In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 98-2657 & 98-2812

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT DANIEL WARD and RODNEY ELLIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 95 CR 730--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

Argued October 27, 1999--Decided April 28, 2000

 Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., FLAUM, and EVANS, Circuit

Judges.

 HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge. On June 16,

1997, a multi-count second superseding indictment

was filed in the Northern District of Illinois

charging Robert Daniel Ward and Rodney Ellis,

along with nine codefendants, for conduct

relating to a large-scale drug distribution

conspiracy. The tremendously successful

conspiracy was organized and supervised by Nathan

"Nate" Hill who began distributing cocaine in the

Chicago area in the late 1980s. Ward and Ellis

were each convicted on two counts of the

indictment following a jury trial. On appeal,

Ward raises several challenges to his conviction.

Ellis also appeals, challenging his sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

 The Hill conspiracy distributed thousands of

kilograms of cocaine in the Chicago area between

1987 and December 1995. Hill obtained this

cocaine from a variety of suppliers. Ward, who

was based in Los Angeles, California, was one of

Hill’s large-scale suppliers. Ward employed a

number of couriers, some of whom were supervised

by Donald Marini and Cameron Wright, to transport

large quantities of cocaine from California to

Chicago. Hill then acted as a wholesaler, selling

multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine to
distributors in the Chicago area. After several

of his couriers were arrested, Ward began

chartering Lear jets to transport cocaine to

Chicago. Between March 1, 1994 and October 7,

1994, for example, Ward chartered eight trips to

Chicago through Sussex Aviation in Van Nuys,

California. Testimony was presented at trial that

each charter trip involved the transportation of

approximately fifty kilograms of cocaine. 

 Drug trafficking provided Hill with sizable

profits which he used to purchase homes, cars,

boats, and, eventually, a four-engine JetStar

aircraft. Hill also sought legitimate business

opportunities through which he could launder his

drug proceeds. One of these businesses was

Pocketown Records, a record producing and

manufacturing business formed in 1993 by Nate

Hill and Michael Jefferson. At Hill’s direction,

Rodney Ellis, a cousin to Hill, participated in

the operation of Pocketown Records. Ellis managed

Pocketown’s daily operations and financial

activities. Pocketown’s expenses were paid

primarily in cash. For example, no salary checks

were issued; instead Hill handed out cash

payments to Pocketown workers. On several

occasions, Ellis transported large amounts of

cash from Chicago to Pocketown, which was located

in New York, and at other times, Ellis received

deliveries of cash from other Hill employees.

Ellis prepared false records for Pocketown in an

attempt to justify the influx of cash to the

business. Ellis also provided inaccurate

information to the accountant who was preparing

Pocketown’s 1993 tax returns. Ellis then signed

the falsified return and filed it with the IRS.

Ellis later became involved in another of Hill’s

business ventures, the production of a motion

picture entitled "Reasons" which was based on

Hill’s life story. Ellis played a limited role in

the "Reasons" production, unsuccessfully

attempting to persuade a recording company to

produce the soundtrack for the film. 

 The initial indictment in the case was filed on

December 13, 1995. It contained eighteen counts

and named twenty-one defendants. A superseding

indictment was filed on October 31, 1996, and on

June 16, 1997, a second, and final, superseding

indictment was filed. Ward was charged under

Counts One and Four of the second superseding

indictment. Count One alleged that Ward was

involved in a conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute mixtures

containing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec.

846. Count Four charged Ward with a violation of

21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1) based on an alleged

attempted distribution of approximately nine

kilograms of cocaine on or about January 21,

1993. Ellis was charged in Counts Seven and Eight
of the second superseding indictment. Count Seven

charged Ellis together with several codefendants

with conspiracy to defraud the United States, in

particular the Internal Revenue Service, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 371, while Count

Eight charged Ellis and several codefendants with

money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec.

1956(h). The case proceeded to a jury trial, and

both Ward and Ellis were convicted on each of the

counts against them. Ward was sentenced to 360

months imprisonment on each count with the

sentences to run concurrently. Ellis was

sentenced to 108 months imprisonment. A timely

notice of appeal was filed in each case, and the

cases have been consolidated for appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

 Ward raises several challenges to his

conviction, while Ellis challenges the district

court’s computation of his sentence. We address

each appellant’s argument in turn.

 A. Robert Daniel Ward

 Ward challenges the district court’s rulings on

his speedy trial motion and on several

evidentiary motions. Ward further asserts that

the district court erroneously limited the scope

of his cross-examination of Donald Marini and

erred in failing to sua sponte recuse itself.

Finally, Ward contends that the government

committed prejudicial error based on a comment

made during closing argument.

 1. Speedy Trial Motion

 Ward was arrested in Los Angeles, California on

January 11, 1996 on charges stemming from a false

application for a passport. While Ward was in

custody on the passport charges, he was

separately indicted in the Central District of

California for narcotics violations based on his

distribution of drugs to the Hill conspiracy. On

October 11, 1996, a criminal complaint was filed

in the Northern District of Illinois charging

Ward with narcotics violations in connection with

the Hill conspiracy. On October 18, 1996, the

narcotics charges pending against Ward in the

Central District of California were dismissed

after prosecutors received the Illinois complaint

and an accompanying bench warrant for Ward’s

arrest. 

 On October 21, 1996, Ward was sentenced to

probation on the passport case. Ward, however,

remained in custody in California based on the

Illinois complaint and warrant. During November
and December 1996, the United States Marshals

Service for the Northern District of Illinois

attempted to obtain custody of Ward through its

normal channels. These attempts were complicated

due to erroneous information received from the

Marshals Service Prisoner Coordination Section

that Ward could not be transported to Chicago

because there were still charges pending against

him in California. On January 7, 1997, Ward was

brought before a magistrate judge in the Central

District of California for an out-of-district

process hearing at which time Ward asserted his

speedy trial concerns. The magistrate noted

Ward’s objections and stated that Ward would need

to raise them in the Northern District of

Illinois following his transfer. On February 11,

1997, the Marshals Service in the Northern

District of Illinois was informed that Ward was

being held in California pending the results of

his tuberculosis test./1 Ward was cleared for

transportation to Chicago on approximately

February 26, 1997. He arrived in the Northern

District of Illinois on either March 6 or 7 and

made his first appearance before a judicial

officer on March 13, 1997. On March 27, 1997,

Ward filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,

arguing that the delay from the time his

California charges were resolved until he was

brought before a judicial officer in the Northern

District of Illinois violated his right to a

speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act, 18

U.S.C. sec. 3161 et seq., the Sixth Amendment,

and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). The

district court denied Ward’s motion. Ward’s jury

trial began on November 6, 1997.

 By its express terms, the Speedy Trial Act does

not apply in the present case. Under the Act, the

trial of an accused must commence "within seventy

days from the filing date (and making public) of

the information or indictment, or from the date

the defendant has appeared before a judicial

officer of the court in which such charge is

pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C.

sec. 3161(c)(1). Ward challenges only the delay

from the time charges were filed in the Northern

District of Illinois until March 13, 1997, the

day he first appeared before a judicial officer

in the Northern District of Illinois. This time

period is outside of the Speedy Trial Act, and

because Ward does not allege any improper delay

during the time his Speedy Trial Act clock was

running, his Speedy Trial Act claim fails.

 The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is

similar to, but separate from, the right created

by the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Koller,

956 F.2d 1408, 1413 (7th Cir. 1992). The Supreme

Court has established a four-factor balancing

test to use in determining whether a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been

violated. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.

647, 651 (1992); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,

530-33 (1972). Under this test, we must consider

"whether delay before trial was uncommonly long,

whether the government or the criminal defendant

is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due

course, the defendant asserted his right to a

speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice

as the delay’s result." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651.

 In determining whether the delay was uncommonly

long, we must consider the interval between

accusation and trial, here over a year. See

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. As the Supreme Court

noted in Doggett, courts have generally found

delays approaching one year to be presumptively

prejudicial. Id. at 652 n.1. However, Ward

challenges only the period between the return of

the indictment and his first appearance in the

Northern District of Illinois. Therefore, this

factor does not weigh heavily toward either side.

With respect to the second factor, Ward alleges

that the delay was the result of a lack of

diligence on the part of the prosecution. An

examination of the record reveals that the delay

resulted from miscommunication and the necessity

of fulfilling certain prerequisites to transfer.

Because this equates at the most to negligence on

the part of the government, this factor must "’be

weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be

considered since the ultimate responsibility for

such circumstances must rest with the government

rather than with the defendant.’" United States

v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1976)

(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531); see also

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 ("To be sure, to warrant

granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by

particularized trial prejudice must have lasted

longer than negligence demonstrably causing such

prejudice."). 

 Ward contends that he fulfilled the third prong

by asserting his speedy trial concerns

immediately upon being brought before the

magistrate in California for his out-of-district

proceedings and by reasserting these concerns at

his initial appearance in the Northern District

of Illinois. However, Ward asserted his right to

a speedy trial after much of the alleged improper

delay had occurred. See United States v. Deleon,

710 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983). Ward knew of

the charges against him and was represented by

counsel from the time the California charges were

resolved, yet he did nothing to assert his speedy

trial right until his out-of-district process

hearing. This factor does not weigh strongly in

Ward’s favor. Finally, with respect to the

prejudice prong, Ward does not allege that the
delay impaired his ability to present his

defense. Instead, Ward "asserts that the stress

and anxiety of being incarcerated and awaiting

transportation to Chicago following the

conclusion of the California cases in October

1996, were oppressive and increased the anxiety

and concern on his behalf." While this is a

proper factor to consider under the prejudice

prong, it is insufficient to tip the scales in

Ward’s favor. See Jackson, 542 F.2d at 409

(stating that general allegations of anxiety and

concern constitute only minimal prejudice,

especially when unenhanced by an impairment in

presenting a defense). Weighing the four factors,

we find that Ward’s Sixth Amendment right to a

speedy trial was not violated.

 We review the district court’s denial of Ward’s

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) claim

for abuse of discretion. Deleon, 710 F.2d at

1223. Under Rule 48(b), "if there is unnecessary

delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court

may dismiss the indictment, information or

complaint." Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b). Rule 48 "is

not circumscribed by the Sixth Amendment,"

Deleon, 710 F.2d at 1223; however, as the Eighth

Circuit has recognized, it is driven "by the same

general considerations as the Sixth Amendment."

United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 923 (8th

Cir. 1985). Incorporating our analysis above and

noting that there was no evidence of purposeful

delay by the prosecution, we find that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Ward’s motion to dismiss the indictment

pursuant to Rule 48(b). See, e.g., United States

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 734, 739

(9th Cir. 1989) ("In general dismissal under Rule

48(b) is appropriate only where there is delay

that is purposeful or oppressive." (internal

quotations and citations omitted)).

 2. Evidentiary Issues

 Ward first challenges the district court’s

admission of testimony from two witnesses who

were cooperating with the government, Donald

Marini and Cameron Wright, regarding drug

involvement with Ward prior to the charged

conspiracy. Marini testified that he began

selling and transporting drugs for Ward in

approximately 1987 and continued to do so until

he was arrested in 1993. Wright testified that he

began purchasing cocaine from Ward when Wright

was still in college and continued to purchase

cocaine from Ward after his graduation from

college in 1991. Eventually, Marini became a

courier between Ward and the Hill operation in

Chicago, and both Marini and Wright supervised

couriers for Ward in connection with the Hill
conspiracy. Ward objected to the testimony

regarding prior drug transactions between himself

and Marini and Ward. The district court overruled

Ward’s objection, finding an inextricable link

between the testimony and the charged offenses

and stating that the testimony about prior drug

relationships was "highly relevant and

probative." Ward argues that this ruling was

erroneous under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence./2 We review for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Akinrinade, 61

F.3d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995).

 Evidence of uncharged criminal activity is

admissible if it is "’intricately related to the

facts of the case’ before the court." United

States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir.

1995) (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 929

F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1991)). The admissibility

of such evidence is limited only by Rule 403 and

is not subject to the limiting requirements of

Rule 404(b). Id. at 1102-03. In the present case,

the testimony of Marini and Wright was

intricately related to the charged conspiracy

because it showed how the men’s relationship with

Ward "began, its basis, and structure, and how

the relationship blossomed into the charged

conspiracy." United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d

1454, 1469 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States

v. Diaz, 994 F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 1993)).

While it was not disputed that Ward knew Marini

and Wright, the testimony regarding the prior

drug transactions was integral to the complete

story of the charged conspiracy in that it

outlined the development of the relationship of

trust between the men which led to their

respective roles in the conspiracy. See Diaz, 994

F.2d at 395. Additionally, to further minimize

the risk of unfair prejudice, the court gave

limiting instructions during the testimony of

both Marini and Wright, instructing the jury to

consider the information regarding the prior

activities only as background and with respect to

the relationship which existed between the

parties. It is clear that the probative value of

the testimony outweighed any potential for unfair

prejudice. Therefore, the testimony was properly

admitted "without regard to Rule 404(b)’s

strictures," Zarnes, 33 F.3d at 1469, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing it. 

 Ward next argues that the district court erred

in allowing evidence regarding Ward’s use of

false identification in the name of Jeffery

Eugene Palmer. Our review is for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Aldaco, 201 F.3d

979, 985 (7th Cir. 2000). While Ward contends

that the district court failed to meet the

requirements for admissibility under Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b), the evidence was not offered under

Rule 404(b) but rather as direct evidence to

support the government’s allegations that Ward

furthered the conspiracy by using aliases.

Evidence was presented at trial that, on March

10, 1995, coconspirator William "Ikey" Hill was

identified driving a black van registered to a

Jeffery E. Palmer. Therefore, the false

identification evidence was probative in that it

showed a link between Ward and members of the

Hill conspiracy. Furthermore, the district court

limited the information that was admitted to

reduce the risk of unfair prejudice to Ward. The

jury was told only that Ward attempted to obtain

a passport in the name of Jeffery Eugene Palmer

and was not informed that Ward was arrested for

this incident. Under these circumstances, the

probative value of the false identification

evidence outweighs any risk of unfair prejudice.

The district court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting the evidence, and Ward’s claim

fails./3

 3. Cross-Examination of Donald Marini

 Ward asserts that the district court improperly

restricted his defense by limiting the scope of

his cross-examination of government witness

Donald Marini. On cross-examination by Ward’s

counsel, Marini testified that, as a result of

his cooperation, federal prosecutors helped to

clear a warrant against Marini based on unrelated

charges in California state court. Defense

counsel then sought to question Marini as to the

nature of the state charges, attempting to elicit

the fact that the charges were based on

allegations of spousal and child abuse. The

prosecutor objected, and following a sidebar, the

court sustained the objection. The court noted

that the information regarding the nature of the

charges was highly inflammatory and irrelevant to

the point being developed on cross-examination

that Marini received a benefit for his

cooperation. We review a district court ruling

limiting cross-examination for abuse of

discretion. Akinrinade, 61 F.3d at 1285. 

 As we have noted, "the sufficiency of crossexamination turns on whether the jury had

sufficient information to make a discriminating

appraisal of the witness’ motive and bias."

Akinrinade, 61 F.3d at 1285 (internal quotations

and citations omitted). Ward argues that the

district court’s ruling prevented him from

inquiring "as to the substantial benefit to Mr.

Marini as bearing on bias, motive and

credibility." However, the district court allowed

Ward’s counsel to elicit the fact that Marini

received a benefit in the form of dismissal of a
state warrant in exchange for his cooperation in

the federal prosecution. This was sufficient to

allow the jury to make a discriminating appraisal

of Marini’s motive and bias. Moreover, "trial

judges retain wide latitude insofar as the

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based

on concerns about, among other things,

harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,

the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware

v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The

district court did not abuse its discretion in

prohibiting defense counsel from inquiring into

the nature of the state charges. 

 4. Recusal

 Following Ward’s conviction but prior to

sentencing, defense counsel became aware, through

our opinion in In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th

Cir. 1998), that Judge Kocoras’s son, John

Kocoras, while acting as a third-year law student

intern in the United States Attorney’s Office for

the Northern District of Illinois, had assisted

in the trial of Gangster Disciple leader Larry

Hoover. Acting under the authority of Northern

District of Illinois General Rule 3.11, John

Kocoras presented eight government witnesses

during the Hoover trial. Judge Kocoras attended

the trial to observe his son’s performance. One

of the witnesses presented by John Kocoras

testified regarding the seizure of $364,000 from

William Hill and a member of the Gangster

Disciple street gang. Testimony regarding this

seizure was presented at Ward’s trial as well.

This was the only overlap between evidence

presented at the Hoover trial and that presented

at Ward’s trial. 

 Ward was convicted on December 19, 1997. Our

Hatcher opinion was issued on May 13, 1998. Based

on the information revealed in Hatcher, Ward

moved for Judge Kocoras’s recusal at his

sentencing hearing on June 18, 1998. Judge

Kocoras denied the motion. On appeal, Ward argues

that Judge Kocoras’s presence at the Hoover trial

and his son’s involvement in Hoover’s prosecution

created a conflict that required recusal or, at

the very least, disclosure. 

 Ward bases his argument in part on 28 U.S.C.

sec. 455(a) which requires a judge to "disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The

government argues that Ward waived his sec.

455(a) claim by failing to pursue it prior to

trial, citing United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d

830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989), United States v. Bonds,
847 F.2d 1233, 1241 (7th Cir. 1988), and United

States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1204-05

(7th Cir. 1985). The application of these cases

to the present situation is debatable because,

given the sequence of events outlined above, it

is clear that Ward did not discover the

information upon which he based his motion for

recusal until after his trial was concluded. In

the present case, we need not decide the waiver

issue because Ward’s claim fails on its merits.

Recusal is required under sec. 455(a) when a

"judge’s impartiality could be questioned by a

reasonable, well-informed observer." Hatcher, 150

F.3d at 637 (citation omitted). The single

evidentiary overlap between Ward’s case and the

Hoover prosecution is insufficient to support

even an appearance of impropriety. Ward’s case is

easily distinguishable from Hatcher, in which

both cases were part of one large prosecution of

a continuing criminal enterprise and involved

"virtually the same offenses, committed by the

same people." Id. at 638. The connection between

Ward’s case and the Hoover prosecution was not

significant enough to require recusal under sec.

455(a). To the extent that Ward asserts claims

under 28 U.S.C. sec. 455(b)(1) and (b)(5), these

arguments were fully addressed and rejected in

Hatcher, id. at 635-37, and we will not reexamine

them here. Recusal was not required.

 5. Closing Argument

 Ward asserts that the prosecution committed

reversible misconduct based on an alleged

improper comment during its rebuttal closing

argument. The comment at issue dealt with several

photographs that law enforcement agents recovered

from Ward when he was arrested on the passport

charges. The photographs, which were presented at

trial, were from Ward’s wedding and included

shots of Donald Marini and Cameron Wright. When

they were seized from Ward, the photos were cut

or folded in such a way as to highlight Marini

and Wright, both of whom Ward knew were

cooperating with the government by this time. 

 The prosecutor did not mention the photographs

in his initial closing argument. In his closing

argument, defense counsel addressed the photos,

calling them a "non-issue" and arguing that the

photos only went to show the conceded fact that

Ward, Wright, and Marini knew one another. A

second Assistant United States’ Attorney

presented the government’s rebuttal argument. In

response to defense counsel’s proffered

explanation for the photos, she stated

 The photos that he [Ward] has with him, when

he’s attempting to leave the country, apparently,
Cameron Wright, Donald Marini, wedding pictures

[sic]. 

 [Defense counsel] would say, okay, it shows

what good friends they are. Ladies and gentlemen,

I believe that you could draw from this an

inference it’s something slightly more sinister.

 This man, he knows without a doubt--Robert

Daniel Ward knows that this man is cooperating

against him as of January of 1996. He knows that

this man in the back seat of that car is

cooperating against him in 1996. For the family

album? I don’t think so, and I don’t think the

evidence indicates that. 

Defense counsel objected, targeting his objection

to "any sinister inference" and stating that

there was no evidence to support the prosecutor’s

line of argument. The court responded, "Well, she

may argue and the jury may accept or reject any

inferences to be drawn. She may argue." Ward

raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct

again in a motion for a new trial, which the

district court denied. We review both the

overruling of Ward’s objection and the denial of

the motion for a new trial for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Knox, 68 F.3d 990,

1000 (7th Cir. 1995).

 Our analysis to assess allegations of

prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument

is two-fold. United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d

243, 254 (7th Cir. 1995). The first step is to

examine the disputed comment in isolation to

determine whether it was in fact improper. Id. If

the comment was improper, we must then examine

the comment in light of the record as a whole to

determine whether the defendant was deprived of

a fair trial. Id. As the district court

recognized, in closing argument, a prosecutor

"may argue reasonable inferences from the

evidence that the jury has seen and heard."

United States v. Waldemer, 50 F.3d 1379, 1383

(7th Cir. 1995). While "innumerable factors may

figure in the reasonableness calculation," the

most obvious considerations are "[w]hether the

evidence bears logical and proximate connection

to the point the prosecutor wishes to prove." Id.

at 1384. It is also important to consider whether

the prosecutor made "the argument solely to

inflame the passions of the jury." Id. Given the

circumstances of the present case, the argument

was logically and proximately connected to the

evidence. Moreover, the argument was not made

solely to inflame the jury but rather in response

to an explanation offered by defense counsel in

his closing argument. The prosecutor’s argument

was not so unreasonable as to deprive Ward of a

fair trial. See id. at 1385. Ward’s prosecutorial
misconduct claim fails.

 B. Rodney Ellis

 Ellis raises several challenges to the district

court’s determination of his sentence. Ellis

first contends that the district court erred in

its application of sec. 2S1.1(b) of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines").

Ellis further asserts that the district court

abused its discretion by sentencing him at the

high end of his Guidelines range. 

 Ellis’s sec. 2S1.1(b) argument is two-fold.

First, Ellis argues that the district court’s

decision to apply both subsection (1) and

subsection (2) of sec. 2S1.1(b) resulted in

impermissible double counting, citing United

States v. Atterson, 926 F.2d 649, 660 (7th Cir.

1991). The present case, however, is

distinguishable from Atterson. The district judge

did not base Ellis’s sec. 2S1.1(b)(2) enhancement

on the street value of the quantity of drugs

involved in the conspiracy, but rather on actual

instances of money laundering. See United States

v. House, 110 F.3d 1281, 1285 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997)

(distinguishing Atterson). There is no

impermissible double enhancement.

 Alternatively, Ellis contends that the district

court’s finding under sec. 2S1.1(b)(2) that the

value of funds laundered exceeded $2 million was

unsupported by the evidence./4 The district

court arrived at this value by holding Ellis

responsible for (1) $750,000 to $1 million

laundered through Pocketown in 1993; (2) $1.5

million laundered into the JetStar aircraft, a

seventy-two foot yacht, and a speed boat which

accompanied the yacht; and (3) $1,107,000

laundered through "Reasons." At sentencing, Ellis

challenged the inclusion of the amounts relating

to the plane, the yacht and speed boat, and

"Reasons." On appeal, Ellis challenges only the

district court’s valuation of Hill’s investment

in Pocketown and the inclusion of amounts

relating to the yacht and accompanying speed

boat. 

 As previously noted, Ellis did not object to

the valuation of the Pocketown investment at

sentencing. Therefore, our review with respect to

this issue is for plain error. United States v.

Monem, 120 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1997). At

sentencing, the district court adopted the

$750,000 to $1 million value for the Pocketown

investment. This value is supported by Michael

Jefferson’s trial testimony and by the

calculations set out in the presentence report.

There is no plain error, and we turn to the
inclusion of the value of the yacht and speed

boat. Because Ellis objected to this inclusion at

sentencing, we review for clear error. United

States v. Gwiazdzinski, 141 F.3d 784, 788 (7th

Cir. 1998). Under this standard, we will reverse

"only if the district court’s findings are

without foundation in the evidence, such that we

are ’left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’" House, 110

F.3d at 1283 (quoting United States v. Herrera,

54 F.3d 348, 356 (7th Cir. 1995)). Under U.S.S.G.

sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), Ellis is liable for funds

laundered by his coconspirators as long as the

acts were reasonably foreseeable. Ellis argues

that there was no evidence that he ever used or

even knew of the yacht; however, the trial

testimony of Elisha Tapes supports a finding that

Ellis at the very least had knowledge of the

yacht. Tapes described a trip to Houston, Texas

which included Tapes, Nate Hill, Hill’s mother,

and Ellis, among others. The group flew to Texas

on Hill’s JetStar aircraft. During the flight,

Hill boasted that he owned the plane and was

proud of it. Tapes further testified that, at one

point during the Houston trip, Ellis was present

during a conversation in which Nate Hill,

together with the man who arranged the yacht’s

purchase, were describing and bragging about it.

The district court’s inclusion of the value of

the yacht and its accompanying speed boat in its

sec. 2S1.1(b)(2) calculation was not clearly

erroneous. 

 Ellis’s remaining challenge to his sentence is

also unpersuasive. Ellis contends that the

district court abused its discretion by

sentencing him at the high end of his Guidelines

range, arguing that the district court’s stated

reasons for imposing a sentence at the top of the

Guidelines range were contradictory and,

therefore, inadequate under 18 U.S.C. sec.

3553(c). A review of the transcript of the

sentencing hearing reveals that the district

court provided a detailed and internally

consistent explanation to justify its decision.

The court recognized that Ellis was not required

to confess, but stated that a sentence at the

high end of the Guidelines range was appropriate

because Ellis failed to show "one ounce of

remorse, one ounce of acceptance of

responsibility, one ounce of some sort of

understanding of why you are here and what you

did[,] . . . one ounce of humanity, [or] one

ounce of recognition." The court informed Ellis

that "it would have been nice at some point for

you, in whatever oblique way you wanted to do it,

to recognize that society was harmed by your

activity." The district judge further noted that

despite Ellis’s insistence that some of the

witnesses lied, he thought the evidence against
Ellis was "overwhelming." This explanation is

both proper and sufficient to satisfy 18 U.S.C.

sec. 3553(c). Therefore, as Ellis’s sentence was

imposed pursuant to the law and within the

applicable Guidelines range, we lack jurisdiction

to review the district court’s placement of the

sentence within the range. See United States v.

Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1991). Ellis’s

sentencing challenges fail. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Ward’s conviction is affirmed. Ellis’s sentence

is affirmed.

/1 Marshals Service regulations will not allow for

the transportation of a prisoner unless the

prisoner has tested negative for tuberculosis.

/2 Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides, "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of

undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence." Under Fed.

R. Evid. 404(b), "Evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident."

/3 Although counsel for Ward attempted to challenge

additional evidentiary rulings at oral argument,

these issues were not raised in his brief and are

waived. United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173,

1198 n.15 (7th Cir. 1997).

/4 This finding resulted in a six-point enhancement

in Ellis’s base offense level under sec.

2S1.1(b)(2).