Col. Forrest L. Marion, USAFR (ret.) 

Col. Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR (ret.)

Foreword by

Lt. Gen. Dennis M. McCarthy, USMC (ret.)

former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

A TOTAL FORCE

The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve

FORGING
A TOTAL FORCE

The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve

Col. Forrest L. Marion, USAFR (ret.)

Col. Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR (ret.)

Historical Office • Office of the Secretary of Defense • 2018

FORGING
Contents

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

1. The Long Road from “Every Citizen a Soldier,”

1790–1918. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Adapting to Global Threats and Global Power,

1919–1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3. Toward a War-Ready Reserve Component,

1954–1989. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4. Growing Reliance on the Reserve Component,

1990–2000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

5. Mobilizing for the Global War on Terrorism,

2001–June 2003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

6. Part-Time Warriors, Full-Time Stress,

July 2003–December 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

7. Regularizing Reserve Mobilization for a Long War, 

January 2007–September 2011. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

8. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Appendix 1 

End Strengths of Reserve Components by Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Appendix 2 

Terminology Issues in the Reserve Component. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Selected Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

This volume is cleared for public release. The views expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or any other agency of the federal government. Portions 

of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source 

credit line is included. The Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would 

appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. 

Use of ISBN

This is the official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein 

identified to certify its authenticity. Use of 978-0-16-094388-1 is for the U.S. 

Government Publishing Office editions only. The Superintendent of Documents 

of the U.S. Government Publishing Office requests that any reprinted edition 

clearly be labeled a copy of the authentic work with a new ISBN. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Marion, Forrest L., author. | Hoffman, Jon T., 1955– author.

Title: Forging a total force : the evolution of the Guard and Reserve /

Forrest L. Marion, Jon T. Hoffman.

Other titles: Evolution of the Guard and Reserve

Description: Washington, DC : Historical Office, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017059869 | ISBN 9780160943881 (alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: United States—National Guard—History. | United 

States—Armed Forces—Reserves—History. | United States. 

Army—Reserves—History.

Classification: LCC UA42 .M35 2018 | DDC 355.3/70973—dc23 

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017059869

Cover Photo: National Guard soldiers talking about procedures during a training exercise at 

the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. (Army photo by SFC Tyrone Walker. Source: Official 

DoD Photo Library.)

 The paper used in this publication meets the requirements for permanence established by 

the American National Standard for Information Sciences “Permanence of Paper for Printed 

Library Materials” (ANSI Z39.48-1984).
vii

Foreword

This book is different from the one I encouraged and authorized in 2011—

different, but better. While serving as assistant secretary of defense for reserve 

affairs, preceded by service in the Marine Corps and its reserve, I had a keen 

awareness of the contributions the men and women of the National Guard 

and reserve had made since our country was attacked in September of 2001. 

I believed those contributions needed to be analyzed and recorded by trained 

historians. I worried that if they were not well preserved, they would not be 

adequately appreciated in the future.

Taking that charter to heart, Jon Hoffman and Erin Mahan from the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense found Forrest Marion to 

collaborate with Jon on the writing effort. This team has fought through many 

challenges to produce a work that not only describes the post-9/11 contributions of the reserve and Guard, but puts those contributions into the context to 

which they properly belong.

Dr. Marion and Mr. Hoffman trace philosophical and political disagreements, challenges met and missed, opportunities seized and lost. They show 

us history that is complicated in some ways, but very simple in others. It is 

a story of cyclical repetition of attitudes and prejudices that have sometimes 

prevented the United States from taking maximum advantage of the potential 

of its force of citizen-warriors. I would describe this cycle as an example of a 

phenomenon called “lessons frequently observed, but seldom learned.”

But the authors also show us a history of periodic but important success—

times at which the friction inherent in our multi-service, full time-part time, 

state-federal defense structure has been overcome, leading to success on the 

battlefield. Too often, however, that friction is overcome only at great cost of 

blood, treasure, and time.

In successive chapters, the authors take us on a methodical march through 

centuries and decades, recording the ebb and flow of national readiness. They 

demonstrate that the overall readiness of the armed forces is closely linked, if not 

directly proportional, to the readiness and capability of the National Guard and 

reserve. The commentary accompanying this review also shows that the proportional relationship between active and reserve readiness has often been ignored 

by senior defense leaders until they find themselves unhappily surprised by 

crises requiring rapid expansion and employment of military and naval forces.

The analysis by Marion and Hoffman provides an interesting review of the 

mobilization of reserve component forces for Operations Desert Shield and 
viii ix

Foreword Foreword

The enforced interdependence of combat in 1991 had not lasted long enough 

to create much of an increase in familiarity and mutual confidence. The next 

decades would change that to a significant degree.

The three words that dominate the discussion of the National Guard and reserves following 9/11 are combat, mobilization, and integration. Combat was 

the necessary end state for many reserve units, and was the reason for their mobilization. The result was integration of the active and reserve components to 

an extent that had not existed since World War II. The mobilization-combat-integration continuum was not always pretty, as Dr. Marion and Mr. Hoffman 

well describe. Structural defects compounded long-standing attitudinal issues, 

but many defects and issues were overcome, and most were at least addressed 

in some way, making possible the closest thing to wartime mobilization many 

of us “seasoned observers” ever expected to see or experience.

That extended mobilization continued as combat operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq evolved, continuing to create both practical and political challenges. 

We see the impact Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had on several of the key 

policy issues related to unexpectedly sustaining a call to active duty that was 

spread over the whole of the reserve and National Guard. Mr. Rumsfeld spoke 

publicly about the need to be “respectful” of reservist’s commitments, but he 

began those remarks by saying, “I was once a weekend warrior too.” It is hard 

to believe he really grasped what the men and women of Guard and reserve 

had become or appreciated their potential. Many of Secretary Rumsfeld’s subsequent decisions on reserve component policy verified both his own lack of 

understanding and the fact that he frequently ignored or rejected the advice of 

both uniformed and civilian officials.

The authors describe the way Department of Defense and uniformed service 

leaders dealt with issues like unit cross-leveling, the disparate impacts of predeployment training, recognition for new approaches to family health care and for 

postdeployment and ongoing care after reservists returned to their communities.2

Lest anyone think that a description of the post-9/11 service of the National 

Guard and reserves is all about combat, the authors provide an excellent—albeit 

abbreviated—account of the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Again, there 

were issues of knowledge, culture, and organizational and command relationships. But the bottom line was that the National Guard led the way with valuable 

support from active component and Federal Reserve forces to serve the people 

of the Gulf Coast region. Friction existed, but was largely overcome.

2. I mean to take nothing away from Dr. Marion and Mr. Hoffman when I say we still 

need a book that provides more insight into what the troops have to say about those 

same issues.

Storm in 1990–1991. They allude to a congressional concern “that there was 

an “anti-reserve bias at work” that started with the administration’s decision to 

use the most limited mobilization authority available, followed by a complaint 

from the defense secretary that limits on the service of reserve units made their 

employment difficult. Having been personally involved as a serving officer in 

both the mobilization and its aftermath, and given the long history of active-reserve relations, I believe the authors may be understating the reluctance of all 

the services in 1990–1991 to employ their reserve components and the support 

of that reluctant attitude by civilian defense leaders.1

The authors do, however, capture the extent of Guard and reserve contributions during the first Gulf War and highlight some of the challenges they 

faced—challenges that would be addressed, if not completely resolved, in the 

succeeding decade.

In reviewing the aftermath of Desert Storm, Hoffman and Marion point out 

many of the major policy issues that informed, but did not perfect, the planning 

for the next major mobilization. The services began to focus on the importance 

of family readiness and support during and after mobilization. The negative 

effects of demobilization uncertainty on individual service members, their families, and employers were at least recognized, as were problems with premobilization and predeployment medical and dental care. Gaps in employer support, 

and the potential of ESGR (Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve) volunteers, gained new prominence, setting the stage for a stronger ESGR program 

after 9/11. Despite improvements, we are shown how these issues and others 

would continue to challenge both service members and Defense policymakers 

during the extended mobilization of the next two decades.

In the years following the first Gulf War, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard remained continuously involved in the day-to-day missions of the Air 

Force. The Marine Corps Reserve retained reasonably close connections with active 

component formations. The Navy Reserve dramatically changed its structure and 

fought the “TAR wars.” But the Army National Guard and Army Reserve continued 

to struggle to find a modus operandi with the active component and with each other. 

As the authors point out, hard feelings continued to exist on all sides of the 

active-reserve component divide, and were certainly not limited to the Army. 

1. While serving as assistant secretary of defense, I had the good fortune to hear 

someone who was present in the room describe the interaction between the president, 

his secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they discussed—among other things—the mobilization of the Guard and reserves. Based on 

that “oral history” I believe the authors have correctly captured that attitude, but I now 

know it was not shared by President Bush (41).
x xi

Foreword Foreword

An enduring issue adversely affecting both the active and reserve components has been their general lack of mutual understanding and respect. Periodically, efforts are made to bridge that gap. For example, in 1984 Congress 

overruled DoD objections and insisted that there be an assistant secretary of 

defense exclusively focused on “Reserve Affairs” with a broad mandate of 

oversight and advice to the secretary of defense. Later, again over DoD and 

service opposition, Congress mandated that three-star officers oversee each of 

the seven components of the National Guard and reserves. But as the authors 

also point out, such efforts are difficult to sustain. 

Although not described by the authors, Congress was convinced several 

years ago to revert to a former organizational construct by eliminating the 

office of ASD(RA), and recently the Senate has proposed the elimination of the 

three-star reserve and Guard leaders. It remains to be seen how these actions 

will work out, but at least we have this book to describe the antecedents and 

precedents for those actions, and to provide insight into the historical highs 

and lows of Guard and reserve capability. I am not certain we would have that 

insight if there had not been an ASD(RA) in 2011.

On a purely personal note, throughout this work I read the names and 

recalled with great admiration the contributions of many colleagues—my 

predecessors as ASD(RA), my contemporaries and successors as “reserve 

chiefs,” many adjutants general, and others with whom I have had the pleasure 

of serving. Each of these trailblazers overcame headwinds and adversity in 

helping to make possible the contributions of the nation’s citizen warriors. I 

take pleasure in knowing them.

As with any work of historical analysis, not everyone will agree with all that 

Forrest Marion and Jon Hoffman have written. Much scholarship remains undone 

in the realms of active-reserve component relations, maximizing the impact of 

defense spending, the role of the citizen-warrior, and many other related issues. 

This work creates a framework for such scholarship and will, I hope, inspire 

others to explore where we are, where we should go, and how to get there.

 Dennis M. McCarthy 

Columbus, Ohio

The authors’ description of Robert Gates’ tenure as Secretary of Defense 

provides many insights. Describing the fact that two Army National Guard 

“chiefs” (Steve Blum and Clyde Vaughn) convinced him to make a significant 

change in mobilization policy is telling. On many issues, Secretary Gates listened—a welcome change.

But on some other issues, his mind was made up. When I interviewed with 

him in 2009 he told me he thought, “We [DoD] have played a ‘bait and switch’ 

on the Guard and reserve—we are asking them to do things they never signed 

up for.” Recklessly for a job seeker, I responded: “I disagree, sir. Everyone 

serving today in the Guard or reserves either enlisted or re-enlisted since 9/11. 

They knew exactly what they were signing on for.” He said something to the 

effect that he hadn’t thought about it that way, and I thought I had hit a home 

run. Several weeks later, however, he gave a major speech that included the 

“bait and switch” observation. Years later, when I read his memoir, Duty, I 

learned that he had made that same “bait and switch” comment to President 

George W. Bush when interviewing with the president to be SecDef. Deeply 

held beliefs are hard to change.

The evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine and its increasing application 

in both Iraq and Afghanistan opened additional opportunities for the reserve 

and Guard to contribute, sometimes in unique ways. Civilian-acquired skills—

agriculture, law enforcement, municipal operations—were embedded in many 

reserve component units. All services found ways to make some use of those 

skills, creating another waypoint on the journey from being exclusively an 

“emergency—break glass in time of war” force to a reliable partner for the 

active component in the full spectrum of military operations.

Homeland defense and consequence management missions continued to 

evolve and force structure was revised, particularly by the Air National Guard 

in response to combined pressure from BRAC closures, aircraft modernization, and the emergence of remotely piloted air vehicles (RPV, drone, UAS).

The review of various studies of reserve component policy since 9/11 points 

out the unresolved existence of structural barriers that impede the integration 

of the active and reserve components, and limit the opportunities to take full 

advantage of the capabilities of both.

But the authors conclude with a review of the case for making the National 

Guard and reserves a full partner with the active component that should be 

considered a continuously available resource, dependable and valuable in both 

peace and war. It appears this case is gaining traction in some quarters, but is 

unfortunately being ignored in others.
xii xiii

Preface

In September 1995 Air Force Chief of Staff Ronald R. Fogleman addressed 

the annual convention of the National Guard Association of the United States. 

He spoke of what he viewed as “America’s return to the militia nation concept.” 

He recounted his own experience three decades earlier flying fighter aircraft in 

Southeast Asia alongside air guardsmen, including one who made the ultimate 

sacrifice. During a later assignment with the reserves, the future chief of staff 

gained further appreciation for the particular issues faced by citizen-soldiers 

from all the services. General Fogleman emphasized to the guardsmen in at-

tendance: “Certainly a fundamental precept of our American military tradition 

is that the United States of America is a militia nation.” To underscore the 

point, he repeated: “It is a militia nation.”

1

Broadly addressing the nation’s military experience in the remainder of his 

speech, Fogleman noted the Cold War-era reliance on large standing forces, 

which he termed “an aberration in our history,” the result of a dangerous threat 

from the Soviet Union. The 1970s’ Total Force policy led, by the end of the 

following decade, to “some of the highest states of readiness [of the reserve 

component] in the peacetime history of our nation.” From the perspective of 

the middle of the 1990s General Fogleman viewed the ongoing drawdown as 

closer to a demobilization, one “taking us back toward our traditional reliance 

on Guard and Reserve forces.”

2

Nearly two decades later, Fogleman returned to his earlier theme. In 2012 

the nation had just withdrawn its forces from Iraq. The former chief of staff 

addressed the current manpower dilemma affecting the nation’s armed forces, 

stating: “In its current form, the force has become unaffordable. Total per-

sonnel costs are consuming more than half of the DoD budget. Nonetheless, 

our nation deserves a modern, balanced and ready defense.” His answer re-

mained what it had been in 1995: “We should return to our historic roots as 

a militia nation . . . the constitutional construct for our military.” Summariz-

ing, Fogleman wrote that senior leaders both military and civilian needed “to 

recognize there is a way back to a smaller active military and a larger militia 

posture. The fiscal environment and emerging threats demand it.”

3

While General Fogleman suggested the time had come for a reevaluation 

of the nation’s force structure vis-à-vis the regular and reserve components, 

in spring 2011 the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, Dennis 

M. McCarthy, conceived the project that evolved into the present volume. A 

retired lieutenant general who had commanded the Marine Forces Reserve 
xiv xv

Preface Preface

down of the 1990s. That decade brought increasing reliance upon the reserve 

component, as the Total Force policy of the 1970s had envisioned. In the wake 

of the Cold War, a smaller active component became more dependent upon 

the reserves than it had been since the early days of the republic. Chapter 

Five (2001–June 2003) focuses on the mobilization and activation of reservists 

from 9/11 through the middle of 2003, at which point the initial objectives in 

Afghanistan and Iraq appeared to have been achieved. Despite all the progress 

made over the previous two decades, serious problems arose as the nation 

drew heavily on its reserve forces for two major campaigns. Chapter Six (July 

2003–December 2006) covers the struggles of the services with Defense Department mobilization policies and practices that were more restrictive than 

the law required, and seemed to threaten long-term access to reserve ground 

forces. Meanwhile, various initiatives affecting reservists’ health care and 

family readiness brought incremental improvement and helped sustain the 

force during a period of high operational tempo. 

Chapter Seven (2007–2011) addresses a new defense secretary’s revision 

of mobilization policy in January 2007 that instituted periodic—and predictable—12-month call-ups (primarily for the Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve, since the other reserve components generally already relied on 

shorter periods of active duty). Chapter Eight suggests that the nation’s increased reliance upon the reserve component in recent years is not so much a 

new paradigm as a return to its original mission, in consonance with General 

Fogleman’s apt reference to the United States as a “militia nation.” It summarizes the primary issues, many of them recurring throughout the history 

of the reserve component, which policymakers will need to grapple with as 

they forge the way ahead, especially if the nation’s citizen-soldiers continue to 

serve as an operational force. 

from 2001 to 2005, he wanted to highlight the transition of the reserve component from the Cold War era’s strategic force to the post-9/11 era’s operational 

role. McCarthy also wanted to call attention to the major issues that the reserve 

component was still dealing with despite those “historic roots as a militia 

nation.” While the policy areas addressed in the following chapters—especially the activation or mobilization of the reserves—are primarily related to 

manpower and personnel rather than equipment, logistics, and infrastructure, 

that focus does not minimize the significance of industrial mobilization issues. 

Rather, it recognizes that the manpower mobilization concerns of the reserve 

component generally differ greatly from the active force and have dominated 

the attention of political and military policymakers for more than two hundred 

years.4

The original plan called for a single background chapter covering the years 

prior to 1990. As the research progressed it became clear that a number of 

issues—for example, training, volunteerism, unit integrity, friction and cultural differences between the components, and the question of who gets called 

in a limited conflict—were long-term concerns for the reserves, the Pentagon, 

and Congress. That history required more detailed treatment to understand 

how the reserve component got to where it was in 1990, resulting in an expansion from one chapter to three. 

Chapter One (1790–1918) sketches the unsteady path from colonial times, 

when every able-bodied male was considered a citizen-soldier capable of 

taking the field with little or no training, to the modern era requiring much 

better preparation for combat. Policy changes never kept up with that changing necessity. Chapter Two (1919–1953) outlines the reserves’ role from the 

interwar period through World War Two and the Korean conflict. The Armed 

Forces Reserve Act of 1952 became the first—and is still the only—comprehensive legislation specifically for the reserve component. Despite the shock 

of no-notice mobilization for Korea, the law still did not fully address the need 

for more and better peacetime training, resulting in continuing over-reliance 

on veterans as the source of ready citizen-soldiers. Chapter Three (1954–

1989) brings the narrative to the Cold War’s close. The advent of the Selected 

Reserve, coupled with the Reagan-era defense buildup, produced a reserve 

component that was better-trained, better-equipped, and more combat-ready 

than it had ever been during any peaceful era in U.S. history. For the first time 

since the minutemen of the Revolutionary War era, the reserves approached 

realistic mobilization timelines not merely in rhetoric but in practice. 

The core of this study is focused on the period from 1990 to 2011, with 

particular emphasis on the decade after 9/11. Chapter Four (1990–2000) highlights the Persian Gulf conflict and the defense reviews and military draw-
xvi xvii

Acknowledgments

As with any such effort, we have accrued numerous debts since November 

2011, when work began on this project. While we cannot hope to mention 

every individual who provided timely assistance or encouragement, we would 

be remiss not to name several. 

Special thanks go to Ms. Betty Kennedy, former director of historical 

services at Air Force Reserve Command, who encouraged Dr. Marion to 

apply for the project just after he returned from Afghanistan in 2011, and to 

Dr. Charlie O’Connell, director of the Air Force Historical Research Agency 

(AFHRA), who allowed Dr. Marion to put his name in the hat and then to 

work out of AFHRA while detailed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Historical Office. Retired MSgt. Craig Mackey, also of AFHRA, 

performed the indispensable work of transcribing fully one-half of the 30 

interviews for this project. Retired Brig. Gen. David McGinnis, the acting 

assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs in 2011, selected Dr. Marion 

and later sat for an interview. Cdr. Ruby Collins, Rear Adm. Steven Day, 

and retired Master Chief Petty Officer, Coast Guard Reserve Forces, Jeff D. 

Smith at U.S. Coast Guard headquarters offered invaluable assistance in re-

searching the smallest of the armed forces (Day and Smith sat for interviews). 

Retired Capt. Jim Grover, in the Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve, pro-

vided timely Navy Reserve documents and introduced several key personnel 

who agreed to interviews. Dr. Joe Gross, former director of the Air National 

Guard history program, wrote several books that were quite helpful in the 

research effort. Retired Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robin Porche of the G-1 

office, Marine Forces Reserve, sat for an interview and was always available 

to check draft paragraphs as the manuscript progressed. Lt. Col. Jeff Lar-

rabee, chief of historical services at the National Guard Bureau, coordinat-

ed interviews with Guard personnel and provided fact-checking assistance. 

Dr. Kathryn Coker and Dr. John Boyd, Office of Army Reserve History, 

provided copies of published Army Reserve histories, valuable feedback, 

and fact-checking. Numerous other historians, archivists, and specialists at 

various history offices, archives, and libraries—including the historic Navy 

Department Library (Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC), the Alfred 

M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center (Quantico, Virginia) and the Fairchild 
xviii

Information Research Center (formerly Air University Library) at Maxwell 

Air Force Base, Alabama—also assisted us. 

Thanks to the several chiefs of staff at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and their professional staffs, who supported the project across the years. The members of the manuscript review panel 

hosted by the OSD Historical Office in September 2014 gave their valuable 

time and insights, which resulted in a better manuscript: Dr. Jeffrey Barlow, 

Naval History and Heritage Command; Dr. David Chu, president, Institute 

for Defense Analysis (and former under secretary of defense for personnel 

and readiness); Col. Nicholas Gentile, U.S. Air Force, operations officer, Air 

National Guard Staff, National Guard Bureau; Lt. Col. Jeffrey Larrabee, U.S. 

Army, chief, Historical Services, National Guard Bureau; Dr. Jim Malachowski, director, Air Force Reserve Command Historical Services; Lt. Gen. Dennis 

McCarthy, USMC (ret.), CEO, Military Experts (former commander, Marine 

Forces Reserve and assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs); Charles 

Melson, chief historian, Marine Corps History Division; Dr. John Smith, senior 

historian, Air Force History and Museums Program; and Mr. Tom Welke, 

deputy director, Operations, Mobilization and Readiness, U.S. Army Reserve 

Command. Dr. Erin Mahan, chief historian of the OSD Historical Office, supported the project in myriad ways and saw it through to completion, supported 

by Carolyn Thorne, who coordinated many administrative issues. A number of 

historians at the OSD Historical Office provided research support, including 

Dr. Joseph Arena, Dr. Ryan Carpenter, Dr. Anthony Crain, Michael Fasulo, 

David Hadley, Rachel Levandoski, Dr. Shannon Mohan, and Dr. Corbin Williamson. Dr. Allen Mikaelian did yeoman’s work as the primary editor, and 

Sandra Doyle shepherded the manuscript through final editing and production. 

Last but not least, we want to thank our families—Jon’s wife, Mary; 

and Forrest’s wife, April, and their children, Nathan, Timothy, Bethany, and 

Hannah—for their love and support. Nathan and Timothy are both now junior 

Marine Corps officers and carrying on the tradition of service to our nation.
1

_______ CHAPTER 1 _______

The Long Road from “Every Citizen a Soldier,”

1790–1918

The proto-democracies of ancient Greece and the early Roman Republic 

equated citizenship with military responsibility—every male who had a 

right to vote was automatically a soldier, required to maintain his own arms, 

and subject to the call to duty whenever his nation needed him. From the 

early Anglo-Saxon days, England also required citizens to provide their own 

weapons and serve in the militia—a part-time army available for local defense. 

In the 18th century authorities continued to extol the traditional militia system, 

but in fact Great Britain had shifted to a professional army. Its colonists in 

America, however, were too poor to support a permanent armed force and 

had no immediate threats from nearby nations, so they came to see a standing 

military as wasteful, undemocratic, and a threat to liberty. Hence they reverted 

to reliance on a universal militia, with every free male citizen obliged to keep 

himself armed and available for service. A training manual printed in Boston 

in 1758 emphasized that a free government required every man to “think it his 

truest honor to be a citizen soldier.” While Americans would hold, in theory, 

to that view for many years to come, in practice the emerging nation would 

adapt over time to a more professional and selective military force. The 

battle between the citizen-soldier ideal and the changing practical requirements of national defense set the stage for many of the policy challenges that 

the reserve component of the United States faced throughout its history and 

still faces today.1

The Colonial Period

Another well-established tradition in British North America in the 1700s 

was the common belief that militia forces were equal, if not superior, to a 

regular army. In several 18th-century joint operations with British forces, the 

militia learned to mistrust the regulars. In 1711 a British expedition to capture 

Quebec failed when the commander lost heart and turned back. The militia, 

now unsupported, also had to withdraw. In 1740–1741 a British naval expedition including militias from nine colonies failed to take Cartagena in the 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

2 3

green American troops” fled, as historian David McCullough wrote, “in pellmell panic” despite General George Washington’s enraged attempts to rally 

them. In the South the militia broke and fled at Camden (1780) but fought with 

skill and valor at King’s Mountain (1780) and Cowpens (1781), key battles 

leading to Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown.5

The Early National Period

With the war’s end, the new nation’s military policies were caught up in 

the larger political debate over the powers of the central government. Those 

in favor of a strong national government wanted a standing army. Their opponents wanted to retain more authority in the states and argued that militias 

could meet security needs. Ultimately the U.S. Constitution authorized a national army, known today as the regular component, and state militias, which 

became the basis of the modern reserve component. The powers granted to 

Congress, in Article I, Section 8, included the following:

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to 

that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 

and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of 

the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, 

and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the 

Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, 

the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training 

the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.6

The Founders chose their words carefully. The distinction between “raise

and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy” was not inconsequential. It reflected the traditional fear of standing armies, brought from Europe 

and reinforced by colonial experience. In the late 18th century more than a 

few Americans expected their armies to be short-term entities, established as 

needed for emergencies. A navy, on the other hand, was essential, even in 

peacetime, to commerce on the high seas and was not deemed a threat to civil 

Spanish Caribbean, strengthening the colonists’ low view of British regulars. 

On the other hand, in 1745, British regular and New England militia forces 

captured the French fortress at Louisbourg. The admirable performance of the 

militia in that battle furthered the belief of citizen-soldiers that they were as 

capable as regulars.2

The type and composition of colonial militias took several forms, basically 

distinguished as either volunteer or standing (also known as common or enrolled) militia. Under colonial law the military-aged, able-bodied, free males 

in a community comprised the standing militia. Normally, they were organized 

into company-size units, provided their own arms, and elected their officers. 

Today’s National Guard traces its lineage to the first three militia regiments 

formed in Massachusetts in 1636. When it came to operational employment, 

however, in most cases standing militia units served as manpower pools that 

colonial governments drew from to form volunteer units. This practice, foreshadowing to a degree the contemporary theme of reserve component volunteerism, enabled some militia members from each locale to stay at home to 

tend farms and businesses while remaining available for local defense.3

The colonies also resorted to volunteer units because their laws generally 

restricted the standing militia to service within defined geographical boundaries, making it largely a force for local operations. Offensive expeditions such 

as Cartagena and Louisbourg thus could only be carried out by volunteers. 

For these missions, volunteer units often fleshed out their ranks by recruiting 

males who were not obligated to serve in the militia, including “farm boys, 

apprentices, and village loafers,” according to one historian. As a consequence 

of this overreliance on ill-trained and poorly equipped recruits, and lack of 

unit cohesion, ad hoc volunteer units earned the contempt of British regulars 

who fought alongside them and assumed that all militias suffered from the 

same shortcomings. The geographic limitation on the employment of standing 

militia was one of the first instances of government policy having a significant 

impact on reserve component mission performance. There would be many 

more to come.4

During the American War of Independence (1775–1783) the Continental 

Congress authorized a national military force, the Continental Army, but also 

partly relied on state militias. Throughout the conflict these two types of units 

served together in a relationship at once competitive and complementary. As 

Continental Army units improved their training and discipline, they gradually 

earned a reputation for steadiness in battle, but the militias’ performance against 

the British varied considerably. In the northern theater, militia units proved 

themselves in several major engagements, including Bunker Hill (1775) and 

the critical victory at Saratoga (1777). But at Kips Bay (1776) the “greenest of 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

4 5

of the 19th century. Some states failed to submit the required annual militia 

reports. The burden of militia service also fell mainly on the poor. Lastly, the 

War of 1812 highlighted the fact that there was still no legal basis to require the 

standing militia to serve in an offensive role on foreign soil.10

While the focus had been land forces in the first years of the Republic, 

Jefferson also was concerned with naval forces. In December 1805 he submitted a bill to Congress to establish a naval militia. The proposed law applied 

to able-bodied white male citizens between ages 18 and 45, but only those 

“whose principal occupation is on the high sea or on the tide-waters within the 

U.S.” Once enrolled by their state, these men would be exempt from service 

in the land militia, but would be required to train six days per year in ship handling and naval artillery and be liable for service up to one year out of every 

two. Jefferson believed this would provide up to 50,000 men for the Navy. 

Congress never acted on the proposal. The nation had relied on privateers—

commercial ships with civilian crews authorized to seize enemy merchantmen 

and share in profits therefrom—to supplement the navy in the Revolutionary 

War and would do so again in the War of 1812.11

During the War of 1812 the performance of the militia varied widely, but 

in the defensive victory at New Orleans in January 1815, under Maj. Gen. 

Andrew Jackson’s leadership, militia soldiers contributed substantially to a 

lopsided victory. That final battle of the war, as explained by two historians of 

the militia, “glorified the militia ideal at a time when the militia system was 

virtually dead.” What some militia advocates missed was the role of leadership. When militiamen were led by extremely capable commanders—epitomized by two future presidents, William H. Harrison in 1813 and Jackson two 

years later—their performance could, indeed, approximate that of well-trained 

regulars.12

Between 1816 and 1835 several presidents offered some 30 recommendations to Congress designed to fix the deteriorating standing militia, but legislators failed to act. While reliance upon the state militias was seen as befitting 

a republic (especially one protected by vast oceans from foreign powers), was 

thrifty, and precluded concern for a standing army’s threat to liberty, it was 

weakening the nation’s defenses.13

One development during this period partially offset the shortcomings of 

the standing militia. A peacetime, company-level, permanent volunteer militia 

system arose and grew increasingly popular, especially in northern urban 

centers. Generally, middle- or upper-class men volunteered for specialized, 

expensive units comprised of cavalry, artillery, or elite infantry. In addition 

to their military value, such units conferred social status upon their members. 

But non-elite infantry units found a place as well, as many immigrants sought 

liberty. Likewise the missions of the militia were all inside the nation’s borders 

and maintained the standing militia’s emphasis on strategic defense.7

In May 1792, stirred by a proposal from President George Washington in 

conjunction with recent military failures against the Indians in the Northwest 

Territory, Congress enacted legislation to better implement the Constitution’s 

militia clauses. The Calling Forth Act of 1792 specified the manner in which 

the militia could be used in federal service to fulfill constitutional roles “to 

execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” 

Because both the Federalists and their Republican opponents feared foreign 

incursions, Congress allowed the president considerable freedom in mobilizing the militia to repel invading armies—a policy that would continue into the 

modern era under various statutes. But Republican-inspired wariness regarding the militia’s use in domestic disturbances resulted in certain restrictions. 

When enforcing the laws of the land, Congress required a federal judge to 

notify the president that local authorities were incapable of doing so prior to 

calling on the militia. The affected state legislature or its governor also had to 

request federal assistance.8

One week after passing the Calling Forth Act, Congress approved the 

Militia Act of 1792. The law required free, white, able-bodied males between 

the ages of 18 and 45, with some exceptions, to enroll in their state’s militia, 

provide their own arms and accoutrements, and muster for training. While 

those forces were available for federal duty, states were not required to coordinate their militia plans or create standardized units that could be quickly 

integrated into a national military campaign. Because the act left it to the states 

to enforce compliance by citizen-soldiers, the law represented “the triumph 

of the Republicans over the Federalists in militia affairs.” A post–World War 

II U.S. Army mobilization study opined, “It was a delusion to suppose that 

the male population would comply with this requirement when there was no 

penalty . . . for failure to do so.” A 1795 modification to the legislation clarified that a militiaman would not have to perform more than three months of 

federal service per year “after his arrival at the place of rendezvous.” That 

short duration, potentially harmful during a longer war, would not be repealed 

until 1861. Despite all these shortcomings, the act would remain the nation’s 

fundamental guiding legislation concerning the militia until 1903.9

In keeping with the Republican viewpoint, President Thomas Jefferson 

took the frugal approach of relying on the militia as the first line of national 

defense to buy time for the federal government to expand its meager regular 

forces. A popular saying of the day claimed the militia was the “shield of the 

Republic” and the regular force its sword. Reality did not match this rhetoric—the standing militia system was already in decline by the opening decade 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

6 7

the army’s cadre-like units, doubling their size. Unlike previous mobilization 

plans, the militia played only a limited role. Although Congress rejected the 

expansible army, the proposal set a precedent. As one historian noted, a secretary of war “had put forth a defense plan that repudiated the militia tradition 

and acknowledged the primacy of Regulars.” Other scholars have referred to 

Calhoun’s proposal as “a permanent legacy” and “one of the most important 

military papers in American history.”15

The Mexican-American War and American Civil War

In 1846 the admission of Texas to the Union precipitated a conflict between 

the United States and Mexico. Concerned about the possibility of a simultaneous war with Great Britain (over Oregon), the James K. Polk administration 

laid the groundwork for the mobilization of the regular Army augmented 

by 50,000 U.S. Volunteers prepared to serve for one year. The volunteers, 

however, would not be called unless and until Mexico initiated hostilities. 

Given the problems experienced during the War of 1812, the U.S. Army’s 

senior leaders opposed calling the state militias. In any case, the obsolescent 

standing militia system, already abolished in several states by the mid-1840s, 

provided a source of volunteers. More than 12,000 militiamen served either as 

U.S. Volunteers or U.S. Army regulars during the war.16

Ulysses S. Grant, a lieutenant during the war, later described the force led 

by Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor as being “under the best of drill and discipline,” 

and probably the best army ever to face an enemy. Even allowing for poetic 

license, Taylor’s experienced regulars were led mostly by West Point–educated officers, but they comprised only 30 percent of American soldiers in the 

war. The statistics could deceive, however, as there was much overlap between 

the different soldier categories. About one-half of the 30,000 regulars began 

the war as volunteers, their change in status merely the result of an oath administered in Mexico. A number of states looked first to their volunteer militia 

companies in order to form federal volunteer regiments, and raised a total of 

58. In Georgia, for example, nine volunteer militia companies combined to 

form the 1st Georgia Regiment. The volunteers, sharing in the wealth of West 

Point–trained leaders available by that time, normally fought as resolutely as 

regulars. One of the war’s outstanding volunteer regiments, commanded by 

Col. Jefferson Davis, was the Mississippi Rifles, the antecedent of today’s 

155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, Mississippi Army National Guard.17

In his annual address to Congress in 1854, President Franklin Pierce 

acknowledged “the valuable services . . . rendered by the Army and its inestimable importance as the nucleus around which the volunteer force of the 

service in a volunteer militia company as a means of demonstrating patriotism 

for their adopted country. During this long period of relative peace, volunteer 

units responded to local crises, enforced the laws, guarded prisoners, and dispersed mobs. In the South the militia effectively buttressed the slave patrol 

system designed to discourage runaways and maintain order on plantations. 

Overall, the permanent volunteer units partly filled the role that the largely 

moribund standing militia was supposed to perform.14

The most significant potential change to the militia system came from Secretary of War John C. Calhoun’s plan for an expansible army, introduced in 

1820 in an attempt to place primary reliance upon the regulars rather than the 

militia. The Battle of New Orleans notwithstanding, Calhoun realized that the 

few training days per year required by the standing militia were insufficient 

to prepare its forces to match Europe’s professional armies. He envisioned a 

peacetime army fully manned in terms of its officers but with only half of its 

enlisted soldiers. In the event of war, new recruits would fill out the ranks of 

At the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815, under Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson’s 

leadership, militia soldiers contributed substantially to victory in the war’s final 

campaign, facilitating the myth of militia superiority over regulars. (Source: Library 

of Congress)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

8 9

Several months later the Union followed suit with similar legislation known 

as the Militia Act of 1862. Although the U.S. law never went into effect, it 

spurred recruiting among volunteer regiments not then in federal service.21

In March 1863, following the horrific casualties at Antietam and Fredericksburg in late 1862, the U.S. Congress passed the Enrollment Act. Similar 

to the old militia laws, the act established the principle of universal military 

obligation and the machinery to carry it out, though it omitted the traditional 

militia requirement for a male citizen to equip himself and periodically train. 

However, Congress intended the law not to conscript directly but rather to 

encourage voluntary enlistment. In the final tally, only 6 percent of Northern 

military manpower was secured directly by the draft. Rather, the threat of the 

draft served as a primary catalyst for otherwise reluctant citizens to volunteer 

or to pay a substitute to enlist in their stead. The same basic phenomenon took 

place in the South but to a lesser degree, where 20 percent of Confederate 

manpower was drafted. Significantly, the conscription procedures of both sides 

were based on the obligation of military service to the nation, not the states.22

The draft did not apply to the Navy and it had no militia to call upon, so 

it relied entirely on voluntary enlistment throughout the war. The 1864 reauthorization of the draft did allow up to ten thousand soldiers with maritime 

experience to transfer to the Navy, and for those mariners who were drafted 

to elect enlistment in the Navy instead. Recent immigrants, often unemployed 

and clustered around the ports where the Navy recruited, provided a major 

source. Free blacks, initially prohibited from serving in the Army, volunteered 

in substantial numbers for the Navy, which had routinely accepted blacks 

throughout its history. Escaped slaves provided another manpower source, especially to vessels operating on southern rivers or blockade duty. At the height 

of the conflict, blacks constituted 23 percent of the Navy’s enlisted strength, 

while immigrants (some of whom were black) accounted for 45 percent.23

The Advent of the National Guard

In 1865 the Union disbanded its volunteer units, and the small regular Army 

soon returned to its antebellum role as a constabulary force primarily dealing with 

Indians in the West. Meanwhile, the National Guard began to develop in almost 

all of the states. Increasingly, states employed the term National Guard instead of 

militia, although the new title belied the primary role of this component as a state, 

not national, instrument. In many cases the volunteer militia companies, more so 

than the standing militia, formed the core of the states’ National Guard units.24

The formation of the National Guard Association (NGA, later the National 

Guard Association of the United States) in the 1870s contributed to the Guard’s 

nation can gather in the hour of danger.” Pierce thereby made clear that the nation’s defense policy had become wedded to a regular army, albeit one heavily 

supported by volunteers. Seemingly, even the traditional rhetorical reliance on 

the militia had passed from the American political scene. Yet the next great 

conflict drew upon what remained of the old militia system.18

When the Civil War erupted in 1861, the militia system of most states had 

changed little since the Mexican-American War. Likewise, the regular Army 

was relatively unchanged, epitomized by its general in chief, brevet Lt. Gen. 

Winfield Scott, then 74, who had served in that capacity since 1841. One 

month prior to the start of hostilities, the Confederacy’s provisional congress 

took the first step toward mobilization when it authorized President Jefferson 

Davis to call out the militia for six months and to accept 100,000 volunteers 

for one year. Following the South’s occupation of Fort Sumter, President 

Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 militiamen for three months’ service in 

accordance with the Calling Forth Act of 1792. At that time the size of the 

U.S. Army was a mere 16,000. By the time hostilities ended in 1865 at least 

2.5 million men had served in the Union’s armies and about 1 million had 

served under the Confederacy.19

Despite the dramatic, unprecedented increase in the size of the U.S. Army, it 

never had more than 20,000 regulars present for duty. In both North and South, 

the regular armies were dwarfed by volunteer regiments formed initially from 

the rosters of the traditional militia companies. Once again, in the 1860s, the 

state militia rolls became the manpower pools for recruiting volunteers. And, 

again, the militia proved to be a mixed bag in battle. While many units performed badly, the 69th New York State Militia (also known as the 2nd Regiment of Irish Volunteers and the lineal predecessor of today’s 69th Infantry, 

New York Army National Guard) was one of the exceptions that fought well.

The militia’s three-month service limit expired soon after the first major 

battle in the East, at Bull Run. Lincoln avoided relying on the militia for the 

rest of the conflict by calling for 500,000 U.S. Volunteers for three-year terms 

and depending primarily on that manpower source thereafter. Although militia 

units did not fight as such in large engagements after the summer of 1861, at 

the war’s outset they at least bought time for the North to expand the small 

regular army with the volunteers.20

During the Civil War both belligerents established a new principle that a 

citizen’s military obligation was due not to individual states, but to the nation. 

That important distinction resulted from desperation on both sides, especially the South, to replace combat losses sustained at rates previously unknown 

to Americans. Ironically, the Confederacy, while claiming it was founded to 

protect states’ rights, began conscription after the Battle of Shiloh in 1862. 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

10 11

pendence. War Department leaders 

wanted to rely primarily on a rapidly 

expanded regular Army—a basically Uptonian approach—while 

Congress, traditional allies of the 

state-affiliated Guard, authorized 

only a small regular Army increase 

and turned to the familiar practice 

of requesting volunteers. President William McKinley called for 

a total of 200,000 volunteers for up 

to two years of federal service to be 

drawn from the existing, partially 

trained National Guard. In authorizing 

the states to raise new units of volunteers, Congress provided for a system 

largely insulated from regular Army 

influence. Only a single regular officer, 

for example, could be appointed to a 

volunteer regiment. The war was extremely popular, and the Army quickly 

secured the requested volunteers.28

Mindful of the constitutional issue of whether militia could 

be used for purposes other than 

homeland defense and maintaining civil order, the law required guardsmen to volunteer individually for the 

Cuban and—after George Dewey’s naval victory at Manila Bay—Philippine 

campaigns. Any unit whose individual members collectively volunteered 

for overseas service, however, would be accepted as a U.S. Volunteer regiment with its existing organization and officers. In many cases the individual 

members of National Guard units were sworn into federal service en masse 

and the former units reconstituted as U.S. regiments with new designations. 

For example, the 1st Regiment, New York National Guard, was redesignated 

the 1st Regiment, Infantry, New York Volunteers. Those relatively few individuals who chose not to volunteer were discharged from their former units, 

their places filled by eager recruits. Nearly 200 National Guard units served 

during the period as volunteer units.29

The raising of volunteer regiments notwithstanding, the Cuban expedition 

was mainly a regular Army affair. Due to the limited shipping available, most 

After the Civil War, Maj. Gen. Emory 

Upton desired to replicate the German 

professional model in the American 

military system. His writings had a 

significant impact on Army doctrine for 

decades after his death in 1881. (Source: 

Library of Congress)

ascent in part by emphasizing its role as a reserve force to supplement the 

regular Army. National Guard leaders did not wish their units to be identified 

with quelling labor disputes on behalf of the business community—although 

this was a mission they performed often—so the organization consistently emphasized the Guard’s role as a “natural component of the nation’s military 

force.” The NGA’s first president was Brig. Gen. George W. Wingate, who 

was also instrumental in founding the National Rifle Association. He seized 

the opportunity to emphasize marksmanship for guardsmen while at the same 

time promoting rifle competitions that enhanced rapport between part-timers 

and Army regulars. His initiative represented an early attempt to reduce the 

barriers between regulars and citizen-soldiers, an issue that would continue to 

bedevil later generations.25

By 1880 Pennsylvania had highlighted the National Guard’s maturation by 

becoming the first state to reorganize its militia during peacetime into a tactical 

division consisting of a headquarters and three brigades. Thus, the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, is considered the Army’s 

“oldest, permanently organized combat division.” The state’s citizen-soldiers 

drilled one night a week, participated in inspections, and attended a six-day 

training encampment each summer, a training regimen typical for the period.26

Paradoxically, the rise of the National Guard occurred at the same time 

the regular Army grew increasingly opposed to reliance on state-based parttime soldiery. One of the Army’s leading intellectuals in the late 19th century, 

Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, had become convinced of the limited value of militia 

unless it was kept under the close supervision of, and subordinate to, Army 

regulars. The most influential of his several books was The Military Policy of 

the United States, in which he failed to distinguish between the American Civil 

War’s organized militia (largely volunteer units) and the manpower rosters of 

the old standing militia. He also underestimated the power of the traditional 

American belief in the militia concept and the fear of large standing armies, 

which had an outsize impact on practical military matters. The German model 

that Upton had observed and admired was based on a large, professionally led 

army of two-year conscripts who spent long years in the reserve after their 

regular service. Although Upton had a significant impact on Army doctrine for 

several decades after his death, his desire to replicate the German model in the 

American military system went unrealized; the United States continued with 

its “traditional dual military institutions.”27

At the end of the 19th century the United States fought a war that resulted in overseas colonial gains and world power status, and also demonstrated the ongoing dilemma of manpower mobilization policy. In 1898 the U.S. 

Congress declared war against Spain for the purpose of securing Cuban inde-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

12 13

nated the Dick Act’s nine-month limit on length of federalized service, and 

required the president to mobilize the Guard prior to calling for volunteers or 

a volunteer force. Those important provisions made the National Guard the 

preferred source of military forces to augment the regular Army, a status NGA 

leaders had long sought.33

Despite the legislative improvements, by 1910 a new U.S. Army 

chief of staff grappled with how to 

raise a wartime army that would be 

effective on the modern battlefield. 

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, along 

with other senior Army leaders, believed that citizen-soldiers required 

a lengthy training period under the 

supervision of professional officers 

to prepare them for combat. Unlike 

Emory Upton, however, Wood understood that he would have to respect 

traditional American distrust of a 

large standing army. Whereas Uptonians, following the German army’s 

example, believed it took two years to 

produce effective soldiers, Wood believed he could do it in six months—

if he could ensure a modicum of 

training for the citizen-soldiery 

during peacetime. Given the protection of two oceans, he deemed 

that enough time to raise an army to 

confront likely foreign enemies. Although the 120,000-strong National 

Guard potentially provided that partially trained force for rapid mobilization, Wood opposed in principle 

all state-affiliated military forces and 

was wary of possible limits on the 

ability to deploy them overseas. The ensuing political battle over mobilization 

policy between 1912 and 1916 brought U.S. Army–National Guard relations 

to one of their lowest points. The result was a compromise that included both 

the National Guard and federal-only reserve components.34

The main author of the Militia Act of 

1903, Senator Charles Dick—also an 

Ohio National Guard major general—

established the principle of providing 

federal dollars in return for increased 

Army control of the Guard. (Source: 

Library of Congress) 

volunteer units were left in the States. The reputation of one of the few volunteer regiments in Cuba, the 71st New York (a redesignated Guard formation), 

suffered as a result of muddled performance in the Battle of San Juan Hill, 

while the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry (raised from scratch and known as the 

Rough Riders) fought admirably in the same engagement. In the prolonged, 

extremely difficult, and unpleasant operations against Filipino insurgents, 

the secretary of war later commended the guardsmen/volunteers for their 

“exhibition of sturdy patriotism which it seems to me has never been fully 

appreciated.” Military historian Brian M. Linn wrote of the Battle of Manila 

in February 1899: “Much to the surprise of Regular officers, the Volunteers 

proved themselves courageous and efficient fighters . . . a good case can be 

made that the Volunteers were the more effective.”30

The 1898 mobilization had encountered major problems, from a too-small 

army to a lack of professionalism. Perceiving the Army’s shortcomings, the 

new secretary of war, Elihu Root, implemented important changes during his 

five years in office. Borrowing heavily from the writings of Emory Upton, 

Root essentially led the transition of the U.S. Army from the late 19th-century 

constabulary era into the age of professionally led mass armies. Among Root’s 

major accomplishments, his support of the Militia Act of 1903 helped pass the 

most significant law in more than a century affecting the reserve component.31 

The Growing Role of the National Guard

The Militia Act of 1903 was known as the Dick Act in honor of Charles 

W. Dick, the House Committee on Militia Affairs chairman, NGA president, 

and an Ohio National Guard major general. Taking advantage of a climate 

friendly to militia reform, Dick worked closely with Root’s War Department 

to craft the legislation. The Dick Act’s major impact was establishment of the 

principle of providing federal funds and equipment in return for greater control 

over Guard training and organization, a trend that would continue in the long 

term. The National Guard’s funding became dependent on the degree to which 

it met federal standards in commissioning officers, recruiting enlisted men, organizing units, and participating in field training. Units that performed at least 

24 drill sessions, each normally 11⁄2 to 2 hours long, and summer field training 

received federal funds. Guard personnel who joined in maneuvers with the 

Army received federal pay and subsistence. Guard officers became eligible to 

attend regular Army schools, including the War College.32

Five years later modifications to the Dick Act resolved several concerns. 

The Militia Act of 1908 clarified that the National Guard could be federalized 

for duty “either within or without the Territory of the United States,” elimi-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

14 15

for a naval reserve, leading to the introduction of several bills after 1901. At 

the time, congressional interest seemed to favor the states’ naval militias in 

lieu of a federal-only reserve, but in 1912 Congress passed an act forming 

the Medical Reserve Corps for the Navy and one year after that it followed 

with legislation establishing the Navy’s Dental Reserve Corps. Several months 

later, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt reported that the 

Navy supported the creation of a national naval reserve. By 1914 Roosevelt 

and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels oversaw the development of a 

plan for a 50,000-man naval reserve. The Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 

(enacted in March 1915) established the U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) while 

providing for continuation of the Naval Militia and National Naval Volunteers. 

The next year Congress authorized the Naval Reserve Flying Corps. Marines 

had long served with the Naval Militia, but the August 1916 legislation also 

marked the official creation of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR).38

Attempts to improve the naval militias took place concurrently with Naval 

Reserve efforts. Although earlier legislative attempts had failed, the Naval 

Militia Act of February 1914 largely brought the states’ naval militias under 

the secretary of the Navy and henceforth they were to be paid for training 

days. The president could call the naval militia to active duty in wartime or a 

national emergency. In the aftermath of the 1915 sinking of the British liner 

SS Lusitania by a German U-boat, which claimed over 100 American lives, 

the U.S. Navy furthered its practice of dealing with the Naval Militia as a part 

of the Naval Reserve.39

Meanwhile, the Army Reserve had its beginnings in the 1908 establishment 

of a medical officer reserve corps. By 1916 the number of reserve physicians 

outnumbered regular Army doctors by four to one. That year, the National 

Defense Act disestablished the medical officer reserve corps, whose members 

were then commissioned into the newly designated Officers’ Reserve Corps, 

which later comprised the bulk of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The genesis 

of the Army Reserve—as well as the Navy’s Dental Reserve Corps—suggested the importance of the specialized skills readily available in the reserve components, one of the inherent advantages of the reserves then and now.40

World War I 

In April 1917 the United States declared war against Germany. At that 

moment, American military preparedness in relation to the task at hand probably was at one of its lowest points in history. President Woodrow Wilson had 

directed Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to have a conscription bill ready 

in the event of war, and in May 1917 Congress passed the Selective Service 

Although the United States was concerned about the war that enveloped 

Europe in 1914, it was subsequent trouble on the U.S.-Mexican border that 

facilitated the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. The law not only 

called for the regular Army to increase over a five-year period to 175,000, 

expansible to 286,000 in wartime, but also advanced the reserve component’s 

training, standards, and status. The National Guard would rise gradually to 

more than 400,000 and receive federal funding for an increase in the number 

of armory drills for guardsmen to 48 per year. In return for greater financial 

support, National Guard units and officers became subject to federal standards. 

Henceforth, officers and enlisted men also took oaths to both their state and 

the nation, swearing to protect the U.S. Constitution and obey the orders of the 

president, which ensured the legality of overseas federal service. Guardsmen 

were thereafter subject to overseas duty of unlimited duration, but were assured 

of serving as National Guard units, not as individual replacements in regular 

Army outfits (the reality would differ from these promises in later years). These 

provisions reinforced the Guard’s status as the nation’s preferred reserve force.35

In addition, the law formalized the summer training programs for 

officer-candidates Wood had initiated, as well as the Officers’ Reserve Corps 

(ORC) and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). The legislation also 

created an Enlisted Reserve Corps, comprised of men who had served on active 

duty in various technical specialties. Unlike the National Guard, the Officers’ 

Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps contained only individuals; there 

were no units. Finally, the act reaffirmed the obligation of able-bodied men, 18 

to 45 years old, to serve in the military if needed.36

The Birth of the Federal-Only Reserve Components

Dating back to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the nation had viewed 

a standing navy more favorably than a standing army. Merchant sailors also 

provided a ready source of trained personnel, and consequently there had been 

less need for state naval militias. The first tentative attempts to form naval 

militia or reserve units dated from 1873 when a group of former naval officers 

met in New York. By the early 1890s several Atlantic seaboard states and California had established their own naval militias, generally designated as naval 

battalions. By 1899, 18 states and the District of Columbia had naval militias. 

The year prior, President McKinley had called the naval militias into federal 

service for the war against Spain; the Illinois and New York naval militias subsequently distinguished themselves in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba.37

The 1898 war, along with a growing awareness of problems with the organization and training policies of the naval militias, stirred greater advocacy 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

16 17

cule when America declared war against Germany—boasted a considerable 

number of veterans of the Aisne defensive and the Aisne-Marne, Saint-Mihiel, 

and Meuse-Argonne offensives in 1918.44

Women provided another source of manpower during the war. Since the legislation establishing the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves referred to persons 

rather than males, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels opted to interpret 

that widely and authorized the recruitment of women as early as March 1917. 

The Navy made immediate use of the option, recruiting some 12,500 women 

by the end of the war. The Marine Corps demurred until August 1918, and 

ended up taking in only 305. Officially designated respectively as Yeoman (F) 

(after the Navy’s clerical rating) and Marine Reserve (F), they were colloquially dubbed Yeomanettes and Marinettes. They underwent no basic training after 

enlistment and generally performed administrative duties stateside to relieve 

men for combat service. When the conflict ended, the Navy Department began 

closing down these programs, but they paved the way for greater reliance on 

women in the military in the future.45

Before the war, John McAuley Palmer, the Army’s foremost thinker on manpower mobilization issues, stated that the “most important military problem is 

to devise means of preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the emergency of modern war.” The American mobilization of manpower in 1917 and 

1918, though far from perfect, succeeded; in so doing, it validated Palmer’s 

thesis. In the process, both the state-affiliated and federal-only reserve components gained legitimacy in the era of modern warfare.46

One unresolved issue concerned the difficult relationship between the 

regular Army and the National Guard. After the war General John J. Pershing 

testified before Congress that the “National Guard never received the wholehearted support of the regular Army during the World War. There was always 

more or less a prejudice against them.” Guardsmen felt certain that the regular 

Army sought to diminish opportunities for National Guard leaders. Only one 

Guard officer, Maj. Gen. John F. O’Ryan of the New York 27th Division, 

served for the duration of the war as a division commander. Among divisional 

commanders in France by November 1918, O’Ryan was the youngest. Guardsmen complained that a number of National Guard general officers considered 

fit for duty on the Mexican border in 1916 were replaced only one year later by 

regular Army officers because of alleged physical unfitness. But despite an appearance of discrimination, it was a certainty that combat on the Western Front 

would be more rigorous than security duty along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 

Pershing’s view, physical fitness and youthfulness generally were key ingredients of effective battlefield leadership, and that explained his tendency to 

replace older National Guard general officers. O’Ryan, the youngest divisional 

Act. It authorized the president to raise the regular Army and National Guard 

to full war strength, to federalize the Guard, and to conduct a federal draft of 

500,000 men. Subsequent legislation increased the number of conscripts and 

expanded the draft pool to include males between 18 and 45 years. Draftees 

would account for two-thirds of the U.S. military forces that participated in the 

war, in contrast with only 6 percent of the Union Army some 50 years earlier.41

The extreme unpreparedness of the nation notwithstanding, the manpower 

mobilizations of 1917–1918 were carried out with considerably greater astuteness, flexibility, and efficiency than those of any previous conflict. Even 

the War Department’s term, selective service, helped soften the reality for an 

American public traditionally opposed to coerced military duty. Of the nearly 

24 million men who registered for selective service, an average of only 1 in 8 

was actually inducted. Still, nearly 2.8 million men were drafted, while another 

1 million enlisted voluntarily.42

The War Department filled the ranks of the regular Army and the mobilized 

National Guard largely with volunteers, while directing most draftees to the 

newly formed divisions called the National Army. In the summer of 1917 the 

United States’ 1st Division, recently arrived in France, became the first of many 

faced with the task described by George C. Marshall biographer Forrest C. 

Pogue as: “to make soldiers of the recruits and military units out of the collections of men.” Those processes required months of hard training, but by early 

1918 the Americans were in the front lines and began to prove their worth. By 

July 1918, 250,000 fresh U.S. soldiers were arriving in Europe every month. 

And in the war’s final months the Americans tipped the balance in favor of the 

Allies at such places as the Marne, Saint-Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. By 

the time of the armistice of 11 November 1918, 4.8 million American men had 

served in the armed forces during the war, 3.7 million of them in the Army. 

Two million men, comprising 43 divisions, served in France with the American Expeditionary Forces. Of those divisions, 18 were National Guard (at least 

originally), 17 National Army (conscripts), and 8 regular Army. Guardsmen 

with civilian experience in aviation also served in the Army’s fledgling air 

component, though they had to transfer to the Signal Corps Reserve to do so—

the Guard would not establish its first aviation unit until 1921.43

The Army was not the only service to mobilize, however. Immediately 

upon the declaration of war, the Navy called into service both Naval Militia 

and Naval Reserve personnel. By July 1918 the number of naval reservists and 

militia on active duty roughly equaled the number of regular Navy personnel. 

The following month, Secretary Daniels ordered the elimination of distinctions in uniforms and titles of rank between regular Navy and Naval Reserve 

members. By the time of the armistice, the Marine Corps Reserve—minis-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 1: 1790 – 1918

18 19

them into trained units while a small standing army backed up by a partially 

trained, larger—but still not large enough—National Guard bought time for 

the new divisions to take the field.50

Moreover, the war signaled the end of the old paradigm of “every citizen 

a soldier.” From colonial times, Americans had assumed that an army could 

be put into the field on short notice by calling its male citizens to arms. The 

reality had been far different. Initially, geographic restrictions had hindered the 

utility of the standing militia for anything beyond local service. By the early to 

mid-19th century the states generally neglected their standing militias in favor 

of much smaller but somewhat better-prepared permanent volunteer militias. 

By the turn of the 20th century advances in military technology and professionalism rendered wildly impractical the very notion that every citizen could 

keep himself armed, equipped, and trained to engage in combat. While the 

draft meant that most male citizens were at least subject to the call to military 

service, such raw manpower required considerable time and effort to produce 

effective combat units. Given the experiences of the 1910s, which included 

watershed legislation, mobilization, and combat operations, it became clear 

that reservists would have to undergo more, and more intense, training during 

peacetime to maintain readiness for the modern battlefield.

The issue of the composition of the reserve components was closely related 

to the lesson regarding training. Shortly after World War I Congress repudiated 

the nation’s historic reliance on volunteer units—not infrequently raised from 

scratch—that had served from colonial times through the Philippine Insurrection. In addition to the added time required to prepare an army for battle, the 

oceans no longer afforded the buffer that they had in an earlier era. That vise 

spelled the end of “the Volunteer Army,” which disappeared from the Army’s 

authorized land forces in 1920. Over the next several decades, the nation 

would increasingly rely on a larger standing army and a larger and increasingly 

better-trained National Guard and reserve. After more than a century marked 

by halting steps, the nation’s defenses now rested upon trained professionals 

and partially trained citizen-soldiers formed into permanent units with either 

state-federal or federal-only affiliation. The era of the traditional, potentially 

untrained and ill-equipped “every citizen” soldier was firmly laid to rest.51

commander to serve in France, not only met Pershing’s criteria, he also had 

been the first guardsman to graduate from the Army War College.47

_______ Conclusion _______

In terms of what the nation expected of its citizen-soldiers, World War 

I offered lessons with policy implications in two major areas: training and 

the composition of the reserve component. Regarding training, for decades 

Emory Upton’s influence over the Army was such that planners took it for 

granted that a lengthy period would always be required to prepare citizen-soldiers for the battlefield. Army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood questioned that 

assumption, but even he envisioned no less than six months’ training to turn 

civilians into soldiers.48

But in the middle of 1918, as long-awaited American divisions were beginning to turn the tide in favor of the Allies, Secretary of War Newton Baker 

concluded otherwise. He stated that given the “inspiration from an existing 

struggle, it takes no such length of time” as the previously assumed “nine 

months or a year to train raw recruits into soldiers in peace time.” Baker asserted that “men who have had four months’ training . . . are pretty nearly ready for 

use in association with . . . veterans and experienced troops.” While the secretary’s conclusion may have been valid with respect to turning civilians into 

competent individual soldiers, and perhaps inserting them as replacements into 

a veteran division, Baker did not address the intangibles of unit cohesion and 

the higher-level tactical skills required of ground combat units. Developing 

an effective unit from scratch, after its soldiers had been trained to individual 

standards, took additional months.49

The experience of the Army’s 1st Division suggested as much. Although it 

arrived in France in the summer of 1917, it was “not a combat division at all, 

but only the raw material for one sent over for assembly in France instead of 

at home.” In his memoirs Pershing acknowledged that his divisions were but 

“partially trained,” even while lauding their spirit and accomplishments in the 

Meuse-Argonne offensive of 1918. Pershing’s First Army commander, Maj. 

Gen. Hunter Liggett, wrote that the strain of command during 1917–1918 was 

“intensified here by the knowledge that they were leading troops only partially 

trained against the best organized and most skillful man-killing machine ever 

set going.” One lesson, therefore, was that even though individual raw recruits 

probably could be trained in less time than previously assumed, the training required—and the time spent together—for effective and cohesive combat units 

was considerably longer than six months. The point argued strongly against a 

defense policy of waiting until a conflict arose to bring in recruits and form 
21

_______ CHAPTER 2 _______

Adapting to Global Threats and Global Power,

1919–1953 

The rapid demobilization after World War I marked the beginning of a turbulent period for American defense policy and the nation’s reserve 

components. Fiscal retrenchment gave way to global economic depression, 

followed by another full-scale mobilization, world war, and hurried demobilization, and finally by an emergency call-up to handle an unexpected conflict 

in Korea. Throughout all this, the United States continued to refine laws and 

policies governing the reserves, in part to deal with longstanding issues, but 

also in response to the evolving strategic, social, economic, and political environment. The result would be a stronger and better-prepared reserve force, 

albeit one that still faced unresolved challenges. 

The Interwar Period

The U.S. military’s demobilization in 1919–1920 was at least as drastic 

as the mobilization two years earlier. Weary of a large and expensive army, 

a devastating European war, and hints of German-style militarism, Congress 

reduced the regular Army to about 140,000 men by 1922. Indeed, an official 

mobilization study referred to “the Army disintegrating under the impact of 

popular pressure to ‘bring the boys home.’” The War Department, believing 

this ongoing retrenchment went too far, in 1919 proposed a peacetime force 

of 500,000 regulars along the lines of the old expansible army plan. Congress 

flatly rejected it. Testifying later in the year before the Senate Military Affairs 

Committee, Col. (later, Brig. Gen.) John McAuley Palmer so impressed the 

chairman with his grasp of the issues that the committee brought him in to 

help draft new legislation. Palmer recommended a much smaller regular force 

than Army leadership desired because he viewed the nation’s citizen-soldiery, 

rather than its regulars, as the bedrock of U.S. land forces, a principle he saw 

as part of the “national genius and tradition.” The recently victorious field 

commander, General John J. Pershing, whose citizen-soldier divisions helped 

win the victory on the Western Front, lent Palmer his considerable support.1
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

22 23

four-star rank, achieved nearly 90 years later. Also, Congress increased the 

number of Guard officers authorized to serve in the Militia Bureau and provided for their assignment to the General Staff.4

One key issue was not resolved satisfactorily from the Guard’s perspective, however. Although legislators “had sold the bill to their fellows” with 

the assurance that National Guard outfits would maintain unit integrity during 

federal service, the law’s wording, according to one historian, “did not amount 

to a firm prohibition against changes following mobilization.” Despite attempts 

to rectify this, including language in the act of June 1933 stating that Guard 

units would be “maintained intact insofar as practicable” following mobilization, unit integrity was never guaranteed. The National Defense Act of 1920, 

nevertheless, greatly clarified the respective roles of the Army’s components, 

increased the importance of the National Guard, and improved the foundation 

of U.S. military policy.5

The 1920 legislation also enhanced the position of the Organized Reserve, 

but fiscal austerity limited the practical impact. There were 72,000 officers on 

the rolls by 1926, but only 5,000 enlisted men. Throughout the interwar period 

there were few training opportunities; officers considered themselves fortunate 

to receive a two-week tour of active duty every four or five years. The lowest 

point came in 1934, when only one in seven ORC officers secured a spot in 

the traditional summer camp. The Army, not excited with the task assigned 

in 1933 to administer the Roosevelt administration’s Civilian Conservation 

Corps (CCC), which put young men to work on parks and other outdoor projects, turned to ORC officers to run the corps’ camps. The War Department 

billed CCC duty as “valuable training” especially in “practical leadership” for 

young officers. It was not tactical training, however, though the paid CCC duty 

likely motivated more than a few officers to remain in the ORC during the 

resource-starved interwar era. Reservists in all the services generally received 

pay only for two-week training sessions, if they could get one, and not for 

weekly drill periods.6

In implementing the 1920 law, the Army’s leadership envisioned that each 

of the nine regular Army divisions, manned at full strength, would train two 

National Guard and three Organized Reserve divisions in its region. When 

the regular Army’s budget dipped even lower than anticipated, Palmer recommended abandoning some of the planned regular divisions in order to keep 

those that remained at full strength. Instead, in a reversion to the expansible 

army plan, the War Department maintained all of them in a skeletonized form, 

planning to fill them with draftees. That decision adversely affected the training of its reservists, as the regulars remained at home station, fully occupied by 

The result was the National 

Defense Act of 1920, officially an 

amendment to the 1916 defense law 

but in fact largely new. It designated 

the several land forces that comprised 

the Army as follows: “the Regular 

Army, the National Guard while in 

the service of the United States, and 

the organized Reserves, including 

the Officers’ Reserve Corps and the 

Enlisted Reserve Corps.” The recent 

conflict had convinced planners that 

volunteer units such as those raised 

in 1898 were no longer viable in 

modern warfare, so the 1920 law 

omitted that option. The act also institutionalized the Reserve Officers’ 

Training Corps system as a peacetime 

program to provide trained junior officers for future mobilizations.2

Reflecting Palmer’s influence 

and congressional desires, the law 

provided for a small regular Army 

backed up by a larger National 

Guard and a smaller Army Reserve. 

Congress authorized a regular Army 

of 280,000 soldiers and affirmed the National Guard’s standing units as the 

preferred reserve component, followed by the trained individuals of the Organized Reserve. Due to lack of funding, however, the regular Army hovered 

near 140,000 men until 1936; the Guard’s strength was only roughly 180,000 

throughout the 1920s; and the 33 Organized Reserve divisions remained units 

in name only.3

Reflecting the Guard’s elevated status and increasing influence with 

Congress, the 1920 act took control of the Militia Bureau (after 1933, the National Guard Bureau) away from the regular Army and required that a National 

Guard major general serve as the bureau chief. The new chief also reported 

to an assistant secretary of war, not the Army chief of staff, thereby minimizing opportunities for regular Army generals to derail Guard initiatives. The 

measure was the first major step toward the elevation of the bureau chief to 

Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, the 

Army’s leading thinker on manpower 

mobilization issues, viewed the nation’s 

citizen-soldiery as the bedrock of U.S. 

land forces under the Constitution, and a 

part of the national genius and tradition. 

(Source: Library of Congress)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

24 25

River that same year. Such civil support missions, repeated often in coming 

years, cemented the importance of the aerial reserve component to state and 

local communities.10

Naval reserve elements also began to develop an aviation capability. The 

Naval Aviation Act of 1935 established an aviation cadet program that offered 

pilot training for qualified college graduates and then a commission in the Naval 

Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve. Since many reserve aviators worked as commercial pilots, their readiness suffered less than that of their counterparts in other 

military specialties who had minimal opportunities to hone their skills.11

While tight funding throughout much of the interwar period negatively impacted the size and readiness of the reserve component, changes in law and 

policy improved the prospects for the future.

World War II 

When the German blitzkrieg overran Poland in September 1939, President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt announced a “limited national emergency” and issued 

an executive order increasing the size of the regular Army and the National 

Guard. The majority of the Guard’s expansion went to bolster its 18 infantry 

divisions. To boost further the Guard’s preparedness for war, the president also 

increased drills from 48 to 60 per year and extended the annual field training 

from 15 to 21 days. By the summer of 1940 the National Guard had reached a 

peacetime high of more than 240,000, while the regular Army, adding 80,000 

soldiers in a single year, topped 260,000. Meanwhile, in 1939 the number of 

ORC officers increased to more than 100,000, nearly one-half of whom would 

be serving on active duty by May 1941.12

Despite the outbreak of war in Europe, Roosevelt—concerned about isolationist sentiment—did not initially advocate conscription or mobilization of the 

reserve component. This changed in the late summer of 1940 in light of Germany’s rapid conquest of France. In August Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the president to mobilize the National Guard and other reserves for one 

year of active duty. Three weeks later legislators passed the first peacetime draft 

in the nation’s history, authorizing selective service of males between 21 and 35 

years old for 12 months. Both measures limited duty to the Western Hemisphere 

except for U.S. possessions such as the Philippines. On the day the president 

signed the selective service bill into law, he also mobilized the first four National 

Guard divisions, which required conscripts to fill their ranks.13

Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, faced with the need to reinforce 

forward-deployed forces in the Philippines and Panama, realized that the immediate result of the Guard’s mobilization in 1940 was decreased readiness. 

tasks in their understrength units. It also meant that even the regular divisions 

were woefully unprepared for combat, since they accomplished little more 

than individual and small-unit training, and would have to build full-scale 

units from scratch when the next war came.7

The ground forces were not alone in facing draconian postwar measures. 

By 1922 the U.S. Navy’s reserve forces consisted of just 6,500 officers and 

enlisted men in a paid status, with the rest transferred into the nonpaying Volunteer Naval Reserve or disenrolled. The Marine Corps Reserve had likewise 

dwindled to less than 600 personnel. The Naval Reserve Act of 1925 at least 

offered legitimacy when it established the redesignated Naval Reserve as a 

part of the Navy, and the Marine Corps Reserve as “a component part” of the 

Marine Corps. Moreover, a month later Congress amended the 1916 defense 

act to establish the Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (NROTC) as a 

counterpart to the Army program. But the Department of the Navy largely 

cancelled the two-week summer training sessions in 1932 and 1933 and temporarily halted all pay for reservists in 1933.8

Despite the lack of funds, the Marine Corps Reserve made some strides 

in the mid-1930s. In 1934 the Marine Corps began to commission a small 

number of NROTC graduates. It also implemented a new system of summer 

training, known as Platoon Leaders Class, to procure second lieutenants for 

the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. Another significant initiative was the Inspector-Instructor (I-I) program, which placed a small cadre of regular Marine 

officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with each reserve unit to 

assist in training and in maintaining equipment. A key feature of the program 

was “the careful choice of Inspector-Instructor personnel and their resultant 

high caliber,” including the ability to “guide and instruct without assuming 

command.” Seventy years later a congressionally mandated commission 

would laud the ongoing I-I program.9

In 1920 the Militia Bureau and the Army Air Service forged a plan for National Guard aviation units, and a year later the Minnesota National Guard’s 

109th Observation Squadron received federal recognition. In a pattern that 

continued for decades, however, the active air components typically sought to 

relegate those functions they considered less important—such as aerial observation in the 1930s—to the National Guard (and later the Air Force Reserve). 

Nevertheless, the fledgling Air Guard quickly made a name for itself. Charles 

A. Lindbergh, a captain in the Missouri National Guard’s 110th Observation 

Squadron, stirred interest in aviation with his historic nonstop transatlantic 

flight in 1927. Other less spectacular but important uses of airpower included 

the Arkansas National Guard’s 154th Observation Squadron air-dropping food, 

supplies, and medicine to inaccessible flood-ravaged areas on the Mississippi 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

26 27

The integration of the Guard into the Army was not without problems. 

“Haunted by recollections of the droves of unfit commanders” that Pershing 

had reassigned in World War I, during this mobilization Marshall was quick 

to relieve senior commanders who appeared to lack what was required to 

succeed. In 1940 he told the House Military Affairs Committee: “Leadership 

in the field depends to an important extent on one’s legs, and stomach, and 

nervous system, and on one’s ability to withstand hardships, and lack of sleep, 

and still be disposed energetically and aggressively to command men, to dominate men on the battlefield.” Despite cries of discrimination against the nonregulars, according to a Marshall biographer, “the percentage of field-grade 

officers retired in the National Guard was somewhat less than in the Regular 

Army.” Only one Guard division commander remained in command throughout the war: Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler, who led Ohio’s 37th Infantry Division in the Pacific theater. Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain, the only guardsman 

promoted to three-star rank, took command of the U.S. XIX Corps in October 

1944, marking the first time a nonregular had become a corps commander 

since the Civil War.15

Although Guard divisions remained intact after mobilization, as envisioned in the 1920 National Defense Act, there was a perception, as reported by later historians, that subordinate units were “ruthlessly reorganized or 

broken up,” while others underwent “wholesale reshuffling to break up local 

officer cliques.” Some of this was likely due to the ongoing reorganization of 

all Army divisions from the prewar square configuration (two brigades of two 

regiments each) to the new triangular structure (three regiments with no intervening brigade headquarters). The shuffling of Guard personnel to cross-level 

experience between units being filled with new conscripts also might have 

contributed to a feeling of dislocation after mobilization.16

Of the first 14 Army divisions to deploy overseas, 8 originated in the Guard. 

The first Army regiment to take the offensive in the Pacific, the 164th Infantry (North Dakota), part of the Guard-heavy Americal Division, fought on 

Guadalcanal beginning in October 1942 and won praise from a veteran Marine 

battalion it reinforced in the midst of a night battle. The first Guard division in 

the European theater, the 34th (Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota), 

entered combat in North Africa in November 1942. The second American division to arrive in the United Kingdom, the 29th (Maryland, Virginia, DC), was 

60 percent conscripts but still retained what one historian called “a distinctive 

Guard flavor.” It formed part of the assault waves at Normandy on 6 June 

1944, the only National Guard division to do so.17

In contrast to the outstanding performance of some Guard units, one operation in the Pacific theater illustrated the potential for unhealthy regular-reserve 

Regulars, who were badly needed in their own understrength units, now had to 

train the guardsmen. Within the next year a series of incremental mobilizations 

brought the remainder of the National Guard into federal service, but no division came onto active duty with more than two-thirds of its required manpower. 

The crisis of 1940 passed without the United States having to go to war, and by 

the summer of 1941 the Army’s strength reached 1.2 million. Of the 29 divisions 

on active duty in early 1942, 18 were National Guard. Ultimately the Guard 

had made an enormous contribution to the Army’s rapid expansion prior to the 

United States joining the conflict, providing immediately available, partially 

trained, organized divisions to supplement the regular Army. That bought time 

for divisions constituted from scratch to become combat ready. The availability 

of a large number of ROTC-trained junior officers in the Organized Reserve 

played an important role in filling out regular, Guard, and conscript divisions. In 

1941 General Marshall applauded the high quality of Army Reserve officers as 

“probably our greatest asset during this present expansion.”14

During the resource-starved 1930s, the Civilian Conservation Corps offered practical 

leadership experience for many Army Reserve officers. George C. Marshall (center), 

later the Army chief of staff, viewed the CCC favorably and acknowledged its leadership benefits. (Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

28 29

history, regular Marine Corps senior officers later indicated “that they never 

really bothered to inquire whether an officer or an enlisted man was a reservist 

or a Regular.” While draftees filled out the National Guard divisions, the units 

maintained their Guard identity (for better or worse, as the 164th Infantry Regiment and the 27th Infantry Division showed).20

The experience of the Naval Reserve was much like that of the Marine 

Corps, with mobilized reservists largely subsumed as individuals into existing regular squadrons and ships, and many of those joining during wartime 

receiving a largely meaningless reserve designation. At the opening of 1944, 

the Navy secretary observed that “nine out of ten line officers with the fleet 

were Reserves procured and trained since the outbreak of the war.” Unlike 

the Corps, however, regular Navy officers maintained a definite disdain for 

their reserve counterparts. A 1944 board reported that relationships between 

the two components were “marred by unfavorable factors that militate against 

the most effective and efficient operation of the Navy.”21

The Coast Guard made a small step toward acquiring a reserve component in 1939, when Congress enacted legislation creating the Coast Guard 

Reserve, though this actually was a nonmilitary entity described by one author 

as “comprised of volunteer boat owners and yachtsmen tasked with promoting 

seamanship and boating safety.” Two years later Congress passed an act that 

redesignated this organization as the Coast Guard Auxiliary and established 

a true Coast Guard Reserve. The entire Coast Guard fell under operational 

control of the Navy on 1 November 1941, and it remained in that status for the 

duration of the conflict. In a fashion similar to the other sea services, by the 

end of the war more than 80 percent of Coast Guard personnel were officially 

reservists, but indistinguishable from regulars in practice.22

World War II also marked the first widespread recruitment of female military personnel, all of them brought onto duty as reservists, and generally as 

part of newly created female-only components: Women’s Army Corps (WAC), 

Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) for the Navy, 

and Semper Paratus Always Ready (SPARs) for the Coast Guard. The Marine 

Corps was the sole service to treat its female reservists as a more or less integral component. The commandant, General Thomas Holcomb, told a national 

news magazine in 1944: “They are Marines. They don’t have a nickname and 

they don’t need one. They get their basic training in a Marine atmosphere at a 

Marine post. They inherit the traditions of the Marines. They are Marines.”23

In 1940–1941 the nation’s reserve components fulfilled their role, providing readily available, partially trained units and personnel to augment the 

regular forces. The president’s increase in annual training and drilling requirements in the year prior had furthered that process, but his decision was a tacit 

relationships. During June–July 1944, U.S. forces took the heavily defended Central Pacific island of Saipan from the Japanese at high cost. Marine 

Corps Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith commanded all U.S. forces on the island, 

comprised of the 2nd Marine Division, 4th Marine Division, and the Army’s 

27th Infantry Division, a Guard outfit. In a move that sparked an acrimonious 

Marine-Army dispute and garnered national attention, Holland Smith relieved 

the 27th Division’s commander, (regular) Army Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, for 

a perceived lack of aggressiveness. The Marine general’s rancorous postwar 

memoir provided an underlying rationale for his decision:

The trouble with the Twenty-seventh Division was, if I may 

coin a word, “militia-itis.” As originally mobilized, the division 

had come entirely from the New York National Guard, with 

a good record and tradition from World War I. Much of its 

leadership . . . stemmed from a gentlemen’s club known as the 

Seventh Regiment, traditionally New York’s “silk stocking” 

outfit, and likewise a worthy unit, per se, with an impeccable 

reputation for annual balls, banquets and shipshape summer 

camps. . . . Any division, however, springing from such sources 

and maintained intact after mobilization, contains the entangled 

roots of home town loyalties, ambitions and intrigues. . .and 

behind all there was Albany, where the State Adjutant General’s 

office allocated peacetime plums.18

Perhaps drawing on Marine Corps practice regarding its own reserve forces, 

General Smith argued that it would have been better “to disband the division 

after mobilization.” Smith’s conviction that “home town loyalties” acted like 

“barnacles on the hull” to decrease combat effectiveness may have had some 

merit, but it also flew in the face of the widespread view that unit cohesiveness, 

resulting from personnel serving together for extended periods, made units 

stronger and more effective.19

The Marine Corps Reserve, in contrast, did not have a state-centered component, was proportionately much smaller in numbers relative to the regulars, 

and was broken up upon mobilization and used to fill out existing active units. 

According to one Marine brigadier general, those reservists mobilized in 1940 

“quickly lost their . . . identities as Reserves, becoming indistinguishable from 

the career Marines with whom they trained side by side.” Although 68 percent 

of the half million men and women who ultimately joined the Corps during 

the war were officially designated as reservists, this status had no practical 

meaning. A wartime reservist went through the same training as someone who 

joined with a regular designation. That explained why, according to a reserve 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

30 31

for citizen-soldiers to “rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can 

definitely qualify.”26

While Palmer’s plan—both in 1919 and 25 years later—at first blush 

seemed to presage a bigger role for the Guard, guardsmen had reason to be 

skeptical based on their experience during World War II. During mobilization 

the Army publicly portrayed the National Guard in a poor light. Likewise, the 

regulars had removed senior Guard leaders for unfitness and placed restrictive 

age brackets on officer grades that appeared to many a contrivance to make 

room for younger regular officers at the Guard’s expense. Moreover, the Army 

relegated the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to an inconsequential wartime 

role despite the 1920 statutory requirement that the Guard participate in the 

development of War Department policies affecting its component.27

Concerned that the War Department was planning to reduce the Guard to 

insignificance, the National Guard Association president, Maj. Gen. Ellard A. 

Walsh, held a series of meetings in 1944 between the NGA and the department. George Marshall, who had served in the mid-1930s as a senior instructor with the Illinois National Guard, understood both the Guard’s merits and 

its challenges. Perhaps recalling the understrength Guard divisions mobilized 

after the fall of France and the small size of the enlisted Organized Reserve, 

he believed that only with UMT “can full vigor and life be instilled into the 

Reserve system.” Walsh and the NGA told the War Department that the price 

of their support for a UMT plan was a renewed commitment to the NGA’s 

historic goals—that the Guard remain the preferred reserve component and 

maintain its dual state-federal status. The NGA’s persistence paid off when the 

War Department, unwilling to risk its preferred postwar plan should the Guard 

fuel a congressional battle, officially supported retaining the National Guard as 

“an integral part and a first line Reserve component” of the armed forces. Once 

again the Guard emerged with the upper hand in a political wrestling match 

with the regular Army.28

The National Guard proved equally adept in protecting and enhancing its 

role in the aviation realm. The Army Air Forces (AAF) argued that future conflicts would likely be destructive, short-lived affairs settled by aviation—a 

position reinforced by the use of atomic weapons against Japan—and therefore the AAF should become an independent service. Army aviation leaders 

believed that a million-member active-duty air component would be the 

primary guarantor of national security, and they relegated the Guard contribution to antiaircraft artillery units. Walsh and the NGA’s political pressure 

led a reluctant AAF to change its plans considerably, however. In October 

1945 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson committed to both a federal entity 

(which would become the Air Force Reserve, or AFRES, as part of the creation 

acknowledgment that guardsmen and reservists in the modern era required 

more training before they could be expected to go to war. The effective service 

of thousands of reserve junior officers, mostly ROTC, validated officer acquisition policies put in place from 1916 to 1920. The need to flesh out mobilized 

units with large numbers of conscripts and the debate over maintaining cohesiveness versus breaking up units to avoid hometown loyalties made clear that 

the nation had yet to determine how best to handle the makeup of citizen-soldier units. Later generations would continue to grapple with these issues.

Postwar Challenges 

When the conflict ended, President Harry S. Truman presided over the demobilization of nearly 12 million uniformed personnel. In his memoirs, he 

opined, “Once hostilities are over, Americans are . . . spontaneous and . . . 

headlong in their eagerness to return to civilian life. No people in history have 

been known to disengage themselves so quickly from the ways of war.” At a 

press conference in April 1946 he noted that seven million soldiers had already 

been discharged, calling it “the most remarkable demobilization in the history 

of the world, or ‘disintegration,’ if you want to call it that.”24

Amidst the demobilization, Truman recognized the need to maintain military capability as tensions ratcheted up with the Soviets, and he saw the 

reserve component as an inexpensive way to accomplish that. Ever since his 

experience in the National Guard during World War I, he saw “a prepared 

soldier-citizenry” as an alternative to a large standing army. In August 1945 

the president proposed “a system of universal training during peacetime which 

would provide this country with a well-trained and effectively organized citizen 

reserve to reinforce the professional armed forces in times of danger.” As an 

added benefit, he wanted a program that included “self-improvement” features 

that would foster “the moral and spiritual welfare of our young people.”25

Truman’s plan envisioned a small professional Army, Navy, and Marine 

Corps; a larger National Guard and reserve of trained units; and “a General 

Reserve composed of all the male citizens of the United States who had received training.” In effect, it was a return to the nation’s early reliance on the 

“every citizen a soldier” ideal. His plan also harked back a generation earlier to 

John McAuley Palmer. In fact, Marshall had recalled Palmer to active duty at 

the start of World War II to plan the postwar military. By 1944 Palmer favored 

a program of universal military training (UMT), which he thought was the 

only means of supplying adequate numbers of partially trained citizen-soldiers 

to meet future national emergencies. In contrast to a more militaristic system 

dominated by professional officers, he believed there should be opportunities 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

32 33

thermore, the act facilitated the president’s access to the reserves, authorizing 

him to order reservists to active duty without their consent for up to 21 months 

without a declaration of war or national emergency. Thus, the 1948 law provided an early instance of presidential call-up authority that presaged by three 

decades the option later known as the presidential reserve call-up (PRC).31

In opting for a new selective service act, Congress rejected the universal 

training system championed by the president and the Army. Despite losing 

out on universal military training, the Army did improve its reserve system by 

merging the separate officer and enlisted reserve pools into a single Organized 

Reserve Corps. With a massive number of wartime veterans available, the 

Army planned for 25 divisions in the Organized Reserve, but funding was so 

scarce that there was no unit training until fiscal year (FY) 1949. Nearly simultaneously, legislation in 1948 authorized members of all reserve components 

to earn retirement points by participating in peacetime training. Personnel who 

accrued the minimum number of points for 20 or more years would be eligible 

for retirement pay at the age of 60, thus providing an additional incentive for 

recruitment and retention in the reserve components. Finally, congressional 

action authorized peacetime career opportunities for women, mainly as nurses 

and medical and administration specialists in the regular Army and the Organized Reserve.32

The postwar policy changes that spurred recruiting and retention, coupled 

with the large number of wartime veterans maintained on the rolls of the reserves, provided an apparent strength in numbers that the reserve component 

badly needed. The Army National Guard, for instance, experienced unprecedented growth in 1948. But that masked an ongoing problem. In a continuation 

of prewar practice, new reservists and guardsmen joined their units without 

any initial training, such as boot camp or an advanced-skill program, relying 

instead upon on-the-job training at the local unit. Since that training came at 

the rate of one evening a week and two weeks each summer, it was a long, 

slow process to acquire basic military skills. Meanwhile most of the veterans 

did not affiliate with a unit and therefore participated in little or no training, 

so their hard-won skills slowly perished as time passed. The long lead-up to 

World War II had enabled the reserve components to mobilize and prepare 

well before they had to go into combat. The next conflict would not provide 

the same luxury.

The Gray Board 

In late 1947 Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, frustrated by the 

“open schism between the National Guard and the Organized Reserve” and 

of the Air Force in 1947) and the state-federal Air National Guard (ANG). 

Moreover, the ANG would be the main source of reserve combat-ready air 

units, giving it a greater role than the AFRES, initially characterized by one 

Air Force general as “a stew-pot, composed of leftovers not included in either 

the Regulars or Air National Guard.” The Air Guard would have a defensive 

orientation, though, in keeping with the militia tradition, and consist mainly 

of fighter, aircraft control and warning, and antiaircraft artillery units. By mid1949 all the authorized ANG units had attained federal recognition, and most 

were fully manned.29

Like the Guard, the AFRES faced the old question of reserve unit integrity 

during mobilization. While the AFRES was organized into units for training 

and administrative control, the Air Force intended that mobilized reservists 

would become individual replacements for Air Force and Air National Guard 

units. Acknowledging that this policy might negatively impact recruiting and 

retention, Air Force leaders concealed these plans from reservists. When mobilization came in 1950, many reservists were outraged when their units were 

broken up and they were reassigned. In the meantime, the Air Force placed a 

low priority on funding the traditional 15-day summer training since they had 

no intention of employing the units as such.30

Meanwhile, larger changes in defense policy took place, manifested initially in the National Security Act of 1947. Following nearly two years of political 

controversy surrounding defense reorganization, the law created a National 

Military Establishment (soon to be reorganized as the Department of Defense), 

headed by a secretary of defense. The new entity took control of the Navy Department and the former War Department, now separated into Army and Air 

Force Departments. Although this consolidation did not immediately impact 

the reserves, it laid the ground work for greater centralization of policy for the 

disparate reserve components.

The president and Congress allowed the wartime Selective Training and 

Service Act to expire in March 1947, a time when postwar manning appeared 

adequate to peacetime needs. One year later the intensifying Cold War propelled passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948. The president signed it on 

24 June 1948, the day the Soviet Union closed Berlin’s ground transportation 

routes to the West. The law required male citizens between 18 and 26 years to 

register for the draft, with induction beginning at age 19. Those picked would 

serve on active duty for 21 months, followed by five years in a nondrilling 

reserve component or three years in a drilling unit of either the National Guard 

or Organized Reserve. The legislation encouraged enlistment in the Guard by 

those younger than 181⁄2 years by offering them deferment from induction in 

some situations as long as they satisfactorily participated in unit training. Fur-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

34 35

were generally unsuitable for state missions, the board recommended the 

Air National Guard and the Air Reserve be combined under the designation 

“The United States Air Force Reserve.”34

To an impressive degree the Gray Board achieved its desired scope, objectivity, and impartiality, and its results deserved careful consideration. Its 

perspective was clearly Palmerian rather than Uptonian, since it accepted that 

even if it was “financially feasible for us to maintain in peacetime a regular 

establishment adequate by itself to defend the nation—and it is not—American tradition would forbid it.” The board viewed the nation’s reliance upon 

citizen-soldiers not as a necessary evil but as a positive aspect of American 

culture. At the same time the board took a realistic position concerning the 

state of military preparedness in 1948: “The impression that these [reserve] 

forces now contain elements which are ready for combat is a dangerous illusion.” The board acknowledged that the Guard had been “extremely valuable 

for mobilization purposes” but pointed out that oceans and allies could no 

longer provide a cushion of several months or more to prepare for combat 

operations. This led directly to two recommendations: federal control of the 

National Guard to ensure it could perform as a “modern Federal striking force” 

and provision for “pretrained personnel” in the reserve forces.35

The board concluded that direct federal control of the Guard was the only 

way to properly “combine authority with responsibility.” As the law plainly 

stated, the National Guard was unavailable for a federal mission unless Congress declared a state of national emergency. Even then, the transfer of “property and equipment from the States to the Federal Government” would consume 

valuable time in a mobilization scenario. The board believed these delays were 

contrary to the rapid mobilization that modern warfare required. The board 

included a letter from John McAuley Palmer arguing that in order to be “fully 

effective,” any Army reserve component must be organized under the Constitution’s clause “to raise and support armies.” The militia clauses, in contrast, 

assigned states the responsibility for organizing and training such forces and 

for selecting their officers, thereby denying the “national war-making power” 

the requisite authority to prepare reserve forces to meet national security missions. Palmer therefore viewed the National Guard’s status as “fundamentally unsound.” The Air Force, displeased with maintaining separate state and 

federal reserve components, agreed with Gray and Palmer.36

With regard to pretrained personnel, the board reminded its audience that 

the nation had always relied upon a small professional force backed up by a 

partially trained citizen-soldiery. However, “the supply of trained citizens has 

never been assured,” the board stated with candor. In the postwar era only a 

“continuous flow of pretrained personnel” would ensure reserve forces were 

the fact that “the reserve forces and the regular services were continually 

engaged in the criticism of one another” formed the Committee on Civilian 

Components (as reserve forces were then known). Chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, it conducted “a comprehensive, objective 

and impartial study” of the role of reserve components in the newly unified 

military. The postwar reserve programs had many critics, including the reservists themselves, who saw limited opportunities, uncertainty about their 

place in the new defense establishment, and a lack of information. The Gray 

Board reviewed appropriate missions and functions; size, composition, and 

organization; standardization of policies and practices; and the joint use of 

facilities (such as armories). The panel completed its report in June 1948.33

The board’s most significant and sweeping conclusion fell under the 

heading: “National Security Requires That All Services Each Have One 

Federal Reserve Force.” It called for the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps to be merged under the designation “The National Guard of the United States,” which the board thought would assuage 

Guard concerns about the merger. Because Air National Guard units 

lacked the lengthy history and traditions of the Army Guard, the ANG 

was much smaller relative to the Air Force Reserve, and modern aircraft 

Named for Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray (left), the 1948 Gray Board 

produced a comprehensive review of the role of the reserve components in the National 

Military Establishment, foreshadowing the policy of periodic operational deployments 

of Guard and reserve forces. (Source: National Archives)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

36 37

undermanned and underprepared. The fate of the Gray Board’s recommendations only served to illustrate that any significant change in policy had to pass 

muster with the Guard and its allies in Congress if it was to have any hope of 

becoming reality.39

The anemic state of the reserve forces led President Truman to issue an 

executive order on 15 October 1948 that required the secretary of defense to 

“proceed without delay” in bringing the reserve components to full strength 

and to “establish vigorous and progressive programs of appropriate instruction 

and training.” He required a report of progress from the secretary within 60 

days and urged every citizen to do their “utmost in aiding the development of 

effective reserve components.” The need for action and further policy review 

led in September 1949 to Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson establishing 

a standing Civilian Components Policy Board to advise him on reserve issues. 

Chaired by a civilian from outside the government and composed of an under 

or assistant secretary, a regular officer from each military department, and 

two reserve officers from each reserve component, its purpose was to provide 

advice to the secretary of defense, develop unified policy, and coordinate the 

activities of the various reserve elements. Each military department in turn 

established a similar board to assist the service secretaries in overseeing their 

reserve components. The Gray Board’s report served as the starting point 

for the new board. In May 1950 the first chairman summarized the state of 

the reserve forces: “Despite the fact that the civilian components are at their 

greatest peacetime strength in history, it is obvious from the many problems 

to which I have alluded that much remains to be done to bring them to the 

minimum strength and state of readiness essential to meet their assigned mobilization missions.”40

The Korean Conflict

In late June 1950 North Korea invaded its southern neighbor and provided 

a catalyst for American rearmament. After the start of World War II in 1939 

the United States had more than two years to prepare for its entry into combat, 

but the Korean conflict took the United States completely by surprise. The 

president quickly committed a woefully unprepared U.S. force to defend the 

Republic of Korea and to repel the North’s Soviet-equipped forces. On 19 

July 1950 Truman announced a partial mobilization of the National Guard and 

Organized Reserve for a period up to 21 months. In the next few weeks the 

Pentagon federalized four National Guard infantry divisions: the 40th (California), 45th (Oklahoma), 28th (Pennsylvania), and 43rd (Connecticut, Rhode 

Island, Vermont). The 40th and 45th divisions had no more than half their 

ready to carry out their missions. The Gray Board was skeptical about the 

1948 selective service law allowing “untrained young men to join the National 

Guard,” since they had little military value. Worse, their presence inflated 

numbers and produced an illusion of greater defense preparedness than was 

in fact the case. A better option was to rotate reserve units and personnel on 

active duty “for substantial periods of time.” Thus, the board advocated an 

early version of the reserve rotational policy embodied in the Army Force 

Generation plan some 50 years later.37

One of the board’s most insightful conclusions was that federal control of 

the Guard would not detract from the local nature of Guard units, nor from 

local support, loyalty, and pride. It perceived that reserve units were inherently 

local and therefore would not be damaged in terms of support and loyalty by 

federal instead of state affiliation. Preserving that local identity constituted 

“a matter of great concern to the federal authority,” because of the important values such as cohesion and morale “inherent in this identity.” But board 

members believed that most guardsmen were primarily motivated to serve 

the nation, rather than their home states, dating back at least to the late 19th 

century when NGA leaders sought to ensure the Guard’s primary role in national security. The guardsman’s “pride in service attaches to the position and 

prestige which that service gives him in his home community rather than to his 

military relation to the State.” Thus, “the deep roots of the Guard units . . . and 

the spirit and pride which come of these things” would continue even with a 

shift from state to federal control.38

The Gray Board’s most far-reaching suggestion—merging the National Guard into a federal-only Army reserve force—struck at the heart of the 

Guard’s affiliations and its source of political power in the states. President 

Truman, well aware that the report was “filled with political dynamite and 

during a Presidential campaign can defeat its own purpose,” did not support 

the recommendation. Guard leaders also appealed to Congress, which rejected 

the proposed merger. While the board did not change the status quo, it had 

identified and judiciously addressed the basic manpower problem faced by 

the United States. For too long the nation had relied on a small regular military establishment supplemented by partially trained reservists, but national 

policy had never ensured that the reserve was large enough or well enough 

trained. The nearly concurrent 1948 Selective Service Act highlighted the 

problem, as the incentives it put into place did not lead to as large a surge in 

reserve enlistments as expected. A combination of war-weariness, confidence 

in the U.S. atomic monopoly, the Truman administration’s commitment to 

balanced budgets and small defense outlays, and the resulting low odds of a 

young man being drafted all conspired to render the nation’s reserve forces 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

38 39

status. Not surprisingly, in November 1950 the commander of Fleet Air Japan 

reported: “Almost without exception, Reserves proved to be conscientious 

and properly motivated, but lacking in technical skill and knowledge which 

only continuous naval duty can give.” The Marine Corps Reserve fared only 

somewhat better. While the Corps strongly supported the reserve program with 

high-quality regulars in key positions and an emphasis on regular assistance 

to reserve summer training, and while the reserve had a very high proportion 

of World War II veterans, young men who joined units in the late 1940s still 

did not undergo any training other than that gained on the job during drills and 

two weeks each summer. In July, when General Douglas MacArthur requested 

a Marine division in Korea, the Corps relied heavily on activated reservists 

to bring the 1st Marine Division to fighting strength. In a matter of days the 

Corps segregated out those who had less than a year in the reserves and had 

not attended summer training and assigned the remaining individuals to fill 

out regular units. But even so, that meant some reservists with as little as two 

weeks of active duty and less than a hundred hours of drill time were heading 

off to combat. At the time of the Inchon landing in September 1950 reservists made up 20 percent of the division, a proportion that rose to 50 percent 

during the first half of 1951, as reservists initially constituted the lion’s share 

of combat replacements. By that time also, Navy and Marine Corps reserve 

pilots were flying up to one-third of the combat sorties over Korea.44

The war in Korea did not require a total mobilization, which raised the 

issue of which reserve component units and individuals would bear the cost 

of combat duty. From the Pentagon’s standpoint it made sense to call up large 

numbers of nondrilling reservists, mostly World War II veterans, to flesh out 

regular units for early deployment to the conflict, while simultaneously leaving 

untouched numerous reserve component units, supposedly the most-ready elements, to serve as a strategic reserve in case a wider conflict erupted with 

the Soviet Union. While the result was not equitable for those who already 

had fought one war for their country, Secretary of Defense George Marshall 

believed that “there was no alternative to this procedure.” By the time an armistice halted the Korean War in July 1953, the U.S. Army had brought more 

than 2.8 million personnel onto active duty. But due to the administration’s 

decision to rely heavily on draftees, only one-third of Army guardsmen had 

been activated and they accounted for only about 5 percent of that total.45

In contrast to the Army Guard, approximately 80 percent of the Air National Guard was federalized for Korea. Prior to the war, the ANG, in the words of 

Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., was arguably “little more than a flying club,” 

in large part a consequence of the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF’s) inability to deal 

successfully with the state-controlled nature of the ANG during peacetime, an 

authorized strength, which required a large infusion of conscripts and considerable training to achieve combat readiness. That was emblematic of the 

overall unpreparedness of the reserves. The first Guard unit to join the fight, 

the Arkansas National Guard’s 936th Field Artillery Battalion, did not arrive 

in Korea until February 1951. By the time the 40th and 45th divisions joined 

the fighting in early 1952, the guardsmen who had come onto active duty with 

those organizations were already nearing the end of their 21-month commitment, leading to personnel turbulence and a loss of unit cohesion. In late 1951 

the 28th and 43rd divisions deployed to Germany to defend against any potential Soviet incursion and suffered a similar loss of mobilized personnel.41

 Following a series of setbacks for the UN forces early in the war, the 

September 1950 Inchon landing and follow-on operations into North Korea 

offered hope for a quick victory and eased concerns about the state of U.S. 

preparedness. But after communist China entered the war in November and 

gravely threatened allied forces, Truman declared a state of national emergency and announced an increase in the armed forces from 1.5 million to 3.5 

million. This buildup also addressed the recognized need to strengthen the 

American commitment to defend Western Europe against a potential Soviet 

invasion. Although the United States relied heavily on draftees to meet manpower needs, in January 1952 it federalized four more National Guard divisions. They remained stateside for training, providing a source of replacements 

for units overseas and serving as part of the strategic reserve.42

At the start of fighting in Korea, the Army’s Organized Reserve Corps consisted of nearly 510,000 officers and enlisted, but fewer than 190,000 participated in paid drills. In the immediate crisis of 1950, the Army called a 

significant portion of the Organized Reserve to active duty, including 400 units 

that reported by the end of August. Many of those recalled as individuals were 

World War II veterans who had not received training, pay, or other benefits 

since 1945; many of them felt it was unfair that they were being activated 

when many units did not receive orders. Such inequities aside, more than 

200,000 Organized Reserve personnel served on active duty, most of them in 

1950 and 1951. Even some of those not recalled were affected, as employers 

were wary of hiring men who might suddenly receive orders. In late 1950 

a member of the Civilian Components Policy Board declared that reservists 

found themselves “unduly penalized [financially] in time of limited mobilization,” an issue that would continue to resurface in the future.43

The Naval Reserve was in the same boat as the Army. In June 1950 it had 

a paper strength of 1.1 million, but only one in six drilled with a unit. By the 

end of August 53,000 naval reservists were on active duty. By June 1951 the 

total was 182,000, but a majority of them came from a nondrilling reserve 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

40 41

the ongoing conflict made its implementation untimely, and he submitted a 

bill reflecting that thinking in January 1951. Congress passed the Universal 

Military Training and Service Act in June, but it was universal in name only. 

By authorizing a commission to develop the details of a National Security 

Training Corps and submit implementing legislation to Congress, it essentially 

called for a plan for UMT that Congress would decide on later. In practice, the 

act amended the 1948 selective service law to extend the service of draftees 

(still only a portion of all males ages 18 to 26) to two years on active duty 

and an additional six years in a reserve component. It also set the permanent 

ceiling of the armed forces at just over two million but allowed a waiver for the 

ongoing conflict for up to five million members. The actual wartime peak in 

manpower came in April 1952 with nearly 3.7 million personnel in uniform.49

The mobilizations, mainly in the first year of the Korean conflict, included 

about 640,000 World War II veterans, many of them drawn from unpaid, nondrilling status. As Secretary Marshall noted in September 1951, “providing 

as quickly as possible combat-ready reinforcements for the forces fighting in 

the Far East . . . could be accomplished only by extensive calls for additional 

service from the veterans of World War II.” Their availability considerably 

ameliorated the consequences of the nation’s inadequate reserve system in 

1950. While many had not had any military training in five years, the weapons 

and tactics used in Korea varied little from those they had employed in the 

previous war. Their proven combat experience offset the lack of recent training and allowed them to assimilate quickly into units heading off to war. As a 

result, the nation’s reserve system appeared better than it was. But the United 

States could not depend on having a similar large pool of recent veterans available for the next conflict.50

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952

The early employment of reservists in combat in Korea highlighted the concerns raised by the Gray Board. In January 1951 Representative Carl Vinson, 

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, directed the Department of 

Defense (DoD) to draft a bill that would replace the myriad laws that governed 

the reserve components with a single act that would “assure the maintenance 

of a strong and vigorous Reserve force.” The task of writing the legislation fell 

to the newly renamed Reserve Forces Policy Board, or RFPB (formerly the 

Civilian Components Policy Board). Congress took up the proposal in June 

1951, greatly amended it based on extensive input from guardsmen, reservists, 

and other interested parties, and finally passed it as the Armed Forces Reserve 

Act of 1952. President Truman signed it into law in July 1952.51

issue the Gray Board had highlighted. Given the Air Guard’s problems, it was 

no surprise when the regular Air Force found most of the earliest mobilized 

units were, according to one officer, “not in a position to do what is expected.” Most units were broken up and their personnel used to fill out regular 

outfits, leading the NGA’s Walsh to accuse the Air Force of “cannibalizing” 

the Air Guard. But the conflict forced a reversal of the steadily deteriorating 

relationship between the Air Guard and the Air Force, and the former’s capabilities steadily increased. Thus, the Korean War represented a watershed 

for the dual-status air reserve component, especially in terms of manpower 

strength and appropriations.46

As for the Air Force Reserve, nearly all its combat and support units were 

mobilized during the Korean conflict, about three-fourths during the first year. 

Although the National Defense Act of 1916 required the National Guard to be 

the first-called reserve component when a crisis required the expansion of the 

armed forces, in 1950 the AFRES was mobilized prior to the ANG. In addition 

to the Air Guard’s lack of combat readiness, two other factors played a part. 

The Far East Air Forces primarily needed specific capabilities such as troop 

carrier and bombardment aircrews that were generally resident in the Air Force 

Reserve. In addition, the Pentagon wanted to maintain Guard units in strategic 

reserve for a European contingency. In the end, the requirements of the situation overrode the dictates of law.47

In response to considerable disgruntlement with the initial calls to active 

duty, in October 1950 Secretary Marshall appointed a board “to recommend 

policies to eliminate any uncertainties and inequities that have arisen under 

[the] present system.” In the interim, he directed the service secretaries to 

publish policies for their respective components that would, “insofar as military conditions permit,” give a reservist at least 30 days from notification until 

his reporting date. In addition, the services should determine their manpower 

requirements six months in advance, to provide even greater notification to 

reservists than the minimum 30 days.48

Since 1945 the president and defense leaders had favored universal military training as the only economical means to maintain adequate military 

preparedness. But the hostilities in Korea and consequent mobilization convinced President Truman it was inadvisable to pursue the measure at that time. 

The services, in particular the Army, were already fully engaged in training 

draftees and activated reservists and guardsmen while establishing new units 

for an expanding force. Training, housing, and equipping an even larger pool 

of recruits brought in under a UMT program, only to send them back to civilian life after six months, was more than the nation could afford in the midst 

of fighting a war. Still, Truman favored the policy in the long term even if 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 2: 1919 – 1953

42 43

scrutiny of reservists.” Reservists agreeing to extended active duty would now 

receive written contracts that guaranteed separation pay if they were released 

from duty earlier than expected. For a host of reasons, then, the Armed Forces 

Reserve Act of 1952—the most comprehensive legislation ever enacted for the 

reserve component—has been considered the reserves’ Magna Carta.53

Despite the act’s substantial improvements, it fell short in terms of mobilization policy, both in the critical matter of providing greater fairness for veterans during future recalls, and in providing sufficient and immediately available 

combat power. Assistant Secretary Rosenberg had testified before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee that the eventual adoption of UMT would prevent 

“the recurrence of past inequities where veterans were called back to service 

to meet an emergency while there were still young men in the community 

who had never served at all.” But, she noted, “It has been virtually impossible 

to get enough men—trained or untrained—to fill out our Guard and Reserve 

units. The lack of previous training in military skills and military habits has 

proved an almost insuperable handicap.” The NGA’s Walsh thought the failure 

to implement meaningful universal military training rendered the law “a delusion” from which “the awakening would be bitter indeed.” Supporters of 

UMT argued that it alone would provide the trained manpower needed to fill 

the reserve establishment. Without it, the nation would be forced to repeatedly 

call veterans back to the colors as it had for Korea and to draft others to fill the 

remaining need, with a consequent bulge in the training establishment at a time 

when a regular force rushing off to war was least able to handle it. Moreover, 

as leaders and mobilization planners had realized increasingly since 1900, it 

took considerable time to turn raw manpower into an integral part of units 

that could fight on the modern battlefield. Nevertheless, for the time being 

the nation would continue to rely on a reserve force that had too little trained 

manpower and relied too heavily on veterans as its source of immediately employable combat power.54

The 1952 act did provide at least limited protection for veterans by establishing three categories of reservists: Ready, Retired, and Standby. The Ready 

Reserve’s authorized ceiling was 1.5 million and consisted of “those units or 

members of the reserve components, or both, who are liable for active duty 

either in time of war, in time of national emergency declared by the Congress 

or proclaimed by the President, or when otherwise authorized by law.” The 

language governing the Standby Reserve omitted the phrase “or proclaimed 

by the President,” thus requiring congressional action to place those personnel 

on active duty against their will. In addition, to access the Standby Reserve 

for active duty the secretary of defense had to certify that the needed capability was not available in the Ready Reserve. Thus a veteran could elect to 

The act achieved several worthwhile goals. It consolidated the various 

statutes and regulations affecting the reserve components and provided increased standardization respecting the composition, duties, and regulation 

of the reserves. It recognized seven reserve components: the National Guard 

of the United States, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, 

Air National Guard of the United States, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard 

Reserve. Most important, it enhanced the role and influence of the reserves in 

defense planning in three ways. It codified the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 

making it “the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters 

pertaining to the reserve components.” It directed that an assistant secretary 

of defense would have “principal responsibility for all Reserve affairs,” with 

that portfolio initially going to Anna M. Rosenberg, the assistant secretary of 

defense for manpower and personnel. It required that each service assign a 

general or flag officer responsible for reserve affairs, with direct access to the 

service chief, and that reserve officers on active duty be assigned to the service 

staff “to assist and participate in the preparation and administration of all policies and regulations affecting their reserve component.”52

The act also provided individual reservists with assurances and benefits 

they had sought for years. Primary among these was a more equitable promotion system, so that reservists would be promoted at roughly the same time as 

their regular counterparts. The law made reserve officer appointments indefinite, thereby removing what one historian called “the stigma of probationary 

Following the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Anna M. Rosenberg became the 

Pentagon official with principal responsibility for all reserve affairs; she was concerned 

that veterans continued to bear the burden of reserve component mobilizations. 

(Source: OSD/HO)
Forging a Total Force

44

serve his time in the Standby Reserve, where the odds of being activated were 

somewhat lower. The Retired Reserve was made up of personnel under age 

60 who had retired from reserve duty but who could be recalled under limited 

circumstances (such as a declaration of war or a national emergency) and only 

by an act of Congress.55

_______ Conclusion _______

Between the end of World War I and the armistice in Korea, the nation 

continued to rely upon a small regular military establishment backed up by 

a partially trained National Guard and federal-only reserve that was expected to hold the line in an emergency before large numbers of draftees could 

be formed into new units and take the field. Although hindered by extremely 

limited funding during most peacetime years, the reserves gradually improved 

in terms of training and professionalism. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 

1952 offered for the first time a comprehensive approach to planning, administration, management, and regulation of the reserve component. But despite the 

wake-up call sounded by the hasty mobilization for Korea, the perennial concerns over reserve unit integrity and the need for better-trained manpower in a 

national emergency remained unresolved. Faced with the choice of returning 

to the historic ideal of every male citizen being a soldier, a solution that would 

have at least provided sufficient numbers in the reserve components, Congress 

balked. That idea, long discarded in practice, would never again resurface for 

serious consideration. 
47

_______ CHAPTER 3 _______

Toward a War-Ready Reserve Component,

1954–1989

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 had failed to settle a number of lingering questions, and the role of the reserves continued to be defined more 

by circumstance than by broad vision. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision 

not to mobilize the reserves for Vietnam struck an unintended but devastating blow, though the establishment in 1967 of the Selected Reserve laid the 

groundwork for a better future. The end of the draft and transition to an all-volunteer force in the 1970s wrought further havoc upon the reserves. The defense 

buildup in the 1980s finally placed the Selected Reserve on solid footing in 

terms of manpower, pay, benefits, family and employer issues, training, and 

equipping—improvements that came just in time as the new presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC) authority made it far more likely than before that 

the reserves would be activated for frequent operational commitments.

The New Look and New Initiatives

President Dwight D. Eisenhower came to office in 1953 with the goal of 

balancing the nation’s security and economic health. To reduce the cost of the 

Cold War, he advanced the New Look strategy—a heavy reliance on air-delivered nuclear weapons to deter war and on allies to defend themselves, backed 

by much smaller and less expensive American active-duty conventional forces 

and even cheaper but larger reserve elements. In early 1953 Eisenhower’s 

defense secretary, Charles E. Wilson, declared that “the Reserve forces must 

become more than ever an integral component of national defense to supplement the Armed Forces on short notice.”1

The difficulty was that the reserve components were not appreciably more 

ready than they had been in 1950. While they had proven sufficient to augment 

the regulars in a limited war, primarily due to the availability of World War II 

veterans, they were ill-prepared to meet the demands of a global conflict that 

would require mobilization of the entire reserve—a problem that would grow 

worse over time as the proportion of combat veterans began to decline. The 

1952 law had not provided an enforcement mechanism or higher drill pay to 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

48 49

reserves needed to bring in young men directly, since relying too heavily on 

the prior-service pipeline resulted in an older force; less than 17 percent of the 

men in the Army Reserve were younger than 24. Army Chief of Staff General 

Matthew B. Ridgway thought that the combination of increasing prior-service 

participation in the Ready Reserve and requiring initial entry training for direct 

enlistees would shorten the time needed to get activated reserve units into 

combat from 10 months to 5.4

In January 1955 Eisenhower asked Congress to pass legislation incorporating much of the work of Flemming’s task force. The president pointed out the 

nation’s recurring failure to maintain in peacetime a “proper military posture,” 

with the cost of the resulting lack of readiness “manifold—in treasure, in 

blood, in the heartbreak of a mighty nation buying time with the lives of 

men.” In keeping with the New Look, he argued that “active military forces 

are only the cutting edge of our nation’s full strength. A vigorous economy, 

a strong mobilization base and trained citizens are the invincible elements in 

our military striking power.” Congress ultimately agreed in part, and incorporated many of the administration’s proposals in the Reserve Forces Act of 

1955. The law authorized the enlistment of men between 17 and 181⁄2 years 

old directly into the reserves for a period of eight years, with a required 

period of initial active duty for training of between three and six months (in 

practice generally the latter). It also extended the draft to 1959 and made 

reservists who failed to participate satisfactorily in unit training subject to 

induction. Finally, it increased the authorized strength of the Ready Reserve 

(all services) from 1.5 million to 2.9 million and authorized the president 

to call as many as one million ready reservists to active duty whenever he 

declared a national emergency. With the extension of the draft, many leaders 

anticipated significantly increased enlistments to follow, but such hopes 

went unrealized.5

As with previous reserve legislation, the 1955 law fell short of what many 

proponents had envisioned. Eisenhower was disappointed particularly in the 

law’s failure to ensure “a hard core of prior service personnel to the National 

Guard” by not making available the same incentives for men leaving active 

duty to join the Guard as they had to join a federal Ready Reserve component. In addition, direct enlistees in the Guard had no obligation to undergo 

basic training beyond that conducted by their unit. The failure to include the 

Guard in major provisions of the law largely resulted from a dispute over a 

proposal to require racial desegregation of the state forces. There was a spur 

for new Guard enlistees to volunteer for basic training, as they would not be 

drafted if they completed at least three months of active-duty training. The 

positive impact of that provision was limited, however, because the training 

ensure active participation in the units of the Ready Reserve. Consequently, 

in the two years following its enactment few young men leaving active duty 

with reserve obligations chose drill-pay status. In mid-1955 there were 2.8 

million ready reservists on the rolls, but only about 28 percent participated in 

paid drills; most of the remainder were inactive members deemed of limited 

military value. In the Army Reserve, of 1.53 million in the Ready Reserve, 

barely 10 percent served in a drilling unit. A congressional report noted that 

“the Ready Reserve, while increasing in size, has not attained the degree of 

organization or training required for its mobilization role.” Another report concluded that the number of personnel on the rolls “was in nowise a measure of 

the military strength of the Ready Reserve.” Simply put, the reserves were not 

ready for war.2

The significant mobilization problems during the Korean War and the increasing importance of the reserve in defense strategy galvanized Washington to undertake studies that would lead to additional legislation. Arthur S. 

Flemming, the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, led one review 

and reported his findings to President Eisenhower in January 1954. Flemming 

acknowledged that the United States lacked “reserve forces adequately organized and trained” to meet its security needs. He noted the need for an “immediately callable reserve” and a “selectively callable reserve,” which equated 

to the 1952 law’s Ready and Standby categories. But he emphasized that the 

Ready Reserve had to be “instantly available” and capable of high “military 

competence.” While personnel leaving active duty with reserve obligations 

provided the level of experience needed, if the number of such men continued 

to fall short of requirements, he proposed drafting men for service in the reserves, beginning with a period of active duty so they could “be given initial 

intensive training for reserve service.”3

In January 1954 the president directed Flemming to brief the National Security Council, which, along with the Defense Mobilization Office and 

the Defense Department, developed a plan outlining the nation’s reserve requirements. They agreed with Flemming’s position that the reserves should 

form around “a substantial proportion of prior-service personnel” who had 

the requisite level of training. To achieve that goal, they believed that the requirement for draftees to serve six years in the reserves after their initial two 

years of active duty should include forced participation in a unit of the Ready 

Reserve. Equally important, they concluded that “Service prescribed initial 

training is necessary for all nonprior service personnel entering” the reserves. 

That would solve the problem of direct enlistees in the reserves receiving only 

on-the-job training. To spur such enlistments, they recommended exempting 

reservists from being drafted as long as they participated satisfactorily. The 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

50 51

their units. The Air Force followed the lead of the Army in 1957, establishing the Air Reserve Technician program to increase Air Force Reserve and 

Air National Guard combat readiness. Like the Army, the Air Force employed reservists and guardsmen as civilian technicians during the normal 

work week and then integrated them into the unit in their role as military 

personnel on training weekends or during active duty periods. The work of 

the technicians and TARs ensured that units and their personnel obtained the 

maximum benefit from the limited training time available.9

Among the reserve components, the Air National Guard, the newest and 

the least married to tradition, experienced the most dramatic improvements 

during the post-Korea period. From 1953 through the remainder of the decade, 

according to an ANG historian, the Air Guard experienced “enormous growth, 

modernization, and increasing [integration] with the active duty Air Force.” 

The ANG doubled its budget and its strength, while its flying wings gained 

definite and diversified missions, standardized aircraft types, improved training regimens, and mobilization assignments. By 1960 the ANG was an alljet-fighter force. That year the Air Force chief of staff, General Thomas D. 

White, wrote that the importance of the air reserves “in terms of total force

can be gained from the fact that two-thirds of the tactical reconnaissance 

units, nearly half of the tactical fighter units, and more than three-fourths of 

the troop carrier units available to the Tactical Air Command in an emergency” were contained in the ANG and Air Force Reserve. Significantly, the Air 

Guard folded its training into the routine operations of the Air Force and the air 

reserve forces increased their peacetime support of regular Air Force missions, 

marking an early effort to integrate the regular and reserve components into 

a single force—an effort that would become known as Total Force policy. In 

parlance that would appear decades later, the ANG already was becoming part 

of the operational force.10

By the end of the 1950s, the reserve component had grown dramatically in 

size, especially in the critical cohort of enlisted strength in Army Reserve 

units, which doubled. The total number of drill-pay reservists among all services in 1960 approached one million, up more than 200,000 in five years. 

By making nonparticipants subject to the draft, the 1955 reserve act put 

teeth into the requirement to participate in a drilling unit. Other measures 

required direct enlistees in the Guard and reserves to undergo six months of 

active duty to complete entry-level individual training. Taken together, these 

changes in policy vastly improved combat readiness. The Ready Reserve 

was much better prepared than it had been, though not yet fully prepared, to 

fulfill its role as a force that could mobilize and quickly support the regular 

components in active operations.11

could occur at any point during the enlistment, though it was most needed 

and effective at the start. Conversely, Eisenhower felt that the pay provided to 

those enlisting in the federal reserves under initial entry training programs, just 

two-thirds of what they would receive if they joined the Guard and went to the 

same training, provided an unfair advantage to the Guard.6

The debate over the requirement for, and the length of, basic training for 

guardsmen brought renewed rancor between the Army and Guard. Secretary 

Wilson did not help matters when he accused the Guard of being a “draft 

dodging” haven. The House Armed Services Committee worked out a compromise, implemented via Army regulation, which permitted the Guard to 

continue its recently adopted 11-week training period through 1957, with 

Guard enlistees thereafter undergoing the same six months of basic training 

as federal reservists.7

Another piece of 1950s legislation, the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 

1954, established a long-overdue system governing the promotion of reserve 

officers. One official study declared that the act “was of tremendous importance 

to officers in the Army Reserve, because it gave to them and other Reservists 

a statutory basis for promotion and service” similar to that of regulars. The 

law also materially improved reserve officers’ opportunity for seniority visà-vis their regular counterparts by crediting their inactive duty for training 

in determining date of rank. Another critical congressional action, in 1955, 

amended the law known colloquially as the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights 

Act. Originally enacted in 1940 to give those who were drafted or mobilized 

the right to reemployment in their civilian jobs (federal government or private 

sector), the new amendment extended that protection to reservists for initial 

active-duty training, active duty for training, and inactive-duty training—the 

kinds of duty typically performed by reserve component members. Five years 

later Congress and the president expanded it to cover the Guard in the same 

circumstances. Finally, in 1956, Congress passed legislation allowing women 

to serve in the National Guard for the first time, albeit only at the officer rank 

in medical specialties.8

The roots of another key development in the training and administration 

of reserve units went back to 1916, when the government first hired full-time 

civilian personnel to tend to the National Guard’s federally owned horses. The 

program expanded over the years to encompass training, maintenance, property accountability, and administration. The Army Reserve adopted its version in 

1950, and a decade later required the civilian technicians to also be reservists 

in the units they supported. The Naval Reserve established a somewhat similar 

program in 1953, dubbed Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR), 

which brought reservists on full-time active duty to maintain the readiness of 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

52 53

tensions increased. By March of 1962, however, McNamara’s thinking had 

shifted. He no longer viewed it practical to call the reserves to meet repeated 

Cold War crises and adopted the policy of “relying on the reserve forces for 

augmentation only when armed conflict is imminent,” although he did credit 

the rapid force buildup the reserves made possible with helping to demonstrate U.S. resolve and stabilize the Berlin situation. As a result, during 

August 1962 the Pentagon demobilized those who had been activated. When 

the Cuban Missile Crisis arose in October 1962, President Kennedy mobilized just over 14,000 Air Force reservists, primarily in troop carrier wings 

and aerial port squadrons—necessary building blocks to prepare for an invasion of the island. They were demobilized the following month.14

The Berlin mobilization was a strategic success, but it had revealed serious 

deficiencies in policies and practices, prompting the House Armed Services 

Committee to open an inquiry into reserve component readiness. In August 

1962 Representative F. Edward Hébert’s (D–LA) subcommittee published its 

report. The review found that the Pentagon sometimes improperly notified reservists of their recall, with word getting out via the news media rather than 

official channels. Congress also received numerous complaints from reservists 

who had not been given the expected 30 days to prepare their personal affairs 

prior to reporting for active duty. Far more concerning was the problem of 

fillers. In a replay of prior mobilizations, “many units had less than 50 percent 

of their assigned drilling strength when recalled.” The Army, in particular, 

lacked the documentation it needed to rationally select units for activation, 

and “every Army Reserve unit recalled to active duty required a considerable 

number of fillers to bring them up to required active duty strength.” The issue 

went beyond a unit’s shortage of personnel at the time of mobilization. The 

prevalence of untrained, inexperienced personnel in the units increased the 

need for fillers. A clerk typist filling a helicopter mechanic billet, for instance, 

had the same impact as an empty slot. Of the 30,000 drilling Army reservists mobilized in 1961, fully one-third occupied “spaces for which they were 

not qualified.” The “generally low experience level of drilling personnel assigned to Reserve units” necessitated the recall of nondrilling reservists with 

the needed skills. The subcommittee realized that unless drilling units could 

attract and retain experienced reservists, particularly in the noncommissioned 

officer grades, future mobilizations “will again require the automatic recall of 

veterans not assigned to drilling units.”15

The Berlin mobilization, coming after a decade of changes designed to 

rectify the shortcomings exposed by Korea, suggested an inherent problem 

in the nation’s geographically based reserve system. When personnel separated from active duty with obligated reserve service, they ideally joined a unit 

Flexible Response and Cold War Crises 

In 1961 the incoming John F. Kennedy administration brought with it a new 

defense policy known as Flexible Response. Contrasting their approach with 

Eisenhower’s New Look, Kennedy and his secretary of defense, Robert S. 

McNamara, wanted the United States to have more options than “humiliation 

or all-out nuclear action.” That required an increase in the nation’s conventional capabilities, as well as its strategic nuclear weapons, where the Soviets 

had been steadily gaining ground. McNamara, cost-conscious and committed 

to efficient management of defense resources, closed unneeded military bases 

and inactivated units—including reserve elements—even as he built up the capability of the nation’s forces. Like Eisenhower, he saw the reserve component 

as an inexpensive way to increase capability.12

Following a summit in June 1961 between Kennedy and Soviet Premier 

Nikita Khrushchev, in which the president appeared to lack resolve, the Soviets 

took measures intended to force the Western powers out of West Berlin. On 25 

July 1961 President Kennedy pledged to defend “our rights in West Berlin and 

our commitments to its people,” and sped up defense initiatives announced 

earlier in the year. He also requested that Congress authorize him to order 

selected Ready Reserve units and individual reservists to active duty, indicating his intent to call AFRES air transport and ANG tactical air units to ensure 

“the airlift capacity and protection that we need.” One week later, Congress 

responded, granting authority to mobilize 250,000 reservists for 12 months. 

Soon after, Secretary McNamara ordered thousands of air reserve members to 

active duty by 1 October. Seven ANG squadrons totaling 216 single-seat fighters quickly deployed to Central Europe, a feat that a House committee called 

perhaps “the outstanding accomplishment” of the mobilization. In fact, the 

U.S. Air Force had never in its history deployed a larger number of jet fighters. 

Air guardsmen accounted for four-fifths of the air reservists who served on 

active duty during the crisis.13

The standoff did not escalate into a “hot” war, so no Army National Guard 

(ARNG) units deployed overseas, though some were activated and underwent 

intensive training at installations in the continental United States to serve as a 

strategic reserve. Mobilization for that role, as opposed to a shooting war, was 

something neither the members nor their families and employers had anticipated. It created turmoil in personal and family lives, schools, and businesses, 

and led to considerable resentment because it seemed unnecessary. Kennedy 

justified his action: “We called them—in order to prevent war, not to fight a 

war.” While it served that purpose and also improved combat readiness in the 

bargain, it raised fears that similar call-ups might happen any time U.S.-Soviet 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

54 55

emergency—the ground forces within weeks and aviation units within days. 

One of the primary changes in training for the new force was an expansion of 

the then-standard two-hour drill period to four hours.18

In early 1968, in response to the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo

and the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, President Johnson finally called 

up a limited number of Ready Reserve units. But by that time, reserve units 

had become known as “havens for those who wanted to avoid active military duty and Vietnam,” to use James T. Currie’s echo of Secretary Wilson’s 

barb. Johnson’s long delay thus had the unintended consequence of helping 

create widespread negative impressions about the reserves. Popular notions 

notwithstanding, many reservists were veterans and a number had been in their 

units for years prior to the war. Many thousands also had served on active 

duty, mostly as volunteers. Air Force Reserve C–124 (Globemaster II heavylift transport) groups, as an example, flew missions into Southeast Asia on 

inactive duty status between 1966 and 1972 in support of the Military Airlift 

Command. Their largest effort came in early 1968, when reserve C–124s airlifted the 82nd Airborne Division and more than 3,000 U.S. Marines to Korea 

and South Vietnam.19

In the end, not all of those recalled served overseas, and the reserves constituted a very small portion of the more than 500,000 U.S. personnel deployed 

in Southeast Asia at that time. At least the rapid mobilization and excellent 

performance of a number of Selected Reserve Force units, particularly ANG 

tactical fighter units, demonstrated the effectiveness of McNamara’s initiative. 

The air reserves, in particular, played key roles. In response to the Pueblo’s 

seizure, the ANG activated several tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance 

groups. When the crisis did not escalate into open hostilities, some units went 

to Vietnam instead. By June 1968 four ANG F–100 Super Sabre units deployed to the war zone and for the next 10 months flew combat missions. The 

January 1968 mobilization, however, encountered major problems associated, 

to some degree, with the fact that there was no 30-day alert period as called 

for in Air Force plans. Not surprisingly, some reservists learned of their recall 

via the media rather than through official channels (as in 1961). Those reservists recalled in May, however, enjoyed the 30-day warning and experienced a 

smoother mobilization.20

Acknowledging the growing importance of the reserves, the Reserve Forces 

Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967 established the position of deputy 

assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs (RA), who served under the 

assistant secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs. In an affirmation of McNamara’s initiative two years earlier, the law also authorized a 

Selected Reserve within the Ready Reserve of each service, with a strength 

where they lived that had a need for their occupational specialty. But instances 

of mismatch frequently arose. An artilleryman, for instance, might end up in 

an area where there were no artillery units. Or his unit might be repurposed 

from artillery to another mission, such as logistics, as the needs of the service 

changed. Even those who enlisted directly in their hometown reserve unit might 

move to a new location and thus have to join a new unit. Often a reservist in 

this situation would not be able to go back on active duty to acquire a new skill. 

The alternative was learning on the job, but that took time, and meanwhile the 

individual would be unqualified or marginally qualified. The challenge of ensuring that reservists’ skills matched those required by their units only increased in 

scope as American society became more mobile. And absent a shift away from 

geographical organization, there was no easy solution.16

Following the Berlin and Cuba crises, McNamara looked for ways to 

improve reserve component combat readiness. Between 1962 and 1967 he 

increased efficiency by reorganizing and reducing the size of the Army reserves, including deactivation of the six newest infantry divisions. He also 

attempted to implement one of the key recommendations of the Truman-era 

Gray Board by creating a single ground-reserve entity, though he planned to 

merge the Army Reserve into the National Guard. While that idea would not 

run into the same strong opposition from the National Guard Association that 

had tabled the Gray Board’s proposal, the reserves enjoyed the support of their 

own professional organization, the Reserve Officers Association, established 

in 1922, which counted 170 congressmen as members. By 1965 McNamara 

realized that he could not implement any major reserve component reorganization because there was no congressional support to drastically reorder the 

status quo.17

The Vietnam War

The American military commitment in Vietnam had increased during the 

Kennedy administration, but rose dramatically in 1965 with the introduction 

of U.S. combat troops and the aerial bombing of North Vietnam. Despite the 

large-scale deployment of forces, President Johnson overruled McNamara and 

resisted calling up the reserves. Instead, Johnson doubled the monthly draft 

calls and increased the regular forces in piecemeal fashion. As units departed 

for Vietnam, the strategic reserve in the United States dwindled. To address that 

problem and achieve some improvement in reserve combat readiness, in 1965 

McNamara announced the formation of a 150,000-strong Selected Reserve 

Force. His goal was a fully manned, highly trained, and well-equipped element 

within the Ready Reserve that would be ready to deploy rapidly in a national 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

56 57

system and appointed former Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates Jr. to lead 

a committee charged with developing a plan to transition to an all-volunteer 

force. The Gates Commission unanimously agreed that “the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective 

standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts.” To spur 

enlistments, its 1970 report called for significant pay increases, better training and educational opportunities, and improved living conditions for military personnel. As American participation in the war dwindled, so did draft 

calls, and in January 1973 Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced 

the termination of conscription.24

As the Gates Commission had recommended, the Selective Service System 

survived in a standby status for a future emergency. But the reservoir of ill will 

toward conscription made that an unlikely source of manpower to augment 

regular forces and ensured that in the next crisis the reserve component, not 

hastily inducted draftees, would be the first source of reinforcements. Likewise, stung by growing antipathy toward the military among a wide swath 

of the population, policymakers and defense leaders wanted to ensure that 

U.S. forces would not be committed again to a conflict without overwhelming 

public support. They believed that one means to guarantee that was to make 

the reserve component indispensable to fighting a war. As the Army’s chief of 

staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, is supposed to have put it: “They’re not 

taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.”25

The Vietnam War also led Congress to attempt to preclude presidents from 

taking the country into conflicts without securing national support. The War 

Powers Act, passed in 1973, required the president to obtain congressional 

approval for deployment of military forces within 60 days of committing them 

to combat. Three years later, to ensure that the act did not unduly limit executive decision making in a crisis, Congress provided for reserve forces call-up 

authority, which permitted the president to call 50,000 Selected Reserve 

members for 90 days without a presidential declaration of national emergency. 

At the end of 1980 President Jimmy Carter signed a law increasing the number 

of reservists to 100,000. In 1987 Congress increased the number to 200,000 

and provided for another 90 days (for a total of 180) with congressional notification. In the future this presidential selected reserve call-up authority would 

play a significant role in several small-scale post–Cold War contingencies.26

In August 1970 Secretary Laird announced the new Total Force concept, 

which emphasized the role of reserve forces “as the initial and primary source 

of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid 

and substantial expansion of the active forces.” Testifying before the House 

Armed Services Committee in February 1972, he stated that “we are placing 

set annually by Congress. Although McNamara’s wartime policies earned strong 

criticism, his initiative in establishing the Selected Reserve was both significant 

and enduring.21

The 1967 law also established the positions of the chief of Army Reserve 

and chief of Air Force Reserve to advise their respective service chiefs of staff 

on reserve matters. The House of Representatives’ version of the bill had the 

chief of Army Reserve as commander of the Army Reserve, but that stipulation did not survive the legislative process. For the time being, command and 

control of the Army Reserve remained with the Continental Army Command. 

For the Air Force, the reserve chief’s office placed AFRES’s top-level policymaker on an equal footing with his Air Guard counterpart. In 1968 the Headquarters Air Force Reserve was activated at Robins Air Force Base (AFB), 

Georgia. But following serious disagreements between the Office of Air Force 

Reserve and Headquarters AFRES over their respective management responsibilities, in 1972 the Air Force gave the chief of Air Force Reserve a second 

hat as the commander of AFRES.22

Although the seaborne reserve forces did not play a major role in the conflicts and crises of the 1960s, they learned from the experiences of the mobilized components. The Naval Reserve discovered after the Berlin crisis that, 

much like the Army Reserve and Guard, only 50 percent of its personnel were 

qualified for their mobilization billets, a problem it took steps to correct as 

much as possible, in part by increasing the proportion of full-time reservists.In 

a 1962 effort to enhance readiness, Marine ground reservists, for the first time, 

conducted annual field training outside the continental United States. The next 

year the Marine Corps began requiring reservists to complete the same annual 

physical readiness test as regulars. The Coast Guard, following its transfer 

from the Treasury Department to the new Department of Transportation in 

1967, joined the military services in using new authority in the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 to call ready reservists to active duty involuntarily if 

they failed to perform obligated service.23

Transition to the All-Volunteer Total Force

In the late 1960s opposition to the Vietnam War and the draft fueled a 

protest movement that reduced political support for both policies. As Russell 

F. Weigley wrote in his history of the U.S. Army, “Eliminating the draft was 

inevitably a part of the nation’s disentangling itself from the war and allowing the wounds of the war to heal.” In 1968 Richard Nixon promised that he 

would end the draft and the war if elected. Once in office, he took a gradual 

approach to both issues. In 1969 he implemented a more equitable lottery 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

58 59

deployment. The Creek Party operation, a 10-year effort that had Air Guard 

tankers refuel tactical fighters over Europe, demonstrated that part-time 

airmen—generally performing two-week tours of active duty—were equal to 

the task of participating in complex air operations and maintaining a longterm commitment. The real-world experience boosted the ANG’s recruiting 

and retention and was another early example of serving as part of the operational force. During the same period both the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve 

provided ongoing airlift support to the U.S. Southern Command. Typically, 

aircrews on two-week tours performed missions such as embassy support, cargo 

movement, paratroop drops with the Army, and humanitarian work in response 

to hurricanes and earthquakes.30

In a similar fashion the Marine Corps Reserve began training extensively 

with regular Marine units, other services, and NATO allies. From 1978 to 1980 

alone, 16 such major exercises occurred, including 3 in Germany, Denmark, 

and Norway. For the Coast Guard, the 1970s marked a major shift from traditional classroom training to operations-oriented augmentation training, which 

entailed reservists performing actual Coast Guard missions. Within two years, 

augmentation expanded from about one-sixth of reservists’ training time to 

account for nearly two-thirds. The more meaningful regimen increased retention and encouraged many members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 

to transfer into the Selected Reserve. It proved operationally valuable in 1980, 

when Coast Guard reservists responded to the Cuban refugee operation, only 

the second time reservists had been mobilized under the 1972 law that authorized the involuntary recall of Coast Guard ready reservists for major natural 

or man-made disasters.31

Although the reserve components grew ever more critical to national 

defense after Vietnam, the 1970s marked a low point for the nation’s readiness 

and mobilization capabilities. The diversion of money from research, development, and acquisition to carry on the Vietnam War; budget cuts following the 

conflict; the prevalence of problems such as racial discord and illegal drug use; 

and the transition to an all-volunteer force produced a significant decline in 

the nation’s defense posture. Active-duty strength decreased from 3.5 million 

during the war to 2.1 million by 1976, while the quality of personnel recruited 

initially was lower than that brought in by the draft. Neither the regulars nor 

the reserves were ready. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when U.S. forces 

assumed increased alert status, the 82nd Airborne Division was the only U.S. 

Army division rated as combat ready, and even it had major deficiencies.32

In 1976 the Pentagon conducted its first major mobilization exercise since 

1961. While one historian called it a “disaster,” defense leaders reported: 

“Solutions to problems uncovered are currently being effected.” But two 

increased emphasis on our National Guard and Reserve components so that we 

may obtain maximum defense capabilities from the limited resources available. The strengthening of the National Guard and Reserve Forces . . . is an 

integral part of the Total Force planning approach.” In August 1973 the new 

secretary of defense, James R. Schlesinger, upgraded the concept to “a Total 

Force policy which integrates the active, Guard, and reserve forces into a 

homogeneous whole.”27

The Army took the idea to the ultimate level in 1970, initiating the Roundout concept, which integrated designated Guard or reserve combat units into 

regular brigades or divisions to bring them to full strength upon mobilization. 

Thus a regular division might have two regular brigades and one Guard brigade. 

The Army pushed the concept in part to field more regular divisions under 

its limited manpower cap, but also to further the goal of making it difficult 

to go to war without resort to reserve mobilization. By 1978 every stateside 

active Army division had an Army Reserve or National Guard roundout unit 

assigned. By 1980 ARNG units deployed annually to West Germany for realistic combat training in exercises based on war plans for the defense of Western 

Europe. The reserve component roundout units received a resource priority 

equal to their gaining command, which theoretically meant newer equipment, 

more supplies, and other benefits, though the practical effect was limited due 

to constrained Defense budgets. The Army also pegged some reserve component units as augmentation to regular commands, meaning that they added 

combat power beyond the standard table of organization and would deploy 

with them or soon after them. As part of that process, the designated wartime 

parent organizations began overseeing the training and readiness of their assigned reserve units.28

The air reserves did not establish a formal program of integration into 

regular commands, but they established a reputation, and were—according 

to a National Defense University study in 1985—a “text book case of success 

for the total-force policy.” Among several factors contributing to their performance were close affiliation between the reserve units and their gaining 

commands; a low proportion of personnel with no prior service; the high level 

of experience of those with prior service; and the tendency of Air Force leaders 

to support additional flying training for the air reserves. The ANG historian 

wrote that in the 1970s air guardsmen “dominated ‘William Tell,’” the Air 

Force’s air-to-air gunnery competition, tangible evidence of air reservists’ 

higher experience levels in comparison with regulars.29

Increased opportunities for overseas training and operational support also 

played a role. In 1977 the AFRES deployed a fighter unit to Germany for 

a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) exercise—its first overseas 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

60 61

problem: over time some technicians lost their reserve status, often through 

no fault of their own. Unlike the Guard, the two federal reserve components allowed these now purely civilian personnel to continue as technicians 

even though they no longer constituted mobilization assets. The dual civilian-military status of all technicians, Guard and reserve, also raised issues such 

as stagnation, since technicians might remain in the same unit and billet for 

many years instead of broadening their experience and advancing in authority 

consistent with a normal career progression. In 1977 the House Appropriations 

Committee lambasted the technician program and advocated that the services 

fill full-time support billets with active-duty personnel.35

The all-volunteer era forced the services to dramatically increase recruiting 

efforts and change their methods. In 1978 the Army Reserve partially addressed 

the personnel shortfall by recruiting more women. In 1972 it had fewer than 

500 women, but a decade later there were 64,000. The Army achieved this 

in part by signing up women to the same six-year (active and reserve) military obligation that applied to men. Women, however, were restricted from 

combat jobs and so could not fill the critical gaps in fields such as infantry. In 

1980 the Navy similarly opened its TAR program to women. To make reserve 

duty more attractive, the Navy led the services in seeking enhanced benefits 

for reservists such as tuition assistance and group life insurance. In 1974 the 

Coast Guard Reserve initiated an innovative program that allowed reservists 

to fulfill their active-duty training requirements in two nonconsecutive stints. 

This particularly benefitted students, who could complete the requirements 

over two summers and therefore enlist without disrupting their education. 

The Coast Guard found that the option not only boosted enlistments but also 

educational levels in the reserve. The Army Reserve followed suit in 1978 

and the other services soon after. It was in effect a partial reversion to the 

11-week initial-entry training program offered by the National Guard in the 

1950s and rejected by the Army as too short to be effective. It had taken nearly 

two decades, but U.S. defense policy finally split the difference by spreading 

the required six months over two summers. It was a simple but long-overdue 

solution. Those efforts notwithstanding, in 1981 the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board expressed “its grave concern to finding solutions to Reserve manpower 

problems, especially the IRR.”36

The Reagan Defense Buildup

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald W. Reagan promised to 

“rearm America.” Once in office, he dramatically boosted spending—for 

higher pay and benefits, increased personnel strength, enhanced training, and 

years later, despite some improvements, the next such exercise likewise 

demonstrated major difficulties. The “hodgepodge of old and unconnected 

Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations and procedures” was 

partly to blame, according to the Army Reserves’ official history, but also at 

play was what a later study called “serene skepticism” among Pentagon officials, many of whom believed that any conflict with the Soviets would be so 

short as to preclude a big call-up. The 1980 mobility exercise, Proud Spirit, 

demonstrated that the shortcomings continued, but they were overshadowed 

by the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran.33

The reserve ground components faced large personnel shortfalls in the 

1970s. The postwar decrease in the size of the active forces, coupled with 

longer voluntary enlistments in place of the two-year term for draftees, resulted in a much smaller stream of personnel departing active duty with a reserve 

commitment. Lingering antiwar sentiment and the failure of military pay and 

benefits to keep pace with the civilian economy, especially for junior enlisted, also contributed. The Army was hit particularly hard. Over the course of 

the decade the ARNG’s rolls fell 15 percent from 409,000 to 347,000, while 

the Army Reserve suffered an even more precipitous 30 percent decline, 

from a drilling strength of 263,000 in 1971 to about 185,000 in 1978. The 

Army’s nondrilling IRR melted away at an astounding rate—from more than 

one million in June 1972 to only 144,000 six years later. The decimation of 

the IRR, the primary source of pretrained fillers for both regular and reserve 

units, was a major problem for planners who envisioned a pool of 400,000 

IRR personnel available within 90 days of a general mobilization. An official 

study observed that “the net effect of ending the draft was increased [reserve] 

responsibilities, and hence greater numerical strength requirements, while 

the capability to fill the [reserve] ranks was decreased.” In 1980 the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board noted that the shift to the All-Volunteer Force had a 

“dysfunctional influence on both the numbers and type of personnel affiliating with the Reserves during the 1970s.”34

The Army Reserve also fell short in another personnel area. A 1978 Pentagon study concluded that it had “the least effective full-time support (technician) force of the seven Selected Reserve Components.” Full-time support 

personnel accounted for only 4 percent of Army Reserve strength, compared 

with 22 percent in the Air Force Reserve. While that difference to some degree 

reflected the greater technological requirements of air as opposed to ground 

units, the Pentagon recognized that full-time support personnel were “one of 

the key elements—and may be the key element—in achieving the readiness 

standards essential to meeting our national defense strategy requirements.” 

Both the Army and Air Force Reserve, however, suffered from a growing 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

62 63

ality with the upgraded equipment of regular forces, making it difficult for 

reserves and regulars to train and fight together. Senator John C. Stennis (D–

MS) spearheaded the legislative effort to give the reserves “equipment that 

still has the factory paint on it.” Congress began putting significant money 

behind the policy in the fiscal year 1982 Defense appropriation act, providing 

for purchases above the levels the Pentagon requested. This translated into, 

for example, nearly 70 new C–130 Hercules military transport aircraft for the 

ANG by 1991. The Army’s roundout units finally began receiving the same 

equipment as their parent combat divisions, including major items such as 

M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles. The Marines pursued the 

same goal for their ground reserve units, gradually transitioning to their reserves being equipped the same as the regulars. In 1982 Secretary of the Navy 

John F. Lehman announced that Naval Air Reserve squadrons would receive 

new aircraft at the same time the regulars did, beginning with the F/A–18 

Hornet. The Navy, which funded Marine aviation, initially did not do the same 

for the Marine Reserve air wing. In 1985 the Reserve Forces Policy Board recommended that the Navy’s air integration policy “be applied equitably among 

all Marine Corps assets.” While the board recognized in the same year that 

“equipment shortages are the most serious limiting factor affecting readiness 

in the Army Guard and Reserve,” by the end of the decade, the board concluded that—although shortages remained—the reserves’ warfighting capability 

had “increased significantly.”38

The defense buildup, coupled with an improving public attitude toward 

military service, dramatically reversed the pattern of decline in reserve end 

strength. In 1983 the Selected Reserve exceeded one million personnel for the 

first time, and continued to grow. The Naval Reserve saw the most dramatic 

increase, climbing more than 50 percent, from 97,000 personnel in 1980 to 

over 148,000 in 1987. The Air Force Reserve went from 155,000 to 195,000 

in the same period. Over the course of the 1980s the Army National Guard expanded by nearly one-third, from a post-Vietnam low of 347,000 to 457,000, a 

peacetime high. By 1988 the Army’s Selected Reserve components (National 

Guard at 452,000 and Reserve at 310,000) nearly equaled the regular force 

(772,300) in strength.39

In a change that affected both manpower and training, Congress took steps 

to vastly increase the number of reserve component personnel serving on extended active duty. While this initially was designed to mitigate the services’ 

misuse of active duty for training to provide full-time recruiters for reserve 

components, it also began to solve the ongoing problems with the Military Technician (MT) programs of the Army and Air Force. By establishing 

a separate budget authorization for full-time active duty for the purpose of 

more and better equipment—resulting in the largest peacetime defense buildup 

in U.S. history. All of these initiatives benefitted the reserve components. But 

Congress also emphasized its views on the growing importance of the reserve 

establishment. One key aspect of this was creation of the dedicated position of 

assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, or ASD(RA), in September 

1983; no longer would it be an adjunct mission of an assistant secretary with 

a broader portfolio. Although the Pentagon opposed the idea, Senator Roger 

W. Jepsen (R–IA), a former Army paratrooper and reservist, believed it was 

the only way to focus “attention to Reserve and National Guard issues at the 

highest level within the Department of Defense.” The first incumbent, who took 

office on 3 May 1984, was James H. Webb Jr., a decorated Marine veteran of the 

Vietnam War. He reported directly to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, 

who took note of his “high-level support, oversight, and advocacy for the reserves in the resource allocation and budgeting processes.”37

In the equipment arena, in June 1982 Secretary Weinberger announced that 

“units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component.” This 

policy marked a sea change for the reserves, which had relied heavily in the 

past on aging weapons and gear handed down from the regular forces. Those 

items were not only more expensive to maintain, they also lacked commonIn 1982 President Ronald W. Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar W. Weinberger 

(left), championed the First to Fight, First to Equip policy. It marked a sea change 

for the reserves, facilitating the reserve component’s increased readiness by the late 

1980s. (Source: National Archives)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

64 65

the AFRES took top honors in two 

competitions: best C–141 Starlifter aircrew and maintenance team. 

From 1985 to 1989, the AFRES 

won several more honors at Gunsmoke, Military Airlift Command, 

and Strategic Air Command competitions. But the Total Force 

policy had a major impact across 

all services. In 1982 the commander of the new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force referred to 

himself as one of the reserve component’s “foremost ‘customers,’” 

especially for support capabilities 

such as civil affairs and psychological operations, which in the U.S. 

Army resided almost exclusively 

in the Army Reserve. Similarly, 

the Marine Corps Reserve provided all of the Corps’ civil affairs 

groups, nearly two-thirds of its 

bulk fuel companies, and one-half 

of its force reconnaissance and air/

naval gunfire liaison companies. The following year the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board rightly declared that “today’s Reserve Component Force is not a force 

‘in Reserve,’ but rather an integral part of the Total Force performing ‘real 

world,’ everyday missions together with the Active Components—indeed, 

‘a force in being.’” Congress fully agreed that same year: “The integral role 

of the reserves in our Nation’s security is often misunderstood. . . . In many 

instances, the active forces would be unable to deploy and accomplish their 

mission without reserve augmentation.”42

Despite the progress toward implementing Total Force, the Pentagon remained anxious regarding the size and status of the IRR. Webb characterized 

the Army’s IRR as comprised of “people who had been discharged for other 

than good reasons,” and in many cases the Army did not even have current 

addresses for them. The assistant secretary pushed the idea of a one-day recall 

as a way to provide at least address verification and a physical exam for IRR 

personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Army opposed the idea, 

but in late 1985 and early 1986, the Army Reserve conducted several small, 

As part of the reserve component’s 

increased importance to the nation’s 

combat readiness in the 1980s, James H. 

Webb Jr. became the first assistant secretary 

of defense for reserve affairs in 1984. He 

reported directly to Defense Secretary 

Weinberger. (Source: National Archives)

organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces, 

Congress ensured that the services would not skimp on these vital components 

of reserve readiness. This new category became enshrined in the Army and 

Air Force as the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program. It experienced 

“phenomenal growth” from 1980 to 1984, according to U.S. Army staff judge 

advocate Thomas Frank England, who studied the new program. Full-time 

support personnel—AGRs and military technicians—accounted for 24 percent 

of the ANG Selected Reserve in 1980, 26 percent in 1983, and 27 percent by 

1988. The number of TARs on active duty rose to comprise one-seventh of 

the Navy’s Selected Reserve by 1984. The Marine Corps continued to rely on 

regulars for its Inspector-Instructor program, but it brought reservists on to 

active duty in other capacities that supported reserve training. In the reserve 

component overall, in 1983, full-time support personnel filled 13 percent of 

the Selected Reserve’s ranks; by 1989 it was almost 15 percent. The RFPB 

observed that the services found full-time support “at the unit level to be especially important to assure that unit personnel optimize their training time rather 

than spend their time performing day to day functions during training drills.”40

The services expanded or initiated other programs to enhance reserve 

training. The Army’s Key Personnel Upgrade program provided selected 

guardsmen in leadership billets a chance to shadow an active-duty counterpart 

during field exercises. By the end of the decade thousands of guardsmen and 

reservists were participating in major exercises overseas and at the Army’s 

National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Between 1981 and 1986 

the number who trained abroad increased more than fourfold, but this was 

not without controversy. Several governors who opposed U.S. aid to the anti-Sandinista movement in Nicaragua attempted to use a decades-old statute to 

prevent their National Guard units from training in neighboring Honduras. In 

1986, when more than 5,000 guardsmen from some 18 states were scheduled 

for training in Honduras, at least a dozen governors expressed concern about 

sending personnel to a nation on the edge of a war zone. Seeking to resolve 

matters, ASD(RA) James Webb addressed a Senate armed services subcommittee, noting that all Guard units were federalized when deployed overseas 

for training or other duty. Ultimately, Congress settled the controversy with the 

passage of the Montgomery Amendment in 1986, which stripped governors 

of the authority to withhold consent for their Guard units to train outside the 

United States unless those units were required for domestic emergencies.41

The fruits of the quickening pace toward a true Total Force were most 

readily apparent in the Air Force, which held annual competitions mixing regulars and reservists. In 1983 an AFRES wing won the Tactical Air Command’s 

Gunsmoke award for best A–10 Thunderbolt II maintenance. The next year 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 3: 1954 – 1989

66 67

presumably an indication that employers were more fully grasping their obligations and fewer reservists were encountering problems. By 1989 the ESGR 

gained several thousand trained volunteers under a new program to ensure 

that every reserve training site would have someone available to resolve 

reservist-employer issues. Despite some notable progress, many employers 

still made it difficult for reservists to continue their service. In a 1989 statement to Congress, Assistant Secretary Duncan noted that “approximately 

one-third of the National Guardsmen and reservists who leave the Selected 

Reserve before completing their first five years of Reserve service will leave 

because of employer pressures.” Oddly enough, the U.S. Postal Service appeared to be the leading offender of reservists’ job rights.46

_______ Conclusion _______

The 1980s proved pivotal for reserve component readiness. In 1978 a study 

conducted for the Pentagon had stated in stark terms: “A truly mission-ready 

Selected Reserve is not one of several alternatives to assure our country of an 

adequate defense—it is the only alternative.” The emphasis on every aspect 

of the force—personnel, training, and equipment—contributed to the creation 

of reserve forces that demonstrated a higher degree of peacetime readiness 

than ever before. Brief IRR recalls, enactment of Section 673b authority, and 

family and employer programs reminded reservists, their families, and their 

employers that the Selected Reserve would be called upon when needed. At 

the close of the decade, Assistant Secretary Duncan spoke to the House Appropriations Committee: “Since 1980, the strength of the Ready Reserve Forces 

has increased by more than 350,000 personnel, an increase of 29 percent. 

The bulk of that growth has taken place in the Selected Reserve, which has 

increased some 32 percent. Today, the Ready Reserve Forces of the United 

States total more than 1.64 million personnel.” Of those, 1.18 million were 

selected reservists. Most important, the reservists and guardsmen of 1989 were 

better trained, better equipped, better paid, and perhaps even more motivated 

than they had been 10 years earlier.47

It had taken three and a half decades, with ups and downs that included 

conflicts hot and cold, enactment of various imperfect but nonetheless helpful 

laws, the end of the draft and the transition to an all-volunteer force, the 

emergence and acceptance of the Total Force policy, creation of a leadership 

position in the department devoted to reserve affairs, implementation of First 

to Fight, First to Equip, and an unparalleled peacetime defense buildup. But by 

the end of this era it was clear that the reserve component was finally, as Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson had declared in 1953, “an integral component 

of national defense.”48

voluntary musters of IRR personnel. A Pentagon spokesman observed that the 

actual numbers and results were not as important as changing “the mind-set of 

the individual ready reservist. We want him to know he’s still in the Army.”43

Congress added funding to the FY 1987 Defense budget for a much larger 

one-day call-up. The same legislation contained a provision, subsequently 

known as Section 673b authority, permitting a president to call up to 200,000 

reservists involuntarily for up to 180 days. Stephen M. Duncan, the new 

ASD(RA), viewed the option as “technically not a form of mobilization” 

because it could be used for “any operational mission not involving a war or 

national emergency.” He primarily designed the 1987 “limited-notice, partial 

call-up” to test notification and reporting procedures under the new authority, so it largely affected units rather than the IRR. The services succeeded in 

contacting nearly 94 percent of the more than 15,000 participants, including 

members from 120 units, as well as individual reservists, all within 72 hours.44

With the growing use of the reserve components in overseas training deployments and high-profile exercises far from home, a new issue came to the 

fore. The Reserve Forces Policy Board virtually ignored the topic until its 

1986 report highlighted family readiness for the first time. The RFPB acknowledged that year that “preparing family members for mobilization, their roles, 

and responsibilities is an integral part of the mobilization process.” The board 

recommended that units develop mobilization orientation programs for families and asked the Pentagon to produce a mobilization handbook for spouses 

and dependents. In the same year the Pentagon conducted its first comprehensive survey of reserve component spouses. The 1987 board commended the 

establishment of the U.S. Army Family Action Plan, the Naval Reserve’s premobilization guide and guide to family readiness, the Marine Corps Reserve’s 

Casualty/Family Assistance Team concept, the National Guard’s family 

program, and the Air Force’s family support centers. In 1989, for the first time, 

the report included a section on “Single Parents and Military Couples.”45

The increasing demands of reserve component training caused employer 

issues to rival family concerns in their detrimental effects on retention. The 

Pentagon had begun to address that problem through the National Committee 

for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), which was established 

in 1972 to ease the transition to an all-volunteer force. In 1985 the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board acknowledged the effectiveness of ESGR programs, but 

it believed the committee required additional resources to handle the growing 

burden. In 1988 the board highlighted the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights 

Act, which allowed reserve component members time off from civilian jobs 

to perform military training. The board noted approvingly that fewer reservists were contacting ESGR and more employers were doing so themselves, 
69

_______ CHAPTER 4 _______

Growing Reliance on the Reserve Component,

1990–2000

At the close of the 1980s the Total Force policy was nearly 20 years old, the

 Selected Reserve was well above one million strong, and its personnel 

were better trained, better equipped, and better compensated than ever before. 

The unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 tested that policy and the 

reserve components, with mixed results. The end of the Cold War also brought 

a significant force drawdown and multiple defense reviews that impacted the 

reserve components and drove further integration with their active counterparts. As the 1990s proceeded, the increase in contingency operations, coupled 

with the decrease in the size of regular forces, resulted in a growing reliance 

on reserve elements to perform operational missions. 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990–1991

On 2 August 1990 Iraqi dictator President Saddam Hussein launched an 

invasion of Kuwait. Within two days his forces controlled the entire country 

and appeared poised to continue the attack. On 4 August, President George 

H. W. Bush met with his top advisers, including the head of the U.S. Central 

Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and decided to commit the 

United States to the defense of Saudi Arabia. The gears of a massive deployment, known as Operation Desert Shield, began to turn.1

On 22 August President Bush ordered the first call-up of the reserves since 

1970, declaring the decision “essential to completing our mission.” The next 

day Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney authorized the service secretaries 

to activate nearly 49,000 Selected Reserve members, half of them from the 

Army Guard and Army Reserve. They were the initial wave of 230,000 reservists from all services who would eventually come on active duty in response 

to the crisis. This early resort to the reserve components proved prescient; ultimately, they provided one of every four U.S. military members deployed to the 

Persian Gulf. But in late August, it was unclear whether U.S. forces would be 

required strictly for deterrence and defense or, eventually, for offense. Whether 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

70 71

of Kuwait. On 5 November he signed the 673b waiver into law and eight days 

later approved an extension of the active duty of affected Selected Reserve 

units and individuals to 360 days. By December, Secretary Cheney authorized 

the services to activate up to 188,000 from the Selected Reserve. In the early 

morning hours of 17 January 1991 the war began with an air campaign. The 

next day President Bush finally declared a partial mobilization and authorized 

activation of units and individuals in the Ready Reserve for up to two years.4

Partial mobilization also provided access to the Individual Ready Reserve, 

a critical source for the battlefield replacements that everyone anticipated 

would be needed in large numbers, especially by the Army and Marine Corps. 

But the initial resort to 673b already had imposed adverse consequences on 

the mobilization process. The president’s decision to delay partial mobilization 

until after hostilities had begun had made it especially difficult to fill empty 

billets in already mobilized reserve units or replace those who did not have the 

proper skills. The services were forced to activate individuals from other Selected Reserve units, thereby disrupting organizations that might themselves 

be called to active duty later. Congress subsequently addressed this problem in 

the fiscal year 1998 Defense authorization act by allowing the president to call 

up 30,000 IRR members to fill vacancies in units preparing to deploy under 

PSRC. That provision would prove its worth in the next major conflict.5

In spite of the limitations imposed by the use of 673b authority, the reserve 

components still played an important role in the war. The air reserve elements, 

consistent with their high proportion of full-time personnel and their program 

of affiliating reserve aircrews with regular squadrons, faced the fewest challenges when it came to rapid deployment. After the Iraqi invasion on 2 August, 

and well before receiving authority to involuntarily activate reservists, the 

Air Force called for volunteers (as did the other services, though they did 

not call for as many). Within 72 hours, more than twice the required number 

came forward. About one week after the invasion, the first Air National Guard 

and Air Force Reserve C–141 Starlifters began ferrying American troops and 

equipment to Saudi Arabia. Two days later KC–135 Stratotankers crewed by 

Kansas air guardsmen arrived in Saudi Arabia to support the U.S. buildup. Air 

Force Reserve associate airlift units, whose reserve crews shared C–141 and 

C–5 Galaxy aircraft with active crews, volunteered in large numbers. By 22 

August, when President Bush announced the Section 673b augmentation, there 

were already thousands of Air Guard and reserve volunteers on active duty (and 

10,000 total volunteers across all the services). During that month they carried 

out more than 40 percent of strategic airlift and one-third of aerial refueling 

missions. A number of those who volunteered were later involuntarily activated 

under Section 673b or the partial mobilization of 18 January 1991.6

or not this uncertainty influenced 

Bush’s decision to use presidential 

selected reserve call-up authority, under Title 10, Section 673b, 

rather than his partial mobilization 

authority, the choice was both consequential and difficult to fathom. 

While PSRC could serve as a step 

toward partial mobilization, by 

itself it granted only 90 days of 

active duty, which the president 

could extend by an additional 90 

days with congressional notification. Active duty beyond 180 days, 

however, required congressional 

approval. The other significant 

limitation with PSRC was that it 

did not provide access to the Individual Ready Reserve, the pool of 

individual fillers, many of whom 

had skills in high demand.2

The decision to use 673b authority led to a debate with some 

members of Congress who wanted 

the administration to rely more 

heavily on reserve forces and 

thereby test the validity of the Total Force policy. Secretary Cheney argued 

that the time limits inherent in 673b authority made it difficult to employ the 

reserves. But that was a constraint the administration had self-imposed by 

opting for 673b in the first place. It could have invoked partial mobilization 

based on the national emergency the president had declared on 3 August, which 

would have allowed mobilization of up to a million reservists for two years. 

Concerned that there was an anti-reserve bias at work, Congress removed any 

impediment by passing legislation granting a one-time extension of 673b authority to a total of 360 days of active duty. An Air National Guard historian 

noted: “The stakes were enormous, for the specter of Vietnam had to be exorcised and the Total Force policy validated.”3

By the end of October 1990, with no indication that Saddam Hussein intended to withdraw, President Bush decided to double the size of the U.S. 

force in Southwest Asia in preparation for an offensive to drive the Iraqis out 

In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and 

its threat to Saudi Arabia, in August 1990 

President Bush called up selected reservists 

under PSRC authority (Title 10, Section 

673b). In January 1991, he implemented 

partial mobilization authority. (Source: 

George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and 

Museum)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

72 73

transporting and sustaining an already large force far from the United States, 

required that deployments remain limited to mission-essential personnel.

The AFRES’s only aviation combat unit to be activated, the 706th Tactical 

Fighter Squadron, an A–10A ground-attack unit from New Orleans, mobilized 

in late December. Within 10 days it departed for Saudi Arabia, the first AFRES 

fighter unit in history to be deployed for combat. The 706th had the critical 

mission of taking out Iraqi air defense radar and early warning systems at 

the war’s outset. Later, it took on the task of hunting Scuds, participating in the 

destruction of mobile launchers and missiles. The unit completed its wartime 

service without losing a single aircraft or suffering any casualties. In a dramatic 

engagement, a 706th pilot shot down an Iraqi helicopter, making history with 

the first A–10 air-to-air kill. By proving their readiness for a short-notice deployment and combat, the unit was a successful product of the Total Force policy.8

The Navy called up its first units and individual reservists, primarily in the 

areas of medical, port security, and minesweeping, on 25 August. In mid-December, following the president’s decision to prepare for offensive operations, 

the Navy activated additional reservists, including its only two combat search 

and rescue helicopter squadrons. As in the air reserves, naval reservists in the 

medical specialties accounted for many of those activated during January and 

February, and by mid-March medical personnel accounted for one-half of all 

U.S. Naval Reserve personnel on active duty. Like their counterparts in air 

reserve medical elements, many backfilled at stateside facilities for deployed 

regular personnel. Stephen Duncan, the assistant secretary of defense for 

reserve affairs, disliked the policy because it required “two personnel moves 

instead of one” and damaged reservists’ morale.9

In its first major call-up since 1950, the Marine Corps Reserve activated 

54 percent of its Selected Reserve, a significantly higher rate than that of the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. They constituted 15 percent of all Marines in 

the combat theater, and took on other missions such as filling in for regular 

battalions in the unit rotation to Okinawa. In terms of equipment, the reserves 

and regulars enjoyed a marked improvement in interchangeability from a 

decade earlier. But the Marine reserves had their share of problems as well. 

Unlike in Korea, this time the Corps kept infantry battalions and regiments 

intact and deployed them as units, which revealed shortcomings in the peacetime training regimen. Because each Marine reserve battalion was scattered 

in company-size or smaller elements over several states, the vast majority 

of monthly weekend drills focused largely on small-unit and company-level 

training. Combined with the recent active-duty experience of many younger 

reservists, particularly among junior officers who had to serve a minimum 

of two years on initial active duty, there was a high degree of competence at 

For the first time in ANG history the majority of guardsmen activated for 

a contingency came from nonflying units, with support specialists such as 

medical, aeromedical evacuation, security police, and firefighters slightly outnumbering airlift, tanker, and fighter unit personnel. In particular, the ANG 

and AFRES activated large numbers of medical personnel to handle expected 

high casualties. By February 1991 the AFRES had called up all of its medical 

units, which comprised nearly 45 percent of AFRES personnel on active duty. 

Many support personnel backfilled at stateside and European installations for 

regulars who deployed to the combat theater. In some cases partially qualified 

regular medics went to Saudi Arabia while fully qualified ANG medics replaced them in stateside hospitals. Reminiscent of the Berlin mobilization in 

1961, reservists were chagrined to be pulled away from families and civilian 

careers only to serve in a nonoperational role.7

The war repeated at least one historical precedent. During the Korean conflict the reserves had been used largely as a replacement pool, a morale-killing 

practice that reserve component leaders vowed never to repeat. During Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm, however, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve 

leaders often accepted the activation of individuals and tailored small elements 

in place of their parent units. Saudi-imposed limits on the number of U.S. personnel that could be based in its territory, along with the logistical difficulty of 

In 1992 the Air Force Reserve activated its first C–17 airlifter associate squadron, 

one of several post–Cold War initiatives that deepened the integration of the reserve 

and regular components in furtherance of the Total Force policy. (Source: National 

Archives) 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

74 75

personnel had been reassigned and its equipment dispersed, but the company 

was miraculously reconstituted, mobilized, and deployed. Similar cases “occurred numerous times,” an Army Reserve historian observed.13

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army Reserve activated a total 

of some 84,000 soldiers, including nearly 650 units and elements and 14,000 

individual reservists who served in a wide variety of combat support (CS) and 

combat service support (CSS) roles (CS refers to combat engineer, military 

police, chemical, and signal units, while CSS includes logistical units such 

as medical, transportation, supply, and ordnance). Tragically, on 25 February 1991, an Iraqi Scud missile hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that 

housed units including the 14th Quartermaster Detachment, an Army Reserve 

water purification outfit from Greensburg, Pennsylvania. The missile killed 

a total of 28. Thirteen of the dead, plus another 43 wounded, were members 

of the detachment, resulting in an 80 percent casualty rate, the highest for 

any American or coalition unit in the conflict and the highest in a U.S. Army 

unit since Vietnam. The episode highlighted another negative aspect of the 

geographically rooted reserve system: one locale might bear the brunt of the 

suffering from a single incident.14

In 1990, 42 percent of the Army’s combat divisions resided in the Guard, as 

did 55 percent of the Army’s nondivisional combat units. Of the seven roundout brigades, six were in the Army National Guard. Ultimately about 63,000 

Army guardsmen in nearly 400 units served on active duty during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm, and roughly 45 percent deployed to the Persian Gulf 

region or Europe (mainly Germany). As it was in the other services, many 

activated personnel who wanted to play their part in the conflict instead backfilled for regulars who went off to war. While many CS and CSS units served 

in the Persian Gulf, the only major Guard combat units to fight were two field 

artillery brigades.15

The no-notice nature of the crisis and the initial decision to rely on 673b 

authority wreaked the greatest havoc on the Army. The first problem arose in 

the logistics field, where the 377th Theater Army Area Command, a reserve 

unit, was the organization designated in war plans to oversee Army logistics in 

a Persian Gulf contingency. It had devoted all its training to that scenario and 

had well-developed relationships with the Third Army, the Army component 

command under Central Command. With no authority to mobilize reservists 

in early August, the Third Army hastily created a logistics headquarters from 

scratch in Saudi Arabia. When access to the reserves came on 22 August, 

Army leaders in the United States were ready to activate the 377th. But Central 

Command opposed that option. It already had pulled together regulars to accomplish the task and was reluctant to try to meld the 377th into that ad hoc 

the company level. The battalions seldom trained together except during their 

annual two weeks of active duty, and often only for a few days at best. A regiment almost never came together as a unit for training. Compounding the challenge of developing higher-level unit skills was the fact that the more-senior 

reserve officers and noncommissioned officers—those expected to lead the 

battalions and regiments—had been off active duty the longest and had never 

served on extended active duty at that level, and so were the most in need of 

opportunities to train at their jobs. A senior Marine officer offered his perspective after Desert Storm: “Companies were great, battalions were marginal, 

regiments were useless.” An example of a “great” Marine unit was Company 

B, 4th Tank Battalion. Activated in late November, it traded in its old M60A1 

tanks for modern M1s and underwent an abbreviated 18-day training program 

on the new Abrams model. Arriving in Saudi Arabia on 19 February, it went 

into battle 5 days later (less than 90 days after its mobilization) and ultimately 

destroyed 59 Iraqi tanks and numerous other armored vehicles without losing 

any of its own.10

Although the Marine Corps, particularly through its long-successful 

Inspector-Instructor program, promoted the mindset that being a Marine was 

more important than whether one was a regular or a reservist, the Desert Storm 

battle assessment team noted that many reservists suspected that regulars did 

not regard them as full teammates. Even if some of the regulars were dismissive of the reservists as a whole and more senior reservists in particular, 

according to historian Mark F. Cancian, many active-duty Marine commanders felt that the younger “reservists were, Marine-for-Marine, better than regulars, even as good as regulars are today. As one regular officer observed, ‘In 

the regulars . . . you’re not going to have squad leaders in their third year of 

chemical engineering.’” Despite policies designed to integrate the two components, there remained a certain amount of tension and mistrust between them.11

In fall 1990 the Coast Guard Reserve marked its 50th year while responding to an involuntary overseas mobilization for the first time in its history. 

Three port security units (PSUs), found only in the reserve, deployed to Saudi 

Arabia and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, where they operated modified Boston 

Whaler boats equipped with machine guns to ensure the safe transit of military 

and civilian cargo.12

Mobilization of the Army Reserve brought an unusual challenge. Beginning in late 1989 the Army initiated Project Quicksilver, a downsizing of its 

forces in response to the thawing of the Cold War. During the massive U.S. 

deployment in the fall of 1990, transportation units were in high demand. One 

heavy equipment truck company (the 660th Transportation Company) had inactivated in October. Two weeks later the Army decided it needed the unit. Its 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

76 77

role, although his words were understood to include them. Other members of 

Congress believed that it was important to test the Total Force policy as the 

nation contemplated force reductions and restructuring in the aftermath of the 

Cold War.18

Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono and other senior leaders held a 

different view: roundout brigades, however well prepared, would need further 

training before deployment, and it was never the intention for them to ship out 

with their divisions. Army plans in July 1990 provided that a regular brigade 

would fill out regular divisions that needed to deploy soon after a crisis arose, 

due to the training requirements the reserve component roundout brigades 

would have to meet. Only in certain circumstances, including a partial mobilization that allowed up to 24 months of active duty, would the roundout 

brigades actually deploy and fight as part of their divisions. In late 1991 a 

congressional report agreed:

Roundout brigades were never intended to deploy without 

some postmobilization training, and it was never envisioned 

that they could deploy immediately in response to a no-notice 

crisis. Unfortunately, a combination of excessive optimism, 

overreliance on numerical readiness ratings, and high-level 

inattention to the actual readiness levels of the roundout 

brigades before Desert Shield/Storm led many to assume that 

they were as ready as similar active Army brigades.19

The report clarified that the postmobilization training should last “at least 

several weeks.” Based on the Army’s readiness ratings of the 48th, 155th, and 

256th, the brigades should have required between 15 to 28 days or 29 to 42 

days of training, depending on circumstances, prior to deployment. That was 

sufficient when war clouds on the horizon allowed time to prepare, as had 

occurred in World War II. But even if the roundout brigades had been ready 

to deploy on short notice, timing would have played a significant role. The 

24th Division began loading on ships on 10 August, nearly two weeks before 

the call-up of reserves began. The 1st Cavalry Division started its movement 

overseas on 4 September, which would have allowed very little time to issue 

mobilization orders, process personnel onto active duty, and marshal equipment for transportation.20

The Army National Guard’s role in the Persian Gulf conflict became inextricably linked to the roundout brigade program, a cornerstone of Total Force 

policy. Once the 48th, 155th, and 256th brigades were on active duty in December, they began an intensive predeployment training period that lasted 

into February 1991. That process brought several readiness issues to light. 

organization, and also viewed the 90-day active-duty limit as a show-stopper 

in a crisis likely to exceed that time frame.16

The problem that garnered the most attention from Congress and the public 

involved the roundout brigades. Two of the major ground units that headed to 

Saudi Arabia early in Desert Shield were the 24th Infantry Division and the 

1st Cavalry Division. Both had National Guard roundouts: the 48th Infantry 

Brigade (Georgia) and the 155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi), respectively. 

But both regular forces deployed without their Guard brigades. Instead, the 

Army filled out the 24th Division with Fort Benning’s school brigade, the 

197th Infantry, which had never trained with its new parent outfit. The 1st 

Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division fleshed out the 1st Cavalry Division. 

Although three Guard roundout brigades—the 48th, the 155th, and the 256th 

Infantry Brigade (Louisiana)—eventually were activated in December, none 

of them went to the Persian Gulf.

Assistant Secretary Duncan believed that “the strong working presumption 

had always been that the roundout brigades would deploy as scheduled after 

the deployment of the remainder of their parent divisions.” But he later felt 

“there is more than a little reason to believe that Schwarzkopf had never supported the roundout concept.” Schwarzkopf acknowledged that disagreements 

over employing Guard brigades generated “heated discussions” with the Army 

staff in Washington, in part due to the duration of 673b activation. Schwarzkopf recalled: “The roundout brigades made no sense for the 180-day call-up. 

. . . These troops would need months of training to be ready for combat; by the 

time we sent them to the Middle East, I’d have to worry about bringing them 

home.” It was a plausible argument.17

The decision to not deploy these roundout brigades became one of the 

thorniest issues of the conflict. The nation’s Total Force policy, the Army’s 

Roundout concept, Weinberger’s First-to-Fight, First-to-Equip program, and 

the heightened emphasis on training and readiness associated with those initiatives had created an expectation in some quarters, as National Guard historian 

Michael Doubler later noted, that the “Roundout brigades should be ready for 

immediate deployment with their parent divisions and require little or no training after mobilization.” Even some senior officials, including Representative 

G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery (D–MS), a retired National Guard major general, 

assumed that the roundouts were ready to deploy on extremely short notice. 

In the excitement of August 1990, after President Bush announced the initial 

call-up, Montgomery declared that the nation’s reservists “are well prepared 

right now, and could be on the job alongside the active forces in a matter of 

days.” While his statement might have applied to certain types of units, it most 

certainly was not accurate with regard to the roundout brigades in a combat 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

78 79

with past callups of similar reserve component units.” (In the next war with 

Iraq, the Army and the Marine Corps would devote that amount of time to 

predeployment training of their reserve combat units.) The experience in the 

first Gulf War, however, sounded the death knell of the Roundout concept. 

One senior colonel at Army National Guard headquarters aptly considered the 

program to be “an anachronism—a Cold War construct that was simply not 

relevant to the circumstances following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.”24

The demobilization of the reserves proved nearly as controversial as the 

roundout issue. During spring and summer 1991, the Pentagon demobilized 

nearly one-quarter million Guard and reserve members, a process it had not performed since Vietnam and not on this scale since Korea. The same tendency of 

the American people that President Truman had noticed after World War II—

rushing to demobilize as energetically as they had mobilized—was still operative. After the fighting ended on 28 February 1991, this pattern played out again, 

with reservists anxious to return to families and civilian jobs. Shortly after the 

cease-fire, General Schwarzkopf established a command redeployment policy of 

“first-in, first-out.” As long as units were not required for operational purposes, 

those that had arrived in the theater first would be the first to be released.25

Duncan viewed Schwarzkopf’s decision as consistent with Total Force 

policy, treating active and reserve units alike. At the same time, the assistant 

secretary was sensitive to the financial hardships many reservists suffered 

when foregoing salaries higher than their military pay grades. Duncan also 

observed that, even in cases “where the first-in, first-out principle was being 

fairly applied,” commanders had a hard time setting and then adhering to 

release dates. A complicating factor was the large number of reserve units that 

performed logistics and maintenance functions, which needed to continue after 

the end of hostilities. And more than 60 percent of such Army units resided in 

its reserve components. By mid-June, when three-fourths of activated reservists had been released, most of those still on duty were in service units.26

Considering that it took five months to complete the buildup of forces in 

the region, the demobilization compared favorably. For most reservists, it was 

the uncertainty rather than the actual time frame that proved most disconcerting. As Senator John Glenn (D–OH) noted: “The main complaint we get . . . 

is people do not know what to plan on. They do not know whether they are 

going back to school, they do not know whether they are going back to their 

business.” Duncan agreed. In April 1991, when about one-fifth of activated 

reservists had been released, he claimed that even a distant return date “would 

be far more welcome to reservists and their civilian employers and families 

than no information at all.” Not surprisingly, demobilization concerns would 

surface again in the decade after 2001.27

A General Accounting Office (GAO) study concluded the Army had “not adequately prepared” its Guard roundout brigades “to be fully ready to deploy 

quickly.” Maintenance skills and gunnery training were key deficiencies. In a 

repeat of past mobilization experiences, too many soldiers in certain critical 

jobs, such as turret mechanics, were untrained, contributing to unacceptably 

low maintenance rates for M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting 

vehicles. The GAO also noted deficiencies among roundout brigade NCOs 

and officers, including lack of leadership training and lapses in standards and 

discipline, which had led to the removal of the 48th’s commander.21

Dental health proved to be another major problem. Because access to dental 

care is very limited during operational deployments, longstanding policy required that soldiers meet certain dental criteria to be eligible for overseas 

duty. Upon activation, one-third of the 48th Infantry’s personnel were deemed 

nondeployable for dental reasons. There was room to argue over whether 

guardsmen or the leadership of the Guard brigades or the Army bore primary 

responsibility for dental health, but the GAO found that there was, inexplicably, no requirement “for the Army to provide routine dental treatment to 

National Guard soldiers during peacetime . . . [and] no requirement for the 

soldiers to maintain healthy teeth as a condition of continued participation in 

the unit.” Thus the root issue was the lack of policies that would ensure dental 

readiness in the reserve component.22

Other factors added to the delay in achieving readiness. The Army had each 

combat brigade go through a 30-day period of training and evaluation at the 

National Training Center, which required travel to and from Fort Irwin, California, but only one brigade could cycle through the center at a time. The 

Guard outfits also underwent Iraq-specific training that many other units conducted after deploying to the theater. In addition, the 256th was still gaining 

experience with the newly acquired Bradley fighting vehicles. Some other 

Guard units, in contrast, did not have to go to Fort Irwin, and the 142nd Field 

Artillery Brigade arrived in Saudi Arabia just one month after its activation.23

After the cease-fire, in spring 1991 discussions turned to how much time 

the Army needed to prepare a reserve brigade for combat. Although six months 

earlier Secretary Cheney had told the House Armed Services Committee that 

60 days was sufficient, by the end of Desert Storm he had revised his thinking: 

“The planning would take into account not that they deploy the first day of 

the war but rather that they get 90 days, 120 days of work-up before you send 

them.” The Army chief of staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, declared to the 

same committee that 90 days was his best estimate. Ultimately the Army had 

validated the 48th Infantry as combat ready 90 days after mobilization, which 

a congressional report viewed as “an unprecedented achievement compared 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

80 81

its intended role during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Committee members 

and volunteers wrote articles for hometown newspapers and conducted interviews for local media, and the Advertising Council launched a massive pro 

bono campaign to highlight employer issues. Most employers supported their 

reservists and many went beyond their legal obligations. One survey found that 

one-third of companies paid the full civilian salaries and benefits of activated 

employees for at least some portion of their Persian Gulf–connected service.30

Despite the nationwide effort to inform both employers and reservists about 

their obligations, there were problems. And, embarrassingly, a few federal 

agencies, including the Postal Service, accounted for an inordinate share of 

employer-related problems. An Air Force-sponsored conference in 1992 at 

Robins AFB, Georgia, highlighted challenges faced by both large and small 

companies, and the hardships placed on activated reservists who worked in 

civilian medical practices. Air Force Reserve leaders learned that in a number 

of cases, reservists had failed to identify themselves as part-time military 

members to their employers—a problem that resurfaced after 2001. Another 

discovery was that some employers had no knowledge of the existence of the 

National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. Likewise, an air reserve historian wrote, “Few reservists knew what their job rights 

were. DESERT STORM rapidly changed that.”31

The Iraq war experience was the first real test of the nation’s Total Force 

policy. The roundout brigade controversy unfortunately brought back old 

conflicts between the regular Army and the Army Guard. Nevertheless, the 

Selected Reserve had responded well overall to the first Total Force callup. And the valuable lessons gained through actual experience would drive 

changes in law and policy to make the reserve components better prepared 

for future mobilizations.

The Base Force, 1990–1992

The Persian Gulf conflict coincided with dramatic changes in U.S. national 

security concerns. For more than 40 years the Soviet Union had represented 

the primary strategic threat, so the reserve component was mainly structured 

to participate in a global war against another superpower. As the Soviets grew 

less threatening in the late 1980s the focus slowly began to turn to more likely 

regional conflicts. The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and the beginning 

of the Warsaw Pact’s disintegration (followed by that of the Soviet Union 

itself) accelerated the shift in U.S. defense policy, leading to the first of four 

major defense reviews in the 1990s. On 2 August 1990, hours after the beginning of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush announced the Base 

The transition to an all-volunteer force had heightened the importance of 

family and civilian employer issues, but in the first large-scale mobilization 

under the new system, existing policies were found wanting in many cases. 

Once activations began in late 1990, each service developed or enhanced its 

own family support programs. In general, programs included briefings or seminars for deploying members and their dependents, publications, hotlines, and 

support groups. In some cases, support groups sprung to life on an ad hoc 

basis when the spouses of deployed members or local retirees took the initiative to assist reserve families. But few observers judged these laudable efforts 

sufficient to the broader need. A Guard historian acknowledged the need for 

comprehensive family support, particularly including childcare, and an Air 

Force Reserve historian noted how disconcerting it was for some mobilized 

personnel to realize there were no family support centers at their reserve installations, and therefore no place where their families could go for assistance. 

Shortly after the conclusion of Desert Storm, the Reserve Forces Policy Board 

declared: “Family support, together with employer support, are perhaps the two 

most important elements of concern.” The board advocated service funding of 

family support programs that would continue even “well after the cessation of 

hostilities, the return of the mobilized personnel, and demobilization.” 28

All the services made strides to improve in this area. A new Army policy 

designated the National Guard the lead agent for family support and required 

National Guard and Army Reserve commanders to operate family assistance 

programs. Following the Navy’s example, the Army developed a family 

reunion program for redeploying personnel. In 1991, for the first time, the 

Army made nonappropriated funds available for reserve family support activities. In 1994 the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) established its 

first family action program advisory council as a means of promoting family 

well-being. The next year the Army Reserve implemented a policy whereby key 

unit personnel and volunteers underwent training at newly established regional 

family program academies. By 1996 the Army Reserve had gone, according 

to one historian, “from nearly zero family support to an extensive system and 

network.” In 1992 the Air Force established a reserve family support program 

and called for family support centers at all 15 of its reserve bases. The AFRES 

created command billets for family support program personnel and authorized 

specialists for its groups and wings at all active and reserve bases.29

Policies that addressed civilian job security were somewhat more effective. 

In 1972 Congress established the National Committee for Employer Support 

of the Guard and Reserve to assist both reserve component members and civilian employers in managing the process of reservists temporarily leaving 

civilian jobs for active duty. Nearly two decades later, the committee fulfilled 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

82 83

to lose 270,000 personnel, reserve strength by 1997 actually would be 50,000 

higher than it had been in 1980. Whereas the reserves had accounted for 30 

percent of the total force that year, under Bush’s plan, the figure would be 36 

percent by the time the cuts were completed in 1997.35

Powell explained the rationale for placing more of certain capabilities in 

the reserves:

Where you have units that have readily transferable 

civilian skills associated with those units—stevedore units, 

transportation units—where it’s not difficult to bring them up 

on active duty and then send them somewhere, and you don’t 

need that kind of capability during normal peacetime activities, 

that’s a prime candidate to put in the reserve force.36

The chairman did not overlook the need for some combat units in the 

reserve components, but, harkening to the Desert Storm roundout controversy, 

he acknowledged they needed “enough time to get ready after mobilization. 

. . . You just can’t call them up on Day 1 and expect them to reach the proficiency of the units that you have in the active force.” (Of course, this was a 

bit of a straw man; no plan suggested that they could be ready to fight on the 

first day.) Focusing on the most controversial aspect of the drawdown, Powell 

observed that for the last two years Congress had forbidden reductions “to 

bring the Army Reserve down to its base force level so that it matches the rest 

of the force.” Cheney stated that the plan, which would eliminate 830 Guard 

and reserve units, had been well thought out, coordinated throughout the Pentagon, and enjoyed the support of the service chiefs as well as the unified 

commanders. The majority of reductions affected units originally designed to 

support active Army divisions fighting the Soviets. Cheney and Powell hoped 

for congressional approval, but in vain.37

A month later Duncan addressed a subcommittee of the House Armed 

Services Committee regarding the reserves’ capabilities and future needs. He 

emphasized that a key principle of the new strategy was to avoid involuntarily bringing “large numbers of reservists to active duty in the initial stages of 

every contingency,” which he thought would cause retention problems if it 

became the norm. Duncan had to admit, however, that following Desert Storm, 

the retention rate among those mobilized was “as high or higher than the rate 

for those members who were not activated.” (This phenomenon reappeared 

after 2001.) The Gulf conflict had enjoyed the support of the American public, 

so reservists felt proud of and rewarded by their service.38

Another major issue for reservists was turbulence, the shift to new locations 

or new missions, often the result of closing installations or dissolving units. 

Force concept, which would reduce the U.S. armed forces by as much as 25 

percent within five years. He envisioned the regular component decreasing 

from roughly 2.1 million to 1.6 million in strength, while the reserve component dropped even more, from over 1.6 million to 906,000. General Colin 

L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, viewed the Base Force as “a 

shift from a solely threat-based force to a threat- and capability-based force” 

that would “maintain certain fundamental capabilities.” He anticipated shifting “certain units or functions into the reserves to avoid the costs associated 

with keeping them in the active force structure.” Assistant Secretary Duncan 

added that “major reliance will continue to be placed upon reserve forces, as 

well as upon active forces.”32

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. response to Saddam Hussein’s 

aggression postponed much of the congressional and public discussion and 

debate surrounding the president’s plan. In fall 1990 the brewing Persian Gulf 

conflict took defense cuts proposed for FY 1991 off the table. Following Operation Desert Storm, in August 1991 President Bush again highlighted the shift 

in U.S. security priorities: 

In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to 

Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a 

smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with 

regional contingencies . . . will shape how we organize, equip, 

train, deploy and employ our active and reserve forces. Today, 

we must reshape our Guard and Reserve forces so that they can 

continue their important contributions in new circumstances.33

Members of Congress, however, ever sensitive to the Guard and reserve 

presence in their districts, refused to approve the Bush administration’s 

desired cuts to the reserve component. In November 1991 the House Armed 

Services Committee led the way in rejecting “the administration’s plan to 

eliminate hundreds of thousands of Guard and Reserve personnel and force 

structure over five years.”34

Four months later Defense Secretary Cheney and General Powell attempted 

to influence a reluctant Congress, albeit indirectly, in a news briefing on the reserves’ balanced drawdown. Explaining that the more likely threat now came 

from regional conflicts, which required a new strategy and a smaller military, 

Cheney affirmed the Guard and reserve would play “an absolutely vital part 

of that new base force that we designed to implement that strategy.” He envisioned a Selected Reserve of 920,000 by 1997, including 6 National Guard 

divisions, 2 cadre divisions, and 11 tactical fighter wings. Attempting to relieve 

congressional anxiety, the secretary pointed out that although the reserves stood 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

84 85

Corps’ traditional focus on missions unrelated to the Cold War, spared it 

from major changes.41

In terms of reserve policy, two of the most important BUR decisions focused 

on the Army. The first clarified the Pentagon’s intent to expand Army Reserve 

CS and CSS capabilities to support the regular Army’s combat units and other 

U.S. forces. The second posited that Guard combat brigades, if mobilized early 

in a crisis, “could provide extra security and flexibility if a second conflict 

arose while the first was still going on.” Furthermore, in the case of prolonged 

operations, “additional Army National Guard combat units will provide the 

basis for the rotational forces.” Thus the BUR declared a policy, albeit without 

fanfare, of the periodic rotation of Army reserve units, especially Army Guard 

combat units, as a part of the operational force. It was not until after 2001 that 

the policy and its implications became obvious, both within and outside of 

the Pentagon. To achieve this goal, the BUR replaced the roundout brigades 

with enhanced readiness brigades or simply, enhanced brigades, with existing roundout brigades becoming the first of 15 enhanced brigades. Planners 

The Bottom-Up Review was the second of four major defense reviews in the 1990s as 

the U.S. defense establishment attempted to reorient following the end of the Cold War. 

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Jr. (right) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Colin L. Powell (left) discuss the review before the House Armed Services 

Committee. (Source: National Archives)

Secretary Duncan pointed out that 93 percent of reserve enlisted members 

and 82 percent of officers resided within a two-hour commute of their units. 

“Unlike active component personnel who can immediately be reassigned to 

other units where their military skills are needed,” reservists were more geographically connected. They were less likely to stay with the service if reassigned to distant units or new missions requiring extensive initial training that 

involved considerable time away from home and a civilian job.39

In October 1992 Congress took action to enhance reserve component readiness in response to the roundout brigade experience of Desert Storm. The 

Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act expanded on and gave 

formal sanction to ongoing Army initiatives known as Bold Shift and Standard Bearer. The efforts focused on improving the quality and preparation of 

officers and NCOs, medical readiness, premobilization unit training levels, 

readiness reporting, active component support to the Guard, and equipment 

compatibility. Some steps, particularly in the equipment realm, would take 

years to fully implement, but progress was immediate and significant.40

The Bottom-Up Review, 1993

By the time President William J. Clinton took office in January 1993, the 

work of defining a post–Cold War strategy remained largely incomplete. 

His secretary of defense, Les Aspin, quickly initiated another major reevaluation of national defense. In September 1993 Aspin announced the 

conclusions of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), so named because the Cold 

War’s end called for a reassessment of the military from the bottom up. It 

concentrated on conventional force structure, addressing the basic question: “How much defense is enough in the post–Cold War era?” With the 

Pentagon focused on North Korea and Iraq as the most likely adversaries, 

the BUR based its analysis on the requirement for the United States “to win 

two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.” Planners 

determined that even under that scenario, a large reduction in force was appropriate. The Air Force would go from 22 general-purpose fighter wings 

to 13; the air reserves would go from 12 to 7 wings. The regular Army 

would shrink from 18 combat divisions to 10, and reserve divisions from 

10 to 8. The BUR set the strength of the Army Reserve at 208,000. With 

the disappearance of the Soviet blue-water navy, the U.S. Naval Reserve’s 

ship augmentation units were unnecessary, leaving the USNR smaller and 

more specialized. The Marine Corps Reserve’s performance in Desert 

Storm—it activated more than half of its Selected Reserve and two-thirds 

of its reserve combat structure with minimal train-up time—along with the 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

86 87

defense. After 2001 that issue came to the fore, with some claiming that the 

change had hobbled the person in charge of reserve affairs at a time when the 

reserves were more important than ever.45

 Congress also tried to solve an acute problem with employment protection 

that arose during and after the Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilization. Under 

the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act of 1968, the burden of proof to obtain 

relief was high. In 1994 Congress passed the Uniformed Services Employment 

and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) to address the increasing strains on 

employer-employee relationships arising from the expanding use of the reserve 

component in an operational role. The revised law applied to voluntary and involuntary service, in peacetime and wartime, within the nation’s borders and 

overseas, and to almost all employers in the United States, including federal, 

state, and local governments and private employers regardless of size. Taking 

note that many federal employees had faced mobilization-related challenges, 

Congress for the first time applied an enforcement mechanism specifically to 

the federal government and also urged that it become a “model employer.” The 

law also authorized double damages for willful employer violations, the right 

to a jury trial, and reimbursement of attorney fees for successful plaintiffs. 

The Supreme Court subsequently placed additional limitations on employer 

defenses typically available in employment discrimination cases.46

The Commission on Roles and Missions, 1994–1995

Concerned about service redundancies and wastefulness, in 1994 Congress created the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, 

which reported on possible changes “in the allocation of roles and missions 

. . . to ensure that the Nation will have properly prepared military forces.” With 

regard to the reserve components, the commission’s 1995 report recommended 

sizing and shaping the reserves to meet new national security needs, furthering 

integration with the regular component, improving training and evaluation, 

and eliminating unnecessary forces.47

The commission called for reorganizing or doing away with some of the 

National Guard combat divisions—at that time there were eight, with a total 

of 110,000 personnel—which a leading Guard historian termed “Cold War 

relics.” Since the regular Army reported a shortfall of 60,000 CS and CSS soldiers, the Guard divisions seemed to provide a ready answer. Although it was 

painful due to long traditions, ARNG leaders agreed to convert the equivalent 

of four combat divisions to CS/CSS units. The commissioners believed that the 

remaining combat divisions and their 50,000 personnel should be eliminated. 

While the enhanced brigades would remain, the commissioners concluded that 

expected that by 1999 these brigades, given high priority for personnel and 

equipment, could deploy within 90 days after mobilization—but not to fill 

out a regular combat division as the roundouts had been designed to do. This 

apparent demotion in status, following close on the heels of the acrimonious 

debate over the roundouts during the Gulf conflict, increased the distrust that 

many guardsmen felt toward the regular Army.42

In a move that undoubtedly contributed to congressional acceptance of the 

Bottom-Up Review’s widespread realignment of reserve forces, for the first 

time senior regular Army leaders and the chiefs of the Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard reached a coordinated decision on major restructuring matters. 

Their 1993 meeting crafted what became known as the Army’s Off-Site Agreement, which led to a large-scale swap of capabilities, with most CS and CSS 

structure at the corps level and above residing in the Army Reserve and most 

combat and division-level support forces in the National Guard. The regular 

Army benefitted by maintaining a higher proportion of combat units in its 

structure, while retaining fuller control over the logistical structure, residing in 

the Army Reserve, needed to support those forces in a contingency. The Army 

Guard would maintain the combat structure and associated logistical units that 

were generally not needed short of a major war. The Army Reserve retained a 

few combat units, such as the 100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry Regiment—the 

most highly decorated battalion of World War II, with 8 Presidential Unit Citations and 21 Medals of Honor.43

In conjunction with the Bottom Up Review, Secretary Aspin reintroduced a 

1992 proposal, first offered by Assistant Secretary Duncan, to increase access 

to the reserve components under Title 10, Section 673b (presidential selected 

reserve call-up authority) by expanding its two periods of 90 days of active duty 

to 180 each. That would allow the president to activate selected reserve components without declaring a national emergency for a total of 360 days without 

congressional approval. Congress passed a compromise in the FY 1995 Defense 

authorization act that granted 270 days, which provided enough time for predeployment training (likely three months) followed by six months of availability 

for operational commitment. One year later, in late 1995, President Clinton employed the 270-day option for the Balkans.44

Ever since the creation of the assistant secretary of defense for reserve 

affairs, the officeholder had, as one RAND study observed, “operated with relative autonomy.” But in 1994 a broad defense reorganization put that position, 

along with the assistant secretaries for force management policy and health 

affairs, under the control of the newly created under secretary of defense 

(USD) for personnel and readiness (P&R). This interposition of a new layer 

of management limited the access of the assistant secretary to the secretary of 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

88 89

the need to upgrade weapon systems, exploit the revolutions in military and 

business affairs, and remain prepared for unexpected threats, General Charles 

C. Krulak, the Marine Corps commandant, considered the exercise “simply a 

continuation of the national ‘demobilization’ planning” since the end of the 

Cold War.50

Consistent with the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1995 commission, 

the QDR concluded that, with the Soviet Union dissolved, a large strategic 

reserve was no longer required. It recommended cuts of 45,000 Army Guard/

Army Reserve personnel and an acceleration of the planned conversion of 

four of the Guard’s eight combat divisions to CS/CSS roles. But neither 

ARNG nor U.S. Army Reserve senior leaders had been involved in the 

final decisions, and the QDR announcement generated, in the words of 

Representative Stephen E. Buyer (R–IN), an “explosion of criticism,” especially from the National Guard. In July 1997 witnesses before his House 

subcommittee made clear that although the Army considered that the 

Guard’s 15 enhanced brigades had a legitimate role in fulfilling national 

security requirements (and could meet the 90-day mobilization timeline), 

the Army’s greatest need was for increased Army Guard CS/CSS assets. 

Ultimately another meeting of Army leaders in June 1997 delayed the bulk 

of the proposed ARNG/USAR manpower cuts to 2001 and beyond, but 

confirmed that the Army Reserve would continue to restructure itself to 

provide CS/CSS to the Army and other U.S. forces.51

Further Steps toward Regular-Reserve Integration

During the 1980s several of the reserve components began a de facto transition from a strategic toward an operational reserve—later termed a part of 

the operational force—but that evolution became increasingly evident in the 

1990s. This was especially true for aviation units due to the air-centric nature 

of many operations following Desert Storm. In their 1997 written testimony to 

Representative Buyer’s House subcommittee, Pentagon officials claimed that 

the “Air Force has the most integrated total force on a day-to-day basis.” The 

air reserves were in high demand, typified by their participation in humanitarian missions, such as support to the Kurds in Iraq beginning in 1991, and, 

later in the decade, the combat operations over Iraq known as Northern Watch 

and Southern Watch. Air reserve forces conducted operations in the Balkans, 

Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti and supported domestic relief efforts following 

Hurricane Andrew in 1992.52

From 1991 to 2001 the regular Air Force drew down from 510,000 to 

353,000 personnel. During the same period the ANG sustained only modest 

they had to include active-duty advisers and full-time military technicians if the 

Army wanted them to deploy within 90 days, as the Bottom-Up Review had 

recommended.48

To enhance integration, the report argued that reserve units should be 

assigned to missions they could accomplish within approved mobilization 

and deployment timelines. The commission observed that the “most effective 

Reserve units have strong, recurring association and cooperation” with regular 

counterparts through assignment to specific unified commands and from training with active units. It acknowledged that reserve units might not be able to 

perform as many or as varied tasks as regular units, but recommended they 

should train “to perform specific tasks to the same standards” as regulars. In 

1996 Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer affirmed an integrated role 

for the reserves in the service’s long-term strategy, Army Vision 2010: 

Reductions in the active force have made the reserve 

component even more essential to meeting the Nation’s needs 

across the full spectrum of operations, from disaster relief to 

war. They are equal partners in meeting the challenges of the 

21st Century and must be trained and equipped with modern, 

compatible equipment to perform assigned missions with their 

active duty counterparts and coalition partners.49

Reimer’s reference to “assigned missions” indicated an emphasis on accomplishing a particular task rather than achieving broader capabilities, in line 

with the commission’s viewpoint.

The Quadrennial Defense Review, 1996–1997

One of the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions 

was that the nation should comprehensively reevaluate its strategy every four 

years. The Clinton administration conducted the first Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR)—and the fourth defense reassessment since the end of the 

Cold War—between November 1996 and May 1997. The QDR attempted to 

balance the requirements of strategy with available resources, looking ahead 

from 1997 to 2015. In addition to maintaining the recent focus on the ability 

to fight two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts, the updated strategy emphasized promoting regional stability, deterring regional aggressors, and being 

ready to respond across the spectrum of conflict, including what it termed 

smaller-scale contingency operations. The latter recognized that U.S. forces 

were increasingly engaging in operations short of major wars—the Army 

counted 25 such deployments from 1990 to 1997. While the QDR stressed 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

90 91

gave prime positions, such as command of units and ships and flag rank promotions, to TARs while not subjecting them to unwanted deployments like 

other personnel.54

Over the course of the 1990s the active Marine Corps went down from 

190,000 to 174,000. The Marine Reserve Forces commander, Maj. Gen. James 

E. Livingston, reasoned that if half of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve had 

been activated during the Persian Gulf War, then a regular Corps reduced 

by 16,000 personnel could not expect to fulfill the nation’s two-major-regional-conflict strategy without mobilizing an even greater percentage. He 

envisioned that “reservists will have to commit to activation in scenarios that 

fall far short of ‘the big one.’” Furthermore, Livingston advocated an end to 

the skepticism of many regulars regarding reserve readiness and capabilities. 

Seconding the suggestion of the Marine Corps commandant, General Carl E. 

Mundy Jr., Livingston endorsed the idea of erasing “the ‘R’ from the designation of Marines” in the reserve: “All Marines would then be ‘USMC.’”55

Livingston did not believe the 4th Marine Division’s battalions and the 4th 

Marine Aircraft Wing’s squadrons were “as prepared as their regular counterparts to assault a hostile shore tomorrow. Nevertheless, the current structure 

of the Marine Reserve component—together with enhanced training opportunities—will enable the Marine Corps to realistically rely upon its reserve 

for prompt introduction into hostilities.” He listed several recommendations 

to enhance combat readiness, including lengthening the traditional twoweek annual training period to four weeks, which might be split into two 

active-duty periods of two weeks each, approximately six months apart. 

In 1994 the Corps renamed its Full-Time Support program as the Active 

Reserve (AR) and made changes to provide better professional development 

and promotion opportunities for those full-time reserve Marines. But Brig. 

Gen. Ronald D. Richard, the assistant deputy chief of staff for manpower 

and reserve affairs at Headquarters Marine Corps, assured everyone that the 

system of active component inspector-instructors “is a proven method of 

training Reserve units and will remain in place.”56

In the mid-1990s the Coast Guard took regular-reserve integration to its 

logical conclusion, largely merging the two components into one and eliminating reserve units. The post–Cold War drawdown, which reduced the service’s 

drilling reserve billets by a third, motivated changes to ensure the Coast 

Guard could meet its responsibilities. An experiment at San Diego offered a 

promising new approach, with reserve units collocating with regular counterparts. A combined administrative office handled such functions (which typically consumed up to 25 percent of reservists’ duty time), while innovative 

training initiatives ensured mobilization readiness. During 1994–1995 the 

reductions, from 117,000 to 108,000 personnel. Moreover, the Air Guard increased its full-time support program—already the highest among the reserve 

components—from 28 percent in 1991 to nearly 31 percent a decade later. The 

ANG already had a history of providing volunteers on short operational tours 

to help meet U.S. Air Force commitments. In the 1990s the Guard did even 

more, in locales ranging from Iraq to Africa to the Balkans, typically deploying 

part-time guardsmen for 15 to 30 days while full-time support personnel often 

served longer tours. In most of these cases, real-world deployments took the 

place of the standard 15-day annual training period. Often, Guard aircraft and 

personnel from multiple units deployed as a package that formed a “rainbow” 

unit, such as the amalgamation of parts from four ANG F–16C Falcon squadrons that went to Turkey in late 1993 to deter Saddam Hussein. In perhaps the 

Air Guard’s most significant integrative development of the decade, between 

1993 and 1997 the ANG assumed the entire fighter-interceptor continental air 

defense mission and took command, from Air Combat Command, of the First 

Air Force headquartered at Tyndall AFB, Florida. In 1991 the AFRES accepted full responsibility for the Air Force’s weather reconnaissance mission. A 

year later the command activated its first C–17 Globemaster III airlifter associate squadron. At the start of 1993 the AFRES activated its first space operations squadron, and in fall 1994 the associate mission expanded to include 

KC–135 tanker aircraft. At about that time, the Air Force stopped using the 

term associate in the official designation of AFRES units, an indication of the 

program’s maturity.53

In the half-decade following Desert Storm, the U.S. Navy improved the 

integration of its regular and reserve components. Rear Adm. Thomas F. Hall, 

who later became the longest-serving assistant secretary of defense for reserve 

affairs (2002–2009), saw this process as going hand-in-hand with his component’s forward-looking study, Vision 2000. During his tenure as Naval Reserve 

chief, his component’s strength declined by one-third, from about 133,000 to 

96,000, but it also deployed ten Naval Reserve guided missile frigates overseas during FY 1995. The ability to prepare for lengthy deployments that were 

typically the purview of full-time sailors largely resulted from a policy that 

authorized reservists to combine required drill periods for longer, but less frequent, duty. The Navy also saw reservists’ civilian skills as an increasingly 

valuable resource and in the mid-1990s established a database with that information, a precursor to a broader initiative throughout the reserve components 

after 2001. Integration was not always a smooth process. The proportion of the 

Naval Reserve’s full-time Training and Administration of the Reserves personnel remained steady at 17 percent, but Admiral Hall recalled the “TAR Wars,” 

an “acid-like” reaction from regulars and part-time reservists to a system that 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 4: 1990 – 2000

92 93

to have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and 

equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are set for the unit—in peace and war.” He emphasized it was the 

responsibility of senior leaders throughout the active and reserve components “to 

create the necessary environment for effective integration.” Even prior to the 

Cohen memorandum, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, in one of his first decisions as chief of naval operations, directed the merger of the Navy’s regular 

and reserve flag officer lists—an example of removing the structural barriers 

to which Cohen alluded. In 1998 the implementation of the green ID card 

for both active and reserve personnel represented another symbolic step in 

keeping with Cohen’s directive.60

The significant advances towards integration and the increasing reliance 

on the reserves as an operational force grew ever more apparent during the 

Balkans deployments. As communist regimes unraveled in Europe after the 

fall of the Berlin Wall, so too did the ethnically diverse state of Yugoslavia. 

When the country broke apart and conflicts arose, the United States joined 

several peacekeeping efforts and combat operations. Reserve component units 

and personnel participated, with most of those called up under presidential selected reserve call-up authority coming from the Army Reserve and ARNG. 

The other components generally met their much smaller requirements largely 

through volunteers. The operations included peacekeeping in Bosnia (Joint 

Endeavor, 1995–1996), stabilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Joint Guard, 

1996–1998), an air campaign against Serbia (Allied Force, 1999), and peace 

enforcement in Kosovo (Joint Guardian, 1999–2013). Although these operations 

were much smaller in scale than Desert Shield/Desert Storm, reserve components played a significant role due to the high concentration of some capabilities, such as civil affairs and psychological operations, in the reserves, and due 

to the high operational tempo experienced by shrinking regular forces. During 

1997, for instance, about one-fourth of the U.S. Army’s personnel in Bosnia 

were from the reserve components. The new paradigm went a step further in the 

long-running Joint Guardian operation, in which ARNG divisions from Pennsylvania, Indiana, California, Texas, and Virginia contributed units for six-month 

tours of duty, spelling regular brigades in the rotation. The once-moribund IRR 

also played a significant role: between 1990 and 1997, more than 37,000 of 

its members participated as volunteers in various Balkan contingencies. At the 

time, the IRR could be involuntarily called only by use of mobilization authority or a declaration of national emergency. Congress finally changed the law in 

the FY 1998 Defense authorization act to permit IRR call-up under presidential 

selected reserve call-up authority. PSRC soon changed to presidential reserve 

call-up to reflect the expansion beyond the Selected Reserve.61

Coast Guard expanded the San Diego experiment across the service, despite the 

policy’s one significant drawback: integration eliminated the traditional reserve 

command structure, depriving most reserve officers of command opportunities 

and calling into question the roles of senior enlisted reservists.57

In 1994 Rear Adm. Robert E. Sloncen became the first Coast Guard reservist to be appointed chief of the Office of Readiness and Reserve. Later in 

the year the Coast Guard commandant, Admiral Robert E. Kramek, formally 

introduced service-wide integration under a moniker coined by reservists in 

1992—“Team Coast Guard”—which consisted of “one set of missions, one 

command structure, and one administrative structure.” Rear Adm. Steven E. 

Day, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR), believed “there were some pockets 

of successes with integration and there were some pockets of not such good 

success.” Reservists sometimes felt that active-duty units only reluctantly embraced them, or did not fully understand their different requirements. Coast 

Guard Reserve Rear Adm. Richard W. Schneider suggested going even further, 

with legislative changes that “would allow active duty personnel to swing in 

and out of reserve status based on individual personal circumstances such as 

maternity leave, post-graduate opportunities, etc. Likewise, reservists need 

easier ways to go on active duty.” Schneider’s recommendations anticipated those of later studies, including the 2005–2008 congressionally mandated 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR).58

Depending on context and reserve component, views differed on the timing 

of the reserve components’ transition from a strategic to an operational reserve. 

But in November 1999 Rear Adm. Carlton D. Moore, USCGR, the Pacific 

Area’s reserve chief, already considered the Coast Guard Reserve to be an 

operational reserve: “With few exceptions, field commanders openly state that 

they could not carry out their missions today without their reservists.” Lending 

credence to his conclusion: reservists comprised nearly 100 percent of the 

Coast Guard’s expeditionary warfare forces: harbor defense, naval coastal 

warfare, and port security units.59

Both civilian and uniformed leaders in the Defense Department appreciated 

the importance of eliminating barriers to active-reserve integration. To mark the 

25th anniversary of the Total Force policy, highlight accomplishments to date, and 

encourage further improvements, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen called 

on the Pentagon’s leadership to remove “all residual barriers structural and cultural” that stood in the way of integration and create a “seamless Total Force.” 

Cohen’s memorandum, prepared by the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs Deborah R. Lee and released in September 1997, was arguably 

one of his most significant directives. He believed integration must be founded 

on the “conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership of all levels 
Forging a Total Force

94

In spring 1999 the ANG and Air Force Reserve (now widely referred to as 

the AFR rather than the AFRES) participated in Operation Allied Force, the air 

campaign undertaken to protect ethnic Kosovars from the Serbian army and 

the most intense U.S. action in the Balkans during the 1990s. On 27 April, one 

month after the start of the operation, Defense Secretary Cohen announced an 

involuntary call-up of air reservists, with a first increment of 2,000 personnel 

and 47 aircraft from nine air refueling units. Five of these units were ANG, four 

were AFR; Cohen underscored the necessary reliance on these units when he 

noted that 55 percent of U.S. air-refueling assets were in the reserves. Air reservists also conducted airlift and special operations missions, in addition to support 

functions like logistics and communications. Beginning on the night of 21 May, 

air guardsmen conducted strikes against Serb forces as part of the 104th Expeditionary Operations Group, a rainbow unit including guardsmen from A–10 

units in Massachusetts, Michigan, and Idaho. The air reserves’ role had become 

indispensable even in a limited operation such as Allied Force.62

_______ Conclusion _______

Beginning with the Persian Gulf conflict, the United States became more 

dependent on the reserve component, as the Total Force policy had envisioned 

two decades earlier. Driven initially in part by the desire to ensure the nation 

would be fully behind any commitment of the military to war, the shift gathered 

steam due to the fiscal savings that accrued from moving missions and structure to the reserves. The integration of the active and reserve forces advanced 

measurably in all services, but unsurprisingly, the Army, the largest service, experienced the greatest challenges and most dramatic changes. The transition of 

the Army Guard’s primary role to one of providing combat units to be deployed 

90 days after activation—sooner than ever before—and of the Army Reserve’s 

role of providing indispensable CS/CSS units facilitated the service of both in 

the Balkans as a part of the operational force. Congress assisted this evolution 

with legislation in 1995 that authorized 270-day PSRC activations and the 1998 

law that provided access to the Individual Ready Reserve without a partial mobilization. The effectiveness of these initiatives and the readiness of the reserve 

components to play a vital role in a lengthy major war would be tested much 

sooner than anyone anticipated.
97

_______ CHAPTER 5 _______

Mobilizing for the Global War on Terrorism,

2001–June 2003

The attacks of 11 September 2001 hastened the transition that had been

underway for years, making the reserve components an even more integral part of the nation’s operational force. Citizen-soldiers responded to new 

and extensive operational requirements in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom) 

and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom) and to protecting lives and critical infrastructure at 

home (Noble Eagle). In each case, reservists were among the operation’s earliest participants. Furthermore, the attacks highlighted the mission of homeland 

security and led to increased roles for the National Guard and Coast Guard. 

With this heightened use, perennial issues—such as mobilization/demobilization, active-reserve integration, medical/dental/family readiness, and civilian 

employer support—assumed a new urgency.

Homeland Security and the 9/11 Attacks

Around the turn of the millennium, homeland security and homeland 

defense became household terms as the threat of terrorist activities on U.S. soil 

increased. In 1999 and 2000, Michèle A. Flournoy, a former principal deputy 

assistant secretary (and future under secretary of defense for policy), led a 

study preparing for the statutorily required 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

In a far-reaching assessment, her group recommended that the National Guard 

assume a leading role in responding to terrorist attacks in the continental 

United States. The new requirement, termed consequence management, would 

become the primary responsibility of the forces assigned, with deployment in 

support of theater contingency plans only a secondary mission.1

Some thought that Flournoy’s assessment called into question the National Guard’s traditional standing as part of the nation’s first line of defense. 

The QDR study group admitted that the transformation of a portion of the 

Guard’s force to focus on the homeland consequence management mission 

held “the greatest potential domestic political volatility, as well as significant 

fiscal impact” of any of their recommendations. Acknowledging the “huge 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

98 99

The terrorist attacks launched by al-Qaeda on the morning of 11 September 

2001 killed nearly 3,000 people and shocked the nation and the world. Within 

hours, citizen-soldiers responded in force. In the District of Columbia, officials 

sent out in small groups more than 600 local Army National Guard personnel to 

help police provide security. In New York, Governor George E. Pataki brought 

into state active duty more than 4,200 traditional guardsmen, in addition to the 

nearly 2,000 who already served in full-time support billets. By mid-afternoon 

on the 11th, guardsmen set up a medical triage center and electrical generators 

one block east of Ground Zero, while others established a casualty collection 

point at a nearby sports complex. That evening, an ARNG/Air Guard civil 

support team arrived and began collecting air samples, which calmed fears 

that the airliners might have carried chemical or biological agents. Guard field 

artillery and infantry units established a security cordon across lower Manhattan. The next day four military police companies mobilized to secure the Pentagon and other key facilities in the Washington area. Army guardsmen in New 

York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania worked from New York City armories to 

provide logistics support, security, and transportation.4

Army Reserve members responded as well. In Flushing, New York, the 

77th Regional Support Command reacted quickly, delivering support items to 

Three days after the 11 September 2001 attacks, President George W. Bush implemented 

partial mobilization, authorizing the involuntary call-up of Ready Reserve members 

for up to two years. (Source: National Archives, photo by Eric Draper)

change in thinking on the part of 

the National Guard” that her ideas 

required, Flournoy still believed 

that the reserve component “is 

the one part of the force structure, 

particularly the National Guard’s 

ground forces, that I feel needs 

to be considered for major restructuring.” Her group’s work, 

released in April 2001, mirrored 

the George W. Bush administration’s independently developed 

restructuring initiative that was 

part of the 2001 QDR. Although 

many defense observers anticipated the QDR would initiate major 

changes, even a transformation 

within the Pentagon, its release 

on 30 September was overshadowed by events. Nonetheless, the 

report’s call for the department 

to “institutionalize definitions 

of homeland security, homeland 

defense, and civil support” helped 

clarify domestic security challenges facing the nation.2

Congress underscored the growing importance of the reserve component in 

the fiscal year 2000 Defense authorization act by elevating the reserve chiefs to 

three-star rank. Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Plewes, the U.S. Army Reserve Command 

commanding general, noted that the new rank gave the Army Reserve chief 

“a comparable voice” at the resources table and brought “a great deal more 

respect to the position.” Vice Adm. John B. Totushek, the Naval Reserve Force 

commander from 1998 to 2003, viewed the decision as proof of “the value of 

the Reserve Component to the active force.” His successor, Vice Adm. John 

G. Cotton, said the change put him “at the table where the money decisions are 

made.” The first three-star Air National Guard director, Lt. Gen. Daniel James 

III, felt that the promotion “levels the playing field rank wise. . . . There are a 

lot of generals in Washington, but the decision makers . . . wear three stars.” 

The additional clout proved advantageous in the mobilizations to come.3

In preparation for the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, Michèle A. Flournoy, a 

former principal deputy assistant secretary 

of defense, led a study that recommended 

the National Guard assume the mission of 

responding to domestic terrorist attacks. 

(DoD photo by Scott Davis)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

100 101

vided nearly half of the aeromedical evacuation assets and the vast majority 

of mortuary affairs support that arrived immediately after the attacks. Reserve 

airlift crews delivered critical supplies, equipment, and personnel including 

federal emergency response teams, excavators, search dogs, and fire trucks. 

Under Operation Noble Eagle, AFR F–16 fighters flew combat air patrols over 

major U.S. cities or stood ready on ground alert, with reserve airborne warning 

and control system aircraft, tanker aircraft (KC–135s), and tactical airlifters 

(C–130s) providing support for the new air defense mission. ANG fighters 

(F–15 Eagles and F–16 Fighting Falcons) also conducted combat air patrols 

over 30 major U.S. cities and maintained alert at locations around the nation, 

furnishing the bulk of the greatly expanded contintental air defense effort. In 

addition, ANG airlift, security forces, civil engineering, and communications 

assets either responded directly or went on alert.7

The air patrols over major U.S. cities required some 265 aircraft and 12,000 

airmen (the vast majority from the ANG and AFR), a commitment that the 

U.S. Air Force chief of staff, General John P. Jumper, viewed as unsustainable. 

By comparison, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) required the support of 

some 14,000 airmen. As a sense of security gradually returned, in the spring 

of 2002 the Air Force transitioned from daily air patrols to random ones and 

implemented a tiered alert program that provided more flexibility. Between 

11 September 2001 and June 2004, U.S.-based jet fighters intercepted roughly 

1,500 airplanes due to security concerns.8

The 11 September attacks brought homeland security to the forefront of 

defense department priorities. The nearly completed 2001 QDR already envisioned the reserve component (in particular the National Guard) playing 

a significant role, with its presence in about 5,000 communities nationwide 

making it a natural fit for many homeland security tasks. The Guard had long 

prized its combat role, however, and found an ally in Secretary of the Army 

Thomas E. White. In early 2002 the retired brigadier general expressed his 

view that homeland security should be “a mission for the Guard, but not the

mission for the Guard.” The reliance of the regular forces on the Guard to meet 

other needs was highlighted by the 29th Infantry Division (Light). In October 

2001 it carried out the largest reserve overseas deployment since the Persian 

Gulf conflict when it took over the U.S. operation in Bosnia for six months.9

Within a week of President Bush’s late September request, about 7,000 

guardsmen (mostly ARNG) began providing security at some 440 U.S. airports, 

a role that continued until May 2002 (in Title 32 status).That duty heightened 

public awareness of the Guard, and the ARNG chief of staff, Col. Charles P. 

Baldwin, considered the mission to have been “incredibly successful.” In early 

2002 President Bush declared the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, a 

assist in the effort at the World Trade Center. Other U.S. Army Reserve personnel, including emergency preparedness liaison officers, crisis action teams, 

and military police units, went into action in New York City and Washington 

or readied themselves at home unit installations. On 14 September, President Bush announced a partial mobilization of the reserves. Three days later 

soldiers from the Army Reserve’s 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary 

Affairs) from Puerto Rico were on duty at the north parking lot of the Pentagon. By 26 September nearly two hundred 311th personnel were serving, all 

of them on mobilization orders.5

On 9/11 the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) suddenly became responsible for 

tightening security at some 350 U.S. ports, a mission made even more daunting by the fact that maritime and port security had been neglected during the 

1990s. The Coast Guard recalled upwards of 3,000 reservists, its largest mobilization since World War II. Many of them served in the port security units, 

almost entirely manned by reservists; the first of these deployed to New York 

City by 14 September, where it remained on duty for six weeks patrolling the 

Hudson River and adjoining bay areas.6

The Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) commander and chief of the Air 

Force Reserve, Lt. Gen. James E. Sherrard III, noted that his command proOn the afternoon of 14 September 2001 Craig Duehring, principal deputy assistant 

secretary of defense for reserve affairs, conducted a DoD news briefing on the 

president’s decision to implement partial mobilization for the first time since 1991. 

(Source: Defense Imagery Management Operations Center, photo by R. R. Ward)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

102 103

ciently funded to carry out its post-9/11 mission, Congress boosted its budget 

20 percent to $6 billion. One year later Coast Guard Selected Reserve strength 

had increased 50 percent, from 5,200 to 7,800.13

Operation Enduring Freedom

In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States took aim at the Taliban 

regime in Afghanistan, which provided a safe haven to al-Qaeda. On 14 September, President Bush authorized the partial mobilization of up to 50,000 

ready reservists for up to 24 months (under Title 10, U.S. Code Section 

12302). The initial service calls were 10,000 Army, 13,000 Air Force, 3,000 

Navy, 7,500 Marine Corps, and 2,000 Coast Guard. On 7 October 2001 the 

United States launched air and missile attacks to initiate Operation Enduring 

Freedom—the U.S.-coalition campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 

Afghanistan. Ground forces joined the campaign 12 days later, and Secretary 

of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld increased the mobilization caps for the Army 

to 34,000; Air Force to 40,600; and Navy to 14,400. Those mobilizations were 

in addition to ongoing presidential reserve call-up, or PRC, activations for 

operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo. The ARNG, 

for example, during FY 2002 deployed 6,700 personnel to Bosnia, Kosovo, 

Macedonia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.14

By the end of October 2001, ARNG elements mobilized for OEF included 

linguists and intelligence specialists from Utah’s 142nd Military Intelligence 

Battalion. In December, Utah’s 19th Special Forces Group entered active 

service, and only a month later it began arriving in Uzbekistan. In April 2002 

detachments from the 19th searched caves in eastern Afghanistan for enemy 

combatants. In January, Alabama’s 20th Special Forces Group entered active 

duty and provided security for government officials and supply convoys in 

Afghanistan. In spring 2002 the United States transferred more than 500 captured enemy combatants to detainee facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A 

detachment from Maryland’s 115th Military Police Battalion became the first 

guardsmen assigned to the joint task force there. One-third of them had significant experience as corrections or police officers, and since 9/11 personnel 

from that unit had guarded the Pentagon and backfilled for active-duty soldiers 

at Fort Stewart, Georgia.15

The air reserves participated in OEF from the outset, with AFR-crewed 

C–17s conducting combat airdrops and humanitarian missions and C–5 airlifters and KC–10 Extender tankers contributing heavily to the air bridge from the 

continental United States to Europe and Southwest Asia. Two weeks into the 

operation, AFR fighters conducted the first F–16 combat sorties of OEF. By 

National Special Security Event that warranted heightened ground and air security measures. At the peak of the games more than 5,000 guardsmen served 

at ground checkpoints, airports, and other stations. And in the Olympic competition itself, three bobsledding guardsmen contributed to two U.S. medals, 

one gold and the other bronze.10

After 9/11 guardsmen served in full state status, federally funded state 

status under the governor’s control (Title 32, U.S. Code), or full federal status 

(Title 10, U.S. Code). The fact that thousands mobilized under state authorities rather than federal authority limited the benefits they would receive for 

service. Because Title 32 did not subject personnel to worldwide deployment, 

guardsmen earned no credit toward veteran status, which conveyed benefits 

such as home loans and hiring preference for jobs. Nonetheless, Guard leaders 

urged President Bush to keep guardsmen in Title 32 status for most homeland 

security missions, as it allowed governors to fulfill their traditional role of 

maintaining security within their borders. Moreover, federalizing the Guard 

for this mission would have run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, a 

statute that prohibited the use of federal troops for domestic law enforcement. 

Finally, as the Adjutant General Association president, Maj. Gen. John Kane 

of Idaho, stated, “Routinely federalizing the Guard for homeland security missions erodes the control of the governor over our soldiers and airmen. It also 

degrades our training and readiness for other state emergencies and for overseas missions in support of the Army and Air Force.”11

By now it was clear that “other state emergencies” could include the unthinkable. In 2002 President Bush authorized an increase, from 32 to 55, in 

the number of Guard civil support teams, organized to respond to the use of 

weapons of mass destruction. Each team consisted of 22 ARNG and ANG 

members trained in 14 specialties and prepared to test for nuclear, biological, or chemical agents in the air, soil, and water that could prove harmful to 

emergency responders or the public. Upon certification, a team was prepared 

to conduct operations within and outside its state under the Guard’s national 

response plan.12

Homeland security responsibilities were intrinsic to the Coast Guard, but 

it had greatly neglected that mission as a result of budget cuts in the 1990s. 

After 9/11, however, the USCG experienced the most dramatic proportional increases in manpower and money of any of the armed forces. On 9/11, 

the Coast Guard Reserve had one-third fewer reservists than it did a decade 

earlier. Moreover, unlike the Defense Department services, the Coast Guard’s 

active component was fully committed during peacetime with environmental, 

humanitarian, and other duties on a day-to-day basis. As a result, it lacked the 

surge capability of its sister services. Realizing the Coast Guard was not suffi-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

104 105

enemy prisoners of war. The ARNG also contributed aviation and linguistic 

support to the task force that searched for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 

By late March the National Guard had mobilized and deployed 95,000 personnel for Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom—as many as 

had deployed for the Korean conflict 50 years earlier. And in Iraq, for the first 

time since the Korean War, a Guard infantry battalion (1st Battalion, 293rd 

Infantry from Indiana) went into combat as a unit. In early April an Arizona 

truck company became one of the first U.S. Army transportation companies 

to be based in Iraq and was among the first ARNG units to reach Baghdad.17

The Army Reserve mobilized various combat support and combat service 

support units for Iraq. Deploying in January 2003, the 362nd Quartermaster 

Battalion (Petroleum Supply) hauled millions of gallons of fuel and water in 

support of the Army’s V Corps. The 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role 

Bridge), in support of the Marines’ advance on Baghdad, threw up hasty 

bridges across the Diyala and Euphrates Rivers under enemy fire. The 323rd 

Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) deployed to Iraq in April 2003 and put 

out oil pipeline and other fires, inspected structures, and provided base fire 

department and aircraft crash-rescue services. In February the 445th Medical 

Detachment (Veterinary Services) mobilized, arriving in Kuwait in May. The 

detachment, which had an area of operations spanning ten countries from 

Kuwait to Kyrgyzstan, cared for military working dogs and handled food inspection quality assurance for more than 18 million meals over the next nine 

months. Military police units established an enemy prisoner-of-war camp and 

provided security for an air base.18

The ANG and AFR were equally committed to the fight in Iraq. In the 

opening weeks of OIF highly experienced ANG A–10 and F–16 pilots operating over the western Iraqi desert provided close air support to special 

operations forces. Of the 60 A–10s in combat operations during OIF’s opening 

phase, 48 belonged to the Air Guard. Most significant, Air Guard A–10s accounted for 60 percent of the Iraqi targets destroyed by all USAF fighter 

aircraft. In addition, 72 of 124 Air Force C–130 transports belonged to the 

ANG. Guard C–130 aircrews flew the first airlift of humanitarian supplies 

into Baghdad International Airport. The ANG accounted for one-third of all 

Air Force tanker aircraft deployed for OIF while continuing to support Noble 

Eagle requirements at home. Moreover, the Air Force deployed the 116th Air 

Control Wing—its only “blended wing,” manned by active component and 

ANG personnel—sending 9 of its 11 E–8C intelligence collection aircraft to 

the Central Command theater. In addition, the ANG provided 3,500 combat 

support personnel for OIF beginning in March 2003, accounting for 27 percent 

of total USAF civil engineering assets in Iraq.19

late October EC–130E aircraft of the Pennsylvania Air Guard’s 193rd Special 

Operations Wing were broadcasting music and information to many Afghans. 

In January 2002 South Carolina’s 169th Fighter Wing deployed six F–16CJ 

aircraft and more than 200 personnel to Qatar, conducting air-to-ground operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda elements and returning home in early April. 

Given the long distances from Southwest Asia bases to Afghanistan, air refueling was indispensable for U.S. and coalition fighter operations. By April 2003 

the ANG had flown nearly one-quarter of OEF fighter sorties over Afghanistan 

and one-fifth of the tanker sorties. Meanwhile the AFR and ANG were still participating in Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch (both over Iraq) 

and Bosnia/Kosovo missions, as well as Noble Eagle at home. By July 2002 

the number of federalized air reservists (ANG and AFR) exceeded 30,000, 

and nearly 8,000 volunteers served. While some reservists demobilized, in 

September 2002 the Air Force announced the extension of more than 14,000 

mobilized ANG and AFR personnel into their second year due to ongoing operational requirements at home and abroad. Fully two-thirds of the extended 

reservists filled security forces billets, many of whom went on to serve during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003.16

Operation Iraqi Freedom

In October 2002, following congressional approval of the use of force to 

topple the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the United States began preparing for offensive action. Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 19 March 2003 

with air and missile strikes, followed soon after by a ground invasion. The 

coalition assault consisted primarily of U.S. and British forces, with smaller 

contributions from 40 other nations. The force was roughly half the size of that 

employed in Desert Storm, but it succeeded in capturing Baghdad and ousting 

Hussein from power on 9 April. Despite the much smaller numbers of troops 

involved, the operation relied heavily on reserve support. The contribution of 

citizen-soldiers grew even larger as the lightning conventional campaign gave 

way to a struggle against a stubborn insurgency that would persist for years.

In late 2002 and early 2003 the Army National Guard mobilized nearly 

32,000 soldiers in connection with OIF, mainly infantry, military police, engineering, ordnance, and logistics units. One of the Guard’s most unusual missions was protecting sealift assets, a task that arose as a result of the Marine 

Corps’ heavy wartime assignments. An ARNG infantry brigade from Puerto 

Rico took up this unique role. Elements of eight infantry battalions—with the 

largest contingents coming from Florida, Indiana, and Oregon—performed 

missions such as providing security at special forces compounds and guarding 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

106 107

battalion—which included many with civilian law enforcement experience—

began creating a new Iraqi police force in the southern city of An Nasiriyah. 

By the end of July the 2nd Battalion returned stateside, completing its second 

deployment in about 18 months.23

Ongoing Challenges to an Operational Reserve

The nation’s civilian and military leadership had made efforts to resolve 

the challenges and problems that the reserve component had experienced 

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The frequent resort to reserve forces 

for contingency operations during the remainder of the 1990s had provided 

opportunities to test those initiatives. Nevertheless, many of the same issues 

cropped up during the early 2000s, revealing that the fixes were inadequate 

and much remained to be done.

Individual reservists not assigned to units played an increasing role in the 

reserve response to the crises of 9/11 and after. These included both individual 

mobilization augmentees (IMAs, who trained regularly and drew drill pay) 

and members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRRs, who did not train or 

receive pay). In the first six months of Enduring Freedom, IMAs constituted 

one-fourth of all activated Air Force reservists. In spring 2002 some 3,300 

IMAs served in a wide variety of specialties, an unprecedented participation 

rate. During 2001 the Naval Reserve had primarily activated individuals, 

rather than units, especially in the law enforcement/force protection, medical, 

supply, and intelligence fields. For the first time since 1990–1991, IRRs were 

used in large numbers to fill out units or to find people with very specific 

skills. In late 2001 Marine Forces Reserve Commander Lieutenant General 

McCarthy emphasized the importance of IRRs when he noted that they “keep 

units together by eliminating the need to take key personnel from units to fill 

individual requirements.”24

The mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve presented special concerns. In some cases members appeared “only dimly aware of their IRR status 

and its obligation,” even expressing surprise at their call-up, according to Dr. 

David S. C. Chu, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness. 

Partly as a result of that lack of awareness, the services could not locate thousands of individual reservists who had failed to update their contact information. Part of the problem was also institutional, as exemplified by the Marine 

Corps. Until the end of 2002, the annual muster of Marine IRRs consisted of 

mailing postcards. If the postcard did not come back marked undeliverable, 

the Corps considered the addressee to be officially accounted for. Given the 

decade since the last mobilization of the Marine Corps IRR and the lack of a 

Air Force Reserve airlifters—as they had done earlier for Afghanistan—

contributed heavily to the air bridge from the continental United States to 

Europe and Southwest Asia. In fact, the AFR provided nearly 50 percent of 

the Air Force’s C–17 and C–5 aircrews. In the initial phase of Iraqi Freedom, 

Air Force Reserve special operations MC–130s refueled USAF MH–53M helicopters that inserted special mission teams at strategic locations in Iraq, and 

six Air Force Reserve F–16s conducted missions over western Iraq, including 

the search for Iraqi Scud missiles. Meanwhile, an AFR aeromedical liaison 

team, embedded with the Marines near the al-Rumaila oil fields, coordinated 

the aerial evacuation of casualties.20

The Navy relied on widespread volunteerism for overseas duty and had 

reservists handling some stateside logistics work during their regular training 

periods, which meant that only one reserve logistics squadron needed to be 

mobilized. In another success story, a reserve F/A–18A squadron—VFA–201 

from Fort Worth, Texas—was “basically mobilized over a weekend,” according to Admiral Totushek, and quickly demonstrated its readiness at training 

sites in Nevada and California. Deployed to the Mediterranean Sea from 

March to May 2003, VFA–201 conducted combat operations as part of OIF.21

In some cases, all the specialized assets in a reserve component served in 

operations. Between February 2002 and November 2003 all of the Marine 

Forces Reserve (MarForRes) intelligence units were employed in stateside or 

overseas missions. The Marine Corps had no civil affairs units outside of the 

reserves, and by late 2002, prior to OIF, elements of its two civil affairs groups 

had been mobilized for duty either in Afghanistan, Kosovo, or both. The 

Marine Forces Reserve commander, Lt. Gen. Dennis M. McCarthy, reinforced 

the commandant’s priorities and maintained the reserve’s focus on combat operations. In late 2002 McCarthy reminded his reservists, “our reserve force is a 

combat force and we [are] not going to activate reserves for ‘other’ missions.” 

Within a year the Marine Corps commandant, General Michael W. Hagee, reported that 21,000 reserve Marines had been mobilized in support of OEF and 

OIF, and roughly 70 percent were within Iraq’s borders at the peak of OIF.22

There were early cases of back-to-back deployments of reserve units, a 

foretaste of future challenges. The 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, returned home 

to New York in late 2002 after a lengthy deployment to Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina. While there the battalion had deployed some of its companies to the 

Balkans and otherwise provided relief to over-committed 2nd Marine Division 

units. Just one month after its return home, however, the battalion received 

notice of its impending mobilization for Iraq. In March 2003 the 2nd Battalion 

conducted three weeks’ predeployment training in North Carolina; in early 

April it began combat operations at a captured Iraqi army base. By May the 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

108 109

but after 9/11, it took 246 orders to 

mobilize the force. Part of that was 

due to the time span from the original terrorist attacks through the 

start of OIF. But that trend was exacerbated by Secretary Rumsfeld’s 

desire to demonstrate the transformation of the Department of 

Defense, to minimize boots on the 

ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 

to send signals of growing resolve 

to Saddam Hussein. He also questioned the manner in which total 

force policy had been carried out in 

recent years. In particular, he was 

concerned about the Army’s Offsite 

Agreement, which placed a disproportionate percentage of logistical 

capability in reserve components: 

“My instinct is that it doesn’t make 

sense to have the people who are 

required very early in a conflict 

in the reserves.” As a result, he 

closely scrutinized all mobilization 

requests, forcing the services to 

justify each unit and to call up many 

smaller force packages rather than entire divisions, wings, or other large commands. While that more tailored approach fit the secretary’s policy objectives, 

the incremental mobilization played havoc with longstanding plans for the 

movement of forces overseas. The GAO further observed that the Pentagon 

lacked the ability to closely track and process the mobilization of the many 

small units and individuals being called up. In addition, there were difficulties in activating reservists once they were identified for duty. Along with the 

many IRRs who could not be located, another 70,000 reservists turned out to 

be ineligible for mobilization due to incomplete training or fitness, medical, or 

dental issues.28

The basic task of generating orders proved difficult. In June 2001 the Air 

Force implemented a new system known as the Military Personnel Database 

System, but among other issues it lacked the ability to produce the necessary 

orders for operational contingencies. As the need for IMAs accelerated after 

As the under secretary of defense for 

personnel and readiness, Dr. David S. C. 

Chu promoted the “continuum of service” 

concept within the Defense Department 

and sought new ways to attract cuttingedge professionals for reserve component 

wartime service. (DoD photo by Helene C. 

Stikkel)

rigorous muster process, challenges after 9/11 were no surprise. Yet another 

issue involved the process for identifying individual augmentees for activation. The MarForRes personnel chief, Col. J. J. Garcia, identified another 

problem. In 2002–2003 some activated individuals were relieved for poor performance because the requesting unit had not properly specified the skills and 

experience required, resulting in reservists being assigned to jobs for which 

they were unqualified.25

Mobilizing IRRs at the same time some regulars were leaving active duty 

as their obligated time expired created additional headaches. In 2002 Army 

Reserve Chief Lieutenant General Plewes acknowledged:

IRR has been very difficult from day one. . . . The leadership of 

the Army was very concerned about . . . the equity of calling up 

the IRR. . . . Why call them up when you are . . . letting active 

Army people go out the other door? . . . So, the first issue was, 

well, if you are going to call up the IRR, you need to have a 

stop-loss. The stop-loss was not a very pretty sight. Somehow, 

the Army Reserve and National Guard got left out of the first 

stop-loss order [and the second]. . . . Third stop-loss order, we 

were in it, finally.

Plewes further observed that the offices responsible for implementing stoploss were unaccustomed to applying it to the reserve component, so “it was a 

comedy of errors.”26

In 2003 the Reserve Forces Policy Board stated that “the IRR is a valuable 

pool of Reservists.” The change in law in FY 1998 that authorized IRR involuntary activations under presidential reserve call-up had increased the IRR’s 

value. But in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, the PRC option was 

not required because the partial mobilization authorization included the IRR. 

The RFPB advocated that drawing from the IRR “should be done with the 

consent of the member being called to full time duty, if possible; or if involuntarily activated, preferably using IRR not previously called.” Although that 

policy worked well initially for OEF and OIF, a number of IRRs went on to 

serve multiple tours.27

Between fall 2001 and spring 2003 the Pentagon oversaw the mobilization of some 280,000 reservists, compared with nearly 230,000 during Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm a decade earlier. There was a much greater disparity in 

the number of mobilization orders used, however. For the first war against 

Iraq, according to a General Accounting Office study, it took fewer than ten 

deployment orders to bring nearly a quarter million personnel onto active duty, 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

110 111

nondeployable personnel off official unit rolls, and permit units to spend less 

time managing these individuals, who accounted for roughly 12 percent of 

the Army Reserve’s strength. At the direction of the U.S. Army chief of staff, 

between 2003 and 2006 the ARNG established a transient account.31

The Naval Reserve also maintained transient accounts. In 2003 Vice Admiral 

Totushek estimated roughly 10 percent of his reservists were in a status that 

limited their utility. He acknowledged the U.S. Naval Reserve needed to do a 

better job of managing and training those personnel in order to maximize their 

usefulness. To achieve that, the Naval Reserve chief pursued a single regular/

reserve pay and personnel system, though a decade later it remained unfinished. By the end of 2001 the Navy had implemented a new web-based pay 

and personnel system dubbed the Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System. 

Totushek viewed it as an improvement and a step toward a truly integrated 

system for the Navy’s active and reserve accounts but realized its introduction 

to the force was his “greatest challenge.” Maximizing the number of reservists 

who could be employed was especially critical after 9/11. In FYs 2000 and 

2001 the Navy had failed to attain its authorized enlisted strength in the Selected Reserve, and Operation Enduring Freedom only made it more difficult 

for the Naval Reserve to attract sailors who were finishing their regular service 

obligations. As Totushek noted, those who “wanted to be involved in the war 

on terrorism, they stayed on active duty.” But those who reached the end of 

their active service and no longer wanted to deploy “didn’t want to come into 

the Reserve Force, for fear that they would be recalled. . . . So we hit a rock.”32

The challenge of filling Selected Reserve units was not confined to the 

Navy. By FY 2003 the ARNG was concerned with its growing reliance on 

cross-leveling—the transferring of trained personnel and functioning equipment from a nondeploying unit to fill gaps in another that was getting ready to 

deploy. From September 2001 through June 2004, the Army Guard transferred 

74,000 personnel (more than 20 percent of its entire strength) and 35,000 pieces 

of equipment into deploying units. In the first year alone after 9/11, equipment 

readiness (measured on a peacetime basis that was already lower than required 

for combat) dropped from 87 percent to 71 percent. Colonel Baldwin observed 

that cross-leveling was acceptable for one or two rotations but over time evolved 

into “death-spirals” as each successive wave of mobilizing units had fewer and 

fewer qualified personnel eligible to deploy. The ARNG got by in part with an 

ad hoc solution, relying heavily on soldiers who repeatedly volunteered—“deployment junkies” in Baldwin’s parlance—because they either lacked civilian 

jobs or preferred being deployed as much as possible. A significant negative 

effect of cross-leveling was the impact on unit cohesion across the force due to 

the added churn of personnel.33

9/11, the deficiencies of the system became obvious, and the Air Reserve Personnel Center turned to older methods. To accomplish the task of activating 

more than 2,000 individuals, personnel specialists returned to the 1950s era 

and set aside regular duties to establish an assembly line, of sorts, for orders 

production. Furthermore, the personnel database did not interact well with the 

pay system. If the pay system rejected the data pertaining to the activated individual, the personnel center did not find out about the error until the reservist 

got in touch to ask why he or she hadn’t been paid. A working group eventually 

resolved most of the pay system’s problems.29

By the end of 2001 the Marine Corps Reserve had implemented the Reserve 

Order Writing System (ROWS). Manpower expert and retired Chief Warrant 

Officer 3 Robin C. Porche of the MarForRes personnel office stated ROWS 

initially had limited integration with the Marines’ pay and personnel software, 

the Marine Corps Total Force System. One report observed that ROWS was—

like the Air Force’s system—designed for peacetime fiscal accountability and 

suggested modifications to support activated reservists. After these changes, 

which included switching to a web-based system, ROWS became a model for 

others. In 2013 Porche commented on its influence: “After seeing what ROWS 

could do, the Navy contracted . . . to build a version of ROWS. . . . They made 

their system web-based, added . . . functionality and called it the Navy Reserve 

Order Writing System.” Most of the other services went on to develop their own 

versions of an order-writing system. Accordingly, by 2003 the Naval Reserve’s 

John Totushek reported that both his reservists and the fleet were pleased with 

the new system, which replaced no fewer than “three legacy systems that were 

later shut down.” In the same year the Army Reserve’s new automated permanent order system began to cut in half the time required to create its orders.30

Administrative systems presented another set of challenges related to the 

tracking of individual training and readiness. In 2002 the new USARC commanding general, Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, directed the establishment of a 

Transients-Trainees-Holdees-Students account, a method for tracking individuals who might normally be counted as part of a unit but who were not able to 

deploy because they were transferring between units, were not yet fully trained, 

or had some other issue (such as medical or legal) that precluded full participation. The Army’s active component had employed the transient account beginning in 1981, but incompatible personnel accounting systems precluded its use 

by the Army Reserve. By Helmly’s time, the USARC’s adoption of transient 

accounts appeared feasible because of the much-anticipated common personnel 

systems database known as the Defense Integrated Manpower Human Resources System. Adoption of transient accounts promised to ensure timely completion of initial occupational specialty training, enhance unit readiness by keeping 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

112 113

Vice Admiral Totushek also referred to the mistaken perception that the 

USNR was slow to act regarding mobilization/activation. Usually by the time 

the Naval Reserve received official notification of a validated billet requirement, weeks had passed—a reality shared by other reserve components. The 

process was slowed in part because the Navy staff had “no tools” to validate 

requirements, other than saying, in Totushek’s words, “Gee, I think that’s a 

real requirement, or, gee, I don’t think that’s a real requirement.” By 2003 the 

process was much improved. For the first time “the Reserve Force got ‘read 

into’ the war plan,” thereby enabling it to advise on units and individual skills 

that might be needed and available. But the outgoing Naval Reserve Force 

commander surmised that “if we don’t do another mobilization for awhile . . . 

we’re going to have the same kind of situation happen again.” In late 2002 

Secretary Rumsfeld believed that the entire mobilization process had to be 

revamped and centralized: “I think we are going to have to find a way to take 

all of the responsibility for activating the guard and reserve from the services, 

the joint forces command and the combatant commanders and put them in one 

place so that the flow of forces, whether it is active duty or reserves, is all in 

one location. We can’t do anything skillfully the way it is currently arrayed.”37

Medical, dental, and physical fitness qualification issues continued to be a 

problem area. At the time, reserve component personnel were required to have 

physical exams every five years, plenty of time for health problems that could 

interfere with readiness to develop undetected. Regulations also still prohibited citizen-soldiers from receiving dental care at government expense unless 

they were on active duty for longer than 30 days, or during the 75 days prior to 

mobilization (though advance notifications of call-up, often as short as 3 to 10 

days, limited the usefulness of that option). Under Secretary of Defense David 

Chu also cited the tendency of Americans to “chintz” on dental care as a significant factor in reservists’ dental unreadiness. But the fact remained that it was 

the military’s mission to ensure readiness; regulars received free dental care to 

keep them ready, and reserve personnel did not, rendering them less ready.38

In 2003 Brig. Gen. Robert V. Taylor, the National Guard Association of the 

United States’ Army vice chair, noted that 30 percent of recently mobilized 

Guard and reserve soldiers initially were nondeployable due to dental problems (though many of those ultimately did deploy after they became eligible 

for care and had their issues corrected). To address the problem, he proposed 

a policy change to authorize Guard dentists to provide services to soldiers in

nonemergency situations. He also sought a better dental insurance program 

“that soldiers can opt out of if they have sufficient civilian dental coverage.” 

The ARNG’s Charles Baldwin recalled that dental readiness for the OIF mobilization “was a disaster.” He related an anecdote that Army Chief of Staff 

In the 15 months after September 2001, the Pentagon enacted six stoploss measures that prevented reservists eligible to retire from doing so. The 

last of these measures, at the end of 2002, applied to entire units, while the 

previous ones had been applied to individuals with specific types of skills. 

All were intended to help preserve the readiness of mobilizing reserve units 

and avoid the use of cross-leveling. Regardless, cross-leveling continued as 

a major issue at least through 2008, when the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves stated the practice “does significant harm.” However, according to retired Col. Paul E. Pratt, formerly the MarForRes operations/plans 

chief, some Guard and reserve colonels who dealt with mobilization simply 

considered it “a fact of life” or “a reality.”34

The Air Force experienced its own difficulties managing its deployable 

reserve forces, initially due to the belief that the response to 9/11 would be 

short term. In 2008 the AFRC assistant vice commander, Brig. Gen. Richard 

R. Severson, reflected on his perspective as an airlift wing commander seven 

years earlier: “I’m not sure early on we had a real good feel for the requirement, so we burned up crews rapidly at the time” by mobilizing them and thus 

starting their 24-month clock. Two years later, Maj. Gen. John A. Bradley, 

the assistant for reserve matters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, judged 

that a long-range view to meeting operational requirements was the better approach. But for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Mobility Command insisted 

on mobilizing airlift personnel because, recalled Bradley, “they didn’t think 

the war would last long.” The future AFRC commander added that the staff 

said, “We’re just going to mobilize for a short time to make sure we have the 

capability we need, and then we’re going to be done.” Bradley acknowledged 

that mobilization held advantages as well as disadvantages but emphasized 

the benefits of using volunteers for reasonable tour lengths, usually not exceeding 120 days. Significantly, AFRC retention and recruiting figures remained high, and the command enjoyed a surplus of volunteers to meet its Air 

Expeditionary Force requirements.35

There were also misunderstandings regarding who was responsible for assigning reserve units and people to meet contingency requirements. Totushek 

recalled that in 2001, when reserve activations began, a question arose: “Who 

owned the mobilization process?” He noted, “I don’t think it was evident to 

a lot of people, including very senior people in the Navy, that it wasn’t the 

Naval Reserve Force. . . . It’s pretty clear that N3/5 [the Navy staff] owns the 

process.” The recognition that the regular Navy was responsible eventually 

led to improvements, including establishment of a special mobilization cell in 

Millington, Tennessee.36
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

114 115

conducted a joint program in which each service alternated hosting an annual 

workshop focused on various topics of interest to families. But the mobilizations 

after 9/11 showed that improvements were still needed in the preparation of 

reserve and Guard families for the activation of their military members.42

The National Military Family Association adopted the term “the suddenly military” to describe the families of citizen-soldiers facing mobilization 

or activation, particularly for the first time. Despite extensive reserve component participation in numerous contingencies in the 1990s, prior to 9/11 

most families of ARNG and USAR soldiers had not given much thought to a 

prolonged mobilization or deployment, let alone one that involved combat. 

Naturally, families that never anticipated a deployment tended to be unprepared for mobilization. In fact, in a 2002 survey 40 percent of Guard families described themselves as “unprepared” for mobilization. Nevertheless, 

Guard spouses reported receiving more assistance—in the form of newsletters, 

support groups, and social events—from their soldiers’ units, when compared 

with USAR families. Volunteers, mostly “from the Guard culture,” were the 

key difference, according to Colonel Baldwin of ARNG headquarters.43

In FY 2002 the Army/Air Guard touted a nationwide force of more than 

20,000 trained volunteers—mainly retirees, spouses, or parents—which the 

National Guard Bureau considered its “greatest asset” in supporting families. 

Even so, the ARNG viewed the geographical dispersion of its 350,000 members’ 

families as among its “greatest challenges” in family support matters, despite 

some 3,000 readiness centers (formerly armories). Perhaps equally challenging 

was the lack of an ongoing commitment to family support among many ARNG/

USAR units, as they tended to establish programs after notification for mobilization and to disband them upon demobilization.44

Recognizing the problems with this ad hoc approach, the National Guard 

established a new paradigm for families. Rather than the family support of 

the Desert Storm era, family readiness became the watchword. As the chief of 

NGB’s family program office observed, “Support has a different connotation 

than readiness. . . . In the past, families might come out to the unit once a year 

for a family picnic. Today the focus is different . . . benefits, entitlements, 

budgeting, child-rearing . . . empowering families to quickly handle situations 

on their own.” The Internet became the preferred vehicle for disseminating 

information. The chief of California’s family programs explained, “[The web] 

is one place where they can get just about anything they need.” In FY 2003 

the ARNG operated 390 family assistance centers (including some in U.S. territories) from which volunteers performed outreach and follow-up, provided 

information, and guided families to additional resources. Some states had as 

many as 20 such centers.45

General Eric K. Shinseki frequently shared concerning one citizen-soldier 

who, after being mobilized for OIF, volunteered to have several teeth pulled 

so he could deploy with his unit. Within months the ARNG took steps to make 

dental resources available to soldiers prior to the tightly packed predeployment 

period. In time, earlier official notification of call-up also enabled soldiers to 

obtain more timely dental services. Even the Naval Reserve, which had the 

best record, still had 19 percent of its personnel show up for active duty in 

2003 with dental issues that prevented immediate deployment.39

By 2003 the services were having many reservists undergo annual medical 

and dental checks. Dr. William Winkenwerder, the assistant secretary of defense 

for health affairs, soon established an individual medical readiness policy that 

required regular health assessments to supplement the more thorough and less 

frequent physical examinations. Nevertheless, several years later a military 

health care task force concluded that dental readiness continued as “the greatest obstacle to medical readiness” for most of the reserve component.40

Health after deployment arose as a new concern, largely due to increasing 

awareness following the first Gulf War of the health risks (physical and psychological) associated with wartime service. In spring 2003 Winkenwerder 

implemented a three-step process to improve the tracking of service members’ 

health upon their return from overseas. They first had to complete a new postdeployment health assessment form with more detailed questions than prior 

versions. Second, they underwent a mandatory face-to-face health assessment 

with a military health care provider. And third, they provided a blood sample 

that would become part of the member’s permanent medical record. Medical 

care after demobilization remained an issue despite a 2002 law that extended 

health care coverage to many activated members for 120 days after their tours 

ended. A significant number of reservists were unable to use these benefits 

and blamed the TRICARE system. Often the period expired before personnel 

could obtain the official documentation of their active duty (Department of 

Defense Form 214) needed to access medical services; in other instances, reservists were simply unfamiliar with the health-care program and how to use 

it. In addition, a survey of reserve personnel indicated problems frequently 

occurred when they and their family members dropped civilian insurance and 

switched to TRICARE. In 2003 Congress extended reservists’ eligibility for 

TRICARE upon completion of active duty to 180 days.41

Family issues had risen to the fore during the first war with Iraq, but for 

the next ten years fell into some neglect in the absence of mass mobilizations. 

In spring 2001, however, during the Army’s biannual review of its programs, 

the Army Reserve raised the subject of emergency financial relief for mobilized 

soldiers. In the spirit of cooperation, the USAR and U.S. Air Force Reserve also 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

116 117

Some companies provided pay differential, extended insurance benefits, and 

family support to their activated employees and families. Hollingsworth touted 

ESGR’s 540-plus trained ombudsmen who provided information and guidance 

to employers seeking to comply with USERRA.49

Even with those efforts, there was an increased flow of telephone calls and 

emails precipitated by the war on terrorism, so the ESGR co-located some of 

its workers with the Navy call center in Millington, Tennessee. The ESGR 

group handled some 2,000 cases monthly, resolving more than 95 percent inhouse, with the remainder requiring formal involvement of the Department of 

Labor. One long-running issue concerned voluntary versus involuntary active 

duty under Title 10, U.S. Code. Although the law prescribed that voluntarily 

activated reservists enjoyed the same civilian job protections as those who 

served under Title 10 involuntarily (i.e., resulting from mobilization), a 

strong perception to the contrary was widespread among the reserve component and employers. The ESGR worked to rectify the misperception.50

Defense leaders had long touted the fact that many reservists’ civilian jobs 

gave them highly valuable, sometimes unique, skills, but DoD had done little 

to establish an inventory of reservists’ civilian skills, according to the RFPB. 

In 2001 the Defense Department asked reservists to voluntarily provide their 

employment information. By early 2002 the Navy administered a mandatory 

skills database system known as Naval Reserve Skills On-Line, a web-based 

system that made it easier for reservists to provide and update information 

about their skills, and easier for commands to learn what skills were available. 

At about the same time, in U.S. Senate testimony, Under Secretary Chu expressed his interest in finding new ways to attract “cutting edge professionals 

in key areas such as biometrics and information technology.” One possibility, 

he surmised, involved “creating new ‘critical specialty’ categories of reserves 

that are incubators for new and emerging talent pools.” Attesting to the presence of unique skills among his reservists, Vice Admiral Cotton stated the 

Navy had “identified 800 civilian skills among reservists that don’t exist in the 

active duty service.”51

Examples abounded of reservists applying their civilian expertise in post9/11 operations, such as Maryland ARNG’s 115th Military Police Battalion, 

which drew one-third of its soldiers from civilian law enforcement. Many 

reserve component aviators were commercial pilots and therefore had more 

experience in some areas that carried over to military aviation. The Marines’ 

reserve combat assessment team noted that among two reserve aerial refueler transport squadrons, crews averaged 800 flight hours more than their 

regular component counterparts deployed with them in Iraq. In an outstanding 

example of a reservist uniquely qualified for an unforeseen mission, Marine 

To enhance its programs, the Army Reserve established a billet for a family 

readiness coordinator who reported to the deputy chief of staff (personnel). In 

2003 the USAR family program office sponsored the first family readiness rear 

detachment commanders’ courses. The mobilization of more than 1,700 Army 

Reserve IMA and IRR personnel in late 2001, and 1,500 the next year (including 

retirees), presented a special problem. Since they did not belong to a unit, the 

usual structure of unit-based programs did not work for their families, so the 

personnel directorate created a dedicated office to manage an IRR/IMA family 

program to help close that gap. More than a few IRR members, however, resided 

too far from military facilities to take advantage of the available services.46

In April 2003 the Naval Reserve highlighted the inextricable link between 

family readiness and mission readiness in its monthly publication, describing 

in detail the Family Readiness Program’s Tool Kit, a predeployment and mobilization handbook. In addition, the article promoted the Guide to Reserve 

Family Member Benefits, which was available in hard copy or online, and the 

Naval Reserve Assistance Center, available to reservists and their families 13 

hours daily, 7 days a week. Harvey C. Barnum Jr., the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for reserve affairs, viewed the “biggest challenge as getting 

the information into the hands of our Reserve families and ensuring that they 

are comfortable with and understand the mobilization process.”47

A relatively new vehicle for disseminating information to reservists and 

their families was Military One Source, a 24-hour hotline that promised confidentiality. As one Tennessee guardsman testified before a congressional 

subcommittee, the system enabled “somebody from Buck Snort, Tennessee . . 

. to call One Source and within 20 seconds have someone answering the phone 

and talking to a real person. . . .” By the end of 2002, Marine reservists had 

access to Marine Corps Community Services One Source, billed as a “‘virtual’ 

family service center for the Marine Corps” and reportedly especially helpful 

for those living far from an installation.48

Employment readiness presented a similar picture of partial success and 

unresolved issues. In 2003 Bob G. Hollingsworth, the executive director of 

the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

and a retired Marine major general, reported that the work of his organization’s 4,200 volunteers nationwide was a remarkable “good news story.” 

Hollingsworth observed that the reserve component was 46 percent of DoD’s 

military manpower and was “shared with America’s employers, large and 

small, public and private. This inextricably links America’s employers to our 

national defense.” He cited examples of employers that exceeded the requirements of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 

of 1994, including Home Depot, Sears, Verizon, General Motors, and Boeing. 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

118 119

normal leave, based on length of deployment. Air Force leadership intended 

for the time “to be compensatory in nature and provide time for the member to 

take care of quality of life issues that resulted from long periods of deployed 

time away from home and family.” Members were considered “‘present 

for duty’ with the duty location being ‘at home.’” But whereas almost all 

regular personnel resided within the area of their unit, many Air Force reserve 

component members lived far from the base their unit returned to prior to demobilization. In April 2002 Air Force Reserve officials argued that the policy 

“has the potential to create an inequitable situation” between active component and reserve personnel. Over the following decade, however, various 

attempts to rectify the inequity ended in vain.55

Pressing Ahead with Regular-Reserve Integration

The series of contingencies and large-scale mobilizations beginning on 

9/11 gave added impetus to ongoing efforts to better integrate the regular and 

reserve components. In 2002 Chu explained the Pentagon’s new continuum 

of service concept within the context of Secretary Rumsfeld’s transformation 

initiative. Chu asserted the transformation challenge required a continuum 

ranging from the traditional two-week annual tour plus 48 drill periods per 

year to lengthier mobilization options. He referred to “a continuum that may 

be as little as a few days in the case of an information technologist, whose services we . . . [may not] need this year, to perhaps as much as nearly full-time 

as we have indeed done with so many volunteers during the current mobilization.” Chu expected the continuum of service to become DoD’s new norm. In 

2003 the Army Reserve, according to Lt. Gen. James Helmly, envisioned the 

continuum offering an easier transition between active duty and reserve status 

“dictated not only by the needs of the Army, but also by what is best for the 

Soldier developmentally and educationally.”56

The naval services, significantly smaller than the army components, appeared better situated for progress. In 2003 Vice Admiral Totushek promoted 

continuum of service “to expand sailor opportunities and optimize recruiting, 

retention, and assignment practices.” His successor, Vice Admiral Cotton, 

viewed the continuum concept as providing “off-ramps and on-ramps” with 

respect to an individual’s service over perhaps a 40- or 50-year time period. 

Age should not matter, he stated in a 2013 interview. Cotton lauded the Marine 

Corps as setting the institutional standard for a mindset consistent with the 

service continuum: “They never stop being Marines.”57

Continuum of service sought to eliminate unhelpful differences between 

the regular and reserve components. To that end, congressional policy changes 

Corps Col. Matthew Bagdanos, a Manhattan assistant district attorney with a 

master’s degree in classical studies, deployed in 2003 to lead the investigation 

into the looting of artifacts from the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad.52

But civilian employment could be a double-edged sword. Given the increased concern for homeland security, the Pentagon was reluctant to call up 

reservists who worked as civilian emergency responders—the same individuals required for an overseas crisis might be needed for one at home. To address 

the issue, in March 2003 Under Secretary Chu directed the services to implement a mandatory program that required disclosure of civilian employers, 

addresses, job titles, and years of experience. This information would alert 

defense officials to reservists who might be needed for a homeland emergency, which they could then factor into their mobilization decisions. In August 

2004 the Defense Department implemented regulations for the new program. 

The downside, of course, would be a loss of unit cohesion when individuals 

were not mobilized with their unit and had to be replaced by an IRR or a 

cross-leveled individual from another unit.53

By summer 2002, with al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters seemingly neutralized in Afghanistan and Iraq still primarily a diplomatic issue, the subject 

of demobilization garnered increased attention at the Pentagon. In June, 

General Jumper and the air staff were trying to “determine which Air Force 

specialties can be demobilized as soon as possible,” while shifting from crisis 

response “to our ‘new steady state,’ which would utilize volunteer Guardsmen 

and Reservists to help meet our mission taskings.” Lt. Gen. Daniel James III, 

the ANG director, asked about beginning demobilizations in a timely manner: 

“Will [air guardsmen] be able to take their leave, outprocess and be off the 

books and headed back to their families and jobs before we hit that one-year 

point?” He worried that retention might be hurt by mobilizations extending 

beyond one year without a clearly identifiable requirement. At the time James 

spoke, there were some 23,000 air guardsmen involved in the war on terrorism, nearly 7,000 of them volunteers. The Air Guard director remained 

attuned to the relevance of his part-time force, acknowledging that the homeland security mission “fits well within the National Guard” but affirming the 

need to “maintain our relevance across the full spectrum of missions,” which 

included combat operations, not just the Noble Eagle air defense mission.54

One demobilization issue that affected morale in the air reserves concerned 

postdeployment downtime, a chance to spend time with families while remaining in a present-for-duty status. With the beginning of OEF redeployments, 

the potential for inequity between returning regular and reserve component 

personnel in this area became apparent. Air Force commands were authorizing 

redeploying members a set number of days of time off, not counted against 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

120 121

ture that tracked individuals’ requirements—including physical exams, security clearances, training requirements, and mobilization codes—suddenly 

disappeared. The retired master chief petty officer of the Coast Guard Reserve 

Forces, Jeffrey D. Smith, likened the situation to taking a “basket of kids . . . 

to the front porch in the middle of the night at the local commands,” turning 

around, and running the other way. When the Coast Guard activated large 

numbers of reservists after 9/11, there were cases of boatswain mates who had 

not “been on a boat for five years because of the other things [they had] been 

doing.” No one had been tracking their requirements or providing “clear direction about what people should be doing” to meet mobilization needs, Smith 

observed. While Rear Adm. John C. Acton bluntly called this “a failure of personal leadership within the Reserve force,” it was also an institutional failure 

to maintain a process to oversee reserve readiness.61

Those challenges served as a catalyst to form the Reserve Strategic Assessment Team, which, according to Rear Adm. Steven E. Day, USCGR, facilitated the “full integration” the service achieved after 2003. Led by Rear Adm. 

Robert J. Papp Jr., a future commandant, the review identified the gaps—84 in 

the reserve program —“that hinder readiness and the things we have to do to 

fix them.” Nearly all were in the administrative arena. In response, the Coast 

Guard began shifting many full-time support billets down the operational chain 

to the command level where two-thirds of reservists actually worked, so those 

full-time personnel could manage reservists’ administrative and equipment 

readiness issues. In fairness, then, the Coast Guard’s full integration occurred 

only after 2003, a decade later than its nominal date. A bigger change for the 

Coast Guard came in May 2002, when the Bush administration proposed the 

reassignment of the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the 

new Department of Homeland Security (created in November 2002).62

A key aspect of making the reserves a stronger part of the Total Force involved the integration of citizen-soldiers on active duty or in full-time civilian 

slots into the reserve structure. Even before 9/11, Lieutenant General Plewes 

considered the number of soldiers filling this role in his component to be “insufficient . . . to support over 2,300 Army Reserve units in day-to-day operations.” With traditionally one of the lowest percentages of such personnel, he 

believed that expanding these programs in the USAR was one of his biggest 

challenges. That year Congress agreed and responded by giving him 950 additional full-time authorizations. In 2002 the Army Reserve was able to fill its 

more than 13,400 Active Guard and Reserve billets, but it needed even more.63

The Army Guard’s problem was almost as great. In FY 2002 Congress provided funding for some 23,600 Active Guard and Reserve and 25,200 military 

enacted in post-2001 national Defense authorization acts implemented more 

equal treatment. The FY 2002 act authorized new reservists to use commissaries “immediately upon entering service, instead of waiting until they have 

attended unit drills for one year.” It also authorized a Survivor Benefit Plan 

annuity to the spouse of any reservist who died “in the line of duty while 

serving on active duty.” The FY 2004 defense act provided reservists with unlimited use of commissaries and amended the survivor benefit plan such that 

the spouses of reservists not eligible for retirement who died “from injury/

disease incurred in the line of duty during inactive duty training” henceforth 

received benefits. An Army Reserve historian considered the change in survivor benefits significant because previous law did not authorize benefits until 

a reservist qualified for retirement.58

Administrative systems were a key component of any strategy to improve 

the flow of personnel between active and reserve duty. The Marine Corps and 

Coast Guard led the way in this area thanks to their integrated pay and personnel systems developed in the 1990s. Personnel expert Robin Porche noted 

that the Marine Corps Total Force System provided all Marines with a “cradleto-grave” personnel system from boot camp to retirement. Unlike the other 

services (except the Coast Guard), the Marine Corps system did not require 

the member to be removed from one personnel system and then accessioned 

into another—a process that could take months. Rather, with two simple data 

entries, a Marine transferred seamlessly from reserve to active-duty status, and 

his or her active-duty pay would begin in a timely manner.59

Between 2000 and 2003 the vice chief of naval operations, Admiral William 

J. Fallon, in the words of John Totushek, sought “to make the Naval Reserve 

much more responsive to the active force,” a theme Vice Admiral Cotton immediately took up. In June 2002 Admiral Fallon and William A. Navas Jr., the 

assistant secretary of the Navy for manpower and reserve affairs, cosponsored 

a study intended to redesign the Naval Reserve, with the goal of increasing active-reserve integration. In terms of personnel management and organizational 

structure, the study claimed that the USNR lacked “visibility to the Active 

Force.” The “single-most agreed upon issue” among participants in the study 

was “Active Force ignorance of the Reserve Force in terms of both capabilities 

and limitations,” an assessment shared by Deputy Assistant Navy Secretary 

Harvey Barnum. To improve that situation, the Navy’s new roadmap for programs, plans, and operations, Sea Power 21, pushed the idea of “ONE Navy to 

fulfill the Nation’s missions.”60

The Coast Guard had led the way in the 1990s in formally integrating its 

active and reserve components. But in the process the reserve support struc-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 5: 2001 – June 2003

122 123

_______ Conclusion _______

As the Total Force policy envisioned, and as most civilian and military 

leaders had declared for years, the mobilizations between fall 2001 and spring 

2003 demonstrated that the reserve component had become indispensable to 

the conduct of U.S. military operations of any significant size and duration. 

The reserves were indeed a part of the operational force. But in the implementation of the partial mobilization President Bush authorized in September 

2001, the Defense Department encountered serious problems. As a result, officials turned their attention to fixing a host of systemic issues, from health 

and dental care to administrative systems that did not mesh with each other 

to family and employer programs. Though the processes were more painful 

than they needed to be, in the end some 280,000 reservists were mobilized 

for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. And, in 

general, the larger mobilization for OIF in 2003 proceeded somewhat more 

smoothly than did the 2001 OEF mobilization. Much work remained to be 

done, however, to make the total force a seamless system that could respond 

to the fast-moving crises of the modern era. Although the major operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq appeared to be largely complete in summer 2003, events 

would soon bring additional serious concerns to the attention of senior leadership within the Pentagon and beyond.68

technicians, but that was just 58 percent of its validated billets. The following year, Congress authorized an additional 1,500 billets, taking the Guard 

to about 61 percent. The National Guard Bureau considered this issue “a top 

priority.” The Army programmed annual funding increases beginning in FY 

2004 to provide the 59,700 AGR and MT personnel needed to meet minimum 

readiness standards by FY 2012. But Guard leaders sought a more rapid expansion, with the National Guard Association’s chairman, Maj. Gen. Gus L. 

Hargett, pushing to reach the goal by FY 2008.64

The Air Force Reserve’s authorized AGR strength had increased from 400 

to 1,400 between 1990 and 2001, but no one element of the staff “exercised overall 

control” of the program. The AFR chief, Lieutenant General Sherrard, established 

a new office in 2002 to provide “a single point of contact of all AGR matters.”65

The Marines continued their successful Inspector-Instructor program as 

the backbone of their full-time support effort for reserve units. Colonel Pratt 

viewed the inspector-instructors as providing important “linkages” and “personal ties” between the reserve and regular components. Pratt considered the 

I-I force—which was 4,000–4,500 strong for most of the decade following 

9/11—essential because they brought regular expertise to the reserves and 

then cycled back to active units, carrying with them fresh insights from the 

reserve component. A 2004 Marine Corps study agreed, adding that the practice of board-selected battalion inspector-instructors made the program “even 

stronger now than during [Operation Desert Storm].” Pratt largely credited the 

Marines’ ability to mobilize more than 20,000 and deploy more than 13,000 

reservists by early 2003 for Iraqi Freedom to the inspector-instructors, who 

maintained relationships with their fellow regulars in the active force that 

helped smooth the process.66

The Marine Corps had the Active Reserve program of reservists on full-time 

active duty, but it was about two-thirds the size of the I-I program and generally functioned in a different capacity. While I-Is almost exclusively resided 

at the unit level in direct support of unit training and readiness, a significant 

portion of ARs filled reserve recruiting billets, staff billets in the command 

echelons of Marine Forces Reserve, or reserve-related planning and liaison 

billets at headquarters outside the reserve (such as Headquarters Marine Corps, 

Marine bases, and other active component commands). Following 9/11 some 

ARs ended up deploying, either as part of the units they supported, or as individual augmentees (leaving their normal billet vacant). As the war continued, 

however, the AR program refocused on supporting the reserve establishment 

rather than getting into the fight, and more AR billets also migrated to reserve 

units to assist the I-Is in preparing units for the more active role they were 

playing in ongoing contingency operations.67
125

_______ CHAPTER 6 _______

Part-Time Warriors, Full-Time Stress,

July 2003–December 2006 

The length and scale of ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

exacerbated by changes in mobilization policies, placed the reserve component under new levels of stress and challenged the viability of the Total 

Force concept. By 2004 the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve 

were struggling with major retention concerns, leading to the Army Reserve 

chief’s “broken force” memorandum warning that administration policies 

could have crippling effects on the part-time force. Other reserve components 

faced similar challenges, albeit to a lesser degree. It would take policy changes, 

an institutionalized Army rotation system, increased benefits for reservists and 

their families, improvements in family readiness/support, and better healthcare programs to turn things around.1

A Challenging Long War

Many thought Operation Iraqi Freedom would be a replay of the first Gulf 

War, with U.S. forces rapidly returning home after a successful conventional 

campaign. Although President George W. Bush landed on the carrier USS 

Abraham Lincoln under a banner that read “Mission Accomplished” and 

thanked American troops for “a job well done,” his qualification—“We have 

difficult work to do in Iraq”—was lost in the euphoria. A growing insurgency surprised many U.S. leaders and led to a lengthy commitment that lasted 

until a full, if short-lived, withdrawal in December 2011. Well into 2010, 

American troop levels in and near Iraq remained well above the 150,000 of 

the initial invasion. Meanwhile, Operation Enduring Freedom continued in 

Afghanistan; U.S. forces remained committed to the Global War on Terrorism in places such as Djibouti, the Philippines, and Guantanamo; and other 

troops fulfilled operational commitments in the Balkans, the Sinai, and elsewhere around the world.2

The Global War on Terrorism, or the Long War, as it became known for a 

time, was unprecedented in the nature of its demands on the reserve compo-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

126 127

surprise in the Army, which required 

12 months in-theater for all its units—

active, reserve, or Guard—a major 

change for personnel accustomed to 

the six-month standard for the Balkans 

and Sinai deployments. While the 

average period of active duty for all 

reserve personnel had been 156 days 

during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it 

was exceeding 300 days in the current 

conflict. This new paradigm came 

amid other changes that placed added 

stress on the force.5

The first additional source of 

strain arose out of Secretary Rumsfeld’s ongoing effort to transform the 

U.S. military to make it more responsive, lethal, and agile. One element 

of this wide-ranging set of initiatives, 

set out in a July 2003 memorandum, 

sought to “promote judicious and 

prudent use of the Reserve components” to “reduce strain,” a matter he 

considered “of the utmost urgency.” 

He wanted to achieve several goals: 

to allow U.S. forces to respond more 

rapidly without waiting for reserve 

call-ups; to be able to act without telegraphing intentions by mobilization; to 

reduce the risk that the frequency and/or duration of mobilizations would adversely affect recruiting and retention in the reserve components; and to rely 

on “volunteers to the greatest extent possible.” To achieve those objectives, 

in January 2004 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

David Chu issued implementing guidance to rebalance forces between the 

regular and reserve components so as to “reduce the need for involuntary 

mobilization during the initial 15 days of a rapid response operation and 

limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year in every six.” One 

exercise had indicated that a rapid response scenario would require some 

9,000 immediate involuntary mobilizations of reservists in critical specialties, and would subject these personnel, their employers, and their families 

to woefully short notification.6

Donald H. Rumsfeld, the secretary of 

defense from 2001 to December 2006, 

sought to limit over-reliance on the 

reserve component during the Long 

War and favored volunteerism in lieu 

of partial mobilization authority. (DoD 

photo by Helene C. Stikkel)

nent. In some previous conflicts (such as the world wars), the entire reserve 

establishment and the nation mobilized for the duration, with a draft providing 

additional manpower. The first year of the Korean War placed heavy demands 

on the reserves, but thereafter regular forces and conscripts carried almost the 

entire load. President Johnson largely kept the reserves out of Vietnam. Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm were over in a matter of months, freeing citizen-soldiers to return quickly to their civilian lives. Other contingencies in the 1990s, 

such as the Balkans, impacted only a small percentage of the reserve component. In the two years after September 2001, few planners expected that 

those called up for Noble Eagle, OEF, or OIF might be mobilized a second 

time. Many, like Robert H. Smiley, the principal director for readiness, training, and mobilization in the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs’ 

office, believed that “this would be a one-time deal” for reservists. But as the 

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq dragged into 2004 with no end in sight, and 

the nation decided not to significantly increase the size of its regular forces, 

the true import of Total Force policy and an operational reserve became apparent—citizen-soldiers, like their regular counterparts, would have to deploy 

repeatedly as part of an indefinite rotation of forces.3

General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff from 2003 through 

2007, realized that the high operational tempo “was muddying the distinction 

between service in the active and reserve components. Soldiers . . . found 

themselves continually on call.” By October 2003 the USAR had mobilized 

or activated 35 percent of its manpower including nearly half of its deployable units, proportionally “the largest mobilization we’ve had since World War 

II,” according to its chief, Lt. Gen. James Helmly. By the end of 2005 Army 

Reserve soldiers had filled 144,000 mobilization billets since 9/11—a significant number given the USAR’s strength of 200,000, though some soldiers, 

including volunteers, served more than once. The issue had been exacerbated 

by the mobilization of large numbers of reserve component personnel in the 

immediate aftermath of 9/11 for homeland security missions. Jet fighters in the 

skies and guardsmen in the airports reassured the American public, but also 

made it more difficult to use those same units again for later combat missions.4

As Schoomaker noted, this increased use of the reserve component challenged the very nature of being a citizen-soldier. Most joined with the expectation that they would only be mobilized for a major conflict, or perhaps for a 

smaller contingency for a short period, which might happen only once in their 

career, if at all. Being involuntarily called to serve repeatedly was a major 

disruption to civilian careers, and was something few reservists had anticipated. Moreover, repeated tours of active duty came as an equal shock to families and employers. Even the length of the deployments proved an unwelcome 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

128 129

The Army Guard went through the same transition from divisions to 

modular brigades, with some of the latter units also undergoing conversion 

from heavy formations to Stryker units. Initial plans called for the ARNG 

to have 34 combat brigades, down from 42 equivalent units in 2000 in its 

old division structure. But in January 2006 Secretary of the Army Francis J. 

Harvey announced that six of the planned brigades would transition to combat 

support units, primarily for support of homeland defense requirements. That 

would leave 28 combat brigades. Although the Army as a whole in 2006 was 

only halfway through the reorganization, planned for completion in 2011, the 

emphasis was on sending newer modular units to the war in Iraq. By the end 

of 2004 every ARNG brigade in Operation Iraqi Freedom was modular. The 

task of converting units that were also preparing to deploy only heightened the 

turmoil of the process.9

The Marine Corps had always been an expeditionary force, but that created 

its own set of challenges. For many years prior to the current conflict, every 

infantry battalion and many aviation squadrons were either in the seven-month 

rotations for Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments at sea or the Unit Deployment Program in Japan. Those requirements continued even as the Corps 

became heavily involved in the counterinsurgency phase of OIF. The only 

way to meet all those obligations was to actively engage reserve units in the 

rotation for all three. Given the relatively small size of the Selected Marine 

Reserve (roughly one-quarter of all Marine units), the result was a frequent 

and repeated use of its citizen-soldiers. While the Navy and Air Force were 

not initially as greatly affected by the ground-centric operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, as time went on defense leaders looked for ways to utilize those 

two services more frequently to provide relief to the Army and Marine Corps.

The growing rotation problems, especially in the Army, began to hit home 

in March 2004. As it became clear that OIF required a high level of forces 

for longer than anticipated, Department of Defense leaders realized that they 

had too little time to deploy fresh units to replace those scheduled to rotate 

home, and too few brigades and support elements ready and available for 

deployment. As a result, the Pentagon announced the involuntary extension 

for up to 90 days of some 20,000 soldiers in the Iraqi theater. Roughly one 

in four was an ARNG or Army Reserve soldier, with 21 Guard units from 14 

states represented in the total. Those who were affected received an additional $1,000 for each month beyond their original scheduled date of return. That 

compensation often did not assuage the disappointment of service members 

and their families, and certainly provided no relief to employers.10

The short-term adverse impact of rebalancing and modularity was soon 

reinforced and even exceeded by another change that took many planners by 

While the primary thrust of rebalancing was to allow the regular component 

to respond rapidly in a crisis without waiting for reservists to mobilize, the 

one-year-in-six ratio for involuntary mobilizations highlighted an even greater 

potential problem with the Total Force concept. The latter issue most affected 

those types of units existing entirely or primarily in the reserve components. 

The Army faced the biggest challenge given the ground-centric nature of 

the war, but all services were affected. As an example, in January 2004, 69 

percent of all reserve law enforcement personnel had already been mobilized 

at least once since 9/11. In a lengthy conflict those units would be subject to a 

much higher mobilization rate than units which could be more readily found 

in the regular component. In accordance with Rumsfeld and Chu’s directive 

to reduce the stress on personnel in these units, the Army planned to convert 

5,600 regular billets to high-demand specialties, including chemical, military 

police, engineering, and medical, by 2006. In the long term, that would reduce 

the likelihood and/or frequency of reserve component call-ups, but planners 

estimated rebalancing might ultimately impact up to 12 percent of the total 

force. The Army experienced turbulence in the short term as units and personnel had to convert to new specialties. And until such time as rebalancing 

was complete, the types of units residing heavily in the reserve establishment 

would experience high rates of mobilization.7

Rebalancing took place amid a much larger Army effort to reorient itself 

from a Cold War force centered on forward-stationed troops, such as those 

in Germany, to one primarily maintained in the States and ready for rapid 

deployment to a wide range of potential crisis spots around the world. While 

experimentation and study had been underway in this area since 1991, the 

process only swung into full implementation in summer 2003. Although no 

one yet realized the scale and duration of the commitment in Iraq, General 

Schoomaker viewed the war as “a strategic opportunity to pull the Army into 

the future.” To achieve a more expeditionary capability, the Army began converting from its division-centric structure to a modular one in which the much 

smaller brigade would serve as the primary element that could deploy as a 

self-contained unit capable of independent action. Each brigade would be able 

to add or shed subordinate elements to tailor it for the mission at hand. As 

part of this transformation, some brigades would convert from heavy armored 

units to lighter ones built around the Stryker wheeled vehicle, thus making the 

task of rapidly transporting them overseas much easier. As operations in Iraq 

intensified in late 2003, the Army took stock and concluded there were not 

enough combat brigades to meet the needs of the ongoing conflict. To address 

this shortfall, in early 2004 the defense secretary approved 10 additional active 

component modular brigades, taking the total to 43.8
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

130 131

Iraq who are going to hit 24 months’ cumulative before the mobilization ends. 

And that is very disruptive.”13

At a Pentagon press briefing on 21 July 2004, the Defense Department announced that it would ask those guardsmen to voluntarily extend beyond two 

years, though an Army spokesman emphasized that “all options are still open 

right now.” Asked specifically about the two-year limit, Rumsfeld noted the 

distinction between the law’s use of consecutive and Chu’s policy of cumulative and called it “an interesting question.” But the very next day, the secretary 

of defense decided to disapprove the Joint Staff’s request to require the soldiers to complete their tour in Iraq. He was motivated in part by the Army’s 

poor planning and bureaucratic errors, which had caused the problem, but also 

by the effect it would have on reserve component “retention, recruiting and 

morale.” While not expressly affirming Chu’s policy, Rumsfeld’s memorandum memorializing his decision employed the “24 months cumulative” language. From this point forward, planners had to assume that the number of 

months a reservist or guardsman served under one mobilization order based on 

Section 12302 would be added to the months of any subsequent mobilization 

order under the same authority, with the total not to exceed 24. A break in time 

between the two periods would not reset the count to zero.14

While the text of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 did not seem to 

support the cumulative interpretation, the law’s legislative history clearly expressed congressional intent “to at least minimize (since they cannot be eliminated) the inequities inherent in again recalling the veteran for a second period 

of service, while other physically fit young men have yet to be called for a first 

time.” Of course that sentiment applied to an era when the draft was available, 

and nonveterans could be readily obtained as needed. In addition, paragraph 

(b) of Section 12302 gave the secretary of defense the authority to consider 

“the length and nature of previous service, to assure such sharing of exposure to hazards as the national security and military requirements will reasonably allow.” Clearly Rumsfeld’s guidance fit within the letter and spirit of that 

provision, as well as his desire to emphasize volunteerism when mobilizing 

reserve personnel.15

Whatever its legal merits, the policy created significant hurdles for officials responsible for mobilizing forces and accounted for some of the reserve 

component’s greatest challenges during Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure. In July 

2004 Chapman noted that he and his ARNG mobilization planners “really had 

to jump through hoops” to provide incentives, such as special payments, to 

encourage soldiers to volunteer to complete their deployments. Those inducements proved insufficient, as 75 percent of those eligible decided to return 

home. The Guard had to draw from other recently mobilized units to fill those 

surprise. The new policy involved the secretary’s interpretation of the primary 

source of mobilization authority used by the Defense Department for OIF and 

OEF—Section 12302, Ready Reserve, paragraphs (a) and (b), of Title 10, U.S. 

Code. Enacted fifty years earlier and known as partial mobilization, it provided: 

In time of national emergency declared by the President after 

January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an 

authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without 

the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any 

member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, 

in the Ready Reserve . . . to active duty for not more than 24 

consecutive months.11

Over the past five decades, the nation had never required any part of its 

reserve component to remain on active duty for up to two years. As a consequence, hardly anyone had parsed the meaning of “not more than 24 consecutive months,” although most mobilization planners prior to 2001 probably 

would have argued that units and members were limited to two years continuous active duty. Presumably then, after some appropriate period off active 

duty, they would be eligible again for involuntary activation. That also would 

comport with a standard judicial doctrine of statutory interpretation, which 

presumes that legislators included words because they had significance. In this 

case, if Congress had meant to limit involuntary activation under partial mobilization to two years total, the word consecutive would have no meaning.12

Just days after the 9/11 terror attack, Under Secretary Chu had advanced as 

policy the view that “the total combined periods of service” could “not exceed 

24 months.” But military leaders, never expecting the war to last that long, 

had overlooked or ignored the potential impact of that constraint. His emphasis on cumulative service first came to the fore during the rotation known as 

OIF-2. Shortly after 9/11, one battalion of Arkansas’s 39th Brigade Combat 

Team had completed a six-month peacekeeping deployment to the Sinai Peninsula (which involved more than six months of active duty, given pre- and 

postdeployment time). In October 2003 the entire brigade became the second 

ARNG brigade federalized for OIF, and in March 2004 it deployed to Iraq. It 

was only when the 39th was serving in-theater that the issue of the 24-month 

cumulative limitation rose to the attention of Army leaders, as well as senior 

planners such as Col. Dennis P. Chapman, the mobilization branch chief at 

Headquarters Army National Guard from 2004 to 2006. Since the brigade 

already had spent six months on active duty in predeployment preparation 

and was scheduled for 12 months in Iraq, Chapman and other Guard leaders 

suddenly realized “there is almost an entire battalion’s worth of soldiers in 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

132 133

admiral, never had a one-on-one meeting with Rumsfeld on a major reserve 

component issue. Hall’s contact with the secretary was limited to attending 

meetings during which he was rarely called upon for advice or information. It 

was a frustrating experience for the senior official whose job it was, statutorily, to be the secretary’s primary adviser on all matters involving the Guard 

and Reserve. It also highlighted the impact of the 1994 reorganization that 

had interposed an undersecretary between the secretary of defense and the 

assistant secretary. It was much the same for Lt. Gen. Dennis McCarthy, the 

Marine Forces Reserve commander during most of Rumsfeld’s tenure. Despite 

heading a reserve component that provided a major portion of the ground force 

for Iraq, he never met with Secretary Rumsfeld and felt he had no opportunity 

for policy input with him. While an assistant secretary and reserve component 

leaders would not normally have direct access to the secretary of defense, they 

were nevertheless frustrated at their inability to directly influence the policies they had to carry out. Lt. Gen. H. Steven “Steve” Blum, the National 

Guard Bureau chief, for one, believed that the assistant secretary of defense for 

reserve affairs needed to be “elevated” and have a “straight shot voice, straight 

to the Secretary.” Under Secretary Chu, on the other hand, believed that Secretary Rumsfeld was aware of the concerns of reserve leaders and often listened, 

specifically in adopting the one-year-in-six mobilization standard.19

Secretary Rumsfeld’s mobilization decisions had long exasperated planners. Colonel Chapman knew that partial mobilization authority granted the 

president and the secretary of defense leeway to equitably implement mobilization, taking into account issues such as length and nature of previous 

service, family obligations, and civilian jobs critical to national interest. The 

problem, according to Chapman, was that none of the secretary’s decisions regarding the application of these factors were put into writing: “You would just 

learn when you had a mobilization packet arrive on the Secretary’s desk that 

he changed his rule. And it would throw your preparation in disarray and you 

had to start over again, because a whole bunch of people in the unit would no 

longer have to go.” Air Force Reserve Col. Barbara Y. Lee recalled that planners had to keep track of what the defense secretary “lined out” on the briefing 

slides during weekly mobilization meetings in order to determine what the policies were, and that verbal policies largely remained the standard throughout 

Rumsfeld’s tenure.20

Approaching the Breaking Point

General Helmly, the Army Reserve chief from 2002 to 2006, called 2003 

an “absolutely volatile, tumultuous year,” and the following year’s continuing high operational tempo provided no respite. Seeing no end in sight, in 

vacancies. The result was a loss of valuable experience in mid-deployment, as 

well as reduced cohesion in both the 39th Brigade and the units that contributed replacements. Since nearly 162,000 of the 190,000 reserve component 

personnel serving on active duty in February 2004 were ARNG or USAR, 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s policy had its greatest impact on the ground forces.16

The genesis of Rumsfeld and Chu’s choice of cumulative over consecutive undoubtedly had its roots in a concern for the long-term health of the 

reserve component. During the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush 

made overdeployment of the Guard and reserves in the Balkans and elsewhere 

a campaign issue against Vice President Al Gore. In a February 2001 speech, 

President Bush had noted the strains of repeated long stints of active duty: “It’s 

not only a tension for employer to employee. It’s tensions often times between 

husband and wife. And overdeployments, constant deployments really create 

a severe issue for morale all throughout the military.” In December 2002, as 

the Pentagon prepared for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Bob Hollingsworth, executive director of the Pentagon’s Office of Employer Support of the Guard 

and Reserve, noted: “Our concern is with employers who’ve just had guys 

demobilized, and now may have them remobilized if this goes down. How 

will employers react to this?” A few weeks later Rumsfeld responded to a 

question at the Reserve Officers Association conference: “If we want to have 

a total force, if we want that concept to work, we’ve got to be respectful 

of the fact that people in the Reserves and the Guard have jobs and they’re 

perfectly willing to be called up, but they only want to be called up when 

they’re needed and for something that’s a real job.” His off-the-cuff answer 

drew applause. This Bush administration point of view acknowledged that if 

reserve duty was too disruptive for employers, families, and citizen-soldiers, 

that would ultimately impact recruiting and retention, the lifeblood of a volunteer reserve force.17

Despite the clarity of the new policy, Rumsfeld understood that reality 

might intrude upon it. Responding to anxieties felt by many 39th Brigade 

guardsmen and their families, at a Pentagon news conference in July 2004 he 

stated that the department had no “plan at the moment to extend people beyond 

the 24 months.” That conditional phrase left open the possibility of longer 

mobilizations. Ultimately, however, no soldier had to serve involuntarily on 

active duty beyond 24 cumulative months during Rumsfeld’s tenure, although 

many exceeded two years voluntarily.18

The way the policy came to pass, with no direct consultation with reserve 

leadership and without warning, was just another source of frustration for mobilization planners during a very difficult period. Thomas F. Hall, assistant 

secretary of defense for reserve affairs from 2002 to 2009 and a retired rear 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

134 135

long and how often” reservists should be deployed in contrast with the regular 

component. The memo endorsed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force rotational model already being implemented, but that by itself could not solve the 

larger problems Helmly had highlighted.22

Given the projected mobilizations and the 24-month-cumulative limit, 

by March 2005 the Army Reserve anticipated having only 31,000 soldiers 

(roughly 15 percent of its strength) with remaining eligibility for future involuntary activation. Moreover, some of those 31,000 were in specialties or 

grades that were not needed at the moment, so the actual number available to 

meet expected requirements was even smaller. Secretary of the Army Harvey 

also pointed out that the Army’s stop-loss program and “a strong Active Component retention program”—both of which lowered the number of soldiers 

separating from regular service—had shrunk the pool of personnel who would 

normally join the Army Reserve upon completion of their active duty obligation. To help correct the manpower shortages, the Army added some 700 

recruiter billets in the USAR in addition to implementing bonus and incentive 

programs. But it would take time to recruit new personnel, who would then 

have to undergo at least six months of initial training before they could join 

a unit and deploy, and they still would lack the level of experience of the prior-service personnel. In short, there was no quick fix.23

The pervasiveness of cross-leveling—transfers of personnel and equipment 

from a nonmobilizing unit to a mobilizing unit—provided strong evidence 

of the downward spiral in the Army Reserve. Between September 2001 and 

April 2005, about one in four USAR soldiers (53,000) and more than a quarter 

million pieces of equipment had been cross-leveled, despite the fact that the 

Army Reserve acknowledged the practice “broke unit integrity and readiness.” 

While personnel cohesion was the primary concern, the equipment exchanges 

also could have subtle but pernicious effects, such as reducing the incentive to 

properly maintain gear and increasing the likelihood of organizations dumping 

their poorer quality materiel on units preparing for deployment. Schoomaker 

referred to excessive cross-leveling as “evil,” because “military necessity 

dictates that we deploy organized, trained, equipped, cohesive units; and you 

don’t do that by ‘pick-up’ teams.” A 1995 DoD policy prohibited taking personnel from one unit to fill out another “in numbers that would degrade the 

readiness standards of their parent Reserve units.” But in the post-9/11 crisis, 

it was routinely ignored.24

While Helmly’s memorandum specifically addressed the Army Reserve’s 

status, a Guard historian wrote that it “succinctly summarized many of the 

same challenges citizen-soldiers faced in the other reserve components, including the National Guard.” Schoomaker’s alarm about cross-leveling, as 

December 2004 Helmly wrote a 

memorandum to General Schoomaker that arguably marked a watershed 

moment for the country’s Army components in the decade following 11 

September 2001. In what became 

known as the “broken force” memorandum, the Army Reserve chief 

warned the Army chief of staff that 

“under current policies, procedures, 

and practices governing mobilization, training, and reserve component 

manpower management,” the USAR 

was incapable of meeting both its 

mission requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan and its need “to reset and 

regenerate its forces for follow-on 

and future missions.” Helmly’s foremost concern was that his forces’ 

“capabilities are limited severely by 

a successive series of restrictive mobilization policies and controls” that 

have “failed to encompass a longer 

range, strategic view of operational 

requirements and Army capabilities.” 

Moreover, in his view, those policies were implemented without proper consideration of the long-term effects they would have on retention.21

The Army Reserve chief argued that several policies threatened his component’s operational effectiveness. These included policies limiting the training 

of demobilized soldiers (designed to permit them to spend more time with 

their families after long deployments), outdated retention and personnel management policies, and the requirement to leave most equipment in-theater to 

save on transportation costs. This last issue the reserves shared with the regular 

component, but it impacted the reserves more heavily given their greater dispersion; they could not borrow from similar units at home stations. In short, 

the USAR was “rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.” At the end of 2004 

a Joint Staff report indicated close to 50 percent of USAR personnel (almost 

100,000) had been mobilized since 9/11, including 15,000 who had been mobilized twice and 2,000 mobilized three or more times. Helmly recommended 

serious efforts by the Pentagon and Congress to deal with the question of “how 

In December 2004 the chief of the Army 

Reserve, Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, 

warned that current mobilization policies 

and practices threatened to result in 

a “broken force.” His memorandum 

facilitated improvements in the total 

Army’s wartime posture. (DoD photo by 

Scott Davis)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

136 137

“number one priority,” and the Army committed to an increase of 2 percent 

per year in AGRs and military technicians through fiscal year 2012. The 

congressionally mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

considered FTS programs essential, declaring, “The FTS force is the caretaker element necessary to keep all people and equipment in mission-ready 

status for training and potential operational missions.” But the Army’s good 

intentions foundered for a time on the same shoals that were endangering the 

overall reserve establishment.27

In FY 2005 the entire reserve component averaged an FTS rate of 21 percent 

of end strength, but the USAR lagged badly at 11 percent, a level the Army 

considered “insufficient to support an operational Army Reserve.” But even 

that number masked greater problems. In 2006 the USAR reported new FTS 

taskings above programmed requirements, to include providing more than 700 

additional recruiters to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Administrative 

billets of that type could not enhance operational capabilities. In fact, an 

Army study found that fewer than one in four billets were located “at the 

company level or below,” where they were most needed to ensure readiness. In addition, in early 2006 the U.S. Army Reserve Command deputy 

commander directed that up to 20 percent of AGRs deploy to fill personnel 

shortfalls. Using these full-time personnel to fix recruiting problems and fill 

From 2005 to 2008, the congressionally mandated Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves addressed dozens of issues connected with transitioning the 

reserve component from a strategic reserve to a part of the operational force. (Source: 

National Archives, photo by MCSN Cale Bentley, USN)

well Secretary Harvey’s concern over the reduction in the flow of prior-service 

personnel into reserve components, applied equally to the Guard, which was 

beginning to struggle to maintain its manpower strength. By mid-2004 the 

Guard had cross-leveled 74,000 soldiers (more than 20 percent of its strength) 

and 35,000 pieces of equipment. The latter figure had jumped to over 100,000 

items a year later. The fact that Guard units typically had less than 75 percent of 

their required equipment to begin with only exacerbated the situation. A Minnesota combat brigade mobilized in 2005 illustrated the scale of the impact. 

By the time it deployed to Iraq in 2006, 1,703 of its soldiers (42 percent of its 

strength) had joined it from other units. Another brigade found that one-quarter 

of the light machine guns it received from other outfits were defective. These 

problems coincided with the height of the Army Guard’s participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, with eight of its combat brigades—each with about 4,000 

soldiers—forming half of all such units in Iraq in mid-2005. That increased 

commitment came at a price. In 13 of the 15 months between October 2004 

and December 2005, at least 10 Army guardsmen deployed for OIF or OEF 

died; the worst period was August–October 2005 when 69 soldiers perished.25

Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Carpenter, later the acting ARNG director, recalled 

that many soldiers decided to leave the Guard upon returning home from Iraq 

in 2004 and 2005. Like those in authority, most guardsmen had expected that 

conflict “to be a single event, one turn . . . over in six months, not unlike what 

happened in Desert Storm.” When it became clear they were likely to face 

multiple deployments to Iraq, and possibly Afghanistan as well, some soldiers 

voted with their feet. Perhaps they were unaware that the secretary’s policy 

did not allow for any involuntary second mobilization that would cause the 

soldier to exceed 24 months cumulative mobilization time, or perhaps some 

knew of the policy but did not expect it to last. Whatever the explanation, 

Carpenter noted that in less than a year Army Guard strength declined from 

350,000 to near 330,000 by mid-2005, a growing concern for ARNG leadership. The falloff in Guard strength resulted in new programs designed to 

boost recruiting and retention, including recruiter assistant programs, much 

higher bonuses, and, according to Carpenter, “more than anything . . . [telling] 

. . . the story of the National Guard, service to country.” But similar to the 

Army Reserve, those initiatives could not quickly solve the shortfall.26

The pace of deployment affected not only part-time citizen-soldiers, but 

also the Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel—comprised of Active Guard and 

Reserve and Military Technician personnel in the Army and Air Force, the 

Active Reserve in the Marine Corps, and the Training and Administration of 

the Reserves in the Navy—who formed a key part of the reserve component. 

In 2003 additional FTS authorizations were the ARNG/USAR leadership’s 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

138 139

diers through no use as we are through the fear of overuse.” Alluding perhaps 

to the defense secretary’s well-known concerns regarding over-reliance on 

reservists, the USAR chief argued, “Demands to use only ‘volunteers’ from 

the Reserve Components threaten to distort the very nature of service” in the 

reserves. Lieutenant General Helmly noted that while soldiers remained protected under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 

Act regardless of their volunteer/nonvolunteer status, “the Soldier is seen as 

having a clear choice by his family and employer.” Thus a soldier who wanted 

to serve might be deterred from volunteering due to pressure, real or imagined, from those quarters, but would willingly respond if ordered. Helmly was 

convinced that “failure to use the inherent authorities of involuntary mobilization during this threatening period in our Nation’s history will set a difficult, 

dynamic precedent for future involuntary use.” Lieutenant General McCarthy 

shared this view. Later, as ASD(RA) from 2009 to 2011, McCarthy stated, “If 

you want . . . Marines from a battalion in the 1st Marine Division to serve, you 

don’t tell them to all volunteer. You just send them a set of orders . . . and I 

guarantee you, they will show up to a man.”31

Some of the component chiefs, however, favored volunteerism over mobilization. Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, Air Force Reserve Command commander 

(and Air Force Reserve chief) from 2004 to 2008, stated: “What we try to do is 

keep the tours at a reasonable length and not mobilize people. There are benefits to being mobilized. There are also cons to it, too. But, there are benefits 

to using volunteers, and that’s what has made it successful for us. We’ve not 

had a shortage of volunteers for our requirements.” Recruiting and retention 

remained strong in the AFR in spite of repeated, albeit generally short, deployments. Aircrews usually served 40–45 days, other personnel 120 days. 

Bradley viewed mobilizations as “a last resort,” but his preference for volunteerism could hardly be divorced from the far shorter duration of deployments 

and higher quality-of-life standards enjoyed by the air reserves in comparison 

with their ground force counterparts. Moreover, cohesion was much less of a 

concern when most elements actually engaged in combat were often as small 

as two pilots.32

 By early 2006 the Army felt it was turning the corner on many of its challenges, with the increasing availability of regular component combat brigades 

and progress on rebalancing reducing the need for reserve component forces 

to deploy. But in the spring of 2006 sectarian violence began spinning out of 

control in Iraq, and Secretary Rumsfeld admitted that “al-Qaida had seized 

the initiative.” The increased need for forces for OIF (and to a lesser extent 

for Afghanistan) brought the Army to a crisis. In one well-publicized case, in 

August the defense secretary extended the yearlong deployment of a regular 

open billets overseas significantly reduced the ability of the AGR program to 

accomplish its true mission.28

The Army National Guard also struggled with FTS issues. In FY 2004 the 

National Guard Bureau reported “up to 18% of ARNG Technicians were on 

leave of absence” due to mobilizations at home or overseas, creating challenges for those units with vacated technician positions. The ARNG chief of staff 

from 2000 to 2003, Col. Charles P. Baldwin, noted that when units mobilized, 

their FTS members often deployed with them. But, with an armory to maintain, stay-behind personnel including pre- and post-basic training individuals to 

manage and train, and equipment that still required servicing, Baldwin stated, 

“The shell of that unit is still there. . . . The work is still there.” In FY 2007 

the ARNG’s FTS percentage was about 15 percent of end strength, far short of 

the benchmark set by Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, the ARNG director. In March 

2006 he told a congressional subcommittee: “Increased full-time resources 

are necessary to achieve acceptable unit readiness. It is critical we increase 

full-time support in the near term to a minimum of 90 percent of the total 

validated requirement.” That was considerably higher than the 72 percent goal 

the ARNG planned to reach by FY 2012. In comparison to the Army numbers, 

the USMCR, U.S. Naval Reserve, and USAFR stood at 16 to 18 percent of end 

strength, with the ANG posting an impressive 34 percent. Robert Smiley considered the air reserves “much more ready [than the Army reserves] because 

they have got so many full-time manning folks.” At a time when the Army 

reserve components were a “broken force,” the issues in its FTS programs 

exacerbated the problems.29

The mobilization challenge became even greater late in 2005, when Secretary Rumsfeld verbally expressed his position that any remobilization under 

the September 2001 presidential declaration of partial mobilization had to 

be voluntary—regardless of how many months remained in the 24-cumulative-months “gas tank.” The ARNG’s Chapman stated bluntly: “This throws 

a monkey-wrench in the mix for a brigade that is trying to go out the door.” 

By that time many if not most of the units and personnel in the Army reserve 

components already were unavailable for a second mobilization due to the 

24-cumulative-months policy, but in the other services, which generally employed shorter rotations of seven months or less, the new guidance prohibiting involuntary remobilization had a greater impact. The Marine Corps, the 

second largest contributor of forces on the ground in Iraq, faced the most significant potential problem.30

Rumsfeld’s new stance highlighted an issue Helmly had raised in his 

“broken force” memo. The Army Reserve general pointed out that typically his 

soldiers wanted to serve, and as a result the USAR was “losing as many Sol-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

140 141

guaranteed return date on the far end of a deployment became another factor 

harming retention. ASD(RA) Thomas Hall spoke for many in the Pentagon 

when he stated, “The most important thing to guardsmen and reservists and 

families is predictability.”33

In an effort to maximize the amount of deployed time within the 24-month 

mobilization window, reserve component leaders had units conduct some 

required predeployment training and processing during weekend drills and 

annual active duty. However, as Carpenter—from 2009 to 2011 the acting 

director, ARNG—recalled, the Army did not count these requirements as 

completed unless they happened during federalized service:

And so consequently we saw the situation where people did 

weapons qualification not one time, not twice, sometimes three 

times . . . four times. We saw people get the same series of 

immunizations over and over . . . because . . . if it didn’t happen at 

Title 10 status, it wasn’t valid, which made absolutely no sense.34

One might argue that repeating a weapons qualification was not a bad thing 

at all, but immunizations were another matter. The seemingly senseless duplication not only wasted valuable training time, it harmed morale. More than a 

few soldiers, who were willing to be deployed again, were terribly discouraged 

with the mobilization process itself. The ARNG boss recalled soldiers saying 

to Lieutenant General Blum: “I want to be part of what’s going on, but don’t 

ever mobilize me again. Don’t send me through that process again, because it’s 

broken.” Similarly, Lieutenant General Vaughn, ARNG director from 2005 to 

2009, remembered soldiers telling him, in effect, “Sir, I’ll go for a year downrange, but I’m not going to the MOB [mobilization] station and take that kind 

of abuse.”35

As the war dragged on, the Pentagon looked for ways to help pay for it. 

One method was a new Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission, 

which ended up causing discontent in the Air Force’s reserve components. In 

2005 the Air Force attempted to rectify the inefficiencies of maintaining too 

few aircraft at certain installations with their proposals to the commission, but 

from the Air Guard’s point of view, those plans undermined the recent history 

of trust and goodwill. The U.S. Air Force sought to reduce the Guard’s fleet of 

1,106 aircraft by 166, affecting 29 ANG wings. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) was displeased that the mandated process 

meant that “BRAC decisions were made without consultation with the governors or the Department of Homeland Security.” The states’ adjutants general 

also had no opportunity to provide input. The BRAC commission agreed substantially with the USAF’s recommendations, but the following year the Air 

unit, the 172nd Stryker Brigade, by several months in an effort to quell the 

violence around Baghdad. Rumsfeld traveled in person to Alaska to meet with 

distraught family members who had been expecting the imminent return of 

their soldiers. Citizen-soldiers were affected as well. The Minnesota National 

Guard’s 34th Infantry Division (mainly its 1st Brigade) was supposed to return 

from Iraq in spring 2007, but had to remain until July. The families of the Minnesota unit were as upset as those of the 172nd, but in this case civilian employers also had reason to be unhappy with the change in return dates. These 

long extensions came on the heels of an August 2005 report by the ASD(RA)’s 

office showing that reserve component tour lengths already had increased to 

an average of 338 days, up from 312 days at the start of the year. At that time, 

45 percent of the entire Selected Reserve was mobilized or had been mobilized 

since September 2001. Cross-leveling reached its highest levels in 2006, with 

the average mobilizing unit drawing more than 30 percent of its personnel 

and 60 percent of its equipment from elsewhere. With the added demands, 

Major General Carpenter later stated, “It got to the point in about 2006 where 

the National Guard was not going to be able—and the Army Reserve was not 

going to be able to meet their mobilization responsibilities.” The threat of no 

The longest-serving assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs and a retired rear 

admiral, Thomas H. Hall (center) initiated the watershed “Utilization of the Total 

Force” memorandum that Secretary Robert Gates issued in January 2007, offering 

predictability and 12-month mobilizations to the reserve component. (DoD photo by 

R. D. Ward)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

142 143

shifted to collective training at the lowest level, such as the squad. Years three 

and two emphasized larger element training at the company level and higher, 

with unit validation/certification expected by the close of year two. In year 

one, units should be ready to deploy within 120 hours from notification, and 

were expected to remain in that state of readiness for 12 months. Ideally a unit 

would deploy at the start of year one, but if mobilization came toward the end, 

that would push its completion of the AREF cycle to six years.38

The first designated AREF packages began filling overseas requirements in 

2004 (though they had obviously not gone through a full cycle leading up to 

deployment). The following year AREF packages provided about 75 percent 

of the Army Reserve’s mobilized units. In 2006 that number declined to 53 

percent, as the process of implementation fell short of the need, but it climbed 

back to 78 percent in 2007. As of February 2007 more than 166,000 Army 

Reserve soldiers had been mobilized since 9/11, one in four of them more than 

once without exceeding 24 cumulative months.39

In early 2006 the secretary of the Army approved a similar scheme for his 

entire service, dubbed the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The 

concept featured three groups: a reset/training pool for units recovering from 

extended operations; a ready pool for units undergoing advanced preparation 

and training; and an available pool of units fully prepared to deploy, either as 

part of an ongoing rotation or in response to a new contingency. Unlike AREF, 

a unit’s current state of readiness, not time, determined its pool, although it 

was obvious that a unit spending an inordinate length of time in other than the 

available pool would garner special attention from higher up. The model provided, in the words of one historian, “inevitability and stability”—something 

previously unknown to soldiers, families, and employers—while promoting 

greater unit cohesion. The Army anticipated trained, ready forces to be the 

bottom-line result. With the advent of ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve refined 

its five-year AREF progression plan to match, with units spending the first two 

years in the reset/training pool, two years in the ready pool, and one year in the 

available pool. In FY 2006 the Defense authorization act included designated 

unit pay for non-obligated soldiers with critical skills in ARFORGEN units 

slated for deployment who were willing to commit to further service. Keeping 

more of them in the units reduced the need for personnel cross-leveling and 

enhanced both retention and stability.40

Another change, more attitudinal than structural, was DoD’s greater reliance on the Individual Ready Reserve. Secretary Rumsfeld had approved 

mobilization of personnel from that source in December 2003. The issue was 

a difficult one for the Guard, which did not have a true IRR component at 

that time. Its equivalent Inactive National Guard was a small pool primarily 

Force took steps to mitigate the impact. Eleven of the 17 states that expected to lose ANG flying units were able to keep them through organizational 

changes, often by further integrating with a regular unit or relocating to an 

active-duty base. By 2006 ANG leaders had a much less negative view about 

the shift. The Air Force Reserve also underwent BRAC-induced changes that 

Lieutenant General Bradley deemed “painful for our people.” The command 

lost six flying wings—which had a major impact—but only one base. In a concurrent initiative, in 2005 the new Air Force chief of staff, General T. Michael 

Moseley, directed a personnel cut of 40,000 across the USAF. The Air Force 

Reserve Command was expected to lose 7,700 between FYs 2008 and 2010, 

though it took the bulk of that reduction in the individual mobilization augmentee category rather than in the traditional unit reserve program.36

Repairing a Moving Vehicle

The Army, which faced the most challenging reserve component problems, 

had been actively trying to solve them even as those issues grew worse from 

2003 onward. In addition to devoting far more manpower and financial incentives to recruiting, in 2005 the USAR/ARNG raised the age limit for enlistment 

from 34 to 39 years. The following year Congress authorized a 30,000-soldier 

increase in Army end strength, which would ultimately reduce the need for 

mobilizations. But those solutions addressed symptoms, not root causes; what 

the system really needed was structural reform. Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz, who 

in 2006 succeeded Helmly as Army Reserve chief, aptly summarized the challenge. He described “two consuming factors” that demanded his attention and 

energies: one was the need to transform his component, and the other was the 

need to do this without stopping “what we’re doing now, because we still have 

to supply about 30,000 soldiers every year to the war.”37

With a realization that the war would not end soon, in the latter part of 

2003 Army Reserve leaders conceived the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 

(AREF) rotational system, a cyclic approach to training and deployment. Lieutenant General Helmly saw it as the “lynchpin of Army Reserve readiness.” 

It divided the majority of Army Reserve forces—combat support and combat 

service support units—into 10 packages, with rotation cycles set at five years 

and 2 packages assigned to each year. As initially envisioned, units counted 

down the years toward the goal of deployment availability in year one of the 

cycle. In year five, forces (presumably just returned from deployment) underwent regeneration, resetting, and restructuring, if needed. That meant replacing worn or outdated equipment, recruiting new personnel to bring the unit to 

full strength again, and focusing on individual training. In year four, attention 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

144 145

few opportunities to travel home 

when off duty. McCarthy likened 

the Marines’ IRR mobilization 

process to “killing flies with a 

sledgehammer.”42

Only once after 9/11 were IRR 

Marines subject to an involuntary 

mobilization, and it was, according to one MarForRes official, “a 

disaster.” The Corps sent notices 

to some 8,000 IRRs, and went 

through an expensive process of 

bringing 5,500 who passed initial 

screening to Kansas City (rather 

than using 29 regional sites). Of 

those, only 2,000 met all criteria 

and ended up serving on active 

duty. The meager 25 percent 

success ratio served as a catalyst 

for a return to the in-person IRR 

musters of the previous decade, 

which began towards the end of 

2006 with scheduled one-day events. Those IRR personnel who showed up received pay for the day, Veterans Affairs (VA) program updates, access to local 

universities and job fair partners, and an opportunity for personal interaction 

with the Corps. It also provided a chance to determine the status of an IRR’s 

uniforms and whether the member had medical/dental issues that potentially 

could affect a mobilization. The IRR-managing entity, later redesignated the 

Marine Corps Individual Reserve Support Activity, began conducting roughly 

10 to 12 such events annually at locations around the country. Typically, up to 

600 IRRs attended each event. As time went on, there were few IRRs who had 

not already been deployed (most during a tour as regulars before going into 

the reserves). By 2013, 80 percent of Marine IRRs had completed one combat 

deployment, and more than 50 percent had served more than one. An unresolved concern, however, was that officials lacked the authority to conduct official physical examinations and thus could not administratively separate IRRs 

with unwaiverable medical conditions. Despite the system’s imperfections, the 

Marine Corps took the IRR seriously. As Vice Adm. John Cotton, chief of 

Navy Reserve from 2003 to 2008, expressed: “the Marine Corps does the best 

job of mustering their IRR.”43

Chief of Naval Reserve Force, Vice Adm. 

John Cotton (right), congratulates Master 

Chief Petty Officer David Pennington as the 

new Navy Reserve Force Command Master 

Chief. Cotton facilitated cultural improvements between the Navy’s regular and reserve 

components, emphasizing “ONE Navy” and 

a “sailor-for-life” mindset. (Source: U.S. 

Navy, photo by Photographers Mate 2nd 

Class Cynthia Z. De Leon)

holding enlistees waiting longer than 120 days to ship to initial training and 

soldiers who were medically unqualified to continue service in a unit. As a 

result, the Army National Guard would have to rely on the USAR’s IRR, composed almost entirely of inactive Army reservists and former active soldiers 

serving out remaining obligated service in the reserve. Colonel Chapman recalled that the Army Guard was skeptical at first and its basic perspective on 

using the nondrilling, no-pay IRR was that “it would be an admission of failure 

of some kind to the Army that we couldn’t fill our own ranks.” Deployment 

officials also had to overcome the reluctance of some if not many of the 

state adjutants general, who opposed the idea of bringing unknown soldiers, 

many without recent training, into their units. Nevertheless, Lt. Gen. Roger 

C. Schultz, the Army National Guard’s long-serving director, agreed to give 

the IRR a try. In summer 2004 approximately 5,600 IRR soldiers received 

mailgrams ordering them to report to a mobilization site in order to fill the 

requirements for 4,400 soldiers as part of the rotations dubbed OIF-3 and 

OEF-6. The excess of 1,200 above the operational requirement provided a 

margin for the inevitable cases of individuals found to be nondeployable 

for various reasons. By 2005 Chapman’s mobility branch began requesting 

200 IRR soldiers for every deploying brigade, because “in the end you will 

always need them.” Given the inactive status of IRRs, planners expected a 

certain percentage of them either to be no-shows or to be unqualified for 

active duty. “So we ordered two for every one we needed. . . [and] over time 

we won acceptance,” noted Chapman. Eventually, the ARNG “became the 

IRR’s biggest customer and kept the IRR relevant.”41

The Marine Corps Reserve also made good use of the IRR, activating nearly 

4,000 of them by August 2004. The Marine Corps’ assistant commandant, 

General W. L. Nyland, noted that “the IRR is an integral part of the Marine 

Corps Reserve,” but there still were hiccups along the way. The policy was 

to activate first those IRRs who volunteered and, when required, to mobilize 

those not previously called. But in the buildup for Iraq in 2003, the Marine 

Corps “misused the IRR,” according to Lieutenant General McCarthy. As 

the MarForRes commander, McCarthy wanted to manage the IRR mobilizations, but the active component manpower division insisted on taking over. 

Instead of looking for available IRRs within the area local to the unit they 

would join, according to McCarthy, the manpower division simply followed 

established procedures that in some cases resulted in “sending a set of orders 

to Corporal Jones who lived in San Diego and sending him to Camp Lejeune 

[NC] and some kid who lived in Jacksonville, North Carolina, and [sending] 

him to Camp Pendleton [CA], because they did not have the sophisticated 

knowledge of what was in the IRR.” In such situations, IRR Marines had 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

146 147

personnel for saving lives by enabling soldiers to more effectively deal with 

the roadside bombs.46

As the war dragged on and more reservists were subject to repeated deployments, health care grew in importance both as a key readiness issue and 

as a retention incentive. In mid-2004 military health-care officials announced 

that reservists who met certain contingency-connected eligibility requirements 

could seek reimbursement from TRICARE if they had paid their medical and 

dental bills and saved their receipts. Not long after, in the FY 2005 Defense 

authorization act, Congress created an improved health-care plan known as 

TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS). The plan was nationwide, premium-based, 

and resembled the active component’s TRICARE Standard coverage. In April 

2005 TRS became available to all reserve component personnel who had been 

activated 90 consecutive days or more and agreed to further service. For each 

additional 90 consecutive days of service and additional one-year commitment, they would receive an additional year of coverage. For example, one 

who served 360 days of qualifying active duty became eligible for four years 

of TRS coverage if he signed up for four additional years of service in the 

reserve component.47

Stephen M. Koper, the NGAUS president and a retired brigadier general, 

considered TRS an improvement, but still “several steps short of what we actually need.” Rather than treating health care “as a reward for special service,” 

his organization argued that individual readiness was the primary issue, and 

from that perspective, TRS should be made available to all selected reservists. 

Lieutenant General Stultz expressed concern that families not have “to switch 

health care every time the Soldier gets off active duty.” The plan did not result 

in widespread coverage, as many Selected Reserve personnel either lacked 

qualifying service or did not wish to extend their service contracts, and so 

remained ineligible for the program. Congress heard these concerns and responded in the Defense authorization for FY 2006, which extended TRS eligibility to include all Selected Reserve personnel in a three-tier premium system, 

with coverage available no later than 1 October 2006. The member could purchase individual or family coverage. The revised program also offered IRR 

members who served a qualifying period of active duty a one-year period following release from active duty to sign up for the Selected Reserve and retain 

TRS coverage. In addition, all Selected Reserve members with 12 or more 

months on their service commitment were eligible for the TRICARE Dental 

Program, which could cover family members as well.48

Family readiness had improved after 2001 due to increasing reliance 

upon trained volunteers and the implementation of the Military One Source 

program, but experience during OIF in 2003 indicated there was room for 

Increased reliance upon the IRR on the part of the Army Guard and the 

Marine Reserve was consistent with broader initiatives within the Defense 

Department. In January 2004 the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization) published 

Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve. The report 

cited the need to increase access to the IRR “to make IRR members a more 

viable source of military manpower and to provide greater depth of capabilities.” The Reserve Affairs secretariat anticipated that greater reliance on this 

resource would result in less cross-leveling of personnel and could redefine 

“how the IRR is used in the 21st century.” Two new initiatives geared toward 

IRR were the Defense Wireless Service Initiative (which sought spectrum 

managers and wireless engineers) and the Army’s linguist program (which 

drew heavily from native speakers in the Arab-American community).44

The Army Reserve also sought to more efficiently use its authorized manpower. It had established its Transients-Trainees-Holdees-Students account 

in 2003 to allow unit commanders to better focus on training and readiness 

by removing the distraction of personnel who could not fully participate. In 

2006 the account target was 12,000 billets, roughly one-half of the traditional 10 percent of USAR’s selected reserve strength that was unqualified at a 

given time. The Army Reserve planned to convert and restructure those saved 

billets over the next several years into spaces in operational units, thereby increasing capability without adding manpower. As part of that process, in 2005 

the USAR had begun eliminating force structure exceeding authorized end 

strength (205,000) and eliminating some billets in nondeploying units.45

Another Pentagon effort to relieve the over-stressed ground reserve components involved increased and sometimes-creative employment of air and 

Navy elements. Two of the Navy’s most resourceful contributions occurred in 

landlocked Afghanistan. In the first case, USNR personnel augmented provisional reconstruction teams, which previously had been sourced largely from 

the Army. The teams worked in rural areas to improve the quality of life for 

local Afghans and thereby increase loyalty to the national government. In 

winter 2004–2005 a full-time support Navy reservist, Cmdr. Kimberly Evans, 

commanded one of a dozen provisional reconstruction teams near Herat in 

western Afghanistan. In another example, EA–6B Prowler electronic warfare 

crewmembers and other electronic warfare specialists—regular and reserve—

deployed to eastern Afghanistan in mid-2006 and augmented U.S. Army elements tasked with countering roadside improvised explosive devices. Before 

the Navy personnel arrived, some soldiers were not maintaining or even 

turning on the electronic warfare equipment in their vehicles because they 

had not been trained in how to use it. Senior Army leaders lauded the Navy 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

148 149

don’t fall through the cracks,” because the Guard was “geographically dispersed . . . centered in every community throughout the nation.”51

The Bumpy Road to Greater Regular-Reserve Integration

Representative Ike Skelton (D–MO) observed in 2004 that the U.S. military 

had a reputation for ignoring “the notion of cultural awareness.” While he was 

referring to understanding people in other lands, his comment just as aptly summarized the gulf between regulars and reservists. Although much had been done 

to eliminate barriers between the two, more work remained. In 2013 former 

ASD(RA) Thomas Hall distilled the discussion of cultural issues to a simple 

question: “Why doesn’t the active duty like the reserves?” As a regular Navy rear 

admiral who commanded the USNR in the mid-1990s, he was uniquely qualified 

to frame the question. Both Hall and Dennis McCarthy, another former component commander who later served as ASD(RA), agreed that ongoing deployed 

operations since 2001 had increased cultural understanding and appreciation 

between the active and reserve components. Both leaders viewed this goodwill 

as a perishable commodity, however, that could quickly evaporate under the 

pressures of budget cuts and reduced employment of the reserve component as 

a part of the operational force in the future. McCarthy observed: “People who 

operate together find ways to reduce the friction, but if they never see each other 

until it’s in extremis, then the potential for misunderstandings, for misinterpretations, for different cultures to . . . clash is greatly increased.”52

The chief of the Navy Reserve, Vice Admiral Cotton, devoted considerable 

attention to the issue of culture and active-reserve integration. Thinking along 

the same lines as Lieutenant General McCarthy, Cotton dispersed dozens of 

his headquarters personnel to active Navy units to establish daily contact and 

explain the USNR’s capabilities as well as its limitations. The Chief of Naval 

Operations (CNO) from 2000 to 2005, Admiral Vernon E. Clark, had selected Cotton as his reserve chief in no small part for his shared commitment to 

improving active-reserve integration under a One Navy concept. Examining 

his service’s biggest issues, Cotton concluded the culture was “what had to be 

fixed most in Navy active and reserve components.” Accordingly, he told reservists in a town hall gathering in late 2004: “You’re all in the Navy. You’re 

not in the Reserve anymore.” Instead of thinking in terms of Naval Reserve 

requirements, Cotton affirmed “there are only Navy requirements.”53

Vice Admiral Cotton recalled that in the 1990s he logged his duty in the 

Navy Command Center as “peacetime contributory support,” while a regular 

doing the same job logged it as operational duty. But as he pointed out, reserve 

activities were clearly operational: “We’re lobbing cruise missiles. We’re in 

further improvement. One strategic study in 2006 advocated “that every unit 

have one full-time paid staff member,” in addition to volunteers, to assist 

with family issues of deployed personnel. The CNGR felt that volunteers 

enabled family members of the deployed to “maintain a sense of belonging to the command” but that paid staff was necessary at the unit level to 

ensure all critical tasks were accomplished. Despite the best of intentions, 

most volunteers were, according to testimony before the CNGR, “spouses 

with full-time jobs trying to take care of the home front while the soldier 

was in theater, and quite frankly, they couldn’t do it all.” Moreover, a 2006 

survey reported that only 18 percent of reserve component respondents had 

accessed Military One Source, while two-thirds remained unaware of the 

program’s existence.49

In the midst of the turbulence and heightened stress experienced after 2003, 

the Army reserve components in particular sought to demonstrate in tangible 

ways that they valued soldiers and their families. Major General Carpenter 

summarized the Army Guard’s perspective: “You cannot have a mission-effective soldier without the support of the family. If something is going on at 

home and the soldier’s distracted, that’s a detractor from the mission downrange. If you don’t have the support of the family and the employers in the 

community, you find that, over time, the soldier gives up and leaves the 

National Guard.” All the other components would have agreed with that assessment. Carpenter had in mind several truck companies that were extended 

in-theater—one more than once—with resulting negative impact on retention. Other challenges arose from new technology and capabilities. Carpenter 

noted cases in which soldiers with satellite phones called home in the middle 

of an operation: “When you get off the satellite phone, if you don’t call back 

. . . the family, for the most part, is going to think the worst.” Such problems 

affected all military families, but reserve component families were far less 

likely to be clustered on or near a base, and thus had much less opportunity to 

share these trials and tribulations with others in a similar situation.50

In 2004 the USAR implemented the congressionally authorized Welcome 

Home Warrior-Citizen Award Program to honor those who answered the nation’s call, initiated a rear detachment operations training program to help 

families learn how to use Army and volunteer support programs, and published a financial guide that mobilizing soldiers received during home station 

processing. Family assistance centers played key roles, and their number increased nationwide from some 390 in FY 2003 to 430 by FY 2005. But even 

in areas where a center did not exist, help was available. The chief of the 

National Guard’s family program believed that the Guard “is uniquely suited 

to ensure that military families who don’t live on or near military installations 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

150 151

Lieutenant General McCarthy viewed the Cold War era’s manpower, personnel, and administrative systems as a “circuit breaker”—one was either on 

or off active duty. But what was needed for the Long War, he argued, was “a 

rheostat” that permitted reservists to move “back and forth across the continuum of service” according to the needs of units and the members themselves. 

McCarthy considered the “artificial barrier that counts personnel on temporary 

active duty for more than 179 days against active component authorizations” 

as the foremost obstacle to volunteerism. For the rheostat to work smoothly, 

however, administrative systems required an overhaul, and regulars needed to 

be knowledgeable about their reserve partners. McCarthy lamented that it was 

“still common to hear senior officers and leaders acknowledge that they know 

little about the Reserve. Worse, there is little desire to learn.”57

Congress addressed the 179-day active-duty issue in 2004 by establishing a new strength category, designated Active Duty for Operational Support 

(ADOS), for reserve component members on active duty in support of a contingency. It allowed a reserve member to serve up to three years out of four 

on ADOS (informally known as the 1,095-rule because three years equaled 

1,095 days) without being treated as an active component member for personnel/career management and strength accounting. DoD officials believed 

this would make it easier to accept the voluntary service of reserve component members in support of contingencies, but not all agreed that it would 

necessarily increase volunteerism. In January 2008 the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves recommended phasing out the ADOS category. In its place, the commissioners wanted Congress to “designate long-term 

billets as either active duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates 

reserve members on full-time active duty tours.” Those options would provide 

career-broadening opportunities for reservists as well as meeting Defense 

Department requirements. In short, the CNGR considered ADOS ineffective 

for force management purposes mainly because it was based on concern for 

service end strength.58

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review report recommended other 

changes to improve access to reserve personnel. It called for an increase 

in the limit on presidential reserve call-up authority from 270 to 365 days; 

Congress responded and enacted the new maximum in FY 2007. The QDR 

also suggested looking into “the creation of all-volunteer reserve units with 

high-demand capabilities.” The Army Reserve soon pursued that initiative 

under the moniker Ready Response Reserve Units, with a pilot program in 

place in FY 2008. In accordance with the continuum of service idea, Lieutenant General Stultz, the USAR chief from 2006 to 2012, advocated a 

Bosnia. We’re doing these kinds of things.” When he became the USNR boss 

in 2003, Cotton employed terminology to facilitate culture change, redesignating reserve centers as operational support centers, and retitling reserve 

liaison officers as operational support officers, as well as relocating them to 

the more prominent operations section in the command headquarters. But 

the most visible title change occurred with the redesignation in 2005 of the 

Naval Reserve to Navy Reserve. Notwithstanding numerous statutes that used 

the term naval, and the opposition of naval associations and traditionalists, 

in April 2005 Cotton secured President Bush’s signature on a memorandum 

redesignating his component the U.S. Navy Reserve. Shortly thereafter, the 

chief of naval operations stated that both regular and reserve personnel were 

“all U.S. Navy sailors” and, as Cotton observed, “that was the real change 

in culture, when everyone dropped the ‘R’” (from USNR). The retired vice 

admiral summed up his perspective: “In the new world, there is no reserve. . . . 

And so it really is the RE-serve Component.”54

Another avenue toward greater integration was the concept of continuum of 

service. Since the military was hard-pressed to offer attractive compensation 

and working conditions to those with advanced skills in fields such as information technology, biometrics, certain foreign languages, and medical specialties, 

DoD considered ways to provide more variability in service options. The goal 

was to allow participation to ebb and flow over the years depending on one’s 

personal life and civilian career as well as military needs, with movement from 

one spot on the continuum to another to be seamless and for benefits to match 

the member’s contributions. Service might range from full-time duty on one 

end of the spectrum to availability as an IRR (with no requirement for military 

training or periodic duty) for mobilization when needed.55

In 2004 a commercially published collection of essays on the 30-year-old 

all-volunteer force highlighted “an increased spirit of volunteerism on the part 

of reservists,” a trend that continuum of service advocates used to their advantage. Promoters pointed as supporting evidence to the documented average 

of 45 days of paid duty on the part of reservists in FY 2000—a modest but 

nonetheless significant increase above the normal requirement. By expanding 

part-time service options, continuum advocates also argued, “the connection 

between the reservist and the community may provide a link to skills, resident 

within that community, that may be needed to support unique, unusual, or specialized military requirements.” A community might be a geographic location, 

a professional field, or some other grouping of people. A good example was 

the Army’s linguist program, whereby many native speakers, particularly those 

of Arab extraction, joined as IRRs and were available to serve as translators.56
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

152 153

“the Marines have learned, you get a couple days off, but you get right back 

with your unit, and you gotta decompress with them over time.”61

Rarely did redeploying personnel willingly acknowledge their mental concerns, which some viewed as evidence of cowardice or weakness. Further, as 

Robert Smiley acknowledged: “We didn’t spend a lot of time with demobilization which is probably a ‘ding’ on us. . . . The other side of the coin [was 

that] the troops didn’t want to hear anything about it. They didn’t want one 

extra moment at a demobilization station.” In at least one case a U.S. senator 

requested that a Guard unit return several days earlier than scheduled so he 

could welcome them home. While soldiers and families alike appreciated the 

initiative in the short term, the soldiers had not completed their out-processing. 

Reserve component leadership also appeared, to some, slow to recognize the 

devastating effects of PTSD and other neurological consequences sustained 

by some deployed members. And unlike regulars, most reservists, once home, 

were no longer in daily contact with their units. Lt. Col. Anthony Lanuzo, 

chief of services division at Air National Guard headquarters, noted: “The 

reserve side is tougher because . . . we only see the member . . . the guardsman, one weekend of the month. And normally if they are seeking . . . medical 

help, it is from a civilian provider. And the military may not even know about 

it.” Furthermore, some if not many members avoided informing their units of 

conditions they perceived could damage their careers.62

On some occasions the apparently seamless interaction of regular and 

reserve forces worked to the detriment of citizen-soldiers, because the reserve 

components failed to receive credit for their accomplishments. One such instance, the subject of a best-selling book and a movie, occurred on the night of 

2 July 2005, when a joint U.S. team including two Air Force Reserve HH–60 

Blackhawk helicopters flew through canyons in darkness into northeastern Afghanistan’s Taliban-infested Kunar Province. With friendly fighter aircraft dispensing ordnance illuminating the sky, one of the HH–60s landed on a rocky 

ledge and rescued Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell, the only survivor of a mission 

that cost the lives of his 3 teammates and 16 other special operations personnel whose helicopter was shot down. Luttrell’s 2007 account, Lone Survivor, 

never mentioned the role of the Air Force Reserve.63

A much bigger example of a failure to emphasize the contributions of the 

reserve component occurred in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Striking 

in late August 2005, the storm was one of the deadliest and costliest natural 

disasters in the nation’s history, with more than 1,800 killed and an estimated 

$148 billion in damage. Within two weeks, more than 51,000 citizen-soldiers 

were on duty as part of one of the largest humanitarian response forces ever 

formed. Guardsmen from all 54 states and territories (including the District of 

“soldier-for-life mentality,” a concept the Army chief of staff soon promoted 

for the total Army.59

Despite the efforts to improve regular-reserve integration, disparities remained between the components and sometimes had greater negative impact 

on citizen-soldiers. A case in point was the recognition and treatment of 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Rapid aeromedical evacuation of battlefield wounded in concert with advancements in medical care were saving 

many lives, but the full extent of injuries, especially mental injuries, did not 

always manifest until much later. Due to increasing awareness of the prevalence of PTSD among veterans, in 1989 the Department of Veterans Affairs had 

established the National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. However, 

it was not until March 2005 that the assistant secretary of defense for health 

affairs took steps to emphasize mental health issues for military personnel returning from combat. He initiated the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment 

Program, which provided personnel with information, screening, and evaluation for postdeployment health concerns. The process included a questionnaire to be completed three to six months after redeployment, and provided 

the member with access to a health-care professional. Further developments 

by 2006 included a congressionally directed mental health task force focused 

on the armed forces and a mental health screening website offering assistance 

to military members and their families.60

By then, Long War veterans were increasingly aware of PTSD. For instance, in July 2005 National Guard highlighted the issue, citing a recent 

medical journal report that nearly one in six “who serve in a combat zone 

return home with PTSD.” At the time, Guard policy prevented redeploying 

soldiers from involuntarily reporting to their units for at least 60 days after 

their return home. The laudable goal was to maximize their time at home with 

family, but it also isolated them from fellow veterans and the opportunity to 

talk about their experiences with others who understood. It had not been so 

with earlier generations of warriors. Vice Admiral Cotton paraphrased his 

boss, Assistant Navy Secretary William Navas, noting that from the days of 

the Roman legions through the two world wars of the 20th century, when soldiers departed the combat theater and headed home, either by foot or by ship, 

they had time to come “down from the high of battle.” Many a doughboy and 

GI spent his evenings on the boat home playing cards, drinking coffee, and 

telling war stories, probably with considerable therapeutic effect. Cotton asked 

rhetorically, “How do we come home from war now? We sit in Kuwait . . . with 

a table like this . . . and we look at ‘em and say, ‘Is there anything wrong with 

you? And if there is, we’ll keep you here and we’ll fix you.’” Not surprisingly, 

few chose that option, and it was likely to their detriment. Cotton observed that 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 6: July 2003 – December 2006

154 155

communications to the American people concerning reserve component operational roles and contributions. Citizen-soldiers often appreciated hearing 

senior leaders note that they saw no difference between regulars and part-time 

professionals, but this was a missed opportunity to trumpet successful action 

by the reserve component.66

_______ Conclusion _______

Between 2003 and 2006 the demands of the Global War on Terrorism 

placed unprecedented strain on the reserve components, especially the Army 

Reserve and Guard, and challenged the viability of the Total Force concept 

and the notion of an operational reserve. New policies, such as the Army’s 

rotational models and the DoD-wide introduction of TRICARE Reserve Select 

and its subsequent extended eligibility to all Selected Reserve members and 

their families, slowly began to right the ship. In the midst of a major war, Hurricane Katrina relief efforts confirmed the importance of homeland security as 

a (but not the) mission of the National Guard. 

By the fall 2006 election cycle, the American public had become weary 

of stalemate and increasing casualties in Iraq. Sadly, the U.S. military death 

toll in Iraq reached 3,000 on the last day of the year. In small communities 

like Houma, Louisiana, and Paris, Illinois, the concentrated loss of hometown 

guardsmen had been devastating. In the November congressional elections, 

the Democratic Party regained control of both the U.S. House and Senate for 

the first time since 1994. Secretary Rumsfeld had offered his resignation prior 

to the election, but it was not until after the results came in that President Bush 

announced he and his defense secretary had agreed to change the leadership 

at the Pentagon. The president nominated former CIA director Dr. Robert M. 

Gates, then serving as president of Texas A&M University, to succeed Rumsfeld. The new secretary would continue and even accelerate the effort to ensure 

that the Total Force—in particular its reserve component—was equal to the 

demands of the ongoing conflict.67

Columbia) and members of the federal reserves (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 

Air Force) participated during the three-month operation. The humanitarian 

airlift was one of the largest ever. The National Guard provided the bulk 

of relief personnel and was credited with the rescue and/or evacuation of 

some 87,000 people. The vast majority were carried to safety by the ANG, 

which conducted nearly 75 percent of Katrina airlift sorties. The scale of the 

response was even more impressive because almost 80,000 other guardsmen 

were deployed at the time, mostly overseas in support of combat operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like the reserve component’s participation in the 

Long War, this large-scale domestic mission in the midst of a major conflict 

was unprecedented. Ironically, Louisiana’s 256th Infantry Brigade was in 

Iraq when Katrina struck, producing a situation in which guardsmen serving 

their country were unable to assist their families and neighbors at a time of 

great need.64

The operation, and particularly the absence of the 256th Brigade, highlighted the importance of Emergency Management Assistance Compacts. In 

use for more than a decade, these agreements between states enabled Guard 

personnel from one state to lend assistance in another state during a crisis. The 

compacts proved their value after Katrina. While President Bush had the authority to federalize the entire force under a single commander and discussed 

that option with the Gulf Coast states’ governors, they demurred. An ANG 

study of the Katrina response concluded that “it would have been easier and 

quicker if the federal government [had] intervened immediately to manage the 

relief operation,” rather than relying on the compacts, but a serious drawback 

with that option would have emerged. The troops would have been under Title 

10 (federal) control in the operational area and, except in rare cases, the Posse 

Comitatus Act of 1878 forbade federal (or federalized Guard) troops from performing law enforcement duties. Guardsmen under state control could, and 

did, enforce the laws—a critically important role especially in the first week 

of the Katrina crisis. Additionally, keeping the troops in Title 32 (state) status 

avoided the sometimes-cumbersome federalization process.65

Many media accounts appeared to represent Army Lt. Gen. Russel L. 

Honoré, the “colorful, cigar chomping” head of Joint Task Force Katrina, as 

the commander of the entire relief effort, but in fact the governors—by virtue 

of the state-to-state compacts—directly controlled the majority of the relief 

force. Guard personnel, who actually outnumbered their regular counterparts 

by more than three to one, were, according to one observer, “dismayed to find 

that the national media consistently portrayed them as active-duty Soldiers” 

under Honoré. The misperceptions regarding command arrangements and the 

source of personnel underscored the importance of clear, accurate, engaging 
157

_______ CHAPTER 7 _______

Regularizing Reserve Mobilization for a Long War, 

January 2007–September 2011

I n 2007 a new defense secretary, Robert Gates, acted quickly to end his pre-

 decessor’s 24-cumulative-months mobilization policy while affirming the 

one-in-six ratio. The ground reserves required considerable time to fully implement the change, but the clearly written policy statement, which offered the 

reasonable hope of predictable deployments to reserve component personnel, 

their families, and their employers, marked a watershed moment in the post9/11 era. It came just in time, as the slow withdrawal from Iraq was offset by 

a substantial increase in troops in Afghanistan. Coupled with fresh domestic 

missions, the demand for reserve forces remained high through 2011, which 

marked a full decade of unprecedented operational tempo for the nation’s citizen-soldiers. Throughout this period, policies continued to evolve to better 

adapt the reserve component for its increased role in national defense.1

A New Mobilization Policy

By 2006 the Pentagon was increasingly hard-pressed to meet the mobilization and deployment requirements for ground combat units in Iraq. A joint staff 

briefing on 31 August made the point in stark terms—all 34 Army reserve component brigade combat teams and four of nine Marine Reserve infantry battalions had used their available mobilization time. The five remaining reserve 

infantry battalions in the Corps and a total of 68,000 Army and Marine individuals had “12 months residual time left on their clock.” But the Defense Department’s criteria regarding the ratio of time spent with boots on the ground (BOG) 

compared to time at home—BOG-to-dwell in military shorthand—meant that 

the Army would not have a single reserve component combat brigade eligible 

for activation until sometime in 2008, close to 18 months away. The next two 

eligible Marine Reserve battalions would not become available until 2009. 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s policy of no involuntary remobilizations, more restrictive than the governing law, further constrained options to solve the problem. 

Moreover, the one-in-six standard applied to individuals, which made it much 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

158 159

First, from this point forward, involuntary mobilization for 

members of the Reserve Forces will be for a maximum one 

year at any one time. At service discretion, this period may 

exclude individual skill training required for deployment, and 

post-mobilization leave.

Second, mobilization of ground combat, combat support and 

combat service support will be managed on a unit basis. This will 

allow greater cohesion and predictability in how these Reserve 

units train and deploy. Exceptions will require my approval.

Third, the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of 

Guard/Reserve units will remain a one year mobilized to five 

years demobilized ratio. However, today’s global demands 

will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be 

remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is that 

such exceptions be temporary and that we move to the broad 

application of the 1:5 goal as soon as possible. Continue to plan 

your force structure on that basis.4

The fundamental improvement of the Gates policy over his predecessor’s 

was the assurance that a single mobilization would no longer extend beyond 12 

months. He reinforced Rumsfeld’s goal that mobilizations should be no more 

frequent than one year in six. Taken together, that offered increased predictability to citizen-soldiers, their families, and employers. To help make that 

possible, he gave the services leeway to conduct some predeployment training prior to mobilization and to avoid setting aside time near the end of the 

year of service for personnel to use accrued leave. Practically speaking, the 

new policy primarily affected the Army Guard and Army Reserve because 

the Marines already relied on 12-month mobilizations that encompassed predeployment training, 7 months overseas, and postdeployment requirements. 

The Air Force not only featured shorter deployments, its units also generally 

were more ready to deploy at the time of mobilization due in large measure 

to their much higher proportion of full-time support personnel, so they required much less training after activation.

The change met with widespread approval among reserve component personnel, families, and employers. The ARNG director from 2005 to 2009, Lieutenant General Vaughn lauded the new policy: 

more complicated for the services, as they primarily managed mobilization in 

terms of units. While Rumsfeld’s focus on volunteerism fit with his emphasis 

on the long-term sustainability of the reserve components, it played havoc 

with unit integrity and cohesiveness, especially critical factors for ground units 

in the midst of combat. To demonstrate the dwindling pool of available manpower, Army charts depicted how many personnel had not yet deployed and 

when to expect the barrel to be empty. A number of observers felt that unless 

the Pentagon continued indefinitely to rotate regular ground combat units at an 

arguably unsustainable BOG-to-dwell ratio of one to two (or less), the department’s mobilization policy would soon face a crisis point.2

Robert Smiley, the principal director for readiness, training, and mobilization in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 

who had prior mobilization experience in the Army secretariat, recalled the 

genesis of the new mobilization policy: “In 2005 we were supposed to have 

three brigades . . . in Iraq.” The situation proved to be dramatically worse 

than expected and the Army needed to deploy significantly more forces, but 

could not “go ‘back to the well’ for 

the Guard and Reserves” due to 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s decisions on 

cumulative months and involuntary 

remobilizations. Smiley credited Lt. 

Gen. Steve Blum, the National Guard 

Bureau chief, and Lt. Gen. Clyde A. 

Vaughn, the Army National Guard 

director, with suggesting to the new 

defense secretary that “if you drop 

the tour length down to one year, 

we can go a second time. And they 

convinced Secretary Gates when he 

came in the door.” Smiley summarized Gates’ change as simply, “We 

are going to get rid of cumulative 

and just use consecutive.”3

On 19 January 2007 Gates issued a 

two-page memorandum, “Utilization of 

the Total Force,” originally developed 

by ASD(RA) Thomas Hall’s office, 

which spelled out the new policy. It contained three major provisions:

In January 2007 the new defense 

secretary, Robert M. Gates, issued a 

utilization memorandum that limited 

mobilized reservists to “a maximum one 

year at any one time,” and promised 

predictability to reservists, families, and 

civilian employers. (Source: National 

Archives, photo by Monica King)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

160 161

over half met the qualifying period (730 consecutive days—two full years on 

active duty) for Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits, while the remainder 

fell short by a month or so, and some by as little as a single day.8

Robert Smiley of the ASD(RA)’s office recalled, “We wrestled with that 

one and spent a lot of time with [the 1/34 case]” because “some of them were 

on duty for . . . 725 days which made them not eligible for the Montgomery 

GI Bill benefits, and that just caused a huge flap.” The soldiers had received 

individual orders that did not all start on the same day or require the same 

length of mobilization. Seeking to redress what many perceived as inequitable treatment, Minnesota’s adjutant general testified in October 2007 before 

the House of Representatives. The Army National Guard Readiness Center, 

the Army Review Boards Agency, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs ultimately joined hands to 

implement a process to review the individual cases of 1/34 Infantry soldiers, and in the end most of those who appealed were found to qualify for 

the educational benefits. Col. James E. “Eddie” Porter—who commanded 

a Guard engineer battalion in Baghdad in 2005–2006—commented that in 

some cases the “small policies” such as those affecting promotions and entitlements were of even greater consequence to citizen-soldiers than the mobilization policy.9

It took time, as the Gates memo had anticipated, to reach the intended ratio 

of one year deployed to five years dwell. In 2009 the Army chief of staff, General 

George W. Casey Jr., affirmed the transition would require several years: “The 

Army will complete transformation of the Reserve Components to an operational force by changing the way we train, equip, resource, and mobilize units by 

2012.” In the meantime, a command history noted that “units rotated on cycles 

shorter than the ARFORGEN goals,” with many mobilized after less than four 

years of dwell time due to the operational necessities of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Colonel Porter, the long-serving chief of staff of the 11,000-strong and heavily 

deployed Alabama ARNG, emphasized in 2013 that his units “hadn’t seen oneto-five since this thing started.” There also were cases of new ARNG units being 

established and then mobilized some 20 months later.10

Despite short-term challenges to full implementation, the new BOG-todwell mobilization policy fit well with the Army Force Generation model, the 

five-year cyclical deployment plan that Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey 

had approved in 2006. But the change from the prior practice of 18-month mobilizations to 12 months presented a major challenge. Army leaders, including 

Army Reserve Chief Lt. Gen. Jack Stultz, immediately recognized that six 

months to get ready and “six months boots on the ground is not going to cut 

it,” in terms of supplementing active component ground units that were still 

What Secretary Gates did was historic. . . . we couldn’t go 

back in and regenerate this force again, asking soldiers that 

have been away from their employers and their families for 18 

months to go back three or four years later . . . for another 18 

months. [But] if you move it back to 12 months total, and 

then you increase the value of the training, and if you get 

validation of task in the year prior to training, you could do 

two mobilizations of 12 months over a period of eight or 

nine years.5

The National Guard Bureau’s deputy chief of plans and readiness, David 

Germain, added in late 2007 that under the Rumsfeld policy the ARNG had deployed soldiers “without certainty when they were coming back. Now, we’re 

going to take a soldier and he’ll be back in one year.” One corollary policy that 

the ASD(RA)’s office clarified days after Gates issued his memorandum was 

that individuals could still volunteer for additional active duty beyond what 

their unit was required to perform, but such duty counted as dwell time—

volunteering members still had to “plan to mobilize according to their unit’s 

schedule.” A few weeks later the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman stated before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee: “Predictability of deployments for all 

Service members is a key factor to quality of life.”6

While the memorandum acknowledged that the goal of one year out of 

six deployed would not always be realized in the near term, it provided a 

basis for the services to make force structure decisions that supported that 

rate of employment over the long term. In January 2007 Congress made the 

goal more achievable by authorizing a temporary increase of 74,200 soldiers: 

65,000 (Army), 8,200 (ARNG), and 1,000 (U.S. Army Reserve). Two years 

later the Army gained an additional temporary increase in end strength of 

22,000 soldiers.7

Preston M. “Pete” Geren, the secretary of the Army from 2007 to 2009, 

recalled that the ordeal of Minnesota’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division (1/34), “crystallized” the wisdom of Secretary Gates’ new policy. 

Mobilized in October 2005, the unit went to Iraq in early 2006. In January 

2007, near the end of its yearlong deployment, President Bush announced his 

decision to significantly increase the number of troops in an effort to change 

the course of the war. The surge, as it became known, extended the 1/34 Infantry tour by four months. When the brigade returned home in July/August 

2007, it had served 16 consecutive months in Iraq—among the longest of any 

combat unit in the war. The extension itself had been difficult enough for the 

guardsmen and their families, but a firestorm of discontent arose when just 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

162 163

Lieutenant General Stultz stated that under the new USAR approach to 

training, “Commanders are now empowered to develop their deployment training plans, determining which tasks will be trained during pre-mobilization and 

which will be accomplished at the mobilization station.” By the end of 2008, in 

most cases, Army Reserve units had decreased the number of postmobilization 

training days. The Army Reserve chief noted in 2009 that the improved training regimen increased the “‘boot-on-ground’ time for combat support hospital 

units by 45 days, military police battalions by 37 days and combat engineer 

companies by 31 days.” By mid-2008 the ARNG touted that “Guard brigades 

mobilize for a year . . . [including] approximately 10 months of overseas duty 

after two months of post-mobilization training.”14

Robert Smiley, who spent time in the field observing the training ramifications of the Gates mobilization policy, noted that one important aspect was 

simply making the mobilization stations “much more efficient” at their job: 

“The theater-required training became much more specific . . . you had less 

down time.” Another part was improving the process of certifying that training 

was accomplished satisfactorily. The Army’s Forces Command was responsible 

for validating the training required for deployments, and in many cases before 

2007, it made Guard units repeat certain training tasks under its watchful eyes. 

The challenge was convincing officials to accept training they had not actually seen. Smiley believed that one of the biggest mobilization issues solved 

during Gates’ tenure as defense secretary was giving state adjutants general 

the authority to certify that their units had accomplished predeployment training, a change the Army chief of staff directed in 2007. Another initiative was 

the adoption of contiguous training, a block of active duty, state-managed but 

federally funded under Title 32, taking place immediately prior to mobilization 

under Title 10 orders. This initially was as long as 90 days, but Department 

of Defense policy soon limited it to no more than 30 days of such training 

within the 90-day window before the mobilization date (aviation units were 

authorized 45 days of contiguous training). This large block of training further 

reduced postmobilization requirements and thus increased deployed time. In 

March 2011 Secretary Gates effectively ended this program, since it violated 

the spirit of his 12-month limit on mobilization.15

While the number of postmobilization training days was generally lowered, 

a mission change could undo some of what a unit had accomplished, since it 

impacted the specifics of mission rehearsal—the primary focus of training at 

the mobilization station. David L. McGinnis, who served as acting assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs for part of 2009 and 2011–2012, recalled a 

visit in 2009 to Camp Shelby, where the 155th Brigade from Mississippi was 

deploying for a full year. Maximizing the time of reserve component units 

in the war zone meant cutting deeply into the time that had been devoted to 

predeployment training during the period between mobilization and departure 

for overseas. It was now critical to reduce that postmobilization training to a 

minimum, without negatively impacting combat readiness. The only solution, 

as Stultz explained, was to shift much of the training to the one to two years 

prior to a mobilization.11

Whereas the training requirements (primarily individual) in the first two 

years of the ARFORGEN model probably could be met with the reservists’ 

traditional 39 training days per year, a greater commitment would be required 

later in the cycle. Instead of the traditional 15-day annual tour, Stultz estimated 

up to three weeks in the third year, and for the fourth year “we need at least 

a 29-day training exercise to get all the warrior tasks done so that when we 

show up at the mobilization site, we have very little training left to do.” The 

focus of training after mobilization would be on mission rehearsal—preparation for the specific tasks assigned to the unit once it was in theater. The Army 

Reserve chief anticipated transitioning to a maximum of three months of predeployment training followed by nine months of boots-on-the-ground, “which 

would give us adequate time, pre- and post-[mobilization], and still be on the 

same cycle as our active duty counterparts.” Secretary Geren felt the Gates 

mobilization policy’s call for force structure planning provided the necessary 

backing for the Army’s full implementation of ARFORGEN.12

To help implement the shift in the timing of and responsibility for training, in spring 2008, the Army Reserve opened two regional training centers 

(RTCs)—at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin—to supplement its existing center at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. The new centers 

provided the wherewithal for USAR/ARNG units to accomplish many of the 

130 predeployment tasks identified as suitable for completion prior to mobilization. Those same three installations doubled as combat support training 

centers, conducting eight-day brigade-level exercises to cut back on postmobilization training while providing more time in-theater. In the Army 

National Guard, most deploying units conducted the bulk of premobilization training at in-state installations, although some units utilized the Army 

Reserve’s RTCs. The ARNG also designated seven training sites as mobilization platforms. Once mobilized, a Guard unit moved from home to one of 

six installations—Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Fort 

Bliss, Texas; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Hood, Texas; or Fort Lewis, Washington—while Fort Benning, Georgia, handled Individual Ready Reserve 

soldiers and contractors.13
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

164 165

full-time support programs and reported that, unlike the four reserve components under the Air Force and Navy departments, the programs in the ARNG/

USAR “do not promote total force integration and uniform operational standards.” Part of the problem was that in 2007 the Army’s previously approved 

plan to increase the ARNG’s percentage of full-time positions was derailed 

at least temporarily. The Guard reported that no new full-time support positions had been added to the 2007 budget, and it disappointingly considered 

the “just plain gloomy” fiscal year 2008 budget sufficient perhaps for a strategic reserve, but not an operational force. National Guard magazine also 

noted one downside to the Gates 12-month mobilization policy: “Guardsmen 

will perform more pre-deployment training and post-deployment recovery 

at home stations, which shifts expenses for those activities from the active 

component to the Guard.” That change exacerbated the ARNG’s funding 

deficiencies. The setback was rectified to some extent by the 2009 budget, 

which enabled the ARNG to add more than 3,500 full-time personnel, most 

of them AGRs. The Guard bureau approvingly called it “the greatest increase 

in 22 years.” Tempering the good news was the fact that in some states the 

Guard remained well below the number of validated full-time support billets 

even after the increase.19

Army Guard officials viewed the lack of full-time personnel as their primary 

shortfall. In 2008 National Guard Association of the United States Chairman R. 

Martin Umbarger, when queried by 

the Army chief of staff, believed that 

fixing the Army Guard’s full-time 

manning shortage was the “Silver 

Bullet to accelerate our transformation.” A year later an Indiana Guard 

human resources officer argued that 

the operational nature of the Guard’s 

service for the last decade required 

it to be manned as an operational 

force, and he considered personnel 

“our center of gravity.” Another official noted that in a typical military 

police company in the South Carolina Guard, five personnel from 

the Active Guard and Reserve personnel and one technician were required, but at current funding levels 

only three billets were filled.20

In May 2006 George W. Bush presided 

over the change of command ceremony 

in which Admiral Thad W. Allen (left) 

relieved Admiral Thomas H. Collins. 

This was the first time a sitting president 

attended a change of the U.S. Coast Guard 

commandant, signifying that service’s 

increased importance to national security. 

(DoD photo by Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen)

conducting final preparation just a few weeks before deploying to the combat 

theater: “They had all kinds of gates, and they were doing well. The day I was 

there, they got a mission change, [and they] had to completely reorient.”16

Army Reserve force restructuring, which continued under the leadership 

of Lieutenant General Stultz, facilitated training and readiness improvements. 

From 2006 to 2008 the USAR activated from scratch or converted existing 

nondeployable support organizations to add nearly 400 deployable operational 

and functional units with some 16,000 deployable billets. This included the 

establishment of eight modular sustainment brigades and two combat support 

brigades (maneuver enhancement) from existing units/organizations. One of 

the most significant actions was replacing the 10 regional readiness commands 

with 4 regional support commands based at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Moffett 

Field, California; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina. 

With the change, command/control and training/readiness oversight shifted 

to 22 (deployable) operational and functional commands. Stultz observed 

that the restructuring “enables us to source more operational units from the 

space savings” from reduced overhead throughout USAR. One of the new 

organizations, the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command went to Iraq in 

August 2007—where it held its formal activation ceremony one month later. 

The success of this modular unit, the first of its type to deploy to an operational 

theater, led the Army to allocate 5 more such commands to the Army Reserve, 

bringing the total to 10.17

The Army National Guard also strove to increase readiness, particularly 

by reducing the number of soldiers who lacked qualification in a military 

occupational specialty. The ARNG went from 26,000 awaiting training in 

2008 to about 10,000 a year later, and also touted the fact that since 2005, 

the percentage of skill-qualified soldiers rose from 77 to 91 percent. In late 

2009 Guard officials reported “personnel readiness is at the highest levels 

in history.” The Marine Corps Reserve, taxed by equally high deployment 

rates, began to experience a shortage of junior officers and senior noncomissioned officers in its selected reserve units during this period. One year out 

from mobilization, many infantry battalions had no more than two officers 

per company (instead of the usual six). It took creative solutions, such as 

assigning newly graduated regular infantry officers and pulling seasoned 

lieutenants from active duty to fill out the battalions during the critical 

team-building months leading up to mobilization.18

A May 2007 briefing by the Office of the ASD for Reserve Affairs emphasized that “a direct relationship exists between the number of full time 

personnel assigned to a unit and the readiness status of that unit.” A year later 

the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves devoted a dozen pages to 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

166 167

initial two teams. The first ADT of about 50 personnel deployed in late 2007 

and consisted entirely of Army guardsmen, but the second team included 

some Air National Guard members as well.23

The ADT program capitalized on the civilian work experience of Guard 

personnel—skills for which there was no equivalent military occupational specialty. One agricultural team from California boasted a horticulturalist 

(Sgt. Jason Stevens); a team from Indiana included an agronomist (Maj. Larry 

Temple); and a Kansas team featured a soil scientist (Capt. Jeffrey Mann). 

ADTs were only an email away from tapping additional experts in academic or government institutions back home, like the Kansas ARNG brigade 

commander who in civilian life worked in the inspector general’s office of 

the Department of Agriculture. At the start of 2010 there were no fewer than 

eight teams on the ground in Afghanistan. While their activity was civilian in 

nature, their real objective was counterinsurgency—if a farmer could provide 

for his family, he was less likely to support the antigovernment rebels.24

It did not always require innovative programs to leverage the civilian skills 

resident in the reserve component. Lt. Col. Morgan Mann, the executive 

officer of the 25th Marines, a reserve infantry regiment, quoted the Marine 

Corps commandant as stating that “in some ways a Reserve battalion is 

The brainchild of Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey, Army National Guard Lt. Gen. 

Clyde A. Vaughn, and the Missouri Farm Bureau’s Charles E. Kruse, Agricultural 

Development Teams strengthened the Afghan economy and improved rural life by 

deploying guardsmen with farming, livestock, and agribusiness expertise. (DoD photo 

by 1st Lt. Lory Stevens, U.S. Army)

The Coast Guard also addressed its full-time support issues, which had 

arisen primarily as a result of the loss of reserve program administration billets 

during the integration with the regular component in the 1990s. Between 2008 

and 2010, the Coast Guard made significant headway in realigning about one 

hundred full-time support billets to staff the U.S. Coast Guard’s new Reserve 

Force Readiness System. This initiative reflected the Coast Guard leadership’s 

commitment to improving reserve readiness and mobilization/demobilization 

processes, major challenges after 9/11. The USCG commandant, Admiral 

Robert Papp, credited the realignment of Full-Time Support billets and personnel down to the sector level (where two-thirds of reservists worked) with 

contributing to the relatively trouble-free mobilization for the Deepwater 

Horizon disaster in 2010.21

New Missions

At the same time that the surge in Iraq was bringing increasing stability to 

that country, a resurgent Taliban threatened progress in Afghanistan. In May–

June 2008, for the first time since Operation Iraqi Freedom had begun five 

years earlier, U.S. and coalition combat losses in Afghanistan exceeded those 

in Iraq. Priorities shifted further when President Barack Obama entered office 

in 2009 with the goal of ending U.S. involvement in Iraq and placing greater 

focus on “al Qaeda and its allies—the terrorists who planned and supported the 

9/11 attacks.” In March 2009 and again that December, he ordered U.S. troop 

surges in Afghanistan that added 51,000. From a strength of 218,500 in September 2007, American forces in OIF declined to 96,200 in September 2010. 

Over the same period, the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan expanded from 

25,240 to 105,900. At the close of 2008, 121,000 reserve component personnel were on active duty supporting the partial mobilization, with the ARNG/

USAR accounting for some three-fourths, or 94,000 of the total.22

This same period witnessed the expansion of nontraditional missions and 

programs for reserve components. The Army Guard was particularly well-suited to one of these initiatives, the agricultural development team (ADT) 

program. The brainchild of Army Secretary Harvey, Clyde Vaughn, and Missouri Farm Bureau President Charles Kruse, ADT sought to improve agricultural productivity and rural communities in Afghanistan by deploying teams 

of guardsmen with farming, livestock, and agribusiness expertise to assist 

with matters such as irrigation, soil, seed production, crop yield, and livestock 

health. Such teams could only be found in the Guard, according to Army 

Secretary Geren, and they capitalized on the farming and livestock expertise 

of guardsmen from states such as Missouri and Texas, which established the 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

168 169

turing the U.S. State Department crest and the name of their faux outpost. 

McGinnis noted that they trained at these locations because “nobody [in the 

regular component] would train them. . . . [or] give them any place to train.” 

As the thoughtful, outspoken McGinnis summed it up, “If the Reserves didn’t 

do it, who would?”27

As the war continued, the Army increasingly used Guard brigade combat 

teams to conduct security force missions, which encompassed tasks such as 

convoy escort, base security, and other force protection measures. From 2007 

through 2011, seventeen of 26 mobilized Guard brigades served in a security 

force role. Another three brigades operated with Task Force Phoenix, which 

provided adviser and training elements for the Afghan National Army. These 

nonstandard missions impacted organization, equipment, and the skills required of soldiers. As examples, a Guard infantry brigade assigned a security force mission needed a large increase in vehicles, while soldiers in fields 

such as artillery might need significant training to serve in a perimeter defense 

role. The nonstandard missions meant that even a unit manned, trained, and 

equipped at normal levels (the goal for unmobilized Guard units in 2007 

was 75 percent of wartime equipment) would need considerable additional 

cross-leveling when it mobilized. And often the unit would only acquire most 

of the large items, such as vehicles, when it arrived in-theater, making it difficult to train soldiers with the limited amount of equipment usually present at 

the mobilization site. Likewise, creation of the agricultural development and 

provincial reconstruction teams resulted in equipment and personnel with the 

needed skills being drawn from standard units, which suffered a loss in readiness as a consequence.28

While the reserve component maintained a high tempo of operations in U.S. 

Central Command’s area, new missions for citizen-soldiers arose at home. At 

the request of President Bush, the National Guard provided volunteers to serve 

along the U.S.-Mexico border to help stem illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and the threat of terrorists entering the country. For 25 months beginning in June 2006, up to 6,000 guardsmen at a time assisted the U.S. Border 

Patrol. While their service on Title 32 orders enabled them to enforce federal 

laws if needed, they were not there to engage in a direct law enforcement role. 

When Operation Jump Start ended in July 2008, some 30,000 guardsmen had 

served. From 2010 to 2011, up to 1,200 Guard volunteers at a time (again in 

Title 32 status) supported security measures along the border with Mexico in 

a similar role.29

In 2008 the Pentagon established a U.S. Northern Command-assigned task 

force to assist civil authorities in the event of a natural disaster or biological, 

chemical, or nuclear attack. While the initial organization consisted mainly of 

even more effective at COIN [counterinsurgency] than a regular battalion.” As of 2011, Marine Reserve battalions had deployed no less than 13 

times for Iraqi Freedom alone, representative of the heavy commitment 

of all reserve components. Mann elaborated that many reservists brought 

with them civilian expertise in areas critical for counterinsurgency success—“law enforcement, trades, medical skills, agriculture, and business 

skills”—all of them enablers for reestablishing basic governmental functions and improving the economy and quality of life of local inhabitants.25 

Navy reservists were also increasingly on the ground in both Afghanistan 

and Iraq, even as the strength of the Navy’s Selected Reserve declined from 

88,000 in 2004 to 68,000 in 2008. The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 

(NECC), established in 2007, quickly evolved to provide maritime capabilities in the near-coast, inner harbor, and riverine settings. Vice Admiral Cotton 

referred to the new command as “the ‘boots-on-ground’ people.” By spring 

2008 the command managed 40,000 sailors, of which nearly 50 percent were 

reservists. More than 11,000 NECC sailors were deployed, many of them 

in traditional functional areas such as naval construction (Seabees), diving 

and salvage, and explosive ordnance disposal. In the expeditionary logistics 

support specialty, reservists accounted for more than 90 percent of personnel. 

The NECC included nontraditional functions such as maritime civil affairs, 

expeditionary intelligence, and expeditionary training. The Navy activated 

its first civil affairs unit in 2007, with reservists filling nearly one-half of the 

billets. A number of NECC civil affairs personnel joined their Army brethren 

in provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan or Iraq.26

Civil affairs exemplified the larger issue of high-demand/low-density (HD/

LD) capabilities—specialties that were not often used in peacetime, and therefore not usually maintained in the regular component in large numbers if at all, 

but which were important when the need arose. Former acting ASD(RA) McGinnis believed: “If there’s anything that you ought to give to the reserve components . . . it’s the HD/LD list. . . . [It] represents the chasm between service 

culture and the needs of the nation, because the services will not invest their 

money . . . in these things that they don’t think [are] important to their culture.” 

In a move consistent with his analysis, in 2006 the Army realigned its civil 

affairs and psychological operations functions, shifting them from the U.S. 

Special Operations Command to the Army Reserve Command. In 2007 the 

Army owned 96 percent of the military’s civil affairs elements, and 93 percent 

of these were in the Army Reserve. Civil affairs/support teams trained at two 

Indiana National Guard installations: Camp Atterbury and the Muscatatuck 

Urban Training Center. The latter base’s simulated urban environment included the Muscatatuck “Embassy” staffed with personnel wearing golf shirts fea-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

170 171

Lieutenant General Blum, made clear the Guard’s vital role: “What the Guard 

does underpins and is the foundation of the military response of Northern 

Command.” One major concern remained the proper delineation between state 

and federal authority in responses to domestic emergencies. While states were 

the first to respond to disasters, depending on the type and extent of damage, 

governors might require federal assistance. But unlike the large Northern 

Command task force, the advantage of the DARTs, HRFs, and other Guard 

assets was that they operated under state control.32

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission affected the reserve 

components to a greater degree than any previous round. For the Army Reserve, 

that mainly meant relocating the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve and the 

Army Reserve Command headquarters, along with closing or realigning 176 

facilities and moving into 125 new armed forces reserve centers. The impact 

on the air components was much greater, as recalled by Craig R. McKinley, 

Air National Guard director from 2006 to 2008: 

I spent most of my time as Air Director trying to mitigate the 

effects of BRAC. We didn’t close any units. . . . It would have 

been a different story if we had just said this unit is closing. 

. . . We “re-roled” them. BRAC said, “You just lose your 

flying mission.” Well, [the] flying mission for a Guard unit or 

Reserve unit is pretty much the centerpiece. . . . You’ve got 

security forces, you’ve got medics, you’ve got civil engineers 

and everything, but that’s all part of the wing . . . part of the 

maintenance and [operations].33

In some cases, active and reserve component leaders were able to mitigate 

the effects of the changes. The Virginia ANG’s F–16 unit at Richmond—

which lost its aircraft—relocated in 2007 to nearby Joint Base Langley-Eustis, 

where it transitioned to the F–22 Raptor as an associate unit, becoming the 

first Guard outfit to fly the Air Force’s newest stealth fighter. The Hawaii ANG 

also entered into an associate program operating the F–22, but in a reversal 

of typical roles, the Guard owned the aircraft and the regulars were the associate unit. The Air Force Reserve also joined in F–22 operations in 2007, with 

the activation of the 477th Fighter Group in an associate role at Elmendorf 

AFB, Alaska. In the same year the Missouri ANG established an associate relationship with the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, flying the 

stealthy B–2 Spirit bomber.34

The BRAC process brought another reversal of roles. While its primary 

purpose was “to reduce infrastructure,” General McKinley noted that the Air 

Guard “actually gained square footage out of BRAC.” He cited Willow Grove 

active component personnel, Secretary Gates approved a plan that called for 

the Guard to establish 10 homeland response force (HRF) teams, one for each 

Federal Emergency Management Agency region, placed no more than a few 

hundred miles from potential disaster areas. The first teams began forming in 

2010, each with more than 500 soldiers and airmen, including more than 100 

full-time personnel. In July 2011 the Ohio National Guard’s 600-member HRF 

was the first to undergo validation, which it completed at the urban training 

center at Muscatatuck. The states continued to form the 22-person National 

Guard civil support teams designed specifically to respond to attacks involving 

weapons of mass destruction.30

In a related development, between 2008 and 2010 the National Guard established two domestic all-hazards response teams (DARTs), one covering the 

eastern United States and another for the west. The DARTs identified Guard 

units that had appropriate capabilities in areas such as engineering, logistics, 

and aviation to respond to specific emergencies, from hurricanes and wildfires 

to biological attacks. Using the existing emergency management assistance 

compacts between various states, in a crisis the DART would serve as a regional liaison, coordinating the response of assets from other states to deal with a 

natural or man-made emergency. In 

a corollary initiative, the Air National Guard moved to fill a requirement identified following Hurricane 

Katrina, when officials realized 

there was no entity assigned the task 

of recovering bodies in a disaster 

area. With the support of the National Guard Bureau chief, Lt. Gen. 

Steve Blum, the ANG activated fatality search and recovery teams. 

By 2013 the Air Guard had 27 such 

units, which could deploy overseas 

if needed and were aligned with the 

ARNG’s civil support teams. The 

experience after Katrina even led 

to development of a disaster relief 

mobile kitchen trailer that could be 

easily transported to provide cooked 

meals in place of the ubiquitous 

packaged MRE ration.31

In spring 2009 the new Northern Command deputy commander, 

The National Guard Bureau chief 

from 2003 to 2008, Lt. Gen. H. Steven 

Blum supported dropping the length of 

Guard mobilizations to 12 months in 

order to allow for periodic additional 

mobilizations following sufficient “dwell 

time” at home. (U.S. Army photo by Staff 

Sgt. Jim Greenhill)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

172 173

are shutting down that wing.” He emphasized that, unlike regular component 

personnel who are reassigned after a unit 

closure, “we and the Air National Guard 

don’t get to do this. A reservist . . . whose 

airplanes are going away, is sort of on his 

or her own.” More than 8,000 Air Force 

reservists—11 percent of the AFR’s selected reserve strength—were affected by 

the BRAC. The command helped personnel with new jobs, early retirements, or 

waivers; developed a web-based guide to 

assist members with career options; and 

requested and received temporary authority to fund travel for dislocated reservists 

to perform inactive-duty training. Even 

so, Bradley acknowledged, “there’s a lot 

of pain in this.” More turmoil came soon 

after when the Air Force directed a cut in 

AFR end strength of some 7,700 personnel between FYs 2008 and 2010, largely 

achieved by reducing individual mobilization augmentee billets.36

In December 2010 NGB chief McKinley touted the favorable relationships between the ANG and U.S. Air Force 

forged during almost a decade of combat operations, but tight budgets could 

quickly strain those bonds. In 2010 the Air Force sought to remove up to 11 

C–130s from several ANG bases and station them with an active wing at Little 

Rock AFB, Arkansas. Guard leaders objected to the plan, and the Nevada adjutant general, Brig. Gen. William R. Burks, considered it “a mere iron grab.” 

As a result, Congress included in the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) a requirement for the Air Force secretary to provide Congress a 

written agreement between the parties detailing any plan “to transfer aircraft 

from one component to the other.”37

Moving Forward and Backward on the

Continuum of Service

In early 2008 the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves devoted considerable attention to the continuum of service, criticizing 

The National Guard Bureau chief 

from 2008 to 2012, General Craig 

R. McKinley became the first fourstar guardsman in the nation’s 

history and a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, a testament to the 

Guard’s indispensable role. (U.S. 

Air Force photo)

in Philadelphia, a Navy Reserve base with a Guard A–10 tenant, the 111th 

Fighter Wing. The wing lost its aircraft, but the Navy Reserve moved out all 

its units, so in 2011 the Pennsylvania ANG assumed responsibility for the installation, which McKinley mentioned is “not our forte, by the way.” The ANG 

traditionally operated with a “very small footprint” on facilities maintained 

by the regular components, thereby allowing the Guard to stay focused on 

its primary mission. In the case of Willow Grove, the outcome for the Guard 

was replacing its former A–10 mission with the MQ–9 Reaper, with the establishment in 2013 of a ground control station at the renamed Horsham Air 

Guard Base. Air Guard units in Houston, Texas, and Syracuse, New York, also 

lost manned aircraft but replaced them with remotely piloted aircraft. While 

not ideal, the move furthered active-reserve integration involving cutting-edge 

weapon systems.35

For the Air Force Reserve, BRAC 2005 resulted in 7 wing realignments, 

1 base closed, and another 28 installations affected. Lt. Gen. John Bradley, 

commander of the Air Force Reserve Command, observed that the BRAC 

created “tremendous turmoil,” particularly while they were supporting combat 

operations in Southwest Asia. The air reserve chief noted: “The seven realignments ended up affecting us like seven closures, because when the . . . [AFR] 

moves its airplanes out of a place, even though we don’t own the base, we 

A pilot from the Virginia Air National Guard’s 192nd Fighter Wing during a 2015 

training exercise. Following the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s 

decisions, the Virginia Air National Guard’s 192nd Fighter Wing became the first 

Guard unit to fly the Air Force’s newest stealth fighter, the F–22, as part of that 

service’s total force integration program. (USAF photo by Staff Sgt. Jonathan Garcia)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

174 175

persist.” The Army was still publicizing the system in 2008 as a commercial 

solution to the challenges of handling the pay and personnel data across its 

three components (regular, ARNG, USAR). The department effectively cancelled DIMHRS by early 2009, though it did not fully die until 2010. Senior 

officials called DIMHRS “a very sad situation,” a “money-pit,” and “a dismal 

failure.” CNGR chairman Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, however, felt that the 

problem resulted as much from a lack of commitment to implementing the 

continuum of service concept as from the system’s technological challenges. 

During the commission’s work between 2005 and 2008, he found the Pentagon 

had “not made any of the underlying changes in the laws, rules, regulations, 

policies, procedures, funding and equipment” to produce a legitimate, ready 

operational reserve. So the DIMHRS fiasco was only a microcosm of the larger 

issue, according to Punaro.41

There was considerable evidence to support Punaro’s point of view. Despite 

the Pentagon’s 2003 mandatory civilian employment tracking initiative, the 

CNGR found that “DOD has been unable to verify employer data for approximately 24 percent of its reservists reporting civilian employment.” That 

increased the likelihood of conflicts between the need to deploy a reservist 

and the need to keep them in a critical civilian position. Comptroller General 

Walker expressed concern that the Department of Defense lacked “adequate 

transparency over total costs to compensate reservists.” He noted those costs 

had increased about 47 percent from FYs 2000 to 2006, and stated, “Much of 

the total growth in compensation is driven by the costs for deferred compensation—that is, funds set aside today for future compensation such as retirement 

pay and health care.” Walker questioned the efficiency of setting aside such 

funds when historically only one in four reservists became eligible for them. 

He further critiqued the expansion of various types of reservist compensation 

in recent years without considering the ramifications. “Because costs to compensate service members are found in multiple budgets both within and outside 

of DOD and are not compiled in a single source to provide total cost,” decision makers in Congress and the Defense Department lacked transparency 

as well as a valid means to determine “affordability, cost effectiveness, and 

. . . sustainability.” The GAO argued that if the nation expected its reservists 

to remain operational, “DOD will also need to develop an integrated set of 

policies, procedures, and business systems to more efficiently enable reservists to move from peacetime to operational status”—the crux of a continuum 

of service.42

Another management concern was the need for senior reserve component 

officers to obtain professional military education, including joint education, 

intended to improve their strategic thinking. The Goldwater-Nichols legisthe Pentagon for failing to adopt a “concrete description of what might actually constitute such a continuum.” In October, Secretary Gates issued a white 

paper on managing the reserve component as an operational force that rectified 

that deficiency. The document defined continuum of service as: 

management policies that provide variable and flexible service 

options and levels of participation that could make military 

service attractive to a broad population . . . consistent with DOD 

manpower requirements and an individual’s ability to serve 

over . . . a lifetime. . . . The continuum . . . aims to facilitate . . . 

transparent movement of individuals between active military, 

reserve military, and civilian service. Such policies offer the 

Department greater flexibility in accessing the variety of 

skills required to meet . . . requirements—particularly highly 

technical and civilian-acquired skills that are difficult to sustain 

full time in the force.38

The reference to participation levels suggested what others, including the 

CNGR, had envisioned, the establishment of “variable participation reserve 

units” whose members agreed to serve significantly more than 39 days per 

year if needed but were not expected to become full-time active-duty personnel. Under Secretary David Chu summed up the advantage: “You didn’t . . . 

have to be stuck with this either 365 or 39 days-of-training model.”39

A critical part of implementing an effective continuum of service program 

remained an integrated personnel management system that would ease the 

movement of members between duty statuses. Throughout the post-9/11 

period, many observed the need to improve personnel and pay systems to keep 

up with the frequent activations of reservists. Despite the Marine Corps being 

a leader in the area of integrated personnel management, reserve Col. Gregory 

Baur wrote in the Marine Corps Gazette in 2007 of the “pay and administrative 

horror stories . . . common among reservists” and noted that such incidents arose 

“especially when going from one status to another.” The CNGR summarized the 

basic issue: “One of the chief complaints among the services is their inability to 

write an order to bring a reservist on active duty and then efficiently and effectively provide pay and benefits.”40

The Pentagon had been touting its Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) as the answer to the services’ pay and personnel 

management needs. Development of the system had gotten underway in 1998, 

but nine years later it was the subject of a negative review by the Government Accountability Office. Comptroller General David M. Walker stated that 

“DOD has yet to deploy DIMHRS, and the concerns it was intended to address 
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176 177

fering them a $10,000 bonus plus a guarantee that they would not be mobilized 

for two full years. At the fall 2010 Corona meeting of Air Force senior leaders, 

the four-star generals decided to apply the service’s policy of 179-day deployments to all airmen who served in an Air Expeditionary Force—which included air reservists (ANG/USAFR). The change apparently came without input 

from the air reserves, whose standard (and predictable) deployment under the 

Air Expeditionary Force construct had been 120 days. Historically, the shorter 

time frame favored volunteerism, and Nevada Adjutant Brig. Gen. William 

Burks complained that the new policy was “a severe, if not fatal, blow” to 

volunteerism in the air reserves, if not also to integration efforts between the 

air components. Burks linked the attempted C–130 “iron grab” with the newly 

imposed 179-day requirement as another Air Force plan “to slowly diminish 

the Air Guard fleet.”46

Burks’ concern raised the question of which of the two basic processes 

to favor when activating citizen-soldiers—mobilization or volunteerism? The 

air reserves tended to favor volunteerism—as had Defense Secretary Rumsfeld—arguing that it helped to relieve the burdens on those who otherwise 

would be mobilized involuntarily to meet requirements. Other senior leaders 

emphasized that the failure to employ the mobilization option threatened to 

undermine its legitimacy in the long term as an accepted tool for protecting 

the nation’s security. Moreover, many reservists who desired to serve operationally—and repeatedly—sought the protection of a mobilization order to 

mollify family members and employers. Lt. Gen. Harry M. Wyatt III, the ANG 

director, remembered airmen who said to him: “Yeah, I don’t mind going, 

but you really need to mobilize me this time. If I raise my hand one more 

time, my spouse is going to shoot me.” If continuum of service only meant 

serving for shorter periods when it suited the citizen-soldier, it would never 

fill the role that Pentagon leaders hoped it would. At the end of 2010 General 

Craig McKinley, the NGB chief, admitted as much when he cited the potential 

end to existing partial mobilization authority and the long-term requirement 

for a “continuing ready access to the National Guard” that would alleviate 

the fears of active component leaders “that they won’t be able to get us in a 

rapid-enough way to use us properly.”47

Refining the Reserve Experience

Early in the Long War, short notice of mobilization constituted a challenge 

for countless reservists. Service members and their families had little time to 

prepare for extended absences, and it delayed civilian employers in finding 

and training replacements. In general the timelines improved by 2007–2011. 

lation of the 1980s had specified joint requirements for active component 

officers, but it neglected the reserves. Three decades later, education for 

senior officers remained a challenge in the Army Reserve (and other components as well) despite the increased involvement in combat operations since 

2001. John F. Hargraves, the civilian deputy director of training at the Army 

Reserve headquarters, commented: 

If you look at the Army Reserve colonel . . . [Troop Program 

Unit, or TPU] cohort, you can become an Army Reserve colonel 

without ever completing the Army War College or Senior 

Service College. . . . [In 2010] less than 30 percent of the Army 

Reserve Colonels in TPUs were War College grads. Which is 

exactly the opposite of the active component force. . . . And so, 

if we’re going to remain a viable federal reserve into the future 

we’ve got to have officers and senior leaders who have got that 

broad perspective.43

The need for education competed, of course, with the demands of an unusually high reserve operational tempo, as well as civilian employment and family 

considerations.44

For the most part, the continuum of service remained largely aspirational. 

The Navy Reserve chief, Vice Adm. Dirk J. Debbink, made the continuum 

one of his three strategic focus areas from 2010 through 2012. But most of 

the initiatives were limited in scope, such as promoting the theme of being a 

“Sailor for Life” and “the value of ‘Staying Navy’ through service in the Navy 

Reserve,” counseling regular personnel on reserve options as they neared 

release from active duty, expanding professional development opportunities for 

reservists, reviewing family programs, and recognizing employers’ support. In 

2011 one new idea Debbink pursued was Variable Service, which offered parttime sailors a continuum of service option that fell between typical Volunteer 

Training Unit service requirements and the Individual Ready Reserve, but that 

only encompassed unpaid training at the very low end of the service spectrum. 

As Punaro had observed, it would take serious and thorough legislative change 

to make continuum of service a viable reality.45

In some cases reserve component leaders pushed back when faced with the 

consequences of closer integration with the regular component. In 2008 Army 

Reserve chief Lieutenant General Stultz reported that increasing numbers of 

his soldiers were seeking transfers into the regular Army. The following year he 

implemented a rule that discouraged the trend by requiring mobilized enlisted 

USAR personnel to wait until after demobilization to apply for a transfer. At 

the same time, he encouraged regular Army soldiers to join the reserve by of-
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

178 179

age 60 (known as gray area retirees) became eligible for TRICARE Standard 

coverage. The law also doubled eligibility for TRICARE coverage to reservists from the previous 90 to a full 180 days before mobilization, and provided 

that personnel could not be denied coverage due to preexisting conditions.50

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves argued in 2008 that 

mobilization and demobilization must be seen as “steps in creating a seamless, 

integrated force, and the relevant policies and procedures must be adjusted 

accordingly.” The Marine Corps’ 2010 version of the Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan paid more attention to 

deactivation than its 2007 predecessor, with the emphasis expanding beyond 

units to the “rapid deactivation and administrative out-processing of IRR, IMA 

and retired Marines.” The CNGR noted that demobilization should be treated 

as “the first opportunity to prepare a reservist for his or her next deployment.” 

When Lieutenant General Stultz, the USAR chief, testified to the commission 

he pointed out the critical role of demobilization in one of his most challenging 

issues, medical readiness, of which dental was a major part: “We need to treat 

the soldier . . . just like we treat a piece of equipment. When we bring a piece of 

equipment back from theater and it’s returned . . . it comes back to me [within] 

standards. It’s the Army’s responsibility to fix that piece of equipment before it 

comes back to me.” He observed that the Army lacked a policy requiring it to 

“take care of dental needs at the demobilization site,” even though a soldier’s 

dental health could be expected to deteriorate during a deployment from “lack 

of dental care while in the desert, plus their diet.”51

With new authority from Congress, in October 2008, the Army Select 

Reserve Dental Readiness System began providing dental examinations 

without regard to where their unit was in the rotation cycle. The new system 

joined two other programs, including Demobilization Dental Reset, in demonstrating an increased commitment to the long-term dental readiness of Army 

reservists. Stultz oversaw a significant increase in Army Reserve mobilization 

dental readiness from just above 50 percent to 74 percent by 2010 and 78 

percent in 2011. Secretary of the Army Geren also emphasized the issue in 

various forums, proving that dental readiness was by no means too far down 

in the weeds for the Army’s civilian boss.In 2011 David McGinnis noted that 

“all Components have met or exceeded the Dental Readiness goal of 75%” and 

were trending in the right direction.52

Another aspect of demobilization that received increasing emphasis was 

reintegration of the returning citizen-soldier with his family and community. 

As the conflict wore on, leaders recognized that in shortening drastically the 

transit and downtime for personnel leaving the combat theater, the opportunity to talk about their experiences with their comrades-in-arms, decompress, 

Following his 2009 deployment for Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps Reserve Lt. 

Col. J. Eric Davis noted: “The notification and activation process is the single 

biggest improvement that I’ve seen since my last activation in 2003.” The 

first time, although he had been aware for three months that he would be 

called, official notification came just two days prior to his actual departure. 

Six years later, much longer advance notification allowed Davis and his employer to work out a plan for his absence. Davis also felt that family readiness had “greatly improved in the last few years.” The Pentagon’s May 2008 

announcement alerting four ARNG brigades for deployment to Iraq in spring 

2009 and a fifth brigade to Afghanistan in spring 2010 represented a dramatic 

improvement in terms of notification timelines from earlier in the war.48

After a decade of increased military duty for so many citizen-soldiers, two 

Pentagon-sponsored studies of employer support indicated that policies in 

that realm were working reasonably well, perhaps bolstered by a continuing 

high level of public support for military service members. In a 2011 survey 

of 78,000 businesses, 86 percent of employers were “satisfied overall” with 

reserve employees, and only 2 percent were “not satisfied.” Seventy-nine 

percent of employers said their reservists “are good team players” with only 

3 percent in disagreement. The results of a 2012 survey of 112,000 reserve 

component personnel were not as positive, but still showed that only a minority experienced significant issues. Seventy-four percent reported employers to 

be supportive of their military obligations, and more than two-thirds indicated 

they did not experience employment problems such as demotion, loss of job, 

or hostility from coworkers or supervisors related to their military service.49

Another effort to make service more attractive and improve medical readiness was the three-tiered TRICARE Reserve Select program that became 

available in October 2006. It increased health-care options for many reservists 

ineligible under the original system, but there was room for further improvement. Responding to the National Guard Association’s initiative, Congress 

revamped the system to make all Selected Reserve members eligible, starting in October 2007, for a single premium level of health insurance virtually 

identical to TRICARE Standard/Extra, the plan for active-duty personnel, and 

much less expensive than the former three tiers. Just one year later, TRICARE 

Reserve Select membership had doubled to some 80,000 personnel and their 

families; by September 2009 coverage increased to more than 100,000. Thus, 

step by step, the reserve component gained increased access to health-care 

coverage at the low rates enjoyed by their regular counterparts—another reminder that maintaining a truly ready operational reserve was expensive. Three 

years later the 2010 NDAA further enhanced the program. For the first time 

reservists who had retired but were awaiting retirement pay that would start at 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

180 181

them during their deployment.” By 2008 the program involved an entire 

weekend, with the service member able to bring a spouse, parent, sibling, 

or friend to attend the event, and all lodging and meals covered. A manual 

stated the program’s purpose: “disseminate information helpful to the demobilized sailor and their family, and recognize and honor the service member 

and spouse . . . provide a large amount of information in a short . . . time (a 

drill weekend) . . . to both the service member and the person who supported 

them most during their deployment.” The format included presentations by 

health-care, insurance, marriage, and communications professionals, while 

small-group breakout sessions offered opportunities for personal interaction. 

Through 2008, most RWWs included about 100 service members.54

The program appeared well-received and worthwhile. One attendee revealed: “Since that weekend, we have [been] attending counseling on a regular 

basis and I am very happy to announce we are no longer considering a divorce. 

We were also able to get a great deal of support information that we never knew 

was even available.” Vice Admiral Cotton considered RWW a great success 

and lauded his deputy chief, Rear Adm. Craig O. McDonald, and his team for 

taking the program from its beginnings in the Southwest region and developing 

and institutionalizing it throughout the Navy. The RWW program eventually 

shared certain resources with the subsequent Yellow Ribbon program, including vendors, locations, materials, and partial funding.55

As the operational tempo continued at a high level, leaders in Congress, at 

the Pentagon, and in statehouses nationwide recognized the need to broaden 

and improve support for citizen-soldiers returning from deployment and their 

families. The 2004 suicide of a New Hampshire air guardsman just 24 hours 

after his return home from Iraq generated early attention toward the issue. 

In response, the state’s adjutant general began a postdemobilization initiative 

for guardsmen. The Minnesota Guard’s adjutant general, Larry W. Shellito, a 

Vietnam veteran, wanted something better for returning warriors than what 

his generation had experienced. In 2005 he tapped his state’s deputy chaplain, 

John Morris, who threw himself into the effort, initially known as “Beyond the 

Yellow Ribbon.”56

Chaplain Morris needed no convincing to take part: he had just returned 

from Fallujah, Iraq, and was well aware of the stresses of combat. He developed a program that included weekend reintegration events held 30, 60, 

and 90 days following a unit’s demobilization. Each gathering emphasized 

particular topics. At the 30-day mark, it was “parenting and marital relationships,” plus a job fair and explanations of benefits. At 60 days, health 

issues took center stage, to include “substance and gambling abuse and anger 

management.” At the 90-day point—by which time previously undiagnosed 

and begin preparing for the transition to life at home had been lost or, at 

best, truncated. The growing appreciation of post-traumatic stress disorder’s 

unseen dangers argued all the more for some sort of institutionalized program 

with more substance than a single item on a mandatory redeployment checklist that few took seriously. In the same fashion as dental readiness, focused 

efforts at the end of active duty could pay dividends in improving personal 

and family readiness for the next deployment. Two initiatives in this area, the 

Returning Warrior Workshop (RWW) and the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration 

Program, better known simply as Yellow Ribbon, gained prominence.53

The RWW program predated Yellow Ribbon by about a year and was later 

rolled into Yellow Ribbon. During 2007–2008 the Navy Reserve formalized 

RWW, which arguably became one of the reserve component’s most successful transitional programs. Its origins stemmed from the Navy’s Deployment 

Support Program, a post-9/11 development intended primarily to help individual augmentees. In 2006 the Navy’s Southwest Reserve Component Command 

turned its attention to the reintegration needs of all its Selected Reserve personnel returning from combat zones, developing the RWW concept and 

testing it at a pilot event in Flagstaff, Arizona. Workshop planners sought 

“to inform, educate and honor the sailors and their families who supported 

As the needs of reservists became more widely understood, in FY 2008 Congress 

mandated the nationwide Guard-Reserve Yellow Ribbon program to address predeployment, deployment, postdeployment, and demobilization concerns of reservists and 

families. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Tech. Sgt. Aaron Perkins)
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

182 183

by reservists from various units, as well as individual augmentees.The NGB’s 

Janet S. Salotti, chief of the reintegration/transition office, noted that some 

states were more creative than others, citing a 2010 Oregon Guard-sponsored 

event held at Clackamus Community College, with attendees staying in dormitories and local vendors providing the meals. She called Oregon “a robust 

state” for Yellow Ribbon.59

In July 2011 acting ASD(RA) McGinnis hailed Yellow Ribbon’s goal of 

fostering resiliency among service members and families. Research increasingly linked the level of resiliency—the ability to deal with a setback—with 

the likelihood of PTSD. In recognition of the program’s importance, the 

USD(P&R) nearly doubled Yellow Ribbon’s funding from $12.9 million in 

FY 2010 to $23.5 million the next year. McGinnis noted that the program “is 

not a ‘war time only’ requirement, but must remain an enduring mission.” In 

2013 the House Armed Services Committee reaffirmed its support for Yellow 

Ribbon to be maintained as a “current, flexible, and viable” program because it 

believed there would continue to be a requirement for mobilizing the reserves 

in support of contingency operations for some years to come.60

In 2008 there were about 700 military family centers nationwide (400 operated by the Guard), but some citizen-soldiers still lacked easy access due 

to distance. Laura Stultz, wife of the Army Reserve chief, initiated what 

became known as family program virtual installations. Situated in areas 

distant from military bases, they would offer to reservists and their families 

the type of assistance normally found on a base. By 2010 there were three 

such sites, located in Rochester, New York; Brevard, North Carolina; and 

Coraopolis, Pennsylvania.61

 Another major issue, which applied equally to citizen-soldiers and regulars, involved the care of combat wounded. The nation had not engaged in 

extended warfare since Vietnam, so there was a lack of recent experience in 

handling a large number of wounded personnel. The prevalence of severe 

injuries resulting from improvised explosive devices further strained the military and veteran medical systems. The matter came to the fore in early 2007 

with media attention to problems at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 

Washington, DC. Congress responded with passage of the Wounded Warrior 

provisions in the FY 2008 NDAA. The law called for improvements in the 

housing of combat wounded, greater emphasis on understanding and treating traumatic brain injury (TBI), reform of the physical disability evaluation 

system, greater coordination between DoD and the Department of Veterans 

Affairs, better electronic medical records, and enhanced support for the families of the wounded.62

neurological issues might be expected to appear (although this took longer in 

some cases)—personnel underwent a comprehensive health assessment. At 

first, the 30-day event posed a problem because policy forbade any mandatory 

formation for a Guard unit within 60 days of release from active duty, but the 

defense secretary granted a waiver.57

Observing the Minnesota program’s favorable results, Representative John 

Kline (R–MN) led the House to include language in the FY 2008 Defense 

authorization bill directing the defense secretary to create the nationwide 

Guard-Reserve Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program. The program encompassed predeployment, deployment, demobilization, and postdeployment concerns of reservists and their families. The legislation tasked the under secretary 

of defense for personnel and readiness office to “administer all reintegration programs in coordination with State National Guard organizations” as well as with 

reserve component family and support programs. The law called for an advisory 

board comprised mainly of the directors and chiefs of the six DoD reserve components plus the ASD(RA). With President George W. Bush’s signature on the 

2008 defense act, the Minnesota program went nationwide, expanding rapidly. 

About one-quarter million citizen-soldiers and family members had attended a 

Yellow Ribbon event by the end of 2009. In FY 2009 alone, the Guard reported holding more than 1,000 events, while the Army Reserve hosted some 250 

gatherings. The following year, the USAR reported 525 Yellow Ribbon events 

serving 26,000 soldiers and 28,000 family members. The Coast Guard was not 

covered under the Defense Department’s legislation, and when David McGinnis realized that service wasn’t receiving funding for Yellow Ribbon through 

the Department of Homeland Security, he brought them into the ASD(RA)’s 

program. In fall 2010 the Coast Guard held its first event for returning deployers 

and their families.58

The diffuse nature of the reserves, with six different Defense Department components, played out in differing approaches to the implementation 

of Yellow Ribbon. While the law provided that “State National Guard and 

Reserve organizations shall hold reintegration activities at the 30-day, 60-day, 

and 90-day interval following demobilization,” the services followed different 

timelines. The Army Reserve typically held the three events 30, 60, and 90 

days after the date of demobilization. But some organizations interpreted it to 

mean that the second event should be held 60 days after the first event, and 

the third event 90 days after the second event, thus spreading them out over 

180 days. In addition, the services differed on how they chose a location and 

participants. An Army Guard or Army Reserve event, for example, might be 

held locally, attended by a single unit’s members and spouses or guests; a 

Navy Reserve or Air Force Reserve event might be a regional affair attended 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 7: January 2007 – September 2011

184 185

able and equitable rotation system was in the works. The reserve component 

also pioneered new missions and organizations, such as the agricultural development team program for counterinsurgency operations, and the homeland 

response force teams and domestic all-hazards response teams for homeland 

security. In each of these cases, the unique capabilities of citizen-soldiers filled 

a niche that would be difficult and expensive, if not impossible, for the regular 

component to replicate. 

In 2008 the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves produced 

a comprehensive final report that reaffirmed the importance of many areas 

the services had already identified for improvements, especially in the pay, 

personnel, and career management of reserve component members. The 

DIMHRS failure hindered the services (excepting the Marine Corps and 

Coast Guard, which had their own integrated systems) in their attempts to 

solve the pay and personnel challenges at the core of the continuum of service 

concept. The continued expansion of programs to accommodate the demands 

of an operational reserve, from increased access to TRICARE Reserve Select 

to the highly acclaimed Yellow Ribbon Reintegration effort, were making it 

possible to rely heavily on the reserve component over the long haul, but at 

an ever-increasing cost.65

As the United States considered its post-Iraq/Afghanistan force structure 

and whether the decade-long model of an operational reserve would survive, 

some leaders warned that “the progress made in the last few years is not irreversible and that old tensions between active and reserve components could 

renew.” Nearing retirement in 2010, Lieutenant General Blum, the deputy 

commander of Northern Command, put it plainly: “There are people out there 

who would like to put the toothpaste back in the tube.” Defense Secretary 

Gates surmised just prior to his departure from the Pentagon in 2011 that the 

Guard and reserve would continue to have an operational role, but it would be 

years before that particular “known unknown”—an apt phrase from his predecessor—could be definitively answered.66

To better focus on the needs of wounded personnel and their families, in 

April 2007 the Marine Corps established the Wounded Warrior Regiment 

(WWR) at Quantico, Virginia. Maj. Christopher J. Iazzetta, the operations 

officer for the regiment’s Marine for Life program from 2008 to 2012, noted 

the vast majority of personnel assigned to staff the organization were mobilized reservists. Also significant was the stand-up of a wounded warrior call 

center at Quantico in 2007, providing 24/7 toll-free service that enabled the 

wounded or a family member to request assistance with any nonmedical issue 

from a trained case manager over the phone. A reserve medical entitlements 

determination section at the WWR tracked and managed reserve Marines’ care, 

both medical and nonmedical. In 2010 the incoming Marine Corps commandant, General James F. Amos, called the WWR “probably one of the greatest 

success stories coming out of this war.” The other services took similar steps to 

ensure better care for their wounded warriors. One important issue was whether 

to keep personnel on active duty while they went through the disability evaluation process. Contrary to the Army’s preference, McGinnis believed soldiers 

should remain on active duty until a disability finding was determined, citing research that four-fifths of the disability evaluation cases in the Army were located 

in only 11 Army hospitals.63

One ominous aspect of the situation was exemplified in the Air Guard. As 

of April 2013, more than half of its 314 wounded warriors had been diagnosed 

with PTSD. The invisible wounds of PTSD and TBI not only could be severe; 

they were the ones many were reticent to acknowledge and the ones often 

missed. In 2014 David McGinnis candidly voiced his opinion that, in general, 

the military’s operational commands had been more aggressive in pursuing advances in PTSD and TBI treatment than the government’s medical community. 

McGinnis noted the interest in learning about the approach of NASCAR and 

the NFL to cutting-edge TBI technology—the result of realizing that a race 

driver’s brain injury from a crash at Bristol may not be much different than a 

HMMWV driver’s from an improvised explosive device at Balad. A Michigan 

Army Guard senior officer described TBI as “the signature injury of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”64

_______ Conclusion _______

Between 2007 and 2011 the Army National Guard and Army Reserve gradually moved toward the goal of 12-month mobilizations that Secretary Gates 

had directed in his far-reaching 19 January 2007 memorandum. While the 

desired BOG-to-dwell ratio was far from reality for many ground units, at least 

reservists and their families and employers had the assurance that a predict-
187

_______ CHAPTER 8 _______

Conclusion

I

n January 2008 retired Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, the chairman of the Co-

 mission on the National Guard and Reserves, wrote that an “explicit recognition” had dawned on Pentagon leaders and planners, Congress, families, and 

employers across the country regarding “the evolution of the reserve components from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed 

to meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force.” 

Many civilians probably did not understand the nuances between strategic 

and operational, but they knew that family members, friends, neighbors, and 

coworkers had begun spending more time on military duty and had even deployed overseas, perhaps multiple times.1

A Militia Nation Returns to Its Roots

The initial objective of this study was to chronicle that evolution of the 

reserve component beginning in the 1990s from a strategic role (rarely called 

upon and only in time of major conflict) to an operational one (routinely and 

frequently employed in situations short of full-scale war). But in looking at 

the long arc of the history of American reserve policy, it becomes clear that 

this is not so much a new paradigm, as it is an echo of the original mission of 

the reserve component at the dawn of the United States. The founding fathers 

viewed a standing army as too expensive, too threatening, and largely unnecessary, and therefore placed the main weight of national defense on the 

nation’s citizen-soldiers. Thus the militia carried a large share of the burden 

in early campaigns against American Indians, insurrectionists, and even the 

British in the War of 1812. That heavy reliance upon the militia to support a 

miniscule regular army in numerous small operations and a major war rivaled, 

and in many respects exceeded, the role of the reserve component during the 

1990s and up through today.

Similar to the early years of the republic, today the United States is neither 

willing nor able to pay the cost of maintaining a regular force large enough 

to deal with all the missions undertaken in the name of national security. And 

while the American public generally no longer sees a standing military as a 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 8: Conclusion

188 189

military spending in comparison with the rest of the world. Likewise, growing 

requirements for social spending have competed for scarce budget dollars. 

That increasing disconnect between a greater use of American military power 

and the willingness and ability of the nation to pay for it led policymakers to 

reemphasize the role of citizen-soldiers in providing a less-expensive supplement to full-time active-duty forces.

Those transformations in warfare, defense policy, and economics, in turn, 

have driven dramatic alterations in reserve policy over the past two-plus centuries in an effort to maintain citizen-soldiers as a relevant part of national 

defense. The recurring theme, however, has been that efforts to fix the shortcomings in the system revealed by the most recent resort to reserve forces 

have never proven sufficient when the next mobilization occurred. In almost 

every case, the reserve component has been less ready than needed, but not due 

to any deficiency in the willingness of citizen-soldiers to serve their country. 

Instead, nearly every problem can be traced to flaws in the laws and policies 

governing the reserves. To cite one example, the long-running issue of poor 

dental readiness in the reserve component did not arise because reservists and 

guardsmen are less careful about their teeth than their active-duty counterparts, but simply because policies never provided them the same access to free 

dental care. 

On the Horns of Our Own Dilemma

Sometimes the inadequate state of reserve component capability and readiness has been due to the aforementioned changes in the nature of war and 

national security requirements. Like the old saying that the military always 

prepares for the last war, our national leaders (civilian and military) have 

rarely dealt with emerging challenges to the reserve system until an adverse 

impact occurred as a result of mobilization. Often, however, the difficulty has 

stemmed less from a failure to foresee problems than from the inability to find 

a solution that leaders could agree upon before negative consequences forced 

their hand. Even then, the reforms usually have fallen short of what was truly 

required. In many cases, this was not a failure of leadership per se. Rather it 

has been a function of the challenge of identifying and implementing good 

alternatives, arising from a host of reasons generally beyond the control of 

those making policy. 

A major hurdle to finding common ground to improve our reserve system 

is built into the very nature of the U.S. Constitution, with a representative government and federalism. Members of both houses of Congress must carry out 

the will of their respective citizens while working for the common good, and 

serious threat to democracy, after the Vietnam War the regulars themselves 

were wary of embarking on operations without strong public support and thus 

reemphasized a reliance on citizen-soldiers as a means to ensure that popular 

backing would be present. As a result of those two impetuses, although the 

repeated forays in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere in the 1990s 

were not much more frequent than campaigns in the first couple of decades of 

U.S. history, the role of the reserves was roughly equally critical in both eras. 

The common thread across nearly 250 years of history is that the demands 

placed on the reserve component have increased tremendously as a result of 

the changing nature of U.S. national security requirements and of war itself. 

In the latter realm, in the late 1700s it was possible to expect nearly every eligible male to provide his own musket, powder horn, and cartridge box, and to 

periodically devote a few hours to practicing the rudiments of drill. A well-led 

militia force, by itself or in support of a small cadre of regulars, could protect 

the new nation against most of the threats it faced. The expanse of the oceans 

and the limitations of transportation meant the fledgling country did not have 

to face the full brunt of invasion by a large professional army. Merchant sailors 

and their ships also could readily supplement the Navy in times of conflict. As 

war grew increasingly complex, in technology and in tactics, it outstripped the 

ability of citizens to arm themselves properly and to train on a part-time basis 

at a level that would enable them to engage in combat on short notice, both as 

individuals and as members of a unit. A hundred neighbors cannot go to the 

village green these days and practice combined-arms warfare, and the country 

cannot readily convert commercial ships and aircraft to combat platforms. 

From the end of the War of 1812 until the beginning of World War II, the 

nation maintained a small regular force, but it was sufficient to handle most 

operations short of major war, such as the Indian campaigns throughout the 

1800s and the Banana Wars in the Caribbean between the World Wars. When 

necessary, volunteers and draftees joined with the Guard and reserve to reinforce regulars for large-scale conflicts, and often vastly outnumbered their 

full-time compatriots. As the United States grew into a superpower and took 

on the task of aiding allies overseas and maintaining international order, the 

scale of military operations, even ones short of major war, grew much larger, 

more challenging, and more expensive. Projecting power rapidly over long distances and maintaining large forces stationed far from home cost a great deal 

more than simply defending one’s borders. Since the end of the Cold War, our 

allies have devoted a decreasing share of their resources to national security, 

thus increasing the relative burden on the United States. At the same time, the 

global economic dominance that the United States enjoyed in the post–World 

War II era has slowly receded, leaving the country with reduced capacity for 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 8: Conclusion

190 191

short notice. In 1947 the Air Force inherited the Guard’s aviation units and 

found it politically impossible to relegate the new ANG to a nonflying role.

Another feature of our reserve system that creates built-in dilemmas is its 

geographic basis in both the state and federal components. While this contributes to unit cohesion (people from the same community or region serve together) and is efficient in some respects (personnel can get to drill weekends with 

minimal travel), it also presents major challenges. One is the concentration of 

loss in a single locality when a reserve unit suffers heavy casualties. Another 

and more universal problem arises from the frequent mismatch of individual 

skills to unit requirements, which routinely arises in several ways. A person 

enlists and acquires a skill for his local unit, only to move later to another area 

where no organization requires that specialty. A service member leaves active 

duty and takes up residence in an area where available units do not need her 

skill. Or a service repurposes a unit, rendering many or all of its personnel unqualified. In each of these cases, much of the experience gained by individuals 

through past training is rendered irrelevant, and they must undergo costly and 

time-consuming retraining. And for some considerable period they fill a billet 

for which they are unqualified, rendering the unit less ready and leading to a 

loss of unit cohesion during mobilization, since they will have to be replaced 

from some other source. The geographic system also makes it more difficult 

for individuals to advance into appropriate billets for their rank and thus gain 

the experience they need as their career progresses. Finally, and perhaps most 

significant, it leads to constant churn in units as individuals move due to their 

civilian schooling, job changes, or other considerations. (There is turnover in 

active-duty units as well, but it generally involves routine end-of-tour departures that include scheduled arrival of trained replacements.) Geographic organization thus decreases unit cohesion, in direct negation of the benefit from 

having neighbors serve together.

As the skills required by modern warfare have grown more complex and the 

requirement for rapid employment after mobilization has grown more urgent, 

the need has risen for more and better premobilization training. The day is long 

gone when an individual could enlist in his local unit and learn on the job, or 

when units could muster for a couple of hours one evening in the drill hall and 

conduct useful training. And the trend continues toward even greater demands 

on the time of citizen-soldiers. The Army Force Generation process, for instance, has required units to conduct more than the usual 48 drills and two 

weeks of active duty in the years immediately preceding mobilization. The 

continuum of service option is predicated on some reservists devoting more 

than the usual amount of time to active service. But those demands for more 

the states are not mere regional subsets of the national government but have 

certain realms of authority in their own right. Like Emory Upton or the Gray 

Board, one might wish to simplify matters with a federal-only reserve component, but short of a dramatic and unimaginable change in our Constitution or 

public opinion, for the foreseeable future we will have a system that includes a 

state-based National Guard and must operate within that framework.

Other issues arise from contradictions that are inherent and thus unavoidable. In the same fashion that maneuver warfare theory seeks to put an enemy 

on the horns of a dilemma where there are no obviously good choices, leaders 

are faced with many serious quandaries in formulating reserve policy. One 

simple example involves personnel who have critical civilian occupations. 

There have been efforts over the years to identify such individuals, so that they 

are not mobilized when doing so would create unwanted disruption, whether 

it be keeping police on duty to deal with terrorism or machinists at work producing weapons. While these attempts have obvious merit, they also come at 

a significant cost. Not mobilizing some members of a unit results in a loss of 

cohesion at the very moment when that organization is going off to war. And 

in many cases, the skills that make them valuable at home are the same ones 

that the reserve system is counting on them to provide, such as civilian police, 

firefighters, medical personnel, and so forth. Policy could dictate that no one 

in critical occupations be permitted to join the reserve component, but that 

would both limit the pool of people who could enlist and cut off a source of 

valuable expertise. A reserve combat medic who works full time as an emergency medical technician is inherently better trained and prepared than one 

who holds a nonmedical civilian occupation. 

One dilemma that developed over time and is unlikely to be remedied is the 

mismatch between the types of units in the Guard and the nature of state-centered missions. It would make sense if many service and support functions 

resided primarily in the Guard, since governors have a need for military police, 

engineering, transportation, water processing, and other capabilities that can 

help with handling domestic emergencies. Instead, the Guard has a disproportionate percentage of combat units, even though armored brigades and jet 

fighter squadrons have little utility at the state level. The Guard had to choose 

between the not-inconsiderable value of tradition, which can be a strong motivator to soldiers, and the more practical benefit of particular capabilities to 

state missions. It opted to maintain its strong historic connection with its original combat regiments and divisions, while the regular Army used the 1993 

Offsite Agreement to focus more of its federal Army Reserve on service and 

support functions needed to get its own divisions and corps into combat on 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 8: Conclusion

192 193

stated: “[Today’s guardsmen] want to be decisively engaged. They want to be 

challenged. Or they don’t want to be there.” That same year the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff vice chairman, Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., flatly asserted: “Returning the reserve component, especially the National Guard, in particular, to [a] 

strictly strategic reserve role is a nonstarter.”2

These recent opinions harken back to the Gray Board’s 1948 recommendation to strengthen the reserve component “by rotating reserve force personnel 

and units on active duty for substantial periods of time.” Shifting to a system 

of periodic mobilization of slices of the reserve raises a number of issues. 

Secretary Gates decreed the model of one year in six to balance the need to 

support the active force in war while not unduly burdening the reserve component. Would that be the best ratio to maintain reserve readiness in peacetime? 

Certainly a great deal of the benefit of a year on active duty would dissipate 

by the third or fourth year, as the temporary benefits of active duty training 

steadily eroded and as personnel departed the unit. Perhaps more important, 

what would be the impact on the size of the active component force? Over 

time, would the nation and Congress decide that the regulars could be cut by 

one-sixth due to the ongoing contribution of the reserve component? Or would 

the mobilizations be cut as an unnecessary expense in peacetime?3

Routine mobilization also would be a major departure from historic norms 

of part-time service. While personnel may want to serve on active duty during 

a conflict, it is difficult to predict if that will hold true during periods of relative peace, when the apparent need is less urgent and the rewards (such as 

combat pay, veterans status, and fulfilling a patriotic duty) are much reduced 

or nonexistent. Employers and families who accepted the sacrifice of repeated 

mobilization during war also may not be as accommodating when the purpose 

is something much more nebulous like maintaining readiness. The mobilization for the Berlin Crisis in 1961 resulted in some resentment, but activations 

for frequent operations in the 1990s generally did not (though they involved 

real world requirements, not routine deployments to enhance readiness). 

Routine mobilization of units also would have a major impact on the Individual Ready Reserve, since experience has shown that a significant number of 

individual replacements are always needed. That percentage might be smaller 

for noncombat mobilizations, as unqualified individuals in a unit would not 

necessarily need to be replaced, but more unit personnel might also find reasons 

to opt out of peacetime active duty. Since IRRs by definition are not generally 

interested in serving with a unit, the likelihood of routine mobilization might 

drive down IRR membership to only those who have a required commitment 

at the end of their initial active-duty contract. Only experience over time will 

time run counter to the need for citizen-soldiers to maintain and advance their 

civilian careers, and may also impact the willingness of employers and families to accept participation in the reserve component. If reserve service makes 

it too difficult to be successful in many civilian career fields, that will necessarily reduce the pool of people willing to serve. On the other hand, emerging 

trends such as the decline of standard nine-to-five, 40-hour-week positions 

and the rise of the gig economy may make greater reserve service possible and 

more attractive.

This issue of time devoted to reserve service is especially salient as the nation’s involvement in conflicts draws down from the levels experienced since 

2001. Several leaders have advocated for the United States to preserve the 

high state of readiness and the wealth of combat experience in the operationalized reserve by continuing to routinely deploy it on a rotating basis. In 2011, 

Marine Corps Lt. Col. Morgan Mann recommended mobilizing “at least one 

Reserve infantry battalion per year in support of our global operational commitments” to maintain the reserve component’s relevance to the active component, “inject fresh operational experiences into the units, and ensure that our 

Reserve regiments and division stay proficient.” Dennis McCarthy, then the 

assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, offered a similar rationale for 

continuing to operationally employ the reserve force. First, when the reserve 

component is not visible “as a part of the everyday force . . . it becomes a 

resource competitor with the Active Component”; second, “if you don’t use 

the Reserve Component, it atrophies”; and, third, if it goes unused, “the best 

people don’t want to waste their time with it.” McCarthy’s successor, David 

McGinnis, testified before a House subcommittee that prudence dictated the 

reserve component continue its “expanded role” as part of the operational total 

force: “To lose the training, experience and integration of the Reserve components by relegating them to a strategic reserve would squander a resource we 

can’t afford to waste.” David Chu, the long-serving under secretary of defense 

for personnel and readiness, observed in 2007: “Most Guardsmen and Reservists have already decided whether they want to join, remain in or leave the 

military based on the expectations of an operational reserve.” Arnold Punaro, 

chairman of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, opined that 

those joining the reserves at that time were “not getting in there to hide out, 

and if we get to the point where we are not using the Guard and Reserve, 

it’s going to significantly deteriorate in terms of the quality of people that 

go in it.” Maj. Gen. Raymond Carpenter, the Army National Guard’s acting 

director from 2009 to 2011, said bluntly: “The National Guard needs to stay 

in combat.” In 2011, the Kansas adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Lee Tafanelli, 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 8: Conclusion

194 195

Active components into a ‘seamless Total Force.’” He defined integration as 

the “conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership of all levels to 

have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and 

equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within 

whatever timelines are set for the unit—in peace and war.” McCarthy, Vice 

Adm. John Cotton, and other senior leaders believed the decade of combat 

operations after 9/11 produced an unprecedented degree of understanding and 

a corresponding reduction of friction between the active and reserve components. But they also warned that familiarity and trust are highly perishable 

commodities that might dissipate when combat operations wind down, reserve 

units cease to deploy periodically, and defense budgets shrink.5

Greater integration of the active and reserve components would reduce friction between them, but poses its own dilemmas. The Coast Guard led the way 

in integration in the 1990s, to the point of disestablishing reserve units and 

merging the personnel into active commands. After 9/11 the service realized 

it had to emphasize the special administrative needs of reservists to ensure 

that their critical requirements did not get overlooked. The Marine Corps, 

from very early in the life of its reserve component, employed a different approach, establishing the Inspector-Instructor system, with active duty Marines 

bringing needed expertise to reserve training and returning to the regular side 

with firsthand knowledge of reserve capabilities. The Army, which has a regular-to-Selected Reserve/Guard ratio of less than one to one (as opposed to 

the Marine Corps’ more than four to one), might find it much more difficult to 

implement a similar system.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged another potential drawback in 2008 when he directed the service secretaries: “Integrate AC and RC 

organizations to the greatest extent practicable, including the use of cross-component assignments, both AC to RC and RC to AC. Such assignments should 

be considered as career enhancing and not detrimental to a Service member’s 

career progression.” If carried out to the extent necessary to have widespread 

effect, exchange tours could create new problems. A regular serving as an 

operations officer in a reserve infantry battalion, for instance, would acquire 

much less practical experience than doing so in an active unit. Even if a promotion board did not hold that against the officer, the fact would remain that 

the officer would be less prepared for more senior billets than a counterpart 

who performed the same function in an active-duty battalion. Likewise, frequent activations of reserve component personnel to serve in regular units 

might prove too disruptive to civilian careers and family life, especially if 

these tours were in addition to routine unit mobilizations. Perhaps one solution could involve swapping reserve personnel from mobilized units with regreveal whether the benefits of a peacetime operational reserve can be obtained 

without imposing an unacceptable cost in reduced willingness to participate.

The Challenge of Increasing Integration

Another longstanding issue is friction between the active and reserve components, which predates the nation itself. Throughout most of this long history, 

relations generally have been chilly at best, and often downright hostile. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas Hall put it plainly: 

“Cultural differences are a euphemism . . . [for] ‘why doesn’t the active duty 

like the Reserves?’” In the aftermath of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Col. 

David E. Shaver, an Army War College faculty member who had served in 

all three Army components, addressed “the root causes of AC/RC problems. 

. . . For an RC officer, the AC officer seems to possess an arrogance toward, 

and an ignorance of, the RC.” Although he admitted that feeling of dislike 

often went both ways, he was convinced that “elimination of the perception of 

AC arrogance, more than anything else, save resolving the AC lack of knowledge about the RC, is vital to the harmonization of the components.” Secretary 

McCarthy focused on knowledge in disparaging an all-too-common mindset 

in the AC: 

If you had a Marine Corps battalion commander stand up in 

front of his boss and say, “Well, I don’t know much about fire 

support, but I got a little guy [on] my staff that takes care of that 

for me,” that would be his last word as a battalion commander. 

But if he said, “I don’t know much about the Marine Corps 

Reserve, but I got a little guy on my staff who takes care of 

that,” well, that’s great....This [Reserve] is a supporting arm, 

and I would suggest that if you don’t know how to employ this 

supporting arm at whatever level you happen to be at, then 

you’re not a “full-up round.”

A perfect example of regulars lacking respect for citizen-soldiers came in 

2007 as the Army Guard sought to shorten postmobilization training for its 

combat units in order to maximize their deployed time. The ARNG director, 

Lt. Gen. Clyde Vaughn, viewed the matter of regulars insisting on revalidating 

training as one of “trust between the components.”4 

Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s landmark 1997 memorandum highlighted the inseparable links between intercomponent relations, integration, 

and combat readiness. He called on the Pentagon “to eliminate ‘all residual barriers structural and cultural’ to effective integration of the Reserve and 
Forging a Total Force Chapter 8: Conclusion

196 197

measure to “obtain maximum defense capabilities from the limited resources 

available,” as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird put it. That change gained 

seemingly irreversible momentum following 9/11. The reserve component met 

and overcame a host of severe challenges over the course of a long and still 

ongoing conflict, for the most part performing extremely well in the crucible 

of combat. Now, as the nation’s overseas engagements dial back from a boil 

to a simmer, civilian and military leaders will have to determine whether the 

reserve component continues to mobilize, as Secretary McCarthy expressed, 

“on a judicious but regular basis,” or not. There are no easy answers to that 

question, but this study illuminates the issues that policymakers will have to 

take into account as they develop the answer.8

ulars, which would achieve cross-pollination without depriving a regular of 

full-time experience or requiring additional active-duty time of a citizen-soldier. Gates’ policy of cross-component assignments never took hold, but the 

real impact of such a program would only come to light after it was in place 

for an extended period.6

The final unavoidable dilemma—and perhaps the most significant one—is 

that the more the nation does to raise the readiness of the reserve component to 

perform an operational role, the greater the cost, thus undercutting one of the 

primary rationales for relying on citizen-soldiers as a supplement to regulars. 

As the years since 9/11 have shown, recruiting a force that will be actively employed is more difficult and more expensive. Incentives in the form of benefits 

(such as medical insurance and care) also must increase, to the point that they 

essentially match those available to an individual in the active force. More duty 

time not only increases immediate personnel costs, it also will lead to more 

individuals receiving bigger retirement checks. Over the 11-year period from 

fiscal year 2005 through FY 2015, the number of retired reservists increased 

by 41 percent, while total reserve retired pay increased by 83 percent. The 

reserve component now requires the same up-to-date weapons and equipment 

found in the active force, and will wear it out nearly as rapidly. Increased readiness requires greater numbers of full-time personnel, sometimes exceeding 

more than 30 percent of a unit’s strength in the Air National Guard. Though 

the point has been debated, taking care of reserve families spread out in the 

civilian world may be more expensive than supporting regular families located 

on or around a home base. As the cost differential shrinks between the regular 

and reserve components, the remaining savings due to part-time service must 

be compared to factors such as the cost in time and money of mobilizing a unit 

and transporting it to a base, the loss of unit cohesion as fillers replace unqualified personnel, the reduced flexibility of employing a unit that has a built-in 

countdown to demobilization, and similar utilitarian dynamics. And in many 

cases, the reserve component force also will be less effective, simply because 

it will have undergone less training and generally have less-experienced personnel (though sometimes reservists can be more experienced, because they 

have remained in the same unit doing the same thing for many years, or due to 

their civilian skills that apply directly to their military billet).7

In the early days of our republic, the nation chose to rely upon an operational reserve component because it saved money and met the national security needs of the time. For roughly two centuries after that, the reserves 

were rarely used, essentially kept in a case labeled: “Break glass in time of 

major war.” Beginning with the adoption of Total Force policy in the early 

1970s, the paradigm has shifted back toward an operational reserve, in large 
199

Appendix 1 

End Strengths of Reserve Components by Year

TABLE 1.

Authorized End Strengths for Selected Reserve

FY 2002 FY 2008 FY 2011 FY 2012

ARNG 350,000 351,300 358,200 358,200

USAR 205,000 205,000 205,000 205,000

USNR 87,000 67,800 65,500 66,200

USMCR 39,558 39,600 39,600 39,600

ANG 108,400 106,700 106,700 106,700

USAFR 74,700 67,500 71,200 71,400

USCGR 8,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 

Source: National Defense Authorization Act (FYs 2002, 2008, 2011, 2012).
200 201

Appendix 1 Appendix 1 TABLE 3. Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard, Actual End Strength as of 30 September 1997–2011 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ARNG* 4,729 4,714 4,590 4,212 4,049 3,142 2,138 1,428 1,504 1,795 2,285 2,677 4,734 4,891 3,608 USAR 273,298 226,479 183,900 161,622 151,745 138,646 117,405 114,732 112,668 93,798 76,548 66,840 76,972 78,911 83,890 USNR 134,498 113,138 103,462 97,147 80,541 71,140 64,699 66,085 64,355 61,302 58,488 55,023 42,763 37,343 38,223 USMCR 56,741 58,276 59,050 60,188 59,567 58,039 57,822 61,799 59,882 61,033 62,230 58,225 56,689 57,865 60,681 ANG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 USAFR 66,240 56,459 54,271 50,304 47,940 41,095 37,004 37,015 41,319 44,904 49,406 49,301 43,182 40,555 35,493 DoD Total 535,506 459,066 405,273 373,473 343,842 312,062 279,068 281,059 279,728 262,832 248,957 232,066 224,340 219,565 221,895 USCGR 5,728 5,284 4,544 4,772 7,658 5,117 5,241 4,570 4,693 4,803 3,374 2,303 1,706 1,795 1,593 Source: Reserve Forces Almanac, 1998–2010. *Technically, the ARNG does not include IRR personnel. This is because a guardsman must be assigned to a unit in order to be considered part of the National Guard. An IRR member, however, is by definition not part of a unit. In any case, the ARNG maintains the capability to call IRR personnel, former guardsmen, to active service as guardsmen, an option that was employed beginning in 2004 (see chapter 6). Although the ARNG does not have an IRR, it has an Inactive National Guard; their numbers are included above. Data for FYs 2008, FY 2010, and FY 2011 provided by OASD(RA), 9 July 2015. TABLE 2. Selected Reserve, Actual End Strength as of 30 September 1997–2011 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ARNG 370,044 362,444 357,469 353,045 351,829 351,078 351,089 342,918 333,177 346,288 352,707 360,351 358,391 362,015 361,561 USAR 212,850 204,968 206,836 206,892 205,628 206,682 211,890 204,131 189,005 189,975 189,882 197,024 205,297 205,281 204,803 USNR 95,317 93,171 89,172 86,933 87,913 87,958 88,156 82,558 76,466 70,500 69,933 68,136 66,508 65,006 64,792 USMCR 41,997 40,842 39,953 39,667 39,810 39,905 41,046 39,644 39,938 39,489 38,557 37,523 38,510 39,222 39,772 ANG 110,022 108,096 105,715 106,365 108,485 112,071 108,137 106,822 106,430 105,658 106,254 107,679 109,196 107,676 105,685 USAFR 71,986 71,970 71,772 72,340 73,757 76,632 74,754 75,322 75,802 74,075 71,146 67,565 67,986 70,119 71,321 DoD Total 902,216 881,491 870,917 865,242 867,422 874,326 875,072 851,395 820,818 825,985 828,479 838,278 845,888 849,319 847,934 USCGR 7,524 7,587 8,110 7,965 5,199 7,816 7,720 8,011 8,187 7,945 7,777 7,970 7,693 7,942 7,933 Source: Reserve Forces Almanac, 1998–2010; Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual Report, FY 1998–2005. Note the RFPB end strengths as of 30 September 2001 for USAFR and USCGR differed from those contained in Reserve Forces Almanac. We elected to use the Almanac’s numbers in the table; all other component end strengths were in agreement between both sources (2001). Note the RFPB annual reports for FY 2010 and FY 2011 did not include component end strengths; data for FY 2010 and FY 2011 was provided to the authors by OASD(RA), 9 July 2015.
202 203

Appendix 2 

Terminology Issues in the Reserve Component

Any in-depth work addressing the issues, organizations, policies, and 

programs of the armed forces of the United States at some point faces the 

challenges of consistent terminology. A work focused on the seven reserve 

components, however, faces an even more daunting task because the reserve 

component is much less monolithic than the active component, consisting as 

it does of reservist categories, programs, statuses, and even histories and cul-

tures. In some cases these vary not merely between the services, but, in the 

case of the National Guard, between no fewer than 54 entities (states, territo-

ries, and the District of Columbia). Ultimately, the fact that a reservist main-

tains a dual identity—as a civilian and as a military member—probably makes 

such complexities unavoidable. This appendix attempts to highlight a few of 

the more difficult terms that warrant a lengthier explanation. 

Probably the most confusing term is “mobilization.” While many individu-

als, families, employers, and even government and military organizations and 

publications refer to mobilization (or some variant of the word mobilize) in a 

broad sense, the present work attempts to limit the use of this term in the text 

to those situations involving involuntary active duty in response to a mobili-

zation authority implemented by the president or Congress. This is in accord 

with the relevant statutes. On the other hand, voluntary active duty by a reserve 

component member in support of a named operation or contingency is general-

ly referred to in the text as activation. Probably the main reason for the overuse 

of mobilization in lieu of activation in American society is that the former 

term is perceived as providing a degree of protection for a reservist/guardsman 

whose spouse, children, and/or civilian employer might be less supportive of 

the member’s time away from home and job if the reason for the absence is 

something that sounds less than mandatory.

1

 

Another particularly troublesome distinction resides in the discussion of 

full-time support and Full-Time Support (FTS) programs and personnel. Many 

documents and publications, official and unofficial, use the terms indiscrim-

inately, but the present study adopts the view that a conceptual distinction 

should be made between those active and reserve component programs and 

personnel that support reserve component units on a full-time basis and those 

strictly from the reserve component that support reserve component units fulltime. The present study uses “full-time support” (lower case) to refer to either 

Forging the Total Force

202
204 205

Appendix 2

Abbreviations

ADOS Active Duty for Operational Support

ADT Agricultural Development Team 

AFB Air Force Base

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency

AFR Air Force Reserve (After 1997. See also AFRES.)

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command

AFRC/HO Air Force Reserve Command History Office

AFRES Air Force Reserve (Up to 1997. See also AFR.)

AGR Active Guard-Reserve

ANG Air National Guard

AR Active Reserve (used by USMC)

AREF Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 

ARFORGEN Army Force Generation 

ARNG Army National Guard

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

BCT Brigade Combat Team 

BOG Boots-on-the-Ground

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 

BUR Bottom-Up Review 

CCC Civilian Conservation Corps

CNGR Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

CS Combat Support

CSS Combat Service Support

DART Domestic All-Hazards Response Team

DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System

DoD Department of Defense

ESGR Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve

FTS Full-Time Support (Differs from “full time support.” See 

Appendix 2.)

active component or reserve component personnel that support reserve units 

full-time, whereas the abbreviation FTS (Full-Time Support, upper case) refers 

specifically to reserve component personnel (and omits active component personnel) who support the reserves full time. In the present study, FTS consists 

mainly of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Military Technician program 

(MT) personnel (and this emphasis reflects the reality of the programs/personnel in the reserve components). Note the distinction between full-time support 

and FTS does not exist in the National Guard; when the Guard refers to fulltime support, it is identical to FTS.2

The Marine Corps’ programs provide a case in which the above distinction 

is especially helpful. The Marines’ Inspector-Instructor (I-I) program was (and 

remains) a “full-time support” program. But because the I-I program consists 

strictly of active component personnel that support Marine Selected Reserve 

units full-time, I-I is not an “FTS” program. The Marines’ Active Reserve 

program, however, constitutes the service’s FTS program (full-time support 

by strictly reserve component members).3
206 207

Abbreviations Abbreviations

Pub. L Public Law

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RA Reserve Affairs

Ret. Retired

RFPB Reserve Forces Policy Board

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

ROWS Reserve Order Writing System

RTC Regional Training Center 

RWW Returning Warrior Workshop 

SEAL Sea-Air-Land

SecDef Secretary of Defense

TARTraining and Administration of the Reserves

TBITraumatic Brain Injury

TPUTroop Program Unit

TRS TRICARE Reserve Select

UMT Universal Military Training

USAF U.S. Air Force

USAR U.S. Army Reserve

USARC U.S. Army Reserve Command

U.S.C. United States Code

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USCGR U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

USD Under Secretary of Defense

USERRA Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act of 1994 

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USMCR U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

USN U.S. Navy

USNR U.S. Naval Reserve (Navy Reserve after April 2005)

WWRWounded Warrior Regiment

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office (General Accounting 

Office before 2004)

GPO Government Printing (now “Publishing”) Office

HCAS House Committee on Armed Services

HD/LD High-Demand/Low-Density 

H.R. House of Representatives

HRF Homeland Response Force Team

I-I Inspector-Instructor

IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee 

IRR Individual Ready Reserve

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

MarForRes Marine Forces Reserve

MRE Meal-Ready-to-Eat 

MT Military Technician 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NECC Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 

NGAUS National Guard Association of the United States (or, NGA)

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NROTC Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

OASD(RA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

ORC Officers’ Reserve Corps 

OSD/HO Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

P&R Personnel and Readiness

PRC Presidential Reserve Call-Up 

PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up

PSU Port Security Unit 

PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
208 209

Endnotes 

Preface

1. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Fundamental to Military Tradition: America, Militia Nation,” 

remarks delivered on 7 Sep 1995, U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Public Affairs), including quotes, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.

aspx?SpeechID=967>, accessed 6 Jun 2015.

2. Fogleman, “Fundamental to Military Tradition,” including quotes.

3. Ron Fogleman, “Militia Model Could Cut U.S. Expenditures,” Defense News, 

16 Jan 2012, including quotes, at <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120116/

DEFFEAT05/301160015/Going-Back-Future>, accessed 6 Jun 2015.

4. Fogleman, “Militia Model,” including quote.

Chapter 1 

1. Eilene Galloway, A Brief History of United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces, 

1775–1951, appendix to Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate on H.R. 5426 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952), 317; David Chandler, ed., 

The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 

26; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967; repr., Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 1984), 3–4; John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard

(New York and London: Macmillan, 1983), 6–15, including quote, training manual quoted by 

Mahon.

2. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History 

of the United States of America (New York and London: Free Press, 1984), 30–35; Mahon, 

History of the Militia and the National Guard, 26–27; Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 

2003), 21–22.

3. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 6–8; Mahon, History of the Militia and the 

National Guard, 31–32; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 16.

4. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the 

United States Army, 1775–1945 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 7–8, 

including quote; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 18–20; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War, 25–26. 

5. David McCullough, 1776 (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 210–213, 

including quotes; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 36–41, 67–68; Mahon, History 

of the Militia and the National Guard, 40, 44; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 42, 

51–60. Various sources use “Kips Bay” or “Kip’s Bay.” 

6. Weigley, History of the United States Army, chapter 5; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War, 61–63; U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, including quote; Millett and Maslowski, For 
210 211

Notes to Chapter One Notes to Chapter One

16. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 182–183; Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 141; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 90–

91; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 90, 96–98; Kreidberg and Henry, History of 

Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 62–66. Between May 1846 and February 1847 

(depending on source), the one-year limitation for enlistees was changed to the duration of the 

war (Weigley). 

17. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 173–174, 183–189, including quote, 

quoted by Weigley; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 91–94; Doubler, 

Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 96–98; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization 

in the United States Army, 66–81; 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, <http://ms.ng.mil/

aboutus/units/155abct/Pages/default.aspx>, accessed 10 Jul 2014; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 137, 142–143.

18. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 130, including quote.

19. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 198–201, 216; Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 165–166; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

97–99; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 101–103; Kreidberg and Henry, History of 

Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 85, 88, 92–95, 134. Several authors mistakenly 

refer to the Militia Act of 1792 as the basis for Lincoln’s call for militia in April 1861; Doubler 

correctly cites the Calling Forth Act. In March 1861 the Confederacy’s provisional congress 

also authorized the raising of a regular army consisting of 10,600 men. 

20. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 198–199, 216; Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 167–169; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 103, 106; 

Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 94–95, 120. 

The Battle of Wilson’s Creek in August 1861 was another large engagement fought early in 

the war mainly by existing militia/volunteers, and, perhaps, quickly raised volunteer units; see 

Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 98–102. Mahon states 40 percent of the 

93,000 militiamen who responded to Lincoln’s call in April 1861 were from old volunteer units. 

In any case, Kreidberg and Henry note that as the war evolved, “Militia quotas and three-year 

Volunteer quotas became inextricably confused. Many regiments mobilized under the Militia 

call later volunteered for three years thereby upsetting administrative accounting” (100). For the 

69th regiment, see <http://www.69thnewyork.co.uk/69history1861.htm>, accessed 10 Jul 2014. 

21. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 205–208; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 196–198; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 100–

103; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 109; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 103–104. 

22. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 198–201; Weigley, History of the 

United States Army, 208–210; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 100; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 109; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 108–109. 

23. Joseph P. Reidy, “Black Men in Navy Blue During the Civil War,” Prologue 33, 

no. 3 (Fall 2003); Enrollment Act of 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess. 1, 13 Stat. 6 (1864), <http://

legisworks.org/sal/13/stats/STATUTE-13-Pg6.pdf>, accessed 6 Jun 2017; Michael J. Bennett, 

Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 

2011), 5–9.

the Common Defense, 88–89; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the 

United States Army, 25–26.

7. U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, including quotes (emphasis added); Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 88; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 48–49.

8. U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, including quote; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common 

Defense, 89–90; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 53; Doubler, Civilian 

in Peace, Soldier in War, 68. 

9. The Militia Act of 1792 is also referred to as the Uniform Militia Act of 1792; see 

Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 89–90. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier 

in War, 67–68, including quote 1; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 93–94, including 

quote 2; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 89–90; Mahon, History of the Militia 

and the National Guard, 52–53; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the 

United States Army, 30–31, including quote 2; U.S. Congress, 3rd Cong., 2nd sess., “An Act 

to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, 

and repel invasions; and to repeal the Act now in force for those purposes” (1 Stat. 424), 28 Feb 

1795, including quote 3. The three-months-per-year limitation was established by the Calling 

Forth Act (2 May 1792) and clarified by the 1795 act.

10. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 99; Mahon, History of the Militia 

and the National Guard, 63–69, including quote; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 

104–115, 120; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 80–83; Kreidberg and Henry, History 

of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 36–40.

11. U.S. Congress, “Bill for Establishing Naval Militia,” Dec 1805, manuscript/mixed 

material, Series 1: General Correspondence, 1651–1827, microfilm reel 035, Thomas Jefferson 

Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib015471>, 

accessed 6 Jun 2017, including quote. 

12. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 107–114, including quote; Weigley, 

History of the United States Army, 122–132, 154–57; Mahon, History of the Militia and the 

National Guard, 69–77; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 83–86. 

13. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 140–143; Mahon, History of the Militia 

and the National Guard, 79; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 86–87, 90–91; 

Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 61. The 

permanent volunteer militia system that increased in numbers and matured in the 19th century 

was another iteration on a broader scale, with differing motives and legal basis, of the volunteer 

units chartered mostly between 1774 and 1786 (Doubler). 

14. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 157; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 129–130; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 83–86; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 90–96. 

15. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 86–87, including quote 1; Weigley, History 

of the United States Army, 140–43, including quote 2; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common 

Defense, 121–122, including quote 3; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

82–83; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 61. 
212 213

Notes to Chapter One Notes to Chapter One

as units, not individual replacements for Army regiments” (313). To relieve such concerns on 

the part of Guard leaders, the 1908 law also established the National Guard Bureau. The bureau 

chief reported directly to the secretary of war rather than to the general staff (314). Also, note 

that since the 1880s some Guard units participated informally in maneuvers with the regular 

Army, but the Dick Act ensured guardsmen would receive federal pay and subsistence for such 

duty (Weigley, 322).

33. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 324–325, including quote, quoted by 

Weigley. The constitutionality of the law, upon which depended no small part of the Uptonians’ 

opposition to any federal reliance upon state-affiliated militia, remained in doubt until the 

National Defense Act of 1916 settled the issue; see Millett and Maslowski, For the Common 

Defense, 313–314, 324–325; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 142, 148–

149; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 144–152, 154–158. 

34. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 335–346; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 322–324; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 152–153; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 154–156. Weigley refers to “the Uptonians of the 

Army insisting that at least two years was necessary to the making of a soldier, and even that 

was not really enough” (337). 

35. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 324–325; Weigley, History of the 

United States Army, 347–348; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 148–149; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 156–159.

36. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 348–350; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 324–325; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 148–149; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 156–159. 

37. Rick Bigelow, Mel Chaloupka, and Andy Rockett, “United States Naval Reserve: 

Chronology 1992,” Naval Reserve Project, 1 Oct 1992, Navy Department Library Special 

Collections, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, 9, 13–16, 18–19. 

38. Four years earlier (1908), Congress passed legislation that established the (Army) 

Medical Reserve Corps. That act has been considered the birth date of the U.S. Army Reserve. 

As a result of the creation of the Officers’ Reserve Corps under the provisions of the National 

Defense Act of 1916, however, the Medical Reserve Corps ceased to exist, its officers being 

absorbed into the new, larger reserve entity; see Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, 

Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983 (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 17–19; Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval 

Reserve: Chronology,” 20–21, 24–26, 29–31; Daniel F. Goergen, “The Impetus Behind the 

Creation of the United States Naval Reserve” (MA thesis, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, 2005), 65; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 322; Marine Corps 

Division of Reserve, The Marine Corps Reserve: A History (Washington, DC: Division of 

Reserve, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1966), 4–5; Naval Service Appropriation Act, Pub. 

L. No. 271, 83 Stat. 629 (2015), <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/63rd-congress/

session-3/c63s3ch83.pdf>, accessed 6 Jun 2017.

39. Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 25, 29. 

40. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 17–20.

24. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 265–267; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 236–241; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 110. 

25. Wingate’s dual role with the National Rifle Association and the National Guard 

Association, and his emphasis on marksmanship in the Guard, led to a close association between 

the NRA and military marksmanship that endures to this day. Mahon, History of the Militia 

and the National Guard, 118–119, including quote; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 

111–114, 118; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939 (New 

York: Viking Press, 1963), 280–282.

26. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 119, including quote; Mahon, History of 

the Militia and the National Guard, 111. For the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army 

National Guard, see <http://pa.ng.mil/ARNG/28ID/Pages/default.aspx>, accessed 10 Jul 2014.

27. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 275–281, 335–337, including quote; 

Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 256–258; Mahon, History of the Militia and 

the National Guard, 120–21; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 138–141. 

28. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 295–297; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 268–273; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 126–

127; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 129; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 150–156; Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 

1899–1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 10. 

29. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 297–298, 307–308; Mahon, History of 

the Militia and the National Guard, 126–127, 136; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 

129; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 157–159. 

30. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 306–308, including quote 1, quoted by 

Weigley; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 290; Linn, Philippine War, 63, 

including quote 2. 

31. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 313–327; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 309–313; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 138–141; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 136–141; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 176–179. 

32. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 320–323, 345; Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 312–313; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

139–141; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 143–145. The current volume can in no 

way address the complexities of the Dick Act. For example, National Guard historians seem to 

differ on whether the act permitted the integrity of Guard units that might be called into federal 

service. Without such a guarantee, the Guard could become merely a manpower pool of partially 

trained volunteers with consequent loss of unit identification, morale, and hometown support. 

Mahon states, “No portion of the Dick Act guaranteed the integrity of National Guard units 

when in federal service” (140); Mahon did not address whether the law permitted unit integrity. 

In contrast, Doubler writes, “Charles Dick and the NGA included important provisions that 

allowed NG [National Guard] troops to be called up for as long as nine months while remaining 

together as distinct units under the leadership of Guard officers” (144, emphasis added), but he 

did not address the lack of a guarantee that units remained intact. Millett and Maslowski state 

the 1908 modifications to the Dick Act contained “a provision that Guardsmen would go to war 
215

Notes to Chapter Two

214

Notes to Chapter One

that in 1940 General Marshall was “haunted by recollections of the droves of unfit commanders” 

that Pershing reassigned to noncombat roles. In 1940 General Marshall told the House Military 

Affairs Committee, “Leadership in the field depends to an important extent on one’s legs, and 

stomach, and nervous system, and on one’s ability to withstand hardships, and lack of sleep, 

and still be disposed energetically and aggressively to command men, to dominate men on the 

battlefield”; see Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New 

York: Viking Press, 1966), 91–97.

48. See paragraph for note 34 above. Wood’s six-month minimum was based largely not 

on raw recruits but, rather, on guardsmen who had undergone some training. Presumably, raw 

recruits required more than six months.

49. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 384–385, 392–393, including quotes, 

Baker quoted by Weigley. For a useful biography of Baker, see C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker, 

A Biography (New York: World Publishing, 1960).

50. Pogue, Education of a General, 147, 150–154, including quote 1; Weigley, History of 

the United States Army, 392–394, including quote 2, Pershing quoted by Weigley; “Legislation, 

Personnel and Pay,” Marine Corps Gazette 19, no. 1 (May 1934): 19, including quote 3 of 

Hunter Liggett; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 152–153; George C. 

Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917–1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 

1976), 15, 19, 36. 

51. The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915, to March, 

1917, vol. 39, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1917), 166; Weigley, History of the United States 

Army, 348–349. For the 1916 and 1920 defense laws, see chapter 2, present work. 

 Chapter 2

1. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 377–

379, including quote 1; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 396–401, including quote 2, 

Palmer quoted by Weigley; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 365–366; Mahon, 

History of the Militia and the National Guard, 169–170; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in 

War, 185–187. 

2. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 378, including quote, statute 

quoted by authors; The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, vol. 39, December, 

1915, to March, 1917 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1917), 166; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 365–367; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 171–172; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 188; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 34, 

52. The phrasing, “the National Guard while in the service of the United States,” referred to the 

federalization of the Guard under the Constitution’s militia clauses; Lt. Col. Les’ A. Melnyk, 

ARNG, conversation with Marion, 30 Apr 2012. We are indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Melnyk, 

the public affairs advisor to the director, ARNG, for his insightful comments on this and several 

other paragraphs; see also Les’ Andrii Melnyk, “A True National Guard: The Development of 

the National Guard and Its Influence on Defense Legislation, 1915–1933” (PhD diss., The City 

University of New York, 2004). 

3. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 399–401; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 366–367. Although the law referred to the “organized Reserves,” most 

sources used “Organized Reserve.” We have followed the latter practice in this chapter.

41. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 352–357; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 331–332; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 155–156; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 169–171; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 241–251. Doubler writes of the Selective Service Act, 

“With a stroke of the president’s pen, the techniques used since colonial times for creating 

volunteer armies based on State quotas died a quiet death. The Selective Service Act of 1917 

was the first effort at gearing all of the manpower of the United States not already serving in 

the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves into a coordinated pool of 

obligated manpower directed toward a single, national purpose” (169).

42. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 356–358, 372; Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 332; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 155–

156; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 169; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 253, 277–279. Millett and Maslowski state that 90 

percent of draftees were unmarried men (332). 

43. Pogue, Education of a General, 150, 157, including quote; Weigley, History of the 

United States Army, 385, 393; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 167; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 182; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 246, 277, 307, 375; Peyton C. March, The Nation at 

War (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1932), 310. Note that the numbers of personnel reported at 

certain times in the war varied by source; we have followed Kreidberg and Henry, the authors 

of the Army’s official mobilization study, clearly the most authoritative source. Charles Joseph 

Gross, The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition: Militiaman, Volunteer, and 

Professional (Washington, DC: Historical Services Division, National Guard Bureau, 1995), 

30–35. An Air Force Reserve history argues “its formal origins” dates from the 1916 defense 

act. For the sake of simplicity, we elected to begin coverage of the Air Force Reserve only in the 

post-World War II period during which the U.S. Air Force separated from the Army (1947). The 

first “U.S. Air Force Reserve” units were formed shortly thereafter (see chapter 2); see Gerald 

T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History of the Air Force Reserve, 1946–1994 (Washington, DC: 

Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 1–2. 

44. Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 32, 35–36, 40; 

Weigley, History of the United States Army, 387; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National 

Guard, 161; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 179; USMC Division of Reserve, 

Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 9–11. 

45. Nathaniel Patch, “The Story of the Female Yeoman during the First World War,” 

Prologue 38, no. 3 (Fall 2006), <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2006/fall/

yeoman-f.html>, accessed 6 Jun 2017; Capt. Linda L. Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I

(Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), 3–4, 25.

46. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 21, including quote, quoted by authors; 

Weigley, History of the United States Army, 360; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 

184–186. Millett and Maslowski write, “Manpower mobilization had always fascinated 

military policymakers, but the experience of World War I showed that industrial mobilization 

plans equaled manpower policies in importance”; see Millett and Maslowski, For the Common 

Defense, 367.

47. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 149, 180–181, 187, including quote, 

quoted by Doubler; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 389. Forrest C. Pogue writes 
216 217

Notes to Chapter Two Notes to Chapter Two

Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 395; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 196–

197; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 63–67; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 379. 

13. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 426–427, 434; Mahon, History of the 

Militia and the National Guard, 179–180; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 197–198; 

Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 145–155. Other units, mainly coast artillery, were mobilized along 

with the four Guard divisions (Mahon, 180).

14. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 428–431, including quote, Marshall 

quoted by Weigley; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 396; Mahon, History 

of the Militia and the National Guard, 180–183; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 82–83, 164–165. 

Some sources considered the Guard to have contributed a 19th division, the Americal Division 

(Doubler, 203–204, 209). 

15. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 91–100, including quotes; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War, 199–200, 207, 213; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

186–187; Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 293. 

16. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 181, including quote 1; 

Weigley, History of the United States Army, 428, including quote 2. 

17. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 183, 188–194, including quote; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 203–204; Jon T. Hoffman, Chesty: The Story of 

Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC (New York: Random House, 2001), 194. 

18. Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass (1949; repr., Nashville, TN: 

Battery Press, 1989), 168–169, including quote; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National 

Guard, 189; Robert Sherrod, On to Westward: War in the Central Pacific (New York: Duell, 

Sloan, and Pearce, 1945), 88–93, 150. Mahon viewed the 27th Division as unfairly treated. 

Sherrod, who was on the island of Saipan during the battle, took a more impartial view while 

accepting the basic version of events favorable to the Marines, particularly concerning the 

events of 7 July 1944. Note General Marshall, according to his biographer, considered the 27th 

“a well-trained division in Hawaii with excellent leaders”; see Forrest C. Pogue, George C. 

Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 254. 

19. Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, 168–619, 173, including quotes. 

20. USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 59–61, 98–99, 

including quotes (quote 1, Partridge quoted by authors).

21. Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 86–95, including 

quotes, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and DuBose Board quoted by authors. Similar to the Coast 

Guard and the Navy, the Marines in early 1943 established a women’s component; see USMC 

Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 77–82. Because most of the reservists 

referred to in the above quote had been “procured and trained” since the war began, they may be 

viewed in a somewhat different context than those reservists that had served as citizen-sailors 

for some years prior to the war’s outbreak. To varying degrees, the same distinction could be 

made in the other services as well. Essentially, the above reservists were little different from 

sailors who enlisted or were inducted since the start of the war; see also Marine Corps Reserve: 

A History, 72. 

4. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 399; Mahon, History of the Militia and the 

National Guard, 171; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 188.

5. Melnyk, “A True National Guard,” 458–461, including quotes, quote 3 quoted by 

Melnyk from 1933 law; Lt. Col. Les’ A. Melnyk, ARNG, email message to Marion, 13 Jun 

2012; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 174–175. Millett and Maslowski 

were mistaken in stating, “In 1933 additional legislation ensured that mobilized Guard units 

would not be broken up” (378).

6. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 40–45, 48–49, including quotes, quoted by 

authors; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 196; Pogue, Education of a General, 274–

280. Due largely to the 1916 defense act, there were many cases in which guardsmen received 

pay for inactive duty training while federal-only reservists went unpaid; see also Mahon, History 

of the Militia and the National Guard, 175; USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: 

A History, 35. 

7. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 400–403, 406; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 366–367, 378; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

173–174; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 189. Presumably, the original intent was 

that a regular Army division’s training detachment would train the citizen-soldier officers and 

enlisted men of the three Organized Reserve divisions within a given corps area, and they, in 

turn, would train the reserve division draftees inducted in an emergency. 

8. USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 23, including quote, 

1925 law quoted by authors; Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 

43–44, 53, 56. In 1925 the Naval Reserve regulations defined the requirements of a “drill” 

period for reservists: a preplanned assembly consisting of at least 1.5 hours of practical work “in 

duties pertaining to the Navy”; only one drill per week was authorized; see Bigelow, Chaloupka, 

and Rockett (56). 

9. USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 40, 45, 48, 57, 

including quotes, Partridge quoted by authors (both quotes); Statutes at Large of the United 

States of America, vol. 47, December 1931 to March 1933 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1933), 

684–685; Dr. Fred Allison, Marine Corps Historical Division, email to Marion, 13 Apr 2012. 

In 2008 the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves observed that the InspectorInstructor program, still fulfilling its original purpose, contributed to the success of the Marine 

Corps Reserve; Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National 

Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force: Final Report to Congress and 

the Secretary of Defense (Arlington, VA: CNGR, 31 Jan 2008), <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/

singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/1655/rec/12#img_view_container>, accessed 24 Jul 2014, 

204.

10. Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 37–46.

11. Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 69–71; USMC 

Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 57; Nathaniel Patch, National Archives, 

email message to Marion, 10 Apr 2012; Robert Cressman, Naval History and Heritage 

Command, email message to Marion, 11 Apr 2012.

12. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 423–424, including quote; Millett and 
218 219

Notes to Chapter Two Notes to Chapter Two

of pretrained officer and enlisted personnel,” which the deferment option failed to provide. 

Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National 

Security: Report to the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: GPO, 1948), 4. The 1948 law 

offered other options as well, but the main ones are those discussed above. 

32. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 86–89; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 28. Note 

that the former Organized Reserve Corps had also used the ORC abbreviation. Mahon, History 

of the Militia and the National Guard, 199–200; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 

231. The law was the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 

(Pub. L. No. 80-810, 62 Stat. 1081).

33. Ltr, Forrestal to Truman, 2 Aug 1948, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO. Original in 

Truman Library, including quotes 1–2; Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for 

National Security, 1, including quote 3, quoted by authors.

34. Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, 9, 16, 

including quotes; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 203; Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 59–61; memo, Gordon Gray for James V. Forrestal, 2 Jul 1948, subj: Synopsis of major 

recommendations of the Gray Board, original at Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. 

Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Gray Board, box 156, copy at Air Force Reserve Command 

History Office, Robins AFB, GA. The Gray Report devoted 10 pages to the conclusion that each 

service should have one federal reserve force, more attention than that accorded any other issue. 

Also, the Gray Board recommended adopting the term “reserve forces” in lieu of “Civilian 

Components,” which it deemed “inappropriate for those organizations which provided most of 

the wartime military establishment.”

35. Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, 2, 4, 5, 7, 

10, including quotes. 

36. Ibid., 10, 87–89, including quotes, Palmer quoted by authors; Gross, Air National 

Guard and the American Military Tradition, 66.

37. Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, 2, 4, 7, 

including quotes (emphasis in original). 

38. Ibid., 16, including quotes.

39. Ltr, Truman to Forrestal, 12 Aug 1948, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO, including 

quote; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 201–202; Weigley, History of 

the United States Army, 501–504; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 477; 

Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 94–95; Keith D. McFarland and David L. Roll, Louis 

Johnson and the Arming of America (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 

2005), 190–204. Not until August 1949 was the designation Department of Defense adopted; 

see McFarland and Roll (154) and Weigley (495). 

40. Exec. Order No. 10007, Organization of the Reserve Units of the Armed Forces, 15 

Oct 1948, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO, including quotes 1–3 (also available at <http://

trumanlibrary.org/executiveorders/index.php?pid=878>, accessed 3 May 2016); Secretary 

of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30 1950 

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1950), 21–22; Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 476, 

66 Stat. 497 (1952) Section 257; DoD Press Releases, No. A-202-49, 22 Aug 1949, and No. 

22. John L. Parkhurst, “Ringing In Our 50th Year!” Coast Guard Reservist, Feb–Mar 

1991, 4–5, including quote.

23. “Women Marines,” Life, 27 Mar 1944, 81, including quote, General Holcomb quoted 

by authors.

24. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 

1955), 506–509, including quotes; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 225. 

25. Truman, Memoirs, 510–511, including quotes; Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, 

“Harry S. Truman Biographical Sketch,” <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hst-bio.htm>, accessed 

16 Jul 2014.

26. Truman, Memoirs, 510–511, including quote 1; Weigley, History of the United States 

Army, 497–500, including quote 2, Palmer-Marshall policy quoted by Weigley; Cantwell, 

Citizen Airmen, 24–27.

27. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 428; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 99–101; 

Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 57. 

28. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 486, 497–500, including quote 1, Marshall 

quoted by Weigley; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 220–224, including quote 2, War 

Department directive quoted by Doubler; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

206; Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 60–61; Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 27, 33. 

29. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 23, including Partridge quote, 28–37, 45–50, 53–55; 

Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 203–204; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War, 226; Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 60, 61, 

65–70. Gross stated 58,000 as the projected strength of the ANG; Cantwell indicated about 

44,000. The difference might have been one of timing, which was not specified in the text. The 

point was that the Air Reserve (in 1947, Air Force Reserve) was larger than the ANG in terms 

of active reserve personnel but Air Reserve personnel were intended strictly as replacements 

to Army Air Forces (in 1947, the U.S. Air Force) and ANG units. The approved air reserve 

program called for 87,500 active reservists compared with no more than 58,000 air guardsmen.

30. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 34–35, 45–46, 97–98; Gross, Air National Guard and the 

American Military Tradition, 77–79. Drilling requirements during this period were not always 

standardized. For example, Organized Reserve Corps (after 1952, U.S. Army Reserve) personnel 

performed varying numbers of paid drills, some as few as 12, in addition to the 15-day annual 

training; see Kathryn Roe Coker, United States Army Reserve Mobilization for the Korean War

(Fort Bragg, NC: Office of Army Reserve History, 2013), 36, <http://permanent.access.gpo.

gov/gpo38677/Korean%20War%20Pub_Revised%20June%2012-2013.pdf>, accessed 14 Oct 

2014. 

31. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (1948); Weigley, 

History of the United States Army, 486, 501; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National 

Guard, 198–199, 200; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 228; Crossland and Currie, 

Twice the Citizen, 94; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 58. The 1948 Gray Board complained that the 

deferment program precluded a period of active duty deemed sufficient for the training of those 

reservists that enlisted under the selective service law. The reserves needed “a continuous flow 
221

Notes to Chapter Three

220

Notes to Chapter Two

48. DoD Press Releases, No. 1310-50, 23 Oct 1950, and No. 1334-50, 27 Oct 1950, 

including quotes, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO.

49. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82–51, 65 Stat. 75 

(1951); Weigley, History of the United States Army, 509; Mahon, History of the Militia and the 

National Guard, 206–208; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 122–124. 

50. Secretary of Defense, Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1951, 3, including 

Marshall quote; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 508–511; memo, National Security 

Training Commission for Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, subj: “National Security Training,” 31 

Dec 1952, 1–3, copies at OSD/HO and AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

51. Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, President, 

National Guard Association of the United States, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952: Hearings 

on H.R. 5426, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 82nd Cong., 1st 

sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952), 105–108; Report to Accompany H.R. 5426, 27 Sep 1951, 

82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1, including quote; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

211–212; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 100–101; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 124–

126.

52. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 100; Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Pub. 

L. No. 476, 66 Stat. (1952). Reproduced in Air Force Bulletin No. 16, “Armed Forces Reserve 

Act of 1952” (Washington, DC, 18 Jul 1952), 11–13, including quotes; Doubler, Civilian in 

Peace, Soldier in War, 238; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 124–125. 

53. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 126, including quote 1; Gross, Air National Guard and the 

American Military Tradition, 84, including quote, quoted by Gross; Air Force Bulletin No. 16, 

“Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952,” 4–5.

54. Walsh and Rosenberg Testimony, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952: Hearings 

on H.R. 5426, 109, 237, including quotes 1 and 3; Statement of Assistant Secretary Anna M. 

Rosenberg Before the Brooks Subcommittee on Reserve Policies, 18 Apr 1951, box 1051, 

Subject Files, OSD/HO, quote 2; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 123–125.

55. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, reproduced in Air Force Bulletin No. 16, 2, 

including quotes; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 211–112; Crossland 

and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 100–101; Rosenberg testimony concerning H.R. 5426. 

Chapter 3

1. USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 182, including quote, 

Wilson quoted by authors; Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–

1956 (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 2001), 38–39; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 511–512, 528–529; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 115–116; 

Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 214–215; Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude 

to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943–1969 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 

History, 1985), 100–101.

2. House Committee on Armed Services (HCAS), National Reserve Plan: House of 

Representatives Report No. 457 [to accompany H.R. 5297] (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 10, 

including quote 1; HCAS, First Interim Report of Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives, on Implementation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955

207-49, 20 Sep 1949, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO; Civilian Components Policy Board, 

Monthly Progress Report of Staff Actions, Oct 1949–Mar 1951, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/

HO; Final Report to the Secretary of Defense of Mr. William T. Faricy Upon Relinquishing the 

Office of Chairman Civilian Components Policy Board, 4 May 1950, including quote 4, box 

1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO.

41. Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 

52–53, 58, 63; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 505–509; Millett and Maslowski, 

For the Common Defense, 484–487; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 

208–209; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 231–238; Coker, Mobilization for the 

Korean War, 39. 

42. Max Hastings, The Korean War, 106–114, chapter 9; Weigley, History of the United 

States Army, 513–516; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 487–488, 492; 

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 232–235.

43. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 95–100, including quote, Rear Adm. I. 

M. McQuiston quoted by authors; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 508; Coker, 

Mobilization for the Korean War, 43. Crossland and Currie acknowledge the number of 

Organized Reserve Corps members that served in Korea was unknown, although 240,000 

organized reservists “were called to active duty” (99). Similar to today’s Ready Reserve, in 

1950 the Army’s Organized Reserve included reservists in drill-for-pay status (unit reservists) 

or unpaid status (individual reservists). As defense secretary in 1950–1951, George Marshall 

promoted the name change from Civilian Components Policy Board to Reserve Forces Policy 

Board. During Korea there was no federally backed entity for employer support to the Guard 

and Reserve. In 1994 the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 

addressed such issues. 

44. Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 117–125, including 

quote, quoted by authors; USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: A History, 165–

173, 179–180. A valuable account of a single Marine Corps Reserve rifle company mobilized 

for Korea is Randy K. Mills and Roxanne Mills, Unexpected Journey: A Marine Corps Reserve 

Company in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). 

45. Secretary of Defense, Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30, 1951, 12, including 

Marshall quote; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 508–510; Mahon, History of the 

Militia and the National Guard, 208–210; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 233; 

Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 97. Weigley and Doubler agreed the Army National 

Guard contributed two of the seven (or eight) divisions sent to Korea. Weigley and Mahon 

stated the total number of Army soldiers who served on active duty in connection with Korea 

was 2,834,000.

46. Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 66, 70, 77, 79, 83, 86, 

101–102, including quotes 1–2; quote 1 of Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier Jr. as quoted by Gross; 

quote 2 of Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead as quoted by Gross; Mahon, History of the Militia and 

the National Guard, 209; “Guard Change Held Essential by Marshall,” news clipping, 25 Oct 

1950, box 1051, Subject Files, OSD/HO, including quote 3 (“cannibalizing”) of Walsh quoted 

in news clipping. 

47. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 87, 92–95, 98–99, 104–105, 115–117. 
222 223

Notes to Chapter Three Notes to Chapter Three

9. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 128–129, 217; Bigelow, Chaloupka, and 

Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 130; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 159–164; Continental 

Air Command News Release 58–50, “Air Reserve Technician Program,” 15 May 1958, AFRC/

HO; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), 

Report on Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve, Jun 1978 (hereafter 

Gerard Study), see John P. White memorandum of 24 May 1978, reproduced on pages 1–4, and 

subsequent chapter 1, page I-8. The aforementioned report, also known as the Gerard Study, 

explained other differences between the technician programs of the various services. Medical 

disqualification and mandatory retirement age were the two most common reasons for loss of 

military status through no fault of the reservist. The Air Force Reserve’s Air Reserve Technician 

program was the federal-only air reserve counterpart to the Army’s Military Technician program; 

see Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 301. Note that “full-time support” (lower case) programs included 

both active component and reserve component personnel who served in support of reserve units 

full-time, whereas the abbreviation FTS and the capitalized spelling of “Full-Time Support” 

referred specifically to reserve component personnel and did not include active component 

personnel. Various sources conflate these two categories, however. In the absence of a need to 

use “FTS” in a given sentence, we have chosen to use “full-time support” to spare the reader 

an abbreviation.

10. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, chap. 4, including quote 1; Thomas D. White, “New 

Accent on the Air Reserve Forces,” Air Force Magazine 43, no. 7 (Jul 1960): 103, including 

quote 2 (emphasis added); U.S. Army, “The Army Reserve as Part of the Operational Force,” 

STAND-TO! (blog), 20 Dec 2010, <https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2010/12/20/>, 

accessed 9 May 2016; John J. Kruzel, “Army Reserve Now Part of Operational Force, General 

Says,” American Forces Press Service, 25 Jun 2007, <https://www.army.mil/article/3797/

Army_Reserve_Now_Part_of_Operational_Force__General_Says>, accessed 9 May 2016; 

HCAS, Subcommittee No. 1, Implementation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, 5303. Note 

General White’s use of the term “total force.” This is the earliest official use of the term we 

have discovered. In 1963 the next Air Force chief of staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, employed 

similar language when he referred to the ANG and AFRES performing “their tasks in the total 

Air Force mission”; Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, CSAF, “Policy on Using Reserve Forces,” Air Force 

Information Policy Letter for Commanders 18, no. 12 (15 Jun 1963).

11. HCAS, Subcommittee No. 1, Implementation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, 5300; 

“RFA ’55, 3 Years Later,” Army Reservist, Sep 1958; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common 

Defense, 528–529. Millett and Maslowski indicated a total of 937,000 drill-pay reservists of all 

services in 1961–1962, a number close to the one million stated for 1960 (537). Army Reserve 

strength increased from 99,000 to 223,000 drilling members. 

12. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 530–532, 537; Director of 

Information, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Information Policy Letter 

for Commanders supplement, Jan 1962, 2, 4, including quote, Kennedy quoted by authors; 

Frederick J. Shaw, ed., Locating Air Force Base Sites: History’s Legacy (Washington, DC: Air 

Force History and Museums Program, 2004), 101–102, 105–107. 

13. Air Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders supplement, Jan 1962, including 

quotes 1–2, Kennedy quoted by authors; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 531; 

Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 177–179; Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 126–127. HCAS, Military 

Reserve Posture, Report of Subcommittee No. 3 on Military Reserve Posture (Washington, DC: 

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1956), 5299–5300, including quote 2; Millett and Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense, 528; memo, Col. Joseph H. West, USAF, deputy chief of staff-personnel, 

HQ Fourth Air Force, for [various offices], 28 Nov 1955, subj: Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Air 

Force Reserve Command History Office, Robins AFB, GA; Crossland and Currie, Twice the 

Citizen, 125. Somewhat different numbers (percentage of drilling reservists was the same) were 

provided by Millett and Maslowski, who stated that prior to the 1955 act, 700,000 reservists, out 

of some 2.5 million, drilled with units; see their 1994 edition (551). 

3. Memo, Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Office of Defense Mobilization, for Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, 6 Jan 1954, AFRC/HO, including quotes; Galloway, History of United States 

Military Policy on Reserve Forces, 476; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 127–128. Recall that the 

UMT feature of the 1951 law was in name only; UMT was never implemented.

4. Task Force on Reserve Mobilization Requirements, A Report to the Secretary of Defense

(Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Personnel, 

1954), 38–41, including quotes; memo, Flemming for Eisenhower, 6 Jan 1954; Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 128–130. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message to Congress on National Security 

Requirements, 13 Jan 1955, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10254>; Congressional 

Quarterly, “Military Reserves Strengthened,” CQ Almanac 1955, 11th ed. (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Quarterly, 1956), 334–343.

5. Eisenhower, Special Message to Congress on National Security Requirements, 

including quotes 1–3; HCAS, Subcommittee No. 1, Implementation of the Reserve Forces Act of 

1955, 5299–5301, 5306; Galloway, History of United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces, 

479–481; memo, West for various offices, 28 Nov 1955; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 

120–124; John H. Thompson, “Await Rush of GIs Under Reserve Act,” Chicago Tribune, 29 

Aug 1955, 16. The Army and the Marine Corps were the first two services to implement the 

six-month program. 

6. Memo, West for various offices, 28 Nov 1955; Eisenhower, Statement by the President 

upon Signing the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, 9 Aug 1955, including quote; Mahon, History 

of the Militia and the National Guard, 216–219; Congressional Quarterly, “Military Reserves 

Strengthened,” 334–343.

7. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 216–219; Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 132–133; HCAS, National Reserve Plan, 6; Galloway, History of United States 

Military Policy on Reserve Forces, 486; “Compromise Program Ends Guard Controversy,” 

Cornell Daily Sun, 27 Feb 1957, 8, including Wilson quote. 

8. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 220–221; Doubler, Civilian 

in Peace, Soldier in War, 249–250; Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: 

Chronology,” 132; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 116–120, including quote; 

Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 135; memo, West for various offices, 28 Nov 1955. Original job 

protection for reservists came in the joint resolution authorizing mobilization in 1940, as 

amended in the law authorizing the draft soon after. S. J. Res. 286, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940), 

Sec 3. (b), <http://legisworks.org/congress/76/pubres-96.pdf>; Selective Training and Service 

Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885 (1940), Sec 8 (f), <http://www.legisworks.org/

congress/76/publaw-783.pdf>. Congress extended coverage to state and local governments in 

1974. Detailed information on what is now known as the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act (Pub. L. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149, now codified at 38 U.S.C. 4301-

4335) is available at <http://www.roa.org/lawcenter>.
224 225

Notes to Chapter Three Notes to Chapter Three

was more in response to stresses on the U.S. force in Vietnam than in Korea, yet those recalled 

deployed to Vietnam, Japan, and Korea, while others remained stateside (Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 221). 

21. Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 90-168, 81 Stat. (1967), 

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-81/pdf/STATUTE-81-Pg521.pdf>; Crossland and 

Currie, Twice the Citizen, 181–183; Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 155.

22. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 155; Library of Congress, Federal Research 

Division, Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components (Washington, DC: Library 

of Congress, Oct 2007), 13–14; Kathryn Roe Coker, The Indispensable Force: The Post–Cold 

War Operational Army Reserve, 1990–2010 (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of Army Reserve History, 

2013), 40; John A. Boyd, USARC, Office of Army Reserve Historian, email message to Marion, 

14 Nov 2014; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 238–246; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 

179–183. 

23. William R. Kreh, Citizen Sailors: The U.S. Naval Reserve in War and Peace (New 

York: David McKay Co., 1969), 6–9, 64; USMC Division of Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve: 

A History, 234, 241, 269; “Reserve Training Reviewed,” Coast Guard Reservist 15, no. 1 (Nov 

1967); “Individual Reservists May Be Called To Active Duty If Not Fulfilling Their Reserve 

Obligation,” Coast Guard Reservist 15, no. 1 (Nov 1967); “Reservists Have Been Involuntarily 

Ordered To Active Duty,” Coast Guard Reservist 15, no. 7 (May 1968); John D. McCubbin, 

“The Admiral’s Corner,” Coast Guard Reservist 15, no. 12 (Oct 1968); “Involuntary Call-Up 

Defended,” Coast Guard Reservist 15, no. 12 (Oct 1968). This issue was misprinted as “Sept. 

1968”; “The Coast Guard in Vietnam,” Coast Guard Reservist 16, no. 9 (Jul 1969). As of late 

1967, about 7,500 Army reservists and a total of 400 reservists from the Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps had been recalled to active duty due to unsatisfactory performance in the reserve; 

see Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 153; Military Selective 

Service Act of 1967, Public Law 90-40; see http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-81/pdf/

STATUTE-81-Pg100.pdf; see also Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 197–198; Cantwell, 

Citizen Airmen, 207; “Nonparticipating Reservists Face Active Duty Call-Up,” Coast Guard 

Reservist 14, no. 10 (Oct 1967).

24. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 567, including quote 1; Richard Hunt, 

draft manuscript biography of Melvin Laird (Nov 2014), chapter 14, pages 11–14, 17–18, 20, 

30, 33–34, including quote 2, Gates Commission quoted by Hunt (manuscript provided to 

authors by OSD/HO); Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 561–562, 569–570.

25. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 364, including quote, Abrams quoted by General John 

W. Vessey Jr.; Coker, Indispensable Force, 4, 19, 463. The so-called Abrams Doctrine has been 

disputed by others who argue there is no contemporary documentation confirming this was 

Abrams’ rationale, though some suspect it “might have been seen as a positive collateral spinoff” 

of active-reserve mix established for other policy reasons. Conrad Crane and Gian Gentile, 

“Understanding the Abrams Doctrine: Myth Versus Reality,” War on the Rocks, 9 Dec 2015, 

<https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/understanding-the-abrams-doctrine-myth-versus-reality> 

accessed 30 May 2017. In any case, by 1993 it was accepted wisdom in many quarters that “the 

Army, in particular, should be structured to make active and reserve units so interdependent that 

a president could not send military forces to combat without activating the reserves.” National 

GPO, 17 Aug 1962), 6654–6656, including quote 3; Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 128, 

133, 136; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 179–184. The recall of reservists was authorized (1 Aug 

1961) by a joint resolution of Congress (Pub. L. 87-117, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/

STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg242.pdf). The partial mobilization law was not employed 

in 1961; rather, the Kennedy administration carried out the mobilization on the basis of the 31 

July 1961 joint resolution that authorized the recall of 250,000 reservists for 12 months. A major 

problem experienced by the ANG was that pilots trained for nuclear, not conventional, missions, 

and had to undergo “a crash program of intensive advanced flight training.” 

14. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 531; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier 

in War, 251–253; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 228–229; Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Information Policy Letter Supplement for Commanders, 

including quote 1, quoted by authors; memo, Secretary of Defense McNamara for President 

Kennedy, ca. 28 Feb 1962, subj: Release of Reservists Involuntarily Recalled to Active Duty, 

Mandatory Review Case NLK-86-30, Document 2, JFK Library (copy at AFRC/HO), including 

quote 2; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 136–147; HCAS, Military Reserve Posture, 

6657; Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 139; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 187–191. 

15. HCAS, Military Reserve Posture, 6657–6659, 6661–6662, 6667, including quotes; 

Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 138–140, 146–148. Of the 700,000 drill-pay Army 

reservists, 400,000 were National Guard; 300,000 Army Reserve.

16. Capt. Jon T. Hoffman, “Reforming the Reserves,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 4 

(Apr 1989): 49–50.

17. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 164–173; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier 

in War, 255–256.

18. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 257–258; Crossland and Currie, Twice the 

Citizen, 173–174; Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 143–146, 150–151. In 1967 McNamara 

reconciled his views with those of Congress by proposing end strengths of 400,000 for the 

Army Guard and 260,000 for the Army Reserve. From that time on, the Army National Guard 

maintained the majority of combat units while the Army Reserve maintained primarily combat 

support and combat service support units (Crossland and Currie, 176–178).

19. James T. Currie, “The Army Reserve and Vietnam,” Parameters 14, no. 3, 77, 

including quote; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 209–211; Cantwell, The Air Force Reserve in the 

Vietnam Decade: 1965–1975 (Robins Air Force Base, GA: Directorate of Historical Services, 

Headquarters Air Force Reserve, Nov 1979), 1–8, 57–58. The nonmobilized aircrews conducted 

the airlift missions either on inactive-duty-for-training, active-duty training (also known as the 

“annual tour”), or military personnel appropriation (MPA) orders; see Air Force Reserve in the 

Vietnam Decade, 2–3.

20. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 173–174, 197–201, 207, 211; Weigley, 

History of the United States Army, 561; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 

559–560; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 257–261; Gross, Prelude to the Total 

Force, 145–146, 152, 156–165; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 205–207, 209–210, 214–217, 220–

223; Cantwell, Air Force Reserve in the Vietnam Decade, 1–8, 46–47, 57–58. Although the 

January 1968 mobilization was in response to the Pueblo’s seizure by North Korea, some units 

later deployed to Vietnam (Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, 158). The May 1968 mobilization 
226 227

Notes to Chapter Three Notes to Chapter Three

32. Brayton, “American Mobilisation Policies,” 26–33. 

33. Ibid.,” 26–33, including quotes 1, 4; Department of Defense, Annual Report of the 

Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, DC: DoD, n.d.), 

Introduction, 12, including quote 2; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 259–262, including 

quote 3. Regarding the 1978 mobility exercise, Army Reserve historians Crossland and Currie 

concluded that “[t]he entire mobilization at [Camp] Shelby would have been a disaster” (260). 

34. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 568–569, 572; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War, 273–276; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 231–232, 239, including 

quote 1; annual reports of the secretary of defense on reserve forces, 1970–1979; RFPB, Annual 

Report, Fiscal Year 1980, 18, including quote 2. There were no IRR personnel in the Army 

National Guard or Air National Guard. 

35. See White Memorandum, reproduced on pages 1–4 of the Gerard Study and the 

study’s “Major Conclusions”, including quote 1–2; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 

218–222; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 301. In 1980 the chief of Army Reserve, testified before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee that the “assignment of full-time military to positions 

in Army Reserve units has the greatest potential for improving unit readiness,” and he sought 

funding for 5,400 positions (Crossland and Currie, 222); Thomas Frank England, “The Active 

Guard/Reserve Program: A New Military Personnel Status,” Military Law Review 106 (Fall 

1984): 8–9; Gerald Cantwell provided an extended discussion of the Air Reserve Technician 

controversy in the 1970s; see his Citizen Airmen, 298–307. The so-called “status quo” issue 

in which air reserve technicians who lost their military status through no fault of their own 

continued as civil service technicians was a very minor issue for the Air Force Reserve.

36. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 567–568; Bigelow, Chaloupka, and 

Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 204–205; “The Admiral’s Corner,” Coast Guard 

Reservist 21, no. 8 (May 1974); RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, 21, including quote; 

Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 237–238. 

37. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 583–584, including quote 

1, Reagan quoted by authors; William F. Ward Jr., “Total Force Finds Rare Skills in Army 

Reserve,” Army [Green Book], Oct 1987, 181. Although the Carter presidency was associated 

with the “hollow force” of the late 1970s, the 1980s’ defense buildup under Reagan actually 

began to a limited degree during Carter’s last year in office following seizure of the U.S. 

Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (November–December 1979). The 

buildup included establishing, in 1980, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, forerunner to 

the U.S. Central Command created three years later; Cong. Rec., 15 Jul 1983, 19466, including 

quote 2; DoD News Release 43-86, “Remarks Prepared for Delivery by The Honorable Caspar 

W. Weinberger” [to Reserve Officers Association], 27 Jan 1986, Public Statements of Secretary 

of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 1986), 117, including quote 3; 

Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614, 24 Sep 1983, Sec. 

1212; DoD News Release 274-84, “First Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

Sworn In,” 23 May 1984, OSD/HO; United States Congress, Biographical Directory of the 

United States Congress 1774–Present, online ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 1998–), 

“James H. Webb,” <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=w000803>, 

accessed 7 Nov 2014; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1983, 3. 

38. RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1983, 14, including quote 1, Weinberger quoted 

by RFPB; Cong. Rec., 15 Jul 1983, 19466, including quote 2, quote of Senator John C. Stennis; 

Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: 

Final Report to the Secretary of Defense Executive Summary (Washington, DC: 1993), 2.

26. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 566; Crossland and Currie, Twice 

the Citizen, 263; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 284; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 

338–339. We have used the term “call” and avoided the term “mobilize” in connection with 

the 1976 law and its amendments because the option could be used for peacetime purposes 

rather than solely for armed conflict; moreover, for that reason ASD(RA) Stephen M. Duncan 

preferred not to refer to the law as authorizing a “mobilization.” Later, PRC authority was also 

known as Title 10, U.S.C. 12304 (referring to the U.S. Code section number), or simply as 

12304. 

27. “‘Total Force’ Concept Revamps Readiness Policy,” Coast Guard Reservist 20, no. 

2 (Nov 1972), including quote 1, Laird quoted by authors; Melvin R. Laird, National Security 

Strategy of Realistic Deterrence: Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s Annual Defense 

Department Report, FY 1973 ([Washington, DC: 1972]), 24, including quote 2 (Laird testimony 

on 17 Feb 1972); Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 248–249, 265; Doubler, 

Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 273–274, 277–278; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 

214–215, 253; Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 114–115, 

including quote 3, Schlesinger quoted by Gross. An overlooked aspect of Laird’s Total Force 

concept was that it included the role of U.S. allies, as in his statement, “The conceptual thrust 

of Total Force is toward the efficient integration of all relevant Free World resources to provide 

more security for all of us”; see Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, 24 

(emphasis added).

28. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 254–256; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier 

in War, 279–284. By the late 1970s the Roundout program enabled the Army to increase from 

13 to 16 active combat divisions; Abbott A. Brayton, “American Mobilisation Policies for the 

1980s,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies 126, no. 1 (Mar 

1981): 26–33; Center of Military History, Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal 

Year 1979 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1982), 129. 

29. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 333–334, including quote 1, National Defense University 

study quoted by Cantwell; Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 126, 

including quote 2. 

30. Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 115–117; Cantwell, 

Citizen Airmen, 329; Brig. Gen. Richard R. Severson, USAF, interview by Betty R. Kennedy, 

Jul 2008, Robins Air Force Base, GA, AFRC/HO, 17.

31. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 

Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1981), 4. Hereafter these 

reports will be cited as, e.g., RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980, 4; Reserve Readiness 

and Proficiency, ECP 15-8 (Quantico, VA: Education Center, Marine Corps Development and 

Education Command, 1980), 3–4; Brayton, “American Mobilisation Policies,” 26–33; J. E. 

Johansen, “The Admiral’s Corner,” Coast Guard Reservist 21, no. 3 (Dec 1973); J. W. Moreau, 

“The Admiral’s Corner,” Coast Guard Reservist 20, no. 1 (Oct 1972); “Coast Guard Reservists 

Activated for First Time to Aid in Containing Flood-Swollen Rivers in Second District,” Coast 

Guard Reservist 20, no. 8 (May 1973); Rear Adm. Sidney B. Vaughn, “Admiral’s Corner,” 

Coast Guard Reservist (Nov-Dec 1980); Vaughn, “Admiral’s Corner,” Coast Guard Reservist

(May-Jun 1981).
229

Notes to Chapter Four

228

Notes to Chapter Three

quote 2, Pete Shugert quoted by Rockstroh; “Military Aide Asks New Reserve Plan,” New York 

Times, 5 Nov 1985, 29; “US Military to Call Up All Inactive Reservists for One Day a Year,” 

Boston Globe, 21 Nov 1985, 48; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1985, 11; RFPB, Annual 

Report, Fiscal Year 1986, 22. One of many indicators of the increasing importance of the RC 

and its Total Force role was in the transition of the main body of the RFPB annual report from 

roughly 30 pages in 1983 to 110 pages in 1986, and to 140 pages in 1989. From FYs 1981 to 

1985 the Selected Reserve increased from 899,000 to 1.1 million. 

44. Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors: America’s National Guard and Reserve Forces 

& the Politics of National Security (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 11, 16, including 

quotes 1, 3 (emphasis in original); Stephen M. Duncan, “Selected Reserve Passes Call-Up 

Test,” Defense Issues 3, no. 2 (22 Dec 1987), including quote 2; “20,000 Called Up in Test of 

Reserves, National Guard,” Washington Post, 25 Oct 1987, 20; “Most Weekend Warriors Heed 

Call as Emergency Readiness Is Tested,” Washington Times, 23 Nov 1987, 4; RFPB, Annual 

Report, Fiscal Year 1986, 62–63. 

45. RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1986, 64–65, 75, including quote 1; RFPB, 

Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1989, 54–56, including quote 2; RFPB, Annual 

Report, Fiscal Year 1985, vi; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1987, 59–60; 

DoD News Release 280-88, “Department of Defense Conducts Survey of Reserve Component 

Spouses,” 2 Jun 1988, OSD/HO.

46. “Reserve Forces of the United States: Prepared Statement by ASD(RA) Stephen 

M. Duncan,” Defense Issues 4, no. 12 (6 Apr 1989), including quote; RFPB, Annual Report, 

Fiscal Year 1985, vi; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1986, 27; RFPB, Reserve Component 

Programs, Fiscal Year 1988, 67–68; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1989, 

60–61. 

47. Gerard Study, I-2, including quote 1 (emphasis in original); Duncan, “Reserve Forces 

of the United States,” including quote 2; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 

1989, 5 (table 2). The 1.18 million Selected Reserve strength was as of 30 September 1989. 

48. Alford, O’Ferrall, Rehberg, and Riedler, “The Transformation of Reserve Component 

(RC) Modernization,” Weinberger quoted by authors; USMC Division of Reserve, Marine 

Corps Reserve: A History, 182, including quote, Wilson quoted by authors.

Chapter 4

1. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography 

of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (New York and Toronto: Linda Grey Bantam Books, 1992), 

295–308. 

2. Dan Balz and Rick Atkinson, “Bush Orders Mobilization of Military Reserves,” 

Washington Post, 23 Aug 1990, 1, including quote, quoted by authors; George H. W. Bush, 

“Executive Order 12727: Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active 

Duty,” 22 Aug 1990, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=23568>, accessed 20 Nov 2014; Marygail Brauner, Harry Thie, and Roger Brown, 

Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total 

Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), xiv–xvi, 

<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR132.sum.pdf>, 

accessed 20 Nov 2014; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 306–307. 

RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1986, 54–55; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1985, 6–8, 

29–30, including quotes 3–4; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1988, 23, 84, 

110, 173 (table 38), including quote 5 (p. 110); RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal 

Year 1989, 12, 33 (table 11), 90; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 289–295; Gross, Air 

National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 120–121; Susan Rosenfeld and Charles 

J. Gross, Air National Guard at 60: A History (Arlington, VA: Air National Guard, 2007), 14; 

Bigelow, Chaloupka, and Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 212–213, 218.

39. RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1983, 3; General Accounting Office, Military 

Downsizing: Balancing Accessions and Losses Is Key to Shaping the Future Force (Washington, 

DC: GAO, 1993), 44; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 276; Center of Military 

History, Department of the Army Historical Summary FY 1988 (Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, 1993), 12–13.

40. England, “The Active Guard/Reserve Program: A New Military Personnel Status,” 

9–11; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1983, 20, including quote 1; RFPB, Reserve Component 

Programs, Fiscal Year 1989, 33, 49; Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military 

Tradition, 126. The FY 1983 full-time support ratio in the reserve component was 13 percent 

authorized strength, which probably differed from actual strength. The Army Reserve was 

authorized only 8 percent full-time support personnel, the lowest among reserve components. 

For the remainder of the 1980s, the Army Reserve’s full-time support ratios fluctuated between 

8 and 10 percent of its Selected Reserve. 

41. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 289–295; Anne Nelson, “National 

Guard Now Used as Auxiliary Fighting Force,” Los Angeles Times, 10 Aug 1986, 1; “Training 

Authority and the National Guard: Statement by ASD(RA) James H. Webb Jr., to Senate Armed 

Services Committee,” Defense Issues 1, no. 51 (15 Jul 1986): 1–3, 6; RFPB, Reserve Component 

Programs, Fiscal Year 1987, 103–104 (table 34); David S. Broder, “Hands Off National Guard, 

Governors Say,” Washington Post, 27 Aug 1986, 5; James H. Webb Jr., Letter to the Editor, 

New York Times, 7 Oct 1986; William V. Kennedy, “Conflict Brews over Training of National 

Guard Units,” Christian Science Monitor, 6 Aug 1987, 5. In 1989–1990 a U.S. Circuit Court of 

Appeals, and then the U.S. Supreme Court, ruled in favor of the federal government against the 

governors; see “States Lose Battle over Control of Guard,” Washington Times, 29 Jun 1989, 4. 

For the “Status Act,” see Les’ Andrii Melnyk, “A True National Guard,” 458–461. 

42. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 359; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 261–265, 

including quote 1, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston quoted by authors; William R. Berkman, “Today’s 

Total Army Commits Its Reserve,” Army [Green Book], Oct 1986, 161; RFPB, Annual Report, 

Fiscal Year 1986, 3 (table 2); William R. Berkman, “Reserve Readiness Shows Steady Rise,” 

Army [Green Book], Oct 1985, 189; Ward, “Total Force Finds Rare Skills in Army Reserve,” 

183. By FY 1983, the Army Reserve had no combat divisions (RFPB, Annual report, Fiscal 

Year 1983, 4, table 2); RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1983, 19, including quote 2; H.R. Rep. 

No. 107, 98th Cong., 1st sess. 202 (1983), including quote 3; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier 

in War, 276 (table 7), 289–291, 298; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1988, 

6 (table 2); DoD News Release 114-82, “Army National Guard Exceeds 400,000 in Strength,” 

19 Mar 1982, OSD/HO. 

43. James H. Webb Jr., interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 3 and 15 Jun 

1998, Arlington, VA, OSD/HO, including quote 1; Dennis J. Rockstroh, “5,000 Former Soldiers 

Recalled in Test of U.S. Military Strength,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 Jan 1986, 8, 10, including 
230 231

Notes to Chapter Four Notes to Chapter Four

Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1991), 

chapter 11, page 1. Guard personnel serving in an overseas contingency or supporting it from 

stateside must be federalized. The following three groups were federalized: volunteer reservists 

activated for Desert Shield and Desert Storm, reservists activated involuntarily under 673b 

authority (22 Aug 1990), and reservists mobilized involuntarily under partial mobilization 

authority (18 Jan 1991); David P. Anderson (Air National Guard/National Guard Bureau 

History Office) email messages to Marion, 5 Nov 2012 and 11 Dec 2012. For the full text of the 

president’s partial mobilization order, see George H. W. Bush, Executive Order 12743: Ordering 

the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty, 18 Jan 1991, <http://www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23582>, accessed 24 Jul 2014. 

7. Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 148–149, 157; 

Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 366–367. 

8. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 94–97; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 368. 

9. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 84, 99–101, 232, including quote; Bigelow, Chaloupka, and 

Rockett, “Naval Reserve: Chronology,” 236, 243–249; Department of the Navy, The United 

States Navy in “Desert Shield”/“Desert Storm” (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 May 1991), <http://www.history.navy.mil/research/

library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-navy-in-desert-shield-desert-storm.

html>, accessed 17 Jun 2016. 

10. Mark F. Cancian, “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia,” Marine Corps 

Gazette, Sep 1991, 35–37; F. G. Hoffman, “Reversing Course on Total Force?” Marine Corps 

Gazette, Sep 1991, 38–39; Mark F. Cancian, “Depend on the Marine Reserve,” Marine Corps 

Gazette, Mar 1994, 18–19, including quote; Lt. Col. Dennis P. Mroczkowski, With the 2d 

Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: History and Museums 

Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), 4; Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf 

Conflict, 11–13.

11. Cancian, “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia,” 35–36, including 

quote (emphasis in original). Under the I-I program, selected regular Marines served tours 

with Selected Reserve units to facilitate their combat readiness; such tours were considered to 

enhance rather than harm the regular’s career. 

12. Mike Price, “PSUs: A Lightning-Quick Response to ‘The Call,’” Reservist, Nov 1990, 

4, 6–7; “Rest of PSUs 303 and 301 follow closely behind first 15 to arrive,” Reservist, Apr 1991, 

7; “What We Do...” The Coast Guard Reserve, Fac Pac 90, 3, 6–7. The Coast Guard Reserve 

was established in 1941, thus 1990 was its fiftieth year; see chapter 1, present work. By 1996, 

PSUs included active component personnel; see Edward J. Kruska, “CG Reservists help train 

active duty PSU in Ohio,” Coast Guard Reservist, Jan 1996, 8; “PSU 303 decommissioning,” 

Coast Guard Reservist, Jan 1997, 4. Between 1995 and December 1998, the Coast Guard 

activated five “official” (not notional) PSUs, for a total of six PSUs by 1999; see Rear Adm. 

Steven E. Day, USCGR, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 6 Mar 2012, Arlington, VA, OSD/HO; 

Thomas J. Vitullo and Robert A. Stohlman, “PSU Update,” Coast Guard Reservist, Nov 1995, 

5–7; “Welcome PSU 313,” Coast Guard Reservist, Feb 1999; Jeffrey D. Smith, USCGR (ret.), 

email messages to Marion, Oct 2012. By the late 1990s, PSUs included a small number of active 

component personnel. 

13. Coker, Indispensable Force, 33, 36–37, including quote.

3. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Krause, eds., The Whirlwind War (Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History, 1995), 72–73; Gross, Air National Guard and the American 

Military Tradition, 149–154, 161, including quote; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 370–371; Bush, 

“Executive Order 12727”; George H. W. Bush, “Executive Order 12722–Blocking Iraqi 

Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq,” 2 Aug 1990, The American 

Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23563>, accessed 23 

Jun 2016. EO 12722 officially declared a “national emergency,” but initiated only economic 

sanctions against Iraq in response to its “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security 

and foreign policy of the United States.” Oddly, EO 12727 did not refer to that state of national 

emergency, or use it to grant explicit authority to mobilize reservists for up to two years. Instead 

it found only that reserves were “necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United 

States for the effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula.”

4. George H. W. Bush, Exec. Order No. 12733, Authorizing the Extension of the Period 

of Active Duty of Personnel of the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces, 13 Nov 1990, <http://

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23572>, accessed 4 Apr 2017. Regarding 673b 

authority, Congress had replaced 90 days in both places with 180 days, for a total of 360 days of 

activation. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 66–67, 69, 76. 

5. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 66–72, 76, 84–85, 89; Schubert and Krause, The Whirlwind 

War, 126; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 313–317; George H. W. Bush, “Executive 

Order 12733—Authorizing the Extension of the Period of Active Duty of Personnel of the 

Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces,” 13 Nov 1990, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/

index.php?pid=23572>, accessed 10 Dec 2014; Stephen M. Duncan, “Capabilities and Future 

Needs of the Reserve Components,” Defense Issues 7, no. 32 (1 May 1992): 2, 5; Coker, 

Indispensable Force, 182–183, 215. 

For further discussion of IRR, see chapter 3, present work. Following the FY 1998 law, 

the term “presidential selected reserve call-up” (PSRC) authority was changed to “presidential 

reserve call-up” (PRC) to indicate the reality that the call-up authority was no longer limited to 

the Selected Reserve (IRR members are part of the Ready Reserve, not the Selected Reserve). 

Cases in point were in August 1990 and September 1994: implementation of 673b authority 

(another term for PSRC) by Presidents Bush and Clinton did not affect the IRR. Prior to the 

mid-1990s, “PSRC authority” was often referred to as “673b authority.” Bush’s executive order 

in August 1990 did not mention PSRC or any similar term; see his Executive Order 12727. The 

same was true in September 1994 regarding Clinton’s Executive Order 12927 (see William J. 

Clinton, “Executive Order 12927—Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active 

Duty,” <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12927.pdf>, accessed 9 

Dec 2014. Both presidents referred to 673b authority rather than to PSRC. In December 1995, 

however, the term “Presidential Selected Reserve” appeared in reference to the reserve call-up 

for the Balkans; see “President Clinton Authorizes Reserve Call-up,” American Forces Press 

Service, 13 Dec 1995, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40501>, accessed 

9 Dec 2014. In April 1999, the term “PSRC” was applied retroactively to refer to the 1990 and 

1994 call-ups, which at the time were referred to strictly as 673b authority; see DoD News 

Release 197-99, “Secretary Cohen Announces Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up,” 27 Apr 

1999, <http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=2066>, accessed 24 May 

2016.

6. Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 141–142, chapter 

6; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 364–367; Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
232 233

Notes to Chapter Four Notes to Chapter Four

assuming their parent organizations did so. A detailed biography of Scales is at <http://www.

deanza.edu/faculty/swensson/article_scales.html>, accessed 20 Nov 2014.

20. Goldich, “Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War,” including quote; 

Schubert and Krause, The Whirlwind War, 73; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 36; Doubler, Civilian 

in Peace, Soldier in War, 312. 

21. GAO, Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades, 3, 12–13, 

16–20, including quotes; Barton Gellman, “Cheney Says Guard Units May Need Reorganizing,” 

Washington Post, 15 Mar 1991, 34; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 316. For 

Roundout brigade program, see chapter 3, present work. The ARNG history office noted that at 

least in the program’s inception, Roundout also served as a means for the Army to preserve the 

maximum number of divisional flags.

22. GAO, Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades, 20–21, 

including quote. 

23. Thomas P. Christie and Richard A. Fejfar, Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action 

Report (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1992), 77, 94–95; GAO, Peacetime 

Guard Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades (Washington, DC: GAO, 1991), 13–14; 

Les’ Melnyk, Mobilizing for the Storm: The Army National Guard in Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 2001), 23.

24. Melissa Healy, “Cheney Would Reduce Reserve Combat Role,” Los Angeles Times, 14 

Mar 1991, 1, <http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-14/news/mn-149_1_u-s-central-command>, 

accessed 19 May 2016, including quote 1, Cheney quoted by Healy; Goldich, “Army’s 

Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War,” ii, including quote 2; “Sullivan to Congress: 

It Takes 90 Days To Train Brigades, Year To Train Divisions,” Inside the Army, 2 Mar 1992, 

2; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 82–84; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 330–331. For 

predeployment training regimens between 2007 and 2011, see chapter 7, present work. Dennis 

P. Chapman, Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: Army Practice, Past and 

Present, Land Warfare Paper No. 69 (Washington, DC: Association of the United States Army, 

Sep 2008), 10, including quote 3.

25. Truman, Memoirs, 506; HCAS, Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee,

Redeployment of Reserves From Operation Desert Storm: Hearing, April 18, 1991 (Washington, 

DC: GPO, 1992), 2, 25, 41; HCAS, Reserve Demobilization Problems: Hearing, 30 December 

1991 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), 38; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 118–121. 

26. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 33, 121–130, including quote; Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Department of Defense Procedures 

for Return and Release from Active Duty of National Guardsmen and Reservists Called Up for 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Hearing, June 11, 1991 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), 5–8, 

13; Gross, Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, 158–159. 

27. Senate Armed Services Committee, Procedures for Return and Release from Active 

Duty, 60, including quote 1; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 124, including quote 2. By late August 

1991, all but 4 percent of mobilized RC personnel had been demobilized. The last unit to remain 

on active duty involuntarily was the Army Reserve’s 1184th Transportation Terminal Unit, 

released on 19 November 1991; see Duncan, 130. 

14. Coker, Indispensable Force, 19–20, 27; John A. Boyd, USARC, Office of the Army 

Reserve Historian, comment on draft to authors, 10 Oct 2014. Coker stated some 79,000 Army 

Reserve soldiers were activated for Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but about 84,000 probably 

is a more accurate number based on the following: First, the Reserve Forces Policy Board 

reported that 63,398 Army Guard personnel were activated for the Persian Gulf; see RFPB, 

Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1991, 11–12, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a249015.

pdf>, accessed 10 Dec 2014. Second, a GAO study referenced 147,000 activated reservists 

from the Army Reserve and Army National Guard (147,000 minus 63,000 Army Guard equals 

84,000 Army Reserve); see GAO, National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately 

Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War (Washington, DC: GAO, 1991), <http://www.gao.gov/

assets/160/151085.pdf>, accessed 22 Nov 2014, 8; third, the estimate of 84,000 Army Reserve 

soldiers activated also appeared in an Army Reserve annual history; see Kathryn Roe Coker, 

The 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of Army Reserve 

History, 2003), xxiii. 

15. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 35–37; Stephen M. Duncan, “Gulf War Was a Test 

of Reserve Components and They Passed,” in Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment of 

Reserve Component: Extracts of Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: U.S. Naval War College, 

n.d.), <http://dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/p162.pdf>, accessed 9 Dec 2014, 21, 25, 30; 

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, 11–14; Doubler, Civilian in 

Peace, Soldier in War, 302–303, 306–307, 329; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal 

Year 1991, 11–12; F. G. Hoffman, “Reversing Course on Total Force?” Marine Corps Gazette, 

Sep 1991, 38–39. Hoffman stated that as of 1 March 1991 about 101,600 of 225,600 activated 

reservists (45 percent) had deployed overseas. We have chosen to use the term “activation” rather 

than “mobilization” in order to distinguish between the authorities available to the president. 

Because initially President Bush did not employ statutory mobilization authority, “activation” 

is the best term. (Later, in January 1991 the president employed partial mobilization authority, 

also known as Section 673.) Former ASD(RA) Stephen Duncan argued that, technically, an 

augmentation based on Section 673b was not a mobilization because the Section 673b authority 

could be used for peacetime operational purposes; see Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 16, 49; and 

chapter 3, present work. 

16. Schubert and Krause, The Whirlwind War, 57–58.

17. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 37–38, including quotes 1–2; Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take 

a Hero, 323, including quotes 3–4.

18. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 331, including quote 1; Duncan, Citizen 

Warriors, 49–50, 63–64, including quote 2, Montgomery quoted by Duncan; Schubert and 

Krause, The Whirlwind War, 72.

19. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 331, including quote 1; Robert L. Goldich, 

“The Army’s Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War” (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, Library of Congress, 22 Oct 1991), ii, including quote 2; Duncan, Citizen 

Warriors, 49–50, 63–64. In the Army’s official account of the Gulf War, leading Army warriorscholar Brig. Gen. (later, Maj. Gen.) Robert H. Scales Jr., wrote that the 48th Infantry Brigade 

was “a late-deploying unit in order to allow time for postmobilization training to prepare for 

combat”; see his Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), 52. His statement should put to rest once and for all any 

notions that roundout brigades were intended to deploy almost immediately upon mobilization, 
234 235

Notes to Chapter Four Notes to Chapter Four

39. Duncan, “Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 10, 

including quote. 

40. Lt. Col. Thomas C. Stredwick, Title XI: An Underfunded Initiative (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Army War College, 15 Apr 1996), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA309074>, accessed 13 Jun 2017.

41. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Defense, 1993), iii, 1, 7, 19, 92–93, 94, including quotes, <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/

administration_and_Management/other/515.pdf>, accessed 2 Dec 2014; Duncan, Citizen 

Warriors, 212–213; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 349–350; Andrew F. Krepinevich, 

The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, Feb 1994), 

i–iv, 1, 12, 17–19, 21–26, 55, 61; Coker, Indispensable Force, 50–51; Cheney and Powell, 

“Drawing Down the Guard and Reserve,” 4. While the defense secretary announced the BUR 

on 1 September 1993, the date that appeared on the published BUR was October 1993; the 

online PDF version (accessed by the above link) appears to have several copies of the BUR 

packaged together. 

42. Aspin, Bottom-Up Review, 22, 91–94, including quotes (quote 2 emphasis added); 

Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin J. Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of 

Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_

reports/MR1387.html>, accessed 24 May 2016, chapter 3, 49, 64; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 

Soldier in War, 350, 362, 384; Coker, Indispensable Force, 51. 

43. Coker, Indispensable Force, 52–53, 148, 468; John A. Boyd, USARC, Office of the 

Army Reserve Historian, comments on draft and email messages to authors, 10 Oct 2014 and 

3 Dec 2014. 

44. Aspin, Bottom-Up Review, 95; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 205, 211–212, 294; Coker, 

Indispensable Force, 215; William Matthews, “Call-Up Power Remains with the President,” 

Army Times, 22 Aug 1994, 22. The new length of activation (270 days) was stated in President 

Clinton’s announcement of PSRC for Operation Joint Endeavor (13 December 1995); see the 

DoD news article at <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40501>, accessed 5 

Apr 2017.

45. Cheryl Y. Marcum, Robert M. Emmerichs, Jennifer Sloan McCombs, and Harry J. 

Thie, Methods and Actions for Improving Performance of the Department of Defense Disability 

Evaluation System (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), Appendix A, 151, including 

quote, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1228/MR1228.

appa.pdf>, accessed 7 Apr 2015; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. 

L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1727 (1993), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/housebill/2401>, accessed 30 Jul 2016.

46. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, Pub. L. 103-353, 

105 Stat. 55 (1994), including quote 1; Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 1186 (2011).

47. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense:

Report of the Commission (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), ES-1, ES-5, 1–2, 2–24, Conclusion, 

including quote, <http://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/topic/general/ADA295228.pdf>, accessed 24 

May 2016. 

28. RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1991, xv, 52–54, including quotes. 

Prior to 1990, the Naval Reserve lacked an institutional family support system (53); Doubler, 

Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 330; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 372–373.

29. RFPB, Reserve Component Programs—FY 1992 (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 1993), 48–49; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1991, 53; Coker, 

Indispensable Force, 137, 232–233, including quote; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 372–374. The 

date of the National Guard’s lead-agent designation was unspecified, but it appeared to be postDesert Shield/Storm. Air National Guard family programs were “administered in conjunction 

with the Army National Guard through each State Headquarters with oversight responsibilities 

in the National Guard Bureau.” Quote in RFPB, Reserve Component Programs—FY 1992, 49.

30. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 111–115. 

31. RFPB, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1991, 50–52; Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 374–375; Duncan, “Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 3; 

Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 111–115. The committee was eventually located within the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 374–375, 

including quote.

32. Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: The 

Joint History Office, 1993), 2–4; Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, with Joseph E. Persico 

(New York: Random House, 1995), 451, including quotes 1–2 (emphasis in original); Duncan, 

“Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 8–9, including quotes 3–4, quoted 

by Duncan; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 168–170; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 

334–335, 343–344; Coker, Indispensable Force, 47; Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, 44. 

The official dissolution of the Soviet Union took place in December 1991.

33. Duncan, “Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 8, including 

quote, Bush quoted by Duncan; Melissa Healy, “U.S. Role in Mideast Helped to Put a Lid 

on Defense Cuts, Strategists Say,” Los Angeles Times, 2 Oct 1990, 18, <http://articles.latimes.

com/1990-10-02/news/mn-1750_1_operation-desert-shield>, accessed 9 Apr 2015; Duncan, 

“Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 8; “The Disarmed Services 

Budget,” Washington Times, 1 Oct 1990, G-2. 

34. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 199, including quote, Aspin quoted by Duncan. 

35. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 199–203; Richard B. Cheney and Colin Powell, “Drawing 

Down the Guard and Reserve,” press briefing, Defense Issues, 26 Mar 1992, 1–3, 6, including 

quote; Duncan, “Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 5. The term “the 

base force,” used throughout this briefing, referred to the smaller, refocused, post–Cold War 

U.S. armed forces. The term dated from 1990 and referred to the minimum force structure 

required “to retain superpower status,” which Duncan considered “an awfully fuzzy standard”; 

see his Citizen Warriors, 167–170, “superpower” quote of Powell and Paul Wolfowitz, under 

secretary of defense for policy, quoted by Duncan. 

36. Cheney and Powell, “Drawing Down the Guard and Reserve,” 3, including quote. 

37. Cheney and Powell, “Drawing Down the Guard and Reserve,” 3, 4–5, including 

quotes; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 202; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 344. 

38. Duncan, “Capabilities and Future Needs of the Reserve Components,” 6, 9, including 

quotes; Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 205–207. 
236 237

Notes to Chapter Four Notes to Chapter Four

Commands,” Air Force Magazine, May 1995, 72; “Major Commands,” Air Force Magazine,

May 1996, 78; “Major Commands,” Air Force Magazine, May 1997, 81; Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen, 378. In 1996, the ANG activated its first space mission unit, the 137th Space Warning 

Squadron, Colorado Air National Guard; see Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 

19–20.

54. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 211; Mary I. Nolan, “‘Vision 2000’: The Future of the 

Naval Reserve,” Sea Power, Oct 1995, 37–40; Rear Adm. Thomas F. Hall, USN, ret., interview 

by Forrest L. Marion, 23 Sep 2013, including quotes; RFPB, Reserve Component Programs—

FY 1992, 35; Nolan, “‘Vision 2000’” 37–40; Jon R. Anderson, “Good news: Bad News Is Over,” 

Handbook for the Guard & Reserve, 1995, 55. 

55. James E. Livingston and Eric L. Chase, “Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up 

Muscle for America’s Post–Cold War Force-in-Readiness,” Marine Corps Gazette, Mar 1994, 

14–17, including quotes; Mark F. Cancian, “Depend on the Marine Reserve,” Marine Corps 

Gazette, Mar 1994, 18; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 331. By 1995, 

Marine Corps active duty strength reached 174,000, the first service to reach the active- duty 

manpower level mandated by the Bottom-Up Review; see “‘We Just Changed the Whole 

Philosophy’, Interview with Lt. Gen. George R. Christmas,” Sea Power, Jul 1995, 11. In 2008, 

the CNGR echoed the recommendation to eliminate the “R” for all reservists, a small matter 

administratively but one possessing significant cultural weight.

56. Livingston and Chase, “Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle,” 14–17, 

including quote 1; James E. Livingston, “Reserve Vision Revisited,” Marine Corps Gazette, 

Jun 1995, 47; Ronald D. Richard, “Seamless Integration at Work,” Marine Corps Gazette, Jan 

1996, 43–44, including quote 2; Allen E. Weh, “The Marines and Total Force: 1997,” Marine 

Corps Gazette, Mar 1994, 22. 

57. “Integration,” Coast Guard Reservist, May–Jul 1993, 7–11; Stephen Wehrenberg, 

“Restructuring, Right People, Right Places,” Coast Guard Reservist, Aug–Sep 1993, 5–8; Ivette 

A. Quarles, “Reserve Downsizing Plan,” Coast Guard Reservist, Jan 1994, 15; Richard M. 

Larrabee, “A View from the Bridge,” Coast Guard Reservist, Apr 1995, 4; Richard W. Schneider, 

“A View from the Bridge,” Coast Guard Reservist, Jan 1996, 5; Richard W. Schneider, “A View 

from the Bridge,” Coast Guard Reservist, May 1996, 4; Day interview, 6 Mar 2012. 

58. Robert E. Kramek, “A View from the Bridge,” Coast Guard Reservist, Oct 1994, 3, 

including quotes 1–2; Day interview, 6 Mar 2012, 4–5, including quote 3; Schneider, “A View 

from the Bridge,” Coast Guard Reservist, May 1996, 4, including quote 4; Robert E. Sloncen, 

“A View from the Bridge,” Coast Guard Reservist Jun 1994, 5; “An Interview With Our 

Commandant,” Coast Guard Reservist, Aug 1997, 5–11; 1998 Team Coast Guard Customer and 

Reserve Member Appraisals (N.p., ca. 1998), 3, 6; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard 

and Reserves, 132–136, 329. The CNGR called for the same option—termed “continuum of 

service”—throughout the reserve component while also crediting the Coast Guard with being 

the first maritime service to implement integration of active and reserve components. Day, who 

participated later in a reserve strategic assessment, felt it was after 2003 when full integration 

occurred. 

59. Carlton Moore, “Relevant and Ready . . . Today and Tomorrow,” Coast Guard 

Reservist, Nov 1999, 6, including quote. Moore’s full title was deputy for mobilization and 

reserve component affairs, Pacific area.

48. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 362–364, including quote; Coker, 

Indispensable Force, 54–55. The other two broad areas addressed by the commission were 

civilian management/support to DoD and planning/programming/budgeting processes (1–4). 

Commission on Roles and Missions, Directions for Defense, 2–24; Aspin, Bottom-Up Review, 

94; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 363–364; CNGR, Transforming the National 

Guard and Reserves, 204–208. In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

addressed both FTS (Full-Time Support) and full-time support personnel. While “FTS” was 

concerned strictly with reserve component members supporting reserve units fulltime, “fulltime support” personnel could be either active component (e.g., “active duty advisors”) or 

regular component (e.g. usually, Active Guard and Reserve, or AGR; or Military Technician, or 

MT) members. The distinction was often blurred and confused even in official reports. 

49. Commission on Roles and Missions, Directions for Defense, 2–23 through 2–25, 

including quotes 1–2; Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Headquarters 

Dept. of the Army, 1996), 9, including quote 3; Coker, Indispensable Force, 55. 

50. Department of Defense, The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, 1997), iii–x, 7–18, including quote 1, <http://history.defense.gov/

Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR1997.pdf>, accessed 5 Dec 2014; Charles C. Krulak, 

“Quadrennial Defense Review Implementation,” Marine Corps Gazette, Jun 1997, 22–23, 

including quote; Commission on Roles and Missions, Directions for Defense, 4–9; Doubler, 

Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 364–365; Coker, Indispensable Force, 168–169, 175. 

51. House Committee on National Security, Military Personnel Subcommittee, Reserve 

Component Issues from the Quadrennial Defense Review: Hearing, 29 Jul 1997 (Washington, 

DC: GPO, 1998), 1, 3, 5–6, 12, 16–17, including quote, <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=p

st.000032141221#view=1up;seq=5>, accessed 5 Dec 2014; Department of Defense, Report of 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, 29–34; Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 364–366; 

Coker, Indispensable Force, 172; Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 29–34, 39–52; Max 

Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” supplement, Army, Oct 1997, 93–

94; DoD News Release 635-97, “FY 1998 Reserve Component Inactivations Closed Out [from 

BUR],” 26 Nov 1997, <http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=1512>, 

accessed 5 Dec 2014. The QDR concluded that the Army National Guard division redesign 

program, directed in 1996 by Secretary of the Army Togo D. West Jr., “will relieve an important 

warfighting shortfall by converting lower priority combat brigades into higher priority CS/CSS 

forces”; see Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 47. The QDR 

accelerated this conversion; see also Bernard F. Veronee Jr., Army National Guard Division 

Redesign, 1, <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug99/MS466.htm>, accessed 5 Dec 

2014; Philip Gold, “The Army vs. the National Guard,” Washington Times, 5 Jun 1997, 21, 

<http://www.discovery.org/a/243>, accessed 5 Dec 2014. 

52. House Committee on National Security, Military Personnel Subcommittee, Hearing 

on Reserve Component Issues from the Quadrennial Defense Review, Jul 29, 1997, 5, including 

quote; Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 27–31; Cantwell, Citizen Airmen, 379–

381. 

53. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 18–31; Charles J. Gross, Adapting the 

Force: Evolution of the Air National Guard’s Air Mobility Mission (Washington, DC: National 

Guard Bureau Historical Services Division, 1999), 48–51; “Air National Guard,” Air Force 

Magazine, May 1993, 104; “Major Commands,” Air Force Magazine, May 1994, 59; “Major 
238 239

Notes to Chapter Five Notes to Chapter Five

3. The chief, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve, remained a rear admiral (two-star rank); Dr. 

Robert M. Browning, USCG historian, email message to Marion, 1 Apr 2013. Although the FY 

2000 NDAA, signed into law by President Clinton, contained “provisions allowing Reserve 

component chiefs to be promoted,” no such promotions actually took place until 2001; see 

RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1999, xxviii–xxix. Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Plewes, USAR, 

interview by Kathryn R. Coker, 15 Nov 2010, Office of Army Reserve History, including quotes 

1–2; Vice Adm. John B. Totushek, USNR, interview by Capt. Kevin Gillis, USNR, et al., 14 

Oct 2003, 28, Arlington, VA, printed by Naval Historical Center, 2003, including quote 3; Vice 

Adm. John G. Cotton, USN, ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 6 Jun 2013, OSD/HO, copy 

at AFHRA, including quote 4; “‘We’re Going to Make Sure We Have a Footprint in Future 

Missions,’ A Conversation with Lt. Gen. Daniel James III,” National Guard, Sep 2002, 67–70, 

including quote 5. The promotion of the ARNG director, Roger C. Schultz, was confirmed by 

the U.S. Senate at the same time as Lt. Gen. Plewes; see Coker, Indispensable Force, 318–319; 

Coker, 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 46.

4. Michael D. Doubler, The National Guard and the War on Terror: The Attacks of 9/11 

and Homeland Security (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, 

May 2006), 32, 40–46; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002

(Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, [2002]), 26; “Update: Total Force Integration,” Naval 

Reserve Association News, Apr 2002, 7; Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 40.

5. Coker, Indispensable Force, 266–267. The president issued Executive Order 13223 on 

14 September 2001. In the order, he did not cite the partial mobilization authority by name (Title 

10, U.S. Code, Section 12302), but he quoted from it, invoking that authority to order units and 

members of the Ready Reserve “to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months”; see 

American Presidency Project, Executive Order 13223, 14 Sep 2001, <http://www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=61504>, accessed 11 Jul 2016. 

6. P. J. Capelotti, Rogue Wave: The U.S. Coast Guard on and after 9/11 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Coast Guard Historians Office, n.d.), 72, 86, 89–90, 94, 97, 131, 154–160; Dana L. Smith, 

ed., 2002 Reserve Forces Almanac (Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 

2002), 97; Master Chief Petty Officer Jeffrey D. Smith, USCGR, ret., interview by Forrest L. 

Marion, 5 Mar 2012, Washington, DC, OSD/HO; Rear Adm. Steven E. Day, USCGR, interview 

by Forrest L. Marion, 6 Mar 2012, Washington, DC, OSD/HO.

7. Betty R. Kennedy, Donald C. Boyd, et al., Turning Point 9.11, Air Force Reserve in the 

21st Century, 2001–2011 (Robins AFB, GA: Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, Sep 

2012), 79–80; Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 41–42; National Guard Bureau, 

Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002, 26; Charles J. Gross, comp., “A Chronological 

History of the Air National Guard and Its Antecedents, 1908–2007,” 2 Apr 2007, 119–120, copy 

provided to Forrest Marion by Gross, the ANG command historian. On 11 September, Navy 

fighter and E–2 surveillance aircraft helped patrol the airspace in the vicinity of New York 

City and Washington (Air National Guard at 60, 40). Three-fourths of USAF’s mortuary affairs 

support capability resided in the AFR. 

8. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 43–44. The U.S. Northern Command 

was activated on 1 October 2002 with the mission of homeland defense; see “NorthCom Setup 

Becomes Clearer,” National Guard, Sep 2002, 33; “Newly Activated Homeland Command 

Includes Guard,” National Guard, Nov 2002, 12–14.

60. DoD, News Release 472-97, “Secretary Cohen Signs Memorandum Emphasizing 

Increased Reliance on the Reserve Components,” 11 Sep 1997, including quotes, <http://archive.

defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=1390>, accessed 24 May 2016; Deborah LeeJames, secretary of the Air Force, interview by Marion via video teleconference, 12 Sep 2014; 

Coker, Indispensable Force, 175–176; Nolan, “‘Vision 2000’,” 40; Terrence M. O’Connell, 

Report of the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board [Fiscal Year 1998] (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998), <http://fas.org/man/docs/adr_00/rfpbstat.htm>, 

accessed 7 Apr 2015.

61. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 355–357; Coker, Indispensable Force, 

161, 164, 215–218, 221; Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve,” 96-100; “President Clinton 

Authorizes Reserve Call-Up,” American Forces Press Service, 13 Dec 1995, <http://archive.

defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40501>, accessed 8 Dec 2014; “Operation Joint 

Endeavor” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_endeavor.

htm>, accessed 8 Dec 2014; DoD News Release 271-96, “Reserve Units Begin Mobilization 

for Rotation to Support Operation Joint Endeavor,” 10 May 1996, <http://archive.defense.

gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=878>, accessed 4 Apr 2017; “Operation Joint Guard,” 

GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_guard.htm>, accessed 8 

Dec 2014; DoD News Release 197-99, 27 Apr 1999, accessed 1 Jul 2016; “Operation Allied 

Force” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied_force.htm> 

accessed 8 Dec 2014; R. Cody Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 6, 52, <http://www.history.

army.mil/brochures/Kosovo/Kosovo.pdf>, accessed 8 Dec 2014. Note that by 2001, the Army 

Guard and Army Reserve were “fully integrated” into the Army’s five-year deployment cycle for 

the Balkans, and the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard participated “in the maturing Air Force’s 

Air Expeditionary Warfare initiative”; see Marty Kauchak, “Reserves In Transformation,” 

Armed Forces Journal International, Aug 2001, 11. In 2001, Michèle A. Flournoy’s pre-QDR 

study acknowledged the Guard’s “growing role in rotational deployments in support of peace, 

humanitarian, and other operations”; see Michèle A. Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001, Strategy-Driven 

Choices for America’s Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001), 98. 

62. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 25–27; DoD News Release 197–199, 

27 Apr 1999.

 Chapter 5

1. Sue Cathcart, “Defining Homeland Defense,” National Guard, Jun 2001, 30–32, 

including quote, quoted by Cathcart; Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001. Flournoy served as principal 

deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction. 

2. Air Force Bulletin No. 16, “Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952” (Washington, DC, 18 

Jul 1952), 2; Flournoy, QDR 2001, 97, 102, 230–231, including quotes 1–2; Kristin Patterson, 

“Emerging Threats,” National Guard, Jul 2001, 24–25, including quote 3, quoted by Patterson; 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of Defense, 30 Sep 2001), 19, including 

quote 4; “Rumsfeld: Review Will Offer ‘No Dramatic Changes,’” National Guard, Jun 2001, 

16; David S. Chu, email message to Jon Hoffman, 28 Mar 2017. The same paragraph in the 

QDR report that called for the definitions also addressed the terror attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon and thus must have been prepared or modified after the attacks. 
240 241

Notes to Chapter Five Notes to Chapter Five

(PRC), reflecting the recent change in law that authorized the call-up of Individual Ready 

Reserve personnel under that authority (IRR members were not part of the Selected Reserve); 

see RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1998, 5, which refers to FY 1998 NDAA that “provided 

for the involuntary call-up of up to 30,000 members from the Individual Ready Reserve under a 

PSRC.” RFPB, Reserve Component Programs . . . Fiscal Year 1999, 5, refers to the president’s 

authority to “order up to 200,000 members of the Reserve components to Active Duty for up 

to 270 days under the presidential reserve call-up (formerly known as the presidential selected 

reserve call-up), as prescribed in Title 10, United States Code.”

15. Michael D. Doubler, The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Defense Transformation (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Office of 

Public Affairs, Mar 2008), 15–17, 20–21, 31–32; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of 

the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002, 25. During 2002 a succession of elements from the 23rd Marines 

also provided security at Guantanamo Bay; see Dennis M. McCarthy, “Congratulations and 

Thanks,” Continental Marine, Fall 2002, 3.

16. Kennedy, et al., Turning Point 9.11, 75–78, 87–88, 99–100; Gross, “Chronological 

History of the Air National Guard,” 121–124, 126; Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard 

at 60, 46–51; Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, AFRC commander, interview by Betty R. Kennedy, 

Apr–May 2008, 66–68, 71, 100, AFRC Hist Office, copy at AFHRA; “Selected Demobilization 

Begins for Air Force,” National Guard, Jul 2002, 18–19; Lisa Daniel, “In Harm’s Way,” National 

Guard, Aug 2002, 22–23; “Air Force Extends Guard Call-Up,” National Guard, Sep 2002, 32; 

“Air Force Wants Guard and Reserve Airmen Home,” National Guard, Sep 2003, 22. Note that 

the AFRC F–16s, which carried the LITENING II targeting pod and associated datalink, were 

the most capable F–16s in the theater (Bradley, 69, 101). 

17. Michael D. Doubler, The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, Nov 2008), 10, 

15, 20–23, 27–31; “Guard in Largest Call-Up Since Korean War,” National Guard, Apr 2003, 

18. Linguistic support came again from the 142nd Military Intelligence Battalion (Utah), 

previously mobilized for Operation Enduring Freedom. At the start of OIF, the Pentagon 

reported a total of more than 212,000 reserve and Guard personnel on active duty including 

units and individual augmentees; see DoD, News Release 127-03, “National Guard and Reserve 

Mobilized As Of March 19, 2003,” 19 Mar 2003, <http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.

aspx?releaseid=3664>, accessed 15 Jan 2015. By comparison, seven weeks earlier the total 

was 94,000 reserve component members mobilized; see DoD News Release 039-03, 29 Jan 

2003, “National Guard and Reserve Mobilized As Of Jan. 29, 2003,” <http://archive.defense.

gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3611>, accessed 15 Jan 2015. 

18. Coker, Indispensable Force, 289–291. 

19. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 52–55; Christopher Prawdzik, 

“Smooth Landing,” National Guard, Jul 2002, 22–24; Gross, “Chronological History of the Air 

National Guard,” 124. The 116th transitioned to the JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System) mission. 

20. Kennedy, et al., Turning Point 9.11, 138–140, 143–144, 162, 167–168.

21. Totushek interview, 14 Oct 2003, 25–26, including quote. For data on the VFA–201, 

see “Carrier Air Wing EIGHT History,” <http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/cvw8/Documents/

history.htm>, accessed 15 Jan 2015. 

9. Under “homeland security” were the categories of homeland defense, civil support, and 

emergency preparedness; see Under Secretary of Defense (P&R), “Comprehensive Review of 

Active/Reserve Force Mix,” briefing (in-progress review), 18 Apr 2002, slide 5, copy at AFHRA; 

“Homeland Security is ‘a Mission, but Not the Mission for the Guard,’” National Guard, Feb 

2002, 16–19, including quote (emphasis in original); Sue Cathcart, “Pentagon Makes Homeland 

Security Mission One,” National Guard, Oct 2001, 14; “29th Infantry Division Takes Over 

Bosnia Duty,” National Guard, Nov 2001, 17; Doubler, National Guard and the War on Terror: 

The Attacks of 9/11 and Homeland Security, 15. 

10. The new Transportation Security Agency assumed the airport passenger-screening 

mission at the end of May 2002. Between September 2001 and May 2002, several hundred 

air guardsmen performed airport security duty. Col. Charles P. Baldwin, Iowa National Guard, 

ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 11 Jun 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including quote; 

National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002, 26; Christopher 

Prawdzik, “Turned Heads,” National Guard, Jun 2002, 30–31; Gross, “Chronological History of 

the Air National Guard,” 121; Bob Haskell, “Golden Performance,” National Guard, Mar–Apr 

2002, 92–94. In March 2015 a document at OASD(RA) (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization) 

indicated that a total of 10,807 guardsmen participated in the airport security mission by 31 May 

2002, of which 975 were ANG; see O-drive/RT&M/RTMQA-Airport Security.

11. Sue Cathcart, “State vs. Federal,” National Guard, Nov 2001, 26; Kristin Patterson, 

“President Urged to Keep Guardsmen Under State Control,” National Guard, Mar/Apr 2002, 

14, including quote, Kane quoted by Patterson; “‘We’re Looking at What Best Fits this Nation 

for the Long Haul,’” interview with ASD(RA) Thomas F. Hall, National Guard, Dec 2002/Jan 

2003, 28–31. Note that the action of federalizing reserve component members only applied to 

ARNG and ANG personnel, because the members of the other reserve components were always 

in federal status.

12. Patterson, “President Urged to Keep Guardsmen,” National Guard, Mar/Apr 2002, 

14; “President Approves 23 More Civil Support Teams,” National Guard, Dec 2002/Jan 2003, 

17–19; Christopher Prawdzik, “Next Battle,” National Guard, May 2003, 28; “A Conversation 

with Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, National Guard Bureau Chief,” National Guard, Jul 2003, 22. 

California maintained two teams; every other state and territory, plus the District of Columbia, 

had one.

13. Capelotti, Rogue Wave, 72, 79, 86, 89–90, 97, 154–155, 179; Smith interview, 5 Mar 

2012; Smith, 2002 Reserve Forces Almanac, 97; Dana L. Smith, ed., 2003 Reserve Forces 

Almanac (Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 2003), 100. 

14. DoD News Release 426-01, “Partial Mobilization of National Guard, 

Reserve Authorized,” 14 Sep 2001, <http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.

aspx?ReleaseID=3040>, accessed 14 Jan 2015; Coker, 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 

200–201, 246. The cap for each service reflected Rumsfeld’s intent for a light footprint in 

Afghanistan, emphasizing the employment of airpower and special operations personnel in lieu 

of a large ground force. “Involuntary Reserve Activations for U.S. Military Operations Since 

World War II,” <http://congressionalresearch.com/RL30637/document.php>, accessed 14 Jan 

2015; GAO, Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges 

Emerging, (Washington, DC: GAO, Apr 1998), 12–13; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review 

of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002, 24. In FY 1999, Congress modified the name of the augmentation 

authority from presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC) to presidential reserve call-up 
242 243

Notes to Chapter Five Notes to Chapter Five

Public Statements 2003, 5:78, including quote; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A 

Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 443; Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, “Pentagon 

Warlord,” Time, 27 Jan 2003; “GAO: One-Fourth of Guard, Reserves Not Ready After 9/11,” 

National Guard, Sep 2003, 20. A detailed discussion of Rumsfeld’s involvement in mobilization 

decisions and the havoc it caused for planning and carrying out OIF is contained in a draft 

manuscript on the Combined Forces Land Component Command in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

by W. Shane Story, U.S. Army Center of Military History. 

29. McCutchan, Cullen, and Marion, “Answering the Call,” 26–28; Chad Warren, 

“MilPDS Upgrade: Stay Ahead of the Curve,” Barksdale Airforce Base website, 18 Oct 

2012, <http://www.barksdale.af.mil/News/Article/320618/milpds-upgrade-stay-ahead-of-thecurve>, accessed 21 Jan 2015; Kenneth J. Albrecht (HQ AFRC/A1M) and Earnest W. Sowell 

(HQ AFRC/A1K), interview by Forrest L. Marion, 21 Aug 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. 

Warren stated there had not been an upgrade to the Military Personnel Database System since 

its implementation in 2001. 

30. Robin C. Porche, email message to Marion, 18 Jul 2013, including quote 1; Totushek 

interview, 14 Oct 2003, 7, including quote 2; Marine Corps Reserve Combat Assessment 

Team, Marine Corps Reserve Forces In Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lessons Learned (Quantico, 

VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Jan 2004), 85, 90, 102, <http://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/usmcr-oif-ll_efcat_5-20-2004.pdf>, accessed 

10 Mar 2015; Paul E. Pratt, MarForRes/Acting G-3/5, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 11 Jul 

2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; Katherine Roe Coker, The 2003 Army Reserve Historical 

Summary (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of Army Reserve History, 2006), 98; see also Lauren 

Malone, et al., An Analysis of Marine Corps Reserve Mobilization Processes and Policies

([Washington, DC]: Center for Naval Analyses, Oct 2009), 36, <https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/

index.cfm?disp=myIdolSearch_XML.cfm>, accessed 15 Jan 2015. Probably in 2005—when 

the Naval Reserve was redesignated the Navy Reserve—the name changed from Naval Reserve 

Order Writing System to Navy Reserve Order Writing System (see chapter 6, present work). 

According to the Totushek interview in Naval Reserve Association News, the 2002 version was 

known as the “New Order Writing System.” According to the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves, it was in 2004 that the Navy implemented the “Naval Reserve Order 

Writing System” in an attempt to improve an unsatisfactory, manual, centralized system then 

in use by reservists when requesting orders; see CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and 

Reserves. The above references may have erred regarding the years and/or the designations for 

each order-writing system. From an interview with Vice Admiral Cotton, it appeared that the 

two different names of the order-writing system actually referred to the same system. As Cotton 

changed the name by deleting the word “Reserve,” the authors assumed that early in his tenure 

the name used was “Naval Reserve Order Writing System” which he altered to “Naval Order 

Writing System.” It was Cotton’s initiative that led to the change in 2005, in an executive order 

signed by President Bush, from the “U.S. Naval Reserve” to the “U.S. Navy Reserve,” which 

led to the revised designation of the order-writing system as the “Navy Reserve Order Writing 

System.”

31. Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary (Fort McPherson, 

GA: Office of Army Reserve History, 2004), xxxi–xxxii, 40, 74, 83–84, 119–120, 196, 203; 

Coker, Indispensable Force, 351; Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, USAR, interview by Kathryn 

Roe Coker, 2 Sep 2010, Office of Army Reserve History; Robert V. Taylor, “Correcting Future 

Call-Ups,” National Guard, Apr 2003, 30–31; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and 

22. Dennis M. McCarthy, “Still Ready, Willing and Able,” Continental Marine, Winter 

2002, 3, including quote; Ryan J. Skaggs, “Leading Leatherneck Motivates MarForRes,” 

Continental Marine, Fall 2003, 17; Thomas W. Crecca, United States Marine Corps Reserve 

Operations: 11 September 2001 to November 2003 (New Orleans: U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 

2005), 12; Amy Forsythe, “Civil Affairs: Only in the Reserves,” Continental Marine, Fall/

Winter 2001, 18–19; Phil Mehringer, “Civil Affairs Group’s Mission In Kosovo Continues,” 

Continental Marine, Fall 2002, 8; Zachary A. Bathon, “From the Ground Up,” Continental 

Marine, Fall 2003, 8.

23. John Neal, “N.Y. Marines Return Home after Year-Long Deployment,” Continental 

Marine, Winter 2002, 8; Crecca, Marine Corps Reserve Operations, 9, 49–51, 53, 55–57, 83. In 

2002, the 4th Marine Division (i.e., reserves) reported nearly 22,800 marines and sailors in 106 

locations; see Jeff Hawk, “New Commanding General Takes the Helm at 4th Marine Division,” 

Continental Marine, Fall 2002, 5. 

24. Kennedy, et al., Turning Point 9.11, 126; Dennis M. McCarthy, “MarForRes: Always 

Ready, Willing, Able,” Continental Marine, Fall/Winter 2001, 3–4, including quote; Clay T. 

McCutchan, Donald N. Cullen, and Forrest L. Marion, “Answering the Call: Contributions of 

the Air Force Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Global War on Terrorism, 11 September 

2001 through 11 September 2003” (unpublished manuscript, 8 Feb 2005), copy at AFHRA, 

5–6, 30–31, 68; “Seapower/Reserves,” Almanac of Seapower, Jan 2003, 22; “Mobilization 

History” (chart) provided by Capt. John J. McCracken III, USN, in email to Marion, 3 May 

2013; Elizabeth A. Jones, “A New Year and New Mission,” Naval Reserve Association News, 

Jan 2002, 30. In September 2002, 6,000 naval reservists were still mobilized; see “An Interview 

with VADM John B. Totushek, USNR, Director of Naval Reserve,” Naval Reserve Association 

News, Oct 2002, 15, <http://www.ausn.org/Portals/0/Services_pdfs/OCTNRAN-02.pdf>, 

accessed 20 Jan 2015. It is possible that the term “mobilized” was used incorrectly in one or 

more of the above sources, as “volunteers” may have been included in the numbers cited. 

25. Dr. David S. C. Chu, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 22 Apr 2013, OSD/HO, 

copy at AFHRA, including quote (emphasis in original); MarForRes officials Col. James E. 

Bacchus, Tom Nelson, Glenn Davis, in discussion with Marion, 10 Jul 2013; Col. J. J. Garcia, 

MarForRes/G-1, in discussion with Marion, 10 Jul 2013. Individual augmentees included 

IRR, IMA, and any personnel that filled an unstructured billet; Lt. Col. Shawn P. Wonderlich, 

USMCR, email message to Marion, 29 Jul 2013.

26. Lt. Gen. Thomas L. Plewes, interview by Capt. Suzanne L. Summers, USAR, 29 Apr 

2002, 15, Fort Bragg, NC, Office of Army Reserve History, including quotes; “Army Extends 

Stop-Loss to Army Guard, Reserve,” National Guard, Jan 2002, 13. A very small number of 

inactive National Guard personnel were included with the IRR under the Ready Reserve. Aside 

from fulfilling the military obligation of many members, IRR status allowed some members, 

seeking a reserve retirement but wanting a temporary break from the more demanding unit or 

IMA categories, to remain in the reserves and still earn points toward retirement (but not pay).

27. RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2003, 18, including quotes. PRC was also known 

as Title 10, U.S.C. [Section] 12304.

28. GAO, DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve 

Forces, (Washington, DC: GAO, Aug 2003), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/239291.html>, 

accessed 13 Jan 2015; Remarks to the Reserve Officers Association, 20 Jan 2003, Rumsfeld 
244 245

Notes to Chapter Five Notes to Chapter Five

OPNAVINST 1001.24, enclosure 4). On 13 February 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld delegated 

mobilization authority to the service secretaries; Mobilization Briefing, slide labeled 

“Mobilization Policy/Memo’s 1 of 4,” provided to Marion by Steven E. Owens, ANG/A3XW, 

17 Apr 2013. 

37. Totushek interview, 14 Oct 2003, 22–23, including quotes. Beginning in 2006 the 

Navy implemented an “open architecture” known as Navy Reserve Homeport (Sharepoint); 

James C. Grover, Office of the Chief of the Navy Reserve, email message to Marion, 30 Jul 

2013; Capt. Scott A. Langley, commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command, email message to 

Marion, 30 Jul 2013; RFPB, Mobilization Reform: A Compilation of Significant Issues, Lessons 

Learned and Studies Developed Since September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: Reserve Forces 

Policy Board, 2003), 5, including quote 5, Rumsfeld quoted by authors.

38. Chu interview, 22 Apr 2013, including quote; Coker, 2002 Army Reserve Historical 

Summary, 270; Taylor, “Correcting Future Call-Ups,” 30–31; Marygail K. Brauner, Timothy 

Jackson, and Elizabeth K. Gayton, Medical Readiness of the Reserve Component (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Center for Military Health Policy Research, 2012), 16; Frank M. 

Hudgins, “Activation/Partial Mobilization of the US Army Reserves and Associated Personnel 

Management System Problems” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 27 Mar 1992), 7–8. 

For more on dental unreadiness in 1990–1991, see chapter 4, present work. 

39. Taylor, “Correcting Future Call-Ups,” 30–31, including quote 1; Baldwin interview, 

11 Jun 2013, including quote 2; “Barnum . . . Answers Our Questions,” 14; CNGR, Transforming 

the National Guard and Reserves, 29, 43–44, 193–195.

40. Brauner, Jackson, and Gayton, Medical Readiness of the Reserve Component, 15–16, 

33, 41, including quote, quoted by authors; Chu interview, 22 Apr 2013; CNGR, Transforming 

the National Guard and Reserves, 193–195, 241. 

41. McCutchan, Cullen, and Marion, “Answering the Call,” 56; Chris Prawdzik, 

“GAO: Guardsmen, Reservists Need More TRICARE Education,” National Guard, Nov 

2002, 12; “Post-Deployment Medical Assessments Bolstered,” National Guard, Jun 2003, 

18; “Demobilized Reservists Get Improved Transitional Health Care Benefits,” Naval 

Reserve Association News, Oct 2002, 10, <http://www.ausn.org/Portals/0/Services_pdfs/

OCTNRAN-02.pdf>, accessed 20 Jan 2015. 

42. Coker, 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 204–208.

43. Bradford Booth, et al., What We Know About Army Families: 2007 Update (N.p.: ICF 

International, [2007]), 49, 53–57, 63, including quote 1, <http://tapartnership.org/enterprise/

docs/RESOURCE%20BANK/RB-FAMILY-DRIVEN%20APPROACHES/General%20

Resources/What_We_Know_about_Army_Families_2007.pdf>, accessed 20 Jan 2015; 

Baldwin interview, 11 Jun 2013, including quote 2.

44. National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, 2002, 21–22, 38, including 

quotes 1–2; Booth, What We Know about Army Families, 57, including quote 3. 

45. Sue Cathcart, “Help For Those Left Behind,” National Guard, Jan 2002, 24–25, 

including quotes, quoted by Cathcart; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal 

Year 2002, 21–22, 38; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2003, 

25, 51; Booth, What We Know About Army Families, 58; Senate Committee on Armed Services, 

Reserves, 189; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002, 37; 

National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2003 (Arlington, VA: National 

Guard Bureau, [2003]), 43; Baldwin interview, 11 Jun 2013. In October 2003 a transient account 

pilot program went into effect at the 81st Regional Readiness Command. Some information on 

the Defense Integrated Manpower Human Resources System was taken from the following: 

Wanda R. Langley (GS-15, ANG/A1 associate director), interview by Forrest L. Marion, 22 Mar 

2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. The system was never employed and was finally terminated 

in 2010 after about 12 years of expense and effort. 

32. Totushek interview, 14 Oct 2003, 2, 6, 20, 26–27, including quotes; L. Edgar Prina, 

“Seapower/Reserves,” Almanac of Seapower, Jan 2002, 270. It was about 2004 when the “shipbased” version of the Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System was implemented; Capt. 

Scott A. Langley, USN, CNRFC N6, telephone conversation with Marion, 24 May 2013; Scott 

A. Langley, email messages to Marion, 29–30 Jul 2013. Although termed the Navy Standard 

Integrated Personnel System, perhaps the earliest version did not standardize active-reserve 

personnel matters but only the pay transactions; see “Mr. Harvey C. Barnum Jr., Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs Answers Our Questions,” Naval Reserve Association 

News, Jun 2003, 14, 17, <http://www.ausn.org/Portals/0/Services_pdfs/JUN03-NRAN.pdf>, 

accessed 21 Jan 2015. In any case, in 2003 Barnum acknowledged the Navy operated “two 

separate personnel systems,” one for the active component and one for the reserve component.

33. Baldwin interview, 11 Jun 2013, including quotes; CNGR, Transforming the National 

Guard and Reserves, 28, 85, 186; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal 

Year 2003, 46; GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for 

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 

2004), 12, 14–15.

34. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 85, including quote 1; 

Pratt interview, 11 Jul 2013, including quote 2; Col. Dennis P. Chapman, Michigan National 

Guard, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 14 Jun 2013, Arlington, VA, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, 

including quote 3; Baldwin interview, 11 Jun 2013; “Stop-Loss Freezes Mobilized Reserves,”

National Guard, Dec 2002/Jan 2003, 20. 

35. Brig. Gen. Richard R. Severson, AFRC/Asst. Vice Cmdr., end of tour interview by 

Betty R. Kennedy, Jul 2008, 50, 63–64, AFRC History Office, copy at AFHRA, including 

quote 1; Bradley interview, Apr–May 2008, 97–99, 107, 109–110, 127, including quotes 

2–3; “Brigadier General Richard ‘Ric’ Severson,” U.S. Air Force website, <http://www.

af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/107912/brigadier-general-richardric-severson.aspx>, accessed 15 Jan 2015; “Lieutenant General John A. Bradley,” U.S. Air 

Force website, <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104723/

lieutenant-general-john-a-bradley.aspx>, accessed 15 Jan 2015. In short, the advantages 

of mobilization over volunteerism are better benefits, “dwell time” protection, and civilian 

employer protection—that is, in the minds of both the employee and employer despite the law’s 

equal protection regardless of volunteer/nonvolunteer status. The civilian employment issue 

also probably helped explain the tendency of many to overuse the term “mobilization” in lieu 

of “activation.”

36. Totushek interview, 14 Oct 2003, 21–23, including quotes (emphasis added); memo, 

OPNAVINST 1001.24, 5 Jul 2000, subj: Individual augmentation policy and procedures, 

2, enclosure (2). OPNAV–N3/N5 also validated requests for unit forces from USNR (see 
246 247

Notes to Chapter Five Notes to Chapter Five

the National Guard and Reserves, 70. The CNGR spelled the surname “Bagdanos”; USA Today

used “Bogdanos”; we elected to follow the CNGR.

53. Bob Haskell, “Reserve Component Civilian Employment Information Program 

Begins,” DoD News, 31 Mar 2004, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=26978>, accessed 14 Jan 2015; GAO, Military Personnel: Additional Actions Needed 

to Improve Oversight of Reserve Employment Issues (Washington, DC: GAO, Feb 2007), 5, 15, < 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07259.pdf>, accessed 14 Jan 2015; Government Accountability 

Office, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Data to Determine If Active Duty Service Has an 

Impact on the Ability of Guard and Reservists to Maintain Their Civilian Professional Licenses 

or Certificates (Washington, DC: GAO, May 2008), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/95490.

html>, accessed 14 Jan 2015; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 149–150.

54. “Selected Demobilization Begins for Air Force,” National Guard, Jul 2002, 18, 

including quotes 1–2, Jumper quoted by National Guard; “‘. . . A Footprint in Future Missions.’ 

A Conversation with Lt. Gen. Daniel James III,” National Guard, Sep 2002, 68–69, including 

quotes 3–5. 

55. Memo (Staff Summary Sheet), Major Mathis, AF/REPX (Action Officer), “Request 

for Exception to Policy to DOD Directive 1327.5 Regarding Special Pass for Deployed Air 

Force Reserve Members in Support of Current Contingency Operations,” 18 Apr 2002 (unsigned 

copy provided to Marion by Lt. Col. George A. Kirkpatrick, HQ AFRC/JA, copy at AFHRA), 

including quotes, quote 2 (emphasis added); memo (unsigned draft), AF/RE for ASD (FMP), no 

date, “Request for Exception to Policy to DOD Directive 1327.5, Leave and Liberty, Regarding 

Special Pass for Deployed Air Force Reserve (AFR) Members Supporting Current Contingency 

Operations,” copy at AFHRA; Daniel N. Powell (HQ AFRC/A5XW), Gerald J. Mekosh (HQ 

AFRC/A5XW), and Columbus Brown (HQ AFRC/A1RR), interview by Forrest L. Marion, 22 

Aug 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. This issue is also addressed in chapters 6 and 7, present 

work. 

56. Christopher Prawdzik, “Sketching A New Paradigm,” National Guard, Oct 2002, 24–

26, including quote 1, Chu quoted by Prawdzik; Coker, 2003 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 

33; James R. Helmly, “Statement by LTG James R. Helmly, Chief, Army Reserve . . . Before 

the Subcommittee on Total Force, Committee on Armed Services, United States House 

of Representatives,” Record Version, 31 Mar 2004, 12, including quote 2; Prawdzik, “Next 

Battle,” 28. In 2008, the CNGR devoted an entire chapter, about one-sixth of its final report, to 

“Creating a Continuum of Service: Personnel Management for an Integrated Total Force”; see 

CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 113–175. 

57. John B. Totushek, “The Naval Reserve in Sea Power 21, Leveraging to Win: Drawing 

Agility from the Naval Reserve,” Naval Reserve Association News, Apr 2003, 27–29, including 

quote 1, <http://www.ausn.org/Portals/0/Services_pdfs/APR03-NRAN.pdf>, accessed 20 Jan 

2015; Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013, including quotes 2–3.

58. Coker, 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 217–218, including quotes 1–2; 

Coker, 2003 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 207–208, including quote 3. 

59. Porche interviews, 10 and 12 Jul 2013, including quote from 10 Jul interview. The 

two smallest military services, the Coast Guard and Marine Corps, took significant steps toward 

active-reserve integration as early as the mid-1990s. 

Subcommittee on Personnel, Hearings and Joint Hearings: Issues Affecting Families of Soldiers, 

Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, 2 Jun and 7 Oct 2003, 24 Jun and 11 Dec 2003 (Washington, 

DC: GPO, 2005), 187–188, 209, <https://archive.org/stream/issuesaffectingf00unit#page/208/

mode/1up>, accessed 21 Jan 2015; Associated Press, “U.S. Expands R&R Program for Iraq 

Troops,” 31 Oct 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/10/31/us-expands-rr-programfor-iraq-troops>, accessed 21 Jan 2015.

46. Coker, 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 9; Coker, 2002 Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, 201–206, 266, 309, 351; Coker, 2003 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 214–

215; Maj. Gen. Herbert L. Altshuler, US Army, interview by Capt. Suzanne L. Summers, USAR, 29 

Jan 2002, 24, Fort Bragg, NC, Office of Army Reserve History. The courses were held in late 2003. 

47. Thomas W. Mobley, “The Role of Family Readiness in Mission Readiness,” Naval 

Reserve Association News, Apr 2003, 13–15 <http://www.ausn.org/Portals/0/Services_pdfs/

APR03-NRAN.pdf>, accessed 21 Jan 2015; “Barnum . . . Answers Our Questions,” 14–15, 

including quote. In December 2003, John D. Winkler, deputy assistant secretary of defense 

for reserve affairs (manpower/personnel), testified before a Senate subcommittee that “mission 

readiness and family readiness are extremely intertwined”; see Issues Affecting Families of 

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, 190–191. The MarForRes commander, Lieutenant 

General McCarthy, emphasized his component’s family readiness program, specifically the 

key volunteer network and the LINKS program; see his “It Is Not Over,” Continental Marine, 

Summer 2002, 3. 

48. Issues Affecting Families of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, 191, 212–213, 

221, including quote 1; C. C. Dysart, “MCCS One Source...Anytime, Anyplace, Anywhere,” 

Continental Marine, Winter 2002, 6, including quote 2.

49. Issues Affecting Families of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, 197–201, 

including quotes; “Who Is ESGR,” Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve website, 

<http://www.esgr.mil/About-ESGR/Who-is-ESGR/What-is-ESGR.aspx>, accessed 14 Jan 

2015; Matthew J. Apprendi, “Reserve Marines Receive Employer Support from ESGR,” 

Continental Marine, Summer 2002, 36; “Overview of USERRA,” Department of Labor 

website, <http://www.dol.gov/elaws/vets/userra/userra.asp>, accessed 14 Jan 2015.

50 “Frequently Asked Questions,” Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve website, 

<http://www.esgr.mil/USERRA/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx>, accessed 14 Apr 2015; 

Robin C. Porche, MarForRes/G-1 assistant operations officer, interviews by Forrest L. Marion, 

10 and 12 Jul 2013, Arlington, VA, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. 

51. David S. C. Chu, “Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 

13, 2002,” Naval Reserve Association News, Apr 2002, 7, including quotes 1–2; CNGR, 

Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 70, including quote 3, Cotton quoted by 

authors; “‘Unsung Patriotic American Heroes’: Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy (Reserve Affairs) Harvey C. Barnum, Jr.,” by James D. Hessman, Sea Power, Feb 

2002, 10–11; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2000, 53. 

52. Doubler, National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Enduring Freedom, 32; 

Crecca, Marine Corps Reserve Operations, 9, 83; “Eclectic Colonel Who Lost Case vs. P. Diddy 

Hunts Iraqi Treasures,” USA Today, 17 May 2003, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/

world/iraq/2003-05-17-unusual-marine_x.htm>, accessed 14 Jan 2015; CNGR, Transforming 
249

Notes to Chapter Six

248

Notes to Chapter Five

66. Pratt interview, 11 Jul 2013, including quotes 1–2; U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 

Combat Assessment Team, Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 25, 

including quote 3.

67. Col. James P. McGuire, USMC, discussion with Marion, 11 Jul 2013; Robin C. 

Porche, email message to Marion, 14 Jan 2015.

68. GAO, DOD Actions Needed, 1–2; USD(P&R), Department of Defense Directive 

1235.10: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, 23 Sep 2004.

Chapter 6

 1. Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary (Fort 

McPherson, GA: Office of Army Reserve History, 2007), 19, 56, including quote, quoted by 

Coker. In FY 2004, USAR “missed its retention and end strength objectives,” but in FY 2005 it 

“exceeded its retention goal”; see memo, Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey for Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 25 Feb 2005, subj: U.S. Army Reserve availability, Rumsfeld 

Papers, <http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library>, accessed 2 Feb 2015. 

2. Seth Cline, “The Other Symbol of George W. Bush’s Legacy,” U.S. News & World 

Report, 1 May 2013, <http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/05/01/the-othersymbol-of-george-w-bushs-legacy>, accessed 9 Jun 2017, including quotes 1–2, quoted by 

Cline; George W. Bush, Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln, press 

release, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 May 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.

gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html>, accessed 9 Jun 2017, including quote 3; DoD 

Personnel Reports, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.

3. Robert H. Smiley, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 24 Sep 2013, OSD/HO, copy at 

AFHRA, including quote; Chapter 1209: Active Duty, 10 U.S.C. § 12302, <http://www.gpo.

gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/html/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1209-

sec12302.htm>, accessed 4 Feb 2015. From his retirement as an Army Reserve colonel in the 

ASD(RA)’s office in 2003, Smiley served until 2009 as assistant deputy for training, readiness, 

and mobilization in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. He then returned to OASD(RA).

4. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 8–10, including quote 

1, Schoomaker quoted by Coker; Coker, Indispensable Force, 293, including quote 2, Helmly 

quoted by Coker. For the rationale behind using the term, “mobilized/activated” and discussion 

of this terminology issue, see notes 18, 31–33 below.

5. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 8–10; Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [ODASD(RA)], Rebalancing Forces: 

Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve (Washington, DC: Office of Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 15 Jan 2004), 7. 

6. Secretary of Defense, Rebalancing Forces (9 Jul 2003), including quotes 1–3; 

ODASD(RA), Rebalancing Forces, v, 1, 4 including quotes 4–5, Rumsfeld quoted by, Chu quoted 

by; Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 15; Coker, Indispensable 

Force, 325. In July 2003 Secretary Rumsfeld forwarded to General Schoomaker a thoughtprovoking paper by General Gorman, U.S. Army, titled “Army Culture and Transformation”; 

see memo, Rumsfeld for Schoomaker, 18 Jul 2003, subj: Army culture and transformation, 

Rumsfeld Papers, <http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library>.

60. Totushek interview, 14 Oct 2003, 5, including quote 1; “21st Century Vision for a 

Fully Integrated Active and Reserve Naval Force” (unpublished paper, [4 Dec 2002], unknown 

author), 1–3, including quotes 2–4, document provided by James C. Grover, Office of the Chief, 

Navy Reserve, in email message to Marion, 6 Mar 2012; slides (draft), “VCNO Brief 18 Apr 

1 Ver16.ppt,” slide 3 of 15, [2003], including quote 5, document provided by Grover in email 

message to Marion, 6 Mar 2012 (document was labeled predecisional but Grover assessed it 

to be very close to the final version); Scott C. Truver, “To Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat: U.S. 

Naval Power in the 21st Century,” Sea Power, Feb 2003, 31, 34; “Barnum . . . Answers Our 

Questions,” 16–18; memo, VCNO (Adm. William J. Fallon), subj: Fully integrated active and 

naval reserve force, document provided by James C. Grover in email message to Marion, 6 Mar 

2012; “Biographies in Naval History, Admiral Vernon Clark,” U.S. Navy website, <http://www.

navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=5>, accessed 15 Jan 2015.

61. Smith interview, 5 Mar 2012, including quotes 1–3; John C. Acton, “Becoming a 

More Effective and Efficient Reserve Force,” Reservist, Jan 2005, 6–7, <http://www.uscg.mil/

reservist/issues/2005/01/issue.pdf>, accessed 5 Feb 2015; John C. Acton, “Is There a Leader 

Inside of You?,” Reservist, issue 5-05, ca. Aug 2005, 14, including quote 4.

62. Day interview, 6 Mar 2012, including quote 1. For more on active component-reserve 

component integration, see chapter 4, present work. Rear Admiral Day was a two-star (USCG 

uses the rank of rear admiral, with differing abbreviations, for both one- and two-stars). Robert 

J. Papp Jr., “Fair Winds, Shipmates,” Reservist, Apr 2004, 6, including quote 2; Robert J. 

Papp, “Reserve Force Update,” Reservist, May–Jun 2003, 6; James C. Van Sice, “See You in 

New London!,” The Reservist, issue 4-05, ca. Jun 2005, 14, <http://www.uscg.mil/reservist/

issues/2005/04/issue.pdf>, accessed 5 Feb 15; Sally Brice-O’Hara, “A Note From The New 

Director,” Reservist, issue 6-05, ca. Sep 2005, 14; Duncan C. Smith III, “Values or Metrics?,” 

USCG Reservist, issue 4-06, ca. Jun 2006, 14. Note the periodical’s name change in 2006. As the 

reserve and training director, Papp was a one-star; Acton served as a two-star.

63. Coker, 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, xxv, 82, including quote; Coker, 

2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 213–214, 266. We do not know how many of the 

950 authorizations were funded. Full-time support programs included all active component and 

reserve component personnel that supported reserve units on a full-time basis. Full-Time Support 

(FTS) programs included only reserve component members who supported reserve units full 

time, mainly AGRs and MTs. The distinction was often blurred even in official documentation. 

For example, the Marines’ Inspector-Instructor (I-I) program was (and remains) a “full-time 

support” program. But because the I-I program consisted of active component personnel, I-I 

was not an “FTS” program. Note the aforementioned distinction between full-time support and 

FTS did not exist in the National Guard; when the Guard referred to full-time support, it was 

identical to FTS. 

64. National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2002, 35–36, 

including quote 1; Gus L. Hargett, “Our Important Dual Focus,” National Guard, Apr 2003, 10; 

National Guard Bureau, Annual Review of the Chief, Fiscal Year 2003, 47; Baldwin interview, 

11 Jun 2013. 

65. History, Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, 1 Oct 1999–30 Sep 2002, v. 1, 

142–143, including quotes, call no. K419.01, copy at AFHRA. 
250 251

Notes to Chapter Six Notes to Chapter Six

(Jul 1952), including quote of paragraph (b); David S. C. Chu, email message to Hoffman, 31 

Mar 2017.

16. Chapman interview, 14 Jun 2013, including quote; DoD News Release 073-04, 4 Feb 

2004, “National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of Feb. 4, 2004,” <http://archive.defense.gov/

Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=7052>, accessed 4 Feb 2015. The 39th Brigade redeployed 

in December 2004; see National Guard Bureau, Annual Review, Fiscal Year 2005 (Arlington, 

VA: National Guard Bureau, 2005), 48.

17. Steven Lee Myers, “Bush Warns Against ‘Overdeployment,’” New York Times, 15 Feb 

2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/15/us/bush-warns-against-overdeployment.html>, 

including quote 1; Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Is Set to Activate Thousands More Reservists,” New 

York Times, 5 Dec 2002, A1, including quote 2, Hollingsworth quoted by Schmitt; Remarks 

to the Reserve Officers Association, 20 Jan 2003, Rumsfeld Public Statements 2003, 1:80, 

including quote 3.

18. “DoD: No Plans to Extend Reservists,” National Guard, Aug 2004, 18, including 

quote, Rumsfeld quoted by National Guard (emphasis added); “Mobilization Rules Still in 

Place, Official Says,” National Guard, Dec 2006, 20. National Guard quoted the secretary as 

follows: “My understanding is that there may be a law or a regulation or a policy that talks 

about 24 consecutive months and then there has been a practice that addresses the 24—not from 

consecutive months, but from cumulative months, which is obviously a lesser threshold.” Note 

the term “mobilization” refers to a reservist who is called involuntarily to active duty under a 

mobilization authority (in this case, the partial mobilization authority); a volunteer, however, is 

not mobilized but is “activated” under a different authority. 

19. Thomas F. Hall, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 23 Sep 2013, OSD/HO, copy at 

AFHRA, including quote 1; Dennis M. McCarthy, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 17 Sep 

2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; Dennis McCarthy, email message to Marion, 29 Jan 2015; 

Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 456; H. Steven Blum, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 17 

Mar 2015, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including quotes 2–3; Chu to Hoffman, email, 31 Mar 

2017, copy in authors’ files, OSAD Historical Office. After 1994 the ASD(RA) reported to the 

USD(P&R) rather than directly to the secretary of defense, altering the ASD(RA)’s access to the 

secretary of defense depending on personalities and relationships within the Pentagon. 

20. Chapman interview, 14 Jun 2013, including quote 1; Barbara Y. Lee, telephone 

conversation with Marion, 28 Aug 2013, including quote 2.

21. Coker, Indispensable Force, 299, including quote 1, Helmly quoted by Coker; Coker, 

2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 19–21, including quote 2, Helmly 

quoted by Coker; memo, James R. Helmly for Chief of Staff U.S. Army Schoomaker, 20 Dec 

2004, subj: Readiness of the United States Army Reserve, including quotes 3–6. In July 2005, 

GAO Report 05-660 supported Helmly’s concerns; see GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated 

Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages (Washington, 

DC: GAO, 2005), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247044.pdf>. 

22. Helmly for Schoomaker, 20 Dec 2004, including quotes; Doubler, National Guard 

and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 79; Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, 22, 63; Christopher Prawdzik, “Fractured Inventory: States Scramble 

as Many Army National Guard Units Are Forced to Leave Equipment in Iraq,” National 

Guard, Apr 2005, 30–33. As of 31 December 2004, the USAR had filled a total of 115,333 

7. ODASD(RA), Rebalancing Forces, 4–5, 8–11; Coker, Indispensable Force, 326. 

8. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 8–10, 32, including 

quotes 1–2, Schoomaker (quote 1) quoted by Coker. 

9. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 30–33; “A 

Conversation with Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army,” National Guard, Nov 2005, 

30–33; Sara Wood, “Unit Rebalance Will Make Guard More Effective, Army Secretary Says,” 

DoD News, American Forces Press Service, 18 Jan 2006, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=14585>, accessed 15 Apr 2015; John Goheen, “Opposition Mounts to 

Proposal to Cut Army Guard,” National Guard, Feb 2006, 14; ODASD-RA, Rebalancing 

Forces, 13–14; Doubler, National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

48; Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary (Fort McPherson, 

GA: Office of Army Reserve History, 2008), 11, 28. At the same time as it was rebalancing its 

forces, the Army Reserve responded to the 2005 BRAC by closing or realigning many facilities 

(including its headquarters), a process it completed in 2011. Note the USAR had the highest 

percentage of BRAC-affected facilities among the services; see Jack C. Stultz, “Army Reserve: 

‘Integral Component of the World’s Best Army,’” Army [Green Book] 56, no. 10 (Oct 2006): 

130–132; United States Army, Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2007, 12. 

For a thorough study of modularity, see William M. Donnelly, Transforming an Army at War: 

Designing the Modular Force, 1991–2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2007). 

10. “Some Army Guard Iraq Tours Extended 90 Days,” National Guard, May 2004, 17–18.

11. Chapter 1209: Active Duty, 10 U.S.C. § 12302, including quote; Dennis P. Chapman, 

Manning Reserve Component Units for Mobilization: Army and Air Force Practice (Institute of 

Land Warfare, Sep 2009), <http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/

Documents/LWP74.pdf>, accessed 4 Feb 2015, 1. Note that in the executive order of 14 

September 2001, President Bush invoked partial mobilization authority and quoted directly 

from the above paragraph, yet without citing Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 12302.

12. Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 13.

13. Memo, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, 20 Sep 2001, subj: 

Mobilization/demobilization personnel and pay policy for reserve component members ordered 

to active duty in response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, authors’ files, OSD/

HO, including quote 1; Chapman interview, 14 Jun 2013, including quote 2; National Guard 

Bureau, Annual Review, 2004 (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2004), 41. The first 

ARNG brigade called up for Iraq was North Carolina’s 30th Brigade, alerted in Jul 2003; see 

Doubler, The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 41–43, 47, 

55–56. 

14. Will Dunham, “U.S. Army Asking Guardsmen to Stay Longer in Iraq,” 21 Jul 2004, 

<http://www.rense.com/general54/sstay.htm>, accessed 8 Jul 2017, including quotes 1–2; 

memo, Rumsfeld for undisclosed recipients, 22 Jul 2004, subj: Extending troops, Rumsfeld 

Papers,<http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library>, including quotes 3–4. 

15. Senate Committee on Armed Services, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Report 

to Accompany H.R. 5426, 19 Jun 1952, 9, including quote 1; Ready Reserve, 10 U.S.C. § 12302 
252 253

Notes to Chapter Six Notes to Chapter Six

26. Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 1:11–12, including quotes; Carpenter interview,

7 Mar 2012, part 2:15; “Reserve Forces,” draft PowerPoint slide, ASD(RA), working papers, ca. 

Aug 2005, copy at AFHRA. Prior to the Gates’ memo of January 2007, Carpenter felt “we were 

on a path to destroy the Reserve Component” because the ARNG and USAR were “not going to 

be able to meet their mobilization responsibilities,” Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 1:12; 

Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 2:4.

27. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 184, 196–209, 200, 

including quote 1–2; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review, 2004, 58–59; National Guard 

Bureau, Annual Review, Fiscal Year 2005, 82. AGRs were RC members serving on active duty, 

mainly with reserve units/organizations. Military technicians were federal civilians most of 

whom maintained dual status as members of the Selected Reserve assigned to the same units 

they served as civilians. The Marines used the term “Active Reserve” to refer to reservists on 

full-time active duty tours; while most were assigned to RC units, some were assigned to active 

component units. The CNGR noted concerns with active component Army members assigned 

to RC units in that many were close to retirement and their promotion rates were significantly 

lower than for active component-assigned personnel of the same grade. CNGR, Transforming 

the National Guard and Reserves, 203. Such was part of the cultural divide between active and 

reserve components.

28. Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 51–52, including 

quote 1; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 85, including quote 2; James 

R. Helmly, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2006: Posture 

Statement Presented to the 109th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: Department of 

the Army, 2006), P21; Jack C. Stultz, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 

Reserve 2007: Posture Statement Presented to the 110th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 27. In 2005, the USAR began eliminating some billets in 

nondeployable units.

29. National Guard Bureau, Annual Review, 2004, 10, including quote 1; Charles P. 

Baldwin, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 11 Jun 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including 

quote 2; “Full-Time Support Crucial,” National Guard, May 2006, 14, including quote 3, 

Vaughn quoted by National Guard; Smiley interview, 24 Sep 2013, including quote 4; Coker, 

2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 19, including quote 5, Helmly quoted 

by Coker; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 198; “Full-Time Manning,” 

National Guard, Apr 2008, 62. The FY 2005 NDAA authorized the ARNG some 26,600 AGR 

and 26,600 MT personnel; see National Guard Bureau, Annual Review, 2005, 82.

30. In this context the term “remobilization” was confusing at best, because a voluntary

mobilization or remobilization was a misnomer; if a volunteer, the reservist was activated. Lee 

telephone conversation, 28 Aug 2013, including quote 1; Chapman interview, 14 Jun 2013, 

including quote 2; Charles Abell, interview by Thomas Christiansen and Anthony Crain, 16 

Sep 2014, 33, OSD/HO. In December 2006, National Guard stated the 24-cumulative-months 

policy remained in effect, or, perhaps more accurately, that the policy was once again the 

primary determining factor in the selection of units and individual reservists for mobilization. 

“Mobilization Rules Still In Place, Official Says,” National Guard, Dec 2006, 20. One joint staff 

briefing in September 2006 made a distinction between the policy of 24 cumulative months and 

the practice of “no involuntary remobilization” (regardless of how many months remained in 

the 24-month “gas tank”). Note that a mobilization was, by definition, an involuntary service of 

active duty; a voluntary service of active duty was an activation. 

mobilization billets since 9/11, including those soldiers who served multiple mobilizations 

(probably including voluntary activations); see memo, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Peter Pace for Rumsfeld, 11 Apr 2005, subj: Mobilization and deployment of forces since 

9/11, Rumsfeld Papers, <http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library>. The scope of the present study 

did not allow a detailed examination of Helmly’s various concerns. The two-page memo was 

followed by six pages of enclosures. By the end of 2005, some 144,000 USAR soldiers had been 

“mobilized”; see Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 10. Again, 

voluntary activations probably were included in the total. Although the Joint Staff’s document 

used the term “mobilized,” its authors appeared to include (voluntary) activations/deployments 

in addition to (involuntary) mobilizations, a common error in terminology. If such a high 

number of soldiers had, in fact, been mobilized (involuntarily) by the end of 2004, Helmly 

would not have felt the need to complain, in the memo cited above, that “demands to use only 

‘volunteers’ from the Reserve Components threaten to distort the very nature of service in the 

[reserve component].” 

23. Memo, Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey for Rumsfeld, 25 Feb 2005, subj: U.S. 

Army Reserve availability, Rumsfeld Papers, <http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library>, accessed 9 

Jun 2017, including quote. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 22; 

Raymond W. Carpenter, interview by Les’ Melnyk, 7 Mar 2012, part 2: 3–4, NGB Public Affairs. 

OIF-4 deploying units rotated into Iraq in mid- to late-2005 and OIF-5 deploying units in midto late-2006; see “US Forces Order of Battle,” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.

org/military/ops/iraq_orbat.htm>, accessed 2 Feb 2015. In early 2005, USD(P&R) David Chu 

was quoted: “There are no plans to expand the mobilization period to a policy of 24 consecutive 

months”; see Mark Mazzetti, “Pentagon Won’t Extend Reservists’ Deployment,” Los Angeles 

Times, 3 Feb 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/03/nation/na-troops3>, accessed 10 

Feb 2015. 

24. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 22, including quote 

1; Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 31, including quotes 2–3, 

Schoomaker quoted by Coker. At least one battalion commander agreed with Schoomaker 

that cross-leveling was “evil”; see CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 

186; Department of Defense Directive 1235.10, 1 Jul 1995, subj: Activation, mobilization, and 

demobilization of the Ready Reserve, 5, including quote 4.

25. Doubler, National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 79, 

including quote; National Guard Bureau, Annual Review 2005, 7, 43. GAO, Reserve Forces: 

Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic 

Missions (Washington, DC: GAO, Nov 2004), 3; GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to 

Improve Army National Guard Equipment (Washington, DC: GAO, Oct 2005), 4; First Army 

slide deck, “2007 Observations”, n.d., and slide deck, “45th IBCT M-RSOI After-Action 

Review,” author files for manuscript, History of Guard Mobilization, Center of Military History; 

John R. Maass, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Army, 2013), 35.

The monthly National Guard magazine reported the following losses of deployed ARNG 

soldiers: 10 in October 2004, 11 in November 2004, 15 in December 2004, 21 in January 2005, 

12 in February 2005, 17 in March 2005, 7 in April 2005, 15 in May 2005, 16 in June 2005, 14 

in July 2005, 23 in August 2005, 28 in September 2005, 18 in October 2005, 8 in November 

2005, and 11 in December 2005. The worst consecutive months were August to October 2005. 
254 255

Notes to Chapter Six Notes to Chapter Six

Apr 2006, 42–44; Bradley interview, 78–79, including quote 2; Daniel L. Haulman, “Base 

Realignment and Closure Commission, 2005,” in Locating Air Force Base Sites, ed. Frederick 

J. Shaw, 211–212, 217, 224, <http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100928-

010.pdf>, accessed 4 Feb 2015. The cut was known as Program Budget Decision 720, also 

referred to as Program Budget Directive 720 depending on source. 

37. Jack C. Stultz, telephone interview by Kathryn Roe Coker, 28, 6 Jul 2012, USAR 

History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, including quotes; “Army Guard Boosts Enlistment Age Limit,” 

National Guard, Apr 2005, 23, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-828941381.html>, 

accessed 4 Feb 2015; “Military—US Army End Strength,” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/agency/end-strength.htm>, accessed 4 Feb 2015. 

38. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 34–36, including 

quote, Helmly quoted by Coker; Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 

24–25; Coker, Indispensable Force, 339–340. The USAR headquarters’ G-7, a colonel, stated, 

“AREF is just the way we organize the units to support ARFORGEN; to rotate.” Coker, 

2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 24, quoted by Coker. 

39. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 36–37; Coker, 

2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 23–25; Stultz, “Army Reserve: 

‘Integral Component,’” Army, Oct 2006, 134. Note in the 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, page 25, there appeared to be some confusion over the level of training 

(i.e., platoon should precede company) conducted during each year of the five-year cycle. A 

contributing factor, no doubt, was that in some cases, depending on the source, AREF years 

were numbered chronologically 5 through 1, but in other cases they were numbered 1 through 

5. Sources varied on the percentage of mobilized forces supplied by AREF in FY 2006. Two 

sources stated “approximately 77 percent of the Army Reserve’s mobilized units were from the 

ARFORGEN model”; see Jack C. Stultz, “The Army Reserve: No Longer a Strategic Reserve,” 

Army, Oct 2007, 142; Jack C. Stultz, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 

Reserve 2007, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA471367>, 9. The Army Reserve history 

office’s publication for FY 2006/2007 stated that AREF packages 1 and 2 provided 53 percent 

of mobilized units for FY 2006; see Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical 

Summary, 25. It was possible that both percentages were correct. Although AREF packages 

1 and 2 (from year one, the available pool) were those expected to provide mobilizing units, 

perhaps units from other packages, from year two for example (the ready pool), were mobilized 

although they may not have been validated/certified for allocation in the available pool. Or 

perhaps there was an error. In any case, we elected to use the more conservative rate supplied 

by the component’s history office. 

40. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 32–36, including 

quote; Stultz, Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2007, 27; Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual 

Army Reserve Historical Summary, 21–25, 28; Coker, Indispensable Force, 335, 339–340. 

41. Chapman interview, 14 Jun 2013, including quotes; “Army to Mobilize 5,600 IRR 

Soldiers,” National Guard, Jul 2004, 22–23; memo, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker for Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, 11 Dec 2003, subj: “Access to the Individual Ready Reserve 

(IRR),” copy at AFHRA; Jeffrey C. Larrabee, email message to Marion, 1 Aug 2016; Inactive 

Army National Guard, National Guard Regulation 614–1, 18 Mar 2010. Chapman recommended 

the Army Guard formalize the practice of requisitioning a set number of IRRs automatically 

for every mobilizing brigade. He viewed IRRs as a better solution than cross-leveling, which 

31. Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 19, including quote 1, 

Helmly quoted by Coker; memo, Helmly for Schoomaker, 20 Dec 2004, including quotes 2–5; 

McCarthy interview, 17 Sep 2013, including quote 6. McCarthy felt “that Secretary Rumsfeld 

and his senior team very much mismanaged the mobilization of the Reserve Component and did 

so to the detriment of the mobilization process.” An address in September 2003 was indicative 

of Rumsfeld’s concerns regarding the reserves: “You’ve got to be very sensitive about the risk 

of back to back deployment for active service, you’ve got to be very careful about short call 

up periods for the reserve, you’ve got to give them as much certainty as possible, you have to 

use volunteers to the greatest extent possible and you have to undertake a project to rebalance 

the Guard and the Reserve with the Active force”; ODASD(RA), Rebalancing Forces, 1, 

Rumsfeld quoted by authors. Legally, those individuals brought onto active duty under the 

partial mobilization authority (Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 12302[a]) are mobilized; those 

that serve under the volunteerism authority (Section 12301[d]) are not mobilized, but rather, 

activated. Helmly felt that the informal and incorrect use of the term “mobilized” tended to 

downplay the voluntary nature of one’s service and thus potentially avoided negative reactions 

from employers and/or family members to a reservist volunteering for active duty.

32. Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, interview by Betty R. Kennedy, Apr-May 2008, 97–98, 107, 

110, 127, AFRC Historical Services, copy at AFHRA, including quotes.

33. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 692–699, including quote 1; Carpenter interview, 

7 Mar 2012, part 2:3–4, including quote 2; “Won’t Rely on the Guard as Much,” National 

Guard, Feb 2006, 12; “Coming Home, The Minnesota National Guard’s 1st Brigade Combat 

Team, 34th Infantry Division, Have Earned Their Welcome Home,” Grand Forks Herald, 22 

Jul 2007, 1D, accessed via <http://nl.newsbank.com>, accessed 2 Feb 2015; “Reserve Forces,” 

draft PowerPoint slide, ca. Aug 2005, ASD(RA) working papers, copy at AFHRA; “Total Force 

Sourcing for the Long War,” PowerPoint briefing slides, version 28, modification 74, 31 Aug 

2006, Joint Staff J-3, copy at AFHRA; CNGR, Strengthening America’s Defense in the New 

Security Environment: Second Report to Congress, 1 Mar 2007, 21; Hall interview, 23 Sep 

2013, including quote 3; Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 22–23, 

34–35. “Predictability” or “predictable” occurred no less than seven times in the cited pages. 

The USAR chief from 2006 to 2012, Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz, stated in congressional testimony, 

“What our Soldiers tell me they want is predictability in their lives.” Quoted in Coker, 2006/2007 

Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 23. The Air Force Reserve Command commander 

from 2004 to 2008, Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, also emphasized the importance of predictability; 

see Bradley interview, Apr–May 2008, 113. 

34. Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 1:13–15, including quote. Perhaps in some 

cases the duplicative effort was a matter of soldiers’ records not keeping up with the soldiers 

themselves as they moved around, as had happened in Korea. A valuable account of a single 

Marine Corps Reserve rifle company mobilized for Korea is: Randy Keith Mills and Roxanne 

Mills, Unexpected Journey: A Marine Corps Reserve Company in the Korean War (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). 

35. Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 1:13, including quote 1, Blum quoted by 

Carpenter; Clyde A. Vaughn, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 25 Mar 2015, OSD/HO, copy at 

AFHRA, including quote 2.

36. John Goheen, “Off Base,” National Guard, Jun 2005, 22–25, including quote 1; 

William B. Lynch, “State of the Air National Guard: Out of the Shadows,” National Guard, 
256 257

Notes to Chapter Six Notes to Chapter Six

attachment, Jody Donehoo (TRICARE program analyst), ca. May 2006, subj: Interim final 

rule, TRICARE reserve select for certain members of the Selected Reserve, AFHRA; memo 

(draft), Deputy Director, TRICARE Management Activity, to ASD(HA), 31 May 2006, subj: 

Policy guidance for TRICARE reserve select (TRS), AFHRA; “Guardsmen Still Eligible for 

Tricare Dental Plan,” National Guard, May 2006, 18–19; “New Three-Tier Tricare Coverage 

Plan Begins,” National Guard, Aug 2006, 18. The Army Reserve history stated 1 October 2007 

as the TRICARE eligibility date for Selected Reserve members rather than 1 October 2006, 

the correct date. Tier 1 required the member to pay 28 percent of total premium while Tier 2 

required 50 percent and Tier 3, 85 percent; see “TRICARE Reserve Select” flyer, ca. mid-2006; 

“New Three-Tier Tricare Coverage Plan Begins,” National Guard, Aug 2006, 18. 

49. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 281–288, including quotes, 

quote 3 testimony quoted by CNGR.

50. Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 1:13–14, including quotes.

51. Craig Collins, “National Guard Family Programs: Holding the Pieces Together for the 

Families of Deployed Service Members,” in The Modern National Guard: Fighting the War on 

Terrorism (Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2005), 102–109, including quotes; Coker, 2004/2005 

Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 49–52; Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, 57; Coker, Indispensable Force, 430–432. 

52. Ike Skelton and Jim Cooper, “You’re Not from around Here, Are You?” Joint Force 

Quarterly, Dec 2004, 13, including quote 1; Hall interview, 23 Sep 2013, including quote 2; 

McCarthy interview, including quote 3.

53. Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Cracking Glass Wall Between Reserve, Active Forces,” 

Sea Power, Jul 2004, 10, including quotes 1, 3, Cotton quoted by Burgess (emphasis added), 

<http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_Reserve_072604,00.html>, accessed 10 

Jun 2017; Mike Kramer, “Be Ready—Chief of Navy Reserve,” Naval Reserve Association 

News, Feb 2005, 30, including quote 2, Cotton quoted by Kramer; Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013. 

Cotton also notes that an integral part of the Navy’s evolution was VCNO Admiral William J. 

Fallon’s “zero-based review” of the USNR. 

54. Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013, including quotes; John J. McCracken III and Joyce Z. 

Randle, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 25 Apr 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; Dennis M. 

McCarthy, “The Continuum of Reserve Service,” Joint Force Quarterly, Dec 2004, 34, <https://

www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-131164211/the-continuum-of-reserve-service>, accessed 5 

Feb 2015; see “The Condition of the Strategic Operational Navy Reserve,” Association of 

the United States Navy, 1 Mar 2006, <http://www.ausn.org/NewsPublications/NavyMagazine/

MagazineArticles/tabid/2170/ID/11937/The-Condition-of-the-Strategic-Operational-NavyReserve.aspx>, accessed 5 Feb 2015. The above article linked integration with culture change.

memo, George W. Bush for Rumsfeld, 29 Apr 2005, subj: Redesignation of the United States 

Naval Reserve to the United States Navy Reserve, the American Presidency Project, <http://

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63724&st=&st1=#axzz2j1cmIP2r>, accessed 5 

Feb 2015; Vice Adm. John G. Cotton, telephone conversation with Marion, 4 Nov 2013. Vice 

Admiral Cotton readily attributed the “RE-serve” concept to his friend, Charles L. Cragin, the 

Acting ASD(RA) from April 1998 to May 2001.

tended to deplete units of certain specialties and could contribute to “cascading un-readiness.” 

He favored the IRR Affiliation Program whereby each IRR was connected loosely with an Army 

Guard or Army Reserve unit. The intent was to provide a human point of contact for issues that 

arose for the IRR soldier. A corollary benefit was that the soldier might decide to join the unit 

and enter active (Selected Reserve) status. In 2006 the Army initiated a transition of the IRR to 

“Individual Warriors” in an attempt to increase soldier readiness and weed out those personnel 

lacking “further potential for useful military service”; see “Army Officials to Transform IRR,”

National Guard, May 2006, 21. 

42. Memo, Gen. W. L. Nyland to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 20 Aug 2004, subj: 

Keeping in touch with the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Rumsfeld Papers, including quote 

1; McCarthy interview, 17 Sep 2013, including quotes 2–4; RFPB, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 

2003, 18. From 1993 to 1995, then-Brig. Gen. Dennis M. McCarthy, commanding general of 

Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (later named Mobilization Command), held one-day 

IRR musters as part of the command’s active management of the IRR. Apparently, by 2001 the 

practice had been forgotten, as evidenced by the “postcard” system. McCarthy interview, 17 

Sep 2013. 

43. Col. James E. Bacchus, Tom Nelson, and Glenn Davis (all MarForRes officials), 

conversation with Marion, 10 Jul 2013, including quote 1; John G. Cotton, interview by 

Forrest L. Marion, 6 Jun 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including quote 2. Tom Nelson, 

email message to Marion, 9 Aug 2016. Prior to 2011, the present-day Marine Corps Individual 

Reserve Support Activity’s designation was “Mobilization Command (MOBCOM).”

44. ODASD(RA), Rebalancing Forces, 21, 28, including quotes; David S. C. Chu, 

interview by Forrest L. Marion, 22 Apr 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; “Army Guard Seeks 

Native Speakers in 20 Languages,” National Guard, Sep 2005, 27, <http://www.highbeam.com/

doc/1P3-904072721.html>, accessed 5 Feb 2015; Lauren Bigge, “Native Tongues,” National 

Guard, Oct 2006, 28–29. The Arabic linguist program was also known as “09-Lima.” 

45. Daniel B. Denning, “Building and Sustaining America’s Army,” Army, Oct 2006, 50–

52; Helmly, Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2007, P11; Coker, 2004/2005 Biannual 

Army Reserve Historical Summary, 14, 30–32; Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, 11, 21. 

46. John G. Cotton, telephone conversation with Marion, 4 Nov 2013; Michael Evans, 

“Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan Commanded by a Naval Reservist (FTS),” 

Naval Reserve Association News, Jun 2005, 30, <http://www.ausn.org/Portals/0/Services_pdfs/

JUN-05-NRAN.pdf>, accessed 5 Feb 2015; Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013; John A. “Andy” 

Mueller, telephone conversation with Marion , 25 Oct 2013. 

47. “DoD Offers Health Care as Deployment Reward,” National Guard, Apr 2005, 22–

23; “Guard Can Seek Medical, Dental Claims,” National Guard, Aug 2004, 17–18; “Deadline 

Looms for Tricare Reserve Select,” National Guard, Sep 2005, 26. 

48. Stephen M. Koper, “Behind the Fanfare,” National Guard, May 2005, 10, including 

quotes 1–2; Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 54–55, including 

quote 3, Stultz quoted by Coker; memo, Deputy Director, TRICARE Management Activity 

for ASD(HA), 6 Apr 2006, subj: Final rule; transitional assistance management program: 

early eligibility for TRICARE for certain reserve component members, AFHRA; memo with 
258 259

Notes to Chapter Six Notes to Chapter Six

policy for reserve component members ordered to active duty in response to the World Trade 

Center and Pentagon attacks—Section 1,” 4. A copy of the memo can be found at the AFHRA.

62. Cotton, “Psychological Casualties,” 27, including quote 1, quoted by Cotton; Smiley 

interview, including quote 2; Anthony Lanuzo and Louis Proper, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 

26 Mar 2013, OSD/HO, including quote 3. A copy of the transcript can be found at the Air Force 

Historical Research Agency. Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 

54. In November 2005, the Army’s Disabled Soldier Support System was redesignated the U.S. 

Army Wounded Warrior Program (Army W2); see Army Reserve Posture Statement 2006, P23. 

63. Marcus Luttrell, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and 

the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10, with Patrick Robinson (New York and Boston: Little, Brown, 

2007), 348–356; Betty R. Kennedy, et al., Turning Point 9.11, 191–193; Daniel Cooney, “In 

Afghan Crash, Deadly Chain of Events for U.S.,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 7 Jul 2005; Bradley 

interview, 107. In June 2007, a Washington Post article published at the time of release of 

Luttrell’s book briefly mentioned the Air Force Reserve identities of the rescue helicopter crew; 

see Laura Blumenfeld, “The Sole Survivor,” Washington Post, 11 Jun, 2007, <http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001492.html>, accessed 9 

Feb 2015. This was two years after the rescue took place, however. For additional detail of the 

Luttrell rescue and dissemination of the story, see chapter 8, present work. Contrast the omission 

of reserve component identification in Luttrell’s rescue and the Katrina relief effort with the 

Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. The Army Reserve identity of those soldiers responsible 

for misconduct at Abu Ghraib was clearly identified in numerous reports, such as Jonathan 

Eig, “Inside Abu Ghraib: Missed Red Flags, Team Under Stress,” Wall Street Journal, 23 Nov 

2004; John W. Gonzalez, “Judge Refuses to Recuse Himself in Court-Martial of Pfc. England,” 

Houston Chronicle, 8 Jul 2005; T. R. Reid, “England to Plead Not Guilty in Second Trial,” 

Washington Post, 8 Jul 2005; John W. Gonzalez, “Judge Rules Out Use of Comments by Pfc. 

England to Interrogators,” Houston Chronicle, 9 Jul 2005. The latter three articles identified 

England as a reservist. 

64. William B. Boehm, Renee Hylton, and Thomas W. Mehl, In Katrina’s Wake: The 

National Guard on the Gulf Coast, 2005 (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, [2010]), 7–8, 

24, 31–32, 35; David P. Anderson, Storm Surge: The Role of the Air National Guard in Hurricane 

Katrina Relief Operations ([Arlington, VA]: National Guard Bureau, 2011), 4, 11; Rosenfeld and 

Gross, Air National Guard at 60, 59–63; Les Melnyk, “Katrina Lessons Learned,” Soldiers, Jun 

2006, 29; Christopher Prawdzik, “East of Big Easy,” National Guard, Sep 2006, 48–52, <http://

www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1140699241.html >, 9 Feb 2015; Coker, Indispensable Force, 364, 

366, 416; William G. Morris, “Reserve Response to Search and Rescue Operations Following 

Hurricane Katrina,” Disaster Recovery Journal, 6 Jul 2010, <http://www.drj.com/articles/onlineexclusive/reserve-response-to-search-and-rescue-operations-following-hurricane-katrina.html>, 

accessed 4 Nov 2015. Boehm’s study indicated that unverified reports of crime in New Orleans 

were rampant and “had a negative effect on relief operations” (21–22). Anderson stated that “in 

less than 36 hours after Army and Air National Guard security forces arrived, the [civil law and 

order] situation dramatically improved” in New Orleans (Storm Surge, 46–47). The loss estimate 

caused by Katrina was $125 billion. The figure of 80,000 deployed soldiers probably included 

those whose units were returning stateside at the time. Lt. Col. Jon S. Middaugh (U.S. Army, 

Center of Military History), email message to Marion, 23 Sep 2015. Note that Melnyk listed 

79,000 guardsmen then in “federal service in the war on terrorism.” 

55. John D. Winkler and Barbara A. Bicksler, eds., The New Guard and Reserve (San 

Ramon, CA: Falcon Books, 2008), 223; ODASD(RA), Rebalancing Forces, 18–19. Of the 32 

pages comprising the body of Rebalancing Forces, nearly 20 percent (18–23) were devoted 

to the continuum of service. The continuum included not only ready reservists but military 

retirees and even civilians who wanted to contribute. Advocates referred to the successful Civil 

Air Patrol and Coast Guard Auxiliary as examples of civilian entities that shared the military’s 

culture and core values and that were capable of performing valuable service. 

56. John D. Winkler, et al., “A ‘Continuum of Service’ for the All-Volunteer Force,” in 

The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service, eds. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and 

John T. Warner (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 298–303, including quotes. Note we are 

using 38 days as the traditional number of required, paid duty days per year. Some sources used 

39 days as the standard, possibly due to differing travel day policies for the annual tour. In any 

case, 38 or 39 days was the standard annual requirement.

57. McCarthy, “The Continuum of Reserve Service,” 31–34, including quotes. McCarthy 

felt most of the barriers to continuum of service were rooted in service policy rather than in the 

law; see McCarthy interview, 17 Sep 2013. 

58. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 24–25, 164–165, 168–169, 

203, including quote (which constituted CNGR’s Recommendation, page 25). Note the ADOS 

category did not affect Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel; AGRs had a separate strength 

authorization. This authorization was also known as 10 U.S.C. 12301(d), or volunteerism.

59. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 

OSD, 2006), 76–77, including quote 1, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.

pdf>, accessed 9 Feb 2015; Stultz interview, 6 Jul 2012, 35–36, including quote 2; John Warner 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2192, 

Sec. 522, Revisions To Reserve Call-Up Authority (2006); Stultz, Posture of the United States 

Army Reserve 2007, 12. 

60. Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 54–55; “Online 

Resources Assist Families During Deployment,” National Guard, Nov 2004, 16; “Mental 

Health Screening Now Available Online,” National Guard, May 2006, 19–20; “Pentagon Mental 

Health Task Force Established,” National Guard, Jul 2006, 22–23; “Post-Deployment Health 

Reassessment (PDHRA) Program (Department of Defense Form 2900),” DoD Deployment 

Health Clinical Center, <http://www.pdhealth.mil/dcs/pdhra.asp>, accessed 9 Feb 2015. The 

history of the National Center for PTSD is at <http://www.ptsd.va.gov/about/mission/history_

of_the_national_center_for_ptsd.asp>, last accessed 9 Feb 2015. 

61. Erika N. Cotton, “Psychological Casualties: States Adapt to Address Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder in Guardsmen Returning from Combat,” National Guard, Jul 2005, 24–27, 

including quote 1; Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013, including quotes 2–4. Vice Admiral Cotton 

attributed the idea expressed above to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs) William A. Navas Jr. Navas’ official Navy bio is at <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/

bios/navybio.asp?bioID=16>, accessed 9 Feb 2015. Erika Cotton’s article stated guardsmen 

were relieved of duty for 90 days following demobilization, but official documentation indicated 

the policy was 60 days for involuntary duty such as inactive-duty-for-training or Annual Tour; 

see memo, David S. C. Chu for Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary 

of the Air Force, 15 Mar 2007, subj: “Revised mobilization/demobilization personnel and pay 
260 261

Notes to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

5. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, “We’ve Got the Youngest Force We’ve Ever Had,” interview, 

National Guard, Aug 2007, 42–44, including quote (emphasis added); see data on Lieutenant 

General Vaughn at https://www.cna.org/reports/economy/board>, accessed 3 Mar 2015; 

another online biographical sketch, more easily accessible and from a quasi-official source, 

listed erroneously his years as ARNG director, see <http://www.ausa.org/MEETINGS/

NATIONALAWARDSAUSA/Pages/2010-LieutenantGeneralClydeAVaughn.aspx>, accessed 

23 Feb 2015. 

6. Ron Jensen, “Precious Commodity,” National Guard, Dec. 2007, 29, including quote, 

Germain quoted by Jensen; OASD(RA), “Changes to Total Force Policy: Briefing to Defense 

Senior Leader Conference” (briefing slides, 23 Jan 2007), slide 6 “Manage Mobilizations on a 

Unit Basis,” copy at AFHRA; Gates Utilization memo, including quote 2; Peter Pace, Posture 

Statement of General Peter Pace, USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 

110th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 6 Feb 2007, 12, including quote 3, <http://

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/posture_6feb07pace.pdf>, accessed 20 Apr 2015; Robert 

M. Gates, “Strategic Perspective,” National Guard, Sep 2008, 16. The 1:5 boots-on-the-groundto-dwell rate has been referred to in various documents as the “dwell rate” or “dwell ratio.” 

Despite the clear wording in the memorandum, apparently there has been confusion in some 

cases over whether the “5” equated to the last year of dwell or the next year of mobilization 

eligibility. Part of the answer may relate to the fact that under ARFORGEN, a unit in its year 

of mobilization eligibility might be mobilized in its first month or—nearly a year later—in its 

twelfth month. The reset clock did not start until the redeploying unit demobilized. Additionally, 

the Army Reserve used a five-year ARFORGEN cycle (1:4) whereas the ARNG may in some 

cases have used a 1:5 cycle; eEmail, Thomas E. Welke, Deputy G-33, USAR, to Kathryn R. 

Coker, historian, USAR, 21 Apr 2014, subj: FW: ARFORGEN question, copy at AFHRA. 

Col. James E. Porter, the ALARNG chief of staff since 2009, felt the 1:4 versus 1:5 issue 

was a “compromise” of sorts. Col. James E. Porter, conversation with Marion, 23 Apr 2014. In 

2007 the USCGR sought “more predictability about when and where reservists will mobilize”; 

see John C. Acton, “Readiness to Mobilize: It’s What We’re All About!” USCG Reservist 54, 

no. 6 (2007): 4. By 2010, the USCG sought a 1:5 mobilization rate; see Daniel R. May, “View 

from The Bridge,” USCG Reservist, 57, no. 1 (2010): 4; Rear Adm. Steven E. Day, USCGR, 

interview by Forrest L. Marion, 6 Mar 2012, 9–10, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. Paul E. Pratt, 

the MarForRes deputy G-3/5 at Marine Corps Support Facility New Orleans, stated the Marine 

Corps Reserve’s BOG-to-dwell rate “is more of a one to four” with infantry battalions typically 

having 48 months of dwell. Paul E. Pratt, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 11 Jul 2013, OSD/HO, 

copy at AFHRA; see also note 13 below. 

7. Kathryn Roe Coker, The Indispensable Force, 345. The department offered 

compensation when it failed to meet the objective of “one day of “administrative absence” a 

month for every month beyond 12 they are mobilized in a 72-month period”; see “DoD to Offer 

Days Off For Extra Deployments,” National Guard, May 2007, 16. 

8. Preston M. “Pete” Geren, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 2 Apr 2014, OSD/HO, copy 

at AFHRA, including quote; Ron Jensen, “Beyond the Yellow Ribbon,” National Guard, Jan 

2008, 22–23; Richard M. Green, “A Continuous Process,” National Guard, Nov 2007, 12; 

Robert H. Smiley, email message to Marion, 24 Feb 2014. Green’s article listed a 22-month 

mobilization. The 30-day reintegration event for 1/34 was held on 15–16 September 2007; see 

65. Boehm, Hylton, and Mehl, In Katrina’s Wake, 10, 26–27, 35, including quote 1; 

Anderson, Storm Surge, 47, 55–56, including quote 2. In the first and second weeks of the relief 

operation, guardsmen served on “state active duty” (SAD), but on 7 September acting Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Gordon England approved the use of federal funds to place guardsmen in 

Title 32 status (federally funded, under state control). The move was primarily for the purpose of 

ensuring medical benefits to guardsmen who were working in hazardous conditions, including 

potentially toxic waters, especially in New Orleans. Anderson, Storm Surge, 56. 

66. Boehm, Hylton, and Mehl, In Katrina’s Wake, 29; Melnyk, “Katrina Lessons Learned,” 

32–33, including quote. For an article featuring Lieutenant General Honoré’s role, published on 

the one-year anniversary of Katrina, see “Army General Recalls Katrina Aftermath,” Washington 

Post, 7 Sep, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/07/

AR2006090700163_2.html>, accessed 9 Feb, 2015. Inexplicably, the article failed to mention 

the National Guard. The Guard sought to correct the record in its own periodical; see John 

Maietta, “Katrina: Myths and Reality,” National Guard, Jan 2006, 48. 

67. “Bush: Time for New Pentagon Leadership,” National Guard, Dec 2006, 18, 

including quote; White House News Release, 8 Nov 2006, “President Nominates Dr. Robert 

M. Gates to be Secretary of Defense,” <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/

releases/2006/11/20061108-4.html>, accessed 9 Feb 2015; Doubler, National Guard and the 

War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom 75–76, 83, 106. According to Doubler (75–76), 

Houma, in a parish of 32,000, suffered the loss of six guardsmen in a single incident in Iraq; 

Paris, a town of 9,000, lost five Guard members in Iraq. 

Chapter 7

1. Ready Reserve, 10 U.S.C. § 12302a (1952), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE2011-title10/html/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1209-sec12302.htm>, accessed 

23 Feb 2015. 

2. Joint Staff J-3, “Total Force Sourcing for the Long War,” version 28, mod 74 (briefing 

slides, 31 Aug 2006), copy at AFHRA, 6–7, including quotes; Robert H. Smiley, OASD(RA), 

email message to Marion, 30 Mar 2015, copy at AFHRA; David S. Chu, email message to 

Marion, 2 Jun 2017, copy in authors’ files at OSD.

3. Robert H. Smiley, OASD(RA), interview by Forrest L. Marion, 24 Sep 2013, OSD/HO, 

including quotes, copy at AFHRA. Lieutenant General Blum served as chief, National Guard 

Bureau, from 2003 to 2008. Lieutenant General Vaughn served as ARNG director from 2005 to 

2009; Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, US Army, ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 17 Mar 2015, 

OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. 

4. Memo, Secretary of Defense for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, 19 Jan 2007, subj: Utilization of the total 

force, including quotes (Gates Utilization memo hereinafter). Also in January 2007, Congress 

authorized a temporary increase of 74,200 soldiers: 65,000 (Army), 8,200 (ARNG), and 1,000 

(USAR); see Coker, The Indispensable Force, 345. In 2009 Gates approved an additional 

temporary increase in Army end strength of 22,000 soldiers. 
262 263

Notes to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

Summary, 15–16, 27; Coker, Indispensable Force, 335; Kathryn Roe Coker, Army Reserve 2011 

Annual Historical Summary, 6, 12; “Five Guard Brigades Alerted for Deployment,” National 

Guard, Jun 2008, 20, including quote 2. For the May 2008 announcement of upcoming Army 

Guard deployments, see Donna Miles, “Upcoming Iraq, Afghanistan Rotations Announced,” 

DoD News, 19 May 2008, at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49926>, 

accessed 23 Feb 2015.

12. Stultz interview, 3 Aug 2010, including quotes; Gates Utilization memo; Preston M. 

Geren interview, 2 Apr 2014; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 

19. Geren served as under secretary of the Army from February 2006 to March 2007 when he 

was named acting secretary of the Army. He was confirmed as the secretary of the Army in 

July 2007; see Army News Service, “Senate Names Pete Geren 20th Secretary of the Army,” 

U.S. Army website, 13 Jul 2007, <http://www.army.mil/article/4042/senate-names-petegeren-20th-secretary-of-the-army>, accessed 23 Feb 2015. The article mistakenly stated he 

served as the under secretary “until Feb. 21, 2006.” Rather, he became the under secretary on 

that date. By the start of 2012, most Army Guard units transitioned to nine-month boots-onground deployments in support of “named operations outside the continental United States”; 

see Coker, Army Reserve 2011 Annual Summary, 98. 

13. Coker, The Indispensable Force, 378–382; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, 26–29; email, Lt. Col. Nicky G. Medley, Mobilization Readiness Officer, 

Alabama ARNG, to Col. James E. Porter Jr., chief of staff, Alabama ARNG, 23 Apr 2014, subj: 

Mob plan, copy in Marion’s possession; Lt. Col Nicky G. Medley, in discussion with Marion, 

14 Aug 2014. By 2012 Camp Shelby and Forts Lewis and Benning were no longer needed as 

mobilization platforms.

Clarifying that the RTC provided a premobilization capability, Maj. Paul Nichols of the 

USARC G-7 office stated: “RTC is the final catch-all, ensuring individual tasks are accomplished 

prior to units and soldiers being mobilized in the execution of the train-alert-deploy construct” 

(Coker, Indispensable Force, 381, emphasis added). Fort McCoy was one of five Army Reserve 

installations; the others were Forts Buchanan (PR), Devens (MA), Hunter Liggett (CA), and 

Camp Parks (CA); see Coker, Army Reserve 2011 Annual Summary, 104. The USAR RTCs 

may have been used for postmobilization as well as pre-mob training, but their primary purpose 

was pre-mob (possible other sites used for post-mobilization training, including the ARNG’s 

mobilization platforms; USAR historian J. Boyd agreed with this assessment).

14. Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 26–29, including 

quotes 1–2, Stultz quoted by Coker; “Five Guard Brigades Alerted for Deployment,” National 

Guard, Jun 2008, 20, including quote 3. 

15. Smiley interview, 24 Sep 2013, including quotes; Robert H. Smiley, email message 

to Marion, 14 Aug 2014; memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, Director, Army National Guard, 

for The Adjutants General of all States, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, and the 

Commanding General of the District of Columbia, 4 Apr 2007, subj: Premobilization training 

certification, copy at AFHRA, provided to Marion by Col. James E. Porter, Alabama ARNG; 

memo, SecDef to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Under Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, 14 Mar 2011, 

subj: Reserve component contiguous training, copy at AFHRA; Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, 

interview by Forrest L. Marion, 25 Mar 2015, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; memo, 14 Mar 2011, 

Richard Kemp, “30 Day Reintegration Event,” NorthStar Guard Online, 17 Sep 2007, <http://

www.minnesotanationalguard.org/press_room/e-zine/articles/index.php?item=1046>, accessed 

25 Feb 2015. Thus 1/34’s 22-month mobilization must have ended by August 2007. Note a 

news article dated 22 July 2007 reported the 1/34’s return home that very week (at least the lead 

elements); see “Coming Home, The Minnesota National Guard’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 

34th Infantry Division, Have Earned Their Welcome Home,” Grand Forks Herald, 22 Jul 2007. 

9. Smiley interview, 24 Sep 2013, including quotes 1–2 (emphasis added); Robert H. 

Smiley, email message to Marion, 24 Feb 2014; Col. James E. Porter, chief of staff, Alabama 

ARNG, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 10 Dec 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including 

quote 3; Green, “A Continuous Process,” 12; House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Witness 

Testimony of Major General Larry W. Shellito, 18 Oct 2007, <http://veterans.house.gov/witnesstestimony/major-general-larry-w-shellito>, accessed 25 Feb 2015; Green, “A Continuous 

Process,” 12; Smiley email message, 24 Feb 2014. Some 700 soldiers from other states were 

affected as well. 

10. Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary

(Fort Bragg, NC: Office of Army Reserve History, 2013), appendix pages l, 16, 27, including 

quotes 1–2, Casey quoted by Coker; Porter interview, 10 Dec 2013, including quote 3; James 

E. Porter in discussion with Marion, 23 Apr 2014; Kathryn Roe Coker, United States Army 

Reserve 2011 Annual Historical Summary (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of Army Reserve History, 

2013), 13, 98. Porter became chief of staff of the Alabama ARNG in August 2009 and continued 

in that capacity as of this writing. Porter agreed with Colonel Chapman (see chapter 6, present 

work) that the IRR programs (including IRR affiliation which ARNG began by 2005, perhaps 

in “pilot” status) worked well in Alabama, and some IRRs actually joined units as a result 

of affiliation. The Army Reserve began its own IRR Affiliation Program as a one-year pilot 

in December 2010; see Coker, Army Reserve 2011 Annual Summary, 25. The Army formally 

began IRR affiliation in July 2011; see Army Reserve Communications, “Army Reserve, Army 

National Guard to launch IRR Affiliation Program,” U.S. Army website, 1 Jul 2011, <http://

www.army.mil/article/60932/Army_Reserve__Army_National_Guard_to_launch_IRR_

Affiliation_Program>, accessed 16 Sep 2015.

Some confusion was unavoidable due to the following: first, the ARFORGEN model 

called for a 1:4 (BOG-to-dwell) cycle; and, second, the Gates mobilization directive called for 

a goal of 1:5 (BOG to dwell). The reality, of course, was that for several years neither 1:4 nor 

1:5 was a realistic option for a number of ground combat or CS/CSS units. A number of sources 

referred to either a 1:4 or 1:5 cycle without mentioning the other model or the reason for the 

difference; see also note 6 above.

In his interview, Porter discussed how the RC has gained “by accident . . . a level of 

operational savvy” not seen during Vietnam, and not since then—the result of 12 years of war. 

“We can’t buy this kind of experience” or readiness, he stated. “We can’t take them all the way 

back” to being a strategic force. Acknowledging that the Guard can’t put a brigade out the door 

in only 30 days, he noted that except for “the ready-brigades at Fort Bragg . . . [and other special 

operations units], you can’t spin an active duty armor brigade that’s not sitting in the theater of 

operations out the door in 30 days either.” But the Guard “can put brigades out the door in 39

days, because that’s what we’ve done” (emphasis added). 

11. Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz, interview by Kathryn R. Coker, 3 Aug 2010, USAR History 

Office, copy at AFHRA, including quote; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical 
264 265

Notes to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

but, given the current funding, they could fill no more than two. In 2013 Colonel Porter stated 

the Alabama ARNG stood at 67 percent of authorized full-time strength; see Porter interview, 

10 Dec 2013.

21. Daniel R. May, “View From The Bridge: Modernizing the Reserve Force,” USCG

Reservist 56, no. 3 (2009): 14; Admiral Thad W. Allen, interview, USCG Reservist, special 

issue, 2008, 13; Michael R. Seward, “Post 9-11 Training Challenges,” USCG Reservist 56, no. 

4 (2009): 10; Andrea L. Contratto, “The View,” USCG Reservist 58, no. 3 (2011): 6; Admiral 

Robert J. Papp Jr., USCG, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 9 Mar 2012, OSD/HO, copy at 

AFHRA; Master Chief Petty Off. Jeffrey D. Smith, USCGR, ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 

5 Mar 2012, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA. The FTS initiative was one part of the Reserve Force 

Readiness System; see Daniel R. May, “View from the Bridge: New Director Outlines Three 

Major Initiatives,” USCG Reservist 55, no. 3 (2008): 14. May was a one-star, Day, a two-star; 

both ranks are termed “rear admiral” in the Coast Guard, although with different abbreviations 

(not used in the present work to avoid confusion). 

22. “News Call: Violence Escalates in Afghanistan,” Army, Aug 2008, 8; “Reserve 

Component Mobilizations,” Naval Reserve Association News, Dec 2008, 11; Barak Obama, 

“Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Washington, DC, 

27 Mar 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama-text.html>, accessed 

10 Jul 2017, including quote; DoD Personnel Reports, <https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/

dwp_reports.jsp>, accessed 11 Jul 2016. For the force increases (totaling 21,000) announced 

by March 2009, see Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, “Obama Sets New Afghan Strategy,” New 

York Times, 26 Mar 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/washington/27prexy.html>, 

accessed 23 Feb 2015. The surge announced in December 2009 was for 30,000 troops; see Barak 

Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan,” 1 Dec 2009, White House Press Office Archive, <https://obamawhitehouse.

archives.gov//the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistanand-pakistan>, accessed 23 Feb 2015.

23. Andrew Waldman, “Unique Guard Program Helps Afghan Farmers Rebuild,” 

National Guard, Mar 2009, 20, including quote; on Kansas guard, Melissa Raney, “Guard 

Agribusinessmen Help Afghan Farmers Plant Saffron,” National Guard, Nov 2009, 44–45; 

Vaughn interview, 25 Mar 2015; “Afghan farmers continue to struggle,” Show Me 11, no. 3 

(May/Jun 2007): 15–16. The Missouri National Guard established the first ADT in 2007; see 

“Army Guard Handles President’s Afghan Agricultural Initiative,” National Guard, Jan 2010, 

14. In 2009, Kansas, Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee were scheduled for ADTs. The term 

“agribusiness development team” was also used; see Jon Soucy, “Missouri Guard’s Agricultural 

Mission Grows in Afghanistan,” DoD News, 23 Dec 2008, <http://www.defense.gov/News/

newsarticle.aspx?id=52447>, accessed 17 Feb 2015. Another nontraditional mission for Army 

guardsmen was that of security forces/theater security (SECFOR/TSEC) from which, by 

2007, Guard leaders sought relief. Lieutenant General Blum, Lieutenant General Vaughn, and 

Maj. Gen. R. Martin Umbarger objected to the Army’s use of guardsmen in “security-force 

companies” in a piecemeal fashion and not according to doctrine; see Lt. Gen. Steve Blum, 

“We Have a Diminished Capability to Respond,” interview, National Guard, May 2007, 27; [R. 

Martin Umbarger] “Here We Go Again,” National Guard, Jun 2007, 10.

24. On Indiana, Tennessee, Texas: “Sowing Seeds of Hope: Teams Give Boost to Afghan 

Farmers,” National Guard, Feb 2010, 46–47; Ron Jensen, “Seeding Hope,” National Guard, 

May 2010, 24–27; on Iowa: “Guard Ag Team Helps Afghans Battle Deadly Rabies Outbreak,” 

subj: Reserve component contiguous training, Historian files, Guard mobilization manuscript, 

Center of Military History. A subsequent memorandum issued by Lt. Gen. Vaughn called for the 

establishment of a premobilization training assistance element in each joint force headquarters 

to assist the adjutants general in “certification of premobilization training”; see memo, Lt. Gen. 

Clyde A. Vaughn, Director, Army National Guard, for The Adjutants General of all States, 

Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Commanding General of the District of 

Columbia, 7 Sep 2007, subj: Change to the premobilization training memo, copy at AFHRA, 

provided to Marion by Col. James E. Porter, Alabama ARNG.

16. David L. McGinnis, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 7 Mar 2014, OSD/HO, copy at 

AFHRA, including quote. 

17. Coker, 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 11–13; Coker, 

Indispensable Force, 333–334, 359; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical 

Summary, 81–84, including quote, quoted by Coker; Coker, Indispensable Force, 356–358; 

email, Thomas E. Welke to Kathryn Roe Coker, 20 May 14, subj: RE: Our History—Official 

Site of the U.S. Army Reserve, copy in Marion’s possession. 

18. “Army Guard Hits End-Strength Goal Early, Readiness High,” National Guard, 

Oct 2009, 16–17, including quote; Morgan Mann, “The Operational Reserve,” Marine Corps 

Gazette, Feb 2011, 41–42. Note that Mann cited a Manpower Plans and Policy Division report, 

“Reserve Company Grade Officer Shortfalls” (Washington, DC: 10 Apr 2010). For ARNG’s 

establishment of Transients-Trainees-Holdees-Students, see chapter 5, present work. 

19. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Readiness, Training & Mobilization, “Full-Time Support to the Reserve 

Components” (briefing slides, 22 May 2007), copy at AFHRA, slide 2, including quote 1; 

CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 200–203, 206, including quote 2 

(emphasis added). The section on full-time support was found between pages 196 and 209. The 

CNGR’s study found the same problem that a RAND study in 2000 had uncovered: only one 

in four “full-time support” (apparently used interchangeably therein with “FTS”) billets of the 

Army reserves (both ARNG and USAR) was located at the company level or below; see CNGR, 

Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 85, 202. A debate in Navy circles concerned 

whether Navy FTS personnel “should be assigned to operational tours”; see Matt Dubois, “Navy 

Reserve Full-Time Support,” Naval Reserve Association News, Apr 2007, 22–23.

In 2011 the NGB explicitly rejected “a return to the Cold War strategic reserve model”; 

see “National Guard Bureau Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army 

National Guard, A Formula for Operational Capacity, White Paper,” Army National Guard 

Directorate, G5: SPZ, 1 Aug 2011, version 3, page 1, <https://g1arng.army.pentagon.mil/

Featured%20News/Attachments/ARFORGEN_Whitepaper_1AUG11.pdf >, accessed 20 Apr 

2015. “Full-Time Manning,” National Guard, Apr 2007, 61; William Matthews, “Good News 

Bad News,” National Guard, Apr 2007, 26–29, including quotes 3–4; Ron Jensen, “Still Short,” 

National Guard, Jun 2009, 24–26, including quote 5; “A Boost For Full-Time Manning,” 

National Guard, Nov 2008, 12. Maine’s adjutant general, Maj. Gen. John W. Libby, stated the 

increase enabled his state to bump up to 223 military technicians—of 432 required. Maine’s 

AGRs ramped up to 201, but the state required 312.

20. R. Martin Umbarger, “Silver Bullet,” National Guard, May 2008, 10, including quote 

1; Jensen, “Still Short,” 26, including quote 2. Major General Umbarger served as the adjutant 

general of Indiana. He stated many company-size units required five or six full-time positions 
266 267

Notes to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

General’s Department, 2012 Annual Report (Columbus: Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, 

[2013]), <http://www.ong.ohio.gov/annual_reports/2012ONG-AnnualReport.pdf?bid=181>, 

accessed 25 Feb 2015. In 2010 the Guard had 17 enhanced-response force packages capable of 

responding to an attack with a weapon of mass destruction. 

31. Andrew Waldman, “Guard Adds, Streamlines Emergency Response Capabilities,” 

National Guard, Jul 2010, 12; Lt. Col. Anthony Lanuzo, USAF, and Louis Proper, ANG, 

interview by Forrest L. Marion, 26 Mar 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; Lanuzo and Proper 

interview, 26 Mar 2013; “Part of History,” National Guard, Feb 2009, 36–37. 

32. “Blum: Guard Vital to Northern Command,” National Guard, Apr 2009, 25, including 

quote; Matthews, “Preparing for the Worst.” 

33. Coker, Indispensable Force, 436–439; Gen. Craig R. McKinley, Florida Air National 

Guard, ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 10 Mar 2014, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including 

quote. 

34. Lt. Gen. Craig R. McKinley, “What I’m Most Concerned about Is Our Air Combat 

Command Footprint,” interview, National Guard, Aug 2007, 47–48; “F–22s at Langley Fully 

Operational,” National Guard, Jan 2008, 20–21; Ron Jensen, “Flying Colors,” National 

Guard, Feb 2009, 26–28; McKinley, “We’re Going to Go through Leaner Times,” 32; 

McKinley interview, 10 Mar 2014; Craig Carper, “Virginia Air Guard F–22 Pilot Soars Past 

1,000 Hours,” 192d Fighter Wing Public Affairs website, 13 Feb 2014, accessed 24 Feb 2015 

(page discontinued); on Missouri: “B–2 Pilot Flies 1,000 Hours; Fourth in Wing to Hit Mark,” 

National Guard, May 2010, 44. Associate units shared the same aircraft between USAF and 

ANG/USAFR pilots/aircrews. McKinley promoted the associate unit model; see his “We Are 

Adaptable, Accessible and Rapidly Deployable,” interview, National Guard, Jul 2009, 24–29. 

35. McKinley interview, 10 Mar 2014, including quotes; Richard M. Green, “A Process 

Gone Awry,” National Guard, Jul 2008, 12. For the conversion of the A–10 to MQ–9 mission 

at Willow Grove, see “Air Force Selects Horsham’s 111th Fighter Wing for New High-Tech 

Mission,” 19 Mar 2013, <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/air-force-selectshorshams-111th-fighter-wing-for-new-high-tech-mission-198980501.html>, accessed 24 Feb 

2015. For the MQ–9 Reaper, see the USAF fact sheet of 18 Aug 2010, <http://www.af.mil/

AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx>, accessed 24 Feb 

2015. Both the 147th Reconnaissance Wing and 174th Attack Wing lost F–16s but transitioned 

to remotely piloted aircraft (the MQ–1B for 147th, the MQ–9 for 174th); see Andrew 

Waldman, “Eyes on Texas,” National Guard, Jan 2010, 22–25. The Houston unit was the 147th 

Reconnaissance Wing; the Syracuse unit was the 174th Attack Wing.

36. Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, USAF, interview by Betty R. Kennedy, Apr–May 2008, 

AFRC Historical Services, copy at AFHRA, 76, 78, including quotes 1–3. Bradley also served 

as chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve, and in that capacity was a member of the air staff. Bradley 

interview, Apr–May 2008, 77–79, including quote 4.

37. “Lawmakers Tell Air Force: Not So Fast on ‘Plane Grabs,’” National Guard, Feb 

2011, 16, including quotes, quote 1, quoted by National Guard; William R. Burks, “Total Force 

or Total Farce?” National Guard, Apr 2011, 34–36, including quote 1.

38. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 113, including quote 1; 

Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force (Department of Defense white 

National Guard, Oct 2010, 55; on Iowa: “Agriculture Team Conducts Class for Afghan 

Veterinarians,” National Guard, Jan 2011, 42; on Texas: Laura Childs, “Greening Afghanistan: 

Guard Farmers Help Reforest Ghazni,” National Guard, May 2011, 52–53; Ron Jensen, “Citizen 

Warrior,” National Guard, Aug 2011, 32–35. By spring 2010 more than 1,000 guardsmen had 

participated with ADTs in Afghanistan. In an earlier version of U.S. agricultural support for 

Afghanistan, in 1962 an Oklahoma ANG C–97 transport airlifted a dozen cows and two bulls as 

a diplomatic gift for King Mohammed Zahir Shah with intent to improve the quality of beef in 

the country; see Ron Jensen, “‘Bull Shippers,’” National Guard, Jul 2011, 34–36. 

25. Morgan Mann, “The Operational Reserve,” Marine Corps Gazette, Feb 2011, 41–42, 

including quotes, commandant quoted by Mann. 

26. Jennifer Smith, “Executing the Navy’s Maritime Strategy in an Expanded Battlespace,” 

Naval Reserve Association News, Apr 2008, 15–21, <http://www.navy-reserve.org/Portals/0/

NRA%20News/APR-08/NRAN-APR-08.pdf>, 23 Feb 2015; Vice Adm. John G. Cotton, USN, 

ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 6 Jun 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA including quote; 

Casey Coane, “The Seascape as It Appears To Me—Part 3,” Naval Reserve Association News, 

May 2008, 16; “Navy Adds Civil Affairs Unit,” Naval Reserve Association News, May 2007, 21. 

27. McGinnis interview, 7 Mar 2014, including quotes; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army 

Reserve Historical Summary, 89; Coker, Indispensable Force, 354. 

28. Mobilization and Readiness Division, Army National Guard G-3 National Guard 

Bureau, slide deck, “ARNG BCT Mob History,” 8 Dec 2014; “TX ADT-02 Mobilization 

AAR Comments,” 22 Feb 2009, 1–2; “39th Infantry Brigade Combat Team: Mobilization 

and Deployment Journal,” 21–23; all three documents in Historian files, Guard Mobilization 

manuscript, Center of Military History; Maass, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 

Fiscal Year 2007, 35.

29. Michael D. Doubler, Operation Jump Start: The National Guard on the Southwest 

Border, 2006–2008 (Washington, DC: NGB Office of Public Affairs, 24 Oct 2008), 15, 23–

27, 32–33, 42–43, 63, 72; “Officials: New Border Mission Similar to Operation Jump Start,” 

National Guard, Jul 2010, 14; “Guard’s New Border Mission Set to Begin Early This Month,” 

National Guard, Aug 2010, 24; “National Guard Reaches 1,200 Troops on Border,” National 

Guard, Oct 2010, 18, 20; “Back to the Border,” National Guard, Oct 2010, 54–55; Andrew 

Waldman, “Southern Watch,” National Guard, Nov 2010, 22–24; “Bargain on the SW Border: 

Efficient Guard May Extend,” National Guard, Jan 2011, 16. Title 32 status meant federal 

funding, under state control (see chapter 6, present work). In 2010–2011 the guardsmen 

supported the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency. For mention of the 1916 use of the 

National Guard along the border with Mexico, see chapter 1, present work. 

30. “DoD Creates Task Force to Aid Domestic Response,” National Guard, Jan 2009, 

16; William Matthews, “Preparing for the Worst,” National Guard, Jan 2011, 22–25; On 

Florida: Thomas Kielbasa, “Second Civil Support Team Passes Realistic Evaluation,” National 

Guard, Feb 2011, 44; “National Guard Bolsters WMD Response Capabilities,” National 

Guard, Nov 2010, 19–20. For the Ohio National Guard’s HRT validation, see Matthew 

Scotten, “Ohio National Guard Homeland Response Force First to Undergo Mission-Capable 

Evaluation, Validation,” Ohio National Guard News, <http://www.ong.ohio.gov/stories/2011/

August/080811_muscatatuck.html>, accessed 25 Feb 2015. For the Ohio National Guard’s 

annual report for FY 2012 including information on its HRF, Ohio National Guard, Ohio Adjutant 
268 269

Notes to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

“Ready now”: Navy Reserve strategic plan—2010, commander’s intent”; Debbink to USNR, 

1 Oct 2011, subj: “Ready Now”: the Navy Reserve strategic Plan—2012, commander’s intent. 

We are indebted to Mr. Grover for his strong support of this study in various ways including his 

providing us with electronic copies of the above-cited USNR strategic plans and for assistance 

with Navy interview candidates. 

46. Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 4–5; “Lawmakers 

Tell Air Force: Not So Fast on ‘Plane Grabs,’” National Guard, Feb 2011, 16; William R. Burks, 

“Total Force or Total Farce?” National Guard, Apr 2011, 34–36, including quotes; “McKinley: 

Relationship Strong Between Guard, Active Duty,” National Guard, Jan 2011, 16, 18. 

47. Lt. Gen. Harry M. Wyatt III, “‘It’s Lining Up Pretty Well for the Air National Guard,’” 

interview, National Guard, Aug 2011, 42–46, 48, including quote 1, quoted by Wyatt; Lt. Gen. 

Dennis M. McCarthy, USMC, ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 17 Sep 2013, OSD/HO, 

copy at AFHRA. Lieutenant General Bradley, the AFRC commander, favored volunteerism 

and viewed mobilization as a “last resort”; see Bradley interview, Apr–May 2008, 97–98, 110; 

Kennedy, et al., Turning Point 9.11, 227–228. Volunteerism was addressed under Title 10, U.S. 

Code, Section 12301(d). Legally, such members were activated, not mobilized, but incorrect 

terminology was often used probably in large part as a means of “protecting” the member from 

perceived or actual negative reactions to volunteerism on the part of employers and family 

members. Gen. Craig R. McKinley, “We’re Going to Go Through Leaner Times,” interview, 

National Guard, Dec 2010, 28–32, including quotes 2–3; Andrew Waldman, “Guardedly 

Optimistic,” National Guard, Oct 2010, 40–41.

 48. J. Eric Davis, “Building a Battalion from Scratch,” Marine Corps Gazette, 

May 2011, 70–71, including quotes. The 2008 National Defense Strategy used the term, 

“Long War,” to describe post-9/11 combat operations; see <http://archive.defense.gov/

pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf>, accessed 23 Feb 2015. Because, for example, the 

2010 National Security Strategy failed to provide an updated proper name for the conflicts 

described therein as “today’s wars,” “the war in Iraq,” and “a war against al-Qaida,” We elected 

to continue use of the simple, clear proper name, the Long War. Stultz interview, 3 Aug 2010; 

“Five Guard Brigades Alerted for Deployment,” National Guard, Jun 2008, 20. For the May 

2008 announcement of upcoming Army Guard deployments, see Donna Miles, “Upcoming 

Iraq, Afghanistan Rotations Announced,” DoD News, 19 May 2008, <http://www.defense.gov/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49926>, accessed 23 Feb 2015.

 49. Defense Manpower Data Center, Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, 

Survey Note, No. 2013-001, 15 Jan 2013, subj: 2011 Department of Defense National Survey of 

Employers and June 2012 Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members: Employer 

Support for Reserve Component Members, copy provided to Marion by OASD(RA) at AFHRA, 

1–3, including quotes. In 2008 Lieutenant General Stultz initiated the Employer Partnership 

Initiative, “a joint venture designed to give business leaders real world benefits for employing 

and sharing soldier-employees.” The American Trucking Association and Inova Health Systems 

of Northern Virginia became the first two businesses to sign agreements with the Army Reserve. 

In 2009 the plan expanded from the USAR to “all seven reserve components, family members, 

wounded warriors, and veterans,” and the name changed to the Employer Partnership of the 

Armed Forces. By 2010 more than 1,300 employers participated in the partnership; see Coker, 

Indispensable Force, 435–436, including endnote quotes; Chu interview, 22 Apr 2013. 

paper), at <http://ra.defense.gov>, accessed 17 Apr 2014 (page discontinued), 9, including quote 

2; see USD(P&R), Department of Defense Directive Number 1200.17, subj: Managing the 

reserve components as an operational force, 29 Oct 2008, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/

corres/pdf/120017p.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb 2015. 

39. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 34–35, 149–150, 244–246, 

including quote 1; David S. C. Chu, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 22 Apr 2013, OSD/HO, 

copy at AFHRA, including quote 2; Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational 

Force, 9. Note that some sources referred to 38 training days as the standard in the Selected 

Reserve; others referred to 39 days. For civilian employment issues, see chapter 5, present work.

40. Gregory Baur, “Our Future Reserve,” Marine Corps Gazette, Jan 2007, 44–45, 

including quotes 1–2; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 153, including 

quote 3. 

41. GAO, Guard and Reserve Personnel: Fiscal, Security, and Human Capital Challenges 

Should Be Considered in Developing a Revised Business Model for the Reserve Component

(Washington, DC: GAO, 20 Jun 2007), 18, including quote 1 (Walker testimony), <http://www.

gao.gov/assets/120/117036.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb 2015; Chu interview, 22 Apr 2013, including 

quote 2; Wanda R. Langley, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 22 Mar 2013, AFHRA, including 

quote 3; Maj. Gen. Arnold L. Punaro, USMC, ret., interview by Forrest L. Marion, 23 Sep 2013, 

OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA, including quote 4; “Panel Slams Pentagon Treatment of Guard,” 

National Guard, Apr 2007, 20, including quote 5, Punaro quoted by National Guard; GAO, 

DOD Systems Modernization: Management of Integrated Military Human Capital Program 

Needs Additional Improvements (Washington, DC: GAO, Feb 2005), 26, <http://www.gao.gov/

assets/250/245300.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb 2015; CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and 

Reserves, 136, 153–156; “Army to Launch New Pay, Personnel System,” National Guard, Jan 

2008, 17. USD(P&R) Chu gave three main reasons for the DIMHRS failure: 1) USD(P&R) was 

removed from the program’s oversight; 2) the service with the data in the worst condition (the 

Army) went first; and, 3) the service with the data in the best condition (the Air Force), was not 

allowed to go first. Given the known problems with DIMHRS by 2008 if not before, why the 

program remained alive until 2010 is a valid question.

42. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 34–35, 149–150, 244–246, 

including quote 1, quoted by CNGR; Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational 

Force, 9. The CNGR quoted GAO, Military Personnel: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Oversight of Reserve Employment Issues. Note that some sources referred to 38 training days 

as the standard in the Selected Reserve; others referred to 39 days. For civilian employment 

issues, see chapter 5, present work. GAO, Guard and Reserve Personnel, 4, 7, 16, 19, 21, 26, 

28, including quotes 2–6.

43. John F. Hargraves, interview by U.S. Army Reserve Historical Office, 2 Apr 2013, 

copy at AFHRA, including quote. The CNGR addressed the needs of RC senior officers to attain 

joint education and qualification; see CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 

138–149.

44. Hargraves interview, 2 Apr 2013.

45. Memo, Vice Adm. Dirk J. Debbink for USNR, n.d., subj: “Ready now”: Navy Reserve 

strategic plan—2009, commander’s intent,” including quotes 1–2, copy provided to Marion by 

James C. Grover, Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve; memo, Debbink to USNR, n.d., subj : 
270 271

Notes to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

53. Casey Coane, “Seascape IV,” Naval Reserve Association News, May 2009, 19.

54. Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013; memo, Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command, 

17 Mar 2008, subj: Reunion and reintegration return warrior event, copy provided to Marion 

by Capt. John E. Cole, USN, ret., on 24 Oct 2013; Peter Weeks, OASD(RA), Director, Center 

of Excellence, Office for Reintegration Programs, email message to Marion, 6 Mar 2014. The 

original name was Returning Warrior Weekend, but in 2007 it was changed to Workshop. The 

policy of all redeploying personnel from Afghanistan spending several days at an intermediate 

station, Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan, provided a limited opportunity to “decompress” and begin 

the transition process; Marion’s observations, Manas Air Base, Jun 2009, May 2011. 

Returning Warrior Workshop Instruction Manual (N.p.: [Navy] Deployment Support 

Program, ca. mid-2007), conclusion, preface and overview, including quotes, copy emailed to 

Marion by Capt. John E. Cole, USN, ret., 24 Oct 2013, copy at AFHRA; Capt. Andrew J. 

Turnley, USN, ret., email message to Marion, 31 Jan and 3 Feb 2014. On acknowledgment of 

Turnley’s key role: John E. Cole, email message to Marion, 24 Oct 2013. A Navy captain is 

an O-6; for reasons of standardization, the Navy’s rank abbreviation was not used in the text. 

Of USNR’s mobilized personnel, 90 percent served as individual augmentees; see Returning 

Warrior Workshop Instruction Manual. “Navy Reserve Returning Warrior Workshop,” briefing, 

slide 5 of 8, provided to Marion by John E. Cole on 24 Oct 2013.

55. Returning Warrior Workshop Manual, conclusion, including quote; Capt. John E. 

Cole, USN, ret., email messages to Marion, 16 Apr 2014; Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013; Coane, 

“Seascape IV,” 19. In 1999 the Guard began a program known as “Building Strong and Ready 

Families,” which evolved into the Army’s “Strong Bonds Enrichment” program. The program 

was designed to “increase Soldier and family readiness through relationship education and skills 

training.” Although not actually part of Yellow Ribbon, Strong Bonds also sought to improve 

marital and family relationships. The Army Reserve held more than 200 Strong Bonds events in 

FY 2008; and more than 300 events with some 12,500 participants three years later. In 2008 the 

Guard reported 8,000 soldiers and family members had attended Strong Bonds events. Similar 

in some respects to RWW, it also differed. For instance, Strong Bonds was chaplain-led whereas 

RWW was not (although chaplains were key participants). Also, Strong Bonds included some 

activities prior to a deployment; see “Army Strong Bonds Program,” at http://www.strongbonds.

org/skins/strongbonds/home.aspx, accessed 25 Feb 2015; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army 

Reserve Historical Summary, 65; Coker, Indispensable Force, 426; Coker, Army Reserve 2011 

Annual Summary, 48-49; “Marriages Strengthened at ‘Strong Bonds’ Event,” National Guard, 

Oct 2008, 25–26. 

56. “Guardsman Called Upbeat Day before Suicide,” Associated Press, 22 Aug 2004, 

<http://www.seacoastonline.com/article/20040822/News/308229983>, 20 Apr 2015; Janet 

S. Salotti, Chief of Reintegration and Transition Office for NGB, conversation with Marion, 

Arlington Hall, VA, 31 Mar 2015; Ron Jensen, “Beyond the Yellow Ribbon,” National Guard, 

Jan 2008, 22–23. 

57. Jensen, “Beyond the Yellow Ribbon,” 23, including quotes. A waiver from the defense 

secretary was required for a National Guard unit to hold a mandatory formation within 60 

days of the unit’s redeployment. In April 2008 USD(P&R) Dr. Chu changed the policy to 

allow “reintegration training programs” to be held within 60 days of demobilization; see 

memo, USD(P&R) to Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air 

Force, 2 Apr 2008, subj: Change to current mobilization/demobilization personnel and pay 

policy, copy at AFHRA.

50. “Affordable Health Care,” National Guard, Sep 2007, 14; “DoD Offers Health Care 

as Deployment Reward,” National Guard, Apr 2005, 22–23; “New Three-Tier Tricare Coverage 

Plan Begins,” National Guard, Aug 2006, 18; “TRICARE Reserve Select Monthly Rates 

Reduced,” National Guard, Feb 2009, 14; “TRICARE Reserve Numbers Increase,” National 

Guard, Sep 2009, 37; Coker, Indispensable Force, 423; Punaro interview, 23 Sep 2013; “New 

TRICARE benefits provide retired reservists with earlier coverage,” Continental Marine, Oct–

Dec 2009, 10; “TRICARE Sought for Gray Area Retirees,” National Guard, Jul 2008, 14. The 

Tricare eligibility of “gray area” retirees was delayed until October 2010 and, even then, rates 

were considerably higher than initially expected; see “TRICARE Benefit Delayed For ‘Gray 

Area’ Retirees,” National Guard, Aug 2010, 24; “‘Gray Area’ TRICARE Benefit Includes SkyHigh Premiums,” National Guard, Sep 2010, 14; “TRICARE for Guard Retirees Available, But 

Expensive,” National Guard, Oct 2010, 16. 

51. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, 309, 311, including quotes 

1 and 3, 4–6, Stultz quoted by CNGR; Marine Corps Order 3000.19A, 25 Aug 2010 subj: U.S. 

Marine Corps total force mobilization, activation, integration, and deactivation plan (short title: 

USMC MAID-P), 3–16, including quote 2. For the parallel paragraph in the 2007 version, see 

MAID-P, 6 Jul 2007, C-1-8. Although “demobilization” and “deactivation” were distinct terms, 

for the purpose of this paragraph it appeared the Marine Corps order’s section on “deactivation” 

matched closely enough to “demobilization” for them to be used interchangeably. Indeed, some 

allowances must be made for any meaningful discussion of the several components because 

of different terminology between them. In some cases, differences exist even between similar 

components, such as the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, to whom, for example, a 

“transfer to active duty” does not mean the same thing; see Langley interview, 22 Mar 2013. 

Department of the Army, Army Regulation 40-35, Dental Readiness and Community Oral 

Health Protection (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2 Aug 2004), i, 

<http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/r40_35.pdf>, accessed 23 Feb 2015.

52. Coker, Indispensable Force, 412–413; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve 

Historical Summary, 34; The United States Army Reserve 2010 Posture Statement, iv; Coker, 

Army Reserve 2011 Annual Summary, 32; Geren interview, 2 Apr 2014. Note the term “Army 

Selected (not ‘Select’) Reserve Dental Readiness System” was used in USAR’s 2008/2009 

summary. Note that Indispensable Force specified “mobilization dental readiness” for the 74 

percent statistic but did not use the word “mobilization” when stating the “52.5 percent dental 

readiness.” We elected to assume that the percentages, used in consecutive paragraphs, did in fact 

compare apples to apples. Army Regulation 40-35 did not employ the term, “mobilization dental 

readiness.” In the FY 2008 NDAA, Congress extended from 90 to 180 days the period following 

separation from active duty (of 90 days or longer) during which a member was eligible to 

receive “onetime dental treatment” from the VA; see CNGR, Transforming the National Guard 

and Reserves, 314. Note the Army Reserve maintained paper medical and dental records until 

2009 when it began implementation of digitized records under the Health Readiness Record 

system; see Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 35. Sources varied 

on the USAR’s dental readiness percentage in 2008, but slightly above 50 percent was a good 

estimate.

David L. McGinnis, Statement before the House Committee on Armed Services, 

Subcommittee on Personnel, 27 Jul 2011, including quotes, <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/

docs/testMcGinnis07272011.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb 2015, webpage discontinued. 
273

Notes to Chapter Eight

272

Notes to Chapter Seven

Regiment Dedicates Call Center to Fallen Marine,” Headquarters Marine Corps news, 9 Dec 

2008, <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/News-Article-Display/Article/552805/woundedwarrior-regiment-dedicates-call-center-to-fallen-marine>, accessed 12 Aug 2014; McGinnis 

interview, 7 Mar 2014. Note that in 2009 an Army policy change allowed for wounded or 

ill ARNG and USAR soldiers to recover at warrior transition units or hospitals near their 

hometowns; see “Wounded Can Heal Closer to Home,” National Guard, Jul 2009, 18–19. 

64. LAPS Walk, “Ernie Irvan Returns to the Racetrack with Fellow NASCAR 

Celebrities for LAPS Walk,” press release, 13 Aug 2007, <http://www.aaa.com/aaa/047/PDF/

LAPSReleaseAug2007.pdf>, 25 Feb 2015, including quote; Mark W. Hamrick, interview by 

Forrest L. Marion, 16 Apr 2013, OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; McGinnis interview, 7 Mar 2014. 

65. Of the CNGR’s 95 recommendations, Secretary Gates approved 82; see Coker, 

2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, xlvii. The Marines’ pay/personnel 

system was known as the Marine Corps Total Force System. For details, see chapter 5, present 

work. 

66. Ron Jensen, “Former Chief Retires,” National Guard, Jun 2010, 14, including quotes, 

quote 2 quoted by Jensen. 

Chapter 8

1. CNGR, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves, unnumbered page 

(accompanying letter, Arnold L. Punaro to Robert Gates, 31 Jan 2008), including quotes.

2. Morgan Mann, “The Operational Reserve,” 43–45, including quotes 1–2; McCarthy 

interview, 17 Sep 2013, including quotes 3–5; McGinnis, Statement, HCAS Subcommittee 

on Personnel, including quotes 6–7; David S. C. Chu, “New Mobilization Reality,” National 

Guard, Feb 2007, 12, including quote 8; Punaro interview, 23 Sep 2013, including quote 9; 

Carpenter interview, 7 Mar 2012, part 3, including quote 10; Ron Jensen, “Citizen Warrior,” 33, 

including quote 11, Tafanelli quoted by Jensen; Ron Jensen, “Challenging Forecasts,” National 

Guard, Oct 2011, 30–37, including quote 12 (page 37), Winnefeld quoted by Jensen.

3. Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, 4, 

including quote.

4. Hall interview, 23 Sep 2013, including quote 1 (emphasis added); David E. Shaver, 

“Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony,” U.S. Army 

War College paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 3, including quotes 

2–3 (emphasis in original); McCarthy interview, 17 Sep 2013, including quote 4; Vaughn 

interview, 25 Mar 2015, including quote 5. 

5. DoD, News Release 472-97, 11 Sep 1997, including quotes 1–3; McCarthy interview, 

17 Sep 2013; Cotton interview, 6 Jun 2013; Punaro interview, 23 Sep 2013.

6. Robert E. Kramek, “A View from the Bridge,” 3; Day interview, 6 Mar 2012, 4–5; 

Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, 29 Oct 2008, 6, including quote 1; Managing the 

Reserve Components as an Operational Force. 

7. Kristy N. Kamarck, Military Retirement: Background and Recent Developments 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 2. During the same period, the 

number of regulars in retirement increased by only 2.2 percent, though their total compensation 

58. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 

122 Stat. 123, § 582, Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, including quote, <http://www.

gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ181/pdf/PLAW-110publ181.pdf>, accessed 25 Feb 2015; 

“Reintegration Program Part of House Mark,” National Guard, Jun 2007, 14; Saxby Chambliss, 

“Just Rewards,” National Guard, Sep 2008, 18; Weeks, email message to Marion, 6 Mar 2014; on 

Alabama: Katrina Timmons, “Yellow Ribbon Program Debuts for Alabama Troops, Families,” 

National Guard, Oct 2008, 57–58; “Yellow Ribbon Program: Big and Getting Bigger,” National 

Guard, Nov 2009, 16–17; Coker, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 64–

65, 111; Coker, Indispensable Force, 425–426; McGinnis interview, 7 Mar 2014; Cmdr. Robert 

M. Cooper, Yellow Ribbon Program Manager, USCG, email message to Marion, 12 Aug 2014.

59. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 122 Stat. 125, including 

quote 1; Terry L. Stegemeyer, Chief, USARC Services and Support Division, Fort Bragg, 

NC, conversation with Marion, 14 Mar 2014; Coker, Indispensable Force, 425–426; Salotti 

conversation, 31 Mar 2015, including quote 2; “Yellow Ribbon Veteran’s Career and Benefit Fair,” 

Vimeo video, 29 Jun 2010, posted by WorkSource Oregon, <https://vimeo.com/12944683>, 

accessed 20 Apr 2015. In any case, two arguments favored the longer version of Yellow Ribbon: 

first, personnel suffering from PTSD/TBI did not necessarily manifest their injuries until several 

months after returning home; and, second, the law itself stated the “Reconstitution Phase shall 

constitute the period from arrival at home station until 180 days following demobilization” 

(125). The Army Reserve held both local and regional events, according to conversations with 

Stegemeyer and Salotti.

60. McGinnis, Statement, HCAS Subcommittee on Personnel, including quote 1; McGinnis 

interview, 7 Mar 2014; HCAS, Report on H.R. 1960, National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2014, report 113-102 (Washington, DC: GPO, 7 Jun 2013), 152, including quote 

2, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt102/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt102.pdf>, accessed 25 

Feb 2015. In FY 2011, Yellow Ribbon transferred to another office for administrative control 

but remained under the Pentagon’s OASD(RA). Yellow Ribbon funding in FY 2012 was $23.7 

million.

61. Coker, Indispensable Force, 426–429; “Family Readiness Groups Honored,” National 

Guard, Mar 2008, 22. 

62. Sarah A. Lister, Sidath Viranga Panangala, and Christine Scott, “Wounded Warrior” 

and Veterans Provisions in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act: Report for Congress

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 13 Feb 2008), <https://www.fas.org/sgp/

crs/misc/RL34371.pdf>, accessed 25 Feb 2015; Coker, Indispensable Force, 424.

63. Maj. Christopher J. Iazzetta, USMC, interview by Forrest L. Marion, 12 Jul 2013, 

OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA; Capt. Ryan M. Powell, email message to Marion, 8 Jan 2014; report, 

director, operations and plans directorate, Marine Corps Reserve, to commandant of the Marine 

Corps, 14 Mar 2008, subj: Annual command chronology [2007], Archives & Special Collections, 

Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA; Aquita Brown, “Reserve Medical Entitlement 

Determination Program Aids Wounded Reserve Marines,” Continental Marines, Fall 2011, 8, 

including quotes 1–2; Capt. Ryan M. Powell, USMC, telephone conversation with Marion, 8 

Jan 14, including quote 3; Hope Hodge Seck, “No End in Sight for Marines’ Wounded Warrior 

Regiment as War Winds Down,” Marine Corps Times, 18 Jan 2014, including quote 4, Amos 

quoted by Seck, <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20140118/NEWS/301180003/

No-end-sight-Marines-Wounded-Warrior-Regiment-war-winds-down>, accessed 25 Feb 2015, 

webpage discontinued; Iazzetta interview, 12 Jul 2013; Capt. Leticia Reyes, “Wounded Warrior 
274 275

Notes to Chapter Eight

Selected Bibliography

Document Collections

Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 

Air Force Reserve Command History Office, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. 

American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, Arlington, Virginia.

Rumsfeld Papers, <http://papers.rumsfeld.com>.

Periodicals

Air Force Bulletin

Air Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders

Air Force Magazine 

American Forces Press Service

Army (also known as the Green Book)

Army Reservist

Army Times

Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary

Boston Globe

Chicago Tribune

Christian Science Monitor 

Coast Guard Reservist

Continental Marine

Cornell Daily Sun 

Defense Issues

Department of the Army Historical Summary

Grand Forks Herald

Joint Force Quarterly 

increased 38.5 percent. Individually, regular retirement checks grew faster, but as a percentage 

of overall retirement pay, the reserve share grew from 10 to 13.5 percent.

8. Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, 24, including quote 1; 

McCarthy interview, 17 Sep 2013, including quote 2.

Appendix 2

1. Former ASD(RA) Stephen M. Duncan preferred the term augmentation in lieu of 

mobilization with regard to activations under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 673b authority; see 

his Citizen Warriors, 36–37, 62–63.

2. AGRs were reserve component members serving on active duty, mainly with reserve 

units/organizations. Military technicians were federal civilians, most of whom maintained “dual 

status” as members of the Selected Reserve assigned to the same units they served as civilians. 

3. While most AR Marines served in support of RC units, some supported the active 

component.
276 277

Selected Bibliography Selected Bibliography

Hall, Rear Adm. Thomas F. 23 Sep 2013.

Hamrick, MSgt. Mark W. 16 Apr 2013.*

Iazzetta, Maj. Christopher J. 12 Jul 2013.

Langley, Wanda R. 22 Mar 2013. 

Lanuzo, Lt. Col. Anthony, and Lt. Col. Louis Proper. 26 Mar 2013.

Lee-James, Deborah. 12 Sep 2014.*

McCarthy, Lt. Gen. Dennis M. 17 Sep 2013.

McCracken, Capt. John J., III, and Joyce Z. Randle. 25 Apr 2013.*

McGinnis, Brig. Gen. David L. 7 Mar 2014.

McKinley, General Craig R. 10 Mar 2014.

O’Connell, Charles F., Jr. 15 Aug 2013.*

Papp, Admiral Robert J., Jr. 9 Mar 2012. 

Porche, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robin C. 10 and 12 Jul 2013. 

Porter, Col. James E. 10 Dec 2013.*

Powell, Daniel N., Gerald J. Mekosh, and Columbus Brown Jr. 22 Aug 2013.*

Pratt, Col. Paul E. 11 Jul 2013. 

Punaro, Maj. Gen. Arnold L. 23 Sep 2013.

Smiley, Col. Robert H. 1 May 2012 and 24 Sep 2013. 

Smith, Master Chief Petty Officer Jeffrey D. 5 Mar 2012. 

Vaughn, Lt. Gen. Clyde A. 25 Mar 2015.*

Wightman, Maj. Gen. Richard O. W., Jr. 7 Mar 2014.

Additional Interviews

Abell, Charles. Interview by Thomas Christiansen and Anthony Crain, OSD 

Historical Office. 16 Sep 2014. OSD/HO, copy at AFHRA.

Altshuler, Maj. Gen. Herbert L. Interview by Suzanne L. Summers. 29 Jan 

2002. Army Reserve History Office. 

Bradley, Lt. Gen. John A. Interview by Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC History 

Office. Apr-May 2008. AFRC/HO, copy at AFHRA.

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Interview by Les’ Melnyk. 7 Mar 2012 (in 

3 parts). ARNG Readiness Center, copy at AFHRA.

Hargraves, John F. Interview by Army Reserve Historical Office. 2 Apr 2013. 

Army Reserve History Office. 

Plewes, Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Interview by Kathryn R. Coker, Army Reserve 

History Office. 15 Nov 2010. Army Reserve History Office.

Life

Los Angeles Times

Marine Corps Gazette

National Guard

Naval Reserve Association News

New York Times

Parameters

Philadelphia Inquirer 

Reservist 

Sea Power

Show Me

Soldiers

Time 

U.S. News & World Report

USA Today

Washington Post 

Washington Times

Interviews by Forrest L. Marion

Copies can be found at the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office 

and the Air Force Historical Research Agency. An asterisk (*) indicates that 

the interview has not been transcribed.

Albrecht, Kenneth J., and Earnest W. Sowell. 21 Aug 2013.*

Baldwin, Col. Charles P. 11 Jun 2013. 

Blum, Lt. Gen. Steven H. 17 Mar 2015.*

Chapman, Col. Dennis P. 14 Jun 2013.

Chu, David S.C. 22 Apr 2013. 

Cotton, Vice Adm. John G. 6 Jun 2013.

Day, Rear Adm. Steven E. 6 Mar 2012. 

Geren, Preston M. 2 Apr 2014.*
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fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-09-18/pdf/01-23359.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2015. 

Cantwell, Gerald T. The Air Force Reserve in the Vietnam Decade: 1965–

1975. Robins Air Force Base, GA: Directorate of Historical Services, 

Headquarters Air Force Reserve, November 1979.

———. Citizen Airmen: A History of the Air Force Reserve, 1946–1994. 

Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997.

Capelotti, P. J. Rogue Wave: The U.S. Coast Guard on and after 9/11. Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard Historians Office, n.d.

Chapman, Dennis P. Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: 

Army Practice, Past and Present. Land Warfare Paper No. 69. 

Washington, DC: Association of the United States Army, Sep 2008. 

<https://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP69.pdf>, accessed 22 

Nov 2014.

———. Manning Reserve Component Units for Mobilization: Army and Air 

Force Practice. Institute of Land Warfare, Sep 2009. <http://www.

ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Documents/

LWP74.pdf>, accessed 4 Feb 2015.

Coker, Kathryn Roe. The 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary. Fort 

McPherson, GA: Office of Army Reserve History, 2003.

———. The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary. Fort McPherson, GA: 

Office of Army Reserve History, 2004.

———. The 2003 Army Reserve Historical Summary. Fort McPherson, GA: 

Office of Army Reserve History, 2006.

———. The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary. Fort 

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———. The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary. Fort 

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———. The 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary. Fort 

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Severson, Brig. Gen. Richard R. Interview by Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC 

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Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C. Interview by Kathryn R. Coker, Army Reserve History 

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Numbered Military Units

First Air Force, 90

1st Division, 16, 18

1st Cavalry Division, 76, 77

1st Georgia Regiment, 7

1st Marine Division, 39

1st Regiment (New York), 11

1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, 12

2nd Armored Division, 1st Brigade, 76

2nd Marine Division, 28

Third Army, 75

4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 91

4th Marine Division, 28, 91

4th Tank Battalion, Company B, 74

V Corps, 105

Seventh Regiment (New York), 28

14th Quartermaster Detachment (Pennsylva-

nia), 75

XIX Corps, 27

19th Special Forces Group (Utah), 103

20th Special Forces Group (Alabama), 103

24th Infantry Division, 76, 77

25th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 106–107

27th Infantry Division, 17, 28, 29

28th Infantry Division, (Pennsylvania), 10, 

37

29th Infantry Division (Maryland, Virginia, 

DC), 27

29th Infantry Division (Light), 101

34th Infantry Division (Iowa, Minnesota, 

North Dakota, South Dakota), 27, 140, 

160

37th Infantry Division (Ohio), 27

39th Brigade Combat Team (Arkansas), 

130–131, 132

Index

Illustrations are indicated by italicized page numbers and tables by “t” following 

page numbers.

40th Infantry Division (California), 37–38

43rd Infantry Division (Connecticut, Rhode 

Island, Vermont), 37

45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma), 37–38

48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia), 76, 77, 78

69th Infantry, (New York), 8

71st New York, 12

77th Regional Support Command (New 

York), 99–100

82nd Airborne Division, 55, 59

104th Expeditionary Operations Group, 94

109th Observation Squadron (Minnesota), 24

110th Observation Squadron (Missouri), 24

111th Fighter Wing, 172

115th Military Police Battalion, (Maryland), 

103, 117

116th Air Control Wing, 105

142nd Field Artillery Brigade, 78

142nd Military Intelligence Battalion (Utah), 

103

154th Observation Squadron (Arkansas), 

24–25

155th Armored Brigade Combat Team (Mis-

sissippi), 7, 76, 77, 163–164

164th Infantry Regiment (North Dakota), 27, 

29

169th Fighter Wing (South Carolina), 104

172nd Stryker Brigade (Alaska), 140

192nd Fighter Wing (Virginia), 172

193rd Special Operations Wing (Pennsylva-

nia), 104

197th Infantry Regiment (Georgia), 76

256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana), 76, 77, 

154

293rd Infantry, 1st Battalion (Indiana), 105
288 289

Index Index

nization, 42; Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) commission (2005) 

and, 141–142, 172–173; Berlin crisis 

(1961) and, 52; C–124 (Globemaster II 

heavy-lift transport) groups, 55; challenge to meet operational requirements 

after 9/11 response, 112; chief position, 

establishment of, 56; civilian technicians, 51–53; creation of, 16, 31–32, 

34; Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and, 

53–54; deployments of 179 days for Air 

Expeditionary Force, 177; end strength, 

199–200t; family support programs and 

centers, 66, 80, 114–115; filling slots 

post-9/11 operations, 122; Gunsmoke 

award for maintenance, 64–65; Headquarters, 56; individual mobilization 

augmentees (IMAs) and, 107; medical 

personnel, call up for Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991), 

72; in merger into National Guard of 

the United States, 34–35; mobilization policies, 40, 159; NATO role of, 

58–59; 9/11 response operations, 101, 

103; Office vs. Headquarters, 56; in 

Operation Allied Force (1999), 94; in 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(1990–1991), 71, 73; in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (2003–2010), 105–106, 112, 

129; postdeployment downtime and, 

118–119; Reagan-era buildup, 63–66; 

recruitment and retention during Afghanistan and Iraq operations, 139; unit 

readiness levels of (2006), 138; weather 

reconnaissance mission, 90

Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), 72, 

112, 142

Air Mobility Command, 112

Air National Guard (ANG): agricultural development team (ADT) program in Afghanistan, 167; airlift support to U.S. 

Southern Command, 59; all-jet-fighter 

force of, 51; in Armed Forces Reserve 

Act (1952) reorganization, 42; Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

commission (2005) and, 141–142, 171–

172, 172; Berlin crisis and, 52; C–130s 

on ANG bases, Air Force seeking to 

relocate (2010), 173; combat readiness 

of, 51, 196; demobilization after 9/11 

response, 118; end strength, 199–200t; 

fatality search and recovery teams, 

establishment of, 170; Gray Board’s 

recommendations for, 34–35; growth 

in 1950s, 51; homeland security role 

of, 102; humanitarian aid provided by, 

90; Hurricane Katrina response, study 

of, 154; in Korean conflict, 40; medical 

personnel, call up for Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991), 72; 

9/11 security response by, 99; in Operation Allied Force, 94; post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD), rates of, 184; 

transfer to Air Force (1947), 191; in 

Vietnam War, 55

Air National Reserve, 32

air patrols over U.S. cities post-9/11, 101

airport security, Guard role post-9/11, 

101–102

Air Reserve Personnel Center, 110

Air Reserve Technician program, 51

Aisne-Marne, battle of (1918), 17

Alabama: 20th Special Forces Group, 103; 

ARNG, 161

Alaska: 172nd Stryker Brigade, 140; 477th 

Fighter Group, 171

Allen, Thad W., 165

Allied Force (1999), 93–94

all-volunteer force (AVF), 47, 56–57, 59–61, 

66–67, 80, 150

al-Qaeda, 99, 103, 104, 118, 139, 166

Americal Division, 27

American Expeditionary Forces, 16

American War of Independence (1775–

1783), 2–3

Amos, James F., 184

ancient Greece and Rome, 1

ANG. See Air National Guard

Antietam, battle of (1862), 9

anti-Sandinista movement (Nicaragua), 64

AR (Active Reserve, Marines), 91, 122–123

ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) 

model (2006), 36, 56, 143, 161–162, 

191

Arkansas: 39th Brigade Combat Team, 130–

131, 132; 154th Observation Squadron, 

24–25; 936th Field Artillery Battalion, 

38

311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary 

Affairs), 100

316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 

164

323rd Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting), 

105

362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum 

Supply), 105

377th Theater Army Area Command, 75–76

442nd Infantry, 100th Battalion, 86

445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services), 105

459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role 

Bridge), 105

477th Fighter Group (Alaska), 171

509th Bomb Wing (Missouri), 171

660th Transportation Company, 74

706th Tactical Fighter Squadron (New 

Orleans), 73

936th Field Artillery Battalion (Arkansas), 

38

A–10 Thunderbolt II: 111th Fighter Wing, 

172; air-to-air kill, 73; maintenance of, 

64; replaced with MQ–9 Reaper, 172; 

units in Balkan operations, 94; units in 

Iraq operations, 73, 105

AAF (Army Air Forces), 31

USS Abraham Lincoln, 125

Abrams, Creighton W., 57

activation: Army Guard and, 94; Army 

Reserve and, 53; attitude of personnel 

toward, 193; improvements in process 

(2009), 178; individual augmentees for, 

108; involuntary activation, 130, 135; 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 

71–72, 76, 78; presidential reserve 

call-up and, 103, 108; reservists’ commitment to, 91; use of terminology, 

205. See also mobilization

active and reserve components: conflict 

between, 27–28, 31, 74, 81, 92; cultural differences between, 149–150, 

194; dental care differences between, 

113; employment protection, differences between, 117; postdeployment 

downtime, differences between, 118–

119; rebalancing between, 127–130; 

Rumsfeld’s goals to rebalance forces 

between, 127–130. See also integration 

of active and reserve components

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), 64, 122, 

136–138, 165, 206

Active Reserve (AR, Marines), 91, 122–123

Acton, John C., 121

administrative systems, 110–111, 120, 151

ADOS (Active Duty for Operational Support 

2004), 151

ADT (agricultural development team) 

program, 166–167, 167

Advertising Council, 81

Afghanistan, 97, 103–108; agricultural development team (ADT) program in, 

166–167, 167; provisional reconstruction teams in rural areas of, 146. See 

also Operation Enduring Freedom

Afghan National Army, Task Force Phoenix 

providing advisers and training to, 169

AFR. See Air Force Reserve, U.S.

AFRC (Air Force Reserve Command), 72, 

112, 142

AFRES. See Air Force Reserve, U.S.

AGR. See Active Guard and Reserve

agricultural development team (ADT) 

program, 166–167, 167

Air Combat Command, 90

aircraft. See specific type

Air Expeditionary Force, 112, 177

Air Force, U.S. (USAF): Base Realignment 

and Closure (BRAC) commission 

(2005) and, 141–142; C–130s on ANG 

bases, Air Force seeking to relocate 

(2010), 173; Gray Board’s recommendations and, 35, 39–40; integrated 

total force, 89–90; Military Personnel 

Database System, 109–110; National Guard’s aviation unit transferred to 

(1947), 191; post–Cold War reduction 

in size, 84

Air Force Reserve, U.S. (AFRES, now 

USAFR): aerial observation role, 

24; airlift support, 59, 112; in Armed 

Forces Reserve Act (1952) reorga-
290 291

Index Index

IRR musters, 65–66; new mobilization 

policy (2006–2011), effect of, 159, 

162–163, 184; 9/11 security response 

by, 99; 9/11-related service calls, 103; 

nonconsecutive stints for reservists in, 

61; operational theater deployed in Iraq 

(2007), 164; in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(2003–2010), 129, 160; post-Cold War 

drawdown, 83, 84; predeployment 

training at regional training centers, 

162; Project Quicksilver (1989), 74–75; 

Quadrennial Defense Review (1996–

1997) and, 89; Ready Response Reserve 

Units, 151; regular-reserve integration, 

88, 119; restructuring improvements 

(2006–2008), 164; retention challenges, 125–126, 135; senior officers, professional military education for, 176; 

support capabilities of, 65, 190; Total 

Force role of, 121; training and administration of, 50–51; transfers to regular 

Army, increasing requests for (2008), 

179; Transients-Trainees-Holdees-Students account, 146; war on terrorism, 

length of mobilization, 126–127, 134; 

Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Award 

Program (2004), 148. See also Ready 

Reserve

Army Reserve Command (USARC), 80, 98, 

110, 168, 171

Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF), 

135, 142–143

Army Review Boards Agency, 161

Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness 

System, 179

Army’s Offsite Agreement (1993), 86, 109

Army Special Forces, 103

Army Vision 2010, 88

Army War College, 176

ARNG. See Army National Guard

ASD(RA). See assistant secretary of defense 

for reserve affairs

Aspin, Les, 84, 85, 86

assistant secretary of defense for reserve 

affairs (ASD[RA]), 42, 62, 65, 86, 139, 

140, 149, 160, 182

AVF (all-volunteer force), 56, 60

aviation capabilities, 24–25. See also Air 

Force, U.S.; Air Force Reserve, U.S.; 

Air National Guard

B–2 Spirit, 171

Bagdanos, Matthew, 118

Bahrain, 74

Baker, Newton D., 15, 18

Baldwin, Charles P., 101, 111, 113, 115, 138

Balkan deployments, 86, 89, 90, 93–94, 106, 

125, 126, 127, 188

Barnum, Harvey C., Jr., 116, 120

Base Force concept (1990–1992), 81–84

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

commission (2005), 141–142, 171–173

battle of ___. See name of specific battle 

(e.g., Antietam, battle of)

Baur, Gregory, 174

Beightler, Robert S., 27

benefits. See pay and benefits

Berlin crisis (1961), 52–54, 193

Berlin Wall, fall of (1989), 81, 93

Blackhawk helicopters (HH–60), 153

blacks in military: in Civil War army, 9; 

racial desegregation, 49

Blum, H. Steven “Steve,” 133, 141, 158, 170,

170–171, 185

Bold Shift (Army initiative), 84

Boorda, Jeremy M., 93

boots on the ground (BOG) time, 109, 163, 

168

boots on the ground-to-dwell (BOG-todwell) ratio as mobilization policy, 

157–158, 161, 184–185

Border Patrol, U.S., 169

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 93, 101, 104

Bottom-Up Review (BUR), 84–87, 85, 89

BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) 

commission (2005), 141–142, 171–173

Bradley, John A., 112, 139, 142, 172–173

brigade structure implemented to replace division structure (2003), 128–129

Armed Forces Reserve Act (1952), 41–44, 

42, 47–48, 131

Army, U.S.: Army Vision 2010 (integrated 

strategy), 88; Bold Shift initiative, 84; 

Bottom-Up Review (BUR), 85–86; 

in Civil War, 8–11; dental health of 

Guard brigades, responsibility for, 78; 

in Korean conflict, 38–40; in Mexican-American War, 7–8; mobilization of Guard as preferred source to 

augment, 13–14; oldest, permanently 

organized combat division, 10; in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2010), 

160; post-Cold War reduction in size, 

80–81; recruitment efforts for increased 

size (2006), 142; regular-to-Selected 

Reserve/Guard ratio, 195; relationship with Guard, 16–17; restructuring 

from divisions to brigades (2003), 128; 

roundout units, 63, 76; Standard Bearer 

initiative, 84; stop-loss program, effect 

on Reserve numbers, 135; training of 

Guard brigades prior to deployment, 

78; Truman’s vision of, 30; Women’s 

Army Corps (WAC), 29

Army Air Forces (AAF), 31

Army Air Service, 24

Army Family Action Plan, U.S., 66

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 

model (2006), 36, 56, 143, 161–162, 

191

Army National Guard (ARNG): agricultural development team (ADT) program, 

166–167, 167; annual deployment 

to West Germany for combat training, 58; in Berlin crisis (1961), 52; in 

Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo operations 

(1995–2013), 93–94, 101; Bottom-Up 

Review (BUR) and, 85–86; cross-leveling of personnel and equipment, 

111–112; dental care, provision of, 

113–114; end strength, 199–200t; enlistment age, increase in, 142; family 

support programs, 80, 115–116, 148; 

filling slots post-9/11 operations, 122; 

Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel in, 

136–138, 165; funding deficiencies due 

to training costs incurred by home stations, 165; homeland security role of, 

102; IRR reliance and (2003–2006), 

144, 146; linguist program, 146, 150; 

new mobilization policy (2006–2011), 

effect of, 159, 164; 9/11 security response by, 99, 101–102; in Operation 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990 

–1991), 69, 75–77; in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (2003–2010), 104–105, 

129, 131–132, 136, 160; personnel 

shortfalls (1970s), 60–61; personnel 

shortfalls (2000–2003), 138; predeployment training at regional training 

centers, 162; Quadrennial Defense 

Review (1996–1997) and, 89; readiness improvements (2006–2009), 164; 

Reagan-era buildup, 63–66; reorganization under Commission on Roles 

and Missions (1994–1995), 87–88; restructuring from divisions to brigades 

(2003–2011), 129; retention challenges, 125, 131–132, 136; security force 

missions in Afghanistan, 169; Task 

Force Phoenix (2007–2011), 169; transient account, 111; U.S.-Mexico border 

security and, 169

Army National Guard Combat Readiness 

Reform Act (1992), 84

Army National Guard Readiness Center, 161

Army Reserve, U.S. (USAR): in Armed 

Forces Reserve Act (1952) reorganization, 42; Army Force Generation 

(ARFORGEN) model (2006), 143; automated permanent order system, 110; 

boots on the ground-to-dwell (BOG-todwell) ratio and, 157; in Bosnia, Serbia, 

and Kosovo operations (1995–2013), 

93–94; Bottom-Up Review (BUR), 85; 

chief position, establishment of, 56; 

civil affairs/support teams, 168–169; 

in Cold War crises, 53–54; creation 

of, 15; cross-leveling of personnel and 

equipment, effect of, 135; CS and CSS 

structure in, 86; demobilization events 

held by, 182; in Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm (1990–1991), 69; end strength, 

199–200t; enlistment age, increase 

in, 142; family support programs, 80, 

115–116; filling slots post-9/11 operations, 121; Full-Time Support billets, 

challenge to meet (2006), 137–138, 

165–166; Helmly memo on inability of meeting mission requirements 

in Iraq and Afghanistan (2004), 134,

134–136; integration with actives, 195; 
292 293

Index Index

Ready (SPARs), 29; Team Coast Guard, 

92; transfer from Transportation to 

Homeland Security Department, 121; 

transfer from Treasury to Transportation Department, 56

Coast Guard Auxiliary, 29

Coast Guard Reserve, U.S. (USCGR): in 

Armed Forces Reserve Act (1952) reorganization, 42; in Cold War period, 59; 

creation of, 29; end force, 199–200t; 

full-time support issues, realignment 

to address (2008–2010), 166; integration of merging reservists into active 

units, 195; mobilization needs and, 121; 

nonconsecutive stints for reservists in, 

61; operational missions as post-9/11 

service, 103; as operational reserve, 

92; port security units (PSUs), 74; 

post–Cold War drawdown, 91; Reserve 

Force Readiness System, 166; Yellow 

Ribbon Reintegration Program, 182

Cohen, William S., 92–94, 194–195

COIN (counterinsurgency), 129, 167–168, 

185

Cold War: all-volunteer total force, transition 

to, 56–61; downsizing following end 

of, 74, 77; Eisenhower and, 47; end of, 

69, 81, 89, 93; Kennedy facing crises in, 

52–54; mobilization exercise (1976), 

59–60; public opinion of military operations in, 187–188; Reagan defense 

buildup, 61–67; reserve personnel 

shortfalls (1970s), 60–61; Truman and, 

30, 32. See also Soviet Union; Vietnam 

War

Collins, Thomas H., 165

colonial America, 1–3

combat support (CS) and combat service 

support (CSS), 75, 85–88, 89, 94, 142

Commission on Roles and Missions of the 

Armed Forces (1994–1995), 87–88, 89

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR, 2005–2008), 92, 112, 

137, 148, 151, 164–165, 173–174, 179, 

185

Committee on Civilian Components, 34

Confederate States (Civil War), 8–9

Congress, U.S.: approval required to deploy 

combat troops, 57; to mobilize Guard 

in time of national emergency, 43; reserves’ buildup in Reagan era, 62–66; 

roundout brigades, report on, 77. See 

also Defense appropriation and authorization acts; specific legislation by name 

of act

Connecticut: 43rd Infantry Division, 37

conscription. See draft

Constitution, U.S.: Article I, Section 8, 3, 35; 

on navy, 3, 14; reserves facing obstacles presented by, 189–190

Continental Army, 2

Continental Army Command, 56

Continental Congress, 2

continuum of service concept, 109, 119, 150–

151, 173–177, 191

Cotton, John G., 98, 117, 119, 120, 145, 145,

149–150, 152–153, 168, 181, 195

counterinsurgency (COIN), 129, 167–168, 

185

Cowpens, battle of (1781), 3

Creek Party operation, 59

cross-leveling of personnel and equipment, 

111–112, 135, 140, 143, 169

CS (combat support) and CSS (combat 

service support), 75, 85–88, 89, 94, 142

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 53–54

Cuban refugee operation (1980), 59

Cuban War of Independence (1898), 10–12, 

14

cultural issues in active-reserve integration, 

149–150, 194

Currie, James T., 55

Daniels, Josephus, 15–17

DARTs (domestic all-hazards response 

teams), 170–171, 185

Davis, J. Eric, 178

Davis, Jefferson, 7–8

Day, Steven E., 92, 121

Debbink, Dirk J., 176

Deepwater Horizon disaster (2010), 166

Defense appropriation act (1982), 63

Defense authorization act (1995), 86

Britain: English militia and army, 7; redcoats 

in colonies and American War of Independence, 1–3

“broken force” memorandum (2004), 134,

134–136, 138–139

budget authorization for reserve forces, 

63–64; shrinking of cost differences 

with actives, effect of, 196

Bull Run, battle of (1861), 8

Bunker Hill, battle of (1775), 2

BUR (Bottom-Up Review), 84–87, 85, 89

Burks, William R., 173, 177

Bush, George H. W., 69–71, 70, 76, 81–82

Bush, George W., 99, 165; Coast Guard 

transferred to Homeland Security 

Department, 121; deferring to governors on Guard call-up, 102; Hurricane 

Katrina response and, 154; increasing 

number of Guard civil support teams, 

102; “Mission Accomplished” declaration of, 125; Naval Reserve renamed 

Navy Reserve, 150; on overdeployment 

of Guard, 132; partial mobilization of 

reserves after 9/11 attacks, 100, 103, 

123; restructuring initiative as part of 

2001 QDR, 98; surge authorized for 

Iraq operations, 160; U.S.-Mexico 

border security and, 169

Buyer, Stephen E., 89

C–5 Galaxy: 71, 103, 106

C–17 Globemaster III: Air Force Reserve 

providing aircrews for, 106; airlifter associate squadron, 72; combat airdrops 

by, 103; Globemaster III airlifter associate squadron, 90

C–124 Globemaster II, 55

C–130 Hercules: 63; relocation to Little 

Rock AFB, 173; tactical airlifters, 101; 

transports, 105

C–141 Starlifter, 65, 71

Calhoun, John C., 6–7

California: 40th Division, 37–38; ARNG divisions in Joint Guardian operations, 93

California naval militia, 14

Calling Forth Act (1792), 4, 8

Camden, battle of (1780), 3

Camp Atterbury (Indiana): Army Reserve regional training center, 162; civil affairs/

support teams training, 168

Camp Lejeune (North Carolina), 106

Camp Shelby (Mississippi), 162, 163–164

Cancian, Mark F., 74

Carpenter, Raymond W., 136, 140–141, 148, 

192

Cartagena, battle for (1740–1741), 1–2

Carter, Jimmy, 57

Casey, George W., Jr., 161

CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), 23, 26

Central Command, U.S., 69, 75, 169

Chapman, Dennis P., 130–131, 133, 138, 144

chemical or biological attack, task force to 

assist in case of (2008), 169–170

Cheney, Richard B., 69–71, 78, 82–83

China, 38

Chu, David S., 107, 109, 113, 117–119, 127–

128, 130–133, 174, 192

citizen-soldiers: in colonial America, 1–2; 

dual civilian-military status of technicians, 61; in early national period, 4; 

Gray Board’s view of, 35; in World War 

I, 19. See also reservists

civil affairs/support teams, 65, 93, 106, 

168–169

Civilian Components Policy Board [later 

Reserve Forces Policy Board], 37, 38

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 23, 26

Civil War, 7–9

Clark, Vernon E., 149

Clinton, Bill, 84, 86, 88

CNGR. See Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves

Coast Guard, U.S. (USCG): budget cuts of 

1990s, 102; in Cold War period, 59; 

creation of Auxiliary and Reserve, 29; 

homeland security and, 102–103; post9/11 port security, 97, 100; president attending change of commandant (2006), 

165; regular-reserve integration, 91–92, 

120–121; reservists, ability to call up, 

56; San Diego experiment of integrated 

units, 91–92; Semper Paratus Always 
294 295

Index Index

E–8C intelligence collection aircraft, 105

EA–6B Prowler electronic warfare crewmembers and other electronic warfare 

specialists, 146

early national period, 3–7

EC–130E, 104

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 47–50, 52

Elmendorf Air Force Base (Alaska), 171

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, 154, 170

emergency responders and response teams, 

101, 102, 118

employers of reservists, 87, 116–117, 132, 

178

Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

(ESGR), 66–67, 80–81, 117. See also

National Committee for Employer 

Support of the Guard and Reserve

end strength, 151, 160, 173, 199–201t

Enduring Freedom. See Operation Enduring 

Freedom

England. See Britain

England, Thomas Frank, 64

Enlisted Reserve Corps, 14, 22

enlistment age, increase in, 142

Enrollment Act (1863), 9

equipment: cross-leveling, effect of, 111–

112, 135–136, 140, 169; improvement 

recommendations post–Desert Storm 

experience (1992), 84; in Operation 

Desert Shield/Storm (1990–1991), 78; 

reserves’ need equal to actives, 196; 

rotational system of replacement, 142. 

See also specific types of aircraft

ESGR (Employer Support of the Guard and 

Reserve), 66–67, 80–81, 117. See also

National Committee for Employer 

Support of the Guard and Reserve

Europe: air bridge connecting, 103, 106; 

Cold War defense of Western Europe, 

58; professional armies in, 6. See also

NATO

Evans, Kimberly, 146

executive orders, 25, 37. See also presidential 

call-up authority

extended active duty, 43, 63, 74

F–15 Eagle, 101

F–16 Fighting Falcon, 101, 103, 105–106; 

F–16C squadrons, 90; F–16CJ, 104

F–22 Raptor, 171, 172

F–100 Super Sabre units, 55

F/A–18 Hornet, 63

Fallon, William J., 120

family issues: annual workshops on family-related topics, 115; costs of family 

support programs for actives vs. reserves, 196; emergency financial relief 

for mobilized soldiers, 114–115; family 

assistance centers, 183; family program 

virtual installations, 183; family readiness programs, 66, 114–116, 147–148, 

178; family support programs, 80, 

148–149; health care, 147; Military 

One Source program for, 147–148; 

reintegration of returning citizen-soldier with family, 179–180; Returning 

Warrior Workshop (RWW) to address, 

180–181; war on terrorism requiring 

repeated service, effect of, 126

Family Readiness Program’s Tool Kit (Naval 

Reserve), 116

Far East Air Forces, 40

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

170

federal funding of Guard, 12, 13, 14

Federalists vs. Republicans (1790s), 4

federalized service, 12–14, 13, 35, 64, 102, 

130, 141, 154, 190

V Corps, 105

fillers, 53, 60, 70, 196

First-to-Fight, First-to-Equip policy, 62,

62–63, 67, 72, 76

Flemming, Arthur S., 48–49

Flexible Response policy, 52

Flournoy, Michèle A., 97–98, 98

Forrestal, James V., 33–34

Fort Benning (Georgia): Army Reserve regional training center, 162; roundout 

brigade from, 76

Fort Bliss (Texas), 162

Fort Dix (New Jersey): Army Reserve regional support command, 164; Army 

Reserve regional training center, 162

Defense authorization act (1998), 71

Defense authorization act (2000), 98

Defense authorization act (2002), 120

Defense authorization act (2005), 147

Defense authorization act (2006), 143, 147

Defense Integrated Manpower Human Resources System, 110

Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), 174–175, 185

Defense Mobilization Office, 48

Defense Wireless Service Initiative, 146

demobilization: after Iraqi invasion (2003), 

118; after Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm (1990–1991), 79; CNGR 

recommendations (2008), 179–180; 

Quadrennial Defense Review (1996–

1997) and, 89; Returning Warrior 

Workshop (RWW), 180–181; Yellow 

Ribbon Reintegration Program, 180,

180–182

Demobilization Dental Reset, 179

Denmark, training exercises in, 59

dental health. See health care

Dental Reserve Corps (Navy), 15

Department of Defense (DoD): 1978 study of 

Army Reserve, 60–61; in Berlin crisis 

(1961), 53; civilian employment tracking initiative, 174–175; cross-leveling 

counter to policy of, 135; demobilization after Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm (1990–1991), 79; Form 

214, 114; Individual Ready Reserve 

(IRR) and, 143, 146; mobilization exercise (1976), 59–60; 1,095-rule, adoption of, 151; post-9/11 operations, 123; 

post–World War II strategic planning, 

40; on reserve requirements (1954), 

48; reserves, size of, 116, 199–201t; 

Rumsfeld’s desire to transform, 109; 

U.S. Northern Command-assigned 

task force to assist in case of biological, chemical, or nuclear attack (2008), 

169–170. See also specific active and 

reserve components

Department of Homeland Security, 121, 182

Department of Labor, U.S., 117

Department of the Navy, 17, 24, 32, 165

Department of Transportation, 56, 121

Department of the Treasury, 56

Department of Veterans Affairs, 152, 183

deployment: in Berlin crisis (1961), 52; extensions for reservists in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, 130–133; future policy 

on, 192; periodical operational deployments, 34, 34; reliance on volunteers 

who opt to deploy repeatedly, 111; in 

Vietnam War, 55. See also specific conflict or operation

deputy assistant secretary of defense for 

reserve affairs, 55

Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation (1990–

1991). See Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm

Dewey, George, 11

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Iraqi attack on 

(1991), 75

Dick, Charles W., 12, 13

Dick Act (Militia Act of 1903), 12

DIMHRS (Defense Integrated Military 

Human Resources System), 174–175, 

185

disasters: base closure, effect of, 171; Coast 

Guard reservists recall for, 59; disaster relief mobile kitchen trailers, 170; 

domestic all-hazards response teams 

(DARTs), 170–171; fatality search and 

recovery teams, establishment of, 170; 

Guard’s response role, 171; humanitarian work, 59. See also hurricanes

District of Columbia: 29th Infantry Division, 

27; 9/11 security response by Army National Guard and Reserve, 99–100

Djibouti, 125

DoD. See Department of Defense

domestic all-hazards response teams 

(DARTs), 170–171, 185

domestic terrorism. See homeland security

Doubler, Michael, 76

draft: in Civil War, 9; end of, 47, 56–57; 

in Reserve Forces Act (1955), 49; 

in Vietnam War, 54; in World War I, 

15–16, 19; in World War II, 25

Duehring, Craig, 100

Duncan, Stephen M., 66–67, 73, 76, 79, 

82–84, 86
296 297

Index Index

113–114; Post-Deployment Health Reassessment Program (2005), 152; redeployed reservists and, 147; tracking 

for service members after return from 

overseas, 114; wounded personnel, care 

of, 183–184; Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program’s focus on health issues, 

181–182. See also TRICARE

Hébert, F. Edward, 53

Helmly, James, 110, 119, 126, 133–135, 134,

138–139

Holcomb, Thomas, 29

Hollingsworth, Bob G., 116–117, 132

homeland security: domestic all-hazards 

response teams (DARTs), 170–171; 

Guard’s response role, 97–102, 98,

121, 126, 171; homeland response 

force (HRF) teams, 170–171, 185; U.S. 

Northern Command-assigned task force 

to assist in case of biological, chemical, 

or nuclear attack (2008), 169–170

Honduras, 64

Honorè, Russel L., 154

Horsham Air Guard Base (Pennsylvania), 

172

House Appropriations Committee, 61, 67

House Armed Services Committee, 50, 53, 

57–58, 78, 82, 85, 183

House Military Affairs Committee, 27

humanitarian missions, 59, 89, 102–103, 

105, 153–154

Hurricane Andrew (1992), 89

Hurricane Katrina (2005), 153–155, 170

Hussein, Saddam, 69–70, 82, 104, 109

Iazzetta, Christopher J., 184

Idaho A–10 air reserves, 94

I-I (Inspector-Instructor) program, 24, 122, 

195

Illinois naval militia, 14

improvised explosive devices: counter-initiatives to deal with, 146; wounded personnel’s severe injuries due to, 183

Inactive National Guard, 143–144; end 

strength, 201t

Indiana: 293rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion, 105; ARNG divisions in Joint 

Guardian operations, 93

Indian wars, 4, 187

individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs), 

107, 110, 116, 142, 173, 179, 180, 183

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR): in Balkan 

operations (1990–1997), 93–94; call 

up without partial mobilization, 94; 

Defense Wireless Service Initiative, 

146; end strength, 201t; family-related 

issues for, 116; linguist program, 146, 

150; mobilization installation for, 162; 

out-processing of, 179; personnel shortfalls (1970s), 60, 61; in post-9/11 operations, 107–108, 118; PSRC and, 70, 

71; Reagan-era buildup, 65–67; reliance on (2003–2006), 143–146; routine 

mobilizations, effect on, 193; transfer 

of members to Selected Reserve, 59; 

TRICARE Reserve Select coverage, 

147

Inspector-Instructor (I-I) program, 24, 122, 

195

inspector-instructors, 91, 122

integration of active and reserve components, 

119–123, 149–155; Army in prewar 

configuration change from square to 

triangular structure, 27; challenge to 

increase, 194–197; Cohen calling for 

removal of barriers to, 92–93; continuum of service and, 119–120, 151; 

cultural differences and, 149–150, 194; 

Gates on benefits of, 195–196; Marine 

Corps in Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm, 74; Navy’s air integration policy, 63; post–Desert Storm 

initiatives for integration, 89–94; reducing barriers between regulars to 

integrate, 10, 152; in reorganization 

(1994–1995), 87–88; World War II relationships between actives and reserves, 

27–28. See also Total Force policy; specific reserve components

interwar period, 21–25

Iowa: 34th Infantry Division, 27

Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981), 60

Iraq: invasion of Kuwait and Operation 

Desert Storm, 69–81; Kurds in, U.S. Air 

Force providing humanitarian support 

Fort Hood (Texas), 162

Fort Hunter Liggett (California), 162

Fort Irwin (California), 64, 78

Fort Jackson (South Carolina), 164

Fort Lewis (Washington), 162

Fort McCoy (Wisconsin): Army Reserve regional support command, 164; Army 

Reserve regional training center, 162

Fort Stewart (Georgia), 103

Fort Sumter (South Carolina), 8

founding fathers, 3, 187

Fredericksburg, battle of (1862), 9

full-time support, 60–61, 64, 90, 122, 146; 

terminology, use of, 206

Full-Time Support billets, 99, 121, 137–138, 

165

Full-Time Support (FTS) programs, 91, 

136–138, 165–166; terminology, use 

of, 205–206

GAO. See Government Accountability Office 

[or previous name General Accounting 

Office]

Garcia, J. J., 108

Gates, Robert M., 140, 158; on continuum 

of service concept, 174; as DoD head, 

155; ending 24-cumulative-months mobilization policy, 157; on future operational role of Guard and reserve, 185; 

homeland response force (HRF) teams 

established by, 170; on integration of 

actives and reserves, 195–196; new 

mobilization policy of, 158, 158–163, 

184, 193

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 57

Gates Commission, 57

General Accounting Office studies: on mobilization for post-9/11 operations, 

108–109; on Operation Desert Storm 

preparedness, 78

geographic limitation on employment of 

standing militia, 2

Georgia: 48th Infantry Brigade, 76, 77, 78; 

197th Infantry, Army, 76

Geren, Preston M. “Pete”, 160, 162, 166–

167, 179

Germain, David, 160

Germany: Cold War troops stationed in, 38, 

128; as model military system, 10, 11; 

training exercises in, 59

Glenn, John, 79

Global War on Terrorism, 97–123, 125–126, 

155. See also regularizing reserve mobilization

Goldwater-Nichols legislation (1980s), 

174–175

Government Accountability Office, 2007 

review of Defense Integrated Military 

Human Resources System (DIMHRS), 

175

Grant, Ulysses S., 7

Gray, Gordon, 34, 34

Gray Board (1948), 33–37, 34, 39, 41, 54, 

190, 193

green ID cards, 93

Guadalcanal, battle of (1942), 27

Guantanamo, Cuba, 103, 125

Guard-Reserve Yellow Ribbon Reintegration 

Program, 180, 181, 182–183

Guide to Reserve Family Member Benefits

(Naval Reserve), 116

Gulf War. See Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm

Gunsmoke award for maintenance teams, 

64–65

Hagee, Michael W., 106

Haiti, 89, 188

Hall, Thomas F., 90–91, 132–133, 140, 141, 

149, 158, 194

Hargett, Gus L., 122

Hargraves, John F., 176

Harrison, William H., 5

Harvey, Francis J., 129, 135–136, 161, 166, 

167

Headquarters Air Force Reserve, 56

health care: dental health, 78, 113–114, 147, 

179, 189; mental health screening and 

issues, 152–153, 181; mobilization 

and readiness issues associated with, 
298 299

Index Index

Marine Corps Community Services One 

Source, 116

Marine Corps Individual Reserve Support 

Activity, 145

Marine Corps Reserve, U.S. (USMCR): 

Active Reserve (AR), 91, 122–123; in 

Armed Forces Reserve Act (1952) reorganization, 42; boots on the groundto-dwell (BOG-to-dwell) ratio and, 

157; Casualty/Family Assistance Team 

concept, 66; civilian expertise and, 

117–118; in Cold War period, 56, 59; 

coordinated training exercises with 

other services and NATO, 59; counterinsurgency (COIN) initiatives and, 

168; creation of, 15–17; end strength, 

199–200t; family support services, 116; 

individual mobilization augmentees 

(IMAs) and, 179; Individual Ready 

Reserve (IRR) and, 107–108, 144–146, 

179; Individual Reserve Support Activity, 145; integrated system of reserve 

and active units, 174; in interwar 

period, 24–25; IRR use (2003–2006), 

144–145; in Korean conflict, 39; mobilization policy (2000s), 159; 9/11-

related service calls, 103; in Operation 

Desert Storm (1991), 71, 73–74, 107; 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 104–108, 

122, 138; post–Cold War reduction in 

size, 84; readiness, creative solutions 

for (2006–2009), 164; regular-reserve integration, 63, 91, 119, 120, 

122; Reserve Order Writing System 

(ROWS), 110; in reserve structure, 42; 

structure of, 24–25; support capabilities 

of, 65; Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation 

Plan (2010), 179; training of reserve 

combat units, 79; in two-major-regional-conflict strategy, 91; unit readiness 

levels of (2006), 138; Volunteer Marine 

Corps Reserve, 24; war on terrorism requiring repeated service, 129; women, 

recruitment of, 17

Marine Corps Total Force System, 110, 120

Marine Expeditionary Unit, 129

Marine Forces Reserve (MarForRes), 106, 

108, 122, 144–145

Marine for Life program, 184

Marshall, George C., 16, 25–27, 26, 30, 31, 

39–41

Maryland: 29th Infantry Division, 27; 115th 

Military Police Battalion, Army National Guard (ARNG), 103, 117

Massachusetts: A–10 air reserves, 94; National Guard’s origins in, 2

MC–130 special mission aircraft, 106

McCarthy, Dennis M., 106–107, 133, 139, 

144–145, 149, 151, 192, 195, 197

McCullough, David, 3

McDonald, Craig O., 181

McGinnis, David L., 163, 168–169, 179, 

182–184, 192

McKinley, Craig R., 171–173, 173, 177

McKinley, William, 11, 14

McLain, Raymond S., 27

McNamara, Robert S., 52–56

medical personnel: in Army, 15; improvement recommendations post–Desert 

Storm experience (1992), 84; in Naval 

Reserve, 73; in Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991), 72, 

73; in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–

2010), 106; women in National Guard 

as, 50

Medical Reserve Corps (Navy), 15

mental health screening and issues, 152–153, 

181

merchant sailors, 5, 14, 188

Meuse-Argonne, battle of (1918), 16, 17, 18

Mexican-American War, 7–8

Mexico border security, 169

MH–53M helicopters, 106

Michigan A–10 air reserves, 94

Military Airlift Command, 55, 65

Military One Source program, 116, 147–148

Military Personnel Database System, 

109–110

The Military Policy of the United States

(Upton), 10

Military Selective Service Act (1967), 56

Military Technician (MT) personnel, 61, 

63–64, 88, 122, 136–138, 206

militia: in American War of Independence, 

for, 89; as most likely adversary (1993), 

84. See also Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm; Operation Iraqi Freedom

Jackson, Andrew, 5, 6, 6

James, Daniel, III, 98, 118

Jefferson, Thomas, 4–5

Jepsen, Roger W., 62

Johnson, Louis A., 37

Johnson, Lyndon B., 47, 54–56, 126

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 65–66, 131, 160, 

173

Joint Endeavor (1995–1996), 93

Joint Guard (1996–1998), 93

Joint Guardian (1999–2013), 93

Joint Task Force Katrina (2005), 154

Jumper, John P., 101, 118

junior officers serving on active duty, 73

Kane, John, 102

KC–10 Extender, 103

KC–135 Stratotanker, 71, 90, 101

Kennedy, John F., 52–54

Key Personnel Upgrade program, 64

Khrushchev, Nikita, 52

King’s Mountain, battle of (1780), 3

Kips Bay, battle of (1776), 2–3

Kline, John, 182

Koper, Stephen M., 147

Korean conflict, 37–41; reserves’ use in, 72, 

126; veterans called up for, 43

Kosovo, 93, 94, 104

Kramek, Robert E., 92

Krulak, Charles C., 89

Kruse, Charles E., 166, 167

Kuwait invasion (1990), 69–71, 70

Laird, Melvin R., 57–58, 197

Lanphier, Thomas G., Jr., 39

Lanuzo, Anthony, 153

law enforcement duties: federalized Guard 

prohibited from performing, 154; reservists undertaking, 105, 117, 128

Lee, Barbara Y., 133

Lee, Deborah R., 92

Lehman, John F., 63

Liggett, Hunter, 18

Lincoln, Abraham, 8

Lindbergh, Charles A., 24

linguist program, 146, 150

Linn, Brian M., 12

Little Rock Air Force Base (Arkansas), 173

Livingston, James E., 91

Lone Survivor (Luttrell), 153

Long War. See Global War on Terrorism

lottery system, 56–57

Louisiana: 256th Infantry Brigade, 76, 77, 

154; 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron 

(New Orleans), 73

SS Lusitania, sinking of (1915), 15

Luttrell, Marcus, 153

M1 Abrams tanks, 63, 74, 78

M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, 63, 78

M60A1 tanks, 74

MacArthur, Douglas, 39

maneuver warfare theory, 190

Manila, battle of (1899), 12

Manila Bay, battle of (1898), 11

Mann, Jeffrey, 167

Mann, Morgan, 167–168, 192

Marine Corps, U.S. (USMC): Full-Time 

Support (FTS) personnel, 91, 136, 206; 

Inspector-Instructor program, 64, 122, 

195, 206; integrated system of reserves 

and actives, 63, 119–120, 195; PTSD 

and, 153; training of reserve combat 

units by, 79; Truman’s vision of, 30; 

Unit Deployment Program, 129; in 

Vietnam War, 55; women, recruitment 

of, 17, 29; World War II dispute with 

Army, 28; Wounded Warrior Regiment 

(WWR), 184–185
300 301

Index Index

tion for, 34–35; PTSD issue and, 152–

153; in reserve structure, 42; retention 

challenges during Iraq and Afghanistan 

operations, 136; Truman’s vision of, 

30; in World War I, 15–17; in World 

War II, 25–30; Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, 182. See also state 

Guard units

National Guard Association (NGA) [later 

National Guard Association of the 

United States], 9–10, 13, 31, 36, 54

National Guard Association of the United 

States (NGAUS), 141, 165

National Guard Bureau (NGB): bureau 

chief, four-star rank for, 22–23; chief 

as member of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

173; family support programs and, 

115; filling slots post-9/11 operations, 

122; vacancies in technician positions, 

report on, 138; wartime role of, 31

National Military Establishment, 32. See also

Department of Defense

National Military Family Association, 115

National Museum of Iraq (Baghdad), 118

National Naval Volunteers, 15

National Security Act (1947), 32

National Security Council, 48

National Security Training Corps, 41

National Training Center (Fort Irwin, California), 64, 78

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 

58–59

natural disasters: Coast Guard reservists 

recall for, 59; fatality search and recovery teams, establishment of, 170; 

Guard’s response role, 171. See also

hurricanes

Naval Air Reserve, U.S., 63; regular-reserve 

integration, 119

Naval Appropriations Act (1916), 15

Naval Aviation Act (1935), 25

Naval Militia: in early national period, 5; 

Marines and, 15; in World War I, 16

Naval Militia Act (1914), 15

Naval Reserve, U.S. (USNR) [after 2005 

Navy Reserve]: in Armed Forces 

Reserve Act (1952) reorganization, 42; 

aviation cadet program, 25; Berlin crisis 

(1961) and, 56; civilian skills database, 

90; creation of, 14–15; end strength, 

199–200t; family readiness for mobilization, 66, 116; individual mobilization 

augmentees (IMAs) and, 107; in interwar period, 24–25; in Korean conflict, 

38, 39; mobilization/activation process, 

resolving problems with, 113–114; 

name change (2005) Naval Reserve 

to Navy Reserve, 149; 9/11-related 

service calls, 103; in Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991), 73; 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 106, 112–

113, 129; post–Cold War reduction in 

size, 84; Reagan-era buildup, 63; regular-reserve integration, 63, 90–91, 93, 

119, 120, 149; in reserve structure, 42; 

training and administration of, 50, 56; 

transient account, 111; women, recruitment of, 17, 61; in World War I, 16; in 

World War II, 29. See also Training and 

Administration of the Reserve

Naval Reserve Act (1925), 24

Naval Reserve Assistance Center, 116

Naval Reserve Flying Corps, 15

Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 

(NROTC), 24

Naval Reserve Skills On-Line, 117

Navas, William A., Jr., 120, 152

Navy, U.S. (USN): Coast Guard under control 

of, 29; draft inapplicable to, 9; in early 

national period, 5; in Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991), 73; 

regular-reserve integration, 63, 90–91, 

93, 119, 120, 149; reserve units, advent 

of, 14–17; Truman’s vision of, 30; U.S. 

Constitution authorizing, 3–4; Women 

Accepted for Volunteer Emergency 

Service (WAVES), 29

Navy Dental Reserve Corps, 15

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 

(NECC), 168

Navy Medical Reserve Corps, 15

Navy Reserve, U.S. (USNR) [prior to 2005 

Naval Reserve]: BRAC 2005, effect 

on, 172; end strength, 199–200t; name 

change (2005) Naval Reserve to Navy 

Reserve, 149; nontraditional missions 

2–3, 187; in colonial period, 1–2; in 

early national period, 188; in Mexican-American War, 7

Militia Act (1792), 4

Militia Act (1862), 9

Militia Act (1903), 12, 13

Militia Act (1908), 12–13

Militia Bureau [after 1933 National Guard 

Bureau], 22–24

Millington, Tennessee special mobilization 

cell, 112

Minnesota: 34th Infantry Division, 27, 140, 

160–161; 109th Observation Squadron, 

24; combat brigade in Iraq (2006), 136; 

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, 

initiation of, 181–182

Mississippi: 155th Brigade, 163–164; 

Armored Brigade Combat Team, 7, 76

Mississippi Rifles, 7

Missouri: 110th Observation Squadron, 24; 

ANG in relationship with 509th Bomb 

Wing, 171

mobilization: in Berlin crisis (1961), 52–53, 

193; boots on the ground-to-dwell 

(BOG-to-dwell) ratio as mobilization 

policy, 157–158, 161, 170, 184–185; 

CNGR recommendations (2008), 179; 

confusion about assignment authority among reserve units, 112–113; 

for Cuban War of Independence, 12; 

in early national period, 4, 7; interwar study, 21; in Korean conflict, 39; 

for modern warfare, 35; new policy 

(2006–2011), 157–166; one year at a 

time policy (2007), 158, 158–159, 170; 

Palmer on, 22, 23; political debate over 

(1912–1916), 13; in post-9/11 operations, 108–109; presidential order for, 

13, 205; regularizing reserve mobilization (2007–2011), 157–185; resentment 

over, when immediate purpose unclear, 

193; Roundout concept and, 58; 

shortcomings, reasons for, 189–194; 

terminology, use of, 205; 24-month mobilization window (Rumsfeld policies), 

130–132, 135, 138, 141, 143, 157; volunteerism vs., 139, 177; for World War 

I, 16–17; for World War II, 25. See also

deployment; Full-Time Support; partial 

mobilization

Moffett Field (California), 164

Montgomery, G. V. “Sonny,” 76–77

Montgomery Amendment (1986), 64

Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits, 

161

Moore, Carlton D., 92

Morris, John, 181

mortuary affairs, 100–101

Moseley, T. Michael, 142

MT program. See Military Technician personnel

Mundy, Carl E., Jr., 91

Muscatatuck Urban Training Center 

(Indiana), 168, 170

National Army, creation of, 16

National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder, 152

National Committee for Employer Support of 

the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), 66–67, 

80–81, 116

National Defense Act (1916), 14, 15, 40

National Defense Act (1920), 22–23, 27

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 

2008), 182, 183

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 

2010), 178

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 

2011), 173

National Defense University study (1985), 58

national emergency, declaration of, 35, 38, 

43, 130

National Guard: 1903 to 1916, 12–14; advent 

of, 9–12; in Armed Forces Reserve 

Act (1952) reorganization, 42; aviation units, 24; cross-leveling, effects 

of, 135–136; elimination of combat 

divisions, 87; family program, 66; firstcalled reserve component, designation 

as, 40; full state status vs. full federal 

status, 102; future role of, 192–193; 

in Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, 

153–155; interwar period, 19, 22–25; 

in Korean conflict, 37–41; merger of all 

services, Gray Board’s recommenda-
302 303

Index Index

tion authority for, 130; need for U.S. 

military forces in, 139; OEF-6 rotation 

and use of IRR soldiers, 144; as priority 

under Obama, 166; USNR personnel in 

provisional reconstruction teams, 146

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, 2003–2011), 

123; 316th Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command (2007), 164; Air Force reserves in, 105–106, 112; Army National Guard in, 104–105; dental problems 

affecting reserve call-up, 113–114; duration of, challenges associated with, 

125–133; family support programs, 

147–148; initiation of, 97, 104–107; involuntary extension of reservist service 

in, 129; Marine Corps reserves in, 104–

108, 122, 129; medical personnel in, 

106; minimizing boots on the ground 

in, 109; mobilization authority for, 

130; mobilization for, 139, 178; Navy 

reserves in, 106, 112–113; new mobilization policy (2006–2011), 158–159; 

Obama policy to end, 166; OIF-2 rotation and 39th Brigade Combat Team, 

130–131; OIF-3 rotation and use of IRR 

soldiers, 144; PRC option in context of, 

108–109; predeployment training in, 

106–107; restructuring ARNG brigades 

to modular units in, 129; restructuring 

improvements (2006–2008), 164; rotational system, USAR institution of 

(2004), 142–143; surge (2007), 160

Operation Jump Start (Mexican border security, 2006–2008), 169

Operation Noble Eagle (homeland security, 

2001), 97, 101, 104, 105, 118, 123, 126

Operation Northern Watch (Iraq combat operations), 89, 104

Operation Southern Watch (Iraq combat operations), 89, 104

ORC (Officers’ Reserve Corps), 14, 22

Organized Reserve Corps: interwar period, 

22–23; in Korean conflict, 37–38; postWorld War II, 32–34; in World War II, 

25–26, 31

O’Ryan, John F., 17–18

overseas duty, 14

Palmer, John McAuley, 17, 21–23, 22,

30–31, 35

Papp, Robert J., Jr., 121, 166

partial mobilization, 70, 77, 99–100, 100,

103, 123, 127; Chapman on, 133; end 

to partial mobilization authority, 177; in 

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), 166; in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

130

part-time service options, 150, 193

Pataki, George E., 99

pay and benefits: 1970s, 60–61; from civilian employers, 81; deferred compensation funds, 175; full state status vs. full 

federal status and, 102; incentives for 

extended service in Iraq, 129, 131; incentives for recruitment during Iraq and 

Afghanistan operations, 135; incentives 

for regular soldiers to join Army Reserves (2009), 176–177; Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits, 161; 

post-9/11 period, 174–175; retirement 

benefits, 178–179, 196; Survivor 

Benefit Plan, 120. See also health care; 

TRICARE

Pennington, David, 145

Pennsylvania: 14th Quartermaster Detachment, 75; 28th Infantry Division,, 10, 

37; 193rd Special Operations Wing (Air 

Guard), 104; ARNG divisions in Joint 

Guardian operations, 93; first state to 

create an organized combat division, 

10; 9/11 security response by Army National Guard, 99

Pentagon. See Department of Defense

Pentagon attack. See September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks

Pershing, John J., 17–18, 21, 27

Persian Gulf conflict. See Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm

Philippines, 11, 19, 25, 125

Pierce, Franklin, 7–8

Platoon Leaders Class (Marines), 24

Plewes, Thomas J., 98, 108, 121

Pogue, Forrest C., 16

Polk, James K., 7

Porche, Robin C., 110, 120

in Afghanistan and Iraq, 168; in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), 

146, 168; in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

168; Returning Warrior Workshop 

(RWW), 180–181; Southwest Reserve 

Component Command, 180; unit readiness levels of (2006), 138; Variable 

Service as continuum of service option 

for, 176

Navy Reserve Order Writing System, 110

Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System, 

111

NDAA. See National Defense Authorization 

Act

NECC (Navy Expeditionary Combat 

Command), 168

New Look strategy, 47, 49, 52

New Orleans, battle of (1815), 5, 6

New York: Seventh Regiment, 8; 69th Infantry, New York Army National Guard, 

8; 71st New York, 12; 77th Regional Support Command, 99–100; naval 

militia, 14; 9/11 security response by 

Army National Guard and Reserve, 

99–100

NGA. See National Guard Association

NGAUS (National Guard Association of the 

United States), 141, 165

NGB. See National Guard Bureau

Nicaragua, 64

9/11. See September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks

Nixon, Richard, 56–57

Noble Eagle. See Operation Noble Eagle

nontraditional missions, 166–169

Normandy, invasion of (1944), 27

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

58–59

North Dakota: 34th Infantry Division, 27; 

164th Infantry, 27

Northern Watch (Iraq combat operations), 

89, 104

North Korea, 37–41, 55, 84. See also Korean 

conflict

Norway, training exercises in, 59

notification to reservists: improved process 

(2007–2011), 177–178; limited-notice, 

partial call-up, 66; no-notice nature of 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(1990–1990), 75; of recall, 53; of reporting date, 40, 53, 55; short notice 

problems at start of Afghanistan and 

Iraq operations, 177

NROTC (Naval Reserve Officers’ Training 

Corps), 24

nuclear attack, task force to assist in case of 

(2008), 169–170

Nyland, W. L., 144

Obama, Barack, 166

Office of Air Force Reserve, 56

Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 161, 

164

Office of Readiness and Reserve, 92

Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, 171

Officers’ Reserve Corps (ORC), 14, 22

Offsite Agreement (1993), 86, 109, 190

Ohio: 37th Infantry Division, 27; homeland 

response force (HRF) team, 170

Oklahoma: 45th Infantry Division, 37–38

Olympics (Winter 2002), 101–102

179-day active-duty issue, 151, 177

One Navy concept, 145, 149

1,095-rule and Active Duty for Operational 

Support (ADOS), 151

Operation Allied Force (NATO, 1999), 94

operational role of reserves, 112, 137, 149–

150, 155, 157, 164–165, 174–176, 

184–185, 187; Coast Guard Reserve 

considered to serve in (1999), 92, 

166; future policies on, 192; post-9/11 

attacks, 97–103; reasons in favor of, 

196–197

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(1990–1991), 69–81, 72, 74–78, 80–84, 

87, 93, 108, 122, 126

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan, 2001–2014), 97, 101, 103–108, 

118–119, 123; duration of, challenges 

associated with, 125–126; minimizing 

boots on the ground in, 109; mobiliza-
304 305

Index Index

189–194; time needed for combat readiness, 78, 86; Truman’s executive order 

(1948) for, 37; in World War I, 18–19

Ready Reserve: authorized ceiling, 43; Berlin 

crisis and, 52; involuntary call-up post9/11, 99; Korean War and, 48–49; Operation Desert Storm (1991) and, 71; 

personnel numbers of, 51, 67; Selected 

Reserve within, 55–56; Vietnam War 

and, 55. See also Individual Ready 

Reserve

Ready Response Reserve Units, 151

Reagan, Ronald W., 61–62, 62

rebalancing between active and reservist 

units, 127–130

Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on 

the Guard and Reserve (Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs report 2004), 146

redeployment policy of “first-in, first-out,” 

79

reductions in force: in 1990s, 69, 82; post–

Cold War, 74, 77, 80–81, 83–84, 91; 

U.S. allies since end of Cold War, 188

regional training center (RTC), 162

regular component: budgetary constraints, 

188–189; capable of handling operations from War of 1812 until World 

War II, 188; interwar period, 21; United 

States unable to support a large enough 

force to meet national security needs, 

187; U.S. Constitution authorizing, 

3. See also integration of active and 

reserve components

Reimer, Dennis J., 88

reintegration of returning citizen-soldier with 

community and family, 179–180

Republicans vs. Federalists (1790s), 4

Reserve Forces Act (1955), 49

Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act (1967), 55–56

Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), 41–42, 

60, 61, 63–66, 80, 108

Reserve Officer Personnel Act (1954), 50

Reserve Officers Association, 54, 132

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), 

14, 22, 26, 30

Reserve Order Writing System (ROWS), 110

Reserve Strategic Assessment Team, 121

reservists: approaching breaking point 

(2003–2006), 133–142; churn in units, 

effect of, 112, 191; civilian law enforcement personnel as, 105, 117, 128; 

civilian occupations critical to maintain security balanced against reserve 

needs, 190; combat role, future policy 

on, 192–193; critical role historically, 187–188, 196; employers of, 87, 

116–117, 132, 178; failure to recognize 

contributions of, 153–154; federal-only, advent of, 14–15; historical origins 

of, 2; involuntary extension of service, 

129; involuntary use, proposal for, 139; 

lack of training, in Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991), 74, 

78; media coverage of, 154–155; more 

geographically connected to home 

units, 83–84; officers, indefinite appointment of, 42; as percent of DoD’s 

military manpower, 116; predictability 

desired by, 140, 141, 157–160, 177, 

185; skills of, 53–54, 117; stop-loss 

measures to prevent retirements, 112; 

24 months cumulative service, interpretation of, 130–132, 135, 138, 141, 

143, 157; in war on terrorism operations, 126. See also Air Force Reserve, 

U.S.; Army Reserve, U.S.; Coast Guard 

Reserve, U.S.; integration of active and 

reserve components; Marine Corps 

Reserve, U.S.; Naval Reserve, U.S.

resiliency inspired by Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, 183

retention rates, 83–84, 125–126, 131–132, 

134–135

Retired Reserve, 44

Returning Warrior Workshop (RWW), 

180–181

Revolutionary War, American. See American 

War of Independence

RFPB. See Reserve Forces Policy Board

Rhode Island 43rd Division, 37

Richard, Ronald D., 91

Ridgway, Matthew B., 49

Porter, James E. “Eddie”, 161

port security units (PSUs), 74

Posse Comitatus Act (1878), 102, 154

Postal Service. See U.S. Postal Service

postdeployment downtime, 118–119

Post-Deployment Health Reassessment 

Program (2005), 152

postmobilization training, 77, 162–163, 194

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 152–

153, 183–184

post–World War II challenges, 30–33

Powell, Colin L., 82–83, 85

Pratt, Paul E., 112, 122

PRC. See presidential reserve call-up

predeployment training: in Defense authorization act (1995), 86; Gates’s mobilization policy and, 159, 161–163; 

improvement recommendations post–

Desert Storm experience (1992), 84; 

mission change, effect of, 163–164; in 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(1990–1991), 77–78; in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, 106–107; regional training 

centers for USAR/ARNG units, 162; 

state adjutant generals’ authority to 

certify for their units, 163

presidential call-up authority, 13, 25

presidential reserve call-up (PRC), 33, 66, 

93, 103, 151

presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC), 

47, 57, 70, 70, 93–94

presidential selected reserve call-up authority, 57, 66, 67, 71, 86, 93

pretrained personnel in reserve forces, 35

privateers, 5

Project Quicksilver (1989), 74

promotion system, 42, 161, 195

protest movement (1960s), 56

Proud Spirit (exercise 1980), 60

PSRC. See presidential selected reserve 

call-up

PSUs (port security units), 74

PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), 152–

153, 183–184

public opinion: after Vietnam War, 188; Operation Desert Storm and, 83; Operation 

Iraqi Freedom and, 155; protest movement (1960s), 56; on standing military 

and its size, 3, 187–188; on state-based 

National Guard system, 190

USS Pueblo, 55

Puerto Rico: 311th Quartermaster Company 

(Mortuary Affairs), 100; ARNG infantry brigade in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

104

Punaro, Arnold, 175, 176, 187, 192

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 1996–

1997 review, 88–89; 2001 review, 

97–98, 98, 101; 2005 review, 151

Quantico, Virginia, wounded warrior call 

center, 184

Quebec, battle of (1711), 1

racial desegregation, 49

“rainbow” units, 90, 94

RAND study on assistant secretary of defense 

for reserve affairs, 86

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 65

readiness: Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model (2006), 143; Bottom-Up 

Review (BUR), 85–86; Coast Guard 

Reserve, realignment to address (2008–

2010), 166; in Cold War period, 56; in 

early national period, 5, 6; in Eisenhower administration, 49; family readiness 

for overseas mobilization, 66, 114–115; 

First-to-Fight, First-to-Equip policy, 

62, 62–63, 67; improvement recommendations post–Desert Storm experience (1992), 84, 94; improvements due 

to restructuring (2006–2008), 164; in 

interwar period, 22, 25; in Operation 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990–

1991), 77–79; in post-World War II 

period, 30, 35; rapid response without 

waiting for reservists to mobilize, 127–

128, 191; rotational system, institution 

of (2004), 143; Selected Reserve Force 

and, 54–55; shortcomings, reasons for, 
306 307

Index Index

The South: in Civil War (Confederacy), 8–9; 

draft during Civil War, 9; in early national period, 6

South Carolina: 169th Fighter Wing, 104

South Dakota: 34th Infantry Division, 27

Southern Watch (Iraq combat operations), 

89, 104

Southwest Asia: air bridge to, 103–104, 106; 

combat operations in, 172; U.S. forces 

stationed in prior to Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm, 70

Soviet Union, 30, 32, 52, 81. See also Cold 

War

Spanish-American War (1898), 10–12, 14

SPARs (Semper Paratus Always Ready), 29

special forces, 103–104

Special Operations Command, U.S., 168

Standard Bearer (Army initiative), 84

Standby Reserve, 44, 48

standing army: in early national period, 3; 

expense of, 187; Founders’ fear of, 3, 

187; interwar period, 19, 22

standing militia in early national period, 3–5

state Guard units: first state to create an organized combat division, 10; full state 

status vs. full federal status, 102; Offsite 

Agreement (1993), 86, 109, 190; public 

opinion on state-based system, 190; 

state adjutant generals’ authority to 

certify for their units, 163; state-centered missions and, 190–191; Title 32 

(state control), 101, 102, 154, 163, 169. 

See also unit cohesiveness

state militias: in Civil War, 8; in early national period, 5; enrollment requirement 

(1792), 4; in Mexican-American War, 

7; U.S. Constitution authorizing, 3; in 

World War I, 19

Stennis, John C., 63

Stevens, Jason, 167

Stimson, Henry L., 31–32

stop-loss orders, 108, 112, 135

Strategic Air Command, 65

Strategic Reserve, 38–39

Stryker units, 128–129

Stultz, Jack C., 142, 147, 151–152, 161–164, 

176, 179

Stultz, Laura, 183

Sullivan, Gordon R., 78

summer training programs, 14, 23, 24, 32, 39

superpower status of United States, 188. See 

also Cold War

Supreme Court cases interpreting USERRA 

protections, 87

Survivor Benefit Plan, 120

Tactical Air Command, 64

tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance 

groups, 55, 59

Tafanelli, Lee, 192–193

Taliban, 103, 104, 118, 153, 166

TAR. See Training and Administration of the 

Reserve

Task Force Phoenix, 169

Taylor, Robert V., 113

Taylor, Zachary, 7

TBI (traumatic brain injury), 183, 184

Team Coast Guard, 92

technician program. See Military Technician 

(MT) personnel

Temple, Larry, 167

terrorism. See Global War on Terrorism; specific terrorist groups and U.S. military 

operations

Tet Offensive (Vietnam War), 55

Texas: ARNG divisions in Joint Guardian 

operations, 93; VFA–201 F/A–18A 

squadron (Fort Worth), 106

threat- and capability-based force, 82

Titles 10 and 32 orders. See U.S. Code

total force: Air Force and, 89; goal to make 

responsive seamless system, 123; integration as goal for, 92, 165; reserves’ 

role in, 121

Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan 

(Marines, 2010), 179

Total Force policy: Air Force and (1980s), 

64–65; challenges to, 128, 155; Laird’s 

description of (1970), 57–58; Operation Desert Storm as test of, 69–70, 73, 

Robins Air Force Base (Georgia), 56; conference on employers and medical practices (1992), 81

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 15, 23, 25

Root, Elihu, 12

Rosenberg, Anna M., 42, 42–43

ROTC. See Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

Rough Riders (1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry), 

12

Roundout concept, 58, 76, 79

roundout units, 63, 75–78, 86

ROWS (Reserve Order Writing System), 110

RTC (regional training center), 162

Rumsfeld, Donald H., 127; desire to transform U.S. military, 109, 113, 119, 127; 

IRR and, 143; mobilization decisions 

of, 103, 131–133, 138–140, 157–159; 

resignation of, 155; on volunteerism, 

127, 131, 158, 177

Rwanda, 89

RWW (Returning Warrior Workshop), 

180–181

sailor-for-life mindset, 145, 176

Saint-Mihiel, battle of (1918), 16, 17

Saipan, battle of (1944), 28

Salotti, Janet S., 183

San Juan Hill, battle of (1898), 12

Santiago de Cuba, battle of (1898), 14

Saratoga, battle of (1777), 2

Saudi Arabia, 69

Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm (1990–1991), 71–78

Schlesinger, James R., 58

Schneider, Richard W., 92

Schoomaker, Peter J., 126, 128, 134–136

Schultz, Roger C., 144

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 69, 76, 79

Scott, Winfield, 8

Sea Power 21 (Navy), 120

Section 673b authority. See presidential 

call-up authority

Selected Reserve: challenge of filling, 111; 

end strength, 199–200t; establishment 

in Vietnam War, 47, 54–56; integration 

with actives, 195; Navy in Afghanistan and Iraq operations and, 168; in 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(1990–1991), 69, 71, 73, 91; in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 129, 147; post–Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 82, 

84; present numbers of, 67; Reagan-era 

buildup, 63–64; reasons why reservists 

leave prior to completing service, 67; 

transfer of Individual Ready Reserve 

members to, 59

Selective Service Act (1917), 15–16

Selective Service Act (1948), 32–33, 36

Selective Service System, 57

Selective Training and Service Act (1940), 

32

Semper Paratus Always Ready (SPARs), 29

separation pay, 43

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 97–103. 

See also Operation Enduring Freedom; 

Operation Iraqi Freedom; Operation 

Noble Eagle

Serbia, 93, 94

Severson, Richard R., 112

Shaver, David E., 194

Shellito, Larry W., 181

Sherrard, James E., III, 100–101, 122

Shiloh, battle of, 8

Shinseki, Eric K., 114

Signal Corps Reserve, 16

Sinai deployment, 125, 127, 130

Skelton, Ike, 149

Sloncen, Robert E., 92

smaller-scale contingency operations, 88

Smiley, Robert H., 126, 138, 153, 158, 161, 

163

Smith, Holland M., 28

Smith, Jeffrey D., 121

Smith, Ralph C., 28

soldier-for-life mindset, 152

Somalia, 89, 188
308 309

Index Index

Vietnam War, 54–56; postwarr decline in 

U.S. defense posture, 59–60; public 

reaction to, 56, 188; reserves’ use in, 

126; War Powers Act (1973) passed in 

reaction to, 57

Vinson, Carl, 41

Virginia: 29th Infantry Division, 27; 192nd 

Fighter Wing, Air National Guard, 172; 

ARNG divisions in Joint Guardian operations, 93

Vision 2000, 90

voluntary vs. involuntary active duty, 117, 

205

Volunteer Army, 11, 19, 127

volunteerism: additional active duty, volunteering for, 160; Air Expeditionary 

Force and, 177; mobilization vs., 139, 

177; Navy and, 106; obstacles to, 151; 

Rumsfeld’s focus on, 127, 131, 158, 

177. See also all-volunteer force

Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve, 24

Vuono, Carl E., 77

Walker, David M., 174–175

Walsh, Ellard A., 31, 40, 43

Walter Reed Army Medical Center (Washington, DC), 183

War College, 12

War Department, 11–12, 16, 21, 23, 31, 32

War of 1812, 5, 6, 7, 187, 188

War Powers Act (1973), 57

Warsaw Pact, 81

Washington, George, 3, 4

weather reconnaissance mission, 90

Webb, James H., Jr., 62, 64–65, 65

Weigley, Russell F., 56

Weinberger, Caspar W., 62, 62

Weinberger policy. See First-to-Fight, Firstto-Equip

Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Award 

Program (2004), 148

West Germany, 52, 58

White, Thomas D., 51

White, Thomas E., 101

Whiteman Air Force Base (Missouri), 171

Willow Grove base (Philadelphia), 171–172

Wilson, Charles E., 47, 50, 55, 67

Wilson, Woodrow, 15

Wingate, George W., 10

Winkenwerder, William, 114

Winnefeld, James A., Jr., 193

women: Army Reserve, recruitment of, 61; 

Marine Reserve (F) classification, 17; 

National Guard, legislation allowing 

women to serve in, 50; Navy recruitment of, 17; Navy TAR program open 

to, 61; in World War II military service, 

29; Yeoman (F) classification, 17

Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency 

Service (WAVES), 29

Women’s Army Corps (WAC), 29

Wood, Leonard, 13–14, 18

World Trade Center attack. See September 

11, 2001 terrorist attacks

World War I, 14, 15–19, 21, 27

World War II, 25–30; most decorated battalion (100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry 

Regiment), 86; U.S. preparation for 

entry into, 37, 77

World War II veterans, 33, 38–39, 41, 42, 47

wounded personnel, care of, 183–184

Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR), 184

Wyatt, Harry M., III, 177

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, 180,

180–182, 185

Yom Kippur War (1973), 59

Yugoslavia, dissolution of, 93

76–77, 81, 94; origins of, 51; in post9/11 operations, 123; ramifications of, 

67, 126, 195–197; Rumsfeld and, 109; 

stress created by, 125–126. See also

integration of active and reserve components

Totushek, John B., 98, 106, 110, 111, 112–

113, 120

training: Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model (2006), 143; differences 

between actives and reserves, 196; drill 

period, lengthening of, 55; mission 

change, effect of, 163–164; premobilization, 191; rotational system, USAR 

institution of (2004), 142–143; senior 

reserve component officers, professional military education for, 175–176. See 

also postmobilization training; predeployment training; readiness; summer 

training programs; universal military 

training

Training and Administration of the Reserve 

(TAR), 50–51, 61, 64, 90–91, 136

transatlantic flight (Lindbergh), 24

Transients-Trainees-Holdees-Students 

account, 110–111, 146

traumatic brain injury (TBI), 183, 184

TRICARE, 114, 147; Reserve Select (TRS), 

147, 155, 178–179, 185

Truman, Harry S., 30, 36–38, 40, 79

Turkey, Air Guard in, 90

24 months cumulative service, 130–132, 135, 

138, 141, 143, 157

Umbarger, R. Martin, 165

UMT (universal military training), 30–31, 

41, 43

under secretary of defense (USD) for personnel and readiness (P&R), 86–87, 133, 

183

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 

(1994), 87, 116–117, 139

The Union in Civil War, 7–9

unit cohesiveness, 28, 30, 135, 139, 143, 158, 

191

United Nations, 38

universal military obligation, 9

universal military training (UMT), 30–31, 

40–41, 43

Universal Military Training and Service Act 

(1951), 40–41

Upton, Emory, 10–13, 11, 18, 35, 190

USAF. See Air Force, U.S.

USAFR. See Air Force Reserve, U.S.

USAR. See Army Reserve, U.S.

USARC. See Army Reserve Command

USCG. See Coast Guard, U.S.

USCGR. See Coast Guard Reserve, U.S.

U.S. Code: Title 10 (federal control), 102, 

117, 154; Title 10, section 12302, 103, 

130, 131; Title 32 (state control), 101, 

102, 154, 163, 169

USMC. See Marine Corps, U.S.

USMCR. See Marine Corps Reserve, U.S.

U.S.-Mexico border, 169

USN. See Navy, U.S.

USNR. See Naval Reserve, U.S. [after 2005 

Navy Reserve, U.S.]

U.S. Postal Service, 67, 81

U.S. Southern Command, 59

U.S. Volunteers, 8, 11

Utah: 19th Special Forces Group, 103; 142nd 

Military Intelligence Battalion, 103

“Utilization of the Total Force” memorandum (Gates), 140, 158, 158–159

Vaughn, Clyde A., 138, 141, 158, 159–160, 

166, 167, 194

Vermont 43rd Division, 37

veterans as reservists, 43, 47, 53, 55. See also

World War II veterans

Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act (1955), 

50

Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act (1968), 

87

Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act (1988), 

66

VFA–201 F/A–18A squadron (Fort Worth, 

Texas), 106
311

About the Authors

Forrest L. Marion

A staff historian since 1998 at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama, Dr. Marion served 30 years in the U.S. Air Force in both active and 

reserve components, retiring as a colonel in 2010 with 16 years on active duty. He 

completed a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering at the Virginia Military Institute 

and advanced degrees in history at the University of Alabama and University of Tennessee. While on active duty he flew helicopters for seven years and, later, instructed 

at the Air Force’s Squadron Officer School at Maxwell. In the Air Force Reserve, he 

served as a historical officer at AFHRA from 1993 to 2002 and finished his military 

career on the faculty of the Air War College, also at Maxwell. As a historian, he deployed to the southern Philippines in 2002 for Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, and in 2009 (military status) and 2011 (civilian status) to Kabul, Afghanistan, 

for OEF-Afghanistan in support of the air advisor mission.

His publications include Brothers in Berets: The Evolution of Air Force Special 

Tactics, 1953–2003 (Air University Press, 2018); Flight Risk: Advising Afghan Airmen, 

2005–2015 (forthcoming, Naval Institute Press); That Others May Live: USAF Air 

Rescue in Korea (Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004); and 13 articles in 

Air Power History from 1993 to 2016.

Jon T. Hoffman

Jon T. Hoffman assumed the duties of chief historian, U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, in August 2016. He was commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve in December 1978 and served 30 years as an infantry officer and field historian, including 

17 years of active duty, and retired at the rank of colonel in 2008. His active-duty tours 

included three years as a history instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy, a year as the 

historian for the Headquarters Marine Corps Roles and Missions Office, and two years 

as the deputy director of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division. He served 

as the civilian deputy of the Marine history program from 2002 to 2005, then spent five 

years as head of the Contemporary Studies Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History. From 2010 to 2016, he was the deputy chief historian for the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense Historical Office. 

His publications include Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders

(Presidio Press, 1994); From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific 

War (USMC, 1995); Silk Chutes and Hard Fighting: U.S. Marine Corps Parachute 

Units in World War II (USMC, 1999); Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis 

B. Puller (Random House, 2001), and USMC: A Complete History (HLLA, 2002). 

He also coauthored The Panama Canal: An Army’s Enterprise (Center of Military 

History, 2009), and was general editor of Tip of the Spear: U.S. Army Small-Unit 

Action in Iraq (Center of Military History, 2009) and A History of Innovation: U.S. 

Army Adaptation in War and Peace (Center of Military History, 2009).
HISTORICAL OFFICE • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE • 2018

Forrest L. Marion is a staff historian at the Air Force Historical Research 

Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He served 30 years in the Air Force in 

both active and reserve components, and retired as a colonel in 2010. He 

holds advanced degrees in history from the University of Alabama and the 

University of Tennessee, is a frequent contributor to Air Power History, and 

is the author of three books on Air Force history.

Jon T. Hoffman is the chief historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History. He served 30 years in the Marine Corps Reserve, including 17 years 

of active duty, and retired as a colonel in 2008. He served six years as deputy 

chief historian for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 

and is author, coauthor, or editor of eight books on topics ranging from 

Marine Corps history to the Army’s work on the Panama Canal. 

Forging a Total Force traces the evolution of law and policies governing the Guard 

and reserve, from the militias of the Revolutionary War era to today’s high-tempo 

operational force. In the early years of the republic, the nation idealized the parttime citizen-soldier as the bedrock of national defense. The wars of the 19th 

and early 20th centuries revealed the need for a more professional force, but policy 

failed to keep up with the changing necessity. During the Cold War, the nation struggled 

to provide adequate training and equipment to the reserves until the emergence of the 

Total Force policy, which better integrated regular and reserve components. Even then, 

it wasn’t until the defense buildup of the 1980s that the ideal of a combat-ready reserve 

came closer to reality.

The core of this book is focused on what happened next, from 1990 to 2011, with particular emphasis on the decade after 9/11. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated both the 

effectiveness of the reserve and the challenges it continued to face. The post–Cold War 

drawdown made the nation more dependent on the reserves than it had been since its 

founding, but after 9/11 long and costly deployments strained the reserves. Finally, the 

authors detail the policy changes made midstream to address issues with the overextended force and to further integrate the active and reserve components. The authors 

conclude by detailing the dilemmas policymakers will encounter as they forge ahead 

with citizen-soldiers as a key part of the total force.