Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), Cha rles F . Bolde n, J r., the c urre nt Administ rator of 1 NA SA, is s ub sti tut e d a s th e name d le a d d e fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA
AHMAD B. NU RRIDDIN, P la in t if f, v. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 04 -2 05 2 ( JD B) CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR., 1 Adm inis tr at or , N at ion al A e r ona ut ic s a nd Space Adm inis trat ion, et al., De fend ant s.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiff Ahmad Nurr iddin was employ ed by the National Ae ronautics a nd Space Administration ("N ASA") from May 1991 throug h Fe bruar

y 2004 in the Educational Affa irs Division. His ti me there was be set by a y ear s-longseries of

conflicts with his supervisors and oth e r N ASAe mpl oye e s, wh ic h h a s r e su lte d in tw o e mpl oy

me nt d isc ri min atio n la

ws uit s a g a ins t the ag ency . His first lawsuit, Civil Action No. 99-3401, c overinga ser ies of eve nts from 1991 throug h August 1996, was broug ht pro se under Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, as amende d, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq, and a lleg ed discrimination on the basis of r ace (Afr icanAmeric an), g ender

(male) , and re ligion (Muslim), hostile work envir onment, and re taliation. The Court e nte re d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or de fe nd ant o n a ll c la ims on Au g us t 17 , 2 00 5. Se e Nurr idd in v. Goldin, 382 F. Supp. 2d 79, 92-109 (D.D .C. 2005) (" Nurriddin I ") . The D.C. Circuit af firmed in all respec ts. Nurriddin v. Griff in, 222 Fed. A

ppx . 5 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 16, 2007).Plaintiff's me dical diagnosis was submitted under sea l and, henc e, the de tails of the 2 seale d filing w ill not be described in this opinion. Pl .' s Ex . 83 (filed unde r sea l May 10, 2007). Howeve r, his public filings c hara cter ize his conditi on g ener ally as depr ession, anxiety , and bac k pain. This is a fair

char acte rization of the rec ord thus far submitt ed, and the Court will employ tho se same g e ne ri c c ha

ra c te ri zat ion s. Nurriddin filed his initial oppositi on brief w ith accompa nying e x hibits on May

10, 2007 3 (E CF #6 3) and

the n f ile d a c or re c te d o pp os iti on

br ie f w ith out e xhibi ts o n July 12 , 2 00 7 ( ECF #68). F or ea se of r efe renc e, the Court will cite to Nurr iddin's c orre cted opposition brief simply as "Pl.' s Mem." a

nd to his ex hibits as "Pl.'s Ex." De fenda nts' me morandum in support of the motion to d ism iss wi ll b e c ite d a s " De fs .' Me m." and the ir e xhibi ts, wh ic h a

re sc atte re d in

the re c or d, wi ll be cited by

ECF docume nt number with the notation " Def s.' Ex ." -2- The sec ond lawsuit -- this action -- picks up wher e the f irst one left off

, and cove rs a se ries of e ve nts fr om l ate 19 96 thr ou g h Nur ri dd in' s te rm inatio n o n F e br ua ry 6, 20 04 . Se e Se c on d A m. Com pl. ¶¶ 51 -1 40 (f

ile d Se pt. 14 , 2 00 9) . A s b e fo re , p ro c e e din gpr o s e , h e br ing s c la ims a g a ins t NASA under

Title VI Ifor a lleg edly

discriminating a g ainst him on the basis of rac e, g ender , and relig ion, hostil e wor

k environment, a

nd reta liation. I d. ¶¶ 2- 3, 141-61, 185-93. In this round of lit ig atio n, he ha s a dd e d c la ims of dis a bil ity dis c ri min atio n in

vio latio n o f t

he Re ha bil itatio n A c t,
a s ame nd e d, 29 U. S.C. §§ 70 1 e t se q. , b a se d la rg e ly on de pr e ssi on , a

nxie ty , a nd ba c k p a in alleg edly cause d by

the eve nts underlying the first ca se. I d. ¶¶ 2, 162- 84, 189-93. He also has 2 added f our NASA e mploy ees a s individual defenda nts -- Vicki Nova

k, Alfre d Castillo, M ark B atki n, and

Ma lc olm Phe lps -- on

the g ro un d th at th e y

have be e n invo lve d in

a c on sp ir a c y

to violate his constitutional rights, citing42 U.S.C. § 1983. I d. ¶¶ 6- 7, 180-84. Def endants have re sponded to the lawsuit with a motion to dism iss or, in the alternative, for summary

judgme nt, prior to the takingof discover y . Plaintiff has filed an opposition on the merits, and also moves f

or an or der de nying summar y judgme nt pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(f) on the g round that discover y is nece ssary

befor e the motion can be resolved. Additionally , he has 3 filed a motion seekinga pre liminary injunction to prevent NASA fr om soliciti ngpersona l-3-

inf or matio n a bo ut h im f

ro m th e De pa

rtme nt o f L a

bo r O ff ic e of Wor ke rs Com pe ns atio n Pr og ra

ms (" OWCP " ). Up on

c on sid e ratio n o f t

he vo lum ino us re c or d, the Cou rt c on c lud e s th at on ly

the Ti tle VI Ic la ims c on c e rn ingdis c re te a dv e rs e a c tio ns may pr oc e e d; t

he re ma ind e r o f Nur

ri dd in' s c la ims will be dismiss ed for

the re asons set for

th below. BACK GR OUND The e vents underly

ing the curr ent claims occ urre d from late 1996 thr oug h 2004, but for context, the Court, li ke the se cond ame nded complaint, will rec ount the most salient events of N ur r i d d i nI t o s e tth e s t a g e f

o r e v a l u at i n gth e p r e s e n tc l a i m s . In M ay 1 9 9 1 , p l a i n t i f f , i n i t i a l l y a contra ct employ ee w orkingfor NA SA, was conve rted to a f ull-time civil servant as a Publications Specialist in NASA' s Educational Af fairs D ivision (also refe rre d to as " Code FE" ), at the G S-12 level. 382 F . Supp. 2d at 86. Shortly there afte r, he a lleg ed that he ha d been hir ed at two grade
levels below othe rs per formingsimil ar duties be cause of his rac e, and sought a noncompetitive promotion to the GS-13 and GS-14 leve ls, based on his level of duties a nd responsibilities. I d. at 86-87, 95-101; Second A m. Compl . ¶¶ 44- 50. Followinghis informal complaints about the discriminatory GS gr ade le vels, plaintiff experience d what he pe rce ived to be fur ther discr iminatory

and re taliatory

actions, including(1) a le tte r o f r e pr ima

nd c iti nghim

fo r a ne g ativ e atti tud e , f

a ilure to f oll owins tr

uc tio ns , f a ilure to complete a ssignments on time, and f ailure to ke ep super

visors abre ast of his location, (2) a fa ilure by manag ement to investig ate of fensive ic ons located on a co-w orker ' s computer; (3)
rea ssignment of

duties; (4) denia l of authorization to travel to a minority confe renc e; and ( 5) fu rt he r a dmo nis hme nts and

re pr ima nd s b y e ma il. 38 2 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 86 -8 8. He ma de his fi rs t contac t with an EEO counse lor in Dec ember 1994, which wa s followed by an administrative complaint; he ag ain contac ted an EEO counselor on N ovember 5, 1996, and filed a

second-4-

administrative complaint on April 3, 1997. I d. at 88. He the n filed his first Title VI Ilawsuit on Dec ember

21, 1999, alleg ing that the fore g oing e mploy ment actions we re motivated by discrimination on the basis of ra ce, g ender , and re ligion, by reta liation for eng ag ing in EEO activity , and constituted a hostile wor k environment. I d. at 85-88. This Court concluded that plaintiff ha d failed to e x haust his administrative reme dies on some of the c laims, including the initial dec ision in 1991 t o hire him two g rade levels below
cer tain other e mploy ees; he nce, summar y judgme nt was ente red f

or def endant on those c laims. I d. at 92-93 (c iting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a )). The Court then examined the rema ining c laims on the merits to deter

mine whether

plaintiff had pr esente d evidenc e suff icient to support an infe renc e of discrimination or re taliation behind any of the a ctions, focusingon the letter of repr imand, the decisions to deny

him a noncompetitive promotion to GS-13 or GS-14 (onc e in the 1991 to 1994 tim e fr ame , a

nd a g a in i n th e 19 94 to 1 99 6 ti me fr ame ), a re fu sa l to fu

nd tr ave l to a

min or ity confe renc e, and a

n "ultimatum" issued to him conc erningrea ssignment or a cha ng e in duties. 382 F . Su pp . 2 d at 93 -1 06 . In e a c h in sta nc e , th e Court

fo un d th at th e re wa s in su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e -- in some instances, no e vidence at all -- f rom which a

rea sonable jury

could find that discrimination
or re ta liatio n p laye d a

ro le in t he c ha lle ng e d a c tio ns . I d. Th e Court a lso re je c te d p la int if

f' s c la im of hostile work e nvironment in toto, ex plaining that "[f]irst and foremost, many of the incidents . . . are not relate d to rac e or r elig ion," a nd further more, that the a lleg ed har assment was not "se vere ," " perva sive," or " abusive." I d. at 108-09. The Court then enter ed summary judgme nt for de fenda

nt on all claims. I d. at 92-109. That decision was subseque ntly aff irmed. Although the events unde rlying Nurriddin I closed in late 1996, pla intiff' s troubles at NASA continued. He re be g ins the story of Nurr iddin I I-- the c urre nt action -- a s rec ounted in the second a mended c omplaint. Bec ause the Court is reviewingthe suffic iency of that complaintPlaintiff presumably ref ers to Dr . J ulius Dasch, a white male GS-14 e mploy ee disc ussed 4 in Nurriddin I . 382 F. Supp. 2d at 97 n.4. P l ai n t i ff al l ege s th atDr
. P h el p s b ec am e "up s et " w i thh i mi nre s p o n s e t o p l ai n t i ff 's 5 proposal to introduce an Af rica n-Amer ican student at the convention. Second A m. Compl . ¶ 58. Plaintiff char acte rizes this as a "r ace -base d verba l alterc ation," a lthough his desc ription does not indicate that Dr . Phelps made ra ce a n issue in their disag ree ment. I d.

-5- ag ainst defe ndants' motion to di smiss, t he Court will presume the f actua l alleg ations are true. By the time of the e vents under r eview, pla intiff had bee n assig ned to manag e the Gra duate Student Resea

rch Program (" GSRP ") and the National Phy sical Scienc es Consortium (" NPSC ") trainingg rant, whe re he had bee n place d since Oc tober 1995, still at the GS-12 level. I d. ¶ 52; see a lso 382 F. Supp. 2d at 102-04, 106 (r ejec ting plaintiff' s claim that place ment at the GS-12 level fr om 1994 to 1996 was discriminatory or re taliatory

). On August 14, 1996, plaintiff
rec eived a

perf ormanc e rating of

"O utstanding" -- the highest ratingpossible -- and w as cited a s an exemplary

member of

the Education Divisi on. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 54. Subsequently , he
rec eived a

n $800 perf

ormanc e aw ard f

or that rating, a lthough wor kers outside of his prote cted classes r ece ived substantially highe r amounts. I d. ¶ 55. In J une 1997, he f

iled a for mal EEO complaint alleg ing c ontinued disparate treatment b a s e d u p o nh is r a c e , g e n d e r

an d r e li g io n , an d

in r e p r is a l f o r p r io r E E O a c ti v it

y . I d
. ¶ 5 6
. T h e n e xt month, he was issued a

lower pe rfor

mance evaluation -- " Fully Successf ul" - - which w as base d on the c omm e nts of

Ma lc olm Phe lps and

She rr i Mc Ge e , h is f

ir st- le ve l su

pe rv iso rs ; F ra

nk lin Ow e ns , his second-le vel supervisor; a nd a " Dr. Da sch," who is descr ibed as a n "inf ormal super

visor." I d.

4 ¶¶ 57, 61. Phelps, McGe e, Owe ns, and Da sch ar e ea ch white; McG ee is a woman. I d. ¶¶ 7, 10, 11 . T his e va luatio n c ame te n d ay s a ft e r p la int if f h a d a ve rb a l a lte rc atio n w ithDr . Ph e lps ov e r h is plans conc erningan NAA CP Youth C onvention. I d. ¶ 58. Plaintiff then initiated contac t with an 5The c ircumstance s surroundingthe promotion to GS-13 are not appar ent from the 6 complaint or the pa

rties' briefs. The complaint only summarily

indicates that plaintiff' s GS-12 status chang ed in Novembe r 1997, and pla intiff repor ts his nex t gr ade a s beingGS-13. -6- EEO Counselor on Septembe r 16, 1997 and f iled another

formal c omplaint on Dece mber 11, 1997. I d. ¶ 24. This and the June 1997 complaint wer e amongthe first of at least nine EEO complaints in the y ear s to come. In or ar ound November

1997, plaintiff re ceive d a long -soug ht noncompetitive promotion to GS-13. I d. ¶¶ 8, 49. That same month, howeve r, plaintiff re ceive d another "lowe red" 6 pe rf or manc e e va luatio n. I d. ¶ 5 9. He he ard , thro ug h D r. Da sc h, that th is w a s d ue to D r. Phe lps ' comment that plaintiff had attended " too many minority confe renc es." I d. As a re sult of the lowere d rating , plaintiff re ceive d a diminished perf ormanc e aw ard. I d. ¶ 60. Plaintiff believe s the low e re d e va luatio n w a s in c on sis te nt w iththe po sit ive c omm e nts he re c e ive d f ro m ot he rs wi thi n and outside of the a g ency , including note s of appr eciation from the NAACP and the A merica n Ind ian Sc ie nc e and

En g ine e ri ngSoc ie ty

and a no te statin g" GSRP Suc c e ss" fr om D r. Ge ra ld Soffen at the NASA Goddar d Space F light Center . I d. ¶ 62. At so me un sp e c if

ie d p oints i n 1 99 7, pla int if f a lso wa s p ur su ingre c la ssi fi c atio n o f h is position i nto the "1701 se ries" -- whic h the re cord implies would g rant him improved promotion potential. I d. ¶ 63. He submitt ed docume ntation in support of the rec lassification to Cliff Woods in Human Resourc es, but Woods allege dly told an EEO counse lor that he stopped wor king on the
rec lassification " beca

use the Ge nera l Counsel's Of fice told him t o stop after [Nurriddin] did not
acc ept the ag ency' s proposed EEO settlement offe r." I d. ¶ 64. Woods also told t he EEO counselor that plaintiff lacke d the " require d education" for rec lassification to the 1701 ser ies, but at least one other e mploy ee - - Ms. Ly nn Marr a -- was plac ed in the 1701 ser ies without the-7-

require d education. I d. ¶ 66. The r ecla ssification revie w was ne ver c ompleted. I d. ¶ 65. Plaintiff then cata logs a

series of neg ative mana g ement ac tions that occurr ed throug hout 1997 and 1998: Ms. McGe e' s denial of c ubicle spac e that wa s distributed by lottery (Jul y 11, 1997) (¶ 67); Mr. Owe ns' decision to remove plaintiff' s responsibilities for the NPSC progr am and to r e a ssi g n th e m to Ms. Mc Ge e (¶ 68 -6 9) ; la c k o f s up po rt

sta ff and fu nd ingfo r p la int if

f' s G ra du ate Student Researc h Prog ram wor k (¶ 70) ; criticisms for untimely g rant proc essing(¶ 70- 71); Mr. Ow e ns ' so lic itatio n o f c o- wo rk e rs to " re po rt on " pla int if

f whil e he atte nd e d a

n N AA CP Convention in J une 1998 (¶ 72); and mana g ement opposition to his t rave l to minorit y confe renc es or liaison activities with minority g roups (¶ 73)
. Be g inning in August 1998, the administrative investigation into pl aintiff' s pendingEEO complaints advanc ed sig nificantly , and in plaintiff' s view, he suf fer ed bec ause of

it. On or around August 26, 1998, the EEO counse lor conc luded her interviews of

Owens, Mc Gee , Phelps, and Vicki Novak, the Associate A dminist rator of Human Resourc es and Educ ation. I d. ¶ 80. That same da y , plaintiff was issued a

letter of r eprimand f

or fa ilure to follow conf

ere nce attendance proce dures with re spect to his attendanc e at the B lacks in Gove rnment Confer ence . I d. ¶ 79. That month, he was a lso denied a nonc ompetitive promotion (presumably to GS-14); but Gary

Gans, a lesser qua lified white co- worke r, re ceive d a noncompe titive promotion. I d. ¶ 78. He was then place d on strict leave restric tions that S eptember ; rec eived two more letters of r eprimand; wa s denied tra vel to two minority

confe renc es; and wa s partially denied a dminist rative le ave for EEOrelated matters. I d. ¶ 84. As these e vents transpire d, plaintiff beg an the pr ocess of pursuingadditional administrative g rieva

nces unde r Title VI Iby

initiating contac t with an EEO counse lor -- on Janu ary 6, 19 98 ; Ma

y 21 , 1 99 8; a

nd Se pte mbe r 9 , 1 99 8. I d. ¶¶ 26 -3 1. Ea c h c on ta c t r e su lte d in-8-

the filing of a f

ormal complaint. I d. Duringplaintiff' s 1998 perf ormanc e eva luation, Dr. Phelps t o l d p l a i n t i f f th ath i s E E O c o mp l a i n t s w e r e " a c r o c k o f s h i t " an d " j u s tb u l l s h i t . " Id
. ¶

8 5
. In response to a question from plaintiff a bout the profa

nity , Dr. Phelps re marke d, "G o file anothe r complaint." I d. Plaintiff alleg es that his health beg an to suffe r as a result of the stre ss at the offic e. I d. ¶¶ 74, 77. He f

elt "sta lked" and " intimi dated" by Dr. Phelps, and took two we eks of stre ss and anxiety -re lated sick lea

ve. I d. In response to his health conce rns, a r eassig nment was e x plored by Novak a nd other mana g ers - - a " perma nent place ment" in a

nother off ice. I d. ¶ 74. B ut after

the EE O i nte rv ie ws of

mana g e me nt, Ow e ns tol d p la int if f t hat th e re qu e st f

or a de ta il o r t

ra ns fe r w ou ld have to b e put in

wr iti ngto t

he EE O o ff

ic e . I d. ¶ 8 2. Pla int if

f a pp are ntl y ma de a wr itt e n r e qu e st for tra nsfer , citing his he alth conce rns, as re flec ted in an exchang e of le tters betwe en his doctor and Paulette Quinn, the Chief of the Huma

n Resource s Operations Bra nch. See id. ¶

82, 96-97; Pl.'s Ex. 82 (L etter f

rom Quinn to Dr. Ec hever ry dated Nov. 12, 1998) ; Pl.'s Ex. 83 (L etter f rom Dr . E c he ve rr

y to Q uinn d ate d D e c . 1 6, 19 98 ) ( su bmi tte d und e r s e a l) . Pl a int if f a lso me t pe rs on a lly with the then-he ad of N ASA, Daniel Goldin, re g ardinghis discrimination and hara ssment complaints, but ex perie nced no improve ments to his si tuation. I d. ¶¶ 86- 87. Plaintiff alleg es that Geor g e Ree se, the Assoc iate Administrator for Equal Opportunity

Prog rams, advise d him that he "w as beingset-up for

prog ressive disciplinar

y action -- including te rmination." I d. ¶ 90. Plaintiff ultim ately

was g rante d a one- y ear

detail to the National Scienc e F oundation (" NSF " ), wh ic h b e g an in

F e br ua ry 19 99 . I d. ¶ 9 2. Pla int if

f a ttr ibute s th is t o a

n in qu ir y int o h is EEO ca se by

Congr esswoman Ele anor H olmes Norton, althoug h the re cord c ontains litt le on thePla int if f a lle g e s th at he loc ate d th e NSF po sit ion thr ou g h h is o wn

e ff or ts, and on ly 7 obtained appr oval for the detail af ter some initial manag ement re sistance. See Pl.'s Mem. at 16. P l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g at i o nr e g ar d i n gth e g o v e r n m e n tl a p t o p i s d i s c u s s e d

i nN ur r i d d i nI. In 8 particula r, the Court notes that Nur riddin Ifound the laptop a lleg ations not probative of discrimination. See 382 F. Supp. 2d at 87, 108 ( noting that f older icons on c omputer labe led "r acist jokes and storie s" a nd "se x bulletin board" wer e empty , the icons we re not dire cted at plaintiff, and Phelps wa s unawa re of the orig in of the icons). Those events may , howeve r, be rele vant to a cla im of retaliation. -9- sp e c if ic s o f h owthe de ta il c ame a bo ut. Se e id. In a

ny e ve nt, pla int if

f c on sid e re d th e de ta il 7
succe ssful. I d. ¶ 93. Working unde r Dr. Joseph Reed at NSF, his perf ormanc e wa s rated a s "O utstanding." I d. Up on his re tur n to NA SA i n F e br

ua ry or Ma rc h 2 00 0, pr ob le ms a

ro se on c e a g a in - - t

his tim e fo c us e d o n a

re qu e st f or a re a so na ble a c c omm od atio n o f a

dis a bil ity . Nur

ri dd in w a s in iti a lly assig ned to work in the H uman Resourc es Off ice with Alfr ed Castillo as his supervisor. I d. ¶ 95. But by Marc h, he wa s instructed to retur n to the Education Divisi on, which mea nt returningto Dr. Phelps' supe rvision. I d. Plaintiff believed that Dr . Phelps and Fr anklin Owens took a "ne g ative view" of his minority

prog ram a ctivities. I d. ¶ 127. F urthermor e, plaintiff be lieved that Dr
. Phe lps ha d d e nie d h im a

wi thi n- g ra de inc re a se be c a us e of a bia s a g a ins t hi m st e mmi ngfr om h is numerous EEO c omplaints naming Phelps as a discriminating of

ficial, a s well as plaintiff' s 1995 alleg ation ag ainst Phelps reg ardinga g overnme nt laptop computer c ontaining r acist and se x ual icons. I d. Plaintiff immediately beg an pursuinga tra

nsfer awa y from the Educ ation Division, 8 based on his 1998 re quest for a perma nent transf

er, which he a

nd at least one other mana g er considere d a re quest for r easona ble ac commodation of a disability . I d. ¶ 96. Af te r g e tti ngpa st s ome ini tia l c on fu sio n o n whe the r a nd wh e n p la int if

f h a d f or ma lly submitt ed a r easona

ble ac commodation reque st, the ag ency beg an tre atinghis request a s such.-10-

See Pl.'s Ex. 51a-c . On April 27, 2000, Ms. Quinn from Huma n Resource s reque sted that an ag ency doctor, Dr . Steven Conway , revie w plaintiff' s medical doc umentation to determine wh e the r a re a so na ble a c c omm od atio n w a s su pp or te d b y the inf or matio n s ub mitte d. Se c on d A m. Compl. ¶ 98. Dr. Conway responde d: Medica l information has bee n supplied to NASA Human Resourc es, by J ohn Eche verr y , Ph.D., and W. Scott S chroth, M.D., M.P.H., Associate Professor of Medicine, G eorg e Washing ton University , both prac titioners in the car e of Mr
. Nurr idd in. I t is the ir

op ini on that Mr . Nur

ri dd in h a s a

me dic a l c on dit ion

[re late d to de pr e ssi on

and anxie ty ], w hic h im

pa c ts o n h is a

bil ity to p e rf or m hi s w or k. I t is also their opinion that workingconditions at NASA ag g ravate[] this disorder. Acc ording ly , they

rec ommend a tra

nsfer to a less stressful wor

k site for Mr. Nurr idd in a

nd c on tin ue d tr e atme nt f

or his ill ne ss. On the basis of the ir repor ts, Iacc ept this opinion by these qua lified Pr a c tit ion e rs . Pl.'s Ex. 2 (Mem. dated June 2, 2000). Ba sed on the same medical doc umentation, one of plaintiff' s first-line super

visors, McGee , circ ulated a dr aft e mail proposing to grant plaintiff sick leave for the pe riod April 20th to May 12th. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 100; see also Pl.'s Ex. 55a-b. Other ma nag ers oppose d the authorization of sick leave, as did NA SA's le g al counse l handling EEO matter s, and plaintiff wa s ultim ately coded a s AWOLfor that pe riod as we ll as other per iods. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-11, 117. Around the sa

me time, plaintiff applied f or and w as ac cepte d into the NASA Voluntary L eave Transf

er Program, whic h permits elig ible employ ees to re ceive annual lea ve donate d by oth e r f e de ra l e mpl oye e s. I d. ¶ 1 12 . Pl a int if f' s a c c e pta

nc e int o th e pr og ra

m w a s b a se d o n h is
me dic a l c on dit ion

and the do c ume ntatio n p ro vid e d b y his do c tor s. I d. Ul tim ate ly , h is a c c e ss t o donated lea

ve wa s sever ely

restric ted, and he was de nied ac cess to at lea st one instance of leave donated spe cifica lly

to him. I d. ¶ 126. His manag ers c hara cter ized his acce ptance into the prog ram a s a " problem" in light of the de cision to designa te him as AWOLand to deny other-11-

le ave re qu e sts . I d. ¶ 1 13 & Pl. ' s E x. 60 a -c . Wh e n th e pr ob le m w a s r a ise d in a se ri e s o f e ma ils , Castillo responded " Yeg ads! will we e ver f inish with t his guy ? " a

nd decide d to let the AWOL code r emain in place . Second Am. Compl. ¶ 114 & Pl.' s Ex . 60a-c
. On August 8, 2000, Hillard Har rison, another

NASA employ ee, note d by email that the pendinglitigation in Nurriddin I might af fec t their approa ch to plaintiff, stating"I g uess this week might be ke y

to know if there will be a settlement [from the mediation], but if it doesn't happe n, we may want to take a

nother look at how to proc eed." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 118. The mediation
was unsucc essful. I d. On August 10, Castil lo sent an ema il to other manag ers stating : "Abse nt compellingrea son for fur ther a ccommodations, medica l or otherwise , it's time to take c orre ctive action for the continuingabsenc es without acc eptable r easons." I d. ¶ 119. Plaintiff, in turn, pursued a dminist rative r ecour se on additional cla ims, contactingan EEO c ounselor on August 18, 2000. I d. ¶ 34. Pla int if f' s le ave status re ma ine d a n o ng oin giss ue fo r m ana g e me nt, a s h is l e ave re qu e sts
a c c umu late d a

nd he ult imate ly

so ug ht a nd wa s g ra nte d w or ke rs ' c omp e ns atio n b a se d o n h is depre ssion and anxiety . Second Am. Compl. ¶ 115-31. Indeed, the rec ord re veals, undisputed by pla int if f, that he sto pp e d r e po rt ingfo r d uty a ft e r Jul y 15 , 2 00 0, but r e ma ine d a n e mpl oye e wh ile
out on va ri ou s f or ms o f l e ave and

wo rk e rs ' c omp e ns atio n. Se e De fs .' Me m. at 28 (c iti ngAf fi davit of Sharmila de Me llo-Z iescha ng¶ 2)) . On August 30, 2000, he reque sted 150 hours of a dvance d sick leave for the pe riod September 12 thr oug h Dec ember 1. I d. ¶ 120. The r equest wa s denied. I d. ¶ 122. He nce, f

or over two months, he was conside red A WOL , and had no sour ce of income. I d. at 120-21. Plaintiff then re quested c overa g e under the Fa mily and Medic al L eave Act on November

8, 2000. I d. ¶ 123. While that request wa s pending , on November 11th, the Depa rtment of L abor O ffice of Workers' Compensation Progr ams -- through Dr. The odore-12-

Pos tol a c he -- dia g no se d p la int if f w ithma jor de pr e ssi on , a

nd a lso de te rm ine d th at th e re wa s a
c a us a l r e latio ns hip be tw e e n p la int if f' s d e pr e ssi on

and c e rt a in e mpl oy

me nt- re late d in c ide nts , including c riticisms for attending"too many minority confe renc es." I d. ¶ 123-24. Te n wee ks later, N ASA approve d his Family and Medic al L eave Act re quest, retr oactive to Nove mber 11, 2000, for a

period of 12 w eeks, e x piring Fe bruar y 9, 2001. I d. ¶ 125. Plaintiff beg an re ceiving worke rs' compensation through the Depa rtment of L abor f

or " occupational disease" in late 2000 or
e arl y 20 01 , whic h c on tin

ue s to date . D e fs .' Me m. at 28 (i de nti fy inge ff e c tiv e date of

wo rk e rs ' compensation as Marc h 2001) (c iting Af fidavit of Dor othy

Egbert ¶ 2) ; see a lso Pl .' s Ex . 104 (filed unde r sea l May

10, 2007) (identify

ing e ffe ctive date as De cembe r 6, 2000). Although pla intiff was out on worke rs' compensation, his request for a transfe r continued to be the subjec t of much discussion amongmanag ement and N ASA' s leg al offic e. Novak was ag ainst g rantinga tra

nsfer to another of

fice . Second Am. Compl. ¶ 128. She sent an e mail on S ep t em b er

1 4 , 2 0 0 1 , s t at i n g: Irea lly do not want to offe r him another job in [Code] F. He ' s not qualified and he' ll justcre ate major

problems if he should ac cept. A while back, B ob Stephens sug g ested that we (F E) take [Nurriddin] back, g ive him work (they have a job for him) and docume nt it if he can' t handle it . . . . Ithink it i s better to wor k this at other than our

level if we can. I d.; Pl.'s Ex. 73a. I n response , Castillo not ed that " leg al counse l" ha d sug g ested off eringplaintiff a job that he would not ac cept a s a " tactica l ploy " that would enable the ag ency "to c lose off the OWCP [worker' s compensation] claim." Sec ond Am. Compl. ¶ 129; P l.'s Ex. 73b. Novak then sent an e mail to Nurriddin' s manag ers - - Castillo, S tephens, B atkin, Owens, Mc Gee , Phelps, and Ha rr i s o n-- t o o rga n i z e am ee t i n g: L a die s and

g e nts , I am a sk ingDe nis e Gr os s, of my sta ff , to se t up a

me e tin gwi th all of us to discuss the AN [Ahmad Nurr iddin] "c ase" in terms of whe re w e ar e g oing on this. It has bec ome clea r to me in the last fe w day s that ever y one is NOT-13-

on the same w ave le ng th in terms of strategy . . . . Fr om there, w e will take w h at e v e r a c t i o ni s n e c e s s ar

y. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 130; Pl.'s Ex. 74a-b. Plainti ff a lleg es that, at that mee ting, a decision wa s made to close off his worke rs' compensation claim by makinghim a job offer

in "Code F E" -- the office that was the sour ce of his stress -- that his manag ers be lieved he w ould not acce pt. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131, 135-36. This was c alled " the FE option" or " the FE approa ch." I d. On Oc tob e r 9 , 2 00 1, Pame la Cov ing ton , a

n A fric an A me ri c an e mpl oye e , s ug g e ste d th at a detail assig nment was a

"strongpossibili ty

at GSFC [Goddard Spac e F light Center ]." I d. ¶ 132. Novak r ejec ted the option, also stating " looks like we ar e hea ding towa rd the F E option." I d. ¶ 133. Har rison echoe d her c omments: "A de tail does nothing positive for us except delay

whateve r will happen. So moving a head w ith FE appe ars to be the best way to proce ed at this point." I d. By letter dated Octobe r 12, 2001, mana g ement notified plaintiff of the dec ision to return him to his duties as an Educ ation Prog rams Specia list i n "F E" , but with a "c hang e" of super visors -- Mc Gee and Owe ns, instead of Dr . Phelps -- to " acc ommodate any limit ations" - - re fer

ringto the stress and de pression alleg edly cause d by

his former situation -- and a c hang e in the phy sical lo cat io n o f hi s o ffi ce t o "reduc[ e] th e po ss ib il it y of co nt actwi th [ hi s] former superv is or [ P hel ps ] ." Pl.'s Ex. 79 (L etter f

rom Castillo t o Nurriddin, date d Oct. 12, 2001); Sec ond Am. Compl. ¶ 136. Pla int if f b e lie ve d th e a c c omm od atio ns of fe re d w e re ina de qu ate be c a us e he wo uld

be re tur ne d to the environme nt that cause d his anx iety and depr ession, under the supervision of those who w ere the subject of his EEO complaints, and he r efuse d the offe r. Second A m. Compl . ¶ 137. He then initiated contact with an E EO counse lor later that month. I d. ¶ 36. B ased on the repr esentations in t he Ca sti llo re tur

n- to- wo rk le tte r, ho we ve r, the Of

fi c e of Wor ke rs ' Com

pe ns atio n Pr og ra

ms te rm inate d p la int if

f' s b e ne fi ts o n D e c e mbe r 2 6, 20 01 . Pl .' s E x. 84 (L e tte r f ro m O WCP toPla int if f a c kn ow le dg e s th at th e re we re no a dv e rs e a c tio ns fr om O c tob e r 2 00 1 unti l 9 Dec ember

2003, though he casts it as " NASA ce as[ing] all communication with him" for tha t period. See Pl.'s Mem. at 28. -14- Nurriddin, date d Dec . 26, 2001). The OWCP then vacate d its decision less than two months later. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1 3 8
. I tex p l ai n edth atth e w o rk er s ' co mp en s at i o ncl ai mwa s o ri gi n al l y gra n t edb as edo np l ai n t i ff 's "O ccupational Disease c laim . . . [ of] depression as a result of his fe dera l job duties," and note d a phy sician' s determination that " claimant could pe rfor m duties without necessar y stress, such a s perc eived discr iminatory

treatment." Pl.' s Ex . 85 (Mem. date d Fe b. 5, 2002). It further explained that: [I ]thas bee n deter mined that the claimant mentions both Ms. Sherrie Mc Ghee [si c] and Mr. F rank O wens in his initial claim[ ] filed ag ainst manag ement of N ASA. Th e re is a lso a

n e ma il m e ssa g e that c ir c ulate d thro ug h N ASAwh e re the a g e nc y is dis c us sin gof

fe ri ngthe c la ima

nt a job that he wo uld

no t a c c e pt. Th e re fo re , h is c omp e ns atio n w ou ld b e te rm inate d. Al tho ug h th e loc atio n o f t he job is d if

fe re nt, Mr. Owe ns and Ms. McGhe e [sic] would still supervise the claimant. This is not satisfac tory

beca use Mr. Ow ens and Ms. McG hee [sic] were na med in the orig inal complaint as contributingto Mr. Nurriddin' s condition. There fore , based on the above e vidence of file, it has be en dete rmined that the job offe r is not suitable. I d. Henc e, plaintiff' s worker s' compensation benefits wer e re stored on F ebrua ry 5, 2002. I d. Th e c omp la int

is s ile nt o n e ve nts at th e of fi c e po st- datin gthe Oc tob e r 2 00 1 Ca sti llo
r e tu r n - to - w o r k le tt e r , p r e s u ma

b ly b e c a u s e p la inti f

f w a s n o lo n g e r

r e p o rti n gto w o r

k
. T h e n e xt 9 signif ic ant e ve nt c ame on

De c e mbe r 4 , 2 00 3, wh e n N ASAse nt h im a le tte r p ro po sin gto t e rm inate hi s em pl oy

men t b asedon a fi nd in g of "med ica l i nab il it y to perf orm th e du ti es o f y ou r po si ti on ." Pl.'s Ex. 95. P laintiff attributes this sudden termination proposa l to his actions in the Nurriddin I lit ig atio n, inc lud inga

mot ion he ha d f ile d th e da

y be fo re to a

me nd his jud ic ia l c omp la int

a g a ins tPla int if f a lso make s a

re fe re nc e to a g e dis c ri min atio n in Count N ine , whic h a

pp e ars to 10 be a mistake , as no other pa ragraph of

his 193-para g raph se cond ame nded complaint make s any ref ere nce to a g e discrimination. Indeed, it is clea

r that at lea st some of the eve nts describe d there in are the subject of 11 Nurriddin I , and we re pr ovided only for ba ckg round information.

-15- NASA. See Nur

riddin Dec l. at 6 (filed July 12, 2007); see a lso Nurriddin v. Goldin, Civil Action No. 99-3401, ECF #93 (Pl.'s Mot. for L eave to Amend Compl.). He also be lieves def endants took this action ag ainst him because of his disability (depr ession). Second A m. Compl . ¶140. The termination was f

inalized on Febr

uary 6, 2004. I d. ¶ 22. After challeng ing the termination administratively , plaintiff then filed this lawsuit seeking pr omo tio n to GS- 15 , r e tr oa c tiv e to Janu ary 1, 19 98 , w itha c c omp any ingba c kp ay , a

nd $3 00 ,0 00 in compensatory

damag es. I d. ¶¶ 38- 39 & Pra y er f or Relief. The second a

mended c omplaint
enumer ates nine c auses of action. He bring s six counts under T itle VI I : rac e discrimination (Count One); sex discrimination (Count Two); relig ious discrimination (Count Three); r etaliation (Count Four) ; hostil e wor k environment (Count Eig ht, but mis labeled Count Nine) , and wr ong ful termination based on r ace , sex, religion, disability , and re prisal (Count Nine). He a lso alleg es 10 two counts under the Rehabilitation Act: failure to rea sonably acc ommodate an individual with a disability or per ceive d to have a

disability (Count Five) , and the de nial of his reque st for
rea sonable a ccommodation as r etaliation (Count Six ). F urthermor e, he a lleg es that four ind ivi du a ls - - N ov ak, Ca sti llo , Ph e lps , a nd B atki n - - w e re e ng a g e d in a c on sp ir a c y

to d e pr ive him of his constitutional rights, on ac count of his ra ce a nd relig ion (Count Seven). The sec ond amende d complaint does not, for the most part, specify which of the many
e ve nts c ata log e d a

re the fo c us of

e a c h o f t he Ti tle VI Iand

Re ha bil itatio n A c t c ounts , in

c on tr a st t o background information. Instead, most counts simply incorporate all of the pr ior para g raphs a nd 11With out su c h ta ilo ri ng , th e Court wo uld be le ft to gue ss whic h o f t

he do zen s o f e ma ils 12 and le tte rs that w e re iss ue d o ve r t he c ours e of

e ig ht ye ars we re the su

bje c t of e a c h c ount. -16- the n s umm ari ly

a lle g e " dis c ri min atio n" or " re ta liatio n. " Ho we ve r, pla int if f' s me mor and

um i n opposition t o defe ndants' motion to di smiss i temizes which of the mana g ement ac tions described
are beingchalleng ed as violations of law , and the Court will tailor its analy sis of eac h count
acc ording ly
. Specifica lly , with respec t to his Tit le VI Iclaims, plaintiff states that " he wa s

12 dis c ri min ate d a g a ins t, b a se d u po n h is r a c e , g e nd e r, and

re lig ion , whe n h e wa s ( a ) wro ng ly te rm inate d; ( b) pla c e d o n A WOL fo r 5 9 d ay s; ( c ) d e nie d w or k- re late d tr ave l to min or ity confe renc es; (d) de nied a non- competitive promotion; (e) de nied prompt use of donated leave while on medica l leave; ( f) de nied per formanc e aw ards; and ( g ) denie d a timely within-g rade inc re a se ." Se e Pl. ' s Me m. at 2. He ide nti fi e s th e same mana g e me nt a c tio ns a s th e su bje c t of his Title VI Ireta liation claim. I d. at 3. With respect to his Rehabilitation Act claims, he a lleg es he was the vic tim of disabilit y discrimination when he w as " (a) wrong ly terminated; (b) place d on AWOLfor 59 da

y s; (c) de nied prompt use of donated leave ; (d) denie d a prompt within-g rade incre ase; (e ) denie d rea sonable a ccommodations; and (f ) denie d perf

ormanc e aw ards." I d. at 2. Def endants' motion to di smiss requests dismiss al of the e ntire ac tion based on a c ombination of arguments: failure to state a claim upon which r elief c an be grante d with respec t to the conspirac y
c ounts ; f a ilure to a lle g e a

dis a bil ity or pe rc e ive d d isa

bil ity ; f a ilure to a de qu ate ly

e xha us t
a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s w ithre sp e c t to c e rt a in c la ims ; and fa ilure to a lle g e fa c ts s uf fi c ie nt t o support an infe renc e of discr imination or retaliation. See De fs.' Mem. at 11-26. In the alter native, defe ndants seek summar

y judgme nt on the discrimination and re taliation claims on the g round that th e re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt an in fe re nc e of

dis c ri min atio n, in p art ic ula r w ithre sp e c t to his termination. I d. at 26-30. The Court addre sses ea ch of the se ar g uments below.-17- STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW I. Dism issal Pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)(6) Al l th atth e F ed er al R

u l es o f C i v i l P ro ce d

ure re qu i re o f aco mp l ai n ti s th ati tco n t ai n"'a sh or t and pla in s tate me nt o f t

he c la im s ho wi ngthat th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to re lie f, ' in o rd e r t o

' g ive the de fe nd ant f

a ir no tic e of wh at th e . . . c la im i s a

nd the g ro un ds up on

wh ic h it re sts .' " B e ll Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) ; acc ord Eric kson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h "de tailed fac tual alleg ations" a

re not ne cessa

ry to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the " g rounds" of " entitle[m ent] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish " more than la bels and
c on c lus ion s" or

" a fo rm ula ic re c itatio n o f t

he e le me nts of

a c a us e of a c tio n. " Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S.
at 55 5- 56 ; se e a lso Pa

pa san v . A lla in, 47 8 U .S. 26 5, 28 6 ( 19 86 ). " To surv ive a mot ion to d ism iss , a complaint must contain suffic ient fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to 'state a c laim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " A shcrof t v. I qbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009) ( quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570); Atherton v. District of Columbi a Of

fice of the Mayor, 567 F .3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A c omplaint is pl ausible on its fac e " when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual content that allows the c ourt to draw the rea sonable infe renc e that the de fenda nt is li able f

or the misconduct alleg ed." I qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This amounts t o a " two-prong ed appr oach" under which a c ourt first identifies the f actua l alleg ations entitled to an assumption of truth and then deter mines "whether

they plausibly g ive rise to an e ntitlement to relief." I d. at 1950-51. The notice pleadingrules ar e not meant to impose a great burden on a plaintiff. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. B roudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005); see also Swierkiewic z v. S orema N.A., 534 U. S. 5 06 , 5 12 -1 3 ( 20 02 ). Whe n th e su ff ic ie nc y of a c omp la int

is c ha lle ng e d b y

a mot ion to dis mis s und e r R

ule 12 (b )( 6) , th e pla int if

f' s f a c tua l a lle g atio ns mus t be pr e sume d tr ue and sh ou ld-18-

be libera lly

construed in his or he r fa vor. L eathe rman v. Ta

rra nt County Nar cotics Intellige nce & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Phil lips v. Bure au of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see a lso Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (c iting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555-56). The plaintiff must be g iven eve ry favor able infe renc e that may be dra wn from the a lleg ations of fa ct. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Sparrow v. United Air L ines, Inc., 216 F .3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Howe ver, " the cour t need not ac cept infe renc es dra wn by plaintiffs if such infere nces a

re unsuppor

ted by the fa cts set out in the complaint." K owal v. MCICommc'ns Corp., 16 F .3 d 1 27 1, 12 76 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 4) . N or do e s th e c ourt

a c c e pt " a le g a l c on c lus ion

c ou c he d a s a fac tual alleg ation," or

"na ked asse rtions [ of unlawf ul misconduct] devoid of further f actua l
e nh anc e me nt. " I qb a l, 1 29 S. Ct . at 19 49 -5 0 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) ; se e a lso Aktieselskabe t AF 21. Nove mber 21 v. F ame Jeans Inc., 525 F .3d 8, 17 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the c ourt has " never acc epted leg al conc lusions cast in the form of f actua l alleg ations")
. II. Summ ary Judgm ent P ursuan t to F ed. R. Civ. P . 56(c) When, on a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion, "matter s outside the pleading s are prese nted to and not excluded by

the cour t, the motion mus t be treated as one for summary judgme nt under Rule 56"
and " [a]ll pa rt ie s mu st b e g ive n a

re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to p re se nt a ll the ma

te ri a l th at is pertinent to the motion." F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see Yates v. Dist. of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Summary judgme nt is appropriate when the ple ading s and the e vidence demonstrate that "ther e is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law." Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) . The pa rty seekingsummary

judgme nt bear s the initial responsibilit y of demonstrating the a

bsence of a g enuine dispute of material fa ct. Se e Ce lot e x Cor

p. v. Catr e tt, 47 7 U .S. 31 7, 32 3 ( 19 86 ). Th e mov ingpa rt y may su c c e ssf ull y-19-

support its mot ion by

identifying those portions of " the pleading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits" whic h it believes demonstrate the abse nce of a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323. In deter mining whe ther ther e exists a ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct suffic ient to prec lude
summa ry jud g me nt, the c ourt

mus t r e g ard

the no n- mov ant' s st ate me nts a s tr ue and a c c e pt a ll evidenc e and ma

ke all infe renc es in the non-movant' s favor . See Ande rson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A non- moving pa rty , howeve r, must establish more than the " mere exis tence of a sc intill a of e vidence " in support of its posit ion. I d. at 252. B y pointing to the absenc e of e vidence proff ere d by the non-movingparty , a movingparty may succe ed on summary jud g me nt. Ce lot e x, 47 7 U .S. at 32 2. " I f t he e vid e nc e is m e re ly

c olo ra ble , o r i s n ot s ig nif

ic antl y probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249- 50 (citations omitted). Summary judgme nt is appropriate if the non-movant f ails to offer

"e vidence on which the jury could re asonably

find for the [non-movant] ." I d. at 252.

DI SCU SSIO N Plaintiff's longhistory

of EEO a ctivity

and Title VI Ilitigation have g iven rise to a se ries of actions by

NASA manag ement that plaintiff pe rce ives to be discriminatory and re taliatory . In an
a pp are nt a tte mpt to p le a d a ll ava ila

ble c a us e s o f a c tio n, pla int if

f h a s c a st h is n e t w ide , a lle g inga ll
mann e r o f d isc ri min ator

y and re ta liator y anim us un de r T itl e VI I , a s w e ll a s d isa bil ity discrimination and conspira cy . Howeve r, some alleg ations are strong er tha n others; indeed, the prese nt rec ord indicate s that, of all of plaintiff' s leg al theorie s, his claim of reta liation is far better supported (a

nd more plausible) than any other c laim. Howeve r, at this ear ly stag e of litig ation, the Court is li mited to assessing whether plaintiff' s complaint states a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d, and whe ther the r ecor d is sufficient to war rant the e ntry

of summary

judgme nt on any-20-

claims. As discussed be low, plaintiff' s claims of re taliation under Title VI Iare supported by de ta ile d f a c tua l a lle g atio ns ind ic atin gre ta liator y anim us and wi ll b e a llo we d to pr oc e e d to discovery . The fa ctual alleg ations in support of discrimination based on ra ce, g ender and re ligion
are far less substantial, but suffice to survive defe ndants' motion to di smiss or for summary jud g me nt u

nd e r t he law o f t

his c ir c uit . In c on tr a st, his c la ims of c on sp ir a c y , d isa

bil ity discrimination, and hostile work envir onment fail as a matter of la

w. No discove ry

is nece ssary for the Court to re ach the se re solutions; hence , plaintiff' s motion under Rule 56(f) a s to these three
c la ims wi ll b e de nie d. Th e Court wi ll b e g in w iththe latte r c la ims
. I. Conspi racy t o Deprive P laintif f of His Constitution al Rights This action is primarily

ag ainst the Administrator of NA SA in his official ca pacity
. Howeve r, plaintiff bring s a cla im for conspira cy to violate his constituti onal rig hts ag ainst Novak, Castillo, P helps, and B atkin in their individual capa cities based on the various ac tions they took ag ainst him during the c ourse of his employ

ment. See Second A m. Compl . ¶¶ 1, 179- 84. He cites " the Conspiracy

Act § 1983" as the ba sis of this claim, refe rring , presumably , to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In response , defe ndants contend that plaintiff fails to state a c laim cog nizable under § 1983 be c a us e that se c tio n a

pp lie s o nly

to s tate s a

nd mun ic ipa lit ie s, ra

the r t ha n th e fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt, and fur ther c ontends that the hea d of the a g ency is the only

proper defe ndant with respe ct to the claims under T itle VI Iand the Reha bilitation Act. See Def

s.' Mot. at 1 n.1; Defs.' Mem. at 11-12. The Court agree s that, as a matter of law, pla intiff may

not pursue a c onspiracy

claim ag ainst any of the de fe nd ants . The Supreme Court has held that Title VI Iis the "e x clusive pre -emptive a dminist rative
and jud ic ia l sc he me fo r t

he re dr e ss o f f

e de ra l e mpl oy

me nt d isc ri min atio n. " B ro wn v. Ge n. Se rv s. Ad min
.. 42 5 U .S. 82 0, 82 9 ( 19 76 ). He nc e , a g g ri e ve d in div idu a ls h ave no t be e n p e rm itt e d to-21-

pursue r edre ss for discrimination in fede ral e mploy ment under pr ovisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 -- 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and § 1985(3) -- or under the Constitut ion. I d. at 835 (af firmingdismiss al of c laim under § 1981 be cause Title VI Iprovides " the exclusive judicial
re me dy fo r c la ims of

dis c ri min atio n in

fe de ra l e mpl oy

me nt" ); Gr e at A me ri c an F e d. Savin g s & L oan Ass' n v. Novotny , 442 U.S. 366. 378 (1979) (a pplying r easoningof B rown to pre clude employ ment discrimination claims labeled a s "c onspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of equal prote ction of the law s" unde r § 1985(3) ); Ethnic Employ ees of the L ibrary

of Cong ress v. B oorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (" fede ral e mploy ees ma y not bring suit under the Constituti on for employ ment discrimination that is actionable unde r Title VI I ") ; Brug v. Nat' l Coaliti on for the Homeless, 45 F . Supp. 2d 33, 42 (D.D.C. 1999) (holdingthat fede ral e mploy ee w as pre cluded from bring ing c laims of constitutional viol ations under § 1983 ba sed on holding s of B rown a nd Novotny ). Of c ourse, de fenda

nts are a lso corre ct that plaintiff' s § 1983 claim fails bec ause that st atu te i s l im it ed t o "st ate act io n, " whi ch i s w ho ll y abs enthere . S ee Dy e v. Uni tedS tat es, 51 6 F. Sup p. 2d 61 , 7 1 ( D. D. C. 2 00 7) (" [b]oth s tatut e s [§§ 19 83 and 19 85 (3 )] a

re a dd re sse d to state
a c tio n, no t f

e de ra l a c tio n" ). Th e re fo re , th e Court ho lds that pl a int if

f' s c la im o f a

c on sp ir a c y

to violate his civil rights (Count Seven) -- whe ther brought under § 1983 or § 1985( 3) -- must be dismiss ed for

failure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. B e c a us e the c on sp ir a c y

c la im i s th e on ly

c la im i n whic h h e name s N ov ak, Ca sti llo , Ph e lps , and B atkin as individual defe ndants, those def endants a re dismissed from this lawsuit. To the
e xtent th at N ov ak is su e d in he r o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity (s e e Se c on d A m. C omp l. ¶ 6) , s he is d ism iss e d in that capa city

as we ll. The only

proper defe ndant in a civil ac tion under Title VI Iis "the he ad of the depa rtment, ag ency , or unit." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c ); Hac kley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 10 8, 11 5 n .1 7 ( D. C. C ir . 1 97 5) ; a c c or d N ic ho ls v . T ru sc ott , 4 24 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 24 , 1 31 n. 8 ( D. D. C.The litera l tex t of section 501(b) require s fede ral a g encie s to create af firmative 13 pr og ra ms f or the hir ing , p la c e me nt, and a dv anc e me nt o f i nd ivi du a ls w ithdis a bil iti e s, but c ourt s have longrec og nized that this section re cog nizes a private a ction for c halleng ing individual employ ment decisions. Tay

lor, 451 F.3d at 390 & n.11.

-22- 20 06 ). T he s ame is tr

ue o f a ci vi l ac ti on un der t he R ehab il it ati on Act . M ars hal l v . P ot ter , 6 34 F. Sup p. 2d 66 , 6 8 ( D. D. C. 2 00 9) (" Sin c e the Re ha bil itatio n A c t dr aws fr om t he pr oc e dure s o f T itl e VI I , the only

proper defe ndant is the hea d of the de partment, a g ency , or unit.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). He re, that person is defe ndant B olden, the Administrator of NASA, now the sole r emainingdefe ndant in the ca se. II. Disabil ity Discrim ination und er t he Rehabilitation Act Pla int if f a lso a lle g e s d isa

bil ity dis c ri min atio n und e r t

he Re ha bil itatio n A c t, b a se d o n h is
c on dit ion s o f m a

jor de pr e ssi on , a

nxie ty dis or de r, and

ba c k p a in. He a lle g e s f

a ilure to r e a so na

bly
acc ommodate an individual with a disability or per ceive d to have a

disability (Count Five) , and that th e de nia l of

his re qu e st f

or re a so na ble a c c omm od atio n w a s in re ta liatio n f

or his dis a bil ity (C ount S ix). He a lso a lle g e s th at he wa s th e su bje c t of oth e r a dv e rs e a c tio ns be c a us e of his disability or per ceive d disability , including ultimately his termination (Count Nine). Se c tio n 5 01 of

the Re ha bil itatio n A c t pr oh ibi ts f

e de ra l a g e nc ie s f

ro m e ng a g ingin employ ment discrimination ag ainst disabled individuals and furthe r re quires ag encie s to make
re a so na ble a c c omm od atio ns fo r p e rs on s w ithdis a bil iti e s unle ss s uc h a c c omm od atio ns wo uld impose undue har dship on the ag ency . See Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 942 ( D.C. Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Rice, 451 F .3d 898, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A per son is disabled under the 13 Rehabilitation Act if he " has a phy sical or menta l impairment which substantially limit s one or more of suc h person' s major life a ctivities; has a re cord of such an impairme nt; or is reg arde d asSignifica nt chang es to the Rehabilitation Act and the Americ ans with Disabilities Act 14 (" ADA" ) took eff

ect on January

1, 2009, long a fter the events unde r re view took place . See ADA Ame ndments Act of 2008, Pub. L . No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). This c ircuit has held that " the Amendments do not apply retroa ctively ," a g ree ing w ith other courts that have addre ssed the issue. Ly

tes v. D.C. Water and Sew er Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 938-42 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (citingEEOC v. Ag ro Distribution, L L C, 555 F.3d 462, 470 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009), a nd Moran v. Premier Educ . Group, L P, 599 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271-72 (D. Conn. 2009)) ; acc ord F redr icksen v. United Parc el Serv., 581 F .3d 516, 521 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009). Henc e, cour ts are to a pply the law prior to ena ctment of the A mendments to determine whether a per son is an "individual with a disability ." L

y tes, 572 F.3d at 942. Th e lia bil ity sta nd ard s o f t

he Re ha bil itatio n A c t and

the AD A a

re the same in 15 e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n c a se s, and thu s c a se s inte rp re tin ge ith e r s tatut e are a pp lic a ble in definingthe term " disability " a nd otherwise de terminingliability . See Adams, 531 F.3d at 943; Br een v. D ep' t of Tra

nsp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D .C. Cir. 2002). -23- h av i n g s u ch an i mp ai rm en t . ” 2 9 U. S
. C
. § 7 0 5 (2 0 )( B)
. De fe n d an t s m o v e t o d i s m i s s p l ai n t i ff 's 14 Rehabilitation Act claims on the g round that plaintiff' s impairments do not constitute a "disa bility " be cause they

do not substantially

limit one or more of his major life a ctivities. Pla int if f r e sp on ds that a c c e pta

nc e of his c la im b y

the Of fi c e of Wor ke rs ' Com

pe ns atio n Pr og ra

ms pr ov e s th at he is una

ble to w or

k a nd , h e nc e , is dis a

ble d, and fu rt he rm or e , th at a g e nc y

of fi c ia ls
nece ssarily

reg arde d him as disabled in light of the ir dec ision to t erminate him based on " medical inability to perfor m the duties of his position." See Pl.'s Me m. at 4-5, 8-9. A. Sub stantial Limitat ion of a MajorLif

e Ac tivity Th e pr ima

ry dis pute on

the dis a bil ity c la im h ing e s o n whe the r, duri ngthe re le va nt t ime periods, plaintiff' s condition substantially limit ed one or

more major life activities. As the Sup re me Court

ha s e mph a size d, " me re ly havin gan im

pa ir me nt d oe s n ot m ake [an

ind ivi du a l] disabled." Toy ota Motor Mfg ., Ky ., Inc. v. Willi ams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002). A claimant 15 must demonstrate that the impairment " substantially limit s" a "ma jor life ac tivity ." I d. F ur the rm or e , th e Sup re me Court ha s c a uti on e d th at th e se te rm s " ne e d to be int e rp re te d s tr ic tly to-24-

cre ate a demandingstandard f

or qualify ing a s disabled," in order to be consistent with leg islative finding s reg ardingthe number of disabled Amer icans. I d. at 197; Ly tes, 572 F.3d at 942 (noting that th e pr ote c tio ns of

the AD A a

re tr ig g e re d o nly

" a ft e r [the ] ' de mand ingsta nd ard ' [of To y ota ] is met.") (bra ckets in orig inal). Neither the ADA nor

the Rehabilitation Act def ines " major life a ctivity ." H oweve r, the Supreme Court has inter

prete d "ma

jor life ac tiviti es" to mean " those ac tiviti es that ar e of c entra l importance to daily

life." Toy ota, 534 U.S. at 197; see a lso Bra g don v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) ( consideringan ac tivity ’s " compar ative importanc e" in life and its g ener al " signific ance ")
. In decidingwhether

something is a ma

jor life ac tivity , courts conside r the a ctivity ' s signific ance as contemplated by

the statute, ra

ther than its importance to a par ticular individual. See Pac k v. Kmart Corp., 166 F .3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999); Colwell v. Suffolk Cty . Police Dep’ t, 158 F.3d 635, 642 ( 2d Cir. 1998). Be cause Congr ess intended the e x istence of a disability

to be deter

mined by defining dis a bil ity " wi th r e sp e c t to an in div idu a l," the de te rm inatio n o f whe the r a n in div idu a l is substantially

limit ed in a major

life ac tivity

must be made on a

case -by -ca se basis. Toyota, 534 U. S. at 19 8. Me re ly

su bmi tti nga

me dic a l di a g no sis of

an im pa ir me nt i s in su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh disability status. I d. Instead, a

plaintiff must "[offer ] evidence that the extent of the limi tation [caused by

the impairment] in terms of their own experienc e ... is substantial.' " I d. (citations omitted). The impairment must "pr event or sever ely restric t" the individual in the major life activity at issue and must have a per manent or long -term impac t. I d. P l ai n t i ff s u gges t s th ath e i s s u

b s t an t i al l y

l i m i t edi nth e m aj o r l i fe ac t i v i ty o f w o rk i n g. P l
. 's Mem. at 8. He contends that he is substantially limit ed in workingin NASA' s Education Division because of the stre ss and depr ession broug ht on by the discrimination and re taliationThis exhi bit was filed under seal be cause it contains a medica l evaluation of pla intiff. 16 Howeve r, the Court has de termined that the quote d text reg ardingplaintiff' s ability to work discloses no confide ntial information and may be plac ed on the public r ecor d. -25- from the supe rvisors there . I d. at 4; Second Am. Compl. at 99. Both the Supre me Court and the D.C. Circuit have a ssumed without decidingthat workingis a major life a ctivity , and this Court will do the same her e. See Sutton v. United Air L ines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999); Dunc an v. Washington Metro. A rea

Transit Auth., 240 F .3d 1110, 1114 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (e n banc) To e sta bli shthat an im

pa ir me nt s ub sta

nti a lly lim its the a

bil ity to w or k, a pla int if f m us t "a lleg e and pr ove that in his particular circ umstances ... his impairment pre vents him from perf orming a " ' substantial class' or ' broad r ang e' of jobs otherwise a vailable to him." D uncan, 240 F.3d at 1115. To be substantially limit ed in working , "one must be prec luded from more than one ty pe of job, a

specia liz ed job, or a

particula r job of choic e." Sutton, 527 U.S . at 492. In this case, plaintiff' s claim ca

nnot succe ed bec ause he has not alleg ed that he is e x cluded f rom a substantial class or br oad ra

ng e of jobs. He has ef

fec tively conce ded that he is not pre cluded f rom a broa d
ra ng e of job s b y a lle g ingthat he c an w or

k s uc c e ssf

ull y outsi de the ne g ativ e atmo sp he re that e xists within NASA's Educ ation Division. For example, in an Apr il 18, 2000, email that plaintiff
c ha ra c te ri zes a s a

re qu e st f or re a so na ble a c c omm od atio n, he state s: " Th is m e ssa g e is t o o ff ic ia lly reque st that Ibe g iven an a ssignment that is not in the FE of fice and does not have extensive interfa ce w ith the FE off

ice." See Pl.'s Ex. 51a. Indeed, pla intiff' s own doctor de termined that plaintiff was a

ble to work " provided he has the opportunity to work in an e nvironment wher e he
c anf e e l r e s p e c te d , u s e f

u l, an d a b le to p e r f

o r m h is d u ti e s w it h o ut u n n e c e s s ar y s tr e s s . " Pl
. ' s E x. 83. 16 Pla int if

f c ite s th e de c isi on

by the Of fi c e of Wor ke rs ' Com

pe ns atio n Pr ogra

ms t o a c c e pt h is-26-

claim for w orker s' compensation as evidenc e of his inability to work. B ut to the contrar y , that
o f f ic e ' s d e c is io na c kn o w le d g e s p la inti f f ' s a b il it y to w o r k in ana p p r o p r iate e n v ir o n me n t. Pl
. ' s E x. 85. In its decision to restore w orker s' compensation on Febr uary 5, 2002, that office explained that "the most curre nt report dated Novembe r 7, 2001 indicate s that [Nurriddin] could per form duties without necessa

ry stress, such a s perc eived discr iminatory treatment." I d. In d ee d , p l ai n t i ff

's o wn co mp l ai n tun d er s co re s h i s ab i l i ty t o wo rko u t s i d e o f N AS A's E d u ca t i o nDi v i s i o n . He h i gh l i gh t s h i s o n e- y ea r d et ai l t o NS F, wh er e h e r ec ei v edan "o u t s t an d i n g" rating , as an e x ample of his ability to succe ed whe n awa

y from the a lleg edly

discriminatory

and
re ta liator y e nv ir onme nt at N ASA . Se c on d A m. C omp l. ¶ ¶ 9 2- 93 . Pl a int if

f m ake s n o atte mpt

to argue that his condition prec ludes him from a broa d rang e or c lass of jobs that exis t in the g e og ra ph ic a l are a s to wh ic h h e ha s a c c e ss, inc lud ing , o f c ours e , p os iti on s b oth wi thi n a nd e nti re ly outside of NASA. In short, neither the complaint, nor any evidenc e off

ere d outside of the complaint, sug g ests that plaintiff is substantially limit ed in the major life activity of working
. There fore , his contention that he has a disability fails as a matter of la

w. B. Being “Regarded As” Having a Disab ility Plaintiff also argues that, by terminatinghim based on " medical inability to perfor m the duties of his position," defe ndants nec essar ily "r eg arde d" him as ha

ving a disability under the third definition of " individual with a disabilit y ," 29 U .S.C. § 705(20)(B )(iii). See Pl.' s Mem. at 4-5, 8- 9. An individual is "re g arde d as" disabled if his employ er “ mistakenly believes that [ the] person has a phy sical impairment that substantially limit s one or more major life a ctivities” or “mistakenly

believes that an ac tual, nonlimit ing impair ment substantially

limit s one or more major life ac tiviti es.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. In other wor ds, to qualify as disabled unde r the " reg arde d as" prong , plaintiff must "do more than show that [he] . . . was reg arde d as havingan impairment-27-

of some sort. Rather , [he] must show that [ his] alleg ed impairment . . . wa s believed to be one that ' substantially

limit s one or more . . . major life a ctivities.'" Adams, 531 F .3d at 943 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B )). The stateme nt cited by

plaintiff fa ils to support t he conte ntion that defenda nts "re g arde d" him as disabled. In rele vant par t, that letter states he is medically unable to per form the f

unctions of his fo rm e r p os iti on

a s an E du c atio n Pr og ra

ms Sp e c ia lis t: " Th is i s a

no tic e of pr op os a l to
remove y ou from your position of Education Prog rams Specia list, GS -0301-13, a nd from the Fe dera l service . . . . The re ason for this proposed remova l is y our medica l inability to perfor m the duties of your position." Pl.'s Ex. 95. But to establish that an impairment substantially limit s the ability to work, he must alleg e that the impairme nt preve nts him from perfor ming a "substantial class" or " broad r ang e" of jobs. Dunca n, 240 F.3d at 1115. The findingreg ardingmedical inability arguably cover s other jobs in the Education Division at NASA. See Pl.'s Ex. 95 ("T he medica l documentation provided on your beha lf by
. . . Dr. John Echever

ry states . . . that you cannot wor k in the office environment to which you wer e assig ned in the Educ ation Division at NASA Hea dquarte rs." ). B ut this i s a fa r cr y from indicating that NASA believe d plaintiff was una ble to perf

orm a " substantial class" or " broad r ang e" of jobs. Se e EE OC v. J. B . H un t T ra ns p. , Inc ., 32 1 F .3 d 6 9, 75 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) ( ho ldi ngthat e mpl oye r w ith policy of not hiringapplicants takingmedications that impaired dr iving a bility did not "re g ard" applicants a s disabled bec ause " driving fre ight- car rying tr actor -trailer

trucks over

long distanc es for e x tended pe riods of time" did not constitut e a br oad ra ng e or c lass of jobs). More over, a s discussed above , plaintiff' s own doctor a ttested to plaintiff' s ability to work in an e nvironment "w i th o u tn ec es s ary

s tre s s " - - a no p i n i o nth atwa s co m mun i ca t edt o d ef en d an t s . He n ce , p l ai n t i ff 's claim that def

endants " reg arde d" him as disable d fails as a matter of la

w.De fe nd ants a lso c on te nd that pl a int if

f f a ile d to e xha

us t hi s a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s w ith 17 respe ct to the followingevents fr om 1998: the alleg ation of stalkingand intimidation by Phelps and " spying" by

co-w orker s at another

supervisor' s reque st; various repr imands and close sc rutiny of pla int if f' s w or k; l e ave re str ic tio ns ; and

fa ilure to p ro vid e a de qu ate su pp or t st a ff and fu nd ingto plaintiff. Howe ver, pla intiff has not cha lleng ed these events, standingalone, a s constituting violations of Title VI I(see Pl.'s Mem. at 2- 3), and the Court construes the c omplaint as alleg ing the se inc ide nts sim

ply a s b a c kg ro un d in fo rm atio n in su pp or t of his e nume ra

te d c la ims , in pa rt ic ula r, his ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im. -28- In summary , plaintiff was not a n "individual with a disability " unde r the Reha bilitation Ac t. A c c or din g ly , h is c la ims of fa ilure to p ro vid e re a so na ble a c c omm od atio n f

or his dis a bil ity and cla ims of disparate tr eatment ba sed on ac tual or per ceive d disability will be dismiss ed. III . Cl aim s o f Dis c r e te Ac ts of D isc r im ina ti on a nd R e ta lia ti on und e r Tit le VI I A. Exhau stion of

Adm inis trat ive Rem edies De fe nd ants mov e to d ism iss se ve ra l of pla int if f' s d isc ri min atio n c la ims fo r f a ilure to
e xha us t a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s - - i n p art ic ula r, the de nia l of

tr ave l op po rt

un iti e s to tw o mi no ri ty
c on fe re nc e s and

the de nia l of

a no nc omp e tit ive pr omo tio n, bo th i n late 19 98
. Se e De fs .' Me m. 17 at 12-16. De fenda

nts acknowle dg e that plaintiff initiated conta ct with an EEO c ounselor for eac h of these c laims within 45 day s, but contend that he f ailed to file a

formal c omplaint therea fter in a tim e ly mann e r. I d. In r e sp on se , p la int if f c on te nd s th at de fe nd ants wa ive d th e e xha us tio n d e fe ns e by acc eptingand investig atingthe EEO c omplaints, and then issuing a final dec ision on the merits, all without mentioning timeliness. See Pl.'s Mem. at 9-10. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)( 1), an e mploy ee a lleg ing disc rimination must contact
anE E O c o un s e l o r

i no r d e r t o tr y t o i n f o r m a l l y r e s o l v e th e m at t e r , an d mu s td o s o " w i th i n4 5 d ays of the date of the matter alleg ed to be discr iminatory , or in the ca se of pe rsonnel ac tion, within 45 day s of the ef

fec tive date of

the ac tion." The EEO counse lor must conduct a " final interview " with the employ ee a

nd, if the matter ha s not been re solved, must provide him written notice of the-29-

rig ht to file an administrative c omplaint with the ag ency that alleg edly

discriminated ag ainst him. I d. § 1614.105(d). The employ ee must file the a dminist rative c omplaint within 15 day s of re ceipt of that notice. I d. § 1614.106(a) -(b) . A par ty must ex haust his administrative reme dies within the Ti tle VI Ilim itatio ns pe ri od fo r e a c h d isc re te a c t of

dis c ri min atio n a lle g e d o r l os e the a bil ity to
rec over f or it. National R.R. Passeng er Corp. v. Mor g an, 536 U.S. 101, 114-15 (2002) . Howeve r,
e xha us tio n o f a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s, " lik e a statut e of lim itatio ns , is su

bje c t to wa ive r, e sto pp e l, and equitable tolling." Z ipes v. Tra ns World Airlines, I nc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); B rown v. Ma rs h , 777 F.2d 8, 14 ( D.C. Cir. 1985). Def endants' exhaustion arg ument suffe rs from two f atal fla ws. First, the e mploy er be ars the burde n of provingfailure to exhaust. S ee B rown, 777 F .2d at 12-13; ac cord H udson v. Children' s Nat' l Med. Ctr., --- F . Supp. 2d ---, 2009 WL 2568008, at *2 (D.D .C. 2009). De fe nd ants have fa ile d to do that he re . T he y c on te nd that pl a int if

f f a ile d to fi le a

tim e ly administrative complaint for the claims conc erningdenial of tra vel opportunities and denia l of a noncompetitive promotion on the g round plaintiff' s complaint was not filed within 15 day s of the "f inal counselinginterview" or " last contac t with the EEO counse lor." See De fs.' Mem. at 13, 14. But unde r § 1614.105(d) and § 1614.106(b) , the per iod runs from " rec eipt of the [written] noti ce" of a r ight to file a

discrimination complaint -- not from the da te of the f inal interview. The rec ord offe red by

defe ndants does not provide the date of plaintiff' s rec eipt of the notice . Moreove r, the Court finds it plausibl e that the a dminist rative c omplaint coveringthe trave l and nonpromotion claims was timely , g iven the date of the fina l counselinginterview ( Dec ember 16, 1998), the filing date of plaintiff' s administrative complaint (January 14, 1999), and the lagtime that often
acc ompanies the pre paration of paper work duringthe winter holiday period a nd the U.S. mail. He nc e , d e fe nd ants have fa ile d to e sta bli sh , o n th e pr e se nt r e c or d, that pl a int if f f a ile d to e xha

us t-30-

his a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s. Second, and mor e sig nificantly , plaintiff has ra ised a ser ious issue as to whether defe ndants have waived this def ense by issuing a f

inal ag ency

decision on the mer its. Under Bow den v. United States, 106 F .3d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1997), an a g ency waives the exhaustion defe nse if it acc epts and investig ates a discrimination complaint, and also " decide [s] it on the merits -- a ll without m entioning timeliness." Def endants c ontend that B owden is a na rrow decision that is "e x pressly limit ed to the fa cts of the c ase," ref err ing to the a g ency' s excessive delay in Bowde n in raisingthe def ense in judicial proc eeding s. Defs.' Reply at 3. To be sur e, the
c ourt highli g hte d th e e g re g iou s d e lay s b y the a g e nc y

in B ow de n in

ra isi ngthe e xha

us tio n d e fe ns e in district court. Bow den, 106 F .3d at 439. Howe ver, the rationale of B owden r ests primarily on the ag ency

havingresponde d to the employ ee' s claim on the merits duringthe administrative pr oc e ss w ith out r a isi ngtim e lin e ss: Be cause [t he ag ency] responded to the merits of [the employ ee' s administrative] complaint without ever que stioning its timeliness, we think the ag ency now has no leg itimate rea son to complain about a judicial de cision on the merits. Had it bee n c on c e rn e d th at in fo rm atio n n e e de d to re so lve [the e mpl oye e ' s] c omp la int wa s st a le or that dec iding his ca se would upset settled e x pectations -- traditional objectives of statutes of limitations -- it could easily have r aised the [time] limit ation during th e a dm i n i s tr at i v e p r o c e s s . W h atw e h av e r e p e at e d l y s t at e d r e g ar d i n gT i t l e V II exhaustion requirements applies he re a s well: They are "pr actica l and pra g matic" . . . and should not be invoked whe n [t hey ] serve[] no prac tical purpose." I d. at 438-39 (quotingWil son v. Pena, 79 F .3d 154, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Subseque nt decisions analy zing B owden have construe d it consistent with it s stated rationale -- " waiver occur s when the
a g e nc y de c ide s th e [ad

min istrativ e ] co mpl a int

on the me ri ts w ith out a dd

re ssi ngthe un tim e lin e ss defe nse." Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 911 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citingBow den, 106 F . 3d at 438);
acc ord Ester v. Princ ipi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 2001) ( "when an a g ency decide s the
me ri ts o f a

c omp la int

wi tho ut a dd

re ssi ngthe qu e sti on

of tim e lin e ss, it h a s w a ive d a tim e lin e ssThe EEO C issued at least one a dditional decision conce rningplaintiff, which is not 18 rele vant to the exhaustion arguments curr ently prese nted to the Court. See Nur riddin v. O' Kee fe, Appea l No. 01A32569, 2004 WL73646 (EEOC Jan. 12, 2004). Plaintiff reporte dly

filed two g rieva

nces ove r re primands and one over a perf ormanc e 19 narr ative. See 2004 WL

2271191, at *2-*3 (la

belingthe g rieva

nces c laims 26, 27 and 28). The EE OC re po rt s th at an a dmi nis tr ativ e jud g e dis mis se d th os e c la im f or fa ilure to s tate a

c la im beca use they constituted an impermissible collater al attac k on the outcome of g rieva nce proce eding s, and that the a g ency adopted that de termination in the final ag ency decision. I d. at *3. -31- defe nse in a subseque nt lawsuit"); Kr iesch v. Johanns, 468 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186-87 (D.D .C. 2007) (" [T] he [ag ency] acce pted for inve stigation, investigate d fully , and dec ided on the mer its all of [t he employ ee' s] EEO complaints and . . . never raised untimeliness duringthe administrative proce ss. Circuit prece dent [Bowden] is clear that, under the se circ umstances, [the ag ency] m ay have w aived its exhaustion defense." ); J ohnson v. Billington, 404 F . Supp. 2d 157, 162-63 (D.D.C. 2005) ( "de fenda

nt has waive d his ex haustion defe nse by not assertingit tim ely

[during administrative proc eeding s]"). In this case, the Court is aw are of at lea st two final ag ency decisions issued by

NASA -- one date d April 15, 2002 and a nother dated Fe bruar

y 14, 2003. Those two ag ency decisions have not been made part of the rec ord in this case, but the Court take s judicial notice of a n EEOC appea l decision that has bee n publicly repor ted and r eviewe d the merits of the ma in final ag ency decision at issue. See Nurriddin v. O' Kee fe, A ppeal No. 01A 23148, 2004 WL2271191 (EEOC Sept. 30, 2004). Acc ordingto the EEOC, the ag ency issued a fina l ag ency

decision on 42 18 claims, including the claims that " on August 11, 1998, [ plaintiff] was not promoted to a noncompetitive GS-14 position," and that he was " denied the oppor tunity to travel" to two confe renc es in 1998. I d. at *2-*4. Althoug h three g rieva nce c laims (not releva

nt here ) we re dismiss ed on proc edura l gr ounds, the EEOC re ports that the ag ency investigated and de cided the 19-32-

rema ining c laims on the merits, and make s no ref ere nce to the a g ency

havingraised a

n untimeliness argument. I d. at *3-*4 (notingthat the final a g ency decision held that plaintiff w as
no t an in div idu a l w itha

dis a bil ity , a nd " a s to the re ma ini ngc la ims
. . . th e a g e nc y tho ro ug hly discussed ea ch cla im and the re levant evide nce of rec ord, and c oncluded that c omplainant had fa ile d to e sta

bli shthat he ha d b e e n s ub je c te d to un lawf

ul d isc ri min atio n o r r e ta liatio n" ). In s ho rt , the cur rent re cord indicates that NASA ac cepte d and investig ated the c laims at issue, and then issued a fina l ag ency

decision on the mer its; i ndeed, the ag ency has not made a

ny contention that it raised the issue of

untimeliness during those pr ocee dings. F ollowing B owden, the Court f inds that defe ndants have waived the exhaustion defense unde r these c ircumstance s,. Henc e, the Court denies de fenda

nts' motion to dismis s for fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies, a nd proce eds to c on sid e r t

he me ri ts o f p la int if

f' s d isc ri min atio n a

nd re ta liatio n c la ims
. B . T h e M er i ts o f

Pl a i n ti f f' s T i tl e V I I Cl a i ms 1. The McDonnell Douglas Fr am ework The fr amewor

k for e stablishing a pr ima fac ie ca se of discr imination or retaliation was introduced f

or Title VI Iclaims in McDonnell Doug las Corp. v. Gre en, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Th e fi rs t st e p in

the ana ly sis re qu ir e s a

pla int if f t o c arr y the burd e n o f e sta

bli sh inga pr ima fa c ie
c a se by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e . I d. ; T e x. De p' t of Cmty . A ff

a ir s v . B ur din e , 4 50 U. S. 24 8, 25 2- 53 (1 98 1) . In o rd e r t o ma ke out a pr ima fa c ie c a se of

dis c ri min atio n, a

pla int if f m us t show that " (1) she is a member of a prote cted c lass; (2) she suf fer ed an a dverse employ

ment action; and ( 3) the unfa

vorable action g ives rise to an infe renc e of discr imination." Stella v. Min e ta , 2 84 F .3 d 1 35 , 1 45 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) (q uo tin gB ro wn

v. B ro dy , 1 99 F .3 d 4 46 , 4 52 (D .C. Cir. 1999)). To e stablish a prima fa cie c ase of reta liation, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) that he
e ng a g e d in

statut or ily

pr ote c te d a c tiv ity ; ( 2) that he su ff e re d a mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e a c tio n b y

his-33-

employ er; a

nd (3) that a

causa l link connects the two." J ones v. B erna nke, 557 F .3d 670, 677 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 9) ; Wile y

v. Gl a ssm an, 51 1 F .3 d 1 51 , 1 55 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 7) . U nd e r t he Sup re me Court's de cision in Burling ton Northern & Santa Fe Ry . Co. v. W hite, 548 U.S. 53, 70 (2006), a materia lly

adver se ac tion in the retaliation context is one that could conce ivably dissuade a
rea sonable wor

ker f rom makingor supportinga cha rg e of discr imination. S ee a lso Velikonja v. Go nza le s, 46 6 F .3 d 1 22 , 1 24 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 6) ; Ro c ho n v . G on zal e s, 43 8 F .3 d 1 21 1, 12 19 (D .C. Cir. 2006). On c e the pla int if

f e sta bli sh e s a pr ima fa c ie c a se , th e burd e n s hif ts t o th e e mpl oye r t o articulate a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for its actions. McDonne ll Dougla s, 411 U.S. at 802. The e mploy er' s burden, howe ver, is mer ely one of pr oduction. Bur dine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. The e mploy er " need not pe rsuade the cour t that it was actua lly

motivated by

the proff ere d rea sons. I t is su ff ic ie nt i f t he de fe nd ant' s e vid e nc e ra ise s a g e nu ine iss ue of

fa c t a s to wh e the r i t discriminated ag ainst the plaintiff." I d. Where a ssessment of the e mploy er' s leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son become s
n e c e s s ar y, a p r o l o n g e d

e v a l u at i o no f

th e s u f f i c i e n c y o f p l a i n t i f f ' s p r i m a f a c i e c a s e i s un n e c e s s ar

y, for the c entra l inquiry

then bec omes " whether

the plaintiff produc ed suff icient evidenc e for

a
rea sonable jury

to find that the employ er' s asserte d non-discriminatory rea son was not the ac tual
rea son and that the e mploy er intentionally discriminated ag ainst the plaintiff on a pr ohibited ba sis ." Se e Ad e y e mi v . D istri c t of Col umb ia , 5 25 F .3 d 1 22 2, 12 26 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) ; se e a lso Br ady v. Offic e of Ser g eant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (citingSt. Mary ' s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 511 (1993), a nd U.S. Post al Serv. B d. of Gove rnors v. Ai ke ns , 4 60 U. S. 7 11 , 7 14 -1 6 ( 19 83 )) . " Whe the r j ud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw i s a

pp ro pr iate in
an y p art i cu l ar

ca s e w i l l d ep en d

o na n u mb er

o f f ac t o rs . . . i n cl u d [ i n g] th e s tre n gtho f t h e p l ai n t i ff 's-34-

prima fa cie c ase, the probative va lue of the pr oof that the e mploy er' s expl anation is false , and any other e vidence that supports the employ er' s case and that prope rly may be conside red on a

motion for judg ment as a matter of law ." Re eves v. Sande rson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148- 49 (2000); ac cord A ka v. Washing ton Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ( en banc );
see a lso W ater

house v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992- 993 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In other
wo rd s, the Mc Do nn e ll D ou g la s sh if tin gburd e ns fr ame wo rk

e ff e c tiv e ly e va po rate s - - t

he so le
rema ining issue is discrimination or re taliation vel non, and " to survive summary judgme nt the pla int if f m us t sh owthat a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld c on c lud e fr om a ll o f t he e vid e nc e that th e a dv e rs e employ ment decision wa s made for a discriminatory

rea son." L athram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see Re eves, 530 U .S. at 142-43.

2 . T h e D i s cr i mi n a ti o n Cl a i ms
a. Adverse Em ployme nt Action Def endants c ontend that seve ral of pla intiff' s claims must be dismis sed bec ause the actions challeng ed ar e not " adver se employ ment actions" -- a

nece ssary

element of

the prima fa cie c ase of dis c ri min atio n. Se e De fs .' Me m. a t 16 -2 0. De fe nd ants fo c us on the no n- a ssi g nme nt o f p la int if f t o a window c ubicle, the r eprimands, the c hang es in duties, the co- worke rs " repor t[ ing] on" plaintiff,
and the de nia l of

tr ave l and

le ave re qu e sts . I d. Af

te r d e fe nd ants fi le d th e ir

mot ion to d ism iss , pla int if f c lari fi e d th at hi s T itl e VI Ic la ims are fo c us e d o n ju st s e ve n o f t he many a c tio ns a lle g e d in the sec ond amende d complaint. See Pl.'s Me m. at 2-3. This approa ch make s sense c onsidering that, afte r the filingof the sec ond amende d complaint, the cour t of appe als aff

irmed the dismissal of seve ral of pla intiff' s claims in Nurriddin I for lac k of an a dverse employ ment action. See Nurriddin I , 382 F. Supp. 2d at 94, 101-02, a ff' d, 222 Fe d. Appx. 5. Nonethele ss, one of the se ven mana g ement ac tions that plainti ff c ontinues to challeng e asTo the extent that plaintiff challeng es the re fusal to provide a window cubicle , the 20 re pr ima nd s, and " sp ying " by

c o- wo rk e rs , a s d isc re te a c ts o f d isc ri min atio n und e r T itl e VI I , th os e c la ims are dis mis se d a s th e y , to o, fa il t o q ua lif y a s a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns be c a

us e the re is no alleg ation of objec tively tang ible harm. See Nurriddin I , 382 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (holdingthat repr imand was not adve rse e mploy ment action); see g ener ally Russell v. P rincipi, 257 F.3d 815, 81 8 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 1) (" no t e ve ry thi ngthat make s a

n e mpl oye e unha

pp y is a n a c tio na ble a dv e rs e action" ). -35- discriminatory

is the denial of tra

vel to minority

confe renc es. Howe ver, this Court alre ady has hel d t hatden ial of t rave l t o co nfer ences is no t an adv ers e empl oy men t ac ti on . Nu rri dd in I , 3 82 F. S u p p . 2 d at1 0 1
- 0 3
. A s e x p l a i n e d th e r e , t o e s t a

b l i s hana dv e r s e e mp l o y

m e n ta c t i o ni na

T i t l e V II dis c ri min atio n c a se , a

pla int if f m us t sh ow" mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e c on se qu e nc e s a ff e c tin gthe te rm s, conditions, or privileg es of e mploy ment or future employ

ment such that a r easona

ble trier of

fac t could find objec tively

tang ible harm." I d. at 103 (quotingBr own v. B rody , 199 F.3d at 457) (empha sis added). D iminis hment of one' s "g ener al stature," and the a ppare nt unfairne ss of availability

of trave l to co-worke rs, does not rise to the le vel of " objectively tang ible harm." I d. at 102-03; see a lso Murray

v. Chicag o Transit Auth., 252 F .3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2001) (de nial of trave l to a confe renc e not a " tang ible employ ment action" ). Ther e ar e no fa cts indicatingthat denial of tra

vel ca used any objectively

tang ible harm -- neither in Nur riddin Inor her e; henc e, pla int if f' s c la im that de fe nd ants vio late d T itl e VI Iby de nyingtr ave l to tw o mi no ri ty c on fe re nc e s is dismiss ed for

failure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. 20 Wit h respe ct to the denial of leave , defe ndants provide little for the Court to conside r. Th e y summa ri ly c on te nd that de nia l of

le ave is n ot a

n a dv e rs e a c tio n, but do no t e la bo ra te on thi s argument. Considering that the leave at issue, as a lleg ed in the complaint, had a financ ial impact
on pla int if f - - h e a lle g e s h e wa s in

AWO Lstatus fo r 5 9 d ay s - - t he Court c ann ot d ism iss that c la im for lac k of an a dverse employ ment action.-36-

The re maining f

ive cha lleng ed ac tions -- termination of e mploy ment, denial of a noncompetitive promotion (i.e., to GS-14), de nial of use of donated lea

ve, denia l of perf

ormanc e
awa rds, and de nial of a timely within-g rade incre ase - - plainly impact plaintiff' s compensation and tang ibl e be ne fi ts. Th e re fo re , th e Court re a dil y c on c lud e s th at pl a int if

f s atis fi e s th e a dv e rs e employ ment action ele ment of a pr ima fac ie ca se of discr imination.

b. Inf

ere nce of Discrim ination Def endants move to dismiss plaintiff's r emainingclaims of discrimination on the g round that plaintiff has fa iled to establish any causa l connec tion between his prote cted c lass (ra ce, g ender , and re ligion) a

nd the adve rse e mploy

ment actions he c halleng es -- in other words, that there is an absenc e of f

actua l alleg ations supporting a n infere nce of

discrimination. See Def s.' Mem. at 21-22. De fenda nts' a rgument is not well-develope d -- it consists of just one para g raph -
- but the Court has nonethele ss conducted a compre hensive re view of the second a mended complaint, construingit liberally in plaintiff' s favor , to determine whether plaintiff has a lleg ed fac ts supporting a

n infere nce of

discrimination. Inev al u at i n g th e s u ff

i ci en cy o f t h e c o mp l ai n t , th e C o urti s m i n d fu l o f t h e D
. C
. C i rc u i t 's caution that the thre shold for plea ding f acts in support of a

Title VI Idiscrimination claim is a low one, and that district courts should not undertake a "f ull causation ana ly sis" in eva luating the sufficie ncy

of the prima f

acie case . See B rady , 520 F.3d at 493 & nn. 1 & 2; Adey emi, 525 F.3d at 1226 n.1. Mere ly

alleg ing that the employ er' s proffe red r easons f or the a dverse employ

ment
a c tio ns is f

a lse may su pp or t an in fe re nc e of

dis c ri min atio n s uf

fi c ie nt t o s ur

viv e a mot ion to dismiss . See Ge org e v. L eavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 ( D.C. Cir. 2005) (re versingdistrict court for requiringplaintiff to support prima fa cie c ase w ith evidence that she wa s treate d differ ently than
s i m i l ar l y s i tu at edem p l o y ee s n o tp arto f t h e p ro t ec t edcl as s b ec au s e "[ e] l i m i n at i o no f [ em p l o y er 'sThe Court empha siz es, howe ver, that plaintiff may not relitigate the cla ims already 21 decide d in Nurriddin I . For example, plaintiff alleg es that his 1991 hiring was mar ked by rac ial and g ender

discrimination (see Sec ond Am. Compl. ¶ 52), and cha lleng es his GS-12 place ment there afte r. The Court a lrea dy has held that the r efusa ls to promote him from 1991 throug h 1996 wer e not discriminatory

or re taliatory , and that holdingwill not be revisited in this case.

-37- leg itimate] rea sons . . .is sufficient, abse nt other explanation, to create an infe renc e that the de c isi on wa s a dis c ri min ator

y on e " ). He re , p la int if

f a lle g e s thro ug ho ut h is c omp la int -- and in h is EE O d oc ume nts -- that de fe nd ants ' pr of fe re d r e a so ns fo r t

he a c tio ns take n a

re fa lse . H e a lso alleg es spec ific instance s where simil arly situated persons outside of his prote cted c lass rec eived
mor e fa vo ra ble tr e atme nt, in p art ic ula r w ithre sp e c t to pe rf

or manc e awa

rd s ( Se c on d A m. C omp l. ¶¶ 24 , 5 5, 71 ) a

nd a no nc omp e tit ive pr omo tio n ( id. ¶ 7 8) . Wh e the r h e c an d e ve lop e vid e nc e in
su pp or t of the se fa c tua l a lle g atio ns re ma ins to b e se e n. Ind e e d, many of his fa c tua l a lle g atio ns , if take n a s tr

ue , w ou ld m or e str on g ly

su pp or t hi s p ara lle l c la im that th e a c tio ns at is su e we re take n in reta liation for his long history of EEO a ctivity

and Title VI I

litigation. B ut at this stage of the
c a s e , th e C o urtmu s td e n y d e f e n d an t s ' m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s th e r e m a i n d e r o f p l a i n t i f f ' s T i t l e V II discrimination claims, even thoug h the more pla usible rea ding of

plaintiff' s claims is that defe ndants ac ted with a re taliatory motive. 21 3. Ret aliation
a. Mate rially Adverse A ction An adve rse e mploy

ment action is nec essar

y to sustain a claim of re taliation, just as it i s for dis c ri min atio n c la ims . H ow e ve r, in t he re ta liatio n c on te xt, an e mpl oy me nt a c tio n th at is "materially

adver se" is defined a s one that is "likely " to " dissuade[] a re asonable worke r fr om makingor supportinga cha rg e of discr imination." B urling ton Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 70; Ging er v. D ist. of Colum bia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1346 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). Def endants ne x t argue that-38-

plaintiff' s retaliation cla ims should be dism issed on the g round that none of the ac tions are sufficie ntly

"a dverse " unde r the " rea sonable pe rson" standard se t forth in Bur lington Nor thern. See De fs.' Mem. at 25-26. The thre shold for " adver se" action in the re taliation context i s lower than the standard f or

" a dv e rs e " a c tio n f

or dis c ri min atio n c la ims (whic h r e qu ir e s a tang ibl e imp a c t on

the te rm s, conditions or privileg es of e mploy ment) bec ause the statute is intended to provide broa d protec tions to encourag e the disclosure of discrimination. Bur lington Nor thern, 548 U.S. at 63- 67; see a lso Baloc h v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 n. 4 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that, in the reta liation context , the term " adver se" encompa sses " a broa der swe ep of a ction than those in a pure discr imination claim"). In light of the Court's de termination above that six of the seve n actions cha lleng ed by

plaintiff constitute " adver se employ ment actions," then, it should come as no surprise that those sa

me ac tions are a lso actionable in the r etaliation context -- that is, they are lik e ly to d iss ua de a

re a so na ble wo rk e r f

ro m makin ga

c ha rg e of dis c ri min atio n. Th e on ly
unre so lve d q

ue sti on wi th r e sp e c t to the re ta liatio n c la im i s w he the r t he de nia l of

tr ave l to min or ity confe renc es is "materially adver se" under B urling ton Northern, notwithstandingthat it is notan "a dverse employ

ment action" in the discrimination context. In makingthis assessment, the Court must consider whethe r " based upon the combined eff ect of . . . alleg ed eve nts, a rea sonable wor ker c ould be dissuaded f

rom eng ag ing in pr otected activity ." T est v. Holder, 614 F . Supp. 2d 73, 84 (D.D.C. 2009) (e mphasis in origina l); Hill v. Kempthorne , 577 F. Supp. 2d 58, 67 (D.D .C. 2008); see a lso Phi llips v. C ollings, 256 F .3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2001) (" [W ]e consider the c umulative eff ect of [t he employ er' s] di scriminatory actions rather than de termining whether any individual action upon which the c laim relies wa s
su ff ic ie ntl y a dv e rs e ." ). He re , th e c on te xt inc lud e s a lle g e d lo we re d p e rf or manc e e va luatio ns ,-39-

denial of pe rfor

mance awa

rds, nonpromotion, and a r efusa l to transfer to another of

fice
. Considering the combined e ffe ct of these events, then, the Court holds that the denial of the tra vel at issue would be likely

to dissuade a r easona

ble worke r fr om eng ag ing in pr otected a ctivity
. This is because minority

outrea ch wa s alleg edly

an important ele ment of plaintiff' s job and plaintiff' s job perfor

mance alleg edly

suffe red f

rom his inability

to attend the minority

confe renc es
at is su e . In s ho rt , a ll s e ve n c ha lle ng e d a c tio ns , in c lud ingde nia l of tr ave l, a re a c tio na ble a dv e rs e actions with respe ct to the re taliation claim asser ted in Count Four. b. Causal Conn ect ion De fe nd ants mov e to d ism iss pla int if f' s r e ta liatio n c la im o n th e g ro un d th at he ha s f a ile d to establish any

causa l connec tion between his prote cted EEO activity and the a dverse actions he challeng es -- i.e., that there is an absenc e of f actua l alleg ations supporting a n infere nce of reta liation. See Def

s.' Mem. at 22. As for

the discrimination claim, def endants' asser

tion is m ore
o f aco n cl u s i o nth an an ar gu m en t . M o re o v er , th e C o urto b s erv es th at , wi thre s p ec tt o p l ai n t i ff 's reta liation claim, plaintiff has produc ed both direc t and circ umstantial evidence of re taliatory animus. To be sure , he re lies on the closene ss in tim e of his prote cted a ctivity (initiating c ontact wi th a n E EO c ouns e lor , f

ili ngEE O c omp la int s, and purs uin gthe lit ig atio n in Nurr idd in I ) t o support an infe renc e of r etaliation. This is, of course , one leg itimate way to support a ca

usal
co n n ec t i o nb et we en th e p ro t ec t edE E O a ct i v i ty an d th e a dv er s e a ct i o n , an d

i ti s n o ts urp ri s i n g, g iven the prolific nature of pla intiff' s protecte d EEO ac tivity , that a ca usal conne ction based on the temporal re lationship is m et her e. But in lig ht of defe ndants' cava lier re quest for dismissal of the re taliation claims, it bears mentioning that plaintiff ha s come for war d with much more than a temporal re lationship. For example, during a 1998 per formanc e eva luation, Dr. Phelps alleg edly called pla intiff' s EEO-40-

complaints "a

croc k of shit" a

nd "just bullshit," and then told him to "[g ]o file another EEO complaint." Sec ond Am. Compl. ¶ 85. W hen plaintiff r equeste d permission in late 1998 to g o on detail to the NSF, the O ffice of Human Resour ces a lleg edly stated that plaintiff " neede d to drop the EE O c la ims in o rd e r f or the NSF de ta il t o b e c on sid e re d, " a me ssa g e a lso imp lie d b y his manag ement' s instructions to subm it his request for de tail to the EEO offic e. Pl.'s Ex. 43, ¶ 11(d). After plaintiff re turned fr om his NSF detail in Fe bruar y 2000, he re quested sick lea ve a f ew months later which wa s initi ally approve d by

his supervisor, but then par tially overr uled by the NASA attorne y

handlinghis EEO matters. Pl.' s Ex . 55a. When his manag ement re alized that he ha d b e e n a c c e pte d into t

he L e ave Tr ans fe r P ro g ra m th e fo llo wi ngJune , o ne mana g e r a lle g e dly responde d "Y eg ads! Will we ever finish with this g uy ? " Pl.' s Ex . 60a-c . Around the same time, the pa rt ie s w e re in m e diatio n in Nurr idd in I . Wh e n me diatio n f a ile d to re so lve that c a se , Ca sti llo advised Nova

k by email that " leg al counse l . . . asked if [an off ice] could find him a job and make an off er . . . e x pectinghe won' t take it . . . ," a nd further stated that " [t ]he offer

of a job is a tac tical ploy to chip awa

y at all his complaints ." Pl.' s Ex . 73a-b ( emphasis adde d). He nce, pla intiff has
c ome fo rw ard

wi th c on sid e ra

ble e vid e nc e to s up po rt

his c la im that de fe nd ants a c te d w ith reta liatory

animus. To be sure , s ome of

the do c ume nts that are pa rt of the re c or d a lso g e ne ra lly re fe r t o plaintiff as a

"pr oblem" e mploy ee, whose many absenc es interf

ere d with his performa

nce at the office . See, e.g ., Def

s.' Ex . 4 (ECF #9- 6); Def s.' Ex . 9 (ECF #9- 11); Pl.'s Ex. 73a. But NASA ha s not y et soug ht summary

judgme nt on the g round that it has a leg itimate nondiscriminatory rea son for e ach of

the cha lleng ed ac tions, nor does it appea r that summary

judgme nt would beWit h respe ct to plaintiff' s termination, defe ndants contend that plaintiff could not 22 pe rf or m th e e sse nti a l f

un c tio ns of

his job , in

the c on te xt of

se e kin gsumma

ry jud g me nt o n h is Re ha bil itatio n A c t c la im. De fs .' Me m. at 26 -3 0. De fe nd ants su g g e st t hat th is a rgume nt a lso shows they

had a le g itimate nondiscriminatory rea son for ter

mination, warra

nting the e ntry

of summary judgme nt on the Title VI Iclaims reg ardingplaintiff' s termination. I d. at 29. In light of plaintiff' s direct e vidence of re taliatory animus, and with no discover y havingy et taken pla ce, the Court concludes that summary judgme nt on the termination claim is premature.

-41- a pp ro pr iate no w b a se d o n th e Court ' s r e vie w o f t he c ur re nt r e c or d. Ac c or din g ly , d e fe nd ants '

22 mot ion to d ism iss or , in

the a lte rn ativ e , f

or summa ry jud g me nt o n p la int if

f' s r e ta liatio n c la im w ill be denie d. IV . Hos ti le Wo r k Env ir onm e nt Employ ers may

not cre ate or

condone a

hostile or abusive wor

k environment. Such a

n
e nv ir onme nt e xists " ' [w]he n th e wo rk pla c e is p e rm e ate d w ithdis c ri min ator y int imi datio n, ri dic ule and insult, that is sufficiently sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the c onditions of the victim’s employ ment and cr eate an abusive workingenvironment.' " O ncale v. Sundowner Of fshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) ( quoting Ha rris v. F orklift Sy stems, I nc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) ; Singletar y v. Dist. of Columbi a, 351 F .3d 519, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The ke y terms, then, ar e

" se ve re ," " pe rv a siv e ," and " a bu siv e ," a s n ot j us t any

of fe ns ive or dis c ri min ator

y c on du c t r ise s to
an ac tionable hostile work envir onment. Under Fa ragher v. City

of B oca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) , in determiningwhether a wor k environment is suffic iently hostile to be actionable , a cour t should consider: (1) the fre quency of the discr iminatory

conduct; (2) the seve rity

of the conduct; (3) whether

the conduc t is phy sically threateningor mere ly

offe nsive; and (4) whether the conduc t unrea sonably interfe res with the e mploy ee' s perf ormanc e. Th e se sta nd ard s f or jud g ingho sti lity

are su ff ic ie ntl y de mand ing

to e ns ur e that T itl e VI Idoes not bec ome a " g ener al civility code." Properly

applied, they

will filter out complaints attacking"the ordinary tribulations of the workplac e, such a s the sporadic use of abusive la ng uag e, g ender -re lated jokes, a nd occa sional teasing ."-42-

I d. at 787 (quotingB. L indemann & D. Kadue , Sex ual Har assment in Employ ment L aw 175 (1 9 9 2 )) ; C l ark

C o un ty S ch o o l Di s t . v . Br ee d en , 5 3 2 U. S
. 2 6 8 , 2 7 1 (2 0 0 1 ) ( "s i mp l e t ea s i n g, offha nd comments, and isolated incide nts (unless extremely serious)" are insufficient). Pla int if f b a se s h is c la im o f h os til e wo rk e nv ir onme nt o n a

se ri e s o f e ve nts datin gpr ima ri ly to the period runningfrom 1997 to late 2001, that a lleg edly targ eted him bec ause of

his protected status (rac e, g ender , and re ligion) a nd his protected E EO ac tivity . Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-140. He a lleg es that, over

the cour se of a

bout four y ear s, his manag ement passe d him over for perf ormanc e aw ards, lowe red his per formanc e eva luations, unfairly repr imanded and c riticized him, made dispara g ing r emar ks about his EEO complaints, closely scrutinized his work, ref

used him a wi nd owc ub ic le , r e mov e d s ome of his dutie s, and

de nie d h is r e qu e sts to t

ra ve l or oth e rw ise failed to provide support for his work w ith staffingand funding . I d. ¶¶ 54- 79. He a lso alleg es that manag ement opposed his ca ree r adva nceme nt in more direc t way s, including the denial of a
no nc omp e tit ive pr omo tio n, de nia l of a wi thi n- g ra de inc re a se , a

nd op po sit ion

to h is tra ns fe r t o another office or deta il assignment. I d. ¶¶ 79, 95- 133. And he a lleg es that, af ter he develope d health proble ms, manag ement denie d many of his leave reque sts and eng ag ed in a se ries of discussions to end his eligibility for wor kers' compensation and to terminate his employ ment at NASA, bef

ore f inally firinghim in Februa

ry 2004. I d. ¶¶ 98- 137. Plaintiff's a lleg ations of dispara g ing r emar ks, criticisms of his work, and othe r neg ative comments do not sufficiently demonstrate a

signific ant level of

offe nsiveness. See, e .g .,Stewart v. Evans, 275 F .3d 1126, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ( use of ter m "idiot" a

nd other prof

anities inadequate wher e languag e wa s not pervasive ); see a lso Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F . Supp. 2d 78, 92 (D.D.C. 2005) ( holding that the spor adic use of abusive la ng uag e is insufficient to esta blish a hostile work environme nt). Nor c an the r emoval of important a ssignments, lowe red pe rfor mance-43-

e va luatio ns , a

nd c los e sc rutiny

of a ssi g nme nts by

mana g e me nt b e c ha

ra c te ri zed a s su ff ic ie ntl y intimi datingor off

ensive in an or dinary

workplac e conte x t. See B ell, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (" Occ asional instance s of less favorable treatment involving ordinar y daily workplac e dec isions
are not sufficient to establish a hostile wor k environment." ). F urthermor e, the a lleg ed eve nts are temporally

diffuse, spr ead out ove r a f our-year period, sug g esting a lac k of per vasivene ss. See Hopkins v. Ba ltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F .3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996) (holdingthat occur renc e of alleg ed incidents intermittently over a seven- y ear

period sug g ests the abse nce of a condition
su ff ic ie ntl y " pe rv a siv e " to e sta

bli shlia bil ity ). Ind e e d, duri ngthe pe ri od at is su e , p la int if

f, by his
own ac count, re ceive d a long -soug ht promotion to GS -13 (Sec ond Am. Compl. ¶ 8), rec eived at least one pe rfor

mance awa

rd (a lbeit not as much as he a lleg edly deser ved) (¶ 55), a

nd also was g rante d permission to work a one -y ear detail at the National Science F oundation from F ebrua ry 19 99 to F e br

ua ry 20 00 (¶ ¶ 9 2- 95 ) - - e ve nts that su bs tanti a lly

un de rm ine his c la im o f a ho sti le work e nvironment. Plaintiff, in effe ct, see ks to transform his cha lleng es to discre te ac ts of alleg ed dis c ri min atio n o r r e ta liatio n ( e .g ., no np ro mot ion s, de nia l of le ave , a nd te rm inatio n) int o a

ho sti le work e nvironment claim by combining those events with a se ries of or dinary workplac e difficulties. B ut "mer e re fer ence to alleg ed disparate ac ts of discrimination ag ainst plaintiff
c ann ot b e tr ans fo rm e d, wi tho ut m or e , into a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt. " Chi lds -P ie rc e v. Ut ili ty Wor ke rs Un ion

of Am e ri c a , 3 83 F . Su

pp . 2 d 6 0, 79 (D .D .C. 20 05 ), a ff ’d 18 7 F e d. Ap px. 1 (D .C. Cir. 2006). Pla int if f a lle g e d a

se ri e s o f s imi lar e ve nts in s up po rt of a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im in Nurriddin I

-- r eprimands, de nials of trave l, disparag ing r emar ks, interfe renc e with his work, multipl e fa ilures to promote, and so on. The re, this Court held that the history of eve nts "indicates-44-

less a per vasive pattern of ha

rassment, a

nd more just isolated employ ment incidents occ urring
over a long pe riod of time" -- a

n observation that applies with equal for ce he re. Nurriddin I , 382 F. Supp. 2d at 108. The Court further noted that " plaintiff was in no wa y phy sically

threatened by
any of the a lle g e d in c ide nts ." I d. (c iti ngF ara g he r, 52 4 U .S. at 78 7- 88 ). Th at r e ma ins the c a se he re -- e ve n a c c e pti nghis a lle g atio n th at he fe lt " sta lke d" by the c on sta

nt s c rutiny

of his supervisor, none of the fa ctual alleg ations support an infer ence of a phy sical threat. Assuming the truth of the alleg ed eve nts and consider ing the m in their totality , plaintiff has fa llen far short of alleg ing c onduct that, under Har ris and Onc ale, amounts to "intimi dation, ridicule a nd insult, t hat is sufficiently

sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the c onditions of . . . employ ment and cr eate an abusive
wo rk i n g en v i ro n m en t . " A cc o rd i n gl y , th e C o urtwi l l gra n td ef en d an t s ' m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s p l ai n t i ff 's
c la im o f a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt. V. P laintif

f' s Motion for Pr elim inary Injun ction Plaintiff has filed a motion see king a temporar y restra ining or der a

nd preliminary injunction to "prohibit [NASA] from . . . solicit[i ng ] i nformation fr om OWC P reg ardingPlaintiff Nurriddin." See Pl.'s Eme rg ency Mot. for Tempor ary

RestrainingOrde r and Pre lim. I nj. at 4 & Proposed Orde r. Plaintiff soug ht this relief upon lea rningthat in J anuar

y 2009 NASA had contac ted the OWCP t o obtain documents conc erninghis worker s' compensation benefits. I d. at 7. Pla int if

f c on sid e rs NA SA' s a c tio ns an e ff or t to te rm inate his wo rk e rs ' c omp e ns atio n b e ne fi ts, in retaliation for

his protected E EO ac tivity . See Pl.'s Reply at 4. In response , defe ndants contend that an injunction is not warra nted bec ause the reque st for information was not ha

rassment or r etaliation, but instead wa s a communication undertake n pursuant to NASA' s g ener al policy of re viewingand ver ifying w orker s' compensation costs, which
are c ha rg e d b a c k to NA SA u

nd e r t he re le va nt s tatut or

y pr ov isi on s. Se e De fs .' Op p' n to Pl. ' s Mo t.The Corra dino affida vit was submitted under sea l beca use it ref ers to var ious medical 23 rec ords. See De fs.' Consent Mot. to File Under Sea l (filed F eb. 18, 2009). N one of the medical information in the Corra dino affidavit is di scussed in this opinion. -45- at 2-5. De fenda

nts have submitted the dec laration of Fra nces Corr adino, a NA SA contrac tor holding the position of Workers' Compensation Specialist, which descr ibes both NASA' s policies with respec t to reviewingworke rs' compensation cases involvingNASA employ ees a nd the nature of the pa rticular c ommunications at issue. See De fs.' Notice of FilingUnder

Seal (F eb. 23, 2009). 23 "I njunctive re lief, not usually available in employ

ment case s, is an extraordinary reme dy
and mus t be sp ari ng ly

g ra nte d. " Rahma

n v . Joh ann s, 50 1 F . Su

pp . 2 d 8 , 1 9 ( D. D. C. 2 00 7) . With that in min d, the sta

nd ard fo r a te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng

or de r o r p re lim ina

ry inj un c tio n is we llestablished. To pre vail, the moving pa rty must demonstrate four

things: (1) a substantial likelihood of succe ss on the merits; (2) that the movingparty would suffe r irre para

ble injury if the injunction were not gr anted; (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other inter ested parties; and ( 4) that the public intere st would be furthe red by the injunction. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churc hes v. Eng land, 454 F.3d 290, 297 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (citingMova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F .3d 1060, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Wint er v. N RDC, I nc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 37 4 ( 20 08 ) ( " A p la int if

f s e e kin ga

pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n mu st e sta

bli shthat he is l ike ly

to
succe ed on the mer its, that he is likely to suffer irrepa rable harm in the a

bsence of pre liminary rel ief , t hatth e bal ance o f equ it ies ti ps in hi s fa vo r, an d t hatan i nj un cti on is in th e publ ic i nt eres t. ") (citing , inter alia, Muna f v. Ge ren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008))
. "I f the movant make s an unusually strongshowing on one of the fac tors, then it does not
ne c e ssa ri ly have to m ake a s st

ro nga sh ow ingon

ano the r f a c tor ." Da

vis v. Pe ns ion

B e n. Gu ara

nty-46-

Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291- 92 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (c iting WMATC v. Holiday Tours, 559 F .2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see also Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Comm'n, 772 F .2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (" The test is a fle x ible one [and] [ i] njunctive re lief may be g rante d with either a high likelihood of suc cess a nd some injury , or vice versa .") . The inver se, of c ourse, is true a s well -- " [i ]f the plaintiff makes a particula rly weak showing on one fa ctor . . . the othe r fa ctors may not be enough to compensate ." Mor g an Stanley DW I nc. v. Rothe, 150 F . Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Hunter v. F ERC, 527 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2007). This appr oach ha s been r efe rre d to as a " sliding sca le." Davis, 571 F .3d at 1291. " ' Despite this flexibi lity , though, a
mov ant m

us t de mon str ate ' at le a st s ome inj ur y ' fo r a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n to iss ue , f

or ' the ba sis of inj un c tiv e re lie f i n th e fe de ra l c ourt s h a s a lw ay s b e e n ir re pa ra ble ha rm .' " Cha

pla inc y of F ull Gospel Churche s, 454 F.3d at 297 (quoting City Fe d Fin. Corp. v. Of

fice of Thrift Super

vision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 ( D.C. Cir. 1995), and Sampson v. Murra y , 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)). Injunctive re lief is not warr anted he re be cause plaintiff ca n demonstrate ne ither a substantial likelihood of success on the me rits nor irre para ble har m. First, the par

ticular instance of re taliation that is the subject of the re quested injunction is not part of plaintiff' s second amende d complaint. As defe ndants corr ectly point out, if plainti ff be lieves NASA' s J anuar y 2009 contac t with OWC P constitut es an a dditional act of re taliation -- one that comes almost five year s afte r the ter

mination curre ntly

beingchalleng ed -- plaintiff first must exhaust hi s administrative
reme dies and then pur sue his judicial reme dies in acc ordanc e with Title VI Iand/or the Rehabilitation Act. See De fs.' Opp' n at 5. Moreove r, eve n if this act could prope rly be conside red part of this ca se, the re cord doe s not establish a substantial likelihood that he would preva il on the
me ri ts o f t

he c la im. As the Court

dis c us se d e arl ie r, the re c or d s ho ws that th e re wi ll b e a fa c tint e ns ive dis pute ov e r whe the r N ASAha d le g iti mate no nd isc ri min ator y re a so ns fo r t

he a dv e rs e-47-

actions at issue. More sig nificantly , plaintiff has fa iled to show any irrepa rable harm whatsoever. Plaintiff acknow ledg es that OWCP denied NASA' s reque st for docume nts. See Pl.'s Opp' n at 4 & Ex . 1 (L e tte r f ro m O WCP to de Me llo -Z ie sc ha ng ). Mo re ov e r, OWCP de nie d th e re qu e st i n te rm s indicatingit would deny

simil ar r equests in the future , stating " [w] e ar e deny ing your re quest for
c op ie s und e r t

he pr ov isi on s o f t

he Pr iva c y

Ac t" and that it wo uld pr ov ide inf

or matio n o nly

if NASA showed it would " use the re quested doc uments independe ntly from our of

fice ." I d. Ex . 1. In addition, the Corradino a ffidavit esta blishes that the J anuar

y 2009 reque st for information was in acc ordanc e with NASA' s routine policy of trac king w orker s' compensation cases. See Cor ra din o A ff

ida vit & Summary

at 1- 4. Ind e e d, OWCP ha d, on its own, un de rt ake n a c tio ns to te rm inate pla int if

f' s w or ke rs ' c omp e ns atio n b e ne fi ts, be fo re c on c lud ingin Jun e 20 08 that hi s be ne fi ts s ho uld

be re sto re d. Se e id. at 2- 3. In th e wa ke of tho se e ve nts , a

n in qu ir y fr om N ASA
c ann ot r e a so na

bly be c on sid e re d h ara ssm e nt, but r athe r i s mo re fa ir ly c on sid e re d a

le g iti mate qu e sti on a bo ut p la int if

f' s c on tin ue d e lig ibi lity

fo r w or ke rs ' c omp e ns atio n b e ne fi ts. Considering plaintiff' s failure to demonstrate a ny likelihood of succe ss on the merits or ir re pa ra ble ha rm , e ve n a

su bs tanti a l sh ow ingon

the re ma ini ngtw o f

a c tor s w ou ld b e ins uf

fi c ie nt t o justify the extraordinar

y relief that he see ks. There fore , the motion for injunctive re lief will be denied. CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Court g ra nts in p art and de nie s in pa rt de fe nd ants ' mot ion

to dismiss or, in the alter

native, for

summary judgme nt, and denies pla intiff' s motion for a tempora ry restra ining or der a

nd preliminary

injunction. Pl aintiff' s claims of disability discrimination (Counts Five a

nd Six ), conspira cy

to violate constitutional rights (Count Seven), a nd hostile work-48-

e nv ir onme nt ( Count E ig ht) are a ll d ism iss e d. No dis c ov e ry is n e c e ssa

ry to r e so lve de fe nd ants ' motion in t hose re spects, and he nce pla intiff' s Rule 56(f) motion to deny defe ndants' motion as pr e matur e is d e nie d o n th os e iss ue s a s w e ll. The c laims that remain pendingare plaintiff' s claims alleg ing disc rimination and reta liation under Title VI I(Counts One, Two, Thr ee, F our, and N ine) ba sed on the following actions: (a) wrong ful termination; (b) plac ement on AWOL for 59 da y s; (c) de nial of a noncompetitive promotion; (d) denia l of use of donated leave while on medica l leave; ( e) de nial
o f p er fo rm an ce aw ar d s ; an d (f ) d en i al o f at i m el y

wi th i n -gr ad e i n cr ea s e. He al s o m ay ch al l en ge the de nia l of

tr ave l to min or ity

c on fe re nc e s a s r e ta liator

y . A ll the se c la ims may

pr oc e e d o nly ag ainst the Administrator of NA SA in his official ca pacity . Vicki Novak, A lfred Ca still o, Mark Batkin, and Malcolm Phelps are dismiss ed fr om this case. Def endant B olden shall answe r the sec ond amende d complaint by not later than January

8, 20 10 . T he Court

anti c ipate s se tti ngthe ini tia l sc he du lin gc on fe re nc e c on te mpl ate d b y F e d. R. Civ. P . 16(b) shortly

there afte r. A sepa

rate order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion.

/ s / J OHN D. B ATES Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge Date: De cembe r 4, 2009