alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Nashua District Court

No. 7104

#### State of New Hampshire v. Charles Kolocotronis

October 29, 1976

*David H. Souter,*attorney general, and *Edward A. Haffer,*assistant attorney general *(Mr. Haffer*orally), for the State.

*612
      *Prolman & Holland (Mr. Francis G. Holland*orally) for the defendant.

Bois, J.

The defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. RSA 262-A:62 (Supp. 1975). The conviction was subject to a determination of an oral motion to dismiss which, after hearing, the District Court *(Harkaway,*J.) denied and reserved and transferred the defendant’s exceptions.

According to the agreed statement of facts the State police officer had been operating his cruiser within the city limits of Nashua when he noticed defendant’s vehicle proceeding at a slow rate of speed. The officer noticed the vehicle cross a portion of the solid line prior to making a right turn. He pursued and stopped the vehicle and eventually effected an arrest for “driving under the influence.” The officer admitted that he had not begun his pursuit with the thought that a crime had been committed.

Defendant relies on RSA 106-BT5 for his argument that the arrest was unlawful. The statute provides that a State police officer “shall not act within the limits of a town having a population of more than three thousand or of any city, except when he witnesses a crime ....” Since Nashua is a city and the officer’s pursuit was not initiated in the belief that a “crime” had been committed, the defendant challenges the officer’s statutory authority to act.

We have previously observed that the restrictions on law enforcement embodied in RSA 106-B:15 are designed to minimize friction between law enforcement agencies and provide for the efficient use of the State police. *State v. Bennett,*116 N.H. 433, 362 A.2d 184 (1976).

Notwithstanding the officer’s personal judgment, it is evident from the agreed statement of facts that his pursuit was initiated by his observation of possible motor vehicle violations. *Id.; State v. Landry,*116 N.H. 288, 358 A.2d 661 (1976); *see*RSA 262-A:21 and 262-A:2 (Supp. 1975) as well as 262-A:57 (Supp. 1975). We held in *State v. Bennett supra,*that motor vehicle violations constituted criminal activity within the meaning of RSA 106-B:15.

We conclude that in the instant case the officer had statutory authority to act, and that the resulting arrest was valid. *State v. Slayton,*116 N.H. 613, 367 A.2d 575 (1976), decided this day.

*Exception overruled.*

All concurred.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                    SUBSIDIARIES OF ASIAINFO HOLDINGS, INC.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                      State or other
                                    Name under which                   jurisdiction
       Subsidiary             the subsidiary does business           of incorporation
       ----------             ----------------------------           ----------------
<S>                       <C>                                   <C>
AsiaInfo H.K. Limited     AsiaInfo HK                           Hong Kong
AsiaInfo (H.K.) Systems   AsiaInfo HK                           Hong Kong
 Co. Limited
AsiaInfo Technologies     AsiaInfo Chengdu                      People's Republic of China
 (Chengdu), Inc.
AsiaInfo Technologies     AsiaInfo Technologies                 People's Republic of China
 (China), Inc.
Bonson Information        Bonson Information Technology Limited Cayman Islands
 Technology Holdings
 Limited(/1/)
Bonson Information        Bonson Information Technology Limited British Virgin Islands
 Technology Limited(/1/)
Guangdong Wangying        Wangying                              People's Republic of China
 Information Technology
 Co. Ltd.
Guangzhou Bonson          Bonson Information Technology Limited People's Republic of China
 Information Technology
 Limited(/1/)
Marsec Holdings, Inc.     Marsec                                Cayman Islands
Marsec System Inc.        Marsec                                People's Republic of China
</TABLE>
--------
(1) These were acquired on February 6, 2002.
#### § 6.16-3 Precautions against sabotage.

The master, owner, agent, or operator of a vessel or waterfront facility shall take all necessary precautions to protect the vessel, waterfront facility, and cargo, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure thereon or therein, from sabotage.

[E.O. 14116, 89 FR 13973, Feb. 26, 2024]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-22361-CIV-ALTONAGA/Torres

VICTOR FARISH,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAUL PEREIRA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte. On July 28, 2022, Plaintiff Victor Farish

filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] asserting 10 claims for relief. (See id. ¶¶ 129–81). The next day, 

the Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. (See July 29, 2022 Order 

[ECF No. 4]). The Order gave Plaintiff until August 11, 2022, to correct the deficiencies identified 

in the Order. (See id. 2–3). To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and the deadline 

to do so has passed. 

Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The 

Clerk is instructed to mark the case as CLOSED. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 16th day of August, 2022.

 ________________________________________

 CECILIA M. ALTONAGA

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:22-cv-22361-CMA Document 5 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/16/2022 Page 1 of 1
Dulce Figueroa DBA Perfect Landscaping

Business Name Loan Type Date Amount Trans Type Lender Acct #

Dulce Figueroa DBA Perfect Landscaping EIDL 7/27/2020 $72,800 Preauthorized Credit SBA 3145

Funded Loans 

Case 9:22-cr-80144-RS Document 204-35 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2023 Page 1 of 1
§ 183.235 Level flotation test without weights for persons capacity. When the conditions prescribed in § 183.220 (a) and (d) through (h) are met, the boat must float in fresh, calm water as follows: ( a ) The angle of heel does not exceed 10 degrees from the horizontal.
( b ) Any point on either the forward or aft reference area is above the surface of the water.
( c ) The reference depth at the reference area that is opposite the reference area that is above the surface of the water is 6 inches or less.
[CGD 77-145, 43 FR 56859, Dec. 4, 1978, as amended by USCG-1999-5832, 64 FR 34716, June 29, 1999]
§ 156.415 Notification. ( a ) Except as provided for in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section, the master, owner or agent of each oil tanker subject to this subpart planning to conduct STS Operations in the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the United States must give at least 48 hours advance notice to the COTP nearest the geographic position chosen to conduct these operations. This advance notice must include: ( 1 ) The oil tanker's name, call sign or official number, and registry;
( 2 ) The cargo type and approximate amount onboard;
( 3 ) The number of transfers expected, the amount of cargo expected to be transferred during each transfer, and whether such transfer will be conducted at anchor or underway;
( 4 ) The date, estimated time of arrival, and geographical location at the commencement of the planned STS Operations;
( 5 ) The estimated duration of STS Operations;
( 6 ) The name and destination of receiving oil tanker(s);
( 7 ) Identification of STS Operations service provider or person in overall advisory control and contact information; and
( 8 ) Confirmation that the oil tanker has onboard an approved STS Operations Plan.
( b ) If the estimated arrival time of an oil tanker to the reported geographic location for the commencement of STS operation changes by more than 6 hours, the master, owner, or agent of that oil tanker must provide a revised estimated time of arrival to the COTP.
( c ) Where STS Operations are conducted as a result of collision, grounding, tank rupture or any similar emergency, the master, owner, or agent of a vessel must give immediate notice to the Coast Guard office.
( d ) In addition to the other requirements in this section, the master, owner, or agent of a vessel that requires a Certificate of Compliance (COC) or other special Coast Guard inspection in order to conduct STS Operations must request the COC or other inspection from the cognizant Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) at least 72 hours prior to commencement of STS Operations.
( e ) The STS Operation advanced notice is in addition to the Notification of Arrival requirements in 33 CFR part 160.
( f ) If all of the information specified in paragraph (a) is not available 48 hours in advance of a planned STS Operation, the oil tanker discharging the oil cargo must notify the COTP at least 48 hours in advance that an STS Operation will occur. In such a circumstances, the information specified in paragraph (a) must be provided to the COTP at the earliest opportunity.
( g ) If STS operations are conducted under exigent circumstances to secure the safety of a ship, to save life at sea, or combat specific incidents in order to minimize the damage from pollution within the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the United States, the master, owner, or agent of each oil tanker subject this subpart shall provide notice with adequate explanation, as soon as practicable, to the COTP nearest the geographic position where the exigent STS operation took place.
#### § 17.05-10 Instructions for administration.

The Commandant, United States Coast Guard, will issue such detailed instructions as may be necessary for the administration of the “United States Coast Guard General Gift Fund” or for the acceptance, operation, or maintenance of property, real or personal, that may be accepted for the benefit of or in connection with any school, hospital, library, museum, chapel, or other institution or organization under the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard subject to the terms and conditions of any particular gift, devise, or bequest.

[CGFR 61-36, 26 FR 9321, Oct. 3, 1961]
I

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4965

To amend the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, to extend

the time period during which persons may file a complaint alleging

the preparation of false inspection certificates at Hunts Point Terminal

Market, Bronx, New York.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 26, 2000

Mr. CONDIT (for himself, and Mr. POMBO) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

A BILL

To amend the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,

1930, to extend the time period during which persons

may file a complaint alleging the preparation of false

inspection certificates at Hunts Point Terminal Market,

Bronx, New York.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF TIME PERIOD FOR FILING CER4 TAIN COMPLAINTS UNDER PERISHABLE AG5 RICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930.

6 Section 6(a)(1) of the Perishable Agricultural Com7 modities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C. 499f(a)(1)) is amended by
2

•HR 4965 IH

1 adding at the end the following: ‘‘Notwithstanding the pre2 ceding sentence, a person that desires to file a complaint

3 under this section involving the allegation of false inspec4 tion certificates prepared by graders of the Department

5 of Agriculture at Hunts Point Terminal Market, Bronx,

6 New York, prior to October 27, 1999, may file the com7 plaint until January 1, 2001.’’.

Æ
#### § 25.709 Assessment limitation on claims.

A claim is permitted in any amount; however, this subpart prohibits any assessment that exceeds one-half of one month's basic pay against the pay of any offender.
#### Fretwell v. Wayt and Winn.

April, 1823.

Interlocutory Decree — What Constitutes — Appeals,*— Where an appeal is taken from an interlocutory decree of a county court to the court of chancery, and that court aifirms the decree, and an appeal is taken to the court of appeals; the decree of the court of chancery will be considered as interlocutory.

The only question in this case was whether the decree of the chancellor was interlocutory or final.

*Fretwell filed a bill of injunction in the county court of Albemarle, against Wayt and Winn and others. The injunction was granted, and afterwards dissolved. From this order of dissolution, an appeal was granted to the Staunton chancery court, where the order was affirmed. Fretwell appealed to- this court.

The counsel for the appellees, moved^ to dismiss the appeal, (the appellant having been called, and not appearing,) on the ground that the decree of the chancellor was interlocutory only; and that under the law, the appellee may call up an interlocutory decree, at any time within sixty days.

*

See monographic *note*on “Decrees” appended to Evans v. Spurgin, 11 Gratt. 615.

JUDGE BROOKE,

April 5th. — delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question in this case is, whether the decree of the chancery court, affirming the decree of the county court, is interlocutory or final. If final, the appeal must take its turn on the docket, and cannot now be dismissed upon calling the appellant. If interlocutory only, the appellee has a right to call it up within the sixty days prescribed by the act of assembly, and it may be dismissed unless prosecuted by the appellant.

The court, upon consideration of the provisions of the act, is inclined to give^ it a construction, which will best accord with the obvious intention of the legislature. An appeal from an interlocutory decree in such case, was allowed by the act, to avoid expense and .delay, and in order to settle the principles of the cause. The direction in the.act, that the record is to be sent to this court, within two calendar months, and the appeal to he heard and determined, within sixty days, was intended to effect the same object.

If in this case then, the decree is to be considered a final decree, because it has been affirmed in the court of chancery, the provisions of the act in relation to interlocutory decrees, would be defeated.

*The court, therefore, is of opinion, that the decree of the chancery court, affirming the decree of the county court, has not changed its character, and that both ‘decrees are still to be considered as interlocutory; and that the appellant having been called and failing to answer, the appeal is to be dismissed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-30731 Summary Calendar

CORBY D. COOVER; MARIA COOVER; BRYANA COOVER, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (USDC No. 99-CV-1920)

_______________________________________________________ December 7, 2000 Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * 

### Sgt. Corby Coover, his wife Maria Coover, and his daughter Bryana Coover appeal from summary judgment on their claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act,2



### ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Because Sgt. Coover was injured (1) while on active duty, (2) while performing military duties, and (3) at Fort Polk, the district court correctly applied the Feres doctrine. See United States v. Johnson , 481 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1987); Feres v. United States , 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). Under the law and holding of the Supreme Court, the suit of the Coovers is barred. AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Patrick J. Allin, certify that:

1.       I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Patron Systems,
Inc.;

2.       Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;

3.       Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4.       The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
         material information relating to the registrant, including its
         consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
         entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report
         is being prepared;

         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
         and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
         this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

         c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
         effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
         evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.       The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

         a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
         controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
         record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
         identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
         internal controls; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
         other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's
         internal controls; and

6.       The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: December 29, 2003

/s/ Patrick J. Allin
------------------------------
Patrick J. Allin
Chief Executive Officer and
Acting Chief Financial Officer
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 27, 2019

izm 

# Order

Clerk December 27, 2019

160728

In re TERRELL

___________________________________________

ROBERT EDWARD TERRELL,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 160728

COA: 350598

KALAMAZOO CIRCUIT COURT,

Defendant

- Appellee.

___________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it i s

DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable

for filing fees.

Within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the

Court the initial partial filing fee of $20.00; submit a copy of t his order; and refile the

copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall

result in the dismissal of this application.

If appellant timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments

shall be m ade to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits

made to appellant’s account until the payments equal the balance due of $355.00. This

amount shall then be remitted to this Court.

Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in

this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full.

The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return

a copy of appellant’s pleadings with this order.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Stanley ADDISON, Claimant of One 1957 Cadillac Convertible, Motor No. 5762-098831, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Appellees.

No. 17046.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 7, 1958.

*909O. B. Cline, Jr., James L. Guilmartin, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of Florida, David C. Clark, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for appellant.

Dean Boggs, Jacksonville, Fla., Murray Goodman, Miami Beach, Fla., Boggs, Blalock & Holbrook, Jacksonville, Fla., for appellees.

Before RIVES, TUTTLE and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This case is in all respects controlled by our decision in United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Automobile, 5 Cir., 256 F.2d 931. The facts in that case, as in this, present in its starkest outline the rigidity and admitted severity of the provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. § 782, requiring forfeiture of an automobile, not a common carrier, in which a passenger, without the knowledge of the owner or lienor, is committing or has committed a crime prohibited by 49 U.S.C.A. § 781 (relating to narcotics crimes).

The language of the statute, however, is plain, and neither the District Court nor this Court is allowed any discretion in its application.

The judgment is reversed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-7601

DARRYL A. MCPHAUL,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

ERIK A. HOOKS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:17-cv-00333-FDW)

Submitted: May 17, 2018 Decided: May 18, 2018

Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darryl A. McPhaul, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Darryl A. McPhaul seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as 

untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) 

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court 

denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on 

procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McPhaul has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED