No. 2--99--0977

________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________

THE COUNTY OF McHENRY,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

	)	of McHenry County.

	Plaintiff-Appellant,		)

		)

v.	)	Nos.	99--OV--2155

	)		99--OV--2205

	)

KATHRYN THOMA,	)	Honorable

	)	John D. Bolger,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)	Judge, Presiding.

________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following a bench trial, defendant, Kathryn Thoma, was found

guilty of two counts of letting her dog run at large.  Defendant

was charged with these offenses under a McHenry County Ddepartment

of Hhealth ordinance, but the State's Attorney's office prosecuted

defendant for these violations.  Defendant was fined $8 on one

count and $3 on the other count.  The trial court's order stated

that both the $8 fine and the $3 fine included court costs.  The

order also provided that the sentence was entered over the State's

objection, but the order did not indicate to what the State, whoich

represented McHenry County (County), specifically objected.  The

County now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in entering

the order because the court did not assess various costs and fees

and order defendant to pay these costs and fees.  We dismiss the

appeal.

	There are several reasons why this appeal must be dismissed.

All of these reasons are premised on the general notion that a

reviewing court is not a repository into which the appellant can 

dump the burden of research.  Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d  677, 682 (1993).  

	We initially note that the appeal must be dismissed because

the record fails to show that the County preserved in the trial

court the issues it now raises on appeal.  Specifically, the County

has not submitted a report of proceedings or a suitable substitute

to establish that its objection to the sentence, as reflected in

the trial court's order, was an objection to the failure to impose

costs and fees.  The County, as the appellant, has the burden of

presenting a sufficiently complete record, and any doubts that may

arise from an incomplete record must be resolved against the

County.  Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).  Because the record fails to show to what the County objected when

the trial court entered its order, we conclude that the County has

waived review of the arguments it raises on appeal.  People v. Gemeny, 313 Ill. App. 3d 902, 912 (2000).

	Second, we note that the County has failed to establish that 

this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.  The County claims

that this court may hear this appeal under Supreme Court Rule

303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)).  The County argues that it

may appeal this cause under the civil rules for appealing final

judgments because ordinance violations are quasi-criminal and many of the civil rules apply in prosecutions for ordinance violations. 

While this may be true, this court was not provided with a copy of

the ordinance at issue here.  This court cannot take judicial

notice of an ordinance unless the parties have supplied the court

with a copy of the ordinance or the court has ready access to the

ordinance.  Thiede v. Tambone, 196 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258 (1990).  Without access to this ordinance, we have no way of knowing, and we

refuse to speculate, what the penalties for multiple offenses under

the ordinance are and whether the ordinance is quasi-criminal.

	The County also argues that this court has jurisdiction

because the trial court's order was void, and void judgments may be

attacked at any time.  In making this argument, the County relies

on City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504 (1998), and People v. Malchow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 665 (1999).  In both of these cases, the courts held that the State could challenge a defendant's sentence

on appeal because the sentence that was entered was void.  Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 510; Malchow, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 676.  More specifically, in both of those cases, the sentences were void

because each trial judge sentenced the defendant to a term of

imprisonment that was not within the minimum sentencing provisions

of the applicable law.  See Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 510 (trial court's order was void because minimum term of sentence under the

ordinance was 90 days' imprisonment and the trial court sentenced

the defendant to 10 days' community service); Malchow, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 675 (trial court's order sentencing the defendant to 18 months' conditional discharge was void because under the applicable

law the defendant's minimum sentence was 7 days' imprisonment).

	Here, in contrast to both Roman and Malchow, the County is not arguing that the trial court entered a sentence that was not within

the minimum sentencing provisions for the offense.  Thus, Roman and Malchow are not applicable, and the County's argument must fail.

	Finally, we note that the County failed to supply this court

with copies of or citations to the ordinances that allegedly

entitled the County to various costs and fees.  For example, the

County claims that it is entitled to a $5 court fund fee, a $10

court security fee, a $5 court automation fee, and a $5 document

storage fee.  The County argues that it is entitled to the $5 court

fund fee under section 5--1101 of the Counties Code (Code) (55 ILCS

5/5--1101 (West 1998)), and the County claims that it can collect

a $10 court security fee under section 5--1103 of the Code.  Both

of these statutes provide that the county board may enact an

ordinance to cover these fees.  The County has not provided this

court with a copy of or citation to any type of ordinance that the

county board enacted to cover these fees.  

	Additionally, the County argues that it can collect a $5 court

automation fee under section 27.3a of the Clerks of the Court Act

(Act) (705 ILCS 105/27.3a (West 1998)), and the County claims that

it has the right to collect a $5 document storage fee under section

27.3c of the Act.  Both of these statutes provide that the county

board may require the county clerk to collect these fees.  The County failed to submit any documentation establishing that the

McHenry county board required the county clerk to impose these

costs.  Because the County failed to submit any ordinance or other

documentation showing that McHenry County has enacted laws to take

advantage of these various costs, we determine that the County's

argument is waived.  See Thiede, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 258.

	For these reasons, the appeal from the order of the circuit

court of McHenry County is dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

23(c)(2) (166 Ill. 2d R. 23(c)(2)).

	Appeal dismissed.

	McLAREN, J., 3withwith .. and GEIGER and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concurring.