No. 85-83 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL 

HEALTH OF 11-C 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Fergus, 

The Honorable Peter L. Rapkoch, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert E. LaFountain argued, Bil.1-ings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Jon A. Oldenburg argued, Deputy County Attorney, 

Lewistown, Montana 

Submitted: September 24, 1985 

Decided: November 6, 1985 

Filed: 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The respondent, Fergus County, State of Montana, 

initiated involuntary commitment proceedings to keep the 

appellant, confined in a hospital for psychological 

nvaluation and treatment. The proceedings were eventually 

dismissed. The appellant filed a petition in District Court 

to order the respondent to pay all costs incurred. The 

District Court allowed some costs and denied others. 

FJe affirm. 

The issue presented is whether a county that has 

initiated involuntary commitment proceedings to confine a 

person to a hospital for psychological evaluation and 

treatment is liable for the costs of attorney fees, expert 

witness fees, and all medical treatment incurred by the 

individual during confinement. 

The appellant is a resident of Fergus County, Montana. 

On May 19, 1983, she was examined by a psychologist in 

Lewistown, Montana, and he concluded that she should be 

admitted to a hospital for further evaluation and treatment. 

He and appellant's daughter arranged for the appellant to he 

admitted to the Billings Deaconess Hospital. He also made a 

recommendation to the Fergus County Attorney's office that 

the appellant be committed. 

On May 20, 1983, prior to any commitment proceedings, 

the appellant was admitted to the Billings Deaconess. Her 

daughter accompanied her. The appellant was admitted to the 

psychiatric ward of the hospital. She maintains that she was 

at all times under the belief that the examination by the 
psychologist and the admission to Fillings Deaconess were for 

physical examination purposes. 

By May 26, 1.983, a petition was filed in the District 

Court. The District Court ordered that appellant be detained 

at the Billings Deaconess Hospital where she had previously 

voluntarily committed herself. At the same time the court 

set a hearing date. The date was postponed. The parties 

tried to negotiate a resolution to the problem. On about 

July 1, 1.983, the appellant left Billings Deaconess of her 

own volition. The county dismissed the commitment proceeding 

on September 8, 1983. It was determined that the a.ppellant 

no longer presented a threat to herself or others. 

The appellant wa.s at the Billings Deaconess Hospital 

from May 20 to about July 1, 1.983. During her stay, in 

ad-dition to psychiatric evaluation and treatment, she 

received evaluation and treatment for certain physical 

disorders. She was treated for dental, thyroid, and colon 

problems. The county maintains that this additional 

treatment was done at appellant's request without the 

knowledge of the county. 

After the proceedings were dismissed the appellant 

submitted. a memorandum of costs incurred as a resul-t of the 

commitment proceedings. Appellant's insurer paid some of the 

claims and the county accepted liability for others. The 

appellant then submitted a petition for allowance of unpaid 

costs to the county. 

The District Court denied the following costs: 

1. Dr. Prill dental $ 28.00 

2. Dr. Hull dental 60.00 

3. Dr. Ryorth thyroid 506.00 

4. Billings Radiology colon x-ray 17.80 

5. Dr. Pierce expert witness 

psychiatrist 714.00 

6. Mr. Brueggman attorney $1,088.00 
The District Court denied the costs numbers one, two, 

three and four because they were not connected with the 

mental disorder. It denied number five because the 

psychiatrist, as an expert witness, was not properly 

requested of the District Court as required by statute. 

Section 53-21-118, MCA. It denied number six because the 

attorney was not the original court-appointed counsel but one 

retained at appellant's own expense. Section 53-21-117, MCA. 

The appellant appealed from this denial of costs. 

Appellant argues that she was involuntarily committed to 

the hospital and that the hospital had a duty to arrange for 

medical treatment as one of her paramount rights as a patient 

to receive prompt and. adequate medical treatment for any 

physical ailment and it is the duty of the health care 

facility to provide that care and treatment at the expense of 

the county who is responsible for the costs of her physical 

disorders while confined. 

In addition to expenses for her care at the hospital, 

appellant argues that the District Court initially appointed 

counsel for her and that is proof that she is indigent and 

therefore is entitled to her medical expenses from the county 

poor fund . 

Fergus County responds that the appellant was 

voluntarily admitted to the hospital but does acknowledge 

that it did seek to commit her soon after she was admitted. 

The respondent does not challenge the fact that the appellant 

was confined and that she received medical treatment for 

physical ailments while confined. Fergus County rejected 

appellant's claims on the ground that the Montana statutes do 

not provide for the payment by the county for expenses 
incurred for treatment unrelated to the mental disorders for 

which a person is committed. 

The respondent also argues that Montana law requires an 

insured person's insurance to pay for the treatment received 

while confined. Respondent further points out that if the 

claimant is unable to pay for her own care, either through 

the insurance company or her own funds, then she may seek 

payment from the county poor fund. Simply because counsel 

was appointed in a commitment proceeding does not mean that 

appellant is classified as an indigent for poor fund 

purposes. 

It's clear that the parties disagree whether appellant 

wzs admitted. to the hospital voluntarily or involuntarily. 

The resolution of this matter is not critical because the 

respondent agrees that at the time of admission, commitment 

proceedings were started. and that during most of her time in 

the hospital appellant was under the confinement order of the 

District Court. It was during this period that she received 

treatment for physical disorders. 

The District Court properly rejected the claims for 

medical expenses for the reason that they were not part of 

the treatment due as a result of the confinement. Section 

53-21-132, MCA, provides: 

53-21-132. Cost of examination and cornrni.tment. 

(1) The cost of the examination, committal, and 

taking a person who is seriously mentally ill to a 

mental health facility must be paid by the county 

in which he resides at the time he is adjudged to 

be seriously mentally ill. The sheriff must be 

all-owed the actual. expenses incurred in taking a 

person who is seriously mentally ill to the 

facility, as provided by 7-32-2144. 

(2) The county of residence shall also pay all 

precommitment expenses, including transportation to 

a mental health facility, incurred in connection 

with the detention, examination, and precommi-tment 

custody of the respondent. The fact that a person 
is examined, hospitalized, or receives medical, 

psychological, or other mental health treatment 

pursuant to this part does not relieve a third 

party from a contractual obligation to pay for the 

cost of the examination, hospitalization, or 

treatment. 

Pursuant to this statute certain expenses incurred must 

be paid by the county. However, the record shows that the 

denied costs were incurred at the appellant's own request 

without knowledge of the county and the costs were not 

related to the treatment due as a result of the confinement. 

The appellant had personal insu.rance that paid a portion of 

the medical expenses. As to the remaining medical expenses 

we do not believe that the legislature intended the county to 

be liable under the facts presented here. 

The court properly rejected her claim for payment of her 

attorney who was retained by the appellant after she 

dismissed her court appointed counsel. Appellant is entitled 

to counsel as provided in section 53-31-116, MCA, which 

provides : 

53-21-116. Right to be present at hearing or 

trial--appointment of counsel. The person alleged 

to be seriously mentally ill has the right to be 

present at any hearing or trial. If he has no 

attorney, the judge shall appoint one to represent. 

him at either the hearing or the trial, or both, 

who shall be compensated from the public funds of 

the county where the respondent resides. 

But when the appellant chose to retain her own attorney 

she came under section 53-21-117, MCA. That provides as 

follows : 

53-21-117. Right to representation by own 

attorney. The respondent or the friend of 

respondent appointed by the court may secure an 

attorney of his own choice and at his own expense 

to represent the respondent. 

The District Court correctly denied attorney fees. 

In refusing to compensate the appellant's expert witness 

the District Court relied on section 53-21-1.18, MCA: 
53-21-118. Right to examination by professional 

person of own choosing. (1.) The respondent, his 

attorney, or the friend of respondent appointed by 

the court may secure a professional person of his 

own choice to examine the respond.ent and to testify 

at the hearing before the court or jury as to the 

results of his examination. 

(2) If the person wishing to secure the testimony 

of a professional person is unable to do so because 

of financial reasons and if the respondent joins in 

the request for the examination, the court shall 

appoint a professional person other than the 

professional person requesting the commitment to 

perform the examination. Whenever possible, the 

court shall allow the respondent a reasonable 

choice of an available professional person 

qualified to perform the requested examination who 

will be compensated from the public funds of the 

county where the respondent resides. (Emphasis 

added. 1 

The failure of the appellant to obtain prior approval of 

the court for expert witness fees precludes payment of 

compensation for that expert witness. 

Affirmed. A 

We Concur: 

Justices