IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA18-873

Filed: 19 May 2020

Iredell County, No. 13 CVS 2701

KIM and BARRY LIPPARD, Plaintiffs,

v.

LARRY HOLLEMAN and ALAN HIX, Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 17 April 2018 by Judge Mark E. Klass

in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 March 2019.

Seth B Weinshenker, P.A., by Seth B. Weinshenker, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Gibbs & Associates Law Firm, LLC, by Seth J. Kraus and E. Bedford Cannon, 

for defendants-appellees.

MURPHY, Judge.

Kim Lippard (“Mrs. Lippard”) and Barry Lippard (“Mr. Lippard”) (together, 

“Plaintiffs”) allege multiple claims of defamation against Larry Holleman 

(“Holleman”) and Alan Hix (“Hix”) (together, “Defendants”). The First Amendment

does not permit courts to hear defamation claims when they were made during an 

internal religious dispute regarding ecclesiastical matters. We affirm the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs were members of Diamond Hill Baptist Church (“DHBC”), where 

Mrs. Lippard had served as church pianist and vocalist. Holleman was the Pastor of

the Church and Hix was Minister of Music. Holleman was DHBC’s leader and was 

“responsible for leading [DHBC] to function as a New Testament Church.” This 

included leading the congregation and DHBC staff to perform their tasks and caring 

for the DHBC members. Hix directed DHBC’s music organization. Its purpose was 

“to teach music, train persons to lead, sing, and play music, [and] provide music in 

the [DHBC] and community.” Under Hix’s direction, the music organization 

“provide[d] and interpret[ed] information regarding the work of the [DHBC] and 

denomination.” 

On 8 August 2012, Mrs. Lippard and Hix had a disagreement over the reassignment of a music solo. The solo was originally assigned to Mrs. Lippard for an 

upcoming Sunday morning service. Hix, however, asked another choir member to 

perform the solo and Mrs. Lippard was upset about the reassignment. When an 

internal conflict between church members arises, DHBC’s bylaws maintain that “the 

pastor and the deacons will take every reasonable measure to resolve the problem in 

accord with Matthew 18.” 

As church leader, Holleman began meeting with Mrs. Lippard and Hix to 

facilitate a “reconciliation” between them and an “improved relationship based on 
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biblical passages.” On 26 August 2012, after several unsuccessful reconciliation 

meetings, Holleman met with the Board of Deacons (“Deacons”) to discuss whether 

Mrs. Lippard should be dismissed from her position as DHBC pianist. At the 

meeting, the Deacons voted to recommend Mrs. Lippard’s dismissal to DHBC’s 

Church Personnel Committee (“the Personnel Committee”). Three days later, 

Holleman informed Mrs. Lippard that the Deacons had voted to recommend her 

dismissal. 

In response to a voice message from Mr. Lippard, Holleman arranged further 

counseling sessions between Mrs. Lippard and Hix. The sessions were to continue 

seeking a “reconciliation” between the two and were scheduled for late September 

through October 2012. 

Ultimately, the Deacons announced its decision to again recommend Mrs. 

Lippard’s dismissal and re-submitted its recommendation to the Personnel 

Committee. The Personnel Committee met and voted to recommend to the full 

congregation that Mrs. Lippard be dismissed as DHBC pianist. The decision had to

be approved by an affirmative vote of three-fourths of DHBC members. On 13 

November 2012, Holleman delivered a letter to Mrs. Lippard, setting forth the 

reasons for his recommendation to dismiss her as pianist.1 

 

1 Although the 13 November letter Holleman sent to Mrs. Lippard is not included in the 

Record, Plaintiffs assert the 13 November letter is a shortened version of a 28 November 2012 letter 

made available to the full DHBC congregation, which is included in the Record. Defendants do not 

contest this assertion. 
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On 25 November 2012, during the morning DHBC church service, Holleman

announced to his congregation that there would be a “church-wide” meeting and a 

vote in three days. At that meeting, DHBC staff would be discussed and it was part 

of the responsibilities of members to be present for the discussion and to vote. He 

also said that a written letter explaining a motion and absentee ballots for the motion 

would be made available. 

At the “church-wide” meeting on 28 November 2012, Holleman delivered a 

sermon on the motion to terminate Mrs. Lippard from the pianist position. He 

repeatedly stated that the recommendation for Mrs. Lippard’s dismissal stemmed 

from her “unwillingness to commit” to the DHBC’s reconciliation process. After the 

meeting, Holleman left printed copies of his 28 November 2012 sermon in the foyer 

for members of the congregation. He also made a letter available titled “Concluding 

Comments to the Present disciplinary Actions by The Body of Deacons and the 

Personnel Committee (November 13, 2012).” It said, “I (we) have yet to hear you 

acknowledge any personal responsibility for your failures.” The letter concluded that 

Mrs. Lippard, “by placing conditions upon [her] obedience to the scriptures as they 

regard reconciliation, ha[s] been the obstacle to that reconciliation.” 

In a sermon on 2 December 2012, Holleman advocated for the DHBC

congregation to remove Mrs. Lippard from the pianist position. Ballots were 

distributed stating the Deacons recommended the dismissal of Mrs. Lippard “due to 
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her unwillingness to admit to any wrongdoing, or to commit unconditionally to the 

process of reconciliation.” The congregation voted against dismissal, and Mrs. 

Lippard remained in her position. Holleman and Hix also continued in their 

respective leadership positions. 

Plaintiffs allege that, after the vote, Holleman and the Deacons unsuccessfully 

sought to remove them as members of DHBC, and that Defendants continued to 

speak with members of the congregation about Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that in

Holleman’s sermons he “continued . . . to defame [Plaintiffs] by consistently preaching 

against those who would not commit to reconciliation,” alluding to Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs further contend Hix said to a DHBC member that “[Mr.] Lippard is a liar 

and you and other people like you are believing him instead of the Scripture.” On 8 

January 2013, Hix also emailed DHBC member Tony Brewer (“Brewer”) about the 

situation, stating Plaintiffs were “openly denying” “verifiable facts” about the 

reconciliation process. 

Holleman also communicated with others about Plaintiffs. When Brewer

complained of the efforts to remove Plaintiffs, Holleman sent a letter to him alleging

that Mrs. Lippard “refuses to acknowledge any wrongdoing, and that she was 

unwilling to commit unconditionally to the process of reconciliation.” In a 6 April 

2013 email, Holleman claimed Mr. Lippard once “blocked [Hix’s] exit from the music 

room and was aggressively going after [Hix], pointing his finger in [Hix]’s face, an 
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action [Holleman] recently learned was illegal and could have very well been reported 

as a crime.” Holleman also emailed DHBC member A.W. Myers (“Myers”), stating 

Mrs. Lippard failed to acknowledge her own role in the dispute between her and Hix. 

In August 2013, Mrs. Lippard resigned her position as DHBC pianist and Plaintiffs 

began attending another church.

A. Unpublished Lippard

Shortly after Mrs. Lippard’s resignation, Plaintiffs filed this action against 

DHBC and Defendants, alleging they were defamed by Defendants, who Plaintiffs 

also allege committed ultra vires corporate activities. In their answer, Defendants 

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim against 

DHBC without prejudice, leaving only their claims against Defendants. Defendants’

Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Anna Mills Wagoner on 25 May 

2014. Defendants later moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for ultra 

vires activities, and Judge Theodore Royster granted Defendants’ motion, leaving 

only the claims for defamation against Defendants. 

After retaining new counsel, Plaintiffs filed a separate civil action (No. 15-CVS606) against Defendants and DHBC upon nearly identical claims of defamation, ultra 

vires activities, and negligent supervision while the claims in the 2013 case were still 

active. Defendants moved to dismiss the claims in No. 15-CVS-606 and made an oral 
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motion to dismiss the claims in this case as well. Judge Michael Duncan dismissed 

the claims in No. 15-CVS-606 while refusing to rule on Defendants’ oral motion to 

dismiss the claims in this case, finding that Judge Wagoner had previously ruled on 

that issue. 

Defendants filed an additional motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ remaining 

defamation claims in this case on 16 February 2016 for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). Judge Martin B. 

McGee heard the motion on 21 March 2016 and dismissed Plaintiffs’ defamation 

claim in an order, stating “[t]he First Amendment deprives the [c]ourt of jurisdiction 

to resolve this dispute involving internal communications between church leadership 

and members of the congregation relating to issues of membership and music 

leadership.” 

Plaintiffs appealed and we vacated and remanded the judgment to the trial 

court in an unpublished opinion. Lippard v. Holleman, No. COA16-886, 253 N.C. 

App. 407, 798 S.E.2d 812, 2017 WL 1629377, at *3 (2017) (unpublished) (hereinafter 

Unpublished Lippard).2 In vacating and remanding the trial court’s dismissal of 

Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(1), we held that Judge McGee’s grant of 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss impermissibly overruled Judge Wagoner’s denial of 

 

2 Our recognition of the law of this case does not convert the holding in our previously 

unpublished opinion into binding precedent. See Rule 30(e).
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the same action. We reasoned subject matter 

jurisdiction is not an exception to the general rule that “one Superior Court judge 

may not correct another’s errors of law; and . . . ordinarily one judge may not modify, 

overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made 

in the same action.” Unpublished Lippard, 2017 WL 1629377, at *3 (quoting

Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972)) (internal 

quotations omitted). We further held that none of the recognized exceptions to the 

Calloway rule applied. See id. at *5. Although we discussed jurisdiction and the 

ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine under the First Amendment in dicta, our opinion 

did not reach the merits of the issue currently before us.

B. Decision on Remand

On remand to the trial court, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 

under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56, stating there was no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judge Mark E. Klass 

granted Defendants’ motion on the following grounds: (1) the First Amendment 

barred Plaintiffs’ claims because “inquiry into the falsity of the claimed ‘defamatory 

statements’ would cross the ecclesiastical limitations prohibited by the First 

Amendment”; (2) “Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law in their 

individual capacities” because Plaintiffs “failed to raise any forecast of evidence that 

Defendants made any of their statements in their individual capacities”; (3) 
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Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law in their representative 

capacities because Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Defendants’ principal, DHBC; (4) 

none of Defendants’ statements were defamatory per se as a matter of law; and (5) 

Plaintiffs failed to “provide any evidentiary forecast that they suffered special 

damages because of any of Defendants’ allegedly defamatory per quod statements.” 

Plaintiffs appealed.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2017). “We review a trial 

court’s order granting or denying summary judgment de novo.” Craig ex rel. Craig v. 

New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 353 (2009) 

(internal citations omitted). 

“Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by either the North 

Carolina Constitution or by statute.” Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 

S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987). “The question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at 

any time . . . .” Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d 

83, 85 (1986). “It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a 

court, as such, jurisdiction over subject matter of which it would otherwise not have 
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jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in this sense cannot be obtained by consent of the parties, 

waiver, or estoppel.” Pulley v. Pulley, 255 N.C. 423, 429, 121 S.E.2d 876, 880 (1961) 

(quoting Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 88, 92 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1956)).

A. First Amendment Ecclesiastical Entanglement Doctrine

Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 

Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on First Amendment grounds. 

According to Plaintiffs, their defamation claims do not require the trial court to 

impermissibly weigh church doctrine because “it is the conduct of [Defendants] in 

carrying on reconciliation proceedings and defaming [Plaintiffs] in the course of such 

proceedings, and not the reconciliation proceeding itself, that is at issue.” In contrast, 

Defendants argue the trial court correctly held that the defamation claim is barred 

under the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine because, to determine whether the 

alleged defamatory statements were false, courts would “becom[e] entangled in the 

statements made during the course of [DHBC]’s religious disciplinary and 

administrative activities between the Lippards, Holleman, Hix, and members and 

choir members of DHBC.” We hold that determining the truth or falsity of

Defendants’ alleged defamatory statements—where the content of those statements 

concerns whether Plaintiffs complied with DHBC’s practices—would require us to 

interpret or weigh ecclesiastical matters, an inquiry not permitted by the First 

Amendment. 
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“The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 

Amendment prohibit any ‘law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 

the free exercise thereof.’” Doe v. Diocese of Raleigh, 242 N.C. App. 42, 47, 776 S.E.2d 

29, 34 (2015) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I.). “As applied to the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment also restricts action by state 

governments and the servants, agents and agencies, of state governments.” Hill v. 

Cox, 108 N.C. App. 454, 461, 424 S.E.2d 201, 206 (1993) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). There is “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence 

from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free 

from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and 

doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 

344 U.S. 94, 116, 97 L. Ed. 120 (1952) (emphasis added). “For the First Amendment 

rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve 

their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.” 

McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 212, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948). We “are prohibited 

‘from becoming entangled in ecclesiastical matters’ and have no jurisdiction over 

disputes which require an examination of religious doctrine and practice in order to 

resolve the matters at issue.” Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 47, 776 S.E.2d at 34-35 (quoting 

Johnson v. Antioch United Holy Church, Inc., 214 N.C. App. 507, 510, 714 S.E.2d 806, 

810 (2011).
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An ecclesiastical matter is one which concerns doctrine, 

creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and 

enforcement within a religious association of needful laws

and regulations for the government of membership, and 

the power of excluding from such associations those 

deemed unworthy of membership by the legally constituted 

authorities of the church; and all such matters are within 

the province of church courts and their decision will be 

respected by civil tribunals.

Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 47, 776 S.E.2d at 35 (quoting E. Conference of Original Free 

Will Baptists of N.C. v. Piner, 267 N.C. 74, 77, 147 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1966), overruled 

in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973)). 

Hearing disputes over these matters is prohibited because of two concerns: “(1) by 

hearing religious disputes, a civil court could influence associational conduct, thereby 

chilling the free exercise of religious beliefs; and (2) by entering into a religious 

controversy and putting the enforcement power of the state behind a particular 

religious faction, a civil court risks ‘establishing’ a religion.” Id. at 48, 776 S.E.2d at 

35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Emory v. Jackson Chapel First 

Missionary Baptist Church, 165 N.C. App. 489, 492, 598 S.E.2d 667, 670 (2004)). 

These dangers demand dismissal “when ‘no neutral principles of law exist to 

resolve claims’ so that [a] court can ‘avoid becoming impermissibly entangled in the 

dispute[.]’” Id. at 58, 776 S.E.2d at 41 (alterations omitted) (quoting Harris v. 

Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 273, 643 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2007)). This necessitates an 

answer to a “dispositive question[:] whether resolution of the legal claim requires the 
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court to interpret or weigh church doctrine.” Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 

494, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1998) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 

426 U.S. 696, 710, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 163 (1976)). Only when an “issue to be 

determined in connection with [a party’s] claim is a purely secular one,” then 

“[n]eutral principles of law govern th[e] inquiry and . . . subject matter jurisdiction 

exists in the trial court over th[e] claim.” Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 55, 776 S.E.2d at 39 

(emphasis added); see also Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conference of United 

Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 713 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (holding that “[a] court 

must determine whether the dispute is an ecclesiastical one about discipline, faith, 

internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law, or whether it is a case in 

which it should hold religious organizations liable in civil courts for purely secular 

disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously 

affiliated organization”) (internal marks and citations omitted).

In Harris, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of avoiding 

entanglement in matters such as ecclesiastical governance, doctrine, practice, 

questions, roles of officials, and internal decision-making. Harris v. Matthews, 361 

N.C. 265, 271-73, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570-572 (referencing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 

v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 163 (1976); Md. & Va. Eldership 

of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368, 24 L. Ed.

2d 582, 583 (1970) (per curiam); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
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Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658, 665 (1969)). 

The Supreme Court concluded that

[w]hen a party brings a proper complaint, where civil, 

contract, or property rights are involved, the courts will 

inquire as to whether the church tribunal acted within the 

scope of its authority and observed its own organic forms 

and rules. But when a party challenges church actions 

involving religious doctrine and practice, court 

intervention is constitutionally forbidden.

Harris, 361 N.C. at 274–75, 643 S.E.2d at 572 (internal marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis added). 

Although our courts have not previously decided whether the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine applies to defamation claims, “the principles set out [in 

Harris] concerning the limitations placed by the First Amendment on the subject 

matter jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate claims against religious entities are 

equally applicable here.” Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 49, 776 S.E.2d at 36. Again, “[t]he 

dispositive question is whether resolution of the legal claim[s] requires the court to 

interpret or weigh church doctrine. If not, the First Amendment is not implicated 

and neutral principles of law are properly applied to adjudicate the claim.” Id. at 49,

776 S.E.2d at 36 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 

494, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398, appeal dismissed, 348 N.C. 284, 501 S.E.2d 913 (1998)).

Defamation claims present a unique challenge under this doctrine because, in North 

Carolina, as in other states, these claims include as an essential element the falsity 

of the defendant’s alleged statements. See Parker v. Edwards, 222 N.C. 75, 78, 21 
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S.E.2d 876, 878-89 (1942) (“It may be stated as a general rule . . . that a defamatory 

statement, to be actionable, must be false.”).

Harris maintains that our courts must avoid entanglement in ecclesiastical 

matters, doctrine, and practice. See Harris, 361 N.C. at 269-75, 643 S.E.2d at 569-

72. Not only do we dismiss claims that involve examining or weighing doctrine, but 

we also dismiss claims that involve examining or weighing ecclesiastical matters. 

Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 46-58, 776 S.E.2d at 34-41; see Harris, 361 N.C. at 270, 643 

S.E.2d at 569 (“The constitutional prohibition against court entanglement in 

ecclesiastical matters is necessary to protect First Amendment rights identified by 

the ‘Establishment Clause’ and the ‘Free Exercise Clause.’”). As discussed above, 

ecclesiastical matters go beyond following church scripture or texts, and our 

precedent has shown the breadth of ecclesiastical matters and church doctrine.

In Doe, we distinguished two tort claims that implicated the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine. On the one hand, we allowed an individual’s negligent 

supervision claim against a diocese and a bishop that stemmed from an alleged sexual 

assault, reasoning that neutral principles of law permitted adjudicating an 

individual’s claim that the diocese and bishop knew or should have known of the 

danger posed by the priest to an individual because of his sexual attraction to minors. 

Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 51-55, 776 S.E.2d at 36-39. We concluded there was no need to 

determine issues such as whether the priest should have been incardinated, allowed 
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to remain a priest, or whether the priest’s relationship with the diocese should have 

been severed. Id. On the other hand, we could not adjudicate the same individual’s 

negligence claim based on defendants’ failure to compel the priest to undergo sexually 

transmitted disease (STD) testing. Id. at 56, 776 S.E.2d at 40. We reasoned that the 

liability theory was premised on tenets of the Catholic church, namely, the degree of 

control existing in the relationship between the bishop and priest. Id.

Our Supreme Court held in Harris that a trial court could not judge “the proper 

role of . . . church officials and whether . . . expenditure[s were] proper in light of . . . 

religious doctrine and practice.” Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. 

Therefore, “[b]ecause a church’s religious doctrine and practice affect its 

understanding of each of [the concepts at issue], [this is like] asking a court to 

determine whether a particular church’s grounds for membership are spiritually or 

doctrinally correct or whether a church’s charitable pursuits accord with the 

congregation’s beliefs,” which are barred. Id. Religious doctrine permeates a church’s 

understandings of numerous aspects of its religious practice. See id. 

Various other North Carolina cases inform what is included in the 

ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine. We held in Emory that we could not look into a 

church’s internal customs or practices. Emory v. Jackson Chapel First Missionary 

Baptist Church, 165 N.C. App. 489, 493, 598 S.E.2d 667, 670-71 (2004) (barring an 

examination of informal meeting notice requirements). Yet, in Azige, we reaffirmed 
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that courts may resolve church disputes through neutral principles of property law 

without necessarily becoming entangled in internal church governance concerning 

ecclesiastical matters. Azige v. Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church, 

249 N.C. App. 236, 239, 790 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (2016). Likewise, in Smith, we did 

not have to interpret or weigh doctrine in a negligent retention and supervision claim 

because the claims merely raised the issue of whether church officials knew or had 

reason to know of a cleric’s propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. Smith, 128 

N.C. App. at 495, 495 S.E.2d at 398. 

United States Supreme Court decisions also support our longstanding aversion 

for entanglement in ecclesiastical matters. Religious disputes can include “matters 

of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” See 

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 

(1976). Indeed, more than 150 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that 

religious disputes could cover “theological controversy, church discipline, 

ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the 

standard of morals required of them . . . .” Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733, 20 L. 

Ed. 666 (1871). “[Watson] radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, 

an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for 

themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 

those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 97 L. Ed. 120 (emphasis added).
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Under our precedent and United States Supreme Court precedent, religious 

doctrine and ecclesiastical matters are expansive. Statements made during religious 

disputes can include a religion’s internal customs, practices, beliefs, faith, theology, 

morality, membership, organization, governance, rules, law, discipline, and degree of 

control between members. The nature of speech, and alleged defamatory statements

in particular, more easily touch upon these subjects than negligence or property 

claims. To illustrate, a corporation’s communications are riddled with corporate 

issues and business matters, just as a religion’s internal communications are riddled 

with religious issues and ecclesiastical matters. It is then unlikely that a church’s 

internal communications will be “purely secular.” See Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 55, 776 

S.E.2d at 39 (holding that we have subject matter jurisdiction over an issue when a 

“claim is a purely secular one” because “[n]eutral principles of law [can] govern th[e] 

inquiry”). 

For defamation claims, we must consider whether a statement is true or false 

without examining or inquiring into ecclesiastical matters or church doctrine. See 

Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 48, 776 S.E.2d at 35. Those matters permeate much of a 

religion’s internal communications, and so it will be a rare occurrence when a 

religion’s internal statements are purely secular. We must remain cautious of 

deciding the truth or falsity of a religion’s internal communications because doing so 
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risks chilling the religion’s “associational conduct” or putting our pen’s power “behind 

a particular religious faction.” See id. at 48, 776 S.E.2d at 35. 

Finally, we cannot favor religions with scripture and disfavor religions without 

scripture. Religions without authoritative scripture or internal documentation would 

be more susceptible to defamation claims than those without. We cannot 

disadvantage religions that lack such texts. Nor can we decide if a religion has 

sufficiently deep ecclesiastical points of faith and practice compared to others. The 

First Amendment serves to prevent exactly this sort of picking of winners and losers 

in ecclesiastical matters.

B. The Statements

Plaintiffs argue several communications by Defendants were defamatory. For 

simplicity, we divide analysis of these communications into discrete sets of 

statements. We hold that determining the falsity of the statements—an essential 

element of a defamation claim under North Carolina law—would require our courts

to examine or inquire into ecclesiastical matters or church doctrine. This is not 

permitted by the First Amendment or North Carolina precedent. We analyze these 

communications in turn.

1. 13 November 2012 Letter
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The first statement Plaintiffs challenge is contained in the 13 November letter

addressed from Holleman to Mrs. Lippard and later sent to DHBC’s congregation in 

an expanded form. Plaintiffs primarily challenge the following statement from the 

letter: “I (we) have yet to hear you [Mrs. Lippard] acknowledge any personal 

responsibility for your failures.” Plaintiffs claim that the statement is false “in that 

[Mrs.] Lippard ha[d] acknowledged her share of responsibility in the dispute with 

Hix.” 

Further context from the 13 November letter shows the ecclesiastical context 

of the challenged statement. In the 13 November letter, Holleman stated the 

Deacons’s recommendation to dismiss Mrs. Lippard came from the Deacons’s belief 

that “[Mrs. Lippard,] by placing conditions upon [her] obedience to the scriptures as 

they regard reconciliation, ha[s] been the obstacle to that reconciliation.” Holleman

stated that, during a reconciliation meeting, he had posed six questions drawn from 

Ephesians 4 to Mrs. Lippard, with three more direct questions asking her to admit 

failures in those areas. He continued, saying “it’s true you answered ‘yes’ but you 

followed that answer three times with the condition of your demand for satisfactory 

answers from [Hix.] What was evident then was that you had missed the essence of 

the Biblical text . . . .” Holleman went on to identify four “personal failures” of Mrs. 

Lippard “that are obviously and Biblically demonstrated as failures or sinful”: (1) her 

immediate response to the song reassignment; (2) that she “failed in [her] continued 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 21 -

resistance to the disciplinary actions of the church,” specifically noting that “Hebrews 

12:11 exhorts [DHBC members] to be ‘exercised’ or ‘trained’ by [the reconciliation 

process]”; (3) Mrs. Lippard’s alleged “slanderous comments about a fellow believer”; 

and (4) her “implied accusation that [Hix] had intentionally concealed the music for 

his solo . . . .” 

Plaintiffs ask us to determine the truth or falsity of Holleman’s claim that he 

and the Deacons had not heard Mrs. Lippard “acknowledge any personal 

responsibility for [her] failures.” What is apparent from the 13 November letter is 

that the acknowledgment of personal responsibility Holleman refers to is 

acknowledgment in the context of reconciliation between persons under biblical 

doctrine as DHBC understands it. Courts cannot undertake such an inquiry. 

To determine whether Mrs. Lippard’s conduct constituted an 

“acknowledge[ment] of personal responsibility” under these conditions would require 

courts to interpret religious doctrine. Here, the statement at issue is whether Mrs. 

Lippard acknowledged personal responsibility for her failures. To determine the 

truth or falsity of that statement, the trial court would have to determine (1) what 

Mrs. Lippard’s “failures” were, in biblical context, and (2) whether Mrs. Lippard’s 

conditional response to the questions asking her to admit failures based on the text 

of Ephesians 4 was sufficient under DHBC doctrine. We hold the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine under the First Amendment prohibits this inquiry.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 22 -

2. 28 November 2012 Sermon

Plaintiffs next contend statements Holleman made in a 28 November 2012 

sermon delivered to the DHBC congregation were defamatory. Plaintiffs challenge 

Holleman’s statement that “[Mrs. Lippard] had yet to acknowledge any wrongdoing 

and that this refusal was the basis for the Deacon’s [sic] recommendation [to dismiss 

her as staff church pianist].” They further challenge Holleman preaching that the 

Deacons’s decision was based on Mrs. Lippard’s “unwillingness to commit” to DHBC’s

reconciliation process; that Mrs. Lippard’s refusal to accept responsibility “for any 

possible error was as strong, if not stronger than ever[]”; and that Mrs. Lippard “never 

conceded to any wrongdoing.” Plaintiffs also challenge Holleman’s claims that Mrs. 

Lippard accused Hix of lying and intentionally hiding sheet music and making

slanderous comments about a fellow choir member. 

The content of the 28 November sermon restates and expands on the 13 

November letter and our analysis demands the same result. The record shows that 

Holleman delivered the challenged statements during a sermon explaining the 

Deacons and Personnel Committee’s decision to recommend Mrs. Lippard’s 

termination as church pianist and advocating for the congregation to approve that 

termination. Specifically, Holleman describes the sermon and gathering as “a 

necessary, though infrequent, part of New Testament Church life and ministry,” and 

the attempted “reconciliation process” and recommendation for termination as an 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 23 -

“application of church discipline” and as “follow[ing] the New Testament pattern for 

church discipline.” 

At the outset of the 28 November sermon, Holleman taught that the

disciplinary process is based on Matthew 18:15-17. Further, as initially stated in the 

13 November letter, Holleman’s comments throughout the 28 November sermon 

made clear that his appeal for commitment to the reconciliation process and 

acceptance of personal responsibility from Mrs. Lippard stems from following 

Ephesians 4:3. Plaintiffs contend Mrs. Lippard “was always willing to commit to the 

reconciliation process, having attended all the reconciliation meetings,” and that she 

had acknowledged personal responsibility for her failures because she “had in fact 

apologized numerous times for any perceived or actual missteps on her behalf.” These 

assertions, however, only illustrate that what is at issue here is not merely a matter 

of fact, but what constitutes “willingness to commit” to DHBC’s reconciliation process 

and “acceptance of personal responsibility” in accordance with its doctrine. 

To evaluate the truth or falsity of these statements, we would need to inquire 

into religious doctrine and practice. In particular, we would have to decide whether, 

as Plaintiffs contend, Mrs. Lippard’s mere attendance at reconciliation meetings 

constituted “willingness to participate” in those meetings, and whether her asserted 

apologies to Hix sufficed for “acceptance of personal responsibility” in the context of 

DHBC’s reconciliation process. Resolving these questions would involve our courts
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 24 -

in determining such essential points of doctrine as what “reconciliation,” 

“wrongdoing,” and “acceptance of personal responsibility” mean, which would 

necessarily involve interpretation of Matthew 18 and Ephesians 4. Courts cannot 

make such determinations without running afoul of the First Amendment.

3. Ballot and Absentee Ballot

Plaintiffs next contend the language of the Ballot and Absentee Ballot (“the 

ballots”) disseminated to the congregation was defamatory. The specific language 

Plaintiffs challenge, which was identical on the ballots, stated: 

The Deacons & Personnel Committee recommend that 

[Mrs.] Lippard be immediately dismissed from her duties 

as church pianist, due to her unwillingness to admit to any 

wrongdoing, or to commit unconditionally to the process of 

reconciliation.

Then, “based upon the following three questions,” the ballots asked congregants to 

“render a decision”:

[1]. Have [Mrs. Lippard]’s actions been clearly 

demonstrated to her and to you as wrong according to the 

Scriptures?

[2]. Have the efforts of the Deacons, Personnel 

Committee and Pastor to restore her into the fellowship of 

the Body of Christ been sufficiently exercised with careful 

deliberation, patience, and graciousness, and according to 

the Scriptures?

[3]. Has [Mrs. Lippard] responded positively as 

instructed by the Scriptures?

Plaintiffs’ defamation claim based on the language of the ballots, which is similar to 

statements made by Holleman in the 13 November letter and 28 November sermon, 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 25 -

is barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine of the First Amendment. To 

determine the truth or falsity of the claim that Mrs. Lippard was “unwilling[] to admit 

to any wrongdoing, or to commit unconditionally to the process of reconciliation,” we

would have to inquire into whether the actions Mrs. Lippard took throughout the 

reconciliation process comported with DHBC’s understanding of the requirements of 

scripture. The ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine prohibits this inquiry. 

4. Communications by Hix about Mr. Lippard

Plaintiffs next argue two statements by Hix were defamatory. They contend 

oral communications made by Hix to an unidentified congregant on 23 December 

2012 were defamatory. They also contend an email sent to Brewer, a DHBC choir 

member, on 8 January 2013 contained a defamatory statement. 

Plaintiffs allege that on 23 December 2012, Hix said “[Mr.] Lippard is a liar 

and you and other people like you are believing him instead of Scripture.”3 Without 

conceding the statement was made, Defendants contend the statement “was made in 

the context of Hix’s interpretation of and Mr. Lippard’s compliance with scripture.” 

Therefore, Defendants argue, “[a]n inquiry into the falsity of the statement would 

require a comparison of Mr. Lippard’s conduct with Scripture, which also prohibits 

lying.” We presume “people like [Brewer]” refers to other DHBC members who 

 

3 We cannot separate the 23 December 2012 statement into two parts and must read it as a 

whole because it is a complete sentence without a comma that would indicate a compound sentence of 

two thoughts.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 26 -

support Plaintiffs. To decide whether Mr. Lippard lied and if people like Brewer

believed Mr. Lippard instead of DHBC’s interpretation of scripture, we would need 

to inquire into DHBC’s definition of lying, when to believe scripture, and how 

scripture determines whom to believe. This is an issue over DHBC’s internal customs, 

practices, morality, and degree of control between members. It cannot be said that 

this statement is purely secular. Analyzing the truth or falsity of this statement 

would require us to assess whether the alleged words or deeds comport with or 

contravene the teachings of scripture regarding lying and DHBC’s interpretation of 

it, an inquiry prohibited by the First Amendment. 

Plaintiffs also contend the following statement from an 8 January 2013 email 

to Brewer is defamatory: “Note that there are verifiable facts and Biblical scriptures 

which [Plaintiffs] are openly denying and defying.” Defendants again argue that “[a]n 

inquiry into the falsity of the statement would require a comparison of [Plaintiffs’] 

conduct with Scripture and whether they were openly denying and defying the 

Scripture.” As we discussed above regarding the 13 November 2012 letter, Plaintiffs 

ask us to determine the truth or falsity of Hix’s claim that Plaintiffs were “openly 

denying and defying” “verifiable facts and Biblical scriptures.” 

This statement arose when Brewer was concerned that “taking anyone off the 

[Special Music] schedule” was an inappropriate “form of discipline in a church 

setting.” Hix replied, in part, that
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 27 -

[Brewer] might want to look closely and note that while 

[Mrs. Lippard] and [Mr. Lippard] were removed from the 

Special Music schedule, that I also removed myself from 

that rotation. Note also that there are verifiable facts and 

Biblical scriptures which they are openly denying and 

defying. Those facts and scriptures still stand. The church 

vote allowed [Mrs. Lippard] to keep her position as pianist, 

but it did not answer the biblical appeal for reconciliation. 

That appeal was extended by 17 out of 18 of our senior 

church leaders. Until [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] are 

prepared to respond to the appeal which was, has been, and 

continues to be extended in biblical love, it would not be 

appropriate to restore them to a position of leading worship 

within the church.

For many, music is worship as it is a celebration of faith and often a time of prayer. 

Confirming the veracity of Hix’s claim would require us to inquire into and examine 

DHBC’s internal discipline process, biblical appeals for reconciliation, and Hix’s 

ability to direct and control the members of DHBC’s music organization. Hix’s 

assessment of whether Plaintiffs are “openly defying” “verifiable facts and Biblical 

scriptures” directly informed his decision of whether “it would . . . be appropriate to 

restore them to a position of leading worship within [DHBC].” Further, an inquiry 

into the falsity of whether Plaintiffs were “openly denying and defying” “verifiable 

facts and Biblical scriptures” would also, again, require us to examine DHBC’s 

customs and practices relating to the biblically-based reconciliation process. The 

ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine under the First Amendment prohibits this 

inquiry as well.

5. Communications by Holleman about Plaintiffs to his Congregation
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 28 -

Plaintiffs next contend statements made by Holleman to various church 

members regarding Plaintiffs were defamatory. Specifically, Plaintiffs cite a 16 

January 2013 letter from Holleman to Brewer, a 6 April 2013 email from Holleman

to Brewer, and a 25 April 2013 email to Myers. 

a. 16 January 2013 Letter

Plaintiffs allege that a litany of excerpts from the 16 January letter were 

defamatory. Among others, Plaintiffs claim the following statements made by 

Holleman were defamatory: (1) “I was not exaggerating when I said to the church 

that [Plaintiffs] have been confronted with appeals for reconciliation 26 times since 

2010[]”; (2) “Obviously, [Mrs. Lippard] is not required to do these things [(i.e., 

voluntary service to the church)] as a part of her job description but if there was an 

eagerness to serve as a staff member and a joyful participant in the ministry of 

[DHBC], it seems that she might find a place of service[]”; (3) “I can’t imagine why 

[Mrs. Lippard] would have been resistant to the idea [of voluntary service] to this 

day, but that resistance certainly doesn’t communicate a spirit of willingness and 

cooperation”; (4) “[Mrs. Lippard is] the present obstacle to reconciliation between her 

and [Hix]”; and (5) “No doubt there are more strategies against the church leadership 

playing out tonight.”

Analyzing the falsity of excerpts (1)-(4) would require us to interpret or weigh 

DHBC’s interpretation of scripture and doctrine. For example, in determining 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 29 -

whether it is true that “[Plaintiffs] have been confronted with appeals for 

reconciliation 26 times,” we would have to determine what constitutes an appeal for 

reconciliation within DHBC. Whether Mrs. Lippard was a “joyful participant in the 

ministry of the church” and had “a spirit of willingness and cooperation” ultimately 

turn on the meaning of those terms within DHBC membership and doctrine. Finally, 

determining the falsity of Holleman’s identification of Mrs. Lippard as “the present 

obstacle to reconciliation between her and [Hix]” would again require us to interpret 

the reconciliation process and the responsibilities of participants according to 

scripture as interpreted by DHBC. Each of these examinations would cross the 

ecclesiastical boundary line under the First Amendment. 

The fifth excerpt that “there are more strategies against the church leadership 

playing out tonight” does not directly invoke scripture, but it does involve other 

ecclesiastical matters.4 The excerpted statement arose in the midst of Holleman

explaining, to a member of his congregation, his thoughts on the ongoing dispute, 

controversy, conversations, confrontations, and involvement of fellow DHBC 

members: 

I am in heartfelt agreement with you here [that the “backand-forth” must stop]. Since the vote, the only action taken 

by the church leadership has been to delay [the Lippards’]

reinstatement into the solo rotation. I’ve given our reasons 

above. While I can’t speak for every member, as far as I’m 

aware, every new conversation or controversy has been 

 

4 We note scriptural interpretations of this phrase are possible, but Defendants do not make 

any such argument on appeal.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 30 -

initiated by [the Lippards], or by those who have been 

advocating for their position. You yourself have attempted 

to engage me in conversation at the church. You have 

asked to speak with James Orbison. And now you’ve 

written this letter and had it delivered to me, Bryan 

Sherrill, and Bill Wooten. [Mr. Lippard] has confronted 

[Hix] multiple times, and this very day, I’ve met with Billy 

Lynch for breakfast, whom [Mr. Lippard] had confronted at 

Church with a copy of Alan’s directives to [Mrs. Lippard]. 

I’ve learned that [Mr. Lippard] has e-mailed [Hix]

requesting an explanation for why he and [Mrs. Lippard]

have not been returned to the solo rotation. And Bryan 

Sherrill indicates that [Mr. Lippard] called him today 

attempting to “catch” me in some mistake. These are just 

a few. No doubt there are more strategies against the 

church leadership playing out tonight. The only time I or 

the church leadership have engaged in further 

conversation has been when we have been compelled to 

answer publicly some charge of wrong doing. You claim 

that you want the back-and-forth to stop yet here I am, a 

month after the church vote, writing out an answer to your 

uninformed accusations of our mishandling of the past 

issues, while [Hix] and Bryan are fielding additional 

complaints and accusations from [Mr. Lippard]. It would 

seem that in large part the back-and-forth ceasing is up to 

you and [Mr. Lippard]. For my part, you are reading what 

is at least near to being my last word on the matter. As to 

your accusation that “Someone, mainly [Hix], wants [Mrs. 

Lippard] off the piano.” Short of making a motion for [Mrs. 

Lippard’s] dismissal from the fellowship of the church, 

what disciplinary action would you have suggested? I 

think the Deacons brought the best recommendation they 

could bring that would communicate to [the Lippards] the 

seriousness of an irreconcilable spirt while also providing 

grace and room for their appropriate response. I doubt that 

they would have been any less enraged by a suspension, 

given the fact that [Mr. Lippard] rejected my offer that he 

and [Mrs. Lippard] might, like [Hix], take a leave of 

absence until the matter could be resolved. Your 

accusation that “mainly” [Hix] wanted [Mrs. Lippard]
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 31 -

removed from the piano, says more about you [sic] personal 

opinion of [Hix] than it does about the reality of the issue. 

I’m sure that [Hix’s] attempts at trying to find a way to 

work with [Mrs. Lippard] have been a source of frustration 

for him over the years, but never has he indicated in the 

slightest that her removal was the solution. [Hix]

recognized early on that the roots of their contentious 

relationship were primarily in [Mrs. Lippard’s] personal 

dislike of him. His willingness to participate in the series 

of meetings I had with them was evidence of his desire to 

address those roots and to make whatever adjustments 

were needed to better their relationship. Having presided 

over those meetings, I am convinced that he [sic] effort was 

sincere. To summarize, nothing in [Hix’s] behavior over 

the past several months would support your claim that his 

(or our) aim has been [Mrs. Lippard’s] removal as church 

pianist.

This quote itself is excerpted from a 13-page pastoral letter. The letter is a formal 

“Pastoral Response” to a complaint filed by a member of the church. The letter and 

the complaint “regard[] [Mrs.] Lippard” and her “recent disciplinary action.” The 

letter concludes that “God Himself will be the judge of this and while I hope that men 

will know my heart, I cannot ultimately be persuaded of my rightness or wrongness 

by their Biblically unsubstantiated opinions alone.” 

Plainly, this controversy and ongoing dispute with the Plaintiffs is a matter of 

DHBC’s internal membership, organization, governance, discipline, and degree of 

control between members. We cannot decide the rightness or wrongness of this

statement by a pastor communicating with his flock. 

b. 6 April 2013 Email
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 32 -

Plaintiffs also contend Holleman defamed them in a 6 April email to Brewer. 

In the email, Holleman stated:

There were several there the Wednesday night that [Mr. 

Lippard], with [Mrs. Lippard] behind him, blocked [Hix’s] 

exit from the music room and was aggressively going after 

[Hix], pointing his finger in [Hix’s] face, an action I recently 

learned was illegal and could have very well been reported 

as a crime.

This excerpted statement does not directly involve scripture, but it does involve 

DHBC’s customs, doctrine, and practice regarding membership and member conduct.

This accusatory excerpt was made in the midst of an extensive multi-page email chain 

that contains several references to scripture and discusses DHBC and Holleman’s 

handling of the dispute:5

[Header of the 6 April 2013 9:07 AM email from Brewer to 

Holleman.]

Hi [Holleman,]

I guess due to you not replying to the last E-Mail, you 

disagree with having a meeting with [Mrs. Lippard] and 

[Mr. Lippard]. 

I am very saddened[.] Could it be that they were wronged 

and have additional information to prove it[?] Could it be 

that others should also be present at a meeting to address 

their part of the issues[?] Could it be that you and the 

committ[e]es were totally right[?] By giving them an 

additional meeting[,] could [it] settle the whole matter or 

not[?] There is everything to gain and nothing to lo[]se. Is 

 

5 Alterations to the email chain include adjusting the names of the parties for consistency, 

removing extraneous spacing and parentheses, adding paragraph breaks, and correcting some 

grammatical and spelling errors.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 33 -

everything better now by not giving them additional 

attention or not? When I was the[re] last[, DHBC] 

members were going around telling other members not to 

speak to [Mr. Lippard]. 

Is this Christian actions[?] By not giving them the needed 

attention they deserve[?] You, committee members and 

others should give them an apology for the way things were 

handled. You know yourself that [Mr. Lippard] was only 

protecting his wife and trying to get someone[’s] attenti[on] 

about setting up a meeting and settling the Issues! 

[Holleman] I have been very concerned about your ministry 

and would not want anything to hinder that[.] Also[,] I 

always try to think of [DHBC] and ways [to] prevent 

conflict. [DHBC] has been through many Issues in the 

past. Mostly petty issues which t[ea]r the cong[r]e[g]ation 

apart[.] WE should learn from our mistakes[.] 

However[,] it appears that we don’t always. That’s also 

partially why our membership does not grow. I trust that 

everyone will do what[’]s right through this conflict by 

showing love and concern for all, even through conflicts. 

Signed[,] 

[Brewer]

[Header of the 6 April 2013 5:25 PM email by Holleman 

replying to Brewer.]

I didn’t respond because you wrote that you had said all 

you wanted on the matter. My assumption was that you 

had also heard all you wanted. 

You’re correct in assuming that I and the Deacons, and the 

Personnel Committee will not provide another meeting 

with [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard]. We have had 5 

meetings with [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] and if you 

count the [DHBC]-wide meeting, they’ve had no fewer than 

6 opportunities to ask their questions. In each of these 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 34 -

meetings we have answered their questions along with 

numerous times in one on one conversations.

The Deacons have indicated to [Mr. Lippard] that if he 

wanted to have a conversation about reconciliation, we 

would be happy to have that conversation. We will not 

provide [Mr. Lippard] with a public platform to make 

accusations against [Hix] or the leadership which he 

cannot give evidence for beyond his own suspicions. I 

Timothy 5:19 says, “Receive not an accusation against an 

elder without two or three witnesses.” True, [DHBC] 

doesn’t elect elders, but leaders serve the same function, 

particularly staff members. How would you like it if a 

single person came to me and demanded a church meeting 

to publicly accuse you of all kinds of things without having 

a single substantial piece of evidence or a witness to 

validate those accusations? Would you be so eager for that 

meeting? I think not. 

So then your suggestion that we abandon the Biblical 

instruction and “give [Mr. Lippard] all the meetings he 

wants” to make all the accusations he wants certainly does 

not have the good and health of [DHBC] in mind. You are 

advocating for [Mr. Lippard]’s desire to do what the 

scriptures forbid. I am certain that if [Mr. Lippard] had 

any substantial evidence to validate any of his claims, we 

would have been informed by now via phone call, E-mail, 

or personal contact. He certainly has not been reluctant to 

raise his “points” thus far. 

I would add that you continue to refer to “others being in a 

meeting.” I’m at a loss to understand why you and [Mr. 

Lippard] cannot seem to understand that [Hix] hasn’t been 

a part of the discussions since August 22, 2012? We’ve not 

been defending [Hix], or his actions past or present, yet 

every time you send an e-mail or every time [Mr. Lippard] 

confronts someone, it involves [Hix]. The actions of the 

Leadership and 59% of [DHBC] are not a vindication of 

[Hix] or his actions, they are simply the actions resulting 

from [Mr. Lippard] & [Mrs. Lippard]’s refusal to yield to 

what the Word of God says. 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 35 -

I very much protest your implied accusation that [Mr. 

Lippard] has some information that we are trying to 

suppress by not allowing him to have a meeting. I think 

seven months of meetings and discussions is ample, in fact 

abundant, time for him to have brought such evidence 

forward. 

Your opinion is getting pretty clear. You obviously agree 

with [Mr. Lippard] that we or (I) have not acted Biblically 

or in a Christian manner towards [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. 

Lippard]. If that’s true then I ask that you provide some 

evidence of that beyond your own opinion. Otherwise you 

are very close to becoming a false witness against those 

who are called to lead [DHBC] according to God’s word. 

(Ephesians 4:11-12) 

An additional meeting will not settle the whole matter, 

because the “matter” to be settled is whether or not [Mr. 

Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] are going to obey God and the 

scriptures. They have refused to yield from the beginning 

to the Word of God. I am exhausted with trying to explain 

that to you, and your continuing advocacy for [Mr. Lippard] 

and [Mrs. Lippard] have made it increasingly difficult for 

us to keep directing their attention to the Biblical 

injunction to be reconciled. Your encouraging them and 

lending a sympathetic ear, have only deepened their 

resolve to reject our appeals and while you think yourself 

to have been acting in a Christian manner toward them, 

you have actually (unwittingly or not) contributed to 

pushing them farther away from the Lord and the true 

peace that might have been, and still may be, found in Him. 

That [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] are out of fellowship 

with God and [DHBC] is painfully evident in the methods 

they are employing against the leadership of [DHBC]. I 

can’t tell you how many times [Mr. Lippard] has twisted 

my words to make them say something to fit his agenda. 

He even claimed that I admitted to him that “I framed him 

and [Mrs. Lippard] with the August 22nd meeting.” 

Absurd! He always fails to inform folks that I was very 

explicit with the conditions set for the meeting, days before, 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 36 -

at the start, and again at the conclusion of that meeting. 

[Mr. Lippard] agreed to those conditions, and even 

admitted later that he did so because he knew that it was 

the only way he could get a face to face meeting with [Hix]. 

I ask you[: W]ho was being dishonest there? I was 

completely straightforward and transparent about the 

nature of that [Wednesday] meeting [on 22 August 2012], 

and he agreed only so that he could conceal his true motive. 

That should tell you that [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] 

did not come into that meeting seeking reconciliation as 

was the stated purpose, but to confront [Hix] with their 

accusations. And accuse they did! [Mr. Lippard] finally 

just interrupted me bluntly, dismissed the scripture I had 

used, and demanded of [Hix] an explanation for the song 

reassignment. [Hix] answered and that didn’t satisfy them 

and [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] immediately went 

after him. At that point, as indicated to them beforehand, 

I ended the meeting and informed them that matter would 

follow the Matthew 18 mandate. There were witnesses 

there to confirm everything I’ve said about that 

[Wednesday] meeting. 

No person in leadership has endorsed anything less than 

respectful behavior toward [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. 

Lippard]. If there are members, leadership and otherwise 

who have who have refused to speak to [Mr. Lippard] and 

[Mrs. Lippard], they have not done so at my request. I have 

been cordial and respectful to [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. 

Lippard], prior to the church vote and following it. 

If folks have been standoffish, it might have something to 

do with [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard]’s behavior. Some 

folks have witnessed their confrontations. There were 

several there the Wednesday night that [Mr. Lippard], with 

[Mrs. Lippard behind him, blocked [Hix]’s exit from the 

music room and was aggressively going after [Hix], pointing 

his finger in [Hix]’s face, an action I recently learned was 

illegal and could have very well been reported as a crime.

(emphasis added).
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 37 -

Add to these the numerous “parking lot” confrontations, 

and angry telephone calls, and it might at least explain 

why some folks are avoiding them. I’m not suggesting that 

this is the right response, but you make it sound as though 

the folks that are “shunning” them are doing so without

any provocation at all. To be honest with you, there are a 

few that are even frightened by [Mr. Lippard]’s

aggressiveness, and I’ve told him this. Having said this, I 

would say that the withholding of full fellowship from a 

rebellious and disobedient (To the Scriptures) believer has 

Biblical precedent (2 Thessalonians 3:14-15; Romans 

16:17-18). 

For this reason, while I have tried to speak to [Mr. Lippard] 

and [Mrs. Lippard] at every opportunity, and be respectful 

and cordial, I have not treated them in such a way as to 

imply or suggest to them that they have been restored to 

full fellowship with [DHBC]. They cannot reject the Word 

of God and refuse to be reconciled to their brothers and still 

enjoy a proper fellowship with God and it is wrong and 

unloving to treat them in such a way as to obscure that 

reality. If the Lord brings to mind by the Holy Spirit or 

through His word that I have wronged or acted wrongly 

toward [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] or anyone else, 

you can be assured that I will make that right without 

delay. But as I’ve said to you multiple times already, if you 

or [Mr. Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard] can demonstrate 

Biblically that this issue has been mishandled or that grace 

and mercy and the humility of Galatians 6:1 has been 

omitted, I will gladly apologize. 

Did you know that I have submitted for the review of four 

fellow Pastors, a written account of every action we’ve 

taken and every decision I’ve personally made, including 

all the arguments that [Mr. Lippard] and others have 

raised[?] [A]nd do you know that they have not discovered 

a single error in our handling of it, and in fact have 

commended the [DHBC] leadership for the thoroughness 

and Biblical consistency with which they’ve navigated 

through this issue[?] Obviously God will be the final judge, 

but I find great encouragement that four of my mentors, 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 38 -

Pastors who have been in the ministry for years, have said 

that they weren’t sure that they would have “handled” it as 

well. 

For this grace, I am deeply grateful to God. I have spent 

hours agonizing over decisions and the words with which I 

should convey them, and in my flesh, I would have surely 

failed miserably, but all the while, God was impressing me 

to just follow the Word. With His grace, and to His glory, 

that’s exactly what we’ve done. I am content if we have 

been pleasing to Him. You may have been concerned about 

me personally, but I don’t think you have been concerned 

about “the ministry to which God has called me.” In fact, I 

don’t think you really understand that ministry. 

For me, church is not merely a background scene in front 

of which I live my life. I’m not just pulpit furniture that 

just happens to be in place each Sunday morning, Sunday 

night, and Wednesday. When I stand in that Pulpit, I feel 

the weight of the responsibility to “rightly divide the 

Word.” There is an urgency in my heart that almost makes 

me feel as though if I don’t preach in such a way as to 

display the glory of Christ, I will have utterly failed. 

There’s a desperation in my heart that everyone present 

might see that we don’t just have a religious book in our 

hands but the very word and voice of God Almighty. You 

may think that my aim is to “keep the peace,” but you 

forget that the Lord Himself said, “Think not that I have 

come to bring peace on the earth, but a sword....” (Matthew 

10:34-39). 

Oh don’t misunderstand, I’m a peace lover too. By nature 

I’m not confrontational at all. But I will not settle for a 

superficial peace that continues to allow sin to fester and 

grow under the surface, only to erupt at the slightest 

“petty” disagreement, and I’m fully aware that that 

position will not be appreciated by all. Jesus said as much, 

if you’ll read the entire reference mentioned above (Mat. 

10:34-39)[.]
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 39 -

You’re right, [DHBC] in large part has not learned from its 

past mistakes and one of those mistakes has been to avoid 

confrontation when it was actually confrontation that was 

needed to expose the root that caused it. (1 Corinthians 

11:18-19) Equally contributing to that error is the 

unbiblical idea of the church as a collection of individuals, 

completely without accountability. We’ve adopted an 

Americanized Christianity that has everyone as 

independent and self-determining lone-rangers. Did you 

know that nothing could be farther from the Bible? What 

[DHBC] has never learned is that without willful 

submission to becoming accountable to God and other 

believers, the intimacy that everyone claims to want and 

enjoy is impossible. So resistant are we to the ideal of 

humble submission and willful vulnerability that we’ve 

decided that we would settle for a shallow, soon to be 

broken, intimacy. I suspect that [DHBC] has settled for 

that for so many years that they’ve began to think that’s 

the norm. It’s not...I assure you! 

The Lord can change that though, and I think that’s what 

He might be up to in all of the last seven months. The 

question I suppose is this: “will I, will you, will [Mr. 

Lippard] and [Mrs. Lippard], will [DHBC] trust God 

enough to simply obey Him? Will we wait for him to lead 

us through the darkness of this present valley, believing 

with our whole heart that there’s a bright meadow on the 

other side?[”] 

This may be more than you can digest in one reading, but 

I don’t think I need to say much more than this. No, I 

absolutely don’t agree with you on multiple Biblical 

grounds, but the increasingly antagonistic and accusatory 

tone of your e-mails suggest to me that I’m alienating you 

ever farther and since that makes no sense and is not 

ultimately helpful, I’ll just leave things as they are. 

I would add one more question. With the exception of my 

leaving the jobsite angrily many years ago, [i]n the 28 years 

you have known me and in the 7 years I’ve served as Pastor 

at [DHBC], have you observed anything in my character 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 40 -

that would suggest to you that I would have acted as 

maliciously in this issue as [Mr. Lippard] has undoubtedly 

portrayed me to you and others? [I]f not, I can’t understand 

how you would so quickly attribute to me the character he 

suggests. 

If I have in fact acted as treacherously and deceitfully as 

[Mr. Lippard] would have you believe, there is a 

constitutional recourse available to you and [Mr. Lippard]. 

You can develop and circulate a petition for my dismissal 

as Pastor. You can force a motion before [DHBC] with a 

petition signed by 25% of the membership and [DHBC] will 

be forced to vote on the matter. 

To be honest, if I am guilty of what [Mr. Lippard] charges 

me with and what you suspect me of, you would be well 

within your Christian duty to do exactly that. 

Respectfully and Prayerfully, 

Larry

[Header of the 6 April 2013 6:45 PM email from Brewer to 

Holleman.]

Hi [Holleman,] 

I know that the committee members were addressing [Mrs. 

Lippard] only, I knew that then[.] However[, Hix] was [a 

part] of the conflict with the song and as Director. This 

part is my real issue. I have had issues with [Hix] before 

and believe there [is] more to it. [N]o one is perfect[.] 

[H]owever[, Hix] should be willing to address their issues. 

That may be why they want another meeting. Another 

meeting can[’]t hurt and may settle it all. No reply 

necessary[.] 

[Brewer]

[Header of the 7 April 2013 email from Brewer to 

Holleman.]
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 41 -

I was thinking about the letter overnight. I think how 

ironic you twist and turn things around and now blaming 

me. I guess I am to blame for at least one thing[—s]howing 

concern[.] 

Let me ask you this[, d]id [Mrs. Lippard] agree to go 

through reconciliation about the issues 2 1/2 years ago and 

did you say things were going well[?] Did you say that you 

were going to recommend to the [D]eacons to drop the 

issues[?] If that is the case, why was that reinstated as a 

problem[?] I have said in the beginning that [Hix] should 

be at the meeting on Wednesday night in question. The 

song issue has not been settled. Until [Hix] is willing to 

meet with [Mrs. Lippard] and [Mr. Lippard] and settle 

their issues. There is no reconciliation. I don’t know what 

they wanted to discuss in a meeting[.] But[,] I think 

another meeting is necessary. If [Hix] had been present at 

the Wednesday night meeting in question, things could 

have been possibly settled. I never intended to question 

your abilities[.] Only to grab your attention[.] I would not 

want you to lo[]se your job over this. Also[, i]t bothers me 

big time that this can and does affect [DHBC] membership. 

We must handle issues above board as quickly as possible. 

Sign 

[Brewer] 

Reply

As in Harris, we would be forced to determine whether the statement at issue 

is proper in light of DHBC’s customs, doctrine, and practice regarding membership 

and conduct. The statement arose from Holleman’s observations of how “folks” in the 

church “have been standoffish” and “have witnessed [Plaintiffs’] confrontations.” The 

email’s language, after the statement, explicitly discusses that “withholding of full 

fellowship from a rebellious and disobedient (To the Scriptures) believer has Biblical 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 42 -

precedent (2 Thessalonians 3:14-15; Romans 16:17-18).” Looking into DHBC’s 

membership governance and how it should react to what it considers improper 

conduct would require examining church customs, doctrine, and practice.

c. 25 April 2013 Letter

Finally, Plaintiffs contend Holleman defamed them in the 25 April letter to 

Mr. Myers. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge Holleman’s statement that “[Hix] 

indicated his willingness to acknowledge his own failures and ask forgiveness. [Mrs. 

Lippard] did not!” They argue that statement is false because “[Mrs. Lippard] 

apologized to Hix several times, even in writing, for any perceived or actual missteps 

on her behalf.” As in the 28 November 2012 sermon discussed above, we are barred 

from evaluating this statement under the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine 

because, in determining the truth or falsity of the claim that Mrs. Lippard did not 

“acknowledge [her] own failures and ask forgiveness,” we would have to interpret and 

weigh DHBC doctrine to determine what constitutes “acknowledgement” of failures 

and “ask[ing] forgiveness” as part of DHBC’s process of reconciliation. Therefore, 

analysis of this statement is barred by the First Amendment.

None of the statements at issue here are purely secular, but we can imagine 

scenarios where members of a religion make defamatory statements wholly apart 

from religion. Churchgoers could make defamatory statements against one another 

outside their religious lives and instead in their personal, business, academic, or 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

- 43 -

other aspects of their temporal existence. But the statements at issue here were 

made between members of the same congregation—including its pastor—about an 

internal dispute regarding ecclesiastical matters. All the statements before us would 

unconstitutionally require examining or interpreting ecclesiastical matters or 

religious doctrine, and we may not do so under the First Amendment or the North 

Carolina Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and argue

several errors. We affirm the trial court’s order on the ground that all statements 

Plaintiffs challenge are barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine. Having 

determined all of Plaintiffs’ claims on this ground, we do not address Plaintiffs’ 

remaining challenges.

AFFIRMED.

Judge BERGER concurs.

Chief Judge MCGEE concurs in part, dissents in part, and concurs in the 

judgment in a separate opinion.
No. COA18-873 – Lippard v. Holleman

McGEE, Chief Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in 

the judgment.

I disagree with the majority that the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine 

under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 

and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of North Carolina bars the courts of our 

state from considering defamation claims as to all the alleged statements challenged 

by Plaintiffs in the present case. I would hold that some of the claims at issue are 

barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine; however, four others are not. 

I. Summary

In determining whether the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine bars the 

courts of our state from considering an issue, the fundamental question is “whether 

resolution of the legal claim requires the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine.” 

Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 494, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398, appeal dismissed, 348 

N.C. 284, 501 S.E.2d 913 (1998) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 

426 U.S. 696, 710, 49 L.Ed.2d 151, 163 (1976)). In the context of a defamation claim, 

which in North Carolina as in other states includes as an essential element the falsity 

of the statement made, whether courts may apply neutral principles to resolve the 

claim depends on whether determining the truth or falsity of the allegedly 

defamatory statement “requires the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine.” 

Although the majority applies this test correctly in some places, in others it expands 

this analysis by holding that courts are barred from analyzing defamation claims 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

2

where they arise out of “matter[s] of [] internal membership, organization, 

governance, discipline, and degree of control between members[,]” even when the 

allegedly defamatory statements do not on their face address those topics and 

determining the truth or falsity of those statements would not require our courts to 

pass upon ecclesiastical issues, such as where one party accuses another of a crime, 

or of lying about “verifiable facts.” The majority’s reading is at odds with precedent 

in this state and would “go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak [religious] 

bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of 

the principles constitutionally safeguarded,” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 495, 495 S.E.2d 

at 398 (citation omitted), effectively prohibiting recovery by those harmed by 

tortfeasors on the basis of the victims’ religious affiliation.6

In the case of defamation claims, I would hold that courts must evaluate the 

specific elements of the claim, including the falsity of the alleged statement, and 

determine whether “resolution of [the truth or falsity of the alleged statement] 

requires the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine. If not, the First Amendment 

is not implicated and neutral principles of law are properly applied to adjudicate the 

claim.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398. Based on this analysis, I 

concur with the majority’s holding for some of Plaintiffs’ defamation claims that they 

 

6 See N.C. Const. Art. I, sec. 18 (“every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, 

person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law[.]”); id. Art. I, sec. 19 (“No person shall 

be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the 

State because of . . . religion . . . .”).
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

3

are barred because resolving the claims would require courts to interpret or weigh 

church doctrine. For four allegedly defamatory statements discussed below, however, 

I disagree and would hold that there is no need for the court to interpret or weigh 

church doctrine in its adjudication of the truth or falsity of these claims. Therefore, 

I dissent in part.

For the claims that I would hold are not barred by the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine, I would nevertheless hold that Plaintiffs have not shown 

sufficient evidence for libel per se or special damages as required for libel or slander 

per quod. Therefore, I concur in the majority’s judgment affirming the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment for Defendants.

II. Analysis

The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 

and Article I, Section 13 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit civil courts “from 

becoming entangled in ecclesiastical matters.” Doe v. Diocese of Raleigh, 242 N.C. 

App. 42, 47, 776 S.E.2d 29, 35 (2015) (citation omitted); see Harris v. Matthews, 361 

N.C. 265, 270, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569 (2007) (“The constitutional prohibition against 

court entanglement in ecclesiastical matters is necessary to protect First Amendment 

rights identified by the ‘Establishment Clause’ and the ‘Free Exercise Clause.’” 

(citation omitted)). Our Supreme Court has long defined an “ecclesiastical matter” 

as
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

4

one which concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of 

the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a 

religious association of needful laws and regulations for the 

government of membership, and the power of excluding 

from such associations those deemed unworthy of 

membership by the legally constituted authorities of the 

church; and all such matters are within the province of 

church courts and their decisions will be respected by civil 

tribunals.

E. Conference of Original Free Will Baptists of N.C. v. Piner, 267 N.C. 74, 77, 147 

S.E.2d 581, 583 (1966) (citation and quotation marks omitted), overruled in part on 

other grounds by Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973).

In the present case, however, Plaintiffs challenge neither the “adoption and 

enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the 

government of membership,” nor DHBC’s “power of excluding from such associations 

those deemed unworthy of membership by the legally constituted authorities of the 

church.”7 Whether ecclesiastical matters are implicated in Plaintiffs’ claims for 

defamation in the present case turns on whether the claims “concern doctrine, creed, 

or form of worship of the church.” 

“The dispositive question” in determining whether a court is barred from 

deciding a cause of action because it would become entangled in ecclesiastical matters 

 

7 In a previous case this Court held the same plaintiffs were barred from doing so. See Lippard 

v. Diamond Hill Baptist Church, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 821 S.E.2d 246, 249 (2018) (holding plaintiffs’ 

claim they were improperly excluded from church even though they did not “take any action to have 

themselves removed from church membership” was ecclesiastical matter under above definitions) 

(citation omitted).
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

5

“is whether resolution of the legal claim requires the court to interpret or weigh 

church doctrine. If not, the First Amendment is not implicated and neutral principles 

of law are properly applied to adjudicate the claim.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 

495 S.E.2d at 398 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 49 L.Ed.2d at 163). The 

application of the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine to defamation claims is a 

question of first impression in North Carolina and our precedents delineate the 

contours of the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine and are applicable here.

A. North Carolina Caselaw on Ecclesiastical Entanglement Doctrine 

In Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973), which this Court 

described as the “seminal case” on the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine in Emory 

v. Jackson Chapel First Missionary Baptist Church, 165 N.C. App. 489, 493-94, 598 

S.E.2d 667, 671 (2004), a dissenting faction of a Baptist church filed a complaint 

against members of the church and the pastor seeking a declaration that the plaintiffs 

were the “true congregation,” that the pastor-defendant “be restrained from 

continuing to act as its pastor” and that the defendants be required to surrender the 

church property to the plaintiffs. Walker, 284 N.C. at 307, 200 S.E.2d at 642. The 

complaint alleged that a division had arisen in the congregation and the plaintiffs 

remained faithful to the previous doctrines and practices of the church while the 

defendants had departed from those doctrines and practices. Id. at 307, 200 S.E.2d 

at 643. The trial court submitted questions to the jury asking it to determine (1) 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

6

whether plaintiffs remained faithful to the doctrines and practices of the church as 

previously practiced and (2) whether the defendants “departed radically and 

fundamentally from the characteristic usages, customs, doctrines and practices of the 

[church.]” Id. at 308, 200 S.E.2d at 643. 

Our Supreme Court applied the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision 

in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), reasoning that “questions 

must be resolved on the basis of [neutral] principles of law”—principles “developed 

for use in all property disputes.” Id. at 319, 200 S.E.2d at 650 (citation omitted). For 

example, courts could determine “(1) [w]ho constitutes the governing body of this 

particular [] church, and (2) who has that governing body determined to be entitled 

to use the properties.” In contrast, the First Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of 

the Constitution of North Carolina prohibit a decision of property rights based on “a 

judicial determination that one group of claimants has adhered faithfully to the 

fundamental faiths, doctrines and practices of the church . . . while the other group 

of claimants has departed substantially therefrom.” Id. at 318, 200 S.E.2d at 649. 

Although our Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs could have prevailed “by 

showing that such action was not taken in a meeting duly called and conducted 

according to the procedures of the church,” id. at 320, 200 S.E.2d at 651, it concluded 

there was no evidence in the record to support such assertion and the trial court’s 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

7

opinion must have been based on an inquiry barred by the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine. Id. at 321, 200 S.E.2d at 651.

Notably, Atkins does not bar all inquiries in disputes over church property 

merely because the property is church property, the parties are religious members 

and organizations, or the dispute arose in a religious context. Rather, our Supreme 

Court held that “[i]t nevertheless remains the duty of civil courts to determine 

controversies concerning property rights over which such courts have jurisdiction and 

which are properly brought before them[.]” Id. at 318, 200 S.E.2d at 649. Relying on 

Presbyterian, our Supreme Court stated that “[n]either the First Amendment to the 

Constitution of the United States nor the comparable provision in Article I, Section 

13, of the Constitution of North Carolina deprives those entitled to the use and control 

of church property of protections afforded by government to all property owners alike, 

such as . . . access to the courts for the determination of contract and property rights.” 

Id. at 318, 200 S.E.2d at 649. In conclusion, “[w]here civil, contract[,] or property 

rights are involved, the courts will inquire as to whether the church tribunal acted 

within the scope of its authority and observed its own organic form and rules.” Id. at 

320, 200 S.E.2d at 650 (quoting W. Conference of Original Free Will Baptists v. Creech, 

256 N.C. 128, 140-41, 123 S.E.2d 619, 627 (1962)). 

In Harris v. Matthews, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles of Atkins

and applied them to a new cause of action—a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

8

minority faction of a congregational church against the pastor, secretary, and chair 

of the board of trustees, based on the allegation that the pastor-defendant “ha[d] 

usurped the governmental authority of the church’s internal governing body.” Harris, 

361 N.C. at 272, 643 S.E.2d at 571. The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs 

claimed the defendants breached their fiduciary duty “by improperly using church 

funds, which constitutes conversion.” Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. Our Supreme 

Court held that the issue of whether the expenditures were proper could not be 

resolved by neutral principles of law because “[d]etermining whether actions, 

including expenditures, by a church’s pastor, secretary, and chairman of the Board of 

Trustees were proper requires an examination of the church’s view of the role of the 

pastor, staff, and church leaders, their authority and compensation, and church 

management[,]” and “[b]ecause a church’s religious doctrine and practice affects its 

understanding of each of these concepts[.]” Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. Although 

the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine barred the claim at issue, the Harris Court 

reaffirmed that “[w]here civil, contract[,] or property rights are involved, the courts 

will inquire as to whether the church tribunal acted within the scope of its authority

and observed its own organic forms and rules.” Id. at 274-75, 643 S.E.2d at 572

(citation omitted).

This Court has applied the principles of the ecclesiastical entanglement 

doctrine in Atkins and Harris to other causes of action and clarified the test for 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

9

whether the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine will bar courts from considering a 

claim. In the leading case of Smith v. Privette, the plaintiffs, former church 

employees, sued a United Methodist Church, the District of the North Carolina 

Conference of the United Methodist Church, and the North Carolina Conference of 

the United Methodist Church (together, “church defendants”), alleging claims for 

negligent retention and supervision based on sexual misconduct by a pastor against 

the employees. Reversing the trial court, this Court held the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine under the First Amendment did not bar courts from deciding 

the negligent retention and supervision claims. Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 495, 495 

S.E.2d at 398. This Court held that, in determining whether the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine would bar a claim, it must answer “the dispositive question” 

of “whether resolution of the legal claim requires the court to interpret or weigh 

church doctrine. If not, the First Amendment is not implicated and neutral principles 

of law are properly applied to adjudicate the claim.” Id. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398 

(citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 49 L.Ed.2d at 163). This Court applied that test 

and held that while “the decision to hire or discharge a minister is inextricable from 

religious doctrine and protected by the First Amendment from judicial inquiry,” the 

plaintiffs’ claim, rather than requiring “the trial court to inquire into the [c]hurch 

[d]efendants’ reasons for choosing Privette to serve as a minister,” “instead presents 

the issue of whether the [c]hurch [d]efendants knew or had reason to know of 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

10

Privette’s propensity to engage in sexual misconduct,” which is “conduct that the 

[c]hurch [d]efendants do not claim is part of the tenets or practices of the Methodist 

Church.” Id. at 495, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, “there 

[wa]s no necessity for the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine in its 

adjudication of the [p]laintiffs’ claim for negligent retention and supervision.” Id. at 

495, 495 S.E.2d at 398. In so holding, this Court noted that “[t]he First 

Amendment . . . does not grant religious organizations absolute immunity from 

liability.” Id. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 397. “Indeed, the application of a secular standard 

to secular conduct that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution.” Smith, N.C. 

App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 397 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In Emory v. Jackson Chapel First Missionary Baptist Church, the plaintiff 

church members brought an action against the church and the pastor, alleging they 

provided insufficient notice to plaintiffs as required by the church bylaws for a 

meeting at which the church altered its corporate structure and that defendants also 

violated the plaintiffs’ contractual and property rights by failing to follow the 

procedure. This Court explicitly noted that “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that a 

trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction is improper only where ‘purely ecclesiastical 

questions and controversies are involved.’” Id. at 492, 598 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting W. 

Conference of Original Free Will Baptists of N.C. v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 140, 123 

S.E.2d 619, 627 (1962)). This Court held the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

11

barred the trial court from determining whether the defendants provided the 

plaintiffs with sufficient notice under the bylaws, because ambiguities existed in the 

bylaws and “long-established church customs exist[ed] that may [have] alter[ed] the 

interpretation of the notice requirements [in the bylaws].” Id. at 492, 165 N.C. App. 

at 670. Thus, “the trial court would be required to delve into ‘ecclesiastical matters’ 

regarding how the church interprets the [] notice requirements and types of meetings 

[in the bylaws.]” Id. at 493, 598 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting Piner, 267 N.C. at 77, 147 

S.E.2d at 583). In addition, this Court noted that, while plaintiffs asserted contract 

and property rights were implicated, the “heart of this matter [wa]s a change in the 

structure of the church” and “the claims of [the] plaintiffs [] only tangentially 

affect[ed] property rights.” Id. at 494, 495, 598 S.E.2d at 671, 672. Thus, there was 

no “substantial property right” affected by the incorporation and the trial court 

properly held the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine barred the claim. Id. at 495, 

598 S.E.2d at 672.

Although the plaintiffs’ claims in Emory “only tangentially affect[ed] property 

rights,” id. at 495, 598 S.E.2d at 672, this Court has clarified the relationship between 

church membership as an ecclesiastical matter and property rights in subsequent 

cases. In Tubiolo v. Abundant Life Church, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 324, 605 S.E.2d 161 

(2004), we held that “membership in a church is a core ecclesiastical matter[,]” and 

“[i]t is an area where the courts of this State should not become involved.” Tubiolo, 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

12

167 N.C. App. at 328, 605 S.E.2d at 164. However, we also held that “the plaintiffs’ 

membership in the defendant is in the nature of a property interest, and that the 

courts do have jurisdiction over the very narrow issue of whether the bylaws were 

properly adopted by the defendant.” Id. at 329, 605 S.E.2d at 164 (citing Bouldin v. 

Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 139-40, 21 L.Ed. 69, 71-2 (1872)). Therefore, the case was 

distinguishable from Emory, because membership rights were implicated and “[t]his 

inquiry [into whether the bylaws were properly adopted] can be made without 

resolving any ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters.” Id. at 329, 605 S.E.2d at 164-65. 

Nevertheless, this Court provided an important caveat on Tubiolo in Azige v. Holy 

Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church, 249 N.C. App. 236, 790 S.E.2d 570 

(2016), where we held that the trial court was barred from considering issues based 

on church membership status because the issues “would require interpretation of 

[church] bylaws which do impose doctrinal requirements.” Azige, 249 N.C. App. at 

242, 790 S.E.2d at 575. For example, “[t]he courts c[ould ]not determine the ‘immoral 

behavior’ of plaintiffs for purposes of the bylaws . . . .” Id. at 244, 790 S.E.2d at 575. 

These claims “raise questions which . . . would ‘require[] the court to interpret or 

weigh church doctrine’ in contravention of the First Amendment,” violating the test 

in Smith. Id. at 244, 790 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting Davis v. Williams, 242 N.C. App. 

262, 892, 774 S.E.2d 889, 892 (2015)). 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

13

Besides property claims which involve ecclesiastical matters, this Court has 

also addressed tort and contract claims under the ecclesiastical entanglement 

doctrine. In Doe v. Diocese of Raleigh, the plaintiff filed complaints against the 

Diocese of Raleigh, the Bishop of the Diocese, and a priest of the diocese alleging, 

among other claims, claims for negligence against the Diocese and the Bishop, 

arguing they negligently supervised the priest and failed to educate the plaintiff 

about boundaries or require STD testing by the priest. Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 43-44, 

776 S.E.2d at 32-33. Relying on Smith and Harris, this Court “examine[d] each of 

[the p]laintiff’s remaining causes of action against the Diocese [d]efendants in order 

to determine whether its adjudication would require ‘an impermissible analysis by 

the court based on religious doctrine or practice.’” See id. at 49, 776 S.E.2d at 36 

(citing Johnson v. Antioch United Holy Church, Inc., 214 N.C. App. 507, 711, 714 

S.E.2d 806, 810 (2011); Harris, 361 N.C. at 274, 643 S.E.2d at 572). 

As to the claim for negligent supervision, this Court analogized to the negligent 

supervision claim in Smith and held that in Doe, as in Smith, the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine did not bar courts from determining whether the elements of 

negligent supervision could be established because, in both cases, there was a 

“commonsense understanding that sexual misconduct is not ‘part of the tenets or 

practices of the [church.]’” Id. at 54, 776 S.E.2d at 38-39. Furthermore, this Court 

held that adjudicating the negligent supervision claim would not require the trial 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

14

court to determine issues that “are inextricably bound up with church doctrine,” “such 

as (1) whether [the priest] should have ever been incardinated; (2) whether he should 

have been allowed to remain a priest; or (3) whether his relationship with the Diocese 

should have been severed.” Id. at 55, 776 S.E.2d at 39. “[T]he issue to be determined 

in connection with [the p]laintiff’s negligent supervision claim [wa]s a purely secular 

one.” Id. at 55, 776 S.E.2d at 39.

In contrast, this Court held courts were barred from considering plaintiff’s 

claim that the Diocese negligently failed to compel the priest to undergo STD testing 

because “this theory of liability is premised on the tenets of the Catholic church—

namely, the degree of control existing in the relationship between a bishop and a 

priest,” and it “seeks to impose liability based on the Diocese [d]efendants’ alleged 

failure to exercise their authority over a priest stemming from an oath of obedience 

taken by him pursuant to the church’s canon law.” Id. at 56, 776 S.E.2d at 40 

(emphasis in original). Thus, this claim fails because “a civil court is constitutionally 

prohibited from ‘interpos[ing] its judgment’ on the proper role of church leaders and 

the scope of their authority ‘[b]ecause a church’s religious doctrine and practice affect 

its understanding of each of these concepts.’” Id. at 56, 776 S.E.2d at 40 (quoting 

Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571).

Finally, this Court addressed a claim for breach of contract in Bigelow v. 

Sassafras Grove Baptist Church, 247 N.C. App. 401, 786 S.E.2d 358 (2016). In 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

15

Bigelow, a pastor claimed the defendants, a Baptist church and its deacons, breached 

a contract and violated the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act by failing to pay him 

compensation and benefits after he became ill pursuant to a written contract entered 

into between himself and the defendants. Bigelow, 247 N.C. App. at 402, 786 S.E.2d 

at 360. This Court held the argument that “the First Amendment of the United 

States Constitution immunizes, without exception, a religious institution from 

liability arising out of a contract between the religious institution and its ministerial 

employees,” was inconsistent with Smith. Id. at 411, 786 S.E.2d at 366. 

Furthermore, this Court held the plaintiff’s claims did not “ask[] the court to address 

ecclesiastical doctrine or church law”; rather, they “require[d] the court only to make 

a secular decision regarding the terms of the parties’ contract and to apply the neutral 

principles of the Wage and Hour Act.” Id. at 411-12, 786 S.E.2d at 366. Therefore, 

the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine did not bar courts from considering the 

plaintiffs’ contract claims.

B. Application of Ecclesiastical Entanglement Doctrine to Defamation Claims

In summary, although the issue of the application of the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine to defamation claims is a question of first impression for North 

Carolina, our state’s extensive caselaw on the doctrine is “equally applicable here.” 

See Doe, 242 N.C. App. at 49, 776 S.E.2d at 36. 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

16

Our courts must look to the specific elements of the cause of action to determine 

whether “neutral principles of law exist to resolve plaintiffs’ claims.” Harris, 361 N.C. 

at 273-74, 643 S.E.2d at 571. For instance, in Harris, our Supreme Court looked to 

the specific elements of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and, in 

particular, the specific theory under the element of breach advanced by the plaintiff 

(i.e., “improperly using church funds,” or “conversion”) in order to determine whether 

the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine would bar the claim. See id. at 273, 643 

S.E.2d at 571. Because resolving that specific element would require courts to 

determine whether actions by the church leadership were “proper” based on the 

church’s view of the roles of those individuals, the Supreme Court held the claim in 

that case was barred. Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. Our courts have first identified 

the cause of action and the specific elements of that claim at issue in determining 

whether the claim is barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine. Our courts 

then determine whether “neutral principles of law exist to resolve plaintiffs’ claims.” 

Harris, 361 N.C. at 273-74, 643 S.E.2d at 572; see Atkins, 284 N.C. at 319, 200 S.E.2d 

at 650 (“[D]eterminations must be made pursuant to ‘neutral principles of law, 

developed for use in all property disputes.’” (citation omitted)). This Court has held 

that we must answer “[t]he dispositive question” of “whether resolution of the legal 

claim requires the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine. If not, the First 

Amendment is not implicated and neutral principles of law are properly applied to 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

17

adjudicate the claim.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (citing

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 49 L.Ed.2d at 163).

In the present case, Plaintiffs allege multiple claims for defamation, including 

libel and slander per se and libel and slander per quod. “In order to recover for 

defamation, a plaintiff generally must show that the defendant caused injury to the 

plaintiff by making false, defamatory statements of or concerning the plaintiff, which 

were published to a third person.” Desmond v. News and Observer Pub. Co., 241 N.C. 

App. 10, 16, 772 S.E.2d 128, 135 (2015) (citation omitted). The only element of 

defamation that Defendants argue violates the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine 

is the first element: the falsity of the alleged statement. I would hold that, in order 

to determine whether courts are barred from considering a claim for defamation, they 

must evaluate the specific elements of the claim, including the falsity of the alleged 

statement, and determine whether “resolution of [the truth or falsity of the alleged 

statement] requires the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine. If not, the First 

Amendment is not implicated and neutral principles of law are properly applied to 

adjudicate the claim.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398. However, if 

resolution of the claim would require courts to interpret or weigh church doctrine, the 

ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine under the First Amendment and Article I, 

Section 13 of the Constitution of North Carolina prohibit them from adjudicating the 

claim.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

18

This statement of the law, grounded in our Court’s precedent and first adopted 

from United States Supreme Court precedent, is more consistent with precedent than 

that adopted in the majority’s opinion, which states that “[f]or defamation claims, we 

must consider whether a statement is true or false without examining or inquiring 

into ecclesiastical matters or church doctrine.” The majority’s imprecise rule 

conflates the broad prohibition against courts becoming entangled in “ecclesiastical 

matters” with the test adopted in Smith for determining whether “neutral principles 

of law are properly applied to adjudicate the claim.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 

495 S.E.2d at 398 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710, 49 L.Ed.2d at 163). Where 

neutral principles of law can be applied, resolving the claim would not impermissibly 

entangle the court in ecclesiastical matters. For instance, in Tubiolo, this Court held 

that “[m]embership in a church is a core ecclesiastical matter.” Tubiolo, 167 N.C. 

App. at 328, 605 S.E.2d at 164. We nevertheless held that “the plaintiffs’ membership 

in [a church] is in the nature of a property interest, and []the courts do have 

jurisdiction over the very narrow issue of whether the bylaws were properly adopted 

by the [church].” Tubiolo, 167 N.C. App. at 329, 605 S.E.2d at 164. 

The majority incorrectly asserts, relying on Doe, that “[o]nly when an ‘issue to 

be determined in connection with [a party’s] claim is a purely secular one,” then 

“[n]eutral principles of law govern th[e] inquiry and . . . subject matter jurisdiction 

exists in the trial court over th[e] claim.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe, 242 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

19

N.C. App. at 55, 776 S.E.2d at 39). This is a misstatement of Doe and contrary to 

Emory where this Court noted that “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction is improper only where ‘purely ecclesiastical questions and 

controversies are involved.’” Emory, 165 N.C. App. at 492, 598 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting 

Creech, 256 N.C. at 140, 123 S.E.2d at 627); accord W. Conference of Original Free 

Will Baptists v Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 140, 123 S.E.2d 619, 627 (1962) (“The legal or 

temporal tribunals of the State have no jurisdiction over, and no concern with, purely 

ecclesiastical questions and controversies . . . but the courts do have jurisdiction, as 

to civil, contract[,] and property rights which are involved in, or arise from, a church 

controversy.” (quoting Reid, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114)). Under Doe, while a claim

being “purely secular” is a sufficient condition to avoid the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine, it is not a necessary one, and there may at times be a gray 

area of questions between those that are “purely secular” and “purely ecclesiastical.”

The majority’s approach to defamation claims does not consider our precedent 

which provides that “the courts do have jurisdiction, as to civil, contract[,] and 

property rights which are involved in, or arise from, a church controversy.” Creech, 

256 N.C. at 140, 123 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added) (quoting Reid, 241 N.C. 201, 85 

S.E.2d 114). Where “neutral principles of law exist to resolve plaintiffs’ claims,” 

Harris, 361 N.C. at 273-74, 643 S.E.2d at 571-72, courts have not only the power but 

the duty to resolve the plaintiffs’ claims, because “[n]either the First Amendment to 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

20

the Constitution of the United States nor the comparable provision in Article I, 

Section 13, of the Constitution of North Carolina deprives [participants in religious 

life] of protections afforded by government to all . . . , such as . . . access to the courts 

for the determination of [civil, ]contract[,] and property rights.” Atkins, 284 N.C. at 

318, 200 S.E.2d at 649. In the case of defamation claims, I would hold that neutral 

principles of law exist and the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine does not bar a 

claim where resolving the claim’s elements, including determining the truth or falsity 

of the alleged defamatory statement, would not require the court to interpret or weigh 

church doctrine.

C. Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Claims

I concur in the majority’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ defamation claims based on 

statements made by Mr. Holleman in the 13 November 2012 Letter, the 28 November 

2012 Sermon, the Ballot and Absentee Ballot, claims based on four statements made 

in the 16 January 2013 letter Mr. Holleman sent to Mr. Brewer, and the claim based 

on a statement made in the 25 April 2013 letter Mr. Holleman sent to Mr. Myers. 

Analyzing these statements would require our courts to “interpret or weigh church 

doctrine,” and, therefore, resolving the claims would impermissibly entangle courts 

in ecclesiastical questions in violation of the First Amendment and Article I, Section 

13 of the Constitution of North Carolina.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

21

I disagree with the majority’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ defamation claims based 

on the 23 December 2012 oral statement allegedly made by Mr. Hix to an unidentified 

congregant; the statement in the 8 January 2013 email to Mr. Brewer, a church choir 

member; one claim based on a statement made in the 16 January 2013 letter Mr. 

Holleman sent to Mr. Brewer; and the claim based on a statement made in the 6 April 

2013 email Mr. Holleman also sent to Mr. Brewer. In its analysis of these statements, 

the majority expands the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine to bar defamation 

claims that can be resolved by the application of neutral principles of law. I will 

analyze these statements in turn.

(1) 23 December 2012 Alleged Oral Statement by Mr. Hix

Plaintiffs argue the following statement they allege Mr. Hix made to an 

unidentified DHBC congregant on 23 December 2012 is defamatory: “[Mr.] Lippard 

is a liar and you and other people like you are believing him instead of Scripture.” In 

response, Defendants argue the statement “was made in the context of Mr. Hix’s 

interpretation of and Mr. Lippard’s compliance with Scripture” and that “[a]n inquiry 

into the falsity of the statement would require a comparison of Mr. Lippard’s conduct 

with Scripture, which also prohibits lying. (E.g., Rev. 21:8)” The majority argues 

that “we would need to inquire into DHBC’s definition of lying, when to believe 

scripture, and how scripture determines whom to believe,” and that “[t]his is an issue 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

22

over DHBC’s internal customs, practices, morality, and degree of control between 

members.” 

This statement contains two independent clauses, each with a complete 

thought. First, I would hold that courts would not have to interpret or weigh church 

doctrine in order to determine the truth or falsity of the first part of the claim, that 

“[Mr.] Lippard is a liar.” Contrary to the arguments of Defendants and the majority, 

the meaning of “liar” in this alleged oral statement is not ambiguous and would not 

require interpretation of the Book of Revelation, or interpretation or weighing of 

“DHBC’s definition of lying” to determine. In interpreting allegedly defamatory 

statements, our courts construe the meaning of statements “as ordinary people would 

understand” them. Renwick v. News and Observer Pub. Co., 310 N.C. 312, 319, 312 

S.E.2d 405, 409 (1984). In ordinary usage, “liar” means “a person who tells lies,” and 

“lie” means, inter alia, “an assertion of something known or believed by the speaker 

to be untrue with intent to deceive.” See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

716, 717 (11th Ed. 2003). Although Mr. Hix is an employee of DHBC, there is no 

indication that there is a special “definition of lying” unique to DHBC. Therefore, I 

would hold courts are not barred from determining a claim based on the alleged 

statement by Mr. Hix that Mr. Lippard is a liar. 

Second, the majority argues that “you and other people like you are believing 

him instead of Scripture” means that “we would need to inquire into . . . when to 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

23

believe scripture, and how scripture determines whom to believe[,]” to determine the 

truth or falsity of the claim that Mr. Lippard is a liar. However, courts would only 

need to determine whether Mr. Lippard knowingly made factually untrue statements 

with the intent to deceive or not, an inquiry which does not require interpreting or 

weighing church doctrine. I would hold the second phrase does not sufficiently allege 

a defamation claim against Mr. Lippard because it is a statement of opinion and not 

fact and does not target Mr. Lippard, but other unnamed churchgoers. Assuming the 

alleged statement is capable of verification and directed against Mr. Lippard, I would 

hold considering the particular implied claim that Mr. Lippard is not following 

scripture is barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine, as courts cannot 

determine whether Mr. Lippard is contravening scripture without inquiring into 

what scripture requires. 

That this claim would be barred does not affect the alleged statement that Mr. 

Lippard is a liar. In a footnote, the majority argues that “[w]e cannot separate the 

23 December 2012 statement into two parts and must read it as a whole because it is 

a complete sentence without a comma that would indicate a compound sentence of 

thoughts.” I would not hold the absence of a comma in a written allegation of an oral 

statement is dispositive of its interpretation; rather, because both conjuncts can stand 

alone as individual sentences, they are independent clauses and each expresses a 

complete thought. But even taken as a whole, in the alleged statement Mr. Hix still 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

24

accuses Mr. Lippard of being a liar, an allegation courts are capable of determining 

the truth or falsity of which without weighing church doctrine. Therefore, I would 

hold the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine cannot bar Plaintiffs’ claim that Mr. 

Hix defamed Mr. Lippard by claiming he was a liar.

(2) 8 January 2013 Email by Mr. Hix to Mr. Brewer

Plaintiffs also allege defamation based on Mr. Hix’s statement in a subsequent 

email to Mr. Brewer, a choir member, stating: “Note also that there are verifiable 

facts and Biblical scriptures which [Plaintiffs] are openly denying and defying. Those 

facts and scriptures still stand.” This statement, like the last by Mr. Hix, mixes 

allegations that Plaintiffs are lying—“there are verifiable facts . . . which [Plaintiffs] 

are openly denying . . .”—with allegations that Plaintiffs are contravening scriptural 

requirements—“there are . . . Biblical scriptures which [Plaintiffs] are 

openly . . . defying.” At deposition, Mr. Hix said “[t]he facts that the (sic) late and/or 

not showing up for worship services when we’re paying her to be on the schedule” 

were the “verifiable facts” to which he was referring. Here, as in the previous 

statement, I would hold that courts are not barred from considering a defamation 

claim based on the allegation that Plaintiffs are “openly denying” “verifiable facts,” 

or lying. I would hold that determining the truth or falsity of whether Plaintiffs were 

“openly denying” the “verifiable fact” that Ms. Lippard was repeatedly late or not 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

25

showing up for worship services would not require courts to interpret or weigh church 

doctrine and courts are not barred from making that limited inquiry.

(3) 16 January 2013 Letter by Mr. Holleman to Mr. Brewer

Mr. Holleman sent a lengthy letter on 16 January 2013 to Mr. Brewer. 

Plaintiffs argue, among others, five statements contained in the letter are 

defamatory. Defendants contend courts are barred from considering each of these 

statements based on the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine. While I concur with 

the majority that courts are barred from considering four of the statements because 

they would require courts to interpret or weigh church doctrine, I disagree with the 

majority’s holding that courts are barred from considering the following statement 

written by Mr. Holleman: “No doubt there are more strategies against the church 

leadership playing out tonight.” I would hold courts are not barred from considering 

this claim because determining the truth or falsity of whether “there [were] more 

strategies against the church leadership playing out” would not require the 

interpretation or weighing of church doctrine. The letter stated in pertinent part:

[A]s far as I’m aware, every new conversation or controversy has been initiated 

by [the Plaintiffs], or by those who have been advocating for their position [as 

opposed to the church leadership]. You yourself have attempted to engage me 

in conversation at the church. . . . You have written this letter and had it 

delivered to me, Bryan Sherrill, and Bill Wooten. [Mr. Lippard] has confronted 

[Mr. Hix] multiple times, and this very day, I’ve met with Billy Lynch for 

breakfast, whom [Mr. Lippard] had confronted at Church with a copy of [Mr. 

Hix’s] directives to [Ms. Lippard]. I’ve learned that [Mr. Lippard] has e-mailed 

[Mr. Hix] requesting an explanation for why he and [Ms. Lippard] have not 

been returned to the solo rotation. And Bryan Sherrill indicates that [Mr. 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

26

Lippard] called him today attempting to “catch” me in some mistake. These 

are just a few. No doubt there are more strategies against the church 

leadership playing out tonight. 

In their brief, Plaintiffs argue this statement implies “nefarious motives ascribed to 

Ms. Lippard by [Mr.] Holleman.” The context of the statement makes clear that 

“strategies” in this context means “a careful plan or method” and “a clever stratagem,” 

here with a negative connotation. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1233 

(11th Ed. 2003). Mr. Holleman is accusing Ms. Lippard of coordinating the meetings 

and stirring dissension. The truth or falsity of the statement that “there [were] more 

strategies against the church leadership playing out [that ]night” could be determined 

by a court without inquiring into religious doctrine or practice, such as by 

determining whether Ms. Lippard asked or instructed others to communicate on her 

behalf or to actively oppose the action of the church leadership. Therefore, I would 

hold the claim is not barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine.

Although the majority concedes that this statement “does not directly [involve] 

scripture” it nevertheless argues that “it does involve other ecclesiastical matters.” 

However, the majority does not rely on the definition of “ecclesiastical matter” 

adopted by our Supreme Court. It does not argue that this is a matter “which 

concerns . . . the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful 

laws and regulations for the government of membership[,]” nor that it concerns “the 

power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership by 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

27

the legally constituted authorities of the church . . . .” Piner, 257 N.C. at 77, 147 

S.E.2d at 583. The Plaintiffs’ claim that this statement is defamatory is neither. 

Instead, the majority asserts that “[p]lainly, this controversy and ongoing 

dispute with the Plaintiffs is a matter of DHBC’s internal membership, organization, 

governance, discipline, and degree of control between members” and that “[w]e cannot 

decide the rightness or wrongness of this statement by a pastor communicating with 

his flock.” “[B]ut,” contrary to the majority’s argument, “the courts do have 

jurisdiction, as to civil, contract[,] and property rights which are involved in, or arise 

from, a church controversy.” Creech, 256 N.C. at 140, 123 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis 

added) (quoting Reid, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114). An act that would otherwise give 

rise to an actionable tort claim is not immunized merely because it arose in the 

context of a communication between a pastor and a churchgoer where neutral 

principles of law could be applied to resolve the claim. See Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 

495, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that a holding “that a religious body must be held 

free from any responsibility for wholly predictable and foreseeable injurious 

consequences of personnel decisions, although such decisions incorporate no 

theological or dogmatic tenets—would go beyond First Amendment protection and 

cloak such bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the 

preservation of the principles constitutionally safeguarded.” (internal citation 

omitted)); accord Bigelow, 247 N.C. App. at 411, 786 S.E.2d at 366 (holding 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

28

“unsupported assertion” that First Amendment “immunizes, without exception, a 

religious institution from liability arising out of a contract between the religious 

institution and its ministerial employees . . . cannot be reconciled with Smith.”). 

Contrary to the majority’s argument, resolving this claim does not require courts to 

determine the “rightness or wrongness” of the pastor’s statement; resolving the claim 

merely requires that courts determine the truth or falsity of it. That particular 

question “does not directly [involve] scripture,” as the majority concedes, and would 

not require courts to interpret or weigh church doctrine. Therefore, I would hold it 

can be resolved by the application of neutral principles of law and is not barred by 

the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine.

(4) 6 April 2013 Email by Mr. Holleman to Mr. Brewer

Finally, the Plaintiffs also argue that the following statement in the 6 April 

2013 email to Mr. Brewer was defamatory:

There were several there the Wednesday night that [Mr. 

Lippard], with [Ms. Lippard] behind him, blocked [Mr. 

Hix’s] exit from the music room and was aggressively going 

after [Mr. Hix], pointing his finger in [Mr. Hix’s] face, an 

action I recently learned was illegal and could have very 

well been reported as a crime. 

Determining the truth or falsity of this allegation of the commission of an allegedly 

criminal act would not require courts to interpret or weigh church doctrine any more 

than the same accusation from any other person based on any other crime would. 

The statement does not allege that Plaintiffs violated an ecclesiastical law, which 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

29

would require such interpretation or weighing of doctrine. Rather, determining the 

truth or falsity of this statement merely requires courts to determine whether or not 

Mr. Lippard in fact “blocked [Mr. Hix’s] exit from the music room and []aggressively 

[went] after [Mr. Hix], pointing his finger in [Mr. Hix’s] face.” Therefore, I would hold 

this claim could be resolved based on the application of neutral principles of law and 

is not barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine.

The majority argues deciding this particular claim is indistinguishable from 

Harris because “we would be forced to determine whether the statement at issue is 

proper in light of DHBC’s doctrine and practice regarding membership and conduct.” 

This is a misreading of Harris. In Harris, the reason the court would have had to 

inquire into whether expenditures made by the church leadership were “proper” to 

resolve the claim was because the cause of action the plaintiffs alleged was breach of 

fiduciary duty, and the only theory alleged by the plaintiffs for the specific element 

of breach of fiduciary duty was that the defendants “improperly us[ed] church funds, 

which constitutes conversion.” Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 572. Therefore, 

determining whether the church leadership’s challenged action was proper was an 

essential issue to the claim before the court. Here, in contrast, the issue is whether 

Mr. Holleman’s statement about Plaintiffs was true or false; the court need not 

determine whether this statement or Mr. Holleman’s actions were “proper” or 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

30

consider “how [DHBC] should react to what it considers improper conduct” to resolve 

the claim. 

I would hold that Plaintiffs’ claims based on these statements are not barred 

by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine because courts could evaluate the specific 

elements of each of these claims, including the falsity of the alleged statement, 

without interpreting or weighing church doctrine. Therefore, “the First Amendment 

is not implicated and neutral principles of law are properly applied to adjudicate the 

claim[s].” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398; see Harris, 361 N.C. at 

273-74, 643 S.E.2d at 571 (holding claims barred by ecclesiastical entanglement 

doctrine “[b]ecause no neutral principles of law exist to resolve plaintiffs’ claims.”). 

D. Substantive Defamation Claims

Although I concur with the majority that the ecclesiastical entanglement 

doctrine bars courts from analyzing most of Plaintiffs’ claims, and I dissent and would 

hold that four claims are not barred, there remain other issues to resolve. In granting 

summary judgment to Defendants, the trial court also held (1) “[a]s a matter of law, 

none of the Defendants’ statements are defamatory per se” and (2) “Plaintiffs did not 

provide any evidentiary forecast that they suffered special damages because of any of 

Defendants’ allegedly defamatory per quod statements.” On appeal, Plaintiffs argue 

that they “have met all the elements of defamation cases [(sic)] whether per se, or per 

quod.” I disagree, and I would hold that, for the claims that I believe are not barred 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

31

by the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine, Plaintiffs have failed to show the claims 

constitute libel or slander per se or per quod.

“Three classes of libel are recognized under North Carolina law.” Renwick, 

310 N.C. at 316, 312 S.E.2d at 408. 

They are: (1) publications obviously defamatory which are 

called libel per se; (2) publications susceptible of two 

interpretations one of which is defamatory and the other 

not; and (3) publications not obviously defamatory but 

when considered with innuendo, colloquium, and 

explanatory circumstances become libelous, which are 

termed libels per quod.

8

Id. at 316, 312 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 537, 251 S.E.2d 

452, 455 (1979)). 

Libel per se is a publication which, when considered alone 

without explanatory circumstances: (1) charges that a 

person has committed an infamous crime; (2) charges a 

person with having an infectious disease; (3) tends to 

impeach a person in that person’s trade or profession; or (4) 

otherwise tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt or 

disgrace.

 

Skinner v. Reynolds, 237 N.C. App. 150, 152, 764 S.E.2d 652, 655 (2014) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis omitted). 

Further: [] Defamatory words to be libelous per se must be 

susceptible of but one meaning and of such nature that the 

court can presume as a matter of law that they tend to 

disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public 

hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned 

 

8 In contrast, slander—an “oral defamatory utterance[]”—is only actionable per se or per quod, not as 

a publication susceptible of two interpretations. Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34, 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 

(1945).
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

32

and avoided. Although someone cannot preface an 

otherwise defamatory statement with ‘in my opinion’ and 

claim immunity from liability, a pure expression of opinion 

is protected because it fails to assert actual fact. This Court 

considers how the alleged defamatory publication would 

have been understood by an average reader. In addition, 

the alleged defamatory statements must be construed only 

in the context of the document in which they are contained, 

stripped of all insinuations, innuendo, colloquium and 

explanatory circumstances. The articles must be 

defamatory on its face within the four corners thereof.

Id. at 152-53, 764 S.E.2d at 655 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis 

omitted). 

In their brief, Plaintiffs do not identify which of the dozens of allegedly 

defamatory statements they cite are defamatory per se. Upon my review of the record 

and the briefs, the only statement not barred by the ecclesiastical entanglement 

doctrine that Plaintiffs might colorably argue was libel per se was Mr. Holleman’s 

description of Plaintiffs’ alleged behavior in the 6 April email to Mr. Brewer, which 

Mr. Holleman characterized as “illegal” and “could very well have been reported as a 

crime.”9 There is a question as to whether the behavior alleged—“block[ing] [Mr. 

Hix’s] exit from the music room,” “aggressively going after [Mr. Hix],” and “pointing 

his finger in [Mr. Hix’s] face”—constitutes an “infamous crime.”

 

9 Despite Plaintiffs’ repeated assertions, none of the statements alleged “tend[] to subject [Plaintiffs] 

to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace” as a matter of law. Skinner, 237 N.C. App. at 152, 764 S.E.2d at 

655.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

33

“At common law, . . . an infamous crime is one whose commission brings 

infamy upon a convicted person, rendering him unfit and incompetent to testify as a 

witness, such crimes being treason, felony, and crimen falsi.” Aycock v. Padgett, 134 

N.C. App. 164, 166, 516 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1999) (citations omitted). Under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-39 (2017), the felony of kidnapping includes an “unlawful[] confine[ment], 

restrain[t], or remov[al] from one place to another [of] any other person 16 years of 

age or over without the consent of such person” for one of several enumerated 

purposes. False imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping. State v. 

Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 210, 415 S.E.2d 555, 562 (1992). “The difference between 

kidnapping and the lesser included offense of false imprisonment is the purpose of 

the confinement, restraint, or removal of another person: the offense is kidnapping if 

the purpose of the restraint was to accomplish one of the purposes enumerated in the 

kidnapping statute.” Id. at 210, 415 S.E.2d at 562 (citation omitted). False 

imprisonment was a misdemeanor at common law and, as it was not superseded by 

N.C.G.S. § 14-39, remains so in North Carolina. See State v. Fulcher, 34 N.C. App. 

233, 242, 237 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1977), affirmed by State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 

S.E.2d 338 (1978) (“The common-law crime of false imprisonment, a general 

misdemeanor, has not been superseded by the new kidnapping statute because there 

may be an unlawful restraint without the purposes specified in the statute.”).
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

34

The conduct Mr. Holleman alleges occurred, being Mr. Holleman’s blocking of 

Mr. Hix in the music room with his body, does not rise to the level of kidnapping or 

false imprisonment, as there is nothing in the statement to indicate Mr. Hix was truly 

confined or restrained. Even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Hix was confined against 

his will, there is no evidence in the statement by Mr. Holleman that he claimed 

Plaintiffs acted with one of the specific purposes enumerated in the kidnapping 

statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-39. Therefore, at most, the conduct Mr. Holleman 

describes would be false imprisonment. As it is only a misdemeanor, not a felony, 

and not treason or a crimen falsi, false imprisonment is not an “infamous crime.” 

Therefore, the allegedly defamatory statement in the 6 April email, like the rest of 

the statements Plaintiffs allege were defamatory, is not libel per se.

Plaintiffs further contend the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to “provide any evidentiary 

forecast that they suffered special damages because of any of Defendants’ allegedly 

defamatory per quod statements.” I disagree.

Libel per quod may be asserted when a publication is not 

obviously defamatory, but when considered in conjunction 

with innuendo, colloquium, and explanatory circumstances 

it becomes libelous. To state a claim for libel per quod, a 

party must specifically allege and prove special damages as 

to each plaintiff.
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

35

Skinner, 237 N.C. App. at 157, 764 S.E.2d at 657-58 (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). This Court has distinguished special damages from general damages as 

follows:

General damages are the natural and necessary result of 

the wrong, are implied by law, and may be recovered under 

a general allegation of damages. But special damages, 

those which do not necessarily result from the wrong, must 

be pleaded, and the facts giving rise to the special damages 

must be alleged so as to fairly inform the defendant of the 

scope of plaintiff’s demand.

Griffin v. Holden, 180 N.C. App. 129, 138, 636 S.E.2d 298, 305 (2006) (citing Rodd v. 

W.H. King Drug Co., 30 N.C. App. 564, 568, 228 S.E.2d 35, 38 (1976)). “Special 

damage, as that term is used in the law of defamation means pecuniary loss, as 

distinguished from humiliation.” Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., 10 N.C. 

App. 384, 387, 179 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1971) (citing Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 33 

S.E.2d 125 (1945)) (additional citations omitted). Indeed, “emotional distress and 

mental suffering are not alone sufficient to establish a basis for relief in cases which 

are actionable only per quod.” Id. at 390, 179 S.E.2d at 324 (citations omitted). Of 

course, some pecuniary damages may stem from mental anguish and humiliation, 

such as the cost of psychological treatment attributable to the defamatory statement. 

See, e.g., Tallent v Blake, 57 N.C. App. 249, 255, 291 S.E.2d 336, 340-41 (1982) 

(“Special damages include illness sufficient to require medical care and expense.”); 

Araya v. Deep Dive Media, LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 582, 599-600 (W.D.N.C. 2013) 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

36

(holding that cost of treatment and psychological counseling for emotional distress 

satisfied requirement for special damages in libel per quod claim).

Furthermore, at summary judgment, a plaintiff must “produce an evidentiary 

forecast to support a prima facie showing of special damages to survive defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment on [a] claim of libel per quod.” Griffin, 180 N.C. App. 

at 138, 636 S.E.2d at 305 (citing Renwick, 310 N.C. at 312, 312 S.E.2d at 408 ). Mere 

allegations and “pure speculation” are insufficient at this stage. Id. at 138-39, 636 

S.E.2d at 305. In the present case, Plaintiffs claim they have suffered “damages for 

injury to their reputation and mental anguish and humiliation,” in addition to 

seeking punitive damages and “full reimbursement of their attorney’s fees.” Mr. 

Lippard also claims that “his reputation as a builder home inspector and real estate 

agent has been tarnished as a result of the publication of [the 28 November sermon] 

and the other defamatory remarks attributed to [Defendants] against [Mr. Lippard].” 

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of producing a forecast of evidence sufficient 

to make a prima facie showing of special damages. Mental anguish and humiliation 

are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement for special damages. See Williams, 10 

N.C. App. at 387, 179 S.E.2d at 322. Rather, to survive a motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiffs must show “pecuniary loss, as distinguished from humiliation.” 

Williams, 10 N.C. App at 387, 179 S.E.2d at 322. However, despite their general 

allegation, Plaintiffs have failed to show any particular pecuniary damages arising 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

37

from the mental anguish, emotional harm, and humiliation they claim to have 

suffered, such as costs for therapy or mental health care.

Mr. Lippard additionally claims that Defendants’ alleged statements have 

“tarnished” “his reputation as a builder, home inspector[,] and real estate agent,” and 

that his “yearly income from 2010 through 2016” is “proof of pecuniary injury as a 

result of the defamation of [Defendants].” Mr. Lippard’s reported income shows 

$13,804.00 for 2010, $31,169 for 2011, $9,824.00 for 2012, and $18,008 for 2013, the 

year following the publication of the majority of the allegedly defamatory statements 

at issue. Mr. Lippard has failed to show how the allegedly defamatory statements 

resulted in pecuniary harm. Without more, any connection between Plaintiffs’ 

income and Defendants’ statements, particularly those allegedly defamatory 

statements which courts are not barred from considering by the First Amendment, is 

“pure speculation.” Griffin, 180 N.C. App. at 138-39, 636 S.E.2d at 305. Plaintiffs 

have failed to show special damages so as to warrant denial of Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on the libel and slander per quod claims. 

III. Conclusion

In the case of defamation claims, I would hold that courts must evaluate the 

specific elements of the claim, including the falsity of the alleged statement, and 

determine whether “resolution of [the truth or falsity of the alleged statement] 

requires the court to interpret or weigh church doctrine. If not, the First Amendment 
LIPPARD V. HOLLEMAN

McGEE, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

38

is not implicated and neutral principles of law are properly applied to adjudicate the 

claim.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398. Based on this analysis, I 

concur with the majority’s holding for some of Plaintiffs’ claims that they are barred 

because resolving the claims requires courts to interpret or weigh church doctrine. 

For the four allegedly defamatory statements discussed above—Mr. Hix’s oral 

allegation that Mr. Lippard is a liar and written allegation that Plaintiffs denied 

“verifiable facts,” along with Mr. Holleman’s statements that “strategies” were 

playing out against church leadership and that Mr. Lippard allegedly committed a 

crime—I disagree and would hold that there is no need for the court to interpret or 

weigh church doctrine in its adjudication of the truth or falsity of these claims. 

[The majority’s] contrary holding—that a religious body must be held free from 

any responsibility for [allegedly defamatory statements,] although such 

[statements] incorporate no theological or dogmatic tenets—[]go[es] beyond 

First Amendment protection and cloak[s] such bodies with an exclusive 

immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the principles 

constitutionally safeguarded.

Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 495, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Therefore, I dissent 

in part. For these claims that I would hold are not barred by the ecclesiastical 

entanglement doctrine, I would nevertheless hold that Plaintiffs have not shown 

sufficient evidence for libel per se or special damages as required for libel or slander 

per quod. Therefore, I concur in the majority’s judgment affirming the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment for Defendants.