[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 112 (Friday, June 9, 2000)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 36649-36651]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-14685]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73


Re-evaluation of Power Reactor Physical Protection Regulations 
and Position on a Definition of Radiological Sabotage

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is re-evaluating its 
power reactor physical protection regulations and the proposed 
definition of radiological sabotage, using performance criteria as the 
basis. The purpose of this re-evaluation is to state precisely what 
kinds of sabotage-induced events a licensee is expected to protect 
against. This request invites public comment on these issues. The NRC 
is publishing as an attachment to this Federal Register Notice, a 
Commission paper entitled, ``Staff Re-Evaluation of Power Reactor 
Physical Protection Regulations and Position on a Definition of 
Radiological Sabotage,'' (SECY-00-0063).

DATES: Submit comments by August 23, 2000. Comments received after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission 
is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before 
this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff.
    Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 
between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
    You may also provide comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking 
website at (http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). This site provides the 
capability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web 
browser supports that function. For information about the interactive 
rulemaking website, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905 (e-
mail: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f9bab8beb9978b9ad79e968f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3e7d7f797e504c5d10595148">[email protected]</span></a>).
    The attached Commission paper is associated with a rulemaking plan, 
``Physical Security Requirements for Exercising Power Reactor 
Licensees'' Capability to Respond to Safeguards Contingency Events,'' 
which is located on the NRC's rulemaking website.
    Copies of any comments received and certain documents related to 
this re-evaluation may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 
2120 L Street NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents 
may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the rulemaking website.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard P. Rosano, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2933, e-mail: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1c4e4f4f5c726e7f327b736a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6f3d3c3c2f011d0c41080019">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of November 22, 1999, the 
Commission approved the staff's recommendation in SECY-99-241 
(Rulemaking Plan, Physical Security Requirements for Exercising Power 
Reactor Licensees' Capability to

[[Page 36650]]

Respond to Safeguards Contingency Events, October 5, 1999) to begin a 
comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor 
physical protection regulations. The Commission directed the staff to 
provide position papers on: (1) The attributes of the design basis 
threat; and (2) the definition of radiological sabotage. The purpose of 
the first position paper is to identify the types of weapons and 
equipment that may be used in the design basis threat and clarify the 
intent of the regulations concerning the strength of the response and 
the strategy of a licensee's security organization. The purpose of the 
second position paper is to define precisely what kinds of sabotage-
induced events a licensee is expected to protect against. This request 
for comments responds to the Commission's second direction to the NRC 
staff regarding development of a position paper on radiological 
sabotage at reactors.

Discussion

    In accordance with the SRM dated November 22, 1999, the staff began 
considering the fundamental issues that would guide a re-evaluation of 
the power reactor physical protection requirements, including 
conducting several public meetings with stakeholders on the subject. 
This process highlighted a longstanding issue with the implementation 
of 10 CFR 73.55 requirements at power reactors. Specifically, the 
implementation of these requirements assumed that compliance with the 
prescriptive requirements of the physical protection plans written in 
accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(b) through (h) would provide the high 
assurance required by 10 CFR 73.55(a). In fact, results of force-on-
force drills conducted pursuant to the Regulatory Effectiveness Review 
(RER) program and the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) 
program cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, due in part to 
the way the requirements were (a) understood by licensees and (b) 
inspected and enforced by NRC. However, overall site security and the 
security organization's readiness to respond to an adversary attack 
were tested and confirmed during regional inspection activity and 
OSREs.
    The staff examined approaches and principles used in existing NRC 
regulations, including the use of margin of safety. The staff also 
integrated appropriate results of previous analyses, such as the study 
to re-evaluate the guidelines and bases used to determine vital 
equipment and areas to be protected in nuclear power plants, as 
documented in ``Vital Equipment/Area Guidelines Study: Vital Area 
Committee Report,'' NUREG-1178 (March 1988).
    In the attachment to SECY-99-241, the staff proposed to review the 
definition of radiological sabotage and consider ways to clarify the 
issue in a way that is meaningful for the protective strategy and 
enhances the process of performance evaluation. After considerable 
discussion, the staff determined that a definition of radiological 
sabotage at power reactors in the new rule may not be necessary if the 
regulation could delineate more clearly the performance criteria to be 
used as the basis for the new physical protection regulations. Several 
public meetings were held with representatives from the Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI), the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and the media, 
from which the staff developed a set of physical protection performance 
criteria that are consistent with criteria used in other areas of 
nuclear power plant regulation. These performance criteria would 
provide the risk-informed basis for the comprehensive review of 10 CFR 
73.55 and associated power reactor physical protection requirements, 
including the exercise requirement.
    These performance criteria are based on ensuring that a plant 
retains the capability to shutdown the reactor safely and assure long-
term heat removal in the face of a malevolent act by the design basis 
threat against the facility. The staff is developing performance 
criteria and requirements for 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect the plant 
against a malevolent act by protecting critical safety functions, with 
an appropriate margin of safety, that include:
    (1) reactivity control;
    (2) reactor coolant makeup for maintaining reactor and spent fuel 
pool inventory;
    (3) reactor and spent fuel pool heat removal;
    (4) containment of radioactive materials;
    (5) process monitoring necessary to perform and control the above 
functions; and
    (6) actions necessary to support the operation of the equipment 
used for safe shutdown.
    These performance criteria would clarify the scope of radiological 
sabotage against which a licensee is expected to protect. In 10 CFR 
73.55(b) and succeeding paragraphs, specific performance criteria would 
be provided for the physical security organization and response 
elements. As described in SECY-99-241, new paragraphs of 10 CFR 73.55 
would require periodic drills and exercises and corrective actions for 
vulnerabilities identified in the exercises.
    The above performance criteria represent a new concept in 
formulating security programs and aligning security with other areas of 
regulation involving plant operations. This approach would provide 
insights on how the remainder of 10 CFR 73.55 might be revised. The 
staff believes that it is important to continue to have stakeholder 
involvement in the early stages of development of performance criteria.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of June, 2000.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.

Rulemaking Issue--SECY-00-0063

(Notation Vote)
March 9, 2000.
    For: The Commissioners.
    From: William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations.
    Subject: Staff Re-evaluation of Power Reactor Physical Protection 
Regulations and Position on a Definition of Radiological Sabotage.
    Purpose: To obtain Commission approval of the staff's (a) approach 
to re-evaluation of the power reactor physical protection regulations, 
and (b) definition of radiological sabotage by providing design 
criteria as the basis for physical protection regulations.
    Background: In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of November 
22, 1999, the Commission approved the staff's recommendation in SECY-
09-241 (Rulemaking Plan, Physical Security Requirements for Exercising 
Power Reactor Licensees' Capability to Respond to Safeguards 
Contingency Events, October 5, 1999) to begin a comprehensive review of 
10 CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor physical protection 
regulations, and directed the staff to provide position papers on: (a) 
the attributes of the design basis threat, and (b) the definition of 
radiological sabotage. The first is used to define the weapons and 
equipment used by the design basis threat and clarify the intent of the 
regulations concerning the response strength and strategy of the 
licensees' security organizations. The purpose of the second is to 
precisely state what sabotage-induced event sequences the licensees are 
expected to protect against. This paper addresses the second request 
regarding development of a position paper on radiological sabotage at 
reactors.
    Contact: Richard Rosano, NRR, (301) 415-2933.
    Discussion: In accordance with the Staff Requirements Memorandum 
dated

[[Page 36651]]

November 22, 1999, the staff began consideration of the fundamental 
issues that would guide a re-evaluation of the power reactor physical 
protection requirements, including conducting several public meetings 
with stakeholders on the subject. This process highlighted a 
longstanding issue with the implementation of 10 CFR 73.55 requirements 
at power reactors. Specifically, the implementation of these 
requirements assumed that compliance with the prescriptive requirements 
of the physical protection plans written in accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55(b) through (h) would provide the high assurance required by 10 
CFR 73.55(a). In fact, results of force-on-force drills conducted 
pursuant to the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) program and the 
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program cast doubt on 
the validity of this assumption, due in part to the way the 
requirements were (a) understood by licensees and (b) inspected and 
enforced by NRC. However, overall site security and the security 
organization's readiness to respond to an adversary attack were tested 
and confirmed during regional inspection activity and OSREs.
    The staff examined approaches and principles used in existing NRC 
regulations, including the use of margin of safety. The staff also 
integrated appropriate results of previous analyses, such as the study 
to re-evaluate the guidelines and bases used to determine vital 
equipment and areas to be protected in nuclear power plants, as 
documented in ``Vital Equipment/Area Guidelines Study: Vital Area 
Committee Report,'' NUREG-1178.
    In the attachment to SECY-99-241, the staff proposed to review the 
definition of radiological sabotage and consider ways to clarify the 
issue in a way that is meaningful for the protective strategy and 
enhances the process of performance evaluation. After considerable 
discussion, the staff determined that a definition of radiological 
sabotage at power reactors in the new rule may not be necessary if the 
regulation could delineate more clearly the performance criteria to be 
used as the basis for the new physical protection regulations. A series 
of public meetings were conducted, including representatives from 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and 
media, from which the staff developed a set of physical protection 
performance criteria in terms of public protection that are consistent 
with criteria used in other areas of nuclear power plant regulation. 
These performance criteria would provide the risk-informed basis for 
the comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor 
physical protection requirements, including the exercise requirement.
    These performance criteria are based on ensuring that a plant 
retains the capability to safely shutdown the reactor and assure long-
term heat removal in the face of a malevolent act by the design basis 
threat against the facility. The staff is developing performance 
criteria and requirements for 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect the plant 
against a malevolent act by protecting critical safety functions, 
including appropriate margin of safety, including:
    (1) reactivity control,
    (2) reactor coolant makeup for maintaining reactor and spent fuel 
pool inventory,
    (3) reactor and spent fuel pool heat removal,
    (4) containment of radioactive materials,
    (5) process monitoring necessary to perform and control the above 
functions, and
    (6) actions necessary to support the operation of the equipment 
used for safe shutdown.
    These performance criteria would clarify the scope of radiological 
sabotage which licensees are expected to protect. 10 CFR 73.55(b) and 
succeeding paragraphs would provide specific performance criteria for 
the physical security organization and response elements. As described 
in SECY-99-241, a new sub-section of 10 CFR 73.55 would require 
periodic drills and exercises and corrective actions for 
vulnerabilities identified in the exercises.
    The above performance criteria represent a new concept in 
formulating security programs and align security with other areas of 
regulation involving plant operations. This approach would provide 
insights on how the remainder of 10 CFR 73.55 might be revised. The 
staff believes that it is important to continue to have stakeholder 
involvement in the early stages of development of performance criteria.
    OSREs have been conducted since 1992 to test licensees' performance 
relative to the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(a). The last OSRE in the 
current cycle is scheduled for May 2000 and with the final rule not 
expected to be published for three years, steps have been taken by the 
staff to fill the gap between May 2000 and the time when the new rule 
is in place. In the short-term, OSREs will continue. Then, pending NRC 
endorsement, an industry proposal for a Self-Assessment Program will be 
used on a trial basis, with NRC oversight, to pilot the performance 
criteria envisioned in the revised physical protection regulations.
    Coordination: The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this 
paper and has no legal objection to its content. The FTE and resource 
issues involved in this paper are already budgeted.
    Recommendations: That the Commission: Approve (a) the staff's 
approach to re-evaluation of the power reactor physical protection 
regulations, and (b) the definition of radiological sabotage by 
providing design criteria as the basis for physical protection 
regulations.
    Note that: Upon the Commission's approval, the staff will (a) 
continue with this work to implement this approach in the new security 
regulations; (b) test these concepts in the industry Self-Assessment 
Program, as appropriate; and (c) publish this paper in the Federal 
Register for public comment, seeking comment on the approach described 
above for revising 10 CFR 73.55(a).

William D. Travers,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 00-14685 Filed 6-8-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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