alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  Annual  Report of  secured  Financial  Network,  Inc.,
formerly  12 top 20 Plus,  Inc.  (the  "Company")  on Form 10-KSB for the period
ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I,  Jeffrey L.  Schultz,  in my  capacity as
Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: May 12, 2005                              /s/ Jeffrey L. Schultz
                                               --------------------------------
                                                    Jeffrey L. Schultz
                                                    Principal Executive Officer
Honorable George H. Sheppard

Comptroller of Public Accounts Austin, Texas
Dear Sir: Opinion No. O-5204 Re: Duty of Comptroller of'Public Accounts to issue certificate ofpayment of inheritance taxes paid to local tax collector but not remitted toComptroller, and related questions.

Inyour letter of-April9, 1943, you enclosed photostatic copy of the original receipt of theTax Collector ofBexar County, dated December 1,,1925, receipting of tiO8.00 inheritance taxes. You stated that only P of'this amount was ever received by you. ?$~~~ Since you are requested to execute acertificate that all such taxes were paid, you desire the opinion of this department as to the proper reply tomake to this request.

Article 7132provides:
"All taxes received under this lawby any executor,administrator or trustee, shallbe paid by him to the tax collector of the county whose county court has jurisdiction of the estate of the decedent. Upon such payment, the collector shallmake duplicate receipts thereof and shall deliver one to the party making payment, the other he shall send to the amount thereof and shall countersign and affix his seal to such receipt and transmit-same to theparty making payment. Acts 1923, 2nd C. S,, p. 63." Apparently these taxes were properly paid to the Tax Collector ofBexar County, andhe issuedhis official receipt therefor. However, the photostatic copy of the receipt handed us.does not appear tohave been countersignedHonorable George H. Sheppard -- Page 2 O-5204

by the duly elected, qualified and acting Comptroller of Public Accounts.

Tax receipts are admissible toprove payment of taxes. Deen v0 Wills, 21 Texas 

## 642.But if the taxes arenot actually paid, the taxing authority may recover the same even though tax reqipts aremade out snd’delivered. Graves v. Bullen, 115 5. W. 1177, City ofGeorgetown v. Jones, 73 5. w. 22. ‘Withthe tax receipt now in thepossession of the taxp~?yer,we are of the opinion thathe can successfully resist any suit to collect these taxes, unless the taxing authority canproduce evidence that such taxes were not actually paid. But we areunable to find any statute making ityour dutv to issue certificates of thepayment of taxes not actually received by you. It is truethat the taxpayer paid the inheritance taxes inquestion to the proper official, but he did not follow the statute andreceive areceipt countersigned by the then Comptroller. The requested certificate is for the convenience of the taxpayer, but we are of the cpinicn that you areunder no legal duty to issue such certificate.
Yours very truly
ATTORNEY GENERAL OFTEXAS

BY Thos. B. Duggan, Jr. Assistant

TBD/pw--pam
APPROVED APR 28

## 1943 GERALD C.MANN ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
APPROVED OPINION COMMITTEE BY BWB, CHAIRMAN
§ 66.01-55 Transfer of ownership. ( a ) When any private aid to navigation authorized by the District Commander, or the essential real estate or facility with which the aid is associated, is sold or transferred, both parties to the transaction shall submit application (§ 66.01-5) to the Commander of the Coast Guard District in which the aid is located requesting authority to transfer responsibility for maintenance of the aid.
( b ) The party relinquishing responsibility for maintenance of the private aid to navigation shall indicate on the application form (CG-2554) both the discontinuance and the change of ownership of the aid sold or transferred.
( c ) The party accepting responsibility for maintenance of the private aid to navigation shall indicate on the application form (CG-2554) both the establishment and the change of ownership of the aid sold or transferred.
( d ) In the event the new owner of the essential real estate or facility with which the aid is associated refuses to accept responsibility for maintenance of the aid, the former owner shall be required to remove the aid without expense to the United States. This requirement shall not apply in the case of any authorized private aid to navigation required by statute or regulation (Class I, § 66.01-15) which shall be maintained by the new owner until the conditions which made the aid necessary have been eliminated.
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Summary of Annual Incentive
Plan

Krispy Kreme has an informal annual
incentive plan which represents, in most cases, the short-term component of our
incentive compensation package. This plan was originally adopted by the
Compensation Committee in July 2006 and was expanded to cover executive officers
in December 2006. This plan ties the incentive compensation payable to the
employee principally to the attainment of specific, objective performance
targets. These targets are based on actual overall company performance compared
to our business plan objectives. It is expected that key plan measurements will
include revenues, EBITDA, cash flow from operations, other company performance
metrics and, to reflect the importance of building sustainable growth, other
measurements based on progress in achieving our mission and strategic
objectives. The targets will not be based, implicitly or explicitly, on meeting
or exceeding any earnings guidance, consensus earnings estimates or similar
measures.

The amount of cash incentives potentially
payable to employees is determined based on (1) a target cash incentive amount
which is set as a percentage of an individual employees salary and (2) how
actual results compare to the targeted performance measures.

Key plan measurements for executive
officers and other employees normally will be determined on an annual basis and
cash incentives will be payable (in compliance with applicable tax rules
regarding deferred compensation) in the first quarter of the fiscal year
following the year in which performance is tested.

The Compensation Committee has the
authority under the annual incentive plan to adjust any goal with respect to the
executive officers and the other employees. These decisions are subjective and
based generally on a review of the circumstances affecting results to determine
if any events were unusual or unforeseen.

---
#### *Green v. Skipwith.

May, 1823.

Office Judgment — When It May Be Set Aside.*' — It is error in acourtof lawto enter a judgment against a defendant, on the day after a conditional judgment has been confirmed at the rules. The defendant has until the next term after the conditional judgment is confirmed in the office, to set it aside, under the act of assembly.

This was an action of debt, brought by Skipwith against Green, in the superior court of Mecklenburg. A conditional judgment was entered against Green and his appearance bail, which was confirmed on the 7th April, at the rules. On the 8th day of April following, judgment was rendered by the court, the defendant “still failing to answer the plaintiff’s action.”

Green obtained a supersedeas from a judge of the court of appeals.

*

Office Judgment — When It Can Be Placed on the

Docket. — In Hale v. Chamberlain, 13 Gratt. 660, it is said: “The provision as to making out the docket is substantially the same as that contained in the *1*Rev. Code 1819, p. 507, § 76, varied so far as was necessary to provide for motions. The law then as now provided that the docket was to be made out before the term, and it followed that no cause could be put on the docket in which there was an office judgment, unless such office judgment had been obtained before the term: and where the office judgment was obtained on the same day the term commenced, the canse could not be put upon the docket at that term. White v. Archer, 2 Va. Cas. 201; *Green v. Skipwith,*1 *Rand.*460.”

See principal case alsocited in Dillard v. Thornton, 29 Gratt. 398. Por further information on this subject see monographic *note*on “Judgments” appended to Smith v Charlton. 7 Gratt. 425.

JUDGE BROOKE,

May 19. — delivered the opinion of the court:

The court is of opinion, that it was error in the superior court to enter a judgment against the defendant, on the day after the conditional judgment had been confirmed at rules; the defendant having until the next term after the conditional judgment is confirmed in the office, tc set it aside, under the act of assembly.

The judgment is, therefore, reversed, and the cause remanded, with liberty to the appellant to plead and set the office judgment aside, on the usual terms, or to be final, in case of his failure to set it aside.
1

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1919

___________

Larry Coffman, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Jay Nixon; Joan L. Moriarty, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: September 1, 2004

Filed: September 3, 2004

___________

Before MELLOY, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Missouri inmate Larry Coffman appeals the district court’s1

 preservice

dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which he filed in forma

pauperis (IFP). Having carefully reviewed the record de novo, see Moore v. Sims,

200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), we conclude the district court

properly dismissed the complaint for the reasons explained by the court, see Waller

v. Groose, 38 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (previous preservice

dismissal as frivolous does not bar plaintiff from asserting identical claim in
-2-

subsequent fee-paid complaint, but such dismissal does have res judicata effect on

frivolousness determination for future IFP complaint asserting same claims).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
Editorial Note on Part 165
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 165 appear by USCG-2006-25556, 72 FR 36328, 36329, July 2, 2007 and by USCG-2018-1049, 84 FR 7813, Mar. 5, 2019.

§ 165.1157 Security Zone; Cruise Ships, Santa Barbara, California. ( a ) *Location.* The following areas are security zones: All navigable waters, from the surface to the sea floor within a 100-yard radius of any cruise ship located within 3 nautical miles of the Santa Barbara Harbor Breakwater Light (Light List Number 3750; 34-24-17.364 N, 119-41-16.260W).
( b ) *Definition.* “Cruise ship” as used in this section means any vessel, except for a ferry, over 100 feet in length, authorized to carry more than 12 passengers for hire; making voyages lasting more than 24 hours, any part of which is on the high seas; and for which passengers are embarked or disembarked in the U.S. or its territories.
( c ) *Regulations.* ( 1 ) Under general security zone regulations in subpart D, entry into or remaining in the zones described in paragraph (a) of this section is prohibited unless authorized by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) Los Angeles—Long Beach (LA-LB), or a designated representative of COTP LA-LB.
( 2 ) Persons desiring to transit the area of the security zone may contact the COTP LA-LB at telephone number 1-310-521-3801 or on VHF-FM channel 16 (156.800 MHz) to seek permission to transit the area. If permission is granted, all persons and vessels must comply with the instructions of the Captain of the Port, or his designated representative.
[USCG-2011-0906, 77 FR 65623, Oct. 30, 2012]
§ 64.11 Marking, notification, and approval requirements. ( a ) The owner and/or operator of a vessel, raft, or other craft wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel must mark it immediately with a buoy or beacon during the day and with a light at night. The requirement to mark the vessel, raft, or other craft with a light at night may be waived by the District Commander pursuant to § 64.13 of this subpart.
( b ) The owner and/or operator of a sunken vessel, raft, or other craft that constitutes a hazard to navigation must mark it in accordance with this subchapter.
( c ) The owner and/or operator of a sunken vessel, raft, or other craft must promptly report to the District Commander, in whose jurisdiction the vessel, raft, or other craft is located, the action they are taking to mark it. In addition to the information required by 46 CFR 4.05, the reported information must contain— ( 1 ) Name and description of the sunken vessel, raft, or other craft, including type and size;
( 2 ) Accurate description of the location of the sunken vessel, raft, or other craft, including how the position was determined;
( 3 ) Water depth; and
( 4 ) Location and type of marking established, including color and shape of buoy or other beacon and characteristic of the light, if fitted.
( d ) The owner and/or operator of a vessel, raft, or other craft wrecked and sunk in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or sunk on the high seas, if the owner is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, must promptly report to the District Commander, in whose jurisdiction the obstruction is located, the action they are taking to mark it in accordance with this subchapter. The reported information must contain the information listed in paragraph (c) of this section, including the information required by 46 CFR 4.05.
( e ) Owners and/or operators of other obstructions may report the existence of such obstructions and mark them in the same manner as prescribed for sunken vessels.
( f ) Owners and/or operators of marine pipelines that are determined to be hazards to navigation must report and mark the hazardous portion of those pipelines in accordance with 49 CFR parts 192 or 195, as applicable.
( g ) All markings of sunken vessels, rafts, or crafts and other obstructions established in accordance with this section must be reported to and approved by the appropriate District Commander.
( h ) Should the District Commander determine that these markings are inconsistent with part 62 of this subchapter, the markings must be replaced as soon as practicable with approved markings.
[USCG-2012-0054, 78 FR 77590, Dec. 24, 2013]
§ 154.2011 Application for acceptance as a certifying entity. ( a ) An applicant seeking Coast Guard acceptance as a certifying entity of vapor control systems (VCSs) must submit a signed, written application to the Commandant containing the information described in paragraph (b) of this section. The applicant's signature certifies that the information in the application is true and that the applicant is not dependent upon Coast Guard acceptance under this section to remain in business and constitutes consent for the Coast Guard to verify any information contained in the application, through personal examination of persons named in the application, or otherwise. If an applicant knowingly and willfully provides any false statement or misrepresentation, or conceals a material fact in the application, the application may be denied or terminated, and the applicant may be subject to prosecution under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1001.
( b ) An application must include the following general information: ( 1 ) The name and address of the applicant, including subsidiaries and divisions if applicable;
( 2 ) A description of the experience and qualifications of any person who would review or test systems on behalf of the applicant, showing that the person is familiar with or otherwise qualified to implement Coast Guard VCS regulations; and
( 3 ) A letter from a facility owner or operator stating his or her intent to use the services of the applicant to certify VCS installations.
( c ) The Commandant reviews each application and either issues a letter of acceptance as a certifying entity to the applicant, or notifies the applicant that it is not accepted, and maintains a list of currently accepted certifying entities that is available to the public at *http://homeport.uscg.mil .*
( d ) The acceptance of a certifying entity may be terminated by the Commandant for failure to review, inspect, or test a system properly in accordance with this subpart.
( e ) A certifying entity may not certify a facility VCS if that certifying entity was involved in the design or installation of the system. “Design or installation” includes, but is not limited to— ( 1 ) Performing system design calculations;
( 2 ) Providing chemical data;
( 3 ) Developing plans, specifications, and drawings;
( 4 ) Conducting failure analysis; and
( 5 ) Installing systems or components.
( f ) A certifying entity may not recertify a VCS design, configuration, or operational change if it was involved in that change, and may not conduct an operational review of a VCS if it has been involved in the design, installation, or operation of the VCS.
( g ) A certifying entity may not conduct the failure analysis of a facility VCS it is certifying. The certifying entity may only point out shortcomings shown by the failure analysis and may not propose changes to correct the shortcomings.
( h ) A certifying entity may not certify the VCS of any vessel or facility owner or operator that owns or has a controlling interest in the certifying entity.
[ EXHIBIT 32.1 ]

               CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report of International Star Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert
Hawkins, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


July 21, 2004                             /S/ Robert L. Hawkins
                                              ------------------------------
                                              President and Chief
                                              Executive Officer
CERTIFICATION
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Aceto Corporation, a New York corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Douglas Roth, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:
  (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 /s/ Douglas Roth
 Chief Financial Officer
 (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
 May 6, 2011
#### § 62.31 Special marks.

Special marks are not primarily intended to assist safe navigation, but to indicate special areas or features referred to in charts or other nautical publications. They may be used, for example, to mark anchorages, cable or pipeline areas, traffic separation schemes, military exercise zones, ocean data acquisition systems, etc. Special marks are colored solid yellow.
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

In the Interest of R.T.M. and I.M., Children

No. 06

- 14

- 00063

- CV Appeal from the 354th District Court of Hunt County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 79,495 ). Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Carter participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

. We note that the appellant s have adequately indicated their inability to pay costs of
appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED DECEMBER 4, 2014 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk