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44–947 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–772 

YOUR MONEY, YOUR FUTURE: PUBLIC PENSION 

PLANS AND THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN RETIREMENT SECURITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

July 10, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee 

( 

(II) 

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 

[Created pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress] 

SENATE 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

JOHN SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Vice Chair 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Ranking Minority 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MICHAEL LASKAWY, Executive Director 

CHRISTOPHER J. FRENZE, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MEMBERS

Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr., presiding, a U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania .......... 1 

Hon. Earl Pomeroy (invited to attend), a U.S. Representative from North 

Dakota ................................................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Kevin Brady, a U.S. Representative from Texas ......................................... 17 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar, a U.S. Senator from Minnesota ......................................... 18 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from New York ............... 19 

WITNESSES

Statement of Will Pryor, vice chairman of the Board of Investments, Los 

Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, Pasadena, CA ............... 8 

Statement of P. Sherrill Neff, partner, Quaker BioVentures, Philadelphia, 

PA .......................................................................................................................... 10

Statement of Christian Weller, Ph.D., senior economist, Center for American 

Progress, Washington, DC ................................................................................... 13 

Statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 15

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer, Chairman ......................... 39 

Prepared statement of Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr ............................................. 41 

Letter dated July 10, 2008 from legislative representatives on behalf 

of 20 national organizations to Senator Casey ........................................... 43 

Letter dated July 10, 2008 from Kenneth W. Marzion, CEO of CAlPERS 

to Senator Casey ........................................................................................... 46 

Chart entitled, ‘‘Defined Contribution Plans Are Nearly Four Times as 

Expensive To Administer’’ ............................................................................ 48 

Chart entitled, ‘‘Defined Benefit Plans Provide Better Income Security 

for Retirees’’ ................................................................................................... 49 

Prepared statement of Representative Earl Pomeroy .......................................... 50 

Prepared statement of Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Vice Chair ............ 52 

Prepared statement of Senator Sam Brownback .................................................. 53 

Article, ‘‘The Other Real Estate Disaster,’’ Forbes Magazine, July 21, 

2008 ................................................................................................................ 56 

Article, ‘‘A Code of Silence,’’ Forbes Magazine, July 21, 2008 ...................... 62 

Prepared statement of Will Pryor, vice chairman of the Board of Investments, 

Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, Pasadena, CA ........ 64 

Prepared statement of P. Sherrill Neff, partner, Quaker BioVentures, Philadelphia, PA ........................................................................................................... 67 

Prepared statement of Christian Weller, Ph.D., senior economist, Center for 

American Progress, Washington, DC ................................................................. 70 

Prepared statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce 

and Income Security Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 78 

(1) 

YOUR MONEY, YOUR FUTURE: PUBLIC PENSION PLANS AND THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN RETIREMENT SECURITY AND ECONOMIC 

GROWTH 

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2008 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met at 10 a.m. in room SD–106 of the Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, the Honorable Robert P. Casey, Jr., presiding. 

Senators present. Casey, Schumer, and Klobuchar. 

Representatives present. Brady, Pomeroy, and Cummings. 

Staff present. Christina Baumgardner, Ted Boll, Chris Frenze, 

Tamara Fucile, Jim Gilroy, Gretta Goodwin, Rachel Greszler, Colleen Healy, Robert O’Quinn, Jeff Schlagenhauf, Annabelle 

Tamerjan, Christina Valentine, and Jeff Wrase. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator Casey [presiding]. The hearing will now come to order. 

I want to thank everyone for taking the time to be here this morning. 

I’ll give you an outline of how we’ll proceed from this point. I am 

going to deliver an opening statement, and then we’ll turn to Members of the Committee. 

Well see, in terms of who appears, in what order, and we’ll try 

to accommodate Members. It’s a busy morning for both the Senate 

and the House, and we’ll be as accommodating as we can. 

Why don’t I just start with my opening, and then we’ll eventually 

get to our witnesses. We’ll have Members who will be delivering 

opening statements, as well, but we’ll try to keep within the 5- 

minute window that we, of course, ask our witnesses to comply 

with, so we’ll try to do that, as well. 

But I do want to thank everyone for taking the time to be here. 

I was saying to the Congressman, Congressman Pomeroy, that the 

Joint Economic Committee has had an opportunity to review a lot 

of important issues over many years. 

I’ve been in the Senate 18 months, but I’m not sure we’ve ever 

had this big room, and I gave him the credit for it, of course, because he’s the one sitting next to me. 

[Laughter.] 

2 

Senator Casey. But it’s nice to have the extra room in a great 

hearing room, and we’re grateful for that today. 

The subject of our hearing today, sounds rather obscure to many 

Americans, and even to all of us here on Capitol Hill: The role of 

defined benefit pension plans in the American Economy. 

However, this type of pension plan plays an important role, a 

very important role, for reasons that we’ll explore today. 

Historically, most public and private employers offered their employees defined benefit plans, which pay an annuity based upon the 

employee’s salary and years of service upon retirement. 

Under this arrangement, employers and employees share the 

risk, share the risk of loss of market declines or bad investments 

of retirement assets and other risks. 

Employers offering defined benefit pension plans take on the responsibility of investing retirement funds, either directly, or 

through outside fund managers. 

By contrast, defined contribution plans, like the 401(k)s that 

most people have today, allocate all investment risk to employees. 

Over the past 30 years, defined benefit plans have come under severe attack. That’s an understatement. 

In the private sector, corporate defined benefit plans have declined substantially. Just consider this: In 1975, not too long ago, 

88 percent of private-sector workers were covered by defined benefit plans—88 percent. In 2005, that number had shrunk to 33 percent of the private-sector workforce. 

There have been a number of well publicized attempts to eliminate defined benefit plans for public pension funds and multi-employer, or so-called Taft-Hartley funds. 

Just today, in fact, in the New York Times, an op ed blames the 

demise of General Motors on its defined benefit pension plan. It 

seems a little strange to me to blame the struggles of a company 

that has gone from 50-percent market share to 20-percent market 

share, on the men and women working on the line. 

We’ll have some debate about this, but that’s basically, in my 

judgment, what that op ed does. I’m sure we’ll have some disagreement about that. This is America and we can disagree, right? 

I would also note that the article in today’s New York Times 

mentions in passing that General Motors fell behind on fully funding its pension obligations. That’s a continuing theme in this discussion. 

That has the double costs of requiring increased contributions 

later and losing out on market gains in good times. 

The GM case only proves that underfunding retirement needs 

has long-term costs. That’s true of any retirement plan, whether 

it’s defined benefit or defined contribution. 

I served a decade in Pennsylvania as an elected official, in two 

Statewide elected offices, the Office of the Auditor General and the 

Office of State Treasurer, and I took a particular interest in the 

two-State public pension funds for teachers and for public employees, which are traditional defined benefit plans. 

As Auditor General, I audited both funds, and as State Treasurer, I served as Trustee for both funds. It gave me an insight and 

gave my staff an insight into the benefits of a well-run defined benVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 May 27, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\44947.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
3 

efit plan, and in both cases, both for retirees and for our economy 

as a whole. 

Defined benefit plans have been proven to earn better returns 

than defined contribution plans over the long run. For example, a 

recent study showed that defined benefit plans outperformed defined contribution plans by 1.8 percent per year over an 8-year 

time period. 

This is because defined benefit plans are professionally managed, 

particularly in their asset allocation decisions, and in addition, 

have access to alternative investments like venture capital, private 

equity, real estate, and hedge funds. 

These ‘‘patient capital’’ investments actually increase the return 

to a pension fund, while reducing overall risk to the fund’s portfolio. Alternative asset categories have low correlation with other 

asset classes. 

That is, they don’t behave—and I know this, for even people who 

have been exposed to this, this gets a little murky, some of the terminology for the uninitiated, but basically, what we’re talking 

about there when we talk about the correlation question, is they 

don’t behave in the same way that private equity or fixed income 

markets do, so that when stocks go down, investments like venture 

capital may not, so it’s—it’s kind of counterintuitive, and the experts here will explain this better than I will. 

Defined benefit plans are a key factor in attracting and keeping 

excellent teachers, firefighters, police, social workers, and other 

employees. We can’t say this enough. It’s lost in the discussion. 

One of the biggest problems we have in America today, in terms 

of our workforce and in terms of meeting priorities like public safety, like healthcare—go down the list—is recruitment and retention. 

I hear it all the time in the healthcare field. 

In order to take care of those in the twilight of their lives, older 

citizens, we’ve got to recruit and retain qualified healthcare personnel. 

We hear it in the context of so many other parts of our economy, 

and the same is true when it comes to our pension plans and those 

who are doing this important work, like teachers and firefighters 

and police officers and social workers and other public employees. 

The best and the brightest of our policemen and policewomen, 

firefighters, and teachers have a big incentive to stay in their jobs 

rather than switch careers because of the promise of pension benefits in retirement. 

Multi-employer or Taft-Hartley defined benefit plans play the 

same role for workers in many of our important industries, including manufacturing, building trades, and others, as well. 

Money invested in defined benefit plans typically stays there 

until the employee leaves or retires, and as a result, defined benefit 

plans can invest in less liquid, alternative asset classes such as 

venture capital, which are crucial to job creation, particularly in 

high-tech industries. 

This is also lost in the discussion. These discussions aren’t limited to the employees. These discussions aren’t limited to the jargon and the terminology. The discussions we’ll have today impact 

the wider economy, whether we’re competitive or not in a world 

economy, whether we create high-tech jobs or not. 

4 

So this isn’t some distant, obscure topic. This is about creating 

jobs and building an economy here in America. 

Over 40 percent of investment capital for venture capital funds 

in the United States now comes from defined benefit plans—40 percent. 

Today, we’ll hear from a number of witnesses. We’ll hear from 

four: An active firefighter from Los Angeles who’s also a Trustee 

of his defined benefit pension fund; a well-known economist who 

has written extensively about this issue; a venture capitalist from 

Philadelphia who manages money for a number of defined benefit 

plans and invests in the biotech industry; and a representative of 

the General Accountability Office, who has studied this subject. 

During this hearing, I believe there is one broader issue we must 

all keep in mind, and that is the issue of how we allocate risk in 

our society. It concerns me that some here in Washington and 

across America, want ordinary Americans to assume sole liability 

for decisions regarding their healthcare, their pension, and their 

Social Security. 

These are risks that have been traditionally shared with employers or with the Government. If we also want people to take 21st 

century global economy type risks like changing jobs, stopping out 

for more education and training, or—and those starting their own 

businesses, we cannot also dump all of the risk of healthcare and 

retirement on them. 

I’m also concerned that moving billions of dollars of retirement 

assets from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans adds 

substantially to the risk we’re asking ordinary Americans, our 

workers, to take. 

I plan to ask each of the witnesses today, as well as a number 

of our other interested parties, for specific recommendations on 

what to do about the future of defined benefit plans, and at a minimum, we should ensure that the circumstances that led to the decline of defined benefit plans in the corporate world are not repeated in the public or Taft-Hartley sectors. 

With economic stability and economic security on the minds of all 

Americans, I look forward to discussing these issues with our witnesses today. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Casey appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 41.] 

Senator Casey. Now, at this time, I’ll turn to Congressman 

Pomeroy for his opening, and we’ll go from there. Congressman, 

thank you very much for being here today and for your long and 

enduring work on this important issue. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EARL POMEROY, A U.S. 

REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Representative Pomeroy. Chairman Casey, thank you. This is 

a good week for pensions, and it was about time we had a good 

week on Capitol Hill. 

Yesterday, the House passed on the Suspension Calendar, at long 

last, the Technical Corrections Act for the Pension Protection Act. 

Importantly, it included additions that were initiated by the Senate, relative to asset-smoothing, as well as credited interest rates 

for public plans. 

5 

These had been missing in the initial Technical Corrections Act 

passed by the House. They are important, in fact, vital improvements, and I’m very pleased that the Senate took its action, very 

pleased that the House passed the bill with a strong bipartisan 

vote on the Suspension Calendar. 

The second dimension of this being a good week is this hearing, 

Mr. Chairman. 

I have now been in Congress for more than 15 years and I have 

been astounded at the absence of discussion, the lack of hearing 

oversight and inquiry into this seismic shift we’ve seen in the retirement savings area, from the defined benefit structure to the defined contribution structure. 

We moved from where the participation in savings from a universal context in a defined benefit plan, to voluntary context in a 

defined contribution plan; placing investment decisions upon the 

employee, even while investment advice was lacking; expecting 

Baby Boomers entering a whole new medical world, in terms of 

what might be expected in terms of life expectancy and retirement 

years, expecting them to self-insure the longevity risk and make 

their assets match the expected time on earth. 

All of those are tremendous risk elements transferred to the individual in the defined contribution context. It’s occurred, not only 

without any particular point of concern being raised on Capitol 

Hill, but we have certainly, in my opinion, made all the wrong 

moves in terms of strategies to preserve defined benefit structures. 

I cite, in particular, the Pension Protection Act advanced by the 

Department of Labor, and cheerleaded by the Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation, even while they failed to evaluate what 

might be the consequences for plan freezing under the new stringent funding requirements. 

Well, it all has been a very bleak picture, one we need to turn 

around, because we’re on the precipice, in my opinion, of a very serious income security and retirement crisis. 

One-third of the Boomers on the doorstep of retirement have no 

financial assets, as reported by the GAO. The median savings of 

those with financial assets is $45,900. 

The 2008 Retirement Confidence Survey reflected a drop of onethird in terms of confidence, with only 18 percent of workers very 

confident that they’ll have assets through the retirement years, 

down from 27 percent a single year before. 

I believe, for these reasons, you’re precisely spot-on in finding a 

public good in pensions, and therefore, something Congress and the 

Administration ought to be advancing is ways to enhance and protect and stabilize this component of the retirement picture. 

But we’re seeing exactly the opposite occur when 3.3 million 

workers have seen their pension benefits frozen in some way. The 

most recent PBGC data on insured plans has found that single-employer plans frozen at the end of the year in 2005, increased by 48 

percent over the 2-year period in 2003. 

And we can certainly expect that this period with stringent funding requirements, a market downturn, and low interest rates is 

going to be, in my opinion, deeply punishing on those corporations 

that want to continue to fund pension plans. Many will freeze their 

plans. 

6 

There is good news, and I know you’re going to have it as a part 

of this hearing in the public pension plans. They protect the retirement security of 12 percent of the Nation’s workforce; $150 billion 

in the checkbooks of 7 million retirees every year. The trustees invest $3 trillion of assets into our economy. They, 

as you mentioned, ensure that those who serve the public are going 

to have their needs met through the defined benefit structure in 

their retirement years. 

Without oversight and regulations, these pensions have funded 

nearly 90 percent of their outstanding retirement liabilities. Now, 

some plans are underfunded, but let us not confuse that for the 

broad picture. 

In the broad picture, they are 90-percent funded. Alicia Munnell 

at the Center for Retirement Research, has said, quote, ‘‘the miraculous aspect of the funding of State and local pensions, is that they 

have been fully funded without Federal law having application to 

their funding levels.’’ 

Well, I believe that it is very important that we early and strongly push back on those, in my opinion, that want to continue their 

effort to take down the defined benefit structure in the private sector by now looking at the public sector, to continue this same assault on the defined benefit pension structure. 

I don’t think that this has all been accidental, Mr. Chairman. I 

believe there are those that wanted to take this protection away 

from the American worker, and I think that it is completely wrongheaded, as wrong-headed as the efforts to privatize Social Security. 

So, I think that having the information about the value of these 

plans and assessing their funding structure in a calm and reasonable way is precisely what’s critically been lacking from the discussions on Capitol Hill. I’m so pleased that you’re adding it here this 

morning. 

I’m going to have to take my leave, regrettably, from this hearing. I anticipated being here all morning, but the House Agriculture Committee, of which I am a member, is looking at speculative activity in the commodities marketplace. That will involve pension funds, too, and I need to excuse myself to participate in that 

hearing, but I thank you very much for allowing me to make these 

words, and I’ll have a statement for the record, if you’d agree to 

accept it. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Pomeroy appears in 

the Submissions for the Record on page 50.] 

Senator Casey. Well, Congressman, I appreciate your being 

here, and for your work on this. I hope that with your departure 

we can still stay in the room that you got us. Is that OK? 

[Laughter.] 

Representative Pomeroy. Yes. As a House member, I would 

say, yes, use any facility over here you like. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator Casey. And we will make sure your statement is made 

part of the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. 

Representative Pomeroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Casey. Thank you. And also I want to note that we’ll 

have other Members who, if they don’t appear, will have statements for the record. 

7 

I do want to note two things for the record, before I introduce 

our witnesses: One is that I want to note my receipt of written correspondence from 19 different national organizations representing 

State and local governments and officials, public employee unions, 

public retirement systems, and more than 20 million public employees and beneficiaries expressing support for our efforts on this 

issue. 

I’d like to submit that for the record. 

[Correspondence referenced above appears in the Submissions for 

the Record on page 43.]) 

Senator Casey. And also for the record, Congresswoman Maloney, who is a co-Chair of this Committee, has asked that her statement be made part of the record. 

She’s attending a House hearing today, with Chairman Bernanke 

of the Federal Reserve Board, as well as Treasury Secretary 

Paulson, so that’s obviously a significant conflict, and we wanted 

to note that. She’s here virtually every hearing we’ve had, and I appreciate her leadership, in general on the Committee, but also in 

particular, her work on issues like pensions, and income, retirement and economic security. 

But I wanted to note that she’ll have a statement for the record, 

which we will include. 

And, as we go, we’ll have other statements for the record, as 

well. 

[The prepared statements of Representative Maloney and Senator Brownback appear in the Submissions for the Record on pages 

52 and 53, respectively.] 

Senator Casey. What I’ll do, I think, now, is, rather than introduce our witnesses all at one time, what I think I’ll do, is introduce 

each witness and just do a summary of their biography, have them 

do their statement, and then we’ll go to the next witness. 

I think I’m going to be going left to right here. Mr. Pryor will 

be first, and I’ll just do a quick summary of his biography. 

William Pryor is vice chairman of the Los Angeles County Employee Retirement Association. He is currently serving as Chair of 

that Association. He’s an active-duty firefighter. Talk about someone who’s in the trenches, understanding the challenges we face 

with this issue, he’s an active-duty firefighter in the county of Los 

Angeles. 

He’s stationed in Huntington Park, he has been an elected trustee of that association since 1999. The Association has a $40 billion 

pension plan that provides a defined benefit pension and retiree 

healthcare program to over 90,000 retirees of the county of Los Angeles. 

Mr. Pryor has spent—has represented, I should say, 19 years 

doing the work of representing the work of firefighters as an IAFF 

Union representative in Los Angeles County, and has held several 

positions in the local union. 

He’s an active trustee and an executive board member of the National Conference of Public Employee Retirement Systems, known 

by the acronym, NCPERS. 

He speaks frequently on the economic impact of defined benefit 

pension plans, and the necessity of defending those plans from political and corporate-sponsored attacks. 

8 

He’s an active member and supporter of the Council of Institutional Investors, and the International Corporate Governance Network, the so-called ICGN, as they advocate for open markets and 

providing value to investors through good corporate governance. 

Mr. Pryor lives in Long Beach, California, and spends his offduty time with his family. Mr. Pryor, we thank you for being here, 

for making the long trip, and for your witness here today as someone who is not just familiar with these issues, but has lived the life 

of a firefighter, and we commend you for that work. 

Try, as best you can, to keep it at 5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF WILL PRYOR, VICE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, PASADENA, CA 

Mr. Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today I’d like to discuss 

the importance of pensions to my fellow firefighters, as well as the 

importance of the pension benefits and pension fund investments 

to our local and national economies. 

Long before firefighters learn how to make a hydrant at a real 

fire or the right way to pull a ceiling, we learn the importance 

about our pensions. 

Veteran firefighters make it a point to take rookies aside and let 

them know, under no uncertain terms, what their pensions mean 

to them and what their pensions will have, once that rookie puts 

some time on the job. 

Admittedly, this is a self-serving conversation. These veteran 

firefighters are ensuring that their own futures will be protected by 

a new generation willing to take future fights to save their pensions and support their unions’ fights for quality retirement. 

For firefighters, a pension means that we will have time to heal 

our bodies after 33 years of service. Seventy-six percent of my 

members, leave the job with an injury that prevents them from future work that is any more strenuous than sedentary. 

This pension helps them to have a decent salary replacement 

that will never run out, good medical care, and solid survivor benefits for their families when they die, which may be in the line of 

service. 

Our pension system also provides to the residents we serve. Our 

Department spends a lot of money training its employees. Paramedic duties, hazardous materials, arson detection, urban search 

and rescue, wild land firefighting and fire prevention, are not easily learned and very expensive to train. 

Offering a good pension with a benefit payout, only after vesting 

or spending a career with that agency, makes it less likely that employees will leave the job after getting this training and experience. 

The public pensions do more than ensure that a community has 

good public servants. They also mean that when a public employee 

retires, they can support their local economy, rather than needing 

to compete with the local job market, or being a drain on local public services. 

In the aggregate, public pension payments have had a huge impact on California’s economy. As detailed in my written testimony, 

public pension payments to California public employment retirees 

9 

in 2006 reached $25.5 billion with a total economic impact of some 

$41.5 billion in the California economy. 

By design and with great success, California’s retirement systems also invest heavily in California. They are a key player in private venture, public equity, and real estate investment centered in 

our State. 

These investments mean jobs, many jobs for Californians, that 

otherwise may have not been created. These investments also 

mean significant community improvements. 

While our pension assets fund real estate projects across the 

board, all projects have bettered the communities we serve. Urban 

in-fill projects, develop inner city properties into housing for middle-income workers, who otherwise would face a 3-hour commute, 

just to get to work. 

We’re also funding rural revitalization programs. 

What our pension plans are doing for California, is not unique. 

Traditional defined benefit pension plans in both public and private 

sectors, play an important role in the overall U.S. and international 

economic cycle. 

Pension plans play a unique profile as asset managers. They are 

long-term, patient investors who generally base investment decisions on annual returns or on returns over several years, not just 

the next quarter. 

Where retail funds or even institutional funds have immediate 

demands to produce over the short term, pension plans are able to 

make the sorts of investments that may not be fully realized for as 

long as 20 years. 

Pension plans can also use their capital to smooth economic volatility, as we’re seeing in the current credit crisis. Specifically, many 

lenders have shuttered their doors to many kinds of financing, including private equity. 

Pension plans, however, are making private equity investments 

at a high rate, plugging the hold that the lending banks have left, 

and have provided much needed capital into the economy. 

In conclusion, I’d like to thank you for giving me the time today, 

letting me share with you, what my fellow firefighters have known 

for years. Traditional public pension plans are sound retirement vehicles that not only act as an employee benefit, but also have a tremendous impact on those who we serve. I’d be happy to answer any 

questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pryor appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 64.] 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Mr. Pryor. I think you 

came under the limit. That never happens in Washington. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. Pryor. Well, when I read it last night, it was right at 5 minutes. I don’t know what happened. 

Senator Casey. It sometimes happens with witnesses; it never 

happens with the United States Senators. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator Casey. So we’re grateful. I’m allowed to say that. 

Mr. Pryor. No comment. 

[Laughter.] 

10 

Senator Casey. I can say that and no one can do anything to 

me when I say it. 

Our next witness is P. Sherrill Neff, who is a partner in Quaker 

BioVentures. He’s founding partner of Quaker BioVentures. 

Mr. Neff was previously chairman of the Greater Philadelphia 

Venture Group, and also was president of the Pennsylvania Biotechnology Association. 

He sits on several boards of directors. I won’t mention every one 

of them. Prior to forming Quaker BioVentures, he was president, 

chief operating officer, and director of a technology company, a publicly traded life sciences company. 

He also was senior vice president of Corporate Development at 

U.S. Healthcare, and also formerly a managing director in the Investment Banking Division of Alex Brown and Sons, and formerly 

a lawyer with the law firm of Morgan, Lewis and Bachius, a tiny 

little law firm in Philadelphia and other places—no, it’s actually 

very large. 

Mr. Neff is a graduate of Wesleyan University and the University of Michigan Law School. I would say for the record that I know 

him and he’s obviously a Pennsylvanian, so we have no bias here 

at all. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator Casey. But we’re grateful for your presence here, and 

look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF P. SHERRILL NEFF, PARTNER, QUAKER 

BIOVENTURES, PHILADELPHIA, PA 

Mr. Neff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good morning. Quaker 

BioVentures is a venture capital firm that invests only in life 

sciences. 

Currently, we manage over $700 million in total committed capital, of which approximately 75 percent comes from large public 

and private defined benefit plans. Our current investors include ten 

different public pension funds from six different States, and also 

major corporate defined benefit plans. 

Today I’d like to explain how the venture capital industry raises 

and invests its money, the economic implications of this investment, and the importance of defined benefit plans in that equation. 

Venture capital is a relatively small but extremely unique subsector of what many institutional investors refer to as alternative 

assets. Venture capital funds are set up as limited partnerships, 

generally, in which sophisticated institutional investors or limited 

partners, LPs, provide capital to a fund managed by a group of 

venture capitalists or general partners, GPs. 

The GPs then invest this capital, along with their own capital, 

in very high-risk private, startup, and early stage companies that 

demonstrate a tremendous promise for high growth over a very 

long term. 

Our typical investment horizon for a venture-backed company, is 

5 to 10 years, often longer, and, given the very high-risk nature of 

this investment, many venture-backed companies ultimately fail. 

However, those that do succeed, return top dollar to investors 

and create many jobs and revenues for the U.S. economy. 

11 

You’ve heard today about many of the positive contributions that 

defined benefit plans offer their participants. I would like to address an attribute that may be less well known, and that is the role 

of these plans in the funding and growth of the venture capital industry, and more importantly, the young, innovative companies 

that make up the entrepreneurial segment of the U.S. economy. 

Defined benefit pension plans have historically been a sizable 

and reliable pool of capital for venture fund formation, and thereby, 

for investment into the Nation’s emerging growth companies. 

The U.S. venture capital industry would not be the economic engine it is today, without the strong investment participation from 

defined benefit plans. 

The growing importance of these private plans in the retirement 

income equation was begun in 1974 with the enactment of ERISA, 

followed by the 1979 issuance of the Labor Department’s Prudence 

Regulation which interpreted ERISA as allowing pension plans to 

invest in young, smaller companies. 

As a direct result of the Prudent Man Rule, a relatively small allocation of money from public and private pension funds began to 

flow at that time into the venture capital space. 

Back in 1980, private independent venture funds had just a total 

of $4 billion in capital under management, and that has risen to 

$257 billion in capital under management in 2007. Much of this 

growth is attributable to the success of venture capital investment 

and the receptivity of defined benefit plans to the high returns the 

asset class has afforded them. 

The mix of limited partners is changing. Because many U.S.- 

based private pension plans have been converted from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans over the past years, we are 

seeing fewer private pension plans actively investing in venture. 

This has been particularly acute on the corporate side so far. 

Filling that gap are LPs from outside the United States, including 

foreign public and private pension funds, who are becoming increasingly interested in investing in U.S.-based venture capital 

funds. 

U.S. public pension plans continue to be critical and reliable 

sources of capital for U.S. venture funds. Most State pension funds 

and many local public pension funds invest a small portion of their 

assets in venture capital because they understand that venture 

capital can deliver high returns that boost the overall financial position of the fund. 

Today, all but a few States permit their public pension funds to 

invest a small amount of their assets into the venture capital asset 

class. States that have been long-term venture capital investors include California, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 

Venture capitalists who take defined benefit pension plans into 

their funds do so because these fund managers are long-term patient investors who understand the nuances and risks of venture 

investing. 

When a defined benefit pension plan invests in a venture capital 

fund, it is not only creating higher returns for its pensioners, but 

it’s also supporting one of our country’s most important economic 

engines. 

12 

Literally thousands of companies would not exist today were it 

not for the venture capital investment support they received early 

on. 

In our portfolio alone, our companies are developing novel approaches to eye disease, diabetes, depression, infectious disease, 

cancer, rare genetic diseases, et cetera. 

On the tech side of the world, similarly, companies whose names 

are now newspaper headlines, like Cisco, Google, eBay, Yahoo, 

FedEx, et cetera, and countless other companies were all at one 

time or another, just ideas that needed startup capital. 

Last year, U.S.-based venture capital-backed companies accounted for more than 10.4 million jobs and generated over $2.3 

trillion in aggregate revenue. Nearly 1 out of every 10 private-sector jobs is at a company that was originally venture-backed. 

Almost 18 percent of our U.S. GPD comes from venture-backed 

companies. None of this would have been possible without the active investment of public and private defined benefit pension plans. 

The relationship between the venture industry and defined benefit managers is symbiotic, and it creates high returns for investors 

and their beneficiaries, and it also creates high returns for the U.S. 

economy. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to weigh in on this important issue. 

[The prepared statement of P. Sherrill Neff appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 67.] 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. We’re joined by Senator 

Klobuchar and Representative Brady. I know that in the Senate 

we’ll be having a vote, probably in about 10 minutes or 15 minutes, 

so we may have to intersperse some opening statements between 

our witnesses. 

But let me introduce our third witness, Dr. Christian E. Weller 

who is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. 

His expertise is in the area of retirement income security, macro 

economics, and international finance. 

Prior to joining the Center for American Progress, he was on the 

research staff of the Economic Policy Institute where he remains 

a research associate. 

Dr. Weller has also worked at the Center for European Integration Studies at the University of Bonn in Germany and also is a 

respected academic with close to 100 publications. Don’t worry, we 

won’t read all those today. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator Casey. He was also, in 2006, awarded the Outstanding 

Scholar Practitioner Award from the Labor and Employment Relations Association. 

He’s frequently cited in the press and is often a guest on national 

TV and radio programs. He’s got a Ph.D. in Economics from the 

University of Massachusetts. 

Dr. Weller, thank you for your presence here, and we look forward to your testimony. 

13 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN WELLER, PH.D. SENIOR ECONOMIST, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. Weller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Members 

of the Committee for inviting me here today for this important 

hearing. 

In my testimony today, I will make the case that public sector 

defined benefit pension plans offer adequate retirement benefits on 

a sustainable and efficient basis. 

Consider for a minute, if you will, what a model retirement 

would look like and compare that to what actually defined benefit 

plans in the public sector look like. 

First of all, such a plan would offer broad coverage. In the public 

sector, eligible public-sector employees are automatically enrolled. 

Second, funds would be secure for retirement. In the State and 

local DB plans, beneficiaries typically cannot borrow from their 

pension; there are no lump-sum payments, and plan sponsors typically do not liquidate. 

Third, the plan would offer lifetime benefits, and because assets 

are secure, public-sector pension plans are better suited than other 

plans to offer annuity lifetime income. 

Fourth, benefits would be portable between jobs. Often if employees move to another Government position within the State, or in 

some cases, out of State, they can purchase service credits. 

Fifth, the plan would offer survivorship and disability benefits. 

State and local government DB plans typically provide survivorship 

and disability benefits for workers and their families. 

Disability benefits are particularly important for State and Government employees in hazardous occupations, such as police officers and firefighters. 

Survivorship benefits are particularly important for women who 

still tend to have much lower retirement incomes and higher life 

expectancies than men. 

Sixth, both employers and employees would contribute to a plan. 

In the public sector, employer contributions comprised about 18 

percent of all public pension revenue from 1996 to 2006. Investment earnings made up 73 percent of revenue and employee contributions accounted for the remaining 9 percent. 

Seventh, the assets would be professionally managed. In analyzing public-sector pension plan investment behavior, Professor 

Jeffrey Winger from the University of Georgia and I found that 

State and local plans exercise a great deal of prudence in their 

asset allocation and that these plans may have actually become 

more cautious in their asset allocation following a period of underfunding after 2000. 

Eighth, participants would face loan costs and fees. Costs are relatively low for DB plans, and I’ll talk more about this later due to 

economies of scale, professional management, and risk-sharing. 

Because public-sector plans typically meet all of the criteria for 

a model retirement plan, beneficiaries receive secure retirement 

benefits, the private sector enjoys a source of stable, long-term financing, and governments can allocate taxpayer dollars in a fiscally responsible manner. 

Let me talk a little bit about adequate retirement benefits. The 

National Institute of Retirement Security recently summarized the 

14 

evidence on DB pensions and adequate retirement income and 

found that retirees with DB pensions are much more likely to have 

adequate retirement income than those relying solely on DC plans. 

Public-sector plans offer adequate, but not lavish retirement benefits. In simulations done for Pennsylvania, my co-authors and I 

found that a typical retiree can come close to but not exceed a typical standard of adequate retirement income equal to about 75 to 

80 percent of pre-retirement earnings. 

These plans are efficiently run. This retirement is achieved efficiently. It is estimated that asset management fees average just 25 

basis points for public pension plans, or between 35 to 145 basis 

points less than for individual accounts. 

That adds up substantially over long periods of time. Also, DB 

plans can take advantage of broader diversification strategies, allocating a small percentage of their holdings to so-called alternative 

investments in venture capital, hedge funds, and private equity. 

These investments can help to improve the returns of a plan’s 

portfolio, by introducing assets whose returns are not correlated 

with each other. Professionally managed DB plans consistently outperform individually managed DC plans. 

One widely cited estimate from the Center for Retirement Research, puts the difference in annual return at 0.8 percentage 

points. Other estimates are even larger than that. 

Further, DB plans lower costs by pooling mortality risks. Because an individual does not know what their ultimate lifespan will 

be, each person must ensure that he or she accumulates enough 

savings to last for the maximum lifespan and not just the average 

lifespan, as would be the case under a DB plan. 

A DB plan will require fewer assets to be accumulated than the 

comparable DC plan, reducing costs by 15 to 35 percent. 

Finally in conclusion, public-sector retirees will be secure in their 

golden years and less likely to rely on public assistance, which is 

often offered through State and local government employees to retirees who do not have enough private savings. 

Public-sector plans serve as a patient source of capital for many 

productive investments because they are prudently managed with 

a long-term investment horizon. 

And finally, they are ultimately an efficient and sustainable retirement savings vehicle for public employers managing fiscally responsible taxpayer dollars. 

Consequently, many design features DB plans already apply to 

DC plans, and automatic savings, universal coverage, and safer, 

lower-cost investment options are among them. 

In the end, though, much of what public-sector DB plans can 

offer will be hard or impossible to recreate in the DC setting, hence 

policymakers at the Federal and the State level should help 

strengthen existing DB plans in the private sector and the public 

sector where appropriate, as well. 

Thank you very much for the chance to talk to you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Weller appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 70.] 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. Our fourth witness is 

Barbara Bovbjerg, who is the Director of Education, Workforce, and 

15 

Income Security Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

In that capacity, Barbara oversees evaluative studies on aging 

and retirement income policy issues, including Social Security and 

private pension programs; operations and management at the Social Security Administration, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, and the Employee Benefits Security Administration of the 

Department of Labor. 

She was previously Assistant Director of Budget Issues at the 

GAO where she managed a variety of budget policy projects, including studies on the long-term effects of budget deficits. 

Before joining GAO, she led the Citywide Analysis Unit of the 

DC Budget Office and analyzed State and local government finance 

issues for the Urban Institute, as well. 

She holds a Master’s Degree in public policy from Cornell University, and a B.A. from Oberlin College, and we appreciate her 

being here today and look forward to her testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF BARBARA D. BOVBJERG, DIRECTOR, EDUCATION, WORKFORCE, AND INCOME SECURITY ISSUES, U.S. 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. Bovbjerg. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. One thing my 

bio didn’t mention was that I was born in the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania. 

Senator Casey. I’m very happy to hear that. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. I did mean to put it on there. 

Senator Casey. You get an extra 15 minutes. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. OK. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. Bovbjerg. All right, thank you. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I should have said in my bio 

that we have also been doing work on public plans over at GAO. 

I am especially pleased to be here today. We’ve done a couple of 

reports in the last year on public plans and have not yet had an 

opportunity to speak about them before Members of Congress, so 

we’re especially excited. 

As Mr. Pomeroy had noted earlier, there are nearly 20 million active employees and 7 million retirees and dependents who rely on 

the pension promises of State and local governments. 

And although these pension plans are largely not subject to Federal laws that govern plans in the private sector, the retirement security of millions of public employees is nonetheless a Federal concern, and that’s why we’re here today. 

Today, my testimony describes the structure of the benefit plans 

and their financial soundness, and it is, again, based on the reports 

we issued last year. 

With regard to plan structures, most State and local governments offer the traditional defined benefit pensions as the primary 

plan for their workers, as we’ve heard from other witnesses. Nationwide, about 90 percent of full-time State and local employees 

participate in such plans, and that includes general government 

employees, teachers, and public safety workers. 

In Fiscal Year 2006, the DB plans covered over 18 million of 

these workers, paid $152 million in benefits to more than 7 million 

16 

beneficiaries. Unlike in the private sector, most of these plans require participants to make contributions calculated as a percentage 

of their own pay. 

Each of the 50 States makes a defined contribution plan available to public employees, but generally as a supplemental, voluntary plan without an employer match. However, there are three 

States—Alaska, Michigan, and the District of Columbia—who offer 

defined contribution arrangements as primary plans. 

These are similar to the 401(k)s that have come to dominate the 

private-sector retirement benefit world. A few States have hybrid 

plans as primary, and these, like cash balance plans you may have 

heard about, combine features of defined benefit and defined contribution plans—both. 

State constitutions, local government charters, and statutes at 

both levels nearly universally protect public employee pensions 

from being eliminated or diminished. 

Thus, workers who are hired under a particular plan cannot lose 

future benefit accruals, even if the plan is closed to new hires. In 

public plans, changes that reduce benefits must only be applied to 

those hired after the changes take effect, much like the Federal 

Government did when shifting from the Civil Service Retirement 

System to the Federal Employees Retirement System. 

Also in some locales, benefit formulas are specified in law, which 

in effect, bars even changes like the CSRS to FERS, because benefit specifications would be different. 

So, it’s not surprising that public pension benefits have changed 

so little over the years. But let me now turn to the finances. 

Although a few plans have reported very low funding levels, most 

State and local plans have enough resources set aside to pay for 

benefits promised for decades to come. 

And even for plans with poor funding, benefits are generally not 

at risk in the near term because current assets and new contributions are likely sufficient to support benefits for at least several 

years. 

However, many governments have contributed less than the 

amount needed to improve or even maintain current funding ratios; 

that is, the percentage of liabilities that their assets cover. 

Such low contributions raise concerns for the future and may in 

effect, shift costs to future generations of taxpayers, since benefit 

changes under current State and local laws generally take decades 

to have an impact on the public budget. 

Available data suggest that although more than half of plans reporting to the Public Funds Survey had a funded ratio of more 

than 80 percent, which is generally considered adequate for public 

plans, these 2006 results suggest that funding levels have fallen 

steadily since 2000. Because State and local governments, unlike 

private employers, are expected to continue operations indefinitely 

in the future and are unlikely to go out of business, public pension 

plans are unlikely to present themselves for Federal bailout, even 

with these falling funding levels. 

Indeed, a simulation we performed last year, suggested that just 

slightly higher contributions from governments as a sector would 

fund plans overall for the next 40 years. However, rising healthcare 

costs and the resulting fiscal pressures could have an impact. 

17 

Retiree health costs, not previously considered a long-term liability for State and local governments, are now being recognized as 

such in State and local financial statements. 

Medicaid costs are an even larger piece of State budgets and are 

driven by the same cost factors. States’ ability to fund pension costs 

in the future will be affected by these other budgetary claims. 

So in conclusion, although most State and local pension plans are 

reasonably sound financially, the ability to maintain current benefit levels will depend, at least in part, on the extent of the fiscal 

challenges these governments face in the decades to come. 

Governments with underfunded plans today will be most vulnerable to those pressures in the future, but all will have to address 

the consequences of uncontrolled healthcare costs, a challenge that 

is not the State and local government’s alone, in fact, but will call 

for leadership at the Federal level, as well. 

On that happy note, that concludes my statement, and I’d like 

to ask that my written statement be included in the record. 

Senator Casey. It will be. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bovbjerg appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 78.] 

Senator Casey. It will be. And I should note for the record that 

all the written statements will be made part of the record. I don’t 

think I said that before. 

I know we have a vote that’s going to be starting shortly, but I 

wanted to have both Senator Klobuchar and Representative Brady 

offer their openings at this time, and then we’ll proceed from there. 

Representative Brady. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KEVIN BRADY, A U.S. 

REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS 

Representative Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to join in welcoming the panel of witnesses appearing before us 

today. I’ve had the pleasure of working through the years with Ms. 

Bovbjerg on a number of Social Security issues, and it’s nice to see 

you again. 

Retirement security of those covered by both public and private 

pension plans is an important priority of policymakers, and I appreciate Senator Casey’s leadership in convening this hearing. 

Turning though to the situation faced by the beneficiaries of pension plans today, there is an emerging threat to retirement security,which is in the form of rapidly increasing prices on oil and gasoline, which have also spilled into higher prices for many food products, as well. 

Retirees on these pension plans, especially those on fixed incomes, are very vulnerable to such price spikes for basic necessities. And I think Congress’s failure to act to lower gas prices in 

America threatens the retirement security of our seniors, it erodes 

the buying power for the beneficiaries of our pension plans, and it 

has become yet another obstacle to improving our anemic savings 

rate here in America. 

For example, seniors 65 and over devote about 10 percent of their 

income to energy expenditures such as utilities, fuel, and transportation. Since half of that is petroleum based, steep increases in oil 

prices will seriously erode seniors’ living standards. 

18 

This year alone,oil prices have risen about 40 percent already, 

with some predicting even higher price increases. The oil price increase to date this year is equivalent to about 2 percent of seniors’ 

income, a very significant amount especially over such a short time 

span. 

These higher energy costs leave retirees with less money to cover 

other necessities, including food, and of course rising food prices 

also reflect higher costs for fertilizer, transportation, packaging, 

and our ethanol policies, among other issues. 

Congress should not sit idly by while oil prices go through the 

roof undermining the retirement security of seniors as well as 

Americans who are still in the workforce. 

Congress should act to encourage more American production of 

energy. Congress should permit the States to allow offshore exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas if they wish to do so. 

However, unfortunately the majority in the House and Senate continue to block repeated attempts to facilitate more American production of oil and natural gas. 

I worry that this do-nothing and drill-nothing policy must come 

to an end. 

While many public Defined Benefit Plans have cost-of-living adjustments, few private plans do. However, it is safe to say that 

soaring oil prices and associated increases in food have far outstripped all of these cost-of-living adjustments. The result is an erosion in the standard of living. 

And in conclusion, it is also likely that higher oil prices will have 

a significant negative impact on the returns of both public and private pension funds, as well as other retirement investments in 

coming years. 

With a number of experts predicting relatively low returns on equity investments in the future, workers and retirees may be hit 

with lower than expected balances in their other retirement investments as well. This makes Congress’s failure to act on America’s 

energy production all the more inexcusable. This is an issue that 

continues to face this Congress. 

I am hopeful that at some point, sooner rather than later, we will 

have some straight up or down votes on production in America in 

measures that both Republicans and Democrats can support together. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Senator Casey. Thank you, Representative Brady. 

Senator Klobuchar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator Klobuchar. Well thank you so much, Senator Casey, 

and thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

As we face tough economic times I think the subject for this 

hearing becomes more and more important. We see families across 

the United States who are stretched by rising prices in every direction, whether it is gas prices or the cost of health care, or their 

housing prices, and what has been happening is that the savings 

rate has been hovering around zero. 

19 

I do not think I have to tell our experts this, but when you look 

at what has happened the last say 8 years where the average 

American family’s wages have gone down $1000 a year and their 

expenditures have increased about something like $3000 to $4000 

a year, they have had a net loss, middle-class families, of $5000 a 

year. It leaves very little for savings. 

There is very little for them to fall back on, and that is why I 

think that talking about how we can do a better job with retirement plans is going to be key to our future. 

I will tell you that I feel fortunate to come from a State with a 

great Public Defined Benefit Retirement Plan. My mother is a 

teacher, so I am well aware of this—a retired teacher. 

There are three State-wide plans in Minnesota: the Minnesota 

State Retirement System; the Public Employees Retirement Association; and the Teachers Retirement Association. They are well 

funded and have an average funding ratio of 88 percent. 

This money helps support over 1⁄2 million Minnesotans’ plans for 

their future. Workers that retire without adequate income, or cannot retire because of a lack of savings, face tough choices at a time 

when they should actually be able to reap the benefits of their 

work. 

More and more we are seeing workers living paycheck to paycheck putting nothing aside. And without sustainable retirement— 

what I am concerned about is that it is my daughter, who is now 

13 years old, who will end up suffering because we are not planning ahead for our future. 

I know it is very important in the public sector, but I also think 

that we can take some lessons from this and apply them to the private sector. 

And then finally, Mr. Neff, I am sure as this hearing goes on I 

hope that we discuss some of the benefits from having investments 

in communities and business development. In Minnesota State Retirement Funds invest $1 billion each year in the growth and expansion of our businesses, like 3M and Target, and MedTronic, and 

General Mills, and Hormel. If you can’t invest in Spam, what can 

you invest in? 

So anyway, I just think that that aspect of this, in addition to 

the importance for individual families, of what this means to have 

these investments made in your own businesses in your own country is very important as well. So thank you very much for being 

part of this panel. 

Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. 

We are joined this morning by the real Chairman of this Committee, not just the Chairman-for-today, Senator Schumer from the 

Great State of New York. Thank you, Senator. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK 

Chairman Schumer. Well thank you. And first I want to thank 

you, Bob Casey, for holding this hearing. There are very few Senators who are as much in touch with the needs of average folks 

than Bob Casey. It has been true throughout his whole career and 

has certainly been true here in the Senate where he is one of our 

most powerful voices. 

20 

That is why it is so appropriate that he is chairing the hearing 

of the JEC on pensions, and on public pension plans, because we 

have two conflicting things happening. 

The average person, whether they be a public worker or a private 

worker, is caught in sort of the pincers of two things. 

One is, people live much longer. That’s the bottom line. Average 

life expectancy keeps going up. That is a tribute to this country. 

With all the complaints about the health care system, we cannot 

forget the good. When I was a little boy I had a great grandmother 

who was 82, and the kids would come on their bikes in our neighborhood and say: come to Schumer’s house and see the oldest lady 

in the world, because no one had ever seen anybody 82 years old. 

Now, praise God, my dad is 85. My mom is 80. And they are driving around and playing golf. So it shows you how the world has 

changed. But that means people’s pensions are more and more important. It covers a greater and greater portion of their life span. 

And second, the average person does not have the buying power 

they once had. So the ability to save, the ability to put things away 

on your own, are declining. The great study of Elizabeth Warren 

of Harvard Law School showed that in 2001 the average worker’s 

income, average family’s income, rather, was $48,000. It had gone 

down to $47,000 by 2007. That is before this recession. So that was 

during the prosperity where we all see those large macro numbers. 

The middle class actually went down a little bit, the median. But it is much worse than that. Buying power went down to $41,000 

because wage increases were not keeping up with inflation. And if 

you had a child in college, it went down to $39,000 because tuition 

is both so expensive and the increase was so great. 

So you put that altogether and pensions are more and more important and need more and more discussion. That is why this hearing is so timely. I just, as Chair of the Committee, want to thank 

Senator Casey for suggesting and putting together the hearing, and 

I think it is going to influence not just those of us on the JEC, but 

the entire Senate as we look into the new world we face and try 

to make the average middle class person’s life a little bit better, 

both while they are working and in retirement. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Schumer appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 39.] 

Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that 

perspective, and also for allowing us to have a hearing like this. 

This is an issue that would not get this kind of attention were 

it not for the work of this Committee, and for the leadership of 

Senator Schumer. We are grateful for that. 

We have a vote going on, so we are going to take a short break, 

as they say on television, but we hope it is about 10 minutes for 

me to get over there and get back. It is only one vote, I guess, so 

it should not be too long. That would give our witnesses a chance 

to breathe before the hours of questioning ahead of you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator Casey. We hope it is only maybe 2 hours or less, but 

we will return here as fast as we can and resume the hearing. Representative Brady, I do not know if you will be able to join us after 

this break, but we are grateful for your presence here. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned for about 10 minutes. 

21 

[Recess.] 

Senator Casey [presiding.] We will resume the hearing. I 

wanted to thank everyone for their indulgence while I ran to vote. 

I tried to keep it in the time window. 

I think what we will do is we will go to questions now for all of 

our witnesses. I and Representative Brady might have questions 

for one particular witness, or we might move around, but we will 

try to keep it as free-flowing as possible. 

We do not have tremendous time constraints, but I want to be 

cognizant of the Congressman’s time, as well as the witnesses’. So 

we will try to keep it to 1 hour, if that is possible. 

Let me start with Mr. Pryor. I wanted to note in particular, 

based upon your own experience, not just on the more technical 

matters we’re talking about here, but just the human dimensions 

of this challenge and the reality for those who are in public safety 

positions, whether it is a fire fighter or police officer. 

I noted at the very beginning of your testimony, and I made a 

note of it after I heard you say it, you talked about, ‘‘healing our 

bodies,’’ meaning fire fighters. 

Could you talk about that just for a moment in terms of that before we get lost in the technical jargon? I think it is important to 

note that. 

Mr. Pryor. Sure. Our occupation, as most of you know—I think 

basically people know what firefighters do—it is a very strenuous 

occupation. Not only are you doing heavy lifting and doing sort of 

consistent arduous activities, you are also doing them at unexpected times. You are doing them when you have just woken up in 

the middle of the night and trying to lift somebody out of a house 

or something, just does not bode well for good ergonomics. 

It is a very hard occupation on your body is what I am trying 

to say. And we have a very high rate of people that have bad backs, 

shoulders, knees—you know, I cannot think of too many people 

that actually retire healthy. It is not a matter of who retires sick, 

it is who retires healthy. 

It does not happen very often. These are not people that can go 

out and get another job doing something of a similar nature. A retirement they can look forward to and not have to push themselves 

to the limit, and to be able to spend time with their grandchildren 

and their families and be able to live in the same house that they 

have had over the years is very important to my members. 

But what is really important to them is that they do not have 

to go out and try and earn a living after they have retired because 

they have an insufficient income. They want to retire and stay retired. 

That includes a pension benefit, and that includes health care, 

which is also very important. Of course they are going to need longterm medical care after they retire. So we try and make sure that 

those firefighters that do retire have a good health plan that will 

provide them with benefits to take care of those long-term injuries. 

Senator Casey. Thank you. And I wanted to move to the other 

area of your expertise, which is dealing with the mechanics of Defined Benefit Plans. 

Mr. Pryor. Sure. 

22 

Senator Casey. You are a trustee of one of the country’s largest 

plans, and you have a lot of experience at this. I wanted to ask you 

about the investment opportunities that are available to DB plans 

that may not be available to, or in some cases are wholly inaccessible to individuals relying upon a Defined Contribution Plan for 

their retirement security. 

Describe in summary fashion in terms of the opportunities that 

are available to your fund that might be not available or are inaccessible to an individual, for example. 

Mr. Pryor. The two examples that really come to mind are private equity investments and real estate investments. We have a— 

we pride ourselves in having long-term relationships with quality 

managers. 

And when we do invest with those managers, usually it is on a 

very long-term basis, not just our relationship with those managers, but also the actual investments that we buy into. 

This can be seen in private equity with startup mezzanine financing, with buyouts. This can be seen in real estate where we 

have some holdings where we literally keep on for decades. And it 

gives us the opportunity to buy or sell in market cycles that are 

advantageous to us. 

So not only are we holding these for a long time, but we are also 

able to pick out good market timing opportunities and be able to 

sell those off at the best time, or buy them at the best time. 

And I just do not know how that could be done with any other 

kind of Defined Contribution plan. The investment opportunities in 

the alternative assets and real estate just are not the same, in the 

same universe when you are involved in a Defined Contribution 

versus a Defined Benefit Plan. 

Senator Casey. Thank you. And I am going to move to Mr. Neff 

only because—or to other witnesses who will not be ignored by me, 

but I want to try to keep it at 5 minutes at a time. Representative 

Brady will go about 5, and then we will alternate. 

But Mr. Neff, I wanted to zero in on something that you and others have raised, but you in particular because of your own experience in the private sector, about this aspect of the question: the utilization by venture capital, utilizing that revenue to nurture innovation, to foster job creation, to actually contribute to the economy, 

which is often not emphasized enough. 

I was looking at Pennsylvania alone. Venture-backed companies 

in Pennsylvania employ nearly 700,000 people and these are in 

high-quality, high-paying jobs. Can you discuss the role that pension funding plays in your own world, your own Fund’s ability to 

promote new technology and business and therefore generate jobs 

for Pennsylvania, and even beyond Pennsylvania? 

Mr. Neff. Absolutely. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, 

approximately 75 percent of our committed funds come from public 

pension funds, including the two leading funds in Pennsylvania, 

the School Teachers’ Fund, and the State Employee Retirement 

Fund, PSERS and SERS. PSERS has been one of our led investors 

since our inception. 

So while on the one hand we are helping to provide retirement 

benefits for school teachers and others who are employed by the 

State or local districts, we are taking a tiny slice of that asset pool 

23 

and employing it directly into startup companies and early stage 

companies exclusively in the region. 

Our fund is particularly regionally focused in the Mid Atlantic, 

and a significant portion of our investment activity is in Pennsylvania. 

I think we have over 20 portfolio companies now in Pennsylvania. And these companies are investing in innovative new drug 

technologies for a variety of diseases. They are investing in groundbreaking medical devices. They are investing in innovative healthcare services. And they are investing in clinical diagnostics technologies that allow both providers and patients to get appropriate 

care for the disease conditions that they have. 

In a typical startup company, we are employing not your average employee in the State with a $27–$28,000-wage level, but we are 

typically employing scientists and other highly skilled professionals 

who have much more typically wage levels in the $75–$80,000-ayear level. And those employees, in turn, typically spend upwards 

of $200–$250,000 per employee per year in their research and investment activity in the early stages of these companies. 

I think if I probably cut all of our companies across the board, 

it would look something like that. So this is very high-impact investment, if you will, wherever it happens. 

We are agnostic as to the source of the research that forms one 

of our companies. It can come from Singapore; it can come from 

Sweden, but for the talent that is used to actually commercialize 

that technology we find a motherlode in our particular region, and 

those are the people that we can pull together to put into a company to actually make that investment work. 

I hope that is responsive. 

Senator Casey. And it is all life sciences, which has the double 

benefit of that you are not only creating, or helping to create highpaying jobs, but you are also fostering the curing of diseases and 

helping our health-care system. So it is a fascinating combination 

of, I think, positive benefits. 

I am now 4 minutes over my time, so the Congressman has at 

least 9 minutes, and I will come back. Thank you. 

Representative Brady. I will try not to take that much time, 

Senator. These questions deserve deliberation. 

This is a great panel. I appreciate you very much. Mr. Pryor, you 

are right; the experience of retirement plans when they deal with 

special occupations like firefighters presents a challenge. 

Two years ago from my seat on Ways and Means we were able, 

working across the aisle with Congressman Gene Green, to change 

the drop formula for the penalties for firefighters and other police 

using that pension plan because, in fact, their bodies wore out before they reached the standard retirement level, and it sort of 

points out how we need to be flexible in these formulas as we address retirement benefits. 

Dr. Weller, in your written testimony you praised Defined Benefit Plans for their ability to make alternative high-risk investments. For example, in futures and venture capital funds. 

According to an article published just last week in the Washington Post, State and local government pension funds have collectively become the largest investors in the oil futures markets. By 

24 

speculating on higher oil prices, the pension funds have earned 

spectacular returns. 

For example, California’s Employee Retirement Fund earned a return of more than 68 percent on an initial investment of $1.1 billion in oil futures, just during the last 12 months. 

However some of my colleagues, including the Speaker of the 

House, Nancy Pelosi, have blamed much of the recent increase in 

gasoline prices on such speculation. Apparently, big speculators 

who were driving up gas prices turn out to be our State and local 

government workers and retirees whose pension plans are investing for a high return. 

In Congress, some have proposed closing the so-called swaps 

loophole through which pension funds have invested in oil futures. 

Dr. Weller, if such legislation were enacted, would it have the 

unintended consequence of diminishing the ability of pension funds 

to earn high returns from alternative investments that you have 

praised? 

Dr. Weller. Well let me talk a little bit about commodities’ speculation in oil prices. I think clearly when you look at what is happening to American families, they are caught between declining incomes and rapidly rising prices, and that is certainly worthy of consideration. 

However, one of the problems we see when it comes to price increases is the sharp volatility in oil prices. If oil prices had always 

been—or gasoline prices—at $4 a barrel—at $4 a gallon—we probably would not have these discussions, but because they have 

promptly risen, that is what concerns us. 

So the problem is, if you are looking at the swings in the commodities markets, you have got to be very careful in terms of regulating those markets. If you say, OK, will we completely shut off 

the ability for large investors who bring a lot of liquidity to the 

market—you are probably doing more harm than good, because you 

are ultimately increasing the volatility of those prices. 

The other side is that if you have some of the proposed regulations, you probably have very little effect in terms of overall driving 

speculation or participants in a market. 

So, I think where you want to go is more transparency of some 

of these speculations, but I think ultimately you have got to touch 

this very carefully, because the problem that we are concerned with 

is the big price swings in commodities. 

And I think closing some of these loopholes could have adverse 

consequences in the sense that they could increase volatility by 

taking out the big players in a market who have a long-term outlook in the market, and who can ultimately provide the liquidity 

that to some degree actually does tend to reduce the volatility of 

the market, and particularly the public sector pension plans tend 

to be somewhat followers rather than leaders in the commodity 

market according to studies by the CFTC. 

Representative Brady. So the impact, if I heard you correctly, 

in addition to the market—the impact on pension funds, if we limited their ability to make these investments, would lower their return by having forced them to switch to other perhaps less—— 

Dr. Weller. Well the plans are investing in these things, in commodities, for inflation hedges and other things. Their rates of reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 May 27, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\44947.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
25 

turn on commodity investments are somewhat uncorrelated with 

other investments, and it is a diversification strategy that is the 

benefit of large pension plans and large institutional investments. 

Representative Brady. But is it your—— 

Dr. Weller. So reducing their ability to do that would increase 

the risk exposure in the short run, or in the long run—it remains 

a little bit to be seen—but presumably, it would reduce their rate 

of return. But it remains to be seen how much, and honestly, I am 

not prepared to give you an estimate on that. 

Representative Brady. I will take that as a ‘‘probably yes.’’ 

Conversely, do any of the panelists take the position that speculation by these pension plans have driven up the price of oil? Do 

any panelists take that position? 

Mr. Pryor. I would not. 

Representative Brady. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

have got another question, but I will hit it after you are completed. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

I am going to try to get back to our first two, but I do want to 

go in order so we are covering everyone. 

Dr. Weller, I wanted to ask you about the assertion that I and 

others have made here today about better annual return for Defined Benefit Plans as opposed to Defined Contribution Plans: ability to pool risk, access to professional management, lower administrative costs, ability to invest in alternative asset classes without 

posing risk. 

All of that, you know the list. But can you talk for a moment 

about two things? One is, in whatever order you want, but one is 

the criteria that you outlined and how important that is that Defined Benefit Plans meet that criteria for performance and for the 

health of a fund. 

But also, in particular, in a similar way that I asked Mr. Pryor 

about, what are some specific opportunities that are available to 

DB plans that are unavailable to an individual based upon the 

work that you have done—especially when you think about the 

long term? 

Dr. Weller. I think the overall—when you look at the rate of return—that is obviously an outcome measure. I think when we look 

at the inputs, you do have risk pooling, especially the mortality 

risk pooling is particular important. 

Again, let me reiterate what I said in my testimony. When you 

have a Defined Contribution Plan, as an individual, you have to 

plan for the maximum possible life span. You don’t want to run out 

of money. In most plans, 95 percent of people do not annuitize their 

income. So if you want to manage your own lifetime, your own lifetime income, you have got to basically over-save, which you do not 

have to do in a DB Plan. 

That does actually add a substantial cost in a Defined Contribution side. 

The other part is economies of scale. I think whatever I have 

studied over my 20 years in financial markets, economies of scale 

do play a substantial role. They allow, by having pooled assets, 

they allow plans to reduce the cost. Regardless, even if they have 

the same investment profile as an individual with their 401K Plan, 

the fact that they are larger, that you need to collect the same inVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 May 27, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\44947.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
26 

formation, whether you invest $10,000 in a company, or $100 million in a company, that can reduce substantially costs. 

And as I said, the asset management fees are about 25 basis 

points for a DB Plan. They are substantially higher for a DC plan. 

Over a 40-year period of 1 percentage point difference reduces, 

roughly speaking reduces your savings by about 25 to 30 percent. 

That is substantially lower retirement savings. So that is one 

thing. 

And then finally, the ability to diversify assets is certainly important. That is something that ultimately is only—it plays a little bit 

into the economies of scale argument. If your portfolio is $40,000, 

you do not want to really start speculating on currencies or commodities. 

But if you are a large pension plan, you want to diversify across 

all potential asset classes, including commodities and currencies. 

And I think that would be—that adds to an improved risk and return profile in the whole mix. 

So I would say probably risk pooling first, economies of scale second, and ultimately the diversification third. And especially diversification is a particularly important aspect here. The interaction 

between diversification and DB plan, with a very long-term horizon, basically an infinite time horizon for the public sector pension 

plans. 

Senator Casey. Tell me a little bit about—and I am going to respond to some of the points that Representative Brady raised about 

hedge funds and the interplay in the commodities market. 

Talk about that for a moment—we know that DB Plans do invest 

in hedge funds, often hedging other investments. If they are doing 

commodities’ hedging, it is usually a small percent of their overall 

investments. 

Talk about that for a moment, if you agree with that, and amplify or expand on that. 

Dr. Weller. Well I think when it comes to hedge funds they are 

part of an overall diversification strategy, as is common for a lot 

of institutional investors, and I know my two colleagues to my 

right can probably speak a little bit more in terms of how that 

interacts with their plans, or the world that they know. 

I think the issues we face with hedge funds, though, are hedge 

fund issues that have nothing to do with public sector pension 

plans. That is that just simply they are a black box in many cases. 

They are not that well regulated. We often do not know exactly 

who are the investors in those, and I think that is—but that is a 

separate issue. I think that is an issue that is something that I 

think all institutional investors should be concerned about. It is a 

financial stability issue generally in terms of increasing transparency and regulatory oversight over hedge funds. 

But I do not think it has anything to do with public sector pension plans investing in hedge funds as part of their overall diversification strategy. 

Senator Casey. This is obviously an important issue for the debate on energy and how we deal with the current economic crisis, 

which a lot of it is centered on the price of gasoline. 

I have talked a lot about the issue of speculation and that there 

has to be more transparency, not just in the context of larger invesVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 May 27, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\44947.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
27 

tors, but just generally in the area of speculation. But there are 

some real conflicts on the issue. 

But I do think, in the context of the debate we are having in 

Washington, the one area where there is some common ground between Democrats and Republicans is on this issue of speculation. 

It is probably the only area where there is common ground right 

now, other than maybe some tax issues. 

So we need to explore it more than we have today. But I wanted 

to, before my time runs out for this round, I wanted to ask you. 

Sometimes in this debate we talk about let’s just look at this from 

the perspective of a taxpayer. Let’s set aside beneficiaries. Let’s set 

aside government. Let’s set aside the impact that DB plans can 

have on the economy overall—taxpayers. 

Because in my State of Pennsylvania, one of the real challenges 

we will face in the State is taxpayers saying: Well, look, do you 

mean to tell me I’ve got to pay more to support these pension 

plans? Because there is obviously a taxpayer role to play here. 

And that is a reality we have got to deal with. It would be nice 

if the world were different, but taxpayers have a very low tolerance 

right now for paying more on a number of fronts, and one of them 

that is around the corner, maybe even if gas prices go down or stabilize, when as a country we do something about health care, which 

we have not yet—Congress has not; the Administration has not— 

we, both parties bear some responsibility here, but around the corner in Pennsylvania and a lot of other States, this question of the 

taxpayer role in this equation is going to become—to say it is going 

to become prominent is an understatement. 

So just from the perspective of a taxpayer, when you were giving 

your opening—during your opening statement you talked about ‘‘efficient allocation of taxpayer dollars.’’ Talk to us about that, in particular, and how taxpayers when they look at this issue, what you 

think they should know about how DB Plans play into their lives 

by efficiently allocating taxpayer dollars. 

I know it is a broad question, but do your best in a couple of minutes. 

Dr. Weller. I will try to keep it short. 

I think for taxpayers—and often when you ultimately explain it, 

it becomes clearer—but taxpayers want to have firefighters who 

are willing to go into a burning building and save people. They 

want to have police officers who take public safety seriously. 

They want to have qualified and skilled teachers educating their 

children for the jobs of the future. And in order to both recruit very 

skilled and courageous people, but also retain them, you do have 

to offer in the public sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans, a good 

benefit. 

Then the question becomes, OK, what’s the best way of offering 

that benefit? So, far, defined benefit public-sector pension plans is 

the biggest bang for the buck. 

In terms of offering a solid retirement benefit that not only offers 

retirement income for life, but also offers survivorship benefits and 

disability benefits, as we’ve heard, are particularly important for 

the hazardous occupations for the public safety occupations. 

So if you, as a taxpayer, are concerned with public safety, with 

a good education quality in your State, and in other good public 

28 

services, you ultimately have to agree that you have to pay a good 

salary, but also overall, offer a good benefits package, including retirement and healthcare benefits. 

Then the question becomes, OK, how do you get to that point? 

How do you deliver that benefit to the public service employees at 

the lowest cost to the taxpayer. 

A large-scale pooled pension plan in the public sector is by far 

the best way of doing it. 

Senator Casey. Thank you. I have some follow-up, but I want 

to give the Congressman another chance. I violated my minutes 

rule. Thank you. 

Representative Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Even 

though high gas prices and food prices are eroding the benefits that 

retirees enjoy from their pension plans, the take-away from this 

hearing seems to be that by most measures—at least within the 

State and local government pension plans—that they are adequately funded over the next two decades or so. 

But turning to the question the Senator raised about healthcare, 

before 2005 the Government Accounting Standards Board didn’t require State and local governments to calculate and disclose their liabilities for retiree healthcare benefits. 

By the end of this year, all State and local governments will be 

required to make this disclosure in their financial statements. 

In January, the General Accountability Office estimated that the 

unfunded liabilities of State and local governments for retiree 

healthcare benefits was between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion. 

Ms. Bovbjerg, just starting with you, have State and local governments generated these huge liabilities largely because they did 

not fund healthcare benefits over time, as they did for retiree pension benefits? 

Ms. Bovbjerg. It’s a whole different model, Mr. Brady, that pensions traditionally have been pre-funded with contributions. I don’t 

know if anyone here pointed this out, but probably two-thirds of 

the assets in a pension fund are from investment returns, not from 

contributions. 

In the retiree health area, it was traditionally considered part of 

employee health benefits, so it was treated much the same way 

that health insurance for active employees was treated, so although 

there are a few governments out there who have prefunded retiree 

health to some extent, virtually none of them have fully done that. 

And we offered that number, but that’s actually not our estimate. 

We talked to all these different people who thought about this, and 

we give the resulting range of anywhere from $600 billion to over 

a trillion, because States have not yet been required to report this. 

This is just starting to come out now. 

Representative Brady. So this is just the early estimate of 

what it may turn out to be? 

Ms. Bovbjerg. That’s right. The reports are required in the fiscal year starting after December 2007, so just now, just now you’ll 

start to get the end of this period. 

You’ll start to get reports on what these liabilities look like. 

When we talked with rating agencies and with States about this, 

the general view was that no one’s going to rush to try to fund all 

29 

of this right away because it’s going to be a pretty big number in 

each case. 

But there seems to be a consensus among the rating agencies 

and among States, that having a plan is important, so we’ll start 

to see some of these plans emerge, as well. 

We have work just now underway for the Committee on Aging 

to look at what actually are States going to do in dealing with the 

retiree health liability. When we did this earlier work, they were 

still trying to grapple with just what are the numbers; how big a 

liability might this be? 

Representative Brady. Well, isn’t it critical to States and local 

governments, to begin now to address those liabilities because, as 

Senator Casey pointed out, taxpayers end up covering those liabilities. There’s rarely cuts in public retiree healthcare benefits, it’s 

a huge number. 

And just the thought that local taxpayers would pay more to support benefits when, in fact, their private benefits are oftentimes 

lower than that, when their savings rate is lower, as well, seems 

to be yet another hickey that the public simply can’t make room 

for in their family budgets. 

Are there States that you know of that are addressing, or local 

governments that are really addressing—have drawn up a plan or 

are following a plan to eliminate those liabilities? 

There are some that have plans. For example, some have issued 

bonds, so essentially, they’ve borrowed to finance the liability. They 

kind of locked themselves, and we’ll see whether that was a good 

decision or not a good decision. 

I think the jury is still out on that. There will be States that will 

just do what they can to start the process of prefunding and fund 

up. And you see pockets of places that are doing that, often at the 

county level. 

And you will see some that will reduce benefits or ask for greater 

employee contributions to those benefits. 

Retiree health benefits are not protected legally the way the pension benefits are in State and local government, so that’s a vulnerability for public employees—for retirees. 

They really need to deal with this. They need to have a plan because States, in our estimate, have about a decade before 

healthcare costs are going to eat them alive, not just retiree health, 

but active employee health, Medicaid. 

That’s why we’ve called for the whole public sector, including the 

Federal Government to really give attention to the issue of 

healthcare costs and how we can address it. 

The States won’t be able to take that on, on their own. 

Representative Brady. Legally, these plans may not be protected, but politically—in the real sense—they are in a way. 

Other panelists, any other thoughts on unfunded liabilities in 

healthcare? 

Mr. Pryor. In our county, which is currently a pay-as-you-go 

system, for retiree healthcare funded by the county of Los Angeles, 

we’re considering funding options. 

We really want to take advantage of the real strength of defined 

benefit pension plans and that is to use prefunding, to use investment income to pay for a benefit. 

30 

Now, the problem with retiree healthcare, of course, is the rapid 

escalation of the cost of providing this healthcare. 

You know, we know what general cost of living is within a small 

parameter. We know what it’s going to be for our retirees, to preserve their purchasing power. 

We don’t know what healthcare is going to cost in the next 20 

years. And what level do we have to fund retiree healthcare to be 

able to keep a good retiree healthcare program? 

You know, we can still fund it. We can still provide, you know, 

with excess money—with bonds—whatever we decide to do. We can 

start this asset pool going, but we’re very careful about predicting 

our liabilities; we’re very careful about making sure our liabilities 

are matched with contributions in the pension world. 

You can’t do that for retiree healthcare, but again, we’re going 

to try; we’re going to put our excess earnings, not from the pension 

system, but we’re going to be putting funds and possibly bonds together to start an asset pool and see if we can start meeting those 

obligations with investment income. 

Representative Brady. So, the ability to invest and get higher 

returns is very important. 

Mr. Pryor. Absolutely. 

Representative Brady. Not just for the pension side, but the 

healthcare side, as well. I do think—go ahead. I’m sorry. 

Mr. Pryor. It’s using what we’ve learned in the defined benefit 

pension world, and trying to use that as a way to fix the funding 

of retiree healthcare. 

Representative Brady. The two biggest questions that I get at 

home in Texas, from State and local governments, is one, how can 

we afford the rising cost of healthcare, and second, how much next 

year do I budget for gasoline? What’s the price at the pump. Now this year, I budgeted $3.50 a gallon. Is it $5 next year? Is it $6 next year? Law enforcement asks me that; school boards and 

districts ask me that; every local government asks me that, again, 

continuing the belief that at some point Congress needs to act, the 

sooner the better. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. I wanted to finally get 

to the other end of the table to Barbara Bovbjerg. 

In particular, I wanted to ask you about the—I know there was— 

and I just made a note of it and didn’t write down every word you 

said, but when you talked in your opening about State and local 

governments having enough money set aside, can you just restate 

that—kind of where you see things right now in terms of what 

State and local governments have set aside for pension benefits 

going forward? 

Ms. Bovbjerg. We looked at the sector of State and local governments in the aggregate. 

Senator Casey. Right. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. And we used an 80-percent funding level. It’s a 

little different than in the private sector because they governments 

are ongoing concerns. 

And we found that the majority of the big plans have enough 

money set aside, that as a sector, they actually look pretty good. 

We did a little simulation model where we tried to look at what 

31 

would it really take to fund pension commitments for 40 years, and 

we found that it would take very little more than what State and 

local governments are putting in right now, as a percentage of pay. 

I think they are putting in about 9 percent of pay now as sector, 

and it would have to go up to 9.3 percent. So it all seems very doable and very reasonable. 

The caution is that there are other things going on out there that 

are going to make claims on State and local resources, but I think 

one of the messages we really wanted to bring to Congress is that 

you do see in press coverage that certain plans are very underfunded, really struggling to make their payments, and that is true. 

There are such plans out there, and some of them are very big 

plans, but by and large, the sector is keeping up pretty well with 

their required payments. 

And that’s a good thing because if you don’t keep up, then it gets 

harder and harder and harder and you lose the magic of compound 

interest, the magic of the investment returns, and you just get further and further behind. 

But, as a sector, they seem to be doing reasonably well. 

Senator Casey. I’ll tell you, that’s good news. In Washington, if 

part of the message we send to the State and local governments is 

you need to do a little more, that would be sweet music to their 

ears. Usually Washington is saying, you’ve got to do the whole 

thing, pal, get ready. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. For some plans it’s a little more; in other plans, 

it’s a lot more. 

Senator Casey. I’m being a little cavalier. 

I wanted to move to—as I said in my opening, I’d ask each of you 

for specific recommendations, and we’ll do that. 

We’re joined by Congressman Cummings, and I wanted to give 

him a chance to do an opening now or to ask questions now, but 

just as a preview to something that I want to do before we leave 

is to ask each of you for your recommendations about what the 

Congress should do. 

We’re elected to serve you; we’re elected to serve constituents 

across this country, and I think hearings should not end without 

an action plan or at least the outlines of an action plan of things 

that we must do here. 

Sometimes the best thing Congress can do is get out of the way 

or not get in the way, but sometimes there are specific steps we 

can take legislatively or otherwise, or even just be better advocates 

to help at the local and State level. 

So I’d ask you for those recommendations, each of you, before we 

leave here today, but also if you have more work to do on them, 

or if you want to amplify or expound in the record on those recommendations, we would not only invite that, but encourage that. 

But before we get to that segment, I know that both Representative Brady might have more questions, but I wanted to have Representative Cummings either present questions, or give commentary. 

Congressman, the floor is yours, and you have plenty of time. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you very much. Thank you 

all for being with us. 

32 

Ms. Bovbjerg, I have a question about the interaction of defined 

benefit pension plans and Social Security. When employees are receiving more of their private pensions from defined contribution 

plans, one assumedly should also raise the payout rate from the 

traditional Social Security, rather than trying to privatize part of 

it. 

What’s your opinion on this matter, and what would be the respective pros and cons of partial privatization? 

Ms. Bovbjerg. Well, as you know, we’ve done a lot of work on 

Social Security and the different issues. One of the points that I 

infer you’re making is something that we’ve raised, which is this 

concern about risk for individuals that, as we move to a defined 

contribution world in the private sector, would we then also move 

to a more defined contribution world in our social insurance program, in Social Security? 

And we think you’d really want to think about that before doing 

so, because you don’t want the same market conditions that are affecting someone’s 401(k) to also be affecting their Social Security 

benefit. You want them to have a little more diversity in their retirement income. 

That said, we have also heard a number of proposals that would 

create a separate savings mechanism. I testified a couple of weeks 

ago on automatic IRAs and those sorts of things that would offer 

people an ability to have some sort of savings account, which is an 

ability that they have now, but would make it easier for them to 

participate. 

I know there are a number of proposals that would have a mandatory savings account that would be separate from Social Security. There is sort of this range of ways to think about that. 

But I would really encourage the Congress to think about this as 

retirement income more broadly. Think about Social Security, personal savings, and pensions all together, so that we do not inadvertently do something that then has a pernicious effect at the end 

of the day, at someone’s retirement. 

Representative Cummings. Mr. Pryor—— 

Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir. 

Representive Cummings [continuing]. In the State of Maryland over 133 parts of local governments participate in the State’s 

pension plan. Moreover as a whole, Maryland has $38.5 billion in 

pension funding as of May of 2008. 

Maryland, unlike California, has a combined pension plan rather 

than one that is divided amongst the various public sectors such 

as CalStar. 

In your opinion, is there a greater benefit to dividing such plans 

based upon the various government sectors? 

Mr. Pryor. I think as long as you have an employee pool that 

shares similar needs in retirement, I think that you can pool. I’m 

sure there are plenty of studies out there about the size of a fund. 

You know, does it have to be $1 billion to $40 billion to fully take 

advantage of asset allocation and use all those good things that I 

think Defined Benefit Pension Plans use? 

So I think you really have to look at the size of the fund and look 

at whether that fund can appropriately diversify rather than just 

look at employee pools. I think administratively you can really— 

33 

you can figure out what kind of benefit and what kind of payment 

different employees are going to have to pay. 

But I think that asset pool needs to be an appropriate size to 

give proper diversification, and my fund is almost the same size as 

your Maryland fund and we find that we are nimble enough, not 

so big that we don’t take over a sector, but at the same time we 

are able to hire staff and hire the right managers to get us in the 

door on some quality investments. 

Representative Cummings. Some people suggest replacing a 

Defined Benefit Pension Plan with a Defined Contribution Plan 

such as 401K. Currently the average 401K account has a balance 

of less than $40,000 upon retirement. 

As a firefighter do you think that that is enough money for a typical public safety officer to retire? 

Mr. Pryor. I think I have made my position very well known in 

the State of California where I stand on this, and frequently 

through a bullhorn and carrying a sign as I was doing. I am horrified at the prospect of members switching to Defined Contribution 

from a Defined Benefit Pension Plan. 

We are doing it right. We have good investments. We have solid 

plans that provide a good retirement for hardworking people. Why 

change things? 

These are plans that do not cost the taxpayer too much money. 

They do not—you know, we are well-run plans. And I think that 

when everything—you know, hearings like these, and meetings like 

we have had in California when taxpayers, when local government 

hear the advantages and the savings they get from having these 

plans, and the doubling and tripling of investment income, and 

benefits paid out to retirees, and how this stimulates local economies and provides good quality health care opportunities for our retirees, I think people understand. 

And they understand that the Defined Benefit Plans are the way 

to go. The days of Defined Contribution Plans, you know, trying to 

take over Defined Benefit Plans, I do not know where that is going 

to go but I know how I feel about it, and I feel very strongly that 

Defined Benefit Pension Plans are what our public employees need, 

and we are here to protect those Defined Benefit Plans. 

Representative Cummings. Just one other question, Mr. 

Chairman. I understand that firefighters—and I have dealt with a 

lot of firefighters as a State Legislator—— 

Mr. Pryor. Yes, sir. 

Representive Cummings [continuing]. And here in the Congress—often retire many years before they are eligible for Social 

Security. As a matter of fact I remember back when I was in the 

State Legislature they were saying that research showed that, 

sadly, firefighters quite often pass away within 5 or 6 years, which 

I found incredible, after retirement. 

Mr. Pryor. Yes. 

Representative Cummings. And so they retire before they are 

eligible for Social Security, and many of them have serious physical 

ailments in their retirement years stemming from spending a long 

career in a demanding profession, and of course inhaling all kinds 

of smoke, fumes, and what have you. 

34 

Are Defined Benefit Pension Plans able to better address these 

kinds of issues? 

Mr. Pryor. Yes. Eventually our bodies are going to break from 

our job, and we realize this. Some sooner, some later; some people 

are able to make it to 55, 56 years old. But we have quite a few 

people that have to leave with just a couple of years on the job because they have taken hazardous—you know, solid injuries that require them to leave. They cannot do arduous employment anymore. 

Really, our Defined Benefit Plans act as the insurance plan, act 

as the annuity for those people when they do have to leave. And 

they can, you know, take time to find other employment of a less 

arduous nature, and they have the insurance of those benefit plans 

behind them. 

And in the most extreme circumstance, and the most unfortunate 

and one they have to deal with quite a bit, is the death of a firefighter. That is, that it provides a survivor benefit, a Defined Benefit Survivor Benefit for the families of those people that are killed 

in the line of duty. 

And in the situation you had said before, if this was just a 401K account that is $40,000. How long does that last a family of four? 

We have been told, well, you can purchase insurance to back it up 

so we will be able to provide for those survivors. 

We cannot. We cannot find insurance to cover that kind of benefit, that level of benefit, if somebody is killed in the line of duty. 

It is not offered. People do not want to cover us for those kinds of 

injuries. 

So we have—and as I said in my testimony—a Defined Benefit 

Pension Plan is a lot more to us than just a Pension. It is also an 

insurance system that provides for us, that provides for our family 

if we are killed or injured in the line of duty. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pryor. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Congressman. I want to 

thank you for your presence here today, your questions, and your 

leadership on this issue. Also, for traveling all the way across from 

the House to join us. We do not get over to see you guys enough, 

and we are grateful for your presence here today. 

Before we get to recommendations—and I will just go. We will 

not call it a lightening round, but we will try to get to everybody 

to make recommendations. And again you can add more for the 

record. 

But the Joint Economic Committee staff does a great job with, 

among the many things they do, with charts. I forgot earlier—and 

I did not need a staff member to remind me; I actually reminded 

myself, which is rare in Congress; we can actually think for ourselves once in awhile, right—but we have two charts here I just 

wanted to quickly highlight for the record. 

Nathan, maybe you can put them up, just because I know the 

work that went into them. The first one—and actually the one I 

wanted to highlight more was this one we have up there. 

The Defined Contribution Plans are nearly four times as expensive to administer than Defined Benefit Plans. I think that is important to point out because sometimes when arguments are made 

in these kinds of debates where there is something new, a different 

35 

road to take, a different direction, some kind of whiz bang different 

way to do things, they always preach it is more efficient, it gets 

better results, all of those arguments. 

[The above chart entitled, ‘‘Defined Contribution Plans Are Nearly Four Times as Expensive To Administer’’ appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 48.] 

In this context I think it is very important to point out the differential here between the Defined Benefit—the public plans, their 

administrative costs, versus the Defined Contribution costs. This is 

little known information. It’s probably never been in a headline, 

never been on a news show, but it is important to point out. 

The second chart just does a very basic calculation, but Defined 

Benefit Plans are providing better income security for retirees. We 

have made this argument, this assertion, but the chart here is 

based upon $100 invested in a DB plan paying almost $200 more 

over time, the long run so to speak, over 25 years, than the same 

money in a Defined Contribution Plan. The green line going upward is the Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution. 

[The chart entitled, ‘‘Defined Benefit Plans Provide Better Income Security for Retirees’’ appears in the Submissions for the 

Record on page 49.] 

I wanted to make sure we saw that graphically because it helps 

to have some graphic presentations of some of these concepts. 

But let’s move to recommendations, and then we will wrap up. 

We can go in any order. We can start with Mr. Pryor, or start on 

the other end with Ms. Bovbjerg. If someone has to run out the 

door, you can go first. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. Well I can go first because, as you know, from 

GAO if I had recommendations in this area you would have already 

seen them in print. 

Senator Casey. Right. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. With regard to public plans, the number of States 

that provide Defined Benefit Plans now is the same that it was 10 

years ago. The mix changes a little bit with the hybrids, but it is 

pretty stable. 

If your goal is to preserve Defined Benefits in the public sector, 

I do not think there is much to be done there. Now I am not in 

the trenches the way some of the other people here are, particularly Mr. Pryor on this panel, who might have a different perception about the debate in Los Angeles. 

On the private sector side, it is a much different situation. As 

you know, Defined Benefit Plans are disappearing. We are not seeing a lot of new Defined Benefit Plans. 

We do have work coming out very soon on the dynamic of frozen 

plans that Mr. Pomeroy raised earlier. I think that will be some 

important work that is going to provide a foundation for us to 

think more about what really needs to be done on that end of employee benefits. 

We have also been asked to start work on looking at what would 

be a really good hybrid plan, a combination of the best characteristics of Defined Benefit Plans and the best characteristics of Defined 

Contribution Plans. 

36 

That is something that we were asked to look at some time ago 

when we convened a Comptroller General’s Forum on Defined Benefit Security, and we are happy to be able to start that work. 

So we will stay in touch with you on this issue, and I hope we 

will have recommendations for you later. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, and I 

appreciate your work and your scholarship and also your contribution here on your testimony. Thank you, very much. 

Ms. Bovbjerg. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Casey. Doctor. 

Dr. Weller. Well I believe a series of publications by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the National Council on Teacher Retirement says it all. The public sector 

plans are getting it right. 

So I think they serve as a model in terms of how we can achieve 

retirement security and allow hard-working Americans to achieve 

a middle class lifestyle in retirement after a lifetime of hard work. 

Having said that, I would say that we can use this model and 

the lessons from public sector plans to improve, to ultimately improve retirement income security in the private sector. 

I think much of the discussion focuses there on how we can implement a number of those features that are important in Defined 

Benefit Plans into Defined Contribution Plans. That goes into automatic enrollment, automatic default investments, life cycle funds, 

and model investment funds. Those kinds of things are already on 

the table, and I think we can do more. 

I think the big question that still needs to be addressed is how 

we can ultimately lower the costs, the fees on Defined Contribution 

Plans. That is a tall order. 

The other part is also—and Barbara already mentioned this— 

looking at, and it has been mentioned a number of times in this 

hearing today, on why is it that in particular single employer Defined Benefit Plans have disappeared very rapidly in the last few 

years. 

Multi-employer plans, which were somewhat similar to the public 

sector pension plans, have actually remained relatively stable. And 

what can be done to promote multi-employer Taft-Hartley type 

pension plans in the private sector, which are somewhat similar to 

the public sector plans, as a particular model for private sector retirement benefit security. 

I think one subaspect of that is I think we need to look at accounting rule changes on the increased uncertainty in terms of contribution volatility for the plan sponsors and what that has done 

in terms of plan sponsorship and the maintenance of those plans. 

As I said, I think the public sector plans and the State and local 

governments are actually getting it right. They are well regulated 

through State and local government regulations. 

I think they can serve as a model as lessons for what we can do 

both in the Defined Benefit side and the Defined Contribution side 

in the private sector, and I think we need to draw out those lessons 

and implement them in the future. 

Senator Casey. Doctor, is there anything—and this is for today 

or if you want to amplify the record—but is there anything that 

you think Congress should do in the near-term on this? 

37 

Dr. Weller. I think on defined—— 

Senator Casey. And I am saying as opposed to a lot of the legislating in this area obviously will be done at the State level as well. 

Dr. Weller. I think on the public sector side, as I said, they are 

well governed. That shows up in their asset allocations and their 

overall performance. I do not think that there is any role really for 

the Federal Government here. The States are doing it right. They 

are closer to those issues. 

I think however on the private sector DB side, the lessons—again 

of the lessons that I think it is important to learn is regular contributions matter. I mean, that is one thing that makes the public 

sector plans different from the private sector plans. 

There are regular employee contributions for instance going into 

those plans. And that is something that you definitely could pick 

up for the private sector side. 

Again, on the multi-employer private sector side, it already exists 

because it is often collectively bargained contributions from the employer. But I think that is an important lesson. 

And then the other part is the accounting rule differences between the public sector and the private sector, which seem to have 

been harmful the last few years to the private sector side. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Neff. 

Mr. Neff. Mr. Chairman, I think we have heard today that on 

balance the Defined Benefit Retirement System works. It works 

well for beneficiaries. It works well for taxpayers. And it has 

worked well for the economy. 

The Defined Contribution System I don’t think we can say has 

worked nearly so well in those three categories. So relative to recommendations, I would say please do nothing that will further encourage the disintermediation of funds from the Defined Benefit 

System to the Defined Contribution System. 

From where I sit as a venture capital partner, putting to work 

a very small slice of the Defined Benefit pool of capital, I would say 

that this is the only pool of capital that is consistently and reliably 

available to those of us who are company builders, company creators with a long-term, multi-decade horizon. 

And the characteristics of the Defined Contribution System are 

completely anathema to that long-term investment in the economy. 

So this may be a very good place to do nothing as it relates to this 

system. 

Senator Casey. We appreciate your candor. Thank you very 

much. I appreciate your testimony today and making the trip to be 

with us today and anything that you or the other witnesses want 

to add to the record, of course, you could. 

We will conclude now with Mr. Pryor. Thank you for having travelled the longest. 

Mr. Pryor. Thank you. I definitely had the risk of having my 

thunder stolen, which apparently has happened by Mr. Weller, but 

I will try and rephrase a little bit. 

That is, that to me a huge step forward is going to be the resuscitation of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in the private sector. 

These are good pension plans that provide for a quality income, 

health care upon retirement after a long career, and we need to put 

38 

that back into the economy in the United States. Because not only 

is it good for the owners of these companies who will have-as taxpayers have—a quality pension that is affordable for those companies, but also it is going to hopefully lead to recruitment and retention and provide for their own needs. 

Also we see the defined benefit impact on the economy as a 

whole, and how these pension dollars are reinvested back into the 

economy. I think that that is something that the Federal Government and State Government needs to concentrate their efforts on 

again revitalizing these private defined benefit pension plans and 

realize what a big give-back those plans are to local economies. 

Maybe when we can start getting more research and have more 

hearings like these to discuss the impact of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, maybe more people will catch on. 

So I think my recommendation is to keep doing what we are 

doing here today. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. And thanks for your testimony. 

Congressman Cummings. 

Representative Cummings. Just one question. 

Mr. Neff, I was listening to your response to the Chairman, and 

I was thinking that in Maryland we ranked fifth among States in 

bioscience venture capital investment between 2002 and 2007, and 

that amounted to about $2 billion invested. 

Moreover, there were sectors of the economy that rely on venture 

capital investment that would be—I’m just trying to figure out, if 

the venture capital funds were to dry up, what sectors would be 

most affected? And would it affect all of this—I am concerned about 

my constituents. 

Mr. Neff. Sure. It is an excellent question. As I testified earlier, 

approximately 42 percent of the entire venture capital industry in 

this country is funded by Defined Benefit Pension Plans. And if 

that source of capital were to dry up, it would have a dramatic impact on investments in biosciences. 

It would have a dramatic effect in investments in all kinds of 

technology sectors. And it would have a dramatic effect on some of 

the newer attention foci of venture capital such as Cleantech. 

So it is an enormously important little engine that drives the future of our economy. And again as a slice of the entire Defined 

Benefit pool, it is very small, maybe 3 percent, two, 3 percent is 

allocated to venture capital, out of maybe 5 to 10 percent totally 

allocated to alternative investments. It is a very small set of dollars. But in the aggregate, it is a very significant slice of the $250 

billion of capital that is tied up in the entire U.S. venture capital 

industry right now. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you, very much. 

Senator Casey. Congressman, thank you. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses and those who attended 

today. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., Thursday, July 10, 2008, the hearing 

was adjourned.] 

(39) 

Submissions for the Record 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. SCHUMER, CHAIRMAN

Good Morning. I would like to begin by thanking Senator Casey for holding this 

important hearing highlighting the need to strengthen our nation’s retirement security. Whether he is fighting to keep rising health insurance premiums down for 

workers or making sure there is sufficient emergency funding for food assistance to 

help families deal with skyrocketing grocery prices, there is no doubt that Bob 

Casey is a true champion for America’s families. The people of Pennsylvania—and 

we here on the Joint Economic Committee—are fortunate to have him in the Senate 

today. 

It is no wonder that American workers today are feeling increasingly anxious 

about their jobs, their wages, and their ability to eventually retire. Every day it 

seems we learn more bad news about the economy: 

• Just 2 days ago we learned that the already anemic housing market continues 

to plummet. Sales of existing homes fell an additional 4.7 percent in May—down 

14 percent from where they were a year ago—and by all accounts the bottom is nowhere in sight, leaving millions of Americans with less access to credit and increasingly worried about whether they owe more on their homes than they are worth. 

• This news comes on the heels of last week’s Labor report showing that the 

country lost another 62,000 jobs last month—marking the 6th straight month of job 

losses and bringing the total number of jobs lost just this year to almost 440,000. 

And as we all know, unemployment has devastating consequences for families. Not 

only must they struggle to make ends meet in the short term, but also their retirement savings suffer as they miss out on the opportunity to contribute to their retirement funds—assuming they were lucky enough to have a retirement fund to begin 

with. 

• All of this news comes at a time when wages are stagnating and prices of everything—from oil to food to consumer products—is skyrocketing. 

The most important thing we in Congress can do today is take steps to improve 

the nation’s economy. But we must also be taking steps to ensure that Americans’ 

long-term financial health is protected. We need to ensure that all workers, and in 

particular those in the public sector—our firefighters, our teachers, our police officers, have access to retirement plans that will provide them with the security they 

deserve. 

Senator Casey is right to point out that strong public pension plans benefit more 

than just the workers they are designed to serve. Public sector defined benefit pension plans provide workers with 34 percent higher earnings over a 25 year period 

than defined contribution plans and save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars 

in reduced state and local government contributions. 

At the same time, these plans help fuel the economy by driving investment to venture capital funds that play a critical role in nurturing American innovation and 

breakthroughs across the technological spectrum—including life saving advances in 

health care. So, it is critical that we in Congress do all we can to ensure that public 

defined benefit pension plans are protected. 

But we must do more than that if we are to truly improve the retirement security 

of all Americans. We must encourage Americans to save more—something I have 

long been a proponent of. It is unacceptable that the U.S. ranks lowest of all industrial nations in personal savings, with a personal savings rate of negative 1 percent 

according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. 

This is why I have sponsored the bipartisan ASPIRE Act that encourages families 

to start saving accounts for their children. As everyone here knows, in today’s economy, asset building is essential to getting ahead. Yet despite that fact, we are not 

encouraging children, who have the most to gain from starting savings earlier in 

life, to become savers. By encouraging families to start accounts at birth (rather 

40 

than when people enter the workforce), making the accounts universal, and providing a match to low-income people, and allowing anyone to contribute to them— 

the ASPIRE Act would go a long way in helping to improve this country’s savings 

rate. 

It is clear that there is no easy answer to solving our savings and retirement security problems. But I believe that today’s discussion about what we here in Congress 

can do to strengthen the retirement security of all Americans is an important first 

step. I look forward to hearing from our panelists today, and I once again thank 

Senator Casey for highlighting this issue. 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EARL POMEROY

Chairman Casey, Senator Brownback, Vice Chairman Maloney and Representative Saxon, I commend you for holding this hearing ‘‘Your Money, Your Future: Public Pension Plans and the Need to Strengthen Retirement Security’’. 

Americans are anxious. Recent figures on the economy loosing 436,000 jobs over 

the last few months underlie part of those uneasy feelings. Americans are also concerned for the long run, rightfully so. If it is your money that you must rely on in 

retirement, then baby boomers need to be concerned. One-third of boomers, on the 

door step of retirement, have no financial assets and among those who have financial assets the median value of their holdings is a meager $45,900. (GAO Baby 

Boom Generation) 

In April, the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) reported that workers 

confidence in their financial prospects for retirement have reached a 7-year low. In 

EBRI’s 2008 Retirement Confidence Survey, only 18 percent of workers were very 

confident that will have enough money to live comfortably throughout their retirement years. In fact, this figure represents a sizable drop—it is one third lower than 

the 27 percent of workers who were very confident just 1 year ago. 

Why? We are witnessing a seismic shift in the risks of retirement as corporations 

with expertise and capacity to bear such risks place the retirement risks on individuals. Workers must not only save enough but then individuals must figure out how 

to make their money last throughout their future years in retirement. Rather than 

feel fully ‘‘empowered’’ by their 401(k) accounts when it comes to protecting financial 

security, Americans are finding that we are all in this alone. Luckily, this is not 

so with public pensions. 

I believe that Congress needs to champion the pension plans that are the focus 

of this hearing. Clearly, defined benefit plans provide greater retirement security to 

workers at a lower cost, and they encourage economic growth in many ways. 

Public pensions are the vibrant core of defined benefit plans; unfortunately, their 

private sector counter parts face tough challenges at the hands of this Administration and Congress. Prior to effective date of the Pension Protection Act, the nation’s 

100 largest defined benefit pensions rebounded from 3 years of investment losses 

to an aggregate $111 billion surplus position as of the end of 2007. (Pensions and 

Investments) 

We have businesses struggling in this recession to pony-up more money than they 

ever had to contribute before because of the Pension Protection Act’s stiffer funding 

requirements. While some argued that could be a good thing for workers, there is 

a hitch. Private sector pensions are a voluntary system. Employers can decide that 

offering a pension no longer makes good business sense. ‘‘Can we freeze this pension 

liability?’’ financial executives question as they shift more risk to workers. 

Already, 3.3 million workers have seen their pension benefit plans frozen in some 

way. Many of the recently frozen plans were well funded. According to the most recent PBGC data on its insured plans the number of single employer-plans frozen 

at the end of 2005 increased by 48 percent over the 2 year period after 2003. For 

older workers, a frozen pension can leave them with little time to make up for the 

loss in benefits. 

There is good news in today’s hearing—Public Pension Plans. They protect retirement security for 12 percent of the nation’s workforce, the plans put $150 billion 

dollars into the checkbooks of 7 million retirees each year and their trustees invest 

$3 trillion in assets in our economy. The public servants protecting our families and 

educating our children covered in these pensions have their benefits protected in 

many cases by the state constitutions which mean that plans can not be frozen and 

obligations must be met. These plans are models. 

Without oversight and regulation by the Federal Government, these pensions 

have funded nearly 90 percent of their outstanding retirement liabilities, in aggregate. No doubt, some plans fall short. Alicia Munnell at the Center for Retirement 

Research calls this ‘‘the miraculous aspect of the funding of state and local pensions’’ 

since it occurred without a Federal law. 

GAO’s work on public pension confirms the general soundness of these retirement 

plans. GAO also found that when governments had difficulty making the needed annual contribution or experienced low funding ratios, concerns about the plan’s future 

status may exist. But public employees do not bear the brunt. When private sector 

plans face the same circumstances, they can choose a less painful way out for the 

business by freezing the pensions, but public pensions must make good on their 

promises to employees. 

Chairman Casey, with my thanks for today’s hearing, I also bring positive news 

to my colleagues in the Senate. Yesterday, the House took a strong bipartisan step 

forward to build retirement security by unanimously passing a technical corrections 

51 

bill that had several important clarifications—such as asset smoothing. The Senate 

added these provisions last year. There is a real urgency to fix the asset smoothing 

problem for private pensions and strengthen public pensions which the bill does. I 

hope the Senate moves to pass H.R. 6382 soon. 

Again, I thank you for putting the retirement security needs of American workers 

at the top of Congress’ to do list today. I am pleased to join you. 

Let this be the starting point for a simple but forgotten truth that Jacob Hacker 

highlighted in his book the Great Risk Shift: economic security is a cornerstone of 

economic opportunity. Both businesses and people invest in the future when they 

have basic protection against the greatest downside risks of their choices. 

52 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAROLYN B. MALONEY, VICE CHAIR

Good morning. I would like to thank Chairman Schumer for holding this hearing 

to examine public pension plans and how they affect retirement security, entrepreneurship and economic growth. I also want to thank Senator Casey for chairing. 

The current turmoil in the financial markets, the housing crisis, increasing credit 

card indebtedness, and the economic downturn have exacerbated concerns about the 

retirement prospects of many Americans. Rising unemployment, long-term joblessness, and falling or stagnant wages are leaving workers feeling not only squeezed 

now, but also unable to save for retirement in the future. Unfortunately, economic 

downturns and bear markets have lasting, as well as immediate, implications. 

Over the past two decades, employer-sponsored retirement plans have not only declined, but also have steadily shifted the risk and responsibility of retirement investment to workers. Employers increasingly have abandoned the promise of defined 

benefits at retirement for defined contribution plans, where the individual ultimately ends up bearing both the risk of longevity and investment decisions before 

and after retirement. 

As a result, today too many Americans are either worried that they won’t have 

enough money saved for a comfortable retirement or they won’t ever be able to retire. This is particularly true for women, who typically live longer than men, but 

earn less over their lifetime. 

Our focus today is on public pension plans, which offer a model for providing retirement security to workers. In the defined benefit plans offered by public pension 

systems, individuals are provided a steady stream of income throughout their golden 

years that is protected from market fluctuations. Moreover, public pension plans 

typically have lower costs and fees while generating higher returns than defined 

contribution plans, because they have a wider range of investment expertise and opportunities available to them than individuals do. 

As Mr. Pryor points out in his testimony, employee contributions and earnings 

from investments make up the vast majority of public pension funding, not taxpayer 

funds. In contrast to private defined benefit plans, most public employees contribute 

to their pension plans. Defined benefit plans help to attract and retain talented employees—firefighters, police officers, teachers—to a life in public service. 

The advantages to workers are clear, but there are also economic benefits that 

are not as well known. Defined benefit plans provide a ‘‘patient pool’’ of available 

capital for investment, such as venture capital, which leads to job creation and the 

promotion of new industries and technologies. In the current credit crisis, pension 

plans have played an important role in providing liquidity to the markets. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and I look forward to the testimony today. 


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1 Hewitt Associates ‘‘Total Retirement Income at Large Companies: The Real Deal.’’ June, 

2008. 2 ‘‘The Relative Performance Record and Asset Allocation of Public Defined Benefit Plans’’ 

Morningstar in conjunction with NCPERS. December, 2007, Page 5. 3 Ibid 2, page 7. 

4Federal Reserve Board—2008 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PRYOR, VICE CHAIRMAM, BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, PASADENA, 

CA 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Joint Economic Committee, thank you for inviting 

me today. My name is William Pryor and I serve as Chairman of the Board of Investments at the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, serving 

approximately 151,000 participants and managing $41 billion assets. 

I also serve on the Executive Board of the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems, the largest public pension trade association with approximately 500 public pension members who collectively oversee nearly $3 trillion 

in assets for the benefit of 21 million public servants. 

State and local retirement plans in the United States cover 14.1 million active 

employees (about 10 percent of the U.S. labor force) and 6.9 million retirees, including teachers, police officers, firefighters, legislators, judges, and general employees. 

Ninety percent of state and local governmental employees are covered by defined 

benefit retirement plans. Approximately 25 percent are not covered by Social Security, including close to half of public school teachers and about 70 percent of police 

officers and firefighters. State and local retirement plans paid annual benefits of 

$150 billion averaging about $20,700 per retiree in 2007. 

The bulk of public pension benefit funding is not shouldered by taxpayers. On a 

national basis, employer (taxpayer) contributions to state and local pension systems 

make up less than one-fourth of all public pension revenue. Earnings from investments and employee contributions comprise the remainder. In 2006, investment 

earnings accounted for 75 percent of all public pension revenue; employer contributions were 16 percent; and employee contributions accounted for 9 percent. Unlike 

corporate workers, most public employees are required to contribute to their pension 

plans. 

Traditional public employee pension systems have resisted the shift to defined 

contribution (DC) plans recently seen in private sector employment. The decision to 

remain with traditional pension plans is a policy decision by local governments carefully made with its costs and benefits considered. Local governments support defined benefit (DB) plans as a cost effective measure to pay for a sustainable retirement for employees and to allow for recruitment and retention of a well trained 

work force. Additionally public DB plans play an important role in local economies 

as a consistent and long term investor in multiple asset classes. 

BACKGROUND

Generally traditional pension plans attempt to support an employee at a 70 to 90 

percent salary replacement rate upon retirement. This replacement level may consider not only the traditional pension annuity, but supplemental allowances or 

health care supplements the employee may have earned during active employment. 

Additionally, many public employees are outside of Social Security. It is estimated 

that a third of all public employees and 75 percent of public safety employees are 

not covered by Social Security. Thus, for many of us, our pension plans may be our 

only retirement income. With recent dramatic rises in health care costs and general 

living expenses, studies now indicate a replacement rate of over 100 percent and as 

high as 126 percent of final salary may be required for a sustainable retirement.1

Traditional local and state public pension plans are well run, well diversified and 

provide a return on investment that cannot be duplicated with private retail mutual 

funds. Recently a report from Morningstar compared retail mutual funds with traditional public pension plans and found those public DB plans out performed their private counterparts by 3.22 percent.2 In traditional Morningstar comparisons public 

pension plans averaged four stars, while moderate allocation mutual funds (assumed peer group) only getting three.3

Traditional public pension plans hold nearly 3 trillion dollars in assets, equal to 

more than 20 percent of the nation’s entire gross domestic product,4 and capture 

over 20 percent of the nations entire retirement market. These plans play an important part in the U.S. economy as long term, well diversified investors. 

65 

5Sacramento State University ‘‘The Combined Annual Economic Impacts of CalPERS and 

CalSTRS Retirement Income Benefit Payments.’’ April 2007, Page 2,5,7. 6 ‘‘Facts at a Glance’’ CalPERS, July 2008, Page 1. 

A majority of local and state agencies participate in Social Security, but not all 

agencies are required to participate. Most pension systems provide either retiree 

health plans and life or long term care products to retirees on a pooled and guaranteed basis. Plan designs for public pension plans vary with size, geography and classifications of employees represented. 

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DB PENSION PLANS PROVIDE BENEFITS NOT TRADITIONALLY OFFERED

IN PRIVATE DC SCHEMES. 

Traditional pension plan benefits provide income that attempts to replace a portion of employee’s salaries upon retirement. This may be an employee’s salary for 

service with either one employer or multiple employers who participate in direct reciprocal agreements. Most traditional pensions are supplemented by death and survivor benefits, additional annuities purchased through the pension plan, health care 

provided by the plan and other pooled insurance services offered as optional benefits 

for participants. These additional benefits may be paid by the employer, provided 

on a matching basis, or with no employer subsidy. 

Traditional pension plans usually provide a death and survivor benefit that will 

ensure a defined benefit survivor allowance to family members of employees that 

may have lost their lives as a result of public service employment. These survivor 

benefits provide a ‘‘floor’’ level allowance even if the employee has not gained 

enough retirement credit to allow a sustainable income replacement. This survivor 

allowance may be higher if the dead or disabled employee has gained enough service 

credit to exceed this floor benefit. 

There are many insurance products designed for temporary or permanent income 

replacement that are available for employers’ purchase. However, only DB plans are 

capable of generating a high level of allowance (in many cases, 50 percent of the 

employee’s annual income) while spreading risk among the entire employee pool. 

When trying to insure public safety employees; most insurance underwriters will 

not carry police and fire employees without a larger group of general employees to 

share the risk. The possibility of large scale loss of life and high rates of industrial 

disability are outside the boundaries of an acceptably insured employee group. As 

testimony, our 3000 member firefighter local has sought coverage under an underwritten long term care policy for active duty firefighters for 6 years but has not had 

coverage through a common long term care provider. No larger underwriter of LTC 

policies will accept a safety only pool. 

Next to survivor and disability benefits the next most common ancillary benefit 

is health care insurance. Because of the ability to pool beneficiaries and guarantee 

coverage, pension plans are ideally suited to provide this benefit. System-provided 

health care allows employees to begin saving for retirement medical care as an active duty employee through benefit funds that will be utilized on retirement. Many 

pension plans allow retirement medical savings within the retirement plan design, 

with the fund administering the benefit. This allows for consistent crediting of investment interest with very low fees. As a result, employees are provided health insurance with guaranteed coverage at low cost and very high level of quality of care. 

DB PENSION PLANS AND THEIR EFFECT ON LOCAL ECONOMIES IN CALIFORNIA

The contribution of traditional public employee pension plans in California can be 

seen in the stable and sustainable income paid to their retirees and the impact of 

those pension payments on California’s economy. These benefits also ‘‘compound’’ 

where retiree payments are invested back into the retirement system investments 

(real estate, venture capital, equities) through normal spending and those investments again, returning to the retiree because they are spending on their own investments. While most traditional public pensions are well diversified investment vehicles, California public pension plans invest heavily in local real estate and private 

ventures due to familiarity with the sector and its participating managers and owners. 

California pension plans, with similar numbers nationwide, pay around 76 percent 

of retiree payroll with investment income. The remaining amount is generally equally divided between employer and employee contributions.5 These payments are paid 

to retirees as pension payments or other pension benefits. Currently, the average 

Ca1PERS retiree left service at 60 years old and will receive an average monthly 

allowance of $1,876 or $22,512 per year.6 Typical of most pension systems, the value 

66 

7 Ibid footnote 1, page 6, Table 2. 

8 Russel Read—Powerpoint ‘‘Impact of CalPERS Investments on the State of California’’ 

http//www.calpers.ca.gov/index jsp?bc=/investments/video-center/view-video/cpfi-conference/ 

calif-invest-econ-study.xml 9 ‘‘Health Care Coverage for Retirees’’ Congressional Research Service, Cornell University 

2006. Page 3. 

of this retirement can be enhanced with other pension system provided benefits 

such as a funded cost of living enhancement or retiree health care. 

With over two million public employees retired and contributing to the California 

economy, those CalPERS, CalSTRS and County payments are a significant part of 

the California salary base and as is their eventual disbursement into the California 

economy. For CalPERS alone this means over 13 billion dollars in direct retiree payments and estimated total economic activity for the State. Those allowances can 

mean over 21 billion dollars in total economic revenues for the state.7 Additionally 

this output means employment to 137,974 state residents. When teachers and County retirement systems total payments and their impact is reviewed, total direct retiree payments reach 25.5 billion and their total economic impact reach an annual 

41.5 billion dollars on the California economy solely as a result of benefit payments 

to resident retirees.8

The provision of good retiree health care also has an impact on the California 

economy. Again, there are over 2 million employees pooled into retirement system 

negotiated health care contracts. This means that a pooled, guaranteed insurance 

product can be offered. Since over 50 percent of retirees having two or more serious 

medical conditions,9 up to one million retirees would be left in jeopardy of losing 

health care coverage due to chronic health problems. With pension system negotiated health insurance, these retirees have a vehicle to negotiate quality care at 

a reasonable price and guarantee coverage for those whom may otherwise be in 

jeopardy. 

LOCAL AND STATEWIDE INVESTMENT BY CALIFORNIA PENSION PLANS

Like most large traditional public pension funds, CalPERS, CalSTRS and County 

retirement systems spend a slightly larger share of certain asset classes on California centered investments. This can be attributed to a political emphasis on local 

investment, a familiarity by investment staff with private investments, and an 

awareness by their managers of investment projects specifically designed to target 

an undervalued market. 

Usually with the assistance of asset managers or other intermediaries, local investment has become a common practice across most asset classes. Since returns 

have been equal to or greater than other investments this trend is expected to continue. 

As a natural result of California’s large stake in private equity or venture capital 

holdings and the large base of real estate investments centered in the state, public 

DB plans will naturally have a bias toward state investments. The large proportion 

of hi-tech industries and now clean-tech sectors based in California meant a natural 

‘‘overweight’’ to California businesses. The origination of these industries in California has meant opportunities for ‘‘ground floor’’ investments in startup companies 

in California companies. These opportunities are usually brokered through private 

equity and venture capital funds that also have a California bias in their investment 

style. This regional emphasis allows both the pension system and their outside managers to find proper investments in private equity investments and fulfill their obligation for due diligence on the investment with other, familiar managers or companies. 

There is also a concentration of California plans in local real estate options. This 

can be directly attributed to the familiarity of investment staff in California real estate opportunities and the managers making those investments. Real estate managers tend to be centered in one geographic area, as with many of our alternative 

assets they generally are more successful when they are smaller in size but large 

enough attract cash investments and partnerships from large institutional clients. 

Often, manager styles and investment types can be matched to a need of some members of the system. One example would be the recent investment in urban centers 

in multi-family apartment and condominium sales. Not only were units built with 

retirement system investments in urban centers in need of revitalization, members 

of the system are seen as quality owners with good credit and income and were 

given the opportunity to purchase these investments with attractive financing incentives. 

67 

DB PENSION PLANS AND THE ECONOMIC CYCLE

In addition to contributing to California’s investments public pension systems, traditional DB pension plans play an important role in the overall U.S. and international economic cycle. Traditional public pension plans have a unique profile for 

asset managers: we are long term, patient investors that generally base our performance on annual returns, or returns over a several years, not the next quarter. 

While other retail funds, or even institutional funds have immediate demands to 

produce over a short term horizon, traditional pension plans may make investments 

in venture or real estate funds that may not be fully realized for as many as 20 

years. 

A current reminder of the importance of DB capital on the economy would be the 

current credit crisis and the importance of DB plans in smoothing some of the volatility of the event. While many lenders have shuttered their doors to many kinds 

of financing due to risk, pension plans and their managers are lending to private 

equity investments at a high rate, plugging the hole that lending banks have left. 

This recent trend provided our funds an investment opportunity in well researched 

cash outlays and provide much needed capital to companies hungry for loans. The 

pension funds’ abilities to lend large amounts within a reasonable asset allocation 

with low risk provide them with unique opportunities and advantages in contrast 

to other asset managers. 

CONCLUSION

Traditional public employee pension plans are well funded, diversified investment 

vehicles that serve their members in all aspects of retirement. They also provide an 

important role in the local and national economy as patient, long term investors. 

Finally, these are nimble enough to take advantage of local investment opportunities that are frequently overlooked by other large investment vehicles. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity to present my views. I would be happy to 

answer any questions the committee may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF P. SHERRILL NEFF, PARTNER, QUAKER BIOVENTURES, 

PHILADELPHIA, PA 

INTRODUCTION

Members of the Committee, good morning. My name is Sherrill Neff and I am a 

partner with the venture capital firm Quaker BioVentures located in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on a very important 

issue for the venture capital industry: the role of defined benefit pension plans as 

a critical source of capital formation for both our industry and the startup companies in which we invest. 

By way of background, Quaker BioVentures is a venture capital firm investing in 

life science companies, including biopharmaceuticals, medical devices, human 

diagnostics, specialty pharmaceuticals, and healthcare services. My partners and I 

invest in companies at all stages of development, from the earliest stage of businesses to later pre-public companies. The firm was formed in 2003 and is currently 

investing Quaker BioVentures II, a $420M fund raised in 2007. In total, Quaker 

BioVentures manages over $700M in committed capital of which approximately 75 

percent percent comes from large public and private defined benefit plans. Our investors include 10 public pension funds from six different states and major corporate 

pension funds. Since 2003, we have invested in 28 life sciences companies, most of 

which were startup or early stage companies, and all of which are pursuing important and innovative therapies, devices, diagnostics or other healthcare services. 

My firm is also a member of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). 

The NVCA represents more than 480 venture capital firms in the United States and 

advocates for policies and legislation that are favorable to American innovation and 

entrepreneurship. In 2007 alone, venture capitalists invested approximately $30 billion into small, high-risk, emerging growth companies in areas such as life sciences, 

information technology, homeland security, and clean technology. The goal of our industry is simple—using the most innovative new products and services to market 

in the most efficient manner, while maximizing returns for our institutional investors. 

Today I would like to explain how the venture capital industry raises and invests 

money, the economic implications of this investment, and the importance of defined 

benefit pension plans in that equation. 

68 

VENTURE CAPITAL FUND STRUCTURE

Venture capital is a relatively small, but extremely unique sub-sector of what 

many institutional investors refer to as alternative assets. Venture capital funds are 

set up as limited partnerships in which sophisticated institutional investors or limited partners (‘‘LPs’’) provide capital to a fund managed by a group of venture capitalists or general partners, (‘‘GPs’’). The GPs invest this capital along with their 

own in high risk and often high tech private startup companies that demonstrate 

a tremendous promise for growth over the long term. The typical investment horizon 

for a venture-backed company is 5 to 10 years, often longer and rarely less. Once 

the company has grown to a viable size, it either goes public or becomes acquired 

by a strategic buyer, hopefully at a significant investment return to the venture capital fund, the entrepreneur, and the LPs. Given the high risk nature of the investment, it is understood that many venture-backed companies ultimately fail. However, those that succeed return top dollars to investors and create jobs and revenues 

for the US economy. Yet, it is not an investment for the faint at heart. 

For that reason venture capital LPs are highly sophisticated investors who understand the value of ‘‘patient capital’’. They recognize that their investment will not 

be liquid for some time but they are willing to make that commitment for the benefit of higher returns. The life of a venture capital fund is typically set at 10 years 

but in reality, it is often much longer—15 to 17 years—until the last investment 

is harvested and distributions are made. Yet, on a pooled basis over the long-term, 

the venture capital asset class has outperformed the public markets for many years. 

The 10 year performance for all venture funds through 12/31/2007 was 18.3 percent 

as opposed to NASDAQ which registered 5.3 percent and the S&P 500 which was 

4.2 percent. Source: Thomson Reuters/NVCA. 

Approximately 90 percent of venture capital commitments come from institutional 

investors—defined benefit pension funds, insurance companies, university endowments, corporations and foundations. The small percentage of individual investors 

who become venture fund limited partners are designated as high net worth and 

have the financial resources and staying power to commit large amounts of capital 

to illiquid investments for periods of time that, as I explained, can exceed a decade. 

All of these investors have the ability to obtain significant independent financial advice in order to evaluate potential investments. For this reason, under applicable 

securities laws, venture capital limited partnerships are not required to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

The relationship between the GPs and the LPs is extremely important in the venture capital life cycle. GPs spend a considerable amount of their time and effort raising the fund which they intend to invest in emerging growth companies. The fundraising process consists of preparing offering materials, identifying and meeting 

with appropriate and compatible investors (LPs) and their professional advisors, responding to LP due diligence requests, and negotiating the terms of their commitment. It is not unusual for this fundraising process to take a year or longer. However, once an institutional investor joins a fund as an LP, they are likely to invest 

in follow on funds if the relationship is a good one. Participation in the most successful funds is highly competitive. Funds will indeed turn away money from institutional investors once their target fund level is achieved. 

The venture capital industry would not exist without the support of limited partners who provide the majority of the capital invested in the young businesses. In 

return, the general partners provide time, management expertise and experience in 

identifying and nurturing these companies so that they grow into viable and valuable businesses. 

THE ROLE OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL SYSTEM

You have heard from the other witnesses today about many of the positive contributions that defined benefit plans offer their participants. I would like to address 

an attribute of the defined benefit plans that may be less well known: the role of 

defined benefit plans in the funding and growth of the venture capital industry and 

the entrepreneurial segment of the US economy. 

Defined benefit pension plans have historically been a sizable and reliable pool 

of capital for venture fund formation and thereby for investment into the nation’s 

emerging growth companies. The US venture capital industry would not be the economic engine it is today without the strong investment participation from defined 

benefit plans. Federal rules first permitted defined benefit plans to invest in venture 

capital in the 1980s. 

In 1974, the Employment Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted to protect the pension and welfare benefit rights of workers and beneficiaries. 

Private pension plans had already been in existence for many years, but the passage 

69 

of ERISA marked the growing importance of these private plans in the retirement 

income equation. 

One of the critical regulations which was established for the first time by the Federal Government in ERISA concerned the investment of pension assets by those responsible for their control. The Department of Labor was given exclusive authority 

to issue regulations and rulings that define who is an ERISA fiduciary. Thus, in 

1979 the Department of Labor issued its ‘‘prudence regulation’’ which interpreted 

ERISA as allowing pension plans to invest in young, smaller companies. This regulation provided managers of pension funds the ability to channel money into venture 

capital funds which they have done in increasing, yet reasonable amounts ever 

since. 

As a direct result of the ERISA ‘‘prudent man rule’’ money from public and private pension funds began to flow into the venture capital space beginning in the 

1980s. In 1980 private independent venture funds had just over $4 billion in capital 

under management. This rose to $18 billion in 1985, $28 billion in 1990, $41 billion 

in 1995, $225 billion in 2000, and $257 billion in 2007. Much of this growth is attributable to the success of venture capital investment and the receptivity of defined 

benefit plans to the high returns the asset class afforded them. 

Yet the mix of limited partners is changing. Because many US based private pension plans have been converted from defined benefit plans to defined contribution 

plans over the past several years, we are seeing fewer private pension plans actively 

investing in venture. Filling that gap are LPs from outside the United States, including foreign public and private pension funds who are becoming increasingly interested in investing in US based venture capital funds. 

Yet US public pension plans continue to be critical and reliable sources of capital 

for US venture funds. The vast majority of state pension funds and many local public pension funds invest a small portion of their assets in private equity because 

they understand that, while long-term and sometimes riskier than bonds and stocks, 

venture capital can deliver returns that boost the overall financial position of the 

fund. Today all but a few states permit their public pension funds to invest a small 

amount of their assets into the venture capital asset class. States that have been 

long-time venture capital investors include California, Washington, Pennsylvania, 

and Wisconsin. 

Most public entities invest only a small portion of their investible assets in private 

equity/alternative assets, often less than 5 percent, because of the potential risk and 

long term nature of the asset class. Thus, in exchange they expect to receive a return on investment that is much higher than traditional asset classes. Defined benefit plans usually diversify their commitments to alternative asset classes two ways: 

(1) by investing across different alternative asset sub-classes (real estate, buyout, 

private equity, venture capital and hedge funds; and (2) within each sub-class investing in a large number of different managers. As a result, the pension plan’s exposure to any one alternative asset class or to any one manager is very limited. 

Venture capitalists who take defined benefit pension plans into their funds do so 

because these fund managers are long-term, patient investors who understand the 

nuances and risks of venture investing. Additionally, VCs have found defined benefit pension LPs to be knowledgeable, forthright and valuable investment partners 

over the length of the fund. With demand for participation in venture capital funds 

at an all time high, this trusted relationship helps guarantee a coveted spot for defined pension plans. However, should these plans convert to defined contribution 

plans, that spot will be forfeited to other institutional investors as the requirements 

for investment in the venture capital industry are not compatible with the characteristics of defined contribution plans. 

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT

When a defined benefit pension plan invests in a venture capital fund, it is not 

only creating higher returns for its pensioners, but it is also supporting one of our 

country’s most important economic engines. Literally thousands of companies would 

not exist today were it not for the venture capital investment support they received 

early on. Federal Express, Staples, Outback Steakhouse and Starbucks are well 

known examples of traditional companies that were launched with venture backing. 

Cisco, Google, EBay, Yahoo and countless other technology companies were all, at 

one time, just ideas that needed startup capital and guidance. 

In the same vein, venture capital has been an important catalyst for innovation 

in the life sciences and a multitude of medical innovations would not have been possible without it. Genentech started with venture backing. So did Amgen, Genzyme 

and Medtronic. Over the last several decades, venture capitalists have partnered 

with scientists to build successful businesses and bring to market such drugs as 

70 

Herceptin, an important part of our war on cancer and Integrilin, which significantly reduces blood clotting. Studies suggest that more than one out of three Americans will use a medical product or service generated by a venture- backed life 

sciences company. 

According to the econometrics firm Global Insight, last year US based, venture- backed companies accounted for more than 10.4 million jobs and generated over $2.3 

trillion in revenue. Nearly one out of every ten private sector jobs is at a company 

that was originally venture-backed. Almost 18 percent of US GDP comes from venture-backed companies. 

Venture investors are constantly looking for the next ‘‘big thing’’ and these days, 

many of my colleagues are active in building alternative energy companies in what 

is called the ‘‘clean technology’’ industry, a sector which I’m sure we all agree will 

play a vital role in America’s global competitiveness for years to come. 

None of this value would have been possible without the active investment of public and private defined benefit pension funds. The relationship between the venture 

industry and defined benefit managers is a symbiotic one that creates high returns 

for the investors and the US economy. It represents a highly efficient use of capital 

that we assert should remain in the system. I can tell you unequivocally that most 

venture firms would prefer to ensure (1) that the jobs and technologies we fund be 

based here in the US, and also (2) that the returns we generate on our investments 

also be returned to American pension beneficiaries. That will continue to occur as 

long as the defined benefit plans are embraced as an important part of our overall 

retirement system. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for the opportunity to weigh in on this important issue. We look forward to working with many of the large defined benefit pension managers for years 

to come. The support of these programs not only helps pension holders, but also creates jobs, generates revenues and fosters innovation for our country, contributing 

to a healthy US economy at both a micro and macro economic level. 

I am happy to answer any questions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN WELLER, PH.D., SENIOR ECONOMIST, CENTER

FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Thank you Chairman Schumer, Vice-Chair Maloney, Ranking Republican Brownback, Ranking Member Saxton, Senator Casey, and members of the Joint Economic 

Committee for this opportunity to speak to you today. My testimony this morning 

will address the public- and private-sector impacts of defined benefit pension plans 

in the public sector. I will specifically discuss the long-term economic performance 

of state and local defined benefit pension plans and how this performance compares 

with that of defined contribution plans. 

A recent poll conducted by Bankrate Inc. found that only about 3 in 10 workers 

expect to have enough money to retire comfortably. Nearly 7 in 10 Americans have 

set low expectations about their retirement prospects. One in five Americans says 

they are afraid they will never be able to retire (Austin Business Journal, 2008). 

It is not hard to see why so many Americans feel so uneasy about their future 

retirement prospects. An ever smaller share of workers has a retirement savings 

plan at work. For instance, only 43.2 percent of private sector workers had an employer-sponsored retirement plan, either a traditional pension or a retirement savings plan, in 2006, the last year for which data are available (Purcell, 2007). This 

is the lowest share in more than a decade and a substantial drop from 50.0 percent 

in 2000, the last peak. In addition, a growing number of workers are saving with 

defined contribution retirement savings plans. This can leave workers exposed to a 

number of new risks—a point I will return to later in my testimony. It also means 

that wealth creation carries unequal tax rewards, depending on one’s earnings. Because contributions to these retirement savings plans are tax deductible, higher-income earners tend to receive a larger tax benefit from contributing to their DC plans 

than lower-income ones. 

These longer-term trends have been overshadowed by recent drops in financial 

and nonfinancial market wealth. Families have lost a lot of financial wealth due to 

a sharp decline in stock prices. Since the beginning of the year alone, the S&P 500 

had lost 12.5 percent of its value by the end of June 2008. Also, the fact that homeowners were highly leveraged due to the recent mortgage boom meant that they 

stood to lose a lot when house prices began to fall (Weller, 2006). Recent data from 

the Federal Reserve, for example, show that home equity relative to income dropped 

by 5.0 percentage points by March 2008, compared to a quarter earlier, the largest 

71 

1 Author’s calculations based on BOG(2008). 

such drop on record.1 These adverse trends have meant that a growing number of 

families will have to rely solely on Social Security as source of retirement income 

(Baker and Rosnick, 2008). 

In light of such trends, policy solutions are necessary to restore the promise of 

a retirement in dignity for the all working families in America. Here, policymakers 

could focus on elements of our retirement system that are working well. State and 

local defined benefit, or DB, pension plans stand out as an example of what works 

when it comes to achieving broad-based retirement income adequacy at a reasonable 

cost. A review of the economic evidence on state and local DB plans tells us that 

these pension plans have proven themselves as model retirement systems. They 

have a successful track record of performance in delivering adequate benefits in a 

sustainable and efficient manner. 

FEATURES OF A MODEL RETIREMENT PLAN

If one were to design an ideal retirement plan, it would probably encompass the 

following features: 

• broad-based coverage, which covers all workers automatically 

• secure money for retirement, with limited opportunities for leakage of retirement assets 

• portability of benefits, which will allow workers to retain benefits if they 

switch jobs 

• shared financing, with contributions from both employees and employers 

• lifetime benefits, so that retirement income cannot be outlived 

• spousal and disability benefits to provide protections against death or the inability to work 

• professional management of assets 

• low costs and fees. 

The DB plans that provide retirement benefits to employees of state and local governments typically meet all of these criteria for a model retirement system. 

Broad-based coverage 

Employees must simply meet the eligibility requirements of the DB plan to earn 

benefits in a public sector DB plan. They are then automatically enrolled without 

having to make any active decisions. 

This truly ‘‘automatic’’ enrollment is a typical characteristic of DB plans. Private 

sector DB plans also automatically enroll all eligible workers. 

Defined contribution, or DC, plans, on the other hand, often require employees to 

enroll themselves, and then to make difficult decisions about how much to save and 

where to direct their investments. 

In passing the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress acknowledged this flaw 

inherent in DC plans, and attempted to make automatic enrollment and efficient 

asset allocation easier. It is too soon, however, to reach any conclusions about the 

law’s effectiveness on increasing automatic enrollment in DC plans. 

Secure money for retirement 

State and local DB plans provide a secure source of income in retirement for a 

number of reasons. First, one’s funds cannot be borrowed from, and typically are not 

distributed as a lump-sum payment. That is, benefits under a public sector DB plan, 

as well as many private sector DB plans, will be there to provide a lifetime stream 

of retirement income. Moreover, a rather obvious point is that the plan sponsors of 

public sector DB plans are state and local governments, which typically do not go 

bankrupt, which is sadly not always the case for single-employer private sector DB 

plans. 

The security of assets in DC plans for future retirement income is, in comparison, 

compromised. Importantly, the vast majority of individuals in DC plans can borrow 

from their retirement accounts or withdraw funds before retirement age. Economists 

use the term ‘‘leakage’’ to describe assets that are drawn out of retirement savings 

plans for purposes other than providing retirement income. According to one conservative estimate, a full 10 percent of all retirement wealth is lost due to leakage 

from DC plans (Englehart, 1999) Another study found leakage to be ‘‘concentrated 

among individuals vulnerable to poverty in old age’’ (Hurd and Panis 2006). Loans 

from DC plans have risen, especially to allow families to smooth over economic hard 

times, which will likely reduce their retirement income security (Weller and 

Wenger, 2008). 

72 

Portability of benefits 

Public pension plans are responding to changing workforce needs in public service 

by offering much greater portability than in the past. Often, if employees move to 

another government position within the state, they are able to carry pension benefits with them; should they move to other jurisdictions, they can usually purchase 

service credits (Brainard, 2008). 

This portability also exists for most DC plans and in some private sector DB 

plans, so-called multiemployer plans. 

Shared financing 

The funding of state and local DB plans is a shared responsibility between employee and employer unlike private sector DB plans, in which employers typically 

finance the entire benefit. In 2004, for workers covered by Social Security, the median employer contribution rate was 7 percent of salary, while the employee contributed an additional 5 percent of salary (Munnell and Soto, 2007). 

Also, because public sector DB plans are prefunded—they accumulate assets to 

cover all expected current and future benefit payments—employer contributions account for only a small share of the funds flowing into public plans that can be used 

to pay benefits. According to data from the Census Bureau, employer contributions 

comprised about 18 percent of all public pension revenue over the 10-year period 

1996 to 2006. Investment earnings made up 73 percent of revenue during that time, 

and employee contributions accounted for the remainder (Census, 2008). 

Lifetime benefits 

State and local DB plans are designed so that retirement income can never be 

outlived—retirees are a guaranteed paycheck for life. This is also the case with private sector DB plans that have to offer an annuity benefit, even if it is as an alternative to a lump-sum distribution. 

This is in stark contrast with DC systems. Here, the burden of managing one’s 

retirement income, so that retirees do not run out of savings in retirement falls 

mostly on the individual. In many cases, though, employees do not understand how 

much money they will need in retirement, the result being that many workers do 

not save sufficiently and face inadequate income in retirement. In order for a private sector worker to purchase a modest annual annuity of $20,000, she must accumulate an estimated $260,000 in a 401(k). The median 401(k) balance for heads of 

households approaching retirement in 2004, however, was just $60,000 (Munnell 

and Soto, 2007). Further, Boston College researchers have found that, in part due 

to the shift from DB to DC plans in recent years, between 44 percent and 61 percent 

of households are at risk of being unable to maintain their living standards in retirement (Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass, 2007). 

Spousal and disability benefits 

State and local DB plans typically provide special protections for spouses of married beneficiaries, as well as disability benefits for active employees who are stricken by illness or injury that prematurely ends a career. 

Disability benefits are especially important for state and local government employees, since many workers, such as police officers and firefighters, have high-risk 

jobs. 

Spousal benefits are particularly important as well, as women have much lower 

retirement incomes than men (Even, 2004) and single elderly women have even 

lower incomes. According to one recent study, among the entire population aged 65 

and older, 19.1 percent of women living alone were in poverty in 2006, compared 

to 11.5 percent of all women and 6.6 percent of all men who lived in poverty in that 

year (Hounsell, 2008). 

Professional management of assets 

Public sector plans and private sector DB plans are managed by professionals 

with ‘‘considerable financial education, experience, discipline, and access to sophisticated investment tools’’ (Watson Wyatt, 2008). 

The individualized nature of DC plans, though, means that these rely on selfmanagement. I will elaborate in greater detail on the significant economic benefits 

professional management provides further below. 

Low costs and fees 

Evidence shows that administrative costs are substantially higher for DC plans 

as compared to DB plans. An international study of plan costs finds that while, on 

average, fees can range between 0.8 percent and 1.5 percent of assets, larger institutional plans can reduce such fees to between 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent of assets 

(James, Smalhout and Vittas, 2001). The UK Institute of Actuaries finds very high 

73 

administrative costs for DC plans—of 2.5 percent of contributions and up to 1.5 percent of assets—leading to the equivalent of a 10 to 20 percent reduction in annual 

contributions; DB administrative costs, however, amount to just 5 to 7 percent of 

annual contributions (Blake, 2000). Similar differences exist in the United States, 

with DB plans incurring substantially lower fees than DC plans (CII, 2006; Weller 

and Jenkins, 2007). 

ADEQUATE RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Obviously, designing a model retirement plan is not a means unto itself. It is intended to generate adequate retirement income for beneficiaries. DB plans, whether 

in the public or private sector, tend to be very effective at ensuring that employees 

will have adequate resources in retirement to support themselves because these 

types of retirement plans often incorporate all of the features laid out in the previous section. 

An ‘‘adequate’’ replacement rate is typically defined as one that allows a retired 

household to enjoy roughly the same standard of living as it did before retirement. 

This standard of adequacy might be deemed to fall anywhere between 75 percent 

and 85 percent of preretirement income. 

Research shows that retirees with DB pensions are much more likely to have adequate retirement income than those relying on DC plans (Munnell et al., 2008). 

Also, a 2007 Federal Reserve study found that the median wealth held in a DB pension plan is about two times larger than the median holdings in DC plans and IRAs. 

This indicates that DB pension plans tend to be better at ensuring employees are 

able to accumulate adequate resources for retirement (Love, Smith, and McNair, 

2007). 

In a DB plan, an individual employee’s benefit is typically determined based on 

a simple formula; this benefit is calculated by multiplying the employee’s final salary (averaged over three to five final years of employment) by their number of years 

of service, and then by a set retirement multiplier. For example, under a system 

with a retirement multiplier of 1.8%, an employee with a final average salary of 

$40,000 and 30 years of service will receive an annual benefit of $21,600 ($40,000 

x 30 x 1.8%). This benefit, then, would replace 54% of the employee’s final average 

salary. This amount, when added to Social Security benefits, would enable the employee to maintain their middle-class standard of living throughout their retirement 

years. 

However, it should be noted that approximately 25 percent of all state and local 

government employees do not participate in Social Security (Brainard, 2007) and 

therefore require a larger pension benefit in retirement in order to compensate for 

their lack of Social Security income. In 2006, the median retirement multiplier was 

1.85 percent for Social Security-eligible employees and 2.20 percent for non-Social 

Security-eligible workers (Brainard, 2007). This means, on average, employees who 

work for a full 30 years in public service will receive a pension that replaces 55.5 

percent of final earnings if they are Social Security eligible, and 66 percent of final 

earnings if they are not Social Security eligible. 

Given these replacement rates, public pensions offer income adequacy in retirement that is manageable and sensible. In 2006, for example, the median public sector retiree received a benefit of $22,000 per year (McDonald 2008). Combined with 

Social Security, such pension benefits generally add up to an adequate retirement 

income. For instance, a typical worker in Pennsylvania, where the multiplier is 2.5 

percent of the final average pay for each year of service, could expect to replace 

about 78 percent of their pre-retirement earnings after a full-career and 52 percent 

with a partial career in state employment due to the combination of a DB pension, 

Social Security, and savings in a DC plan (Weller, Price, & Margolis, 2006). State 

and local DB plans, then, comprise a system of reasonable and adequate income replacement in retirement. 

SUSTAINABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF DB PLANS

Importantly, these adequate benefits are sustainable in the long run. Because of 

their group nature, public sector DB plans create significant economies for taxpayers and employees, which allow them to offer retirement benefits in an efficient 

manner. 

Two sets of factors drive these economies. First, because public DB plan assets 

are pooled and managed by professionals, these systems can achieve higher returns, 

at a lower cost, than DC plans based on individual accounts. Second, DB plans 

lower costs for participants and plan sponsors by pooling mortality and other risks. 

74 

The benefits ofpooled, professional asset management 

By pooling assets, state and local DB plans are able to drive down administrative 

costs and reduce asset management and other fees. Asset management fees average 

just 25 basis points for public pension plans. By comparison, asset management fees 

for private 401(k) plans range from 60 to 170 basis points (Munnell & Soto 2007). 

Thus, DC plans suffer from a 35 to 145 basis point cost disadvantage. 

This disadvantage may appear small, but like water carving a canyon out of rock, 

over a long period of time, it compounds to create a significant affect on assets. For 

example, over 40 years, a 100 basis point cost disadvantage compounds to a 24 percent reduction in the value of assets available to pay for retirement benefits (Weller 

& Jenkins, 2007). 

Investment decisions in state and local DB plans are made by professional investment managers, whose activities are overseen by trustees and other fiduciaries. 

Public pension plan assets are broadly diversified and managers follow a long-term 

investment strategy. 

In analyzing public sector pension plan investment behavior, Professor Jeffrey 

Wenger and I have found that state and local plans exercise a great deal of prudence, tending to rebalance their assets regularly in response to large price changes. 

Also, public sector plans holdings of higher-risk/higher-return assets increases when 

these plans have higher funding levels, thereby indicating that plans do not ‘‘chase 

return’’ in response to lower funding levels. Specifically, the equity allocation is larger in the period after we observe higher funding levels, which suggests that trustees 

wait to know what their financial situation is before they change the risk exposure 

of their portfolio. In addition, public sector plans’ holdings of equities is smaller 

when demands on employers in the form of higher contributions increase. This relationship seems to have become stronger after 2000, which suggests that public sector plans not only avoided employer conflicts of interest as larger demands on employers in the previous period translated into a ‘‘flight from risk,’’ but if anything, 

these plans may have become more cautious in their asset allocation following a period of underfunding (Weller & Wenger 2008). 

The prudent investment behavior of professionally managed DB plans stands in 

contrast to the situation in DC plans where individuals direct their own investments. Research finds that asset allocation in retirement savings plans is considerably more volatile than what is found in professionally managed DB plans (Boivie 

& Almeida 2008). 

In addition, a wide literature in the field of behavioral finance finds that despite 

their best efforts, individuals often make poor decisions when it comes to investing 

for retirement (Benartzi & Thaler 2007). For example, Holden and VanDerhei (2001) 

found that more than half of all DC plan participants had either no funds invested 

in stocks—which exposes them to very low investment returns—or had almost all 

their assets allocated to stocks, making for a much more volatile portfolio. Other research has found that many individuals’ inertia subjects asset allocation in individual accounts to acute imbalance. At the other extreme, some individuals engage 

in excessive trading, which results in the problem of buying high and selling low 

(Mitchell & Utkus 2004; Munnell & Sunden 2004). This puts individual savers at 

a disadvantage vis a vis professionally managed DB plans, leaving individual savers 

to pay more for fewer benefits. 

Another advantage of pooling and professional management is that DB plans can 

take advantage of broader diversification strategies. In recent years, some DB plans 

have allocated a small percentage of their holdings to include so-called ‘‘alternative’’ 

investments such as private equities, venture capital, and hedge funds. These investments can help to improve the returns and/or reduce the overall risk of a plan’s 

portfolio by introducing assets whose returns are uncorrelated (Seco 2005; Phillips 

& Surz 2003; Indjic & Partners 2002). 

Such diversification may allow a plan to show just single-digit losses in a market 

decline, for example, when other equities may show double-digit losses—a result 

that can significantly affect a retirement plan’s compounded rate of return over 

time. Data from Watson Wyatt (2008) show that during the 2000 to 2002 market 

downturn, DB plans outperformed DC plans, in part because of their exposure to 

a broader range of assets, including alternatives. 

However, in order to successfully invest in such ‘‘alternative’’ assets, investors 

must have a long time horizon and must have a high degree of sophistication to understand these often complex investments. Such factors make alternative investments a sound investment choice for some DB plans. Individual investors in retirement savings plans typically have neither the access nor the expertise to invest in 

these types of assets. 

Because of these three effects—lower fees, professional and pooled investment 

management, and access to more sophisticated diversification strategies—it should 

75 

2 Employers that offer individual retirement savings plans could come close to approximating 

these economies by offering annuity distribution options. In practice, however, it is the rare plan 

that does so (Perun 2007). 

not be surprising that professionally managed DB plans consistently outperform individually managed DC plans. One widely cited estimate from Munnell and Sunden 

(2004) puts the difference in annual return at 0.8 percent. Over a 30-year time period, this compounds to a 25-percent difference in total return. A 2007 report from 

the global benchmarking firm, CEM, Inc., concluded that between 1998 and 2005 

DB plans showed annual returns 1.8 percentage points higher than DC plans, largely due to differences in asset mix (Flynn & Lum 2007). And Watson Wyatt (2008) 

found that between 1995 and 2006 DB plans outperformed DC plans by 109 basis 

points, on average. 

The benefits of risk pooling 

DB plans create additional economies for participants and plan sponsors by pooling mortality and other risks. By pooling the mortality risks of large numbers of 

people, DB plans need only accumulate assets sufficient to fund retirement benefits 

over the average life expectancy. By contrast, in a DC plan based on individual savings accounts, more assets will be required. Because an individual does not know 

what their ultimate lifespan will be, it is extremely difficult to know exactly how 

much one needs to save for retirement and to be certain that one will not outlive 

those savings. Thus, in a system of individual accounts, each person must ensure 

that he or she accumulates enough savings to last for the maximum lifespan. Thus, 

a DB plan will require fewer assets to be accumulated than a comparable DC plan, 

reducing costs by 15 percent to 35 percent (Fuerst, 2004).2

To summarize, state and local DB pension plans provide taxpayers an excellent 

‘‘bang for the buck.’’ DB plans possess several sources of economic efficiencies when 

it comes to delivering retirement benefits. They combine the effects of lower fees, 

professional management, more sophisticated diversification strategies, and risk 

pooling. Actuaries have determined that DB plans are much more efficient than DC 

plans and that they provide retirement benefits at a far lower cost (Fuerst 2004; 

Waring and Siegel 2007). Thus, to the extent that public retirement systems are 

supported (at least partially) by taxpayer funds, a DB plan design for state and local 

retirement systems supports the goal of fiscal responsibility. 

CONCLUSION

My review of the economic evidence on state and local DB plans tells the story 

of a thriving, well-designed system. State and local DB pension plans have been remarkably successful in providing adequate benefits to public sector retirees in a sustainable and efficient manner. Their proven performance makes these plans a model 

to emulate. 

DB plans in the public sector incorporate the features policymakers should look 

for in successful retirement systems: broad-based coverage, secure money for retirement, portability, shared financing, lifetime benefits with spousal and disability protections, professional management of assets, and low costs and fees. 

Public sector DB plans have been highly successful in ensuring that the millions 

of middle-class Americans who work in service to the public have the resources they 

need to take care of their own needs in retirement. They provide modest benefits 

that retirees can count on to last as long as they do. 

And public DB plans serve taxpayers and public employees alike with their costeffective structure. The sustainability and efficiency of public sector DB plans hinge 

on the pooling of assets and risks. By pooling assets, DB plans can benefit from professional management which drives down costs and enhances return. By pooling longevity risks, DB plans reduce the cost of providing retirement benefits even further. 

The lessons that we can learn from the experience of DB plans in the public sector 

can and should be applied to private sector retirement savings. This is particularly 

true for the design of DC plans. Much is already done in this way to make saving 

in these plans more automatic, increase its coverage, and secure its assets. In the 

end, though, much of what public sector DB plans can offer will be hard or impossible to recreate in the DC setting. For instance, mortality risk will likely remain 

a feature of DC plans for the foreseeable future. Hence, policymakers should help 

strengthen existing DB plans, in the private and public sector. Against the backdrop 

of widespread and rising retirement income insecurity, models of strong retirement 

security are rare and yet desperately needed. 

76 

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