Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

IRAQI REFUGEE 

ASSISTANCE 

Improvements Needed 

in Measuring Progress, 

Assessing Needs, 

Tracking Funds, and 

Developing an 

International Strategic 

Plan 

April 2009 

GAO-09-120 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2009

IRAQI REFUGEE ASSISTANCE 

Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, 

Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing

Highlights of GAO-09-120, a report to an International Strategic Plan 

congressional committees. 

Iraqi refugees are one of the largest 

urban populations the UN has been 

called on to assist. The UN reports 

government estimates of up to 4.8 

million Iraqis displaced within the 

last 5 years, with 2 million fleeing, 

primarily to Syria and Jordan. 

GAO examined challenges in (1) 

measuring and monitoring progress 

in achieving U.S. goals for assisting 

Iraqi refugees, (2) providing 

humanitarian assistance to Iraqi 

refugees, (3) offering solutions for 

Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing 

an international strategic plan to 

address the Iraqi refugee situation. 

 

GAO analyzed reports and data; 

met with officials from the U.S. 

government, the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), international 

organizations, and NGOs; and did 

fieldwork in Jordan and Syria. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of State, with relevant 

others, (1) develop performance 

measures to assess and report 

progress in achieving overall U.S. 

goals and objectives for Iraqi 

refugees; (2) track and report 

funding apportioned, obligated, and 

expended for Iraqi refugee 

programs in each host country; 

(3) assess the number and needs of 

Iraqi refugees and the related needs 

of countries hosting them; and 

(4) develop a comprehensive 

international strategy for 

assistance and solutions for Iraqi 

refugees. The Department of State 

generally concurred with our 

recommendations. 

To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily 

funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing partners, which include 

international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). These 

activities provided Iraqi refugees and host country populations with 

education, vocational training, health care, food, and financial support. 

However, State did not clearly link program achievements to its stated goal 

and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has limited information to 

assess and report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve 

program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor projects, 

difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable 

data have challenged State’s efforts to ensure that projects help the intended 

beneficiaries. 

U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi 

refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of reliable 

estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the funding targeted at 

Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live interspersed among the local urban 

populations and are not easily identified. Official government estimates on the 

number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult 

to determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs 

because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and 

multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee programs 

separately from that provided for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for 

Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred 

solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to return. 

According to the International Organization for Migration, the Iraqi 

government has cited improvements in security and offered financial 

incentives to returning refugee families. Although another solution is 

integration and settlement in host countries, Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi 

refugees “guests” who should return to Iraq once the security situation 

improves. The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees 

under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in 

the United States in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. 

According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the 

international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to 

address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated 

Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international 

community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the international 

community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of the needs of 

vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host them. Second, State, 

UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may 

affect assistance efforts. Third, the international community has lacked a 

coordination mechanism that involves all stakeholders. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-120. 

For more information, contact Joseph A. 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 7 

Iraqis Benefit from Assistance, but State Has Not Measured 

Progress in Meeting Its Overall Goals, and State and Its Partners 

Face Monitoring Challenges 10 

Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. 

and UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees 22 

The U.S. Government and UNHCR Face Challenges in Offering 

Permanent Solutions for Iraqi Refugees 28 

Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has 

Hindered Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees 35 

Conclusion 41 

Recommendations for Executive Action 41 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42 

Appendix I Special Immigrant Visa Programs 47 

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 52 

Appendix III Status of U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned 

to Iraq-Related Humanitarian Assistance, and 

Intended Beneficiaries, as of September 30, 2008 55 

Appendix IV U.S. Contributions to UNHCR Appeals for 

Iraq-Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended 

Beneficiaries, Calendar Years 2003 through 2008 57 

Appendix V Individual Iraqi Refugee Beneficiaries of UNHCR 

Assistance in Syria and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008 59 

Page i GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI Comments from the Department of State 60 

Appendix VII Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 71 

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 72 

Tables 

Table 1: Iraqi Refugees Registered with UNHCR and Neighboring 

Host Government Estimates of Iraqi Refugees, as Reported 

by UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008 23 

Table 2: U.S. Government Iraqi Refugee Processing and Admissions 

under USRAP, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 31 

Table 3: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement Departures by Country of 

Resettlement, Calendar Years 2007 through 2008, as of 

September 30, 2008 34 

Table 4: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqi and Afghan 

Translators/Interpreters and Their Dependents, under 

Section 1059, as of September 30, 2008 49 

Table 5: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqis and Afghans 

and Their Dependents, under Section 1244, as of 

September 30, 2008 50 

Figures 

Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees 8 

Figure 2: Types of Assistance Provided to Iraqi Refugees and 

Vulnerable Host Country Populations 12 

Figure 3: Outreach Volunteer Conducting a Home Visit in Jordan 13 

Figure 4: PRM-Funded Clinic in Syria 14 

Figure 5: Comparison of State Department 2008 Performance 

Management Procedures for Iraqi Refugee Assistance 

with Leading Results-Oriented Management Practices 16 

Page ii GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Abbreviations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

IDP internally displaced person 

IOM International Organization for Migration 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OPE overseas processing entity 

PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

SARC Syrian Arab Red Crescent 

SIV special immigrant visa 

UN United Nations 

UNDP United Nations Development Program 

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

USRAP United States Refugee Admissions Program 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page iii GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

April 21, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

According to the United Nations (UN), Iraqi refugees represent one of the 

largest urban refugee populations the organization has been called upon to 

assist and pose an unprecedented burden on the countries hosting them. 

The UN reports that regional governments estimate that over the last 5 

years about 4.8 million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes in 

search of safety, with about 2 million fleeing to neighboring countries, 

primarily Syria and Jordan. According to the Department of State (State), 

because of its unique role in Iraq, the United States has recognized the 

need to take the lead in mitigating the effects of this humanitarian crisis. 

GAO is assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect and assist Iraqi 

refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). In this report, we 

examine challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving 

U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian 

assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and 

(4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee 

situation.1

 In addition, we reviewed the progress made in implementing 

special immigrant visa programs for Iraqis, which may also benefit some 

refugees but are not designed specifically for them (see app. I). We plan a 

subsequent review that will examine challenges faced in assisting 

internally displaced Iraqis. Because of broad congressional interest in the 

U.S. engagement in Iraq, we are completing this report under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own 

initiative. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed reports and data 

from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), other UN 

agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), 

and research institutes. During our fieldwork in Washington, D.C., we met 

with officials from State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions, and special immigrant 

 

1

As part of our methodology, we limited our fieldwork to Syria and Jordan, which reported 

hosting significantly more refugees than other neighboring countries, such as Lebanon, 

Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf States. 

Page 1 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

visa programs and the challenges they have encountered. We also met with 

research institutions and NGOs and held discussion groups with NGOs 

conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq to discuss strategic planning 

and program implementation challenges. Through our fieldwork in 

Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; and Damascus, Syria, 

we met with officials from the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi 

governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella agencies, including the 

World Food Program and IOM; international and local NGOs; and research 

institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we held discussion groups 

with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations, needs, 

assistance received, and challenges encountered. We toured and observed 

assistance projects and activities in resettlement processing centers. We 

analyzed U.S. funding, refugee admissions, and visa data, and found the 

data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Appendix II 

contains a more detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State 

primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing partners, 

which include international organizations and NGOs.2

 These State-funded 

activities provided Iraqi refugees and the populations of the countries that 

host them with primary education, vocational training, health care, 

psychosocial services, distribution of food and household items, and 

financial support, among other efforts. However, based on our review of 

State’s assessment of progress in fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to 

determine the extent to which State achieved its overall goal and 

Results in Brief 

 

2

According to State officials, its international organization partners include UNHCR, the 

World Health Organization, the World Food Program, IOM, the International Federation of 

the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the United Nations Children’s Fund. For 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008, State officials said that they had 9 and 11 NGO partners 

implementing their program, respectively. 

Page 2 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

objectives.3 For example, State reported on a number of individual 

projects but did not specifically measure these accomplishments against 

benchmarks or report how these project-level accomplishments helped 

State achieve its overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, 

State has limited information to judge progress in reaching its goal and 

objectives for Iraqi refugee programs and improve effectiveness. Assessing 

progress is complicated by difficulties State confronts in overseeing 

refugee projects that it funds in Jordan and Syria—the countries with the 

largest number of Iraqi refugees. Insufficient quantity of staff to monitor 

projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the lack 

of reliable data on education and health needs have hindered State’s 

efforts to ensure that projects are helping the intended beneficiaries. For 

example, in April 2008, State reported that UNHCR was able to effectively 

monitor approximately 40 to 59 percent of its implementing partners in 

Jordan. In November 2008, State officials reported that the refugee 

coordinator did not complete annual reviews of UNHCR programs in Syria 

and Lebanon because of difficulties getting into each country as a result of 

visa and security restrictions. In Jordan and Syria, difficulty obtaining 

reliable data for the education and health sectors has hindered UN efforts 

to monitor progress. 

U.S. and international efforts to effectively provide humanitarian 

assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by two 

key factors—the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees 

and data on the funding targeted toward Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi 

refugees mostly live interspersed among the local urban populations 

which has made them difficult to identify. First, official government 

estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be 

overstated. Jordan and Syria, with the largest reported numbers of Iraqi 

refugees, estimate 450,000 to 500,000 and 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 Iraqi 

refugees, respectively, in their countries. In contrast, UNHCR reported 

officially registering 54,411 Iraqis in Jordan and 221,506 Iraqis in Syria, as 

of September 30, 2008. Neither country has enabled an independent and 

comprehensive survey of refugees to be undertaken, asserting that 

 

3

State’s 2008 goal was to maintain basic humanitarian assistance and protection for Iraqi 

refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Its regional objectives were to meet the assistance 

and protection needs of refugees and other conflict victims through expanded engagement 

and funding of international and NGO partners; contribute to regional stability by 

channeling humanitarian assistance through primary international organization partners; 

promote UNHCR to achieve solutions for Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees; and ensure greater 

burden sharing among donors, including the Iraqi government. 

Page 3 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

assistance should not be targeted toward Iraqi refugees while they have 

vulnerable populations that need help. As a result, both countries have 

based requests for international assistance primarily on the health and 

education needs of their citizens rather than on the numbers of Iraqi 

refugees residing there. Accordingly, the U.S. government and the UN have 

included the needs of both Iraqi refugees and host country populations in 

their Iraqi refugee programs. Second, it is difficult to determine the 

amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. 

government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding 

sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from 

that provided for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance.4

 For fiscal years 

2003 through 2008, the U.S. government made available about $1.6 billion 

and spent about $1.2 billion for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. 

UNHCR funding appeals for calendar years 2003 through 2008 totaled 

about $730 million and resulted in about $542 million in contributions for 

its Iraq Operation, which, in addition to Iraqi refugees, also included 

internally displaced Iraqis and other vulnerable populations in Iraq and 

host countries. The United States contributed about $316 million, or about 

58 percent, of these UNHCR contributions. According to State, all 

multilateral and bilateral donations from other countries met only a 

fraction of the needs inside and out of Iraq. Representatives of donor 

countries raised concerns regarding the uncertain number of Iraqi 

refugees and the extent of their needs and noted that the lack of objective 

and complete information made it difficult to garner support for funding. 

Some also stated that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi 

humanitarian crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the 

refugees are its citizens, should bear most of the costs. Although in 2007 

the Iraqi government pledged and later transferred $25 million to support 

the assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is unclear 

whether Iraq plans to provide additional funds to support Iraqi refugees. 

Iraqi officials stated that the government is reluctant to fund programs for 

Iraqi refugees because improving refugee conditions in neighboring 

countries may discourage refugees from returning to Iraq. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for 

Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the 

preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to 

 

4

Iraq-related humanitarian assistance funding includes that for Iraqi refugees and 

vulnerable populations of neighboring countries hosting them; internally displaced Iraqis; 

vulnerable populations in Iraq; refugees in Iraq, such as Palestinians; and other conflict 

victims. 

Page 4 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

return. According to IOM, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in 

security and offered financial incentives (about 1 million Iraqi dinars) to 

returning refugee families. However, according to UNHCR, refugees fear 

leaving the safety of their host countries for the uncertain environment in 

Iraq, and there is no clear trend on the number of Iraqis returning to or 

leaving their country. According to the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may 

be returning, but this may be due to increasing hardship in their host 

countries rather than improvements in Iraq. Although another solution is 

integration and settlement in host countries, both Syria and Jordan 

consider Iraqi refugees “guests” who should return to Iraq once the 

security situation improves. In Syria and Jordan, difficulties in renewing 

visas, a lack of funds, and limited access to employment and public 

services affect Iraqi refugees’ decisions to stay or return to Iraq. According 

to Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither government 

anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to UNHCR, Syria and 

Jordan are determined not to establish arrangements that might lead to 

permanent residence, such as officially allowing employment of Iraqi 

refugees. Resettlement to a third country is another option, but a limited 

number of countries resettle refugees, according to UNHCR, and less than 

1 percent of registered refugees worldwide are resettled in third countries, 

according to State. The U.S. government has made progress in resettling 

Iraqi refugees to the United States under its U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program, established in February 2007. In 2007, the U.S. government 

admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees but did not achieve State’s own expectation 

of resettling 2,000 to 3,000 refugees under the program. However, the U.S. 

government surpassed its fiscal year 2008 goal of 12,000 with the 

admission of 13,823 Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, as of September 

30, 2008, other countries resettled a total of 5,852 refugees in calendar 

years 2007 and 2008. 

According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the 

international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to 

address the Iraqi refugee situation.5

 Although the international community 

has recognized the need to strategically plan for the Iraqi refugee situation, 

it has focused on the crisis within Iraq and annual planning efforts while 

deferring strategic planning for the refugee situation. Although the 2009 

UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region showed significant 

 

5

A strategic plan should contain strategic or long-term goals that cover a period of not less 

than 5 years from the year it is submitted and should be updated and revised at least every 

3 years. 

Page 5 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

progress in strategic planning, the UN and the international community 

continue to lack a longer-term approach. According to NGOs, the lack of 

an international strategy has hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi 

refugees in Syria and Jordan. First, the international community lacks a 

comprehensive independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi 

refugees and the economically vulnerable populations that host them. 

Host countries’ unwillingness to enable these assessments impedes 

strategic planning efforts. Without these assessments, it is difficult to 

determine the scope of the problem and to appropriately prioritize and 

align resources to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Second, State, 

UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may 

affect assistance efforts. For example, according to NGOs, the annual 

budget focus of UNHCR and key donor countries, including the United 

States, makes it difficult for them to conduct longer-term planning because 

they do not know whether their efforts will be funded from one year to the 

next. Thus, they may focus on shorter-term efforts in lieu of more effective 

long-term efforts. Third, the international community has lacked a 

coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders—including the 

governments hosting refugees, international organizations, NGOs, and the 

donor community—that would help ensure effective delivery of 

assistance. For example, NGOs in Jordan cited duplication of efforts and 

competition for beneficiaries as impeding progress in helping Iraqi 

refugees. NGOs cited the need for international strategic planning to use 

resources efficiently and address coordination difficulties. 

In this report, we make several recommendations. First, we recommend 

that the Secretary of State develop performance measures to assess and 

report progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees. 

Performance goals, objectives, and measures should clearly and 

transparently address the extent to which programs should target Iraqi 

refugees and host government populations. Second, we recommend that 

the Secretary of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) Administrator develop systems to separately track and report 

funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi refugee programs 

in each host country, to the extent practicable. Third, we recommend that 

the Secretary of State work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, 

Syria, and other relevant host governments to expedite efforts to conduct 

independent comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi 

refugees and the related needs of the countries hosting them. Fourth, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. 

agencies and in coordination with the donor community, work with 

UNHCR and the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and other relevant 

host governments, to build on the efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated 

Page 6 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

Appeal for Iraq and the Region and develop a comprehensive international 

strategy for providing assistance and solutions for Iraqi refugees. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, State generally agreed with 

each of our recommendations and noted aspects that the department 

believes might be difficult to implement. USAID commented that our 

recommendation regarding tracking and reporting USAID funding was 

resolved. However, we continue to believe that additional action is 

needed. State’s and USAID’s written comments and our evaluation of 

those comments are discussed in detail later in this report. State, DHS, and 

UNHCR provided technical comments, which we incorporated where 

appropriate. 

According to IOM, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara in 

February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that increased the number of 

displaced Iraqis. Although military operations, crime, and general 

insecurity remained factors, sectarian violence became the primary driver 

for population displacement.6

 As displayed in figure 1, many Iraqis fled 

their country and immigrated to neighboring countries, particularly to 

Syria and Jordan. 

Background 

 

6

IOM, Iraq Displacement & Return; 2008 Mid-year Review.

Page 7 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees 

According to UNHCR, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 

Refugees and its 1967 Protocol provide the foundation for modern refugee 

protection. According to the Convention, a refugee is someone who, 

“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 

opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to 

such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country....” 

Page 8 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 

0 500 miles

Sources: GAO, based on maps from UNHCR; Map Resources (map).

Flow of Iraqi refugees

Disputed borders

Europe

Turkey

Greece Cyprus

Egypt

Jordan

Israel

Lebanon

Armenia Azerbaijan

Georgia

Kuwait

Gulf States

IRAQ Islamic

Republic

of

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Uzbekistan

Syrian 

Arab 

Republic
 

The 1951 Convention does not apply to persons who have committed 

crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. UNHCR 

recognizes and registers as refugees both those persons who fall within 

the 1951 Convention criteria and those falling within the extended 

definition of persons fleeing generalized armed conflict or civil unrest. 

Registration allows UNHCR to identify Iraqis in need of protection, offer 

them assistance, and screen them for possible resettlement. According to 

the UN, of the countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the Middle East, only 

Turkey, Egypt, and Iran are parties to the 1951 Convention. Syria and 

Jordan, the two countries hosting the largest number of Iraqi refugees, 

have not signed the 1951 Convention. As a result, according to the UN, 

although the refugees have been able to access public services, they have 

not been able to obtain legal employment and may face deportation if they 

do not comply with visa requirements, which have become more 

restrictive over the years.7

 According to UNHCR, the identification, 

registration, intervention in detention and deportation, and monitoring of 

access to asylum are important UNHCR functions for refugees. 

UNHCR coordinates the provision and delivery of shelter, food, water, 

sanitation, and medical care to refugees throughout the world. UNHCR is 

also mandated to find solutions to the plight of refugees. According to 

UNHCR, three solutions are available:8

• First, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution for the majority of 

refugees. Most refugees prefer to return home as soon as circumstances 

permit (generally when a conflict has ended and a degree of stability has 

been restored). UNHCR promotes, supports, and facilitates voluntary 

repatriation as the best solution for displaced people, provided it is safe 

and reintegration is viable. 

• Second, UNHCR may help refugees integrate and settle in the “asylum,” or 

host, country where they reside as refugees. Some refugees cannot or are 

unwilling to return because they would face persecution. According to 

UNHCR, relatively few countries allow refugees to settle. 

 

7

According to the UN, Syria has no domestic legislative framework securing the rights of 

Iraqi refugees and most Iraqis are issued 1- to 3-month residence permits, with a minority 

being granted 1- to 2-year resident permits or permits covering a school year. According to 

the UN, in Jordan all Iraqis and others that are permitted to enter are allowed to stay for 3 

months in accordance with the Law on the Residence of Foreigners. In May 2008, Jordan 

announced that all Iraqis must obtain a visa prior to arrival. 

8

UNHCR, Protecting Refugees & the Role of UNHCR, 2007-2008 (Geneva). 

Page 9 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

• Third, UNHCR may assist refugees in permanently resettling in third 

countries. According to UNHCR, only a small number of nations take part 

in UNHCR resettlement programs worldwide and accept annual quotas of 

refugees. According to State, historically, less than 1 percent of registered 

refugees are resettled in third countries. 

Within the U.S. government, the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has primary responsibility for 

formulating U.S. foreign policy on population issues, protection and 

assistance to refugees and conflict victims, and international migration. It 

also administers U.S. refugee assistance and admission programs. In this 

capacity, PRM has the lead role within the department in responding to 

complex humanitarian emergencies around the world and in working to 

resolve protracted refugee situations. According to State, to protect and 

assist Iraqi refugees, PRM works closely with regional bureaus, U.S. 

embassies, and U.S. missions to provide guidance to its international 

organization and NGO implementing partners and to engage with other 

donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees. PRM primarily 

implements its U.S. humanitarian assistance goals for Iraqi refugees by 

funding and monitoring international organization and nongovernmental 

organization projects. USAID also provides some humanitarian assistance 

that benefits Iraqi refugees, but according to State and USAID, most of its 

programs focus on efforts within Iraq. PRM is also responsible for 

managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Within this 

program, DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is 

responsible for interviewing refugees and adjudicating their applications 

for resettlement in the United States. 

The Department of State and its international partners, including UN 

agencies and NGOs, have funded and implemented a number of programs 

and projects that benefit Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. However, 

although State has established a broad goal and objectives for its 2008 

efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, it did not establish performance 

measures for assessing progress in achieving them. In addition, State and 

its implementing partners face challenges in monitoring their Iraqi refugee 

assistance projects. 

Iraqis Benefit from 

Assistance, but State 

Has Not Measured 

Progress in Meeting 

Its Overall Goals, and 

State and Its Partners 

Face Monitoring 

Challenges 

Page 10 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

To implement its goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily 

funds and monitors the activities of its implementing partners, which 

include international organizations and NGOs.9

 According to State, U.S. 

funding through these organizations has supported the most vulnerable 

refugees and host country populations. UNHCR, other international 

humanitarian organizations, and NGO partners provided education, health 

care, food, financial assistance, and other assistance to Iraqi refugees and 

vulnerable host country populations (see fig. 2). 

State Department and UN 

Fund Assistance to 

Support Iraqi Refugees 

 

9

According to State officials, its international organization partners include UNHCR, the 

World Health Organization, the World Food Program, IOM, the International Federation of 

the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the United Nations Children’s Fund. For 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008, State officials stated that they had 9 and 11 NGO partners 

implementing their program, respectively. 

Page 11 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

Figure 2: Types of Assistance Provided to Iraqi Refugees and Vulnerable Host Country Populations 

Rice

$

Sources: GAO analysis of Department of State and UNHCR data; GAO (photo); Nova Development (clip art); Map Resources (map).

 U.S. government and other 

international funding

Medical 

assistance 

Legal 

protection 

Food

Nonfood 

items

Vocational 

training 

Financial 

assistance 

Education 

Shelter 

Psychosocial 

services

UNHCR, other international 

humanitarian organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations

Nongovernmental 

organizations

 Organizations provide assistance to 

Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host 

populations through direct 

implementation of projects or 

implementing partners

Beneficiaries

Types of assistance provided 

Page 12 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

For example, in Syria, UNHCR and the World Food Program provided food 

rations and nonfood items such as mattresses, blankets, and household 

items to Iraqi refugees. Additionally, in Syria and Jordan, UNHCR provided 

monthly cash assistance primarily to vulnerable Iraqi refugees, including 

single female heads of households. In Syria, for example, the heads of 

households received approximately $100 per month, with an additional 

$10 for each dependent. Appendix V provides more details on the number 

of Iraqis who benefited from UNHCR assistance in 2008. 

In terms of health care, we visited a clinic in Jordan, funded through the 

State Department’s PRM bureau, which assisted Iraqi refugees, and met 

with outreach workers. According to the program manager, the project 

provided health care to Iraqis and stipends for some Iraqi women 

conducting community outreach. (See fig. 3, showing an Iraqi volunteer 

conducting outreach.) 

Figure 3: Outreach Volunteer Conducting a Home Visit in Jordan 

Source: International Relief and Development.

Page 13 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

In Syria, we visited another PRM-funded project that provided medical 

assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host country populations (see 

fig. 4). According to the program manager, the clinic provided primary 

health care, child health screening, chronic noncommunicable disease 

care, maternal health care, and health education. We toured the pharmacy, 

the dental unit, and the laboratory where basic tests are performed. 

Figure 4: PRM-Funded Clinic in Syria 

Source: GAO.

At another NGO project site in Syria, we visited a summer school program 

for Iraqi refugee children. According to the program manager, in addition 

to the academic lessons provided in Arabic, English, math, and science, 

Iraqi students participate in summer camp activities. During our visit, we 

observed children participating in various camp activities, including arts 

and crafts and a musical production. According to the program manager, 

all of the participants were Iraqi children. He also stated that the children 

received meals while attending the activities. The program manager stated 

that these activities were designed to promote the Iraqi students’ 

emotional and social well-being. 

Page 14 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

It is difficult to determine the progress of U.S. efforts to assist and protect 

Iraqi refugees because State’s 2008 goal and regional objectives were 

broad and difficult to measure. In addition, State did not have 

corresponding performance measures that clearly linked the achievements 

of its Iraqi refugee activities to progress in meeting its overall 2008 goal 

and objectives for Iraqi refugees. Prior GAO work suggests that leading 

organizations promote accountability by establishing results-oriented 

goals and corresponding performance measures by which to gauge 

progress. Measuring performance allows organizations to track the 

progress they are making toward their goals and give managers crucial 

information on which to base their organizational and management 

decisions.10 Figure 5 provides more information on State’s 2008 

performance management efforts for Iraqi refugee assistance compared 

with leading results-oriented practices. 

The State Department Has 

Not Linked Progress to 

Overall Goals and 

Objectives 

 

10Government Performance and Results Act principles include setting strategic goals, 

measuring performance, and reporting on the degree to which goals were met. See GAO, 

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results 

Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

Page 15 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

Figure 5: Comparison of State Department 2008 Performance Management Procedures for Iraqi Refugee Assistance with 

Leading Results-Oriented Management Practices 

Establish program goals and 

objectives

Establish performance measures to 

assess progress

YES, State established program goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees

and efforts within Iraq.

Goals:

• Maintain humanitarian assistance and protection for Iraqi refugees

• Within Iraq, support assistance and protection programs for non-Iraqi 

refugees

• Within Iraq, support international organization programs to assist and 

protect returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict victims

Regional objectives:

• Meet the assistance and protection needs of refugees and other 

conflict victims through expanded engagement and funding of

international and nongovernmental organization partners

• Contribute to regional stability by channeling humanitarian 

assistance through primary international organization partners

• Promote UNHCR to achieve solutions for non-Iraqi and Iraqi refugees

• Ensure greater burden sharing among donors, including the Iraqi 

government

NO, State did not develop performance measures to assess progress toward 

its goals and objectives for Iraqi refugee efforts. Instead, State measured 

global humanitarian assistance and protection efforts, but these global 

performance measures were not linked to Iraq-specific program goals and 

objectives.

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

State’s 2008 proceduresa Leading results-oriented 

management practices

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Collect data on performance

Analyze data and report results

Adjust program goals and objectives

to improve program efficiency and 

effectiveness

NO, State did not collect and compare performance data against established 

performance measures for its goals and objectives. 

NO, State did not analyze performance data and report results. State 

prepared a descriptive report of partners' accomplishments but no 

assessment of how these accomplishments helped achieve State's goals

and objectives for Iraqi refugees. 

NO, Without linkage between partners’ accomplishments and State’s overall

 goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it was difficult to assess progress

 and identify ways to improve program efficiency and effectiveness.

Information lacking

Information flow

?

a

Department of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Policy and Implementation 

Paper for Iraq Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) for FY 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

11, 2008). 

Page 16 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

As shown in figure 5, State established a goal and objectives for its 2008 

efforts concerning Iraqi refugee efforts as part of its overall goals and 

objectives for its efforts to assist refugees, internally displaced persons, 

and other conflict victims.11 However, on the basis of our review of State’s 

assessment of progress achieved in fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to 

determine the extent to which State achieved its overall goal and 

objectives.12 Although State reported progress achieved in 2008 by sector 

and at the country level,13 it did not aggregate these data to demonstrate 

how these activities that it funded helped State meet its overall goal of 

assisting and protecting Iraqi refugees. Similarly, State did not develop 

corresponding performance measures and milestones, nor did it compile 

and aggregate the data it needed to assess and report on its progress in 

achieving its objectives to expand engagement through funding of NGOs 

and international organizations, contribute to regional security by 

channeling humanitarian assistance through primary international 

organization partners, promote UNHCR to achieve solutions for Iraqi 

refugees, or ensure greater burden sharing. 

State measures PRM’s bureauwide progress for humanitarian assistance at 

the global level, but this effort does not include specific performance 

measures for assessing progress toward its goal and objectives for Iraqi 

refugees. According to State officials, the goal and objectives for Iraqi 

refugees are in line with the PRM bureau’s overall humanitarian response 

strategic goal for fiscal year 2008 and with its performance goals for global 

refugee protection, solutions, and assistance. State officials said that 

progress on its global efforts is measured through bureauwide indicators, 

including acute malnutrition and crude mortality rates. Similarly, progress 

on protection efforts by PRM partners is measured at the global level 

through performance relating to “non-refoulement,” as reported in 

 

11In addition to its goal to maintain humanitarian assistance and protection for Iraqi 

refugees, State’s PRM established two goals for its efforts within Iraq to (1) support 

assistance and protection programs for non-Iraqi refugees while pursuing opportunities to 

resettle or temporarily relocate these refugees to safe havens where they can be processed 

for resettlement or repatriation and (2) support UNHCR and International Committee of 

the Red Cross programs to assist and protect returning refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims 

and develop policy and assistance frameworks for refugee and IDP returns. PRM’s 

objectives apply to all three goals. 

12The Fiscal Year 2009 Policy and Program Review Committee paper outlines State’s goals 

and objectives for fiscal year 2009 and provides a review of performance in fiscal year 2008. 

13Sectors include humanitarian assistance, protection, education, water and sanitation, and 

health, among others. 

Page 17 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

UNHCR’s annual protection reports.14 However, these indicators are not 

generally applicable to specific programs targeting Iraqi refugees. 

According to State, global acute malnutrition, for example, is used as a 

proxy of the overall health and well-being of a population. PRM monitors 

situations where more than 10 percent of refugee children are suffering 

from wasting;15 where this occurs, high malnutrition levels indicate a 

serious humanitarian crisis. However, according to State officials, the 

absence of reports of acute malnutrition occurring among Iraqi refugee 

children makes this indicator a poor choice for assessing the effectiveness 

of State’s Iraqi refugee programs. 

State’s implementing partners reported progress against agreed-upon 

performance indicators for assessing Iraqi refugee-related activities.16

However, State did not aggregate individual project or program 

performance so that it could measure progress toward its overall goal and 

objectives. GAO previously reported that leading organizations seeking to 

become more results-oriented clearly define desired outcomes, measure 

performance to gauge progress, and use performance information as a 

basis for decision making.17 For example, in its 2008 and 2009 policy 

papers on Iraqi refugees, State reported on a number of individual projects 

but did not specifically report how these project-level accomplishments 

helped State achieve its overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees.18 In 

 

14According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “non-refoulement” is the principle 

protecting refugees from nonvoluntary repatriation to places where their lives or freedom 

would be threatened because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

social group, or political opinion. 

15Wasting is a measure of acute malnutrition. 

16For international organizations, State officials noted that they provide input on objectives 

and performance measures through participation in board meetings, donor trips, and 

country operation planning meetings. Regarding NGOs, State officials noted that they work 

with each NGO partner to establish specific objectives and performance measures for 

projects in each country; these measures are documented in the partner agreements. 

17See GAO, GAO/GGD-96-118. 

18State Department, Policy and Program Review Committee (PPRC): Policy and 

Implementation Paper for Iraq Refugees and IDPs for FY 2008, Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 

2008. The 2009 paper is sensitive but unclassified. 

Page 18 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

addition, on the basis of our review of NGO monitoring reports,19 State 

received information on its partners’ achievements but did not identify 

how it would use these data to measure and report on overall progress for 

its Iraqi refugee goal and objectives.20 For example, in its NGO guidelines, 

State generally requires that a project demonstrate that at least 50 percent 

of beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees.21 According to State officials, NGO 

partners are required to submit beneficiary statistics by objectives and 

indicators. Our review of the 13 available final NGO reports showed that in 

10 cases NGOs reported that 50 percent or more of beneficiaries were Iraqi 

refugees,22 while in 3 cases less than 50 percent were Iraqi refugees.23

However, these data were not aggregated or reported as a measure of 

progress in meeting the U.S. goal and objectives for assisting Iraqi 

refugees. 

For 2009, State has made progress in articulating more results-oriented 

goals and objectives; however, the elements that State identified as 

corresponding performance indicators are not clearly linked to the 

objectives and are not consistently measurable.24 State reported that, on 

the basis of discussions with GAO, it established more detailed objectives 

and indicators for fiscal year 2009 to measure progress in providing 

assistance and protection to Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons, 

 

19We also reviewed 13 interim program evaluation reports prepared by State for 13 projects 

implemented by 8 NGO partners, the 13 final NGO reports available, and international 

organization partners’ progress reports. We also interviewed State officials on their 

monitoring and evaluation efforts. (State Department officials prepare interim program 

evaluations for each NGO project from the information obtained from NGO reporting. 

These evaluations assess progress made and are used to make management decisions 

about an NGO’s performance and future funding for Iraqi refugee programs.) We did not 

assess the reliability of the data in these reports. 

20For programs that were funded in fiscal year 2007, State officials stated that they required 

monitoring reports at 4 and 12 months, and for programs funded in fiscal year 2008, State 

required quarterly reports. 

21The 2007 Guidelines for Proposal Submissions for NGO Protection and Assistance 

Programs Benefiting Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon was issued as a part of the March 

13, 2007, request for proposals. 

22We did not assess the reliability of the data provided in these reports. 

23As of the end of our fieldwork, the State Department had made available 13 of the 16 final 

NGO reports for our review. For one NGO for which State did not provide a final report, 

State reported that it did not meet the 50 percent requirement. 

24State considers the 2009 goals and objectives sensitive and not for public release. 

Page 19 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

and conflict victims. According to State, it has developed a spreadsheet to 

track progress toward these objectives and indicators throughout the year. 

State Department and Its 

Partners Face Challenges 

in Project Monitoring 

The Department of State and its implementing partners use a number of 

methods to monitor their refugee programs and activities; however, 

according to State and its implementing partners, a lack of resources, 

difficulty gaining physical access to projects and refugees, and a lack of 

reliable data create challenges to their monitoring and evaluation efforts. 

According to State officials, they monitor their partners’ programs and 

projects by conducting site visits, reviewing progress and final reports, 

reviewing NGO project beneficiary statistics, meeting and conducting 

follow-up with program managers, and consulting other donors and 

humanitarian organizations. According to UNHCR officials, they have an 

extensive monitoring system that includes field monitoring, program 

evaluations, and financial account and document reviews. State is working 

with its partners to improve their monitoring and evaluation efforts. A 

Framework for Cooperation between State and UNHCR noted that 

enhancement of the quality of monitoring and evaluation activities that 

UNHCR undertakes deserved particular attention.25 Additionally, in State’s 

Framework for Cooperation with IOM, both parties committed to 

strengthening monitoring and evaluation capacity and to quantify program 

results and impact more effectively.26

While there are challenges to monitoring and evaluation, State has taken 

steps to improve its oversight of NGO projects. For example, in the fiscal 

year 2007 NGO cooperative agreements, State required NGOs to provide 

two reports. The first report covered the first 4 months of the project, and 

the second report covered the last 8 months of the project. However, for 

NGOs funded in fiscal year 2008, State revised the formal reporting 

requirements included in the cooperative agreements. As a result, NGOs 

are required to provide quarterly reports on project progress, including 

progress against objectives and indicators. Additionally, State reported 

 

25Framework for Cooperation between the Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. 

Department of State, for the Year 2008 (Nov. 29, 2007). 

26Framework for Cooperation between the IOM Administration and the Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State, for the Year 2007 (Apr. 

18, 2007). 

Page 20 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

that it has expanded the template used to track the progress made by 

NGOs on a quarterly basis. 

However, according to State and implementing partner officials, 

monitoring continues to be impeded by the following challenges. 

• Insufficient monitoring resources: In April 2008, State reported that 

UNHCR effectively monitored approximately 40 to 59 percent of its 

implementing partners’ program activity sites in Jordan.27 State noted that 

it faced the same challenges, given that program activities are conducted 

at more than 200 sites and that PRM’s officer would be able to visit only a 

fraction of these activities over the course of a year. During our visit to a 

small project site in Jordan, the embassy official responsible for 

monitoring in Jordan noted that this was the first visit to the site, given 

that it was one of the smaller projects and embassy staff had limited time 

to make site visits. Moreover, State reported that it expected the problem 

to increase for UNHCR as it continued with plans to decentralize its 

services to Iraqi refugees to 18 locations throughout Jordan. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has taken steps 

to mitigate the lack of monitoring resources in Jordan.28 In Syria, 

monitoring efforts are limited by a lack of PRM monitoring staff at the U.S. 

embassy. In August 2008, a senior U.S. embassy official in Syria stated that 

the U.S. embassy had limited staffing resources to monitor all Iraqi refugee 

program activities. According to State, monitoring efforts for Syria, 

Lebanon, and Jordan are carried out by two PRM staff based at the U.S. 

embassy in Jordan and visiting PRM staff from Washington, D.C. 

• Difficulty gaining physical access to projects: In November 2008, State 

reported that the refugee coordinator did not complete annual reviews of 

UNHCR programs in Syria and Lebanon because of difficulties getting into 

 

27Department of State, The Annual Review of UNHCR Country Achievements and Future 

Planning, April 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008). According to State, it determined 

these percentages based on discussions with UNHCR in Jordan regarding current and past 

programming. State reported that site visits are determined by several criteria, including 

policy priorities, performance history, funding level, and security conditions. However, 

State did not provide any specifics on the percentage of partners’ program activity sites 

that should be monitored. 

28According to UNHCR, in 2009, UNHCR monitoring of implementing partners and their 

respective programs has expanded beyond a financial audit into an evaluative mode with 

the extensive use of multifunctional teams visiting project sites, undertaking home visits, 

and conducting focus group sessions with Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, over the 

past quarter a Project Control Officer and Senior Oversight Officer have arrived in Jordan 

and physical verification of projects is now a requirement. UNHCR has also decided to 

reduce its intended decentralization of services from 18 to 16 locations. 

Page 21 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

each country because of visa and security restrictions. According to State 

officials, the United States is constrained in monitoring its assistance 

efforts in Syria because of its poor relationship with the government of 

Syria and resulting restrictions on the visas of U.S. government visitors. In 

addition, according to two interim program evaluations, State personnel 

were unable to monitor the two NGO projects in Lebanon because of 

security constraints. The U.S. embassy in Beirut operates under strict 

security protocols that limit the ability and flexibility of the mission to host 

visitors. State monitoring officials planned to travel to Beirut in May 2008, 

but this trip was canceled after violence escalated. 

• Lack of reliable data: According to the UN, in both Syria and Jordan, 

difficulty obtaining reliable data in the education and health sectors has 

hindered efforts to monitor progress. For example, according to the UN, 

student attendance data in Jordan are not disaggregated by gender and 

age. According to the UN, information management systems in the Syrian 

and Jordanian health sector need improvement to collect more reliable 

data on beneficiaries served. 

U.S. and UNHCR efforts to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to 

Iraqi refugees are challenged by the lack of reliable needs estimates and 

data on funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Without a 

comprehensive assessment of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees in 

Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to prioritize and fund efforts to help ensure 

sufficient assistance and protection efforts. Donor countries are resistant 

to providing funds without further information on the needs. According to 

UN and donor representatives, they are also resistant because they believe 

the United States and Iraq should fund the majority of assistance efforts. 

Efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees are hindered 

by the lack of reliable information on their number, the extent of their 

needs, and the needs of the countries hosting them. Iraqi refugees 

primarily live interspersed among the local urban populations, rather than 

concentrated in camps, and are not easily identified. According to the UN, 

statistics on the number of Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries vary 

and are difficult to verify. The UN further notes that efforts are needed to 

Lack of Reliable 

Needs Estimates and 

Funding Data Affects 

U.S. and UNHCR 

Efforts to Assist Iraqi 

Refugees 

The Number of Iraqi 

Refugees and the Extent of 

Their Needs Are Unknown 

Page 22 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

improve data collection on Iraqi refugees across the region.29 In contrast to 

official host government estimates of Iraqi refugees, a significantly smaller 

number of refugees have registered with UNHCR for protection and 

assistance (see table 1). However, UNHCR officials stated that the 

registration numbers may not be a true proxy of the number of Iraqi 

refugees in each country because an unknown number of refugees do not 

register or seek assistance.30 The actual number of Iraqi refugees in need 

may be somewhere in between these figures. 

Table 1: Iraqi Refugees Registered with UNHCR and Neighboring Host Government 

Estimates of Iraqi Refugees, as Reported by UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008 

Country hosting Iraqi 

refugees 

Number of Iraqi refugees 

registered with UNHCR 

Host government 

estimates of number of 

Iraqi refugees

Syrian Arab Republic 221,506 1,200,000-1,500,000a

Hashemite Kingdom of 

Jordan 

54,411 450,000-500,000 

Lebanon 10,764 50,000

Egypt 10,163 Not available

Turkey 6,610 Not available

Islamic Republic of Iran 4,861 27,725

Gulf Cooperation Council 

countriesb

2,112 200,000

Sources: UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region. 

a

According to the UN, the total number of Iraqis in Syria remains unconfirmed, with estimates ranging 

from 700,000 to 1.5 million people. As of September 2008, the Syrian government reported that 1.2 

million Iraqis currently hold residence permits. 

b

Gulf Cooperation Council countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the 

United Arab Emirates. 

Further, neither Jordan nor Syria, the countries reporting the largest 

number of Iraqi refugees, has enabled an independent, comprehensive 

survey of refugees to be undertaken. As shown in table 1, as of September 

 

29According to the UN, government estimates largely rely on cross-border movements, 

which may result in counting persons more than once. See UN, Iraq and the Region, 2009 

Consolidated Appeal, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York and 

Geneva). 

30According to the UN, Iraqi refugees may not register with UNHCR for a variety of reasons, 

including fear of being identified and deported, inability to reach a registration center, lack 

of understanding of the benefits of UNHCR registration, and lack of need for UNHCR 

protection or assistance. 

Page 23 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

30, 2008, UNHCR reported that the estimated number of refugees, as 

provided by the governments of Syria and Jordan, was 1.2 million to 1.5 

million in Syria and 450,000 to 500,000 in Jordan.31 However, State, NGOs, 

and international organizations have questioned these high numbers.32 In 

2007, the Jordanian government tasked Fafo, a Norwegian research 

institute, to estimate the number of Iraqi refugees living in the country.33

After Fafo estimated that 161,000 Iraqi refugees resided in Jordan, the 

Jordanian government disagreed with the institute’s findings, citing 

conflicting estimates. Fafo conducted further work with the Jordanian 

government that resulted in an estimate of 450,000 to 500,000 Iraqi 

refugees as of May 2007.34 According to State, while some NGOs agree with 

this estimate, others believe the number may be as low as 200,000. State 

further reported that although the Jordanian government initially 

approved a UNHCR proposal for a joint study to assess Iraqi refugee needs 

in September 2008, it has yet to take any action to initiate the required 

work. In Syria, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 

produced a preliminary study in January 2008 that was intended to analyze 

the Syrian economy since 2003 and assess the macroeconomic impact of 

Iraqi refugees. However, the report, which included estimates of the 

numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria, has not been released to the public.35

According to a UNDP official, the study was only a preliminary report 

pending the commissioning of a survey on the number, geographic 

location, and socioeconomic characteristics of Iraqis in Syria. UNDP 

received comments from the Syrian government and agreed to incorporate 

them into the final report. UNDP also found that some of the results were 

contradicted by other studies and agreed with the Syrian government on 

 

31According to UNHCR, the Iraqi embassy in Syria estimates that the total number of Iraqis 

in Syria is between 800,000 and 1,000,000. 

32According to State, in its interim program evaluations for NGOs, NGOs in Jordan set 

targets for numbers of Iraqi beneficiaries too high because they based them on faulty 

estimates of the total number of Iraqi refugees. 

33According to Fafo, it supplies decision makers and organizations, nationally and 

internationally, with research on working life and social policy. 

34Fafo, Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics (Norway, 2007). We 

assessed Fafo’s methodology and found that the number of 161,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan 

as of May 2007 is reliable, but we were unable to establish the reliability of the numbers 

beyond the initial 161,000. 

35United Nations Development Program, Macroeconomic Impact of Iraqi Refugees on the 

Syrian Economy (January 2008). 

Page 24 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

the need to further analyze and validate the preliminary results once a 

survey is conducted. 

Moreover, government officials in Jordan and Syria stress that their most 

vulnerable citizens as well as refugees need assistance. As a result, both 

countries prohibit parallel assistance systems that would provide refugees 

with increased aid and potentially create resentment within their 

respective populations. Both countries have primarily based their requests 

for international assistance on their countries’ overall health and 

education needs rather than on the numbers of Iraqi refugees. In the 2009 

UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region, the UN notes that host 

countries have drawn on their existing social services to assist Iraqi 

refugees. The UN concludes that, therefore, efforts should continue to 

reinforce basic needs such as health and education, among others, for all 

refugees and local populations. Although the figure has been debated,36

according to State, the Jordanian government contends that Iraqi 

migration into Jordan has cost it about $2 billion over the last 3 years 

because of increased stress on its health, education, and water 

infrastructure in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid. 

However, the extent to which Iraqi refugees affect these sectors is not 

clear, government numbers are not clearly supported, and supporting 

government assessments are not publicly available. For example, 

according to State, the Jordanian government stated that a total of 24,000 

Iraqis enrolled in public and private schools during the 2007 to 2008 school 

year, but some NGOs estimated that the public school attendance figure 

may have been as low as 9,000 students. Both State and the UN have 

reported that the Jordanian government has not made disaggregated 

figures available and has declined to allow independent confirmation of 

the number of students in the public school system. Further, NGOs 

reported that outreach efforts in Syria were discouraged by the Syrian 

government, limiting the ability to obtain information to better understand 

the needs of Iraqi refugees in Syria. Similarly, according to State, the 

Jordanian government has withheld permission from UNHCR to conduct 

mobile registration drives and public outreach campaigns. 

In the absence of a comprehensive survey of the needs of all Iraqi refugees 

and a transparent assessment of the impact of Iraqis on host countries, the 

 

36Center for Strategic Studies, The Iraq War’s Impact on Growth and Inflation in Jordan, 

University of Jordan, 2007. 

Page 25 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

UN relied on available information to identify refugee needs. In 2008, the 

UN expanded the efforts of its working groups and relied on the UNHCR 

central registration system as the most effective means for UN agencies to 

assess needs, estimate refugee movements, and understand the changing 

circumstances of the Iraqi refugee community. The UN also considered 

other information, such as public studies, limited surveys, and host 

government data. As a result of its working groups’ assessments, in its 

2009 Consolidated Appeal, the UN targeted assistance in areas such as 

protection, health, education, sexual and gender-based violence, food, 

psychosocial support and mental health, and skills development. The UN 

tailored programs for what was known at the time about the situation in 

each host country. According to UNHCR and NGO officials, to ensure that 

these programs reach Iraqi refugees, they target their assistance programs 

in Jordan and Syria in poor and underserved areas where Iraqi refugees 

are known to live. However, according to the UN, a growing number of 

Iraqi refugees are leaving costly urban areas, resulting in a more dispersed 

population and creating the need for further outreach.37

The amount of U.S., UN, and other funding spent to assist Iraqi refugees is 

not readily available. The U.S. government and UNHCR, reportedly the 

largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not always designate 

and report funding solely for Iraqi refugee programs, which target refugees 

and the vulnerable populations of the countries that host them. Instead, 

the U.S. government reports funding for all Iraq-related humanitarian 

assistance that may include assistance to Iraqi refugees, internally 

displaced Iraqis, and other vulnerable populations in Iraq and host 

countries. According to funding data provided by State and USAID, for 

fiscal years 2003 through 2008, the U.S. government has apportioned about 

$1.6 billion, obligated about $1.5 billion, and expended about $1.2 billion 

for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance (see app. III). 

Similarly, UNHCR includes Iraqi refugees in its Iraq Operation and obtains 

funding through a number of funding appeals made to the international 

community. Some appeals, such as the 2008 UN Iraq Consolidated Appeal, 

were for efforts inside Iraq; others, such as the 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation 

Supplementary Appeal, were intended for programs that benefit Iraqi 

refugees, internally displaced persons in Iraq, non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq 

The United States, Donors, 

and Iraq Have Funded 

Programs Benefiting Iraqi 

Refugees, but the Total 

Amount of Funding 

Explicitly for Iraqi Refugee 

Programs Is Unavailable 

 

37According to UNHCR, as of March 2009, UNHCR and its partners now have approximately 

200 Iraqi outreach workers in the region. 

Page 26 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

(such as Palestinian refugees in Iraq), and Iraqi returnees. For calendar 

years 2003 through 2008, UNHCR appeals for its Iraq operation, including 

Iraqi refugees, totaled about $730 million and resulted in about $542 

million in contributions (see app. IV). The United States contributed about 

58 percent of the donor contributions to these appeals. 

Moreover, in addition to providing UNHCR funding, donor countries also 

fund the appeals and efforts of other UN agencies and international 

organizations that assist Iraqis and other conflict victims in the region. 

Because of the number of overlapping appeals, it is difficult to track the 

amount requested and funded for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. 

To better coordinate efforts among UN agencies, humanitarian 

organizations, and donors, in December 2008, for the first time, the UN 

consolidated all of its Iraq-related appeals for UN agencies and over 15 

NGOs. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region requests 

$547.3 million, of which $355 million is requested for efforts to assist Iraqi 

refugees and host country populations and $192.3 million is requested for 

efforts within Iraq. 

In addition to multilateral funding, an unknown amount of bilateral 

funding and private contributions is made to programs benefiting Iraqi 

refugees and others. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs reports data on multilateral and bilateral contributions. However, it 

relies primarily on self-reporting, and the data may be incomplete. 

According to State, all donations from other countries meet a small 

fraction of the needs inside and out of Iraq. State officials also noted that 

the department demarched both the Gulf States and traditional donors in 

2007 and 2008, asking for greater support. However, representatives of 

donor countries raised concerns regarding the uncertain numbers of Iraqi 

refugees and the extent of their needs, and they noted that the lack of 

objective and complete information made it difficult to garner support for 

funding. Some also noted that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi 

humanitarian crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the 

refugees are its citizens, should bear most of the funding costs. 

Although the Iraqi government pledged funds in 2007 to support the 

assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is unclear 

whether additional funds will be provided. The Iraqi government pledged 

$25 million to assist neighboring countries hosting Iraqi refugees. Of this 

amount, the government provided $15 million to Syria, $2 million to 

Lebanon, and $8 million to UNHCR in Jordan. For efforts within Iraq, the 

Iraqi government donated $40 million, left over from the Oil for Food 

Program, to the World Food Program through the UN’s 2008 Iraq 

Page 27 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

Consolidated Appeal. In August 2008, Iraq’s Council of Representatives 

passed a supplemental budget that included an additional $208 million 

primarily for IDPs and Iraqi returnees. It is unclear whether any of these 

funds are intended for or have been expended for Iraqi refugees. Iraqi 

officials noted that the government is reluctant to fund programs for Iraqi 

refugees because improving refugee conditions in neighboring countries 

may discourage refugees from returning to Iraq. Instead, the Iraqi 

government’s position is to improve conditions in Iraq to encourage 

returns and focus government resources on those Iraqis who are displaced 

within the country. According to the UN, in 2009, the Iraqi government 

plans to direct more of its resources to the poorest Iraqi families in Iraq. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering permanent 

solutions for Iraqi refugees. Conditions in Iraq are not suitable for their 

return, and host countries such as Jordan and Syria prefer that the 

refugees return to Iraq. Although the United States is making progress 

resettling Iraqi refugees in the United States, a limited number of Iraqi 

refugees are being resettled abroad. 

According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred permanent 

solution for the majority of refugees worldwide. However, in the case of 

Iraq, according to the UN and the IDP Working Group,38 the conditions for 

their return are not yet suitable.39 According to IOM, the Iraqi government 

has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives (about 

1 million Iraqi dinars) to returning refugee families. However, while the 

UN notes that some improvements have been made, the UN cites major 

obstacles to large-scale returns, including the uncertain security 

The U.S. Government 

and UNHCR Face 

Challenges in Offering 

Permanent Solutions 

for Iraqi Refugees 

Conditions Are Not 

Suitable for Repatriation, 

and Neighboring Host 

Countries Resist 

Integrating Refugees 

 

38The IDP Working Group members include UNHCR, IOM, other UN agencies, and NGOs. 

Its reporting is based on surveillance data gathered by IDP Working Group members and 

on information provided by the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the Kurdistan 

Regional Government, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other NGOs. 

39See UN, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs (New York and Geneva: Dec. 2008); United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq Situation Update–August 2008 (Geneva: Aug. 2008); and 

IDP Working Group, Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq–Update June 2008 (Amman: 

2008). 

Page 28 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

situation,40 lack of a mechanism for restoring ownership of property, lack 

of access to basic services, and the need for reconciliation among ethnoreligious groups and political solutions. According to the U.S. Senior 

Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and IDP Affairs, the most critical challenge 

is the uncertain security environment. According to the UN, although 

voluntary return is the preferred solution, Iraqi refugees should not be 

encouraged to return until the security situation allows for large-scale 

return and sufficient monitoring. 

Nonetheless, according to the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may be 

returning, but it may be more due to increasing hardship in the host 

country and some recent improvements in security rather than significant 

improvements in Iraq. According to UNHCR, there is no clear trend 

regarding the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving their country. In 

Jordan and Syria, difficulties in renewing visas and a lack of funds, 

employment, and public services affect Iraqi refugees’ decisions to stay or 

return to Iraq. Moreover, according to UNHCR, refugees may return to Iraq 

for religious holidays and school breaks or to visit family and property. 

Returning refugees may become internally displaced if their homes have 

been destroyed or occupied. In early August 2008, the Iraqi Chairman of 

the Committee for the Displaced noted the difficulties in removing the 

current occupants of homes owned by Iraqi refugees who want to return. 

According to UNHCR and the IDP Working Group, returnees primarily 

return to neighborhoods, districts, and governates under control of the 

sects to which they belong, and as of August 2008, few families had 

returned to areas under the control of another sect. Moreover, some 

refugees, including many with whom we met in Jordan and Syria, will not 

leave because they fear that they will be unable to return to their host 

country, if needed, because of the tightening of borders since they left 

Iraq. Others fear they cannot safely return to Iraq because of their ethnic 

or religious identity or employment by coalition forces. Although the Iraqi 

government, with the support of UNHCR and others in the international 

community, has initiated planning for the return of refugees, some 

 

40UNHCR reported in August 2008 that among the main dangers and concerns for returnees 

are detention and kidnappings, reported from all over the country but most frequently in 

Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Muthanna, Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Wassit governates. 

Page 29 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

international organizations reported that it is unknown whether the Iraqi 

government has the capacity to implement such plans.41

Meanwhile, according to the UN, the continued willingness of countries in 

the region to host Iraqi refugees is essential to ensuring refugee protection; 

however, opportunities for local integration in neighboring countries are 

limited for Iraqi refugees. The governments of Syria and Jordan consider 

Iraqi refugees to be “guests” and have stated their preference that the 

refugees return to Iraq once the security situation in Iraq improves rather 

than integrate and settle in their countries. On the one hand, a tradition of 

hosting and protecting Arab nationals provides a political and moral 

imperative to accept Iraqis in need of refuge, according to the UN and the 

international community. On the other hand, Syria and Jordan are 

determined not to establish arrangements that might lead to permanence, 

such as officially allowing employment of Iraqi refugees, according to 

UNHCR. According to Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither 

government anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to the UN, 

most countries in the region have provided Iraqi refugees with access to 

education and health care even though social services and infrastructure 

were already strained meeting the needs of the local population. 

Although the international community has commended both Syria and 

Jordan—Syria in particular—for initially opening their borders to refugees, 

both countries have now tightened their borders because of security and 

economic factors and their own capacity to address the situation. 

According to State, UNHCR, and host government officials, both 

governments are concerned that the past Palestinian refugee experience 

may repeat itself. According to State, UNHCR, and host government 

officials, parallel assistance systems or institutions, such as schools, 

camps, and social services that were created to serve the Palestinian 

population became an incentive for Palestinians to stay in Jordan or Syria. 

These parallel structures created resentment among the host population, 

which led to a strong desire for these governments not to do the same for 

the Iraqis.42 State reported that the Jordanian government wishes to avoid 

 

41See GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts 

Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk, GAO-08-117 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007). 

42As of July 2008, Jordan, with a total population estimated at 6.2 million, hosted an 

estimated 1.8 million Palestinian refugees, and Syria, with a population of an estimated 19.7 

million, hosted an estimated 522,100 Palestinian refugees (Central Intelligence Agency, 

World Fact Book, Aug. 21, 2008). 

Page 30 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

the perception that Iraqis, like Palestinians, intend to stay in Jordan and 

compete with Jordanians for jobs and resources. 

The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under 

its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; however, only a limited number of 

other countries have admitted Iraqi refugees through resettlement 

programs.43 Once the program was announced, in February 2007, State 

estimated that if USRAP became fully operational, then the U.S. 

government would be able to admit 2,000 to 3,000 refugees in fiscal year 

2007. For fiscal year 2008, the U.S. administration formally established an 

admission goal of 12,000 Iraqi refugees. Although the U.S. government did 

not meet State’s fiscal year 2007 goal, admitting 1,608 Iraqi refugees, it 

surpassed its fiscal year 2008 goal, admitting 13,823 Iraqi refugees as of 

September 30, 2008 (see table 2 for processing steps and progress made). 

Table 2: U.S. Government Iraqi Refugee Processing and Admissions under USRAP, 

Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 

The United States Has 

Made Recent Progress in 

Resettlement Efforts, but 

Limited Numbers of 

Refugees May Be Resettled 

Worldwide 

Key processing steps 

Fiscal 

Year 2007 

Fiscal 

Year 2008

Total Fiscal 

Year 2007

 and 2008

Referrals and applications 

received 

11,646 28,886 40,532

Prescreened by State Department’s 

overseas processing entity (OPE) 

7,519 25,111 32,630

Applicants interviewed and adjudicated for 

refugee status by DHS 

4,422 24,845 29,267

Applicant pending final DHS 

decision 

32 1,073 1,105

Applicant denied by DHS 819 2,160 2,979

Applicant approved by DHS for refugee 

status (and awaiting completion of 

outprocessing coordinated by OPE) 

2,378 21,812 24,190

Admitted to the United States 1,608 13,823 15,431

Source: GAO analysis based on information from the Department of State, Refugee Processing Center, Worldwide Refugee 

Admissions Processing System. 

 

43This report does not include information on the outcome of asylum procedures or the 

admission of refugees outside of resettlement programs. 

Page 31 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

PRM is responsible for managing USRAP. PRM’s regional refugee 

coordinator accepts referrals from UNHCR, embassies, and certain NGOs44

and provides them to an overseas processing entity (OPE).45 Certain 

categories of Iraqis with U.S. affiliations may apply directly for 

consideration under the USRAP program in Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq.46 The 

OPEs, working under a cooperative agreement with State, prescreen cases 

by collecting and verifying personal and family information, details of 

persecution or feared harm, and information for security name checks. 

State has cooperative agreements with IOM, which operates processing 

centers in Damascus, Amman, Cairo, and Baghdad, and the International 

Catholic Migration Commission, which operates centers in Istanbul and 

Beirut.47 Once the OPE prescreens the case, it is then provided to USCIS, 

of DHS, which makes periodic visits to the regions to interview refugees 

and adjudicate their applications for resettlement in the United States.48

Once USCIS approves or conditionally approves cases, they are returned 

to the OPE, which coordinates outprocessing, including security 

clearances, medical examinations, cultural orientation, and travel 

arrangements. Once the security background check and medical 

 

44The regional refugee coordinator was based in Cairo until the summer of 2008, when the 

new position was established in Amman. A refugee coordinator in Baghdad is responsible 

for in-country processing and embassy referrals from Iraq. 

45According to the U.S. government, the vast majority of submissions are UNHCR referrals. 

46With the passage of a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, certain refugees of special humanitarian concern could apply 

directly to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Such refugees include Iraqis who were or 

are employed by the U.S. government, a U.S. contractor, or a U.S.-based media organization 

or NGO, and their family members. 

47The Departments of State and Homeland Security have recently initiated in-country 

processing of Iraqis employed by the U.S. government. According to State, IOM provides 

rotational coverage in Baghdad using a mobile office from Amman. 

48Under Section 101 (a) (42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, [8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101 (a) (42)] the term refugee includes “any person who is outside any country of such 

person’s nationality...and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Under this section, the term 

refugee also includes, in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate 

consultation [as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (e)] may specify, any person who is within the 

country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within 

the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has 

a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 

a particular social group, or political opinion. 

Page 32 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

examination are completed with no adverse findings, then the refugee and 

eligible family members are cleared for departure to the United States. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR acknowledged that they initially faced 

challenges setting up and expanding their resettlement programs for Iraqi 

refugees. State’s Office of Inspector General reported that State had little 

processing infrastructure in place in the region when the Iraqi resettlement 

program was announced in February 2007. According to the Inspector 

General, State had no permanent OPE presence in Damascus or Amman, 

UNHCR was not actively engaged in registering refugees, and USCIS had 

no permanent presence in the region. According to DHS and State, one 

reason for initial delays in processing resettlement referrals in Syria was 

the Syrian government’s delays in approving visas for DHS officials and 

limitations set on IOM staffing and operations. However, according to 

UNHCR and State, a significant increase in the number of resettlement 

departures to the United States has occurred since June 2008.49 According 

to State and IOM officials, this has been due to increased processing 

capabilities after the initial expansion of the U.S. refugee-processing 

program. According to the Inspector General, on average, the total 

processing time from case creation to arrival in the United States for Iraqi 

refugee cases is 222 days. This is less than the average of 452 days for all 

other refugee cases worldwide.50 According to State officials, every case 

moves through USRAP at a different pace and can be delayed at any step 

along the way; however, if serious delays occur in any one case, they are 

generally due to the time it takes to complete security clearances.51

In contrast to U.S. efforts, only a small number of nations take part in 

resettlement programs and accept annual quotas of refugees from around 

the world, according to UNHCR. UNHCR refers cases to potential 

resettlement countries. According to State officials, most of its USRAP 

 

49According to the State Department, on average about 70 percent of UNHCR referrals in 

the region receive U.S. refugee status. 

50The Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector 

General, Middle East Regional Office, Status of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Processing for 

Iraqi Nationals, MERO-IQO-08-02 (May 2008). 

51State officials noted that about 53 percent of the Iraqi refugees who were approved for 

resettlement but have not left for the United States have not done so because State is 

awaiting completion of security clearances, known as security advisory opinions, from the 

Central Intelligence Agency. According to State, the lack of personnel resources at the 

Central Intelligence Agency has become a significant issue for all immigrant and refugee 

applicants needing security advisory opinions, not just Iraqis. 

Page 33 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

applicants come to the program through UNHCR referrals. According to 

UNHCR, the numbers referred to each country are negotiated based on the 

numbers each country is willing to consider for resettlement. In August 

2008, UNHCR reported that since the first quarter of calendar year 2007, of 

the more than 40,000 Iraqis referred for resettlement, about 30,000 were 

referred to the United States. According to UNHCR, for calendar years 

2007 and 2008, the United States had resettled a total of 15,170 Iraqi 

refugees, while other countries had resettled 5,852 Iraqi refugees, as of 

September 30, 2008 (see table 3). 

Table 3: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement Departures by Country of Resettlement, 

Calendar Years 2007 through 2008, as of September 30, 2008 

Resettlement 

country 

Calendar year 

2007

Calendar year 2008 

through September 

Total calendar 

years 2007 and 

2008 through 

September

Canada 793 1,257 2,050

Australia 464 954 1,418

Sweden 856 427 1,283

Netherlands 124 162 286

Finland 23 113 136

Norway 54 32 86

Others 64 529 593

Subtotal 2,378 3,474 5,852

United States 2,615 12,555 15,170

Total 4,993 16,029 21,022

Source: GAO analysis based on data compiled by UNHCR from resettlement countries. 

Note: While the U.S. government generally reports its data on a fiscal year basis, the UN and many 

international organizations report their data on a calendar year basis. According to UNHCR, data 

received from resettlement countries has not been verified. 

Page 34 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the 

international community lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the 

Iraqi refugee situation. We previously reported that strategic planning is a 

key element in results-oriented management.52 A strategic plan should 

contain long-term goals that cover a period of not less than 5 years from 

the year it is submitted and should be updated and revised at least every 3 

years.53 Although the international community has recognized the need to 

strategically plan for the Iraqi refugee situation, it has often focused on the 

crisis within Iraq and annual planning efforts while deferring strategic 

planning for the refugee situation. Specifically, the international 

community lacks a comprehensive international strategy that fully 

identifies and aligns the need with resources, identifies and addresses 

factors that may affect planning efforts, and ensures coordination among 

stakeholders. 

Although the international community has recognized the need for 

international strategic planning to address the Iraqi refugee situation, its 

strategic planning efforts have focused on the situation in Iraq while 

calling for more to be done for Iraqi refugees. In January 2007, UNHCR 

stated that its operational and contingency plans must be revised and 

undertaken as part of a wider effort that involves other UN agencies and 

government and NGO stakeholders.54 UNHCR further noted that the 

security, political, social, and financial impact on Iraq, the region, and 

beyond would be felt for many years and that the response to Iraqi 

displacement must incorporate a long-term perspective to ensure 

protection for Iraqis and other displaced groups and overall stability in the 

region. According to the UN, beginning in January 2007, a series of highlevel and technical consultations took place, involving key humanitarian 

agencies, UN headquarters, and UN member states, including the Iraqi 

government. These consultations resulted in the broad recognition that a 

Lack of 

Comprehensive 

International Strategic 

Planning Has 

Hindered Efforts to 

Assist and Protect 

Iraqi Refugees 

UN Continues to 

Recognize Need for 

Comprehensive Strategic 

Planning for Iraqi 

Refugees, but Focus 

Remains on Annual 

Country Operations Plans 

and Funding Appeals 

 

52GAO has found that three practices appear to be critical for effective strategic planning. 

Organizations must (1) involve their stakeholders; (2) assess their internal and external 

environments; and (3) align their activities, core processes, and resources to support 

mission-related outcomes. See GAO, Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key 

Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, D.C.: May 

1997, Version 1). 

53Government Performance and Results Act, Section 3 (a) and (b). 

54See UNHCR, Strategy for the Iraq Situation (Geneva: revised Jan. 1, 2007); and UNHCR, 

Iraq Situation Response Supplementary Appeal (Geneva: Jan. 2007). 

Page 35 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

humanitarian crisis was unfolding in Iraq and that a multisector 

interagency response was required. 

Accordingly, in April 2007, the UN Country Team for Iraq, under the 

leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, developed the Strategic 

Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq as a basis for a coordinated 

response by the international community.55 However, this framework 

solely focused on the immediate measures needed to expedite 

humanitarian assistance inside Iraq. It also called for a comprehensive 

approach to addressing the concerns of the Iraqi population displaced to 

neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Syria. Moreover, when 

governments in the region, donors, international organizations, and NGOs 

convened in April 2007 at a UNHCR-initiated international humanitarian 

conference on displaced Iraqis, the NGOs called for a multifaceted 

international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation.56 However, a 

comprehensive long term approach has yet to be developed. 

UNHCR and State have focused on UNHCR’s annual planning efforts for 

UNHCR and its implementing partners and myriad funding appeals rather 

than on a comprehensive international strategic plan. State and UNHCR 

note that planning for Iraqi and other refugees is done through the annual 

UNHCR country operations plans. Each year, with donor input, UNHCR 

develops country operations plans that provide a summary of UNHCR’s 

program goals and objectives for refugees in each country in which it 

operates. However, these plans, focusing on the efforts of UNHCR and its 

implementing partners, do not contain a mechanism to measure longer 

term progress in achieving strategic goals. Further, the complete plan has 

not always been made public.57 In January 2008, UNHCR issued its Iraq 

Situation Supplementary Appeal, which sought funds and support to 

address the immediate protection and assistance needs of Iraqi refugees, 

 

55Strategic Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq, United Nations and Partners, 

April 2007. 

56NGO Statement on Regional Consequences of the Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq; 

International Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Needs of Refugees and 

Internally Displaced Persons inside Iraq and in Neighboring Countries (Geneva: Apr.17-18, 

2007). 

57UNHCR develops annual country operations plans that address its plans and performance 

measures for the refugee situation in each country. Country operations plans or summaries 

of plans for Syria and Jordan were made public from 2004 through 2006. Plans from 2007 

through 2009 were not made public until UNHCR responded to a draft of this report. 

Moreover, recent plans now cover a period of 2 years. 

Page 36 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

internally displaced Iraqis, refugees returning to Iraq, and refugees from 

other countries living in Iraq. Although the appeal provided information on 

activities, objectives, and targets, it did not prioritize efforts for funding 

and sets targets only for the immediate appeal. In February 2008, UNHCR 

stated that the international community needed to develop strategies and 

allocate resources that not only address immediate and medium-term 

needs, but also acknowledge that, over the long term, a significant portion 

of displaced Iraqis may never return.58 According to the 2007 study by Fafo, 

a Norwegian research institute, only one in five Iraqis in Jordan had 

concrete plans to immigrate to a third country.59

With the release of its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region in 

December 2008, the UN has shown progress in its strategic planning 

efforts for Iraqi refugees. However, the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal is a 

1-year funding request and plan and does not include or refer to strategic 

plans for the longer term. According to the UN, the 2009 UN Consolidated 

Appeal’s Pillar II, which focuses on Iraqi refugees, targets Iraqi refugee 

needs in accordance with priorities agreed to by all concerned 

humanitarian actors and, for the first time, presents a comprehensive 

statement of their planned response. Rather than have separate and 

sometimes overlapping appeals and strategies as in the past, UN agencies 

came together, and with NGO and donor input, developed one funding 

appeal and plan for the Iraqi refugee situation. Pillar II states the mission,60

and the objectives of the humanitarian action plans for each host country 

are clearly aligned with the strategic objectives for the year and with 

UNHCR’s overall goals to protect and assist refugees.61 The UN expects its 

2009 Consolidated Appeal to serve as a framework for UN and NGO 

collaboration across the region. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal also 

includes a monitoring and evaluation plan and notes that there will be a 

 

58UNHCR, Estimating the Immediate Needs of Iraqi Refugees in the Middle East, 

February 2008.

59Fafo, Iraqis in Jordan 2007; Their Number and Characteristics (Norway: 2007). 

60Pillar II’s mission is to “ensure host countries maintain welcoming environments in which 

Iraqi refugees can live their lives in safety and dignity while awaiting return or 

resettlement.” It also notes that ultimately the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and 

the Region must be measured by its impact on the lives of the Iraqi refugees. 

61Pillar II objectives within the UN’s 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region are 

to (1) ensure that Iraqis are able to seek asylum and continue to receive protection; (2) 

ensure that Iraqi refugees’ basic needs are met, with special attention to the most 

vulnerable; (3) support targeted resettlement for vulnerable Iraqis; and (4) undertake 

contingency measures for potential voluntary returns. 

Page 37 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

midyear progress report in June 2009. However, the 2009 UN Consolidated 

Appeal lacks long term goals, and while it uses available information to 

assess needs, it is not based on a comprehensive needs assessment and is 

unclear on how efforts will be prioritized if the appeal is not fully funded. 

Further, the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal relies on existing coordination 

mechanisms that the NGOs stated were problematic.62

According to NGOs, the lack of a comprehensive international strategy has 

hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria. 

Specifically, the international community lacks a strategic planning effort 

for the assistance of Iraqi refugees that includes (1) a comprehensive 

assessment of the needs of Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host government 

populations and uses this assessment to prioritize activities for funding; 

(2) a discussion of the limitations of annual budget cycles and efforts to 

mitigate these limitations; and (3) a coordination mechanism involving all 

stakeholders, including host country governments, international 

organizations, international and local NGOs (including local churches), 

and donor countries. 

First, the international community lacks a comprehensive assessment of 

the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the economically vulnerable 

populations that host them that would establish a baseline for strategic 

planning. Without a comprehensive needs assessment in host countries 

such as Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to determine the scope of the 

problem and to appropriately prioritize and align resources to address the 

Iraqi refugee situation. This is particularly important given the limited 

amount of funding and resources, as well as the decision to avoid 

developing parallel systems. However, to date, host countries’ 

unwillingness to enable completion of these assessments impedes 

strategic planning. 

Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses 

concerns raised about factors that may impact assistance efforts, such as 

the limitations of working with annual budget cycles and efforts to 

mitigate these limitations. According to State, UNHCR, and NGOs, the 

annual budget cycle of UNHCR and State’s annual funding determinations 

Lack of International 

Strategic Planning Has 

Hindered Efforts to Assist 

Iraqi Refugees in 

Neighboring Host 

Countries 

 

62In commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has appointed a senior 

regional coordinator that will be based in Amman beginning in mid-April 2009 to address 

coordination issues in the region. 

Page 38 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

for NGOs impede strategic planning efforts. According to State, planning is 

constrained by a reliance on donors whose contributions are inconsistent 

from year to year and whose annual budget cycles undermine multiyear 

planning on the part of UNHCR and other international humanitarian 

organizations. According to a UNHCR official, the organization is 

constrained by a supplementary budget process that has to be approved 

and renewed each year, thus forcing UNHCR to focus on annual objectives 

and targets. According to NGOs, the annual budget focus of UNHCR and 

key donor countries, including the United States, makes it difficult for 

them to conduct longer-term planning because they do not know whether 

their efforts will be funded from one year to the next. Thus, they may 

focus on shorter term efforts in lieu of more effective long term efforts. 

Third, NGOs noted that a comprehensive international strategy with longterm goals is needed to improve coordination among all stakeholders to 

provide humanitarian assistance, effectively use the limited resources 

available, and prevent duplication of effort. On the basis of discussions 

with NGOs and UNHCR and a review of NGO progress reports and State’s 

interim progress evaluations of its NGO implementing partners, we found 

that the lack of coordination among stakeholders has hindered progress. 

For example, according to interviews and reporting, the international 

community in Syria lacks an adequate coordination mechanism. UNHCR, 

to maintain a good working relationship with Syrian authorities, will 

officially meet and coordinate only with NGOs formally approved to work 

in the country by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). According to U.S., 

UNHCR, and NGO officials, the SARC registration process is lengthy and 

nontransparent. Few NGOs have obtained formal SARC approval, 

although the number of approvals is increasing. According to NGOs, 

unapproved NGOs are not invited to UN coordination meetings and 

attempts to meet with UN agencies in Syria and develop formal beneficiary 

referral processes have been unsuccessful, even for those implementing 

U.S. programs. 

Moreover, NGOs in Syria further stated that there is limited information 

sharing between church and other humanitarian organizations and 

UNHCR and relevant UN organizations. The Syrian government has not 

required SARC approval for assistance provided by churches in Syria. 

Church officials stated that they were unaware of UNHCR coordination 

meetings. According to UNHCR, its religious organization partners are 

aware of coordination meetings but may not attend because they want to 

maintain a low profile. An NGO that was approved by SARC reported to 

State that the lack of full NGO participation, including that of churches, 

means that coordination meetings do not include all NGO activities 

Page 39 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

assisting Iraqis in Syria. According to a State official, the department 

ensures coordination among its NGO implementing partners. NGOs noted 

that more needs to be done to coordinate efforts in Syria as the number of 

NGOs increases. 

In Jordan, UNHCR reported that implementing partners do not speak 

directly with each other to coordinate areas and types of coverage. For 

example, UNHCR reported in its Annual Program Interim Report for 2008 

that its effort to decentralize the delivery of essential services and 

humanitarian assistance in 17 geographical areas in Jordan was not fully 

implemented and was delayed because of operational constraints and lack 

of coordination among implementing partners. As a result, UNHCR 

decided to decentralize fewer services in fewer locations and conduct 

outreach to other locations. Also, according to NGOs in Jordan, 

coordination is made difficult by the large number of NGOs operating in 

Jordan on similar programs. NGO officials stated that at one point, the 

same beneficiaries were attending multiple programs offering the same 

services and that NGOs were competing for and taking beneficiaries from 

each other’s programs. UNHCR commented that as soon as the 

organization became aware of the situation, it took immediate action. 

According to NGOs, they are now working by sector (health, education, 

etc.) in conjunction with UN agencies to prevent duplication that may 

have occurred among their programs. UNHCR is also developing a 

database of beneficiaries in Jordan—the Beneficiary Information 

System—that is intended to make enrollment in NGO programs more 

transparent. However, UNHCR encountered difficulties establishing the 

new system, including delays in data entry, inconsistent use of the system, 

and noncompliance with established procedures and guidelines on the 

part of implementing partners. According to UNHCR’s 2008 annual interim 

program report, it has provided additional data entry staff and training for 

implementing partners to address these issues. 

According to international organization, NGO, and State officials, it may be 

difficult to engage countries hosting Iraqi refugees in international 

strategic planning efforts because these countries want the refugees to be 

repatriated as soon as feasible. According to Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi 

government officials, they did not initially expect the refugee situation to 

be a long term problem. However, Jordanian and Syrian government 

officials spoke of the long term needs of their education and health 

sectors, which they said were most affected by the refugee situation. In 

accordance with host country requirements that parallel assistance 

systems not be developed, refugee assistance programs have been targeted 

to both refugees and vulnerable populations in each country. Moreover, 

Page 40 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

according to UNHCR, although repatriation is the primary goal, the return 

of refugees to Iraq will need to be phased in over time. While NGOs praise 

Syria and Jordan for hosting refugees, they also note that more needs to be 

done to coordinate efforts to register refugees and facilitate the work of 

relief and resettlement organizations. 

The global community is looking to the United States to address the Iraqi 

refugee situation. However, without a comprehensive assessment of the 

number and needs of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to 

prioritize and fund efforts to help ensure assistance and protection for 

these refugees. Given that programs and funding currently target both 

refugees and vulnerable host country populations, the lack of transparent 

and complete assessments of the impact of the refugees on critical sectors, 

such as health and education, further exacerbates planning efforts. 

Similarly, the lack of transparent data on funding complicates efforts to 

make decisions regarding the assistance to be provided for neighboring 

countries. Further, without performance measures that assess overall 

progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it is not 

possible to show the full impact of U.S. assistance efforts. Moreover, 

without a comprehensive international strategy with long-term goals and 

the involvement of all stakeholders, it is difficult to effectively use the 

limited resources available. 

To enhance the ability of the Department of State to evaluate and report 

progress toward its stated goals and objectives to assist Iraqi refugees, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State develop performance measures to 

fully assess and report progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for 

Iraqi refugees. Performance measures and indicators should be clearly 

linked to progress in achieving stated goals and objectives. Performance 

goals, objectives, and measures should clearly and transparently address 

the extent to which programs should target refugees and host government 

populations, respectively, to the extent practicable. 

To provide more transparency in funding provided for Iraqi refugee 

programs and help Congress and the Administration consider funding 

requests for neighboring countries, we recommend that the Secretary of 

State and the USAID Administrator develop systems to separately track 

and report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi refugee 

programs in each host country, to the extent practicable. 

Conclusion 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 41 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

To enhance the ability of the U.S. government and the international 

community to plan their assistance programs based on need and provide 

longer term solutions for Iraqi refugees, we recommend that the Secretary 

of State take the following two actions: 

1. Work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, Syria, and other 

relevant host governments to expedite efforts to conduct independent 

comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees 

and the related needs of the countries hosting them. 

2. In conjunction with relevant U. S. agencies and in coordination with 

the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq, 

Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the 

efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and 

develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing 

assistance and solutions for Iraqi refugees. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 

Homeland Security, USAID, and UNHCR. State and USAID provided 

written comments, which are reprinted in appendixes VI and VII, 

respectively. State, DHS, and UNHCR provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated where appropriate. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally agreed with our 

recommendations regarding the need for improvements in measuring 

progress, assessing needs, tracking and reporting funding, and developing 

an international strategic plan for Iraqi refugees. However, State 

commented that it does not measure progress for specific refugee 

populations because such specificity runs counter to State’s principles of 

universality and impartiality. We recognize throughout the report that 

State’s refugee programs help both Iraqi refugees and vulnerable 

populations in the host countries. However, State’s NGO guidelines 

generally require that its projects demonstrate that at least 50 percent of 

beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees. Given the importance of the Iraqi refugee 

situation to the United States, and the fact that State established goals and 

objectives specifically for Iraqi refugees and efforts within Iraq for 2008 

and 2009, we believe that it is important that State establish performance 

measures and indicators that are clearly linked to its goals and objectives. 

Additionally, regarding our recommendation to track and report U.S. 

funding for Iraqi refugee programs, State noted that it is not practicable to 

track and report multilateral contributions for Iraqi refugees at the country 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 42 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

level. We realize that State may not always be able to specifically track and 

report funding that is comingled by multilateral and international 

organizations before being apportioned to projects in each host country. 

However, State could provide Congress with information on the large 

percentage of U.S. contributions to UNHCR appeals and information from 

UNHCR on projects funded in each country. In addition, State should track 

and report bilateral funding for neighboring countries hosting Iraqi 

refugees, funding for its NGO implementing partners, and funding for 

specific multilateral and international organization projects. As a result, 

Congress and the Administration would be better able to assess funding 

requests from Iraq’s neighboring countries and incorporate funding data 

into future planning efforts. 

In response to our recommendation that the USAID Administrator develop 

systems to separately track and report funding for Iraqi refugee programs, 

USAID noted that the issue was resolved because the agency no longer 

provides assistance to Iraqi refugees. We continue to believe that USAID 

needs improvement in tracking and reporting funding for Iraqi refugee 

assistance. First, based on data that USAID provided, it appears that the 

agency is still expending funds on Iraqi refugee programs. Second, the 

agency had considerable difficulty tracking, reporting, and verifying the 

accuracy of its funding data when GAO requested the information, 

resulting in a protracted effort that extended over a period of months. 

USAID had difficulty reconciling its funding data with amounts it 

previously reported to State as Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. 

USAID officials stated that the agency does not have a centralized system 

for tracking funding for Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. To help 

Congress and the Administration consider funding requests for 

neighboring countries and to better incorporate these requests into 

planning efforts, USAID should develop a system for tracking and 

reporting funding for Iraqi refugee assistance. 

Page 43 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, and the Administrator for USAID. We will also make copies 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you 

or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Joseph A. Christoff 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

 and Trade 

Director 

International Affairs

Page 44 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chair 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chair 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chair 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Judd Gregg 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chair 

The Honorable John M. McHugh 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Page 45 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Chair 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns 

Chair 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

Chair 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy 

United States Senate 

Page 46 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Page 47 GAO-09-120 

Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Two U.S. special immigrant visa (SIV) programs afford qualified Iraqis 

with opportunities to immigrate to the United States. Some Iraqi refugees 

may qualify under these programs. The first SIV program, established in 

fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and Afghan translators and their 

dependents and resulted in 2,130 visas issued in fiscal years 2007 and 

2008.1

 The second SIV program, established in fiscal year 2008, targeted 

certain Iraqis who had been U.S. government employees, contractors, or 

subcontractors and their dependents.2

 This program resulted in a total of 

705 visas issued in fiscal year 2008. 

The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Consular Affairs administers 

laws, formulates regulations, and implements policies relating to consular 

services and immigration. Consular Affairs administers two SIV programs, 

in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to 

further assist Iraqis wanting to permanently immigrate to the United 

States. Principal applicants and their families who meet the conditions 

may file a petition (Form I-360) with DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS). The petition is to include information 

about the petitioners and their immediate family members, proof of 

nationality, a favorable recommendation documenting their service, and 

other supporting documents. USCIS examiners evaluate the petition and, if 

it is approved, send it to State’s National Visa Center. The center contacts 

the applicants and sets an embassy or consulate location for a visa 

interview, informs the applicant about the materials and documents 

required, verifies by e-mail that applicants have collected all required 

documents, and may request a security advisory opinion. The applicants 

and family members formally submit their application to a consular officer 

in person at the embassy or consulate. Consular officers interview 

applicants and review documents submitted and security and medical 

clearances and issue an immigrant visa if candidates satisfy all criteria. 

Iraqi SIV recipients are eligible for the same resettlement assistance, 

entitlement programs, and other benefits as Iraqi refugees admitted under 

the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).3

 Finally, DHS officers 

Management and 

Processing of Special 

Immigrant Visas for Iraqis 

 

1

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, Section 1059. 

2

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, Section 1244. 

3

After December 26, 2007, Iraqis and Afghans who receive special immigrant status are 

eligible for a period up to 6 months for resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and 

other benefits available to refugees admitted under section 207 of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L. No.110-161). 

 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs 

verify the entire SIV package upon the applicants’ arrival in the United 

States before granting individuals admission as lawful permanent resident 

aliens. Recipients of SIVs have lawful permanent residence status upon 

entry into the United States and are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship 

after residing for 5 years in the United States. 

The Departments of State and Homeland Security have implemented two 

SIV programs, established by Congress, to further assist qualified Iraqis 

who worked for the U.S. government and want to immigrate to the United 

States.4

 Qualifying Iraqi refugees may apply for these programs. However, 

the Departments of State and Defense have not maintained a complete 

record of Iraqis working for the U.S. government. In August 2008, the 

Congressional Budget Office reported that between 2003 and 2007, an 

estimated 70,500 Iraqi nationals worked as contractors for the U.S. 

government. However, this number does not include Iraqi subcontractors 

because the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development could not provide this information.5

The first SIV program, established under section 1059 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and Afghan 

translators and their dependents and resulted in a total of 2,130 visas 

issued in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as of September 30, 2008. In January 

2006, Congress authorized that up to 50 Iraqi or Afghan translators who 

worked directly with U.S. armed forces and met other conditions as 

outlined in the law could receive SIVs during any fiscal year. Those who 

qualified are known as principal applicants. Spouses and children of 

principal applicants could also receive SIVs, but they were not counted 

against the authorized cap. In June 2007, Congress amended the program, 

authorizing an increase in the limit to 500 SIVs for each fiscal year 2007 

and 2008 and expanding it to cover both translators and interpreters who 

worked directly for the U.S. armed forces and those that worked under the 

State and DHS 

Implemented Two Special 

Immigrant Visa Programs 

That Were Available to 

Qualified Iraqi Refugees 

and Others 

 

4

Under these programs, Iraqi nationals who worked for the U.S. government, as defined in 

each program’s authorizing legislation, and met other conditions are eligible to receive 

special immigrant visas. 

5

Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 

2008 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2008). 

Page 48 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs 

chief of mission authority.6 According to State, given that Congress 

increased the limit late in the fiscal year, the department had little time to 

notify and process an additional 450 applicants. Therefore, according to 

State, it exercised its authority, under section 203(g) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, as amended, to estimate and anticipate the future 

number of visa approvals and thus scheduled far more applicants for 

interviews than the available number of SIVs. According to State, this was 

done on the assumptions that some would not appear for the interview, 

clearances would not be received, or some might not qualify. State 

officials said that while a cutoff date is usually imposed for other 

immigrant visa categories, it was not imposed for this program because 

these applicants faced imminent danger and State did not want to fall 

short of the cap. The result was that State exceeded its 500 limit in fiscal 

year 2007 by issuing 526 SIVs for principal applicants and in fiscal year 

2008 by issuing 560 SIVs for principal applicants (see table 4). 

Table 4: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqi and Afghan Translators/Interpreters and Their Dependents, under 

Section 1059, as of September 30, 2008 

Number of principal applicants 

issued visas 

Number of spouses and children of 

principal applicants issued visas 

Fiscal 

year 

Authorized 

number of 

principal 

applicant visas Iraqi Afghan Other Total Iraqi Afghan Other Total

Total 

number of 

issued visas

2007 500 429 92 5 526 383 69 10 462 988

2008 500 357 202 1 560 350 221 11 582 1,142

Totals 1,000 786 294 6 1,086 733 290 21 1,044 2,130

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Note: “Other” includes Iraqi and Afghani nationals who were born in a country other than Afghanistan 

or Iraq. The State Department tracks data by the applicant’s country of birth. 

The second SIV program, established under section 1244 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, targets certain Iraqis who have 

been U.S. government employees, contractors, or subcontractors and their 

 

6

In fiscal year 2009, however, the authorized number of SIVs for this program will revert to 

50 annually. See An Act to Increase the Number of Iraqi and Afghani Translators and 

Interpreters Who May Be Admitted to the United States as Special Immigrants, and For 

Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 110-36, June 15, 2007. 

Page 49 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs 

Page 50 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 

dependents.7 This program had resulted in 705 visas issued in fiscal year 2008. 

In January 2008, Congress authorized up to 5,000 Iraqis, per year for the next 

5 fiscal years, who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq and 

had experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a 

consequence of that employment and who meet other conditions outlined in 

the law, could receive SIVs. Further, the law allowed that if the 5,000 ceiling 

was not met in any given year, the unused authorized amounts could be 

carried over to the following year. Additionally, spouses and children of 

principal applicants are also eligible to receive SIVs, although these are not 

counted against the 5,000 cap. In June 2008, Congress amended section 1244 

to allow processing to begin immediately and authorized State to convert 

approved section 1059 SIV petitions filed before October 1, 2008, for which a 

visa was not immediately available, to section 1244 SIV petitions.8

 As of 

September 30, 2008, State had issued 371 visas to Iraqi and Afghan principal 

applicants under section 1244, all of which were converted from section 1059 

petitions (see table 5). 

Table 5: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqis and Afghans and Their Dependents, under Section 1244, as of 

September 30, 2008 

Fiscal 

year 

Authorized 

number of 

principal 

applicant visas 

Number of principal applicants 

issued visas 

Number of spouses and children of 

principal applicants issued visas 

Total 

number of 

issued visas 

 Iraqi Afghan Other Total Iraqi Afghan Other Total 

2008 5,000 169 198 4 371 125 195 14 334 705

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Notes: While petitions for these visas were approved under the section 1059 program, since visas 

were not immediately available under this program, they were converted to the section 1244 program 

for issuance. Authority to convert these petitions was given to State and DHS in Pub. Law No. 110-

242 in June 2008. 

“Other” includes Iraqi and Afghan nationals who were born in a country other than Afghanistan or 

Iraq. The State Department tracks data by the applicant’s country of birth. 

 

7

Under the 1244 program, the Chief of Mission or his or her designee is required to conduct 

a risk assessment of the principal applicant and an independent review of records 

maintained by the U.S. government or hiring organization to confirm employment and 

faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government prior to approval of a petition. 

According to State, the Chief of Mission has delegated this responsibility to the Senior 

Coordinator for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. 

8

Pub. L. No. 110-181, as passed in January 2008, did not allow processing to begin until 

fiscal year 2009. However, Pub. L. No. 110-242, passed on June 3, 2008, amended the 

legislation to allow processing to begin in fiscal year 2008 and continue through 2012, and if 

any unused amounts remained, into 2013. 
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs 

According to a May 2008 State Department Office of Inspector General 

report, several challenges may delay processing of Iraqi employees under 

the second SIV program.9

 Officials we spoke with reiterated two key 

challenges: 

• Eligibility screening takes time because no central repository or database 

containing the names of the thousands of Iraqis that have been employed 

on behalf of the U.S. government since March 2003 is available. 

• Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus will require additional staff 

and physical changes to their workspaces to accommodate the increased 

workload, according to the Office of Inspector General and consular 

officers we spoke with in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus. According to 

State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, since the publication of the Office of 

Inspector General report, it has (1) added an officer in Amman and is 

working with the embassy to add additional interview space and an 

interviewing window, and (2) authorized an additional officer and two 

locally employed staff for the consular section in Baghdad. 

 

9

U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector 

General, Middle East Regional Office, Status of Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs 

(May 2008). 

Page 51 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 52 GAO-09-120 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To examine efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, we assessed 

challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. 

goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to 

Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing 

an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. In 

addition, we reviewed the progress made in implementing special 

immigrant visa (SIV) programs for Iraqis, which may also benefit some 

refugees but are not designed specifically for them (see app. I). We also 

conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, 

Italy; Amman, Jordan; Damascus, Syria; and, to a limited extent, Iraq. 

To assess progress in achieving U.S. goals for Iraqi refugees, we 

interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and their 

implementing partners and reviewed their policies, strategies, planning, 

programming, progress reporting, and monitoring documents. We also 

reviewed 13 Department of State interim program evaluation reports and 

13 final nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports to assess progress in 

meeting goals.1

 In Washington, D.C., we met with officials within State’s 

Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) bureau from the Office of 

Policy and Resource Planning and the Office of Assistance for Asia and the 

Near East. We obtained and assessed information on the general 

management of refugee assistance programs, coordination with 

international partners, and progress and program performance reporting. 

In Jordan and Syria, we interviewed U.S. embassy officials responsible for 

monitoring the programs and their implementing partners, including 

UNHCR and nongovernmental organizations. We also toured U.S. and 

UNHCR projects and met with project implementers. We discussed 

implementation and monitoring challenges with NGOs in Washington, 

D.C.; Jordan; and Syria. 

To assess U.S. government and international efforts to provide 

humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and to assess international 

strategic planning efforts to address the Iraqi refugee situation, we 

interviewed officials of the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi governments; 

UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other 

United Nations (UN) agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and 

research institutes. We reviewed and analyzed relevant strategies, funding 

appeals, planning and reporting documentation, studies, and other related 

 

1

We did not assess the reliability of the data in these reports. 

 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

documents. We also held discussion groups with NGOs with a presence in 

Jordan, Syria, and/or Iraq to discuss program and overarching challenges 

and held discussion groups with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to 

discuss their situations, needs, assistance received, and challenges 

encountered. To further assess the numbers and needs of Iraqi refugees, 

we reviewed and assessed the reliability of available assessments and 

report data. To identify the nature and extent of U.S. and international 

funding, we reviewed funding data provided by State’s PRM, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), the UN, UNHCR, and the 

Iraqi government. According to PRM, its official data were obtained from 

its Global Financial Management System. USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign 

Disaster Assistance provided its official data from its Abacus and Phoenix 

systems, and USAID’s Food for Peace program provided its data from its 

Food for Peace Information System, New Management System, and 

Phoenix system. UNHCR’s Donor Relations & Resource Mobilization 

Service, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and 

State’s PRM bureau provided funding data for the UNHCR appeals and 

contributions received by the United States and other donors. To verify 

our summarization of the funding data, we sent out draft tables to agency 

and UN contributors and made supported changes. 

To assess the key challenges the U.S. government and UNHCR face in 

offering solutions for Iraqi refugees and the special immigrant visa 

program, we interviewed and assessed documentation from State’s PRM; 

State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs; State’s Office of Inspector General; the 

Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS); U.S. embassy officials in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq; 

UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IOM, and 

other UN agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and research 

institutes. In the United States, we held discussion sessions with 

nongovernmental organizations with a presence in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. 

In Jordan and Syria, we held discussion sessions with Iraqi refugees and 

visited U.S.- and UN-funded programs. To further assess the U.S. Refugee 

Admissions program, we obtained and assessed data from State’s 

Worldwide Refugee Admissions Program System. We toured State’s 

overseas processing entities managed by IOM and reviewed processing 

steps and data with IOM, USCIS, State, and U.S. embassy officials, 

including refugee coordinators. We analyzed U.S. admissions data and 

found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To 

further address the SIV programs, we reviewed the legislative 

requirements for the two SIV programs found in Section 1059 of the Fiscal 

Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act and Section 1244 of the 

Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. We reviewed 

Page 53 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

relevant documents from the Bureau of Consular Affairs concerning Iraqi 

interpreter/translator SIV program planning, processes, resources, and 

implementation. Also, we met with Consular Affairs officials in 

Washington, D.C.; Iraq; Syria; and Jordan, who provided information on 

general consular management and oversight, visa processing and 

procedures, staffing, and resource needs. We analyzed SIV data and found 

the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 54 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation 

Funds Apportioned to Iraq-Related 

Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended 

Beneficiaries, as of September 30, 2008 

Dollars in millions 

Funding 

Source of funds Agency/ program ApportionedaObligated Expended Intended program beneficiaries 

2003 Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1)/ 

P.L. 108-11 

2004 Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)/ 

P.L. 108-106 

State/ Population, 

Refugees, and 

Migration Bureau 

(PRM) 

$160.5 $160.4 $159.0 In Iraq: Internally displaced 

persons (IDP) and vulnerable 

populationsb

In region: Iraqi refugees and host 

country populationsc

USAID/Office of U.S. 

Foreign Disaster 

Assistance (OFDA) 

129.3 129.3 126.8 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: none 

Food for Peace/ P.L. 480 Title II; 

108-7, P.L. 108-447, P.L. 110-5, 

P.L. 110-161 

USAID/ Office of Food 

for Peace 

218.2 218.2 218.2 In Iraq: IDPs 

In region: Iraqi refugees and host 

country populations 

Food for Peace/P.L. 108-7d USAID/ Office of Food 

for Peace 

191.1 191.1 191.1 In Iraq: Iraqi population 

In region: none 

Migration and Refugee 

Assistance/ P.L. 108-7, P.L. 109-

102, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161 

State/PRM 170.9 170.8 124.7 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees and host 

country populations 

Supplemental for Migration and 

Refugee Assistance/ P.L. 110-28, 

P.L.110-252 

State/PRM 173.5 118.2 48.0 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees and host 

country populations 

International Disaster and Famine 

Assistance/ P.L. 108-7, P.L 107-

115, P.L. 108-447, P.L. 109-102, 

P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 

110-252 

USAID/OFDA 163.5 127.7 59.4 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: none 

2003 Economic Support Fund/ 

P.L. 108-7 

USAID/OFDA 12.0 12.0 11.6 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: none 

2006 Economic Support Fund/ 

P.L. 109-234 

State/PRM 50.0 50.0 31.8 In Iraq: none 

In region: Iraqi refugees and host 

country populations in Jordan, 

Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt 

2007 Supplemental for Economic 

Support Fund/ P.L. 110-28 

USAID/ Office of 

Middle Eastern Affairs 

10.3 10.3 1.2 In Iraq: none 

In region: government of Jordan 

to meet the needs of Iraqi 

refugees and host country 

population 

Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation 

Funds Apportioned to Iraq-Related 

Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended 

Beneficiaries, as of September 30, 2008 

Page 55 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation 

Funds Apportioned to Iraq-Related 

Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended 

Beneficiaries, as of September 30, 2008 

Page 56 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 

 Funding 

Source of funds Agency/ program ApportionedaObligated Expended Intended program beneficiaries 

2008 Supplemental for Economic 

Support Fund/ P.L. 110-252 

State/PRM 45.0 45.0 0 In Iraq: none 

In region: Iraqi refugees in Jordan 

and host country population 

 USAID/ Office of 

Middle Eastern Affairs 

155.0 155.0 110.0 In Iraq: none 

In region: government of Jordan 

to meet the needs of Iraqi 

refugees and host country 

population 

Emergency Refugee and 

Migration Assistancee

 / 

Presidential Determination (P.D.) 

2003-17, P.D. 2003-13, and P.D. 

2001-22, P.D. 2007-31 

State/PRM 51.9 51.6 48.8 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees and host 

country populations 

Development Assistance/ P.L. 

108-7 

USAID/OFDA 28.5 28.5 26.3 In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 

populations 

In region: none 

Child Survival and Health/ P.L. 

108-7 

USAID/OFDA 5.8 5.8 5.7 In Iraq: IDPs 

In region: none 

Total $1,565.5 $1,473.9 $1,162.6 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from the Department of State and USAID. 

a

USAID-apportioned funds also include funds recovered or unallocated in prior years. 

b

Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk; Iraqis who have returned from other 

countries; refugees in Iraq from other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims. 

c

U.S. refugee programs benefit the host country population because countries hosting Iraqi refugees 

in the region, such as Jordan and Syria, do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Iraqi 

refugees. Host countries receiving assistance are identified when the information was made 

available. In instances where the host country is not identified, a portion of the funds was contributed 

to international organizations that may have spent the funds in one or a number of the countries 

hosting Iraqis in the region. 

d

According to USAID, in 2003, USAID’s Food for Peace Program received $191.1 million, which was 

reallocated from funds originally appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic 

Support Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine Assistance 

accounts. 

e

The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund is drawn upon by the 

President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs whenever the President 

determines that it is in the U.S. national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to the 

ERMA fund and remain available until expended. 
Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR 

Appeals for Iraq-Related Humanitarian 

Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, 

Calendar Years 2003 through 2008 

Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR 

Appeals for Iraq-Related Humanitarian 

Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, 

Calendar Years 2003 through 2008 

Dollars in millions 

Amount of appeal funded

UNHCR appeals for Iraq 

Operation 

Amount of 

appeal Carryovera

New 

contributionb

U.S. portion of 

new 

contributions

U.S. portion of 

new 

contributions 

(percentage) 

Intended program 

beneficiaries 

2003 UNHCR Appeal for the 

Iraq Situation, and UNHCR Iraq

Revised Appeal— Ensuring 

Protection and Enabling Returnc

$90.6 0 $77.4 $31.0 40.1% In Iraq: Internally 

displaced persons (IDP) 

and vulnerable 

populationsd

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populationse

2004 UNHCR Iraq Operation 

Appeal 

74.1 $20.2 30.5 16.2 53.1 In Iraq: IDPs and 

vulnerable populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populations 

2005 UNHCR Iraq Operation 

Supplementary Appeal 

42.0 18.9 21.7 19.2 88.6 In Iraq: IDPs and 

vulnerable populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populations 

2006 UNHCR Iraq Operation 

Supplementary Appeal 

29.8 8.9 15.0 8.0 53.3 In Iraq: IDPs and 

vulnerable populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populations 

2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation 

Response, and UNHCR 

Supplementary Appeal Iraq

Situation Responsef

123.7 3.5 112.2 36.0 32.1 In Iraq: IDPs and 

vulnerable populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populations 

UNHCR Portion of 2007 

UNHCR and UNICEF Joint 

Appeal — Providing Education 

Opportunities to Iraqi Children 

in Host Countries: A Regional 

Perspectiveg

 

99.0 0 39.9 30.0 75.2 In Iraq: none 

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populations 

2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation 

Supplementary Appealh

271.1 9.1 245.0 175.4 71.6 In Iraq: IDPs and 

vulnerable populations 

In region: Iraqi refugees 

and host country 

populations 

Total $730.3 Not 

applicable

$541.7 $315.8 58.3% 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs, and the U.S. State Department. 

Page 57 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR 

Appeals for Iraq-Related Humanitarian 

Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, 

Calendar Years 2003 through 2008 

a

Carryover includes funds contributed but not used from prior year. 

b

New contributions include funds from donors for that year’s appeal. 

c

The 2003 UNHCR Iraq Revised Appeal reduced the original appeal from $154.1 million to $90.6 

million. 

d

Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk; Iraqis who have returned from other 

countries; refugees in Iraq from other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims. 

e

Refugee programs benefit the host country population because countries hosting Iraqi refugees in 

the region, such as Jordan and Syria, do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Iraqi 

refugees. 

f

The 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal increased the appeal from $59.7 million to $123.7 

million. UNHCR’s portion of a 2007 Joint Health Sector Appeal and contributions made were folded 

into the 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal. 

g

The UNICEF portion of the Joint Education Appeal included additional funding requirements for 

$31.0 million. The amount of this portion of the appeal that was funded was $9.4 million, including 

$9.0 million in contributions from the United States, representing 95.7 percent of total contributions to 

the UNICEF portion of the Joint Education Appeal. 

h

Contributions to the 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal included here are as of 

December 10, 2008. 

Page 58 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee 

Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance in Syria Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008 

Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance in Syria 

and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008 

Type of assistance provided Syria (individuals) Jordan (individuals)

Food and nonfood itemsa144,900 13,909

Cash assistance 38,234 18,074

Health care 570,000 25,498

Education supportb35,224 10,631

Students supported in public universities 154 Data not available

Legal support 12,930 1,380

Psychosocial services 13,861 6,152

Outreach 72,000 21,128

People with disabilities assisted 779 912

Source: UNHCR data. 

Note: We did not assess the reliability of the data provided by UNHCR. 

a

Food (i.e., oil, rice, lentils, sugar, tea, tomato paste, pasta, and cracked wheat ) and nonfood items 

(i.e., mattresses, blankets, soap, detergent, and sanitary materials) provided to Iraqi refugees in 

Jordan included 5,087 hygiene kits, nonfood items for 602 individuals, and food for 8,220 persons. 

b

Education support provided to Iraqi refugees in Syria included uniforms, shoes, and school materials. 

Education support provided to Iraqi refugees in Jordan included 2,615 school kits, 1,685 school fees, 

vocational training for 2,063 students, nonformal education for 2,493 individuals, and formal 

education provided to 1,775 students. 

Page 59 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department Appendix VI: Comments from the of State 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 60 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 61 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 62 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 63 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 64 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 65 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 66 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 1. 

Page 67 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 2. 

Page 68 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

Page 69 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

The following are GAO’s comments to the Department of State’s letter 

dated March 31, 2009 

1. We added text in the background to describe other components of GAO Comments PRM’s work. 

2. As stated in the draft of this report, in April 2008, State reported that 

UNHCR “effectively monitors 40 to 59 percent of its partners.” In 

State’s written and technical comments, the department notes that the 

statement in its document should have read “implementing partners’ 

program activity sites.” We have revised this report to correct State’s 

reporting error. Further, despite our requests for an updated 

evaluation, State did not provide updated percentages of site visits. 

UNHCR, in its technical comments on the draft, provided evidence on 

the steps it has taken in 2009 to mitigate this challenge. We 

incorporated this information, as appropriate. 

3. This statement was deleted from the text. 

4. We added a footnote to provide information on the 1244 program’s 

requirement for Chief of Mission approval and the approval process. 

Page 70 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

Agency for International Development 

Page 71 GAO-09-120 Iraqi Refugees 
Appendix VIII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 72 GAO-09-120 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov

In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Minty Abraham; Lynn 

Cothern; David Dornisch; Timothy Fairbanks; Kathleen Monahan; Mary 

Moutsos; Andrew Stavisky; and Heather Whitehead made key 

contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Shirley 

Brothwell, Elizabeth Curda, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Etana Finkler, David 

Hancock, and Jeremy Sebest. 

 Iraqi Refugees 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(320565) 
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