J-S20034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAY-C O'BRYAN MCGLUMPHY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 832 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 7, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0003895-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: October 13, 2022

Appellant, Jay-C O’Bryan McGlumphy, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

order entered in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his 

first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The PCRA court set forth the factual and procedural history of this case 

as follows:

On June 6, 2016, at 9:31 p.m., the City of Erie Police 

Department responded to a report of shots fired on Lincoln 

Avenue near the Bayfront Parkway in Erie, Pennsylvania. 

When they arrived, they found Isiah Wiley dead in the 

driver’s seat of a white 2003 Cadillac. There police

interviewed Luis Lopez, who had been in the passenger seat 

when Wiley was killed. Lopez told police that an unknown 

assailant or assailants pulled over in another vehicle, fired 

several shots into the Cadillac, and fled the scene. The 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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bullets spared Lopez, but claimed the life of Wiley. Other 

witnesses described the vehicle carrying the shooter as dark 

in color. Police found three 9-millimeter shell casings and a 

bullet at the crime scene. The coroner ruled the victim’s 

death a homicide.

Police later found a Taurus PT111 9-millimeter 

semiautomatic handgun at the scene of a separate incident 

on June 12, 2016. Detectives were able to lift a latent 

fingerprint from the gun. The Pennsylvania State Police 

(PSP) Crime Laboratory issued a report identifying the gun 

as the one which had fired the three 9-millimeter casings 

and the bullet from the Lincoln Avenue crime scene. PSP 

also identified the fingerprint found on the handgun as the 

left thumb print of [Appellant]....

On August 1, 2017, Police interviewed [Appellant regarding]

the June 6, 2016, incident. [Appellant] told police that he 

was picked up that night by three others in a dark-colored

SUV. [Appellant] and the other individuals found a white 

Cadillac in which Lopez was a passenger. They followed the 

Cadillac, lost it, but found it again near the 1000 block of 

Lincoln Avenue near the Bayfront Parkway. The other 

individuals in the vehicle handed [Appellant] a loaded gun 

and directed him to fire at the Cadillac. He fired the gun six 

or seven times, at which point he noticed the victim slumped 

over in the driver’s seat. [Appellant] had been 17 at the 

time of the incident.

On October 27, 2017, [Appellant] was charged with several 

counts related to the June 6, 2016, incident, including 

criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, criminal 

conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, aggravated 

assault, recklessly endangering another person, possession 

of an instrument of crime, possession of a firearm by a 

minor, firearms not to be carried without a license, and 

criminal attempt at murder in the first degree. The

Commonwealth maintained that, although Wiley was the 

ultimate victim of the shooting, Lopez had been the intended 

target. (See N.T. Sentencing, 12/12/18, at 18).

On November 1, 2017, Attorney Keith H. Clelland was 

appointed to represent [Appellant] on the charges related 

to the June 6, 2016, incident. On March 6, 2018, Attorney 
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Clelland filed an omnibus pre-trial motion for relief on behalf 

of his client, seeking recognition of an alibi defense,

decertification of the case to juvenile court, access to 

[Appellant’s] juvenile record, and a psychological 

evaluation. On April 5, 2018, the [trial court] granted the 

motion in part, permitting Attorney Clelland access to 

[Appellant’s] juvenile record, and allowing Attorney Clelland 

further time for discovery. Subsequently, [on July 3, 2018,]

Attorney Clelland filed a formal motion to decertify the case 

to juvenile court and [the trial court] ordered a 

psychological evaluation.

The evaluation revealed a troubled past, including an 

extensive juvenile record dating back to 2012, and 

placement in several juvenile programs as an adjudicated 

delinquent where he twice absconded. The evaluator noted 

that “[i]nformation generated from the subject’s 

psychological testing, clinical interview and records review 

do not support [Appellant’s] amenability to treatment within 

the juvenile justice system” and consequently opined that 

“[Appellant] lacks the necessary insight and motivation for 

juvenile rehabilitation.” On August 28, 2018, a hearing was 

held...on the motion to decertify. On September 24, 2018, 

[the trial court] denied the motion.

By letters dated July 18, 2018, and October 5, 2018, 

[Appellant] requested that [the trial court] appoint him new 

counsel. On October 10, 2018, Attorney Clelland filed a 

motion to withdraw representation. Attorney Clelland’s 

motion indicated he “continuously had to pull teeth to get 

any sort of response” from his client. ([Motion to Withdraw 

Representation, filed 10/10/18]). Attorney Clelland further 

stated that [Appellant] undermined his representation “and 

in fact flagrantly goes out of his way to make a case even 

more difficult.” (Id.) On October 11, 2018, [the trial court]

denied the motion to withdraw, noting no further request for 

a change of counsel would be entertained by the court.

On October 19, 2018, [Appellant] entered into a plea 

agreement, pleading guilty to murder of the third degree, 

possession of an instrument of crime, and possession of a 

firearm by a minor. Sentencing occurred on December 12, 

2018. Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth informed 

[Appellant] of his right to file a post-sentence motion or an 
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appeal and the time periods in which he would have to do 

so. (N.T. Sentencing at 5-6).

During the sentencing hearing, [the trial court] addressed a 

letter sent by [Appellant] to the court where he maintained 

his innocence, claiming he was taking the blame for 

someone else. (Id. at 8-9). To the extent that [Appellant]

was requesting to [w]ithdraw[] his guilty plea, [the trial 

court] denied the request, noting [Appellant] had already 

admitted in open court when he entered his plea that he 

fired the bullets that caused the death of the victim. (Id. at

9). [The trial court] then proceeded to sentence [Appellant]

to an aggregate period of 25 to 50 years of incarceration 

plus restitution and costs. (Id. at 32). Neither a postsentence motion nor a notice of appeal was timely filed on 

[Appellant’s] behalf.

On May 9, 2019, the clerk of courts received a letter dated 

May 6, 2019, asking about the status of an appeal. On June 

12, 2019, the clerk of courts received a similar letter from

[Appellant] in which he inquired on how to conduct his own 

appeal.

On December 16, 2019, [Appellant] filed the present PCRA 

petition pro se, claiming: a) violation of the Constitution of 

this Commonwealth or the laws of the United States which 

so undermined the truth determining process that no 

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place, b) ineffective assistance of counsel which so 

undermined the truth determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place, c) 

a plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances 

make it likely that inducement caused him to plead and he 

is innocent, and d) improper obstruction of government 

officials of his right of appeal where a meritorious appealable 

issue existed and was properly preserved in the trial court. 

(See Pro se PCRA Petition, 12/16/19, at 2). On March 5, 

2020, [Appellant], by and through PCRA counsel, filed an 

amended PCRA petition, limited to the ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim. (See Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief, 3/5/20). On April 6, 2020, the 

Commonwealth filed a response.

On September 18, 2020, an evidentiary hearing was held on 
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the PCRA petition. Both [Appellant] and Attorney Clelland 

testified. At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the [c]ourt

made initial factual findings and took the matter under 

further advisement. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/18/20, at 37).

On December 7, 2020, [the PCRA court] issued an Opinion 

and order to dismiss PCRA pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908, 

denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition.

[Appellant] did not initially appeal that decision. On March

23, 2021, [Appellant] penned a letter to the Erie County 

Clerk of Courts claiming that his PCRA counsel informed him 

he “had to write her a letter to give her [permission] to file 

an appeal to the Superior Court” and further alleging that 

he tested positive for COV1D-19 on January 1, 2021, and as 

a result, he was confined to the medical block and could not 

communicate with PCRA counsel to indicate his desire to file

an appeal before the time to do so had expired. (Letter, 

3/23/21). In the letter, he unequivocally stated that he 

“would like to get [his] appeal rights back so [he] can appeal 

[his] PCRA to the Superior Court.” (Id.) On April 8, 2021, 

the court informed both PCRA counsel and the

Commonwealth of the letter, putting the parties on notice of 

[Appellant’s] desire to reinstate his appellate rights. On 

June 15, 2021, the Commonwealth indicated to the court 

that it did not object to the reinstatement of [Appellant’s]

appellate rights nunc pro tunc. By order dated June 22, 

2021, the court treated the March 23, 2021, letter as a

motion to reinstate appellate rights nunc pro tunc and 

granted the motion, providing that [Appellant], by and 

through counsel, would have 30 days in which to file a notice 

of appeal of the court’s dismissal of the PCRA petition with 

the Superior Court.

[Appellant timely] filed a [nunc pro tunc] notice of appeal 

on July 16, 2021. That same day, [the PCRA court] ordered

[Appellant] to file a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

August 3, 2021, PCRA counsel filed a statement of intent to 

file an Anders/McClendon[2] brief in lieu of a 1925(b) 

statement, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4), and indicating that 

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2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), 

and Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981).
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after performing a thorough review of the file and 

transcripts, she found there to be no issues of merit to raise 

on appeal....

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 8/24/21, at 1-6) (some record citations omitted).

Preliminarily, appellate counsel has filed a petition for leave to withdraw 

as counsel, together with an Anders brief. Before counsel can be permitted 

to withdraw from representing a petitioner under the PCRA, Pennsylvania law 

requires counsel to file a “no-merit” brief or letter. Commonwealth v. 

Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 946 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

[C]ounsel must...submit a “no-merit” letter to the [PCRA] 

court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature 

and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing 

the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed, 

explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and 

requesting permission to withdraw.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007). Counsel 

must also send to the petitioner a copy of the “no-merit” letter or brief and 

motion to withdraw and advise petitioner of his right to proceed pro se or with 

privately retained counsel. Id. “Substantial compliance with these 

requirements will satisfy the criteria.” Karanicolas, supra at 947. 

Instantly, counsel filed with this Court a petition to withdraw and a nomerit brief. 3

 Counsel’s brief details the nature of her review and explains why 

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3 Where PCRA counsel requests to withdraw, the appropriate filing is a “nomerit” letter/brief per Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 

(1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en 

banc). Here, counsel mistakenly designated her no-merit brief as one 
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Appellant’s claims lack merit. Counsel’s brief also demonstrates that she 

examined the certified record and found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Counsel notified Appellant of the request to withdraw and advised Appellant

of his rights. Thus, counsel has substantially complied with the Turner/Finley

requirements. See Wrecks, supra; Karanicolas, supra. Accordingly, we 

proceed to an independent evaluation of the record. See Turner, supra at 

494-95, 544 A.2d at 928-29 (stating appellate court must conduct 

independent analysis and agree with counsel that appeal is frivolous). 

Counsel raises the following issue on Appellant’s behalf: 

Whether the PCRA court erred when it denied Appellant’s 

PCRA petition and supplemental PCRA petition? 

(Turner/Finley Brief at 3).4 

Appellant argues there was a breakdown in the attorney-client 

relationship between Appellant and plea counsel. Appellant asserts plea 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file post-sentence motions on Appellant’s 

behalf. Likewise, Appellant insists plea counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file a direct appeal on his behalf. Appellant further suggests plea counsel 

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pursuant to Anders. Nevertheless, we can accept an Anders brief in lieu of 

a Turner/Finley brief where counsel seeks to withdraw on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2004), 

appeal denied, 584 Pa. 691, 882 A.2d 477 (2005). 

4 Appellant has not filed a responsive brief pro se or with newly-retained 

counsel. Nevertheless, on March 9, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se response to 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, agreeing that the court should permit counsel 

to withdraw, and requesting a copy of his client file.
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improperly induced him to plead guilty. Appellant concludes plea counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the record evidence supports the court’s determination 

and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 A.2d 

319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA 

court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth 

v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 

A.2d 74 (2007). If the record supports a post-conviction court’s credibility 

determination, it is binding on the appellate court. Commonwealth v. 

Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297 (2011). 

“Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.” 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal 

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020). 

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances 

of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to 

prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; 

and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is 

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), 
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appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for 

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

Regarding Appellant’s first allegation of ineffectiveness, that counsel 

failed to file post-sentence motions on his behalf, we note that the failure to 

file a post-sentence motion does not automatically give rise to a presumption 

of prejudice. Rather, where counsel fails to file post-sentence motions, the 

traditional three-prong test applies to determine whether counsel was 

ineffective. Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 134, 923 A.2d 1119 (2007) 

(holding defendant must satisfy traditional three-prong ineffectiveness test 

concerning counsel’s failure to file post-sentence motions). See also 

Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 16, 977 A.2d 1089, 1092 (2009) 

(emphasizing that “the failure to file post-sentence motions does not fall within 

the limited ambit of situations where a defendant alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel need not prove prejudice to obtain relief”). Therefore, 

an appellant bears the burden of establishing that counsel’s failure to file a 

post-sentence motion prejudiced him; namely, that his “counsel’s 

performance was deficient” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” Reaves, supra at 147, 923 A.2d at 1127.

Notably, in general, an appellant who pleads guilty may only challenge 

the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of the sentence, and the validity of 
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the guilty plea on appeal. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286, 290 

(Pa.Super. 2017). “[W]hen ‘the plea agreement contains a negotiated 

sentence which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no 

authority to permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence.’” 

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa.Super. 

1991)).

Instantly, Appellant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to file a post-sentence motion.5 The court sentenced Appellant to an 

agreed upon aggregate sentence of 25-50 years’ imprisonment following his 

guilty plea. Because the court imposed the negotiated sentence, Appellant

would not have been permitted to challenge the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. See Morrison, supra. In addition, prior to sentencing, the court 

considered a pro se letter from Appellant as a request to withdraw his plea, 

and denied that request, stating:

I’m not going to let you withdraw your plea...for a number 

of reasons. When you stood before me for your plea I asked 

you, and to put it bluntly, I asked if you pulled the trigger 

that injected the lead that went into the [victim’s] body and 

caused his death and under oath to me in this solemn place 

you said yes. That’s the end of it. 

(N.T. Sentencing, 12/12/18, at 9). On this record, Appellant cannot prove 

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5 We note that at the PCRA hearing, Attorney Clelland testified that Appellant 

“never asked [him] to file any post-sentence motion.” (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 

9/18/20, at 15). The PCRA court found Attorney Clelland’s testimony credible. 

(See PCRA Court Opinion at 14). 
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that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to file a post-sentence motion, and 

he cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground. See 

Reaves, supra; Sandusky, supra.

Regarding Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file 

a direct appeal on his behalf, we observe that the “[a]ctual or constructive 

denial of the assistance of counsel...falls within a narrow category of 

circumstances in which prejudice is legally presumed.” Commonwealth v. 

Lane, 81 A.3d 974, 978 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 658, 92 

A.3d 811 (2014). Our Supreme Court has held:

[W]here there is an unjustified failure to file a requested 

direct appeal, the conduct of counsel falls beneath the range 

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, 

denies the accused the assistance of counsel guaranteed by 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well 

as the right to direct appeal under Article V, Section 9, and 

constitutes prejudice for purposes of Section 9543(a)(2)(ii). 

Therefore, in such circumstances, and where the remaining 

requirements of the PCRA are satisfied, the petitioner is not 

required to establish his innocence or demonstrate the 

merits of the issue or issues which would have been raised 

on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 226-27, 736 A.2d 564, 572 (1999) 

(internal footnote omitted). In other words, if counsel neglects to file a 

requested direct appeal, “counsel is per se ineffective as the defendant was 

left with the functional equivalent of no counsel.” Commonwealth v. 

Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 715 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 615 Pa. 764, 

40 A.3d 1235 (2012). 
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Even if a defendant does not expressly ask counsel to file a direct appeal, 

counsel still has a duty “to adequately consult with the defendant as to the 

advantages and disadvantages of an appeal where there is reason to think 

that a defendant would want to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bath, 907 

A.2d 619, 623 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 695, 918 A.2d 741 

(2007) (emphasis added). Where the defendant did not request counsel to 

file a direct appeal but counsel failed to consult with the defendant, counsel is 

not per se ineffective and the court applies the traditional three-prong test “to 

decide whether counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by 

failing to advise [the] client about his appellate rights.” Markowitz, supra

at 716. 

Pursuant to [Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 

S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) and its Pennsylvania 

expression, Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250 

(Pa.Super. 2001)], counsel has a constitutional duty to 

consult with a defendant about an appeal where counsel has 

reason to believe either “(1) that a rational defendant would 

want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular 

defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was 

interested in appealing.” Touw[, supra] at 1254 (quoting 

Roe[, supra] at 480, 120 S.Ct. [at 1036]).

Bath, supra at 623. “Where a petitioner can prove either factor, he 

establishes that his claim has arguable merit.” Markowitz, supra at 716. 

Prejudice in this context means a defendant must show a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s failure to consult, the defendant would have 

sought additional review. Touw, supra at 1254. 
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Instantly, at the PCRA hearing, Appellant admitted that he never asked 

Attorney Clelland to file an appeal after sentencing. (N.T. PCRA Hearing at 

7). Instead, Appellant claims he asked counsel to file an appeal prior to 

sentencing, stating: “I asked him the whole time I was in the county. I asked 

him to put a motion in to suppress evidence, direct appeal, which he never 

put no direct appeal in.” (Id.) Appellant explained that when he wrote a 

letter to the clerk of courts asking about the status of his appeal, that was an 

inquiry “to figure out how to get one.” (Id. at 8). 

By contrast, Attorney Clelland testified that Appellant “never asked 

[him] to file an appeal.” (Id. at 15). The PCRA court found Attorney Clelland’s 

testimony credible. (See PCRA Court Opinion at 14). We see no reason to 

disrupt the court’s credibility determination in favor of Attorney Clelland. See 

Dennis, supra. Thus, Appellant has failed to establish that counsel was per 

se ineffective for failing to file a requested direct appeal. See Lantzy, supra; 

Markowitz, supra. 

The PCRA court also found that Appellant did not establish Attorney 

Clelland’s ineffectiveness for failing to consult with Appellant about the 

possibility of an appeal. The court credited Attorney Clelland’s testimony that 

he discussed post-sentence and appellate procedures generally with 

Appellant. Attorney Clelland acknowledged that he did not specifically discuss 

the merits of an appeal with Appellant, but if he had done so, he would have 

advised against an appeal as there were no meritorious issues to appeal. The 
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PCRA court credited plea counsel’s testimony and concluded that Appellant 

failed to establish Attorney Clelland’s ineffectiveness regarding counsel’s duty 

to consult. The record supports the PCRA court’s credibility determination in 

favor of Attorney Clelland, and the court’s analysis. See Dennis, supra. See 

also Bath, supra. 

With respect to Appellant’s final claim that Attorney Clelland rendered 

ineffective assistance by inducing him to enter a guilty plea, we observe that 

“[a] criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea process 

as well as during trial. A defendant is permitted to withdraw his guilty plea 

under the PCRA if ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant to 

enter an involuntary plea of guilty.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 

394, 397 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within 

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Kersteter, 877 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa.Super.

2005)). 

Here, Appellant was facing first degree murder and related charges for 

the shooting of Mr. Wiley. Appellant confessed to the crime and his 

fingerprints were on the murder weapon. (See N.T. Sentencing at 10). 

Further, Attorney Clelland explained at the evidentiary hearing:

...I got a letter from [Appellant] in October asking me to 

arrange a plea bargain. And he had given me permission –

he had waived confidentiality, so I could speak to his family. 

I went to his family and I said, I am – do not believe I can 
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win this trial. I said, if I lose, he will spend the rest of his

life in prison. I said, will you speak to him about taking a 

third degree murder. They did. They said they would. And 

in fact, they did. I have a copy of the letter they sent. They 

said, please, listen to [Attorney Clelland]. Please take the 

plea, we want you to get out of jail at some point in your 

life. He thereafter took it and that’s where my mind thought 

was....

(N.T. PCRA Hearing at 25-26). On this record, there is no arguable merit to 

Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness for inducing his guilty plea. See 

Patterson, supra. See also Sandusky, supra. 

Following our independent review of the record, we agree with counsel 

that there are no other non-frivolous issues on appeal. See Turner, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/13/2022