United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces, Committee

on Armed Services, United States Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EST

Wednesday,

March 5, 1997

COMBAT AIR POWER

Joint Mission Assessments

Could Enhance Investment

Decisions

Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security

Analysis, National Security and International Affairs

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the combat air power capabilities

of the United States. There has been considerable discussion in recent

months about the Department of Defense’s (DOD) aircraft modernization

programs. Much of the discussion has focused on whether DOD will be able

to “afford” the large number of new combat aircraft it currently plans to

buy. Today, I would like to focus more on joint warfighting requirements,

the aggregate capabilities of U.S. combat air power forces to meet those

requirements, and DOD efforts to place greater emphasis on joint

considerations in program and budget decisions.

My testimony is based on a comprehensive report of the major issues

related to U.S. combat air power.1

 This report synthesized the findings

from our reviews of six key air power mission areas2

 and other recent

reviews of individual weapon systems. The overall objective of our work

was to determine whether sufficient information is being developed from a

joint perspective to help the Secretary of Defense decide whether new air

power investments should be made, whether programmed investments

should continue to be funded, and what priority should be given to

competing programs. To provide context for this assessment, we

examined major changes in U.S. air power capabilities since the Persian

Gulf War in relation to those of potential adversaries.

Today, I would like to make three points based on our work:

1. The United States possesses a larger inventory of modern

high-performance fighter and attack aircraft than any other country. The

capabilities of these aircraft continue to be enhanced through key

improvements in the aircraft, the weapons they use, and the targeting

information they are provided. Conversely, the air defense forces of

potential adversaries have not been substantially improved and, for the

foreseeable future, are not likely to pose a serious threat to U.S. air

power’s successful execution of its missions.

2. Long-range bombers and missiles and attack helicopters are

increasingly supplementing fighter and attack aircraft in providing the

capability to attack ground targets. The result is an extensive inventory of

1

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 1996).

2

These include interdiction, air superiority, close support, air refueling, suppression of enemy air

defenses, and surveillance and reconnaissance.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
capabilities to accomplish many of the same missions. Yet, the services are

modifying current systems and developing new systems at substantial

costs, even though they have not compared aggregate capabilities with

joint mission needs.

3. Comprehensive assessments of requirements and capabilities from a

joint mission perspective would aid the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to carry out his responsibilities as the senior military advisor to the

Secretary of Defense on the requirements, programs, and budgets of the

military services. While progress has been made in achieving a stronger

joint orientation in DOD, ongoing cross-service mission studies should

allow DOD to identify unnecessary duplications in capabilities and make

difficult program tradeoff decisions so defense resources can be used

more efficiently.

Although Smaller,

Current U.S. Air

Power Forces Remain

Highly Capable

Despite downsizing, U.S. forces remain highly capable. While DOD has

reduced its number of combat aircraft, it has retired older aircraft while

adding new aircraft and enhancing the capabilities of existing aircraft.

These actions have yielded a force that, in many areas, is more capable

than the larger Cold War force. DOD’s total inventory of combat aircraft has

declined from about 8,200 in 1991 to about 5,900 in 1996, as shown in the

following chart. The quantities shown include aircraft designated for

operational missions as well as aircraft set aside for testing and training.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
GAO Changes in Inventory of Attack and Fighter 

Aircraft, Attack Helicopters and Bombers 

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

4,243

2,783

2,314

1,552

1,649

1,556

Total Aircraft

1991 8,206

1996 5,891

Army Navy and Marine Corps Air Force

Source: Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft

and Air Force bombers have been reduced the most—from about 6,400 in

1991 to about 4,100 in 1996. The services have achieved these reductions

primarily by retiring older aircraft that have been costly to operate and

maintain. At the same time, they have added many newer model

aircraft—about 70 F-15E strike fighters, about 250 F-16 multimission

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
fighters, and about 200 F/A-18 fighter and attack aircraft. These assets

have bolstered U.S. combat air capabilities.

The total number of attack helicopters has only declined by 79. Although

600 older AH-1 Cobras were retired between 1991 and 1996, both the Army

and the Marine Corps have added newer more capable helicopters. These

include about 150 Apache attack helicopters and 300 OH-58D Kiowa

Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters in the Army and about 70

Cobras in the Marine Corps.

Although DOD now has fewer aircraft, many of the aircraft being retained

have been qualitatively improved. For example, DOD has improved the

navigation, night fighting, target acquisition, and self-protection

capabilities of many aircraft and has made more aircraft capable of

delivering advanced munitions. These capabilities contributed significantly

to the effectiveness of tactical aircraft in the Gulf War. DOD is also

substantially increasing its inventory of long-range missiles and

precision-guided munitions (PGM). It is presumed that the growth in PGMs

could reduce the number of flights and aircraft needed to destroy

designated targets. The following chart shows the added capabilities in

these areas since 1991.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
GAO Increases in Key Air Power Capabilities 

Since 1991

Long-range missiles

Night-fighting 

PGM-capable

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000

2,662

961

707

Number of systems added since 1991

aircraft

aircraft

Note: Long-range missiles include the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Army Tactical Missile

System. Night-fighting aircraft includes those designed to permit use of night-vision goggles

and/or those equipped with infrared detection devices. PGM capability refers to the ability of

aircraft to autonomously employ PGMs using laser designators.

Source: Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Threats to U.S. Air

Power Are Limited

Potential regional adversaries currently possess defensive and offensive

weapons that are considered technologically inferior to U.S. forces.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Improvements in these capabilities are dependent on the acquisition of

weapons and technology from outside sources.

The current air defense capabilities of potential adversaries have

limitations. Regarding aircraft, these nations have only small quantities of

modern fighters for air defense. The bulk of their air forces are older and

less capable, and their fleets are not expected to be bolstered by many

modern aircraft. Similarly, for their surface-to-air defense forces, these

nations tend to rely on older systems for high-altitude long-range defense

and to use the more modern and effective systems, when available, at low

altitudes and short ranges. The most prevalent threats are assessed to be

overcome by U.S. aircraft with the use of tactics and countermeasures.

Furthermore, the location of the most threatening air defense assets tends

to be known.

For offensive operations, like defense forces, the bulk of potential

adversaries’ aviation forces, which may comprise significant numbers, are

older and less capable aircraft. The same assessment applies to long-range

missile capabilities. Some potential adversaries possess significant

quantities of ballistic missiles, but they tend to be of low technology and of

limited military use. The potential land-attack cruise missile capabilities of

these nations are low and are not expected to increase in sophistication

until the middle of the next decade, if at all. Though the threat to military

forces from conventionally armed missiles is low, the possibility that such

weapons could be used for political purposes—and possibly armed with

nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads—may affect the employment of

U.S. forces.

Air defense is a high priority of potential adversaries, and it is believed

most potential adversaries are trying to improve their effectiveness and

survivability by upgrading existing systems, purchasing more modern

weapons, and using camouflage and decoys. These improvements, if

achieved, could delay U.S. combat air power from achieving air superiority

quickly and cause higher U.S. and allied casualties. These nations would

also like to improve their aviation and ballistic and cruise missile

capabilities.

Several factors are likely to inhibit these nations from improving their

capabilities quickly. First, they lack the indigenous capability to develop

and produce the advanced systems that would permit them to significantly

enhance their capabilities. Therefore, advances will likely be confined to

upgrades of existing equipment and the possible acquisition of advanced

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
systems from outside sources. Second, worldwide arms transfers have

fallen significantly in recent years and are not expected to reach former

levels any time soon. The following chart illustrates both the decline in the

international arms market between 1987 and 1995 and the dominance of

Western suppliers.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
GAO Trend in the Worldwide Transfers of 

Conventional Arms, 1987-1995

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

0

20

40

60

80

100

U.S. and Allies Russia and China Rest of World

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, (preliminary data) Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency.

Third, the United States and its allies are cooperating to limit conventional

arms transfers to certain nations. For example, the United Nations

imposed sanctions on several nations in the 1990s. These sanctions

prohibited the transfer of weapons or commercial technology that could

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
be used for military purposes to these nations. No measurable arms

transfers were made to these nations after the sanctions were imposed.

Fourth, the high technology weapons that could seriously threaten U.S. air

power are expensive, no matter what the source. For example, an

advanced air defense system like the Patriot PAC-3 costs over $100 million

for each battery. Given the state of the economies of potential adversaries,

it would be difficult for them to purchase many high-cost systems.

To summarize, available information suggests that no potential adversary

possesses sufficient capabilities to prevent U.S. forces from achieving

their objectives in a military engagement. This was perhaps best captured

recently by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he said: “the

delta between us and anyone who could possibly wish us ill today is

greater than it certainly has ever been in my lifetime.” This advantage is

expected to carry into the next century, according to the Congressional

Budget Office (CBO). In a January 1997 report,3 CBO, using Office of Naval

Intelligence data, estimated that in 2005, the United States would have

about twice as many of the latest generation fighters as Russia, and about

15 times as many as China, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq combined. Efforts

by potential adversaries to narrow this delta will likely continue to be

inhibited by declines in the post-Cold War arms market, national and

international efforts to limit the proliferation of conventional arms, and

the high cost of advanced weapons.

Extensive Capabilities

Exist Among U.S.

Forces to Accomplish

the Same Missions

During the Cold War, the military services invested hundreds of billions of

dollars to develop largely autonomous combat air power capabilities,

primarily to prepare for a global war with the Soviet Union. The Air Force

acquired bombers to deliver massive nuclear strikes against the Soviets

and fighter and attack aircraft for conventional and theater-nuclear

missions in the major land theaters, principally Europe. The Navy built an

extensive carrier-based aviation force focused on controlling the seas and

projecting power into the maritime flanks of the Soviet Union. The Army

developed attack helicopters to provide air support to its ground troops.

The Marine Corps acquired fighter and attack aircraft and attack

helicopters to support its ground forces in their areas of operation. The

United States ended up with four essentially autonomous air forces with

many similar capabilities, but each largely operated within its own

warfighting domains.

3

A CBO Study, A Look at Tomorrow’s Tactical Air Forces, January 1997.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Today, there is no longer a clear division of labor among aviation forces

based on where they operate or what functions they carry out. The air

power components of the four services are now focused on joint

conventional operations in regional conflicts with many of the assets

having the same missions. Most of the likely theaters of operation are

small enough that all types of aircraft can reach most targets. And while

the number of combat aircraft has been reduced, the reductions have been

largely offset by an expansion in the types of assets and capabilities

available to the combatant commanders.

The overlapping air power capabilities of the current force structure do

provide combatant commanders with operational flexibility to respond to

any circumstance. The question is whether maintaining the current levels

of duplication, in the post-Cold War era, is necessary and is the most

efficient use of resources. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said

recently that, in his judgment, unnecessary duplications exist. From our

reviews of the interdiction, air-to-air combat, and close support of ground

forces mission areas, it is evident that U.S. capabilities are overlapping and

substantial. Planned investments in new weapons may, in some cases, be

adding little needed military capability at a very high cost.

The total inventory of assets that can be used to interdict enemy ground

targets illustrates the condition that exist. As shown by table 1, each of the

services have extensive inventories of weapons that can be used to attack

ground targets.

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Table 1: DOD’s Multiple Assets to

Interdict Enemy Ground Targets Service Category Asset 1996 Inventory

Air Force Fixed-wing aircraft F-15E 203

F-16 1,450

F-117 54

A/OA-10 369

B-1B 95

B-2 17

B-52 66

Navy and

Marine Corps

Fixed-wing aircraft A-6E 63

AV-8B 184

F-14A/D 323

F/A-18 806

Helicopters Cobra 176

Missiles Tomahawk 2,339

Army Helicopters Apache 798

Cobra/Kiowa Warrior 758

Missiles Army Tactical

Missile System

1,456

Source: Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Based on our analysis of DOD’s targeting data, the services collectively

have at least 10 ways to hit 65 percent of the thousands of expected

ground targets in two major regional conflicts. In addition, interdiction

assets can provide 140 to 160 percent coverage for many types of targets.

Despite this level of capability, the services are modifying current

platforms and developing new systems that will provide new and

enhanced interdiction capabilities over the next 15 to 20 years at a total

estimated cost of over $200 billion. This figure excludes the Joint Strike

Fighter program, which will also provide interdiction capabilities.

In the area of air-to-air combat—a critical mission to achieve and retain air

superiority—over 600 combat-designated F-14 and F-15 fighter aircraft are

initially dedicated to this mission. This number far exceeds the quantity

and quality of fighter aircraft potential adversaries are projected to have.

In addition, about 1,900 other combat-designated multirole fighter aircraft,

such as F-16s and F/A-18C/Ds, while not dedicated to air superiority

missions, are very capable air superiority fighters. These aircraft could

assist F-14s and F-15s to defeat enemy fighters before being used for other

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
missions such as interdiction and close support. The capabilities of these

fighter aircraft have also been enhanced extensively with the procurement

of advanced weapons—particularly over 7,400 advanced medium range

air-to-air missiles—and through continuing improvements to these

weapons and to support platforms, such as airborne warning and control

system aircraft, that help the fighters locate, identify, track, and attack

enemy aircraft at great distances. Despite these unparalleled capabilities,

the Air Force plans to begin to replace its F-15s with 438 F-22 fighters in

2004, at an estimated average unit procurement cost of about $111 million,

and to design and develop the multirole Joint Strike Fighter, which will

have air-to-air combat capabilities.

Decisions on Air

Power Programs and

Priorities Require

Comprehensive Joint

Assessments

Through key legislation, Congress has sought to better integrate the

capabilities of the military forces, provide for improved military advice to

the Secretary of Defense apart from that provided by the military services,

and strengthen the joint orientation of DOD. Although DOD has improved its

joint orientation in many respects, the services continue to heavily

influence defense decisions, particularly those related to investments in

weapons. Stronger military advice from a joint perspective is needed if the

Secretary is to objectively weigh the merits not only of combat air power

but also of other defense capabilities and programs.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

made the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible for providing

military advice from a joint perspective to the Secretary of Defense. As

senior military advisor to the Secretary, the Chairman is expected to

advise the Secretary on the requirements, programs, and budgets of the

military services. The act directs the Chairman to (1) provide advice on the

priorities of requirements identified by the regional commanders,

(2) determine the extent to which service program recommendations and

budget proposals conform with the regional commanders’ priorities,

(3) submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals

within projected resource levels to achieve greater conformance with

these priorities, and (4) assess the military requirements for defense

acquisition programs. The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal

Years 1993 and 1996 further directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to examine how DOD might eliminate or reduce duplicative

capabilities and authorized him, through the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council (JROC), to assess military needs from a joint warfighting

perspective.

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Although progress is being made, we believe that the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff needs to do more to effectively carry out these

responsibilities. For example, DOD established a joint warfighting

capabilities assessment (JWCA) process, under which assessment teams are

examining issues related to 10 selected mission areas. Established in 1994

to support the JROC, these assessment teams have identified ways to

improve joint warfighting and have proposed other operational

improvements. However, the teams so far have had little impact in

reducing unneeded overlaps and duplication in existing capabilities. Also,

they have not been directed to delve into more controversial issues related

to U.S. air power, such as assessing alternative ways to modernize U.S. air

power capabilities.

Additionally, we found little evidence that the JROC, with the support of the

JWCA process, has developed specific proposals to transfer resources from

one service to another to meet higher priority needs. A review of Future

Years Defense Program data also indicated no notable shifts in acquisition

funding among the services between fiscal year 1994 and 2001. A key goal

in expanding the JROC’s role in 1994 was, according to the Office of the

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to enhance force capability by

assisting the Chairman in proposing cross-service transfers of resources.

Additionally, Joint Staff officials told us that funding has not been shifted

from one program to another as a result of the JWCA team assessments to

reflect higher priorities from a joint perspective.

In assessing the impact of the JROC and the JWCA process on combat air

power, we examined two important ultimate outputs of the process—the

Chairman’s Program Assessment and Program Recommendations to the

Secretary of Defense. Under its broadened mandate, the JROC has been

made a focal point for addressing joint warfighting needs. It is expected to

support the Chairman in advising the Secretary by making specific

programmatic recommendations that will, among other things, lead to

increased joint warfighting capability and reduce unnecessary

redundancies and marginally effective systems, within existing budget

levels. However, in reviewing the Chairman’s 1994 and 1995 program

assessments and 1995 program recommendations, we found little to

suggest that this type of advice is being provided. The documents did not

offer specific substantive proposals to reduce or eliminate duplication

among existing service systems or otherwise aid in addressing the problem

of funding recapitalization. In fact, the Chairman’s 1995 Program

Assessment indicated a reluctance on the Chairman’s part, at least at that

point, to propose changes in service programs and budgets. While the

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Chairman expressed serious concerns in his assessment about the need

for and cost of recapitalizing warfighting capabilities and said that the

power of joint operations allows for the identification of programs to be

canceled or reduced, his advice was to defer to the services to make such

choices.

DOD Must Overcome

Certain Obstacles to

Achieve a Stronger

Joint Orientation

DOD must overcome several obstacles that have inhibited JWCA teams and

others that try to assess joint mission requirements and the services’

aggregate capabilities to fulfill combat missions. Major impediments

include (1) a dearth of information on joint mission requirements and the

aggregate capabilities of the services to meet those requirements, (2) weak

analytical tools and databases to assist in-depth joint mission area

analyses, and (3) the services’ resistance to changes affecting their

programs.

Comprehensive Joint

Mission Area Analyses

Have Not Been Performed

DOD has done little analysis to establish joint mission area requirements for

specific combat air power missions or to plan the aggregate capabilities

needed by each of the services to meet those requirements. Studies that

may provide such information on several key air power missions have

been initiated but have not yet been completed. Without such analyses,

decisions on the need for new weapon systems, major modifications, and

added capabilities evolve from requirements generation and weapons

acquisition processes that encourage each service to maintain its own

view of how its own capabilities should be enhanced to meet warfighting

needs.

In its May 1995 report, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the

Armed Forces substantiated what our reviews of defense programs have

found, that “each Service is fully engaged in trying to deliver to the CINCs

(regional commanders) what the Service views as the best possible set of

its specific capabilities—without taking into account the similar

capabilities provided by the other Services.” The analyses used to generate

weapon system requirements for new acquisition programs are most often

narrowly focused. They do not fully consider whether the capabilities of

the other services to perform a given mission mitigate the need for a new

acquisition or major modification.

Significant limitations in study methodologies and the use of questionable

assumptions that can result in overstated requirements are apparent in

three DOD bomber requirements studies we examined. None of the studies

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
assessed whether fighters or long-range missiles could accomplish the

non-nuclear mission more cost-effectively than bombers. One of the

studies, done by the Air Force and used by it to estimate and justify

bomber requirements, assumed that only bombers would be available to

strike time-critical targets during the first 5 days of a major regional

conflict. This assumption seems to conflict with DOD planning guidance,

which assumes that Air Force and Navy combat aircraft would arrive early

enough in theater to attack targets at the outset of a major regional

conflict.

The services’ analyses of alternatives to meet mission needs can also be

limited. A 1995 study done at the request of the Chairman of the JROC

identified this as a problem. The study team found that analyses done to

support JROC deliberations frequently concentrate only on the capability of

the DOD component’s proposed system to fill stated gaps in warfighter

needs. Potential alternatives are given little consideration.

Thus, while DOD has decision support systems to assist senior officials in

making critical decisions, reviews like those done by the JROC and by the

staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense are very dependent on the

services for analytical support. They do not have the benefit of

information on joint mission requirements and the aggregate capabilities

of the services to meet those requirements to aid them in their oversight

and review role. They are heavily dependent on the services to provide

much of the supporting analyses. Therefore, such oversight reviews can

provide little assurance that there is a valid mission need, that force

capabilities are being properly sized to meet requirements, and that the

more cost-effective alternative has been identified.

Better Analytical Tools and

Data Are Needed to

Improve Joint Assessments

DOD officials acknowledge that current analytical tools, such as computer

models and war games used in warfighting analyses, need to be improved

if they are to be effectively used to analyze joint warfighting. They told us

these tools often do not accurately represent all aspects of a truly joint

force, frequently focus on either land or naval aspects, and often do not

consider the contribution of surveillance and reconnaissance and

command and control assets to the warfighter. Some models are grounded

in Cold War theory and must be augmented with other evaluations to

minimize their inherent deficiencies.

DOD representatives and analysts from the military operations research

community also observe that there are serious limitations in the data to

Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
support analyses of joint capabilities and requirements. Presently, anytime

DOD wants to study joint requirements, a database must be developed.

Concerns then arise over whether the databases developed and used are

consistent, valid, and accurate. Efforts have been made in the past to

collect joint data and develop appropriate models for analyzing joint

warfare. These efforts, however, fell short, as there was not a consistent,

compelling need across enough of the analytic community to do the job

adequately.

A current major initiative aimed at improving analytical support is the

design and development of a new model—JWARS—that will simulate joint

warfare. JWARS will seek to overcome past shortcomings and will include

the contributions of surveillance and reconnaissance and command,

control, and communication assets to the warfighter. This initiative was

developed as part of DOD’s joint analytic model improvement program

because of the Secretary of Defense’s concern that current models used

for warfare analysis are no longer adequate to deal with the complex

issues confronting senior decisionmakers. Under this program, DOD will

upgrade and refine current warfighting models to keep them usable until a

new generation of models to address joint warfare issues can be

developed. The new models are intended to help decisionmakers assess

the value of various force structure mixes. As part of this broad initiative,

DOD also intends to develop a central database for use in mission area

studies and analyses.

Desire to Have Consensus

Can Inhibit Needed

Changes

DOD has reduced its force structure and terminated some weapon

programs to reflect changes in the National Military Strategy and reduced

defense budgets. But further attempts to cancel weapon programs and

reduce unnecessary overlaps and duplications among forces are likely to

generate considerable debate and resistance within DOD. Because such

initiatives can threaten service plans and budgets, the tendency has been

to avoid debates involving tradeoffs among the services’ systems. The

potential effects of program reductions or cancellations on careers, the

distribution of funds to localities, jobs, and the industrial base also serve

as disincentives for comprehensive assessments and dialogue on program

alternatives.

The Chairman’s 1995 Program Assessment indicates the difficulty the

Chairman has had in identifying programs and capabilities to cancel or

reduce. While the Chairman recognized that the increasing jointness of

military operations should permit additional program cancellations or

Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
reductions, he noted that the Joint Chiefs—despite the added support of

the JROC and the JWCA process—had been unable to define with sufficient

detail what should not be funded. The Chairman recommended that the

Secretary of Defense look to the military services to identify programs that

can be slowed or terminated. He said for this to happen, however, the

services would have to be provided incentives. The Chairman

recommended that the Secretary return to the services any savings they

identify for application toward priority recapitalization or readiness and

personnel programs.

Joint Staff officials indicated that the Chairman’s reluctance to propose

changes to major service programs may be attributable to the need for the

Chairman to be a team builder and not be at odds with the service chiefs

over their modernization programs. Adoption of the Chairman’s proposal

could lead the services to reduce or eliminate programs and otherwise

more efficiently operate their agencies, including reducing infrastructure

costs. However, it is difficult to appreciate how these unilateral decisions

by the services will provide for the most efficient and effective use of

defense resources.

Conclusion Air power plays a pivotal role in national military strategy. The United

States’ dominant air power capabilities provide combatant commanders

the capability to seize and control the skies, to hold vital enemy

capabilities at risk, and to help destroy the enemy’s ability to wage war. To

maintain this dominance and ensure a combat-ready force in the future

within likely defense budgets, the Secretary of Defense will need to make

difficult decisions in at least two critical areas—how best to reduce

unneeded duplication and overlap in existing capabilities and how to

modernize the force in the most cost-effective manner. To aid the

Secretary in making such decisions, DOD needs to conduct broader, more

comprehensive joint assessments.

To be of most value, such assessments should be done on a continuing

basis and should, at a minimum, (1) assess total joint warfighting

requirements in each mission area; (2) inventory aggregate service

capabilities, including the full range of assets available to carry out each

mission; (3) compare aggregate capabilities to joint requirements to

identify shortages or excesses, considering existing and projected

capabilities of potential adversaries and the adequacy of existing

capabilities to meet joint requirements; (4) determine the most

cost-effective means to satisfy any shortages; and (5) where excesses

Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
exist, assess the relative merits of retiring alternative assets, reducing

procurement quantities, or canceling acquisition programs.

These assessments, while very demanding, should provide insights into

how best to scale back air power modernization plans, reduce duplicative

capabilities, and otherwise make more efficient use of defense resources.

An example of such an assessment is the ongoing deep attack weapons

mix study which was recommended by the 1995 Commission on Roles and

Missions. The objective of the first phase of the study is to identify the

appropriate mix of different munitions, focusing on tradeoffs between

standoff and direct attack weapons and the needed inventories of different

munitions. The second phase will focus on the potential that the growing

inventory and the increasing capabilities of weapons could allow some

consolidation of the ships, aircraft, and missiles that deliver the weapons.

The results of this study should aid the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to advise the Secretary on the requirements, programs, and budgets

of the military services. The services could also draw upon the study’s

database to broaden their analyses of mission needs. Similar studies need

to be completed in other mission areas.

One concluding thought. Last month the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, in his 1997 posture statement, said

“With all of the talk about today’s dangerous world and the difficulties Americans have

faced, it is easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and its Allies are much

safer than they were in the dark days of the Cold War. This ’strategic pause,’ where the

United States has no adversaries who are global powers, is providing us with the time to

regroup, reflect on the challenges ahead, and prepare America’s forces for the next

millennium.”

To take full advantage of this opportunity—“strategic pause”—and make

the most efficient use of defense resources to prepare U.S. forces for the

next century, DOD needs to proceed with the type of comprehensive

assessments I have described. Such assessments will provide the type of

information required to make the hard tradeoff decisions that will be

needed.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may

have.

Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Selected GAO Reports Related to This

Testimony

Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can Be Improved

(GAO/NSIAD-97-77, Feb. 1997).

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making

Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 1996).

U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to Maintain

and Operate (GAO/NSIAD-96-160, Aug. 1996).

Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement

at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 1996).

Combat Air Power: Assessment of Joint Close Support Requirements and

Capabilities Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-45, June 1996).

Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction

Capabilities Could Save Billions (GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 1996).

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little

Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 1996).

Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air

Defenses May Be Too Low (GAO/NSIAD-96-128, Apr. 1996).

Navy Aviation: AV-8B Harrier Remanufacture Strategy Is Not the Most

Cost-Effective Option (GAO/NSIAD-96-49, Feb. 1996).

Aircraft Requirements: Air Force and Navy Need to Establish Realistic

Criteria for Backup Aircraft (GAO/NSIAD-95-180, Sept. 1995).

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,

Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 1995).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 1995).

Cruise Missiles: Proven Capability Should Affect Aircraft and Force

Structure Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-116, Apr. 1995).

Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed

(GAO/NSIAD-95-9, Nov. 1994).

Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
Selected GAO Reports Related to This

Testimony

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 1994).

Strategic Bomber: Issues Relating to the B-1B’s Availability to Perform

Conventional Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-81, Jan. 1994).

(701110) Page 21 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-105
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