Report to the Co-Chairman, Caucus on 

International Narcotics Control, U.S. 

Senate 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

DRUG CONTROL

Better Coordination 

with the Department 

of Homeland Security 

and an Updated 

Accountability 

Framework Can 

Further Enhance 

DEA’s Efforts to Meet 

Post-9/11 

Responsibilities 

March 2009 

GAO-09-63 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

DRUG CONTROL

Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland 

Security and an Updated Accountability Framework 

Can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 

Responsibilities

Highlights of GAO-09-63, a report to the 

Co-Chairman, Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate 

Given the global context of the war 

on drugs—coupled with growing 

recognition since September 11, 

2001 (9/11), of the nexus between 

drug trafficking and terrorism—the 

mission of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) and efforts 

to forge effective interagency 

partnerships and coordination are 

increasingly important. GAO was 

asked to examine, in the context of 

the post-9/11 environment, DEA’s 

(1) priorities, (2) interagency 

partnerships and coordination 

mechanisms, and (3) strategic plan 

and performance measures. GAO 

reviewed DEA policy, planning, and 

budget documents and visited 7 of 

DEA’s 21 domestic field offices and 

3 of its 7 regional offices abroad—

sites selected to reflect diverse 

drug-trafficking threats, among 

other factors. GAO also contacted 

other relevant federal agencies—

including U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP)—and various 

state and local partner agencies. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Attorney General and the Secretary 

of Homeland Security take actions 

to enhance the effectiveness of (1) 

interagency partnerships involving 

DEA, ICE, and CBP and (2) the 

multiagency Special Operations 

Division and the OCDETF Fusion 

Center. DOJ agreed. DHS 

responded that discussions with 

DOJ are ongoing. DHS neither 

explicitly agreed nor disagreed 

with GAO’s recommendations but 

suggested revisions to the wording, 

which GAO did not make. 

Since 9/11, while continuing its primary mission of enforcing U.S. controlled 

substances laws, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by 

prioritizing narcoterrorism cases—drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism—

and by implementing other policies and actions, such as collecting terrorismrelated intelligence from confidential informants and foreign partners. Also, 

DEA is using a new enforcement authority to pursue and arrest 

narcoterrorists—even those who operate outside the United States. 

Because most of the nation’s illegal drug supply is distributed by Mexican 

drug organizations, DEA’s partnerships and coordination with Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that have border-related missions–ICE 

and CBP—are important. However, an outdated interagency agreement–and 

long-standing disputes involving ICE’s drug enforcement role and DEA’s 

oversight of that role—have led to conflicts and the potential for duplicative 

investigative efforts. Another interagency agreement, predating CBP’s 

formation under DHS, has led to operational inefficiencies, as reflected in a 

bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized at the nation’s borders. 

That is, drugs seized by CBP between ports of entry are to be referred to DEA, 

but drugs seized at ports of entry are to be referred to ICE. According to CBP, 

an updated agreement that specifies a standardized process would be more 

efficient and less confusing. Further, in conducting the war on drugs, an 

important interagency coordination mechanism is the Special Operations 

Division, a DEA-led intelligence center that targets the command and control 

capabilities of major drug-trafficking organizations. Another coordination 

mechanism is the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 

Fusion Center, which collects and analyzes drug-trafficking and related 

financial information and disseminates investigative leads. However, ICE is 

providing limited information to the Special Operations Division and is not 

participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. As a result, according to DEA, 

these coordination entities are not as effective as they could be. Resolution of 

these interagency issues necessitates involvement by both the Attorney 

General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, given that their respective 

departments’ component agencies have been unable to reach mutually 

acceptable agreements. Notably, because of links between drug trafficking 

and terrorism, DEA has established new partnerships with the Department of 

Defense (DOD), especially in Afghanistan, where they share intelligence and 

DOD provides airlift and other support for DEA operations. 

DEA’s strategic plan has not been updated since 2003; also, DEA’s annual 

performance plans do not provide results-focused measures for assessing the 

agency’s post-9/11 activities, such as counterterrorism efforts. A current and 

comprehensive strategic planning and performance measurement framework 

would help to ensure accountability by providing crucial information to DEA’s 

senior leadership for making management decisions and to the Congress and 

the administration for assessing program effectiveness. In February 2009, DOJ 

reported that it was reviewing DEA’s updated strategic plan. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-63. 

For more information, contact Eileen Larence 

at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6

Background 10 

Since 9/11, DEA Has Adopted New Policies and Utilized a New 

Enforcement Authority to Assist in Counterterrorism Efforts and 

Respond to Changing Global Drug Threats While Addressing 

Resource Constraints 17 

DEA Partners with Federal, State, and Local Agencies, and though 

Some Partnerships Have Improved since 9/11, Others Continue 

to Have Conflicts and Inefficiencies 24 

DEA Coordinates Activities and Leverages Resources through 

Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers; However, 

Two Centers Are Less Effective Because ICE Is Not Providing 

All Relevant Intelligence 44 

DEA Has Improved Its Strategic Plan and Performance Measures; 

However, They Do Not Reflect the Agency’s Current Direction 

and Programs and Are Insufficient to Measure Progress and 

Guide Future Investments 50 

Conclusions 53 

Recommendations for Executive Action 54 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 55 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 58 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Justice 69 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 71 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 74 

Page i GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Tables 

Table 1: Drug-Related Intelligence Centers—Missions and 

Participating Agencies 46 

Table 2: DEA Field Divisions; Other Federal Agencies; and State, 

Local, and Tribal Agencies Visited by GAO at Domestic 

Locations 61 

Table 3: Federal and Foreign Agencies and Personnel Interviewed 

by GAO at International Locations 62 

Table 4: National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement 

Committee Members Interviewed by GAO 65 

Table 5: Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers Visited 

by GAO 66 

Figures 

Figure 1: Map of DEA’s Domestic Divisions 13 

Figure 2: Map of DEA’s International Regions 15 

Figure 3: DEA Enacted Budget Authority for the Salary and 

Expenses Account 22 

Figure 4: DEA Authorized and Actual Full-time Equivalent 

Positions, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007 23 

Figure 5: Department of State Obligations under Interagency 

Agreements with DEA, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 39 

Figure 6: DOD Obligations under Interagency Agreements with 

DEA, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007 41 

Page ii GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Abbreviations 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CPOT consolidated priority organization target 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FTE full-time equivalent 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy 

PTO priority target organization 

USMS U.S. Marshals Service 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 20, 2009 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Co-Chairman 

Caucus on International Narcotics Control 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Co-Chairman: 

Illegal drugs and drug abuse remain a problem in the United States. In 

2007, 114 million Americans—46 percent of the U.S. population over the 

age of 12—reported having used illegal drugs at least once in their lifetime 

and about one-third of these individuals (36 million Americans) reported 

having used illegal drugs during the previous year, according to 

government estimates.1

 Revenue generated from illegal drug trafficking is 

estimated to have topped $64 billion in 2000.2

 In addition, in 2002, the most 

recent year for which estimates were published, drug use was estimated to 

cost the U.S. economy over $180 billion annually in health care costs, lost 

productivity, and other costs.3

 

The diversity of illegal drugs and their sources make drug control efforts 

challenging. Drugs consumed in the United States include substances 

grown and produced domestically, such as marijuana; smuggled from 

other countries, such as cocaine; and diverted from legal uses to be used 

illegally, such as oxycodone. While marijuana and methamphetamine are 

produced domestically, the distribution of those drugs and drugs smuggled 

into the country are increasingly controlled by Mexican drug-trafficking 

organizations. Although some drugs, such as MDMA, commonly known as 

ecstasy, enter the United States through the northern border and by other 

means, most drugs are smuggled through the southern border with 

Mexico. Also, the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy noted that because 

 

1

 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies, 

Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, 

NSDUH Series H-34, DHHS Publication No. SMA 08-4343 (Rockville, Md.: 2008). These are 

the most recent data available. 

2

 Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, What America’s 

Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-2000 (Washington, D.C.: December 2001). These are 

the most recent data available. 

3

 Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, The Economic 

Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002 (Washington, D.C.: November 2004). 

Page 1 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

of interdiction successes in the transit zone—a 6 million square mile area 

that includes Central America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the 

eastern Pacific Ocean—South American drug traffickers are increasingly 

using West Africa as a gateway to Europe and North America. In addition, 

according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) component agency dedicated to enforcing 

the controlled substances laws of the United States through targeting and 

disrupting drug-trafficking organizations, the illegal use of pharmaceutical 

drugs has become an increasing concern in recent years. 

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), within the Executive 

Office of the President, directs the nation’s counternarcotics policy and is 

responsible for developing the annual National Drug Control Strategy, a 

three-part strategy that aims to (1) prevent drug use before it starts, 

(2) intervene and heal those who use drugs, and (3) disrupt the market for 

illegal substances. DEA, as the federal law enforcement agency dedicated 

to enforcing the controlled substances laws of the United States, plays a 

role in the third objective of the strategy—disrupting the market for illegal 

substances. In particular, DEA seeks to investigate and arrest drug 

traffickers and help prepare prosecutions. 

In fiscal year 2007, DEA operated under a $2 billion budget with 9,309 

positions to work toward those goals.4

 DEA operates through 227 

domestic field offices that encompass all 50 states and also has an

international presence overseas with 87 foreign offices in 63 countries. To 

accomplish its mission domestically and internationally, DEA partners 

with other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) and other DOJ components, as well as U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

offices. DEA coordinates with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies directly and through task forces, particularly task forces in the 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program and 

the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.5

 DEA also 

 

4

 DEA’s $2 billion budget for fiscal year 2007 does not include funding or positions 

reimbursed through agreements with other federal agencies. 

5

 OCDETF task forces are short- and long-term task forces made up of federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies that target identified organizations linked to the major 

drug-trafficking organizations most responsible for the nation’s drug supply. HIDTA task 

forces, funded and managed by ONDCP, are made up of federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies that combat local and regional drug problems that are beyond the 

control of local law enforcement. 

Page 2 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

coordinates international drug control efforts with the Departments of 

State and Defense and host-country governments in foreign locations. 

While the fight against illegal drugs is ongoing, the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001 (9/11) prompted the FBI to reprioritize policies and 

programs to support counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, DEA has 

found links between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers—in 

particular, terrorist organizations using drug trafficking and related 

proceeds to fund terrorist activities. As a result, agencies that formerly 

focused on preventing and investigating traditional crimes, such as drug 

trafficking, have taken on new homeland security responsibilities. 

Because of ongoing concerns about drug abuse and trafficking, the 

changing landscape in counternarcotics enforcement, and the links 

between drug trafficking and terrorism, you asked us to review changes to 

DEA in the years following 9/11. This report examines (1) post-9/11 

changes to DEA policies, strategies, and authorities to support national 

counterterrorism efforts and address evolving global drug threats; 

(2) changes to DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies 

with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11, and any effects of those 

changes; (3) mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid duplication 

with partner agencies; and (4) the extent to which DEA’s strategic plan 

and performance measures have changed to reflect the post-9/11 

environment. 

To understand the larger drug control context, we reviewed policy and 

planning documents obtained from ONDCP, including the National Drug 

Control Strategy, and we interviewed relevant ONDCP officials. Also, to 

obtain additional perspectives on these topics, we conducted a literature 

search of congressional hearings, DOJ Office of the Inspector General 

reports, and other published materials. We reviewed DEA budget 

documentation for fiscal years 2000 through 2009 and other relevant 

agency documentation. We interviewed DEA officials, including the Chief 

of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence, at DEA headquarters, and the 

Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division.6

 Also, we 

 

6

 Functional since 1994, the DEA-led Special Operations Division was established to target 

the command and control capabilities of major drug-trafficking organizations. Originally, 

the division was operated exclusively by DEA and DOJ’s Criminal Division, but other 

federal agencies soon became partners, beginning with the FBI in 1995, followed by the 

U.S. Customs Service in 1996. Presently, additional partners include the Internal Revenue 

Service; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Page 3 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

conducted site visits and spoke with special agents-in-charge and other 

officials at 7 of DEA’s 21 domestic field divisions.7

 We selected these sites 

to reflect diverse characteristics, including (1) drug-trafficking and 

consumption threats identified by the 2008 National Drug Threat 

Assessment (e.g., marijuana, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine); 

(2) geographic differences such as border and nonborder areas, urban and 

rural areas, and federally recognized Indian reservations; and (3) locations 

with and without OCDETF and HIDTA representation. While the 

information obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all of 

DEA’s domestic field divisions, the information provided valuable insights 

into a variety of drug enforcement issues and mechanisms. For 

perspectives on DEA’s international presence, we spoke with officials at 

DEA’s regional offices in Mexico and Thailand, two countries in which 

DEA has had long-standing operations and partnerships, as well as in 

Afghanistan where DEA resources have been increased in recent years. 

Also, we spoke by telephone with a DEA official in Brussels, Belgium, to 

better understand DEA’s new attention to drug trafficking in West Africa;8

and the Regional Director of DEA Bogotá, where DEA has had a presence 

since 1972, about changes since 9/11 and partnerships with other federal 

agencies there. While the information obtained during these visits cannot 

be generalized to all of DEA’s foreign field offices, they provided valuable 

insights into DEA’s operations, partnerships, and coordination overseas. 

To understand how DEA partners and coordinates with other federal 

agencies, we reviewed counternarcotics documentation, including 

interagency agreements and agency directives, and interviewed officials 

from 

• DEA and other DOJ components, including the FBI; the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S. Marshals 

 

7

 DEA operates 21 domestic field division offices that are responsible for overseeing DEA’s 

efforts in the respective geographic areas of responsibility. We visited the following 

domestic field divisions: Detroit, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; New 

York, New York; Phoenix, Arizona; Seattle, Washington; and St. Louis, Missouri (see table 2 

in app. I). 

8

 Because the Country Attaché of DEA’s office located in Lagos, Nigeria, was unable to 

speak with us, we spoke with the Assistant Regional Director for the Europe Region, 

whose area of responsibility includes West Africa. 

Page 4 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Service (USMS); the Executive Office for OCDETF; and the OCDETF 

Fusion Center;9

 

• two DHS components—ICE and CBP; 

• the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, and the respective U.S. embassies’ Narcotics 

Affairs Sections in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), and Kabul 

(Afghanistan); and 

• the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and 

Global Threats. 

In states where we visited DEA’s domestic field divisions, we also 

interviewed officials from DEA’s principal federal partners and at least one 

state, local, or tribal law enforcement agency (see table 2 in app. I). In 

addition, we conducted telephone interviews with 17 of the 27 members of 

the National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement Committee (see 

table 4 in app. I). These 17 members, while not representative of all local 

law enforcement, provided us additional insights into DEA’s partnerships 

and coordination with local law enforcement. Although DEA partners with 

agencies that have counternarcotics roles that focus on interdiction, such 

as the U.S. Coast Guard, we do not discuss DEA’s partnerships with those 

agencies in this report because DEA does not focus on interdiction 

activities. We compared DEA’s strategic plan, performance measures, and 

interagency coordination activities with recommendations made in the 

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States (9/11 Commission Report) and the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),10 and interagency 

coordination practices recommended by GAO.11 Appendix I contains 

additional details about our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

 

9

 The OCDETF Fusion Center, which began operating in fiscal year 2006, was created to 

enhance the overall capacity of the OCDETF program to engage in intelligence-driven law 

enforcement by combining the analytical resources and intelligence information of the 

OCDETF member agencies and others. The center collects and analyzes drug-trafficking 

and related financial information and disseminates investigative leads to OCDETF 

participants. 

10 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. 

11 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

In the years since 9/11, DEA has given top priority to narcoterrorism cases 

(drug cases linked to terrorism) and changed existing procedures as well 

as used new policies and authorities to support this shift in focus. 

Specifically, while DEA continues to focus on counternarcotics efforts, 

DEA modified its policies to prioritize narcotics investigations that have 

links to terrorist organizations and to require that informants who provide 

drug-related intelligence be questioned at least quarterly to collect 

terrorism-related intelligence. DEA is also pursuing narcoterrorists using a 

new enforcement authority authorized as part of the USA PATRIOT 

Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which criminalizes 

“narcoterrorism”—drug trafficking in support of terrorism—even if it 

occurs outside the United States.12 As of October 2008, use of this authority 

had resulted in the indictment of four individuals. To further enhance the 

coordination of counternarcotics and terrorism intelligence, a component 

of DEA rejoined the intelligence community. DEA made strategic 

modifications to focus on major drug-trafficking organizations, their 

financial infrastructures, and global drug threats. For example, DEA has 

made drug-trafficking organizations most responsible for the smuggling of 

illegal drugs into the United States the top investigative priority after those 

cases that involve links to terrorism. In fulfilling its counternarcotics 

mission while taking on new responsibilities and addressing other 

challenges since 9/11, DEA’s inflation-adjusted budget increased by less 

than 1 percent during fiscal years 2002 through 2007. As a result, during a 

self-initiated hiring freeze that lasted from August 2006 until December 

Results in Brief 

 

12 This enforcement authority was enacted in March 2006 as section 122 of the USA 

PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 

225 (2006). It is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 960a. 

Page 6 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

2007,13 DEA pursued fewer narcotics-trafficking cases and reduced some 

programs. 

DEA partners domestically with federal, state, and local agencies, and 

internationally with federal and host-country agencies; however, 

partnerships have changed since 9/11 and outdated interagency 

agreements have led to conflicts with ICE and operational inefficiencies at 

CBP. In October 2005, we reported that agencies can more effectively 

coordinate by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, 

establishing compatible policies and priorities for operating across agency 

boundaries, and monitoring the status and results of these efforts.14 DEA 

partners with DOJ components such as the FBI, USMS, and ATF, and 

reprioritizations and reorganizations since 9/11 have improved some of 

these partnerships. However, DEA’s partnerships with DHS component 

agencies—ICE and CBP—are less clearly defined. An outdated 

interagency agreement that does not reflect ICE’s current organization and 

responsibilities—coupled with long-standing jurisdictional disputes 

involving ICE’s drug enforcement role and DEA’s oversight of ICE’s drugrelated investigations—have led to conflicts between DEA and ICE that 

remain unresolved. Without an updated interagency agreement between 

DEA and ICE, there is potential for duplicative investigative efforts and 

concern that officer safety could be compromised. Also, while DEA and 

ICE have cross-designation procedures for giving ICE agents authority to 

pursue counternarcotics cases, the procedures have proven to be 

inefficient and problematic, which has led to fewer ICE agents being 

designated to assist in counternarcotics efforts. Another interagency 

agreement—predating CBP’s organization under DHS—has led to 

operational inefficiencies at CBP for handling illegal drugs seized at the 

nation’s borders and referring related intelligence to DEA. Without an 

updated interagency agreement between DEA and CBP, these operational 

inefficiencies are likely to continue. Applicable interagency agreements 

involving DEA, ICE, and CBP have not been updated or amended and 

there is no monitoring process in place to ensure that new agreements will 

be reached. Internationally, DEA partners with the Department of State to 

 

13 DEA ended the hiring freeze following enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory 

statement accompanying DEA’s appropriation, the Congress provided funding above the 

President’s request in order to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741, 

H15799 (2007). 

14 See GAO-06-15. 

Page 7 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

provide counternarcotics training and related support to other nations. 

Also, DEA has new and evolving partnerships with DOD in Afghanistan, 

Africa, and Central Asia where linkages exist between narcotics 

trafficking, DEA’s area of expertise, and terrorist activities. 

DEA continues to use multiagency task forces and intelligence centers to 

coordinate counternarcotics investigations and operations with other law 

enforcement entities, avoid duplication, and leverage partner agency 

resources; however, there are limitations to the effectiveness of the 

Special Operations Division because ICE is not providing all of its drugrelated information.15 Also, ICE is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion 

Center. DEA participates with federal, state, and local law enforcement in 

the OCDETF program to jointly target major drug-trafficking organizations 

and the HIDTA program to coordinate investigations and operations in 

regions with significant drug-trafficking problems. According to officials 

we interviewed, these multiagency task forces are effective for leveraging 

limited resources to target multijurisdictional drug-trafficking 

organizations. DEA has a lead role in the Special Operations Division and 

the OCDETF Fusion Center, which bring together the intelligence and 

analytical resources of federal agencies with counternarcotics roles to 

detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to illegal drug trafficking and, in 

some cases, terrorist activity. The 9/11 Commission Report asserted that 

information sharing and the use of all relevant sources of information are 

critical for combating threats to the United States. However, though ICE 

leadership is aware of this, and DEA has discussed it, ICE has continued to 

provide limited information to the Special Operations Division and is not 

participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. ICE officials acknowledged 

that ICE does not share all of its most sensitive data, such as some 

confidential informant information and bank account information, with 

the Special Operations Division. DEA officials noted that other agencies, 

such as the FBI, do share sensitive information with the division, and DEA 

has demonstrated that it can adequately protect the information. Also, the 

DEA officials stressed that such information facilitates being able to 

“connect the dots” during investigations of major drug-trafficking 

organizations. Regarding nonparticipation in the OCDETF Fusion Center, 

the ICE officials said that although ICE has made various concessions 

 

15 While other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have special operations 

divisions, for the purposes of this report, Special Operations Division refers to the DEA-run 

intelligence coordination center. Because of the sensitivity of intelligence coordinated by 

the Special Operations Division, we do not identify specific intelligence that is provided to 

the center in this report. 

Page 8 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

relating to the information data set that ICE is willing to share with the 

center, none have been acceptable to DEA and, thus, negotiations are at an 

impasse. According to DEA, absent full participation by ICE, the Special 

Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center are unable to most 

effectively identify links to and target major drug-trafficking organizations. 

DEA’s strategic planning and performance measurement framework—

which consists of a multiyear strategic plan and annual performance 

plans—has improved over time in response to previous criticisms; 

however, DEA’s strategic plan has not been updated since 2003 and does 

not reflect all of the program and policy changes the agency has made 

since 9/11, particularly in reference to DEA’s role in supporting the 

nation’s counterterrorism efforts—efforts that have received increased 

DEA focus and funding since 9/11.16 As such, the strategic plan does not 

fully reflect the intended purpose of providing a template for ensuring 

measurable results and operational accountability. DEA’s 2009 annual 

performance plan does include four performance measures of the agency’s 

counterterrorism efforts—measures such as the number of intelligence 

products completed by DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence. 

However, these measures do not provide a basis for assessing the effects 

of DEA’s efforts, such as the prevention of specific terrorist actions. 

Having an up-to-date strategic plan and results-focused annual 

performance plans could improve DEA’s efforts to provide the Congress, 

the administration, and other policymakers with information needed to 

assess the agency’s progress, help inform future funding and program 

decisions, and ensure that the agency is achieving its part of the National 

Drug Control Strategy. 

To enhance collaborative efforts to combat narcotics trafficking, we are 

recommending that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security jointly develop a new interagency agreement or other mechanism 

to clarify their respective departments’ counternarcotics roles and 

responsibilities, particularly the roles and responsibilities of DEA, ICE, 

and CBP, and monitor the implementation of the new agreement or other 

mechanism and make any needed adjustments. We are recommending that 

the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop 

more efficient cross-designation procedures—that is, procedures for 

 

16 In its February 6, 2009, written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ noted that DEA 

has submitted to the department for review and approval an updated strategic plan (for 

fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional language that supports the post-9/11 goal 

of addressing counterterrorism. 

Page 9 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

granting ICE agents authority to pursue counternarcotics cases. Also, we 

are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE 

to contribute all relevant drug-related information to the Special 

Operations Division and fully participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center 

and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds. Finally, we are recommending that 

the Administrator of DEA update the agency’s strategic plan to more fully 

and accurately reflect the agency’s post-9/11 responsibilities and activities 

and also establish appropriate performance measures that provide a basis 

for assessing progress. On February 6, 2009, in commenting on a draft of 

this report, DOJ concurred with our recommendations. On March 9, 2009, 

DHS responded to our draft report asserting that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and the Attorney General have begun meeting 

regularly in order to enhance coordination between DHS and DOJ on a 

range of issues, including those addressed in this report. While neither 

explicitly agreeing nor disagreeing with our recommendations, DHS 

suggested several revisions to the wording of the recommendations, which 

we considered but did not make. We believe that implementation of our 

recommendations will help to ensure continued progress in addressing 

long-standing issues. 

DEA is the nation’s federal agency dedicated to drug law enforcement. 

DEA was created in 1973 as a result of Department of Justice 

Reorganization Plan No. 2 and Executive Order 11727.17 Basically, the 

President proposed the “creation of a single, comprehensive Federal 

agency within the Department of Justice to lead the war against illicit drug 

traffic,” namely DEA, which consolidated the drug enforcement functions 

performed by legacy DOJ components and by the Department of the 

Treasury (Treasury).18 The implementing executive order authorized the 

Attorney General, through DEA, to coordinate the enforcement of U.S. 

drug laws among all executive branch departments and agencies, requiring 

those agencies to assist DEA on drug enforcement efforts when requested. 

Background 

 

17 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), is 

reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 1, along with the accompanying President’s Message to Congress. 

Executive Order No. 11727 appears at 38 Fed. Reg. 18357 (1973). 

18 As discussed in more detail later in this report, Reorganization Plan No. 2 preserved 

Treasury’s authority to conduct drug searches, seizures, and arrests “at regular inspection 

locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land or water borders of the United 

States,” provided that any evidence or persons seized by Treasury officials are turned over 

to the Attorney General. 

Page 10 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Today, DEA works to disrupt and dismantle the leadership, command, 

control, and financial infrastructure of major drug-trafficking 

organizations. DEA uses a multifaceted approach that includes 

investigating narcotics cases and preparing them for prosecution; 

managing a national drug intelligence program to collect, analyze, and 

disseminate drug intelligence; enforcing counternarcotics laws involving 

the diversion of legally produced substances for illegal purposes; and 

coordinating with and leveraging the resources of international, federal, 

state, and local partners. 

DEA’s operations are conducted under a framework comprising four 

strategic areas: (1) domestic enforcement, (2) international enforcement, 

(3) state and local assistance, and (4) diversion control.19 

 

19 Diversion control is the detection, prevention, and elimination of the diversion of legal 

drugs, such as pharmaceuticals, to the illegal drug market. 

Page 11 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

DEA works to eliminate drug use and trafficking domestically with a 

multijurisdictional approach that focuses federal, state, and local 

resources to disrupt and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations. DEA 

investigates, arrests, and refers to prosecution individuals associated with 

these drug-trafficking organizations. DEA also collaborates with federal, 

state, and local law enforcement partners; develops intelligence through 

court-ordered wiretaps, confidential informants, and other sources; and 

utilizes asset forfeiture authorities.20 As of September 30, 2008, DEA had 

6,023 personnel based in domestic field offices, which included 3,809 

special agents.21 These personnel operate from 227 domestic field offices, 

which are organized under 21 divisions that encompass the nation (see 

fig. 1). 

Domestic Enforcement 

 

20 21 U.S.C. § 881 provides that proceeds from drug-related crimes, as well as property used 

to facilitate certain crimes, are subject to forfeiture to the government in order to ensure 

that criminals do not benefit financially from their illegal acts. 

21 Domestically, as of September 30, 2008, DEA also employed 2,487 employees at 

headquarters and operational support facilities, such as the El Paso Intelligence Center, 

OCDETF Fusion Center, the DEA-led Special Operations Division, and laboratories. 

Page 12 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Figure 1: Map of DEA’s Domestic Divisions 

Sources: GAO (analysis, map art), MapResources (map), DEA (data).

Houston Field Division

Los Angeles Field Division

Miami Field Division

Newark Field Division

New Orleans Field Division

New York Field Division

Philadelphia Field Division

Phoenix Field Division

San Diego Field Division

San Francisco Field Division

Seattle Field Division

St. Louis Field Division

Caribbean Field Division

Washington, D.C. Field Division

Atlanta Field Division

Boston Field Division

Chicago Field Division

Dallas Field Division

Denver Field Division

Detroit Field Division

El Paso Field Division

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1

2

3

4

7

6

8

11

10

9

16 15

13

19

20

21

18

5

14

12

17

9

18

9

Page 13 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Since the majority of illegal narcotics are produced outside the United 

States and smuggled into the country, DEA has established the largest 

federal law enforcement presence overseas to disrupt and dismantle the 

world’s most significant drug-trafficking organizations where they are 

located. As of September 30, 2008, the agency’s 616 foreign-stationed 

personnel included 427 special agents, operating from its foreign offices. 

DEA’s foreign field offices are divided into seven regions (see fig. 2). 

International Enforcement 

Page 14 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Figure 2: Map of DEA’s International Regions 

1

2

7

6

5

3

4

Mexico City

San Juan

Bogotá

La Paz

Rome

Ankara

Bangkok

7

1

2

3

4

NORTH AND CENTRAL 

AMERICA REGION

Belize 

Canada (2 offices)

Costa Rica

El Salvador 

Guatemala

Honduras

Mexico (11 offices)

Nicaragua

Panama

Regional office: 

Mexico City, Mexico

CARIBBEAN REGION

Barbados

Dominican Republic

Haiti

Jamaica

Netherlands Antilles

Puerto Rico

Suriname

Trinidad & Tobago

Regional office:

San Juan, Puerto Rico 

ANDEAN REGION

Colombia (2 offices) 

Ecuador (2 offices)

Peru

Venezuela

Regional office:

Bogotá, Colombia

SOUTHERN CONE 

REGION

Argentina

Bolivia (4 offices)

Brazil (2 offices)

Chile

Paraguay

Regional office:

La Paz, Bolivia

5 EUROPE / AFRICA 

REGION

Austria

Belgium 

Denmark 

France 

Italy (2 offices)

Netherlands

Nigeria

Poland 

South Africa

Spain 

Switzerland 

United Kingdom 

Regional office:

Rome, Italy

6 MIDDLE EAST / 

CENTRAL ASIA REGION

Afghanistan 

Cyprus

Egypt 

Greece 

India

Pakistan (2 offices)

Russia

Tajikistan 

Turkey (2 offices)

Turkmenistan 

United Arab Emirates

Uzbekistan 

Regional office:

Ankara, Turkey

7 FAR EAST REGION

Australia

Burma

China

Hong Kong 

Japan 

Laos

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore 

South Korea

Thailand (3 offices)

Vietnam 

Regional office:

Bangkok, Thailand

Source: GAO (map art), Map Resources (map), DEA (data). 

DEA’s foreign offices conduct bilateral drug investigations with hostcountry counternarcotics agencies, coordinate international drug 

intelligence, train foreign law enforcement agency personnel in drug 

Page 15 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

enforcement methods, assist with domestic U.S. counternarcotics 

investigations that have international links, liaise with foreign 

governments and law enforcement agencies, and collaborate on drug 

investigations and other efforts with other U.S. law enforcement activities, 

as needed. 

To ensure a consistent national approach to drug law enforcement, DEA 

trains state and local law enforcement officers. DEA’s training is designed 

to enhance the capabilities of state and local law enforcement in 

investigative techniques, intelligence gathering, and cleanup of toxic 

laboratories associated with the production of illegal substances such as 

methamphetamine. DEA also manages DOJ counternarcotics grant 

programs that provide assistance to state and local law enforcement. 

The mission of DEA’s Diversion Control Program is to prevent, detect, and 

investigate the redirection of controlled pharmaceuticals (such as 

narcotics, stimulants, and depressants) and certain listed chemicals (such 

as ephedrine) into the illicit market, while ensuring that adequate supplies 

are available to meet medical, scientific, and other legitimate needs. To 

achieve this mission, the program’s investigative resources are focused on 

identifying, targeting, disrupting, or dismantling diverters of licit 

controlled substances and chemicals at the domestic and international 

level. The program is funded through the Diversion Control Fee Account, 

which consists of registration fees paid by licensed pharmacies and 

wholesale distributors of licit controlled substances.22 Because we focused 

on DEA’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle the market for illegal drugs, we 

do not address the Diversion Control Program or the diversion of legal 

drugs in this report. 

State and Local Assistance 

Diversion Control 

 

22 For fiscal year 2008, the account total was $239 million. 

Page 16 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

In the context of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism, DEA changed 

some policies and strategies to assist in counterterrorism efforts and 

respond to global drug threats, such as prioritizing narcotics cases with 

links to terrorism, collecting terrorism-related intelligence from 

confidential sources, utilizing a new law enforcement authority, and 

participating in the intelligence community. In addition, in order to most 

effectively use resources, DEA has focused investigations on narcoticstrafficking organizations most responsible for smuggling illegal drugs to 

the United States, and has targeted these organizations’ financial 

infrastructures. While increasing its counterterrorism efforts and 

maintaining its traditional role of pursuing narcotics traffickers, DEA 

operated under a relatively flat budget and implemented a temporary 

hiring freeze to address resource constraints, which led to the pursuit of 

fewer narcotics cases. 

According to DOJ officials, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, DEA and 

other federal law enforcement agencies were asked to leverage their 

resources and ongoing efforts to assist in counterterrorism and homeland 

security efforts. In 2002, with the implementation of the Global War on 

Terrorism, DEA implemented policies to prioritize counternarcotics cases 

that have links to terrorism. To further support the nation’s 

counterterrorism efforts, DEA headquarters also mandated that DEA 

agents periodically (at least every quarter) question all of the agency’s 

worldwide network of confidential informants (approximately 5,000) to 

determine whether they have information related to terrorist organizations 

or plots. According to DEA, confidential informants have provided 

valuable information on terrorists groups, for example, in Afghanistan 

where this information has thwarted hostile acts against U.S. personnel 

and interests. In 2003, DEA also instituted procedures that require agents 

to share terrorism-related information with partner agencies and the FBI’s 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces to further ensure intelligence coordination 

and participate in the determination of linkages between terrorists and 

narcotics traffickers.23 These procedures require that DEA agents and 

agents-in-charge (1) immediately pass terrorism-related information to the 

local FBI office and Joint Terrorism Task Force; (2) forward information 

Since 9/11, DEA Has 

Adopted New Policies 

and Utilized a New 

Enforcement 

Authority to Assist in 

Counterterrorism 

Efforts and Respond 

to Changing Global 

Drug Threats While 

Addressing Resource 

Constraints 

DEA Contributes to the 

Global War on Terrorism 

by Giving Top Priority to 

Cases with Links to 

Terrorism, Adapting 

Intelligence Collection and 

Sharing Policies, Pursuing 

Narcoterrorists, and 

Rejoining the Intelligence 

Community 

 

23 Joint Terrorism Task Forces are partnerships between the FBI and other federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies. 

Page 17 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

to relevant state and local law enforcement; (3) in foreign offices, 

immediately pass the information to relevant government agencies that are 

part of the respective U.S. embassy; (4) notify DEA headquarters of the 

information and the agencies with which information was coordinated; 

and (5) pass information to the Special Operations Division. These 

protocols were reiterated most recently in 2004. A senior DEA official 

reported that these protocols help to leverage interagency resources and 

enhance the nation’s counterterrorism efforts. 

DEA is directly contributing to counterterrorism efforts by pursuing 

narcoterrorists—those who fund terrorist activities with proceeds from 

narcotics trafficking—through the use of a new enforcement authority. 

Section 122 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 

2005 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 960a) expands federal jurisdiction for drug 

crimes committed outside the United States, where the prohibited drug 

activity is for the purpose of funding any person or organization that has 

engaged or engages in terrorist activity or terrorism.24 As a practical 

matter, the provision expanded the reach of U.S. law enforcement beyond 

U.S. borders by granting extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate, indict, 

and seek the extradition of narcoterrorists worldwide. While DEA has 

pursued drug-trafficking organizations identified as having links to 

terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia, commonly known as FARC, DEA officials reported that prior to 

the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 

2005, and specifically 21 U.S.C. § 960a, DEA was unable to charge 

traffickers outside the United States unless it could prove that they 

intended to traffic narcotics to the United States. This proof requirement 

does not appear under the new provision, which made trafficking 

narcotics to any destination with the intent to fund terrorist activities 

prosecutable in U.S. federal courts. According to DEA officials, 

approaches to applying the new provision are still being explored because 

of its recent enactment, the complexity of international investigations and 

relations, and the continuously developing partnerships with foreign law 

enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, the officials stressed that the new 

authority is an important tool in the counterterrorism fight because most 

countries generally accept the illegality of drug trafficking and the danger 

of allowing drug-trafficking organizations to flourish. Because of this 

general agreement, in some countries, DEA has leveraged its relationships 

 

24 In general, extraterritorial jurisdiction would exist under 21 U.S.C. § 960a based on a 

sufficient connection between U.S. interests and the offender or his or her offense. 

Page 18 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

with host governments to arrest and extradite traffickers on narcotics 

charges in cases where terrorism charges could prove divisive for relations 

with the host country. As of October 2008, DEA reported that four 

individuals had been charged under 21 U.S.C. § 960a. 

Additionally, a component of DEA, the Office of National Security 

Intelligence, joined the intelligence community in 2006 to better 

coordinate drug- and terror-related intelligence. DEA was a member of the 

intelligence community until it was removed in 1981 in conjunction with 

then-ongoing efforts to separate the federal government’s intelligence and 

law enforcement functions. The 9/11 Commission Report identified 

intelligence and information sharing as two of five key areas that the 

federal government needed to improve to decrease the likelihood of a 

terrorist attack in the future. DEA and intelligence community agencies 

recognized that DEA can contribute unique narcotics and terrorismrelated intelligence to the intelligence community. For example, DEA 

collects intelligence from confidential informants, judicial wiretaps, and 

foreign law enforcement partners—sources that may not be available to 

other intelligence community partners. Since becoming an official member 

of the intelligence community in 2006, DEA’s Office of National Security 

Intelligence has established liaison positions at various intelligence 

community components, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, and also 

provides reports to intelligence community partner agencies—selfinitiated reports as well as reports generated in response to specific 

requests. For example, DEA reported in April 2008 that it provides partner 

agencies approximately 130 terrorism-related intelligence reports per 

month. According to senior officials at DEA, membership in the 

intelligence community has provided a link that ensures that terrorism and 

narcotics intelligence is coordinated with all intelligence community 

partners. Further, according to a recent DOJ Office of the Inspector 

General report, intelligence community partners find DEA’s intelligence 

valuable in their efforts to examine ongoing threats.25 

 

25 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, The Drug 

Enforcement Administration’s Use of Intelligence Analysts, Audit Report 08-23 

(Washington, D.C.: 2008). 

Page 19 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

While DEA made a number of changes to its policies and procedures to 

reflect the nation’s and law enforcement’s counterterrorism priority 

following 9/11, DEA made additional strategic modifications to focus on 

the most serious drug traffickers and their financial infrastructures. 

According to DEA’s Chief of Operations, prior to 9/11, DEA pursued major 

drug-trafficking organizations; however, the adoption of the consolidated 

priority organization target (CPOT) strategy has focused drug enforcement 

efforts on the narcotics-trafficking organizations most responsible for the 

importation of illegal drugs into the United States. The CPOT list was 

launched by the Executive Office for OCDETF in 2002 as part of a 

comprehensive drug enforcement strategy that uses the expertise of 

multiple federal law enforcement agencies to identify and target the most 

significant drug-trafficking organizations and their components. According 

to a senior official in the Executive Office for OCDETF, since 2002, the 

Executive Office for OCDETF has managed the CPOT selection process, 

set the selection criteria, and maintained responsibility for the 

dissemination of the CPOT list. DEA has reported that by targeting 

organizations with the greatest effect on the U.S. drug supply, DEA is 

maximizing the use of limited resources. 

DEA Modified Strategies to 

Target, Disrupt, and 

Dismantle the Most 

Dangerous DrugTrafficking Organizations 

and Their Financial 

Infrastructures 

All 46 of the narcotics-trafficking organizations on the CPOT list are based 

in countries outside the United States. DEA has added personnel to 

foreign offices, and plans to increase the number of foreign-deployed 

personnel as funding allows, to pursue CPOT organizations where they 

operate. DEA officials have described their efforts of pursuing drug 

traffickers abroad before their illegal narcotics can arrive in the United 

States or at the nation’s borders as “expanding the border.” From fiscal 

years 2000 through 2007, DEA increased the number of agents stationed in 

foreign offices by 14 percent, to 427 positions, and foreign intelligence 

specialists by 28 percent, to 67 positions. DEA increased the number of 

agents in regions where DEA has identified new and emerging drug 

threats, such as in the Middle East, East Asia, and South and Central 

America, and has plans to further increase its presence in these regions. 

In order to increase DEA’s resources in foreign offices, the administration 

decreased some domestic programs to focus resources on the CPOT 

program. For example, mobile enforcement teams, teams of 8 to 12 agents 

who deploy to assist local law enforcement with drug problems or 

traffickers that cannot be addressed with local resources, were eliminated 

from DEA’s 2005 and subsequent budget requests to focus resources on 

Page 20 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

higher priorities, including the CPOT strategy.26 Likewise, Demand 

Reduction, a program that uses DEA’s expertise to assist state and local 

law enforcement with efforts to prevent and reduce illegal drug use, was 

eliminated from DEA’s budget requests beginning in 2005. 

In 2003, the DEA Administrator made financial investigations one of the 

top priorities for DEA, articulating that attacking the financial 

infrastructure of drug-trafficking organizations was essential to fully 

dismantling them. Accordingly, the Administrator made financial 

investigations a required component of every narcotics investigation. To 

implement this, DEA established the Office of Financial Operations and 

provided agents with specialized training on financial operations. Also, 

DEA charged the Office of Financial Operations with being the point of 

contact for the financial services industry as well as federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies. With the emphasis on investigating the 

financial infrastructures of drug-trafficking organizations, DEA has 

reported denying $7 billion in revenue to drug-trafficking organizations 

from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007.27 

While DEA’s Role Has 

Expanded to Include 

Assisting in 

Counterterrorism Efforts, 

Resource Constraints and 

a Self-Imposed Hiring 

Freeze Have Affected Its 

Ability to Pursue Some 

Narcotics Targets 

While DEA has implemented changes, such as assisting in 

counterterrorism efforts and focusing on CPOTs, it has done so in the 

context of resource constraints and a self-imposed hiring freeze, which 

have affected its ability to pursue some narcotics targets. To maintain 

funding for operations in the context of a relatively flat budget, DEA 

implemented a hiring freeze that lasted from August 2006 until December 

2007, when DEA began operating under its fiscal year 2008 appropriation. 

DEA has reported that as a result of the hiring freeze and other factors, it 

pursued fewer CPOT-linked priority target organization (PTO) and nonPTO cases.28 

 

26 In 2008, DEA received funding to reinstate mobile enforcement teams in 10 DEA 

domestic field division offices—Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, 

Philadelphia, San Diego, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. 

27 Revenue denied is the sum of DEA’s worldwide asset seizures and the production value 

of drug seizures. 

28 PTOs are those drug-traffikcing organizations that have an identified hierarchy engaged 

in the highest levels of drug trafficking, drug money laundering operations, or both and 

have a significant international, national, regional, or local impact upon drug availability. 

Page 21 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Page 22 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 

Since 9/11, DEA has received limited additional funding to support specific 

programs that assist in counterterrorism efforts. As such, DEA’s new 

strategies and policies generally have been undertaken with few additional 

resources. DEA’s direct funding for salaries and expenses increased by 

approximately $280 million during the fiscal years following 9/11—from 

$1.48 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $1.76 billion in fiscal year 2007 (see fig. 

3).29 However, after adjusting for inflation, that increase amounts to less 

than 1 percent per year, on average. Additionally, figure 3 shows that 

DEA’s budget has been relatively flat from 2002 to 2007 after adjustment 

for inflation and even experienced slight decreases from fiscal years 2003 

through 2004 and from fiscal years 2005 through 2006. 

Figure 3: DEA Enacted Budget Authority for the Salary and Expenses Account 

Note: Data exclude the DEA Diversion Control Fee Account. 

 

29 For this analysis, we did not include funding from the Diversion Control Fee Account, 

which consists of fees charged to DEA registrants, such as legal manufacturers, 

distributors, dispensers (including physicians), importers, and exporters of controlled 

substances and listed chemicals. 

0

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Dollars (in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of DEA and ONDCP data.

Fiscal year

Not adjusted for inflation

Adjusted for inflation

1,530

1,619

1,729

1,775 1,768 1,772 1,768 1,790

1,256

1,360

1,481

1,551 1,585

1,639

1,689

1,757
 

Page 23 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 

From fiscal years 2000 through 2005, DEA received annual authorizations 

to increase the number of personnel it could employ. However, DEA has 

reported that because of budget constraints, it was unable to increase the 

actual number of onboard staff and concurrently maintain the agency’s 

operations. As shown in figure 4, although DEA was authorized to increase 

the number of personnel on board by more than 8 percent from 7,336 in 

fiscal year 2000 to 8,025 in fiscal year 2007, the actual number of personnel 

on board was lower in 2007 than in 2000. 

Figure 4: DEA Authorized and Actual Full-time Equivalent Positions, Fiscal Years 

2000 through 2007 

Note: Data exclude full-time equivalents (FTE) funded through the DEA Diversion Control Fee 

Account. 

In August 2006, to address budget limitations while maintaining priority 

programs and operations, DEA elected to institute a hiring freeze, which 

remained in effect until December 2007. A senior DEA official explained 

that DEA chose to defer hiring and streamline programs for efficiency in 

addition to non–priority program cuts noted above. According to DEA 

estimates, as a result of the hiring freeze, there are now approximately 220 

to 225 fewer special agents operating in the field. DEA noted, for example, 

that during the hiring freeze, the agency trained only one class of new 

0

6,500

7,000

7,500

8,000

8,500

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

FTE

Source: GAO analysis of DEA and ONDCP data.

Fiscal years

Actual FTE

Authorized FTE

7,336 7,412

7,515

7,661

8,018

8,250

8,157

8,025

7,131 7,063

6,973 6,921

7,087 7,122

7,225

7,071
 

agents, whereas the agency typically trains four to nine classes of new 

agents each year. Also, according to DEA, the reduction in the number o

agents resulted in a 22 percent decrease in the number of special agent 

investigative work hours dedicated to CPOT-linked cases during fiscal 

year 2007 compared to fiscal year 2006. Further, DEA reported that 

because of the hiring freeze, 34 percent fewer CPOT-linked PTOs we

identified and 41 percent fewer were disrupted or dismantled in fiscal ye

2007 than targeted in DEA’s goal. Likewise, the agency reported that it 

pursued 8 percent fewer non-PTOs—organizations of lower priority to 

DEA—from the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 to the first quarter of fisc

year 2008. 

f 

re 

ar 

al 

The hiring freeze ended in December 2007 with enactment of the 

 funding 

ted 

EA partners with other federal, state, and local law enforcement 

h DOJ 

d 

s of 

ement 

 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which provided additional

to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 30 DEA reported that from January 6, 

2008, through September 27, 2008, it hired 150 special agents and 189 

nonagents and held four special agent training classes. DEA has repor

that it intends to hire an additional 200 special agents and 550 nonagents in

fiscal year 2009. 

D

agencies to leverage counternarcotics resources. DEA partners wit

components, such as the FBI, USMS, and ATF, and reprioritizations and 

reorganizations since 9/ 11 have improved some of these partnerships. 

DEA also partners with DHS law enforcement agencies, such as ICE an

CBP on narcotics-smuggling cases, but outdated interagency agreements, 

among other reasons, have led to conflicts with ICE and operational 

inefficiencies at CBP. DEA continues to partner with the Department

State and Defense, and these partnerships have evolved in regions such as

Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia. Finally, DEA leverages the 

manpower and intelligence resources of state and local law enforc

agencies while also partnering with these agencies to provide training and

other resources. 

DEA Partners with 

Federal, State, and 

Local Agencies, and

though Some 

Partnerships H

Improved since 9/11

Others Continue to 

Have Conflicts and 

Inefficiencies 

ave 

, 

30 Pub. L. No. 110-161, Division B, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory 

statement accompanying DEA’s appropriation, DEA received additional funding above the 

President’s budget request to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741, 

H15799 (2007). 

Page 24 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Since 9/11, DEA has made progress in partnering with other DOJ law 

enforcement agencies—the FBI, USMS, and ATF—on investigations, 

intelligence sharing, and operations, and more clearly defining roles and 

jurisdictional responsibilities within DOJ. While DEA and the FBI have 

long partnered to enforce the counternarcotics laws of the United States, 

the events of 9/11 led the FBI to revise its priorities and shift resources 

from traditional crime enforcement activities, such as counternarcotics, to 

counterterrorism and other issues. For example, while the FBI had 2,078 

positions dedicated to counternarcotics prior to 9/11, the number had 

reduced to 600 positions by the end of fiscal year 2006—and 86 percent of 

the 600 positions were funded under the OCDETF program. According to 

the Chief of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, as a result of this 

reduction, the FBI has pursued fewer drug cases. For example, DOJ 

statistics show that the FBI referred 40 percent fewer drug cases to U.S. 

Attorneys and participated in 44 percent fewer OCDETF investigations in 

fiscal year 2007 compared with fiscal year 2000. According to DEA and FBI 

officials at headquarters and in field offices, before 9/11, DEA and the FBI 

had conflicts caused by investigational overlap. Since 9/11, the FBI’s focus 

on counterterrorism efforts has reduced such overlap with DEA, and FBI 

officials report that they collaborate more with DEA directly and through 

other mechanisms. For example, senior DEA agents and a supervisory FBI 

agent in field offices reported that the two agencies have improved their 

relationships through efforts such as the OCDETF program, which 

leverages the resources of the FBI, DEA, and other agencies. 

DEA Continues to Build 

Collaborative Partnerships 

and Clearly Define Roles 

and Responsibilities with 

Other DOJ Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

During our field visits, DEA special agents-in-charge of the Los Angeles, 

Phoenix, and Seattle field offices told us that DEA collaborates with the 

FBI on counternarcotics and counterterrorism intelligence, often via 

participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces, OCDETF task forces, and 

investigations involving gangs. For example, DEA and the FBI partnered 

on an investigation targeting gang and drug activity in Los Angeles that 

resulted in the indictment of 20 defendants in November 2007. 

Additionally, two senior FBI field agents indicated that they regularly use 

information-sharing tools, such as the DEA-led Special Operations 

Division, to ensure that information is coordinated with DEA and other 

agencies on counternarcotics investigations. Senior officials at DEA 

headquarters also indicated that the FBI’s participation in the Special 

Operations Division was vital, given that the FBI provides terrorism case 

information as well as counternarcotics intelligence. 

In three countries—Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand—DEA and the FBI 

collaborate through Resolution 6, an agreement whereby FBI agents are 

posted in DEA’s offices in these countries to jointly conduct investigations 

Page 25 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

of multijurisdictional and international drug-trafficking organizations.31

FBI agents in these locations reported that their collaboration with DEA 

facilitated cooperation and reduced the risk of duplicative or overlapping 

investigations. Additionally, both agencies report to the U.S. ambassador 

within the respective embassy, and U.S. government policy is that DEA is 

the primary point of contact for all counternarcotics investigations in 

foreign countries. 

DEA also partners with USMS and ATF on relevant counternarcotics 

cases. Each agency’s defined role in such investigations and participation 

in coordination mechanisms, such as OCDETF task forces, have helped to 

facilitate collaboration. As the principal federal agency responsible for 

locating and apprehending fugitives, USMS primarily coordinates with 

DEA on the apprehension of narcotics fugitives and suspects indicted on 

narcotics charges. The Attorney General issued a policy in 1988 that allows 

DEA to turn over its fugitive apprehension responsibilities to USMS. By 

leveraging the resources of USMS, DEA can use its special agents on other 

investigative priorities. 

ATF also has a defined role focusing on the firearms aspect of 

counternarcotics investigations, which facilitates collaboration with DEA. 

Because ATF’s mission includes, among other things, enforcing U.S. laws 

regulating firearms and explosives, a senior ATF official reported that the 

agency does not conduct independent, complex narcotics investigations; 

however, suspects involved in firearms-trafficking cases often are involved 

in or have links to drug-trafficking organizations. As such, firearms 

investigations often evolve to incorporate a narcotics component. 

However, according to senior officials at ATF headquarters and field 

offices, when cases develop more complex linkages to narcotics 

trafficking, such as cases involving international drug-trafficking 

organizations, ATF either invites DEA to participate or turns those cases 

over to DEA. Senior ATF officials representing offices in New York and 

the western region of the United States reported that they collaborate well 

with DEA because ATF has a clearly defined role that is distinct from 

DEA’s, which reduces duplicative investigative efforts. 

 

31 Resolution 6 is a 1994 joint resolution between DEA and the FBI designed to enhance 

their coordination of international narcotics cases. Under Resolution 6, FBI agents are 

assigned to DEA foreign field offices to conduct counternarcotics investigations. 

Page 26 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Also, in providing technical comments on a draft of this report in January 

2009, DOJ noted that DEA agents were participants—in either a full-time, 

part-time, or as-needed capacity—in 31 ATF task forces (referred to as 

Violent Crime Impact Teams).32 The department noted that DEA has 

requested an enhancement for its fiscal year 2010 budget to create 36 

special agent positions to further support these teams. 

DEA Partners with DHS 

Component Agencies; 

However, Outdated 

Interagency Agreements, 

among Other Causes, Have 

Led to Conflicts with ICE 

and Operational 

Inefficiencies at CBP 

In carrying out its counternarcotics mission, DEA partners with related 

DHS component agencies, ICE and CBP. However, an outdated 

interagency agreement and long-standing jurisdictional disputes have led 

to conflicts between DEA and ICE, with the potential for duplicating 

investigative efforts and compromising officer safety.33 Another 

interagency agreement—predating CBP’s organization under DHS—has 

led to operational inefficiencies at CBP regarding the reporting and 

disposal of illegal drugs seized at the border. 

DEA and ICE partner on drug enforcement efforts; however, conflicts 

exist because the applicable interagency agreement has not been updated 

since 1994 to reflect organizational and other changes, and long-standing 

disputes over ICE’s drug enforcement role and DEA’s respective oversight 

exist. Specifically, these disputes date back to DEA’s and ICE’s 

predecessor agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and 

the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which was then a component of 

Treasury.34 According to the President’s message to the Congress that 

accompanied Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, DEA was created “to 

DEA and ICE Partner on 

Counternarcotics Efforts, 

Although an Outdated 

Interagency Agreement and 

Long-standing Jurisdictional 

Disputes regarding Roles and 

Responsibilities Have Led to 

Conflicts 

 

32 Initiated in 2004 by DOJ and ATF, the Violent Crime Impact Team program is designed to 

reduce homicides and other firearms-related violent crime in selected cities. See 

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections 

Division, Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Violent 

Crime Impact Team Initiative, I-2006-005 (Washington, D.C., May 2006). 

33 According to DEA and other federal, state, and local agencies that we contacted, 

overlapping operations resulting from investigations that are not coordinated can lead to 

high-risk incidents, including the possibility of injured or killed law enforcement officers. 

34 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred Customs and the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, with the exception of certain functions, to the newly created DHS. 

Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 403, 412, 441, 451(b), 462, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178, 2179-2180, 2192, 2196, 

2202-2205 (2002). DHS established ICE by combining the criminal investigators from 

Customs and the criminal investigators from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 

which had been a component of DOJ. The remaining elements of Customs and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service were reorganized into, among other agencies, CBP. 

Page 27 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

serve as a single, comprehensive Federal agency within the Department of 

Justice to lead the war against illicit drug traffic.” Among other things, the 

reorganization plan transferred all of Treasury’s drug-related intelligence, 

investigative, and law enforcement functions to the Attorney General, and 

by delegation, DEA, except to the extent that they relate to searches and 

seizures of drugs and the apprehension and detention of suspects at 

“regular inspection locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land 

or water borders of the United States.” The plan further required Treasury 

officials to turn over drug-related evidence and suspects to the Attorney 

General. Thus, although Treasury remained responsible for interdicting 

drugs and drug suspects at ports and borders, it retained drug-related 

intelligence, investigative, and law enforcement functions only to the 

extent that those functions relate to searches and seizures of drugs, or the 

apprehension or detention of persons in connection therewith at ports and 

borders. All other drug-related intelligence, investigative, and law 

enforcement functions were to be the responsibility of DEA. 

While Reorganization Plan No. 2 was intended to clarify counternarcotics 

roles and reduce conflicts between DOJ and Treasury component 

agencies, disputes continued. As a result of these disagreements, DEA and 

Customs sought clarification on a variety of issues, including Customs’ 

jurisdiction over counternarcotics cases, from DOJ’s Office of Legal 

Counsel, which is responsible for addressing questions of legal authority 

among executive branch agencies, among other things. In addressing the 

disagreement over Customs’ drug enforcement jurisdiction, the Office of 

Legal Counsel stated that the role of Customs in drug enforcement was 

limited to interdictions at the international borders of the United States 

and that as a result of the reorganization plan that created DEA, Customs 

did not have independent authority to carry out drug investigations.35 The 

Office of Legal Counsel further stated that under 21 U.S.C. § 873(b), the 

Attorney General is authorized to request assistance from other federal 

agencies in carrying out Title 21 enforcement duties and that it is the duty 

of those agencies to furnish assistance. The Office of Legal Counsel further 

observed that Customs agents may participate in drug investigations, but 

that the Attorney General required Customs agents to work under the 

supervision of DEA when doing so.36 This principle is embodied in DOJ’s 

 

35 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney 

General, “United States Customs Service Jurisdiction” (June 3, 1986). 

36 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Joseph R. Davis, Chief 

Counsel, DEA, “Authority of the United States Customs Service to Participate in Law 

Enforcement Efforts Against Drug Violators” (June 11, 1985). 

Page 28 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

regulations, which authorize “cross-designated” federal law enforcement 

officers to undertake “drug investigations under the supervision of the 

DEA.”37

In an attempt to resolve their differences, DEA and Customs negotiated a 

memorandum of understanding (MOU), the most recent version of which 

was completed in 1994, to set forth the policies and procedures by which 

DEA would cross-designate Customs (now ICE) agents to enforce Title 

21.38 The stated purpose of the MOU was to enhance the overall drug 

enforcement strategy by empowering cross-designated Customs agents to 

enforce Title 21;39 promote coordination, communication, and cooperation; 

and avoid dangerous, confrontational, and duplicative activities between 

the two agencies. Among other things, the MOU specifically restricted 

cross-designated Customs agents to investigating individuals and 

organizations involved in the smuggling of controlled substances across 

U.S. international borders or through ports of entry. It prohibited Customs 

agents, even once cross-designated, from using Title 21 authority to 

perform domestic or nonsmuggling counternarcotics investigations. 

Disputes about how to interpret the 1994 MOU continue to hinder 

collaboration between DEA and ICE. First, while the MOU authorizes 

cross-designated ICE agents to investigate individuals and organizations 

involved in drug smuggling across U.S. international borders or through 

ports of entry, the MOU does not include any parameters for what 

constitutes a border or port-of-entry smuggling investigation. ICE officials 

have stated that ICE’s border enforcement authority extends to all ICE 

investigations of drug trafficking that have a demonstrated link to the 

border, including investigations that lead to the nation’s interior. However, 

a senior ICE official also acknowledged that determining what defines a 

demonstrated link to the border often relies upon agent experience. DEA’s 

view of what constitutes a border or port-of-entry smuggling investigation 

 

37 28 C.F.R. subpart R, app., § 11. 

38 Titled “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Drug Enforcement Administration 

and the United States Customs Service to Implement Title 21 Cross-Designation Policies 

and Procedures,” the 1994 MOU was the core document incorporated into the parties’ 

Cross-Designation Manual, which also included a variety of other implementing 

documents. Upon the creation of DHS and the reorganization of Customs, ICE became a 

party to this agreement. 

39 As reflected in the MOU, Title 21 of the United States Code contains the country’s 

controlled substances laws, including the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled 

Substances Import and Export Act of 1970. 

Page 29 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

is narrower in scope. According to both DEA and ICE officials, this lack of 

clarity has led to disagreements between DEA and ICE regarding the 

difference between drug enforcement connected to the border and related 

smuggling violations versus domestic enforcement of U.S. drug laws. 

Further, ICE has stated that it is increasingly difficult to separate drugsmuggling investigations from alien smuggling investigations because the 

same organizations often participate in both types of smuggling. For 

example, during an ICE operation conducted against an alien smuggling 

organization along the Southwest border in May 2007, ICE agents 

discovered that the organization was also trafficking in marijuana. 

Second, DEA and Customs, and later, ICE, have disagreed on the scope of 

supervision that DEA is to exercise over ICE counternarcotics 

investigations under the MOU. While the MOU recognizes that crossdesignated Customs agents are to work under DEA supervision when 

conducting counternarcotics investigations, it also states that “such 

supervision shall be general in nature.” DHS, in a January 2008 proposal to 

the Office of Management and Budget advocating concurrent authority for 

ICE to investigate counternarcotics crimes, noted that “One bureau cannot 

effectively supervise, in the long term, what amounts to a significant part 

of another bureau’s resources, policy, programs, and activity.” Further, an 

ICE unit chief stated that under the current MOU, DEA’s oversight of drug 

investigations among federal agencies is based on an “antiquated process,” 

which is cumbersome, slow, and ineffective. This ICE official also 

expressed concern that DEA intends to increase its supervision of ICE 

agents who conduct counternarcotics investigations. DEA, meanwhile, 

noted that its primary concern is that counternarcotics investigations are 

coordinated across agencies. 

Third, a 1999 addendum to the MOU identified DEA as the primary point 

of contact for all counternarcotics investigations that involve the 

cooperation of foreign law enforcement agencies. However, according to a 

senior DEA official, ICE does not always coordinate its international drugrelated investigations with DEA country offices, and the official provided 

us examples of five occurrences of this from 2005 through 2006. As a 

result, according to DEA’s Chief of Operations, DEA’s relationships with 

some foreign law enforcement authorities were negatively affected. ICE’s 

Director of Investigations responded that two of the five investigations 

were not narcotics cases, two others were coordinated with DEA domestic 

offices as required by the MOU, and one had been coordinated with 

foreign government authorities responsible for border security. The U.S. 

ambassadors in two countries where these events occurred expressed 

concern about the disputes, and asked DEA and ICE to improve 

Page 30 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

coordination to avoid adversely affecting other collaborative law 

enforcement efforts with these countries. 

ICE and DEA also disagree about certain restrictions on ICE’s authority to 

collect foreign drug intelligence under the terms of a 1975 MOU.40 This 

MOU states that Customs (now ICE) has primary responsibility for 

intelligence gathering on smuggling activities and supports DEA in 

investigating drug smuggling and trafficking. The MOU further states that 

nothing in the agreement precludes Customs (ICE) from gathering 

information from the air and marine community related to the transporting 

of contraband, and that the agency will continue to coordinate with and 

gather information from foreign customs services on all smuggling 

activities. However, the agreement states that Customs officers may not 

employ an informant for counternarcotics efforts without DEA’s prior 

approval. ICE maintains that these provisions preclude ICE’s 200 special 

agents assigned to 52 foreign offices throughout the world from 

developing drug-smuggling intelligence. ICE officials have stated that ICE 

must rely upon DEA to provide international drug-smuggling intelligence 

to assist in their border security missions, which limits their effectiveness. 

DEA disagrees with this interpretation of the 1975 MOU, stating that the 

1975 MOU does not prohibit ICE from collecting drug intelligence, but 

rather prohibits ICE from employing an informant without prior 

agreement and concurrence from DEA. 

There have been negotiations to revise the MOUs between DEA and ICE to 

resolve the above disputes and reflect the reorganization of Customs into 

ICE, but these negotiations have been unsuccessful. For example, in 2004, 

DEA requested that the MOU be renegotiated to address various 

operational issues and reflect the reorganization of the government under 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002; however, the negotiations between 

DEA and ICE were unsuccessful and the agencies continue to operate 

under the terms of the existing MOU. DEA has reported that DHS is 

seeking to expand its authority to independently pursue counternarcotics 

investigations, which would fragment the nation’s counternarcotics 

efforts. ICE officials, meanwhile, have reported that DEA desires to 

increase its supervision of ICE agents and operations and that ICE is 

unable to effectively accomplish its mission because it is hampered by 

 

40 The 1975 MOU is titled “Memorandum of Understanding between the Customs Service 

and Drug Enforcement Administration on Operating Guidelines.” The parties incorporated 

this MOU into their Cross-Designation Manual along with the 1994 MOU. 

Page 31 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

requirements to coordinate with and be supervised by DEA on 

counternarcotics investigations. As mentioned previously, DHS submitted 

a legislative proposal in January 2008 to the Office of Management and 

Budget advocating that ICE be granted authority to enforce U.S. drug laws 

independent of DEA, so that ICE could investigate all narcotics-smuggling 

crimes and thereby unify DHS border security. DEA, in its response 

opposing the proposal, expressed concern that approval of the proposal 

would fragment the federal government’s drug enforcement efforts and 

would reduce cooperation and coordination of investigations—as had 

been the case before Reorganization Plan No. 2 established DEA. Further, 

DEA responded that it was not clear how or if the concurrent authority 

would ameliorate the current jurisdictional and interagency conflicts. 

According to ICE, as of October 2008, the Office of Management and 

Budget had not submitted the proposal to the Congress because DHS and 

DOJ did not agree on a resolution to the proposal. As a result, the two 

agencies still operate under the guidelines established by existing MOUs. 

In October 2005, we reported that agencies can more effectively 

collaborate by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, 

and establishing compatible policies and priorities for operating across 

agency boundaries; our report also noted the importance of monitoring 

these activities.41 While senior officials in certain DEA and ICE field offices 

that we visited have established positive working relationships with their 

counterparts to improve the effectiveness of partnerships, these efforts are 

not institutionalized as a consistent practice at all locations. For example, 

in Mexico City, where drug trafficking is prevalent, DEA and ICE officials 

agreed that the relationship between the two agencies has strains and DEA 

officials reported that a new MOU could improve the relationship by 

clarifying roles and responsibilities. Additionally, representatives of two of 

the state enforcement agencies we spoke with expressed concern about 

the poor working relationship between DEA and ICE and the resulting 

potential for compromising counterdrug operations. While safety and 

duplicative investigations are concerns for all law enforcement entities, 

without establishing effective collaboration practices with mutually 

defined roles, responsibilities, and shared goals, there is a greater 

likelihood for duplication between the agencies and incidents that could 

threaten law enforcement officer safety. Further, because the 

disagreements between ICE (formerly Customs) and DEA have a long 

history, resolution may not be reached absent focused attention by the 

 

41 See GAO-06-15. 

Page 32 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. Until these 

issues are resolved, it will be difficult for DEA and ICE to ensure that 

shared objectives are achieved and resources are used effectively. 

Another source of disagreement between DEA and ICE concerns the 

cross-designation of ICE agents. First, in accordance with a ceiling 

established in conjunction with the terms of the existing MOU, a maximum 

of 1,475 ICE agents can be cross-designated at a given time. According to 

ICE officials, this maximum limits ICE’s ability to accomplish its mission 

because agents who are not cross-designated cannot pursue borderrelated drug-smuggling investigations into the United States. Further, ICE 

officials noted that the number of agents permitted to be cross-designated 

(1,475) was chosen when Customs had only 3,500 criminal investigators, 

whereas ICE currently has more than 6,000 agents. 

DEA, in response to our inquiry, reported that ICE has not demonstrated 

the need for—or asked for—additional cross-designations for its agents. 

According to DEA, as of January 2008, 1,256 ICE agents were crossdesignated—below the 1,475 maximum—and as of October 2008, DEA 

reported that it did not have any outstanding cross-designation requests 

from ICE. 

However, ICE officials told us in October 2008 that it had submitted to 

DEA a list of 120 ICE agents for cross-designation but had received no 

response. ICE reported that the names of some agents on the list had been 

submitted for cross-designation as many as three times and others were 

submitted as far back as 2002. ICE further reported that the current 

process of submitting paper cross-designation requests to DEA field 

offices, which then are to forward the requests to DEA headquarters for 

approval, has resulted in misplaced and mismailed requests. DEA 

responded that ICE’s primary liaison to DEA had not reported problems 

with the cross-designation process or outstanding requests. In January 

2009, in commenting on a draft of this report, ICE expressed an opposing 

view. Specifically, ICE stated that its agents—assigned to DEA in a liaison 

capacity—have on numerous occasions brought to the attention of DEA 

headquarters management that cross-designation requests were not being 

forwarded from local DEA offices to DEA headquarters. Also, in its 

comments, ICE noted that DEA currently did not have a liaison officer 

assigned to ICE headquarters as directed by the 1994 MOU. 

Page 33 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

DEA and CBP also partner on drug enforcement efforts, and senior 

officials in DEA and CBP headquarters and field offices report that they 

have improved their coordination since 9/11 by sharing more narcoticssmuggling intelligence and collaborating on counternarcotics efforts. 

However, procedures for handling illegal drugs seized at the nation’s 

borders predate CBP’s current organization under DHS and are not 

standardized.42 

DEA and CBP Share NarcoticsSmuggling Intelligence and 

Coordinate Activities; 

However, Procedures for 

Handling Illegal Drugs Seized at 

the Nation’s Borders Predate 

CBP’s Organization under DHS 

and Are Not Standardized 

CBP is responsible for, among other things, seizing illegal drugs at the 

nation’s borders—at ports of entry and between the ports of entry. 

According to DEA’s Chief of Operations and senior officials at CBP 

headquarters, the two agencies have improved their coordination in the 

years since 9/11. For example, senior officials at CBP headquarters and 

field offices reported that DEA is providing more intelligence to CBP that 

is useful for its drug interdiction efforts. The Chief of Intelligence 

Operations for CBP’s Tucson Sector (Office of Field Operations) reported 

that DEA is more closely coordinating on counterdrug operations that 

cross the border with Mexico. Also, CBP is coordinating with DEA by 

providing staff and intelligence to DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center, a 

tactical intelligence coordination center, which has improved the 

coordination of drug and smuggling intelligence according to DEA and 

CBP officials there. 

According to CBP officials, despite improved coordination and partnership 

between CBP and DEA, agreements between the two agencies have not 

been updated to reflect the merging of several border security agencies 

into CBP and ICE as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Prior to 

the formation of DHS, CBP’s drug-related enforcement responsibilities 

between the ports of entry were primarily handled by the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service’s Border Patrol, while drug-related enforcement 

responsibilities at the ports of entry were handled by inspectors with 

 

42 CBP was created in 2003 by combining, among other things, the port-of-entry and borderrelated resources and missions of Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 

See Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department of Homeland Security, H.R. Doc. 

No. 108-32 (Feb. 4, 2003). 

Page 34 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Customs. 43 However, while an agreement existed between DEA and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service that outlined the handling of illegal 

drugs seized between the ports of entry, the agreement has not been 

updated to reflect the formation of DHS. Also, in providing technical 

comments on a draft of this report, CBP noted that there are no formal 

agreements for how illegal drugs seized at the ports of entry are to be 

handled. Generally, the absence of updated agreements can be attributed 

largely to the considerable challenges faced by DHS upon its 

establishment in March 2003—challenges associated with the 

reorganization, transformation, and management of assembling 22 

separate federal agencies and organizations with multiple missions and 

cultures into one department. 

Today, agents with CBP’s Office of Border Patrol, which operates along 

the nation’s borders between the ports of entry, follow drug seizure and 

intelligence guidelines laid out in a 1996 MOU between DEA and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service. Specifically, the MOU outlines 

that Border Patrol agents are to turn over to DEA all drugs and related 

intelligence seized at the border between the ports of entry. However, 

CBP’s Office of Field Operations, which operates at the nation’s ports of 

entry, has no formal agreements with DEA and, as a result of legacy 

operations from Customs, Office of Field Operations’ agents turn over all 

drugs seized at ports of entry to ICE.44 According to a program manager in 

CBP’s Office of Field Operations, this bifurcated process has led to 

inefficiencies and confusion. The official added that a standardized 

process for handling drugs seized by CBP along the U.S. international 

borders would be more efficient and less confusing. Similarly, DHS’s 

 

43 In its technical comments on a draft of this report, ICE noted that prior to the creation of 

DHS both Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service shared responsibilities 

for interdicting illegal immigrants and contraband at the border. ICE explained that (1) 

Border Patrol agents operated between the ports of entry with a primary mission of 

interdicting illegal aliens and contraband and (2) Customs also employed Customs patrol 

officers who operated between the ports of entry with a primary mission of interdicting 

narcotics. ICE noted that even today, it employs Native American Customs patrol officers 

(known as the “Shadow Wolves”) on the Tohono O’Odham Indian Nation in Arizona. 

Further, ICE noted that prior to the creation of DHS, inspectors of Customs and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service were cross-designated at ports of entry to enforce 

both customs and immigration laws. 

44 Under current procedures, when an ICE agent is notified by CBP that a seizure has 

occurred at a port of entry, the ICE agent is to respond, process the evidence, and conduct 

an investigation. According to ICE, in this scenario, ICE does not turn over the narcotics to 

DEA; rather, ICE provides a copy of the report of investigation and the violator’s 

biographical information for input into DEA’s database. 

Page 35 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, the policy arm for the 

department’s counternarcotics efforts, has expressed concern regarding 

the handling of illegal drugs seized by DHS components at the nation’s 

borders. Further, the broad scope of CBP’s responsibilities reinforces the 

need for standardizing the handling of illegal drugs seized. For example, 

the following are noted in CBP’s Performance and Accountability Report 

for fiscal year 2007: 

• CBP is responsible for protecting more than 5,000 miles of border with 

Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, and 95,000 miles of 

shoreline. 

• More than 46,743 CBP employees manage, control, and protect the 

nation’s borders at and between 327 official ports of entry. The Border 

Patrol’s 20 sectors encompass 142 stations nationwide and 34 

permanent checkpoints. 

• In fiscal year 2007, CBP processed over 400 million passengers and 

pedestrians and more than 25 million sea, truck, and rail containers 

and seized over 1.7 million pounds of illegal drugs. 

The bifurcated process of CBP’s referrals to either ICE or DEA adds 

additional complexities to an already complicated system, and a 

standardized process of referring drug-related investigations could help 

streamline and strengthen CBP’s role and limit confusion and 

inefficiency.45 Agreed-upon roles and responsibilities and compatible 

policies are important elements to a collaborative working relationship.46

Establishing effective collaboration practices could improve the collective 

efforts of DEA, CBP, and ICE to address the smuggling of illegal narcotics. 

 

45 In its technical comments on a draft of this report, DEA noted that the present MOU is a 

legacy issue for CBP that affects coordinating drug seizures at the border but does not 

affect cooperative efforts between DEA and CBP. DEA commented that the two agencies 

have an excellent working relationship. 

46 GAO-06-15. 

Page 36 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Since 9/11, DEA has continued to benefit from the Department of State’s 

support of DEA’s international counternarcotics programs and foreign 

offices, as well as the department’s support of the international law 

enforcement community in general.47 Via interagency agreements, the 

department assists DEA’s international operations in a variety of ways, 

including ordering equipment to develop the capacity of DEA’s foreign law 

enforcement partners, administering DEA funding provided to foreign 

countries, and funding DEA training of foreign law enforcement agencies.48

However, funding with which the Department of State reimburses DEA for 

certain expenditures, such as training, has fluctuated greatly, which affects 

DEA’s long-term training strategies. The department has benefited from 

DEA’s law enforcement expertise and procedural guidance on 

international counternarcotics programs and from DEA’s foreign 

partnerships, such as DEA’s role in Afghanistan. 

DEA Benefits from 

Department of State 

Counternarcotics 

Assistance, and the 

Department of State 

Benefits from DEA’s 

Counternarcotics 

Expertise, Including New 

and Evolving Efforts in 

Afghanistan 

Among other things, the Department of State provides foreign assistance 

to support other countries’ efforts to build counternarcotics and law 

enforcement capacities, which ultimately benefits DEA agents as they 

conduct bilateral drug investigations with their foreign counterparts. DEA 

also may leverage the use of aircraft, wiretapping equipment, and other 

equipment or facilities provided to host-country law enforcement by the 

Department of State. In Afghanistan and other countries, the department 

funds the operations and maintenance of sensitive investigative units,49

which partner with DEA to conduct bilateral drug investigations. 

According to DEA officials, the Afghan Sensitive Investigate Unit is a 

critical component of DEA’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle drugtrafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan. 

 

47 DEA coordinates with the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the department’s Narcotics Affairs 

Sections in U.S. embassies abroad, which receive program guidance and funding from the 

bureau. 

48 The interagency agreements we reviewed stem from two different sources of authority. 

The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, authorizes agencies to enter into agreements, such as 

reimbursable agreements or MOUs, for the interagency provision of goods and services. 

Further, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2291 et seq.) 

authorizes similar interagency agreements for foreign assistance purposes. See 22 U.S.C. § 

2392(b). 

49 Sensitive investigative units are groups of host-nation investigators that DEA polygraphs, 

trains, equips, and mentors to conduct bilateral drug investigations and collect 

counternarcotics intelligence. DEA, with Department of State assistance, supports 11 

sensitive investigative units, including one in Afghanistan. 

Page 37 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

DEA also trains foreign law enforcement counterparts under interagency 

agreements with the Department of State. DEA has trained foreign law 

enforcement officers since 1969 to improve their capability, knowledge, 

and motivation to pursue high-level international narcotics investigations 

and to increase foreign law enforcement cooperation. Specifically, DEA 

trains foreign law enforcement through its in-country and regional training 

programs and at regional international law enforcement academies.50

According to DEA’s Office of Training, DEA trained nearly 1,400 foreign 

law enforcement officers in fiscal year 2007 through interagency 

agreements with the Department of State. 

While the Department of State continues to provide administrative, 

financial, and logistical support to DEA country offices, the department’s 

obligated funding to DEA for counternarcotics training activities via 

interagency agreements was 54 percent less in fiscal year 2007 than in 

fiscal year 2001, and has fluctuated greatly over that time period (see fig. 

5). The department reported that these fluctuations are a result of other 

department priorities. In addition, Department of State officials also 

reported that there is no guarantee that an embassy’s request for DEA 

training will be granted. DEA reported that the fluctuations in funding 

most affect its bilateral training programs with other countries. DEA 

indicated that a reliable annual funding base would improve its ability to 

provide a consistent number of courses annually and develop training 

programs that build upon previous training sessions. A DEA training 

official stated that DEA country attachés have also increased their efforts 

to coordinate with the Narcotics Affairs Sections at U.S. embassies to 

mitigate the fluctuations in the Department of State’s requests for DEA 

training activities in other countries. 

 

50 Funded by the Department of State, international law enforcement academies are a 

collaborative effort among U.S. law enforcement agencies, including DEA, to provide law 

enforcement training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies. 

International law enforcement academies are located in Bangkok, Thailand; Budapest, 

Hungary; Gaborone, Botswana; San Salvador, El Salvador; and Roswell, New Mexico. 

Page 38 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Figure 5: Department of State Obligations under Interagency Agreements with DEA, 

Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Dollars (in thousands)

Source: GAO summary of DEA and Department of State data.

Fiscal year

3,861

1,599

3,545

663

1,974

1,024

1,782

While the Department of State has supported DEA’s international 

counternarcotics programs, foreign offices, and law enforcement training 

efforts, the department has also benefited from DEA’s law enforcement 

expertise and narcotics intelligence. According to DEA and Department of 

State officials at headquarters and foreign posts, DEA serves as a technical 

consultant to the department on funding decisions for law enforcement 

projects requested by host governments. In addition, DEA uses its law 

enforcement expertise to identify competencies that the Department of 

State should include in training curricula to improve the capacity of 

foreign law enforcement agencies. Finally, DEA and Department of State 

officials reported that DEA provides intelligence that the department uses 

to better target resources to support host-country governments’ efforts, 

such as in Colombia where the Department of State uses DEA intelligence 

in its efforts to eradicate coca and poppy, necessary precursors for 

cocaine and heroin, respectively. 

Senior DEA and Department of State officials at headquarters and 

embassies we visited in Bangkok and Kabul reported that in general their 

roles in international counternarcotics efforts were distinct and clearly 

defined. While DEA’s primary emphasis internationally is on bilateral drug 

investigations, the Department of State emphasizes capacity building of 

Page 39 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

foreign law enforcement agencies. DEA and Department of State officials 

reported that they cooperate well through regular meetings (e.g., monthly 

or biweekly meetings) to share information and coordinate law 

enforcement activities at the respective embassies. 

DEA and DOD Continue to 

Share International 

Counternarcotics 

Intelligence, DOD Provides 

Support to DEA, and Their 

Partnership Is Evolving in 

Afghanistan and 

Elsewhere 

DEA and DOD continue to share international counternarcotics 

intelligence and, as both agencies recognize and address linkages between 

narcotics traffickers and terrorists, are developing new and evolving 

partnerships in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia. Prior to and since 

9/11, DOD has provided domestic support for counternarcotics operations 

to DEA and its federal, state, and local counterparts.51 For example, 

according to DEA and DOD officials, National Guard intelligence analysts 

work in HIDTA investigative support centers, described further below, to 

provide DEA and its federal, state, and local partners with linguistic or 

intelligence analysis skills. 

Since 9/11, DEA has increasingly partnered with DOD as both agencies 

have shifted resources to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The DOD and DEA 

partnership has evolved in Afghanistan as DOD has increased funding to 

DEA counternarcotics efforts via interagency agreements, implemented 

programs that build the capacity of DEA law enforcement partners, and 

provided limited operational support for DEA’s bilateral drug 

investigations, such as airlift and evacuation assistance. According to 

senior DEA and DOD officials in Afghanistan, DOD previously viewed 

counternarcotics and counterterrorism as separate issues; however, DOD 

now recognizes narcotics trafficking as a threat to U.S. national security 

interests because of the relationship between narcotics trafficking and 

terrorist-financing networks. DOD enters into agreements with DEA for 

counternarcotics law enforcement training programs, travel expenses for 

training program instructors, and support of DEA personnel assigned to 

DOD. As illustrated in figure 6, DOD components—including the Office of 

 

51 DOD is authorized to provide specific types of support to civilian law enforcement 

officials in the form of information sharing, as well as facility and equipment loans and 

associated personnel support. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-374. DOD policy generally 

encourages cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials in a manner consistent with 

the needs of national security and military preparedness and in accordance with applicable 

law and other principles limiting direct military involvement in searches, seizures, arrests, 

or other similar civilian law enforcement activities. See DOD Directive 5525.5, sections 4 

and E.4.1.3. In addition to providing support to civilian law enforcement, DOD also serves 

as the lead agency to detect and monitor the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into 

the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 124(a). 

Page 40 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, 

Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, as well as several joint 

interagency task forces—have increased obligations to DEA under 

interagency agreements from $456,000 in fiscal year 2003 to over 

$2.5 million in fiscal year 2007, an increase of 455 percent. 

Figure 6: DOD Obligations under Interagency Agreements with DEA, Fiscal Years 

2000 through 2007 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Dollars (in thousands)

Source: GAO summary of DEA data.

Fiscal year

0 0 0

456

182

1,117

2,060

2,527

In addition to the obligated amounts shown in figure 6, DOD has provided 

other funding to support DEA’s efforts. For example, in fiscal years 2004 to 

2007, DOD provided $226.9 million for training and equipping (and 

building a facility for) the Afghan National Interdiction Unit. Also, DOD 

provided funding for DEA to train the Afghan Sensitive Investigative Unit 

at the DEA training facility in Quantico, Virginia. 

Senior DEA and DOD officials reported that the agencies’ relationship in 

Afghanistan continues to evolve, is mutually beneficial, and has been 

helped by the fact that each agency has a distinct and clear mission in 

Afghanistan. While DEA has benefited from DOD’s interagency funding, 

capacity building, and operational support, DEA’s Chief of Intelligence 

reported that DOD has benefited from DEA intelligence, which has helped 

to thwart several attacks in Afghanistan. DEA reported that it seeks to 

Page 41 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

further improve coordination with DOD by placing additional liaison 

officers and intelligence research specialists at DOD commands. 

DEA Partners with State 

and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies to 

Leverage Manpower and 

Intelligence While 

Providing Training and 

Other Support 

DEA partners with state and local law enforcement agencies to leverage 

the manpower and intelligence that they provide, while supplying them 

with counternarcotics training and other support, such as intelligence 

about drug-trafficking organizations that operate across jurisdictional 

boundaries. DEA partners with state and local law enforcement agencies 

through the DEA state and local task force program. The program partners 

DEA agents and state and local law enforcement officers in permanent 

task forces to investigate and develop cases against significant local drugtrafficking organizations that have links to regional and international 

organizations. State and local law enforcement agencies receive three 

primary benefits from participating in task forces: (1) DEA, in most cases, 

reimburses state and local agencies for officer overtime related to 

participation in task force efforts; (2) state and local law enforcement 

officers receive federal credentials, which allow the officers to pursue 

narcotics investigations outside of their local jurisdictions; and (3) state 

and local law enforcement agencies receive a percentage of assets seized 

as the result of successful operations. According to senior officials at DEA 

headquarters and in field offices such as New York, working with state and 

local law enforcement officers in a task force environment gives DEA 

access to knowledge about the local area and provides additional 

personnel for counternarcotics efforts. As of the end of fiscal year 2007, 

DEA reported that there were a total of 118 DEA state and local task 

forces, with 1,401 state and local officers, and DEA reimbursed the 

respective agencies for overtime for 1,133 state and local task force 

officers. 

While the state and local law enforcement agencies receive benefits from 

working in a task force environment, some state and local law 

enforcement agencies expressed concern about decreased federal funding 

for such task forces. Specifically, representatives from 11 state and local 

law enforcement agencies commented that if federal funding for local drug 

task forces continues to decrease, their ability to pursue narcotics cases at 

the local level would be affected. 

In addition to the state and local task force program, DEA also coordinates 

directly with state and local law enforcement agencies to share 

information. For example, DEA provides information to state and local 

law enforcement agencies on imminent enforcement operations to avoid 

disrupting investigations and to ensure officer safety. Of the 

Page 42 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

representatives of 16 state and local agencies that do not participate in 

task forces that we spoke with, representatives of 12 said that they 

nevertheless communicate directly—via telephone or face-to-face 

conversations—with DEA before conducting narcotics enforcement 

operations to ensure the safety of their officers. Those same 12 agencies 

reported that DEA coordinates with them before conducting operations. 

However, regarding the other 4 agencies, one official noted that DEA has 

not operated in his jurisdiction, while officials at the other 3 agencies 

reported that DEA did not always provide notification of narcotics 

enforcement operations—an issue that occurred regularly for 2 of the 

agencies. Officials at these 2 agencies expressed concern that the safety of 

their officers could be jeopardized if communication were not improved. 

DEA also provides training to state and local law enforcement officers, 

including (1) clandestine laboratory training, which instructs state and 

local law enforcement officers how to identify, protect, and dispose of 

hazardous materials encountered in methamphetamine laboratories; 

(2) commander training for state and local drug units; and (3) basic 

narcotics investigative techniques. Of the 35 state and local law 

enforcement agencies whose representatives we spoke with, 20 reported 

that they had participated in DEA’s training courses. Seven of those 20 

reported participating in clandestine laboratory training, the most 

commonly attended course. State and local law enforcement officers we 

spoke with in rural jurisdictions reported that DEA training was 

particularly valuable because, as part of the training, DEA contributed 

equipment to trainees for use in their home jurisdictions. 

Page 43 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

DEA coordinates with other federal law enforcement agencies and, in 

some cases, state and local law enforcement agencies, on multiagency task 

forces and in intelligence centers that target drug-trafficking organizations 

operating at the regional, national, and international levels. As in its state 

and local task forces, DEA coordinates with and leverages the personnel 

and resources of other agencies in drug enforcement efforts through 

OCDETF and HIDTA task forces, which comprise DEA, other federal law 

enforcement agencies, and in the case of some task forces, state and local 

law enforcement agencies. DEA also coordinates intelligence, 

investigations, and drug enforcement operations with federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies through intelligence centers to avoid 

duplicative efforts and ensure officer and agent safety. However, ICE is 

not fully participating in two of these intelligence centers—the Special 

Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. The lack of full 

participation by ICE limits the ability of these interagency entities to most 

effectively investigate major drug-trafficking organizations. 

DEA works with multiagency task forces in the OCDETF and HIDTA 

programs to coordinate efforts and leverage the resources of federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies. OCDETF task forces—typically casespecific, temporary task forces—leverage the resources of federal law 

enforcement agencies and, for certain cases, state and local law 

enforcement to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the drug-trafficking and 

money-laundering organizations most responsible for the nation’s supply 

of illegal drugs—particularly CPOTs. For example, on some task forces, 

DEA leverages the expertise of the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal 

Investigation Division to investigate complex drug money-laundering 

cases. Generally, DEA participates in a majority (about 90 percent) of 

OCDETF task forces and usually has a leadership role. During fiscal year 

2007, for instance, DEA led or co-led 81 percent of all OCDETF 

investigations. 

DEA Coordinates 

Activities and 

Leverages Resources 

through Multiagency 

Task Forces and 

Intelligence Centers; 

However, Two 

Centers Are Less 

Effective Because ICE 

Is Not Providing All 

Relevant Intelligence 

DEA Uses Task Forces to 

Coordinate with and 

Leverage the Resources of 

Federal, State, and Local 

Agencies to Target 

Regional, National, and 

International DrugTrafficking Organizations 

DEA also coordinates with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies through task forces in 28 geographic areas across the country 

that have been designated as HIDTAs—that is, areas identified as having 

drug-trafficking problems that exceed the resources of state and local 

agencies. In particular, HIDTA task forces focus on drug-trafficking 

organizations that operate within a particular region of the United States 

Page 44 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

but affect drug distribution across the nation.52 Unlike OCDETF task 

forces, which do not require the participation of state or local law 

enforcement, HIDTA task forces require the participation of at least one 

federal and one state or local agency. HIDTA task forces also require 

participating agencies to operate out of shared work facilities (otherwise 

known as collocation) and interact freely with other participants 

(otherwise known as commingling). As required by the ONDCP 

Reauthorization Act of 2006, DEA participates in each HIDTA intelligence 

support center and, therefore, each HIDTA.53 However, DEA is not 

required to and does not participate in every HIDTA task force. For 

example, in fiscal year 2007, DEA participated in 62 of the Southwest 

Border HIDTA’s 111 task forces. According to ONDCP, in fiscal year 2007, 

DEA provided fewer agents to participate in HIDTA task forces because of 

the hiring freeze. Additionally, according to officials at ONDCP 

responsible for managing the HIDTA program, DEA is unable to provide 

full-time agents to HIDTA task forces in rural areas because of resource 

limitations. 

Senior DEA officials responsible for the Miami, New York, and Seattle 

field offices reported that working through OCDETF and HIDTA task 

forces has improved collaboration between DEA and other participating 

agencies and helped DEA leverage the personnel resources and knowledge 

that other participating agencies bring to drug enforcement. For example, 

according to the DEA Associate Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York 

field office, the participation of DEA, ICE, and the Internal Revenue 

Service in the permanent OCDETF task force in New York has led to 

better cooperation and reduced conflicts on money-laundering 

investigations related to drug-trafficking organizations. Also, a local law 

enforcement official responsible for counternarcotics efforts in Tampa 

(Florida) stated that participating in HIDTA task forces allowed for greater 

 

52 HIDTAs are designated by the Director of ONDCP in consultation with the Attorney 

General, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and the Treasury, the heads of the National 

Drug Control Program agencies, and relevant governors to determine whether (1) an area 

is a significant center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or 

distribution; (2) state, local, and tribal law enforcement have dedicated resources to the 

problem; (3) drug-related activities are having a significant impact on the area and other 

areas of the country; and (4) a significant increase in federal resources to the area is 

necessary to combat drug and drug-related activities. 21 U.S.C. 1706(b)(1), (d). Each 

HIDTA may have multiple task forces, and each task force may have different participating 

federal, state, and local agencies. 

53 ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-469, § 301, 120 Stat. 3502, 3518-24, 

codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1706. 

Page 45 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

access to federal funding, improved cooperation with DEA, and increased 

the ability to share law enforcement resources locally, such as the joint 

monitoring of judicial wiretaps targeting drug traffickers. 

DEA Uses Multiagency 

Intelligence Centers to 

Coordinate Intelligence 

and Investigations; 

However, the Special 

Operations Division and 

the OCDETF Fusion 

Center Are Less Effective 

Because ICE Is Not 

Providing All of Its DrugRelated Intelligence 

DEA and other federal agencies and, in some cases, state, local, and 

foreign law enforcement agencies coordinate intelligence and investigative 

efforts against drug-trafficking organizations through multiagency 

intelligence centers such as the Special Operations Division and the 

OCDETF Fusion Center. However, the effectiveness of these two centers 

is limited because ICE is not sharing all of its drug-related intelligence. 

Intelligence fusion centers are collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, 

investigate, and respond to criminal and, in some cases, terrorist activity. 

Drug intelligence fusion centers provide a centralized location where DEA 

and other law enforcement agencies share drug-related intelligence with 

the goals of linking ongoing investigations and targeting major drugtrafficking organizations. In addition, the 9/11 Commission Report stressed 

that sharing all available information from relevant sources is critical to 

assessing and responding to threats. Table 1 identifies key 

counternarcotics intelligence centers and their lead agencies, missions, 

and participating agencies. 

Table 1: Drug-Related Intelligence Centers—Missions and Participating Agencies 

Intelligence center 

and 

lead agency Mission of intelligence center Participating agencies 

DEA-led Special Operations 

Division 

Lead agency: DEA 

(1) Coordinates intelligence received from sources 

worldwide and provides information to partner 

agencies to support ongoing investigations against 

drug-trafficking organizations. (2) Assists DEA’s 

domestic field divisions in building national conspiracy 

cases by using multijurisdictional wiretaps. 

(3) Coordinates ongoing counternarcotics 

investigations across federal law enforcement 

agencies. 

DEA, FBI, USMS, ATF, DOJ Criminal 

Division, National Drug Intelligence Center, 

ICE, CBP, Internal Revenue ServiceCriminal Investigation, Central Intelligence 

Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. 

Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South, Joint Interagency Task ForceWest, U.S. Special Operations Command, 

National Security Agency, and United 

Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime 

Agency. 

OCDETF Fusion Center 

Lead agency: DEA 

(1) Conducts cross-agency integration and analysis of 

drug and related financial intelligence to create 

comprehensive, strategic intelligence assessments of 

major drug-trafficking organizations. (2) Passes leads 

to OCDETF participants in the field to assist in 

developing more comprehensive investigations of 

major drug-trafficking organizations. 

DEA, El Paso Intelligence Center, FBI, 

USMS, ATF, National Drug Intelligence 

Center, U.S. Coast Guard, Financial Crimes 

Enforcement Network, and Internal 

Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation. 

Page 46 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Intelligence center 

and 

lead agency Mission of intelligence center Participating agencies 

El Paso Intelligence Center 

Lead agency: DEA 

(1) Provides real-time tactical intelligence to federal, 

state, and local law enforcement regarding the 

networks of drug-trafficking organizations operating in 

the United States. (2) Provides access to the 

intelligence bases of all federal law enforcement 

agencies to assist in developing probable cause to 

search vehicles for drugs during traffic stops by state 

and local law enforcement. (3) Provides training to 

state and local law enforcement on interdiction 

techniques. (4) Serves as the repository for 

information about drugs seized in the United States. 

DEA, FBI, ATF, USMS, National Drug 

Intelligence Center, DHS, CBP, ICE, U.S. 

Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, Internal 

Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, 

Department of the Interior, DOD, National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Joint 

Interagency Task Force-South, Joint 

Interagency Task Force-North, Texas Air 

National Guard, Texas Department of Public 

Safety, El Paso County Sheriff’s Office, and 

El Paso Police Division. 

Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth 

Lead agency: U.S. Coast Guard 

Conducts counter-illicit-trafficking operations in the 

Caribbean and eastern Pacific by detecting and 

monitoring illicit air and maritime targets, fusing 

intelligence from various sources, providing 

information to law enforcement and military agencies, 

and promoting regional security cooperation. 

U.S. Coast Guard, DEA, FBI, National Drug 

Intelligence Center, CBP, ICE, Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, National Security Agency, National 

Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National 

Reconnaissance Office, U.S. Army, U.S. 

Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, 

United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime 

Agency, and components of foreign 

militaries.a

HIDTA Intelligence Support 

Centers 

Lead agency: Varies 

Deconflicts partner and nonpartner agency HIDTAregion-specific counternarcotics operations and, in 

some cases, ongoing investigations to avoid 

duplicative efforts and ensure officer safety. 

Varies across the 28 HIDTAs, but includes 

DEA and usually includes other federal law 

enforcement agencies and state or local law 

enforcement agencies. 

Sources: DEA and ONDCP. 

a

Other foreign militaries include the British, Dutch, French, and Spanish navies as well as military 

support provided by nations in Latin America. Because of the sensitive nature of these nations 

partnering with the United States on military endeavors, we are not specifically identifying these 

nations in this report. 

The usefulness of these intelligence centers to target drug-trafficking 

organizations is only as good as the information that participating agencies 

contribute to them. The 9/11 Commission Report asserted that intelligence 

sharing is critical to combat threats to the United States and that 

intelligence analysts should utilize all relevant sources of information. 

While DEA has reported good coordination with and participation by 

relevant federal agencies in most of the above centers, DEA officials have 

reported that ICE is not submitting all of its drug-related intelligence to the 

Special Operations Division, and that ICE does not participate in the 

OCDETF Fusion Center. 

Page 47 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division 

reported that while ICE provides staff and some data to the center, ICE 

agents are not submitting all drug-related intelligence necessary to ensure 

that cases do not overlap and efforts are not duplicated. The DEA official 

stated that not submitting all relevant information limits the usefulness of 

the Special Operations Division in supporting ongoing investigations. For 

example, during the course of a DEA investigation in New York, DEA 

determined that ICE agents working on an overlapping investigation had 

not provided relevant drug-related intelligence to the Special Operations 

Division but had provided it to a local intelligence center. Because DEA 

agents coordinated with the local intelligence center, DEA became aware 

of the information and coordinated the investigations. In this case, not 

routinely providing the drug-related intelligence to the Special Operations 

Division resulted in overlapping investigations and could have resulted in 

officer safety concerns. 

ICE reported that it has been a participant in the Special Operations 

Division since 1996 and is providing information obtained from judicial 

wiretaps related to narcotics investigations. Further, ICE reported that in 

recognition of the importance of the Special Operations Division’s primary 

purpose—which is to deconflict and prevent investigative overlap and 

thereby minimize the inherent threat to officer safety—ICE has dedicated 

10 agents to the division, plus a GS-15 Supervisory Special Agent to serve 

as the division’s Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge, and also contributes 

$2 million annually to the support the division’s functions and capabilities. 

Moreover, ICE noted that in addition to its managerial responsibilities, ICE 

regularly attends Special Operations Division coordination meetings in 

which agencies with investigative overlap meet face-to-face to discuss 

investigative strategy, prosecutorial venue, and agency roles. 

As further evidence of its support, ICE pointed out a July 2000 policy 

memorandum—from the Acting Assistant Commissioner of Customs to 

the agency’s special agents-in-charge and other managers—stating that use 

of the Special Operations Division was mandatory in order to coordinate 

Customs’ counternarcotics investigations with DEA, FBI, and the Internal 

Revenue Service. More recently, in September 2008, during the course of 

our review, the Director of ICE’s Office of Investigations issued a policy 

memorandum to all of the agency’s field offices, specifying that agents 

should submit information to the Special Operations Division when the 

information is “significant enough to warrant focused investigative action.” 

The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division 

reported that—before issuance of the September 2008 memorandum—ICE 

agents were not submitting all drug-related intelligence to the Special 

Page 48 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Operations Division. In January 2009, the DEA Special Agent-in-Charge 

reported that the amount of drug-related data submitted by ICE agents to 

the Special Operations Division increased after issuance of the September 

2008 memorandum; however, the DEA official noted that despite the 2000 

and 2008 memorandums, ICE agents continue to withhold some drugrelated intelligence data. 

ICE officials acknowledged that ICE does not share all of its most 

sensitive data, such as some confidential informant information and bank 

account information, with the Special Operations Division. DEA officials 

stated that without this information, the division cannot effectively 

“connect the dots” to follow all potential investigative leads and go as far 

as possible in identifying linkages to major drug-trafficking organizations. 

The DEA officials also said that other agencies, such as the FBI, do share 

such information and DEA has demonstrated that the agency can 

adequately protect it. 

ICE officials also acknowledged that ICE does not participate in the 

OCDETF Fusion Center, although negotiations about ICE’s participation 

have been ongoing since December 2005. ICE officials reported that the 

agency does not participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center because there 

is not agreement on the conditions for participation—including the types 

of data ICE will provide to the center and how sensitive confidential 

source information will be safeguarded. ICE officials said that although 

ICE has made various concessions relating to the information data set that 

ICE is willing to share with the center, none have been acceptable to DEA 

and thus negotiations are at an impasse. As additional perspective, the ICE 

officials noted that ICE has participated in working groups concerning the 

operational and technical development of the OCDETF Fusion Center 

since fall 2003. Since that time, however, the ICE officials noted that the 

mission of the center “has changed dramatically and ICE now finds itself 

stuck in negotiations between assisting DEA to a degree ICE finds 

unnecessary and protecting the identities of its sources.” 

In October 2008, senior ICE officials reported that the agency is willing to 

provide the same types of data to the OCDETF Fusion Center that other 

participating agencies provide. The ICE officials noted, however, that the 

Executive Office for OCDETF was asking ICE to submit more types of 

data than other partners, including the FBI. In separate responses to our 

inquiry, the Director of the Executive Office for OCDETF and DEA’s 

Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence reported that neither 

OCDETF nor DEA has asked ICE to provide more data than other 

Page 49 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

agencies and that ICE has objected to providing the same types of 

information as other agencies. 

DEA stated that it is unable to most effectively target major drugtrafficking organizations and avoid duplicative investigative efforts 

because ICE is not providing all drug-related information to the Special 

Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. Therefore, until DEA 

and ICE resolve this impasse, investigations into drug-trafficking 

organizations may be affected and duplication of investigative efforts may 

occur. 

DEA’s strategic planning and performance measurement framework, 

particularly its strategic plan and annual performance plans, have seen 

improvements since we and DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General 

reviewed and identified problems with previous versions. However, the 

framework does not reflect all of DEA’s activities, in particular, those 

undertaken to assist in counterterrorism efforts. DOJ is required to engage 

in strategic planning and performance planning under GPRA, and requires 

that component agencies (including DEA) develop strategic plans and 

annual performance plans that contribute to department-level plans to 

fulfill GPRA requirements.54 DEA uses a multiyear strategic plan that 

presents DEA’s missions and long-term goals, objectives, and strategies55

and annual performance plans that lay out the agency’s annual budget and 

describe the agency’s major programs, annual strategies, performance 

measures, and expectations for the programs for strategic planning and 

performance measurement. 

DEA’s strategic plan links to DOJ’s long-term strategic plan and serves as 

the DEA strategic planning and performance measurement framework’s 

long-range planning document. Specifically, the strategic plan defines 

what DEA seeks to accomplish, presents the strategies DEA plans to use 

to achieve desired results, and provides a basis for measuring the agency’s 

success in achieving the stated goals and objectives. According to DEA, 

DEA Has Improved Its 

Strategic Plan and 

Performance 

Measures; However, 

They Do Not Reflect 

the Agency’s Current 

Direction and 

Programs and Are 

Insufficient to 

Measure Progress and 

Guide Future 

Investments 

 

54 GPRA requires federal agencies—defined as executive departments, such as DOJ—to 

develop strategic plans and annual performance plans. However, related guidance advises 

that component agencies, such as DEA, should develop goals and measures that are linked 

with the parent agency’s strategic goals. 

55 At the time of our review, DEA’s most current strategic plan covered fiscal years 2003 to 

2008 but had not been updated since 2003. 

Page 50 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

the strategic plan is the template for ensuring measurable results and 

accountability in day-to-day operations. The plan consists of a mission, to 

enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United 

States; a general goal, to contribute to DOJ’s goal to reduce the availability 

of drugs in America; four strategic goals: (1) disrupt and dismantle 

international PTOs, (2) disrupt and dismantle domestic PTOs, (3) assist 

state and local agencies with drug enforcement, and (4) reduce the 

diversion of licit drugs; and goals, objectives, and strategies for each of the 

four strategic goals. 

DEA’s annual performance plans are to be updated as part of each fiscal 

year’s congressional budget submission to provide the strategic planning 

and performance measurement framework’s direct linkage between DEA’s 

longer-term goals defined in the strategic plan and the day-to-day activities 

of its managers and staff. The annual performance plan submitted with 

DEA’s 2009 congressional budget justification includes performance 

measures that are linked to the four strategic goals in the strategic plan. 

In May 1997, we reported that strategic planning is a continuous process 

and leading management practice in strategic planning provides that 

though plans may cover a specific time period over several years, plans are 

to be updated and revised every 3 years.56 We have also reported that 

strategic plans should align an agency’s activities, core processes, and 

resources to support mission-related outcomes. Further, in 1997 we 

reported that strategic plans help an agency to maintain a consistent sense 

of direction and serve as a foundation for the most important things an 

agency does each day by communicating goals and strategies throughout 

an agency and assigning accountability to managers and staff for goal 

achievement. With regard to annual performance plans, we reported in 

1998 that performance plans submitted to the Congress are to reflect an 

agency’s annual performance goals and measures, and that the process of 

setting annual targets and measuring progress enables agencies to show 

clear relationships between overall goals and daily operations within the 

agency.57 

 

56 GAO, Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate 

Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997). 

57 GAO, Managing for Results: Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address 

Strategic Planning Challenges, GAO/GGD-98-44 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 1998). 

Page 51 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

DEA’s strategic planning and performance measurement framework, while 

improved over previous efforts, has not been updated and does not reflect 

some key new and ongoing efforts. For example, while DEA is assisting in 

counterterrorism efforts through policies requiring that agents collect 

terrorism information from confidential informants and refer terrorismrelated intelligence to intelligence community partners, and DEA also has 

strategies to pursue narcoterrorists and coordinate intelligence through 

participation in the intelligence community, DEA’s strategic plan has not 

been updated since 2003 to reflect these efforts.58 As such, the strategic 

plan does not fully reflect the intended purpose of providing a template for 

ensuring measurable results and operational accountability. DEA’s 2009 

annual performance plan does include four performance measures 

regarding counterterrorism efforts: (1) the percentage of bilateral 

investigations initiated in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southwest 

Asia regions; (2) the number of counternarcotics operations conducted by 

foreign-deployed advisory support teams in conjunction with the Afghan 

Counter Narcotics Police/National Interdiction Unit; (3) the number of 

Afghan National Interdiction Unit officers trained by foreign-deployed 

advisory support team agents and deployed; and (4) the percentage of 

counterterrorism-related products completed by DEA’s Office of National 

Security Intelligence and the Special Operations Division. However, these 

measures do not provide a basis for assessing the results of DEA’s 

counterterrorism efforts—efforts that include giving top priority to 

counternarcotics cases with links to terrorism and pursuing 

narcoterrorists. 

DEA has also reported that its coordination and collaboration with other 

federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies are essential to 

its work. However, DEA’s strategic planning and performance 

measurement framework does not reflect the importance of such efforts. 

For example, while DEA’s strategic plan and the 2009 annual performance 

plan list strategies to coordinate with domestic and foreign law 

enforcement, these documents do not have measures of the results of this 

coordination. 

 

58 In its February 6, 2009, written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ noted that DEA 

has submitted to the department for review and approval an updated strategic plan (for 

fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional language that supports the post-9/11 goal 

of addressing counterterrorism. 

Page 52 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

An updated strategic plan that includes long-term goals, objectives, and 

strategies and complete annual performance plans that list the measures 

used to gauge performance, could assist the Congress, the administration, 

and other stakeholders in assessing the effectiveness of funded DEA 

activities, such as counterterrorism and coordination efforts. 

Given the evolving and global context of illegal drug trafficking—coupled 

with competing demands for limited law enforcement resources and the 

complexities of investigations that target major drug-trafficking 

organizations—effective partnerships between DEA and other law 

enforcement agencies at all levels of government are necessary for 

conducting the war on drugs. Effective partnering has become 

increasingly important since 9/11, with growing recognition of the nexus 

between drug trafficking and terrorism. 

Conclusions 

Moreover, because most of the nation’s illegal drug supply is produced and 

smuggled from abroad, DEA’s partnerships with DHS component agencies 

(ICE and CBP) that have border-related missions are particularly 

important. Yet, the operational underpinnings of DEA’s partnerships with 

ICE and CBP—the applicable interagency agreements (MOUs)—predate 

the formation of DHS and have not been successfully revised. The impasse 

between DEA and ICE in negotiating a new MOU has lasted for several 

years and involves significantly differing views regarding roles and 

responsibilities. Also, the process to cross-designate ICE agents for 

conducting counternarcotics investigations is inefficient and has resulted 

in fewer agents being available to conduct such investigations. 

Furthermore, while there have been memorandums or policy directives 

from management regarding ICE’s (and previously Customs’) participation 

and information sharing in the Special Operations Division, ICE is not 

sharing all of its sensitive drug-related data with the division, even though 

DEA asserts that adequate protections are in place, as evidenced, for 

example, by the FBI’s willingness to share its sensitive information. 

Likewise, ICE is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center largely 

because of an impasse in negotiations regarding the types of data that ICE 

would provide. Absent ICE’s full participation, the Special Operations 

Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center are not as effective as they could 

be, according to DEA. Further, the DEA and CBP partnership can be 

strengthened to limit inefficiencies and confusion by revising the existing, 

bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized by CBP at the nation’s 

borders—a process that differs for seizures at ports of entry and seizures 

between ports of entry. 

Page 53 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

Effective coordination and partnerships between DOJ and DHS would 

help to fulfill the nation’s counterdrug strategy. As such, the joint 

involvement of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security would be useful not only for developing a new MOU or other 

mechanism to clarify counternarcotics roles and responsibilities between 

the departments, but also for developing processes for monitoring its 

implementation and making any needed adjustments. 

Finally, in considering revisions to its strategic plan, DEA has not 

incorporated post-9/11 responsibilities and activities, or established 

appropriate performance measures that provide a basis for assessing 

progress to their goals. A comprehensive and current strategic planning 

and performance measurement framework would help ensure 

accountability by providing information to DEA’s leadership for making 

organizational and management decisions and to stakeholders, such as the 

Congress and the administration, for tracking resources and assessing the 

effectiveness of the war on drugs. 

To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating narcotics 

trafficking—and its links to terrorist organizations or activities—and to 

help ensure integrated policy and program direction across all parts of 

DEA, we are making five recommendations. Specifically, we recommend 

that 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly 

and expeditiously develop a new MOU or other mechanism to 

(1) clarify their respective departments’ counternarcotics roles and 

responsibilities, particularly those of DEA, ICE, and CBP, (2) provide 

efficient procedures for cross-designating ICE agents to conduct 

counternarcotics investigations, and (3) standardize procedures for 

handling illegal drugs seized at the nation’s borders and making 

referrals to DEA; 

• the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop 

processes for periodically monitoring the implementation of the new 

MOU or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments; 

• the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE to contribute all 

relevant drug-related information to the Special Operations Division 

and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds; 

Page 54 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

• the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE to participate in the 

OCDETF Fusion Center and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds; and 

• the Administrator of DEA update the agency’s strategic plan to more 

fully and accurately reflect the agency’s post-9/11 responsibilities and 

activities and also establish appropriate performance measures that 

provide a basis for assessing progress. 

On January 5, 2009, we provided a draft of this report for comment to DOJ, 

DHS, the Department of State, DOD, and ONDCP. 

In its written comments, dated February 6, 2009, DOJ concurred with our 

recommendations. DOJ commented that it will continue its efforts to 

establish a mutually agreeable MOU with DHS and also noted that a 

mechanism for monitoring ongoing implementation of such an agreement 

must be an essential part of the MOU. Also, DOJ commented that it stands 

ready to facilitate ICE’s participation in the Special Operations Division 

and the OCDETF Fusion Center. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In reference to our final recommendation, DOJ commented that DEA has 

submitted to the department for review and approval an updated strategic 

plan (for fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional language that 

supports the post-9/11 goal of addressing counterterrorism. DOJ also 

noted that the updated strategic plan includes performance measures 

related to DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence and that DEA was 

in the process of evaluating further performance measures related to 

CPOTs and PTOs that are linked to terrorist organizations. DOJ did not 

provide us an estimated date for completing departmental vetting of DEA’s 

updated strategic plan. 

The full text of DOJ’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II. DOJ 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report 

where appropriate. 

In its written comments, dated March 9, 2009, DHS noted that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have begun 

meeting regularly in order to enhance coordination between DHS and DOJ 

on a range of issues, including those addressed in this report. While 

neither explicitly agreeing nor disagreeing with our recommendations, 

DHS suggested several revisions to the wording of the recommendations 

that we make solely to the Secretary of Homeland Security or jointly to the 

Secretary and the Attorney General. For instance, DHS commented that—

Page 55 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

as the two departments work together to clarify roles and 

responsibilities—the new agreements reached by the departments might 

not take the form of an updated MOU or other mechanism that continues 

the current practice of cross-designation. Rather, DHS noted that a wide 

range of options could be explored for making best use of DHS’s law 

enforcement and border enforcement authorities and resources. We 

believe that the language of our first recommendation, which calls for 

development of a “new MOU or other mechanism” is sufficiently broad to 

provide for a wide range of options that DHS and DOJ can jointly consider 

for ensuring effective interagency collaboration. 

Also, in its written comments, DHS suggested that because the form of any 

new arrangement is still under discussion with DOJ, our second 

recommendation should be stricken—that is, the recommendation that the 

Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop 

processes for periodically monitoring the implementation of the new MOU 

or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments. We believe that 

irrespective of the form of any new arrangement, implementation of the 

recommendation will help to ensure maintenance of continued progress in 

addressing long-standing issues. 

Regarding ICE’s involvement with the Special Operations Division and the 

OCDETF Fusion Center, DHS commented that DOJ and DHS are 

discussing issues of mutual information sharing and participation. Noting 

that it expects to address these issues in the manner most likely to ensure 

officer safety, efficient use of federal resources, and success in the 

ultimate goal of combating drugs and the related crimes, DHS offered 

some alternative language for the wording of our recommendations. We 

believe that the constructive intent of our recommendations—which is to 

generate action to enhance interagency collaboration in combating 

narcotics trafficking—is more important than the nuanced wording of the 

recommendations. Moreover, going forward, both DHS and DOJ have an 

opportunity to clearly articulate—to applicable congressional committees, 

as required by 31 U.S.C. § 72059—the substantive implementation actions 

taken in response to our recommendations. 

 

59 Specifically, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written 

statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform not later than 60 days from the date of the report and to the 

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for 

appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report. 

Page 56 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
 

The full text of DHS’s written comments is reprinted at appendix III. DHS 

component agencies, ICE and CBP, provided technical comments that we 

incorporated in this report where appropriate. 

On January 27, 2009, the Department of State’s Director of the GAO 

Liaison Office, Bureau of Resource Management, responded by e-mail that 

the department had no comments. On January 12, 2009, DOD’s Office of 

the Inspector General responded by e-mail that the department had no 

comments. On January 16, 2009, ONDCP’s Deputy General Counsel 

responded by e-mail that the office had no comments. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, State, Defense, the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy and other interested parties. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss 

the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-6510 or 

larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in 

appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Eileen Larence 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 57 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 58 GAO-09-63 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

In response to a request from the Co-Chairman of the Senate Caucus on 

International Narcotics Control, we examined 

• changes to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) policies, 

strategies, and authorities post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) to support 

national counterterrorism efforts and address evolving global drug 

threats; 

• changes to DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies 

with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11 and any effects of 

those changes; 

• mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid duplication with 

partner agencies; and 

• the extent to which DEA’s strategic plan and performance measures 

reflect the post-9/11 environment. 

We reviewed the National Drug Control Strategy to gain context for DEA’s 

role in supporting the objective of disrupting and dismantling the market 

for illegal substances.1

 To obtain additional perspectives on DEA’s role in 

enforcing the counternarcotics laws of the United States, we conducted a 

literature search of congressional hearings, Department of Justice (DOJ) 

Office of the Inspector General reports, and other published materials. We 

interviewed DEA officials, including the Chief of Operations and the Chief 

of Intelligence, at DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. During these 

interviews, DEA identified agencies it partners with and mechanisms it 

uses to coordinate its activities with other agencies.2

 We also visited a 

nonprobability sample of DEA’s domestic field divisions and foreign 

country offices to discuss changes to DEA since 9/11 and how DEA 

Objectives 

Scope and 

Methodology 

 

1

 The three national priorities for combating narcotics in the United States are stopping 

drug use before it starts, intervening and healing America’s drug users, and disrupting and 

dismantling the market for illegal drugs. Our scope excludes the first two priorities. 

2

 Within the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area, we interviewed officials at DEA; the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Forces; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the 

U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Department of State’s Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and the Department of Defense’s 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and 

Global Threats. 

 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

partners with other entities (see tables 2 and 3).3 At the domestic 

locations, we interviewed other federal, state, and local law enforcement 

officials to better understand how DEA coordinates with other agencies. 

Although the information obtained cannot be generalized as representative 

across the nation, we selected these domestic locations because they 

represent or include (1) diverse geographical areas, including border and 

nonborder areas, urban and rural areas, and Indian tribe reservations; 

(2) various drug-trafficking and consumption threats (e.g., marijuana, 

crack cocaine, and methamphetamine); and (3) locations with and without 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) representation. 

To understand DEA’s focus on international operations and coordination 

with other U.S. government agencies abroad since 9/11, we interviewed 

DEA officials and other federal officials at five international locations (see 

table 3). We spoke with officials in Mexico City, Mexico; Bogotá, 

Colombia; and Bangkok, Thailand, because DEA has had long-standing 

operations and partnerships in those countries. Also, in each of these three 

countries, DEA has a regional office and a Resolution 6 team, a program 

that colocates Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in DEA offices 

overseas to combat drugs. We visited DEA’s country office in Afghanistan 

because DEA reportedly had shifted substantial resources to Afghanistan; 

created major new programs in-country, such as the Foreign-deployed 

Advisory and Support Team program; and developed stronger 

relationships with U.S. government agencies there, particularly with the 

Department of Defense (DOD). In addition, DEA mentors and trains 

sensitive investigative units in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and 

Thailand. Also, we spoke by telephone with a DEA official in Brussels, 

Belgium, to better understand DEA’s new focus on drug trafficking in West 

Africa.4

We did not discuss DEA’s partnerships with interdiction agencies, such as 

the U.S. Coast Guard, in detail in this document because DEA is not the 

lead agency in U.S. interdiction activities. Additionally, while DEA is 

 

3

 Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population, because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

4

 Because of unforeseen circumstances, the Country Attaché of DEA’s office located in 

Lagos, Nigeria, was unable to meet with us. However, we were able to speak with the 

Assistant Regional Director for the Europe Region, whose area of responsibility includes 

West Africa. 

Page 59 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

responsible for monitoring the diversion of legal, controlled substances for 

illegal use, we did not review diversion control activities because they are 

not appropriated activities and DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General 

recently issued a report on DEA’s use of the diversion control fee 

account.5

 More details about the scope and methodology of our work 

regarding each of the objectives are presented in the following sections. 

 

5

 The diversion control fee account consists of registration fees paid by licensed 

pharmacies and wholesale distributors of licit controlled substances. See, for example, 

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s Use of the Diversion Control Fee Account, I-2008-002 (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2008). 

Page 60 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Table 2: DEA Field Divisions; Other Federal Agencies; and State, Local, and Tribal Agencies Visited by GAO at Domestic 

Locations 

Other law enforcement agencies visited DEA field 

divisions visiteda

Location Federal agenciesbState, local, and tribal agencies 

Detroit, MI U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) 

• Michigan State Police 

• Wayne County Sheriff’s Office 

Columbus, OH FBI • Columbus Police Department 

Mansfield, OH Not applicable • Mansfield Police Department 

Detroit 

Newark, OH Not applicable • Licking County Sheriff’s Office 

Miami, FL Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF), U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), FBI, ICE, U.S. Marshals 

Service 

• Miami-Dade County Police 

Department 

Miamic

Tampa, FL Not applicable • Tampa Police Department 

• Hillsborough County Sheriff’s 

Office 

New York New York City, NY ATF, FBI, ICE • New York City Police Department

Phoenix, AZ Not applicable • Arizona Department of Public 

Safety 

• Maricopa County Sheriff 

Tucson, AZ CBP, FBI, ICE • Pima County Sheriff’s Office 

Sacaton, AZ Not applicable • Gila River Indian Community 

Police Department 

Phoenix 

Sells, AZ Not applicable • Tohono O’Odham Nation Police 

Department 

Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA ATF, FBI • California Bureau of Narcotics 

Enforcement 

St. Louis Des Moines, IA Not applicable • Iowa Department of Public Safety d 

Marshalltown, IA Not applicable • Marshall County Sheriff’s Office 

Seattle Seattle, WA CBP, ICE • King County Sheriff’s Office 

Source: GAO. 

a

The geographical scope or area of responsibility of a DEA field division can encompass several 

states (e.g., the Detroit Division’s area of responsibility includes Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio). Thus, 

a DEA field division, in addition to having a division office location, may also have district offices or 

other posts of duty. The specific locations we visited are noted in the table. 

b

Locations where we did not contact other federal agencies during our visits are denoted by “not 

applicable.” 

c

In addition to visiting DEA’s Miami Division, we also visited and spoke with DEA officials at the 

Tampa District Office. 

d

While we did not visit DEA’s St. Louis Division, we visited and spoke with officials at DEA’s Des 

Moines Resident Office, which is part of the St. Louis Division. 

Page 61 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Table 3: Federal and Foreign Agencies and Personnel Interviewed by GAO at International Locations 

Country City Agencies and personnel interviewed 

Afghanistan Kabul British Serious Organized Crime Agency, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command 

Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Attaché, DOJ, DEA, U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission 

(DCM), FBI, U.S. Joint Interagency Coordination Group, U.S. Department of State’s 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State) 

Belgium BrusselsaDEA 

Colombia BogotáaDEA, FBI, ICE, State 

Mexico Mexico City ATF, DEA, DOJ, FBI, ICE 

Thailand Bangkok DEA, DCM, FBI, ICE, State 

Source: GAO. 

a

Denotes agencies contacted via telephone or video conference. All other interviews were conducted 

in person. 

Changes to DEA Policies, 

Strategies, and Authorities 

Post-9/11 to Support 

National Counterterrorism 

Efforts and Address 

Evolving Global Drug 

Threats 

To ascertain changes to DEA’s policies, strategies, and authorities since 

9/11 to support national counterterrorism efforts and address evolving 

global drug threats and how DEA has contributed to the Global War on 

Terrorism, we reviewed 

• DEA budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2007, including DEA’s 

congressional budget justifications; 

• DEA documents relating to the hiring freeze;6 

• DEA staffing data; 

• provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21 of the U.S. Code), 

including sections 959 and 960a that provide extraterritorial 

jurisdiction to DEA; 

• DEA case statistics on investigations linked to consolidated priority 

organization targets and Department of State–designated foreign 

terrorist organizations; 

 

6

 Beginning in August 2006, DEA initiated a hiring freeze to address funding constraints 

created in part by unfunded pay increases and budget rescissions. The hiring freeze ended 

in December 2007 with enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Pub. L. 

No. 110-161, Division B, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory statement 

accompanying DEA’s appropriation, DEA received additional funding above the President’s 

budget request to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741, H15799 

(2007). 

Page 62 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

• DEA guidance and standard operating procedures for conducting 

financial investigations and collecting and forwarding information on 

cases with terrorism links to the intelligence community; and 

• documents related to DEA’s programs that assist other law 

enforcement agencies, such as DEA’s mobile enforcement teams. 

We also interviewed DEA officials and other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement officials about changes to DEA’s strategies, policies, and 

activities since 9/11 and the effects of these changes on DEA and other law 

enforcement entities. 

Changes to DEA’s 

Partnerships with Federal, 

State, and Local Agencies 

with Counternarcotics 

Responsibilities since 9/11 

and the Effects of Those 

Changes 

To determine changes to DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local 

agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11 and the effects 

of those changes, we interviewed officials at 

• DEA, including DEA’s Chiefs of Operations and Intelligence and other 

headquarters and field personnel, to gain perspective on changes to 

DEA’s partnerships and coordination since 9/11 and the effects of 

these changes; 

• other DOJ components, including the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the United States Marshals Service; 

and the Executive Office for OCDETF; 

• two Department of Homeland Security components that have 

counternarcotics responsibilities—U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 

• the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs and the respective U.S. embassies’ Narcotics 

Affairs Sections in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), and Kabul 

(Afghanistan); and 

• DOD’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats. 

We also interviewed officials at selected state and local partner agencies 

that have perspectives on changes to federal agencies’ drug control 

missions after 9/11. Details on locations visited and federal agencies 

whose officials we interviewed are included in tables 2 and 3. In addition, 

we reviewed various documents, including 

Page 63 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

• GAO, Inspector General, and Congressional Research Service reports 

on DEA’s partner agencies (e.g., reports on the FBI’s transformation 

after 9/11); 

• DEA and other agency budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2007, 

including data on reimbursable authority provided to DEA; 

• memorandums of understanding between DEA and partner agencies 

and other documentation illustrating changes to agencies’ 

counternarcotics strategies and activities and relationships with DEA 

since 9/11; and 

• data from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys and the Executive 

Office for OCDETF for fiscal years 2000 through 2007 illustrating 

changes in the number of narcotics cases brought by federal law 

enforcement agencies. 

To better understand DEA’s partnerships and coordination with state and 

local law enforcement, we 

• reviewed budget documents and other information for fiscal years 

2000 through 2007 provided by DEA officials responsible for state and 

local efforts and managing field offices illustrating (1) DEA funds 

allocated to support state and local programs and (2) trend data 

regarding the number of state and local officers assigned to 

interagency task forces; 

• interviewed DEA officials responsible for state and local efforts at 

headquarters and the field to collect information on changes to DEA’s 

work at the field offices; 

• interviewed officials at selected state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies within proximity to the DEA offices we visited 

(see table 2); and 

• conducted a telephone survey of 17 of the 27 members of the National 

Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement Committee who agreed to 

participate (see table 4).7

 

7

 The National Sheriff’s Association is a nonprofit organization that provides programs for 

sheriffs, their deputies, chiefs of police, and other law enforcement professionals to raise 

the level of professionalism within the criminal justice field. The primary purpose of the 

association’s Drug Enforcement Committee is to provide a forum to discuss and address 

the issues that sheriffs’ offices face when combating illegal drugs. 

Page 64 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Table 4: National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement Committee Members 

Interviewed by GAO 

State City Agencies interviewed 

Alabama Brewton Escambia County Sheriff’s Office 

Arkansas Wynne Cross County Sheriff’s Office 

Florida Labelle Hendry County Sheriff’s Office 

Orlando Orange County Sheriff’s Office 

Georgia Dahlonega Lumpkin County Sheriff’s Office 

Illinois Wheaton Dupage County Sheriff’s Office 

Kentucky Glasgow Barren County Sheriff’s Office 

Minnesota Rochester Olmsted County Sheriff’s Office 

North Carolina Morganton Burke County Sheriff’s Office 

Ohio Hamilton Butler County Sheriff’s Department 

Pennsylvania Towanda Bradford County Sheriff’s Office 

South Dakota Sioux Falls Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Office 

Texas Orange Orange County Sheriff’s Office 

Vermont Bennington Bennington County Sheriff’s Office 

Burlington Chittenden County Sheriff’s Office 

Wisconsin Jefferson Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office 

Wyoming Sundance Crook County Sheriff’s Office 

Source: GAO. 

Note: We contacted all 27 members of the National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement 

Committee and were able to complete interviews with 17 members who were available during the 

period that we conducted our telephone survey. 

We then compared DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local 

agencies with past GAO recommendations on practices that can enhance 

and sustain collaboration among federal agencies.8

 

8

 See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 65 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To understand the mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid 

duplication with partner agencies, we first interviewed DEA officials to 

identify the task forces and intelligence centers used by DEA. We then 

interviewed federal, state, and local officials at various multiagency task 

forces and intelligence centers to discuss their effectiveness at 

coordinating efforts and avoiding duplication (see table 5). We also 

reviewed memorandums of understanding between DEA and other law 

enforcement entities governing their relationships at task forces and 

intelligence centers and other agency documents illustrating resources 

dedicated to task forces and intelligence centers for fiscal years 2000 

through 2007. We then compared DEA’s and partner agencies’ 

coordination efforts with recommendations on information sharing made 

in the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report) and Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government.

9

Mechanisms DEA Uses to 

Coordinate and Avoid 

Duplication with Partner 

Agencies 

Table 5: Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers Visited by GAO 

State or country City Task force or intelligence center 

Afghanistan Kabul • U.S. Border Management Task Force 

• Interagency Operations Coordination Center 

Arizona Tucson • Southwest Border HIDTA 

District of Columbia Metropolitan area • DEA-led Special Operations Division 

• National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

• OCDETF Fusion Center 

Florida Key West • Joint Interagency Task Force-South 

Michigan Detroit • Michigan HIDTA 

New York New York • New York/New Jersey HIDTA 

Texas El Paso • El Paso Intelligence Center 

Thailand Bangkoka • Joint Interagency Task Force-West 

Washington Seattle • Northwest HIDTA 

Source: GAO. 

a

We interviewed a representative from the Joint Interagency Task Force-West in Bangkok, Thailand; 

however, the task force is headquartered at the U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii). 

 

9

 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 66 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To determine the extent to which DEA’s strategic plan and performance 

measures reflect the post 9/11 environment, we reviewed 

• the National Drug Control Strategy prepared by the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy, 

• DEA’s most recently available strategic plan (Strategic Plan: Fiscal 

Years 2003 – 2008) and DEA’s annual performance plans for 2008 and 

2009, and 

• DOJ’s Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007 – 2012. 

We discussed the development and implementation of DEA’s strategic 

plan with responsible DEA officials and then compared DEA’s strategic 

plan and related performance measures with requirements of the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), GAO’s 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,

10 and GAO’s 

recommended practices for implementing GPRA.11

To assess the reliability of statistical information and budget data we 

obtained from DEA and partner agencies—such as budget authority and 

full-time equivalent personnel data, number of case referrals to U.S. 

Attorney’s offices, and performance data—we discussed the sources of the 

data with agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the 

compilation of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of this review. 

The Extent to Which DEA’s 

Strategic Plan and 

Performance Measures 

Reflect the Post-9/11 

Environment 

Data Reliability 

We did not review or assess information relating to specific instances of 

intelligence sharing between DEA and other federal agencies, primarily 

because such information involves ongoing counterterrorism 

investigations or intelligence community activities. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

 

10 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

11 See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

Page 67 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 68 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 69 GAO-09-63 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 70 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Homeland Security 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 71 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 72 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 73 GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 74 GAO-09-63 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Eileen Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Danny Burton, Assistant Director, 

and Sean Lovitt, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. 

John Bagnulo, Shannon Finnegan, and Ryan MacMaster contributed 

significantly to all aspects of this report. 

Michele Fejfar assisted with methodology and data reliability. 

Willie Commons and Christine Davis provided legal support. 

Sally Williamson assisted in report development. 

 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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