79–008 

111TH CONGRESS REPT. 111–144 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session Part 1 

EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR DESIGNATION OF JUNE 10TH 

AS ‘‘NATIONAL PIPELINE SAFETY DAY’’ 

JUNE 9, 2009.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Mr. OBERSTAR, from the Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H. Res. 484] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to whom 

was referred the resolution (H. Res. 484) expressing support for 

designation of June 10th as ‘‘National Pipeline Safety Day,’’ having 

considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment 

and recommend that the resolution be agreed to. 

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

House Resolution 484 supports the designation of June 10 as 

‘‘National Pipeline Safety Day.’’ 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

June 10, 2009, marks the 10th anniversary of the deadly Olympic Pipe Line explosion in Bellingham, Washington, which caused 

the release of about 237,000 gallons of gasoline into a creek that 

flowed through Whatcom Falls Park. The gasoline ignited, sending 

a fireball about 1.5 miles down the creek, which took the lives of 

two 10-year-old boys, Stephen Tsiorvas and Wade King, and an 18- 

year-old young man, Liam Wood. Eight additional injuries were 

documented. A single-family residence and the city of Bellingham’s 

water treatment plant were severely damaged. 

According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

which investigated the accident, a number of events and conditions 

set the stage for the June 10, 1999 rupture. First, IMCO General 

Construction, Inc. damaged the pipeline in the vicinity of the rupture during excavation activities related to the construction of a 

nearby water treatment plant. The NTSB found that had the pipeVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:07 Jun 11, 2009 Jkt 079008 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR144P1.XXX HR144P1

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line not been weakened by the excavation damage, it would have 

been able to withstand the pressure that occurred on the day of the 

rupture, and the accident would not have happened. Although the 

damage was detected during subsequent in-line inspections of the 

pipeline in 1996 and 1997, Olympic did not excavate and inspect 

the pipeline to repair the damage. 

Second, during construction of the Bayview products terminal, 

pressure relief valves were installed that were found to be improperly configured or adjusted, and the actions taken by the company 

to test and correct the valve settings were ineffective. When the 

Bayview terminal came on line about six months before the accident, controllers discovered operational issues that they believed 

resulted from the proximity of the Bayview terminal to a previously 

existing pumping station. The controllers said they did not believe 

they were adequately trained or otherwise prepared to deal with 

these operational issues. The controllers reported these issues, but 

they were never corrected. Finally, on the day of the accident, the 

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system that 

controllers used to operate the pipeline became unresponsive, making it difficult for controllers to analyze pipeline conditions and 

make timely responses to operational problems. 

As a result of Olympic Pipe Line’s failures, the Department of 

Transportation’s (DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration announced that it was seeking a $3.05 million penalty 

against the pipeline operator. According to the press release: 

Today we are seeking the largest civil penalty in the history of our pipeline safety program. In cases like this, 

where a pipeline operator fails to take appropriate actions 

to ensure safety, we will penalize the company to the fullest extent possible to ensure full compliance with federal 

safety rules. 

Five years later, DOT settled the fine for $250,000, a 92 percent 

reduction. 

The tragedy did, however, lead to the creation of the Pipeline 

Safety Trust, a safety organization based on the efforts and recommendations of SAFE Bellingham and the families of the children 

who were killed in the 1999 explosion. On June 18, 2003, a U.S. 

district court judge ordered that $4 million of Olympic Pipe Line’s 

criminal fines imposed as a result of the Bellingham tragedy be 

awarded as an endowment to fund the Pipeline Safety Trust. Since 

that time, the Pipeline Safety Trust has worked with Congress, 

safety advocates, the industry, and the public to enhance pipeline 

safety for the betterment of communities and a healthier environment. 

A year after the Bellingham accident, on August 19, 2000, another serious accident occurred on a natural gas transmission pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company near Carlsbad, 

New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. 

Twelve persons who were camping near the pipeline were killed 

and their three vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension 

bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were also extensively 

damaged. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the 

rupture and subsequent fire was a significant reduction in pipe 

wall thickness due to severe internal corrosion. The severe corroVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:07 Jun 11, 2009 Jkt 079008 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR144P1.XXX HR144P1

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sion had occurred because El Paso’s corrosion control and pipeline 

inspection program failed to prevent, detect, or control internal corrosion within the pipeline. 

Although most shipments of natural gas and liquid petroleum 

move through the pipeline system safely and without incident on 

a daily basis, pipeline accidents, such as the accidents in Bellingham and Carlsbad, are not isolated events. According to the 

Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), which now oversees the safety of the nation’s 2.2 million 

miles of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, 2,888 significant pipeline incidents occurred between 1999–2008, resulting in 173 fatalities, 632 injuries, and $2.7 billion in property damage. However, 

pipelines generally have a better safety record (deaths, injuries, 

fires/explosions) than other modes of transportation. For example, 

compared to the pipeline record, there are 87 times more oil transport truck-related deaths, 35 times more oil transport truck-related 

fires/explosions, and twice as many oil transport truck-related injuries. 

In 2002, Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act 

of 2002 (P.L. 107–355), which addressed many of the concerns that 

were raised following the Bellingham and Carlsbad accidents. The 

bill provided for State enforcement of the one-call notification program; increased penalties for violations of safety standards; required the development of qualification programs for employees 

who perform sensitive tasks; strengthened pipeline testing requirements; established a public education program for communities 

that live around pipelines; required government mapping of the 

pipeline system; and enhanced whistleblower protections. 

In 2006, Congress furthered pipeline safety by enacting the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act (PIPES 

Act) (P.L. 109–468). 

The PIPES Act required DOT to issue a rule ensuring that all 

low-stress hazardous liquid pipelines are subject to the same standards and regulations as other hazardous liquid pipelines. It also 

strengthened DOT’s enforcement by increasing the number of Federal pipeline safety inspectors from 90 to 100 in 2007, 111 in fiscal 

year 2008, 123 in fiscal year 2009, and 135 in fiscal year 2010— 

a 50 percent increase in inspectors by 2010. 

The PIPES Act also strengthened PHMSA’s authority to order 

pipeline operators to take corrective action to remedy a condition 

that poses a threat to public safety, property, or the environment. 

It strengthened the DOT’s authority to help facilitate the restoration of pipeline operations during manmade or natural disasters, 

and it required implementation of a number of NTSB recommendations regarding worker training, fatigue, the installation of excess 

flow valves, and standards for SCADA systems. 

In addition, the PIPES Act required operators of natural gas distribution pipelines to implement a pipeline integrity management 

program with the same or similar integrity management elements 

as the hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines. 

Distribution pipelines make up 1.8 million miles of the 2.2 million 

miles of pipelines in the United States. They distribute gas to local 

towns, businesses, and homes, and are responsible for the majority 

of pipeline deaths and injuries. 


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To increase accountability among pipeline operators and their 

senior executives, the PIPES Act required the certification and signature of annual and semi-annual pipeline integrity management 

program performance reports by a senior executive officer of the 

company operating the pipeline. In addition, the PIPES Act increased transparency by requiring monthly public summaries of all 

gas and hazardous liquid pipeline enforcement actions taken by the 

DOT, and required the Secretary to review incident reporting requirements for operators of natural gas pipelines to ensure that the 

data collected is accurate. 

Despite these significant measures, much work remains. It has 

been more than two years since enactment of the PIPES Act and 

DOT has not implemented many of the statutory mandates required by the legislation. The list of regulations required by the 

PIPES Act that have not been issued by PHMSA includes the following: 

• final regulations for low-stress hazardous liquid pipelines; 

• regulations prescribing minimum standards for integrity management programs for distribution pipelines and the use of excess 

flow valves; 

• regulations requiring pipeline operators to develop and implement a human factors management plan designed to reduce risks 

associated with human factors, including fatigue; and 

• regulations implementing the NTSB’s SCADA recommendations. 

With regard to security, the PIPES Act required the DOT Inspector General to conduct an assessment of the actions taken to implement the annex to the memorandum of understanding between the 

DOT and the Department of Homeland Security relating to pipeline 

security. 

On May 21, 2008, the DOT Inspector General released the results of the assessment, entitled ‘‘Actions Needed to Enhance Pipeline Security,’’ which found that PHMSA and the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) have taken initial steps toward formulating an action plan to implement the provisions of the annex; 

however, further actions are needed because the current situation 

is far from an ‘‘end state’’ for enhancing the security of the nation’s 

pipeline system. 

The Committee intends to hold further hearings on the implementation of the PIPES Act and to continue to promote pipeline 

safety. 

SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION

H. Res. 484 expresses support for the designation of June 10th 

as ‘‘National Pipeline Safety Day’’; encourages state and local governments, safety groups, industry, and other pipeline stakeholders 

to promote pipeline safety; and urges individuals across the nation 

to become more aware of the pipelines that run through their communities, and to take appropriate safety measures to prevent damage to underground pipelines. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On June 25, 2008, the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 

Hazardous Materials held a hearing on Implementation of the 


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Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 

2006. 

On May 21, 2009, Congressman Rick Larsen introduced H. Res. 

484, expressing support for designation of June 10th as ‘‘National 

Pipeline Safety Day’’. 

On June 4, 2009, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure met in open session to consider H. Res. 484. The Committee ordered H. Res. 484 reported favorably to the House by 

voice vote with a quorum present. 

RECORD VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires each committee report to include the total number of 

votes cast for and against on each record vote on a motion to report 

and on any amendment offered to the measure or matter, and the 

names of those members voting for and against. There were no recorded votes taken in connection with consideration of H. Res. 484 

or ordering the resolution reported. A motion to order H. Res. 484 

reported favorably to the House was agreed to by voice vote with 

a quorum present. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of 

the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee’s oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in this report. 

COST OF LEGISLATION

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of 

the Rules of the House of Representatives, H. Res. 484 is a resolution of the House of Representatives, and therefore does not have 

the force of law. As such, there is no cost associated with this resolution for fiscal year 2009, or for any fiscal year thereafter. 

COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XIII

1. With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and section 308(a) of 

the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee advises that 

the resolution contains no measure that authorizes funding, so no 

comparison of the total estimated funding level for the relevant 

programs to the appropriate levels under current law is required. 

2. With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the resolution contains no measure that authorizes funding, so no statement of general performance goals and objectives for 

any measure that authorizes funding is required. 

3. With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee advises that the 

resolution contains no measure that authorizes funding, so no cost 

estimate nor comparison for any measure that authorizes funding 

is required. 


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COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XXI

Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 

Representatives, H. Res. 484 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

With respect to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, H. Res. 484 is a resolution of the House 

of Representatives, and therefore does not have the force of law. As 

such, clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII does not apply. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

H. Res. 484 contains no federal mandates. 

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the 

report of any Committee on a bill or joint resolution to include a 

statement on the extent to which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state, local, or tribal law. The Committee states 

that H. Res. 484 does not preempt any state, local, or tribal law. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act are created by this resolution. 

APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the resolution does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (P.L. 104–1). 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

H. Res. 484 makes no changes in existing law. 

Æ 


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