United States District Court 

for the 

Southern District of Florida 

In re: 

Josue Cepero and Leticia Cepero, 

Debtors. 

Hammocks Community Association 

Inc., and Marglli Gallego, Appellants, 

v. 

Josue Cepero and Leticia Cepero, 

Appellees. 

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Civil Action No. 22-22686-CivScola 

Bankruptcy Case No. 17-20358-

LMI 

Opinion and Order 

This matter is before the Court on Appellants Hammocks Community 

Association Inc. (“Hammocks”) and Marglli Gallego’s (collectively, the 

Appellants) Initial Brief (ECF No. 10) on their appeal of the bankruptcy court’s 

orders finding the Appellants in contempt and granting damages to the 

Appellees (and Debtors below), Josue and Leticia Cepero.1 The Appellees have 

submitted their Answer Brief. (ECF No. 20.) Hammocks has filed a Reply Brief. 

(ECF No. 33.) The Ceperos have also filed a motion to strike Hammocks’ Reply 

Brief. (Mot. Strike, ECF No. 34.) Hammocks has responded. (Resp., ECF No. 

35.) The Ceperos have not filed an optional reply, and the time to do so has 

passed. After considering the briefs, the record, the argument of counsel, and 

the applicable authority, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms

in part and denies in part the bankruptcy court’s Contempt Orders, denies

the Ceperos’ motion to strike (ECF No. 34), and remands this matter for 

further proceedings consistent with the terms of this order. 

1 Collectively, the bankruptcy court orders addressing the contempt findings and damages that 

are the subject of appeal here are the following orders, as identified on the bankruptcy court’s 

docket: ECF No. 328 (“Order Finding Hammocks Community Association and Marglli Gallego in 

Contempt”), ECF No. 339 (“Order on Sanctions”), ECF No. 477 (“Order Granting in Part Motion 

to Reconsider”), ECF No. 480 (“Order on Damages”), and ECF No. 510 (“Order Granting in Part 

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Rehearing, Relief from Judgment and/or 

Reconsideration as to ECF 480”). (Not. Appeal at 1-2, ECF No. 1.) The Court will refer 

collectively to the orders on appeal as the “Contempt Orders,” or will reference them 

individually by docket entry number from the bankruptcy court case (as “Bk. ECF No.”), as 

appropriate. 

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1. Background

This matter arose from Appellees Josue and Leticia Cepero’s Chapter 13 

bankruptcy proceedings. Hammocks, as the homeowner’s association for the 

Ceperos’ residence, is a creditor in the underlying bankruptcy. Gallego was, at 

the time, Hammocks’ president. (Bk. ECF No. 389, R. at 412.) She and the 

Ceperos had also maintained a personal relationship prior to the bankruptcy 

proceeding. (Id.) Needless to say, that personal relationship soured. Prior to 

filing for bankruptcy, the Ceperos began publicly alleging that Gallego was 

abusing the authority of her position as Hammocks’ president to commit fraud 

and enrich herself, at the expense of Hammocks’ residents. (R. at 260-64, 277-

82.)

While the Court need not recount every detail here, these accusations 

resulted in deteriorating personal relationships, to the extent that the 

bankruptcy court felt it necessary to issue orders directing Gallego, and 

Hammocks, to cease and to avoid contact and communications with the 

Ceperos (and vice-versa; referred to as the “No-Contact Order”). (Bk. ECF No. 

189, R. at 2-3.) Nevertheless, Gallego and the Ceperos became involved in an 

“altercation” on May 15, 2019 (the “May 2019 Incident”). (R. at 412-13.) The 

bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing, where it heard from witnesses to 

the altercation—including a responding police officer, a security guard, another 

witness, and Mr. Cepero, as well as Gallego herself—and reviewed documentary 

evidence, including video recordings of the incident and an audio tape of 

Gallego’s call to 911 at the beginning of the incident. (R. at 412-18.) 

Ultimately, the bankruptcy court found Gallego’s testimony to be wholly 

incredible because the Court observed that she had lied about when she first 

called 911, who had blocked whose car, and the events leading up to the 

incident. (R. at 417-18.) The bankruptcy court observed that physical evidence, 

including the 911 call recording and the video footage of the incident, 

contradicted Gallego’s statements. (Id.) Accordingly, the bankruptcy 

disregarded her testimony in its entirety. (Id.) 

Based on the testimony of Mr. Cepero and the other witnesses, as well as 

the physical evidence, the bankruptcy court found that Gallego initiated the 

altercation by pulling in front of and blocking the Ceperos’ car in the spot 

where it was parked. (Id.) The bankruptcy court observed that Gallego then “got 

out of [her] car and approached the Ceperos’ car while talking on the phone.” 

(R. at 416.) The Ceperos remained in their car for the duration, and the 

altercation ended after the police responded and began to question those 

involved. (R. at 416-18.) Finally, the bankruptcy court observed that Gallego 

was driving a Hammocks vehicle at the time. (R. at 418.) Based on these 

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factual findings, the bankruptcy court determined that both Gallego and 

Hammocks had violated the No-Contact Order. (Id.) 

After the May 2019 incident, and while the bankruptcy proceedings

remained ongoing, Gallego and Hammocks filed suit in Florida state court 

against Leticia Cepero for defamation, among other acts. (R. at 418-19.) The 

lawsuit—filed in November of 2020—alleged that Mrs. Cepero had made “false 

and defamatory statements over the last four years (at a minimum) about Ms. 

Gallego,” thereby harming Gallego and Hammocks. (Id.) Upon being informed of 

the Ceperos’ ongoing bankruptcy, Gallego’s and the Hammocks’ counsel 

immediately dismissed the suit. (Id.) Based on the allegations in the “November 

2020 Lawsuit,” the bankruptcy court found that Gallego and Hammocks had 

violated the automatic stay, but not the No-Contact Order. (R. at 419-20.) 

Based on the May 2019 Incident (as a violation of the No-Contact Order) 

and the November 2020 Lawsuit (as a violation of the automatic stay), the 

bankruptcy court granted the Ceperos’ request for damages. (R. at 421-22.) The 

bankruptcy court considered the question of damages separately, and it 

ultimately awarded the Ceperos their attorneys’ fees, damages for emotional 

distress, and punitive damages. (Bk. ECF Nos. 339, 480, 510, R at. 423-34, 

709-21, 745-50.) The bankruptcy court awarded the Ceperos a total of 

$126,718.80 in actual damages and another $126,718.80 in punitive damages, 

for a total award of $253,437.60. (R. at 750.) The bankruptcy court imposed 

these damages jointly and severally against both Gallego and Hammocks. (Id.) 

Gallego and Hammocks filed this appeal in August of 2022, seeking to 

overturn the bankruptcy court’s findings of contempt and imposition of 

monetary sanctions. (Not. Appeal at 1-2.) They initially raised five arguments 

on appeal. (Init. Brief at 21-22.) First, they argue that the bankruptcy court 

“erred in finding that the terminology in the [No-Contact] Order . . . is clear, 

definite, and unambiguous.” (Id. at 21.) Second, they argue that the 

bankruptcy court’s findings of contempt were not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. (Id. at 21-22.) Third, they argue that the bankruptcy court 

“improperly held Hammocks in contempt” for Gallego’s role in the May 2019 

Incident. (Id. at 22.) Fourth, they assert that the bankruptcy court abused its 

discretion in finding that the November 2020 Lawsuit violated the automatic 

stay. (Id.) Fifth, and finally, they argue that the bankruptcy court erred in 

holding Hammocks jointly and severally liable for punitive damages, both by 

applying the wrong standard and applying the standard it did use incorrectly. 

(Id. at 22-23.)

The Ceperos responded in opposition to each point, arguing that the NoContact Order was clear, the bankruptcy court’s determinations should be not 

overturned as they are not clearly erroneous, and that the bankruptcy court 

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applied the right standard, correctly, to find Hammocks jointly and severally 

liable for punitive damages. (Ans. Brief at 12-13.) The Ceperos also argue that 

Hammocks waived its argument relating to the imposition of joint and several 

liability for punitive damages below. (Id.) 

Only Hammocks replied, however, and after an extended stay of this 

matter: Gallego was arrested in November of 2022 following complaints by 

many homeowners that she defrauded Hammocks and its residents “of millions 

of dollars over a period of approximately seven (7) years” as president. (Reply 

Brief at 2.) Hammocks therefore had a receiver appointed to take over its 

operations. (Id.) The receiver fired prior counsel (who had represented both 

Gallego and Hammocks) and, after the resolution of additional matters in the 

bankruptcy court below, replied to the Ceperos’ Answer Brief alone (Gallego 

has not replied). (Id.) Hammocks now argues that it cannot be held liable for 

Gallego’s actions because her misconduct was not committed during the scope 

of her employment as Hammocks’ president. (Id. at 12-21.) 

The Ceperos responded with a motion to strike, arguing that Hammocks 

raises issues not argued below and not raised in the Appellants’ Initial Brief. 

(Mot. Strike at 1-3.) Hammocks, of course, asserts in response that no new 

arguments have been raised—even if Hammocks’ counsel now puts a clearer 

argument forward about why Hammocks cannot be jointly and severally liable 

for the Ceperos’ damages, that argument was made repeatedly below and at 

length in the Initial Brief. (Resp. at 2-4.) 

 2. Standard of Review 

The Court reviews ‘the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error 

and the court’s conclusions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de 

novo.” In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2015). “A finding of civil 

contempt must be based on ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that a court order 

was violated.” Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Decisions regarding the imposition of sanctions through civil contempt orders 

are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “Applying this standard, a reviewing 

court ‘must affirm unless [it] find[s] that the lower court has made a clear error 

of judgment, or has applied the wrong standard.’” In re Siskind, 2018 WL 

634547, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018) (Rosenberg, J.) (quoting In re Walker, 

532 F.3d at 1308.) “The reviewing court may affirm on any legal ground 

supported by the record.” Id. 

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3. Analysis

The Court, in summary, finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding that Gallego violated the No-Contact Order during the 

May 2019 Incident. The Court further finds that the bankruptcy court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that both Gallego and Hammocks violated the 

automatic stay by filing the November 2020 lawsuit. Therefore, the Court 

affirms those parts of the Contempt Orders. 

But the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not apply the correct 

legal standard to determine whether Hammocks should, in fact, be liable for 

Gallego’s conduct during the May 2019 Incident and that any such finding 

does not have factual support in the record. Accordingly, the Court reverses 

this part of the bankruptcy court’s findings (holding Hammocks jointly and 

severally liable for damages relating to the May 2019 Incident) and remands 

this matter for the purpose of determining whether Gallego was acting within 

the scope of her duties as president of Hammocks during the May 2019 

Incident. 

A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Factual Findings Are Not Clearly 

Erroneous 

First, the Court observes that none of the bankruptcy court’s factual 

findings are clearly erroneous. In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1318. The bankruptcy 

court observed the testimony of the witnesses during its evidentiary hearing on 

the Ceperos’ contempt motion. (R. at 417-18.) It made the decision to disregard 

Gallego’s testimony based both upon its own observation of her testimony and 

on the multiple conflicts it observed between her testimony and the physical 

evidence presented at the hearing. (Id.) The Court will not second-guess the 

bankruptcy court’s factual findings where they are based on observation of 

witness testimony and conflict between that testimony and physical evidence in 

the record. See, e.g., In re Brown, 742 F.3d 1309, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(holding bankruptcy court’s factual findings to not be clearly erroneous where 

those findings had support in the record). 

B. The No-Contact Order is Sufficiently Clear

Second, the Court makes the simple observation that the No-Contact 

Order’s prohibition of “contact” and “communication” between Gallego and 

Hammocks, on the one side, and the Ceperos, on the other, is sufficiently clear, 

definite, and unambiguous. As the Ceperos observe, the bankruptcy court 

“made it abundantly clear that both [Hammocks] and Ms. Gallego were 

forbidden from engaging in any contact or interaction with the Debtors.” (Ans 

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Brief at 15. Whether the happenings of May 15, 2019, are termed an 

“altercation” (the Ceperos’ choice of words) or an “incident” (Gallego’s), they are 

precisely the sort of interaction that the No-Contact Order is worded to prevent. 

(R. at 2-3.) The No-Contact Order prohibits the following conduct by 

Hammocks and Gallego: “any further contact,” “communication from any

representative” of Hammocks or from its “President, Marglli Gallego.” (R. at 2 

(emphasis added).) 

The Appellants’ linguistic parsing in their Initial Brief regarding the terms 

“contact” and “communication” is meritless. The No-Contact Order’s 

prohibitions are simple, clear, and straightforward. Gallego and Hammocks 

were barred from making contact with or communicating with the Ceperos 

during the bankruptcy. “Contact” is defined as “association, relationship, 

connection, [or] communication.” Contact, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contact (last accessed June 23, 

2023). “Communication” is defined as “a process by which information is 

exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or 

behavior.” Communication, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/communication (last accessed 

June 23, 2023). The No-Contact Orders are therefore clear and unambiguous. 

Gallego and Hammocks were barred from any interaction or exchange with the 

Ceperos that involved spoken, written, or behavioral exchanges between the 

parties. 

C. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding 

that Gallego’s Conduct During the May 2019 Incident Violated the 

No-Contact Order 

In light of the bankruptcy court’s factual findings and the clear terms of 

the No-Contact Order, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse 

its discretion when it found Gallego to be in contempt for violating that order. 

Gallego’s intentional blocking of the Ceperos’ car during the May 2019 Incident 

was a form of “contact,” and even if Gallego did not verbally “communicate” 

with the Ceperos, her behavior certainly sufficed as “communication.” (R. at 

412-18.) The bankruptcy court made no “clear error of judgment” in finding 

that Gallego violated the No-Contact Order. See In re Siskind, 2018 WL 634547, 

at *1. Gallego’s violation, as demonstrated by multiple witnesses and physical 

evidence, was supported by clear and convincing evidence. (R. at 412-18); Jove 

Eng’g, 92 F.3d at 1545. Accordingly, the Court must affirm the bankruptcy 

court’s finding of contempt against Gallego for her conduct during the May 

2019 Incident. 

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D. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding 

that Both Gallego and Hammocks Violated the Automatic Stay in 

Filing the November 2020 Lawsuit 

Next, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court correctly determined the 

Appellants’ filing of the November 2020 Lawsuit to be a violation of the 

automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court affirms the bankruptcy court’s 

Contempt Orders against both Gallego and Hammocks for violating the stay. 

The Eleventh Circuit considers the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay (11 

U.S.C. § 362(a)) to be “essentially a court-ordered injunction, and any person 

or entity who violates the stay may be found in contempt of court.” Jove Eng’g,

92 F.3d at 1546. While the review of the bankruptcy court’s entry of contempt 

for violating the automatic stay is still done under an “abuse of discretion” 

standard, that standard is “less deferential” than typical. Id. The Court must be 

satisfied that the finding of contempt is based on clear and convincing evidence 

and that the bankruptcy court’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 

1545. 

The bankruptcy court’s decision was supported by clear and convincing 

evidence: the substance of Gallego’s and Hammocks’ pleadings against Leticia 

Cepero. Gallego and Hammocks based the November 2020 Lawsuit not just on 

post-petition conduct, but also on allegations that Mrs. Cepero had made “false 

and defamatory statements over the last four years (at a minimum) about Ms. 

Gallego,” and that those statements harmed Gallego and Hammocks. (R. at 

418-19.) Gallego and Hammocks repeated these allegations—of defamatory 

statements going back four years or more—in their counts for relief as well. 

(Id.) The four years prior to November 2020 include time in 2016 and 2017 

prior to the Ceperos’ bankruptcy petition. Whether the November 2020 lawsuit 

included post-petition allegations is therefore irrelevant; it did include 

allegations relating to pre-petition conduct, which the automatic stay prohibits. 

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). 

Therefore, the bankruptcy court’s decision was not clearly erroneous, 

and it was supported by incontrovertible, not just clear and convincing, 

evidence. The Court must affirm the finding of contempt against both Gallego 

and Hammocks relating to the November 2020 Lawsuit. 

E. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Apply the Correct Standard in 

Finding Hammocks Jointly and Severally Liable for Punitive 

Damages for Gallego’s Conduct in the May 2019 Incident 

The Court finds that the bankruptcy court’s entry of contempt against 

Hammocks for Gallego’s conduct during the May 2019 Incident is an abuse of 

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discretion, however. The bankruptcy court applied the wrong standard in 

determining that Hammocks was liable for punitive damages for Gallego’s 

actions as its president during the May 2019 Incident. 

First, the Court must briefly address the Appellees’ motion to strike 

Hammocks’ Reply Brief. The motion to strike is without merit: although 

Hammocks applies different legal reasoning in its Reply Brief than originally 

submitted in its Initial Brief, the point made remains the same, and was 

argued (perhaps unartfully) below. Hammocks asserts that the bankruptcy 

court improperly found it to be liable for Gallego’s conduct because she was not 

performing her duties as president at the time of the May 2019 Incident. (Init. 

Brief at 42-43; Reply Brief at 12-19.) Therefore, the Court denies the motion to 

strike and considers Hammocks’ reply brief in full.2 

Florida law sets two different standards for an employer’s liability for an 

employee’s actions. The first, for all employees, is established by statute. 

Florida Statutes § 768.72(3) requires the following: 

(3) In the case of an employer, principal, corporation, or other legal 

entity, punitive damages may be imposed for the conduct of an employee 

or agent only if the conduct of the employee or agent meets the criteria 

specified in subsection (2) and: 

(a) The employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity 

actively and knowingly participated in such conduct; 

(b) The officers, directors, or managers of the employer, principal, 

corporation, or other legal entity knowingly condoned, ratified, or 

consented to such conduct; or 

(c) The employer, principal, corporation, or other legal entity 

engaged in conduct that constituted gross negligence and that 

contributed to the loss, damages, or injury suffered by the 

claimant. 

2 The Court notes, however, that even if it had struck Hammocks’ reply brief, it still would have 

found that the finding of contempt against Hammocks for the May 2019 Incident was not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the evidence against Hammocks is thin (at 

best). The only point supporting a finding that Gallego was performing her duties as president 

at the time of the incident was that she was driving a Hammocks vehicle. (R. at 418.) This 

alone would not suffice to hold Hammocks jointly and severally liable for her conduct, as the 

remainder of the evidence in the record says nothing about what Gallego was doing at the time. 

(R. at 412-18.) Gallego’s own testimony supports a finding that she was not performing her 

duties for Hammocks but rather was using the vehicle to pick up her son from school; this 

testimony is not useful to support any finding, though, because the bankruptcy court 

disregarded her testimony in its entirety as untruthful. (Id.) 

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The second, for an employer’s managing agent, is much different, and set by 

the Florida Supreme Court’s case law. The Florida Supreme Court has 

confirmed that a corporation bears direct, rather than vicarious, liability for an 

officer or managing agent’s misconduct. Schropp v. Crown Eurocars, Inc., 654 

So. 2d 1158, 1160-61 (Fla. 1995); see also Bankers Mult. Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 

464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985). As the Appellants themselves concede, the 

codification of an employer’s vicarious liability for an employee’s misconduct 

via Florida Statutes § 768.72(3) did not abrogate or otherwise alter the Schropp

and Bankers rule that an employer is directly liable for an officer or managing 

agent’s misconduct. (Init. Brief at 42 (citing When Is a Manager a Managing 

Agent, Christopher Johnson and Ted Craig, 75 Fla. Bar J. 62 (2001)).) 

The bankruptcy court properly applied the Schropp standard, finding 

that Hammocks would be directly liable for Gallego’s conduct based on her 

status as a managing agent (as president). (R. at 748-49.) But the bankruptcy 

court failed to make the final, necessary finding: it nowhere evaluates whether 

Gallego was acting in performance of her duties as Hammocks’ president at the 

time of the May 2019 Incident. As Hammocks observes in its Reply Brief, there 

is an implicit understanding in Schropp and Bankers that the managing agent’s 

conduct which gave cause for punitive damages must have occurred during the 

course of the managing agent’s employment. 654 So. 2d at 1159-61 

(addressing corporation’s responsibility for punitive damages in the context of 

fraud committed by corporation’s sales manager in the course of negotiating 

with a customer); 464 So. 2d at 533 (addressing corporation’s responsibility for 

punitive damages in the context of president of the corporation’s tortious 

interference with an employee’s contract with the employee’s attorneys). 

This rule makes perfect sense, too—surely a corporation cannot be “on 

the hook” for its managing agent’s conduct that is unrelated to the workplace. 

If a bank’s president damages her neighbor’s property in a personal dispute, 

the bank cannot be expected to be liable for those damages based on the 

president’s employment. So too here: if Gallego was truly acting in a personal 

capacity at the time of the May 2019 Incident, then Hammocks cannot be 

expected to be liable for her conduct. 

The only evidence that could possibly demonstrate that Gallego was 

acting in the course of her employment during the May 2019 Incident is the 

fact that she was driving a Hammocks vehicle. (R. at 418.) Because the 

bankruptcy court disregarded Gallego’s testimony entirely due to its 

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perceptions of her untruthfulness, the Court will not consider it here.3

Accordingly, there is not clear and convincing evidence in the record for the 

Court to find that Gallego conduct occurred during the course of her duties as 

Hammocks’ president. Because the bankruptcy court did not determine 

whether Gallego was acting on behalf of Hammocks, and because the record 

lacks sufficient factual support for the Court to determine that she was on its 

review on appeal, the Court must reverse the portion of the Contempt Orders 

finding Hammocks to be responsible for Gallego’s conduct during the May 2019 

Incident. Hammocks cannot be liable for punitive damages for Gallego’s 

conduct on May 15, 2019, based on the record presented here. 

 4. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Court affirms in part and reverses in 

part the bankruptcy court’s contempt orders and remands this matter to the 

bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this order. The Court 

also denies the Ceperos’ motion to strike the Association’s reply. (ECF No. 34.) 

The hearing set for May 29, 2023, at 8:30 A.M. is canceled. 

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on June 23, 2023. 

 ________________________________ 

 Robert N. Scola, Jr. 

 United States District Judge 

3 As the Court observed above, if it had considered Gallego’s testimony, that testimony would 

have supported a finding that Gallego was not acting in the course of her duties as Hammocks’ 

president at the time of the May 2019 Incident. 

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