Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

IRAQ

Key Issues for 

Congressional 

Oversight 

March 2009 

GAO-09-294SP 
Page i GAO-09-294SP

Contents 

Letter 1

Next Steps for U.S. Engagement in Iraq 

Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions Need to Be Met to Undertake a 

Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces 9 

Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational Requirements of the U.S.-Iraq 

Security Agreement 11 

Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment from 

Iraq 13 

Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. Government Contractors in Iraq 

during a Drawdown 15 

Enclosure V: Determining the Department of Defense’s Future Costs for Iraq 17 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a Predominantly Military to a Civilian 

Presence in Iraq 19 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian Presence in Iraq 21 

Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of Engagement of the International 

Community 23 

U.S. Efforts to Help Iraq Govern and Address Its People’s Needs 

Enclosure IX: Building Iraq’s Capacity to Assume a Greater Cost Share of Its 

Security, Reconstruction, and Economic Needs 25 

Enclosure X: Building Iraq’s Capacity to Improve Critical Service Sectors 27 

Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to Promote National Reconciliation 29 

Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq’s Refugees 31 

Appendices 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 33

Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force Levels in Iraq 39

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Treasury 44

Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 47

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Iraq
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Page ii GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 24, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

To assist the 111th Congress, we have enclosed a series of issue papers for 

consideration in developing congressional oversight agendas and 

determining the way forward in securing and stabilizing Iraq. These papers 

are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) and the more than 130 Iraq-related products we have issued 

since May 2003. 

Since fiscal year 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the 

Department of Defense (DOD) for military efforts primarily in support of 

the Global War on Terrorism.1

 The majority of this amount has been for 

military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, 

since fiscal year 2003, about $49 billion2

 has been provided to U.S. 

agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including 

developing Iraq’s security forces, enhancing Iraq’s capacity to govern, and 

rebuilding Iraq’s oil, electricity, and water sectors, among other activities. 

This report expands on issues discussed on GAO’s transition Web site, 

http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-294sp.

In January 2007, President Bush announced The New Way Forward in Iraq to 

stem violence and enable the Iraqi government to foster national 

reconciliation. This strategy established goals and objectives through July 

2008 and reasserted the long-term goal or end state for Iraq: a unified, 

democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an 

ally in the war on terror. To support the strategy, the United States increased 

its military presence through a surge of brigade combat teams and associated 

forces. In June 2008, we reported that the United States had made some 

progress in reducing overall violence in Iraq and working with the Iraqi 

 

1

This figure includes appropriations for domestic and overseas military operations in 

support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as Operation Noble Eagle, Operation 

Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as stabilization and 

reconstruction appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan. See GAO, Global War on 

Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense, GAO-09-233R 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2008). 

2

Of this $49 billion, about $22 billion was provided to DOD for improving Iraqi security 

forces and is included in the $808 billion provided primarily in support of the Global War 

on Terrorism. 

Page 1 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
 

government to pass legislation promoting national reconciliation. However, 

many unmet goals and challenges remained, including building capacity in 

Iraq’s ministries, helping the government execute its capital investment 

budgets, and providing essential services to the Iraqi people.3

With the completion of The New Way Forward and the end of the military 

surge in July 2008, we recommended that the Administration develop an 

updated strategy that clearly articulates U.S. goals, objectives, roles and 

responsibilities, and the military and civilian resources needed to build on 

security and legislative gains. Furthermore, in a second report,4

 we 

recommended revisions to the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq—an 

operational plan for U.S. military and civilian activities in Iraq developed 

by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the U.S. Embassy Baghdad—

that would help Congress assess progress in achieving the conditions that 

would allow for the continued drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. 

Specifically, we recommended that DOD and the Department of State 

(State) identify and prioritize the conditions that must be achieved in each 

phase of the campaign to enable a drawdown; report the number of U.S. 

combat brigade teams and other forces required for each campaign phase; 

and estimate the time needed to reach the desired end state and end the 

military portion of the campaign. The strategic level actions we called for 

in our first report would guide revisions to the Joint Campaign Plan.5

In February 2009, President Obama described a new strategy for Iraq 

consisting of three parts: (1) the responsible removal of combat brigades, 

(2) sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq, 

and (3) comprehensive U.S. engagement across the region. According to 

DOD, the United States plans to reduce the number of combat troops from 

about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 

2009—a difference of 12,000 troops representing two brigades and their 

support units. Under the schedule announced by the President, U.S. force 

 

3

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, 

Updated Strategy Needed, GAO-08-837 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). 

4

GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the Conditions Necessary for 

the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq, GAO-08-700C (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 

2008). In December 2008, DOD declassified the recommendations GAO made in this report. 

The body of the report remains classified. 

5

Activities at the strategic level include establishing national and multinational military 

objectives, as well as defining limits and assessing risks for the use of military and other 

instruments of national power. In contrast, activities at the operational level establish 

objectives that link tactics on the ground to high-level strategic objectives. 

Page 2 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
 

levels would decline further by August 31, 2010, to no more than 50,000 

troops. Under the November 2008 bilateral security agreement6

 between 

the United States and Iraq, the United States must remove all of its 

remaining forces by December 31, 2011. 

The issues discussed in the enclosures to this report should be considered 

in further defining the new strategy and its supporting operational plans. 

Key issues include: 

• The security agreement establishes dates for repositioning U.S. forces 

in Iraq and removing them from the country—a significant change from 

the United States’ prior, conditions-based strategy for Iraq.7

 A 

responsible drawdown in Iraq will need to balance the timetable 

established in the security agreement, military doctrine that calls for 

the delineation of conditions that must exist before military operations 

can end, and the wishes of the Iraqi government. 

• If the United States adheres to the timetable contained in the security 

agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the end 

of 2011. The redeployment of these forces and the removal of their 

equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort. 

• The large U.S. military presence has provided vital support to civilian 

operations and has undertaken many traditionally civilian tasks. In 

moving forward, the United States will need to consider how to 

transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one as 

U.S. forces draw down. 

• As U.S reconstruction efforts end, Iraq will need to develop the 

capacity to spend its resources, particularly on investment that will 

further economic development and deliver essential services to its 

people. GAO estimates that the Iraqi government had a cumulative 

budget surplus of $47 billion at the end of 2008. 

We obtained information from agency documents and interviews with U.S. 

officials in Iraq and Washington, D.C., including DOD, State, and the 

Departments of Energy and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International 

 

6

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the 

Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities 

during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, November 17, 2008, that took effect January 1, 

2009. DOD also refers to the security agreement as a status of forces agreement (SOFA). 

7

The agreement also defines Iraqi jurisdiction over U.S. forces, DOD civilian employees, 

and U.S. forces’ contractors in Iraq. 

Page 3 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
 

Development (USAID); the Army Corps of Engineers; MNF-I; and the Defense 

Intelligence Agency. We conducted this performance audit in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. Appendix I contains additional details about our scope and 

methodology. Appendix II provides updated information on the levels of 

violence in Iraq, as measured by the number of enemy-initiated attacks, and 

on the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. Appendix IV contains a list of GAO 

products directly related to this letter and each of the enclosures. 

The Department of the Treasury provided written comments on a draft of 

this report, which are reprinted in appendix III. Treasury agreed that 

although Iraq’s end-2008 cumulative surplus fell short of GAO’s earlier 

projection, Iraq’s budget surpluses will sufficiently cover its projected 2009 

budget deficit. Treasury also agreed that Iraq’s inability to fully execute its 

budgets hampers the government’s efforts to further reconstruction and 

economic growth. Treasury, DOD, State, and USAID also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees 

listed below. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the 

President and Vice President of the United States, and executive branch 

agencies. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions, please contact Joseph A. 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov, or the individual(s) listed 

at the end of each enclosure. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page 

of this report. For press inquiries, please contact Chuck Young at 

(202) 512-4800. Key contributors to this report are included in appendix V. 

Gene L. Dodaro 

Acting Comptroller General of the United States 

Page 4 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

The Honorable John McCain 

ittee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

ittee on Foreign Relations 

n 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

ittee on Homeland Security and 

te 

nouye 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

mittee on Defense 

nate 

The Honorable Judd Gregg 

mittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

ropriations 

Chair 

Ranking Member 

Comm

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chair 

Ranking Member 

Comm

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberma

Chair 

Ranking Member 

Comm

 Governmental Affairs 

United States Sena

The Honorable Daniel K. I

Chair 

Vice Chairman 

Subcom

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Se

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Chair 

Ranking Member 

Subcom

 and Related Programs 

Committee on App

United States Senate 

Page 5 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chair 

he Honorable John M. McHugh 

es 

ward L. Berman 

Lehtinen 

olphus Towns 

ssa 

ernment Reform 

n P. Murtha 

ung 

erman 

nd South Asia 

T

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Servic

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ho

Chair 

The Honorable Ileana RosRanking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ed

Chair 

The Honorable Darrell E. I

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Gov

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Joh

Chair 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Yo

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Gary L. Ack

Chair 

The Honorable Dan Burton

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on the Middle East a

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

Page 6 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Chair 

The Honorable Kay Granger 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 7 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

Page 9 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure I: Determining What Conditions 

Need to Be Met to Undertake a Responsible 

Drawdown of U.S. Forces 

 Background Issue 

The security agreement between the United States and Iraq establishes a 

timetable—but no conditions—for drawing down U.S. forces from Iraq by the 

end of 2011. Adopting a drawdown timetable marks a major change from the 

prior U.S. approach of drawing down forces based on security and other 

conditions in Iraq. Military doctrine states that effective campaign planning 

cannot occur without a clear understanding of the conditions that must exist 

to draw down forces. In February 2009, the President described a new 

strategy in Iraq, calling for a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces. In further 

defining this strategy and revising the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq, the 

administration will need to clarify what conditions need to be met to 

undertake this drawdown responsibly. 

In November 2008, the United 

States and Iraq signed a bilateral 

security agreement, which 

governs the operations of U.S. 

forces in Iraq. The security 

agreement entered into force on 

January 1, 2009. 

 Key Findings 

Before signing the security agreement with Iraq, the prior administration had 

linked the drawdown of U.S. forces to the achievement of security, political, 

economic, and diplomatic conditions. Meeting these conditions would enable 

the United States to achieve its strategic goal for Iraq: a unified, democratic, 

and federal Iraq that could govern, defend, and sustain itself and become an 

ally in the war on terror. Some conditions the United States sought to achieve 

in Iraq included an improved security situation; more capable Iraqi security 

forces; improved essential services such as access to clean water and reliable 

electricity; and the passage of legislation promoting national reconciliation, 

such as laws governing the distribution of oil revenues and amnesty for 

former insurgents. 

Under Prior Administration, 

Conditions-based Strategy 

Shifted to a Time-based 

Approach for Drawing 

Down U.S. Forces 

As GAO has previously reported, progress toward achieving these conditions 

has been mixed. For example, while the security situation remains tenuous, 

violence has decreased significantly over the past 2 years: enemy-initiated 

attacks decreased from a peak of almost 180 per day in June 2007 to about 27 

per day in January 2009 (see app. II). Further, the number of Iraqi army and 

police forces nearly doubled from about 320,000 in January 2007 to just over 

600,000 in October 2008. However, according to the Department of Defense 

(DOD), over the same period, the number of Iraqi army units capable of 

conducting operations independently remained at about 10 percent of total 

units. 

The November 2008 security agreement marked a major shift from a 

conditions-based strategy to a time-based approach for drawing down U.S. 

forces. The security agreement sets a two-phase timetable—but with no 

security, political, economic, or other conditions—for removing U.S. forces 

from Iraq over a 3-year period, primarily because the Iraqi government did not 

agree to include conditions, according to DOD and State officials: 

 June 30, 2009: U.S. combat forces must withdraw from Iraqi cities, 

villages, and localities. According to DOD officials, U.S. combat forces 

would continue to conduct combined operations in these areas from bases 

located outside Iraqi cities, villages, and localities. Further, some U.S. forces 

who train Iraqi forces may be co-located with Iraqi units in these areas. 

 December 31, 2011: All U.S. forces must leave Iraq. According to DOD and 

Department of State (State) officials, the agreement does not envision any 

U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after that date. 
Page 10 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

Either government can unilaterally terminate the security agreement by 

providing 12 months advance notice. Without a security agreement or other 

mandate, U.S. forces would lack the authority to continue operating in Iraq 

and would have to leave. For example, if Iraqis reject the security agreement 

in a referendum that may be held in July 2009, the Iraqi government has said it 

would abide by the results of this referendum. Thus, Iraq would likely 

terminate the security agreement, and U.S. forces would have to leave Iraq by 

as early as July 2010. 

Either government can unilaterally terminate the security agreement by 

providing 12 months advance notice. Without a security agreement or other 

mandate, U.S. forces would lack the authority to continue operating in Iraq 

and would have to leave. For example, if Iraqis reject the security agreement 

in a referendum that may be held in July 2009, the Iraqi government has said it 

would abide by the results of this referendum. Thus, Iraq would likely 

terminate the security agreement, and U.S. forces would have to leave Iraq by 

as early as July 2010. 

Iraq and the United States 

Could Move Forward or 

Extend the Drawdown 

Time Frame 

In addition, DOD and State officials noted that the U.S. and Iraqi governments 

can amend the security agreement by mutual agreement. Such amendments 

could include an extension of the drawdown timetable or an authorization of 

a residual U.S. force to continue training Iraqi security forces after 2011. 

However, according to officials at State and DOD, the Iraqi government did 

not agree to include conditions-based provisions in the security agreement 

due to political pressure against a continued U.S. presence. 

In addition, DOD and State officials noted that the U.S. and Iraqi governments 

can amend the security agreement by mutual agreement. Such amendments 

could include an extension of the drawdown timetable or an authorization of 

a residual U.S. force to continue training Iraqi security forces after 2011. 

However, according to officials at State and DOD, the Iraqi government did 

not agree to include conditions-based provisions in the security agreement 

due to political pressure against a continued U.S. presence. 

The new administration has emphasized the importance of a responsible 

drawdown of U.S. forces but has not yet defined this term. In February 2009, 

the President announced a significant drawdown of U.S. forces by August 31, 

2010 and, consistent with the security agreement, the removal of all U.S. 

forces by the end of 2011. According to DOD and Multinational Force-Iraq 

(MNF-I) officials, the United States plans to reduce the U.S. force level from 

about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 2009, 

where it would remain through Iraq’s national election scheduled at the end of 

2009. Based on conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may 

recommend further reductions prior to the election. A few months after the 

election, the United States plans to reduce forces to no more than 50,000 

troops by August 2010 (see app. II). 

The new administration has emphasized the importance of a responsible 

drawdown of U.S. forces but has not yet defined this term. In February 2009, 

the President announced a significant drawdown of U.S. forces by August 31, 

2010 and, consistent with the security agreement, the removal of all U.S. 

forces by the end of 2011. According to DOD and Multinational Force-Iraq 

(MNF-I) officials, the United States plans to reduce the U.S. force level from 

about 140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 2009, 

where it would remain through Iraq’s national election scheduled at the end of 

2009. Based on conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may 

recommend further reductions prior to the election. A few months after the 

election, the United States plans to reduce forces to no more than 50,000 

troops by August 2010 (see app. II). 

The Administration Should 

Further Define What 

Conditions Must Be 

Achieved to Allow a 

Responsible Drawdown of 

U.S. Forces 

Military doctrine states that effective planning cannot occur without a clear 

understanding of the end state for U.S. operations and the conditions that 

must exist to end military operations and draw down forces. According to 

doctrine, military operations generally should be driven by conditions rather 

than time requirements. However, DOD officials stated they are well aware 

that a 3-year timetable now exists for removing all U.S. forces from Iraq. 

Military doctrine states that effective planning cannot occur without a clear 

understanding of the end state for U.S. operations and the conditions that 

must exist to end military operations and draw down forces. According to 

doctrine, military operations generally should be driven by conditions rather 

than time requirements. However, DOD officials stated they are well aware 

that a 3-year timetable now exists for removing all U.S. forces from Iraq. 

In further defining a new U.S. strategy and revising the Joint Campaign Plan 

for Iraq, the administration must establish the parameters of a responsible 

drawdown, including clarifying the end state for U.S. military operations and 

prioritizing the conditions that would allow U.S. troops to draw down. It 

should also consider how the United States would respond if it does not 

achieve the conditions necessary for a responsible drawdown within the 

security agreement timetable. The administration must work with the Iraqi 

government in further defining the new strategy for Iraq. 

In further defining a new U.S. strategy and revising the Joint Campaign Plan 

for Iraq, the administration must establish the parameters of a responsible 

drawdown, including clarifying the end state for U.S. military operations and 

prioritizing the conditions that would allow U.S. troops to draw down. It 

should also consider how the United States would respond if it does not 

achieve the conditions necessary for a responsible drawdown within the 

security agreement timetable. The administration must work with the Iraqi 

government in further defining the new strategy for Iraq. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. How does the administration define a responsible drawdown from Iraq? 

2. What is the current strategic goal for Iraq and how does it differ from the 

prior goal of a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq that can govern, 

defend, and sustain itself and become an ally in the war on terror? Point of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

3. To what extent will the administration’s plans for removing U.S. forces be 

based on achieving specified conditions in Iraq? 

4. To what extent will the United States attempt to renegotiate provisions of 

the security agreement if security conditions deteriorate or other 

conditions are deemed insufficient to draw down responsibly? 

5. What are the U.S. contingency plans in the event that Iraqis vote against 

the security agreement in July 2009? 
Page 11 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure II: Implementing Key Operational 

Requirements of the U.S.-Iraq Security 

Agreement 

 Background Issue 

The U.S.-Iraq security agreement 

provides the basis for a U.S. 

military presence in Iraq, which 

previously was authorized by 

United Nations (UN) Security 

Council resolutions. 

It also defines legal jurisdiction 

over U.S. servicemembers and 

DOD civilians and contractors in 

Iraq, which previously were 

covered by a Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) order. 

In addition to setting a timetable for drawing down U.S. forces, the security 

agreement governs the operations of U.S. forces supporting Iraqi efforts to 

maintain security and stability. It requires Iraqi agreement for U.S. military 

operations; defines U.S. and Iraqi legal jurisdiction over individual members of 

U.S. forces, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees, and U.S. forces’ 

contractors in Iraq; and generally requires all U.S.-held detainees to be released or 

transferred to Iraqi custody. However, many implementing details remain to be 

resolved. In further defining the U.S. strategy and Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq, 

the administration will need to accommodate the substantial changes in U.S. 

operational authority in Iraq. 

 Key Findings 

Iraqi Goverment Must 

Agree to All U.S. Military 

Operations in Iraq 

The security agreement marks a change in the nature and authority of the U.S. 

military presence in Iraq; its implementation will require a shift in how U.S. 

forces plan, coordinate, and execute operations in the country. From 2003 

through 2008, the UN Security Council authorized the U.S.-led multinational 

force to take all necessary measures to maintain security and stability in Iraq. 

Acting under this mandate, U.S. forces were able to conduct combat 

operations against violent groups, search for and secure weapons, and detain 

Iraqis and others considered to be a threat to Iraq’s security and stability. 

Under the security agreement, all U.S. military operations in Iraq must be 

conducted with the Iraqi government’s concurrence and fully coordinated 

with Iraqi authorities through a new Joint Military Operations Coordinating 

Committee. For example, U.S. forces must obtain Iraqi warrants or other legal 

authorization to detain individuals and search homes, except during combat 

operations undertaken with Iraqi concurrence. U.S. forces retain the right of 

self-defense in Iraq, as defined in international law. 

According to DOD and Department of State (State) officials, many 

implementing details in the security agreement must be resolved. For example, 

it is unclear whether U.S. forces will have a “blanket” authorization to conduct 

certain types of operations, such as medical evacuations or routine joint 

patrols. As of mid-January 2009, the new joint coordinating committee had 

held two initial meetings to develop details on implementing the security 

agreement’s requirements for U.S. military operations in Iraq. 

The security agreement covers individual U.S. military service members, DOD 

civilian employees, and U.S. contractors and subcontractors, as well as their 

employees in Iraq that supply goods, services, and security to or on behalf of U.S. 

forces under a contract with or for those forces. Before the security agreement, 

CPA Order 17 granted immunity from the Iraqi legal process to U.S. military 

personnel under the multinational force and to U.S. contractors operating in Iraq 

for acts performed pursuant to the terms and conditions of their contracts. 

Security Agreement Defines 

U.S. and Iraqi Legal 

Jurisdiction over U.S. 

Military Servicemembers 

and DOD Civilians and 

Contractors 

Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise 

jurisdiction over members of U.S. forces and the civilian component for asyet-unspecified, grave premeditated felonies, when such crimes are 
Page 12 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

committed outside agreed facilities and duty status. The United States has 

jurisdiction over all other crimes. The security agreement requires Iraqi 

authorities to notify U.S. authorities immediately if they detain U.S. service 

members or DOD civilians and transfer them to U.S. custody within 24 hours. 

committed outside agreed facilities and duty status. The United States has 

jurisdiction over all other crimes. The security agreement requires Iraqi 

authorities to notify U.S. authorities immediately if they detain U.S. service 

members or DOD civilians and transfer them to U.S. custody within 24 hours. 

Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise 

jurisdiction over U.S. forces’ contractors, subcontractors, and their employees 

in Iraq. In addition, Iraqi authorities have recently suspended CPA Order 17, 

making all U.S. and foreign contractors and their employees in Iraq subject to 

Iraqi law, according to U.S. officials. According to State, a joint U.S.-Iraqi 

committee is working to establish procedures and guidelines for exercising 

Iraqi jurisdiction for private contractors operating in Iraq, including those 

covered by the security agreement. 

Under the security agreement, Iraq has the primary right to exercise 

jurisdiction over U.S. forces’ contractors, subcontractors, and their employees 

in Iraq. In addition, Iraqi authorities have recently suspended CPA Order 17, 

making all U.S. and foreign contractors and their employees in Iraq subject to 

Iraqi law, according to U.S. officials. According to State, a joint U.S.-Iraqi 

committee is working to establish procedures and guidelines for exercising 

Iraqi jurisdiction for private contractors operating in Iraq, including those 

covered by the security agreement. 

DOD, UN, and human rights reports have identified significant shortcomings 

in Iraq’s judicial system. A December 2008 Human Rights Watch report, for 

example, concluded Iraq’s central criminal court “seriously” failed to meet 

international standards of due process and fair trials. Some of these reports 

raise concerns that detainees in Iraqi custody may be tortured or mistreated 

because Iraqi officials often rely on coerced confessions instead of physical 

evidence, particularly in criminal cases. Whether contractors could 

renegotiate their contracts given the changes in circumstances would depend 

on the terms of their contracts, according to DOD officials. These officials 

said that U.S. contractors and their employees are subject to host government 

jurisdiction in other countries where U.S. forces operate under a status of 

forces agreement. Moreover, they note that many U.S. contractor employees 

are Iraqi nationals and, as such, would be subject to Iraqi jurisdiction. 

DOD, UN, and human rights reports have identified significant shortcomings 

in Iraq’s judicial system. A December 2008 Human Rights Watch report, for 

example, concluded Iraq’s central criminal court “seriously” failed to meet 

international standards of due process and fair trials. Some of these reports 

raise concerns that detainees in Iraqi custody may be tortured or mistreated 

because Iraqi officials often rely on coerced confessions instead of physical 

evidence, particularly in criminal cases. Whether contractors could 

renegotiate their contracts given the changes in circumstances would depend 

on the terms of their contracts, according to DOD officials. These officials 

said that U.S. contractors and their employees are subject to host government 

jurisdiction in other countries where U.S. forces operate under a status of 

forces agreement. Moreover, they note that many U.S. contractor employees 

are Iraqi nationals and, as such, would be subject to Iraqi jurisdiction. 

Reports Raise Concerns 

about Iraqi Judicial System 

The security agreement requires the release or transfer to Iraqi authorities of 

all detainees held by U.S. forces in Iraq unless otherwise requested by the 

Iraqi government. Acting under UN mandate, U.S. forces detained thousands 

of Iraqis and others considered a threat to Iraq’s security and stability. As of 

January 2009, more than 15,000 detainees remained in U.S. custody, according 

to State and DOD. DOD officials plan to release or transfer to Iraqi custody 

about 1,200 to 1,500 detainees per month based on their assessment of Iraqi 

authorities’ ability to process and absorb these transfers. Under the security 

agreement, U.S. forces are to provide available information about all detainees 

in their custody to Iraqi authorities, who will then obtain arrest warrants for 

persons wanted by those authorities. U.S. forces are to transfer custody of 

those detainees subject to an arrest warrant and release the remaining 

detainees unless otherwise requested by the Iraqi government. According to 

DOD and State, many implementing details for this process must be resolved. 

The security agreement requires the release or transfer to Iraqi authorities of 

all detainees held by U.S. forces in Iraq unless otherwise requested by the 

Iraqi government. Acting under UN mandate, U.S. forces detained thousands 

of Iraqis and others considered a threat to Iraq’s security and stability. As of 

January 2009, more than 15,000 detainees remained in U.S. custody, according 

to State and DOD. DOD officials plan to release or transfer to Iraqi custody 

about 1,200 to 1,500 detainees per month based on their assessment of Iraqi 

authorities’ ability to process and absorb these transfers. Under the security 

agreement, U.S. forces are to provide available information about all detainees 

in their custody to Iraqi authorities, who will then obtain arrest warrants for 

persons wanted by those authorities. U.S. forces are to transfer custody of 

those detainees subject to an arrest warrant and release the remaining 

detainees unless otherwise requested by the Iraqi government. According to 

DOD and State, many implementing details for this process must be resolved. 

Security Agreement 

Requires U.S. Forces to 

Release or Transfer 

Detainees 

Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent will the change in authority for the U.S. military operations 

affect U.S. planning efforts in Iraq? 

2. To what extent will the security agreement’s provisions granting Iraq 

primary legal jurisdiction over U.S. contractors and their employees in 

Points of Contact Iraq affect the availability and cost of contractors to support U.S. forces? 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

3. What kinds of legal protection, if any, could the United States provide to 

contractors in Iraq given the current state of the Iraqi judicial system? 

4. To what extent have Iraqi and U.S. officials identified appropriate legal 

authority and developed options for detaining individuals that pose 

continuing security threats to Iraqi or U.S. forces? 

5. What possible amendments to the security agreement, if any, should the 

United States seek to negotiate with Iraq? 
Page 13 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure III: Managing the Redeployment of

U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq 

 Background Issue 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

guidance emphasizes the 

importance of early planning for 

redeploying U.S. forces and 

equipment. 

The exact pace for redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq has yet to be determined. 

If the United States adheres to the timeline contained in the security 

agreement, DOD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the end of 2011. 

In addition, the redeployment of U.S. forces and the removal of their 

equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort. As of March 

2008, the United States had in place about 170,000 pieces of equipment worth 

about $16.5 billion that would need to be removed from Iraq. 

 Key Findings 

DOD’s Initial Plans for 

Redeploying U.S. Forces 

from Iraq Focused on Three 

Key Assumptions 

It is unclear how the timeline in the security agreement and operations in 

Afghanistan will affect DOD plans for redeploying U.S. forces and equipment 

from Iraq. As of September 2008, DOD’s redeployment plans for Iraq were 

based on three key assumptions that may no longer be applicable: 

• Any redeployment will be based on Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 

and Department of State assessments of security and other conditions 

in Iraq. 

• There will be sufficient lead time to refine redeployment plans once 

an order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued. 

• The redeployment of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated 

on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and an estimated flow of no 

more than 2.5 brigades’ worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq 

through Kuwait each month. 

Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning efforts, 

GAO found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD’s redeployment 

efforts will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that address 

several issues. For example: 

DOD Should Consider Key 

Issues in Developing a 

Comprehensive Plan for 

Redeploying U.S. Forces 

from Iraq • Roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the return of 

materiel and equipment. Although the U.S. Central Command has 

designated an executive agent to coordinate the redeployment of U.S. 

forces from the Iraqi theater, no unified structure exists to coordinate 

the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute the 

return of materiel and equipment. This results in confusion on the 

ways in which those teams should be utilized. Joint doctrine states 

that an unambiguous chain of command and clear responsibilities and 

authorities are necessary for any such effort. In September 2008, GAO 

recommended that DOD take steps to clarify a unified or coordinated 

chain of command over logistical operations. In commenting on our 

draft report, DOD indicated it was taking steps to implement this 

recommendation. 

• Time and cost estimates for base closures. Closing or handing over 

U.S. installations in Iraq will be time consuming and costly. As of 
November 2008, there were 283 U.S. installations in Iraq that will need 

to be closed or turned over to Iraqi forces. According to U.S. Army 

officials, experience has shown that it takes 1 to 2 months to close the 

smallest platoon- or company-size installations, which contain 

between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However, MNF-I has 

never closed large, complex installations—such as Balad Air Force 

Base, which contains about 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 

years. U.S. Army officials estimate it could take longer than 18 months 

to close a base of that size. 

November 2008, there were 283 U.S. installations in Iraq that will need 

to be closed or turned over to Iraqi forces. According to U.S. Army 

officials, experience has shown that it takes 1 to 2 months to close the 

smallest platoon- or company-size installations, which contain 

between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However, MNF-I has 

never closed large, complex installations—such as Balad Air Force 

Base, which contains about 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 

years. U.S. Army officials estimate it could take longer than 18 months 

to close a base of that size. 

• Uncertainties regarding redeployment of contractors. Maintaining 

accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. government 

property under the control of contractors may present challenges to 

redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of 

contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. From late 

2007 through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces 

did not include a theater-wide plan for redeploying contractors. 

• Uncertainties regarding redeployment of contractors. Maintaining 

accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. government 

property under the control of contractors may present challenges to 

redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of 

contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. From late 

2007 through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces 

did not include a theater-wide plan for redeploying contractors. 

• Use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries. The 

pace at which units can be redeployed and U.S. equipment returned 

would be governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring 

countries, and restrictions on their use. According to DOD, Kuwait is 

the main point of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel in 

Iraq. There are nine installations that the United States uses to support 

operations in Iraq, and the U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation 

Agreement governs their use. Any redeployment must consider the 

terms of this agreement, particularly given Kuwait’s desire to limit the 

U.S. footprint in Kuwait, according to DOD. 

• Use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries. The 

pace at which units can be redeployed and U.S. equipment returned 

would be governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring 

countries, and restrictions on their use. According to DOD, Kuwait is 

the main point of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel in 

Iraq. There are nine installations that the United States uses to support 

operations in Iraq, and the U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation 

Agreement governs their use. Any redeployment must consider the 

terms of this agreement, particularly given Kuwait’s desire to limit the 

U.S. footprint in Kuwait, according to DOD. 

• Availability of transportation and security assets and route 

restrictions. The availability in theater of military owned and operated 

heavy equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined 

with limits on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of 

materiel out of Iraq. According to DOD, two types of heavy equipment 

transports support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of operations: 

commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored military 

transports. Any increase in the number of civilian transports without a 

corresponding increase in military transports to facilitate control and 

security increases the risk of accidents. However, DOD officials have 

reported shortages of military transports in theater. 

• Availability of transportation and security assets and route 

restrictions. The availability in theater of military owned and operated 

heavy equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined 

with limits on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of 

materiel out of Iraq. According to DOD, two types of heavy equipment 

transports support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of operations: 

commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored military 

transports. Any increase in the number of civilian transports without a 

corresponding increase in military transports to facilitate control and 

security increases the risk of accidents. However, DOD officials have 

reported shortages of military transports in theater. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent has planning begun for the drawdown of U.S. forces from 

Iraq in accordance with the security agreement? 

2. What are the plans and processes by which U.S. installations in Iraq will 

be turned over to the Iraqis? 

 Point of Contact 

William Solis, 202-512-8365, 

solisw@gao.gov

3. What are the plans and processes for determining the disposition of 

contractor-managed, U.S.-government-owned property in Iraq? 

4. To what extent will neighboring countries be able to support the 

drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with timelines outlined 

in the security agreement? 

5. What effect, if any, will the expansion of operations in Afghanistan have 

on the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq? 

Page 14 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Page 15 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure IV: Managing and Overseeing U.S. 

Government Contractors in Iraq during a 

Drawdown 

 Background Issue 

The Departments of Defense 

(DOD) and State (State) have 

relied heavily on contractors in 

Iraq to support troops, civilian 

personnel, and reconstruction 

efforts. As of October 2008, DOD 

estimated it had more than 

163,000 contractors under its 

contracts. Contractors have 

provided security services, life 

support, and facilities 

maintenance, among other things. 

Over the past 6 years, contractors have played a key role in U.S. efforts to 

stabilize and rebuild Iraq. As the U.S. and Iraqi governments implement the 

November 2008 security agreement that governs the presence, activities, and 

drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, DOD and State will need to assess the 

type and level of contractor support needed during the drawdown of U.S. 

forces. At the same time, both departments will need to overcome challenges 

in providing a sufficient number of trained personnel to effectively manage 

and oversee contractor performance. As the administration further defines its 

plans for Iraq, it will need to consider the implications of the changing nature 

of contractor support, as well as ways to enhance DOD’s and State’s 

management capacity. 

 Key Findings 

Both DOD’s and State’s ability to effectively manage their contractors in Iraq 

has been hindered by several challenges. The challenges experienced by one 

or both of these agencies include a failure to adequately plan for the use of 

contractors and clearly define their requirements, a lack of acquisition and 

trained contract management and oversight personnel with experience 

working in contingency operations, and a lack of policies and procedures. 

Further, both DOD and State have had difficulties identifying the number of 

contractor personnel in Iraq. The lack of visibility makes it difficult for 

commanders and other senior leaders to make informed decisions on the 

food, housing, and security needed for contractors who reside on U.S. 

facilities. In July 2008, DOD and State entered into an agreement to use a 

common database to track contractor personnel in Iraq; however, DOD 

officials have acknowledged that there are weaknesses in the systems 

designed to track contractor personnel in theater. 

DOD and State Have Had 

Difficulties Managing and 

Overseeing Contractors in 

Iraq 

The lack of a sufficient number of trained acquisition and contractor oversight 

personnel continues to present a considerable challenge to both DOD and 

State. This has contributed to higher costs and schedule delays and has 

hindered operations. For example, 

DOD’s and State’s Capacity 

to Provide Personnel to 

Oversee Contractors 

Remains Uncertain • In September 2008, GAO reported that the lack of qualified personnel to 

oversee contracts, including those providing linguistic services and 

maintaining the military equipment used in Iraq, hindered efforts to 

oversee and, as necessary, correct poor contractor performance in a 

timely manner. For example, in many cases, the contractor presented 

military equipment that failed government inspection and had to be 

repaired again at additional expense and time to the government. DOD 

personnel indicated they lacked the resources to perform data analyses, 

identify trends in contractor performance, and improve quality processes. 

• In July 2008, GAO raised concerns about whether DOD could sustain 

increased levels of oversight on its private security contractors. GAO 

found, for example, that the Defense Contract Management Agency 

(DCMA), which had been recently tasked to provide contract 

administration over private security contracts, increased the number of its 
Page 16 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

personnel in Iraq by shifting personnel from other locations and had no 

strategy for sustaining this increase. 

 

 

 Points of Contact 

William Solis, 202-512-8365, 

solisw@gao.gov

John Hutton, 202-512-7773, 

huttonj@gao.gov

• In January 2009, State’s Office of the Inspector General reported that the 

department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have a strong control 

environment to ensure its primary security service contract in Iraq is 

effectively managed due, in part, to frequent changes in management 

personnel and understaffing combined with a drastic increase in 

workload. In response, State noted that it planned to increase the number 

of contract oversight personnel in Iraq for its private security contract and 

develop additional policy and guidance to better manage these 

contractors. 

• In January 2009, State’s Office of the Inspector General reported that the 

department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have a strong control 

environment to ensure its primary security service contract in Iraq is 

effectively managed due, in part, to frequent changes in management 

personnel and understaffing combined with a drastic increase in 

workload. In response, State noted that it planned to increase the number 

of contract oversight personnel in Iraq for its private security contract and 

develop additional policy and guidance to better manage these 

contractors. 

As the drawdown of U.S. military forces occurs, DOD will need to assess the 

proper mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, and contractor 

personnel during this transitional period. Our prior work has shown that the 

nature and relative degree of contractor support can change as the military’s 

mission changes. For example, in Bosnia and Kosovo, contractors assumed 

responsibility for certain support functions that had been previously 

performed by military personnel. Moreover, State’s reliance on contractors 

may increase as the department currently depends on DOD to provide some 

services. The U.S.-Iraq security agreement complicates this assessment 

because it changes the conditions under which contractors operate. For 

example, the agreement includes several provisions that affect U.S. 

contractors working for DOD, such as providing the Iraqi government the 

primary right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. contractors in the enforcement 

of criminal and civil laws. Similar agreements could also affect U.S. 

contractors working for DOD, particularly State’s security contractors. 

As the drawdown of U.S. military forces occurs, DOD will need to assess the 

proper mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, and contractor 

personnel during this transitional period. Our prior work has shown that the 

nature and relative degree of contractor support can change as the military’s 

mission changes. For example, in Bosnia and Kosovo, contractors assumed 

responsibility for certain support functions that had been previously 

performed by military personnel. Moreover, State’s reliance on contractors 

may increase as the department currently depends on DOD to provide some 

services. The U.S.-Iraq security agreement complicates this assessment 

because it changes the conditions under which contractors operate. For 

example, the agreement includes several provisions that affect U.S. 

contractors working for DOD, such as providing the Iraqi government the 

primary right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. contractors in the enforcement 

of criminal and civil laws. Similar agreements could also affect U.S. 

contractors working for DOD, particularly State’s security contractors. 

Level and Nature of Future 

Contractor Support Needs 

to Be Assessed 

 Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent are DOD and State taking actions to improve their ability 

to track and identify contractor personnel in Iraq? To what extent do the 

departments know the functions these contractors are performing? 

2. What are the desired mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, 

and contractor personnel in light of the planned drawdown of U.S. forces? 

What actions are needed to achieve this desired mix? 

3. What process is DOD using to assess the impact of the November 2008 

security agreement and its implementation on DOD’s use of U.S. 

contractors to support deployed forces or other key functions? What plans 

has DOD developed in the event that contractors providing essential 

services withdraw their employees? 

4. Is DCMA’s workforce sufficient in terms of size and skill level to support 

contingency operations without degrading its ability to oversee contractor 

performance in the United States and elsewhere? 

5. Have DOD and State (1) assessed whether the drawdown of U.S. forces in 

Iraq will increase its reliance on contractors and (2) taken action to 

ensure they have sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel? 

6. What action is State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security taking to ensure the 

effective oversight of its security contractors? 
Page 17 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure V: Determining the Department of 

Defense’s Future Costs for Iraq 

 Background Issue 

DOD has reported substantial costs for Iraq and can expect to incur 

significant costs in the foreseeable future, even as the United States develops 

plans to scale back its presence in Iraq. GAO has found problems with DOD 

processes for cost reporting and estimating—processes that will be of critical 

importance to making sound decisions about the defense budget. In addition 

to the need for better cost information, moving funding that is currently 

outside the annual budget process into DOD’s base budget would enable 

decision makers to better weigh priorities and assess trade-offs. 

Since 2001, Congress has 

provided about $808 billion to the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

for military efforts in support of 

the Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT). The majority of this 

amount has gone to military 

operations in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

 Key Findings 

U.S. military commitments in Iraq, and their associated costs, will continue to 

be substantial, particularly in the near term. These types of costs include 

procurement of new and replacement equipment and operation and 

maintenance costs, which include items such as housing, food, and services; 

the repair of equipment; and transportation to move people, supplies, and 

equipment. The magnitude of DOD costs will depend on several factors and, in 

some cases, assumptions and decisions that have not been made. For 

example, these costs will likely be affected by: 

Near-term Costs for Iraq 

Are Likely to Be 

Considerable 

• implementation of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement and associated 

troop redeployment plans; 

• the nature and extent of continued U.S. military and civilian presence 

in Iraq; 

• types of facilities needed to support troops remaining in and around 

Iraq and costs associated with turning facilities over to Iraq; 

• availability of transportation and security assets to remove materiel 

from Iraq; and 

• the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. 

Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs, GAO has seen from 

previous operations in the Balkans and Kosovo that costs could rise in the 

near term. For example, as GAO reported in February 2008, the U.S. Army 

estimated it would cost $12 billion to $13 billion a year for at least 2 years 

after the operation ends to repair, replace, and rebuild the equipment used in 

Iraq. Moreover, as GAO reported in September 2008, the cost of closing the 

large number of installations in Iraq will likely be significant, according to U.S. 

Army officials. However, these costs are difficult to estimate due to 

uncertainties related to the management of hazardous materials and waste, as 

well as the transfer of personal property. Finally, after deployed units return 

home, DOD will need to invest in training and equipment to return these units 

to levels capable of performing “full spectrum operations”—all of which could 

increase war-related costs. 
Page 18 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

As of September 2008, DOD has reported about $508 billion in obligations for 

operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, 

our prior work has shown that the data in DOD’s monthly report of GWOT 

obligations are of questionable reliability. GAO was unable to ensure that 

DOD’s reported obligations for GWOT were complete and accurate. 

Therefore, these reported obligations, including obligations for specific 

operations, should be considered approximations. For example, GAO found 

numerous problems with DOD’s processes for recording and reporting its warrelated costs, including long-standing deficiencies in DOD’s financial 

management systems and business processes, the use of estimates instead of 

actual cost data, and the lack of adequate supporting documentation. DOD 

has taken some steps to address these issues, but problems remain. 

Meanwhile, DOD uses these reported obligations to develop funding estimates 

for many types of costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, such as 

procurement and some types of equipment reset. Without transparent and 

accurate cost information, Congress and DOD will not have reliable 

information on how much the war is costing, sufficent details on how 

appropriated funds are spent, or the reliable historical data needed to develop 

and provide oversight of future funding needs. 

As of September 2008, DOD has reported about $508 billion in obligations for 

operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, 

our prior work has shown that the data in DOD’s monthly report of GWOT 

obligations are of questionable reliability. GAO was unable to ensure that 

DOD’s reported obligations for GWOT were complete and accurate. 

Therefore, these reported obligations, including obligations for specific 

operations, should be considered approximations. For example, GAO found 

numerous problems with DOD’s processes for recording and reporting its warrelated costs, including long-standing deficiencies in DOD’s financial 

management systems and business processes, the use of estimates instead of 

actual cost data, and the lack of adequate supporting documentation. DOD 

has taken some steps to address these issues, but problems remain. 

Meanwhile, DOD uses these reported obligations to develop funding estimates 

for many types of costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, such as 

procurement and some types of equipment reset. Without transparent and 

accurate cost information, Congress and DOD will not have reliable 

information on how much the war is costing, sufficent details on how 

appropriated funds are spent, or the reliable historical data needed to develop 

and provide oversight of future funding needs. 

Reliable Cost Reporting and 

Cost Estimating Processes 

Are Critical for Sound 

Defense Funding and 

Budgetary Decision Making 

Funding for operations in support of GWOT, including Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, has been provided through annual appropriations, as well as 

supplemental appropriations that are outside the annual budget process. With 

U.S. commitments in Iraq continuing for the foreseeable future, requiring 

decision makers to make difficult decisions, GAO has recommended that DOD 

consider moving recurring costs into the baseline budget, as it has done with 

other operations. As costs for an operation reach a known level of effort and 

costs become more predictable, additional funding should be built into the 

baseline budget to provide decision makers with more transparent 

information. GAO has made recommendations to improve transparency and 

fiscal responsibility related to funding the war on terrorism and to help 

Congress and the administration establish priorities and make trade-offs 

among those priorities in defense funding. DOD has taken steps to address 

several of GAO’s recommendations in order to improve the reliability and 

transparency of its reported cost information and some progress has been 

made. However, until all DOD efforts are more fully implemented, it is too 

soon to know the extent to which these changes will improve the reliability of 

DOD’s cost reporting. 

Funding for operations in support of GWOT, including Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, has been provided through annual appropriations, as well as 

supplemental appropriations that are outside the annual budget process. With 

U.S. commitments in Iraq continuing for the foreseeable future, requiring 

decision makers to make difficult decisions, GAO has recommended that DOD 

consider moving recurring costs into the baseline budget, as it has done with 

other operations. As costs for an operation reach a known level of effort and 

costs become more predictable, additional funding should be built into the 

baseline budget to provide decision makers with more transparent 

information. GAO has made recommendations to improve transparency and 

fiscal responsibility related to funding the war on terrorism and to help 

Congress and the administration establish priorities and make trade-offs 

among those priorities in defense funding. DOD has taken steps to address 

several of GAO’s recommendations in order to improve the reliability and 

transparency of its reported cost information and some progress has been 

made. However, until all DOD efforts are more fully implemented, it is too 

soon to know the extent to which these changes will improve the reliability of 

DOD’s cost reporting. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent has DOD estimated the future costs of any continued 

military involvement in Iraq? 

2. How will the redeployment of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq affect 

funding needs and requirements? 

3. What steps is DOD taking to move recurring GWOT costs into its baseline 

budgets? 

 Point of Contact 

Sharon Pickup, 202-512-9619, 

pickups@gao.gov 4. What steps is DOD taking to accurately report costs by operation? 

5. How will DOD balance funding requirements for Iraq with funding needs 

to support other military operations, such as in Afghanistan? 

6. What, if any, steady state funding will be required to support DOD 

activities in Iraq following the eventual drawdown of U.S. combat forces? 
Page 19 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning from a 

Predominantly Military to a Civilian Presence 

in Iraq 

 Background Issue 

A May 2004 presidential directive 

affirmed, upon the termination of 

the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, that the Chief of 

Mission would assume 

responsibility for all U.S. 

employees, policies, and activities 

in Iraq, except those under an 

area military commander. It also 

gave the U.S. Central Command 

responsibility for U.S. security 

and military operations in Iraq, 

and U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi 

security forces.

The United States had a projected 140,000 military personnel deployed in Iraq 

in March 2009 (see app. II). In addition, there are about 1,300 authorized U.S. 

personnel assigned to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad—one of the largest in the 

world—including about 450 civilian personnel at 28 Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRT) at the provincial and neighborhood levels. The large U.S. 

military presence has provided vital support to civilian operations and has 

undertaken many traditionally civilian tasks. In further defining its strategy for 

Iraq, the administration needs consider how to transition from a 

predominantly military presence to a civilian one as U.S. forces draw down. 

 Key Findings 

The projected 140,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq are part of the 

Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). This U.S.-led force operates under the U.S. 

Central Command and consists of three major units—the Multinational 

Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which is responsible for 

organizing Iraqi security forces; the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the 

tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations 

throughout Iraq; and the Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

which provides engineering, program, and project management support for 

civil and military construction throughout Iraq (see fig. 1). 

U.S. Military Has an 

Extensive Organizational 

and Basing Footprint in Iraq 

Figure 1: Organization of Multinational Force-Iraq 

U.S. Central Command

Multinational Force - Iraq

(Lead: United States)

Multinational Security

Transition Command - Iraq

(Lead: United States)

Multinational Corps - Iraq

(Lead: United States)

Gulf Regional Division

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(Lead: United States)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and Multinational Force-Iraq documents.

Multinational Force - 

West

(Lead: United States)

Multinational Division -

North

(Lead: United States)

Multinational Division -

South East

(Lead: United Kingdom)

Secretary of Defense

Multinational Division -

Baghdad

(Lead: United States)

Multinational Division -

Center

(Lead: United States)

MNF-I has an extensive basing footprint in Iraq. According to a DOD report, as 

of March 2009, MNF-I had a total of 51 larger bases—known as contingency 

operation bases and sites—throughout the country. Contingency operating 
Page 20 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

bases are usually occupied by an element larger than a brigade combat team, 

typically serve as a hub for command and control or logistics, and may include 

an airfield that can accomodate C-130 aircraft. MNF-I also has about 232 

smaller bases, known as contingency operation locations, that are usually 

occupied by a battalion-size element capable of quick response to operations, 

security, civic assistance, and humanitarian assistance relief. 

bases are usually occupied by an element larger than a brigade combat team, 

typically serve as a hub for command and control or logistics, and may include 

an airfield that can accomodate C-130 aircraft. MNF-I also has about 232 

smaller bases, known as contingency operation locations, that are usually 

occupied by a battalion-size element capable of quick response to operations, 

security, civic assistance, and humanitarian assistance relief. 

In addition to conducting counterinsurgency operations, U.S. military 

personnel under MNF-I and its subordinate commands have performed a wide 

range of activities in Iraq, including supporting U.S. civilian operations, 

rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure, and training and equipping Iraqi security 

forces. For example: 

In addition to conducting counterinsurgency operations, U.S. military 

personnel under MNF-I and its subordinate commands have performed a wide 

range of activities in Iraq, including supporting U.S. civilian operations, 

rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure, and training and equipping Iraqi security 

forces. For example: 

Large Military Presence Has 

Supported U.S. Civilian 

Operations and Has 

Undertaken Many Civilian 

Tasks • U.S. military forces provide PRTs—most of which are located on U.S. 

military bases—with extensive security, food, housing, medical 

evacuation, and other support. The military commander has authority 

over the security and movement of embedded PRTs. Many others provide 

security for PRTs that are collocated with U.S. military units. As U.S. 

forces draw down, the Department of State (State) will have to play a 

larger role in providing security and other support for U.S. civilians. 

• U.S. military forces provide PRTs—most of which are located on U.S. 

military bases—with extensive security, food, housing, medical 

evacuation, and other support. The military commander has authority 

over the security and movement of embedded PRTs. Many others provide 

security for PRTs that are collocated with U.S. military units. As U.S. 

forces draw down, the Department of State (State) will have to play a 

larger role in providing security and other support for U.S. civilians. 

• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and MNC-I have 

played key roles in reconstructing Iraq. As of January 2009, the Gulf 

Region Division had overseen nearly $7 billion in reconstruction projects 

in such areas as electricity, oil, water, hospitals, and schools. Further, 

from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, DOD obligated about $3.3 billion in 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds for projects that are 

intended to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

requirements at the brigade and battalion levels. This program has funded 

about 34,400 education, electricity, sanitation, and other projects. In 

comparison, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—the 

primary U.S. foreign assistance agency—has obligated $7.2 billion on 

reconstruction projects in several areas in Iraq from fiscal year 2003 

through the end of December 2008. It is unclear what assistance USAID 

will provide after U.S. forces leave Iraq. 

• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and MNC-I have 

played key roles in reconstructing Iraq. As of January 2009, the Gulf 

Region Division had overseen nearly $7 billion in reconstruction projects 

in such areas as electricity, oil, water, hospitals, and schools. Further, 

from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, DOD obligated about $3.3 billion in 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds for projects that are 

intended to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

requirements at the brigade and battalion levels. This program has funded 

about 34,400 education, electricity, sanitation, and other projects. In 

comparison, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—the 

primary U.S. foreign assistance agency—has obligated $7.2 billion on 

reconstruction projects in several areas in Iraq from fiscal year 2003 

through the end of December 2008. It is unclear what assistance USAID 

will provide after U.S. forces leave Iraq. 

• Two MNF-I subordinate commands support the development of capable 

Iraqi security forces. MNSTC-I is responsible for organizing, training, 

equipping, and mentoring Iraqi military and police, as well as advising 

Iraq’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. Brigades under MNC-I 

partner with Iraqi army units during operations. This arrangement differs 

from other countries where a DOD security cooperation organization 

manages security assistance programs for the military and State manages 

and funds police training under the direction and supervision of the Chief 

of Mission. 

• Two MNF-I subordinate commands support the development of capable 

Iraqi security forces. MNSTC-I is responsible for organizing, training, 

equipping, and mentoring Iraqi military and police, as well as advising 

Iraq’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. Brigades under MNC-I 

partner with Iraqi army units during operations. This arrangement differs 

from other countries where a DOD security cooperation organization 

manages security assistance programs for the military and State manages 

and funds police training under the direction and supervision of the Chief 

of Mission. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. How does the U.S. government plan to provide security, housing, medical 

evacuation, and life support for its civilian personnel in Iraq as U.S. forces 

draw down and eventually leave Iraq? Points of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov 2. What additional resources, if any, would State, USAID, or other civilian 

agencies require to compensate for the loss of military support to civilian 

government operations and tasks? 

3. What is DOD and State’s plan for transitioning assistance to Iraqi security 

forces from MNF-I to a traditional security cooperation organization and 

police training program under Chief of Mission authority? 
Page 21 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing the U.S. Civilian 

Presence in Iraq 

 Background Issue 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was established under extraordinary 

circumstances in a war zone environment. Normalizing embassy operations, 

including determining appropriate staffing levels, will be a challenge. Security 

vulnerabilities and escalating costs have led to calls to evaluate and realign—

or rightsize—the number and location of staff at U.S. embassies and 

consulates worldwide. A clearly defined strategy for U.S. efforts in Iraq will be 

critical for the rightsizing exercise at Embassy Baghdad. 

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is 

one of the largest U.S. embassies 

in the world. As of March 2009, it 

had about 1,300 authorized U.S. 

civilian positions. 

 Key Findings 

In 2002, GAO developed a framework that provides a systematic approach for 

assessing overseas civilian government workforce size and identifying options 

for rightsizing. The framework links staffing levels to the mission’s priorities 

and requirements, physical security, and operational costs. The rightsizing 

framework encourages consideration of a range of options for meeting 

workload requirements after an analysis of mission, security, and cost tradeoffs. Decision makers are then able to determine whether to add, reduce, or 

change the staff mix at an embassy. The Office of Management and Budget 

and Department of State (State) have adopted this framework. State has used 

it as the basis for rightsizing reviews at more than 120 embassies. 

State Has Adopted GAO’s 

Rightsizing Framework 

Embassy Baghdad is scheduled to conduct a rightsizing review in the fall of 

2009 to link its long-term staffing needs to key mission goals. The embassy 

should consider the following as part of this review: 

Embassy Baghdad Is 

Scheduled to Conduct a 

Rightsizing Review in 2009 • Assessing mission priorities and requirements. The placement and 

composition of staff overseas must reflect the highest priority goals of 

U.S. foreign policy, both in terms of worldwide presence, and within a 

specific post. The 2009 rightsizing review will require a long-term, 

strategic assessment of Embassy Baghdad priorities and allow State 

and other agencies to determine their workload requirements. 

• Determining the appropriate mix of staff. As of March 2009, 

Embassy Baghdad had about 1,300 authorized U.S. civilian positions 

and a mix of contractors, third country nationals, and locally hired 

Iraqis. Unlike most other posts, State has faced challenges in hiring 

and retaining Iraqi employees, as association with the U.S. 

government continues to place Iraqi embassy staff at risk. Thus, State 

has had to rely more extensively on U.S. direct-hire civilians and 

contractors than is customary at other U.S. embassies—a more costly 

approach than hiring local Iraqis. 

• Determining the future role of temporary U.S. civilian entities in 

Iraq. The number of U.S. civilians in Iraq has been, in part, driven by 

the need to staff temporary entities in Iraq. For example, as of March 

2009, the U.S. government had about 450 personnel deployed to U.S.-

led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq, which aim to 

increase Iraq’s capacity to govern and deliver public services. 
According to State, PRTs will eventually draw down, but there is 

currently no determination as to what residual form, if any, the PRTs 

will take. Furthermore, in 2007, State established the temporary Iraq 

Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) to help maintain an effective 

diplomatic presence in Iraq. ITAO was tasked with supporting U.S. 

agencies in Iraq in their implementation of U.S. foreign assistance, 

including hiring temporary U.S. employees. At Embassy Baghdad, 

according to State, there are about 100 such positions. It is unclear 

what role, if any, temporary entities such as PRTs and ITAO will play 

in the future. 

According to State, PRTs will eventually draw down, but there is 

currently no determination as to what residual form, if any, the PRTs 

will take. Furthermore, in 2007, State established the temporary Iraq 

Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) to help maintain an effective 

diplomatic presence in Iraq. ITAO was tasked with supporting U.S. 

agencies in Iraq in their implementation of U.S. foreign assistance, 

including hiring temporary U.S. employees. At Embassy Baghdad, 

according to State, there are about 100 such positions. It is unclear 

what role, if any, temporary entities such as PRTs and ITAO will play 

in the future. 

• Providing security for U.S. civilian personnel during and after the 

U.S. military transition. According to State, Embassy Baghdad has 

more security requirements than other U.S. embassies. Keeping staff 

secure, yet productive, remains one of the largest challenges for 

State’s diplomatic security agents, who are responsible for securing 

the embassy’s personnel, facilities, and information. According to 

State, in addition to diplomatic security agents, the department 

obligated about $1.1 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to 

fund approximately 1,400 security contractors in Iraq. To secure the 

embassy personnel and safeguard embassy information, State also has 

relied on support from the U.S. military. As the U.S. military 

transitions out of Iraq, State’s workload—and thus its resource 

requirements—will increase. 

• Providing security for U.S. civilian personnel during and after the 

U.S. military transition. According to State, Embassy Baghdad has 

more security requirements than other U.S. embassies. Keeping staff 

secure, yet productive, remains one of the largest challenges for 

State’s diplomatic security agents, who are responsible for securing 

the embassy’s personnel, facilities, and information. According to 

State, in addition to diplomatic security agents, the department 

obligated about $1.1 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to 

fund approximately 1,400 security contractors in Iraq. To secure the 

embassy personnel and safeguard embassy information, State also has 

relied on support from the U.S. military. As the U.S. military 

transitions out of Iraq, State’s workload—and thus its resource 

requirements—will increase. 

• Assessing the costs of Embassy Baghdad operations. State has called 

for the consolidation of as many administrative and programmatic 

activities at overseas posts as possible to contain costs and expose 

fewer employees to security risks. The International Consolidated 

Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system offers a standard 

method of sharing administrative costs such as motor pool, utilities, 

and information technology services. According to State, ICASS is not 

operational in Iraq due to the mission’s security needs. Some agencies 

may need to reassess their staffing levels in Iraq once they are 

required to pay their share of administrative costs. 

• Assessing the costs of Embassy Baghdad operations. State has called 

for the consolidation of as many administrative and programmatic 

activities at overseas posts as possible to contain costs and expose 

fewer employees to security risks. The International Consolidated 

Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system offers a standard 

method of sharing administrative costs such as motor pool, utilities, 

and information technology services. According to State, ICASS is not 

operational in Iraq due to the mission’s security needs. Some agencies 

may need to reassess their staffing levels in Iraq once they are 

required to pay their share of administrative costs. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. What type of diplomatic mission does the administration envision in Iraq 

and how does it plan to provide for the security of its personnel, facilities, 

and information? 

2. To what extent does State have contingency plans in place if Embassy 

Baghdad is unable to decrease its reliance on U.S. civiliangovernment 

personnel over the next 5 years? 

3. To what extent does State have plans in place to balance priorities for 

temporary entities in Iraq, such as PRTs, and any future consulates in Iraq 

against the security requirements and costs of operations? 

 Points of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

Jess Ford, 202-512-4268, 

fordj@gao.gov

4. When should non-State agencies at Embassy Baghdad be expected to 

contribute to the full-cost recovery of administrative support services? 

Page 22 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Page 23 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure VIII: Considering the Level of 

Engagement of the International Community 

 Background Issue 

The international community is an important partner in Iraq’s reconstruction 

and economic development efforts, providing varying levels of military and 

financial assistance since 2003. Since January 2004, the United States’ 38 

coalition partners have collectively contributed as many as 25,600 troops to 

help stabilize the security situation. International organizations and several 

countries also pledged substantial financial assistance for reconstruction 

efforts, offering Iraq almost $12 billion in loans and providing $5.6 billion in 

grants. The Paris Club and commercial creditors have forgiven most of Iraq’s 

Saddam Hussein regime debt, as Iraq seeks relief from its high debt burden. 

As the United States further defines its assistance strategy for Iraq, it must 

coordinate its efforts with those of the international community. 

Since 2003, 38 countries have 

participated in the coalition to 

help secure Iraq. In addition, 42 

nations and international 

organizations have provided 

direct financial assistance in the 

form of grants or loans for 

reconstruction efforts. Several 

nations have also forgiven some 

of Iraq’s outstanding debt to help 

Iraq finance its reconstruction 

 Key Findings 

By December 2003, the multinational force in Iraq included 34 nations and 

almost 151,000 troops—about 24,000 of which were provided by coalition 

partners.1

 As the security situation has improved and the United Nations (UN) 

mandate for the multinational force expired, most coalition partners have 

removed their troops. As of March 2009, only three coalition partners remain 

in Iraq—Australia, Romania, and the United Kingdom. These coalition 

partners have an agreement with Iraq to remove their troops by July 2009 (see 

fig. 1). At that time, the United States will be the sole remaining nation with 

troops stationed in Iraq. 

Non-U.S. Coalition Troops 

Expected to Leave Iraq by 

July 2009 

Figure 1: Non-U.S. Coalition Troops in Iraq 

Number of non-U.S. coalition troops

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Projected

Jan.

July.

Jan.

July

Jan.

July

Jan.

July

Jan.

July

Jan.

July

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

 

1

Subsequently, four countries joined the coalition. 
To support reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and essential services, 

international donors have offered Iraq almost $12 billion in loans and provided 

about $5.6 billion in grants. As of January 2009, the Iraqi government had 

entered into agreements to borrow more than $3.7 billion from Italy, Iran, 

Japan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, according 

to the Department of State (State). Of the $5.6 billion given in grants, almost 

one-third—or $1.8 billion—has been deposited in the International 

Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, which is composed of two trust funds, 

one run by the UN Development Group and the other by the World Bank. 

Almost all of these funds have been committed to almost 160 projects that will 

be completed by 2010. In February 2009, the UN and World Bank presented 

plans to commit the remaining funds and close out the trust funds by 2013. 

Both organizations plan to fund any additional assistance to Iraq through 

other funding streams, according to State. 

To support reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and essential services, 

international donors have offered Iraq almost $12 billion in loans and provided 

about $5.6 billion in grants. As of January 2009, the Iraqi government had 

entered into agreements to borrow more than $3.7 billion from Italy, Iran, 

Japan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, according 

to the Department of State (State). Of the $5.6 billion given in grants, almost 

one-third—or $1.8 billion—has been deposited in the International 

Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, which is composed of two trust funds, 

one run by the UN Development Group and the other by the World Bank. 

Almost all of these funds have been committed to almost 160 projects that will 

be completed by 2010. In February 2009, the UN and World Bank presented 

plans to commit the remaining funds and close out the trust funds by 2013. 

Both organizations plan to fund any additional assistance to Iraq through 

other funding streams, according to State. 

The International 

Community Has Provided 

Reconstruction Funding 

As the security situation has improved, international organizations have 

increased their assistance and re-examined their strategies. In August 2008, 

the UN released its Iraq Assistance Strategy for Iraq 2008-2010 that defines 

how the UN will support Iraq’s reconstruction in various sectors, including 

governance, education, and economic reform through projects and technical 

assistance. In the last year, the UN also has added staff and is considering 

opening offices in Kirkuk, Najaf, Ramadi, and Mosul to support its increased 

assistance activities. Similarly, the World Bank is developing an updated 

assistance strategy to replace its current strategy from August 2005. 

As the security situation has improved, international organizations have 

increased their assistance and re-examined their strategies. In August 2008, 

the UN released its Iraq Assistance Strategy for Iraq 2008-2010 that defines 

how the UN will support Iraq’s reconstruction in various sectors, including 

governance, education, and economic reform through projects and technical 

assistance. In the last year, the UN also has added staff and is considering 

opening offices in Kirkuk, Najaf, Ramadi, and Mosul to support its increased 

assistance activities. Similarly, the World Bank is developing an updated 

assistance strategy to replace its current strategy from August 2005. 

To help attract investment needed to finance its economic reconstruction, 

Iraq has sought debt forgiveness for loans taken under the Saddam Hussein 

regime. At the end of 2004, Iraq owed about $120 billion to foreign creditors—

an amount almost five times the size of its economy at the time. Of that 

external debt, Iraq owed about $36 billion to members of the Paris Club,2

 who 

committed to forgive 80 percent of that debt if Iraq agreed to follow an IMF 

reform program. Iraq received the final tranche of Paris Club debt relief in 

late 2008. Nevertheless, Department of the Treasury officials estimate that 

Iraq owes between $49 and $77 billion in bilateral debt. In addition to these 

debts, Iraq owes $29 billion in compensation claims for damages and losses 

resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990.3

 Iraq’s oil 

revenues are currently immune from garnishment, liens, and other judgments 

that would compel Iraq to pay these debts and claims, but this immunity will 

expire in December 2009 absent further UN Security Council action. 

To help attract investment needed to finance its economic reconstruction, 

Iraq has sought debt forgiveness for loans taken under the Saddam Hussein 

regime. At the end of 2004, Iraq owed about $120 billion to foreign creditors—

an amount almost five times the size of its economy at the time. Of that 

external debt, Iraq owed about $36 billion to members of the Paris Club,2

 who 

committed to forgive 80 percent of that debt if Iraq agreed to follow an IMF 

reform program. Iraq received the final tranche of Paris Club debt relief in 

late 2008. Nevertheless, Department of the Treasury officials estimate that 

Iraq owes between $49 and $77 billion in bilateral debt. In addition to these 

debts, Iraq owes $29 billion in compensation claims for damages and losses 

resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990.3

 Iraq’s oil 

revenues are currently immune from garnishment, liens, and other judgments 

that would compel Iraq to pay these debts and claims, but this immunity will 

expire in December 2009 absent further UN Security Council action. 

Some of Iraq’s Creditors 

Have Supported 

Reconstruction through 

Debt Relief 

 Oversight Questions 

1. What efforts are under way to help Iraq coordinate any future bilateral 

assistance, including the United States, for meeting its reconstruction and 

development needs? 

2. How will U.S. strategic planning reflect the efforts of the UN and other 

international organizations in such areas as elections assistance, 

resolution of disputed internal boundaries, and electricity production? Point of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

3. How is the United States helping Iraq in its efforts to secure relief from its 

remaining Saddam Hussein regime debts? 

 

2

The Paris Club is a group of 19 creditor nations and includes the United States. 

Page 24 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

3

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 5 percent of Iraq’s annual oil export revenue 

is earmarked to finance payment of these reparations.
Page 25 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure IX: Building Iraq’s Capacity to 

Assume a Greater Cost Share of Its Security, 

Reconstruction, and Economic Needs 

 Background Issue 

From 2005 through 2007, Iraq had an estimated cumulative budget surplus of 

$29 billion, in part due to limited spending of its investment budgets. The need 

for Iraq to spend its own resources has become increasingly critical as U.S. 

agencies have obligated nearly 90 percent of the $49 billion in U.S. 

appropriations since fiscal year 2003 for reconstruction and stabilization 

efforts in Iraq. Agencies have disbursed nearly 80 percent of these 

appropriations, as of December 2008. Iraq’s substantial oil reserves and 

current budgetary resources offer the government of Iraq the potential to 

better finance more of the costs of its own security, reconstruction, and 

economic needs. 

Oil export revenues are critical to 

Iraq’s economy, accounting for 

over half of the country’s gross 

domestic product and over 90 

percent of revenues. From 2005 

through 2008, Iraq generated an 

estimated $152 billion in 

revenues from crude oil export 

sales. 

 Key Findings 

As of June 2008, the Iraqi government had accumulated financial deposits of 

$39.6 billion (a 33 percent increase from December 2007), held in the 

Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) at the New York Federal Reserve Bank and 

central government deposits at the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and Iraq’s 

commercial banks. This balance is the result, in part, of an estimated 

cumulative budget surplus from 2005 through 2008. This amount does not 

include funds in Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves, funds held at the New York 

Federal Reserve Bank intended for Foreign Military Sales purchases, or funds 

disbursed from the DFI to J.P. Morgan Chase and Citibank for payment on 

letters of credit. 

Iraqi Government 

Accumulated Surpluses 

from 2005 through 2008 

For 2008, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $68 billion in total 

revenues, of which crude oil export sales accounted for about $62 billion. As 

displayed in table 1, Iraq ended 2005 through 2007 with a cumulative budget 

surplus of $29 billion. GAO estimates that Iraq ended 2008 with another budget 

surplus of $18.3 billion. As a result, the Iraqi government had a cumulative budget 

surplus of about $47.3 billion at the end of 2008. This is less than GAO’s prior 

projection of a cumulative surplus of between $67 billion and $79 billion and 

reflects declining oil prices and an increase in Iraqi spending. In the preliminary 

2009 Iraqi budget, the Iraqi government projects a budget deficit of $16 billion, 

which would indicate that it plans to spend a portion of the accumulated 

surpluses from prior years. 

Table 1: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surpluses, 2005-2008 

(Billions of U.S. 

dollars) 2005 2006 2007 

Total 

2005-2007 2008 

Total 

2005-2008 

Total revenues $24.1 $32 $39.9 $96.0 $67.8 $163.7 

MoF expenditures 17.6 22.8 26.6 67.0 49.5 116.5 

Surplus 6.5 9.2 13.3 29.0 18.3 47.3 

Source: GAO analysis of CBI and IMF data and Iraqi Ministry of Finance Budget (MoF). 

Note: Total revenues for 2008 are based on actual crude oil export receipts and IMF projections for 

other revenues, such as taxes and domestic oil sales. Sums may differ from totals due to rounding. 
Page 26 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

 Iraq’s inability to spend its resources, particularly on investment activities, 

limits the government’s efforts to further economic development and deliver 

essential services to the Iraqi people. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi 

government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment 

activities. Ninety percent was spent on operating expenses, such as salaries 

and goods and services, and the remaining 10 percent on investments, such as 

structures and vehicles. While total expenditures grew from 2005 through 

2007, Iraq was unable to spend all of its budgeted funds. For example, in 2007, 

Iraq spent 80 percent of its $29 billion total operating budget and 28 percent of 

its $12 billion total investment budget. However, the central government 

ministries1

 responsible for providing essential services to the Iraqi people 

spent a smaller share, 11 percent, of their $8 billion investment budgets. In 

2008, Iraq’s investment expenditures have increased as compared to 2007. Iraq 

spent 39 percent of its $24 billion investment budget, while the central 

government ministries have spent 23 percent of their $16 billion investment 

budget. According to U.S. government, coalition, and international officials, a 

number of factors continue to affect the Iraqi government’s ability to spend 

more of its revenues on capital investments and effectively manage resources. 

These factors include the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and 

budgeting systems, and violence and sectarian strife. 

 Iraq’s inability to spend its resources, particularly on investment activities, 

limits the government’s efforts to further economic development and deliver 

essential services to the Iraqi people. From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi 

government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment 

activities. Ninety percent was spent on operating expenses, such as salaries 

and goods and services, and the remaining 10 percent on investments, such as 

structures and vehicles. While total expenditures grew from 2005 through 

2007, Iraq was unable to spend all of its budgeted funds. For example, in 2007, 

Iraq spent 80 percent of its $29 billion total operating budget and 28 percent of 

its $12 billion total investment budget. However, the central government 

ministries

Iraqi Government Has Been 

Unable to Spend All of Its 

Investment Budget 

1

 responsible for providing essential services to the Iraqi people 

spent a smaller share, 11 percent, of their $8 billion investment budgets. In 

2008, Iraq’s investment expenditures have increased as compared to 2007. Iraq 

spent 39 percent of its $24 billion investment budget, while the central 

government ministries have spent 23 percent of their $16 billion investment 

budget. According to U.S. government, coalition, and international officials, a 

number of factors continue to affect the Iraqi government’s ability to spend 

more of its revenues on capital investments and effectively manage resources. 

These factors include the shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and 

budgeting systems, and violence and sectarian strife. 

Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies have led individual efforts to improve the 

capacity of Iraq’s ministries without having an overall integrated strategy. In 

2007, The New Way Forward emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq’s 

ministries and help the government execute its capital investment budgets. In 

response, U.S. capacity development efforts shifted their emphasis from longterm institution-building projects to an immediate effort to help Iraqi 

ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital investment budgets. 

Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies have led individual efforts to improve the 

capacity of Iraq’s ministries without having an overall integrated strategy. In 

2007, The New Way Forward emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq’s 

ministries and help the government execute its capital investment budgets. In 

response, U.S. capacity development efforts shifted their emphasis from longterm institution-building projects to an immediate effort to help Iraqi 

ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital investment budgets. 

U.S. Has Funded Capacity 

Building Activities Since 

2005 but Lacks Integrated 

Strategy 

In October 2007, GAO recommended that Congress consider conditioning 

future appropriations on the completion of an integrated strategy for U.S. 

capacity development efforts. In June 2008, State and Treasury created a new 

Public Financial Management Action Group to help integrate and coordinate 

U.S. government assistance to improve budget execution. In addition, in 

September 2008, State hired a contractor to draft a strategic planning 

document for ministry capacity development. As of March 2009, State is 

reviewing the contractor’s proposals. 

In October 2007, GAO recommended that Congress consider conditioning 

future appropriations on the completion of an integrated strategy for U.S. 

capacity development efforts. In June 2008, State and Treasury created a new 

Public Financial Management Action Group to help integrate and coordinate 

U.S. government assistance to improve budget execution. In addition, in 

September 2008, State hired a contractor to draft a strategic planning 

document for ministry capacity development. As of March 2009, State is 

reviewing the contractor’s proposals. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. How do U.S. capacity-building efforts and future foreign assistance 

programs in Iraq address the government of Iraq’s ability to spend its 

resources on investment and maintenance activities? 

2. What strategy does the United States have for transferring remaining 

defense and reconstruction costs to the government of Iraq as current U.S. 

appropriations for these rebuilding activities ends? 

3. What budgetary resources can the government of Iraq provide to increase 

its support for security, economic, and reconstruction efforts in the 

country? 

 Point of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

 

1

The central government ministries include the ministries of oil, water, electricity, public 

works, health, housing and construction, defense, and interior. These figures therefore 

exclude the Kurdistan Regional Government and provincial governments. 
Page 27 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure X: Building Iraq’s Capacity to 

Improve Critical Service Sectors 

 Background Issue 

The Iraqi government’s efforts to increase its legitimacy and counter the 

insurgent threat depend, in large part, on its ability to expand its oil exports 

and provide essential services such as electricity and clean water to all Iraqi 

communities. Given that appropriated U.S. funds for rebuilding these sectors 

have largely been expended, continued reconstruction and sustainability will 

be dependent on an Iraqi government that can resolve the challenges it faces 

in delivering essential services. As the administration further defines its plans 

for Iraq, it will need to consider how best to support the Iraqi government’s 

efforts and address these challenges. 

Following the 2003 invasion, U.S. 

and Iraqi authorities inherited an 

infrastructure that had 

deteriorated due to the previous 

regime’s neglect, international 

sanctions, and years of conflict, 

leaving many Iraqis with limited 

or no access to essential services. 

 Key Findings 

Oil production and exports account for about 90 percent of Iraq’s revenue. 

The Iraqi government’s ability to fund reconstruction efforts and provide for 

its citizens depends, in part, on increasing oil production and exports. Iraqi 

and U.S. government investments in the oil sector have increased production 

and exports since 2003, but U.S. officials have stated that insufficient focus on 

security limited the impact of the initial U.S. investment. Iraq’s oil production 

increased from an annual average of 1.3 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 

2003 to 2.36 mbpd as of March 2009. According to the Departments of Defense 

and State (State), investment in Iraq’s oil sector is below the minimum 

required to sustain current production; additional foreign and private 

investments are needed. The Ministry of Oil has indicated that investments 

between $25 billion and $75 billion are needed to achieve its production target 

of 6 mbpd. In 2008, the Ministry of Oil spent $421 million, or 19 percent of its 

investment budget for that year. 

Oil Production and Exports 

Have Increased but More 

Investment Is Needed 

Restoring the electrical infrastructure is critical to reviving the Iraqi economy 

and ensuring productivity of the oil sector; however, demand has grown 

subtantially and continues to outstrip capacity. For 2008, supply met around 

52 percent of demand, even with increased generation. As a result, Iraq 

continues to experience electrical shutdowns despite billions of dollars 

invested. According to State, at the end of November 2005, average hours of 

power per day were 8.7 hours in Baghdad and 12.6 hours nationwide; by the 

end of November 2008, Baghdad averaged 15.4 hours and the rest of the 

country averaged 14.6 hours. The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity estimated in its 

2006-2015 plan that it would need $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to 

provide reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. However, U.S. government 

officials working with the ministry estimate twice that amount will be needed 

for power generation, transmission, distribution, and other infrastructure. 

Based on U.S. and United Nations reporting, inadequate operating and 

maintenance practices, as well as the lack of skilled technicians, inhibit an 

effective electrical infrastructure. 

Electricity Production Has 

Increased, but Demand 

Continues to Outstrip 

Capacity 

In the water sector, as of July 2008, U.S.-funded projects had the capacity to 

provide an additional 8.1 million Iraqis with potable water, short of the goal of 

8.5 million. Even with the additional capacity, many Iraqis are without water 

or have access to water that puts them at risk of diseases such as cholera and 

Even with Additional 

Capacity, Many Iraqis 

Remain without Potable 

Water 
Page 28 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

dysentery, as evidenced by outbreaks in 2007 and 2008. According to the 

United Nations, only 40 percent of children have reliable access to safe 

drinking water; with water treatment plants operating at only 17 percent 

capacity, large volumes of untreated waste are discharged into Iraq’s 

waterways. The health risks associated with a lack of access to potable water 

and proper sewage treatment are compounded by the shortage of medical 

professionals in Iraq’s health care system. The World Bank has estimated 

$14.4 billion is needed to rebuild the Iraqi public works and water system. 

dysentery, as evidenced by outbreaks in 2007 and 2008. According to the 

United Nations, only 40 percent of children have reliable access to safe 

drinking water; with water treatment plants operating at only 17 percent 

capacity, large volumes of untreated waste are discharged into Iraq’s 

waterways. The health risks associated with a lack of access to potable water 

and proper sewage treatment are compounded by the shortage of medical 

professionals in Iraq’s health care system. The World Bank has estimated 

$14.4 billion is needed to rebuild the Iraqi public works and water system. 

Iraq has not followed through on commitments to spend more of its own 

money on reconstruction efforts and faces challenges sustaining U.S.-funded 

projects. As table 1 indicates, U.S. agencies have spent 87 percent, or about 

$9.5 billion, of the $10.9 billion allocated since fiscal year 2003 for 

reconstruction activities in the oil, electricity, and water sectors. In contrast, 

Iraq has spent about 12 percent, or about $2.0 billion of the $17.2 billion 

allocated for investment activities in these sectors. In addition, Iraq has faced 

difficulties in sustaining U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. According to 

U.S. officials, Iraqi managers lack the skill level and authority to create plans 

and buy the materials necessary to sustain projects in the energy and water 

sectors. Moreover, poor security has prevented the successful implementation 

of long-term training programs to create the local capacity needed to operate 

and maintain U.S.-funded projects. 

Iraq has not followed through on commitments to spend more of its own 

money on reconstruction efforts and faces challenges sustaining U.S.-funded 

projects. As table 1 indicates, U.S. agencies have spent 87 percent, or about 

$9.5 billion, of the $10.9 billion allocated since fiscal year 2003 for 

reconstruction activities in the oil, electricity, and water sectors. In contrast, 

Iraq has spent about 12 percent, or about $2.0 billion of the $17.2 billion 

allocated for investment activities in these sectors. In addition, Iraq has faced 

difficulties in sustaining U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. According to 

U.S. officials, Iraqi managers lack the skill level and authority to create plans 

and buy the materials necessary to sustain projects in the energy and water 

sectors. Moreover, poor security has prevented the successful implementation 

of long-term training programs to create the local capacity needed to operate 

and maintain U.S.-funded projects. 

Iraqi Government Has 

Spent Little on Improving 

Essential Services and 

Faces Challenges in 

Sustaining Existing Projects 

Table 1: Comparison of U.S. and Iraqi Allocations and Spending for 

Selected Sectors (in billions of U.S. dollars) 

U.S. Government Government of Iraq 

Fiscal years 

2003–2008 

Fiscal years 

2003– June 2008 

2005–2008 2005–2008 

Sectors Allocated SpentaAllocated Spenta

Oil $2.7 $2.5 $10.8 $0.7 

Electricity 5.3 4.8 5.2 0.8 

Water resources 2.9 2.2 1.3 0.6 

Total $10.9 $9.5 $17.2 $2.0 

Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Finance budgets and expenditures, and Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury and 

U.S. Agency for International Development data. 

Note: The Iraqi figures refer to investment expenses which include capital goods and capital projects. 

The sums may differ from totals due to rounding. 

a

This refers to funds disbursed by U.S. agencies and funds spent by the respective Iraqi ministries. 

Oversight Questions 

1. What activities are under way to strengthen the Iraqi government’s ability 

to operate and maintain its essential services infrastructure, particularly 

for those efforts funded by the U.S. government? 

 Point of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

2. How much additional investment in Iraq’s oil infrastructure is needed to 

ensure sustained production and export levels? What actions is Iraq taking 

to encourage foreign investment? 

3. While the capacity for providing potable water has increased, what steps 

are being taken to ensure both sustainable delivery and quality of water 

throughout Iraq? 
Page 29 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure XI: Enacting Iraqi Legislation to 

Promote National Reconciliation 

 Background Issue 

Since 2007, the Iraqi government has passed legislation allowing some former 

members of the Ba’ath party to work for the government, granted amnesty to 

Iraqis accused of or in prison for certain crimes, defined provincial powers, 

and passed and implemented a provincial elections law. These actions could 

address grievances by Sunnis and others, namely that they have been removed 

from government, unfairly arrested, and underrepresented in provincial 

councils. However, Iraq has not fully implemented some of these laws, passed 

hydrocarbon legislation, or a law to demobilize militias. Finally, Iraq has not 

completed the constitutional review or the constitutionally mandated process 

to deal with claims over disputed areas, especially Kirkuk. In further defining 

the U.S. strategy for Iraq, the administration should consider how to support 

Iraq’s reconciliation efforts. 

In 2007, The New Way Forward 

identified Iraqi political 

compromise as crucial to 

promoting national reconciliation 

and stabilizing the country. The 

U.S. and Iraqi governments stated 

that passage of legislation to 

address core Sunni, Shi’a, and 

Kurd grievances and to share 

hydrocarbon resources equitably 

was essential. 

 Key Findings 

Figure 1 shows the steps Iraq has taken as of February 2009 to enact key laws 

Despite Sectarian intended to promote national reconciliation. 

Differences, the Iraqi 

Government Has Passed 

Key Legislation 

Figure 1: Status of Enacting Iraqi Legislation 

Framework 

Revenue sharing

Ministry of Oil Restructuring

Iraq National Oil Company

Electoral commission

Provincial election law

Elections

Amnesty

Provincial powers

Disarmament and demobilization

De-Ba’athification

Hydrocarbon laws

Drafting laws Enacting

First reading completed

Laws drafted and reviewed

Second reading

completed

Third reading completed;

Draft referred to Council 

Representatives/ 

Ratification procedures

Law published in

Gazette

Steps taken since February 2009.

Committee

vote taken

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, United Nations, and Iraqi government 

data.

No legislation drafted

Implementation of 

Legislation Has Been Slow 

Although Iraq has enacted laws on de-Ba’athification, amnesty, and provincial 

powers, it has been slow to fully implement them. For example, the Iraqi 

government passed de-Ba’athification reform in February 2008, but as of 
Page 30 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

January 2009, the Council of Ministers had not nominated individuals to head 

the new commission to implement the law. The amnesty law provides for the 

release of Iraqis sentenced to prison and those under investigation or trial, 

provided they are not involved in certain crimes such as kidnapping or 

murder. According to the Department of State (State), Iraqi courts have 

granted amnesty to many, but releases are slow. Also, the Iraqi and U.S. 

governments are working to transfer detainees held by U.S. forces to Iraqi 

facilities, as required by this law and the November 2008 security agreement 

with Iraq, so that the provisions of the amnesty law can be applied to them. 

U.S. forces held approximately 15,000 Iraqi detainees, as of January 2009, 

according to State and Department of Defense (DOD) officials. In addition, 

Iraq held provincial elections in 14 provinces on January 31, 2009. 

January 2009, the Council of Ministers had not nominated individuals to head 

the new commission to implement the law. The amnesty law provides for the 

release of Iraqis sentenced to prison and those under investigation or trial, 

provided they are not involved in certain crimes such as kidnapping or 

murder. According to the Department of State (State), Iraqi courts have 

granted amnesty to many, but releases are slow. Also, the Iraqi and U.S. 

governments are working to transfer detainees held by U.S. forces to Iraqi 

facilities, as required by this law and the November 2008 security agreement 

with Iraq, so that the provisions of the amnesty law can be applied to them. 

U.S. forces held approximately 15,000 Iraqi detainees, as of January 2009, 

according to State and Department of Defense (DOD) officials. In addition, 

Iraq held provincial elections in 14 provinces on January 31, 2009. 

The Iraqi government has not enacted laws to share oil revenues and disarm 

Some Legislation Has Yet to militias, and has not resolved issues in its constitutional review. 

Be Enacted and 

Constitutional Issues Have 

Not Been Resolved 

• Hydrocarbon legislation consists of four separate laws, but the key 

framework law is stalled, according to State. This law defines the 

control and management of Iraq’s oil and gas sector. According to 

State, the delay illustrates struggles between the federal government 

and the Kurdistan Regional Government about how much control the 

Kurdistan Regional Government will have over its oil resources. 

• Hydrocarbon legislation consists of four separate laws, but the key 

framework law is stalled, according to State. This law defines the 

control and management of Iraq’s oil and gas sector. According to 

State, the delay illustrates struggles between the federal government 

and the Kurdistan Regional Government about how much control the 

Kurdistan Regional Government will have over its oil resources. 

• As of February 2009, a law to disarm and demobilize militias had not 

passed. According to State, no legislation has been proposed, but 

militia activity, specifically from Jaysh al-Mahdi, has substantially 

declined. According to a December 2008 DOD report, some militias 

are considering reconciliation with the government. 

• As of February 2009, a law to disarm and demobilize militias had not 

passed. According to State, no legislation has been proposed, but 

militia activity, specifically from Jaysh al-Mahdi, has substantially 

declined. According to a December 2008 DOD report, some militias 

are considering reconciliation with the government. 

• Iraq’s Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October 

2005, but this did not resolve several contentious issues, including the 

powers of the presidency versus the prime minister, claims over 

disputed areas such as oil-rich Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the 

regions versus the federal government. Among these issues, a 

resolution on the status of Kirkuk remains a key issue for the 

Kurdistan Regonal Government and the United Nations ; Kurdistan 

Regional Government officials want resolved the issue of whether 

Kirkuk is to be part of Kurdistan. As of February 2009, the United 

Nations was working with a special committee to recommend 

mechanisms for sharing power in Kirkuk. 

• Iraq’s Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October 

2005, but this did not resolve several contentious issues, including the 

powers of the presidency versus the prime minister, claims over 

disputed areas such as oil-rich Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the 

regions versus the federal government. Among these issues, a 

resolution on the status of Kirkuk remains a key issue for the 

Kurdistan Regonal Government and the United Nations ; Kurdistan 

Regional Government officials want resolved the issue of whether 

Kirkuk is to be part of Kurdistan. As of February 2009, the United 

Nations was working with a special committee to recommend 

mechanisms for sharing power in Kirkuk. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent have new provincial elections helped stabilize Iraq and 

support national reconciliation? 

2. What are the prospects of resolving the impasse on hydrocarbon 

legislation? 

3. What challenges remain to implementing the laws that have already been 

passed? 

 Point of Contact 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov 4. What actions should the United States take to encourage the Iraqi 

government to pass the remaining legislation intended to promote 

national reconciliation? 
Page 31 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

March 2009 

Enclosure XII: Assisting Iraq’s Refugees

 Background Issue 

Despite security improvements, UNHCR has reported that conditions are not 

yet suitable for the safe return of Iraqi refugees, and most refugees that do 

return are settling in areas controlled by their particular sect. According to the 

Department of State (State), the United States has recognized the need to take 

the lead in mitigating the effects of this humanitarian crisis. As the 

administration further defines its plan for Iraq, it will need to consider how 

best to support the Iraqi government and the international community in 

addressing the needs of Iraqis displaced within Iraq, as well as those who have 

fled to neighboring countries. 

The United Nations (UN) reports 

that about 4.8 million Iraqis have 

been displaced from their homes, 

with about 2 million fleeing to 

neighboring countries. According 

to the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR), Iraqi 

refugees pose an unprecedented 

burden on the economies and 

social infrastructures of the 

countries hosting them. 

 Key Findings 

Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees 

Lack of Reliable Needs 

Assessments Impedes 

Assistance 

Sources: GAO based on maps from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Map Resources (map).

0 500 miles

According to UNHCR, the majority 

of Iraqi refugees went to Syria and 

Jordan.

Disputed borders

Europe

Turkey

Greece Cyprus

Egypt

Jordan

Israel

Lebanon

Armenia Azerbaijan

Georgia

IRAQ Islamic

Republic of

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Syrian 

Arab 

Republic

Gulf

States

Kuwait

Uzbekistan

The lack of reliable needs estimates impedes U.S. and international efforts to 

assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria. Official Jordanian and Syrian 

government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be 

overstated, with each country estimating up to 500,000 and 1,500,000 Iraqi 

refugees, respectively, in their countries. This is in contrast to the 

approximately 54,000 and 220,000 Iraqis that UNHCR had officially registered 

in Jordan and Syria, respectively, as of September 2008. Neither country has 

enabled an independent and comprehensive survey of refugees to be 

undertaken, asserting that assistance should not be targeted toward Iraqi 

refugees while they have populations that need help. Both countries have 
Page 32 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 

based requests for refugee assistance primarily on their countries’ health and 

education needs rather than on the numbers of displaced Iraqis in their 

countries, and the U.S. government and UN have included Iraqi refugees and 

host country populations in their assistance programs. Donor country 

representatives further noted that the lack of objective and complete 

information on the numbers and needs of refugees has made it difficult to 

garner support for these efforts. 

based requests for refugee assistance primarily on their countries’ health and 

education needs rather than on the numbers of displaced Iraqis in their 

countries, and the U.S. government and UN have included Iraqi refugees and 

host country populations in their assistance programs. Donor country 

representatives further noted that the lack of objective and complete 

information on the numbers and needs of refugees has made it difficult to 

garner support for these efforts. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges offering lasting solutions 

for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the 

preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to 

return. The Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered 

financial incentives to returning families, but there is no clear trend on the 

number of Iraqis returning to or leaving Iraq. Difficulties renewing visas, lack 

of funds, and limited access to employment and public services affect Iraqis’ 

decisions to stay in or return to Iraq. Another solution is resettlement in the 

host countries, though Jordan and Syria consider Iraqi refugees “guests” who 

should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. Resettlement to a 

third country is another option, according to State. The U.S. government has 

made progress resettling Iraqis under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. In 

2007, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees but did not achieve 

State’s expectation of admitting 2,000 to 3,000 refugees; however, the U.S. 

government surpassed its fiscal year 2008 goal of 12,000 with the admission of 

13,823 Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other 

countries resettled 5,852 Iraqi refugees in calendar years 2007 through 2008. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges offering lasting solutions 

for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the 

preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to 

return. The Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered 

financial incentives to returning families, but there is no clear trend on the 

number of Iraqis returning to or leaving Iraq. Difficulties renewing visas, lack 

of funds, and limited access to employment and public services affect Iraqis’ 

decisions to stay in or return to Iraq. Another solution is resettlement in the 

host countries, though Jordan and Syria consider Iraqi refugees “guests” who 

should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. Resettlement to a 

third country is another option, according to State. The U.S. government has 

made progress resettling Iraqis under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. In 

2007, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees but did not achieve 

State’s expectation of admitting 2,000 to 3,000 refugees; however, the U.S. 

government surpassed its fiscal year 2008 goal of 12,000 with the admission of 

13,823 Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other 

countries resettled 5,852 Iraqi refugees in calendar years 2007 through 2008. 

U.S. Government Resettles 

Iraqis, but Lasting Solutions 

Remain a Challenge 

A related issue for Congress to consider is the plight of Palestinian Iraqis who 

have been living, mostly under very harsh conditions, in three refugee camps 

in Syria and Iraq for about 3 years. As of December 31, 2008, about 2,540 

refugees remained in these camps. About 446 camp refugees were resettled in 

2007 and 2008, mostly in Chile and Europe. According to UNHCR, during the 

fall of 2008, Australia, Canada, the United States, and several European 

countries expressed interest in resettling these refugees. 

A related issue for Congress to consider is the plight of Palestinian Iraqis who 

have been living, mostly under very harsh conditions, in three refugee camps 

in Syria and Iraq for about 3 years. As of December 31, 2008, about 2,540 

refugees remained in these camps. About 446 camp refugees were resettled in 

2007 and 2008, mostly in Chile and Europe. According to UNHCR, during the 

fall of 2008, Australia, Canada, the United States, and several European 

countries expressed interest in resettling these refugees. 

GAO subsequently will issue a more detailed report on U.S. and international 

efforts to assist Iraqi refugees, including some of the key challenges faced in 

planning and delivering this assistance, such as determining the amount of 

funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs by the United States, Iraq, and UN 

agencies. GAO plans to issue a second report in 2009 that will discuss the 

challenges in assisting internally displaced persons within Iraq. 

GAO subsequently will issue a more detailed report on U.S. and international 

efforts to assist Iraqi refugees, including some of the key challenges faced in 

planning and delivering this assistance, such as determining the amount of 

funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs by the United States, Iraq, and UN 

agencies. GAO plans to issue a second report in 2009 that will discuss the 

challenges in assisting internally displaced persons within Iraq. 

 Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent is the U.S. government helping Iraq address the needs of 

displaced Iraqis, bilaterally and in coordination with UN assistance 

efforts? 

2. As U.S. military forces in Iraq draw down, how will the U.S. government 

aid Iraq in ensuring the security of internally displaced and returning 

 Point of Contact Iraqis and support their access to housing and essential services? 

Joseph A. Christoff, 202-512-8979, 

christoffj@gao.gov

3. How is the U.S. government working with the international community to 

improve conditions for Palestinian Iraqis in refugee camps and facilitate 

their eventual resettlement? 
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 33 GAO-09-294SP 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

The issues discussed in the 12 enclosures are based on completed and 

ongoing GAO work on Iraq security and reconstruction issues. They 

incorporate information from agency documents and interviews with U.S. 

officials in Iraq and Washington, D.C., including the Departments of 

Defense (DOD), Energy (Energy), State (State), and the Treasury 

(Treasury); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the 

Army Corps of Engineers; the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I); and the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

Enclosure I: Determining 

What Conditions Need to 

Be Met to Undertake a 

Responsible Drawdown of 

U.S. Forces 

To discuss the change in approach that the U.S.-Iraq security agreement 

represents from prior strategies, we relied on previous GAO reporting and 

reviewed the security agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement that 

the U.S. and Iraqi governments signed in November 2008. We interviewed 

DOD and State officials to clarify the language and application of the 

agreements. 

To present the levels of violence, we used MNF-I data on enemy-initiated 

attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners obtained from DIA. We 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for establishing general 

trends in the number of enemy-initiated attacks in Iraq. To determine the 

reliability of the data, we reviewed MNF-I’s attacks reporting guidance, 

compared the unclassified data to classified sources, and discussed how 

the data are collected, analyzed, and reported with DIA officials. 

To report on the growth of Iraqi security forces, we relied upon DOD 

updates to weekly State reports. We used DOD’s number of trained and 

equipped personnel for January 2007 data to represent the number of the 

Iraqi security forces. DOD changed its reporting metrics in November 

2007 from “trained and equipped” forces to “authorized,” “assigned,” and 

“trained” forces. GAO determined that “assigned” data, based on payroll 

data, are the closest figures to the number of Iraqi security forces and are 

sufficiently reliable and similar to establish a general trend of growth in 

those forces under the previous metric. “Assigned” numbers show the 

same trend as other measures of Iraqi security forces growth—“trained” 

 Iraq 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

and “authorized” forces. However, as we have noted in previous reports, 

GAO recognizes limitations to these reported data. To display the change 

in Iraqi capabilities, we relied on unclassified DOD reporting of Iraqi Army 

units’ “Operational Readiness Assessments.” We have reviewed the 

Operational Readiness Assessments and, to the extent possible, 

corroborated the trends with classified data. 

We based our discussion of administration plans for a responsible 

drawdown on public statements. 

To discuss the implementation of the security agreement, we reviewed the 

text of agreement and the strategic framework agreement that the U.S. and 

Iraqi governments signed in November 2008, Coalition Provisional 

Authority Order 17, and the United Nations (UN) Security Council 

resolutions authorizing the U.S. presence in Iraq. We also interviewed 

State and DOD officials to clarify our understanding of the specific 

language and application of the agreements. We used our prior reports as 

background information for this enclosure. 

To assess DOD’s ability to manage the redeployment of U.S. troops from 

Iraq, we reviewed relevant documents, including command briefings and 

in-progress reviews, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections of 

the U.S. Code, and staff analyses that we obtained from several DOD 

organizations including U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, and U.S. Army 

Central. We also interviewed officials who were directly involved in the 

logistical planning efforts to determine the status and scope of these 

efforts. We traveled to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD officials 

from a variety of organizations to discuss planning efforts. We also visited 

locations at which various aspects of the redeployment and removal 

process are performed and spoke with local commanders and on-site 

supervisors about their experiences and challenges. 

To assess DOD’s capacity to manage and oversee contractor performance, 

we relied extensively on our prior reports. In preparing these reports, we 

reviewed applicable DOD policies and guidance; interviewed DOD and 

contractor personnel in the United States, Iraq, and other locations; and 

reviewed contract-related information. We also reviewed the security 

agreement to identify provisions applicable to DOD’s use of U.S. 

contractors in Iraq. We obtained updated information from DOD on the 

number of contractor personnel working under DOD contracts of as 

Enclosure II: Implementing 

Key Operational 

Requirements of the U.S.-

Iraq Security Agreement 

Enclosure III: Managing 

the Redeployment U.S. 

Forces and Equipment 

from Iraq 

Enclosure IV: Managing 

and Overseeing U.S. 

Government Contractors 

in Iraq during a Drawdown 

Page 34 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

October 2008. Our prior work concluded that complete and reliable data 

on contractor personnel data were not available, but we presented the 

reported data along with their limitations as they established a minimum 

number of contractor personnel and provided insight into the extent to 

which agencies had information on the number of contractor personnel. 

Given the limitations we previously found, the data presented should not 

be used to reach conclusions about the total number of contractor 

personnel in Iraq. 

To discuss the costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, we relied 

extensively on our prior reports related to reporting of overall Global War 

on Terrorism (GWOT) costs, estimating of GWOT funding needs, spending 

associated with the reset of equipment, and the redeployment of U.S. 

forces from Iraq, among others. Our prior work has found the data in 

DOD’s reported obligations for GWOT to be of questionable reliability. 

Consequently, we are unable to ensure that DOD’s reported obligations are 

complete, reliable, and accurate, and therefore any reported obligations 

contained in this enclosure should be considered approximations. 

To present the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, we relied on 

personnel data provided by DOD Joint Staff. We determined the data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes by comparing unclassified U.S. troop 

numbers to classified sources and discussing how the data are collected 

and reported with DOD officials. To determine the organization, missions, 

and tasks of U.S. military forces in Iraq, we reviewed documents from 

DOD, MNF-I, and MNF-I subordinate commands. 

To develop the elements of the rightsizing framework, we analyzed 

previous reports on overseas staffing issues, including those of the 

Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP).1

 We interviewed officials from 

the Office of Management and Budget to discuss rightsizing initiatives in 

relation to the President’s Management Agenda.

2

 We discussed embassy 

Enclosure V: Determining 

the Department of 

Defense’s Future Costs for 

Iraq 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning 

from a Predominantly 

Military to a Civilian 

Presence in Iraq 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing 

the U.S. Civilian Presence 

in Iraq 

 

1

Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright established OPAP following the 1998 

embassy bombings in Africa to consider the organization of U.S. embassies and consulates. 

Department of State, America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the 

Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

2

Office of Management and Budget, The President’s Management Agenda, Fiscal Year 

2002 (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

Page 35 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

staffing with rightsizing experts, including the Chairman of OPAP and 

former Undersecretaries of State for Management. We also interviewed 

officials from the State, DOD, Treasury, and the Departments of 

Commerce, Justice, and Agriculture, among others. To further develop and 

test the framework, we conducted a case study at the U.S. embassy in 

Paris (see our July 2002 report3

 for more details about this case study). 

In the enclosure, we describe how elements of the rightsizing framework 

could be applied to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. We obtained agency 

documents and interviewed officials from State’s Office of Rightsizing, the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

regarding rightsizing challenges at Embassy Baghdad. We obtained data on 

the staffing levels at Embassy Baghdad from State’s Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, as its data were the most comprehensive. To assess the 

reliability of these data, we talked with agency officials about data 

limitations. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable to 

demonstrate that Embassy Baghdad is one of the largest U.S. embassies 

worldwide with an estimated 1,300 total authorized positions. 

Enclosure VIII: 

Considering the Level of 

Engagement of the 

International Community 

To present the number of non-U.S. troops participating in the coalition, we 

analyzed data from State and DOD from December 2003 to December 

2008. The departments did not have information on coalition troops in Iraq 

from March to November 2003. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for estimating the number of troops contributed by 

other countries. 

To discuss the international community’s financial contributions to Iraq’s 

reconstruction, we updated information previously reported by reviewing 

State documentation and consulting with State and UN officials. 

To report on Iraq’s foreign debt, we examined documents from the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club of international 

creditors, and relevant U.S. agencies and international organizations. To 

determine the amount of outstanding debt in 2004 (prior to debt 

restructuring) and 2006, we used official IMF estimates of Iraq’s external 

debt. Since the IMF estimates for 2006 included debt restructuring by nonParis Club official creditors that had not been completed, we used the IMF 

 

3

GAO, Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support 

Rightsizing Initiatives, GAO-02-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002). 

Page 36 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

estimate from 2004 for these countries. We worked with Treasury officials 

to update this information. 

To identify Iraq’s estimated revenues and expenditures from 2005 through 

2008, and Iraq’s financial deposits and budget surpluses through 2008, we 

relied on the data sources and methodology outlined in our August 2008 

report.4

 To update 2008 revenues, we used actual crude oil export 

revenues data through December 2008 as reported by the Central Bank of 

Iraq and provided by Treasury and a December 2008 update of the IMF’s 

forecast of net revenues from oil-related public enterprises and taxes and 

other revenues. To update total expenditures for 2008, we reviewed Iraqi 

Ministry of Finance monthly budget and expenditure data through 

December 2008, which were provided by Treasury. 

To assess Iraq’s capacity to provide essential services, we relied 

extensively on our prior reports and updated the information as necessary. 

To do so, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the U.S. 

Embassy in Baghdad, DOD, and the UN. We have determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for identifying production goals and whether 

actual production is meeting these goals. We updated the data on U.S. and 

Iraqi spending for the oil, electricity, and water sector that we used in our 

August 2008 report. Our data on U.S. spending includes appropriations for 

the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund, Iraq Security Forces fund, 

Economic Support Fund, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 

Iraq Freedom Fund, Democracy Fund, other agency program funds used 

for Iraq activities, and operating expenses from the Coalition Provisional 

Authority. 

To determine progress made on actions related to Iraq’s constitutional 

review and enacting and implementing key legislation, we used prior GAO 

reporting and updated information where appropriate. In updating the 

information, we reviewed reports and documentation and spoke with 

officials from the UN, the U.S. Institute for Peace, nongovernmental 

organizations, USAID, DOD, and State. We reviewed draft laws and 

enacted legislation, as well as analyses of the laws. 

Enclosure IX: Building 

Iraq’s Capacity to Assume 

a Greater Cost Share of Its 

Security, Reconstruction, 

and Economic Needs 

Enclosure X: Building 

Iraq’s Capacity to Improve 

Critical Service Sectors 

Enclosure XI: Enacting 

Iraqi Legislation to 

Promote National 

Reconciliation 

 

4

GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus, 

GAO-08-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2008). 

Page 37 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To identify key challenges to providing humanitarian assistance and 

offering solutions to Iraqi refugees, we reviewed and analyzed reports and 

data from the U.S. government, the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 

other UN agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), and research institutes. During our fieldwork in Washington, D.C., 

we met with officials from State and the Department of Homeland Security 

regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions, special immigrant visa 

programs, and the challenges they have encountered. We also met with 

research institutions and NGOs and held discussion groups with NGOs 

conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq to discuss strategic planning 

and program implementation challenges. Through our fieldwork in 

Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; and Damascus, Syria, 

we met with officials from the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi 

governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella agencies, including the 

World Food Program and IOM; international and local NGOs; and research 

institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we held discussion groups 

with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations, needs, 

assistance received, and challenges encountered. We toured and observed 

assistance projects and activities in resettlement processing centers. We 

analyzed U.S. funding, refugee admissions, and visa data, and found the 

data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Enclosure XII: Assisting 

Iraq’s Refugees 

Page 38 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix II: Le

Levels

vels of Violence and U.S. Force 

 in Iraq 

Page 39 GAO-09-294SP 

Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. 

Force Levels in Iraq 

This appendix provides information on (1) the levels of violence in Iraq, as 

measured through trends in enemy-initiated attacks from May 2003 

through January 2009 and (2) the number of U.S. troops deployed to Iraq 

from January 2006 through January 2009 and projected troop levels 

through October 2010. 

Levels of Violence As shown in figure 1, security conditions in Iraq deteriorated following the 

February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, but then 

improved following the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq during 2007. 

Specifically, the average daily number of enemy-initiated attacks has 

declined from about 180 in June 2007 to about 25 in October 2008 and has 

remained about the same through January 2009. This change accounts for 

a decrease of about 85 percent over a period of a year and a half—

primarily due to decreases in violence in Baghdad and Anbar provinces. 

From 2003 through 2007, enemy-initiated attacks had increased around 

major political and religious events, such as Iraqi elections and Ramadan. 

In 2007 and 2008, attacks did not significantly increase during Ramadan. 

According to early reporting from the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), 

the provincial elections in January 2009 were not associated with 

significant increases in violence. 

 Iraq 
Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force 

Levels in Iraq 

Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy Initiated Attacks, May 2003 through December 2008 

Total average daily attacks

Average daily attacks on coalition

Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces

Average daily attacks on civilians

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Intelligence Agency-reported Multinational Force-Iraq data, January 2009.

Number of average daily attacks per month

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

May

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

The enemy-initiated attacks counted in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 

(DIA) reporting include car, suicide, and other bombs; ambushes; 

murders, executions, and assassinations; sniper fire; indirect fire (mortars 

or rockets); direct fire (small arms or rocket-propelled grenades); surfaceto-air fire (such as man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS); and 

other attacks on civilians. They do not include violent incidents that 

coalition or Iraqi security forces initiated, such as cordon and searches, 

raids, arrests, and caches cleared. 

According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not 

account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may 

underreport incidents of Shi’a militias fighting each other and attacks 

against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few or 

no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they represent a 

reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify 

trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation. 

Page 40 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force 

Levels in Iraq 

Reports from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, as well as the 

United Nations, have attributed the reduction in violence since June 2007 

to three key factors. First, the U.S. surge of troops allowed a change of 

tactics and contributed to improvements in the security environment (see 

the following section). Second, according to DOD and MNF-I reports, the 

establishment of local nongovernmental security forces that oppose al 

Qaeda in Iraq has helped decrease the levels of violence in parts of Iraq, 

most notably in Anbar province. Third, the cease-fire declared in August 

2007 by Moqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, an extremist Shi’a 

militia, contributed significantly to the decline in violence in the second 

half of 2007, according to DOD and UN reports. 

U.S. Force Levels in Iraq In January 2007, the prior administration called for an increase of over 

20,000 U.S. combat and other forces, including an additional five brigades, 

to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods and protect the local 

population. Figure 2 shows the increase of U.S. forces in Iraq from about 

131,500 in December 2006 to about 169,000 in August 2007, an overall 

increase of about 37,500 troops—almost 30 percent above the December 

2006 force level. 

Page 41 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force 

Levels in Iraq 

Figure 2: U.S. Troops in Iraq, January 2006 through October 2010 

Number of troops

0

35,000

70,000

105,000

140,000

175,000

Sources: DOD, Joint Staff, and State Department data, and Presidential speech Feb. 27, 2009.

Presurge number of troops-131,500

Projected

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Dec. 2006

Month before surge 

(131,500 troops)

Aug. 2007

Peak of surge

(169,000 troops)

July 2008

Declared end of surgegoal of 140,000 troops

(147,500 troops)

Mar. 2009

(140,000 troops)

a Aug. 31, 2010

(50,000 troops)

Dec. 2009

(128,000 troops)

Jan. 2009

(144,000 troops)

Note: Projections of troop drawdowns between March 2009 and October 2009 and between March 

2010 and August 31, 2010 reflect an average rate of troop reductions over that period. 

a

DOD has not yet provided the final, unclassified number of U.S. troops in Iraq for February and 

March 2009. The March 2009 number is based on a projection provided by DOD officials. 

In September 2007, President Bush announced that the United States 

would draw down the surge forces by July 2008—the end of The New Way 

Forward strategy—resulting in a decline in U.S. brigade combat teams 

from 20 to 15 and a projected force level of about 140,000 U.S. troops. By 

December 2008, another brigade combat team was removed from Iraq, 

bringing the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to 14, as of 

March 2009. The number of U.S. troops in Iraq has remained above 

Page 42 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix II: Levels of Violence and U.S. Force 

Levels in Iraq 

projected levels for the end of the surge, and as of January 2009, there 

were about 144,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. 

In February 2009, the President announced a significant drawdown of U.S. 

forces by August 31, 2010. According to DOD and MNF-I officials, the 

United States plans to reduce the number of combat troops from about 

140,000 projected in March 2009 to about 128,000 by September 2009. This 

troop drawdown would represent 2 combat brigades and their support 

units, reducing the number of U.S. brigades from 14 to 12. Based on 

conditions in Iraq, the MNF-I Commanding General may recommend 

further reductions prior to Iraq’s national election scheduled for December 

2009. A few months after the election, the United States plans to further 

reduce U.S. forces to at most 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010. According 

to DOD officials, the remaining force will consist of 6 brigades and 

additional support units. 

Page 43 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix III: Comme

of the Treasur

nts from the Department 

y 

Page 44 GAO-09-294SP 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of the Treasury 

 Iraq 

Note: GAO’s comment 

supplementing those in 

the report text appears at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 1. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of the Treasury 

Page 45 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of the Treasury 

The following is GAO’s comment to the Department of the Treasury’s 

letter dated March 13, 2009. 

1. GAO’s estimate of Iraq’s cumulative surplus differs from the 

Department of the Treasury’s estimate because we use different 

sources to determine a small a portion of Iraq’s 2008 government 

revenues—specifically, non-oil export related revenues. GAO and 

Treasury both use data from the Central Bank of Iraq concerning 

revenue generated from exports of crude oil, which represents about 

90 percent of the government’s revenue. However, GAO uses the 

International Monetary Fund’s estimate of Iraq’s government revenue 

that is derived from all other sources, such as oil-related public 

enterprises and taxes. In contrast, Treasury is utilizing information 

gathered by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. GAO asked Treasury 

officials for documentation validating their estimate, but they could 

not do so in time for this report’s publication. GAO will work with 

Treasury to validate the Ministry of Finance’s data for subsequent 

work in this area. 

GAO Comment 

Page 46 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 

Page 47 GAO-09-294SP 

Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2008. 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the Conditions 

Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq.

GAO-08-700C. Washington, D.C.: June 2008. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ 

Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are 

Not Fully Developed. GAO-08-143R. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2007. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development 

Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage 

Risk. GAO-08-117. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not 

Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks.

GAO-07-1195. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 

Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006. 

Plans for Stabilizing Iraq. GAO-06-152C. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 

2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and 

Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq. GAO-05-868C. 

Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-1021T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 23, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2008. 

Letter and Enclosure I: 

Determining What 

Conditions Need to Be Met 

to Undertake a 

Responsible Drawdown of 

U.S. Forces 

Enclosure II: Implementing 

Key Operational 

Requirements of the U.S.-

Iraq Security Agreement 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional 

Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007. 

 Iraq 
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for 

Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO-08-930. Washington, D.C.: 

September 10, 2008. 

Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational 

Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements. 

GAO-09-114R. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2008.

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and 

Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-09-19. Washington, 

D.C.: October 1, 2008.

Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight 

and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further 

Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements. GAO-08-966. Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2008. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance 

on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. 

GAO-08-572T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other 

Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of 

Contractors in Future Operations. GAO-08-436T. Washington, D.C.: 

January 24, 2008. 

Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of 

Defense. GAO-09-233R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO-09-86R. 

Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2008. 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for 

Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 

Iraq. GAO-08-736R. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008. 

Enclosure III: Managing 

the Redeployment of U.S. 

Forces and Equipment 

from Iraq 

Enclosure IV: Managing 

and Overseeing U.S. 

Government Contractors 

in Iraq during a Drawdown 

Enclosure V: Determining 

the Department of 

Defense’s Future Costs for 

Iraq 

Enclosure VI: Transitioning 

from a Predominantly 

Military to a Civilian 

Presence in Iraq 

Page 48 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has 

Reached Iraqi Security Forces. GAO-07-711. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2007. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO-09-86R. 

Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2008. 

Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New 

Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and 

Maintenance Requirements. GAO-06-641. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006. 

Overseas Staffing: Rightsizing Approaches Slowly Taking Hold but More 

Action Needed to Coordinate and Carry Out Efforts. GAO-06-737. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006. 

Embassy Management: Actions Are Needed to Increase Efficiency and 

Improve Delivery of Administrative Support Services. GAO-04-511. 

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2004. 

Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Is Key to Considering Relocation of 

Regional Staff to New Frankfurt Center. GAO-03-1061. Washington, D.C.: 

September 2, 2003. 

Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S. 

Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries. GAO-03-396. Washington, 

D.C.: April 7, 2003. 

Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can 

Support Rightsizing Initiatives. GAO-02-780. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 

2002. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and 

Surplus. GAO-08-1031. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International 

Donor Commitments. GAO-07-827T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007. 

Enclosure VII: Rightsizing 

the U.S. Civilian Presence 

in Iraq 

Enclosure VIII: 

Considering the Level of 

Engagement of the 

International Community 

Rebuilding Iraq: International Donor Pledges for Reconstruction Efforts 

in Iraq. GAO-08-365R. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2007. 

Page 49 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts.

GAO-05-876. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 

and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures and 

Surplus. GAO-08-1144T. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and 

Surplus. GAO-08-1031. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2008. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate 

Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq's Budget 

Execution. GAO-08-153. Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2008.

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development 

Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage 

Risk. GAO-08-117. Washington, D.C.: October 2007. 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and 

Surplus. GAO-08-1031. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2008. 

Enclosure IX: Building 

Iraq’s Capacity to Assume 

a Greater Cost Share of Its 

Security, Reconstruction, 

and Economic Needs 

Enclosure X: Building 

Iraq’s Capacity to Improve 

Critical Service Services 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for 

Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 

Iraq. GAO-08-736R. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008.

Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s 

Oil and Electricity Sectors. GAO-07-677. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007. 

Page 50 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products 

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 

and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2008. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some 

Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2008. 

Enclosure XI: Enacting 

Iraqi Legislation to 

Promote National 

Reconciliation 

Enclosure XII: Assisting 

Iraq’s Refugees 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional 

Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007. 

Page 51 GAO-09-294SP Iraq 
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 52 GAO-09-294SP 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov

In addition, the following staff contributed to the report: Judith 

McCloskey, Assistant Director; Johana Ayers; Kathryn Bernet; Margaret 

Best; Ann Borseth; Monica Brym; Burns Chamberlain; Joseph Carney; 

Carole Coffey; Lynn Cothern; Martin de Alteriis; Timothy DiNapoli; Walker 

Fullerton; Richard Geiger; Rhonda Horried; John Hutton; Bruce Kutnick; 

Drew Lindsey; Guy Lofaro; Mae Liles; Tetsuo Miyabara; Kathleen 

Monahan; Mary Moutsos; Valérie Nowak; Suzanne Perkins; Jason 

Pogacnik; Michael Rohrback; Audrey Solis; and William Solis. In addition, 

Kathleen Arredondo provided technical assistance. 

 Iraq 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320651) 
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