1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 4:22-mc-10086-KMM

IN RE: SUBPOENA SERVED ON

R. JOYCE GRIFFIN, Supervisor of 

Elections for Monroe County, Florida. 

___________________________________ /

R. JOYCE GRIFFIN, Supervisor of 

Elections for Monroe County, Florida,

Movant,

v.

MYPILLOW, INC. and 

MICHAEL LINDELL,

Respondents.

___________________________________ /

ORDER1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Motion to Quash Rule 45 Subpoena and 

Incorporated Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 1), filed by Movant R. Joyce Griffin, Supervisor of 

Elections for Monroe County, Florida (“Movant” or the “Supervisor”). Respondents Michael J. 

Lindell (“Lindell”) and My Pillow, Inc. (“My Pillow”) (collectively, “Respondents”) filed an 

Opposition to Motion to Quash (ECF No. 13); Movant did not file a reply, and the time to do so 

has passed. The Motion (ECF No. 1) was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable K. Michael 

Moore, United States District Judge, to take all necessary and proper action as required by law 

and/or to issue a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 4). I convened a hearing on the Motion 

1

 Because a motion to quash a subpoena under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 is non-dispositive, I dispose of the 

instant Motion by Order rather than by Report and Recommendations. See Jordan v. Comm’r, Mississippi Dep’t of 

Corr., 947 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jordan v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 141 S. Ct. 251 (2020).

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on November 2, 2022, in Key West, Florida. Having considered the Motion, the Response, the 

record as a whole, and with the benefit of the Parties’ positions advanced at oral argument, the 

Motion (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED, in part, as further set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from an out-of-district subpoena directed to the Supervisor of Elections 

for Monroe County, Florida (the “Subpoena”) (ECF No. 22-1),

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issued in connection with US 

Dominion, Inc. et al. v. My Pillow, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00445-CJN (D.D.C.), which is

currently pending in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the “District of 

Columbia Case”). 

The District of Columbia Case is an action for defamation brought by plaintiffs US 

Dominion and its subsidiaries (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), against defendants My Pillow and its 

CEO, Michael Lindell, who are Respondents in the instant proceeding.3 Plaintiffs, who are 

manufacturers of vote tabulation systems used in elections throughout the country, set out in their 

complaint that My Pillow and Lindell promoted then-President Donald J. Trump’s election-related

claims (that the 2020 U.S. presidential election had been stolen from him) to boost their My Pillow 

product sales among audiences watching certain news outlets, knowing these claims to be false.

4

 

According to Plaintiffs, Lindell published the false statement that Plaintiffs, through an

algorithm encoded in their election vote tabulation systems by hacking, caused the 2020 U.S. 

presidential election to be rigged. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to Lindell’s persistent publication

of claims that algorithms in Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines overcounted votes for now2

 The Subpoena was initially filed as Docket Entry 1-1. 

3

 See generally Dominion, Inc. et al. v. My Pillow, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00445-CJN, ECF No. 1 (D.D.C. 2021).

4

 The District of Columbia Case’s complaint describes the various rallies and events at which Lindell purportedly

published false statements that Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines rigged the 2020 U.S. presidential election, and the 

marketing exposure My Pillow received in connection with those rallies and events.

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incumbent President Joseph R. Biden, and undercounted votes for then-President Trump, such that 

each vote for President Biden counted as approximately 1.2 votes, and each vote for President 

Trump counted as approximately 0.7 votes. 

However, Plaintiffs assert that these claims have been resoundingly discredited and 

rejected in numerous courts, by various agencies of the Federal government, by election officials 

in numerous states, and by election specialists. According to Plaintiffs, the evidence defendants 

and others have put forward to substantiate their claims (that the 2020 election was stolen) was 

manufactured, speculative, untrustworthy, and cherry-picked. Plaintiffs allege that Lindell and 

others (including attorneys Sidney Powell and L. Lin Wood), nonetheless continued to publish that 

Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines, allegedly hacked so as to encode the algorithm described 

above, caused the 2020 presidential election to be stolen in favor of President Biden.

Plaintiffs assert that they sent retraction demand letters to Lindell’s allies, including 

attorney Sidney Powell, and to various media organizations, including One America News 

Network, Newsmax, and The Epoch Times. Plaintiffs aver that the retraction letters received 

significant media attention, and thus Lindell was likely aware of the letters’ contents. And, on 

December 23, 2020, Plaintiffs sent Lindell a letter demanding that he stop making false claims 

about Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs contend that, as a means of promoting My Pillow’s products, 

Lindell nonetheless continued to publish false statements, on Twitter, at political rallies, and 

elsewhere, that the 2020 U.S. presidential election was rigged by algorithms in Plaintiffs’ vote 

tabulation machines that overcounted votes for President Biden and undercounted votes for 

President Trump. 

On January 8, 2021, Plaintiffs sent Lindell another retraction letter, pointing to information 

and evidence in the public domain (and further summarized in Plaintiffs’ complaint in the District 

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of Columbia Case) allegedly demonstrating the falsity of Lindell’s statements about Plaintiffs’ 

vote tabulation machines. Plaintiffs contend in their complaint that, nonetheless, Lindell 

continued, on Twitter and on television, to publish his false election-related claims as a means of 

selling more My Pillow products. Plaintiffs assert that Lindell attempted to prove up his claims, 

pointing to a non-credible report and allegedly fraudulent data manufactured by obviously 

discreditable conspiracy theorists. Plaintiffs’ complaint details the ways in which the report and 

data cited by Lindell are false. Yet, as further set out in Plaintiffs’ complaint, certain news 

organizations continued to afford Lindell a global platform to publish his election-related claims

because those organizations relied on Respondents’ advertising and marketing fees.

Plaintiffs contend that, after the inauguration of President Biden on January 20, 2021, 

Lindell continued to publish his claim that Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines contained an 

algorithm that caused the 2020 presidential election to be stolen. When Lindell and My Pillow 

were later banned from Twitter as a result, Lindell continued to advance this claim through 

interviews on television programs that wanted to continue to receive My Pillow advertising fees.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert that, on February 4, 2021, they again put the defendants 

on notice of the falsity of their statements, pointing the defendants to the alleged flaws in the report 

and data that the defendants had used to support their election-related claims. In response, the 

defendants asserted, in television interviews, that they were being targeted by Plaintiffs. The next 

day, and after having been put on notice by Plaintiffs regarding the alleged falsities of his 

statements, Lindell broadcasted a purportedly sham documentary-style movie, which is described 

in greater detail in the complaint. Plaintiffs contend that, apart from promoting My Pillow’s 

products in that movie, Lindell knowingly lied that the discredited report and allegedly 

manufactured data obtained from conspiracy theorists both were proof that the 2020 presidential 

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election had been stolen, due to algorithms hacked into Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines. 

According to Plaintiffs, Lindell’s claims regarding Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines

enriched him and My Pillow at Plaintiffs’ expense. As further alleged in the complaint, 

Respondents’ defamatory marketing campaign against Plaintiffs led to a more than 30-to-40 

percent increase in sales at My Pillow. In contrast, Plaintiffs contend that they have suffered 

reputational and financial harm, projected in the amount of $200 million over the next five years, 

as a result of Lindell and My Pillow’s allegedly defamatory marketing campaign. Due to death 

threats and other threatening messages prompted by Lindell’s election-related claims, Plaintiffs 

assert that they have had to increase their security expenditures. Plaintiffs also contend that state 

legislators in various states that use Plaintiffs’ vote tabulation machines have expressed their intent 

to reconsider or review long-term contracts; Plaintiffs claim their ability to win new contracts has 

also been put in jeopardy.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert causes of action against defendants for defamation per se and 

for deceptive trade practices, under Minnesota law. 

On September 7, 2022, Respondents served the Subpoena on the Supervisor, commanding 

production of 22 different categories of information related to the voting system used by Monroe 

County, Florida during the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The requested information includes

forensic copies of all computer drives affiliated or attached to the Supervisor’s vote tabulation 

system, forensic copies of certain files generated by the vote tabulation systems, diagrams of the 

Supervisor’s computer networks running the election system, MAC addresses for election 

equipment, network logs, credentials for encryption services used by the election system, lists of 

personnel who had access to the election system before and shortly after the November 2020 

presidential election, vote tabulation documents generated during the November 2020 election, 

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documents produced in relation to the November 2020 election, documents related to intrusion 

attempts on the election system, contracts and agreements with the supplier of the election system, 

and contracts and agreements related to network security and cybersecurity.

Now, the Supervisor moves to quash the Subpoena, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 45(d)(3).5

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, a party to an action may command a non-party 

to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things at a place within 100 

miles of where that non-party resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(A). However, a party serving a non-party with a subpoena “must take 

reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Rule 45 permits a subpoenaed non-party to file objections to requested 

discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). Such objections are due “before the earlier of the time 

specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). 

A subpoenaed non-party may also move to quash a subpoena directed to her. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 45(d)(3). A court in the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena 

that “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the 

geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected 

matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 45(d)(3)(A). Moreover, a court may modify or quash a subpoena where the subpoena would 

require “(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 

5

 In the alternative, the Supervisor seeks a protective order extending the time to produce documents responsive to 

Requests 4(a), 4(b), 7, and 8, subject to the Supervisor being compensated for the expense associated with that 

production.

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information; or (ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion or information that does not describe 

specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert’s study that was not requested by a 

party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(B).

Though Rule 45 does not explicitly recognize a motion to quash based on irrelevancy or 

overbreadth, courts consider the scope of discovery under a subpoena as the same as the scope of 

discovery under Rule 26. Jordan, 947 F.3d at 1329; Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Employees 

(AFSCME) Council 79 v. Scott, 277 F.R.D. 474, 476 (S.D. Fla. 2011). In turn, under Rule 26(b), 

parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 

claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In this 

respect, “a subpoena issued under Rule 45 should be quashed to the extent it seeks irrelevant 

information.”6 Jordan, 947 F.3d at 1329.

III. DISCUSSION

The Supervisor seeks to quash the Subpoena on three grounds. First, the Supervisor argues 

that compliance with the Subpoena constitutes a threat to the cybersecurity of the election system 

in Monroe County. According to the Supervisor, Respondents seek the production of information 

(network diagrams, MAC addresses, IP addresses, and credentials) that would permit the 

infiltration of Monroe County’s voting system; the Supervisor contends that production of this 

information would constitute a security breach in violation of 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 and Florida 

Statutes § 212.318, and there is a significant risk that the information would be publicly disclosed 

even if subject to a protective order. Moreover, the Supervisor asserts that the information sought 

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 “Relevance in the context of discovery ‘has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 

reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’” Akridge v. Alfa 

Mut. Ins. Co., 1 F.4th 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 

(1978)). It is well-established that information need not be admissible in evidence for it to be discoverable. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

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is protected from disclosure under Florida Statutes § 119.0725. And, the Supervisor contends that 

the information sought constitutes “other protected matter” requiring that the Subpoena be 

quashed, under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii).

Second, the Supervisor argues that the Subpoena should be quashed because it seeks 

production of confidential and proprietary trade secrets. Specifically, the Supervisor contends that

the information sought constitutes trade secrets under Florida law and that the information, 

particularly the source code and associated documentation, is otherwise confidential pursuant to 

the Voting System Agreement between the Supervisor and Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Supervisor 

asserts that production of documents requested in Requests 1(a)–(h), 2(a)–(b), 3(a), and 3(c) would 

require the Supervisor to violate the Voting System Agreement.

Third, the Supervisor argues that Subpoena should be quashed because compliance would 

impose an undue burden on the Supervisor. Specifically, the Supervisor argues that the Subpoena 

is unduly burdensome because the Supervisor is a non-party; the Subpoena covers an extensive 

time span, with four of the requests being “unlimited” in scope; the Subpoena calls for production 

of documents and materials, the creation of which is beyond the scope of the Supervisor and her 

staff’s expertise (e.g., forensic images); and compliance with the Subpoena will require hundreds 

of hours of work and will be unduly expensive. Last, the Supervisor argues that disclosure of the 

requested materials would likely require that the Monroe County voting system be replaced.

Notwithstanding, at the November 2, 2022 hearing, the Parties appeared to confirm that 

the instant dispute centers on Respondents’ request for documents and information responsive to 

Requests 1 through 3.7 Upon weighing the relevant factors, the Court finds that, with respect to 

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 Counsel for the Supervisor represented that: (1) the Supervisor objects only as to timing for Requests 4(a) and 4(b)

and is amenable to conferring on a narrowed production for Request 4(c); (2) there are no documents responsive to 

Requests 5, 6, and 8; and (3) the Supervisor satisfied Request 7 by attaching a copy of the Voting System Agreement

to the Motion to Quash. Respondents offered no objection to an extension of 8–10 weeks for the Supervisor to produce 

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Requests 1 through 3, the Subpoena must be quashed, as unduly burdensome.8

A. Factors Applicable

The burden of proof in demonstrating that compliance with a subpoena presents an undue 

burden lies with the party opposing the subpoena, while the party seeking to enforce a subpoena 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the request is relevant. Fadalla v. Life Auto. Products, Inc., 

258 F.R.D. 501, 504 (M.D. Fla. 2007). To determine whether a subpoena imposes an undue 

burden, the Court must balance the requesting party’s need for the discovery against the burden 

imposed upon the subpoenaed party. Id. Courts consider the following factors in this analysis: 

“(1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the 

breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity 

with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa v. 

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. City of Dallas, 

178 F.R.D. 103, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1998)). “The status of the subpoena recipient as a non-party is 

also a factor that can weigh against disclosure in the undue burden inquiry.” Jordan, 947 F.3d at 

1337 (citing Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818).

B. Analysis

As to the first Wiwa factor, the specific relevance of the information in the Supervisor’s 

possession is tenuous. In the Motion, the Supervisor asserts that the requested information is not 

relevant. (ECF No. 1 at 19). In their Response, Respondents point to evidence in the public record 

about Dominion’s vote tabulation systems that purportedly establish Respondents’ reasonable 

documents and information responsive to Requests 4(a) and 4(b). Respondents also did not object to the Supervisor’s 

request for reasonable costs associated with that production.

8

 Under Rule 45(f), “[w]hen the court where compliance is required did not issue the subpoena, it may transfer a 

motion under this rule to the issuing court if the person subject to the subpoena consents or if the court finds 

exceptional circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f). At oral argument, the Supervisor consented to transfer of the 

instant Motion to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. However, in light of the Supervisor’s 

subsequent request at the hearing for a ruling that day, I construed that request as non-consent to transfer.

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basis to pursue the requested information, generally. For example, the Response identifies 

Dominion’s ImageCast X equipment, and D-Suite 5.5-B and D-Suite 5.5-C software, as containing 

vulnerabilities or anomalies, thus providing a reasonable basis for the information sought from the 

Supervisor, as that information purportedly bears on the truth or falsity of Mr. Lindell’s statements. 

(ECF No. 13 at 4–5, 16–18). However, at oral argument, the Supervisor proffered that Monroe 

County does not use this particular equipment or software, and instead uses “ImageCast Evolution”

equipment, in addition to software that is several versions out of date. This proffer is supported 

by the Voting System Agreement attached to the Motion, (ECF No. 1-3), which identifies the 

Supervisor’s equipment as the ImageCast Evolution system. While the Subpoena appears to 

appreciate there are different Dominion hardware systems in use, see (ECF No. 22-1 at 4–5), the 

particular equipment and software that the Supervisors uses, which has not been identified as 

containing vulnerabilities, weakens a finding that the information the Supervisor actually 

possesses is relevant, irrespective of whether the information sought, generally, is relevant. 

However, it is not my finding that the information Respondents seek is irrelevant, and I 

make no finding as to the relevance of the information sought. Rather, it is my finding that the 

information the Supervisor possesses is of tenuous relevance. Indeed, as the Supervisor argued at 

oral argument, there appears to be a difference between what she possesses and what Respondents 

assert that information will support as evidence. Accordingly, I find that the first factor does not 

weigh in favor of either side. See Jordan, 947 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “the relevance of the 

requested information to the underlying litigation, or the lack thereof, is important”). 

I nonetheless turn to Respondents’ need for the information sought. As to the second 

factor, Respondents’ need for the information sought from the Supervisor is here diminished. 

Indeed, Respondents have served subpoenas identical to that here on at least 39 other Dominion 

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customers. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order Regarding 

Third Party Subpoenas, US Dominion, Inc. et al. v. My Pillow, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00445-

CJN (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2022), (ECF No. 145-1 at 4 n.2). Further, the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia has entered a protective order governing the production of confidential 

information. See Protective Order Governing the Production and Exchange of Confidential 

Information, US Dominion, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00445-CJN (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2022), (ECF 

No. 152). Thus, whatever need Respondents have for the information sought in the Subpoena, the 

need for the information the Supervisor possesses is diminished in light of the 38 other identical 

non-party subpoenas.

Next, I turn to the burden compliance would impose on the Supervisor. Regarding the third 

Wiwa factor, the breadth of the documents requested is indisputably voluminous. Relatedly, and 

dovetailing with the fourth factor, the Subpoena is overbroad, in part. In Request 1, Respondents 

seek, from a non-party, “forensic images of every computer drive and memory device that is part 

of the voting system and every piece of hardware that is part of or used by the voting system.”

(ECF No. 1-5 at 2 ¶ 6) (summarizing Request 1). In Request 2, Respondents seek, without 

specifying any time period, forensic copies of specific file formats generated from tabulators and 

ballot marking devices, in addition to “all data related to the November 2020 Election subject to 

the 22-month voter records retention requirement under U.S. federal law.”9 (ECF No. 22-1 at 6). 

As to this request, the Subpoena is overbroad. And in Request 3, which at oral argument

Respondents confirmed is contingent on receiving productions responsive to Requests 1 and 2, 

Respondents seek a complete network map of the Supervisor’s Dominion election tabulation 

9 At oral argument, the source of this retention requirement was questioned, as the Supervisor represented that she 

was unaware of any requirement that would require her to preserve forensic images of the machines and computer 

systems for 22 months following an election. Respondents’ counsel similarly could not identify what authority would 

impose the retention requirement implied by the subpoena request. 

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system, digital addresses for the hardware, network logs (again, not time-limited), log-in 

credentials to bypass encryption services, and a list of personnel who had access to the network 

from January 1, 2019 through November 30, 2020. (Id.).

Because the Supervisor’s Dominion election equipment has been used in elections since 

the November 2020 general election time, I questioned the Parties whether forensic images and 

copies of the relevant drives and systems requested in Requests 1 and 2, from the time of the 

November 2020 general election, could even be created or whether, by virtue of their subsequent 

use, the drives will have necessarily changed. Because counsel for Respondents explained that 

what is sought is an image of the drives as they were immediately following the 2020 general 

election, the Supervisor could not represent that the data would still exist. The Supervisor 

proffered that she could not, without hiring an outside service, determine whether she can create

the forensic images and copies from the time period requested. The expense of attempting to 

collect the responsive data—indeed, of even determining whether it would be possible to collect 

that data—is unquestionably burdensome. Moreover, Respondents’ counsel agreed that images 

that fail to accurately reveal the status of data following the election would not be relevant to the 

defenses advanced. The information sought is, essentially, a digital copy of a non-party’s entire 

election system. And in this regard, the Supervisor’s status as a non-party is relevant. Jordan, 

947 F.3d at 1337 (citing Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818). I afford the Supervisor’s non-party status great 

weight in light of the voluminous information requested.

Finally, while the Subpoena describes the documents requested with particularity, the 

burden imposed in complying with Requests 1–3 is otherwise undue. The Motion is premised, in 

part, on the burden compliance would impose coinciding with the Supervisor’s preparation for and 

administration of the 2022 general election leading up to and during early-November 2022. That 

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election has since passed and, as noted above, Respondents consented at oral argument to an 

extension of time to comply with Requests 4(a) and 4(b). Accordingly, I recognize that the burden 

has diminished since the filing of the instant Motion. 

However, the Supervisor attested that her office employs only nine people, none of whom 

possess the technical knowledge or expertise required to generate productions responsive to 

Requests 1, 2, and 3(a)–(d). (ECF No.1-4 at 2–3 ¶ 7). Thus, to comply with Requests 1, 2, and 

3(a)–(d), the Supervisor would have to incur the expense of outside computer experts, which she 

represents “would probably be Dominion”; although, the Supervisor did not provide the estimated 

cost of compliance. (Id. at 3 ¶ 8). In any event, the Supervisor further attested that she likely will

have to replace her election system if that system’s network maps and drives are disclosed, either 

to ensure that the system is not hacked or to restore public confidence in the system. (Id. at 3 ¶¶ 

8–9). There has been no proffer advanced to discredit this attestation. The concern is not 

unreasonable in light of the special importance placed on cybersecurity surrounding election 

systems, which both sides recognize, and the potential handling or disclosure of the requested 

information should the District of Columbia Case proceed to dispositive pretrial motions or public 

trial.10 While the Supervisor has not adduced evidence of the cost of replacing the election system, 

review of the Voting System Agreement attached to the Motion reveals that, in 2013 when the 

Supervisor licensed her system from Plaintiffs, the system cost more than $700,000.00. (ECF No. 

1-3 at 12). That cost, in 2022, likely remains high.

A similar argument regarding the cost of complying with a subpoena, and the potential 

need to replace and/or recertify an election system if required to produce the forensic images and 

10

 At this time, the court in the District of Columbia Case has separately ordered the Parties to provide supplemental 

briefing on the effect, if any, of the protective order on the disclosure of any information sought through third-party 

subpoenas. See December 8, 2022 Minute Order, US Dominion, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00445-CJN (D.D.C. 

Dec. 8, 2022). That supplemental briefing was filed on December 16, 2022.

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network maps requested, was raised in support of quashing a subpoena identical to that here, served 

by Respondents on the Kent County Clerk in Michigan. See Lyons v. My Pillow, Inc. et al, No. 

1:22-cv-01191-HYJ-PJG (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1 at 9–10. That subpoena was 

recently quashed by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan.

11

 See 

Order, Lyons, No. 1:22-mc-00107-PJG, ECF No. 16.

For these reasons, I find that the burden imposed by the Subpoena is high.

I am not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that courts have previously ordered the 

disclosure of election system software. When asked at the hearing whether any court had ever 

done so, Respondents pointed to Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elections 

Commission, 944 N.W.2d 357, 392 Wis. 2d 382 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). However, that case 

involved an appeal regarding the scope of an administrative agency’s proposed confidentiality and 

nondisclosure agreement that would permit a candidate’s campaign to gain access to software 

components of a voting system used in the November 2016 general election, pursuant to the 

campaign’s statutory right to do so under Wisconsin law. 944 N.W.2d 357, 392 Wis. 2d 382 at ¶¶ 

3–4 (citing Wis. Stat. § 5.905(4)).

Respondents also pointed to United States District Judge Amy Totenberg’s August 11, 

2022 Order in Curling v. Raffensperger, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT (N.D. Ga.), ECF No. 1453. There, 

among other things, the court denied Respondents’ motion to intervene in the Northern District of 

Georgia so that Respondents could gain access to an expert report filed under seal in that court, for 

use in support of Respondents’ defense in the District of Columbia Case. Respondents characterize

the expert report as providing a “roadmap explaining how to hack election equipment,” and argue 

that forensic copies of the Supervisors entire election system plus network maps “certainly” should 

11

 That Order has been appealed to the District Court Judge.

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be produced in litigation with appropriate protections if the roadmap to hack that system can be 

produced in litigation. (ECF No. 13 at. at 10) (emphasis omitted). The Court is not convinced. If 

anything, the argument runs in the other direction. Accordingly, neither case advanced by 

Respondents militates against quashing the Subpoena.

For all these reasons, weighing the tenuous relevance of the information in the Supervisor’s 

possession, Respondents’ diminished need for the information sought from the Supervisor, the 

high burden on the Supervisor of compliance, and considering the Supervisor’s status as a nonparty, I find that the burden on the Supervisor of complying with Requests 1 through 3 is undue. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

(1) The Motion to Quash Rule 45 Subpoena and Incorporated Memorandum of Law 

(ECF No. 1), filed by Movant R. Joyce Griffin, Supervisor of Elections for Monroe 

County, Florida, is GRANTED, in part;

(2) The Subpoena served upon the Supervisor is QUASHED, in part, with respect to 

Requests 1, 2, and 3 of the Subpoena; and,

(3) The time to produce documents responsive to Requests Nos. 4(a) and 4(b) is 

extended to January 11, 2023.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 20th day of December, 2022.

____________________________________

LAUREN F. LOUIS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:22-mc-10086-KMM Document 24 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/21/2022 Page 15 of 15