts and documentation following the FAA security investigation that occurred in June, 

23 

Inspector Boutris and I filed disclosures with the Office of Special 

Council. We supposed the OSC and the T&I detailed documentation which substantiated our safety concerns and supported our 

disclosures. The poor condition of the Southwest Airlines regulatory 

maintenance oversight was a risk that neither Inspector Boutris 

nor I was willing to accept. 

On August 28th, during a telephone conversation with T&I Congressional staff personnel, I was informed that a call had been 

placed to FAA Headquarters to the Director of Flight Standards, 

James Ballough. Mr. Ballough was not available to take the call; 

however, a message was left regarding the events at Southwest 

Airlines and he was encouraged to return the call. During the next 

few weeks, several unsuccessful attempts and messages were said 

to have been made by T&I personnel to contact the Director during 

the time period between August 28th and mid-September. 

According to T&I staff personnel, the FAA initially refused to cooperate with a request for information regarding this matter. Only 

under threat of subpoena in an October 5th, 2007 letter to Acting 

Administrator Sturgill from Chairman Oberstar and Chairman 

Costello was the documentation from the FAA internal investigation obtained. 

September 9th, 2007, Acting Manager Bobby Hedlund called a 

Southwest CMO for an all-hands meeting where Division Manager 

Tom Stuckey and Assistant Division Manager Ron McGarry were 

present. The meeting was called to announce that Bobby Hedlund 

was selected as the permanent Manager of the Certificate Management Office and that Mike Mills had accepted a position as Assistant Manager at the DFW FSDO. To my knowledge, that was the 

first visit by the Division Manager to address the CMO in over two 

years. He spoke about change and made reference to the train leaving the station, and if anyone didn’t want to be on that train, he 

might be able to help them in making arrangements for that person or persons to work in another location. 

At the close of the meeting, I asked to speak to him. Mr. Stuckey 

and Assistant Division Manager Ron McGarry visited me in my office. I stated to the Division Manager that I did not want to be on 

that train and that I had put in a request for reassignment to the 

AMR Certificate Management Office. I also stated that he was 

about five months too late. I made reference to the divide in the 

office and how Gawadzinski’s previous subordinates with one other 

inspector had engaged in unethical and inappropriate actions in 

May. 

I presented a copy of the June 14th memo that I had given to 

then Acting Manager Hedlund. He briefly scanned over the memo 

and handed it to Ron McGarry. They both acknowledged my request for reassignment and stated that they would have to talk to 

the manager of the AMR CMO, but the final decision would be entirely up to him. 

On October 14th I was reassigned to the AMR CMO as the Acting Boeing 757 Partial Program Manager. 

Only under the watchful eyes of the T&I Committee, the OIG, 

and the OSC did this gross misconduct by FAA management personnel and the Southwest CMO, Regional, and Headquarter levels 

receive the close scrutiny that was warranted. 

24 

It didn’t have to come to this. Or maybe it did. 

As a follow-up to the FAA town hall meeting which was held 

March 18th, ironically, one year following the AD overflight SelfDisclosure by Southwest, it was evident that management personnel with the responsibility and the authority to take appropriate action proved themselves unworthy to being custodians of 

the public trust. The proof was provided by their blatant disregard 

and failure to respond to significant safety events that were constantly reported in both verbal and written form to the Division 

Management Team. 

Mr. Sabatini made several points in his FAA town hall meeting 

which I agree with, first being that we have identified a risk. However, I am not confident that the risk defined by him is accurate. 

Secondly, I also agree that what is in the media is troubling, and 

I believe that, as an agency, appropriate action does indeed need 

to be taken. After being a key witness to the lack of concern for 

public safety through the intentional and blatant disregard of national policy, I do not have the confidence that all responsible individuals will be identified and held accountable. 

There have been public statements made that indicate FAA is 

conducting damage control to protect the agency’s reputation, while 

clouding the issues surrounding the impropriety that occurred in 

the FAA’s Southwest Region and was known by FAA senior management. There is evidential proof that there are more involved 

than just one man or a few individuals. It is my earnest plea that 

this Committee take the accompanying data along with the factual 

testimony that is being voiced today to draw conclusions and submit a plan of action that not only restores faith in the FAA, but 

also dispels any fears or concerns that the American citizens might 

have towards aviation safety. 

The implications that this is all the doing of one man is simply 

a misnomer. This one man, Douglas Gawadzinski, was fueled and 

energized by others around him who were willing to disregard policy. We operate on a documented and carefully un-engineered system of rules and orders, and at no time is any one of the individuals involved permitted the self-appointed power to make determinations contrary to that guidance. 

In the aforementioned FAA town hall meeting, Mr. Ballough described the events surrounding Inspector Boutris’ claims. He stated, ‘‘There were indicators, there were warning signs that we 

should have picked up that go back for a period of over two years, 

at least.’’ Southwest Airlines, yes, I agree we have identified a risk 

and a breakdown. Regarding Boutris, it wasn’t at the inspector 

level. Regarding Manager Mills, it wasn’t at the CMO manager 

level. These two individuals were raising safety concerns to the Division Management Team for over two years. 

In addition to meetings by CMO Manager Mills with the Division 

Management Team personnel, e-mails and memos from Boutris 

and myself, several WEAT Team visits occurred. WEAT Team was 

a term used for Workplace Evaluation Assessment Team, where 

other FAA Management personnel would come to visit and assess 

the environment within the office. These are the office audits I 

spoke about earlier today. I personally communicated my concerns 

during the past three years to WEAT Team members. The audit 

25 

that occurred in April 2007 revealed several shortcomings regarding the lack of approval documentation for Southwest Airlines’ 

maintenance program. 

The flying public and Southwest Airlines deserves to hear the 

truthful facts surrounding the lack of oversight at this carrier. 

They also deserve to board a flight without having to worry if the 

FAA inspector responsible for the oversight of that carrier has allowed them to knowingly fly in an unsafe aircraft. They deserve to 

fly in a plane knowing that when known safety concerns are 

brought to FAA Divisional, Headquarter levels, that they are not 

ignored and pushed aside until the threat of subpoena has been 

made by Congress. 

In conclusion, let me say that I feel it is my duty to see this matter through in hopes of the Committee assessing the information 

and making the determination of what needs to happen next. The 

unethical actions that have been identified and permitted, as well 

as the known unsafe conditions, have gone on for too long. The fact 

that FAA senior management knew about these issues within the 

Southwest CMO is undisputed. 

I have received unsolicited encouragement from field inspectors 

all throughout the agency, with many of them revealing examples 

of the same types of mismanagement that we are discussing today. 

Not only for my sake, but for theirs, I feel empowered and compelled as a United States citizen, and having the privilege of being 

a Federal employee, to stand up for the rights of all aviation safety 

inspectors. I am thankful for the opportunity to come before you 

and explain the obstacles that we face on a daily basis, placed upon 

us oftentimes by our own agency that hinders us from our first and 

foremost duty: safety. 

As for Southwest Airlines as a whole, it is my opinion that your 

company was led down the wrong path by a handful of individuals 

both within your ranks and ours. Unfortunately, these individuals 

have negatively impacted your company’s reputation and put passengers and crew at risk. I am not sure how long it will take to 

recover from this, but I am sure that if any company can do it, 

Southwest Airlines can. You have a great company and your reputation will shine again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Peters 

I think the American public should take great heart from the 

courage demonstrated by these two witnesses and, as we will see, 

from the others in this panel, but also from the depth of conviction 

with which they give their testimony. And I just want to say, parenthetically here, Mr. Peters’ statement I do not have confidence 

that all responsible individuals will be held accountable, I make 

the observation that Mr. Gawadzinski, about whom you heard devastating testimony, is still an FAA inspector. He has been removed 

from the Southwest Certificate, transferred to the American Airlines Certificate as CMO at $100,000 a year pay. 

Mr. Mills. 

Mr. MILLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mica, and honorable 

Members. My name is Michael Mills. I am currently Assistant 

Manager of the Dallas-Fort Worth Flight Standards District Office 

in Fort Worth, Texas. I have been employed with the FAA for alVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
26 

most 13 years, including 6 years in management. Prior to my employment with the FAA, I worked for 28 years as a commercial airline pilot, and much of that time was spent in airline operations 

management. I have accumulated more than 15,000 hours of accident-free flying, and in my employment with the FAA I have enjoyed a blemish-free employment record until May 8th, 2007, when 

I was abruptly removed from my position as Manager of the Southwest Airlines Certificate Management Office. 

My removal occurred within a matter of days after I had discovered and reported to my superiors that Southwest Airlines had 

overflown critical safety inspections of some of its aircraft and that 

one of my subordinates, the Principal Maintenance Inspector, 

Douglas Gawadzinski, had apparently suppressed this information. 

Inspectors Boutris and Peters, along with one of my supervisors, 

Paul Cotti, all of whom are appearing with me today, were instrumental in discovering and analyzing the records that led to my initial reporting of these overflights to the regional level and my call 

for an investigation in early April 2007. I applaud their courage in 

exposing this episode, especially in light of the humiliating treatment that I have received as a result of my actions. These are honest, hard-working men, proud of what they do, and who attempted 

to work within the system to have their concerns addressed. They 

saw in me someone they could trust, and I decided to help them. 

My dismissal for doing so was a fate that certainly was not lost on 

them, so it is no surprise that they sought the whistleblower protection that was available. 

Even considering the damage to my reputation at the hands of 

my superiors, I am still proud to be a part of this agency and its 

important mission. 

The partnership concepts that are the subject of this inquiry 

have some use in the FAA toolbox, but this unfortunate episode 

bears stark evidence that the success of these partnerships is highly dependent upon the integrity of those persons engaged in the 

process and the propriety of their actions. 

I was appointed Manager of the Southwest Airlines Certificate 

Management Office by Tom Stuckey, the Southwest Region Flight 

Standards Division Manager. After a few months on the job, it became clear to me that the oversight mission of the office towards 

Southwest Airlines was considerably degraded by virtue of the informality of its business and the coziness between some of the inspectors and their counterparts at Southwest Airlines. 

I also found that the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, 

Douglas Gawadzinski, one of four supervisors who reported to me, 

appeared to be unusually lenient with the carrier in several areas, 

especially enforcing Federal aviation regulations. He had also accrued among the office staff a number of adherents to his philosophy of accommodation for the carrier. 

He professed to have been enlightened to this approach through 

personal relationships he convincingly purported to have had at 

FAA Headquarters with Flight Standards Director James Ballough 

and Associate Administrator Nicholas Sabatini, whose names he 

frequently dropped, describing them as his mentors and the sources 

of this line of thought. As I was and still am a strong advocate of 

regulation enforcement, Gawadzinski considered me an impediVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
27 

ment to his cause, and I became a source of great irritation and 

conflict for him. 

My assessment that the CMO’s oversight and enforcement posture had deteriorated led me to publish a memorandum entitled A 

Time for Change, setting forth my goal of refocusing the office toward a more business-like oversight model. 

Mr. Chairman, I am running out of time. Would you like for me 

to continue? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. If you could summarize the rest of your statement, please. 

Mr. MILLS. Okay. 

Counseling Gawadzinski had proved futile and my attempts to 

document his actions were met with a warning against doing so 

from my supervisor, Ron McGarry. This exemplified a pattern of 

protection of Gawadzinski from above my level. That I was unable 

to penetrate into the Southwest Airlines AD overflight occurred in 

March 2007. 

My full testimony recounts the numerous occasions that I reported to my superiors the concerns I had for the PMI’s actions, 

most of which were initiated through reports from Mr. Boutris. The 

record will show these warnings and requests for assistance were 

ignored, shelved, or responded to with smokescreen events like office audits or forced mediation, but did nothing to address the safety implications of what I was reporting. 

Finally, in late March, when I became aware of Gawadzinski’s 

role in allowing Southwest to fly unsafe airplanes contrary to an 

AD, I reported the circumstances to my superiors and called for an 

investigation. Soon afterward, I found that Gawadzinski had allowed Southwest to overfly required rudder system inspections and 

did also suppress this information, which I reported to my superiors. Their response was a chilling telephone call where I was informed that the region wanted to keep this matter very quiet and 

low key. Within five days I was removed from my position as Office 

Manager. 

In my view, my actions over the period of my tenure as Southwest CMO were focused on the elimination of a serious deficiency 

in the maintenance oversight of the carrier, an imperative I felt I 

could not ignore even though I could not be sure of its impact on 

my career. My actions were met with indifference or roadblocks at 

every turn from the regional level. The price of my effort to ensure 

safety, however, was not recognition, as perhaps might be expected 

for the first management official to report the incidents, but the 

humiliating ejection from my job under circumstances that could 

only invite questions as to whether it was a coverup attempt by the 

region. 

Within a few weeks after my removal, and still very concerned 

about these matters, I wrote a prophetic e-mail to the Office Manager who succeeded me at the Southwest CMO. I had no idea then 

just how poignant my remarks would turn out to be. In the message I mentioned that I suspected the region was soft-peddling 

these events, and then I wrote, ‘‘My feeling is that this will likely 

not remain low profile, nor quiet. My advice to you as my successor 

would be to ensure that you are fully conversant with these two 

events, among others you may ultimately discover, and take whatVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
28 

ever measures are necessary to validate the adequacy of 

Southwest’s control over its maintenance program.’’ 

Because of the illumination of this unfortunate estimate, Mr. 

Sabatini has announced that he will take steps to improve employee communication at all levels, including a mechanism to encourage employees to take their concerns to a higher authority 

when there is a failure in the chain of command. Time will tell as 

to whether this will be effective, and I would add to that initiative 

a recommendation that higher level FAA managers be rotated periodically so as to lessen the likelihood that a dysfunctional management team perhaps too willing to give in to outside influence can 

perpetuate what in this case can only be termed a hoax on the flying public. 

I thank this honorable Committee for the opportunity to present 

this information. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Mills. Your last comment about rotating high-level personnel comes right along with 

the earlier proposal I made of limiting the revolving door. 

Mr. Hayes? 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt just a moment. I 

have a statement from the Southwest Airline Pilots Group that I 

would like to submit under unanimous consent for the record. They 

are obviously a very important part of the whole safety program 

and not knowing what time constraints are going to do, I would 

like to give it to you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Without objection, the material will be included 

in the record, along with the testimony from Southwest Airlines. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Cotti. 

Mr. COTTI. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. My name is Paul Eugene Cotti. I am currently an Airworthiness Unit Supervisor in the FAA’s AMR Certificates Management Office. I have been in the FAA Flight Standards Service 

for nearly 18 years, four as a Principal Inspector and over three 

now as a frontline supervisor. 

My work experiences prior to the FAA include a variety of aviation maintenance-related positions in commercial and military 

aviation. Like so many in the FAA Flight Standards Service, I care 

very deeply about ensuring the safety of the flying public and for 

FAA’s success in achieving the objectives of its critical mission. I 

am honored to be appearing before you today. 

I served as the Geographic Unit Supervisor in the Southwest Airlines CMO from March 2005 to May 2007. During that entire period, the Office’s management team was often divided on matters 

relating to the management and oversight of the Southwest Airlines operating certificate. This division can be summarized as 

being between management officials that insisted on adherence to 

the stated and implied intent of FAA orders and those that insisted 

on exercising degrees of latitude and discretion that often fell well 

outside of the parameters of those orders. 

Under the banner of collaboration with the airline, the latter 

group, whose most important or prominent member was the Supervisory Principal Maintenance Inspector, did so in a manner that 

29 

was often contrary to FAA orders and at times openly hostile to the 

requirements of transparency and accountability. 

Proper collaboration with airlines can be an effective method for 

collectively reducing risks and improving safety; however, in this 

case, it was engaged in an environment in which regulatory compliance could be delayed or gained only through deals which under 

the best of circumstances only provided to the traveling public that 

to which it is already entitled to on a continuing basis. It is unfortunate that the resistant group was not as committed to collaboration with the office manager as it apparently was to the airline. 

Had they done so, the events and conditions that ultimately resulted in these hearings would have been avoided. 

By virtue of his important position, the PMI’s erroneous decisions 

and opinions were unfortunately afforded a significant degree of legitimacy by the airline. Consequently, a distinct contrast was created between the PMI and the resistant group on one hand and the 

compliant management officials and inspectors, such as Boutris 

and Peters, on the other. 

This had a very detrimental impact on how the airline perceived 

the hazards and risks that were discovered and presented to them 

by FAA personnel that were attempting to follow FAA orders. By 

his words and actions, the PMI presented a distorted view of FAA 

expectations and a very negative example to his subordinates. Over 

time and for various reasons, the PMI’s resistance to transparency 

and accountability was in turn adopted by a number of other inspectors in the office as well. This further exacerbated divisions in 

the office and had a very detrimental impact on the office’s productivity and effectiveness. 

The expectation to follow FAA orders was specifically expressed 

and elaborated on many times by the office manager. It was also 

expressed by the Regional Division Manager at every management 

conference attended by the Office Management Team during the 

above period. In light of their obligations and such frequent admonitions from their chain of command, I am at a loss to understand 

how the PMI or the resistant group could have possibly justified 

their actions, or why those actions went uncorrected for over two 

years. 

Although the office’s Geographic Unit, which I supervised, provided airworthiness and operations inspection services to the principal inspectors, it was deliberately designed by the FAA as a separate work unit, with its own supervisor and with a line of responsibility and authority that was direct to the Office Manager. This design constituted a control to ensure that, from a supervisory standpoint, the Geographic Unit was independent of the PMI and the 

other two principal inspectors. 

The PMI, and at times the Principal Avionics Inspector, were 

openly adverse to that organizational design, and particularly so 

when I, as the Geographic Unit Supervisor, insisted that the unit 

follow FAA policies that resulted in inspection and enforcement 

outcomes that did not meet with the PMI’s personal desires. Regulatory violation findings by the Geographic Unit were often met 

with active or passive resistance from the PMI. On more than one 

occasion the PMI or one of his direct reports improperly contacted 

one of my subordinates to undermine my position with regards to 

30 

regulatory enforcement in order to effect an outcome that was outside of the FAA’s orders. 

The PMI was also openly critical of my efforts to improve the deficient safety inspection and enforcement performance of a number 

of my direct reports. I concluded from his behavior that the PMI 

was threatened by inspection and enforcement outcomes which he 

personally could not influence and control, regardless of the fact 

that those outcomes would fully conform to FAA policies. 

On quite a few occasions, responsible inspectors such as Boutris 

and Peters brought disconcerting airline events or circumstances to 

the manager’s attention, apparently, because they were unable to 

garner the level of acknowledgment and support from the PMI that 

was necessary for appropriately addressing those matters. A number of the issues they brought forward were especially alarming because they represented precursors for aviation accidents. 

When the PMI failed to display appropriate reactions to the manager’s resulting inquiries, he often tasked the assistant manager 

and me with conducting objective reviews in order to determine the 

validity of the inspectors’ concerns. The results of those reviews 

were dutifully reported back to the manager and further exposed 

the scope and nature of the office divide with further discoveries 

that certain investigative enforcement and airline safety oversight 

related processes were being mismanaged. Examples included failures to take required enforcement action in response to discovery 

of regulatory violations by the air carrier. 

It must be understood that I am referring to all levels of enforcement, including simple administrative actions. There were concerns 

with how voluntary disclosure and aviation safety action programs 

were being administered; there were efforts by the PMI and his 

ASAP representatives to prevent dissemination of de-identified 

ASAP information to the manager, who is responsible for approving 

continuation of that program; there was misapplication of the 

ATOS surveillance process; and there were concerns with the manner in which Southwest Airlines maintenance time limitations for 

maintenance tasks were approved and documented. When the results of these reviews were brought to the PMI’s attention, he was 

hostile, close-minded, and resistant to efforts to professionally discuss and take actions appropriate to those concerns. 

The most glaring example of the PMI’s failure to follow FAA orders involves the manner in which he responded to the now wellknown voluntary disclosure from the airline that it had grossly 

overflown a structural inspection Airworthiness Directive. The prohibition against further passenger flights until the AD was accomplished should have been immediately and specifically conveyed to 

the airline, and enforced as necessary. Such a response should be 

clear to any journeyman inspector and a natural reflex for someone 

in the critical position of Principal Maintenance Inspector. 

The FAA’s voluntary disclosure and aviation safety action programs can be beneficial to the traveling public and to the airlines 

and individuals that fundamentally commit to the requirements of 

those programs. However, the effectiveness and long-term legitimacy of those programs is dependent on sound understanding of 

responsibilities, proper exercise of authorities, and on effective efforts to detect and correct abuses. 

31 

Throughout the above period, I communicated my concerns 

through appropriate channels and maintained the expectation and 

faith that FAA machinery would engage and appropriately correct 

the PMI and those that were driving the office divide by their resistance to authority and accountability. Unfortunately, I do not believe that the scope and source of the serious safety and compliance-related differences in the Southwest Airlines CMO were ever 

properly acknowledged or understood outside of the CMO during 

the above period. 

My observations concerning events and conditions within the 

Southwest CMO ended with my transfer to the AMR CMO in May 

2007. 

I trust that my statement and responses to any questions are 

helpful to this distinguished Committee and its processes. Whatever the outcome of these hearings, I am also hopeful that the outstanding service and everyday commitment to aviation safety by so 

many others in the Flight Standards Service is not forgotten by 

those that we constantly strive to faithfully serve. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Cotti. The web, it 

seems, gets ever more intricate. 

Mr. Naccache. 

Mr. NACCACHE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members. In 

response to your invitation, it is an honor and privilege to be here 

to provide you with my testimony. 

First, if I may, now that I have retired, I would like to take a 

minute to introduce myself and state some of my credentials. My 

name is Robert Andre Naccache. After more than 20 years of service in flight standards, I recently retired in November 2007 from 

the FAA as an Assistant Manager of the Southwest CMO. 

During my tenure with the FAA, I served about three years as 

a Principal Inspector for 129 foreign carriers, six years as a Principal Operation Inspector for several 129 supplemental air carriers 

operating domestically and internationally, eight years as a Supervisor for Certificate, airman certification and carrier certificate and 

surveillance, and, lately, three years as an Assistant Manager at 

the Southwest CMO. While with the FAA, I was presented the 

Southwest Region’s Field Inspector of the Year Award in 1994. I 

also twice received the Southwest Region’s Supervisor of the Year 

Award for the year 2001 and 2003. 

Prior to my career with the FAA, I was an airline pilot for 17 

years, flying overseas Boeing 707 and the Boeing 747, as a captain, 

between Europe, Asia, Australia, and the U.S. Before that, back in 

my mid-twenties, I was an FAA-certified flight instructor for three 

years. This gives me over 40 years of experience in the field of 

aviation. 

Now let me tell you that I care a great deal about the FAA. It 

is an excellent agency, unmatched anywhere else in the world. 

And, trust me, I have experience of that, flying overseas. The majority of employees produce outstanding work for aviation safety. 

The FAA guidelines are well conceived. The air transport industry 

and the FAA created partnership program as a means of addressing safety problems and to prevent potential safety hazards; however, they need to be consistently and fairly implemented across 

the board. 

32 

This has been the problem in Southwest Airlines Certificate 

Management Office. Of the FAA partnership programs, I notice the 

abuse of authority of the following two, discussed in my written 

testimony. They are voluntary disclosure reporting program and 

Memorandum of Understanding addressing airman certification. 

Very important. 

Mr. Mike Mills and I were assigned to the Southwest Airline 

Certificate Management Office simultaneously as Manager and Assistant Manager, respectively, on November 14th and 15th of 2004. 

It was not long until we noticed that there was a lack of substantiating data records, correspondence and other reporting documentation related to certificate management. In addition, we also 

noticed that the Principals, two or three of them, were not adhering to FAA policy and guidance when it came to enforcement actions. 

My attempts to correct these issues were always met with intense resistance, especially from the Principal Maintenance Inspector. As our concern about the Principal Maintenance Inspector and 

other inspectors’ relationships with the carrier increased, the Manager tried in vain, through numerous meetings and memos, to correct the situation. Some of these inspectors are still working at the 

Southwest Airlines Certificate Management Office. 

After communicating several times to the Regional Office about 

this issue, the Manager was told it was a personal problem between the Principal Maintenance Inspector and himself. Ultimately, the Regional Office prepared an agreement of cooperation 

which management at the office were told to sign. The last version 

of this agreement was signed in January of 2007. 

Two months later, in March of 2007, Southwest Airlines flew several aircraft without compliance with an unworthiness directive. 

After self-disclosure by the carrier under the VDRP program, this 

violation continued with the knowledge of the Principal Maintenance Inspector and probably other inspectors. Allowing Southwest 

Airlines to continue operation of these aircraft in passenger revenue service by the Principal Maintenance Inspector is an abuse of 

authority. I am not sure whether the other two Principals knew or 

not. This was a serious safety issue because cracks were found in 

the aircraft fuselages. 

About the same time there was another case of Southwest Airlines operating aircraft without complying with the required inspection concerning the standby rudder power control unit. One 

airworthiness inspector who became aware of these violations tried 

to do the right thing and kept insisting to follow the agency guidelines. He was shunned as a troublemaker and, for a period of several months, was suspended by the Regional Office from any work 

related to Southwest Airlines. The manager sent repeated requests 

to the Regional Office for assistance. The last one relating to the 

power control unit was sent the first week of May of 2007. A few 

days later he was removed from his position and replaced by the 

Principal Operation Inspector at the time. 

I have more details in my written testimony. 

On the operation side, guidance and policy were not followed in 

the approval of a Memorandum of Understanding concerning airman certification. According to Order 8400.10, now 8900.1, SouthVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
33 

west Airlines is not qualified to have a designee program; therefore, not eligible to have a Memorandum of Understanding for 

training of FAA Aircrew Program Managers. 

Despite their lack of qualifications, Southwest Airlines has been 

approved by the Regional Manager’s Office for many years to have 

a Memorandum of Understanding which does not limit the training 

to an Aircrew Program Manager as specified in the Order I mentioned earlier. But this approval allows all FAA Operation Inspectors, including FAA management, to receive all required training 

and to obtain a type rating at the carrier’s expense. I believe that 

this improper approval was a blatant abuse of authority by higher 

management, leading to conflict of interest and unethical practices 

and, in addition, endangering the public safety. This is well detailed in my written statement. 

In conclusion, we need to make sure that the job is done in a 

manner consistent with FAA policy guidance and directives. I believe that abuse of authority and regulatory partnership programs 

should never be allowed because this will lead to serious consequences. Thank you very much. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Naccache. Certainly, against your 

extraordinary professional background, that is very compelling testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. NACCACHE. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Lambert. 

Mr. LAMBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Terry 

Lambert. I have been a Federal employee for 37 years. I have been 

an Aviation Safety Inspector with the FAA since February 1998. 

Those years, I had six years in management. I have been assigned 

as a Manager of the Safety Analysis and Evaluation Branch, ASW290, Southwest region since April 1st, 2007. During the last year, 

I have spent almost 100 percent of my time investigating the issues 

within the Southwest Certificate Management Office. 

As you have heard, there is no way I could present all these findings in a mere five minutes; therefore, I will summarize a few of 

the most serious. 

In April 2007, the Southwest Region Division Management Team 

assigned ASW-290 to investigate into the Southwest Certificate Office based on the following: a technical evaluation conduct in April 

2007; Workplace Evaluation Assessment Team report from 2005; a 

review of letters of concern by Bufford Eatmon in December 2005; 

AD 2004-18-06 overflight review conducted in April 2007 by Kermit 

Teppen and Skip Whitrock; and a memo from Bobby Boutris dated 

April 30th, 2007, sent to the Office Manager, Mr. Mills. Here are 

some of the results: 

The technical evaluation team discovered 42 issues in the office. 

The office file system was almost non-existent or not current. The 

office did not maintain the proper documentation of approvals or 

rejections. The office relied on documents that Southwest Airlines 

maintained in their online system as historical documents. Southwest Airlines called Mr. Gawadzinski, the SPMI, Supervisory Principal Maintenance Inspector, on March 15th, 2007, and informed 

him of AD issues on 100 aircraft. Gawadzinski encouraged Southwest to self-disclose the issue. Southwest filed a Voluntary Disclosure on March 19th, 2007. 

34 

The initial report stated it would take until March 21st, 2007, to 

complete the inspections; it actually took until March 23rd. The report did not state which aircraft were affected. Southwest Airlines 

stated the non-compliance issue had ceased. A review of log sheets 

by ASW-290 indicated that Southwest continued to operate the aircraft in passenger operation between March 15th and March 23rd, 

2007, and flew 1,241 flights during that time with passengers onboard. Southwest’s comprehensive fix did not include any changes 

to the AD management system. Mr. Gawadzinski was the only inspector to address the disclosure and accepted Southwest’s actions. 

The Teppen-Whitrock report had similar issues with the AD, but 

only two aircraft were reviewed. 

A review of 29 letters of concern issued by Gawadzinski indicated 

at least five of the letters should have been letters of investigation. 

Mr. McGarry, from the Southwest Region, instructed Gawadzinski 

to stop sending letters of concern and send letters of investigation, 

as required. Mr. Gawadzinski continued to send letters of concern. 

The Southwest Office appeared to be divided between those that 

supported Mr. Gawadzinski and those that support the Office Manager, Mr. Mills. 

Mr. Boutris wrote a memo to Mr. Mills on September 16th, 2005 

with some of the same concerns as his April 2007 memo. Mr. 

Boutris stated that Gawadzinski removed the letterhead from a letter of investigation so he could personally go to Southwest to resolve the violation. Mr. Gawadzinski instructed Don Back to 

change his paperwork so that Southwest could voluntarily disclosure an issue that Mr. Back had found. Mr. Gawadzinski allowed 

Southwest to make changes to approved manuals without FAA review. The review substantiated Mr. Boutris’ concerns addressed in 

his memo. 

Safety Attribute Inspection 1.3.6 AD Management had not been 

accomplished since 1999. In 1999, there were a multitude of no responses. Mr. Boutris was assigned the inspection and had approximately 20 no responses when he was put on desk duty as a result 

of an anonymous complaint received by Southwest Airlines. The inspection was assigned to John Bassler and Larry Collamore. They 

did not use any of Mr. Boutris’ information. When completed, Mr. 

Bassler had seven no responses and Mr. Collamore had zero. The 

inspection was reassigned to a regional team. 

Southwest Airlines overflew a rudder PCU check inspection in 

March 2007. Southwest voluntarily disclosed the issue to Mr. 

Gawadzinski; however, they continued to operate 70 aircraft while 

the inspections were being accomplished. All this information was 

contained in Executive Summary submitted to the Division Management Team in May 2007. 

In June 2007, ASW-290 was assigned by Mr. Ron McGarry to assist Security with conducting an investigation to a hot line complaint against Mr. Gawadzinski. Mr. McGarry requested that ASW290 provide technical assistance to the security inspector, take 

notes, and provide a summary. The following was discovered during the interviews. 

Mr. Gawadzinski stated that he should have grounded the aircraft, but he chose not to. Mr. Comeau stated that Gawadzinski did 

not tell him to ground the aircraft. Mr. Gawadzinski insisted he asVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
35 

signed the Voluntary Disclosure to Mr. Larry Collamore. In his 

first two interviews, Mr. Collamore claimed Mr. Gawadzinski never 

told him anything about the self-disclosure. 

Mr. Collamore changed his statement in his third interview, indicating that Mr. Gawadzinski had told him as soon as Southwest 

had called. Mr. Collamore said he did nothing because Mr. 

Gawadzinski did not assign him any tasks. Mr. Gawadzinski 

showed favoritism to Matt Crabtree, an inspector in the office, 

when he paid out of his pocket for Mr. Crabtree to attend training. 

Office management has not effectively dealt with the issues in 

the office. A summary of these events was given to the Division 

Management Team in June 2007. It was also noted that Mr. 

Gawadzinski continually suppressed the work efforts of Mr. Boutris 

and his ability to do surveillance. 

These are a few of the issues that have been and are being 

worked at the Southwest Regional Office. Mr. Gawadzinski’s actions, his relationships with Southwest employees, and the actions 

of other inspectors that have supported Mr. Gawadzinski is outside 

the guidance and authority entrusted to FAA employees. This has 

affected the oversight of the Southwest Airline Certificate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Committee Members. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Lambert. 

I would note for the record that Mr. Lambert, as a member of 

management at FAA, is in effect here testifying against his boss, 

and that takes enormous courage to do that. 

I thank all of the panel, all members, for the courage you have 

shown in coming forward, I will say it once again, for your publicspirited defense of aviation safety. 

The FAA would have us believe that what took place was an isolated incident and has been contained. In fact, the testimony we 

have heard substantiates that, clearly, this is not an isolated aberration attributed or attributable to a rogue individual, but, rather, 

a systematic breakdown of the safety oversight role of the FAA. It 

is misfeasance, malfeasance, bordering on corruption. If this were 

a grand jury proceeding, I think it would result in an indictment. 

The FAA has incorporated into its oversight system, for a variety 

of reasons, what is called the ATOS, Air Transportation Safety 

Oversight System. That is supposed to be a rating, supposed to be 

a structure, a system for tracking safety and, through record-keeping, identify shortcomings. I think the result of ATOS is that inspectors are spending more times looking at databases than doing 

hands-on inspection. This is not new. This goes back to the mid1980s, when FAA inspectors were telling me they were spending 

more time inspecting paperwork than engine work; more time processing papers than spending time on the floor of the maintenance 

shops and observing the work being done. 

So I have a question for Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters. What has 

happened here? Has the ATOS broken down? And let’s look at the 

chronology. March 6th, after revelation of our Committee inquiry 

and your representations and documentation to the Committee, 

FAA imposes a $10.2 million fine on Southwest; March 10, a special FAA team is sent to investigate Southwest; March 11, Southwest puts three employees on administrative leave; March 12, 

Southwest grounds 41 aircraft for inspection; March 13, FAA issues 

36 

a national order to all flight standard district offices to conduct a 

special emphasis validation of AD oversight; American Airlines 

grounds 200 aircraft, 200 MD-80s, for further inspections; U.S. Airways loses a part of a wing panel in flight; United Airlines grounds 

its entire 777 fleet for further inspections; Delta Airlines grounds 

its MD-88s for further inspections; Northwest holds back its 757s 

for slats inspections; and Southwest grounds another 38 aircraft for 

further inspections. 

If ATOS is so good, why has it failed? Why have these incidents 

come to light only after what your testimony has submitted here 

took place? Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir. Unfortunately, ATOS is a generic oversight 

system that applies to an air carrier that might operate, let’s say, 

10 aircraft of one specific fleet type or model. That also applies to 

an air carrier that might be considered a mega-carrier, with over 

600 aircraft and maybe six different types of fleet types. I say it 

is generic that the tools are the same; however, in this particular 

element, AD management, it is considered a high criticality element, and those generic procedures apply to both small carrier, 

large carrier. High criticality requires an inspection twice a year. 

Of course, the Principal Maintenance Inspector responsible for that 

can increase that number based on the number of different fleet 

types and the number of different models that they operate. 

ATOS doesn’t really address that. Our guidance is weak when it 

comes to the larger carriers that operate different types of fleets of 

aircraft and they operate them whether in or outside of the United 

States. It is generic and I don’t believe that it is adequate, our policies and procedures. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. I have long felt that it is insufficient. 

It is a useful tool, but insufficient, and in this case, combined with 

the Voluntary Disclosures, resulted in a major failure of safety. 

Mr. Lambert, were you ordered to destroy your notes after FAA 

Region learned that our Committee was investigating the incidents 

about which you testified? 

Mr. LAMBERT. If you are referring to the notes that I took during 

the investigation? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Correct. 

Mr. LAMBERT. Yes, sir, I was. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Who issued that order? 

Mr. LAMBERT. I believe it was in October of 2007, and it would 

have been Mr. Steve Douglas. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And who is Mr. Steve Douglas, Mr. Chairman? 

Who is Mr. Steve Douglas? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Douglas is? State for the record his title. 

Mr. LAMBERT. He would be one of the Assistant Division Managers at the Southwest Region. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Southwest Region, yes. We have that information 

in our files. 

In light of this testimony, what changes do you recommend in 

the Voluntary Disclosure and the ATOS systems? Mr. Lambert? 

Mr. LAMBERT. One of the changes I would make is we need to 

train the inspectors on how to do the inspections, rather than how 

to do the computer work associated with those inspections. It is not 

37 

just a matter of putting it into the computer; it is a matter of doing 

the inspection. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. Over-reliance on system rather than 

people doing inspections, putting their nose into the work. It is not 

a matter of going around and demeaning, saying, well, we don’t 

need people going around kicking tires and putting hands on fuselage. That is demeaning of the role of inspector. And you are right 

about the degree and extent of training. 

I will withhold at this point. 

Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am interested in getting a sense of this. It is a very traumatic 

thing for the agency and for the individuals involved. Is it in part 

a difference of philosophy, of trying to do things completely by the 

book, when the book may be outdated, as opposed to creating an 

ethos of safety and working together for a common end? Is this underlying this at all, a difference in sort of management philosophy 

here, or is it malfeasance by an individual? I don’t know who would 

like to testify to that. Mr. Mills, you would be in a position, I think. 

Mr. MILLS. It is my opinion that there is a necessity that is clear 

to Washington Headquarters that, based on the ever-increasing airline industry and the failure of the FAA oversight capability to 

keep up with that, some mechanism needs to be put in place in 

order to allow the airlines to take a bigger role in their oversight, 

and I believe that is why ATOS was created, because we simply 

can’t be everywhere to do everything as inspectors. 

I do not believe any of the people who run the FAA are opposed 

to regulatory enforcement. I think perhaps that we may have gone 

too far toward considering airlines as customers and being customer-friendly. But in an effort to be everywhere and do everything 

we can, I believe that is why this model was created. 

And there are different schools of thought within the FAA. There 

is the old school of thought that says enforce the regulations and 

make life difficult for those operators who don’t comply with them, 

and the school of thought that was represented by the Principal 

Maintenance Inspector was that this was outdated and we needed 

to secure the cooperation of the operators in order to have some degree of effectivity in our oversight. 

In my view, ATOS needs to be a tool. We need to surveill based 

on risk, but we also can’t have the advice that it is the be-all and 

end-all. I know of some inspectors who believe that, when they are 

sent out and assigned a task under ATOS, that they can’t look at 

anything else but what they are specifically assigned according to 

the risk. 

There is also the element that it is easy to answer a question yes 

when a question is raised by ATOS as to whether an airline has 

a specific thing that it is supposed to have, and it is sometimes 

hard to say no because it creates a great deal of extra paperwork 

and it often causes the carriers to display some difficulty with the 

FAA. So inspectors are human beings; some of them respond poorly 

to that. I think the model may need to be revised. 

Mr. PETRI. Let me just say it clearly is a management problem 

if you have honest and very hard-working, able inspectors who 

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38 

ating, not entirely, but in some respects here, and that is not 

healthy. If there may be differences in philosophy, then that is 

management’s job to work with people so that they understand 

what that is and have confidence in it; and if there are differences, 

that they are treated and dealt with, rather than intimidating people or pushing them under the counter, and this seems to be one 

of the issues here. 

Mr. MILLS. It is a training issue, largely, I believe. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We have a vote in progress, but there is time for 

further questions, and I will turn to Mr. Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for all of our witnesses. Do any of you have evidence 

or reason to believe that the issues that have occurred at this CMO 

is occurring in other parts of the Country? Is this widespread or 

is it unique to this CMO? Mr. Boutris? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Well, sir, I cannot speak for the other offices because I don’t have any experience with the other offices, but the observation that somebody can make, including our CMO, is if our 

ATOS databases are doing the job they are supposed to do, why do 

we have all these hundreds of airplanes taken out of service? In my 

opinion and belief—and I have lived it—management can control 

the outcome of the ATOS database. 

If you are a principal and you send me out to do the job, I will 

come back with at least several noes, because no airline has all the 

procedures they are required to be there. So if I came back and put 

no in the database, then you, as a Principal, will have to do a risk 

analysis; you will have some red on your dashboard and you have 

to take action. If you send Inspector B out that is going to give you 

all the yeses, you can sit back and say my dashboard looks good. 

So you can manipulate the system and by that have the results you 

want. And I believe that what I am stating is the result, when you 

see all these airlines grounding airplanes, they are under ATOS 

also. Shouldn’t the Principal have something on his dashboard saying, hey, we have something wrong here? 

Mr. COSTELLO. The other members of the panel, do you have either evidence or reason to believe that this is happening at other 

CMOs? No? 

Mr. COTTI. Mr. Costello, ATOS, or the Air Transportation Oversight System, is based on system safety principles, and those principles dictate that, in order to have appropriate safety measures in 

place or to have an appropriate level of safety, that you have to 

have controls in place and that, more than anything, you have to 

factor out the human being as much as possible from the equation 

because that is where a lot of the errors occur. 

I think, in response to your question, what happened at the 

Southwest CMO, from my perspective, was unique in that it was 

so out of line—and I have been to a number of different offices 

around the Country—it certainly was unique, and it was gross as 

compared to some of the things I have seen elsewhere. But thinking in terms of system safety and the human element, this could 

have occurred in any office, because our current design is still pretty heavily dependent on the human being. 

39 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Boutris, you specifically say in your testimony that you were told by Mr. Gawadzinski that you were not to 

enter information in the ATOS system. Is that correct? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Why do you think he told you that? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. That was referencing the AD safety attribute inspection I had started and the one that Southwest had requested 

for me to be removed from. The first two inspections I did on two 

different dates—— 

Mr. COSTELLO. My question is, though, why do you think he told 

you not to enter the information—— 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Because, in my opinion, my supervisor knew that 

in a week from there I was going to be under investigation and, 

therefore, would be knocked from the database. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Very good. 

We have got a vote, so, very briefly, if you will keep your answers 

concise. 

Each of you and the IG reviewed to two different camps, one 

loyal to Mr. Gawadzinski and the other to Mr. Mills. Was Mr. 

Stuckey and the Regional Office aware of these two loyalties and 

these two camps? 

Mr. PETERS. Sir, I believe they were, and that is evident by the 

office audits that were conducted and the WEAT Team visits that 

were conducted during the past two years prior to the AD event. 

And I think Mr. Lambert’s testimony that he briefed the Division 

Manager May 2nd of similar events, I know that in my security investigation I explained the divide in that as well, and I believe that 

he briefed the Division Management Team. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Do either of you believe that this went up to 

Headquarters in Washington, that they had knowledge of the divide? 

Mr. PETERS. I know that they did as far as mid-September they 

did, because that was the date that I contacted the T&I staff, and 

they had requested to speak to Mr. Ballough. So I can only say that 

date for sure. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And that was in 2007, September of last year? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. But you have no knowledge or no reason to believe that Headquarters knew about it before then? 

Mr. PETERS. I don’t. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Boutris? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. The only thing, as I stated earlier, sir, was that 

every time I went to my supervisor with non-compliance issues 

which were direct violations of the Federal regulations, I bring my 

manager in, Mr. Mills, and I will quote the regulation, I will 

present my findings, and my supervisor will state that my guidance 

was out of date. Well, we are talking about Federal regulations 

here, so he is telling me they were out of date. And he was talking 

to Mr. Ballough on a daily basis; we have him the ups and comings. So, to me, right there will say that he had communication 

with Mr. Ballough. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The final question before I run out of time here, 

just so everyone understands the time line here,—we have the time 

line in front of us, but so everyone understands the time line— 

40 

when did you, Mr. Boutris or Mr. Peters, first raise the issue, your 

concerns that Southwest was out of compliance with AD? When 

was the first time you raised the concern? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Are you talking about the flying aircraft or with 

out of compliance with having the required procedures in place to 

manage the AD compliance? 

Mr. COSTELLO. Both. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. I started the process that Southwest Airlines did 

not have the proper procedures in place and that were required 

back in 2003. They accepted my findings and it took them a year 

to bring the engine AD compliance records into compliance with 

121.380 14 CFR. In 2006, when I changed positions and I had the 

airframes and systems for the 700 aircraft, I found the same discrepancies, and that is when my supervisor did not want to send 

Southwest Airlines a letter. And after going to Mr. Mills and asking my supervisor we have to deal with it, he assigned me the inspection. That was the same inspection that Southwest Airlines requested my removal and that was the same inspection that Mr. 

Gawadzinski instructed me not to put the negative findings in the 

database. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And can you explain for everyone the difference 

in the two letters, the letter that you wanted to write versus the 

letter you were directed to write? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Our guidance does not provide any information or 

does not really identify what the letter of concern is. This is something that some principals or supervisors or management come up 

with. You call it the letter of concern. Our guidance is crystal clear: 

according to Order 2150, we have to document the non-compliance—or even if it appears as non-compliance. 

So even if it appears as non-compliance, we have to send to the 

carrier a letter of investigation. That does not mean there is a violation. What it means is we think there is a violation. It appears 

there is a violation. 

You do the investigation. You can close it with no action. You can 

close with administrative actions. You can close it with civil penalty. But you have to document what you think might be wrong at 

the time that you looked at it, and this way you can go back if you 

have previous violations or future violations and compare your 

findings. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You were told not to send a letter of investigation. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Yes, sir. That was also told in front of Mr. Mills, 

my manager, and that is when Mr. Mills. 

There is a memo and I have testimony. Starting 2005, I sent an 

e-mail to my supervisor, copied Mr. Mills on it: I will no longer 

send Southwest Airlines letters of concern because I have sent so 

many on the same previous issues and through my surveillance I 

was finding the same problems that were not fixed. In addition, I 

was finding new ones. 

That e-mail is part of my testimony. 

In addition, my supervisor, after I sent the e-mail out, he 

grounded me. He told me I cannot do any more surveillance. So I 

went to his office. I went to my manager’s office, and I said: According to my PD, the position description, part of my job is to manage 

41 

the program and also do surveillance inspections to ensure Southwest Airlines is following their procedures. 

His response to that was: I have other inspectors for that. 

I do have an e-mail from him, stating that my area of inspection 

is Dulles. Well, that is the only place that Southwest Airlines flies. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. A further way of answering your question is to 

say very simply that a letter of investigation has consequences that 

can result in fines. A letter of concern does not. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Yes, correct. Yes, sir, that is correct, but the letter 

of concern is nowhere identifying our guidance. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is right. That is correct. 

The Committee will stand in recess, pending the votes on the 

House floor, and we will resume 20 minutes after the last vote. The 

panel, since they are under oath, will be sequestered by the Committee staff. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Committee will resume its sitting. 

At the time that we broke for the votes, Mr. Costello had concluded his questioning, and now we turn to Mr. Hayes of North 

Carolina, a pilot, a diligent Member of this Committee. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a very important hearing. I think we have established 

several things. That is serious mistakes in oversight have occurred 

on the part of the FAA and on the part of Southwest Airlines, and 

I am confident that we will move aggressively on the part of everyone involved to correct the situations that have been pointed out 

in great detail. 

As others have said, thank you for the testimony from our first 

panel. 

I would like to pick up, if I may, on a question that Mr. Costello 

asked. I think it is very appropriate to make sure that we understand and have the right answer. His question, if I remember correctly, was: Do you think the problem that we have uncovered and 

discussed today is system-wide or restricted to the area that you 

all have been covering? 

There was yes and one acknowledgment, but I would like to ask 

the panel that across the board. Mr. Boutris, would you? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. That was in regard to if this problem exists in 

other CMOs and other FAA offices here? 

Mr. HAYES. Correct. That is basically the question. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Basically, the only thing I can say is what I responded earlier, that the ATOS program can be manipulated and 

the person that looks at the dashboard. 

Mr. HAYES. Just a yes or no. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. No. 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Peters? Okay, no. 

Mr. PETERS. I think potentially it could, however. 

Mr. HAYES. Well, obviously, it could, but do you think this is a 

system-wide problem of this extent? 

Mr. PETERS. Maybe not to this extent. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. And, Mr. Mills, you shook your head a minute 

ago as it is not a system-wide. 

Does anybody disagree? Let’s not belabor it. 

42 

All right. My point is we want to correct the problems that we 

have identified from this hearing, but we also want to make sure 

that the perception of the flying public is not mistakenly headed in 

the wrong direction because of the issues we talk about today. 

The facts are very clear that aviation in general, whether it is 

airline or general aviation, is in the safest period in its history and 

that is what we all strive for. The airlines have a similar record 

now of that type of safe operation. It is far safer than driving. 

So my point, again, is to make sure that people who are flying 

or thinking about flying know how much effort goes into keeping 

everything safe. 

I have been flying for 40 years. Those of you who are sitting behind the microphones there know that every time the pilot does a 

pre-flight, he is an inspector. Now he doesn’t have everything dissected but, as someone said earlier, it is important to focus on the 

fact that there is a culture of safety that exists, that wraps around 

the entire issue. It doesn’t necessarily start with anybody, but everybody has their part to play. 

So, as important as this hearing is, I hope, again, that the main 

end result is we take a situation that has been brought to light, 

correct it, correct the problems that may carry over. But there are 

people and there are machines and there are subjective issues and 

there are objective issues. So, again, the perspective is we can always be a little bit safer, but we are flying in the safest time in 

history. 

Mr. Mills, what is the main takeaway today for the FAA and for 

the airlines? 

What is the action plan? What is the first thing we do when we 

walk out that door? 

Mr. MILLS. Well, I think the initiatives that I espoused in my 

testimony would be worthwhile, a rotation of senior managers to 

ensure that if something like this doesn’t happen due to entrenchment. 

Mr. HAYES. Cordial but not cozy, is that what we are saying? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes. I think it was my memo that coined the term, 

coziness. 

Mr. HAYES. Yes. 

Mr. MILLS. It was pretty clear to me what was cozy and what 

wasn’t. 

And, to answer your question earlier about whether this is pervasive, I don’t really think it is. I think there may be some degrees 

of problems among other offices, but this is a unique situation 

where we had a rogue inspector who simply could not be corralled 

and made to go in the right direction and appeared to be protected 

at every turn. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. Thank you. That is very important. 

I just had something I wanted to finish up with, but I can’t remember what. 

Oh, in the letter that I submitted, Mr. Chairman, from the pilots, 

they pointed out a very important issue. They, as pilots, are obviously concerned as much, if not more so, than anybody because 

they are responsible for their own safety and the safety of their 

passengers. The pilots, in the case of Southwest and other airlines, 

are very, very diligent in doing their part. 

43 

I don’t know about you all as flyers, but as somebody flying an 

airplane I have a good relationship with the mechanics that are 

turning the wrenches. I think that is appropriate. There is a relationship, cordial, businesslike, not cozy. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I can’t yield back my time. I don’t 

have any. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for his observations. He is 

a pilot of long standing, and he has been diligent in participating 

in the work of the Aviation Subcommittee and the Full Committee. 

I do have to point out that my definition of safety is the relative 

absence of risk. It is not whether the whole system is working well, 

but is there risk, what is its relevance and how wide is that risk 

and how wide are we establishing the margin of safety. 

When you have an egregious breakdown as occurred in the instance that we have heard about this morning, in excruciating detail, then there is the possibility that it creeps to the rest of the 

system. The purpose of hearings of this nature and oversight of 

this kind is to ensure that it does not creep. 

We now go to Mr. DeFazio, former Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee and one who has had a longstanding interest 

and participation in aviation issues. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, I am alarmed at what I have heard 

today, and I am just going to recount a little history because we 

have very short memories around here. 

When I first came to Congress, there was something that was referred to as the tombstone mentality at the FAA which is we went 

after problems, after a bunch of people had died. 

I got involved in the 737 rudder problem very early on before the 

second plane went down, when the FAA was still saying, oh, it was 

some weird rotor wind or the pilot had a heart attack or whatever. 

We found out we had a severe mechanical problem that was very 

occasional but, unfortunately, very fatal. That took quite some 

time. 

I fought for years to get over-wing access after the Manchester 

flight when it was demonstrated that if you don’t have adequate 

access over the wings, people die piled up like cord wood. It took 

years. 

It took them six months in Britain. It took us years. 

Then the whole issue of since I have been here I have been trying to get OSHA coverage for flight attendants, which not inconsequentially would provide for a safer environment for the passengers, but the agency refuses. 

Now a lot of this is embedded in history, and the history was the 

agency was charged with promoting something it inherited from 

the CAB, promoting the industry and regulating safety. From the 

time I first came here, I said you can’t do both those things. It 

doesn’t work. 

I had administrators say, oh, no, no problem. No problem. 

Then finally after the Value Jet tragedy, it was recognized that 

that wasn’t working, was it? And so, I got legislation that Mr. 

Costello, Mr. Lipinski and I had introduced with the support of 

Chairman Oberstar inserted into the FAA Bill that year that 

stripped away the dual mandate. 

44 

Now I am going to get to a question, but this comes from Mr. 

Boutris’ testimony because, as I was listening to him and reading 

this, I thought, have we rolled back the clock to the dual mandate 

era? Are we promoting? Is this a result of customer service initiative? 

When you said in here, what is alarming is the fact that even 

today we are still being reactive. This is proven by the notice that 

the FAA issued two weeks ago, ordering FAA inspections on the 

airlines in order to validate AD compliance because of this hearing. 

Then you ask about ATOS. I also had at least three meetings 

with Nick Sabatini, as Ranking Member, expressing the same concerns as the Chairman, saying, I don’t get how this ATOS thing is 

going to work. I want people out there watching, on the ground, 

monitoring and doing real inspections. 

A computer system to monitor a computer system. As we heard 

from Mr. Boutris if you are told not to input something into that 

computer system, well, it just goes away, doesn’t it, or maybe something worse happens. 

Then you said down at the bottom of that page, the majority of 

ADs are the result of catastrophic accidents and, as the industry 

saying goes, ADs are written in blood. 

So I guess my question would be to the panel: Did the FAA take 

seriously the change in the law that I made in 1996, stripping 

away the mandate to be a promoter and to be a regulator in the 

public interest for public safety? Were we making progress? 

I knew there was a long culture. I knew it would take time. Were 

we making progress up to 2003 or did nothing ever change or did 

2003, with this customer service initiative which came from an Administration that hates government, is contemptuous of government and hates regulation even more? 

The customer service initiative, to me, is clearly intended to say, 

we are not going to regulate really. You are our customers, and we 

wouldn’t want you to be upset with our scrutiny. 

If you read through the directive and Marion Blakey’s speech 

and all that, it becomes apparent. 

So the question is, to anybody on the panel, did 1996 make a difference when we changed the law? Was there a cultural difference 

evolving? 

Were we becoming more a regulatory agency and less a promoter 

of the industry up to 2003, and did 2003 mark a sea change with 

the customer service initiative and the culture of the Bush Administration and all the political appointees pushing to be customerfriendly to those people we are supposed to be regulating? 

Mr. Boutris? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. I will take that question, sir, and I think it is a 

very good question. What you are saying, I agree with you 100 percent. I have been in the aviation industry for 30 years, 20 outside 

the FAA and 10 with the FAA. 

What you eliminated, which was fostering promoting aviation 

and trying to regulate at the same time, was excellent. However, 

I think the facts are proving, but another thing came in, the customer service initiative which took its place. So, yes, we are promoting safety through customer service, and I believe we cannot do 

both. 

45 

I believe that the airlines are our customer, and I will do anything in my power to help them out like I did with the engines 

when I found the problem. I worked with them for a year. 

However, we have forgotten the most important customer which 

is the taxpayers. We have taken an oath that we are going to ensure that the airlines provide safe public transportation. 

Are we doing that? Well, from what I gave you, on our side, I 

don’t believe we are doing that. 

And I do, though, with all due respect to Mr. Hayes, I want to 

go back because he said the answer was no. 

Actually, my answer was not no. The answer was yes because if 

ATOS was working when the notice came out to do the compliance 

for the ADs, he shouldn’t have any airplanes grounded, but he had 

hundreds of airplanes grounded. So this is not just Southwest. 

So, with all due respect, to Mr. Hayes, I just want to say my answer was yes. It was not no, and I know it was cut short. 

But if the system was working, a lot of these principal inspectors 

should have a lot of red lines on the dashboard, the ATOS dashboard having risk indicators. This way, they can do these inspections prior to you having this Committee hearing, and there was 

another knee-jerk reaction. 

Let’s issue the notice and see how things are going out there. 

Let’s take the polls. Well, the polls were not well. I want to tell you 

that the patient is not that well. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. 

Anybody else want to reflect on whether the customer service initiative could be part of the root cause here and/or whether or not 

we ever saw a cultural changes resulting from the change? 

Were people aware of the change in the law? Was it made aware 

to people in the agency when I changed the law in 1996? Were people aware of that, that we had stripped away the promotional mandate? 

Anybody? 

Yes, you were. Okay. 

Does anybody think that things just never changed or we kind 

of got set back as Boutris thinks by the so-called customer service 

initiative, which again created this sort of conflict? 

Mr. Mills? 

Mr. MILLS. Well, I think the, excuse me, the customer service initiative did set us back because I remember when we started promoting this. I was mandated to go to every single operator in the 

Dallas district office. It took me weeks to drive to all those places 

and hand them materials that made them understand how friendly 

we are now and how we want their concerns to be elevated through 

this mechanism. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You had to hand deliver this package? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I want to hear this. Continue, but if you could also 

relate to me how often you were able to get around in an inspector’s capacity to all of those same folks. 

Mr. MILLS. I was not able to do that, sir. I was the manager at 

the time. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But in this, were you ordered to go see them all? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes. 

46 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. So you were not able to get there in a capacity of oversight and inspection because there were just too many 

of them. 

Mr. MILLS. Right. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But you were torn away from those other duties 

to hand deliver a package that could have been mailed or they 

could have gotten on the internet about the customer service initiative. 

Mr. MILLS. That is correct. We had to visit them personally. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Anybody else want to comment on this thing? 

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am over my time. I will have 

more questions later. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mrs. Capito. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that I will hold 

my questions until later. I appreciate it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I appreciate the testimony I heard earlier today, and I am glad 

to have the opportunity to ask a few questions. 

Let me initially direct my line of questioning to Mr. Mills. I am 

thinking about how we go forward from, this point in time, and you 

point out the value of the self-disclosure programs, but that it is 

highly dependent upon the integrity of those that are implementing 

that disclosure program. In your opinion, who is in the best position to exercise the oversight of the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting 

Program, at what level, what position? 

How do we prevent what you describe happening from happening 

again? 

Mr. MILLS. I am not sure that at the journeyman inspector level 

is the place for it. Perhaps, those individuals could be participants, 

but I think there needs to be more review at an upper level of that. 

I am not sure what level. 

But it is, in this case, something that was terribly abused, and 

I would say I would start perhaps at the manager level, office manager level. 

Mr. MORAN. Can you briefly describe for me the scenario? 

When you say it was seriously abused in this circumstance, describe for me, again, that scenario. Where was the failure? 

Mr. MILLS. Well, the failure was on the part of the principal 

maintenance inspector who, because of his cozy relationship with 

Southwest, was not only accepting the self-disclosures but encouraging the operator to file them so that they wouldn’t have to, so 

that he wouldn’t have to file enforcement actions against them. Of 

course, enforcement actions are a matter of record and self-disclosures are not. 

So that, I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. MORAN. It does. 

The supervisory principal maintenance inspector that you just 

mentioned, his personality you talked about and his inference of 

his connections, rapport with those in more senior positions. Does 

that accurately describe what you testified to earlier? 

Mr. MILLS. Yes, it was a very strange situation. I presumed that 

much of his hype, self-hype, was just that, self-hype, but there were 

certain instances that occurred during my relationship with him 

47 

that led me to wonder if, in fact, some of his purported support 

might have some legs. 

For example, I do know that Mr. Gawadzinski and Mr. Ballough 

were engaged in some sort of assessment of the staffing of my office, and I found that out as the second hand, and I always wondered why Mr. Ballough didn’t afford me the courtesy of letting me 

know that that was happening. 

On another instance, we were attending, excuse me, a conference 

at Southwest Airlines headquarters where Mr. Sabatini was speaking, and our management team from the office was invited, and we 

sat at separate tables. Mr. Sabatini and his entourage sat at one 

table, and we sat at another one. And, Mr. Gawadzinski abandoned 

our group and went over and sat with Mr. Sabatini and his entourage for the duration of the conference. 

And, of course, that was not lost on our management team or 

Southwest Airlines for that matter and probably gave him a good 

deal of imprimatur in terms of his success in thwarting what we 

were doing. 

Mr. MORAN. The effect this appearance of this relationship had, 

what is the consequence of that appearance? 

People believed that there was a relationship that may affect 

their jobs if they crossed? 

Mr. MILLS. Absolutely and, of course, for Southwest Airlines, 

that gave him a certain degree of appearance of influence that he 

might not ordinarily have had. 

For my office, the people in my office who reported to him, it certainly elevated his stature in their eyes and made life a lot more 

difficult for me. 

Mr. MORAN. Did he do things that would merit his termination 

and, if so, why was he not terminated? 

Mr. MILLS. On at least five occasions, I sent to the regional office, 

and I have records of it, instances of misdeed that he was doing 

that certainly warranted an investigation, and it was not until I reported the Southwest overflight of the AD, that investigation actually occurred to my knowledge. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Mills, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me the time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Carney, the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We just came off of our votes and I was down on the floor, speaking with a number my colleagues, and they really had question as 

to why all of a sudden American and Delta and United pulled significant chunks of their fleet down for inspections all at once. We 

hear about the creep in the system, and certainly I have to echo 

Mr. DeFazio’s concerns about this. 

I would like your assessment on why this is going on now, suddenly, Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Like I spoke about earlier, ATOS is generic and it 

was designed to be generic for all 121 carriers. I believe the FAA 

ensured that all 121 carriers would fall under the ATOS oversight 

program sometime in 2007 or early 2008. 

In doing so, the baseline inspections that were required by ATOS 

in the early days, the baseline requirement for inspections was a 

little bit higher, and I don’t know the numbers exactly. But if we 

48 

are to base our oversight system on data alone and then we have 

reduced the requirement for the data, the data points being inspections, how can we say that we have raised the bar? 

I mean it seems like we are complacent with the fact that we are 

at the safest time ever. If we are not looking enough, which is evident by last week’s groundings, how can we say we are safer or we 

have raised the bar? 

I mean it is pretty obvious to know that these generic requirements, they do apply to small carriers and they do apply to large 

carriers, and ATOS brings a lot of good questions and discoveries 

when doing these inspections. There really is. There are some really great tools. 

However, I don’t believe it has been properly executed for carriers like the larger carriers where you have got several fleet types, 

engine types and several different types of operations. You can’t 

look at that and use those baseline data points that you would for 

a smaller operation that might fly domestically. 

Our guidance is it is almost like an assumption that we should 

automatically increase our surveillance activity based on the number of aircraft that we have, and we do have risk indicators, but 

the risk indicators only raise it to a level of high which is still a 

baseline requirement of two inspections per year. 

Had we been doing more, I think we would have found the problems that we found last week throughout the past history and several years prior. But this basically happened all at once where we 

were going to look at them all, and I think it is evident that our 

oversight, at least of the AD management, which was the only one 

that we looked at last week, is inadequate. 

Mr. CARNEY. I am trying to get a sense then. Do you think that 

this is coincidental with the announcement of today’s hearing or 

did today’s hearing startle enough folks to say maybe we ought to 

take a look at our airplanes? 

Mr. PETERS. I think we looked at it after the media coverage. 

The FAA decided to reassure the public that we didn’t have a problem. Unfortunately, with all the groundings, it had a negative effect. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes, it did, absolutely. 

This is for all of you. Do you believe that the regional management team was trying to play down the seriousness of any of these 

issues? 

Mr. Mills? 

Mr. MILLS. Without question. The phone that I got just prior to 

my dismissal couldn’t have been more cryptic. When the staffer 

says, under his breath almost, Mr. McGarry wants to keep this 

very quiet and very low key, what else could that mean? I was dismissed five days later. 

Mr. NACCACHE. I was his assistant, and I agree with that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Anyone else? 

Okay. Mr. Cotti, you state in your testimony that Mr. 

Gawadzinski ‘‘often took positions and made decisions that defied 

FAA logic.’’ Could you please elaborate? 

Mr. COTTI. Sure. For that entire two-year period, issues would 

pop up such as the application of our enforcement policies, things 

like how we managed our inspection oversight program, that he exVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
49 

pressed positions or made decisions that just made no sense in the 

context of the issue or how it was governed by our guidance. 

Things like the aviation safety program information where mechanics can disclose to the agency that they have done something 

wrong and if it fits certain criteria, in the interest of safety, the 

FAA accepts that information. 

He took a position—where de-identified information, information 

where the mechanic’s name had been removed and the core safety 

information remained—he took the position that that information 

went into a black hole where no one outside of this very small 

event review committee, which is made up of the airline management, the labor group and the FAA, that the information could not 

be shared in any way outside of that group. 

And when the manager, Mr. Mills, attempted to rectify that situation so that that data could be used for the purpose with which 

it was intended, he was very resistant to that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Did they defy the law, never mind FAA logic? I 

know you are not a lawyer, but I am asking. 

Mr. COTTI. Right. I don’t know that it violates any sort of law. 

I mean each situation would be looked at differently, but certainly 

it was contrary to our policies and, as I expressed earlier, it just 

didn’t make any sense. Why would you tightly guard and prevent 

that information from being disseminated to appropriate folks 

when that was the whole purpose of gathering that data? 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am a little over my time. 

Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is quite all right. 

Ms. Hirono. 

Well, first, Mrs. Capito, do you have any? 

All right. The gentlewoman from Hawaii, Ms. Hirono. 

Ms. HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think what really is described here is the too close relationship, 

of course, between the regulators and the regulated with people 

who come from the private sector, i.e., working for airlines, moving 

into the FAA as employees and vice-versa, not to say that that in 

and of itself is a problem. 

I realize that the Chair has said that maybe one of the ways that 

we can prevent too cozy a relationship is to rotate the assignments. 

Do any of the panelists have any other suggestions on how we can 

prevent the too cozy relationships from arising? 

Mr. MILLS. I think perhaps Mr. Sabatini has a good idea in having some mechanism through which lower level managers can have 

a voice unfettered by a dysfunctional superior. I am not sure how 

that would work, but it seems to me that newspapers have ombudsmen. I can’t say the word, ombudsmen. 

Ms. HIRONO. Ombudsmen. 

Mr. MILLS. And there are many entities out there where you 

have a no-fault avenue to take your concerns. 

In the case of the Southwest region, it was unwritten but understood policy that we would never go outside the chain of command 

without some serious repercussions. And, at the point where I was, 

I wasn’t sure who was connected to what, concerning Mr. 

Gawadzinski. So I was very careful in whom I should speak to and 

50 

fearful of the consequences that might occur if I did get out of that 

loop. 

Ms. HIRONO. Any of the other panelists care to respond? 

I know, Mr. Boutris, in your testimony, you raised some concerns 

about that kind of a system when you, yourself, were so clear in 

what you were pointing out. 

I have another question especially to the first three panelists. As 

more and more of our aircraft maintenance is outsourced, do you 

have concerns that this makes it even harder for the FAA to maintain the kind of oversight over maintenance because so much of the 

maintenance is out of our Country? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. I believe that we should be concerned about that. 

I hear statements and I read that the regulation applies the same 

way if you do maintenance in this Country or if you do maintenance in another country. Well, I can tell you the requirements are 

not the same. 

In this Country, the aircraft mechanics have to take a drug and 

alcohol test. In other countries, there is no requirement for that. 

Also, in our Country, the mechanics have a duty time where they 

have to take time off after so many days. There is no requirement 

in other countries to do that. So we do have differences. 

As for oversight, it is harder to go and perform surveillance, but 

on the same token I don’t want this to sound like every country 

that offers aircraft maintenance is bad because a lot of countries 

out there that offer aircraft maintenance are a lot better than, 

sometimes, our own maintenance. 

But for surveillance, for me, I participated three times for oversight for different repair stations. I want to tell you that that was 

part of the work group when they came out to do these team inspections on the repair stations because, for example, I am on 

Southwest Airlines. If Southwest Airlines sends engines or their 

aircraft, for example—well, in Brazil, for example, Southwest Airlines has a contract with General Electric. The engines go to Brazil 

GE and that is where some of the engines get overhauled. 

Now if I went over there for Southwest Airlines, I did my inspection for Southwest Airlines, I came back, and I reported my findings based on the regulation and the Southwest Airlines procedures. Now if somebody worked for American Airlines, they go 

down there to do the same thing. If you work for Continental, you 

go down there to do the same thing. 

So they came up to do the team inspections. Instead of sending 

100 people, you just send a team of people. And then you can take 

that report and, based on that, you can look at the findings. 

Well, my question to the work group was when they were in the 

process of coming up with this team inspection was when I go down 

there or any repair station outside the United States, one of the 

questions specifically states: Does the repair station follow the air 

carrier’s procedures? 

As you know, the air carrier’s procedures take precedence over 

the regulation because we approve some of them, and we make 

sure that they follow the regulation and they meet the regulation, 

and that is why the procedures are approved. 

So my question was, if I go to Brazil, for example, and look at 

GE engines that Southwest has in house for overhaul, I answer 

51 

that question just specific for Southwest, that GE is following 

Southwest Airlines’ procedures. 

Now how can you tell the inspector who works for Continental 

Airlines you have to accept that answer because I don’t know what 

Continental’s procedures are. I know what the regulations are, but 

each airline has above and beyond procedures in place for that. 

So the answer to that was from the group leader, that well, that 

is why they have CASS in place which is a Continuous Analysis 

and Surveillance System for an airline. So they are going back then 

to self-policing themselves. So if you are going to accept the answer 

from their program for the CASS program, why go and do the inspection at all? Just accept their whole inspection then. 

So you see there is disconnect there, and as of today that is what 

is happening. We are sending team inspectors out there to do team 

inspections, and then you look at their findings, and then you accept what they have found. However, you are not ensuring that 

your airline is really part of it. 

Ms. HIRONO. Mr. Chairman, is my time up? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Your time is expiring. 

Ms. HIRONO. I saw a hand. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. If you have a follow-on comment, you may do it. 

Ms. HIRONO. Well, I saw a hand going up, Mr. Peters, and really 

briefly if you care to comment. 

Mr. PETERS. Well, it will be brief, and I would like to respond 

to that. 

If we are having trouble seeing the carriers in the Country, how 

can we effectively oversee carriers that are outsourcing their maintenance? 

The inspection team that would go and inspect this foreign repair 

station to the air carrier’s standards would have to be very familiar 

with that particular air carrier, and in the ATOS world that is an 

air carrier specific briefing that is a requirement by each certificate 

office that oversees the carrier that they are assigned to. 

So, how can we say that it is an equivalent level of inspection 

when we have inspectors that do a great job in an international 

field office that might go in once a year for recertification of that 

repair station, not know American or Southwest or United or whatever the carrier’s procedures are? 

It takes quite a bit of time and effort. These carriers are so complex and their maintenance program is embedded in several different areas throughout the carrier manual system. For us to go in 

there and give it a one shot quick inspection, calling it a recertification and not knowing how the system works for that particular 

carrier, I don’t think we could honestly say to the Committee or to 

the flying public that it is an equivalent level of safety. 

Ms. HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you again. 

I am sure, at least if the way things normally happen in Congress happen again in regard to this issue, we will have a discussion about resources to the FAA budget, money, allocations. 

Is what we are talking about here in this discussion today, is it 

related exclusively to management, to personnel, to management 

52 

style, practice and operator’s manuals and instructions? This is a 

management issue, not a funding issue, is that accurate? 

Mr. PETERS. We are not. Down in the field level, we don’t really 

know the particular budget issues, but I can tel you that for the 

fleet that I am responsible to manage, from the maintenance aspect, we are severely understaffed. 

Mr. MORAN. As a result of that being severely understaffed, is 

the consequence the one that we are talking about today or this is 

a totally different topic? 

Mr. PETERS. Well, I will be real honest with you. The notice that 

was put out last week, every issue that I had on my fleet, I had 

to put it to the back burner. 

Prior to that, the aircraft that I am responsible for was basically 

generating occurrences around the Country, and one of them is in 

the news today about the 757 windshield crack. All of those investigations, they take resources. I mean they require myself and possibly another inspector to go and investigate those occurrence or incidents that happen throughout the Country. 

We have got our surveillance, our regular surveillance duties 

that we are required to do along with managing the certificate. So 

if we are just reacting to the fires, we can’t assure the air carrier 

or the flying public that—I don’t want to say that they are safe because, of course, they have a process in place that is designed to 

keep them safe, and it is not getting the intention that we need 

due to the lack of resources that our surveillance and investigations require. 

Mr. MORAN. So volume and staffing levels are an issue. 

Mr. PETERS. I would say they are. I couldn’t say truthfully that 

they are not. 

Mr. MORAN. But the circumstances that we are exploring with 

you here today, they have occurred not as a result of lack of money 

but a lack of management. Is that fair? 

Mr. PETERS. I think so. 

Mr. MORAN. Anyone disagree with that? 

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would call it a failure of management, not a 

lack of management. 

Mr. MORAN. You are a more precise wordsmith than I, and I 

agree with your choice of words. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Forgive me, Mr. Naccache, if this is a repeat of a question you 

have already been asked, but can you describe the type and level 

of harassment that was inflicted on Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters for 

reporting things they thought were problems that needed to be reported? 

Mr. NACCACHE. The description is it was very intense. 

Mr. HALL. I will just try to keep this brief and little more general. We hear testimony about national security issues relating to 

aviation, and it seems that the FAA is trying to encourage and we 

are all trying to encourage a culture or an atmosphere that would 

lead people to report problems that they see when it comes to national security, i.e., terrorism. 

53 

I am just curious why we don’t have the same emphasis regarding reports of safety problems like, for instance, skin fatigue and 

cracks that could have resulted in the sudden fracture and failure 

of the skin panels of the fuselage, consequently causing a rapid decompression which would have a catastrophic impact during flight. 

That is a physical threat to the physical security to the passengers 

and the crew. 

It seems to me that everyone, the FAA, certainly the airlines and 

the industry, ought to be at least as concerned about this as they 

are about on time arrivals or food service. What is more important 

to your image as a company and what is really more important to 

the agency, to the FAA, in terms of their charge? 

I am just curious what and maybe, Mr. Lambert, you would like 

to take a stab at this. Has this changed at all? What can we do 

to change it in terms of encouraging, not punishing, the reporting 

of problems that may actually be threats to safety of passengers 

and crew? 

Mr. LAMBERT. Well, I think we have systems in place for that, 

maybe not adequate, but the systems we have in place don’t take 

into effect a manager or supervisor that totally decided not to comply with the rules the FAA has provided in the authority they are 

given. I don’t know that we have anything that can fix that right 

now. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Naccache, do you care to? 

Mr. NACCACHE. Yes, I do agree with him. 

And I remember concerning Mr. Boutris and Peters I sent an email—let me see just a second here—on April 19 to all the supervisors. I was then Acting Manager. I sent an e-mail on April 19, 

directing them to do their part in reducing tension in any perceived 

adverse action concerning Mr. Boutris who was the subject of a recent anonymous letter. 

He could not have a private phone conversation without everything said being repeated around the office, and Mr. Boutris was 

to come to my office often and complaining. So I directed the supervisors that day the directive to make sure that they were sharing 

this information with their employees and to try to stop that. 

Then I had some other information that Doug Peters was to come 

and let me know that some of the inspectors always gave him dirty 

looks, rudeness towards them. They were also badmouthing them 

to the carrier. 

Mr. Boutris was also put as a persona non grata in all maintenance meetings, which I was kind of shocked, and I discussed it 

with Mr. Gawadzinski. Apparently, Mr. Boutris informed me that 

day that one of his peers, Mr. Crabtree, requested that he not be 

present at any of the maintenance personnel meetings since he was 

shown that he had this letter, anonymous letter against him. They 

didn’t want him around to participate in any of the personnel meetings. 

Mr. HALL. Well, thank you, sir. 

My time has just expired, and I just wanted to comment that on 

the passenger side I have seen signs in airports telling the public 

if you see something, say something. I have seen the same signs 

in New York City subways, by the way. We are, on one hand, trying to tell the customers and the passengers to speak up if you see 

54 

something wrong, but when our inspectors, when they try to do the 

same thing, they are harassed and, in effect, told to be quiet or removed from their positions. 

I, and I assume other Members of this Committee, will be working to make sure that the FAA helps guide the airlines and themselves in the direction of encouraging openness and honesty in the 

interest of safety and the security and airworthiness of the planes. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman. 

Chairman Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I could ask a lot of questions. I think we could 

probably keep this panel here for another few hours. I am anxious 

to get to the next panel actually, but let me make a couple of comments. 

One is a follow-up to my friend from Kansas, Mr. Moran, who 

asked the question, is this a matter of funding or is it a management personnel issue. 

I would just like for the record for people to understand that numerous times when the Administration and representatives, both 

the Administrator and others representing the FAA have testified 

before the Aviation Subcommittee, we have asked that question: Do 

you have adequate numbers? Do you have adequate inspectors in 

order to do the job or do you need more? 

The answer has always been we could always use more, but we 

have adequate numbers. 

I have said, if you need more, tell us, and we will attempt to provide the funding so that you can hire more inspectors. 

They have never come back, to my knowledge, with a number, 

certainly not to me and certainly not to this Committee. 

So I want to make that very clear, that it is not a matter of the 

Administration or the FAA requesting additional inspectors. We 

have asked that question. They have said, we have adequate numbers. 

Number two is that I think it is worth noting that in the reauthorization bill that we passed on September 20th in the House, 

that we have historical levels in the reauthorization bill to accomplish a number of things including hiring additional inspectors because it is our belief and certainly my belief that we need to hire 

additional inspectors. 

I wanted to make both of those points on the record so that they 

were not missed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to keep the panel. 

I mean they have been very generous with their time, but I wanted 

to go back again to Mr. Boutris’ testimony. 

I think the question is, at least among us—we may hear differently from some of the Administration witnesses—there is a 

larger problem than one rogue guy, and the question becomes how 

do we deal with this more systemically. 

I guess one of the proposals is to have a hot line, and I thought 

Mr. Boutris’ criticism of that was pretty well taken. I would like 

him to comment, and others, where you say if management doesn’t 

55 

respond when I openly and on the record raise serious safety concerns, how is a hot line going to work? 

I guess the answer is they say, well, you go higher up in the 

agency. But then you go on to say, well, basically, I had a similar 

hot line system in place that inspectors do not trust because hot 

line complaints on safety issues end up on the FAA Administrator’s 

desk. 

Then they are passed down to the local regional office. The local 

regional office assigns FAA security who doesn’t have technical expertise, and then the technical portion is reassigned to regional 

people who might be part of the problem to report on. In the end, 

not much happens. 

Can anybody else? Mr. Boutris, do you want to expand on that 

at all and anybody else who wants to comment on problems with 

the existing hot line? 

Because if the idea, if the solution is to establish yet another hot 

line, it sounds like this is a problem that needs to be addressed and 

maybe it needs to be somewhere outside of political appointees like 

the Administrator and other folks. Maybe there needs to be a 

whole—I don’t know. Could you address that? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Well, sir, I stand behind what I say there. If we 

already have one system and inspectors like myself don’t trust it, 

why burden the taxpayers on another system, no matter what you 

call it? 

Like you stated, what I have in my testimony, I openly and on 

record, for years now, I have been raising safety concerns, and I got 

nobody’s attention. How is the system gong to work? I do not know. 

But to me, what I want to state here is accountability and like 

I stated there, I will state it again, there is no accountability 

throughout the ranks in the FAA. 

Case in point, I have the new generation 737s. This fleet that 

was affected was not my fleet. The partial program manager that 

is the inspector for that fleet also was fully aware of the unsafe 

conditions seven days before I did, the same time that Mr. 

Gawadzinski was aware. So we cannot just hold Mr. Gawadzinski 

responsible. 

That inspector was in charge for that fleet, and he had knowledge at the same time that Mr. Gawadzinski had. He should have 

raised the flag, followed Title 49, followed our handbook on our responsibility which states: An inspector, who becomes aware of an 

unsafe condition on an aircraft that has been operating or about to 

be operated, must take immediate action. 

Did that inspector take that action? I don’t think so. 

Why should that be seven days later? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Where is that inspector now? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That inspector? 

Mr. BOUTRIS. That inspector is Mr. Collamore, and what really 

I don’t understand was after they removed Mr. Gawadzinski, the 

new manager that took Mr. Mills’ place promoted him in Acting 

Supervisor/Principal Maintenance Inspector. 

I wrote to Mr. Stuckey, e-mail after e-mail after e-mail. You are 

rewarding inspectors that look the other way, and I have a problem 

with that because the safety concerns I raised, they were seven 

56 

days later. Had this inspector done what I did, the airplanes 

wouldn’t be flying for seven days because Mr. Mills would have 

grounded them. 

So, to answer your concern, I think we need to start with accountability. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Anybody? 

Yes, Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Mr. DeFazio, I know it might seem like harsh words 

when I said that the management personnel with the responsibility 

and authority have proved themselves unworthy to be custodians 

of the public trust. That is my, that is coming from my heart. I 

really don’t. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You can see you feel very deeply about this. 

Mr. PETERS. Well, it is sad. It is sad that it has come to this, but 

it has, and we have to face reality. That is why Mr. Boutris and 

I were so persistent in getting the information forward to the Committee so that we can take appropriate action. 

If you are asking us what the appropriate action might be, I 

don’t think the FAA can be trusted to police itself in regards to this 

matter that you spoke about, with a hot line, I don’t see how that 

would help. 

An external organization, I don’t know what you would call it. 

Maybe we have an organization in place that could do that. Maybe 

give them more authority to come in and inspect what do, where 

we would have to provide evidential proof this is how we determined and this is how we got to where we are at in our inspections. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That is something to think about, Mr. Chairman. 

I liked your earlier idea on a legislative fix, but I think that is 

someone who would not be in that political chain of command and 

would be more responsive perhaps to these concerns. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think that is a very important line of consideration and one that we will have to explore. To address this issue 

takes more than one fix. It is going to take maybe a series of actions that will result in a change in the culture of the FAA. 

This lingering question about manpower, workforce and ATOS, I 

just go back to 1986, following the hearing our Subcommittee held 

on Galaxy Airlines. Here is this so-called airline. It had one flying 

Electra and two Hangar Queens from which parts were scavenged 

to supply the flying aircraft. 

When we uncovered all the wrongdoing behind the scenes of the 

management of that so-called airline, FAA rushed in half a dozen 

inspectors to oversee Galaxy, leaving a major air carrier in the 

Southwest FSDO with only a skeletal maintenance oversight crew 

of FAA inspectors. 

They were, in effect, making the FAA the maintenance provider 

for this scummy airline, and I say that with deliberate intention. 

I know, well, I won’t go into the disreputable operation of that carrier. 

So I went then to my good friend, Mr. Mineta, who was Chair 

of the Aviation Authorizing Subcommittee and said, when the appropriation bill comes to the House floor, I want you to join with 

me in offering an amendment to increase funding for the inspector 

workforce of FAA. He did. We offered an amendment to provide an 

57 

additional $10 million a year to hire at least an additional 1,000 

inspectors. 

The amendment passed, survived the Senate and conference, 

signed by the President and the FAA began expanding its workforce. We need to do that again. We need to expand that workforce. 

But when I made that move, it was with full participation and 

compliance—I shouldn’t say compliance—full partnership with the 

FAA top level management at the time. They said, you are right. 

We are understaffed. We need the help. Help us do this. 

We need that same attitude today instead of what Mr. Costello 

referred to a little bit ago. 

I want to come back to one of the fundamental issues here, and 

that is the voluntary self-disclosure. A non-compliance issue is eligible for self-disclosure without penalty if it is found by the airline 

first, correct? With no prior knowledge by the FAA, correct? 

That is a very fine line. If you have someone within the FAA who 

is tipping off the airline, then they can get to first base before the 

ball gets there. Is that right? 

Isn’t that a little bit of what happened here? 

Aren’t there some non-compliance issues that have been filed 

over the last couple of weeks that were previously allowed to be 

submitted as self-disclosure even though FAA knew about it? That 

then would have made them ineligible, isn’t that correct? 

Don’t nod because that can’t be recorded in the testimony. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Yes, sir. It is correct. If the FAA finds out about 

non-compliance first, the airline cannot self-disclose the violation. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. All right. We are going to explore this voluntary 

self-disclosure in more detail at the next panel. 

I also want to come to the customer service initiative. After what 

we have heard today, my opinion is that it ought to be withdrawn, 

repudiated, torn up, thrown away, and we ought to start fresh. I 

wonder what you think about that. 

Mr. COTTI. Mr. Chairman, I would be careful on throwing out the 

baby with the bath water. I believe that program has some merit, 

and in those cases where it did not work as advertised I think it 

would be more appropriate to rectify those situations. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You wouldn’t throw it out. You would modify it. 

Mr. COTTI. Yes, sir. I would put tighter controls on how it is 

being used. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. All right. 

Mr. Lambert? 

Mr. LAMBERT. Yes, sir. The customer service initiative was initially put in place to where if there was a disagreement between 

an inspector and a carrier, that it could be elevated to get the right 

guidance approved or whatever they needed. 

It has become a complaint system. If an air carrier doesn’t like 

a principal’s decision, they do it in a CSI because they know it will 

eventually get to you guys and they will get a decision in their 

favor more than likely because it becomes political at that point. 

It needs to be modified and used as was intended to get the guidance, the proper guidance to resolve the issue at the lowest level. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Other comments from other panel members? Mr. Peters? 

58 

Mr. PETERS. Well, last week, when I was conducting the AD inspections for my carrier, when I returned, I read an e-mail that referred to my carrier as a client. It is a little troubling for me to understand where I stand as an inspector, as a regulator when I am 

dealing with my client which, to be honest with you, I have never 

been trained on anything to do with a client other than enforcing 

the regulations. So it is kind of a gray area for some. 

I think it does have some benefit, like Mr. Lambert said, where 

we do work with a carrier and, if they need for resolution, they certainly need to have the avenue to raise their level or to raise their 

concern to somebody within the agency if they are not getting the 

proper response. 

But the client and customer initiative, as it is being used today, 

I don’t see the value. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. This is a multi-modal Committee. We have jurisdiction over all the modes of transportation except elevators. There 

was one year when there were more fatalities in elevators than 

there was in aviation. That was about 15, 20 years ago. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In the rail safety arena, in 1994, 1995, 1996, I 

found an astonishing practice between the freight railroads and the 

Federal Railroad Administration in which there were similar Railroad Safety Advisory Committees. 

The railroads sat down nicey-nicey, patty-patty with the Federal 

railroad inspectors while the members of the railroad brotherhoods—the signalmen, the maintenance workers, the conductors, 

the locomotive engineers—were saying there are serious safety 

problems on the railroads that are not being addressed because the 

Federal railroad inspectors are hand in hand, hand in glove with 

the railroads. I exposed that at a hearing and raised holy hell, put 

it this way, with the Administrator of FRA. 

The result was they changed that system. They didn’t use the 

term, customer, but instead of treating the railroads as a partner, 

they changed their mind set to: We are here to oversee safety. Our 

responsibility is to assure that you are running your railroad in a 

safe manner for employees, for the cities through which you operate and for the freight that you are carrying. 

And we need that same change of attitude. I don’t think that the 

role of the FAA is to consider the airlines as their customer. They 

are not a service organization to serve the airlines. Airlines are a 

service organization to their passengers. If there is a culture of customer, then it has to be by the FAA to the air traveling public. 

I think we need, yes, Mr. Cotti, I think some sort of cooperative 

arrangement where the airlines voluntarily bring information forward but one that is done within a regulatory framework. 

In the end, the airlines have the primary responsibility. There 

must be a culture of safety in the corporate board room. It must 

permeate the whole organization and so with the FAA. It has to 

start at the top. 

Every one of you witnesses here has shown that you have that 

culture of safety, that you have it in your soul and your heart and 

your spirit on every day and every piece of action that you take, 

and I want that demonstrated at the top in the FAA. 

59 

As long as the FAA thinks of the airlines as their client, thinks 

of the airlines as their customer, that culture of safety is not going 

to take hold and not going to permeate the organization. 

Oh, Ms. Johnson has arrived, our Chair of the Water Resources 

Subcommittee. At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman 

from Texas. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

I ask unanimous consent to put my statement in the record. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I apologize for having to leave out earlier, but I 

just want to be very quick with this. 

As I see the problem, I put most of the blame on FAA because 

if FAA inspects and reports it to the right avenue, then I cannot 

understand why an airline would not take heed. So what I would 

like to hear from you is where is the kink? Is it the buddy system? 

What is it? 

Where does it fall off the line? Anybody or all? 

Mr. COTTI. Ms. Johnson, I would submit that it becomes an issue 

of integrity. I think a lot of the issues we were talking about today 

have had to do with the integrity of one or several individuals. Integrity is one of the core values of our organization. 

And, I think there is lots of ways to look at this, but this wasn’t 

rocket science. This was there was an opportunity to make a decision, and the wrong decision was made, and I think it goes down 

to integrity with individuals 

Ms. JOHNSON. Do you think rotating employees? 

I know that it takes a certain amount of expertise for the inspectors, but it seems to me that when people stay in one place a long 

time they kind of get accustomed to letting things slide based upon 

the fact that they don’t think it will be immediately that of a problem. 

I have been trying to think through where we start. Do we prohibit FAA employees from going to work for a private airline for 

at least two years after they leave FAA or what do you think? 

I know it has to start from the top, but it has not started from 

the top, it seems to me. So I am trying to deal with the problem. 

Mr. MILLS. Well, I think that would certainly be a step in the 

right direction. In this particular case, the employee who left the 

FAA and went to work for Southwest Airlines certainly raised the 

question in my mind about propriety and, because of that, I asked 

for an investigation of that instance. 

So I think it would be very helpful to have a waiting period before an inspector leaves the FAA and goes to work for industry. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Anyone else? Do you concur? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, I do. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 

I don’t want to leave an impression here about whether the situation under discussion today with Southwest and the FAA is limited only to this particular FSDO. 

Even if there were problems only with Southwest, it is clear that 

we have a structural problem at FAA. The problem at the operating level between the maintenance inspector and the air carrier 

60 

is evident in the testimony, but the chain of command above the 

inspector level was at fault, and that suggests that it could well be 

at fault elsewhere in the FAA and other Flight Standards District 

Offices. Correcting the problem at the top has to be our primary 

concern. 

I want to thank this panel for their candor, their integrity, for 

putting public service ahead of private interest and personal interest, for risking yourselves for the safety of the flying public. You 

have done aviation and aviation safety an immense service. Thank 

you. 

The panel is dismissed. 

Mr. BOUTRIS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Our next panel consists of the Honorable Calvin 

Scovel, Inspector General of DOT; Scott Bloch, Special Counsel, the 

U.S. Office of Special Counsel; Mr. Nicholas Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at FAA; Mr. James Ballough, the 

Director of Flight Standards Service; Mr. Thomas Stuckey, Manager, Flight Standards Division, FAA Southwest Region. 

I ask you all to rise, raise your right hand. Do you solemnly 

swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee in the 

matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth 

and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are sworn in, and we thank you for your 

presence at the hearing. 

Mr. Scovel, we will begin with you. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; THE HONORABLE SCOTT J. BLOCH, SPECIAL COUNSEL, U.S. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL; NICHOLAS A. 

SABATINI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION 

SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; JAMES J. 

BALLOUGH, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AND THOMAS STUCKEY, 

MANAGER, FLIGHT STANDARDS DIVISION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, SOUTHWEST REGION 

Mr. SCOVEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize, but if I may request what I hope will be a minor departure from protocol. I know the Committee’s time is limited. I estimate, however, that I will need about eight minutes for my oral 

statement in order to inform the Committee of our findings, our 

conclusions regarding FAA’s programs and our recommendations. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We do not want to limit witnesses arbitrarily by 

time. I want you to give your testimony and what you think is necessary in your oral remarks. Your written testimony, of course, will 

be part of the record, and I have read all of that already anyway, 

but please proceed. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, 

Members of the Committee. 

At the request of this Committee, we are reviewing FAA’s handling of whistleblower concerns regarding Southwest Airlines’ failure to follow a critical FAA airworthiness directive or AD. As you 

heard from the first panel, these are serious matters. 

61 

Let me clear. The events at Southwest Airlines and the actions 

of an FAA inspector represent significant breakdowns in safety 

oversight that unnecessarily increased risk to the traveling public. 

We also have concerns about FAA handled the matter, and we are 

deeply troubled by the treatment of the whistleblowers. Corrective 

actions are urgently needed to strengthen FAA’s oversight and prevent similar problems from recurring. 

Before I discuss these matters in detail, let me highlight some 

key facts. The AD in this case required Southwest to inspect the 

fuselages of its Boeing 737s for potential cracks. FAA issued this 

AD in response to the Aloha Airlines 737 incident in 1988 where 

an aircraft lost a major portion of its fuselage in flight, resulting 

in one fatality and multiple injuries. 

According to FAA, when an air carrier determines that it has not 

implemented an AD, it is required to ground, immediately, all noncompliant aircraft. FAA inspectors share this responsibility by ensuring that this is done. 

We found, however, that Southwest did not have an effective system to ensure it completed these inspections. As a result, Southwest operated 46 aircraft in violation of the AD on over 6,000 

flights for up to 9 months, carrying an estimated 6 million passenger. Southwest discovered it had violated this AD on March 

14th of last year and notified an FAA principal maintenance inspector, a PMI, the following day. 

However, the PMI did not direct the airline to ground the affected planes as required and, Southwest continued to operate 

them for nine more days. The PMI permitted and encouraged 

Southwest to formally self-disclose the AD violation through FAA’s 

voluntary disclosure problem which allowed the airline to avoid 

penalties. 

FAA accepted the self-disclosure, even though multiple disclosures on AD violations had already been accepted. This should 

have raised the question of whether underlying problems had been 

corrected. Once it self-disclosed violation, Southwest stated that it 

had inspected or grounded all affected aircraft. 

However, two FAA inspectors, whistleblowers, reported that the 

PMI knowingly permitted Southwest to continue flying the identified aircraft. Southwest officials confirmed this and stated that the 

PMI gave them verbal permission to continue flying the aircraft. 

When Southwest finally inspected them, it found fuselage cracks in 

five. 

While these critical safety lapses indicate problem with an airline’s compliance, they are symptomatic of much deeper problems 

in several key areas of FAA oversight. 

First, problems with FAA’s partnership programs. We found that 

FAA’s Southwest inspection office developed an overly collaborative 

relationship with the air carrier which repeatedly self-disclosed AD 

violations without ensuring that a comprehensive solution was implemented. The balance has tipped too heavily in favor of collaboration at the expense of effective oversight and appropriate enforcement. 

Southwest violated four different ADs eight times since December, 2006 including five in 2008. Lack of FAA oversight in this area 

appears to allow rather than mitigate recurring safety violations. 

62 

Partnership programs can help to identify and correct safety 

issues, using information that might not otherwise be available. 

However, FAA cannot rely too heavily on self-disclosures at the expense of rigorous oversight and appropriate enforcement. 

Second, weaknesses in FAA’s national oversight allowed the 

problems at Southwest to go undetected for several years. Red flags 

were flying and should have been warning signs to FAA. 

As early as 2003, one of the whistleblowers expressed concerns 

about Southwest’s compliance with ADs. In 2006, he began urging 

FAA to conduct system-wide reviews, but FAA did not begin these 

reviews until after the details of the March, 2007 disclosure became public. 

In fact, we found that FAA inspectors had not reviewed 

Southwest’s system for compliance with ADs since 1999. At the 

time of the Southwest disclosure, 21 key inspections were overdue 

since more than 5 years had elapsed since the last inspection date. 

As of March 25th, 2008, FAA still had not completed at least five 

of these required inspections with eight years having elapsed since 

the last inspection date in some cases. 

We have identified problems with FAA’s national program for 

risk-based oversight in the past. For example, in 2005, we found 

that inspectors did not complete 26 percent of planned inspections 

and half of these were in identified risk areas. We had recommended the need for greater national oversight in 2002 and 

again in that 2005 report, and this is still needed today. 

Third, problems with FAA’s process for conducting internal reviews and ensuring appropriate corrective actions. In the Southwest case, FAA’s internal reviews found, as early as April, 2007, 

that the PMI was complicit in allowing Southwest to continue flying aircraft in violation of the AD. 

FAA did not attempt to determine the root cause of the safety 

issue or begin enforcement action against the carrier until November, 2007. Too much attention was focused on the messenger, not 

on fixing legitimate safety concerns. This also raises questions 

about FAA’s ability to investigate safety allegations raised by inspectors. 

We are deeply troubled by the fact that FAA failed to protect the 

whistleblowers from retaliation. For example, after one whistleblower voiced his concerns to FAA, Southwest lodged an anonymous hot line complaint against him according to the PMI. The 

complaint was nonspecific and never substantiated, but the inspector was removed from oversight duties for five months. 

However, FAA did not suspend other inspectors who were subjects of similar complaints, including the PMI who admitted that 

he had allowed Southwest to continue flying in violation of the AD. 

Our work at Northwest Airlines found the same problem with 

FAA’s handling of an inspector who reported legitimate safety concerns. As with the inspector in the Southwest case, FAA managers 

reassigned the experienced inspector to office duties and restricted 

him from performing oversight on the carrier’s premises based on 

a complaint from the airline. The inspector’s safety concerns were 

later validated. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. By complaint from the airline, you mean Northwest? 

63 

Mr. SCOVEL. Northwest, yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. Okay. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Both the Southwest and Northwest cases demonstrate that FAA must take steps to improve how it investigates 

safety issues and protects employees who bring important safety 

issues to light. 

Finally, I would like to turn to the actions needed to prevent 

these events from occurring again. As the Committee is well aware, 

FAA has taken actions but only after events became public last 

month and this Committee’s investigation was well underway. 

FAA has proposed to fine Southwest over $10 million and initiate 

a review of AD compliance at Southwest and other air carriers. 

These actions are necessary but long overdue, given the overflight 

was discovered a year ago. FAA must take actions to improve oversight of all air carriers, strengthen the use of partnership programs 

and restore confidence in the agency’s ability to conduct oversight. 

In addition to steps underway, we recommend that FAA establish an independent body to investigate inspector concerns, periodically transfer supervisory inspectors to ensure reliable and objective air carrier oversight, revise guidance to ensure that air carriers take corrective actions to address violations identified through 

self-disclosure, implement a process for second level review of selfdisclosures before accepting and closing them, implement a process 

to track field office inspections and alert local, regional and headquarters offices to overdue inspections, and revise post-employment 

guidance to require an appropriate cooling off period for inspectors. 

My office will continue to examine FAA’s oversight approach 

from a national perspective as requested by the Chairman. We 

must ensure that these problems are not repeated and that corrective actions are properly implemented. We will report to you on our 

progress as well as other steps that can be taken to enhance safety. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I welcome questions. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for a very strong, hard-hitting, straightforward statement. 

Mr. Bloch. 

Mr. BLOCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Mr. 

Petri, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity 

to discuss the work of the U.S. Office of Special Counsel regarding 

today’s important hearing. 

OSC exists as the chief protector of whistleblowers and the enforcer of the Whistleblower Protection Act. 

The French have a saying: La plus ca change, la plus c’est la 

meme chose, which translates the more things change, the more 

they stay the same. 

Things have changed in air travel but too much has stayed the 

same like safety, compliance and oversight. Management at FAA 

has fostered a culture of convenience and complacency which compromises safety. 

In this case, thousands of real passengers were put at real risk 

because of FAA’s breach of duty. The work of my office over the 

last four years shows this is not merely an isolated instance of one 

manager’s cozy relationship with the airlines. It shows FAA has a 

64 

preference for reprisal against courageous whistleblowers who 

point out breaches by management. 

Through the efforts of this Committee, my office and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Inspector General, it is my hope real 

change will result in better compliance, greater transparency and 

more effective FAA oversight. 

In recent years, whistleblowers have made disclosures to my office of wrongful conduct by officials and employees of the FAA, conduct that endangers public safety. 

Last July, I found there was a substantial likelihood that Anne 

Whiteman and other air traffic controller whistleblowers at DallasFort Worth were correct in the disclosure that FAA managers at 

DFW were systematically covering up operational errors made by 

air traffic controllers. No one would listen to her concerns until she 

made her disclosures to us. 

Similar disclosures by Ms. Whiteman in 2004 were investigated 

by the DOT Inspector General after OSC substantiated them. The 

IG report noted a seven-year management practice of under-reporting operational errors, but two years later Ms. Whiteman alleged 

that nothing had changed. The IG had been conducting a thorough 

investigation and we expect a report soon. 

OSC has received disclosures from a former Flight District 

Standards Office manager, Gabriel Bruno, alleging that unqualified 

mechanics remain in the aviation industry because they have not 

been reexamined adequately. He and another whistleblower made 

closely related disclosures to us in 2003. 

We referred these to the DOT, and the IG investigated, recommending that FAA reexamine mechanics certified by St. George 

Aviation and reporting that the FAA was taking steps to do so. 

Mr. Bruno now alleges that despite FAA assurances, the public 

remains at risk. I, again, referred this matter to the U.S. DOT for 

investigation. It seems nothing has changed. 

In December, I found a substantial likelihood that FAA aviation 

inspectors, Bobby Boutris and Douglas Peters, had disclosed wrongful conduct involving FAA’s oversight of Southwest Airlines and 

several years of coverup by FAA of airline non-compliance. I ordered DOT to do a thorough investigation. 

They disclosed, the whistleblowers disclosed that the FAA principal maintenance inspector for Southwest Airlines knowingly permitted aircraft to operate in an unsafe condition. 

Higher management knew about what was going on and tried to 

keep Mr. Boutris from requiring Southwest’s compliance with airworthiness directives. Southwest Airlines had self-reported it had 

not completed with an FAA airworthiness directive on fuselage 

crack inspection only after it became obvious that the whistleblower was going to catch them in the violation. 

With the knowledge and approval of FAA officials, these aircraft 

remained in operation until overdue inspections could be accomplished. These inspections revealed fuselage cracks in the critical 

areas of the airworthiness directive. 

Southwest flew 1,400 flights, approximately, with those fuselage 

cracks. So passengers were put at real risk for the convenience of 

the FAA and Southwest Airlines. 

65 

When we receive the reports on these investigations, we will 

transmit our findings and recommendations to the President and 

Congress. Still, to ensure the flying public is not at risk, we must 

determine if there are system-wide problems at the FAA. So I have 

three recommendations. 

First, an expert commission should be established to investigate 

how the FAA could allow coverups that potentially endanger the 

flying public, investigate the complicity of the airline industry and 

recommend comprehensive reforms of oversight and airline safety. 

Second, more audits and no-notice inspections should be done by 

a better financed and staffed U.S. DOT Inspector General. The IG 

has the independence and knowledge to ensure better oversight 

and compliance but needs more resources. 

Third, wrongdoers and those who retaliate against them, against 

whistleblowers should receive real discipline to punish behavior, 

set the example and reassure the public that they are protected by 

effective oversight. 

These proposals are justified and safety demands them. Otherwise, we may think we have caused things to change while they 

have, in fact, stayed the same or become worse. 

Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Bloch. 

And now Mr. Sabatini. 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Turn the microphone on. We want to hear every 

word. 

Mr. SABATINI. Sorry about that. I have been here enough times. 

I should know about that button. 

Mr. Chairman, Chairman Oberstar, Congressman Petri and 

Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear 

before you once again. 

With me today is Jim Ballough, Director of the Flight Standards 

Service and Tom Stuckey, Manager of the Flight Standards Division in the Southwest region. 

Today, I would like to put into context the truly disturbing incident that occurred last year when Southwest Airlines knowingly 

continued to fly passengers after they learned that they had overflown an airworthiness directive that required an inspection for 

cracks in the aircraft fuselage. 

That an airline of Southwest’s reputation would ever think that 

flying passengers in non-compliant aircraft was appropriate is astounding to me. Even more alarming and upsetting to me is that 

this was done with the implicit consent of one of my aviation safety 

inspectors. 

I want to state at the outset and in the most unequivocal terms 

that it is never permissible for any airline to continue to operate 

commercial flights that are in non-compliance with an AD, and no 

one in the FAA, not the Acting Administrator, not me, not Jim, not 

Tom, has the authority to allow such operations. And, frankly, even 

if we did, none of us would allow it. It flies in the face of everything 

we stand for. 

This is such a fundamental tenet of aviation safety that it is not 

surprising that the events of last year are receiving the amount of 

attention that they are today. I will not condone or defend anyone 

66 

who was responsible for or complicit in the events surrounding the 

decisions made to operate those flights. Following our investigation, FAA issued a $10.2 million proposed 

civil penalty to Southwest Airlines for their actions in this matter. 

The amount of the civil penalty reflects the fact that the airline 

knew they were in non-compliance and deliberately continued to fly 

the aircraft in commercial operations rather than grounding them 

as was required. 

We know this because the airline voluntarily reported its noncompliance to an FAA principal maintenance inspector, the PMI, 

who failed to ensure that the affected aircraft were grounded. The 

inspector is the subject of an ongoing personnel action and has 

been removed from aviation safety inspector duties. 

We also know this because one of the inspectors working in that 

office expressed repeated concerns about the PMI and ultimately 

reported the Southwest Airlines incident to the Administrator’s hot 

line. 

So where do we go from here? As an agency, we must accept responsibility for our mistakes, understand why they were made and 

implement safeguards to prevent them from happening again. That 

is why Acting Administrator Sturgell and I announced yesterday a 

five-point plan that addresses the issues of responsibility, accountability, communication and ethics. I believe these initiatives will 

help ensure that our rules are being followed. 

First, in order to assure our employees that they are encouraged 

to raise their concerns without fear of reprisal, we are going to develop and implement a safety issues reporting system by the end 

of the month. SIRS, its acronym, provides a totally new avenue for 

employees to raise their issues, to get attention and results. 

Second, we are initiating a rulemaking to address post-employment ethics concerns. We want to consider a cooling off period to 

ensure that there is greater objectivity when overseeing or working 

with a previous employer. 

Third, we are gong to work with the manufacturers and carriers 

to help clarify the rules themselves to improve effective implementation. 

Fourth, we will amend the voluntary disclosure program to require that senior airline officials sign off on the reports to ensure 

that there is awareness at the highest levels of the airline of what 

types of deviations are occurring within their system. 

And, finally, we are accelerating the expansion of our aviation 

safety information and analysis program. Now that we have all 117 

carriers participating in ATOS, we are blending this oversight data 

with our other data sources to enhance our ability to protect nationwide trends and provide a better perspective on the health and 

safety of the system. 

In addition to this plan and to ensure that what happened with 

Southwest Airlines was an isolated problem and not a systemic 

one, I ordered a special emphasis surveillance, the first phase of 

which has just been completed while a second, more comprehensive 

phase is ongoing. 

Our initial findings validate that our systems safety approach of 

oversight is working as intended. Over 99 percent of the ADs 

checked are being complied with by U.S. commercial carriers. 

67 

Most importantly, if there was a question about the technical 

compliance with an AD, the carriers grounded the affected aircraft 

rather than take a chance that they were in non-compliance. This 

is certainly the right response to a potential safety risk. 

While it is certainly not my intention to underplay the severity 

and egregious nature of what happened at Southwest Airlines, the 

initial findings of the special emphasis surveillance support what 

we all know to be true. By any standard, this is the safest period 

in the history of aviation. I say this every time I appear before you 

because I am extremely and extraordinarily proud of the hard work 

and dedication it took by the thousands of safety aviation professionals in both industry and the FAA to get us to this point. 

It is not a miracle, it is not a coincidence, and it is not good luck. 

It is finding a way to identify and focus on risk in order to effectively address it before it can result in an accident. Clearly, the accident rate reflects that this is working. 

One of the reasons we have been able to do what we have done 

so effectively is because of the important information we receive 

from the airlines, their employees and even their aircraft through 

voluntary reporting programs. Without these programs, we had access to such limited information, less than 5 percent of what we are 

receiving now. Identifying and responding to risk often involved 

using information we learned about as a result of an accident. 

Because of these programs, we now have access to a great deal 

of information that we can analyze and evaluate to assist in identifying trends that point to the risk we need to stay ahead of. Again, 

the accident rate supports that using the information obtained 

through these programs is effective. 

It is entirely appropriate for us to discuss how these programs 

are implemented and where the line should be drawn between getting the information and taking enforcement action. I am happy to 

talk about this today and at any time in the future, but it is my 

hope that as we assess what happened at Southwest Airlines or the 

value of reporting programs or the relationship between FAA and 

industry, we do not lose sight of the fact that the system is safe, 

and I will continue to work as hard as I can to keep it safe. 

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer your questions at this 

time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ballough. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Mr. Chairman, the FAA had one opening statement, and we stand ready to answer your questions. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay, neither you nor Mr. Stuckey has a comment. Thank you very much. 

Well, very powerful testimony, Mr. Scovel, Mr. Bloch and a very 

interesting rebuttal, in a sense, response from Mr. Sabatini. 

Mr. Scovel, you say corrective action is urgently needed, and 

then you set forth several specifics: an independent body to investigate inspector concerns; transfer supervisory inspectors, that is 

move them around within the system, so they don’t get too comfortable. 

The State Department does that with our overseas personnel. 

They get three years at one station. They are moved to another. 

The military does that. The Corps of Engineers does it with district 

68 

engineers, division engineers. It seems a pretty good practice, so 

people don’t get too cozy and comfortable with those they are overseeing. 

Revise the guidance. Now, what guidance are you referring to 

there? Is that the voluntary? 

You address self-disclosure the next recommendation. Do you include that in your proposal to revise guidance? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Your question doesn’t refer to post-employment 

guidance, Mr. Chairman. You are talking about self-disclosure programs? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Revise guidance, this is your third recommendation. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ensure that air carriers take corrective actions to 

address violations identified through self-disclosure. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Right. Our understanding of the voluntary disclosure reporting program now is that it envisions the inspector or the 

PMI, who receives the self-disclosure, reviewing it, making sure 

that it contains the required elements first of all, that if there has 

been an overflight, that the offending action has ceased immediately. 

Second, that there be a comprehensive corrective plan laid out, 

that there be an implementation timeline and that there be a follow-on audit planned. 

At least in this case, in the Southwest case, it is clear that the 

PMI basically simply rubber-stamped what Southwest had submitted. 

We would like to make clear by this recommendation that the 

PMI, the inspector and, if our other recommendation were to be accepted, for the second level approval authority, that they ensure 

that the air carriers take the corrective actions identified in that 

comprehensive corrective plan so that the basic underlying violations can be corrected. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is a very helpful clarification. 

Then track field office inspections and alert local regional headquarters office to overdue inspections. How would you envision setting up such a tracking system? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Let me begin to answer your question, sir, by noting 

what we found in the Southwest case. 

Our written statement makes clear that as of the date of this 

oversight, this overflight that we are examining here today, March 

of 2007, there were 21 key ATOS inspections that were overdue. 

These were ATOS inspections that should have been completed by 

the Southwest CMO that had not been done. And, in fact, at the 

top of that list and most egregious is the fact that the AD compliance program for Southwest had not been inspected by FAA’s CMO 

since 1999. 

Now you well know that ATOS was first implemented in 1998. 

Southwest was one of the first 10 or so carriers initiated into 

ATOS. The following year, 1999, the CMO did review the carrier’s 

AD compliance program, but it had not been reviewed since then. 

It should have been reviewed at least a five-year interval, making 2004 the drop-dead date. Yet, here we are sitting last year, 

March, 2007, AD compliance program not done. 

69 

Our question was why didn’t higher authorities in FAA know 

that? 

The data is sitting right there. We found it within the last month 

or two, yet it was clear to us that no one was beating on the door 

of the CMO, asking why have you not done these 21 key inspections and particularly the AD compliance program inspection. 

We think there has to be a way in this program to track, in the 

ATOS program, to track the progress of key inspections. When are 

they completed? Are they in danger of becoming overdue? 

And when they do become overdue or even in a short period of 

time before that, put up a yellow flag, notify the CMO that they 

are in danger of crossing the trip wire. Then people, higher headquarters in FAA needs to get on the CMO’s back and make sure 

that they follow through. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Now that makes very good sense, but I want to 

come back. Ten years ago, ATOS was initiated. I thought of it then 

as an adjunct, a supplement. It has become a replacement for the 

historic inspection procedure and process and has led to an overreliance on an automated system with very little personnel input 

and hands-on management of the system. I think that has led to 

this easy, cozy relationship. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Well, perhaps, Mr. Chairman. I can’t speak to how 

ATOS was originally envisioned or I hesitate to use the word, sold, 

in 1998, but how it was explained to you and others who are interested. 

But what has clearly happened with ATOS over the years is that 

it has evolved into a system for FAA, ideally in their view, to better 

target or better channel their limited inspector resources to areas 

of greatest risk. And that is we have identified that, as you well 

know, in our past work as an advantage we see to ATOS. 

Given the fact that we do have limited inspector resources, how 

can they be best used? Well, we think they ought to be targeted 

on the highest risk areas. 

How do I identify those risk areas? Through data, and that data 

is supposed to be collected through the ATOS program. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the right data isn’t put into the system, then 

it is not very useful. 

Mr. Sabatini, you mentioned, without naming him, Mr. 

Gawadzinski was removed from his position. What you didn’t say 

is he has been moved to another CMO at American, where he is 

doing paperwork at full salary. Is that an appropriate thing for him 

to do? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, sir, as you know. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I know he has employee rights, and I know he 

there is an entire procedure, but is this an appropriate place to put 

him after hearing what we heard this morning? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, Mr. Chairman, what we have done is put 

him in a position where he has absolutely no responsibility for safety decisions, and the investigation is not complete. We are waiting 

for the other agencies to complete their component. 

And, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, I consider what has happened here, egregious, and we will apply the full measure of the 

law when we have all the information that we need to take whatever action the law will allow. In the meantime, yes, sir, he is still 

70 

in the Dallas area, but he is not performing any function related 

to safety. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is encouraging, but I think he ought to be 

taken out of a CMO and put some place else. 

We heard from the whistleblowers this morning about your proposal to establish a hot line. They said, what good is a hot line 

going to do when we stood up, we put our names on or, in the case 

of Mr. Boutris, he put his name on reports time and time again, 

and nothing happened, and it went up the chain. 

What good is going to be accomplished by another hot line? 

Mr. SABATINI. This is more than just another hot line, Mr. Chairman, while it has certainly that as part of its component. What is 

absolutely essential is a clear communication I have already made 

with our management. 

Number one, I will not tolerate a management or any manager 

who does not develop and encourage an atmosphere of a safety culture, and that is the ability to report concerns that one may have 

to his or her supervisor. 

Secondly, if there is a professional difference, and this process 

does not exist today, there will be a rigorous and disciplined process subject to scrutiny by myself, personally, as well as my other 

leadership people in the management chain. It will require that if 

there is a professional difference, that that professional difference 

be documented and a control number assigned to it and, if it is not 

resolved at that level, it will move to the next level. 

It will have total transparency, and I will expect my service directors, as well as division managers and headquarters people, as 

well as regional people and field office management level people to 

review on a periodic basis the results of these controlled items. 

And, if someone still feels that there is reason to not use that 

system, then I don’t want them to just use the regular safety administrator’s hot line but one that clearly comes to my attention, 

and I will pay attention. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that it 

will be subject to my review. 

And I want to know if someone still feels that they cannot report 

to their supervisor. It will speak volumes if they have to choose to 

go around it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is very strong talk, and I appreciate hearing 

it. I want to propose to you, not propose but to tell you that I will 

institute a periodic review, say every six weeks, with Mr. Petri, Mr. 

Costello, Mr. Mica and myself and have you come in and your staff 

and review with us what you have done. 

Secondly, I want to point out a shortcoming of these hotlines. 

You may recall the hard landing several years ago of an air carrier 

flying from Tulsa to Kansas City and landed in a rainstorm, landed 

at Tulsa, a hard landing in a rainstorm. 

A ramp check was undertaken. They found no problems, but the 

ramp check was done by a maintenance crew not of the airline that 

had the hard landing and they were inspecting by a different 

standard. 

The aircraft went on to Kansas City. A flight attendant on board 

that aircraft knew that this aircraft was damaged. It was vibrating 

in a way that she knew there was something serious wrong. 

71 

She called the FAA in Chicago which was their next stop. When 

that aircraft landed in Chicago, an inspector jumped on the aircraft, looked at it and found a six-foot crack and grounded the aircraft. 

The next day that flight attendant was removed from duty by the 

airline. They knew who did it. 

Don’t let something like that happen to your hotline. 

Now you say the low accident rate reflects success of our work, 

but how can the program be called a success when 1,400 flights occurred with cracks in the hull of those aircraft? That is reducing 

the margin of safety. 

If you are looking at safety as a system, the system itself has 

cracks and they need to be fixed. I believe you have the public spirit to do that, but you are going to have to stand up to superiors 

as well just as those whistleblowers did this morning, stood up to 

their superiors at great risk, being removed from position, shifted 

out of duty, subjected to harassment. 

We can’t have a situation in which the customer calls the FAA, 

complaining about their service person, Mr. Boutris, to get him removed. That is intolerable, and I charge you with the responsibility 

to make sure that never happens again. 

Mr. SABATINI. I accept that responsibility, Mr. Chairman, and I 

can assure you that I welcome review by this Committee any 

time—three weeks, six weeks, any time. I will deliver to you 

changes that will be made as a result of what we have learned as 

a result of this. 

And let me for a moment address what I believe happened. What 

we have in place, because one of the witnesses said that I referred 

to a human risk that we identified. I would like to explain. We 

have processes in place to address how airlines are operated. We 

have a mirror image template so that inspectors can use it for the 

oversight. Those are processes. 

What I feel is one of the risks that have been identified is a failure on the part of the human in terms of integrity. Humans are 

very much a part of everything we do, and we are putting in place 

a process that assures that if someone fails that integrity test I will 

find out about it and I will take swift and summary action, I can 

assure you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. We will hold you to that. 

Mr. Petri? 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

begin by asking Inspector General Scovel if he has any reactions 

or comments on the catalog of initiatives that Mr. Sabatini has 

mentioned in his testimony here today as a result of reviewing this 

whole situation. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Thank you, Mr. Petri. Yes, I would, and I would like 

to address primarily what may be called the newest hot line or the 

newest communication channel. I don’t want to denigrate it. I don’t 

believe it would be prudent for me to preliminarily at this point, 

without data, cast doubt on any new communication channel. To 

the extent that it may help, even if only marginally, as Inspector 

General I would favor it; however, it begs the question, How will 

complaints similar to those raised by the panel this morning be investigated. 

72 

Mr. Sabatini has cast the SURS process as one where philosophical differences between inspectors and supervisors or different 

camps within a CMO might raise the question and have it resolved, 

yet I see all kinds of situations, like those that our panelists this 

morning addressed, that will perhaps come to Mr. Sabatini and 

others through the new process. Unless they are satisfactorily investigated, we are going to be back in the same situation we are 

today, with an insufficient investigation conducted on a catch as 

catch can basis within the aviation safety chain of command, and 

perhaps therefore suspect from the beginning as not being objective. 

What our statement has proposed as an alternative is the creation of an independent investigative body still within FAA but certainly out of the aviation safety chain of command, so it would be 

removed from under Mr. Sabatini and Mr. Ballough. 

We would suggest that FAA and the Congress consider marrying 

that up with the AOV system, which was created to handle safety 

complaints handled by air traffic controls. That was removed from 

the air traffic control organization and placed perhaps ironically 

under Mr. Sabatini. But in our experience with the investigative 

capabilities of that organization, we have been favorably impressed. 

However, if we were to marry the two of these up, we would suggest that it report directly at a much higher level than Mr. 

Sabatini or the air traffic organization. 

There was talk earlier today of taking it out from under the control of a political appointee, and that would certainly be a point to 

merit consideration, as well. 

Mr. PETRI. One practical thing with these hot line or other whistleblower, all these procedures, is that they can be abused. I mean, 

they can correct abuses, but they can also be used for all kinds of 

other hidden agendas or because of other disputes. So how do you 

separate the sheep from the goats? It seems to me there needs to 

be some willingness on someone when they use that mechanism 

that they are willing to stand behind. I mean, it should be secret. 

There shouldn’t be retaliation. But on the other hand, they should 

be accountable for raising this and putting the systems through all 

this. Otherwise, someone like Mr. Sabatini has 101 things he has 

to rely on his team, and the next thing you know they are saying, 

well, this was looked into. So how do you make this work in practice? 

Mr. SCOVEL. At times it can be very difficult, Mr. Petri. As an 

Inspector General, we have our own hot line, as well, and we run 

into that. 

We have several categories of complaints. We have complainants 

who identify themselves by name and contact information, and that 

is always most helpful because we can get back to them and seek 

to substantiate the basis of the complaint. We have other complainants who may identify themselves but ask to remain confidential. 

And, finally, we have complaints that are submitted anonymously, 

and oftentimes those are the most problematic. They may lack detail and, because we don’t even have a name or any way to contact 

the submitter, we are often at a loss. 

In fact, the situation that you identified happened in this very 

case with regard to Mr. Boutris. You will remember from this 

73 

morning that it was the PMI who identified to Mr. Mills that an 

anonymous complaint from Southwest had been submitted against 

Mr. Boutris, and in partial response to that Mr. Boutris was removed from his inspector duties for a period of five months. 

We have examined that particular complaint, and in my opinion 

as a former prosecutor and judge, and in the opinion of our investigators on my staff, we consider it baseless. There would have 

been good reason for FAA at the time not to have removed Mr. 

Boutris from his duties. The complaint was anonymous, it was nonspecific, it related to supposed actions that had no connection to 

Mr. Boutris’ performance of duties. I don’t think any reasonable 

person after performing that kind of scratch and sniff test would 

have questioned FAA if they had decided to leave a competent, 

dedicated inspector like Mr. Boutris on the job. Instead, they took 

him off. 

It is very much a problem. What do you do? How do you sort it 

out? All I can say is we apply common sense, good investigative expertise, and take it case-by-case. 

Mr. COSTELLO. [Presiding]. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Mr. Sabatini, tell us the current employment status of Mr. 

Gawadzinski, just very briefly. I have several questions that I want 

to ask, so be as brief as possible. 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Gawadzinski is currently still employed. He 

has been removed from his duties as a supervisory principal maintenance inspector and has been placed in another office, still in the 

Dallas area, where he has been relieved of any responsibilities related to safety inspector duties. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Under the rules of the Department, could you 

have suspended him with or without pay and relieved him of his 

duties under suspension? 

Mr. SABATINI. As you know, Mr. Chairman, there are definite 

rules on what we need to do to put this case together. 

Mr. COSTELLO. That is my question. My question is, Could you 

have suspended him with or without pay? 

Mr. SABATINI. Not at this point in time, sir. This investigation is 

still open, and we want to gather all the evidence. The Office of the 

Inspector General is still conducting its investigation, and when 

that is complete I will have all the information I need to apply the 

full measure of the law. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he the only employee at the FAA that disciplinary action was taken against thus far? 

Mr. SABATINI. Thus far. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And you heard the testimony of the whistleblowers. You heard the testimony of the IG, the Special Counsel. 

Surely you do not believe at this point that all of this falls on one 

employee at the FAA, do you? 

Mr. SABATINI. No, sir, I do not believe that it is just one employee. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would like you to elaborate on that. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I believe that there was a failure on the part 

of the leadership in the southwest region. 

Mr. COSTELLO. In the southwest region? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir. 

74 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let’s get to the point. We know that back in 2003 

through 2005 Mr. Boutris complained and said, Look, we know that 

there is compliance issues, and he raised those issues back as far 

as 2003. When did these issues reach your office headquarters in 

Washington, D.C.? When did you, not personally, but your office, 

become aware that issues have been raised concerning the CMO 

with Southwest? 

Mr. SABATINI. May of 2007. 

Mr. COSTELLO. May, 2007? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And when did you personally become aware of the 

issues, the safety issues that were raised by both Mr. Boutris and 

others? 

Mr. SABATINI. Several months thereafter. I don’t have an exact 

date, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So May of 2007 is when your office became aware 

of it, and you became aware of it several months thereafter? Why 

did it take so long for the FAA to take action either against one 

of your employees or assess the fine against Southwest? And it has 

been noted by the Chairman and others that the action was taken 

after this Committee started its investigation. So the question is, 

If you were aware of these issues back in your office in May of 

2007, why did it take this Committee to get involved to begin an 

investigation for your agency to act against the airline and your 

employee S? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I have looked at the data 

and what I have come to understand about this, for about two-anda-half years before the disclosure there were many activities that 

were undertaken by the leadership in the FAA’s southwest region. 

Now, I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have been a division manager. This is not theory to me. I practiced for ten years as a division manager. In looking at what happened, the division manager 

in the flight standards division in the southwest region, elected to 

give the information he received in his office, and some time in 

early April, the investigation was turned over to the security division, which is separate and apart from my organization. It would 

result, in essence, in being a third-party review. 

What I would have done differently was to not hand over the enforcement aspect of that investigation. What they had asked security to look at was the investigation of the impropriety of the individual supervisory principal maintenance inspector. I would have 

separated that out. We have the sole responsibility for the enforcement action and that should have been started immediately. 

However, there were several months where the security division 

conducted its investigation, and it was during that period of time 

that both the results of the impropriety on behalf of an employee 

was investigated, as well as a slow review—I don’t think it was intentionally slow—review of the enforcement process. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You heard the testimony of, again, the whistleblowers. You heard the testimony of the IG and the special counsel 

regarding this CMT and the concern, Is this a systematic problem 

or is it isolated? I want you to comment on that. 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Chairman, while evidence has not been given 

to me, although I asked for it, I have been told evidence doesn’t 

75 

exist to document the fact that this is systemic. What I have been 

told is that it could potentially be systemic, and I take that very 

seriously. 

So, while the evidence exists for the southwest region, I take that 

as a lesson learned and put in place what I have begun to describe 

in terms of the safety information recording system to assure that 

this doesn’t happen anywhere else. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I will have other questions after other Members 

have an opportunity to ask. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlemen from Oregon, Mr. 

DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let’s go back to what I think is partially the root of this whole 

problem, which is the erosion of the mandate which we reset in 

1996 to exclusively focus on safety to this customer service initiative, where regulated airlines became clients, which obviously is 

causing tremendous confusion among people who are supposed to 

be inspecting and regulating them. 

Who initiated the customer service initiative? Where did that 

come from? Mr. Ballough, you are a political appointee. The first 

time I heard about it was a Secretary at a speech, but where did 

this come from? Who wrote it? 

Mr. BALLOUGH. The customer service initiative, sir, was an AVS 

effort with all of the lines of business, all directors, from the respect of services in the AVS organization. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, you are using the language in all the lines 

of business. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Excuse me, sir. Let me clarify. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You are a Government agency. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And you are supposed to be regulating in the public interest for public safety, and the law very clear in 1996. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So could we address it as a Government agency, 

please. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Yes. The Agency took this initiative to address 

concerns and articulate rights for the industry, whoever they may 

be. It was intended to elevate a question, to get a right to an answer to a question that they would pose to us. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So the industry complained to whom? Was this initiated at the Secretary’s level? At the White House level? Or did 

professional employees other than politicals come and say, We need 

this customer service initiative? Are you telling me it was professional employees? 

Mr. BALLOUGH. This was in our safety organization, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So the safety organization, line employees, at what 

level? Since you are saying it was within the organization and it 

was professionally generated, do you want to tell me about this, 

Mr. Sabatini? Where did this come from? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, Mr. DeFazio, first let me say Jim Ballough 

is not a political appointee, he is a career service employee. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I am sorry. I forgot. I thought he was political. 

Mr. SABATINI. Sir, I would like—— 

76 

Mr. DEFAZIO. He came from here working for Republican staff, 

so I thought he was political. I am sorry. 

Mr. SABATINI. So let’s go back to the early 1990s, where industry 

came in and complained to Congress that there was a lack of responsiveness on the part of the FAA, who was heavy handed in 

how they were treating the air carrier industry. As a result of that, 

there was legislation creating—and it exists today—a Management 

Advisory Council, which is the MAC, and it is part of the mechanism that was put in place to improve the FAA and force us to listen to the concerns that business people have at that high level so 

that we can be responsive. 

The customer service initiative has been taken totally out of 

what it was intended to be. The customer service initiative, sir, is 

to treat anyone, whether it is a student pilot or a private pilot or 

an applicant for any one of our certificates, in a respectful, professional, courteous manner. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. I can understand that, but the question is 

it seems like this leans very far in the direction of where the airlines, companies worth tens of billions of dollars with tens of thousands of employees, become clients of individual inspectors. Clients? 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. DeFazio, let me say—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I mean, we seem to have a little confusion here. 

You heard from these people earlier. I do apologize, I was confusing 

Mr. Ballough with Mr. Ballough, who is a political appointee. 

Sorry. I apologize for that. It is spelled differently, too. 

Mr. SABATINI. The customer service initiative was never intended 

for anyone in our organization, in our safety organization, to ever 

start referring to people as clients. I heard that for the first time 

today, sir. That is unacceptable. 

What I am hearing is that we are going to re-calibrate and make 

certain that we are, in fact, not abandoning enforcement, that enforcement is part of our tools. That is part of how we gain compliance. 

What you said earlier this morning, Mr. Chairman, it is not just 

compliance with the rules. That is an absolute. It is also operating 

at the highest levels of safety day in and day out. That is what we 

strive for. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But, as you can understand, Mr. Sabatini, given 

the peculiar bent of this Administration to being, you know, rabidly 

anti-regulatory, it seems that somehow at some point to line employees the airlines became clients. I just wonder where that came 

from. 

Mr. SABATINI. Sir, I am the career senior safety officer in the 

FAA. I can tell you this: no one ever instructed me to treat entities 

differently than what they are in the regulations, and that is they 

are applicants. They are air carriers with the responsibility to comply with the rules. I was never challenged on safety decisions. So 

I take that responsibility and I also take the responsibility that we 

are going to re-calibrate this misunderstanding, because clearly 

there was a misunderstanding from what I heard today from the 

witnesses. And let me add I consider Mr. Boutris a hero and I commend him for coming forward, for having the integrity to come forward and the courage to do that. 

77 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Because a lot of the emphasis in this and materials 

provided, particularly the flow chart for how one would file a complaint and where it would go, it really seems to me that we sent 

out the wrong message here. I am just trying to get at whether this 

is totally inadvertent or whether we have political pressure applied 

here, as everywhere else in the Bush Administration where they 

are saying we don’t regulate, markets will regulate. God, no one 

would fly an airplane that was unsafe, because that would be bad 

for business when it crashes. Markets can regulate themselves, just 

like Wall Street just did. 

I am feeling like we are coming in sort of a situation here that 

is similar. Somehow this thing became perverted at the application 

level, at least in one region, and I fear in many more. And we are 

hearing from the IG he thinks the same thing. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, sir, I believe that it is inadvertent. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You believe it is inadvertent. I am glad to hear 

that, but I still will have questions. 

Mr. Chairman, I am over my time. I will have more questions in 

another round. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Ms. Johnson? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to pose this question to whomever, I guess the chief 

safety person. At what point was Southwest Airlines notified of the 

discrepancies in safety? 

Mr. SABATINI. They are the ones who discovered it. 

Ms. JOHNSON. But I hear you talking about a $10 million fine. 

What is your justification? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, prior to their time where they disclosed a 

possible noncompliance with the airworthiness directive, they had 

flown those airplanes for an extended period of time on thousands 

and thousands of flights. 

Ms. JOHNSON. With no paper trail of you telling them that that 

is not safe enough? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, it is the responsibility of the air carrier for 

them to comply with the rules. The FAA—— 

Ms. JOHNSON. I understand that, but you have inspectors to notify them when they are not in compliance, don’t you? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, when we discover noncompliance we do that. 

Ms. JOHNSON. But you had to wait for them to tell you about the 

problems they were having? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I would characterize it as we were informed, 

and when we were the people responsible in the FAA for taking 

swift and summary action and putting those aircraft on the ground 

failed to do that. During that period of time between notifying the 

FAA until the time that they did get those airplanes into compliance, they operated roughly 1,400 flights. The penalty is based on 

a calculation that is a formula that is in our Compliance and Enforcement Handbook. It is not an arbitrary or capricious figure. It 

is set in guidance. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. I am still having difficulty understanding 

that they are the ones who notified you. Where was your responsibility? 

Mr. SABATINI. Our responsibility—and it should have been discharged by the supervisory principal maintenance inspector was to 

78 

say you cannot continue to operate those airplanes in noncompliance. 

Ms. JOHNSON. And did that happen? 

Mr. SABATINI. No, it did not, ma’am. 

Ms. JOHNSON. What happened to that person? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, that person has now been removed from that 

position—is still employed by the FAA. The investigation continues—and has been removed from any safety inspector duties. 

Ms. JOHNSON. No fine? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, we are continuing the investigation, and I 

can assure you, Ms. Johnson, that I will take the full measure of 

the law and apply it. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I wonder if the gentlelady will yield? 

Ms. JOHNSON. I will yield. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Sabatini, let me follow up on that question and a question 

I asked about the disciplinary action that was taken. You said that 

you removed the employee and assigned him to other responsibilities that are not related to safety; is that correct? 

Mr. SABATINI. That is true, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I am told that he is now auditing the office at 

Dallas Fort Worth and he is participating or supervising an AFS 

pre-audit. Is that correct? As we speak, that is exactly what he is 

doing? 

Mr. SABATINI. That should not be what is happening. If I may, 

I would like to ask Mr. Stuckey to address that. 

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Costello, when he was removed from the 

Southwest CMO he was placed in a position where he had no inspector duties, and his duties for the last year have been preparing 

an office for an external flight standards audit. He is looking at office files. He is reviewing manuals within the office. He is checking 

compliance within the office of their processes and procedures, but 

no inspector duties. And he has not done any inspector duties since 

he was moved. 

Mr. COSTELLO. But he is participating in this pre-audit; is that 

correct? 

Mr. STUCKEY. He is helping to rewrite manuals and check files 

and do administrative work. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And under the current rules within the FAA, Mr. 

Sabatini, how long will it take to go through due process so that 

the Agency can reach a conclusion as to his future? 

Mr. SABATINI. The Office of the Inspector General is going to conclude its investigation, and when that is done we will put that entire package together and we will—— 

Ms. JOHNSON. Reclaiming my time for one second, is he being 

paid? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you have to do to get fired there? 

Mr. SABATINI. Ma’am, you know we are so lucky to live in these 

United States. Every single person has rights, no matter what the 

charge may be, and this County affords that right to whoever that 

person may be. 

79 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes, but it seems to me that if this person was responsible for allowing the condition to go on without taking a positive step to do anything about it, and that was his responsibility, 

in any other job there would be some kind of disciplinary action. 

If it was somebody in my office, they would be fired. So that is my 

point. I don’t understand why he is okay and the airline is being 

fined. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, the results of the investigation may support 

that he is other than okay. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Ms. Johnson, if I may? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Let me shed a little bit of light. Mr. Sabatini has 

referred to the OIG’s report, which will help FAA make up its mind 

in this particular case regarding the PMI. Three weeks ago FAA 

contacted my office and indicated that they were contemplating a 

personnel action against the PMI, which consisted of a reduction of 

two pay grades and a reassignment. I spoke with Mr. Sabatini on 

the telephone and advised him, of course, that whatever personnel 

actions would ultimately be taken were within FAA’s purview. 

They are not the IG’s. We are not judge, jury, and executioner. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Sure. 

Mr. SCOVEL. But before the Agency took an action that some 

might view as premature and overly lenient, that it would certainly 

be helpful to the Agency to have all the facts. 

It is my understanding, based on that, that FAA has, indeed, 

held up. At that time we were working on information concerning 

the PMI’s approval of voluntary self-disclosure submitted by Southwest in other instances than the one we are talking about here 

today. That would certainly be information perhaps that the Agency would want to consider in this case where dereliction of duty 

would be the primary charge. 

Another concern that I expressed to Mr. Sabatini at the time was 

that the PMI be taken completely out of the safety decision-making 

loop. As Mr. Sabatini has reported today, that certainly has happened. We want to commend the Agency for that. 

This week we have had further contact with FAA, and my staff 

has informed FAA that, of course, at any time if they believe they 

have sufficient evidence to fire him they can do that. Of course, 

what they want to do was make it stick. I thank them for their confidence in the IG’s report. If they believe that that is what will be 

necessary in order to make the personnel action stick, then we will 

get it done as soon as we can and turn it over to them so they can 

take their action. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would observe that, while the question the gentlewoman from Texas, our Chair of the Water Resource Subcommittee, may have sounded harsh, it comes from a woman who 

in the private sector owned and managed six businesses. I think 

she brings a very different judgment and perspective to bear. 

I wanted to return just a moment, Mr. Sabatini, to Mr. 

Gawadzinski. Can you state unequivocally that Mr. Gawadzinski is 

not in a position to undertake inspections, to do oversight of carrier 

maintenance; that he is not engaged in any such action? 

80 

Mr. SABATINI. I have been assured that that is the case, sir. I 

would ask Jim and Tom to confirm that for me. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Mr. Chairman, it is certainly my understanding, 

being the Director of the Flight Standards Service, that he is not 

doing inspector duties at this time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have information to the contrary, and I think 

you had better take a closer look. 

Mr. Cummings, the Chair of the Coast Guard Subcommittee? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sabatini, I am sitting here and I have been listening to you 

and I have been watching you. I have got to say, when Ms. Johnson 

asked the question about the firing of this particular person, your 

reaction seemed like, just watching you, how can we do that, this 

person has rights. 

Let me tell you something: the flying public has rights, too. The 

flying public has rights, and you have used some wonderful words 

here. You know, they have been very nice. You want to operate 

under a culture of safety. We want to do everything in our power 

to make sure that we have the highest level of safety day in and 

day out, but, you know, let me tell you what, I guess as a lawyer 

and one who has tried a lot of cases: something doesn’t smell right 

here. I am just telling you, it sounds like we are trying to boil down 

this thing to maybe one person. I know the investigation continues, 

but it seems like there are some other people that are probably responsible. I don’t know how high up it goes, but I will tell you one 

thing: if I were in charge of a department and I had a situation 

where these flights went out and the flying public had established 

a trust—there is a book written by Covey that is entitled, The 

Speed of Trust. The public, when we get on this airplanes, all those 

people out here, I bet you every one of them have flown on an airplane within the last month. But when we get on an airplane, but 

when we get on an airplane we trust that the people that we pay 

with our tax dollars are doing what they say they are going to do. 

We don’t expect, for example, a doctor, if he is going to operate 

on our heart, to party all night and then at 5:00 come home and 

then do the operation at 6:00. There is a certain level of trust. 

I am just trying to figure out, does the buck stop with you? Do 

you take responsibility for this, since you are the top safety guy? 

Mr. SABATINI. Absolutely, Mr. Cummings. I take complete responsibility for this, and I am going to take action to address what 

we learned here. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, you said today that you have learned some 

things just today that you didn’t know; is that right? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You have said that several times. What is the 

most significant thing that you learned today that you did not 

know before today? 

Mr. SABATINI. If I may, I would like to put it in context. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is fine, but, you know, the Chairman just 

said something. Apparently you didn’t know that. He said that he 

had some information that somebody, this particular person, is still 

doing certain types of duties. You and Mr. Stuckey—is the immediate supervisor the person that Mr. Oberstar was talking about? 

You are in charge of that region, right? 

81 

Mr. STUCKEY. Yes, sir, I am the regional manager, but not Doug 

Gawadzinski’s supervisor. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. Well, I guess what I am getting at, I want 

to make sure that the information is flowing, because apparently 

something is missing here. 

Anyway, Mr. Sabatini, I would love to hear what you have to say. 

Mr. SABATINI. My entire life has been in public service. I have 

been a police officer in the city of New York for 20 years. I know 

police work and I know law enforcement. I learned aviation and I 

have spent four decades in aviation safety. I am absolutely committed to aviation safety. I am second to none when it comes to 

aviation safety, I can assure you, sir. And I take responsibility for 

what happened in my organization, and I will take what I have 

learned and correct that. 

A couple of things have been learned. One, as an inspector it was 

absolute, Safety 101, you do not allow noncompliance. You will enforce the law. Obviously, there are some who thought otherwise. I 

am going to deal with those people, but I must do it—as a lawyer 

you know, Mr. Cummings, I must operate within the law. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I do, but I want to make sure you get everybody 

up the line or down the line. Everybody. 

Mr. SABATINI. Up and down. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. La-de-da and everybody who may be responsible. 

Mr. SABATINI. I will address that, Mr. Cummings, absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. My time is running out, but I want to ask you 

another question. Mr. Scovel talked about this whistleblower hot 

line, for lack of a better term. He seems to think that his recommendation is a better one than what is going on here. Can you 

just react to what he said about whistleblowers, because he makes 

a very good point. If somebody is calling and it is not being reacted 

to properly, what difference does it make? As a matter of fact, it 

is probably worse, because then the person is subject to all kinds 

of repercussions. 

I just wanted you to comment on what he said, because that 

sounds like it makes sense. Since you said what you just said—you 

are very concerned about safety—and I believe you, I really do— 

I want to make sure we have the best system possible so that whistleblowers can come forward. 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I believe that the process that we are putting 

in place will allow everyone the opportunity to bring forward their 

concerns. I also welcome the involvement of the Office of the Inspector General. They are welcome to review what I do as we speak 

today. But I would encourage even more scrutiny on this particular 

subject. 

I will be happy to work with this Committee, your staff, and with 

the Inspector General. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. He has already said your system is not going to 

be the most effective and efficient system. He has already said 

that. 

Am I right, Mr. Scovel? 

Mr. SCOVEL. That is correct, sir, without a proper investigative 

body. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So all I am saying to you is why not, since you 

are concerned, as you are, about everything operating properly, and 

82 

you just gave a wonderful statement about your 20 years, and here 

is this man who says your system is not going to be the most effective and efficient one, and since all of this goes to safety, why not 

say let’s go with you, Mr. Scovel? 

Mr. SABATINI. Well, I think maybe I didn’t make myself clear. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, you didn’t. 

Mr. SABATINI. I am willing to work with the Inspector General 

and take in whatever his recommendation may mean, and how do 

we—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And put it in place? 

Mr. SABATINI. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. Carney? 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Scovel, Mr. Sabatini, I will come back to the question I asked 

in the earlier panel. We have seen the grounding of a lot of aircraft 

lately. Why do you think that is, in the last few days? What do you 

attribute that to? Mr. Scovel? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Let me take a stab. I think carriers are gun-shy 

right now. I think they see FAA waking up after this incident last 

year. There has been a lot of publicity. The Committee has certain 

made known its intent to hold this hearing. FAA properly recognizes that AD compliance is a vulnerability. 

We have identified that with Southwest the key ATOS inspection 

of its AD compliance system hadn’t taken place since 1999. Southwest was certainly vulnerable. They got burned last year. Other 

carriers now have seen what has happened. They are feeling some 

of the heat. They are seeing the sunshine that is coming in to this 

and they are taking all steps that they possibly can to comply, even 

down to the letter. There have been media reports of carriers with 

their MD-80s, MD-88s measuring the spacing of their wiring bundles down to a quarter of an inch. Great, because if that is what 

the AD requires, that is what the carriers ought to be doing and 

that is what the inspectors ought to be checking. 

The Chairman earlier ran down a partial list. Probably it was 

the whole list. I have only got a partial list of the groundings lately. Starting with Southwest on March 13th and up through United 

yesterday with its Boeing 777s, my count stands at 565 aircraft. I 

didn’t bother to count up the number of flights and the number of 

passengers affected. Tens of thousands. It is a serious matter. 

Mr. CARNEY. Were reports suppressed? Did management suppress some of these reports or have the airlines quietly sort of self 

disclosed things, too? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Well, they certainly did at Southwest. We absolutely 

have evidence of that. I hoped during the break before my panel 

came forward that you all received a copy of an extract from our 

written statement. It is a timeline showing Southwest’s aging aircraft AD violations. It is the one attached to that. That is the 

timeline of the March 2007 incident. It is the one right behind it. 

You can see from December 2006, where we had earliest access 

to the data, up through March 2007 and even continuing into this 

year, Southwest has had problems with these violations. 

83 

We don’t know what may be happening at other carriers. I would 

expect and welcome and invite this Committee’s request to my office to continue on these lines and find out what has been happening in the voluntary disclosure reporting program industrywide. We already have an audit underway to investigate the ASAP 

program, which is another partnership program of FAA. 

Mr. CARNEY. I certainly think everybody on this Committee 

would welcome that information. 

Mr. Sabatini, can you answer that? 

Mr. SCOVEL. That request will be forthcoming. 

Mr. SABATINI. What we discovered is that an airworthiness directive is a very complex instruction, and, again, a lesson learned here 

is that in the future, when we issue airworthiness directives, we 

are going to make certain, by working with the manufacturers and 

the operators, to make sure that the language is clear and understandable and essentially in plain language, plain English, so that 

it can be executed without difficulty. 

I must tell you, sir, that of the almost 2,400 inspections that we 

have done, we found that 99 percent of the system was in compliance, full compliance. That 1 percent represents events like there 

was one carrier, because they had a low utilization of an aircraft, 

the airworthiness directive was not yet due, not due until 2028, yet 

they were in technical noncompliance with the AD because they 

had not submitted their plan on how they were going to implement 

the AD. 

There were others. You heard about American Airlines and Delta 

and the MD-80. Again, the AD requires precision and the accuracy 

in order to be complied with. In this case, what we were finding 

is that wire bundles that ran along a particular part we will call 

the wheel well, where the landing gear retracts, that this wire bundle was not fastened against the bulkhead every one inch as specified by the airworthiness directive. So they took the most prudent 

action. They put the aircraft on the ground. Other cases were very 

similar to that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Scovel, are you concerned that the FAA does 

not have appropriate quality control mechanisms to maintain its 

oversight for reasons of the CMO? 

Mr. SCOVEL. We are concerned. In fact, I am not sure whether 

it was the Chairman or Mr. Costello or perhaps Mr. DeFazio who 

was asking if all of this was happening at the Southwest CMO, 

who else knew about it or who else should have known about it. 

Those kind of quality control mechanisms, knowledge up the chain 

of command, should be in place. 

When we are talking specifically about voluntary disclosure programs, for instance, it is our understanding that there is no reporting requirement up the chain to gain some insight into how a particular CMO may be carrying out its duties on the voluntary disclosure reporting program. 

We do know for a fact that the data that is supposedly being collected through the ASAP, which is another partnership program, 

self-disclosure program, that FAA and other aviation safety experts 

don’t always have access to that data. 

84 

So while the intent of the program is to obtain information that 

may not otherwise be available, it is useless unless the data is collected and made available and subsequently analyzed. 

Mr. CARNEY. Are we going to fix that? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, sir. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, I will ask 

Jim Ballough to tell you what it is that we have underway as we 

speak. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. In terms of the data analysis, we recently released a new version of our ATOS—Air Transportation Oversight 

System—and it was called version 1.2. A part of that is the national role of ATOS inspections so that we can give ourselves that 

red, green, yellow light look at how many completions we have in 

terms of surveillance and oversight of our programs. That is one 

aspect of it. 

In terms of the voluntary programs, voluntary disclosure, ASAP 

programs, we have had, as you heard in the earlier panel today, 

we have the national info share programs that brings the member 

organizations that participate in those programs together and 

shares information from a safety perspective. 

What we haven’t done a good job at, and what we are in the 

process of modifying, is the notion of making that data available 

to those who actually need it to make safety decisions. That is a 

piece of it that we have yet to work on and finish. It will migrate, 

as Nick said earlier, into the data analysis program in the future. 

But we have some interim steps that we can take. 

In terms of integrity of the voluntary disclosure program, you 

know, the IG made some very good recommendations to us and we 

thank him for that, and we will review those recommendations and 

we will put them in place. 

What we learned from this Southwest incident or enforcement is 

this: number one, we feel that senior leadership at the airline must 

know that a disclosure has been filed and they should be aware of 

it. That will be implemented in our guidance material. 

The additional piece of that, back in the paper system before we 

went to a web-based voluntary disclosure program, the office manager had to sign off on every file. You heard that earlier today, a 

recommendation. That will be put back in place as well, sir. 

And then ultimately an analysis of the voluntary disclosure program so that everybody can learn, one airline to another can learn 

what we are learning out of this system. 

We think that these initiatives to strengthen the voluntary disclosure program will go a long way to put measures in place so that 

we don’t have a recurrence of this. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, hopefully from one airline to another and one 

region to another, and I hope the ATOS 1.21 has flashlights and 

screwdrivers involved with it, where they are actually crawling 

through the aircraft. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Mr. Carney, I can assure you we do a number 

of on-aircraft inspections, as well. 

Mr. CARNEY. Very good. 

I have grossly violated my time. You are very generous, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Richardson? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

85 

First of all I have one question and four comments. The question 

is to Mr. Stuckey. 

We have seen documents that were sent to you alleging repeatedly that your SPMI was frequently reducing letters of investigation to simple letters of correction. Didn’t that cause some alarm 

bells to go off in your mind? We haven’t seen any evidence to indicate that it did. What were you doing? 

Mr. STUCKEY. Ms. Richardson, that is correct. We had received 

a report in the fall of 2005 that Doug Gawadzinski was issuing letters of concern instead of letters of investigation. As was pointed 

out by the panel this morning, letters of concern don’t really have 

any application in our compliance and enforcement program. 

The importance of using letters of investigation is that they get 

into our system and we can track them. That was brought to the 

region’s attention in, I believe, September or November of 2005. We 

asked for an independent review of that, and we took two assistant 

managers from another office assigned to Continental Airlines who 

basically validated that yes, out of, I think, twenty-nine letters of 

concern, at least I think four or five of those should have been letters of investigation. 

At that time it was communicated to Mike Mills, office manager, 

and then later to the supervisory principal maintenance inspector 

that he should stop that practice. That is not appropriate. The 

practice is not consistent with Agency policy. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, now I will get into my comments, and I 

will direct them to Mr. Sabatini. 

A couple of things. First of all, it disturbs me to hear you kind 

of off-the-cuff refer to low accident rates, 1 percent. In five minutes 

I am going to be leaving here to get on a plane, and I am not very 

thrilled at this moment. I think if the American public really all 

understood clearly what we were discussing here today, I think a 

lot of people would not be. 

In the business of public safety, as you said you are an expert 

of, we are not held to the same standards of people who manufacture pencils. We have people’s lives in our hands and we are expected to perform at 100 percent rate, not at 99. The 99 is not acceptable, because our failure to perform may cost major life, which 

is not acceptable for us to think 99 percent is okay. 

I will tell you my background. I worked in corporate America for 

14 years. I have a master’s in business. I would strongly recommend—you talked a lot about your public safety background. I 

would recommend going back and doing a little business work. Let 

me tell you what I mean by that. And I mean no disrespect, but 

I think we have to speak frankly here. 

In the world of business school, this is a clear failure, as has 

been said, of quality control. Clear failure. There must be ongoing 

sampling, as there is in any industry. This should not be viewed 

as bureaucratic Government, anything like that. When you were 

talking about maintenance, sampling must occur on an ongoing 

basis at every single level. When you have a lack of independent 

review and you are not properly monitoring and validating, you are 

going to have problems like this. 

I don’t understand, for the years that this has been done, why 

this has not been caught. 

86 

Let me leave with my last point. I am really frustrated, because 

you mentioned this was a failure of humans. I disagree with you, 

with a business background. This was not a failure of humans. A 

failure of humans is one individual who fails to complete a report 

appropriately in 2005, who makes a mess up and is addressed. 

What we see here, a pattern of several years of lack of proper monitoring, validating, and really correction I don’t think is a problem 

of humans; I call it a problem of process and management, which 

all of you here are responsible for. 

This is not just limited, as has been said by many of my colleagues, of the one person back there. To me the problem is right 

here, because it is ultimately your responsibility. 

When I hear Congressman Cummings ask you do you know if 

this person is still working, and you say it has been said to me, 

you know, in the business world what we do, it was your responsibility to go physically and to ensure. I don’t care how busy you are; 

you are not so busy that when we have planes flying around with 

inches thick of leaks and all these other things going on, it is your 

responsibility to get out of the office and to get on the ground. That 

is my expectation, and I think the public’s expectation that you 

would do immediately. 

So as I would close I will say to you that this has really risen 

to the threshold that I think it is beyond the reports and the headlines that we will see tomorrow. I think you owe the public an acknowledgment of exactly what happened and exactly what you intend to do. 

We can talk all day long about the programs and processes that 

you are going to put in place, but I will kind of break it down really 

simple now, since we have talked about the business side. You are 

lacking some hall monitors. You need people in the halls making 

sure that people and the things that are supposed to happen, of all 

these great things that you said that they are going to do, all that 

is is another report this thick for someone to read once a year. We 

need action. We need people on the ground. And we need true monitoring and validation. Anything less than that is unacceptable to 

the American people. 

Now I am going to put my life in your hands, unfortunately, and 

say a prayer as I hop on this flight. We are, unfortunately, working 

the angels overtime, and I hope that you would do a better job of 

protecting all of us. 

Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentlewoman. 

Mr. Petri? 

Mr. PETRI. Just to put things in context, I would rather put it 

a little more positively. We want you to keep on batting 1000. We 

have gone four years. I think it was pointed out at the beginning 

that 200,000 people have died on the highway and zero have died 

during that same period of time in airline crashes and airplanes. 

So if you are worried about going home, fly. But that is not saying 

it is perfect and it is not saying that things couldn’t be a lot better. 

You have done so well, and the last thing we want to do is to 

start slipping down on the job or getting cozy arrangements that 

then end up with loss of life, and so we want to celebrate success. 

It is fantastic. It is unprecedented in world history, I think. But we 

87 

at the same time don’t want to rest on our laurels. We want to continue to keep on doing even better. 

One other quick question. I will submit other questions for the 

record. I am sure there is an explanation for it. I don’t know that 

it has been made part of the record. We have this organization 

chart of your Agency from Mr. Sabatini all the way down, and the 

aviation safety inspectors, supervisor. Principal Maintenance Inspector Douglas Gawadzinski has been mentioned often. He has 

not been here. I think there should be some reason why. 

And then the other issues I would like to ask Mr. Scovel if there 

have been comments that Mr. Gawadzinski was talking to people 

at headquarters or this or that. Did you uncover or did you discover 

any of that, or was he basically speaking without authority, so to 

speak? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. Petri, it is our understanding that, in fact, he 

did know officials at FAA headquarters. To the extent he is embellishing his relationship with them so he could puff himself up in 

the eyes of colleagues down in the Southwest CMO, that appears 

certainly to have been happening, as well. 

Mr. PETRI. Any of you like to respond? Mr. Sabatini? I think both 

of your names have been mentioned. Mr. Stuckey? 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Yes, Mr. Petri, thank you very much for the opportunity. Yes, it is true. I know Doug Gawadzinski, just like I 

know a lot of my workforce. I spend a lot of time on the road to 

interact with those folks. Mr. Gawadzinski came to New York when 

Nick and I were in New York together and spent 90 days on a detail. He then went back to the southwest region. Since 2001, when 

I became the Director of Flight Standards Service, I have talked to 

him or seen him a very limited number of times. Certainly the portrayal today of daily conversations with Mr. Gawadzinski or the inference by the management in the Southwest CMO that I somehow 

had some kind of relationship with Mr. Gawadzinski is just not factual, sir. 

I state for the record that I have been absolutely consistent, from 

the day I became the Director of this organization and went out 

and talked to the field. I attend every management team meeting 

at the regions and speak to the supervisory ranks as well as at offices. I have been absolutely consistent for the last seven years that 

I expect, number one, standardization; number two, that following 

national policy is paramount for me. It always has been. So this 

notion that he had somehow had some dispensation from following 

national policy is a fabrication. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Now, Mr. Sabatini, you knew on July 12, 2007, 

of the incidents at Southwest. A report was completed, correct? 

Mr. SABATINI. I am not sure of the exact date, sir, but certainly—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. In July? 

Mr. SABATINI. In that time frame. That would be correct. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But that is the date given to the document of 

completion of the inquiry. Why did you wait until March of this 

year to audit other airlines? 

Mr. SABATINI. We didn’t know the gravity at that time of what 

was going on at the Southwest CMO. 

88 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Shouldn’t something have gone off and said 

maybe we ought to take a look at the system? Since we are operating on a system—ATOS—maybe something else amiss? 

What I am getting at is that there is an over-reliance on ATOS, 

and that if it is so successful, why is it that old-fashioned inspector 

feet on the ground, on shop floors, and engine rooms, are finding 

airworthiness directive compliance issues affected hundreds of aircraft? In other words, you need more people, you need more inspectors, need more hands-on work, and I want you to think hard about 

this, notwithstanding directives from Office of Management and 

Budget—we have gone through this with other FAA leadership in 

years past and other Administrations—work with us to develop an 

inspector workforce need list that we can realistically deliver on. 

Will you do that? 

Mr. SABATINI. You have my commitment, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Now, the customer service initiative, what do you think about, 

what was your reaction? What was your gut reaction when you 

heard the statement in the earlier testimony from the whistleblower panel, the customer, Southwest, called the FAA and complained about the service they were getting from Mr. Boutris to get 

him removed? What was your reaction to that? 

Mr. SABATINI. Unacceptable. That is simply an abuse of what our 

customer service initiative was intended to be. It was a mechanism 

to allow citizens of the United States who contact the FAA to express whatever concerns they may have, not to be used as a vehicle 

to accommodate a like or dislike about a particular inspector. 

I will say time and time again, we are responsible for enforcement. Voluntary programs do not mean that we have abandoned 

enforcement. We will continue to enforce the regulations. Our mission is to gain full compliance and to operate at the highest levels 

of safety. You have my commitment, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Then I hope I have your commitment also to revisit this customer service initiative and re-aim it and redirect it, 

and thereby redirect back to its original purpose the mission, the 

safety mission of FAA. 

Mr. SABATINI. You have my commitment, Mr. Chairman. I am 

planning to do that. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. That may be the most significant 

thing accomplished today. 

Are there others who have questions? Mr. Costello? 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I really do not have any other 

questions, but I would like to make a comment and express a concern, and that is Mr. Sabatini has been before our Subcommittee 

many times, and we have talked about safety and other issues. You 

know, frankly, my concern is this: that you have pointed out, and 

rightly so, that 99 percent of the planes that have been recently inspected are in full compliance. Frankly, I think that the Agency 

continues to rely on the fact that we have the safest system, aviation system, in the world. I know you are proud of the fact that 

99 percent are in full compliance, but again I go back to my comments in my opening statement, and that is—and I don’t think that 

you would disagree with me, and if you do I want to hear it, but 

there is no question when it came to runway safety that the FAA 

89 

took their eye off the ball. At one time in 2000, 2001, very serious 

about it, brought together all the stakeholders, and then when the 

numbers started going down the FAA went and directed their attention to other things. 

The same thing with the hazardous conditions in the powers and 

facilities. Nothing was done until the Subcommittee took action. 

Even though employees were reporting mold and other hazardous 

conditions in these facilities to the FAA, there was no action taken 

until the Subcommittee scheduled a hearing, and then we started 

getting calls that said hey, finally the FAA is reacting, and it is because you are holding a hearing on this matter. 

The list goes on and on with congestion and delays. I went 

through the whole list earlier. 

So my concern, frankly, Mr. Sabatini, is that 99 percent compliance, what are people concerned about. We are concerned about the 

one that is not in compliance, and we have a responsibility and you 

have a responsibility to make certain that we get as close to 100 

percent compliance as we can. 

The FAA here—and you have acknowledged it—has failed, and 

we hope that you will produce a plan that will prevent from this 

ever happening again. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. Sabatini, do you wish to respond? 

Mr. SABATINI. I want to assure everyone here that the only reason why I mentioned 99 percent is to just demonstrate what we 

found in both cases. But I can tell you this: what I am paranoid 

about is the 1 percent, and we do not rest on our laurels. We strive 

every day to look at what is that remaining risk, and that is the 

challenge of the future. 

We no longer see common cause accidents. That is because of the 

hard work that has been done over the years by many, many safety 

professionals in FAA and in the industry across the board. The 

challenge is: what are those risks out there and how do we learn 

about those risks? That is what we work hard every day to understand, and that is why it is so critically important to have a professional working relationship with industry so that together we can 

identify and resolve the remaining risk. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. DeFazio? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sabatini, I would like to know, you mentioned this process 

is for citizens, the customer service initiative. What are the aggregate numbers? Who has used the system and who are they? Do you 

have those numbers, like how many are airlines, operators, how 

many are repair stations, how many are individual airmen? Do you 

have those numbers? 

Mr. SABATINI. I can get you those numbers. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But has this process been used a lot? Have a lot 

of resources been devoted to resolving problems through this customer service initiative? 

Mr. SABATINI. I would say it certainly requires resources, but it 

is not a drain on the system. 

90 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Well, I would like to see the numbers of who 

has accessed it, what the categories were, etc. I am sure the Committee would be interested. 

And then how about when you heard from Mr. Mills, Mr. 

Sabatini? Was that an Agency-wide directive that everybody should 

drop everything they are doing? They haven’t been out to that particular repair station for the last eight years, but they should go 

out to that repair station, not in an inspector capability, but to 

hand-deliver the packet of the customer service initiative that could 

have been mailed or e-mailed to those people? Are you aware how 

widespread that practice was that we diverted resources to handdelivery of these packets? Was that a unique thing? 

Mr. SABATINI. I was surprised to hear Mr. Mills say that he had 

to or had been instructed to hand deliver that. That certainly is not 

in the guidance. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay, Mr. Ballough, are you aware of how prevalent this practice was? 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Mr. DeFazio, from what I know, it was supposed 

to have been delivered through routine carrier visits and repair 

station visits. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But that would have meant that people wouldn’t 

see it for seven years, because a lot of times we only get around 

to these repair stations once in a great while. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. At least once a year, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well—— 

Mr. BALLOUGH. I was surprised. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. How about you, Mr. Stuckey, since you are in that 

region? Was this widespread in your region that people were diverted to hand-delivering these packets? 

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. DeFazio, as I recall, initially—and it has been 

a few years ago—we had, like, three years to get out to your major 

operators, your air carriers, your major repair facilities, your taxi 

operators, and that is something that an office manager would normally do. Mr. Mills at the Southwest CMO had one operator. At 

the Dallas FSDO we probably had maybe 100 operators of that category. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. STUCKEY. So it depends on the particular office, but it is important to get out and visit those operators. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right, but he was not sent to visit. He wasn’t sent 

to do oversight. He wasn’t sent to do safety inspections to places 

he might not have been for quite some time; he was sent to hand 

deliver something that you could have sent out in e-mail, you could 

have faxed. I mean, you certainly had to know how to contact these 

people. You could have mailed it to them. I mean, this was widespread then? A lot of people were delivered to hand deliver this 

thing? 

Mr. STUCKEY. I wouldn’t say it was widespread. Again, I think 

it was—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So you are not disturbed that one individual spent 

three months hand delivering this? 

Mr. STUCKEY. That would not have been my expectation. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. I find it very disturbing. 

91 

Now, you have talked about Mr. Gawadzinski and his current 

duties. You are telling us he is in an office somewhere and all he 

is doing is reviewing manuals. Do those manuals have a purpose? 

I mean, do they somehow dictate Agency actions that relate to the 

real world, like safety? 

Mr. STUCKEY. We have a national flight standards evaluation officer in headquarters, an SF-40, that reports to Jim. They get 

around and do technical reviews, I think every three years, and the 

office that Doug is assigned to now is going to get one later this 

summer, so his duties would involve making sure we have all the 

office files in order, do we have all the documents that we should 

have in an airline—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So he is not editing? I mean, he is just like a clerk level? At $100,000 a year he is just making sure the files are complete? 

Mr. STUCKEY. More or less, and I have been—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That is an expensive clerk. 

Mr. STUCKEY. He has been assigned—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I tell you what I would do with this guy. If you 

can’t fire him, I would do what they have done here in the past. 

You put his cube in the hall. He doesn’t have a phone. He is not 

allowed to read anything, and he just sits there. 

Now let me ask you this: has he done enroutes in the last year? 

Mr. STUCKEY. I think he has last year. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Within the last year has he done enroutes? 

Mr. STUCKEY. My information is he did three round trips, one to 

training and I think he had two enroutes to do, I think, job interviews within the FAA. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Sabatini, does that raise any concern with 

you? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes, it does, because my expectation is that this 

person be in the office essentially counting paper clips. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. 

Mr. SABATINI. I need to complete my understanding. If he, in 

fact, conducted enroute inspections after he was moved to this 

other position. I don’t have that information. I intend to get that 

information. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Now one last thing, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the generous 

grant of time, but I feel so strongly about this issue. 

I really think that—and I guess we had testimony in the previous panel—we shouldn’t throw out the whole customer service 

initiative. But when I read through the rather lengthy documents 

and the way they are worded, I can see where this devolved from 

customer to client and the whole thing is set up for talking about 

all the levels of appeal and the flow charts and all those sorts of 

things. 

I just really think, again, this is my supposition, but Nick, did 

this advisory group of yours really initiate this idea and write this 

and then you just handed it to the administrator, who then went 

and gave the Aero Club speech? This wasn’t something she initiated or something she wanted to do or something that came from 

some other political person or political level? This really perked up 

from the professionals, we want to start talking about our airlines, 

92 

its customers, we want to have all these multiple levels of review, 

we want all these forums and all? That really came from your professionals? 

Mr. SABATINI. Sir, what we know about our organization across 

the board is that we do not behave in a consistent and standardized manner. This was one mechanism put in place. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But it has a particular lilt to it, this whole airlines 

are now customers and there are all these complaints. There are 

other ways to deal with service quality, I think, maybe the inspector general or others might address that, I think, than this. I really 

think it deserves major overhaul. 

And then finally, just one thing. I have heard a lot about how 

great things are and how no one has died, and people have qualified that by saying major or big or whatever, or 135s versus 121s. 

We have had two deadly crashes in the last four years. One was 

due to a maintenance issue, which was 21 people at Charlotte. The 

other I think is still under investigation at Lexington, which has 

been attributed to pilot error or under-staffing of the air traffic control tower or other issues. I don’t think there has been a final disposition on that one yet. 

But people have died. That was 49. So yes, the system is doing 

pretty darned good. Can it do better? Yes. Are we concerned about 

the number of AD deviations, we find out there were deviations? 

Yes. And I understand there may yet be some others out there. 

There are three airlines that have some AD problems. Why aren’t 

they named? 

Mr. SABATINI. I would be happy to submit their names. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, why don’t we just have them right now? 

Mr. SABATINI. It is an open investigation, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I don’t want to stimulate the gentleman further—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. This customer initiative sounds very strangely 

like public-private partnership. The gentleman will desist. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Carney and then Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, sir. 

This is for the whole panel. Well, probably not Mr. Scovel. I was 

thinking about Mr. Gawadzinski, who is still employed, and Mr. 

Mills. Mr. Mills was not under investigation for anything, he apparently did nothing wrong. Why was he removed? 

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Carney, initially, when we got the report of 

the AD overflight, we also, that same month, had already scheduled two office evaluations. As a result of all three things that were 

going on in the month of April, it is standard practice to remove 

someone from their position when you find some serious issues involved. Mr. Mills was initially detailed at his same grade, same 

pay, to an office in the DFW area until an investigation was completed. 

In Mr. Mills’ case, it was decided that he was going to be permanently transferred to that same office as an assistant manager, 

same pay, same grade. Primarily because his supervisor back in 

2005 had given him instructions to follow national policy, you have 

93 

some issues here, letters of investigation, letters of correction. 

There were several issues there pertaining to relationships in the 

office that were causing disharmony, including what you heard 

from the first panel this morning. You really had two groups in the 

office, those that supported Doug and those that supported Mike. 

For those reasons, he was administratively transferred to another office. That was made permanent I think in August of last 

year. 

Mr. CARNEY. Given all we have heard today, that sounds a little 

suspicious, I have to tell you. That doesn’t sit well. That doesn’t 

seem quite just, actually, from where I sit, at least. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Doesn’t sit well with me, either. 

Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sabatini, one of the most, as far as I am concerned, one of 

the most significant questions that has been asked today is the one 

that the Chairman of our Aviation Subcommittee asked you a few 

moments ago. He talked about, if you will recall, how it seems like 

certain things have to come to the Congress before certain actions 

are taken by your agency. That is very, very significant. 

Let me put that over here, and then I am going to take you to 

another place. That is that you, when the Chairman asked you a 

question about why didn’t you at within a certain period of time, 

you said, I think, and I am not trying to put words in your mouth, 

that you did not realize, or you all didn’t realize the gravity of the 

situation. Is that right? 

Mr. SABATINI. That is correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Now, to me, the one thing the flying 

public wants, as I said a little bit earlier, is they want to be able 

to trust. They want to know that when they get on that plane, the 

plane has a pretty good chance of getting to its destination. And 

I guess what I am concerned about and I am wondering about is, 

are mechanisms now in place, and Mr. Scovel, you may want to 

comment on this, too, so that one can appreciate the gravity of the 

problem? 

Because I would think that we could put all the mechanisms in 

place of communicating a problem. But if there is no one on the 

other end of the line who can appreciate the significance of the 

problem, and the problem still takes, in other words, for example, 

airlines are still flying that aren’t supposed to be flying, then it 

seems like it smacks in the face of what we are about here, and 

that is trying to make sure we do what you said, that is, have the 

highest degree of safety that we can and to worry about the 1 percent that you and Mr. Costello talked about. 

So I am wondering what is in place now or what will be in place 

to help you or whoever, your committee or whoever makes these 

decisions, as to when we act, how we at, to what degree we act, 

what is in place now that will help you to have a better grasp of 

how significant a problem is? You can’t get too much more significant than this. 

Mr. SABATINI. I believe there are a number of things already in 

place, and I keep coming back to at the Southwest region, that 

issue was mishandled for two and a half years. And that was not 

94 

evidenced at my level. Once the AD non-compliance became apparent, then around the July time frame is when we realized the severity of what we had in terms of the failures that had occurred 

in the Southwest region. 

Now, I am concerned about the 1 percent. I want to assure you 

of that. And the system is a sound system. But it is not perfect. 

And we strive to make it better. The recommendations that have 

been made by the inspector general we take very seriously, all of 

them. And we will be working with the office of the inspector general to do what is being recommended. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to come back to you, but my time is running out, I want to make sure Mr. Scovel has a chance to comment 

on that. I am hoping that we walk out of this hearing, Mr. Scovel, 

with the public having a higher degree of trust that may have been 

at least slightly eroded after reading about the things that they 

read about. But not only do I want them to have the trust, I want 

the trust to be deserved. I want it to be reality. Because having the 

trust is one thing. If it is not deserved, that is another thing. 

So I am just wondering, are things happening now, and if they 

are not happening now, are there things that we can do immediately to make sure we have that? Do you follow me? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I think I do, Mr. Cummings. One reassurance then 

an observation or two, perhaps. We have talked extensively about 

the problems at Southwest. We have seen threads of a couple of aspects of the Southwest problem at other carriers and CMOs. But 

it is not nationwide. I hope that the American public and the Congress doesn’t take that message away from my testimony, at least, 

because that is not what I intended to convey. 

I think we are in a similar situation where we were last August 

or September when the Minnesota bridge fell, and I know Chairman Oberstar well remembers that. The natural question is, what 

about all the other Nation’s bridges, and national bridge inspection 

program. Well, it needs to be looked at. And that is where we are 

today with Southwest problems. Are they at other carriers? Well, 

we will have to take a look at that. So that is a reassurance. 

An observation, however, of FAA’s, some would call it culture, 

some would call it its organizational model, there is a disconnect 

between FAA headquarters here in Washington and what happens 

out in the field. We saw it at Southwest. There was a CMO in turmoil. There was a bitter struggle being waged for the heart and 

soul of that organization. Aspects of that were communicated to the 

region and then bounced right back down. Not much if anything 

was coming up here to headquarters. 

There has been a consistent lack of ownership, desire to exercise 

ownership from the national level over some of these problems that 

pop up at CMOs and elsewhere. We see it when we have inspectors 

like Mr. Boutris or the Northwest Airlines inspector who are put 

in the corner on the basis of an airline’s request or complaint. Mr. 

Boutris called it cherry-picking. It evokes a dismissive attitude on 

the part of a carrier, and it signals a regulator who has failed to 

command the respect of the regulated entity. That should cause everyone at FAA problems. 

My office has made recommendations dating back to 2002 for 

FAA to exercise greater ownership over the ATOS system. Those 

95 

recommendations have not yet been implemented. We have seen 

problems with the voluntary disclosure reporting program and the 

Chairman indicates that he will request my office to look into that. 

Again, that was a problem that was happening at the CMO, invisible to FAA headquarters. That needs to be fixed. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the Chairman for those inquiries. I must 

also observe at this time my great appreciate for all but one of our 

Subcommittee Chairs participating at this late hour in this hearing. 

The gentlewoman from Florida, Chair of the Rail Subcommittee, 

is here, Ms. Brown. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just 

want you to know, I thank you very much for holding this hearing. 

Now that everything has been televised, you can watch every aspect of it on television, even if you are not here the whole time. So 

thank you again for having this hearing. 

I guess I will start with Mr. Scovel. Does the FAA place too much 

emphasis on the electronic surveillance of carriers instead of the 

on-the-ground review and inspection? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Ms. Brown, I don’t think FAA has found the right 

mix yet. If you are referring to the use of ATOS versus inspectors 

on the ground and on the shop floor, as the Chairman has referred 

to, ATOS is an imperfect system. That has been made clear today. 

FAA headquarters needs to exercise greater national program oversight over that. When we have an AD compliance program at 

Southwest that has been left uninspected since 1999, that is unsatisfactory. 

Properly used, ATOS has potential, in order to target inspectors 

to the areas of greatest need and then to put them on the shop 

floor and on the airplane, crawling through all the nooks and crannies and doing what they do best. But we are not there yet. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. How long do you think this breakdown 

with FAA has been going on, this culture that we have been talking about all day? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Well, in this instance, we can date back, well, my 

predecessors would probably harken back to instances from their 

day that would highlight the same organizational culture. I am relatively new in the position and I can testify on the basis of my 15 

or 16 months in office. 

Regarding this problem specifically, I can say that since 2002, 

when my office submitted its first report on the ATOS system, for 

instance, that the recommendation that we made to FAA for national program oversight was not implemented effectively. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Mr. Sabatini, I recently had the opportunity to go back and look at the FAA vision statement. Under mission, it listed the following one-sentence statement, our vision is to 

improve the safety and efficiency of aviation while being responsive 

to our customers and accountable to the public. Do you think it is 

appropriate to view the airline as an FAA customer? 

Mr. SABATINI. Ms. Brown, I can tell you that what we have 

learned here is that we have drifted away from what was intended 

when we first used the term customer. Certainly they are the people who are regulated and are subject to enforcement. 

96 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Stakeholders, partners, yes. But not 

customer. 

Mr. SABATINI. I would agree with that. We are going to recalibrate that. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Can you describe your customer service 

initiative program? 

Mr. SABATINI. It is designed to allow anyone who has come to the 

FAA, either for a pilot’s certificate or an applicant for any one of 

the authorizations that are issued, once someone demonstrates 

competence and qualifications. And if during the course of that 

interaction one believes that the rules were not followed, then 

there is a process to bring that to the attention of the next level 

of management. What we require is that when that documentation 

of that interaction clearly applies the rule, the guidance, whatever 

that may be, so that there is consistency in the organization. It was 

designed around the issue of assuring consistency with whoever we 

might be dealing with. To assure that we treat whoever comes in, 

whoever we come in contact with, with the respect and the courtesy 

and the professionalism and timeliness that you would expect of a 

Federal agency. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Would you explain a little bit more 

about the self-reporting? 

Mr. SABATINI. Yes. That is the voluntary self-disclosure. And that 

is a situation where anyone who finds that they have made a mistake or are in non-compliance, if they are the ones who come forward and tell us about it, then we will consider that in the mitigation of whatever that penalty or action might be. If we are the ones 

who first find that non-compliance, then there is no self-disclosure. 

And there are various things that can be done if it is brought to 

our attention. 

The idea is to encourage people to tell us about mistakes, so that 

we can address those mistakes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentlewoman yield? 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The question you raise is a very important one 

and the answer is interesting. But we discussed it earlier in this 

hearing. This voluntary disclosure system sets up a race to the answer. If the airline knows that they have done something, they can 

voluntarily disclose. If the FAA knows it ahead of time, they can’t 

voluntarily disclose, they, the airline, can’t voluntarily disclose. 

That sets up a risky environment, especially when you have 

someone within the FAA who is willing to pass information to the 

airline, say, you are about to be inspected, you had better get on 

the stick and self-disclose. That is where this voluntary self-disclosure process has vulnerability. That is the point that needs to be 

corrected. 

Mr. SABATINI. And we are, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are going to find a way to correct it. 

Thank you. The gentlewoman may proceed. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. Sabatini, I have had time to reflect a little on the question 

I asked you earlier: why did you wait until March 13th of 2008 to 

97 

audit the other airlines. And your answer was that you really 

didn’t know the extent of problems. I find that unacceptable. That 

is, you are a safety professional, committed your whole career to 

aviation safety, starting even before you came to the FAA in the 

police department of New York City. That is something you have 

to have your hands on. That is your responsibility. 

Those incidents at the lower level should not have escaped your 

attention. Let’s go back to 1985. In the Miami FSDO, the general 

counsel issued a ruling on safety to the inspector corps in that 

FSDO. It didn’t get around the rest of the Country. And other 

FSDOs were doing things, taking actions that were exactly the opposite. The administrator didn’t know about it. The head of the 

Aviation Safety Office didn’t know about it. 

At the time, there were the nine fiefdoms, as they were roundly 

called, the nine regional administrators. And they held information, didn’t share it with the rest of the FAA. Centralization of FAA 

resulted in a very significant improvement in safety, because information now was flowing freely, flowing around the agency. And 

that centered responsibility on the head of the Office of Safety. 

That was your responsibility to know this stuff. I want you to think 

about how you are going to do a better job of having hands-on at 

the operational level within the agency. 

Now, Mr. Scovel and Mr. Bloch, well, before I come to that, I 

asked Mr. Stuckey, Mr. Lambert a question about a directive he received to shred information that he submitted up the chain of command. He was under oath when he answered. Are you aware, were 

you aware, did you know about the directive to shred records that 

Mr. Lambert referred to pursuant to my question? 

Mr. STUCKEY. No, sir. That is the first I had heard that today. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I want you to think about that. 

An ethics question, Mr. Bloch, and—Mr. Sabatini? 

Mr. SABATINI. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to interrupt your chain 

of thought. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Not at all. 

If you have a response—— 

Mr. SABATINI. Not a response, I need a personal break. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I understand that. You may be excused. 

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, please. I admire your holding ability. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mine is not as good. 

I have a question. Mr. Petri, do you have something? 

Mr. PETRI. Nothing urgent. I was going to ask something if you 

were going to pause. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I want to pursue this. No, I think I will let you 

go ahead, because I think Mr. Sabatini needs to be responsive. So 

please, go ahead. 

Mr. PETRI. I just was curious, we didn’t get a particular response 

to this chart question about why Mr. Gawadzinski was either not 

subpoenaed or given an opportunity to appear. Is there any reason 

for the record? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The reason he was not called, we considered that. 

He was under disciplinary order by the FAA, as we understood it 

at the outset of this hearing. It now appears that he is not under 

98 

very sufficient disciplinary order. In fact, he is probably in an operating position that is inappropriate, given what came out at this 

hearing. And secondly, his actions were the subject of the testimony by the other witnesses. I thought that that would, with those 

two factors together, that he would not be in a position to respond, 

since he was under disciplinary action by the FAA. 

Mr. PETRI. People are obviously under oath, whether they are 

sworn or not, and he is a central figure in all of this, not only on 

the organization chart, but in the concern about the operation of 

the relationship with Southwest Airlines and that office and how 

the inspectors were treated and so on. It would probably at some 

point be worthwhile, if it seems appropriate. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We certainly can revisit the issue of his role and 

bring him to the Committee. 

Mr. PETRI. Very good. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Scovel, the Southwest region, and Mr. Bloch, 

of FAA has approved a memorandum of understanding to provide 

type ratings to FAA inspectors at Southwest Airlines’ expense. The 

policy of the FAA stipulates that such MOUs should be approved 

only when necessary for the FAA to issue a type rating to air carrier pilots. Since Southwest hires pilots who are already type rated 

and only such pilots, what is the justification or need for this program at Southwest, that is to have inspectors type rated at 

Southwest’s expense when they are also charged with the inspection and investigation of that carrier? 

I have made some inquiries about what that service might cost, 

and it is in the range of $20,000 to $25,000 per type rating. This 

exchange has somewhat the feel of a way of acquiring influence at 

the FAA. And I understand that this practice was approved by Mr. 

Stuckey. What is your reaction? I know you don’t have much advance warning of it, but just on the basis of what I have described. 

Mr. SCOVEL. I have had very little advance warning, Mr. Chairman. I was informed within the last week of such an arrangement. 

And I should caveat what I am about to say by indicating that this 

is a matter that we would like very much to inquire into in the 

course of our audit and investigative activities surrounding the 

whole Southwest CMO incident. 

It is a troubling process, if only for the perception that Southwest 

is acquiring influence through FAA. On the face of it, it certainly 

feeds our conclusion that there is an overly collaborative and close 

relationship between the Southwest CMO an the carrier. Very troubling. I can’t speak for the CMO except simply to speculate, and 

I know I am on very thin ice here as an IG, and never speculate, 

you always go with the data. 

But I would suspect that the region would attempt to justify it 

by saying that they gained expertise and insight if their inspectors 

or their managers are able to know what key figures in the carrier 

are doing and what they are experiencing and what their particular maintenance concerns might be on a day to day basis, as 

an operator as opposed to an inspector or from a management level 

with the carrier. 

But I see Mr. Stuckey is back, and I will defer to him. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Bloch, did you have a comment? 

99 

Mr. BLOCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know the details 

of this. It raises in my mind questions about Government ethics 

rules. We have laws under the Ethics in Government Act that prevent us from investigating someone or having business before our 

agency where we have a substantial interest in the outcome of the 

matter or our independence and objectivity could reasonably be 

questioned by a third party due to entanglements, such as financial 

or other entanglements. 

So certainly from an ethics standpoint, such an arrangement 

does raise serious questions. By analogy, if I am investigating 

someone in the Government and they offer to pay for my child’s college education, I think a third party could reasonably question my 

objectivity. So I think I would have to leave it at that. I don’t know 

what the details of this program are. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Stuckey, you came in just as I was pursuing 

this matter. Let me restate it. The Southwest region of FAA has 

approved a memorandum to provide type ratings to FAA inspectors 

at Southwest Airlines’ expense. The policy of FAA provides that 

such MOUs should be approved only when necessary for the FAA 

to issue type ratings to carrier pilots. 

Since Southwest hires only pilots who already are type rated, 

what is the justification or need for such a program at Southwest? 

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for the break. 

The APM, APD program goes back to the 1980s. It is a national 

program and it was initially set up to make sure that we could leverage our resources between the FAA and the airline to where we 

would have inspectors. Back when I was an air carrier inspector, 

we did all the check rides. We just don’t have the resources to do 

that. So they developed a program where the air carrier check airman, highly qualified people could do the check ride for the FAA, 

and that set up the program back in the 1980s. 

This program was reviewed back in the mid-1990s by the inspector general’s office and the FAA at that time I forget the administrator, but he wrote a letter back to the IG and I think that is a 

matter of public record, where they reviewed that relationship. I 

think the problem here is that the policy says that it would be to 

APMs, assistant APMs and FAA inspectors to do certification check 

rides. 

The issue that was raised to me was, why would the principal 

operations inspector, the supervisory principal operations inspector 

get that same training. That is not consistent with FAA policy. So 

when that was raised as an issue recently, we looked at it in the 

region and decided that would be changed. It should only be for 

FAA inspectors that do certification activities. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, and managers as well. I don’t understand. 

It just seems to me that on the face of it, conflict of interest questions arise. And as Inspector General Scovel said, it raises the appearance of impropriety, that there ought to be firewalls around 

these activities. They should not be receiving any benefit of that 

type from the carrier that they are inspecting. 

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn’t disagree with that. The 

main purpose as a regional manager or years ago, as an air carrier 

inspector, we need our inspectors trained, just like the air carrier 

inspectors are trained, in the same equipment, same training proVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
100 

grams. Because we do sample some of that work. And if there is 

some way to provide that training by another means, I certainly 

would support that. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And the training is very important. I concur. But 

there has to be a way, and I will ask Inspector General Scovel and 

Mr. Bloch to think this matter through, come back to the Committee and back to the FAA, review with you means of achieving 

that training without the appearance or the reality of impropriety. 

If there are no further questions of this panel, we thank you for 

your time, for your answers, for your candor, for the testimony. Mr. 

Sabatini, you have committed to a number of very significant actions. I will look forward to following up vigorously with you and 

with the FAA and with the IG’s office and Mr. Bloch as well. 

Thank you. 

Our next panel includes Mr. Herb Kelleher, the face of Southwest Airlines, the presence of Southwest Airlines, the man who 

personifies Southwest Airlines. They sent their best and the brightest, the most engaging, the most sweet-talking. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The softest hand-holding. 

[Laughter] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Gary Kelly, who is Chief Executive Officer of 

Southwest; Mr. Vincent Collamore, Aviation Safety Inspector at 

Southwest; Mr. John Bassler, Principal Avionics Inspector, Dallas 

Fort Worth Flight Standards District Office. 

Gentlemen, please stand, raise your right hand. Do you solemnly 

swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee in the 

matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth 

and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You may proceed. 

We will begin with Mr. Kelleher. Turn your microphone on, we 

want to hear every word. 

TESTIMONY OF HERB KELLEHER, EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, 

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY; GARY KELLY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY; VINCENT LARRY COLLAMORE, AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, 

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CMO; JOHN BASSLER, PRINCIPAL 

AVIONICS INSPECTOR, DALLAS FORT WORTH FLIGHT 

STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE 

Mr. KELLEHER. I wish I were a prettier face, Mr. Chairman. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Oh, yours has been the face of Southwest for so 

long, it is unmistakable. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri and distinguished Members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, my name 

is Herb Kelleher. I helped to start Southwest Airlines, have been 

working on the Southwest business venture since the fall of 1966, 

have been on the board of directors for 41 years, have been the executive chairman of our board for 30 years, and was the CEO of 

Southwest from 1981 through 2001. I guess I could fairly be called 

the Methuselah of Southwest Airlines. 

101 

A friend, now a former friend, recently said to me, I hear you 

have a connection with the Air and Space Museum. I said, yes, I 

do. He said, are you on the board or are you an exhibit? That is 

why I describe him as a former friend of mine. 

From first-hand knowledge, not hearsay, I can tell you that 

Southwest Airlines was founded upon the principle of providing 

more value for less fare, not less value for less fare. Professor Mike 

Levine was CEO of New York Air, and he encapsulated this concept very adeptly. Mike stated at an airline investor’s conference 

that it is very easy to be expensive and good, and very easy to be 

inexpensive and bad. But that Southwest did a beautiful job of simultaneously being both inexpensive in its fares and very good in 

its operations and the service that it provided to customers. 

Southwest Airlines, through the dedication, through the energy 

and through the warm hearts of its much beloved and truly cherished employees, has faithfully delivered on its original promise of 

more value for less fare for 37 years. 

In 1966, when I started work on bringing Southwest Airlines into 

being, we said we were going to free the American people to fly. 

And we did. At that time, something like only 15 to 20 percent of 

adults in the United States had ever flown on a single commercial 

airline flight. Today, that number stands at 85 percent. 

The DOT calls this phenomenon the Southwest Effect, the Southwest Effect, which, based on Southwest’s model, has subsequently 

been emulated across our globe. Southwest Airlines said, we are 

going to get you there on time. And we did. Southwest has the best 

cumulative on-time performance record of any major airline in existence at the inception of those on-time statistics in 1987, 21 years 

ago. 

Southwest Airlines said, our wonderful people are going to provide the best customer service in the industry. And they did. 

Among major airlines in existence in 1987, Southwest has the best 

cumulative customer satisfaction record, the fewest complaints per 

100,000 passengers carried since the inception of such customer 

satisfaction statistics in 1987, 21 years ago. 

Southwest Airlines for many decades was the most heavily 

unionized of the major airlines, and our unions are here today in 

support of our company, such as Tom McDaniel and Mike Massoni, 

officers of TW 556, people from our TW 555, the Southwest Airlines 

Pilots Association, AMFA that represents our mechanics. And I 

was going to introduce them individually, with the Chairman’s permission, but in light of the hour, I decided that I would refrain 

from doing that. 

But we said we are going to take good care of our splendid people. And we did. Southwest instituted the first employee profitsharing plan in the American airline industry and no Southwest 

Airlines employee ever, not one, has sustained an involuntary furlough. And this perfect job security transpired during a 37-year period when probably a million or more airline employees experienced 

furloughs throughout the global industry. 

And finally, we said, we are going to operate the safest airline 

in the world. And we have. Conde Nast Traveler magazine pointed 

out some years ago that Southwest Airlines had operated more 

flights and Southwest Airlines had carried more passengers withVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
102 

out a single, not one, passenger accident fatality than any other 

airline in the world. After 16 million flights carrying 1.2 billion 

passengers, without a single, not one, passenger accident fatality, 

Southwest Airlines’ record as number one in safety, is intact today, 

the best airline passenger safety record in the world. Although 

sadly and very tragically, we did cause a non-passenger fatality 

with a runway over-run during a snowstorm. 

We have always, and we have constantly, jawboned our people 

to the effect that flight safety is Southwest Airlines’ number one 

objective. And I submit to this Committee that our superlative 37- 

year passenger safety record sustains the thrust of my comments 

in this respect. An exhibit illustrating multiple aspects of our leadership, and I do mean leadership, in safety and also our devotion 

with respect to safety, is attached to Gary Kelly’s and my joint 

written testimony. 

One of the things that has concerned me today is that this Committee has an enormous reputation for what it has accomplished in 

the field of safety and in the field of transportation, and I am very 

familiar with that record when it used to be the Public Works Committee, before it became Transportation and Infrastructure. I know 

all the programs which the Chairman mentioned earlier that you 

have initiated and you have served in order to make transportation 

more safe. 

And I didn’t want anyone on this Committee to get the impression that Southwest was just rumbling around the skies in a contumacious manner, not having inspected cracks on its airplanes. 

Mr. Oberstar earlier mentioned the leadership that this Committee 

had taken subsequent to the Aloha accident with respect to aging 

aircraft. My recollection is that he was the keynote speaker at the 

international conference of airlines throughout the world and regulatory bodies throughout the world to decide what should be done 

about that situation. 

What may not be so well known is that following the leadership 

of the Chairman and this Committee, Southwest Airlines is the one 

that originated, Southwest Airlines, itself, originated the plan for 

inspecting for cracks in the 737 classics and for repairing those 

cracks. That led to the Boeing service bulletin in 2002 as I remember or thereabouts that really incorporated the Southwest Airlines 

plan for dealing with this crack problem, and later led to the very 

AD that has been in question and the subject of today’s hearing. 

That really originated in Southwest Airlines’ work. 

Now, if I may say this, Mr. Chairman, these ADs are not like 

Dick and Jane’s first grade reader, you know, this is a ball, this 

is Spot, the dog. On this very subject, cracks, there are six ADs encompassing 1,100 pages. And they are interrelated, some of them, 

and overlapping. 

What Southwest Airlines did, again, leaping ahead, in terms of 

safety, was to develop a modification for our airplanes that replaced the need to inspect and repair cracks. That was launched 

with the Boeing Company and the FAA’s approval. 

So how did we get to the point where we screwed up by not putting our planes on the ground when an AD had been violated? 

Well, actually, what happened was because of the plane modifications that we had made under another AD, we were relieved of a 

103 

lot of our inspection requirements. If you replace the panels, you 

no longer need to inspect them. 

Our engineering department in the midst of this welter of ADs 

and this 1,100 pages issued a document, our engineering department, which missed the fact that there was a small part of the airplane, about maybe two inches high and about this long, that still 

needed to be inspected despite all the modifications that we had 

made. Now, that was our mistake. But nobody realized it for quite 

some time. We weren’t just rumbling around saying, oh, gee, we 

failed to inspect this part of the airplane. As Gary Kelly will explain more fully, we were inspecting these airplanes interminably 

in regular inspections, many, many times per year. And he can fill 

you in on that. 

But all of a sudden we discovered, Southwest Airlines discovered 

that we should have been inspecting that tiny part of the airplane 

in a special inspection under the ADs, that the engineering order, 

in other words, was erroneous. 

So what did we do? We reported it to the FAA. We told them 

what was going on. Here is where the big mistake came. The FAA, 

at the principal maintenance inspector level, said we could continue to fly the planes while we inspected that small portion of the 

fuselage. And we did. And we should not have, and we have 

learned our lesson. When another ambiguity came up, and you 

have seen newspaper articles about this, at least, when another 

ambiguity arose as to how to apply a Boeing inspection requirement to our airplanes, we simply put the planes down until it was 

resolved. Totally different behavior within a very short period of 

time. 

I apologize to this Committee. We realize those planes should not 

have flown during that period while the inspections were made of 

the window belts. But at the same time, I have to say that maybe 

our people made some engineering judgments, which they weren’t 

entitled to make. Those airplanes should have been all on the 

ground. 

But at the same time, there was not even the remotest chance 

of a repetition of the Aloha Airlines roof peel incident, which some 

coverage has mentioned. The Aloha Airlines 737 was a 1969 89,000 

cycle, non-advanced 737-200, embodying a 1960s lap joint adhesive 

process that was abandoned by the Boeing Company in the 1970s. 

Southwest Airlines has not flown a non-advanced 737-200 like the 

Aloha airplane since 1978, 30 years ago, and presently has no 737- 

200s of any kind in its fleet. 

And as Gary Kelly will more fully explain, Boeing has carefully 

manufactured the fail-safe 737 models, which constitute all of 

Southwest’s present 737 fleet, so that small cracks will not propagate into the 18-foot long roof tear involved in the Aloha roof tear 

incident. 

Now, is that any excuse for not putting those planes down? I tell 

the Members of this Committee it is not. And we recognize what 

the Chairman described earlier and some other Members have spoken about, the creep, the creep issue. So I apologize for not fulfilling our duty in that respect. But again, some of these accounts 

have referred to these airplanes, I am talking about media accounts, as uninspected. That is false. Nothing could be further from 

104 

the truth. And Gary Kelly will explain why that is the case. They 

were inspected over and over and over and over again. 

So thank you very much for the opportunity to be with you. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address some of the allegations 

that have been made about Southwest Airlines’ behavior. 

And if I may, there is one other thing that I apologize to you for, 

and it has been a little bit of a burden today. I think it is unfortunate that the name of the airline is Southwest and the name of the 

region of the FAA is Southwest. I think at some point, maybe when 

people are talking about Southwest, some of the people in the audience were saying, which one, the CMO or the airline. 

Mr. Kelly is widely esteemed, very, very bright. Intensely conscientious and intensely safety-conscious. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I assure you, Mr. Kelleher, that the Chair knows 

the distinction between the Southwest region and Southwest Airlines. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Thank you, sir. You noticed that I said, the audience. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLEHER. I didn’t want to accuse any Member of the Committee of committing that mistake. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Oberstar and Mr. Petri, Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to be here today. My name is Gary 

Kelly and I am CEO of Southwest Airlines since July of 2004 and 

a Southwest Airlines officer since 1986. 

As Mr. Kelleher has so eloquently stated, Southwest Airlines has 

been a great success for a great many years. We believe our people 

are the best in the aviation industry and that they have enormous 

devotion to our company and tremendous pride in its results. But 

above all, the safety of our people and our customers and our own 

families is my top priority, and it is Southwest Airlines’ top priority. And on this, you have my personal commitment on behalf of 

our 34,000 Southwest family members. The need to be safe is a 

part of our history, it is a part of our culture and certainly it is 

a part of our DNA. 

On March 6th of 2008, Southwest received a letter of civil penalty from the FAA related to a March 2007 matter of regulatory 

non-compliance. I first learned of that matter in February of 2008, 

and that this Committee was conducting an investigation. So we 

then launched our own internal investigation conducted through 

our general counsel. 

On March 10th, I received the preliminary results. Two issues 

had to be addressed immediately. The first was that better judgment should have been exercised than to allow these aircraft to 

continue to fly after there was a potential non-compliance discovered. The second was that senior management should have been 

consulted on such a significant issue, but was not. So based on our 

March 10th preliminary briefing, we took immediate action. I requested, and Southwest was granted, a face to face meeting with 

top FAA officials in Washington on March 12th. 

We placed on leave the employees from our regulatory compliance group that were involved in the March 2007 event. We confirmed with our reorganized regulatory compliance group that senVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
105 

ior management will be involved in all decisions of that magnitude, 

and then of course, we reaffirmed to all of our maintenance and engineering leadership that we will not operate an aircraft is there 

is any credible evidence of an AD non-compliance. 

Now, we also initiated a number of additional efforts to strengthen our maintenance and engineering regulatory compliance and our 

AD compliance functions, including the following. We have done an 

audit of all open FAA airworthiness directives, we have a review 

underway by outside independent experts, we have a reorganization of our AD and regulatory compliance function with enhanced 

management reporting. We have a restructure of our continuing 

analysis and surveillance system, otherwise known as the CASS 

system. We have an increase in the number and the scope and the 

frequency of audits, and also a segregation of the audit function 

from regulatory compliance. And we have more stringent documentation of our AD and maintenance plan changes. 

So when Southwest, the FAA and independent consultants will 

complete their reviews, we will act quickly to evaluate all the findings and the recommendations and of course will make all the necessary changes. 

While there was clearly a mistake with our regulatory compliance, we wanted to assure ourselves that safety of flight was not 

an issue. And we have done that. That has been confirmed by two 

outside experts. First of all, the Boeing 737 is the most popular 

commercial aircraft in the world, with over 5,000 produced. Southwest operates the 737 exclusively and has the largest 737 fleet in 

the world. So in short, the experience with this aircraft is extensive 

around the globe and at Southwest Airlines. 

The Boeing 737 classic was designed with a fail-safe structure, 

and that affords a supreme margin of safety. The fuselage design 

is fail-safe because there are three independent structure elements: 

the external skin, the internal bonded doubler and also the aircraft 

frames and stringers. This design allows skin cracks and other skin 

damage to occur without compromising structural integrity. 

Next, the FAA-approved Southwest maintenance program provides for frequent, scheduled, repetitive, overlapping and comprehensive inspections and repairs with another supreme margin of 

safety. Stated more plainly, our aircraft are inspected far more 

often than is absolutely necessary. Routine inspections of varying 

degrees occur daily, weekly, every 50 days, every 100 days, then we 

have intermediate half C inspections every 250 days and then 

heavy wide checks are performed every two years. 

In addition to these regularly scheduled, baseline maintenance 

skin inspections, there are also skin inspections required by the six 

different ADs that Herb mentioned. The combination of these inspections makes our 737 aircraft one of the most carefully inspected aircraft fleets in the world. So indeed, it is false to say that 

these aircraft were not inspected. They were. And in fact, the error 

in the AD in question was discovered through an inspection and a 

crack repair in the very area that is in question. 

So from a safety perspective, we found the non-compliance, we 

voluntarily reported it, and we fixed it. 

Now, our airplanes are designed to be safe and our maintenance 

program is designed to keep them safe and we have a culture of 

106 

safety excellence. We have safely operated more than 16 million 

flights over 37 years serving more than 1.2 billion customers. I 

think that easily makes us the safest airline in the world, and a 

record that anyone would justifiably be proud. I believe deeply that 

we have the best maintenance and engineering employees in the 

airline industry. 

But I do want to assure this Committee and the American people 

that we will not rest on our safety record, no matter how good it 

may be. And I do commit to you that we will constructively and aggressively address the issues raised by the FAA and this Committee. Because we want to enable our proud, safe airline to continue as the safest in the world. 

Our record makes credible this aspiration, our Southwest people 

will accept nothing less and our customers deserve nothing less. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Do your colleagues have statements as well? I am sorry, you are 

the FAA inspectors. I am sorry. I was distracted for a moment. Mr. 

Bassler? 

Mr. BASSLER. Yes, sir, I do have a statement here I would like 

to give to the panel. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Pardon me? 

Mr. BASSLER. I do have some testimony I would give. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, you are next. 

Mr. BASSLER. My name is John Bassler. I came to Southwest 

CMO from the Continental CMO, which I spent eight and a half 

years down there, back in June of 2005, as the assistant principal 

avionics inspector, under the supervisory principal avionics inspector, Mr. Colin, up until December 2007, when I requested to be 

moved to a different office. 

When I arrived at the Southwest Airlines CMO in 2005, one of 

the first things I noticed was how fractured the Airworthiness 

group was. I came from the Continental CMO in Houston where 

that Airworthiness unit had scheduled meetings, including both 

specialties, avionics and maintenance, on a regular basis. The 

Southwest Airlines CMO did not, and as a matter of fact, it did not 

start having meetings of this nature until the latter part of 2007. 

I found the Airworthiness unit, in my opinion, to be dysfunctional. 

I had not been in the office for very long when I witnessed my 

immediate supervisor, the principal avionics inspector, giving the 

middle finger gesture to the principal maintenance inspector when 

his back was turned. I thought that very unprofessional and I 

voiced my objections to my supervisor and I told him that I did not 

appreciate that in my presence. 

Things progressively got worse in the office. Most of the friction 

was within the management ranks. During this time it must be 

noted that the inspectors continued to operate at an exceptional 

level, even without management support. 

Around early March 2007, rumors began to fly that inspector Mr. 

Boutris had a couple of hot line complaints filed on him from outside the agency. This is when things really started to become hostile in the office. Mr. Boutris began to spend a lot of time conversing directly to Mr. Robert Naccache, the assistant manager, 

and Mr. Michael Mills, the office manager, behind closed doors, 

107 

several times a day. Mr. Boutris also began spending a lot of time 

with the data evaluation program manager, Mr. Doug Peters. 

I started to recognize what appeared to me to be the obvious dislike Mr. Peters, Mr. Boutris, Mr. Mills and Mr. Naccache had toward the PMI. This dislike, in my opinion, seemed to be of a very 

personal nature toward this man. One day Mr. Peters was overheard by several inspectors, including myself, making a comment 

from Boutris’ cubicle, the gloves are coming off. 

Mr. Boutris was removed from his duties and work program, to 

my understanding, pending the outcome of the investigation and 

the complaints made against him. He was to have no contact in 

any capacity with the air carrier or its programs. This is evidently 

right around the time frame with Southwest Airlines contacted the 

PMI disclosing the possible over-fly of an Airworthiness directive of 

some of their aircraft. Being of avionic specialty, I was not privy 

to this information and therefore had no knowledge of the details 

or specifics of this disclosure. 

Around the April 2007 time frame, the PMI was looking for volunteers to help complete the job assignments that were assigned to 

Mr. Boutris but that were not completed. Mr. Gawadzinski was 

having difficulty getting anyone to volunteer. He approached me 

and asked if I would be willing to work the SAI on ADs 1.3.6, on 

the airworthiness directives. And I told him I would be willing to 

do the assignment. 

Had I known at the time Mr. Boutris’ intentions, I would have 

never volunteered myself for this assignment. It wasn’t a couple of 

days later I witnessed Mr. Boutris entering my cubicle and removing data from the SAI folder I had just acquired from him. Mr. 

Boutris never started the SAI. He had a couple of notes on a decision collection tool, but that was it. I had to start the inspection 

completely from scratch. 

I began to become aware of the militant attitudes that were developing in the office from the individuals I have identified in the 

aforementioned paragraph. I became concerned that I was going to 

be targeted by these inspectors due to my agreeing to perform the 

SAI. I sent an e-mail to my supervisor, requesting that I be removed from the SAI because of the hostile environment developing 

in the office. My supervisor refused to remove me from the SAI. I 

then requested to at least add some inspectors to the inspection so 

that it would be a team event and I would not be individually targeted. My supervisor agreed and added one inspector, Mr. 

Collamore. 

During this inspection, Mr. Boutris felt it important enough to 

approach Mr. Collamore and notify him that the SAI was being 

watched very closely. Mr. Collamore stated to me that he felt very 

threatened by Boutris’ comment. I also learned of events that had 

transpired between Mr. Boutris and certain Southwest Airlines employees, which I was told was almost developed into a fistfight. 

Mr. Collamore and I finished the inspection during this month 

of June 2007. There was a lengthy delay in completing the SAI due 

to Mr. Kervanik, who manages the Airworthiness Directives portion of Southwest Airlines’ maintenance program, being on leave 

due to a medical situation within his immediate family. The final 

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turned with numerous, two full pages of comments. This upset me 

because in my ten years at the time experience with ATOS, I had 

never seen so many comments from a DEPM. I had performed inspections in the past and never had anything like this returned 

from the DEPM in this fashion before these events. This upset me 

deeply and I brought my concerns to my supervisor. I explained 

that I felt, again, I was being targeted and that the DEPM was 

using his position to personally attack my credibility. 

Nothing was done about my concerns. I made a couple of spelling 

corrections to the verbiage and again forwarded it to the DEPM for 

review. This time, it was satisfactorily entered into the ATOS master record repository. 

Several days later, the PAI wanted changes made again to the 

SAI, no comments, and had me request it being sent back from the 

repository. This is very unusual. Once an inspection has been saved 

to the data base, it never gets returned unless it is unusual circumstances. I have never witnessed it in my ten years of working 

in the ATOS. Phone calls are made and the SAI is returned. At 

this particular time, management personnel are attending a seminar out of State. So the only permanent management official still 

in the office was the assistant manager, Mr. Naccache. 

The SAI sits in the DEPM’s possession for approximately 15 

days. When management finally returns to the office, I send an email to the office manager, who now is Mr. Hedlund, and I ask him 

the status of the SAI. He responds to me to let me know the DEPM 

is waiting for PMI feedback. As a note, this is the third PMI, second actor so far. I thought this peculiar, since this individual had 

no information and was not present during the time the SAI was 

being performed. 

A meeting is held at the request of the DEPM to discuss his concerns with the SAI with the PMI and the PAI. I was not invited 

to the meeting, nor was Larry. I was the team coordinator for this 

SAI. This upset me, because I was the team coordinator. I felt my 

knowledge was instrumental in this conversation. I voiced this concern to my supervisor. Nothing was done about my concerns. 

After the meeting, the PAI sent an e-mail to the SAI team member, Larry Collamore, requesting the ‘‘yes’’ comments in the control 

section of the SAI. At this time, ATOS 1.1 was the national policy, 

and it did not require ‘‘yes’’ comments. Mr. Collamore responded to 

the e-mail by respectfully refusing to add the ‘‘yes’’ comments. His 

response also identified the inappropriate behavior being displayed 

by certain inspectors in the office. 

Management meets in the manager’s office to discuss the SAI. 

The next morning, the SAI work instructions are changed to require ‘‘yes’’ comments. This action was contrary to ATOS and AFS 

900 policy. A meeting is held to discuss the SAI. The meeting included the PAI, Mr. Colin, the temporary PMI, Mr. Hoover, the 

temporary POI, Mr. Nelson, the manager, Bobby Hedlund, the 

DEPM, Mr. Peters, myself and Larry. 

Larry and I voiced our frustration with the entire process and 

the way this inspection is being handled. Both Larry and I felt we 

were being targeted and that we were not getting fair and equitable treatment. Our concerns went unaddressed again. By the 

time the SAI was saved to the ATOS repository, it sat in the 

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DEPM’s review for 20 days. This again is contrary to ATOS data 

quality guidelines and the required disciplinary action on the 

DEPM was not taken. 

At this point, I was fed up with the office environment and how 

I was being unfairly treated by management and certain inspectors. I requested to be transferred to another office in the local 

area. I was finally told by the manager, Mr. Hedlund, that I received a transfer to the DFW FSDO. This meeting took place in my 

cubicle. During the conversation, my supervisor walked up, walked 

by and made some comments, then flipped me off with both fingers 

from both his hands, in front of the manager. 

I sent a grievance to the region and I requested immediate removal from the office. The SAI letter addressing the findings during the SAI 1.3.6 still had not left the office. I do not know what 

the final letter looked like, since I was no longer employed in the 

office. I also cannot take ownership of the final SAI, since I believe 

the data has been manipulated since my departure. 

I made every attempt to complete this assignment in the most 

professional manner humanly possible. I followed national policies 

and guidance through the entire process. I pride myself as a public 

servant to make every attempt to make the safest transportation 

system in the world. I swore an oath to do just that. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Bassler. 

Mr. Collamore, do you have a separate statement? 

Mr. COLLAMORE. No, sir, I don’t. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much for your 

testimony. I appreciate your candor and your forthrightness. 

Mr. Kelleher and Mr. Kelly, Southwest Airlines is not on trial 

here. I want you to understand that. Your customer satisfaction 

rating is not on trial or in question. What is at stake in this hearing is the role of the FAA and the compliance with the Airworthiness Directives. 

At the very outset of all this disclosure, there was a statement, 

initial public statement from Southwest Airlines, implying that it 

had received concurrence from Boeing that it was acceptable to 

continue flying the aircraft. Those were statements from Southwest 

reported in the news media, copies of which we have received. Is 

it Boeing’s responsibility to give approval on Airworthiness Directive matters, or is that the FAA’s responsibility? 

Mr. KELLEHER. Mr. Chairman, I think there has been a mistake 

there with respect to what you read. We never asked the Boeing 

Company to deal with the subject of regulatory compliance. We 

simply asked the Boeing Company whether or not there were any 

safety of flight issues involved in flying those airplanes for the 

eight days that it took to re-inspect them. The Boeing statement 

itself specifically says, we are not addressing the issue of regulatory compliance. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Did they put that in writing to Southwest? 

Mr. KELLEHER. I believe it is. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would you submit that for the record, so we can 

have the record correct on that matter? 

Mr. KELLEHER. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It certainly gave a very inappropriate impression 

to my investigative mind and my experience. 

110 

Mr. KELLEHER. Yes, I understand that. But they didn’t opine on 

the regulatory aspect of it. They just said that they didn’t think 

there was any threat to the safety of flight during those eight days, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I appreciate your refreshing candor in saying, we 

should not have flown when we found those cracks. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Thank you, sir. We respect this Committee and 

will always be candid with it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And I also appreciate your reciting, which I did 

earlier in the hearing, the events that led up to the aging aircraft 

legislation, the meeting out here at Crystal City with over 400 

aviation safety professionals from around the world that eventually 

resulted in the legislation and the Airworthiness Directive that 

took FAA an inordinately long time to publish. 

Now, I don’t want to be nit-picking, but it bothers me to hear 

someone of your caliber to say it was a tiny part of the aircraft. 

It was a tiny part of that Aloha 737 that began to unravel. It always starts with a tiny part. That is why Airworthiness Directives 

are issued and that is why there is a requirement for rigorous inspection. I stipulated at the outset that this Aloha aircraft was one 

that had 89,000 cycles. 

I should have gone further, which I do in other contexts, and 

point out that that aircraft had flown over the continental United 

States for most of its lifetime. Then it was, for a few years, put in 

service with Aloha over salt air in a salt air environment. As we 

know, those of us who follow these matters, when an aircraft is 

pressurized, the skin expands microscopically. Moisture is taken 

out of the interior of the aircraft and condenses around the hull 

and drains around the sides. With the 727, by the time it reaches 

altitude, it has drained 120 gallons of moisture out of the interior 

of the aircraft. And it drains out of weepholes, but not all of it 

drains out. When it lands and is decompressed, some of that moisture remains. 

In the case of the Aloha, some of that moisture, some of that 

water had an electrolytic reaction with the aluminum-copper skin 

of the aircraft that proved to be fatal. It is secondly true that Boeing abandoned the cold bond method of manufacturing aircraft hull 

for much more stable and reliable method. 

But the point was that what should not have happened, what 

was designed not to happen, what had never happened before, did 

happen. The same with the PCU, the power control unit and the 

rudder. It should not have happened. Boeing came into my office 

in the aftermath about Aliquippa and said, we have flown 93 million hours of 737s and this has never happened before. 

But it had. The NTSB, God bless them, went back after Aliquippa to look at previous incidents, uncommanded rudder movement incident for which they had not found a probable cause, and 

attributed to the failure of the PCU that caused an uncommanded 

rudder movement. That corresponded with other similar incidents 

reported by pilots enroute that raised concerns about the PCU and 

Boeing then went back and re-engineered, did an enormous amount 

of work and Southwest, I know, was engaged in that practice. 

I go to this extent to say, these Airworthiness Directives have 

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ceptable within FAA regulatory proceeding to fly beyond the airworthiness directive mandatory inspection time. 

Mr. KELLEHER. It is certainly not, Mr. Chairman. Everything 

that you have said is 100 percent right, and I don’t disagree with 

anything you have stated. Your knowledge is really all-encompassing regarding this matter. 

When I said a tiny part, I didn’t mean to demean the significance 

of it. That comment was made in the context of 1,100 pages covering 6 ADs and the failure of the engineering order to cover that 

tiny part of the airplane. What I was saying was, not that it was, 

not that any airplane part is insignificant. I didn’t mean to convey 

that. But what I meant was, out of the whole airplane, with 1,100 

pages and 6 ADs, the engineer missed a small part. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, I understand that. And there is some traffic 

on the websites of various skeptics saying, oh, there are way too 

many Airworthiness Directives, they are way too complex, way too 

many pages for us. Well, if there are, then you’d better find something else to do. Because at 35,000 feet in the air, there is no curb 

to pull over, look under the hood and find out what is wrong. You 

have to do it right. That is why there is redundancy built into aviation. You understand it. You have a safety mind set, I appreciate 

that. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Yes, sir. And what I was suggesting, again, that 

is not an excuse. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Good. 

Mr. KELLEHER. That is not an excuse. I was just saying, I can 

understand how an engineer would miss a tiny part of the airplane 

in the midst of all this hullabaloo. If you will, if my recollection is 

correct, Mr. Chairman, yesterday, Administrator Sturgell said himself during his press conference that some of these ADs maybe 

need to be simplified, so that they are crisper and easier to understand. 

Again, that is not an excuse. But it would, making them plainer 

and simpler and unified would facilitate, I think, understanding 

them. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would be very, look with a very skeptical eye 

on any simplification they would do. 

But what is the status of the Southwest employees you announced had been placed on administrative leave? Mr. Kelly? 

Mr. KELLY. They are at home. They are on leave, they are being 

paid pending our investigation. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. They are not at work, they are not at a desk? 

Mr. KELLY. They are not. And of course, our investigation is 

weeks old at this point, so we are not complete yet. But yes, they 

are on leave. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, 

the witnesses, for putting in a long day here at the Capitol. Just 

trying to shift the focus a little bit to kind of looking forward, because what we want to do is certainly learn from the past and do 

better in the future, and in that regard, I would really be interested in hearing your discussion of how you build safety into an organization and how you work with the people who have responsiVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
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bility for oversight, the FAA safety inspectors in this case, to 

achieve what should be a common goal. I can’t imagine anybody is 

looking to have accidents and all that. 

There are different psychologies and some say, you know, you 

can do the stick and keep beating them and that way, and others 

say no, you kind of try to build a team. I learned a lot from a fellow 

named Burt Rutan. I represent the EEA in Oshkosh. And I sat in 

a lunch with him. He has built cutting-edge airplanes for a generation. I think he has never had a loss of life. And he didn’t want 

one of those planes certified as an airplane because he would have 

to defend the design. He wanted to keep it as a spaceship, because 

he said every day, he wanted every person working on that plane 

to try to think of a way to make it safer. And if they once had a 

design that they had to defend, they would go in and there would 

be 50 changes in it and the inspectors would say, how could you 

possibly say this is a perfect design? 

So I just wonder if you could talk about the psychology going forward. My bottom line is that it looks like your biggest mistake is 

that you are operating under a dysfunctional regional office that 

seemed to have not got its act completely together. It is not an excuse, but some wanted to be punitive and others seemed to want 

to work on a collaborative basis and there you are trying to figure 

out what you are supposed to be doing. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Well, I will tell you what. I learned more about 

the alleged lack of harmony at their CMO this morning than I 

think Gary and I ever had any idea. So that was kind of a revelation to us. But I will say this, that I have worked personally with 

the FAA, and I mean, for 15 years on a day to day basis insofar 

as any alleged infractions were concerned, insofar as FAA policies 

were concerned. 

I must say that from my personal experience over that period of 

time, I think the FAA did an excellent job, which might be called 

a tough love job. Because the FAA was not hostile, but indeed, it 

was firm. I can just give you one little example of what I am talking about. And I am not talking out of the side of my neck when 

I say this, I am telling you the truth. 

I was sitting in my office one day and the FAA inspector comes 

in and he says, Herb, you have too many foreign objects on the 

ramp. And I said, no, we don’t, Eric, I said, I keep track of foreign 

object damage to our engines, and I haven’t seen any. He said, are 

you going to be here for a couple more hours? I said, yes, sure. He 

leaves, and he comes back and he has a big bag full of bolts and 

nuts that he took off our ramp. I said, I think he is right, let’s get 

some magnetic sweepers to clean the ramp. 

In other words, it wasn’t a kissy-kissy relationship. But he just 

said, you are wrong and I am going to show you. And I said, and 

you are right and I am going to act on it. We have always had, historically had that sort of relationship with the FAA. And I think 

the FAA has done a tremendous job over its history. I know a lot 

of carriers abroad that would love to have the FAA as their regulatory body instead of the one that they have. And its record is superb and it is unparalleled. 

But of course, I haven’t particular cottoned, and I am sure Gary 

hasn’t, either, to anything that was said today by previous witVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
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nesses with respect to the dysfunction of our CMO. And of course, 

several times Members quite properly asked the question, is this 

more widespread. Well, frankly, we are not in a position to tell you, 

Gary Kelly or myself. But I think it has to be like one of those relationships with, we are married to each other, in effect. And we 

need to treat each other with respect. We both need to be proactive 

with respect to safety issues. 

Having a hostile FAA, and I know no one here has suggested 

that, but having a totally hostile FAA I think would cause carriers 

to perhaps be less forthcoming about some of the mistakes that 

they have made and to shy away perhaps from some of the programs that we have put together to keep track of trends and in cooperation with the FAA. 

I think there is a balance that needs to be struck. But I think 

it would be a mistake, I don’t know whether Gary disagrees with 

me, but I don’t think he does, to toss out the whole voluntary disclosure program. I do think from what I heard today that maybe 

it could use some improvements. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir, I would just add that first of all, we are accountable for the safety of Southwest Airlines. And certainly we 

want to cooperate, and we respect what the FAA’s role is and they 

are the regulator. We fully understand that. I would want our employees to disclose problems. If there was such a punitive atmosphere created that people are incented to hide things, that is in no 

one’s best interest, and certainly for the leadership of a company 

like Southwest Airlines. So a voluntary reporting program, I think, 

is critically important. 

Likewise, we want to share information with the FAA. This particular matter has been under investigation for a year, but we the 

airline are just now learning about it a year later. So it would be 

nice, in other words, to know instantly if there are concerns. There 

is always a matter of trying to reconcile conflict among people. So 

there has to be a mechanism to do that and we have to embrace 

that. But in the end, we have to have leadership and accountability 

to be able to reconcile that conflict. 

Southwest Airlines, I think, it is a trendy term today, but Colleen Barrett, our president, had a whistleblower line before it was 

the thing to do. So you have to have an open door, you have to welcome feedback and information. It is that kind of an atmosphere 

that creates a culture of safety, quite frankly. 

Mr. PETRI. We need some ideas or some reasonable procedures 

to prevent the self-disclosure program, which seems to be a wellintended, constructive one, from turning into a heads-up program 

where people, you are being accused of hiring, or inside dealings 

basically, because employees come and then they have relations 

with each other and the next thing you know, they are calling their 

buddies up and saying, we just are about to find out something 

that is going to, and you are going to be in it, so that is not the 

spirit of self-disclosure. 

Mr. KELLY. It is not. 

Mr. PETRI. It is not really in anyone’s long-term interest. 

Mr. KELLEHER. No, it is not. 

114 

Mr. PETRI. So you need to figure out ways, as an industry, as 

well as we, to make something like this work for the traveling public. 

Mr. KELLY. We have found some opportunities here to put better 

checks and balances in place, to have more frequent audits, that 

would help mitigate the kind of thing that you are talking about. 

But in the end, I would still rather hear people disclose what problems are as opposed to have people incented to hide them. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr Petri. I appreciate your thoughts 

and you suggested some very important lines of further consideration. 

Chairwoman Brown, the Chair of our Rail Subcommittee. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you. Mr. Kelleher and Mr. Kelly, 

I want to tell you that most Members of Congress, they think they 

are experts definitely with aviation, because we travel two, four 

times a week. As I told you, I am from Florida and I use your airline all the time. In fact, in my other life, I used to be a travel 

agent. So I understand all of the wonderful things, on time, the 

cost, the safety, the fact that you have carried over a billion people. 

But this little incident, as you know, is a black eye on Southwest. 

I guess I have a couple of questions in that light. One of them is 

that your Washington representative said that neither you nor the 

management team had any knowledge of those violations until 

some of the stories started appearing in the press. Is this unusual? 

You know this has damaged the airlines. What have you done to 

make sure that this doesn’t happen again? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, it is unusual. We have never found ourselves 

in this situation before, quite honestly. To put this particular matter into context, the reason that the mistake was made in the first 

place was because Southwest Airlines was making investments and 

modifications to our aircraft to make them safer. So we were reducing areas that had to be inspected previously by installing new 

solid metal panels. 

This one small area that Herb mentioned earlier was left off. 

Clearly, this experience has identified a change order control process that we want to improve upon. We don’t find many errors, but 

I think what we have all heard all day is that we want to strive 

to be perfect. And I can guarantee you that we will strive to be perfect. I cannot guarantee you that we will be perfect. But we are always looking for opportunities to improve. 

And it is a black eye. But my commitment to you is that we are 

going to take this constructively and we are going to better for 

that. We have implemented already a number of changes within 

our regulatory compliance function so that we will escalate these 

issues to the proper management level without question. And we 

will address the root cause to mitigate the number of errors. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Mr. Kelleher, if there was a song coming 

up that I really liked, like, you have personality and the airline 

represents kind of your personality, and you have done a great job. 

But we just finished talking about, and I know you heard it, about 

this culture as far as customer as opposed to stakeholder and the 

relationship between you all and FAA. Can you talk about that a 

little bit? Because basically, it seems as if the relationship is too 

115 

close. Not that we want adversaries. But it is just the difference 

between me and Mr. Oberstar and me and Ms. Johnson. 

Mr. KELLEHER. I think one of the things that the Committee has 

touched on here that is very, very meaningful, Congresswoman, 

and it is exactly what you said, from what I have now heard and 

from what I have found out, since this became an issue, there can 

be too much closeness between the regulator and the regulated. 

And we were very, Gary in particular, and Ron Ricks, were very 

disturbed to learn that this decision had been made without bringing it to the attention of even our vice president of maintenance. 

That will not happen again. I can assure you. 

But there was some kind of temporary malfunction there for 

some reason. We certainly don’t want a relationship that is too cozy 

with the FAA. Because of course, that doesn’t in the longer run do 

the carrier any good. The carrier needs to have people at the FAA 

saying, hey, wait a second, you are not doing this right, you can 

do this better, you need to revise your records. That sort of thing, 

that advice, that counsel, that guidance, I think is very important 

to the carrier, coming the other way. And apparently, we were a 

little shy on getting that too. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you. I yield back the balance of 

my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. I now call on Chairwoman Johnson, 

Chair of our Water Resources Subcommittee. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am probably one of the few people on this Committee that has 

known Southwest Airlines ever since there has been a Southwest 

Airlines. What I am concerned about, Mr. Kelleher, is, do you feel 

at any time that the safety of the passengers was breached during 

this time? 

Mr. KELLEHER. No, I do not, in any way, shape or form. Let me 

give you a comparison, if I might. And I am bearing in mind the 

Chairman’s admonition earlier against creep. I do understand that. 

But to put this in context, when you first come under the aging 

aircraft AD, right, you are just getting under it, the FAA gives you 

4,500 cycles before you have to start inspecting. With our operations, that is about a year and a half before you have to start inspecting. 

We flew these airplanes for about eight months. I think Inspector 

Boutris mentioned 30 months, but that is not so. It was June of 

2006 to February of 2007. And so what I am saying is that the FAA 

doesn’t regard that there is any threat to the airplane from cracks 

until you fly it for a year and a half. We flew it less than a year 

and a half. 

Furthermore, as Gary Kelly said, we probably inspected that particular airplane and its fuselage 80 times during the year. Don’t 

think that an airworthiness inspection directive is the only inspection that airlines apply to airplanes. We probably have four times 

as many regular inspections on our airplanes as the FAA requires. 

Those airplanes, it is like going to an internist twice a week for an 

examination with respect to the fuselage. 

And there is another special AD inspection that comes within 

seven tenths of an inch of where we are talking about. So it would 

116 

be unusual to do that one and not go seven tenths of an inch and 

look at the other area of the fuselage. 

So no, I don’t think there was any threat whatsoever to the safety of passengers during that time. And I base that on technical 

analysis, not just saying, nothing happened, even though we have 

never had anything happen from the passenger fatality standpoint, 

as I explained. I think the planes were perfectly safe and the public 

could have complete confidence in them.AFTER 6:00 p.m. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Nobody flies them more than we do. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Mr. Bassler, have you been in communication with 

the Southwest Airlines manager of regulatory compliance since 

your reassignment? 

Mr. BASSLER. Was that to me? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. BASSLER. No, ma’am. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Did you call from a Government phone or your 

personal cell phone when you attempted to—— 

Mr. BASSLER. After I was reassigned to the DFW FSDO? No. Not 

to my knowledge, no. I haven’t had any communication with them. 

Not that I am aware of. Are you talking about Southwest Airlines 

employees, correct? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. BASSLER. No. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Did you say you requested the reassignment? 

Mr. BASSLER. Yes, ma’am, I did. Back in October of 2007. 

Ms. JOHNSON. And what was your major frustration at the time? 

Mr. BASSLER. There was a very hostile work environment. And 

we had brought it to the attention of management up to region, 

many, many investigations came through there over the issue. And 

nothing was done about it. It was continually dysfunctional and 

hostile. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Did you have a conversation with the person who 

is now on suspension that was in charge of the Southwest Airlines 

inspection? 

Mr. BASSLER. The principal maintenance inspector? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Pardon me? 

Mr. BASSLER. The principal maintenance inspector? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. BASSLER. Doug Gawadzinski? 

Ms. JOHNSON. I am sorry, I don’t know his name. The person 

that got suspended from Southwest when they found out about 

the—— 

Mr. BASSLER. Mr. Gawadzinski, correct? Because there were two, 

there was Mr. Mills, I think, the manager, and Mr. Gawadzinski. 

If you are talking about Mr. Gawadzinski, I have conversed with 

him since, yes. Not on these topics, though. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Pardon me? 

Mr. BASSLER. Not on these topics, though. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. But do you feel that he was lax in his responsibility and did you talk with him about it? 

Mr. BASSLER. As I said in my testimony, I wasn’t privy to the information because I am avionics and he was maintenance. He 

wasn’t my direct supervisor. I didn’t directly work for him. 

117 

I did have, when my supervisor PAI was out of town or if he was 

incapacitated, I of course would fill in for him as the PAI on occasion. So during the two and a half years, I had gone to meetings 

as the PAI with the PMI. And at no time had I ever seen that type 

of behavior exhibited by Mr. Gawadzinski, at least in my presence. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. Thank you. I apologize for having been absent a period of time. But lots of things go on at the same time 

here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Cummings, Chair of our Coast Guard Subcommittee. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank all of you for your testimony. 

Let me talk very briefly, Mr. Kelly, you talked about improvements to the voluntary disclosure program. I want to know exactly 

what you may have had in mind. I want to go back to something 

that Ranking Member Petri talked about. He was saying sometimes you can have a voluntary disclosure and people abuse it. 

That is true. In Baltimore, we had a situation where at a hospital 

they were giving AIDS tests and hepatitis B tests with equipment 

that did not work. Thousands of them, thousands of AIDS tests, 

people getting the wrong results. And if it were not for disclosure, 

we would have never known it. 

Part of the problem with the disclosure is that when it was disclosed, management sort of suppressed it and kept it sort of in a 

little cocoon, and it never got past a certain point. I guess what I 

am getting at is, I get the impression that you are looking at your 

voluntary disclosure procedures and trying to make sure they are 

what you want them to be. 

I think we have to be very careful and set a different kind of 

standard when we are talking about life or death. In other words, 

I don’t worry so much about, I do understand people may abuse the 

process. But I agree with you that I would rather know than not 

know. If you are talking about life or death, those pilots sitting 

back there, if it is going to their lives and al the passengers that 

they fly around, I want to know. 

So I hope that when you reevaluate, you said you were looking 

at it and whatever, I hope you will keep that in mind. I understand 

what Mr. Petri is saying, but we are talking about thousands of 

flights and thousands of people. We are also talking about that 

thing that I talked about a little bit earlier, that trust that things 

are in order. 

Did you have a comment on that? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, yes, sir and hopefully I can clarify. I am a huge 

proponent of our voluntary disclosure program, because we do want 

to know, we want to know the truth. If mistakes are made, we 

want people to feel comfortable that they can report mistakes without some kind of punishment. 

The point that I was making earlier is we want to make sure 

that that is a credible self-reporting process and have enough proper research done, have enough independent checks and balances to 

look at that to make sure that the proper decision is being made 

about how to deal with a matter once it becomes known. 

I am more concern about that, in other words. 

118 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I guess at the earliest possible point. In 

other words, making that determination. 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir, and I think that is part of the complication 

and trying to discuss these issues in a one size fits all fashion. As 

Herb was describing earlier, he has colorfully described this, the 

AD requirements as not being the 10 Commandments. So they are 

very complex, they are very overlapping. It doest require research 

often to determine if there is in fact an issue. 

And Mr. Chairman, for the record, if I could, the rudder is a 

similar scenario, where there was a possible non-compliance that 

was discovered like the AD in question that we are talking about 

for March. Both issues were self-reported. Upon further research, 

one was ultimately determined to be truly a non-compliance issue. 

The rudder issue, once we completed our research there, it was 

found that it in fact was not a non-compliance. 

So out of an abundance of caution, we did the self-disclosure 

there. So sometimes it does take some effort, and we do want to 

do exactly what you said, which is encourage people, once there is 

some credible evidence that there is a problem, to bring it up so 

that it can be researched properly and we can make the right, safe 

decision. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am running out of time, I just want to ask you 

both this other question. I think you both talked about the change 

order process, you were trying to improve the planes. And come to 

find out, there is that space that you talked about that you somehow were maybe not aware of that, that it needed inspection also. 

Is there something that the FAA needs to do to make sure that it 

is very, very clear that when you make X, Y, Z improvements you 

still have to deal with certain things? In other words, what we 

want to do is make sure that we don’t, and I know you don’t, want 

to go down this road again. Since you all are doing, trying to make 

your planes safer, it seems to me we would want to make sure that 

we are very clear as to what still needs to be inspected. Since I assume that this is an ongoing process, you are constantly trying to 

make airplanes better, how do you make sure that you have all the 

information you need to be able to accomplish what I just said? 

Mr. KELLEHER. As the Administrator said, as I mentioned earlier, Congressman, this particular set of ADs is six in number, pertaining to the same issue. And furthermore, as a result of the voluntary program that we have undertaken at enormous expense to 

improve these airplanes, you get into a situation where you get an 

interaction between the ADs. In other words, if you replace the 

skins on this part of the airplane, you don’t have to inspect these 

other parts of the airplane. 

Well, airplanes are big. They have a lot of skin. And under that 

circumstance, it is no excuse, but I can understand the engineer 

missing the fact that you still needed to inspect this part of the airplane, despite the fact that the rest of it was exempt. And those 

particular ADs, I think, could be streamlined and simplified. I don’t 

mean to imply, nor does Gary Kelly in any way, shape or form, as 

a way to get out from under them. It is just to make them more 

understandable, so they are easier to comply with and easier to enforce. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

119 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. Carney, the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

panel for their patience. I can imagine you are going to do a lot of 

standing this evening. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CARNEY. Everybody understands the context in which these 

hearings are being held, and the state of the airline industry and 

Southwest is much better than your competitors in many regards. 

But still it is tough context, fuel prices, tough economy, et cetera. 

We never want to create the perception here that the airlines are 

cutting corners on safety in this context. I hope we can put that 

to rest, and we are all going to have to work very closely in this 

Committee in particular. We are doing our jobs from the Hill here, 

and you and all your competitors are also going to have to do that. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Could I make a comment that might be helpful, 

Congressman, in that respect? When deregulation took place, there 

were a lot of predictions that because of the enhanced competition 

in the industry, the safety of the industry would be reduced. Because they said, ah, more competition, fewer profits as a result of 

it, and airlines would start cutting back on their maintenance. 

They didn’t. Their record was better after deregulation than it was 

prior to that time. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Kelleher, I understand. 

Mr. KELLEHER. And I think we are in that situation now, where 

no airline is going to sacrifice, no matter what the economy is like. 

Mr. CARNEY. I certainly hope so. But you can understand the 

perception out there, because I hear that from my colleagues, and 

frankly, my constituents are a little nervous sometimes. 

Mr. KELLEHER. I want to reassure them. 

Mr. CARNEY. Of course, although you don’t fly anywhere near my 

district, I am afraid. We can talk about that offline sometime. 

For Mr. Kelly and Mr. Kelleher, has your investigation been able 

to determine whether anyone in your tech ops organization pressured Paul Comeau to keep the airplanes in service after the selfdisclosure was filed, or was that his decision alone? 

Mr. KELLY. That investigation is still continuing. We have testimony and other words from some employees. We have been able to 

audit some records, but there is obviously more input that we could 

gain, so at this point, no, there is no evidence of that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Did you take 70 aircraft offline for the rudder 

PCU issue? Or did you self-disclose at least 70? 

Mr. KELLY. I would love to spend maybe two minutes describing 

the rudder issue to clarify. 

Mr. CARNEY. That is up to Mr. Oberstar. He has been very generous today, so I think he will probably let us. 

Mr. KELLY. This is a March 2007 matter. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. This is the modification you made at Boeing, that 

Boeing recommended that you didn’t have to do but you did anyway? 

Mr. KELLY. On the rudder. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. No, on the windows. 

Mr. KELLY. No, this is on the rudder, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You’re talking about the rudder. All right. 

120 

Mr. KELLY. So just a little background. The rudder has two separate power units. It has the main power unit with two hydraulic 

lines coming in, it has the standby power unit. The main power 

unit is subject to an Airworthiness Directive. The standby power 

unit is not. It is not. 

It is the standby power unit that we had information that there 

was a possible non-compliance with our maintenance program, not 

with an AD, with our maintenance program. And we self-disclosed 

that. Initially, we did think it was 70 airplanes. After we researched it, we eliminated 52. They were in full compliance. We 

discovered that a year ago. Once we completed our research this 

year, we found that all of those airplanes were in fact compliant 

with our maintenance program. 

Mr. CARNEY. How long does research take on that sort of thing? 

Mr. KELLY. This particular one was confusing. Because of again 

just all the complexities associated with the changes that have 

been made to the rudder over the years. But in this particular case, 

it took a while to look at the paper trail, probably took three or 

four weeks. But we did not do, we did not complete the research 

last year to determine whether we were in compliance. We simply 

made the self-disclosure. We got the proper FAA approval for the 

remedy and we made the remedial action last year, even though we 

later found out that we didn’t have to do that. 

So it was an abundance of caution and hindsight. 

Mr. CARNEY. That is good to know. I appreciate that. 

One more question, actually, for Mr. Collamore and Mr. Bassler. 

Isn’t it true that another team of inspectors performed the same inspections at Southwest Airlines after you did, and you found 50 favorable findings and 8 negative, is that correct? And the other 

team found, changed it actually to 41 negative findings and 17 favorable ones? 

Mr. COLLAMORE. Actually, that SAI has been accomplished five 

times with five different results. 

Mr. CARNEY. Do we have an average of those results then? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COLLAMORE. Not on me, no, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Bassler? 

Mr. BASSLER. I would like to add something, too, Mr. Carney. I 

pulled up the data, that ATOS data repository. We had nine noes 

and of the nine noes, we had an inspector action taken, which is 

required even under 1.1 on every single one, including an investigation EIR for the one that was the only one that was regulatory. 

An EIR was sent. 

The one that they did right after ours, which was under 1.2, 

which has even stricter requirements, they had 17 noes and out of 

the 17 noes, 15 have no action taken. 

Mr. CARNEY. Why is that? 

Mr. BASSLER. That is a good question. And that is what I am trying to raise, is that our data is skewed. I know, I can tell you—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Hold on, hold it, hold it, Mr. Bassler, hold on a second. I kind of want to get to the crux of something here. How much 

subjectivity is actually in this process? It seems to me that there 

is some hard science here that you actually have to follow. 

121 

Mr. BASSLER. You answer the question. You answer the question. 

We are told, when we answer these questions, if it is a yes, it can 

be no yes, but, it is a yes, move along. We have been drilled on that 

for 10 years. In the SAI they have incorporated now, yes comments 

are required, under 1.2. But in the EPIs they are not still required 

to have yes comments. The reason being is when you get, it is good 

information to have when an inspector goes out there and he does 

an SAI of the subsystem level, which is what the SAI is, to look 

at the program, do they have a program in place? For the next inspector that comes along a year or two later, you want to see where 

is it, where is it in the manual system. 

But like I said, here you have one, when this was right after 

ours, when it was known that this was a hot, critical issue, a supervisor was the TC and 15 noes have no action taken. How did 

that get through the data quality, all the way through the DEPM 

to the data base with no actions taken? That means you have 15 

no answers. What is the FAA doing about it? 

I am pretty sure you can go to the office and find there was a 

letter sent. I am almost sure. I know these two individuals, there 

was a letter sent. But the data base doesn’t reflect it. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, data base management is certainly a critical 

factor here. If we can’t go back and do a research or do a history 

on a plane or fleet, that is certainly an issue. But I think that we 

probably need to get a lot less subjectivity in the process and a lot 

more objectivity in the process by all members, everybody involved 

in this process. 

Gentlemen, I thank you for your time. It has been a long time 

and I appreciate your patience. Thank you. No further questions. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. DeFazio, Chair of our Surface Transportation Subcommittee. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I regret 

I had to miss some of the testimony, I had to go do a television 

feed. 

To either Mr. Kelleher or Mr. Kelly, this is a very substantial 

fine and in my recollection it is one of the largest, if not the largest 

ever assessed. But I also know historically with the FAA, things 

happen. There is a lot of publicity about a big fine. And then the 

fine is appealed and reduced and ends up in many cases being insignificant. 

Have you or do you intend to appeal this fine and have it reduced? 

Mr. KELLEHER. We have not sat down with the FAA legal department to discuss what approaches might be taken one way or the 

other. Although as soon as we found out about what had been transpiring, Congressman, Gary did take all this to Washington and sit 

down with the FAA with respect to the issue. But the fine itself 

was not, the amount of the fine was not discussed. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But you would not be unique among airlines, it would be standard practice if you were to seek to have this 

reduced. But the FAA has made much to do here today about the 

magnitude of this fine and the gravity of the situation and how serious they are about changing the systemic problems we have. I 

just want to kind of put a caveat on that, it may or may not end 

up being a $10.2 million fine. 

122 

Mr. KELLEHER. That is possible. That is entirely possible. And 

may I suggest in sort of a sotto voce way that perhaps, if this Committee had not been as active as it is, it might have been a lower 

fine. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, and I am afraid we may not have gotten some 

of the assurances we got. I have to say that Mr. Bassler’s testimony 

is a bit confusing to me, because initially I thought in talking about 

the tumult in the office and the personality conflicts, he was saying 

that effectively there were no problems, which I would have questioned because of what the IG found. But now what he is saying 

is there might have even been more problems that somehow later 

got swept under the rug. Is that the thrust of your testimony here, 

that those 15 that you say are unanswered? 

Mr. BASSLER. Mr. DeFazio, I am raising the question that the 

data bases that we have in the FAA and the policies and procedures that we have in place, and you have to remember that when 

these two SAIs were done, one was done under 1.1, which at the 

time was the national policy, when Larry and myself did the SAI, 

this was under 1.2 with even stricter requirements. How does that 

pass all those quality processes. 

And how can you do the same SAI five times by AFS 900, I don’t 

even know how many, because I haven’t even been privy to that, 

I just heard it was done five times after ours and they all came out 

with different conclusions. There is something wrong with either 

the process or the questions we are asking here or how you view 

it. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I would reflect that when I was a ranking Democrat and they were developing this ATOS process, I had Mr. 

Sabatini and others in three or four times to explain to me how 

this might work. I expressed at the time that I was really dubious 

that this was going to be an effective program. I understand the 

idea of mega data and trying to look for anomalies and targeting 

those sorts of things. 

But I said to them then, and I guess I would repeat now, I would 

rather have the inspectors out in the field, the good old-fashioned 

way, armed with as much data as we can give them, but not sitting 

there just plugging stuff into a computer program. Because it does 

seem that this program, which I have never understood, does potentially have some problems. 

Mr. BASSLER. Sir, may I just add, and just remember that at the 

SAI level, you are at a sub-system level. So you are looking at the 

program. You are not necessarily touching the airplane. That is 

where the EPI comes in. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I understand, and that is a big concern to me. At 

the time, when I was relating this back to Mr. Sabatini many years 

ago, I recounted how United did its in-house maintenance then, 

and I had just been to the United facility at San Francisco. And 

an old-time mechanic had found a problem with a rotor that 

shouldn’t have been there, but something wasn’t quite right, so 

then he required they do additional testing and whatever they call 

it, flux testing, and they can find these micro-cracks. 

It is the same thing, people who are there with hands-on experience and looking over someone’s shoulder and seeing what someone 

is doing and talking to them, I think they are going to pick up 

123 

some of the threads that we are trying to pick up with this ATOS 

thing, personally, but that is my own Luddite prejudice, I guess. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It is not Luddite in the least, and Mr. Sabatini 

earlier committed to modifying this voluntary disclosure program 

and correcting holes in it and reporting back to us in due course. 

Ms. Brown. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just have one follow-up question. 

With respect to all recent grounding, you know, Delta had a big 

one, and I think American, do you think the type of non-compliance 

we are now seeing with previously allowing aircraft to continue in 

operation instead of grounding? 

Mr. KELLEHER. I am not really familiar from the technical standpoint with what required the grounding at the other carriers. And 

if I were to give an opinion on that, I think I would have to be inside those carriers or inside the FAA. So it is really hard to tell 

exactly what transpired. I have read press accounts of what went 

on with respect to some of the airplanes. But I really don’t have 

any insight into how serious the issues were with the other carriers. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Mr. Kelly? 

Mr. KELLY. I don’t have any insight at all as to what happened 

at other carriers. I can describe our own March 11th experience, 

which was in creating a new document for a change order, and 

being ever-vigilant in this environment, we did find an instruction 

that was conflicting. It was confusing. We used the word ambiguous. It was unclear which type of inspection was required for 44 

of our aircraft. Mind you, we did an inspection. We just weren’t certain that we did the inspection with the right method. It is either 

with an electrical device or doing it visually. 

We talked to Boeing, we talked to the FAA. All agreed that the 

wording was ambiguous. So they asked us to perform the most conservative inspection on the night of March 11th. Once we tried to 

do that inspection, we found that it could not be done. The metal 

was such that it would not accept this electrical eddy current device. It took all day on March 12th to resolve that particular discrepancy. 

So I do think that you will find things like that when all of this 

is subjected to that level of scrutiny. I am not complaining about 

it, but I am just pointing out that some of the reactions that you 

might be seeing are in fact just taking it to that level of detail. We 

had one aircraft that was grounded for an entire weekend over a 

washer that is less than the size of a dime. Historically, manufacturing allowances are such that you could use one washer, two 

washers, up to three washers. We had two washers on one bolt that 

was about an inch and a half long. And it took all weekend to resolve whether we could use two washers instead of one washer. 

So there is that kind of detail that is embedded in 1,110 pages 

of inspections that human beings are being subjected to try to work 

their way through. So I am sympathetic to what some of the airlines are going through. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Would either one of you like to respond 

to that question? 

124 

Mr. COLLAMORE. I think the thing that led us astray was if you 

looked in the preamble to the AD 2004-1806, the particular question was asked about the area that Southwest Airlines had missed 

during the NPRM stage that because of the window belt and the 

over-wing exits the extra skin and doubler inside made that area 

on stringer 10 between body stations 540 and 727 extremely difficult, if not impossible to inspect. And the FAA’s response at that 

time, from the ACO, the aircraft certification office, was that because of the extra skin and the doublers in that area, they did not 

consider that area as a cracking concern. 

I can’t speak for Mr. Gawadzinski. But I believe that that was 

what he had based his decision on to allow those airplanes to be 

flown, because that was the exact same area that Southwest Airlines had disclosed to us. 

Ms. BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you for those questions. They are very pertinent and very right on point. 

Mr. Kelleher and Mr. Kelly, earlier in the exchange, you one, referred to a statement by Mr. Boutris that, or attributed to him the 

30-month violation. In fact, this is documented in your own self-disclosure detail document on page three, time violation remained undetected, 30 months. This is your own document. 

Reason why the violation was inadvertent, your response is, due 

to individual human errors during the document data transition, I 

won’t go through all the items, were inadvertently, the inspections 

were inadvertently omitted. Unfortunately, due to the extended 

time span, we cannot definitively determine the exact reasons the 

initial error occurred and was then overlooked during creation of 

the document, its revisions and reviews. We can reason that the 

error occurred because of the complex nature of the ADs involved. 

Do you disagree with the ADs? 

Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I don’t remember the 30 months. But 

our executive vice president reminds me that the 30 months maybe 

the time that the document was out there in error, but the actual 

aircraft were not in non-compliance for that entire time period. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But do you disagree with this directive? 

Mr. KELLY. No, I don’t disagree with the AD, no. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Good. There is a process by which you can disagree with Airworthiness Directives, not only you but all airlines. 

Mr. KELLY. No, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You haven’t done that and you’re not in disagreement? 

Mr. KELLY. We are not, no. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Count one of the FAA fine imposition reads, 

‘‘Fifty-nine thousand seven hundred ninety-one of the flight cycles 

addressed in paragraph 16 were operated at the time when Southwest Airlines was unaware of its failure to incorporate the repetitive external detailed and eddy current inspections of stringer 10 

left and right at body stations 540, 597 and 663, 727 at intervals 

not to exceed 4,500 flight cycles.’’ 

Number 17, ‘‘The aircraft addressed in paragraph two were unairworthy when they were operated on the flights above because reVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
125 

quired AD inspections had not been accomplished.’’ That is the 

finding of the FAA. Do you disagree with that? 

Mr. KELLY. I think we have fully admitted that once we discovered the non-compliance and self-reported it, that we should not 

have continued to fly those aircraft based on what we know today. 

So we certainly don’t agree with that. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And that is the statement Mr. Kelleher made earlier, we should not have flown? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. There are maybe many other questions, but 

again, I just want to underscore that it is your own document that 

says, time violation remained undetected, 30 months. This was not 

attributable to an FAA inspector. This is your own filing, your own 

admission. And I think that is appropriate. It is candid. You should 

not be disputing the time frame. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, again, as I say, my recollection is based on the 

schedule of aircraft that I looked at, that the time that we were beyond the 4,500 cycle requirement, the longest time period was eight 

months. What I think the 30 months refers to is the time that the 

AD documentation was created that had the small area missing 

from the inspection. So I believe that that is what the 30 months 

is. But I apologize, otherwise I just, I don’t recall the 30 months. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. It is clear from the body of evidence presented 

today and the testimony that there is a great deal of adjustment 

that needs to be made and process at issue here. Voluntary disclosure, partnerships, relationships, the ability of a carrier to call and 

complain about an inspector and have that person removed, those 

are things that should not be happening within the safety context 

of FAA and its relationship with the airlines. As Mr. Sabatini said 

earlier in response to my questions, there are going to be substantial adjustments on a number of those policies, and we will follow 

those very, very closely. We look forward to airline participation in 

this process as well. 

I thank the panel for their presentation and testimony, and appreciate your being here throughout this very long day. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. KELLEHER. Thank you for the opportunity to appear. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are always welcome. 

Our next panel includes Mr. Tom Brantley, President of the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists organization, accompanied by 

Linda Goodrich, Vice President, Region IV of PASS; Mr. Richard 

Andrews, Aviation Safety Inspector, American Eagle Operations 

Unit, also of PASS; Mr. Joseph P. Thrash, Aviation Safety Inspector, retired, for Continental Airlines; and Mr. Bill McNease, retired 

Aviation Safety Inspector, FedEx CMO. 

I will ask you all to raise your right hand. Do you solemnly 

swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee in the 

matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth 

and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. Brantley, we will begin with you. 

126 

TESTIMONY OF TOM BRANTLEY, PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL 

AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALISTS, ACCOMPANIED BY LINDA 

GOODRICH, REGION IV VICE PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL 

AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALISTS; RICHARD A. ANDREWS, 

AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, AMERICAN EAGLE OPERATIONS UNIT, AMR CMO, PROFESSIONAL AVIATION SAFETY 

SPECIALISTS; JOSEPH P. THRASH, RETIRED AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CMO; AND BILL MC 

NEASE, RETIRED AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, FEDEX 

CMO 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by quickly introducing the people here with me. 

I think they may very well end up being helpful. Linda Goodrich, 

as you said, our Regional Vice President, representing our aviation 

safety inspectors. And Rick Andrews, a retired FAA safety inspector. I want to thank Rick for offering his own comments today. 

In the interest of time, I am going to dispense with my prepared 

remarks. I would just like to comment on a few things I have heard 

today that I found very disturbing. They relate to this idea of 

whether this is an isolated incident, what happened in the Southwest CMO or whether it is a systemic problem. I see the FAA trying very hard to portray this problem as a Southwest CMO problem. 

What I would offer is that there are problems in that CMO that 

are unique. They have the two factions down there that are battling constantly. That really exacerbated the problems with their 

system. But I think what we are seeing is a systemic problem. The 

fact that we are seeing delays and cancellations at many airlines, 

because they are grounding planes for checks, for maintenance that 

they are concerned hasn’t been done or that in fact has not been 

done, speaks to the fact that this is a systemic problem. I think trying to portray it as anything else is a little misleading by FAA. 

Along those lines, one of the things that has been most disturbing to me has been the way the FAA has described this special 

review that they have undertaken over the last 10 days. I think it 

is clear to everyone that was nothing more than an attempt to 

paint a picture for this Committee, plain and simple. That review 

was set up in a manner that there was no way they would find 

problems. 

I mean, quite frankly, they made a public announcement that 

they are doing this special review, and then they quietly sent direction to inspectors that unless the aircraft is already out of service 

for heavy maintenance, don’t worry about a visual or physical inspection. Review the data that you are provided by the airline and 

make your determination based on that. That is exactly what they 

did before this review. 

So to expect them to find a problem that hadn’t already been 

found is kind of ludicrous. I think the biggest fear that I have isn’t 

that we know how unsafe things are, it is that we have no idea 

right now what the status of the industry’s compliance with these 

airworthiness directives is. Frankly, right now, we don’t have any 

idea. We can guess that the majority of them are done, and I think 

that is safe. 

127 

But without having the physical inspections that verify compliance, I think it leaves everyone wondering exactly where we are. 

I think until the FAA integrates that piece back into their process, 

it is going to be a flawed process. I don’t care how much data you 

collect, if you don’t know that the data is good, it is meaningless, 

it is absolutely useless, as you mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman. 

I think until the agency is forthcoming about that and faces that 

problem and deals with it, this is not going away. I will conclude 

on that and I look forward to any questions you might have. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you for your candor. 

Ms. Goodrich? 

Ms. GOODRICH. I am going to turn this over to Rick Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Chairman Oberstar, Members of this Committee, 

thank you for holding these hearings on the relationship between 

the FAA and the airlines. My name is Richard Andrews. I was employed as an aviation safety inspector by the FAA at the American 

Eagle Certificate Management Office in the Southwest Region and 

assigned as an aircrew program manager in the American Eagle 

unit until March 31st of this year. 

I am a member of the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists 

and I served as the PASS representative for the American Eagle 

Airlines Operations Unit in that Certificate Management Office. 

I have worked for the FAA over 31 years. During that time, I 

have witnessed dramatic changes in the aviation industry. When I 

first started my career with the FAA, safety of the system was the 

priority. With the financial hardships facing many of the airlines 

and the pay for performance mentality of FAA managers, safety 

has become a second thought. 

My work at the Certificate Management Office has proven to me 

that management’s primary goal is to fill the quotas for the office, 

in other words, producing members is the focus, rather than getting the job done right. As FAA inspectors, we are the workforce 

trained to focus only on the safety of the system. It is beyond frustrating when we discover a problem with an air carrier and are 

prevented from doing anything about it. We are frequently stopped 

in our tracks by several layers of management and our focus is on 

pleasing the airlines. 

Thirty-one years ago, I was out in the field with my hands on 

airplanes and looking for safety problems. I had the power to make 

a difference. Now, in the age of self-disclosure and the tight relationships between FAA management and the airlines, inspectors 

are sitting at their desks getting their information into a computer. 

Unfortunately, what suffers most from all this is the safety of the 

system. 

I have seen and experienced the repercussions of these cozy relationships between the FAA and airlines in the past. A recent situation illustrates the point. In October of 2007, I met with the American Eagle Unit assistant manager and principal operations inspector to discuss the status of American Eagle Airlines’ flight operations and training. It was agreed that American Eagle should be 

under surveillance, and I was asked to start doing an in-depth 

evaluation of their manuals and programs. After several months of 

working on this project, in addition to my other full-time assignVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
128 

ments, I came up with numerous issues that placed regulatory 

compliance in question. 

After completing my research, I drafted 11 letters detailing handbooks, compliance issues, procedural problems and training issues. 

The drafts were forwarded to the principal inspector so that he 

could put them into formal FAA letter format. The principal inspector forwarded those letters to the unit supervisor. And in November of 2007 and again in January of 2008, I asked the unit supervisor about the status of the letters in the presence of the principal 

inspector and the assistant unit manager. On both occasions, the 

unit supervisor, who I have been told used to work for American 

Eagle, responded that we cannot send all those letters to American 

Eagle, as it ‘‘will overwhelm them.’’ 

However, after details of this hearing were released, I was notified last week by the principal inspector that the unit supervisor 

has now told him, get those letters out of this office. It took over 

four months for anything to happen with these letters. I am confident that nothing would have happened if not for this hearing. 

Due to the extended delay in sending out the letters, several of 

the compliance issues I discovered remain unaddressed or undocumented. I was forced to attempt to do work-arounds on many of the 

issues. This has not damaged my credibility with the air carrier, 

but it is not the best way to address situations so important to public safety. 

As I previously stated, I retired at the end of last month. I would 

have worked longer, but I could not do so under the current conditions that prevail at the FAA. Inspectors in large offices are confined by all these get out of jail free programs, and FAA’s management’s refusal to hold airlines accountable. 

Again, I thank the Committee for holding these hearings and investigating these serious issues. As an experienced FAA inspector, 

I believe nothing should ever be more important that the agency’s 

safety mission. Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Andrews. I greatly appreciate your testimony. It raises issues that I will come back to 

in a moment. 

Mr. Thrash? 

Mr. THRASH. I have heard Sam Rayburn’s name only once today, 

so I would like to hear it again. I would like to thank the people 

from Tennessee for sending Sam Houston down to what we can 

now say is Texas, and that is where I came from, through Houston, 

via Lufkin, Houston, up here. 

So they sent us both, Sam Rayburn and Sam Houston. So if 

there is any Tennessee people out there, I want to thank you very 

much. And I hope we can invoke their spirit in your hearts to have 

the strength to follow through on some of the facts of the matter 

that you have heard today. 

I look around here and some of the people that I wanted to talk 

to are gone. That is Mr. Stuckey, Mr. Sabatini and Mr. Ballough. 

By the way, my name is Phil Thrash, and I have about 40 years 

operational aviation experience, military, part 121 Frontier Airlines. I was in the FAA unit that oversaw Continental Airlines for 

20 years. My last 10 years I served as an FG-1825, that is an aviation safety inspector, air carrier operations. My job description was 

129 

the aircrew program manager over the Continental Airlines Certificate Management Group in Houston, Texas. 

We do, did, when I left, have a functional CMO. My beef is not 

with the airlines, but it is with FAA higher level management. I 

put my family in the back of any of those airlines right now, because that was my job, to enure that their manuals and training 

programs complied with the orders of the FAA and the regulations. 

My executive summary, which you have, Continental Airlines contract mechanic was killed during ground operations January 16th 

at El Paso, Texas. This was a fatal aircraft accident and the flight 

crews’ actions were accepted into FAA’s ASAP program during the 

week following the accident. The week following the accident. 

As the FAA’s Boeing 737 aircrew program manager in the Continental Airlines Certificate Management Office, I sent a February 

14th, 2006 e-mail to my professional disagreement with the ASAP’s 

decision to Administrator Blakey. On February 27th I was interviewed by Assistant Manager of the FAA’s American Airlines CMO, 

Mr. Don Klos, regarding my e-mail concerns at the request of Mr. 

Thomas Stuckey, who has departed. We know who he is. 

During the interview, Mr. Klos stated the previous week that he 

had visited Thomas Stuckey and indicated that Administrator 

Blakey and FAA’s Associate Administrator, Mr. Sabatini, who was 

also a part of these proceedings, told Mr. Stuckey to investigate 

how the El Paso matter had gotten accepted into ASAP. Mr. Klos 

stated during this February 27th, 2006 interview that he and 

Thomas Stuckey agreed that the accident should not have been accepted into ASAP, but that ‘‘Washington FAA’’ would have the final 

call. 

I advised Mr. Klos that the Continental CMO certificate manager, Bernie Mullins, and Principal Operations Inspector, John 

Merrifield, had stated in previous meetings with me that ASAP 

had not provided any precursors to the El Paso accident. The horse 

was already out of the barn. There was no quid pro quo. That is 

what ASAP is based on, you get amnesty, you give something. 

There was no quid pro quo. 

A December 17th, 2001 memo by AFS-1 Director of Flight Standards Service, Mr. Ballough, might be the key that Mr. Scovel can 

use in your wisely-directed order to him to inspect this ASAP program. This is a key memo, because it gives the ASAP FAA event 

review committee member total autonomy in his or her decision to 

accept or reject the crew member’s ASAP report. This event review 

committee is made up of three people: two Continental people, usually a senior management captain and usually a union representative. The FAA event representative ASAP in our Continental Certificate Management Office was a retired was a retired Continental 

Airlines pilot. 

After the El Paso accident occurred, another Continental Boeing 

737 safety-related incident occurred, which was accepted into 

ASAP. The Continental manager then, Bernie Mullins, removed 

this ASAP representative from the ASAP program. During this 

FAA ASAP representative’s tenure from 2001 to 2006, I was never 

contacted regarding any ASAP reports. The manager, POIs and 

APMs could not access APM’s data repository to gather risk indicators, accident precursors on which to focus our limited inspector reVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
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sources. From the summer of 2006 until my retirement, I conducted two enforcement investigative reports regarding FAR violations and four reexaminations of airmen under 47 U.S. Code, that 

is the Aviation Code, 44709 paragraph, which was after this former 

ASAP representative, the ex-Continental Airlines captain, was removed from his ASAP position and was replaced with the aviation 

safety inspector, who was rated on the 737. 

During this tenure, from 2001 to 2006, this former ASAP person, 

the Continental Airlines representative, was not qualified on any 

of Continental’s all-Boeing fleet. 

AFS-2, FAA Deputy Director of Flight Standards Service, John 

Allen, wrote an FAA memo dated April 28th to Administrator 

Blakey as FAA’s Flight Standards official position to my February 

14th, 2006 e-mail. Allen’s memo appears to obfuscate the facts that 

happened at El Paso to cover up these facts to support that FAA’s 

highest level management in the FAA’s Flight Standards Service, 

AFS-1’s, Mr. Ballough, who is not here now, and AFS-2’s decision 

to sustain this matter acceptance into ASAP. This memo is in the 

written testimony. It contains fictionalizations, false statements, 

innuendoes and unfounded conclusions. I recommend your questions to me in that regard. 

If Mr. Allen’s official memo of record was an intentional obfuscation of facts, he may be in violation of Federal laws. If Mr. Allen’s 

official record contains unintentional mistakes and misstatements 

of facts, he might be seen as incompetent. I don’t know if the Secretary of Transportation is still Ms. Peters or not, she is? Well, I 

think she might need to know about that as well. 

On September 21st, 2006, Mr. Ballough, that is Mr. Allen’s boss, 

Mr. Ballough, AFS-1, the Director of Flight Standards Service, sent 

an official letter of response to the Honorable Texas Senators Kay 

Bailey Hutchison and Jon Cornyn to close out their Congressional 

inquiries into the El Paso ASAP matter. Mr. Ballough included Allen’s aforementioned memo to corroborate the FAA’s Flight Standards official position on the acceptance of the El Paso ASAP matter, a fatal aircraft accident, into ASAP. 

If Ballough intentionally forwarded to United States Senators 

known fictionalizations, false statements, inaccuracies and obfuscation of facts, he may have violated some Federal laws. If unintentional, his competency might be in question. I was unable to accomplish my duties as aircrew program manager, which is on the front 

of 110(a), based on the FAA Act of 1958, to sustain Flight Standards’ mission statement to provide accident-free operations to the 

traveling public. 

Due to the policies and decisions made by James Ballough, AFS1, FAA Director of Flight Standards Service James Allen, and AFS2, FAA Deputy Director of Flight Standards Service, Mr. Ballough, 

Mr. Allen, they sustained the acceptance of that fatal accident into 

FAA’s voluntary disclosure program known as ASAP. 

The DOT OIG has had my file since October of 2006. It is very 

comforting to hear you give them guidance and orders to look into 

the ASAP matters. I think Mr. Scovel will be on target in that regard. 

I think the Achilles heel is the 2001 memo, which we can share 

with Mr. Scovel. Twice I made myself available to discuss the matVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
131 

ter with Administrator Blakey, Sabatini, Ballough and Allen, which 

did not happen. 

Mr. Nicholas Sabatini signed Regulation 14, CFR Part 193, 

under provisions of 49 U.S.C. 40123, to essentially prohibit the release of ASAP and other certain FAA-approved voluntary disclosure information on January 26th, 2005. The regulation essentially 

protects ASAP, which is a non-regulatory, voluntary program, created by an advisory circular, which supplants Federal Aviation regulations in this particular case, from the public’s rights and the 

freedom for information regarding their safety. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. Very precise, very specific references. 

I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. McNease. 

Mr. MCNEASE. First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting 

me here today. Before I get into my statement, FedEx, where I was 

located, FedEx Certificate, the last guy on the seniority list is 

called the caboose. And I am the caboose here. I am not going to 

talk about ASAP, I don’t need to do that, talk very little about 

ATOS. I can, because I have had the opportunity to listen to all of 

the testimony, there are a couple of items before I get into my 

statement that I would like to mention. 

Mr. DeFazio, and well, let me wait and maybe he will come back 

and I will mention that. ATOS is now being mandated to all 135 

operators and all 141 operators. It is going to be an impossible situation. There is not going to be any way for that to work. In the 

general aviation part of it, if you have one inspector, you can have 

10 certificates, how is he going to do the work that it takes a fleet 

of people to do in the current situation with ATOS. So mandating 

the new, the operators, 135 and 141, to go to ATOS, is again going 

to be a real problem, I believe. 

Just a little bit of background about myself, and I wasn’t going 

to tell you all this stuff, but I need to, I have received numerous 

awards from the FAA. I was nominated as inspector of the year for 

the Southern region in 2005. I received a letter of commendation 

from Admiral Bussey many years ago. I graduated first in my military flight school class. I flew 173 combat missions. 

I was appointed as the chairman of the Government Safety Inspector Working Group for the International Society of Air Safety 

Inspectors. I am a member of the Royal Aeronautical Society. I 

have been a test pilot. I currently hold an airline transport certificate with more than 16,500 hours and 40 years. I have 23 type ratings. I have pilots certificates from Switzerland, Italy, Indonesia, 

Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia, Malawi and Hungary. 

I was also an undercover pilot for the DEA and Customs. Currently, I am the Director of Safety, Security and Regulatory Compliance for an air carrier in China. 

Now I am going to read my statement, if you don’t mind. I have 

spent 14 years of my life working for the U.S. Government; 10 of 

those with the FAA. During my last assignment with the FAA as 

an inspector on the Federal Express certificate, I found an issue 

with FedEx that has implications not with just FedEx, but 

throughout the industry. 

Due to the loss of retirement benefits and large cuts in pilot salaries, many pilots are supplementing their income by flying for comVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Apr 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41821 JASON
132 

panies other than their primary employer. This is legal and in accordance with current Federal aviation regulations only as long as 

flight, duty or rest times are complied with. 

What I found was that the Director of Operations at Federal Express was issuing authorization letters allowing pilots to do outside 

commercial flying. When I contacted the Federal Express crew 

scheduling section, I was informed that the company has no policy 

nor method to track outside commercial flying. 

During the course of another investigation, it came to the attention of our office that a pilot for FedEx had been caught flying an 

illegal charter trip. The pilot admitted that he had flown the trip, 

and immediate his status as check airman, representing the FAA, 

was rescinded. This pilot is an MD-11 international captain. 

Since this pilot and the company had possibly violated the Federal aviation regulations by not recording or tracking the outside 

commercial flying, I asked my supervisor how he wanted me to proceed. I was told not to continue my investigation. I was given no 

reason why not to proceed. 

I followed up with an e-mail to my supervisor to verify what I 

was told. No answer via e-mail was ever received by me. I later 

met with my supervisor, along with another inspector to act as a 

witness, and asked once again if he wanted me to not investigate 

this matter. I got the same answer, do not continue the investigation. 

I was amazed that I was being told not to continue an investigation with such far-reaching implications. I am not implying that 

FedEx or the pilot involved had violated the Federal aviation regulations. What I am saying is that without an in-depth investigation, the FAA and FedEx have no way to determine if a violation 

has occurred or is continuing to occur. 

This same situation applies throughout the airline industry and 

to my knowledge is not being investigated. Since I have given you 

this statement, and I will provide a copy of this to the Committee, 

it is an INFO, Information for Operators concerning this subject 

was issued by the FAA on March 21st, 2008. I don’t think this is 

a coincidence that this was issued. 

On another issue, I was treated the same way but at a much 

higher level with the FAA. I was told from FAA management in 

Washington to stop working on a problem. I attempted to contact 

the Associate Administrator, Nick Sabatini, via e-mail, telephone 

and through the chain of command for more than two years. I 

never once received any acknowledgement from him, in spite of his 

so-called open door policy. 

I had the same situation with Mr. Ballough. I finally did get to 

see him. The purpose of my meeting with Mr. Ballough was to discuss an issue with Thomas Stuckey. I was given 30 minutes to 

present my case. I was told that I would receive an answer within 

two weeks from his staff. I am still waiting, it has been two and 

a half years. 

I understand that the other issue that has to do with security, 

Chairman Oberstar has referred that matter to another Committee. So I won’t go into details at this time. But it is very serious. 

I have met with the Homeland Security Committee people and 

something will happen with that. 

133 

Now that Mr. DeFazio is back and Mr. Carney and Ms. Johnson 

also, thank you very much for sticking around. I appreciate it. 

One other thing, to Mr. DeFazio, I waited to hold this, you questioned a number of times about Mr. Mills’ hand delivering everything. The answers you got from Mr. Sabatini, Mr. Ballough and 

Mr. Stuckey seemed to think that, or they seemed to tell you that 

that wasn’t the way things happened. That is incorrect. It was the 

way things happened. I was in the Southern region, not the Southwest region. In the Southern region, my manager had to go out and 

deliver every one of those to everybody. It took him really probably 

a month and a half, or at least that long. He had other duties. But 

it happened throughout the FAA, it is not localized. 

I hope you see that the testimony from all of us is that this is, 

I believe, a systemic problem with the FAA. It is happening in 

other parts of the Country, not just in the Southwest region. 

Thank you for your time. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for that testimony and for 

the reaffirmation of Mr. Mills’ testimony. 

I have one question. Each of you has referred to this shift that 

we have been discussing throughout the day of emphasis at the 

FAA from a regulatory compliance oversight role in maintenance to 

one that is airline-friendly, cooperative with these voluntary disclosure programs, with the customer service initiative, with ASAP and 

ATOS. When did you see this shift occurring? During what period 

of time? What time frame was it happening? It didn’t happen all 

at once, it just happened somewhat gradually, but you have all testified to it. We have heard it throughout the day. You are on the 

ground level, tell me when. 

Mr. MCNEASE. I spent three tours with the FAA. I left in disgust 

all three times. It is terrible that I had to do that. But when I left 

the FAA before this last time, when I retired, I left in 1988. In 

1988, we didn’t have this problem. We just didn’t have the problem 

that we have now. 

When I came back in 2003, I noticed then that in 2003, we had 

another significant problem. Things had changed considerably over 

that period of time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, 1988 was roughly the Bussey era? 

Mr. MCNEASE. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. There was a very compliance-oriented period 

then. 

Mr. Thrash? 

Mr. THRASH. Thank you. And I would like to say, it is a wise 

leader who surrounds himself with aviation expert professionals, as 

you have done, with Clay Thushay [phonetically]. As a Greek Hermes who was the pathfinder to help people along their way, on 

line-oriented flight training, which incorporated aircrew decisionmaking, he, I could say, I guess, fair Clay, Robert Helmick was a 

mentor. Dr. Robert Helmick worked in a brain trust sponsored by 

FAA, NASA and the University of Texas on 23, not 2317 

Showcreek, but on Showcreek Boulevard down there, Lamar Boulevard. He also was a pioneer on advance qualification programs, 

which is a voluntary training program, which incorporates what 

Clay started, the crew resource management. And aircrew decision 

134 

making has been responsible or probably even in the Flight Standards Guide for more than 60 percent of fatal aircraft accidents. So 

aircrew decision-making. 

Getting back to your point, Bill here drew a good picture. We are 

in sort of a schizophrenic situation. In 1988, we were operating 

under two sets of rules, essentially. We have the voluntary disclosure, which came along in I would say 1998 or so, along with 

ATOS. And prior to that, 1988, we have a compliance and enforcement order, it is 2150.3(a), I believe that is right, 2150.3(a), which 

is a compliance order. It is an order. It tells us what we do. And 

we have like a 45-day deadline, once we start on an EIR, to get 

our facts together to get it up to legal at that point. 

After 1998, ASAP 2001 to 2006, as I previously mentioned, I did 

not do an EIR. We had one of our attorneys come down from the 

Southwest region, Tim Duff, and he said they are farming him out 

to the Southern region, because he didn’t have any business in the 

Southwest region. 

So anyway, I think to answer that question, 1998, when ATOS 

took over and we started the voluntary ASAP. But we are still 

under this, I would submit, this schizophrenic, we have two sets of 

rules here. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. That is roughly about 

what I was thinking. 

I want to move to Mr. DeFazio and recognize him at this point 

for questioning. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. McNease, for helping fill out the testimony of 

Mr. Mills. I felt it probably wasn’t isolated, and I am going to hope 

in some way the Committee can pursue that, whether through the 

IG or someone else. We need to know how many people basically 

were sent on this mission, which is to hand deliver something 

which could have been easily and effectively delivered electronically 

or via the United States Postal Service. But I guess this Administration wouldn’t want to do that, because that means you are using 

Government employees to deliver it. 

But something that took them away from their critical safety 

mission. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The fact that Mr. Mills and others that Mr. 

McNease identified a moment ago were directed personally to undertake this mission shows the high level of significance upper 

FAA management placed on this cozy relationship structure that 

they were setting up. That goes right to the top. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. How about Mr. Brantley? Have you heard this 

from others? Could you survey your folks and ask how many were 

given this mission, maybe since we can’t get a straight answer out 

of the upper echelons of the FAA? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, Mr. DeFazio, we can survey them and see 

what kind of feedback we get. I can tell you that just in talking 

with inspectors throughout the Country, my understanding is they 

were directed across the board to do this, that managers in every 

office were told. 

135 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, how could that be if Mr. Sabatini, Mr. 

Ballough and Mr. Stuckey didn’t know a thing about it? I wonder 

who directed them? I guess maybe someone above them directed 

them and left them out of the loop? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Their memories may not be as good in this room 

as they are outside. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is the only salvation they have, because 

they were testifying under oath. If they have faulty memory under 

oath, that is one thing. But we have them on record. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Brantley, I think it was you or someone else 

from PASS at a hearing in the not too distant past testified about, 

we were talking about basically the scope of inspectors’ jobs and as 

I remember the particular focus of this hearing was outsourcing 

and trying to find whether or not it was possible for people to even 

get to and inspect the people who are theoretically under the purview. I remember some testimony that, working as quickly as they 

could, it would take some people years before they could get 

around. Is that accurate? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, that is accurate, sir. Just the process of getting permission, getting it arranged and then being able to get out 

and do it, the lead time is anywhere from six to eight months if 

things go well. That is on something out of the Country, yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But yet we heard again from Mr. Stuckey in a 

rather cavalier way, well, they are out there all the time, they are 

seeing, going around visiting people all the time, and it would be 

no problem to ask them to just carry this multiple page document 

with them and distribute it. 

Mr. BRANTLEY. I am comfortable saying that is simply not true, 

sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Well, I hope we can figure out what the consequences would be. Do we still have that little jail over there in 

the Capitol? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I also asked questions of them, the previous panel, 

the customer service initiative. I think you are well familiar, I 

talked about the changes I made in the law in 1996. I am trying 

to nail them, whether after we changed the law in 1996, to say the 

focus is safety, not promotion, if we started down that path and we 

were making progress and kind of removing that conflict from people’s minds and from their workplace, and if we did start down that 

path, when did we go wrong? Was it before 2003 or was it particularly in 2003 with this customer service initiative? Can you give us 

a little, anything on that? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. In my recollection, I think your instincts are 

probably pretty good. Because I think there has always been an undercurrent in the FAA, but I really saw it start to blossom around 

2002, 2003. It has been the last five or six years that it has really 

started moving strongly that way. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That is what I was afraid of. And specifically, 

ValuJet came at the end of a bad era, and with outsourcing, and 

we are into even more outsourcing today. I am very alarmed, if we 

are back to the pre-1996 attitude with more outsourcing than we 

had in 1995, 1996. Most of the majors have outsourced now. 

136 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, sir, I believe we are, if not in a worse state, 

we are at least back to where we were in 1996, 1997. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Do you think ATOS will protect us? Is that a substitute? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Again, when the data can’t be verified, without 

physically checking that the maintenance is being accomplished 

and just taking the word of the carrier, I think that is a flawed 

process, and we will continue to see problems like what occurred 

with Southwest. Hopefully, they will be compliance issues and not 

accidents. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I think in the case of Southwest, they didn’t try 

and phony up compliance, they didn’t report that they had complied and get bad data in the computer, it was more complicated. 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But there could be, and I think back to the good 

old days of Frank Lorenzo, imperious management that is basically 

telling people to phony up data. 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, sir. One of the keys that we have seen is, 

ATOS was set up to try to accomplish oversight with limited resources. But it has evolved over the last decade as not just a way 

to do that, but a way to further reduce resources, if possible. So one 

of the things we hear frequently from the FAA is, we are trying 

to find a way to get the work done without having the people. 

And quite frankly, they have gone to a point where there is not 

enough of the people doing the work that they should to make sure 

that the data base that they’re relying on, that this automated system is a tool rather than the ultimate authority. And right now it 

is the authority and it doesn’t know what it is talking about. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Chairwoman Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brantley, would you describe your professional responsibilities? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, ma’am. Actually, my professional responsibilities, as it relates to—are you referring to what I would do for 

the FAA? I come from a different workforce. I come from the systems specialists that repair and maintain the equipment that the 

FAA uses to control air traffic. So I am not an aviation safety inspector. 

Ms. JOHNSON. And you work with a number of other specialists? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Yes, ma’am. Not today, but I have, yes. Today I 

work full-time for the union. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. Has there ever been any discussion of some 

of the relationships or some of the things that might be missed because of it in your group? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. It is a little bit different, because there is not the 

outside interaction. What we tended to see more in the workforce 

I came from was managers or even employees going to work for a 

company right after leaving the FAA and sometimes not in the, 

let’s say under questionable circumstances. 

I can recall, there was a director of what was then airway facilities, six or eight years ago, that retired from the FAA, went to 

work for a company immediately after. And the way he got around, 

apparently, ethics rules was the last year, six to twelve of his 

137 

months of employment with the FAA, he just recused himself from 

being involved in any decisions that might be related to that company. That seemed like an ethics problem to me. 

So I think there are loopholes that are found throughout the 

FAA. That is something that I have had a concern with for a while. 

But it is a very different issue than I think what you are looking 

at with the inspector workforce. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Do you think it is widespread practice that the 

flight standard managers alter information entered into the FAA 

data base or anything to protect the airlines? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Ma’am, I think that is not just a bad idea, I think 

that is, if not criminal, it should be. I just think that if there is 

a difference of opinion, there should be a way to document that and 

get it to a place where a decision can be made. 

But to give anyone the authority to just unilaterally override 

what has been found, and this is the findings of an investigation 

or an inspection, to just override that is I think extremely poor 

judgment by the agency. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Do you think the ATOS is broken? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. I need to qualify my answer, because I think 

there is a lot of things that could be fixed with ATOS and with the 

voluntary disclosure systems. I think there is value in both of 

them. But quite frankly, unless there is a change in leadership in 

the FAA, none of that will matter. Because the culture has to 

change. And that won’t change because of changes in the programs. 

That has to come with changes in the people at the top. And that 

has to flow down. 

Until that happens, I think anything else would be cosmetic, and 

it may keep things out of the newspapers for a period of time. But 

the problems will be there, they will remain. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you for your questions, very pointed and 

right on target. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for anybody who 

cares to jump in. I have asked this of prior panels earlier today, 

too. It is about, since the investigation broke in the press a couple 

of weeks ago, we have seen the FAA order the national audit. In 

the last couple of weeks, hundreds of aircraft have been grounded 

in six of the major airlines. Why is that happening now? Why 

shouldn’t this have been occurring all along? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Well, sir, I think, if I might start, it is clear in 

my mind that there is fear that something is going to be found that 

they wouldn’t want to be found. There is going to be an incentive 

for the airline to disclose that. One of the things that I didn’t mention earlier that is also a part of this ongoing review that the FAA 

is doing, they are doing this jointly with the airlines. So it is not 

like just inspectors doing it, either. That way, if there is a problem 

found, it can very easily be voluntarily disclosed. Then it is nonpunitive. And frankly, I think that gets to the heart of the problem 

again. 

It feels to me like the FAA just doesn’t get it, or maybe they’re 

just arrogant enough to believe that they can do it anyway. 

Mr. CARNEY. Anyone else? 

138 

Mr. MCNEASE. I will chime in just a bit, since I am not in the 

Southwest region. If ATOS worked, somebody said this earlier, if 

ATOS worked, these other carriers would have already been identified as having those problems. ATOS didn’t work, I don’t believe it 

is going to work, it is certainly not going to work for the 135 carriers of which there are thousands, not just a hundred. I don’t see 

ATOS working. I believe it failed. 

Mr. CARNEY. How much of a problem do you all think the revolving door is, private industry and FAA? 

Mr. ANDREWS. I don’t see that as near a big a problem as ATOS 

is. 

Mr. CARNEY. Really? 

Mr. ANDREWS. No. And something that not been mentioned about 

ATOS here is the resources that it drains from the inspector workforce. The AFS 900 is a virtual office, and I believe, it is my understanding they employ close to 100 inspectors there. So there is 100 

inspectors that could be out in the field, looking at airplanes, flying 

with pilots, doing the job that we used to do, they are sitting in 

an office somewhere generating questions on a computer. 

And to answer the Congresswoman’s question about, she had 

some question earlier about the questions, I have been here 31 

years, and some of the questions, the question that came up was, 

how can we do the same SAI 5 times and get 5 different results. 

I was with the FAA for 31 years, and some of the questions that 

are contained in those SAIs and EPIs, I have no idea what they 

mean. I mean, literally, some of them I have read over and over 

again, trying to figure out what they want me to do. 

That is not an isolated incident. The entire system is set up like 

that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. McNease, I will close on this, Mr. Chairman, 

when you raised the issue to your management about the FedEx 

pilot that took the illegal charter trip, what was their response? 

Why did they not pursue action against this pilot? 

Mr. MCNEASE. Their response to me was, don’t do anything. Actually, his illegal charter that he flew, in his own airplane, I might 

add, that particular trip, the guidance that we have in our enforcement handbook calls for any deliberate violation of a regulation, 

any regulation, equals a revocation of your certificates. 

He received a 30-day suspension, which he was able to whittle 

down at a hearing, or at a meeting with the FAA, to 13 days. He 

took two weeks’ vacation and a day of sick leave, so it didn’t cost 

him anything. Not a thing. 

So the enforcement guidelines were not followed in that case. But 

that was a separate case from my issue. My issue was, was he flying over the requirements using that trip and what he was flying 

at Federal Express. Simply I don’t know, because I wasn’t allowed 

to do my inspection. Why my supervisor told me not to do the inspection is a question you ought to ask him. 

Mr. CARNEY. Maybe we ought to ask that question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We can certainly send written questions and require their response. 

Mr. CARNEY. Very good. No further questions. Thanks to the 

panel. 

139 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Carney, and members of the 

panel, I want to thank you. But before we conclude, the Inspector 

General made several suggestions and I am sure you heard those, 

let me repeat. Recommending the establishment of an independent 

body to investigate inspector concerns, do you think that is a good 

idea? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Can I speak to that? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Certainly. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I think that is an excellent idea. A question came 

up a while ago about the manipulation of the ATOS data. Less 

than two months ago, I wrote a hot line complaint to the Inspector 

General, and part of the problem I addressed was the manipulation 

of inspection data. The IG apparently felt that it wasn’t within 

their purview, and they forwarded that complaint down to the Federal Aviation Administration Flight Standards Division. 

And guess where they sent it? They sent it down to the two guys 

that I wrote it about to answer. So I don’t think our existing hot 

line is effective in any way at all. In the past, I have used the Administrator’s hot line and I have used the IG hot line as a lever 

to move this organization where I saw a serious problem and 

couldn’t address it from the floor up. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. As the first panel today said, or Mr. Boutris said, 

I signed my name. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I did too, every time. Every time I have submitted 

one, I put my name and phone number. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So what is a whistleblower, unidentified whistleblower line going to do? If they don’t pay attention when you sign 

it, then how are you going to pay attention if you don’t sign it? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Exactly. I have never asked for whistleblower protections and I have never submitted an anonymous complaint. I 

think if you are going to have an effective hot line, and I think you 

need an effective hot line, it is going to have to be something similar to the way a police department works, like a civilian review 

board that has no outside or governmental interest one way or the 

other. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The question is, we are going to have an independent body, the IG said, recommended that the FAA established 

it. I think that would be dangerous. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Absolutely. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Who should be the originating entity to create an 

independent body? Mr. Brantley? 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Mr. Chairman, as everyone has said, another internal hot line is the last thing the FAA needs. I think this needs 

to be set up by, it has to be independent. I think the IG could probably come up with some regulations for that very quickly. And with 

all respect to both the Inspector General and the Office of Special 

Counsel, I would have a hard time recommending to any of the 

members that I represent that they go anywhere but one of those 

two places. Because there is nothing internal to the FAA that will 

get their problems resolved without them becoming a target. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is absolutely right. I have been mulling this 

over and probably a combination of recommendations by the Inspector General, the Comptroller General, the General Accounting 

140 

Office or Government Accountability Office and maybe Mr. Bloch’s 

office. 

Mr. BRANTLEY. Absolutely. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Or a recommendation from the NTSB, which has 

independent authority. Something of that nature. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Oberstar, if I might, I have to tell you, too, 

I was amazed to sit here today and listen to Mr. Stuckey and Mr. 

Ballough and Mr. Sabatini speak about what heroes they thought 

Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters are. Because it has been my experience 

over the last years that people like Mr. Boutris and Mr. Peters and 

these gentlemen sitting here next to me are not treated like heroes 

by the FAA. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. They certainly weren’t until this hearing. 

Mr. ANDREWS. That is exactly right. And they generally define 

this as problem employees or disgruntled. That is why the people 

in our organization are afraid to stand up and be counted. The culture inside the FAA is, there is no problem in my unit, there is no 

problem in my office, there is no problem in my region and there 

is no problem in the FAA. Until the FAA admits that we have serious problems, they are not going to be able to fix themselves. 

Mr. MCNEASE. I would like to say that I do agree with an outside 

agency, however it is set up. The hot line deal doesn’t work, because it does come right back down to the inspector. And everybody 

knows who it comes back to. But you mentioned earlier, and you 

mentioned in one of your press conferences prior to this that we 

need to clean house here. It needs to start from the top. I think 

all of us agree here on this panel in particular that it certainly 

needs to happen from the top. That is Mr. Sabatini, Mr. Ballough 

and Mr. Stuckey. If you think integrity is an issue, there is more 

to check into. There are a lot of integrity problems. 

It is just unfortunate that they have been allowed to take us 

down this route. I believe they have done it. I believe that when 

Mr. Sabatini said, the buck stops here, I agree, it stops there. And 

it should stop there and action should be taken. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. Mr. Thrash? 

Mr. THRASH. I would like to piggyback on what Mr. McNease 

said. The ferret, warm-blooded animal, was used before the common era, you have to say BCE any more to be sensitivity proper, 

but nevertheless, it was used to exterminate vermin for ages and 

ages and ages. It looks like a mink and it is small and warm-blooded and thin-bodied and they can be domesticated. 

They were introduced into the United States in the 1800s from 

sailing ships, because they were infested with rats. The sailors 

didn’t like the rat terriers, because they barked and kept them 

awake. The cats were a favorite, but the rats could get into the 

hold and the cats couldn’t get them. 

But when they brought the ferrets in, the rats didn’t have any 

place to go. And of course, if you have some rats in the rafters 

higher up in these places here in the Washington area and the division area, the term, metaphorically of course, rats of abuse, metaphorically speaking, obviously, the term ‘‘ferret out’’ comes from 

that. And you all have the horsepower to get that done. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

141 

We are going to use that horsepower, and today’s hearing was a 

launch pad to do that. Your testimony and those of your colleagues 

preceding you are powerful tools for us to use to improve aviation 

safety. 

The real question is, does the buck really stop with Mr. Sabatini? 

Or does it go higher? That is a question that we aren’t really going 

to know until there is a sweeping change of administration and a 

new administrator and we begin making corrections from the top 

down. 

My Italian grandfather immigrated from Naples. When you look 

at a fish, you know whether it is good or not if the head is in good 

shape. But if the head is rotting, then the whole fish is no good. 

And we have to take a good look at this fish. 

Thank you very much for your testimony, for your candor, for 

your courage in coming forward. This has been a most enlightening 

and invigorating hearing. We will proceed forward with lessons 

learned today. 

The Committee stands adjourned. I thank Members for persisting throughout this day as well. 

[Whereupon, at 7:37 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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720 

Æ 


41821.596