J-S33008-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

WILLIE MILES 

 Appellant No. 843 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 14, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003921-2011 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD,* J. 

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JUNE 17, 2016 

 Appellant, Willie Miles, appeals pro se from the order of the Allegheny 

County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his second Post Conviction Relief 

Act1 (“PCRA”) petition, entitled “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence,”2 as 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

2

 We note that 

[t]he PCRA provides: 

The action established in this subchapter shall be the 

sole means of obtaining collateral relief and 

encompasses all other common law and statutory 

remedies for the same purpose that exist when this 

subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and 

coram nobis. This subchapter is not intended to limit 

the availability of remedies in the trial court or on 

direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, to 

provide a means for raising issues waived in prior 
J-S33008-16 

- 2 -

untimely. Appellant contends that his February 21, 2012 sentence following 

his convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver3

(“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance,4 and possession of drug 

paraphernalia5 is illegal under Alleyne v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2151 

(2013).6 We affirm. 

 Appellant was sentenced on February 21, 2012, to five to ten years’ 

imprisonment for PWID with no further penalty at the remaining counts. On 

February 26, 2013, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Miles, 446 WDA 2012 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. 

 

proceedings or to provide relief from collateral 

consequences of a criminal conviction. 

42 [Pa.C.S.] § 9542. Accordingly, if the PCRA offers a 

remedy for an appellant’s claim, it is the sole avenue of 

relief and the PCRA time limitations apply. 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 

2013). 

Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 879 (Pa. Super. 2015). The 

PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did 

not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral 

relief.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542). Therefore, the PCRA court properly treated 

Appellant’s “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence” as a PCRA petition. See 

Wyatt, 115 A.3d at 879; Jackson, 30 A.3d at 518. 

3

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 

4

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 

5

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). 

6

 We note that Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013. 
J-S33008-16 

- 3 -

Super. Feb. 26, 2013). On March 26, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA 

petition. Counsel was appointed and filed a motion to withdraw on June 17, 

2013. The PCRA court granted the motion to withdraw. On July 24, 2013, 

the PCRA petition was denied. On March 23, 2015, Appellant filed the 

instant pro se “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence.” On March 27, 2015, the 

PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

On April 6, 2015, Appellant filed a “Written Response” to the Rule 907 

notice.7 On April 14, 2015, the court dismissed the PCRA petition. This 

timely appeal followed.8 Appellant filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Is Appellant’s sentence illegal and unconstitutional 

pursuant to recent decisions declaring 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508 

unconstitutional? 

 

7

 We note that the written response was docketed on April 16, 2015. 

Appellant’s certificate of service is dated April 6, 2015. 

8

 In the instant case, the notice of appeal is docketed as filed on May 21, 

2015, beyond the thirty day appeal period from the April 14, 2015, order. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2001) (noting “questions of jurisdiction may be raised sua 

sponte”) (citation omitted). However, pro se Appellant is incarcerated. The 

notice of appeal is dated by Appellant as having been served on May 12, 

2015, and Appellant attached an envelope post-marked May 14, 2015. It is 

well settled the “prisoner mailbox rule provides that a pro se prisoner’s 

document is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities for 

mailing.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citation omitted). Thus, we adopt May 12, 2015 as the date of filing and 

conclude the present appeal is timely. See id. at 40. 
J-S33008-16 

- 4 -

2. Since Appellant’s sentence is unconstitutional is 

Appellant entitled to resentencing in that his sentence is 

illegal? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

When analyzing the dismissal of a PCRA petition, “an appellate court’s 

scope of review is limited by the PCRA’s parameters; since most PCRA 

appeals involve mixed questions of fact and law, the standard of review is 

whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and free of 

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 2009) 

(citation omitted). 

 Before examining the merits of Appellant’s claims, we consider 

whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to entertain the underlying PCRA 

petition. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a threshold question that 

implicates the jurisdiction of a court to consider the merits of the relief 

requested. Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

To be timely, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year 

of the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence 

became final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner 

proves one or more of the following statutory exceptions: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with

the presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 
J-S33008-16 

- 5 -

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). 

We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the 

burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness 

exceptions applies. In addition, a petition invoking any of 

the timeliness exceptions must be filed within 60 days of 

the date the claim first could have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). A petitioner fails to satisfy the 60–

day requirement of Section 9545(b) if he or she fails to 

explain why, with the exercise of due diligence, the claim 

could not have been filed earlier. 

Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719-20 (Pa. 2008) (some 

citations omitted). “[A]n untimely petition may be received when the 

petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited 

exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at [42 Pa.C.S. § 9545] 

are met.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(footnote omitted). 

 Appellant was sentenced on February 21, 2012. This Court affirmed 

his judgment of sentence on February 26, 2013. Appellant did not seek 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Thus, his 

judgment of sentence became final on March 28, 2013. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3) (providing “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 
J-S33008-16 

- 6 -

for seeking the review[ ]”). Appellant generally had until March 28, 2014, to 

file his PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Therefore, because 

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on March 23, 2015,9 his petition is 

untimely.10 

 Appellant avers that he is serving an illegal sentence pursuant to 

Alleyne,

11 and therefore his sentence should be vacated. Appellant’s Brief 

at 8, 11. He contends his mandatory minimum sentence is unconstitutional 

under Alleyne. Id. at 8. We find no relief is due. 

 In Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 2015), this 

Court opined: 

[A]n Alleyne claim is a non-waivable challenge to the 

legality of sentence. Such a claim may be raised on direct

appeal, or in a timely filed PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9542 (“persons serving illegal sentences may obtain 

collateral relief”); Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, [ ] 

689 A.2d 283, 288 [(Pa. Super.] 1997) (“Issues relating to 

the legality of sentence cannot be waived and are 

cognizable under the PCRA”; addressing challenge to

 

9

 The PCRA court erroneously states that Appellant’s “Motion to Vacate 

Illegal Sentence” was filed on December 22, 2014. See PCRA Ct. Op., 

11/3/15, at 2. The “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence” was filed with 

Appellant’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on March 23, 2015. 

The docket does not indicate any activity in the instant case in 2014. 

 

10 We note that Appellant does not argue that any of the timeliness 

exceptions apply in the instant case. See Marshall, 947 A.2d at 719-20. 

11 The United States Supreme Court in Alleyne held that “[a]ny fact that, by 

law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted 

to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 

2155. 
J-S33008-16 

- 7 -

imposition of a mandatory minimum under 18 Pa.C.S. § 

7508(a)). Indeed, in [Commonwealth v.] Newman [99 

A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)] the en banc panel 

recognized that Alleyne constituted a “new rule” that 

“applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct 

review.” Newman, [ ] 99 A.3d at 90 (emphasis 

supplied), quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, [ ] 124 S. Ct. 

2519, [ ] (2004). 

Id. at 60 (some emphasis added).12 Moreover, 

[i]t is also settled that Alleyne does not invalidate a 

mandatory minimum sentence when presented in an 

untimely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014). In concluding Alleyne

does not satisfy the new retroactive constitutional right 

exception to the PCRA’s one year time bar, 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(iii), the Miller Court explained: 

Even assuming that Alleyne did announce a new 

constitutional right, neither our Supreme Court, nor 

the United States Supreme Court has held that 

Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases in 

which the judgment of sentence had become 

final. . . . This Court has recognized that a new rule 

of constitutional law is applied retroactively to cases 

on collateral review only if the United States 

Supreme Court or our Supreme Court specifically 

holds it to be retroactively applicable to those cases. 

Id. at 995 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 

Furthermore, this Court also recently declined to give 

Alleyne retroactive effect to cases on timely collateral 

 

12 This Court has determined that the following cases be considered by the 

Court en banc: Commonwealth v. Aybar, 1224 MDA 2014, 

Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 3114 EDA 2014, and Commonwealth v. 

Haskins, 1815 MDA 2014. The en banc Court will address the issue of 

“[w]hether the PCRA petitioner is entitled to relief when he raises, in a 

timely PCRA petition, a claim that his sentence is illegal pursuant to 

Alleyne . . . and Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A. 3d 86 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (en banc)”. 
J-S33008-16 

- 8 -

review when the defendant’s judgment of sentence was 

finalized before Alleyne was decided. See 

Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058 (Pa. Super. 

2015). 

Id. at 58. 

 Appellant’s judgment of sentence was final on March 28, 2013. Thus, 

his PCRA petition, filed on March 23, 2015, is facially untimely. Alleyne

does not apply retroactively to an untimely PCRA. See Ruiz, 131 A.3d at 

60. Appellant did not plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s 

timeliness requirement. See Marshall, 947 A.2d at 719-20; Lawson, 90 

A.3d at 5. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 

legality of Appellant’s sentence. See Davis, 86 A.3d at 887. The PCRA 

court did not err in dismissing his PCRA petition as untimely. See Pitts, 981 

A.2d at 878; Marshall, 947 A.2d at 719-20. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/17/2016