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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1666

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

T O NY C UR

RI E, Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana , Indi ana pol i s Divisi on. No. 1: 10 -cr- 00 93 -SE B-KPF — Sara h Evan s Ba rker , Judg e.

A RGU E D O CT OB E R 25, 2012

— D E C I D E D J ANUAR Y 7, 2014

Before F L AUM

, M AN I O N

, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges.
R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Defen dant-Appellant T ony Currie pleaded gui lty to char g e s t hat he conspi red to di strib ute 50 gr ams or more of cocaine base, in v io l a t io n of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a )( 1 ) and 846, and possess ed a fi rear m following a felony convic tion, i n v i olation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The di stric t court or dered hi m to serv e a pris on ter m of 121 months, at the lo w end of t he range advis ed by the S entencing Gui delines and just abov e what the court and the parties beli ev ed to2 No. 12-1666

be the statuto ry minimum pris on ter m of ten y ears. Currie appeals, contendi ng that the di stric t court err oneously deni ed his mo tion to supp ress evidenc e wi thout conduc tin g a n evidenti ary hearin g a nd t hat i ts choi ce of sentence w as premi sed on i ts mi staken understanding that t he new , low er mandatory mini mum s speci fi ed by the Fair Sente ncing Ac t of 2010 di d not apply at Currie’s sentencing. W e find no error in the di stric t court’s deci si on to deny C ur rie’s motion to suppress wi thout an evidenti ary hearin g. As to hi s sent ence, w e
or der a li mit e d remand for purposes of ascertai ning whether the di st r ict court w ould be inclined to sentence Currie di ffer

ently knowi ng that Currie i s subject to the l ow er statuto ry mini mumter m of fiv e y ears as prov i ded by the FS A I. Follo wing hi s own arr est in Februar y 2010 for possess i on of di strib uti on-si zed quanti ties of cocaine and crack cocaine, an
unnam ed i ndi vidu al agr eed to coo perat e wi th the author i ties and lead them to hi s supp li er , Currie. The confi denti al source (“CS”) proceeded to make a seri es of contro lled, recor ded purchas es of crack cocaine from Currie. These purchas es led to the i ssu ance of a sear ch w arr ant for Currie’s resi dence; the ensuing search i n turn produced evidenc e of a loaded rev olv er i n Currie’s home. The fi rst of the contro lled buys too k place on Mar ch 4, 2010. After a seri es of moni tor ed phone calls to arr ange the purchas e of 1.5 ounces of crack cocaine from Currie, t he CS met Currie at a resi dence i n Anderson, Indi ana. The CS w as wi red wi th equi pment whi ch produced a video and audi o recor ding of the encounter

. The CS follow ed Currie into the kitch en, whereNo. 12-1666 3

Currie presented hi m wi th a plasti c bag contai ning ro ughly 91 gr ams of cocain e ba se. A t Currie’s r equest, the CS proceeded t o r e-cook the cocaine base; Currie then re-w ei ghed t he sub stance on a di gital scal e (i t now w ei ghed 96 gr ams) and repackaged i t for the CS. The CS pai d Currie th e agr eed-upon pric e and left the residen ce. The CS sub sequently engaged in tw o more contro lled purchas es of crack cocaine from Currie on Mar ch 12 and Mar ch 18, 2010. These tr ansac tions w ere not rec o r d ed on video, but audi o recor d ing s w ere made in both instances

. Mor eov er , as wi th the Ma rch 4 purchas e, both tr ansac tions w ere preceded by

recor ded telephone calls in whi ch the CS arr anged to make the purchas es from Currie. On May 10, 2010, the governm e nt sought and obtained a search w arr ant for Currie’s resi denc e in Indi anapoli s. The affi davit sub mi tte d i n supp or t o f the w arr ant request noted that the government’s C S h a d made three contro lled purchas es of co ca i ne from Currie in Mar ch. The affi davit repo rt ed the CS’s prior cri minal hi stor y , noted that the CS had been cooper atin g wi th the gover nment since Februar y 2010, and i ndi cated that much of the information supp li ed by the CS had been corr obor ated. The CS’s three tr ansac tions wi th Currie

w ere then described in d e t a il, along wi th the fact that the p ur chas es w ere both recor ded by the CS and preced e d by

consens ually moni tor ed telepho ne calls betw een the CS and Currie. The agent who prepar ed the affi davit indi cated that he had rev i ew ed the vi deo r ecording of the Mar ch 4 transacti on. He descri

bed t he acti ons depicted o n t hat video and av err e d ,4 No. 12-1666

based on hi s tr a ining and exper i ence, that the sub stance that Currie handed to the CS w as, in fac t, cocai ne base. The search w arr ant w as executed on May 1 1 , 2 0 1 0

. Upon enter i ng the resi dence, a g e nts found Currie in hi s bedroo m, atte mpti ng to hi de a loaded rev olv er in t he clo set. V arious i ndi ci a of drug t raffi cki ng w ere also found i n the resid ence. The di scov ery of the gun led to the in clus i on of a felon-inpossess i on charge along wi th the fi v e narcotics -related charges i n the i ndi ctment that the g r a nd jury ret urned again st Currie

on Ju ne 8 , 2010. Currie sub sequently mov ed to supp ress the results of the search on multi ple gr ounds. As relev ant here, he contended that th e a ffidavi t sub mi tte d in supp or t of the

w arr ant appli cati o n w a s insu ffi ci ent, absent the CS’s own testim ony

, to establi sh the CS’s reliab i li ty and thus to establi sh probable caus e for the search. Currie a l so contended that the CS had pr ov i ded mi sleading information to law enforcement offi cers whi ch had made i ts w ay into the affi davit. Pursu ant to Franks v
. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S

. Ct. 2674 (1978), Currie asked the di stric t court t o conduc t an evidenti ary hearin g on thi s sec ond contention. The di stric t court deni ed the motion to supp ress wi thout a hearin g. The court described Currie’s attack on the suffi ci ency of the w arr ant affi davit vis -à-vi s the CS’s credibi li ty as “a nonstart er ,” giv en that the CS’s tr ansac tions wi th Currie had been both moni tor ed and recor ded, and the agent who prepar ed the affi davit described the steps take n in t ha t reg ard as w ell as what he saw and heard in rev i ewing the recor dings. R. 73 at 7. Consequently

, “[t]here w as no relianc e placed on the CS’s i ndependent, uni later al, uns upervised acti ons or statements,”No. 12-1666 5

and no need for addi tional information (or li v e testim ony from the CS) to document the CS’s reliab i li ty and to establi sh probable c ause for the search w arr ant. R. 73 at 7. “W e find the Affi davit to be both detailed and thor oug h, with no cri tic al omi ssi ons or uns ubs tantiated, unreli able av erments.” R. 73 at 8. The court saw no need for an evidenti ary hearin g on Currie’s addi tional clai m that the affi d a v i t contai ned mi sleading i nformation. “There i s no evidenc e that [the agent] ‘knowin gly , i ntentionally

, or wi th a reckless disregard for the tr ut h, made false st atements i n the w arr ant affi davit and that the false statement s w e re necess ary for the judi ci al offi cer to conclu de that pr obable cau se exis ted.’” R. 73 at 9 (quoti ng United S tat es
v. Norris , 640 F .3d 295, 300–01 (7th Ci r . 2011)). Currie sub sequ e nt ly deci ded to change hi s plea whi le

reserv i ng hi s ri ght t o appeal the adv erse ruling on hi s motion to suppress. As w e indi cated at the outset, Currie pleaded gui lty to the narcotics conspi racy and felon-in-poss essi on charges. Although Currie w as sentenced after the enactment of the Fair Sente ncing Act of 2010, 124 St at. 2372 (the “FS A”), the parties, the probat i on offi cer , and the di stric t court, in accord wi th thi s court’s deci si on in United States v
. Fisher, 635 F .3d 336 (7th Ci r .), reh’g en banc denied, 646 F .3d 429 (7th Ci r
. 2011), vacated & remanded sub nom. D or s e y v
. United States , 132 S. Ct. 2 321 (2012), assu med that the more fav or able statuto r y penalti es speci fi ed by the FS A d id not apply at Currie’s sentencing becau se hi s offenses were complete before the FS A too k effect; there fore t hey assum ed that Currie w as subject t o
a mini mum statuto ry pris on ter m of ten y ea rs. The court
or dered Currie to serv e a ter m of 121 months, a sentence at the low end of the range advis ed by the Sente ncing Gui delines and6 No. 12-1666

one month abov e what t he co urt beli ev ed w as the statuto ry mini mum
. II. Currie’s contention that the affi davit i s on i ts face inadequate i s, as the di stric t court obser ved , going nowhere. The contents of a w arr ant affi davit wi ll establi sh probable caus e to search i f, based on the tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances, the affi davit presents evidenc e supp or tin g a reasonable beli ef that the search of the subject pre mises wi ll produce evidenc e of a cri me
. Illinois v
. Gat es , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 1 0 3 S

. C t

. 2317, 2332 (1983). Currie’s attack on the suffi ci ency of the affi davit focus es
on the credi

bi li ty of the CS: Currie maintai ns that the affi davit does not supp ly enough information to est a bl ish the CS’s reliab i li ty as an i nformant. See, e.g. , United S tat es v . Sear cy, 664 F .3d 1119, 1122 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (outli ning f actor s whi ch inform

asses sment of i nformant’s credibi li ty). But in thi s case, the key i nformation set fort h in t he a ff ida v i t had t o do wi th the three cont r olled purchas es of cocaine from Currie. Those tr ansac tions w ere both moni tor ed and recor ded by the authoriti es, so the s tor y as to what o ccu rr ed di d not rest on the CS’s accoun t alone. Indeed, the agent who prepar ed the affi davit had

rev i ew ed the audi ov i sual recor ding of the fi rst of the sales and described what the recor ding show ed: that Currie ha nd e d a bag of what appeared to be crack cocaine to the CS, had the CS re-cook i t, and then repackag ed the cocaine for the CS. That

recor ding, and t he audi o recor dings of the other tw o sales, supp li ed all the corr obor ation of the CS tha t w as necess ary
. The affi davit w as there fore suffi ci ent on i ts face, and there w as
no need for the mag ist rat e judge who i ssu ed the searchNo. 12-1666 7

w arr ant to hear testim ony from the CS before deter mining that probable caus e exis ted to search Currie’s resi dence. Nor w as i t necess ary for the court to conv ene a Franks hearin g based on Currie’sasserti on that t he w arr ant affi davit repeat ed false or mi sleading information suppl ie d by the CS. A co urt mus t conv ene a Franks hearin g when the defendant makes a sub stanti al prelim inary showing that authoriti es deliberately or recklessly made material mi srepresentat i ons in the affi davit used to procure the search w arr ant. 438 U.S. at 155–56, 98 S

. C t

. 2676; see also , e.g. , United States v
. Harris , 464 F

. 3 d 733, 738 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (defendan t i s entitled to Fra n ks hearin g when he shows that (1) w arr ant affi davit contai ned materially i naccurate information, (2) authoriti es knew of or recklessly di sregar ded th e inaccuracy , and (3) purpor tedly i naccurate statement w as necess ary to the finding of probable

caus e). In thi s case, Currie nev er i denti fi ed any particu lar aspect of the w arr ant affi davit that w as false or mi sleading (let alone deliberately or recklessly so); he instead sought a Franks he a r ing based solely on a gener ali zed allegation that the CS prov i ded mi sleading information to inv esti gato rs whi ch made i ts w ay i nto the affi davit. Indeed, e ven on appeal, Currie has fai led to i denti fy any av erment in the w arr ant affi davit whi ch

w as false or mi sleading. Under these ci rcums tances, the c ourt commi tte d no err or i n denyi ng the motion to supp ress wi thout

an evidenti ar y he a r ing. See, e.g. , United States v
. Johnson , 580 F .3d 666, 671 (7th Ci r
. 2009) (“Conclus or y, self- ser v ing statements are not enough to obt a in a Franks hearin g.”) (ci tin g Franks , 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct . at 2684).8 No. 12-1666

W e turn to the matter of Currie’s sentence. Currie pleaded gui lty to conspiring to di strib ute 50 or more gr ams of crack cocaine. At the tim e of hi s offens e, commi tte d in the s prin g of 2010, that quanti ty of crack cocaine tr i gge red a statuto ry mini mum pris on ter m of ten y ears. By the tim e Currie w as sentenced inMar ch 2012, the Fai r S entencing Act of 2010 had low ered the statuto ry mini mum ter m appli cable to someone in Currie’s posi tion to fi v e y ears. How ev er , giv en our holding in Fisher, 635 F .3d 339–40, that t he new s tatut or y mi ni mum s did not apply to defendan ts whose offenses predate d the Act, the parties and the court assu med that Currie w as sti ll subject to the ten-y ear mini mum
. Sev eral months aft er Currie w as sentenced to a ter m of 121 months, the Supreme Court held in Dorsey that the FS A appli e s to any defendant sentenced after i ts effecti v e date, e ven i f the offense w as commi tte d before the Act’s enactment. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct . 2321. W e now know that Currie w as subject to a st a t ut or y mini mum ter m of fi v e y ear s a nd not ten y ears, as the di stric t court presumed. Although Currie di d not preserve an arg ument below that the low er mini mum ter m speci fi ed by the FS A appli ed to hi m, he contends that the court commi tte d plain
err or i n deeming hi m subject to the pre-FS A te n - ye a r mini mum and that he i s, consequen tly , entitled to re sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P

. 5 2 (b)

. Gi v en the Supreme Court ’s deci si on in Dorsey, there i s no di spute that the di stric t court commi tte d an
err or which is, i n ret ro spect, plain in the sens e of being obvious. See Hender son v
. United States , 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1127–28 (2013). The di sputed i ssu e i s whether Currie w as prej udi ced by the err or , i n the sens e that he mi ght hav e receiv ed a lesser sent ence had the court realized he w as not sub ject to the ten-No. 12-1666 9

y ear mini mum
. See United States v
. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 734–35, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777–78 (1993); United States v
. Paladino , 401 F .3d 471, 483 (7th Ci r . 2005). Currie contends that becau se t he court, i n sentencing hi m to a 121-month ter m, remark ed that i t
w as bound by the ten-y ear mini mum, there i s ev ery reason to beli ev e t hat hi s sentence w as the product of the court’s mi staken beli ef as to the statuto ry mini mum
. The government,
on the other hand, emphas i zes the court’s addi tional remark that the 121-month ter m w as a fai r sentence, an observ a t i on that i n i ts view makes clear the court w ould hav e i mposed the

same sentence ev en had i t realized that i t w as not bound by the statute t o im pose a mini mumter m of ten y ears. W e take our cue i n resolv ing thi s di spute from Paladino , 401 F .3d at 483–84. In the w ake of the Supreme Court ’s deci si on in United States v
. Boo ker

, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), whi ch render ed the Sente nc ing Gui delines advis or y , Paladino establi shed our framew or k for deci ding wh e t he r a di stric t court’s mi stake in tr eating the Gui delines as binding consti tuted plain
err or
. Paladino recog ni zed that the answer to that inqui ry turns
on prej udi ce. 401 F .3d at 481–84; see also United States v
. Lee, 399 F .3d 864, 866 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (“In or der to s how plain err or the defendant mus t establi sh, among other thi ngs, that the err or ‘affected sub stanti al rights’—whi ch i s to say that i t ma d e t he defendant w or se off.”). As a rev i ewing court, we could say that the err or di d not prej udi ce the defendant i f i t w as clear that the sent e ncin g judge w ould hav e i mposed the same sentence absent the err or
. Paladino , 401 F .3d at 483. The di ffi culty , as w e recog ni zed, w as i n deter mining what the se ntencing judge

w ould hav e d o ne had he realized he w as not bound by the Gui delines range.10 No. 12-1666
[S]entencing i s not ei ther -or; i t i s the ch o ice of a poin t wi thi n a range e st abli shed by Congr ess, and normally the range i s a broad one. There are exceptions, notably where the choi ce i s betw een death and li fe i n pris on; then, as in Jones v
. United States , 5 2 7 U.S. 373, 402–05, 119 S. C t. 2090 (1999), i t may be feasi ble for the appellate co ur t to deter mine that despi te the err or the ch oic e w ould hav e been the

same. Cf. Un i te d S tat es v
. Cotto n , 535 U.S. 625, 633–34, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002). That i s not tr ue her e; here, un less any of the judges in the c ases before us ha d sai d i n sentencing a defendant pre- Boo ker th a t he w ould hav e giv en the sa me sentence ev en i f the gui delines w ere merely advis or y (wh i ch none of the j ud ges di d say), i t i s i mpossi ble for a rev i ewing court to deter mine— without consul ting the sente ncing judge (a preg nant quali fi cati on, as we are about to see)—whether t he judge w ould hav e done that

. 401 F .3d at 482 (emphas i s in or ig inal). In some numb er of

cases, w e recog ni zed, i t wi ll be possi ble to predic t what the sentencing judge w ould hav e done wit ho ut havin g to ask, as when the judge departe d below the Gui deline range to i mpose
a sentence at the statuto ry mini mum, or conv ersely , when she i mposed a sentence at the statuto ry maxi mum and r emarked that he w ould hav e sentenced the defendant t o a longer ter m i f she could. Id. at 482–83; see also Lee, 399 F .3d at 866–67. Shor t of such clues, “[t]he only practic al w ay (and i t happens also to be the shortest, the easi est, the qui ckest, and the surest w ay) to deter mine wh e ther the kin d of plain err or arg ued in these cases has actually occurred i s to ask the di stric t judge.” Paladino, 401No. 12-1666 11

F .3d at 483. If the judge indi cates that she w o uld not hav e sentenced the defendant di fferent l y had she realized the Gui delines w ere not binding, then w e w ould conclu de that the defendant w as not prej ud ice d by the err or and w e w ould proceed to affi rm the sentence so long as i t w as reasonable. Id. at 484. If, on the other hand, the di stric t court indi cated that i t
w ould be i nclined to i mpose a di fferent sentence, that prej udi ce w ould be establi shed, and w e w ould v acate the judgment and remand for re sentencing. Id.
Here the di stric t co ur t w as si mi larly mi staken as to the li mi ts of i ts sentencing au thor i ty

. Rather than being bound by

a ten-y ear statuto ry mini mum, the court w as instead bound by

a si gni fi cantly low er fi v e-y ear mini mum
. In asses sing whether Currie w as pr ejudice d by the err or , such t hat he i s ent i tled to relief un d e r the plain err or doctrine, w e apply the Paladino model. See United States v
. Maxw ell , 724 F .3d 724, 729 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Here, competing inferences can b e drawn from the r ecord

as to what the sentencing judge mi ght have done had she known that she w as not bound by the ten-y ear mini mum
. Thi s i s the relev ant pass age from the judge’ s remark s at sentencing: E v e ry b od y agr ees, Mr

. Currie, that 121 months, ev e n thou g h i t’s the low poin t of the gui delines, and i t pret ty much nai ls the mandatory mini mum on the head, i s a long tim e. So w e can’t pull any punches on t ha t

. W e know that’s the fact, but i t seems to be a reasonable sentence under the cir cum stances, not only becau se of what the law requires, but giv en the nature and ci rc um stances of thi s offense and y our12 No. 12-1666
prior cri minal hi stor y

, and y our problems wi th addi cti on, y our wi llingness to partici pate in thi s cocaine conspi racy

, y our p o sses si on of fi rear ms,
ev en when y ou had a prior gun convic tion, y ou had a fi rear m agai n, and s o on. R. 1 3 6 at 26–27. The government construes Judge Barke r’s remark that the 121-month sentence “seems to be a reasonable sentence under the ci rcums tances” as a si gnal that she w ould hav e i mposed the same sentence ev en had she realized she w as not bound by the ten-y ear mini mum
. Currie, on the o t her hand, contends that the judge’ s view as to the reasonableness of a 121-month sentence w as necess arily pre mi sed on her mi staken beli ef t hat ten y ears w as t he mini mum sentence s he could i mpose. Havin g rev i ew ed the sen t e ncing tr ansc ript ourselv es, w e cannot say wi th complete confid e nce that the court w ould hav e i mposed the same sentence reg ardless of the statuto ry mini mum
. As i n Paladino , a l i mi ted remand i s the most prudent w ay to r e so lv e all doubt on thi s questi on. As the government concedes, at no tim e di d the di stric t judge actually say that she

w ould hav e i mposed the same sentenc e ev en w ere there no ten-y ear mini mum ; nor does her choi ce of sentence other wi se make that clear i n one of the w ays w e di scu ssed in Paladino or Lee

. The judge di d say t ha t t he sentence w as “a reasonable sentence under the ci rcums tances, not only becau se of what the law requires , ” R. 136 at 26 (emphas i s ours), but for the other reasons she articulated; and perhaps by that sh e meant to say i t w as the sentence she w ould hav e chosen reg ardless of any mini mum . But the statuto ry mini mumw as nec essari ly one ofNo. 12-1666 13

the ci rcums tan c e s th a t the judge had to consi der in ascertai ning a reasonable sentence. See, e.g. , United S tat es v . L yons , 733 F .3d 777, 784 (7th Ci r
. 2013). St atuto ry mini ma and maxi ma hav e an obvious anchori ng effect on t he judge’ s deter minati on of a reasonable sentence i n the sens e that they demarcate the range wi thi n whic h t he judge may i mpose a sentence. See United States v
. Aguilar-Huer ta , 576 F .3d 365, 366 (7th Ci r
. 2009) ( d e s c ri b in g p re - G u i d e lines sentencing practic e). Peugh v
. Un ite d States , 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2082–84 (2013), makes thi s same poin t wi th respect to the Sente ncing Gui delines. The Court in Peugh held that the Constituti on’s ex postfacto claus e i s violated when

a court sentences a defend a nt using a post-offense v ersi on of t he Gui delines that produces a hi gher sentencing range than the v ersi on in effect at the tim e of th e d e fendant’s cri me. In

r ej e ct ing the view of thi s and other courts that the advis or y nature of the Gui delines obviates any ex post fac to problem (bec ause a judge i s free in t he exer ci se of her di screti on to i mpose a sentence o utsi de of the Guide l ines range, see United States v
. Demaree, 459 F .3d 791, 795 (7th Ci r
. 2006)), the Supreme Court emphas i zed that the Gui delines sti ll suppl y the framew or k for the sentencing deci si on: the judge mus t begi n her analysi s wi th the corr ectly-calcu lated Gui delines r a ng e, remain cogni zant of t he Gui delines thro ughout the process, and hav e a justifi cati on for both a deviati on fr o m t he Gui delines range and i ts ext ent. 133 S. Ct. at 2083. Thus, ev en a nonGui delines sentence i s, in the end, a product of the Gui delines. Id. Thi s i s all the more tr ue when i t co mes to statuto ry li mi ts. A nd absent an expr ess statement li ke “Thi s i s a reaso na bl e sentence, and I w oul d hav e i mposed i t ev en wi thout the teny ear mini mum,” see United States v
. Foster, 701 F .3d 1142,14 No. 12-1666

1157–58 (7th Ci r
. 2012); United S tat es v . Campbell , 503 F

. App’x 472, 473–74 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (n onprecedential deci si on), i t i s di ffi cult to say whether th e co urt w ould hav e arr i v ed at the

same sentence had i t realized i t w as bound by a si g nific antly low er stat utor y mi ni mum
. The di stric t judge ’s remark s at sentencing giv e us no i ndi cati on that she ev er consi dered the possi bi li ty that a low er statuto ry mini mum mi ght apply to Currie (recall that Currie di d not challen ge the appli cabi li ty of the te n-y ear mini mum ter m below), nor do th e y inclu de an unamb i guous statement to the effect that t he j udg e w ould hav e consi dered the 121- month sentence i t i mposed reasonable ev en i f th e fi v e-y ear mini mumspeci fi ed by the Fair Sent encing Act appli ed, as w e now know (in hindsi ght) thati t does.
W e there fore or der a li mi ted remand so that the di stric t j udge may consi der

, and state on the recor d, whet he r sh e
w ould hav e i mposed the same sent ence on Currie knowi ng that he w as subject to a fi v e-y ear rat her than a ten-y ear statuto ry mini mum ter m of i mpri sonment. W e sh all ret ain jurisdi cti on ov e r thi s a p p e a l p e nding the di stric t court’s answer to o ur i nqui ry

. AFF IRM ED IN P ART and REMANDED.