FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 29, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1225 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 6- 80 70 2- CV-KLR LORI JO BAI LEY, as the Per sonal Representative of the E state of Ch ad Be al , Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us JANSS EN PHARMACEUTICA, INC., JANSS EN, L. P., et a l., D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 29 , 200 8) Be fo re A N D E RS O N a nd S IL E R, * C ir cu it Judg es . **

____ ____ ____ __ * Honora ble Eug ene Siler, Jr., United States Circuit J udg e for the Six th Circuit, sit ting by desig nation. ** Judg e F ra

nk M. Hu ll w a s a

me mbe r o f t

he pa ne l w hic h h e ard

or a l argume nt b ut r e c us e d h e rs e lf followingoral a

rgument and did not participate in this decision. The c ase is dec ided by a quorum. See 28 U.S.C. §46(d) (2006) ; 11th Ci r. R. 34-2.2

AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge: Pl ai nti ff -a ppe llant, L or i Jo Ba ile y , br ough t this w ro ngf ul d eath a ct ionon be ha lf of Ch ad E dgar Be al ( “ Be al ”) , w ho d ie d of f en tany l t oxi ci ty

a ft er he use d a pr es cr ipt ionpa tc h m anuf ac tur ed , dis tr ibu te d, a nd r et ai le d by the de fe ndant co m panie s. T he a ct ionw as or igi na lly f ile d instate c ourt and r em ove d un de r 28 U. S. C. § 144 1(a), pursuant to § 1446 (b), by the last-served defe ndant m ore than thi rty day s a ft er

se rv ic e on the oth er

de fe ndants . Appe llant m ove d to r em an d th e action to state court, asserting that the notice of rem oval was untim ely . The district co urt de nie d th is m oti on and the re af te r gr an te d de fe ndants ’ m oti ons to d ism iss w ith pr ejud ic e th e fi rs t am en de d c om pl ai nt on pro cedur al an d s ub st an ti ve gro un ds . Appe llant c ha lle nge s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of he r m oti on t o r em an d and the di sm is sa l o f he r co m

pl ai nt . T his c as e pr es en ts an is sue of f ir st i m pr es sio n f or the Co urt w ithr eg ar ds t o whether, in m

ulti-defendant litig ation, the lim itations period for re m oval expires uponthi rty

day s f ro m se rv ic e on the f

ir st- se rv ed

or la st- se rv ed

de fe ndant unde r 28 U . S. C. § 14 46( b) . F or

the r ea sons that f

oll ow , w e ad opt

the so- ca lle d “ la st- se rv ed ” d ef en d an tru l e a n dac co rd i n g l y af fi rm th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s d en i al o f ap p el l an t ’s m oti on t o r em an d th e ca se to state c ourt. W e re sol ve the appe al of the m oti on t o dis m iss in anunp ubl ish ed appe ndi x to thi s op ini on.3 I. FACTS T he de ce de nt, Ch ad

E dgar Be al , die d onMarc h 5, 200 4, a ft er havin g re ce ive d an a lle ge dly

le tha l do se of

apa in n ar co tic , f

en tany l, via

atr an sde rm al ski n patch prescribed to him

by his docto r. T he prescription patch, D uragesic, wa s m anuf ac tur ed by de fe ndant A lz a Co rp or at ion( “ A lz a” ) an d di str ibu te d by de fe ndant Janss enP harm ac eu tic a, I nc . ( “ Janss en ”) , both of w hic h are sub sid iari es of the hol din g c om

pany , de fe ndant J ohns on & Joh nson , I nc . ( “ John son & J ohns on” ). T he pa tc h w as sol d to Be al a t a sou th F lor ida

sto re of de fe ndant W al gr ee n C o. (“ W al gr een ”). Be al ’ s a dm ini str at or

or igi na lly

br ough t this w ro ngf

ul d eath a ct ionin Pa lm Beac h County , F lorida, on Februar y 28, 2006. T he first defe ndant served was W al gr ee n, on M ay

12, 200 6. T he ne xt d ef

en dant, A lz a, w as se rv ed

on M ay 15, 2006 , and defendant Janss en wa s served several day s later on May 19, 2006. A lza an d Janss enf

ile d m oti ons to d ism iss in state c ourt onJun e 12, 200 6. T he la st de fe ndant s er

ve d w as Joh nson& John son, a nd i t w as se rv ed on June 22, 200 6. A ll de fe ndants uti liz ed

the sam e attor

ne y to re pr es en t the m

in the pr oc ee din gs i n st at e co urt. O n Ju ly

24, 200 6, the la st- se rv ed de fe ndant, Joh nson& John son, f ile d a notice of rem oval of the action based on com plete diversity , pursuant to 28 U.S .C.This motion was filed within thirty day s of re ceipt of se rvice by J ohnson & 1 John so n, un de r F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 (a ). Th ir ty da y s f ro m r e c e ipt

of se rv ic e wo uld

have be e n o n July 22, 2006, a Saturda

y , so the last day

for f iling wa s J uly

24, 2006, the followingMonday . Under appellant’ s argument, the time for r emoval would have expired befor e 2 J ohnson & Johnson even re ceive d service of proc ess. 4 §144 6(b). 1 O nc e the a ct ionw as in fe de ra l c our t, the appe llant t im el y

sou ght r em an d, ar gui ng tha t, und er

§14 46( b) , the ti m e fo r fi lin g anot ic e of r em ova l r

uns fr om the da te of se rv ic e on the f

ir st d ef en dant— he re , W al gr ee n onMay

12, 200 6—and the re fo re Joh nson& John son’ s no tic e w as not ti m el y br ough t w ith in 3 0 day s of the May 12 s er vic e. I n it s N ove m

be r 14, 200 6, or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt a dopt ed the 2

“ la st- se rv ed ” de fe ndant r ule , w hic h pe rm its e ac h de fe ndant t o f ile ati m el y

m oti on fo r rem ov al wit hi n t hi rty days of re cei pt of s erv ic e b y th atin di vi du al de fen da nt . U nde r thi s r

ule , e ar lie r- se rv ed

de fe ndants w ho m ay

have w ai ve d th ei r ri ght

to independ ently

seek rem oval by

failing to tim ely

file a notice of rem oval—as Janss en , A lz a, a nd W al gr ee n di d he re —m ay ne ve rthe le ss c onse nt t o ati m el y m oti on by ala te r- se rv ed

de fe ndant. T he dis tr ic t c ourt, the re fo re , de nie d th e m oti on t o re m an d th e ac tio n to state c ourt, havin g f ound that the not ic e of

r em ova l w as ti m el y an d t ha t al l d efen da nt s co ns en te d t o t he no ti ce.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW5

Beca use it invo lves questi ons of federal subj ect m atter j urisdictio n, w e re view the de nia l of

am oti on t o r em an d ar em ove d st at e co urt a ct ionde nov o. P ac he co de Pe re z v. A T &T Co . , 139 F . 3d 1 368, 137 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) . Mo re ove r, the interpretation of § 144 6(b) is a question o f lawwe also reviewde novo. United St at es v. H oosh m an d, 931 F . 2d 7 25, 737 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) . W e ha ve j ur isd ic tio n to co nsi de r de nia l of

am oti on t o r em an d up on the e ntr y of af ina l or de r, w hic h inthi s ca se w as the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s Apr il 11, 200 7, or de r, dis m iss ing w ithpr ej udi ce the first am ended com

plaint. Schell v. Food Mch. Corp. , 87 F. 2d 38 5, 387 (5th Cir. 1937 ). III. DISC USSION Se ct ion144 1( a) auth or iz es ade fe ndant t o se ek r em ova l of

asui t or igi na lly br ough t i n st at e co urt w he n th e fe de ra l c ourt ha s di ve rs ity j ur isd ic tio n ov er

the ca use of a ct ion . 28 U . S. C. §14 41( a) ( 2006 ). S ec tio n 14 46 d es cr ibe s th e ap pr opr ia te re m ova l pr oc ed

ur e to i nvok e fe de ra l j ur isd ic tio n, a nd r equir es the de fe ndant s ee kin g re m ova l t o f

ile ati m el y

not ic e of r em ova l st at ing the gr ound s f or r em ova l w iththe ap pr op ria te fed eral di st ric t co ur t. 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 46 (a). In ord er t o b e ti m el y , [t] he notice of rem oval of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed w ith in thirty

day s a ft er

the r ec ei pt b y

the de fe ndant, thr oughse rv ic e or oth er w ise , of ac opy of the ini tia l pl ea din g se tti ng f orth the c la im

f or rel ie f up on whi ch su ch act io n o r pr oc eed in g i s b as ed. . . .Commentators have split as we ll: the Si x th Circuit observed in B rierly that at the 3 tim e it d e c ide d to e nd or se the la st- se rv e d d e fe nd ant r ule , th e tw o le a din gtr e atis e s, Wri g ht & Miller and Moore ’s, ca

me to diverg ent conc lusions on the issue. See Br ierly , 184 F.3d at 532 n.2. 6 §144 6( b) . T he S upr em e Co urt he ld i n M ur phy Br oth er s. , I nc . v. Mi ch etti Pi pe Stringing, Inc. , 526 U. S. 344, 347-48, 119 S. Ct. 1322 , 1325 (1999), that the tim ew ind owin § 14 46( b) “ is tri gge re d by sim ult an eo us s er

vic e of the sum m ons an d co m pla int , or r ec ei pt o f the c om

pla int , ‘ thr oughse rv ic e or oth er w ise , ’ a ft er

a nd ap ar t f ro m se rv ic e of

the sum m ons, but not by m er e re ce ipt

of the c om pla int unattended b y

any form al service. ” O n it s f ac e, §14 46( b) doe s no t a

ppe ar to ad dr es s it se lf

to m ult i- de fe ndant litigatio n. Br ierly

v. A lusui sse Flexible Packaging, I nc., 184 F.3d 527, 532 (6th Cir. 1999 ) (“ T he statut or

y langua ge it se lf

c ont em plate s on ly

one de fe ndant and thus doe s no t answ er

the que sti on o f howto ca lc ulate the ti m ing f or r em ova l i n th e ev en t that m ult ipl e de fe ndants a re se rv ed a t di ff er en t t im es , one or

m or e of the m out sid e the or igi na l 30 -d ay

pe ri od. ”) . I n a

ppl y ing the statut e to m

ult i- de fe ndant l iti ga tio n, courts have split over w hether eac h indi vidu al defendant has a right to seek rem oval w ith in thirty

day s of r ec ei pt o f se rv ic e or

w he the r the appr opr ia te ti m e w ind owf or §144 6(b) runs from

rec eipt of service by

the first-ser

ved defendant only —in oth er 3 wo rd s , wh et h erth e “fi rs t -s er v ed ” o r “la s t -s er v ed ” d ef en d an ttri g g er s § 1 4 4 6 (b )’sThe nomenc lature use d by the cour ts on this i ssue is, g ener ally , “last-se rved” 4 ve rs us “ fi rs t- se rv e d, ” and so we have a c c or din g ly

us e d th is s ame langua g e . B ut w e no te that it may be more in keepingwith our interpre tation of the rule to think of the “ last-serve d” def endant rule a s the “e ach de fenda nt” rule. In other wor ds, the statute should be re ad to per mit each de fe nd ant, wh e the r f

ir st o r l a st s e rv e d o r s ome wh e re in b e tw e e n, thi rt y da y s w ith in whic h to fi le a notice of

remova l upon rec eipt of ser vice. The F ourth Circuit’s dec ision in McKinney v. Boa rd of Tr ustees of Ma

yland 5 Communi ty

College , 955 F.2d 924 ( 4th Cir. 1992), endorse d the first-se rved r ule, but in dicta. Se e id. at 92 6 n .3 (“ In a

dif fe re nt s itu atio n, wh e re B is s e rv e d mo re tha n 3 0 d ay s a ft e r Ais serve d, two timing issues ca n arise, a nd the law is settled as to e ach. F irst, if A petitions for

7 lim itatio ns p er iod . Appe llant urg es us t o a dopt the f ir st- se rv ed

de fe ndant r

ule and 4 accordingly

find that Joh nson & Johnso n’ s notice of rem oval was not tim ely under §144 6( b) be ca

use it w as f ile d m or e than th irty

day s a ft er

r ec ei pt o f se rv ic e of process by

the first-ser

ved defendant. F or the following reasons, w e re j ect ap pe llant’ s arg um en t and i nte rp re t §1 446( b) to pe rm it ea chde fe ndant thirty day s in w hic h to se ek

r em ova l. W e thu s c onc lud e that Jo hnso n & Joh nson ’ s no tic e of rem ov al was t im el y . First, we observe that the trend in recent ca se lawfavors the last-served de fe ndant r

ule . S ee , e . g. , G en er al P um p & W el l, I nc . v. L ai be S uppl y Co rp . , N o. C V 6 0 7 - 3 0 , 2 0 0 7 WL 3 2 3 8 7 2 1 , * 2 ( S . D . Ga . Oc t . 3 1 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( “Mo r e r e c e n t l y, how ev er , the tr en d inthe c as e lawha s be entow ar d th e la te r- se rv ed r ule . T he S ixth an d th e E igh th C ir cu its , se ve ra l di str ic t c ourts i n th is c ir cu it an d ac ourt i n th is district have followed the later ser ved rule.” ). A m ong th e four courts of appeals that ha ve c onsi de re d th is i ssu e, onl y the F if th C ir cu it an d ( se em ing ly ) the F ourth C ir cu it 5remova l within 30 day s, the ca se may be re moved, and B can e ither join in the petition or move for r emand. Sec ond, if A does not petition for r emoval within 30 day s, the ca se may not be remove d.”); see also id. at 926 (“While the first ser ved def endant c lear ly

must petiti on for remova l within thi rty

day s, section 1446(b) doe s not impl y in any way that later se rved defe ndants have less than thirty day s in which to act.” ). The a ctual issue in McKinne y , howeve r, wa s whe the r a

late r- se rv e d d e fe nd ant h a s th ir ty da y s a ft e r e ff

e c tiv e se rv ic e to j oin

in a tim e ly petition for re moval filed within thirty day s of the first-se rved de fenda nt. The petition for remova l was filed within thirty day s of the first-se rved de fenda nt in McKinney , but a later -ser ved defe ndant did not join the notice within the orig inal thirty -day window. The c ourt held that ea ch individual defenda

nt has thirty

day s in which to join a timely filed notice of

remova l. I d. at 928. The Nor thern District of A labama w as proba bly corr ect to note that Mc Kinney endorse d, essentially , a middle g round betwe en the f irst-serve d and last-se rved de fenda nt rules; the cour

t said: [T] he F ourth Circuit has adopted a position som ewhe re in be tween the first-ser ved and last-se rved- defe ndant rules. In McKinney , the cour t held that eac h defe ndant ha s th ir ty da y s f ro m th e date on

wh ic h it is s e rv e d to joi n in

“ an o the rw ise va lid remova l petition.” Thus, if the orig inal notice of r emoval filed by an ear lier-se rved de fenda

nt is defec tive in some way , the later -ser ved def endant may not remove, e ven if it attempts to do so within t hirty day s of beingserve d. Fitzge rald v. B estway

Service s, Inc., 284 F . Supp. 2d 1311, 1315-16 (N.D. Ala . 2003) (inter nal citations omitt ed). 8 ha ve a dopt ed

the f ir st- se rv ed

r ule , a nd h av e he ld tha t a

not ic e of r em ova l i s on ly ti m el y if i t i s fi le d wi th in th irt y

da y s o f se rv ic e o f pr oc es s o n t he fir st de fen da nt . Se e Br ow n v. D em co , I nc . , 792 F . 2d 4 78, 481 -8 2 ( 5thCi r. 198 6) ( “ T he ge ne ra l r ule

. . . is that i f the f

ir st s er ve d de fe ndant a

bst ai ns f ro m se ek ing r em ova l or

doe s no t ef fe ct ati m el y r em ova l, sub se que ntl y

se rv ed de fe ndants c an not

r em ove . . . due to the rule of unanim ity

am ong d efendants which is required f or rem oval.”) (internal quot at ion s and p unc tuatio n om itt ed ); G etty O il Co rp . v. I ns. Co . of

N . A m . , 841 F. 2d 1 254, 126 2- 63 ( 5thCi r. 198 8) ( “ Inc as es inv olv ing m ult ipl e de fe ndants , theI t is worth noting that none of these c ases is proc edura lly identical to the instant 6 c a se : in B ro wn , a ne wl y a dd e d d e fe nd ant— fo ur

y e ars a ft e r t

he su it h a d c omm e nc e d in state court—wa s denied the r ight to re move under the first-se rved de fenda

nt rule; in McKinney , the court pe rmitted a later -ser ved def endant thirty

day s in which to join a notice of r emoval filed within thirty

day s of the first-se rved de fenda nt; in Getty

Oil, the court he ld that all then-ser ved de fe nd ants have to j oin

a no tic e of a pp e a l f ile d w ith in t

hir ty da y s o f t he fi rs t de fe nd ant. For example, in this case , there is no indication as to why service was de lay ed on 7 J ohnson & Johnson for more than a month after f

iling of this ac tion. Of course , J ohnson & J ohnson, as the par ent company , likely knew a bout the lawsuit prior to its rece ipt of service . But the Supreme Court ha s rejec ted usingsimple notice or construc tive service to start the clock on § 1446(b) time window. See Murphy Br os., 526 U.S. at 347-48, 119 S. Ct. at 1325.

9 thi rty -d ay pe ri od b eg ins to run a s so on a s th e fi rs t de fe ndant i s se rv ed ( pr ovi de d th e ca se is the n r em ova

ble ). ”) ; M cK inn ey

v. Bd . of T ru ste es of

Md . Co m

m . Co ll. , 955 F. 2d 9 24, 926 & n. 3 ( 4thCi r. 199 2) . T he m ost r ec en t of the se de ci sio ns, the F ourth 6 Ci rc uit ’ s de ci sio n inMc K inn ey , is nowm or e than f if te eny ears old . C onve rs el y , the tw o c ourts am ong the c ir cu it co urts t o have a dopt ed the la st- se rv ed

de fe ndant r

ule ha ve don e so f

ar m or e re ce ntl y : the E igh th C ir cu it in 2 001, a nd the S ixth C ir cu it in 1999 . Marano E nters. of Kan. v. Z- Te ca Re sts., L. P. , 254 F. 3d 75 3, 755 (8th Cir. 2001 ); Brie rly

v. A lusui sse Flexible Packaging, I nc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1999 ). Se co nd, w e ar e co nvi nc ed that bo th c om

m on s en se a nd c onsi de ratio ns o f equity favor the last-ser

ved defendant rule. The f irst-served rule has been c riticized by oth er c ourts a s be ing ine qui ta

ble to la te r- se rv ed

de fe ndants w ho, thr oughno f au lt of the ir ow n, m igh t, by

vir tue of the f ir st- se rv ed

r ule , los e the ir

statut or y r igh t t o 7The F ourth Circuit in McKinney relied in pa

rt on statutory

chang es—which ma de 8 Rul e 11 a pp lic a ble to p e tit ion s f

or re mov a l—t o p e rm it d e fe nd ants a fu ll thir ty da y s in wh ic h to decide whether

to join an otherwise timely notice of r emoval. I f later -ser ved def endants did not have the fu ll thir

ty da y s to de c ide wh e the r t o jo in a pe tit ion fo r r e mov a l, i t w ou ld b e ha rs h to subject them to Rule 11 sanctions. See Mc Kinney , 955 F.2d at 928. 10 seek rem oval. Both the E ighth and Sixth Circuits endorsed th e last-served de fe ndant r

ule , a t l ea st i n part , f

or e qui ta ble r ea sons . S ee Marano, 254 F . 3d at 75 5 (“ [T he Fifth Circ uit] did no t consider, however , the ‘ hardships ’ to a defendant w hen the first-served def

endant for whate ver re ason does n ot file a notice of r em oval w ith in thirty

day s of se rv ic e. L at er -s er

ve d de fe ndants w oul d no t be a ff or de d th e oppo rt uni ty to atte m pt t o pe rs ua de the ir

c o- de fe ndants to j oinanot ic e of r em ova l i f mo r e th a n th i rt y d a ys h a dp a s s e ds i n c e th e f i r s td e f e n d a n twa s s e rv e d . ” ) ; B r i e r l y, 184 F. 3d at 53 3 ( not ing that “ as am atte r of f ai rn es s to la te r- se rv ed

de fe ndants ” it endorsed the last-served rule). 8 T hir d, the S ixth C ir cu it re co gni ze d th at the f ir st- se rv ed

r ule r equir es r ea din g fi rs t- se rv ed

de fe ndant i nto the statut e, w he re as the statut e, a s w ri tte n, c oul d re as ona bly be r ea d to pe rm it ea chde fe ndant a r igh t t o r em ove w ith in thirty day s of se rv ic e on the ind ivi dua l de fe ndant: “ as am atte r of statut or y c onstru ct ion , hol din g that the ti m e fo r re m ova l c om m en ce s f or a ll pur pose s up on s er

vic e of the f ir st de fe ndant w oul d r equir e us t o in se rt ‘ fi rs t’ be fo re ‘ de fe ndant’ int o th e langua ge of the statute. W e ar e naturally reluctant to rea d additio nal words into the statute,11

how ev er . ” Br ie rl y , 184 F . 3d at 53 3. Fo ur th , we are u np ers ua de d b y th e rat io na le be hi nd th e fi rs t-s erv edrul e. Tho se co ur ts th atha ve en do rs edth e fi rs t-s erv edrul e h av e g en eral ly don e so fortwo re as ons: ( 1) it

is pe rc ei ve d a s m or e co nsi ste nt w iththe unanim ity r ule f or not ic es of rem oval; and, (2) courts ar e to narrow ly construe the rem oval statute and federal juri sd ic ti on . See, e.g ., Bro wn, 7 92 F.2d at 4 82 . T he unanim ity

r ule r equir es that a ll de fe ndants c onse nt t o and j oinanot ic e of rem ov al in ord er fo r it to be effe ct iv e. See R us se ll Co rp . v. Am . Hom e Ass ur . Co., 264 F. 3d 1 040, 105 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . T he la st- se rv ed r ule is not inc onsi ste nt w ith the rule of unanim ity . Earlier- served defendants m aychoose to join in a laterse rv ed de fe ndant’ s m oti on o r not , the re fo re pr es er vin g th e ru le that a

not ic e of re m ova l m

ust have the unanim ous co nse nt o f the de fe ndants . T he unanim ity r ule alone does no t com

m and that a first-ser

ved defendant’ s failure to seek r em oval necessarily

wa ives an unserved defendant’s r ight to seek rem oval; it on ly requires that the later-ser

ved defendant receive the c onsent o f all then-served def endants at th e ti m e h e fi le s h is no ti ce o f rem ov al . A lth oughit

is tr ue that w e ha ve state d pr ev iou sly that “ al l un ce rt ai nti es a s to re m ova l j ur isd ic tio n are to be r es olv ed in favor of r em an d, ” Ru sse ll Co rp . , 264 F . 3d at 105 0, w e do n ot f

ind that a str ic t c onstru ct ionof

the r em ova l st at

ute ne ce ssari ly12

co m p el s u s t o en d o rs e t h e f

i rs t -s er v ed d ef

en d an tru l e i n l i g h to f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s de ci sio n inMurp hy

Br oth er s, 526 U . S. a t 34 7- 48, 119 S . Ct . a t 13 25. S ee Marano, 254 F.3d at 756 (noti ng that th e Murphy Brothers Court appear ed to relax its strict co ns tru ct io ni st ap pr oa ch to in te rp ret in g t he rem ov al st atut e); see als o M ur ph y Bro s., 526 U . S. a t 35 7, 119 S . Ct . a t 13 30 ( Re hnqu ist , C. J. , dis se nti ng) ( statin g th at the Mur phy Br oth er s de ci sio n “ de part s f ro m thi s C ourt’ s pr ac tic e of

str ic tly c onstru ing rem oval and sim ilar j urisdictio nal statutes”). Fi n al l y, we a g re e w i t h th e E i g h t h Ci rc u i ti n Ma ra n o th atth e S up re m e C o u rt ’s decision in Murphy

Brothers supports end orsing th e last-served r ule. T he court obse rv ed : The [ Suprem e] Court [in Murphy Brothers] held that form al pr oc es s is r equir ed , not ing the dif fe re nc e be tw ee n m er e not ic e to a de fe ndant and o ff

ic ia l se rv ic e of

pr oc es s: “ A n in div idu al or e nti ty na m ed a s ade fe ndant i s no t ob lig ed to en ga ge in lit igatio n un le ss notified of the action, and brough t under a court’ s authority , by form al pr oc es s. ” T hus, ade fe ndant i s “ re qui re d to take a ct ion ” as a de fe ndant—

that i s, bound b y

the thi rty -d ay

li m it on r em ova l— “ onl y uponse rv ic e of

asum m ons or oth er auth or ity -a sse rt ing m ea sur e statin g the ti m e w ith in whic h th e party se rv ed m ust appe ar a nd d ef en d. ” T he Co urt e sse nti al ly

a cknow le dge d th e sig nif ic an ce of f orm al se rv ic e to the j udi ci al pr oc es s, m ost not ab ly the im portanc e of

se rv ic e in the co nt ex t o f th e ti m e li m it s o n re m ov al . . . . Marano, 254 F . 3d at 75 6 ( int er na l c itatio ns o m itt ed ). A cc or din gly , the E igh th Ci rc uit c onc lud ed

that the S upr em e Co ur

t, ba se d onit s r ea soni ng i n M ur phySee, e.g . Gene ral Pump & Well, Inc. v. L aibe Supply Corp., No. CV607-30, 2007 9 WL3238721, at *2 (S.D. Ga . Oct. 31, 2007) ( adoptinglast-serve d defe ndant rule) ; C.L .B. v. Fr y e, 469 F . Supp. 2d 1115, 1119-20 (M.D. F la. 2006) (f ollowing last-se rved de fenda nt rule); Adams v. Charte r Commc’ns. VI I , L L C, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (adopting f ir s t- s e r v e d d e f e n d an t r u le ) ; K im b r o u g hv . Ci ty

o f Co c o a , N o . 0 5 CV 4 7 1 O RL 3 1 KRS , 2 0 0 5 WL 1126651, *5 (M.D. F la. May 5, 2005) (a dopting last-se rved de fenda nt rule); F itz g era ld v. Be stway Servs., Inc., 284 F . Supp. 2d 1311 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (followinglast-serve d rule forlateradded de fenda

nts); Coll ings v. E- Z Serve Convenie nce Store s, Inc., 936 F . Supp. 892, 895 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (same) . But see Kuhn v. B runswick Corp., 871 F . Supp. 1444, 1447 (N.D. Ga . 1994) (followingfirst-ser

ved rule ). 13 Brothers, would endorse the last-served defendant rule beca use that rule recognizes that indi vidu al defendants are not required to take action—whether seeking rem oval or otherwise r espond ing to another defendant’ s notice of rem oval—un til they are properly served, “ regardless of when—or if—previouslyserved defendants had filed such noti ces. ” Id. In other w ords, Murphy Brothers supports th e last-served defendant rule because a

defendant has no ob ligation to participate in any rem oval pr oc ed ur e pr ior to his r ec ei pt o f fo rm al se rv ic e of j udi ci al pr oc es s. C ontrary to Murphy Brothers, the first-ser

ved defendant rule would oblig ate a def endant to seek re m o v al p ri o r t o h i s re ce i p to f f o rmal p ro ce s s b ri n g i n g h i m u n d erth e c o u rt ’s juri sd ic ti on . Pe rh ap s pr ior

to Mur phy Br oth er s and i ts h old ing that no tic e is i nsuf fi ci en t t o trigger § 1446 (b)’ s tim e w indo w, the issue of which rule to endorse w ouldbe a closer call than it is now. T he tide of rec ent decisions by the courts of appeals, a s w el l a s th e m aj or ity

of the dis tr ic t c ourts i n th is C ir cu it, r ec ogni ze that e qui ty 9Ap pe lla nt a lso argue s th at th e mot ion s to dis mis s f ile d in state c ourt

by de fe nd ants 10 Alza and J anssen c onstitut ed a w aiver of their r ight to re move and a lso barre d their subseque nt joinder of Johnson & J ohnson’s remova l petition. W e re cently held “that the r emoving defe ndant did not waive its rig ht of remova l by filing a motion to di smiss t he plaintiff’ s complaint while the ca se wa s still pendingin state court.” Cogde ll v. W y eth, 366 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2004). On the ba sis of our controllingopinion in C og dell, we r ejec t appellant’s 14 favor s pe rm itt ing e ac h de fe ndant thirty day s inw hic h to se ek

r em ova l un de r the statut e. A s th e E igh th C ir cu it obse rv ed , the la st- se rv ed de fe ndant r

ule is co nsi ste nt w ithMurp hy

Br oth er s, in w hic h th e Su pr em e Co urt he ld tha t a

de fe ndant h as no ob li ga ti on to en ga ge in li ti ga ti on pri orto hi s re cei pt of f or m al ser vi ce o f pr oc es s. Mur phy Br oth er s a lso sig na ls a

sli ght de part ur e fr om the w ei ght

c ourts m igh t or din ar ily put on s tr ic t c onstru ct ionof

the r em ova l st at

ute . I t a ppe ar s to us t o be co ntr ar y to the S upr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ng i n M ur phy Br oth er s, a s w el l a s th e int er es ts of equity , to perm it a first-ser ved defendant to, in effe ct, bindlater- served defendants to a state court forum when those defendants could have so ught rem oval ha d th ey be enm or e pr om

ptl y se rv ed by the pla int if

f. I nde ed , und er

the f ac ts o f thi s case, the first-ser

ved defendant rule would require us to find that the three ear lierserved defendants wa ived Joh nson & Johnso n’ s right to seek rem oval, before it wa s obl igate d to part ic ipate in the law sui t un de r Mur phy Br oth er s. W e cannot

sanc tio n suc h r es ult , a nd the re fo re c onc lud e that the la st- se rv ed de fe ndant r

ule is in k ee pin g w ithMurp hy

Br oth er s, is co nsi ste nt w iththe tr en d of c as e law , a nd i s th e m ost reasonable interpretation of §1446 (b). 10argument. The re st of appellant’ s arguments on appea l are addre ssed in a sepa rate , 11 unpublished appendix to t his decision, which af firms in part, and r ever ses in part the dismissal with prejudice of the a

ppellant’s complaint. 15

IV. CONCLUSION W e here by

adopt the last-served defendant rule, which perm its each defendant, upon form al service of process, thirty

day s to file a notice of re m oval pur suant t o §1 446( b) . A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of appe llant’ s m oti on to r em an d th e ac tio n to state c ourt i s AFFIRMED. 11