This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

36391

Vol. 65, No. 111

Thursday, June 8, 2000

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–127–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Learjet

Model 35, 35A, 36, and 36A Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to all

Learjet Model 35, 35A, 36, and 36A

series airplanes. This proposal would

require revision of the Airplane Flight

Manual (AFM) to add procedures for

donning the flightcrew oxygen masks

when the cabin altitude warning horn is

activated. This action is intended to

prevent incapacitation of the flightcrew

due to lack of oxygen and consequent

loss of control of the airplane due to

absence of AFM procedures for donning

the flightcrew oxygen masks when the

cabin altitude warning horn is activated.

DATES: Comments must be received by

July 24, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–

127–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays. Comments may be

submitted via fax to (425) 227–1232.

Comments may also be sent via the

Internet using the following address: 9-

anm-nprmcomment@faa.gov. Comments

sent via fax or the Internet must contain

‘‘Docket No. 2000–NM–127–AD’’ in the

subject line and need not be submitted

in triplicate.

Information regarding this docket may

be examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ben

Sorensen, Flight Test Pilot, ACE–117W,

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate,

Wichita Aircraft Certification Office,

1801 Airport Road, Room 100, MidContinent Airport, Wichita, Kansas

67209; telephone (316) 946–4165; fax

(316) 946–4407.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following

format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue.

For example, discuss a request to

change the compliance time and a

request to change the service bulletin

reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific

change to the proposed AD is being

requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or

data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 2000–NM–127–AD.’’

The postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

2000–NM–127–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

On October 25, 1999, a Learjet Model

35 series airplane operating under part

135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR 135) departed Orlando

International Airport enroute to Dallas,

Texas. Air traffic control lost

communication with the airplane near

Gainsville, Florida. Air Force and

National Guard airplanes intercepted

the airplane, but the flightcrews of the

chase airplanes indicated that the

windows of the Model 35 series airplane

were apparently frosted over and

prevented the chase airplane flightcrews

from observing the interior of the Model

35 series airplane. The flightcrews of the

chase airplanes reported that they did

not observe any damage to the airplane.

Subsequently, the Model 35 series

airplane ran out of fuel and crashed in

South Dakota. To date, causal factors of

the accident have not been determined.

However, lack of the Learjet flightcrew’s

response to air traffic control poses the

possibility of flightcrew incapacitation

and raises concerns with the

pressurization and oxygen systems.

Recognizing these concerns, the FAA

initiated a special certification review

(SCR) to determine if pressurization and

oxygen systems on Model 35 series

airplanes were certificated properly, and

to determine if any unsafe design

features exist in the pressurization and

oxygen systems.

The SCR team found that there have

been several accidents and incidents

that may have involved incapacitation

of the flightcrews during flight. In one

case, the airplane flightcrew did not

activate the pressurization system or

don their oxygen masks and the airplane

flew in excess of 35,000 feet altitude. In

another case, the airplane flightcrews

did not don their oxygen masks when

the cabin aural warning was activated.

Further review by the SCR team

indicates that the Airplane Flight

Manual (AFM) of Learjet Model 35/36

series airplanes do not have an

emergency procedure that requires

donning the flightcrew oxygen masks

when the cabin altitude aural warning is

36392 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 111 / Thursday, June 8, 2000 / Proposed Rules

activated. Additional review has found

that the AFM’s of Model 35A and 36A

series airplanes also do not contain

appropriate flightcrew actions when the

cabin altitude aural warning is

activated. However, the AFM’s do

contain an abnormal procedure that

allows the flightcrew to troubleshoot the

pressurization system prior to donning

the oxygen masks after the cabin

altitude warning sounds.

Troubleshooting may delay donning of

the oxygen masks to the point that

flightcrews may become incapable of

donning their oxygen masks.

The SCR findings indicated that the

most likely cause for incapacitation was

hypoxia (lack of oxygen). The only other

plausible cause of incapacitation is

exposure to toxic substances. However,

no evidence was found to support the

existence of toxic substances.

Delayed response of the flightcrew in

donning oxygen masks when the

activation of the cabin altitude warning

horn could lead to incapacitation of the

flightcrew and loss of control of the

airplane.

Explanation of Requirements of

Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the proposed AD would

require revising Emergency Procedures

Section of the AFM to provide the

flightcrew with appropriate and timely

actions in response to activation of the

cabin altitude warning horn.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 739 Learjet

Model 35, 35A, 36, and 36A series

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that

500 airplanes of U.S. registry would be

affected by this proposed AD, that it

would take approximately 1 work hour

per airplane to accomplish the proposed

actions, and that the average labor rate

is $60 per work hour. Based on these

figures, the cost impact of the proposed

AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be

$30,000, or $60 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this proposed AD were not adopted. The

cost impact figures discussed in AD

rulemaking actions represent only the

time necessary to perform the specific

actions actually required by the AD.

These figures typically do not include

incidental costs, such as the time

required to gain access and close up,

planning time, or time necessitated by

other administrative actions.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have a substantial direct

effect on the States, on the relationship

between the national Government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

it is determined that this proposal

would not have federalism implications

under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

Learjet: Docket 2000–NM–127–AD.

Applicability: Model 35, 35A, 36, and 36A

series airplanes, certificated in any category.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent incapacitation of the flightcrew

and consequent loss of control of the airplane

due to delays in donning oxygen masks in

response to the activation of the cabin

altitude warning horn; accomplish the

following:

(a) Within 10 days after the effective date

of this AD, revise the Emergency Procedure

Section of the FAA-Approved Airplane

Flight Manual (AFM) to include the

following. This may be accomplished by

inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM.

‘‘CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING HORN

ACTIVATES (EMERGENCY DESCENT)

1. Oxygen Masks—Don. Select 100%

oxygen.

2. Thrust Levers—IDLE.

3. Autopilot—Disengage.

4. SPOILER switch—EXT.

5. Landing gear switch—DN below MMO

VLE as appropriate for altitude. Keep sideslip

angles to a minimum (ball centered) when

extending gear.

6. Descend at MMO or VLE as appropriate,

but NOT below minimum safe altitude.

7. PASS OXY Valve—NORM.

8. PASS MASK Valve—MAN.

WARNING: If pressurization loss is due to

structural failure, limit speeds and

maneuvering loads as much as possible

in descent.

NOTE:

Descent from 45,000 feet to 15,000 feet

requires approximately 2 minutes 45

seconds.

Hats and ‘‘ear-muff’’ type headsets must be

removed prior to donning crew oxygen

masks.

Communication between crewmembers

can be accomplished by using the INPH

function of the AUDIO CONTROL

PANEL and adjusting the MASTER VOL.

Communication with passengers can be

accomplished by using PASS SPKR

function of the AUDIO CONTROL panel

and adjusting the PASS SPKR VOL level.

The HORN SILENCE switch will mute the

cabin altitude warning horn for 60

seconds.

If Time and Conditions Permit:

9. Transponder—Emergency 7700.

10. Pilot and Copilot OXY—MIC

switches—ON.

11. Notify controlling agency.

12. Check condition of passengers and

provide assistance if conditions permit.’’

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Wichita

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall

submit their requests through an appropriate

FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who

may add comments and then send it to the

Manager, Wichita ACO.

Note 1: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Wichita ACO.

Special Flight Permit

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 111 / Thursday, June 8, 2000 / Proposed Rules 36393

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 2,

2000.

Donald L. Riggin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–14438 Filed 6–7–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[CGD01–00–146]

RIN 2115–AA97

Security Zone: Dignitary Arrival/

Departure and United Nations

Meetings, New York, NY

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to

establish two permanent security zones

near the United Nations Headquarters

located on the East River at East 43rd

Street, Manhattan, New York. This

action is necessary to protect the Port of

New York/New Jersey and visiting

dignitaries against terrorism, sabotage or

other subversive acts and incidents of a

similar nature during the dignitaries’

meetings at the United Nations

Headquarters. This action establishes

two permanent exclusion areas that are

active from shortly before the

dignitaries’ arrival at the United Nations

General Assembly meetings until

shortly after their departure.

DATES: Comments and related material

must reach the Coast Guard on or before

July 24, 2000.

ADDRESSES: You may mail comments

and related material to Waterways

Oversight Branch (CGD01–00–006),

Coast Guard Activities New York, 212

Coast Guard Drive, room 205, Staten

Island, New York 10305. The

Waterways Oversight Branch of Coast

Guard Activities New York maintains

the public docket for this rulemaking.

Comments and material received from

the public, as well as documents

indicated in this preamble as being

available in the docket, will become part

of this docket and will be available for

inspection or copying at room 205,

Coast Guard Activities New York,

between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Lieutenant M. Day, Waterways

Oversight Branch, Coast Guard

Activities New York (718) 354–4012.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Request for Comments

We encourage you to participate in

this rulemaking by submitting

comments and related material. If you

do so, please include your name and

address, identify the docket number for

this rulemaking (CGD01–00–006),

indicate the specific section of this

document to which each comment

applies, and give the reason for each

comment. Please submit all comments

and related material in an unbound

format, no larger than 81⁄2 by 11 inches,

suitable for copying. The comment

period for this proposed regulation is 45

days. This time period is adequate to

allow local input because the locations

have been used for United Nations

General Assembly Security Zones in

previous years. The shortened comment

period will still allow the full 30-day

publication requirement prior to the

final rule becoming effective. If you

would like to know they reached us,

please enclose a stamped, self-addressed

postcard or envelope. We will consider

all comments and material received

during the comment period. We may

change this proposed rule in view of

them.

Public Meeting

We do not now plan to hold a public

meeting. But you may submit a request

for a meeting by writing to the

Waterways Oversight Branch at the

address under ADDRESSES explaining

why one would be beneficial. If we

determine that one would aid this

rulemaking, we will hold one at a time

and place announced by a later notice

in the Federal Register.

Background and Purpose

New York City is often visited by the

President and Vice President of the

United States, as well as visiting heads

of foreign states or foreign governments,

on the average of 12 times per year.

Often these visits are on short notice.

The President, Vice President, and

visiting heads of foreign states or foreign

governments require Secret Service

protection. Due to the sensitive nature

of these visits, a security zone is needed.

Standard security procedures are

enacted to ensure the proper level of

protection to prevent sabotage or other

subversive acts, accidents, or other

activities of a similar nature. In the past,

temporary security zones were

requested by the U.S. Secret Service

with limited notice for preparation by

the U.S. Coast Guard and no

opportunity for public comment.

Establishing permanent security zones

by notice and comment rulemaking

gives the public the opportunity to

comment on the proposed location and

size of the zones. The proposed

regulation establishes two permanent

security zones that could be activated

upon request of the U.S. Secret Service

pursuant to their authority under 18

U.S.C. 3056.

These security zones have been

narrowly tailored, in consultation with

the United States Secret Service and the

maritime industry, to impose the least

impact on maritime interests yet

provide the level of security deemed

necessary. Entry into or movement

within these proposed security zones

would be prohibited unless authorized

by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port,

New York. The activation of a particular

security zone will be announced via

facsimile and marine information

broadcasts.

Discussion of Proposed Rule

The two proposed security zones are

as follows (all nautical positions are

based on North American Datum of

1983):

The first proposed security zone at

United Nations Headquarters includes

all waters of the East River bound by the

following points: 40°44′37′′ N,

073°58′16.5′′W (the base of East 35th

Street, Manhattan), then east to

40°44′34.5′′N, 073°58′10.5′′W (about 175

yards offshore of Manhattan), then

northeasterly to 40°45′29′′ N,

073°57′26.5′′W (about 125 yards offshore

of Manhattan at the Queensboro Bridge),

then northwesterly to 40°45′31′′ N,

073°57′30.5′′W (Manhattan shoreline at

the Queensboro Bridge), then southerly

to the starting point at 40°44′37′′ N,

073°58′16.5′′W. The proposed security

zone prevents vessels from transiting a

portion of the East River. Marine traffic

will still be able to transit through the

eastern 100 yards of the western

channel of the East River. Additionally,

vessels may transit through the eastern

channel of the East River during this

security zone. This zone is generally

enacted from 8 a.m. until 7 p.m. during

the United Nations General Assembly

meetings. Generally, these meetings take

place from Monday through Saturday

for two consecutive weeks. Normally

this occurs between the final two weeks

of September and the first two weeks of

October.

This proposal is necessary to protect

the Port of New York/New Jersey and

visiting dignitaries against terrorism,

sabotage or other subversive acts and

incidents of a similar nature during the

dignitaries’ meetings at the United

Nations Headquarters. This security

zone has been narrowly tailored, in

consultation with the United States

Secret Service and the maritime