### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 07 -00 330 -CV

M ilt on H ill , I ndiv idua llyand o n be hal f of The He ir s o f Andr e a K . Hi ll , A ppe lla nt
v. Kim berly Ann Russell, CRNA , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0005 64 , HO NORAB LE STEP HEN Y ELENOSK Y , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Appellant Milton Hill, i ndividually and on behalf of t he heir s of Andre a K. Hill, filed a hea lth care liability

claim ag ai n s t appellee Kimberly Ann Russell, CR

NA. Russell sought summary judgme nt, arguing that Mr. Hill’s suit was barre d by limit ations. The trial court a g ree d, g rantingsummary

judgme nt in Russ ell’s favor. Mr. Hill appe als, and we reve rse a nd rema nd.
F ac tu al b ac kgr ound Andre a K. Hill, Mr. Hill’s daug hter, died dur ing sur g ery for re m o val of a

cy st on September 23, 2004. Russell, a nurse a nesthetist, provided ane sthesia servic es to Ms. Hill during surg ery . On September

21, 2006, Mr. Hill sent Russell a noti ce of claim pursuant to section 74.051 of the c ivil practice and re med i es code. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.051 (We s t 2 0 0 5 )
. M r . H il l n e g le c te d to e n c lo s e w it

h th e n o ti c e th e f

o r m a u th o r iz in g th e r e le a s e of Ms. Hill’s health information, which is require d by section 74.052. Se e id . § 74.052 (West 2005).Mr. Hill also sued the hospital whe re the surg ery took place. A fter the trial court g rante d 1 summa ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f R us se ll, it sev ered Mr . H ill ’s c la ims a g a ins t Ru sse ll f ro m th os e ag ainst the hospital. Claims related to the hospital are not before us in this cause. I n h is o ri g ina l pe tit ion , M r. Hi ll m ist a ke nly re fe rr e d to the no tic e re qu ir e me nts of “ Ar tic le 2 45 90 i, S e c tio n 4 .0 1( a ) o f t he Me dic a l L ia

bil ity and I ns ur anc e I mpr ov e me nt A c t.” Ho we ve r, art ic le 4590i, which included a

notice re quirement a

nd allowed for the tolling of limit ations upon proper notice, wa s repe aled eff

ective September 1, 2003, and repla ced by section 74.051 of the c ivil practice and re medies code
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.051 (West 2005). This minor err or in p le a din g is n ot a

n is su e on a pp e a l. 2 Mr. Hill corre cted that omission fo u r d ay s later, se nding the authorization form to Russell on Se pte mbe r 25 , 20 06
. On De c e mbe r 6, 20 06 , Mr . H ill fi le d s uit a g a ins t Ru sse ll, asser

ting that she 1 had bre ache d the s tandar d of care in her treatment of Ms. Hill, resulting in Ms. Hill’s death. Rus se ll 2
mo v e d f o r s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n t , ar g u i n g t h a t M r . H i l l ’ s c l a i m s w e r e b ar r e d b y t h e t w o - y e a r s ta tut e of limitations on health care liability claims. Se e id . § 74.251 (West 2005)
. Mr. Hill responded that his suit was tim ely

under se ction 74.051(c) , which tolls the running of limit ations for se venty -five day s if a cla imant provides the def endant wi t h notice of a

claim under

chapte r 74. Se e id
. § 7 4. 05 1( c ). Rus se ll a

rgue d th a t be c a

us e Mr . H ill did no t pro vid e the a uth or iza tio n for

m withhis notice and within two y ear s of Ms. H ill’s de ath, Mr. Hill did not provide Russell proper notice that would toll the running of

limit ations. The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt in Russell’s favor. Mr. Hill moved for a new tr ial, which wa s overr uled as a matter of la

w. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(c).
Discussion I t is undisputed that Mr. Hil l did not file his suit withi n two y ear s of Ms. Hill’s death. Th e re fo re , h is s uit

is b arr e d b y

lim itatio ns un le ss he c an re ly on a tol lin g pr ov isi on that mak e s h is suit—filed on Dec ember 6, 2006, approximately two y ear s and two months after the ca use of a ction3

acc rued—timely . The issue be fore us, then, is w hether Mr. Hill’s f ailure to include the authorization form with his notice of c laim, which was pr ovided to Russell withi n two y ear s of Ms. Hill’s death, means that the notice did not toll the running of limit ations until suit was filed. Russell insi sts that proper notice t h at al l o ws a plaintiff to re ly on section 74.051(c ) for tolling re quires thre e elements—the no t i ce itself, the medical a uthorization form, and servic e by cer tified mail. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.051(a ). B eca use the noti ce timely sent by Mr. Hill lacked the authorization form, she argues, the notice was insuffic ient to trigg er the seventy -five da y tolling of limitations. M r. Hill, o n t h e other hand, conte nds that his failure to include the form did not invalidate his timely

notice and that Russell was at most entitl ed to a four -day abate ment under section 74.052(a ). See id. § 74.052(a) (fa ilure to include a uthorization wi th notice abates proce eding s ag ainst defe ndant “until 60 day s following rec eipt” of authorization form). Be cause we ag ree with Mr. Hill that the authorization form is a separ ate document from the require d “notice” that trig g ers tolling unde r sec tion 74.05(c), we reve rse the tr ial co u rt ’s g rantingof summary judgme nt
and re mand the c a us e fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. We reviewthe g rantingof summary judgme nt de novo an d u n d er well-established standards of

revie w. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Di v e rsi c ar e Ge n. Pa rt ner , In c . v . R ub io , 185 S.W .3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). “A de fenda nt moving for

summary judgme nt on the aff

irmative defe nse of li m i t ati ons has the burde n to conclusively establish that defe nse, including the ac crua l date of the cause of action. I f the movant e stablishes that the statute of limitations bars the ac tion, the nonmovant must then adduce summary judgme nt pr oof raising a fac t issue in avoidance of the statute of limitations.” DiversicareGen. Partner , 185 S.W .3d at 846 (c itations omi tted).4 Section 74.051 require s a hea lth care liability claimant to
g ive wr itt e n n oti c e of

su c h c la im .
. . to e a c h p hy sic ian o r h e a lthc are pr ov ide r a g a ins t whom such cla im is being made at least 60 day s befor e the filing of a suit . . . . The no tic e mus t be ac c omp anie d by the a uth or iza tio n f

or m f or re le a se of pr ote c te d h e a lth information as re quired unde r Section 74.052.

. . . . (c) Notice g iven as provide d in this chapter sha ll to l l the applica ble statute of limit ations to and including a per iod of 75 day s following the g iving of the notice.
Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e § 7 4. 05 1( a ), (c ). Se c tio n 7 4. 05 2 p ro vid e s th a t
N o t i c e o f a h e a l t h c ar e c l a i m u n d e r S e c t i o n 7 4
. 0 5 1 m u s tb e a c c o mp an i e d b y a me dic a l a utho riza tio n in

the fo rm sp e c if ie d b y thi s se c tio n. F a ilure to p ro vid e thi s authorization along with the n o t i ce of hea lth care claim shall abate all furthe r pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t th e ph y sic ian or he a lthc are pr ov ide r r e c e ivi ngthe no tic e un til 60 day s fol lowing r ece ipt by the phy sician or he alth car e provide r of the r equire d authorization.

Id . § 74.052(a)
.

Ru s s el l co n t en d s t h at b ec au s e t h e au t h o ri z at i o nfo rm i s re qu i re d b y s ec t ion 74.051(a), its absence rende red Mr . Hill’s notice ineff ective to trig g er the s ev enty -five da y tolling per iod. Russell’s argument, howeve r, re quires us to rea d the statute more strictly than nec essar

y and re quires
u s t o i mp l y

l an gu age t h at t h e l egi s l at u r e c h o s e n o t t o i n s er ti n t o t h e s t at u t e. W h en i n t er p re t i n g a statut e , w e a tte mpt

to d isc e rn

the le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt a nd we beg in ou r inqui ry

wi th t he pla in lang uag e of the statute. Fitzgerald v

. Advanc ed Spine Fixation Sys., Inc

. , 996 S.W .2d 864, 865-66 (Tex. 1999). We assume that the leg islature “tr ies to say what i t m ea n s ” and ke ep in mind that “ordina ry citizens should be able to rely on the plain languag e of a statute to mean what it say s.” Id.5

at 866. I f i n our i nterpre tation we stray from the statute’s pl ain l anguag e, “we risk encr oachingon the L eg islature’s f

unction to decide what t he law should be .” Id. I f the statute is unambig uous, we g ener ally adopt t h e interpre tation supported by the plain meaningof the statute’ s lang uag e. Id. at 86 5. We c on sid e r t

he wh ole statut e , a s w e ll a s o the r c on te xtua l inf or matio n, no t a sin g le se c tio n in isolation. Id. at 866.

I n enac ting se ctions 74.051 and 74.052, t he leg islature unambiguously ref err ed to the require d “notice,” which trig g ers tolling, as a separ ate document from the authorization form. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Co d e An n . § § 7 4 .051, .052. I ndeed, in se ction 74.052(a) , the leg islature provided that fa ilure to include the author ization “along w ith the notice” would r esult in a six ty -day
a b a te me n t o f th e p r o c e e d in g s a g a in s t th e h e a lt h c ar e p r o v id e r “ r e c e iv in g th e n o ti c e ” u n ti l the authorization was re ceive d by the provider
. Id. § 74.052(a) . The le gi s l ature did not state that the authorization was a pa rt of the notice document or that tolli ng was not trig g ere d in the absence of t h e au t h o ri z ation. I nstead, it treated notice a s a sepa rate and distinct document fr om the authorization form, which should be include d with the notice. Id . § 74.051. I t is the provision of “notice,” not the authorization form that trig g ers tolling unde r sec tion 74.051(a).

Had the le g islature intended Russell’s proposed interpre tation, it easily could have written that i n t en t ion into the statute, and we w ill not read such languag e into the statute, which would re quire us to ig nore the leg islature’s use of “notice ” in the statute a s distinct from the

“ a uth or iza tio n fo rm .” Th e purp os e of the no tic e re qu ir e me nt in a he a lth c are liabil it y c a se is t o e nc oura g e pr e -s uit ne g oti a tio ns and

se ttl e ment and

to r e du c e lit ig a tio n c os ts. De Chec a v. Di agnostic Ctr. Hosp., Inc. , 852 S.W .2d 935, 938 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Schepps v . Presbyte rian Hosp. , 6 52 S.W. 2d 93 4, 93 8 ( Te x. 19 83 )) ; see al so Hi ne s v . H as h ,6

84 3 S. W.2 d 4 64 , 4 68 (Tex
. 1992 ) ( re fe rr ingto f or me r h e a lthc are lia

bil ity no tic e pr ov isi on

in interpre ting de ceptive t

r a d e p r a c ti c es notice pr ovision, and stating that pur pose of notice require ment statutes “is better se rved by abatingan ac tion filed without noti ce fo r the dura tion of the statutory notice per iod to allow the parties to neg otiate, than by dismiss ing the action altogethe r”)
. Abateme nt of a su it b ro ug ht by a pla int if

f wh o fa ils to p ro vid e pr e -s uit no tic e , r a the r t

ha n im me diate dis mis sa l, also further s neg otiation a nd settlement. See D e Chec a , 8 52 S.W. 2d a t 93 8; Schepps , 652 S.W .2d at 938. Simil arly , allowing tolling when a plaintiff sends notice w ithout the authorization form give s the he a lthc are pr ov ide r f a ir wa rn ingof an im min e nt c la im a

nd the n a llo ws the p ro vid e r t o o bta in an abatement for negot iations and eva luation of the cla im. W e will not rea d an over ly strict and
un fo un de d r e qu ir e me nt int o sec tio n 74. 05 1 whe n the pla in langua g e of the statut e pr ov ide s u s w ith an unambiguous and re asonable meaning
. Se e Fi tzge ra ld , 996 S.W .2d at 865-66.

We c on c lud e that a

pla int if f’s fa ilure to i nc lud e the re qu ir e d b ut s e pa rate
a uth or iza tio n f

or m w he n h e pr ov ide s n oti c e of his c la im to a de fe nd ant he a lth c are pr ov ide r w ith in the two-y ear

limit ations period does not ba r the tolling of limit ations but instead allows the provide r to obtain an abatement until s i x t y day s after she re ceive s the authorization form. We there fore
re ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra nti ngof summa ry jud g me nt i n Ru sse ll’ s f

a vo r a nd re mand

the c a us e to the c ourt fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: F ebrua

ry 14, 2008