Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

March 2009 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER 

Accelerating 

Procurement before 

Completing 

Development Increases 

the Government’s 

Financial Risk 

GAO-09-303 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-303.

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-09-303, a report to 

congressional committees 

March 2009

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Accelerating Procurement before Completing

Development Increases the Government's Financial 

Risk 

JSF development will cost more and take longer than reported to the 

Congress last year, and DOD wants to accelerate procurement. Two recent 

estimates project additional costs ranging from $2.4 billion to $7.4 billion and 

1 to 3 more years to complete development. Despite cost and schedule 

troubles, DOD wants to accelerate JSF procurement by 169 aircraft from fiscal 

years 2010 through 2015; this could require up to $33.4 billion in additional 

procurement funding for those 6 years. DOD plans to procure hundreds of 

aircraft on cost-reimbursement contracts, magnifying the financial risk to the 

government. 

Ongoing manufacturing inefficiencies and parts problems have significantly 

delayed the delivery of test assets. The prime contractor has extended 

manufacturing schedules three times and delivered 2 of 13 test aircraft. The 

program is still recovering from earlier problems that resulted in design 

changes, late parts deliveries, and inefficient manufacturing. The contractor is 

taking positive steps to improve operations, the supplier base, and schedule 

management. Schedule risk analyses could further enhance management 

insight into problem areas and inform corrective actions. Officials expect to 

deliver all test aircraft and fix many problems by 2010. By then, DOD plans to 

have purchased 62 operational aircraft and will be ramping up procurement. 

Procuring large numbers of production jets while still working to deliver test 

jets and mature manufacturing processes does not seem prudent, and looming 

plans to accelerate procurement will be difficult to achieve cost effectively. 

DOD’s revised test plan adds a year to the schedule, better aligns resources 

and availability dates, and lessens the overlap between development and 

operational testing, but it still allows little time for error discovery and 

rework. DOD’s decision late in 2007 to reduce test aircraft and flight tests 

adds to risks while any additional delays in delivering test aircraft will further 

compress the schedule. The revised plan relies on state-of-the-art simulation 

labs, a flying test bed, and desk studies to verify nearly 83 percent of JSF 

capabilities. Only 17 percent is to be verified through flight testing. Despite 

advances, the ability to so extensively substitute for flight testing has not yet 

been demonstrated. Significant overlap of development, test, and 

procurement results in DOD making substantial investments before flight 

testing proves that the JSF will perform as expected. Under the accelerated 

procurement plan, DOD may procure 360 aircraft costing an estimated 

$57 billion before completing development flight testing. 

Procurement Investments and Progress of Flight Testing

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

Cumulative procurement 

(billions of dollars) $0.9 $3.6 $7.4 $15.4 $28.2 $42.5 $57.0 $72.3 $89.0 

Cumulative aircraft 

procured 2 14 30 62 132 241 360 506 684 

Percent flight tests 

completed <1% <1% 2% 9% 34% 62% 88% 100% - 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

most complex and ambitious 

aircraft acquisition, seeking to 

simultaneously produce and field 

three different versions of the 

aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and eight 

international partners. The total 

investment required now exceeds 

$1 trillion—more than $300 billion 

to acquire 2,456 aircraft and 

$760 billion in life cycle operating 

and support costs, according to 

program estimates. The Ronald W. 

Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005 requires GAO to review the 

JSF program annually for 5 years. 

This is the fifth and final report 

under the mandate in which GAO 

(1) determines the program’s 

progress in meeting cost, schedule, 

and performance goals; 

(2) assesses manufacturing results 

and schedule risks; and (3) 

evaluates development test plans, 

progress, and risks. GAO’s work 

included analyses of a wide range 

of program documents, cost data 

and interviews with defense and 

contractor officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

(1) report to the congressional 

defense committees on the risks 

and mitigation strategy for use of 

cost reimbursement contracts for 

procurement and plans to 

transition to fixed price contracts 

and (2) ensure that the prime 

contractor performs periodic 

schedule risk analyses to improve 

schedule and budget actions. DOD 

agreed to take these actions. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

More Money and Time Will Be Needed to Complete JSF 

Development, While DOD Plans to Accelerate Procurement 7 

Continued Manufacturing Inefficiencies Will Make It Difficult for 

the Program to Meet Its Production Schedule 14 

The JSF’s Test Plan Is Improved but Faces Numerous Challenges 

to Complete Development on Time and on Budget 20 

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

Appendix II GAO Assessment of Prime Contractor Schedule 

Management Processes 34 

 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 41 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44 

 

Related GAO Products 45 

Tables 

Table 1: Changes in JSF Program Cost, Quantity, and Delivery

Estimates 6

Table 2: Estimated Cost and Schedule for System Development 8 

Table 3: Projected Procurement Funding Requirements for Fiscal 

Years 2010 through 2015 11 

Table 4: Proposed Accelerated Procurement 12 

Table 5: Overlap of Procurement Investments and Flight Testing 21 

Page i GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Table 6: Prime Contractor Schedule Management System 

Compared to Best Practices 36 

Figures 

Figure 1: Cumulative Procurement Costs and Quantities 13 

Figure 2: JSF Labor Hour Estimates for Development Test Aircraft 15 

Figure 3: Budgeted Manufacturing Hours by Development Aircraft 

(Wing and Mate and Delivery Stages) 16 

Figure 4: Comparison of Budgeted Labor Hours to Build Last 

Development Aircraft 17 

Figure 5: JSF Planned Development Test Flights 22 

Figure 6: Breakdown of Verification Venues for the JSF 24 

Abbreviations 

CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

CTOL conventional takeoff and landing 

DOD Department of Defense 

JSF Joint Strike Fighter 

MRP Manufacturing Resource Planning 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

STOVL short takeoff and vertical landing 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 12, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most 

complex and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously 

produce and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine 

Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical to our nation’s 

plans for recapitalizing the tactical air forces and will require a long-term 

commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The total expected 

investment is now more than $1 trillion—more than $300 billion to acquire 

2,456 aircraft and $760 billion in life cycle operation and support costs, 

according to official program estimates. 

The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005 requires GAO to review the JSF program annually for 5 years.1

Previous reports identified opportunities for the program to reduce risks 

and improve chances for more successful outcomes. We have expressed 

concern about the substantial overlap of development, test, and 

production activities and recommended a more evolutionary and 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy with limited investment in 

production aircraft until each variant demonstrates required capabilities in 

flight testing. Our most recent report questioned DOD’s decision to reduce 

test aircraft and flight hours and recommended that a new comprehensive 

cost estimate be prepared.

2

 The department has not implemented our 

recommendations and cost and schedule increases have been the result. 

This is the fifth and final report under the mandate in which we 

(1) determine the JSF program’s progress in meeting cost, schedule, and 

performance goals; (2) assess plans and risks in manufacturing and 

capacity to accelerate production; and (3) evaluate plans, progress, and 

risks with testing plans and risks in testing activities. 

 1

Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 213 (2004). 

2

GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks, GAO-08-388 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008); Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges

Remain, GAO-07-360 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to

Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance, GAO-06-356

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006); and Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in

the Joint Strike Fighter Program with Different Acquisition Strategy, GAO-05-271 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

To conduct this work, we tracked and compared current cost and 

schedule estimates with those of prior years, identified changes, and 

determined causes. We obtained program status reports, manufacturing 

data, and test planning documents. We assessed the program’s scheduling 

estimates against best practices. We discussed results to date and future 

plans to complete JSF development and accelerate procurement with 

DOD, JSF, and contractor officials. Some of the cost data used in our 

report are based on cost projections that were current at the time of our 

review rather than the official program of record. Appendix I includes 

additional information about our scope and methodology. We conducted

this performance audit from June 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

JSF development will cost more and take longer than reported to the 

Congress last year, and DOD wants to accelerate procurement believing

that will more quickly recapitalize tactical air forces. The program office 

estimates that an additional $2.4 billion is needed for cost overruns on the 

air system and engine contracts and for a 1-year extension to the 

development schedule. Its estimate does not include funding for the 

alternate engine program. An independent joint DOD cost estimating team 

identified a need for as much as $7.4 billion in additional funding for 

development through fiscal year 2015 and a 3-year schedule extension. 

This would increase total system development costs to $51.8 billion—-a 17 

percent increase from the April 2008 estimate—and delay completion of 

development to October 2016. The joint team’s cost estimate was higher 

than the program office’s estimate because it included the alternate engine

effort directed by the Congress and made more conservative assumptions 

about engineer staffing levels, software requirements growth, 

manufacturing labor hours, and flight testing. Despite development cost 

increases and schedule delays, DOD officials want to accelerate JSF 

procurement by purchasing an additional 169 aircraft from fiscal years 

2010 through 2015. This would require up to $33.4 billion in additional 

procurement funding for those 6 years and expose the government to 

additional risk from future cost increases because of the contract type.

The plan would not increase the total JSF quantity through completion, 

but would buy these aircraft earlier than planned. DOD did not estimate 

the net effect this plan would have on future procurement funding to 

complete JSF acquisition. 

Results in Brief 

Page 2 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Ongoing manufacturing inefficiencies and parts problems have 

significantly delayed the delivery of needed test aircraft, and the prime 

contractor has not yet achieved the levels of learning expected, even as 

the program ramps up production. The contractor has extended 

manufacturing schedules three times and produced 2 of 13 development 

test aircraft. In the past year, budgeted hours to complete work on all test 

aircraft have increased by 40 percent. The program is still recovering from 

earlier problems in development—late release of engineering drawings 

resulting in design changes and delays in establishing the supplier base, 

late part deliveries, and inefficient manufacturing line work-arounds 

where unfinished work is completed out of station. The prime contractor 

has taken steps to improve manufacturing, the supplier base, and schedule 

management. A thorough schedule risk analysis could further enhance

management insight into areas of uncertainty and better inform 

subsequent actions to correct persistent problems, such as schedule 

slippage and allocation of management reserves. Officials expect to deliver 

all test aircraft and address most of these problems by 2010. By that time,

DOD plans to have procured 62 operational aircraft and will be quickly 

ramping up production. As DOD has a large backlog of production jets on 

order and is still working to deliver test jets and mature manufacturing 

processes, plans to accelerate procurement will be difficult to achieve in a 

cost-effective manner. 

DOD’s revised test plan adds an extra year to the schedule, better aligns 

resources and availability dates, and lessens the overlap between 

development and operational testing, but it is still aggressive and allows 

little time for error discovery, rework, and recovery from downtime. 

DOD’s decision late in 2007 to reduce the number of development test 

aircraft and to decrease the number of flight tests added risk, while any 

additional delays in delivering test aircraft will further compress the 

schedule. The independent cost team believes flight testing will require an 

additional 2 years to complete and suggests more flight hours to test 

mission systems and the carrier variant in particular. The revised plan 

relies on advanced and robust simulation labs, a flying test bed, and 

analytical studies to verify nearly 83 percent of the aircraft’s capabilities 

while only 17 percent is to be verified through flight testing. While the labs 

appear more prolific, integrated, and capable than those used in legacy 

programs, the ability to substitute for flight testing has not yet been 

demonstrated. Significant overlap of development, test, and production 

schedules results in DOD making substantial investments before flight 

testing proves that the JSF will perform as expected. Under the 

accelerated procurement plan, DOD may procure 360 aircraft costing an 

estimated $57 billion before completing development flight testing. 

Page 3 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Acquiring large numbers of aircraft before testing successfully

demonstrates that the design is mature, meets performance requirements, 

and is suitable could result in substantial future cost growth to correct 

deficiencies found during testing. 

To enhance congressional oversight and increase the likelihood of more 

successful program outcomes, we are recommending that the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics report on 

the JSF’s contracting strategy to the congressional defense committees by 

October 1, 2009. This report would include (1) an explanation of the 

remaining program risks and the factors justifying the continued use of 

cost reimbursement contracts for JSF’s future low-rate production 

quantities, (2) the program’s strategy for managing and mitigating risks 

associated with the use of cost contracts versus fixed-price contracts, and 

(3) plans for transitioning to fixed-price contracts for production, 

including time frames and criteria. To further maintain confidence that the 

program is on track to meet planned cost, schedule, and performance 

goals, we are also recommending that the JSF Program Office ensure that

the prime contractor performs periodic schedule risk analyses for the JSF 

program to provide better insight into management reserve, production 

efficiencies, and schedule completion. 

The JSF is a joint, multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps and eight international partners. The program 

began in November 1996 with a 5-year competition between Lockheed 

Martin and Boeing to determine the most capable and affordable 

preliminary aircraft design. Lockheed Martin won the competition, and the 

program entered system development and demonstration in October 2001.

Program goals are to develop and field an affordable, highly common 

family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air 

Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies. 

Background 

The JSF is a single-seat, single-engine aircraft, designed to rapidly 

transition between air-to-ground and air-to-air missions while still 

airborne. To achieve its mission, the JSF will incorporate low-observable 

(stealth) technologies, defensive avionics, advanced onboard and offboard

sensor fusion, internal and external weapons, and advanced prognostic 

maintenance capability. The JSF family consists of three variants. The 

conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant will primarily be an airto-ground replacement for the Air Force’s F-16 Falcon and the A-10 

Warthog aircraft, and will complement the F-22A Raptor. The short takeoff 

and vertical landing (STOVL) variant will be a multi-role strike fighter to 

Page 4 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

replace the Marine Corps’ F/A-18C/D Hornet and AV-8B Harrier aircraft. 

The carrier-suitable variant will provide the Navy a multi-role, stealthy 

strike aircraft to complement the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. DOD is 

planning to buy a total of 2,456 JSFs and allies are expected to procure a 

minimum of 730 CTOL and STOVL aircraft. 

Because of the program’s sheer size and the numbers of aircraft it will 

replace, the JSF is the linchpin of DOD’s long-term plan to modernize 

tactical air forces. It is DOD’s largest acquisition program, with total cost 

currently estimated at $300 billion, and the longest in planned duration, 

with procurement projected through 2034. In addition, the JSF remains 

DOD’s largest cooperative program.3 Our international partners are 

providing about $4.8 billion toward development, and foreign firms are 

part of the industrial base producing aircraft. DOD’s funding requirements 

for the JSF assume economic benefits from these foreign purchases in 

reducing unit costs for U.S aircraft. 

Table 1 shows the evolution of DOD’s official estimated cost, quantity, and 

deliveries from the initiation of system development in October 2001 to the 

current official program of record dated December 2007 and submitted to 

the Congress in April 2008. It depicts quantities reduced in the last major 

program restructure in 2004, the impacts of increased costs on unit prices, 

and the slip in delivering initial operating capability to the warfighter. 

 3

The international partners are the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada,

Australia, Denmark, and Norway. These nations are contributing funds for system 

development and have signed agreements to procure a minimum of 730 aircraft. Israel and 

Singapore are security cooperation participants, and several other nations have reportedly 

expressed interest in acquiring aircraft. 

Page 5 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Table 1: Changes in JSF Program Cost, Quantity, and Delivery Estimates 

October 2001

(system

development 

start)

December 2003

(2004 replan) December 2006 December 2007

Expected quantities 

Development quantities 14 14 15 13

Procurement quantities (United States only) 2,852 2,443 2,443 2,443

Total quantities 2,866 2,457 2,458 2,456

Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions) 

Development $34.4 $44.8 $44.2 $44.4

Procurement 196.6 199.8 255.1 254.0

Military construction 2.0 0.2 0.5 0.5

Total program acquisition $233.0 $244.8 $299.8 $298.9

Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in millions) 

Program acquisition $81 $100 $122 $122

Average procurement 69 82 104 104

Estimated delivery dates 

First operational aircraft delivery 2008 2009 2010 2010

Initial operational capability 2010-2012 2012-2013 2012-2015 2012-2015

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Data are from the annual selected acquisition reports that are dated in December of each year 

but are not officially released and reported to the Congress until March or April of the following year. 

The December 2003 data reflect the last major restructuring of the program. The December 2007 

data represent the official program of record at the time of our review and was reported to the 

Congress in April 2008. 

Military construction costs have not been fully established, and the reporting basis changed over time 

in these DOD reports. 

In our March 2008 report,4 we stated that JSF costs would likely grow 

much higher than reported because the program of record at that time did 

not include all acquisition costs (including the alternate engine program 

directed by the Congress), made overoptimistic assumptions, and did not 

fully reflect the mounting cost and schedule pressures from manufacturing 

 4

GAO-08-388. 

Page 6 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

inefficiencies and compressed time frames for completing development. 

We questioned the Mid-Course Risk Reduction Plan adopted by DOD in 

September 2007 that cut two development test aircraft, reduced test 

flights, and accelerated the reduction in the prime contractor’s 

development workforce in order to replenish management reserves 

depleted by design changes and manufacturing problems. We 

recommended that DOD accomplish a full and comprehensive estimate of

the total program verified by an independent third party and revisit the 

Mid-Course Risk Reduction Plan with an intensive analysis of the causes 

of management reserve depletion, progress against the baseline 

manufacturing schedule, and correction of deficiencies in the contractor’s 

earned value management system. DOD agreed to make a comprehensive 

independent cost estimate, but decided to go ahead as planned with the 

Mid-Course Risk Reduction Plan, stating that it would monitor and 

evaluate progress and revise the plan later if it failed to achieve 

expectations. 

Two recent estimates indicate that JSF development will cost more and 

take longer to complete than reported to the Congress in April 2008, 

primarily because of contract cost overruns and extended time to 

complete flight testing. DOD also plans to accelerate aircraft procurement 

over the next 6 years—buying more aircraft sooner than planned last year. 

This new plan will require significantly more procurement funding sooner,

but officials did not assess its net effect on total program costs through 

completion of JSF acquisition. 

Development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and 

$7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development extended

from 1 to 3 years, according to recent estimates—one by the JSF Program 

Office and one by a joint team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

Air Force, and Navy officials.5

 Cost overruns on both the aircraft and 

engine contracts, delays in manufacturing test aircraft, and a need for a 

More Money and Time 

Will Be Needed to 

Complete JSF 

Development, While 

DOD Plans to 

Accelerate 

Procurement 

New Estimates Project 

Rising Costs and Further 

Delays to Complete JSF 

Development 

 5

In April 2008, OSD asked the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) to lead a joint 

estimating team in assessing the overall executability of the JSF development program and 

resource requirements for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. The joint estimating team was

composed of CAIG, Air Force, and Navy representatives as well as subject matter experts. 

Page 7 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

longer, more robust flight test program are the primary cost drivers. The 

joint team’s estimate is higher than the program office’s because it 

included costs for the alternate engine program directed by the Congress 

and used more conservative assumptions based on current and legacy 

aircraft experiences. Program officials contend that funding the program 

to the higher cost estimate is premature and believe processes are in place 

to substantially improve on the test experiences of past programs. 

Regardless, both estimates agree that cost and time to complete 

development have increased from the official program of record at the 

time of our review. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Estimated Cost and Schedule for System Development 

2007 program of record JSF Program Office Joint estimating team

Development costs to complete $7.4 billion $9.8 billion $14.8 billiona

Total development costs $44.4 billion $46.8 billion $51.8 billiona

Date to complete development October 2013 October 2014 October 2016

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

The joint estimating team only projected costs through fiscal year 2015. Extending development to 

October 2016, as the team projects, would increase both cost figures. DOD data suggest that 1 year 

of additional flight testing and other government costs could be about $700 million. 

The program office’s revised development cost estimate projects an 

additional $2.4 billion and a 1-year extension in the schedule compared to 

the official program of record reported to the Congress. This would 

increase the system development portion of the acquisition program to 

$46.8 billion and delay its completion to October 2014. The cost increases 

primarily resulted from the following factors. 

• $1.2 billion for aircraft development. Program officials declared a cost 

overrun on the prime air system contract because of increased labor 

hours, higher prices, and supply shortages. Included in this figure is 

$200 million to be added to the contractor’s management reserve.6

 Last 

year, we reported7

 that mounting cost and schedule pressures depleted 

reserves much faster than anticipated. By summer 2007, the program 

 6

Management reserves are budgeted funds set aside for unanticipated development 

challenges and increase a program’s capacity to deal with unknowns. 

7

GAO-08-388. 

Page 8 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

had spent about two-thirds of budgeted funds but had accomplished 

only half the work required. Since then, DOD’s efforts to restore 

reserves and fix manufacturing inefficiencies have not fully achieved 

intended results, requiring another cash infusion. 

• $800 million for engine development. According to officials from the 

Defense Contract Management Agency, the engine contractor

continued to face development problems, which resulted in a contract 

cost overrun. Higher costs for labor and materials, supplier problems, 

and the rework needed to correct deficiencies with the engine blade

design discovered during ground testing were major contributing 

factors. 

• $300 million for flight test extension. The program extended system 

development by 1 year to provide more time for development and 

operational flight testing. In April 2008, an operational test review team 

recommended extending the development contract by 1 year. The 

review team considered but dismissed several other options to address 

the schedule problem, including deferring requirements. 

On the other hand, the joint estimating team estimates that it will cost 

$14.8 billion to complete JSF development, $7.4 billion more than the 

official program of record at the time of our review. This would increase 

the total development costs to $51.8 billion from the $44.4 billion reported

to the Congress last year—a 17 percent increase. The joint team also 

projected a 3-year program extension beyond the program of record in 

order to complete system development, 2 years more than the new 

program office estimate. 

The joint team’s estimate was $5 billion more than the new program office 

estimate.8

 Several factors account for the difference between the two 

estimates. 

• Alternate engine. The joint estimating team included $1.4 billion to 

complete development of an alternate engine for the JSF; the program 

office estimate did not include alternate engine costs. The Congress 

has directed DOD to develop a second source for the JSF engine to 

 8

The difference in the two estimates is actually more than $5 billion. The joint estimating 

team’s numbers only go through fiscal year 2015, but they are expecting development to

take at least 1 more year beyond then. Program data presented to the Joint Chiefs suggest 

that an additional year for development flight testing and other government and contractor

expenses could cost about $700 million.

Page 9 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

induce competition and to ensure that one engine’s failures would not 

ground all JSFs, thereby reducing operational risks in the future. DOD 

has not wanted to pursue this second engine source and twice removed 

funding from the JSF program line.

• Engineering staffing. The joint estimating team projected a need for 

the contractor to retain considerably more engineering staff and for 

longer periods of time than the program office estimate to complete 

development, evaluate test results, and correct deficiencies. Releasing 

engineering staff prematurely risks not discovering problems until late 

in development or during fielding, when they would be more expensive 

to address. 

• Software development. The joint estimating team believes that the 

software productivity rate will be less than the program’s calculation 

and anticipates much more growth in software requirements. The JSF 

aircraft is expected to require 7.5 million lines of computer code—the 

most by far of any aircraft. By comparison, the F/A-18E/F has only 1.1 

million and the F-22A 2.2 million. Experiences on past acquisitions 

have shown 30 to 100 percent growth in software requirements over 

time, while the JSF Program Office estimate assumed no growth. 

• Flight testing. The joint estimating team projects that flight testing will 

require more time and effort than the program office has built into its 

current schedule. Continuing delays in delivering test aircraft are 

expected to hamper and further compress test schedules. In particular, 

the joint team projects that the two aircraft dedicated to carrier 

suitability tests will be late off the production line, thereby delaying 

test activities. It also projected that the JSF will require about 2,700 

hours of flight testing for mission systems, significantly more than the 

1,700 hours that the program office currently estimates. 

• Manufacturing production hours. The joint estimating team projects 

that production span times for the JSF will be longer than the program 

office estimates based on the program’s performance to date and 

experience of recent programs, such as the F/A-18 E/F and the F-22A. 

The span time is an indicator of how long the manufacturing effort 

takes and when flight testing can begin. The program office assumes 

that span times will decrease over the course of the development 

contract. We note that span times typically increase during 

development, as was the case for both the B-2 bomber and F-22A 

programs. 

Program officials believe that their estimate is more accurate and that 

providing extra funding to address future risks is premature and does not 

Page 10 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

provide incentives for contractors to control costs. The program office 

attributes its lower cost estimate to several factors. First, the quantity, 

quality, and flexibility of the JSF laboratories should enable the program 

to reduce more risks in a laboratory environment, rather than through 

flight testing, which is considerably more expensive. In addition, the 

program’s efforts to develop the final software system infrastructure early

should reduce significant software problems later in the program, 

according to the program office. The program office also believes that 

costs will be lower because progress in several key development areas is 

either matching plans or is ahead of where legacy programs were at 

similar points of time in their development. For example, the program is 

currently reducing engineering staff as planned. The program is also 

producing software at a rate significantly higher than that of the F-22A 

program and is at least 18 months ahead of where the F-22A program was 

at a similar point in developing mission systems, according to program 

officials. Officials told us that they intend to fund the fiscal year 2010 

development budget based on the joint team’s higher estimate. However, it 

is not clear at this stage which estimate will serve as the basis for future 

budget submissions. 

Much Higher Annual 

Procurement Funding 

Required to Accelerate JSF 

Procurement 

The program office and joint estimating team also projected procurement 

funding requirements for the 6-year period fiscal years 2010-2015 based on

DOD plans to accelerate procurement of operational aircraft. Through this 

effort, DOD wants to recapitalize tactical air forces sooner and mitigate 

projected fighter shortfalls in the future. Compared to last year, this 

accelerated plan would procure an additional 169 aircraft during these 6 

years, moving aircraft that had been scheduled for procurement beyond

2015 to earlier years. According to the two estimates, this plan would 

require from $21.8 billion to $33.4 billion more funding than the official 

program of record, as shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Projected Procurement Funding Requirements for Fiscal Years 2010 through 2015 

2007 program of record JSF Program Office Joint estimating team

Procurement funding requirements $59.7 billion $81.5 billion $93.1 billion

Procurement quantity 485 654 654

Average procurement unit cost $123 million $125 million $142 million

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

The joint team’s estimate is higher than the program office’s, primarily for 

these reasons: 

Page 11 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

• The joint team projected slower gains in production efficiency than the 

program office. Typically, production efficiency is improved and unit 

costs are lowered over time as a workforce becomes more experienced

building a new product and manufacturing processes are honed. 

• The joint team also assumed fewer savings from commonality. 

Commonality—a key selling point for the JSF program—refers to the 

use of the same or similar parts, structures, and subsystems shared by 

the three variants. Greater commonality can save money by decreasing 

development times and facilitating economic order quantities. 

• The team projected higher labor and material costs and longer

production span times, based on JSF performance to date in 

manufacturing development test aircraft. 

Table 4 shows the additional aircraft and funding requirements for DOD’s 

accelerated plan compared to the official program of record. These 

quantities are for the United States only; during this same period, the 

international partners are expected to buy 273 aircraft. 

Table 4: Proposed Accelerated Procurement 

FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 Total

2007 program of record funding requirements

a

$6.0 $6.9 $10.5 $10.8 $12.4 $13.1 $59.7

2007 program of record quantities 30 43 82 90 110 130 485

Program office accelerated funding requirementsa $8.0 $12.8 $14.3 $14.4 $15.3 $16.7 $81.5

Joint team accelerated funding requirementsa$8.9 $13.9 $16.7 $16.6 $17.8 $19.3 $93.1

Accelerated quantities 32 70 109 119 146 178 654

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

Funding requirements are expressed in billions of then-year dollars. 

Procurement of 

Operational Aircraft under 

Cost Reimbursement 

Contracts to Continue; 

Increases the 

Government’s Exposure to 

Risks 

The JSF program is procuring a substantial number of aircraft on cost 

reimbursement contracts. Cost contracts place most of the risk on the 

buyer—DOD in this case—who is liable to pay more than budgeted should 

labor, material, or other incurred costs be more than expected when the 

contract was signed. JSF officials plan to procure at least the first four 

low-rate production lots under cost reimbursement contracts and to 

transition to fixed-price instruments when appropriate, possibly between 

lots 5 and 7 (fiscal years 2011 to 2013). It is unclear exactly how and when 

this will happen, but the expectation is to transition to fixed pricing once 

the air vehicle has a mature design, has been demonstrated in flight tests, 

and is producible at established cost targets. To date, DOD has procured 

Page 12 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

the first three lots for a total of 30 aircraft and $7.4 billion on cost 

reimbursement terms. Under the accelerated procurement plan, DOD 

could procure as many as 360 aircraft costing about $57 billion through 

fiscal year 2013 on cost reimbursement contracts, as illustrated in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Cumulative Procurement Costs and Quantities

Number of aircraft

Cumulative quantity

Dollars (in billions)

Cumulative cost

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

0

20

40

60

80

100

FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15

Period of possible

transition from 

cost contracts

to fixed-price 

contracts

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15

Period of possible

transition from 

cost contracts

to fixed-price 

contracts

Cost reimbursement contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred 

costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. According to the Federal

Acquisition Regulation, cost reimbursement contracts are suitable for use 

only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit 

costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixedprice contract.9

 Cost reimbursement contracts for weapon production are 

considered appropriate when the program lacks sufficient knowledge 

about system design, manufacturing processes, and testing results to 

establish firm prices and delivery dates. In contrast, a fixed-price contract 

provides for a pre-established price, places more of the risk and 

responsibility for costs on the contractor, and provides more incentive for 

efficient and economical performance. 

Procuring up to 360 production aircraft on cost reimbursement 

contracts—-nearly 15 percent of the total DOD program—seems to be a 

tacit acknowledgment by DOD and the contractor that knowledge on JSF 

 9

Federal Acquisition Regulation § 16.301-2.

Page 13 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

design, production processes, and costs for labor and material is not yet 

sufficiently mature and that pricing information is not exact enough for 

the contractor to assume the risk under a fixed-price contract. It also 

seems to be a consequence of the substantial concurrency of development, 

test, and production built into the JSF schedule. Significant overlap of 

these activities means that DOD is procuring considerable quantities of 

operational aircraft while development test aircraft are still on the 

production line and much in advance of testing to prove aircraft 

performance and suitability. Establishing a clear and accountable path to 

ensure that the contractor assumes more of the risk is prudent. We note 

that the significant ramp up in JSF production under the accelerated 

profile starts with lot 5, the fiscal year 2011 procurement of 70 aircraft. 

Manufacturing of development test aircraft is taking more time, money, 

and effort than planned, but officials believe that they can work through 

these problems and deliver the 11 remaining test aircraft by early 2010. 

However, by that time, DOD may have procured as many as 62 production 

aircraft, accumulating a backlog of aircraft to be produced. Manufacturing 

inefficiencies and parts shortages continue to delay the completion and 

delivery of development test aircraft needed for flight testing. The 

contractor has not yet demonstrated mature manufacturing processes, or 

an ability to produce at currently planned annual rates. It has taken steps 

to improve manufacturing, the supplier base, and schedule management. 

However, given the manufacturing challenges, we believe that DOD’s plan 

to accelerate production in the near term adds considerable risk and will 

be difficult to achieve in a cost-effective manner.

The prime contractor has restructured the JSF manufacturing schedule 

three times, each time lengthening the time to deliver aircraft to the test 

program. Delays and manufacturing inefficiencies are prime causes of 

contract cost overruns. The contractor has produced two development 

test aircraft—an original non–production representative model and the 

first STOVL aircraft. It now projects delivering the remaining 11 aircraft in

2009 and early 2010. Problems and delays are largely the residual effects 

from difficulties early in development. The effects of the late release of 

engineering drawings, design changes, delays in establishing a supplier 

base, and parts shortages continue to cause delays and force inefficient 

production line work-arounds where unfinished work is completed out of 

Continued 

Manufacturing 

Inefficiencies Will 

Make It Difficult for 

the Program to Meet 

Its Production 

Schedule 

Time and Money Needed 

for Manufacturing 

Development Test Aircraft 

Continue to Increase 

Page 14 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

station.10 Data provided by the Defense Contract Management Agency and 

the JSF Program Office show continuing critical parts shortages, out-ofstation work, and quality issues. The total projected labor hours to 

manufacture test aircraft increased by 40 percent just in the past year, as 

illustrated in figure 2. 

Figure 2: JSF Labor Hour Estimates for Development Test Aircraft

Budgeted labor hours (in thousands)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

BF-1 BF-2 BF-3 BF-4 AF-1 AF-2 AF-3 CF-1 CF-2 CF-3 BF-5 AF-4

Aircraft

Budgeted hours (June 2007)

Budgeted hours (June 2008)

343

358

233

294

180

251

155

229

188

258

146

218

131

204

239

255

126

210

118

196

103

174

91

165

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Performance data for two major cost areas—wing assembly and mate and

delivery—indicate even more substantial growth. Figure 3 compares the 

increased budgeted hours in the new schedule to last year’s estimates. The 

2007 schedule assumed a steeper drop in labor hours as more units are 

produced and manufacturing and worker knowledge increases; this 

increased efficiency because of learning is typical of production programs. 

The new schedule, based upon actual performance, projects a less steep 

 10An efficient production line establishes an orderly flow of work as a product moves from

workstation to workstation and on to final assembly. Out-of-station work, sometimes 

referred to as traveled work, refers to completing unfinished work on major components, 

for example, the wings, after they have left the wing workstation and moved down the

production line to another station, such as mate and final assembly. 

Page 15 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

decline in labor hours, indicating lesser gains in worker efficiency. As of 

June 2008, the planned hours for these two major stations increased by 

about 90 percent over the June 2007 schedule, which itself had shown an 

increase from the 2006 schedule. 

Figure 3: Budgeted Manufacturing Hours by Development Aircraft (Wing and Mate and Delivery Stages)

Wing manufacturing data Mate and delivery manufacturing data

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

CFBF-5

AF-4

3

AFCF-1

CF-2

3

BFBF-4

AF-1

AF-2

3

BF-1

BF-2

Aircraft

June 2007

July 2008

Budgeted labor hours (in thousands)

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

CFBF-5

AF-4

3

AFCF-1

CF-2

3

BFBF-4

AF-1

AF-2

3

BF-1

BF-2

Aircraft

June 2007

July 2008

Budgeted labor hours (in thousands)

The overlap in the work schedule between manufacturing the wing and 

mating (connecting) it to the aircraft fuselage has been a major concern 

for several years because it causes inefficient out-of-station work. The 

contractor continues to address this concern, but the new schedule 

indicates that this problem will continue at least through 2009. One 

indicator of its persistence is the projected hours for building the last test 

aircraft. As figure 4 shows, estimated labor hours increased more than 80 

percent from the June 2007 to June 2008 schedules, and the planned hours 

for wing assembly and for the mate and delivery phases more than tripled. 

Page 16 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Figure 4: Comparison of Budgeted Labor Hours to Build Last Development Aircraft 

11%

19%

70%

9,735

17,084

64,399

91,218 budgeted hours

41%

32%

27% 43,980

52,820

68,640

165,440 budgeted hours

June 2007 June 2008

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Mate and delivery

Wing

Other components

Prime Contractor Actions 

to Improve Schedule 

Management, 

Manufacturing Efficiency, 

and Supplier Base 

Our evaluation determined that the prime contractor now has good tools 

and integrated processes in place that should improve its schedule 

management activities and is also implementing actions to improve 

manufacturing efficiency, the delivery of parts, and proactive oversight of

subcontractors. The effects from these recent actions are not yet fully 

apparent, and the contractor has not yet accomplished its own schedule 

risk assessment that could provide more insight into impacts from areas of 

risk and uncertainty. The coming year will be critical for implementing 

management improvements in order to accomplish a firm and effective 

transition from manufacturing a few test aircraft to producing operational 

aircraft at high annual rates. 

Page 17 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

The prime contractor demonstrated to us that its schedule management 

processes largely meet established best practices criteria. With

improvements implemented in 2008, the contractor’s management systems 

meet or partially meet eight of the nine established criteria.11 For example, 

the master schedule can identify and track activities associated with over 

600 projects. It also establishes the critical path between activities, 

allowing the program to examine the impacts of schedule delays and 

determine schedule flexibility. Appendix II discusses our examination of 

the prime contractor’s schedule management process against best 

practices criteria in more detail. 

Prime Contractor’s Scheduling 

Management Processes Meet 

Many Best Practices, but 

Program Risks Are Not Entirely 

Visible 

The one area not meeting best practices was related to performing a 

schedule risk analysis, and as a result, the contractor has limited insight 

into areas of risk and uncertainty in the schedule. The prime contractor 

has not conducted its own risk assessment that would (1) determine the 

level of confidence it has in meeting completion dates and (2) identify and 

apportion reserve funds for contingencies. A thorough risk analysis could 

improve management insight and subsequent corrective actions on two 

recurring problem areas in particular: schedule slippage and inadequate 

management reserve levels. Naval Air Systems Command officials did 

accomplish an independent schedule risk analysis that indicated that the

program could slip more than 2 years based on the productivity risks 

associated with software development and assembly of the various 

airframes as well as the time needed to complete all flight testing. Both the 

contractor and the JSF Program Office disputed the findings of the Naval

Air Systems Command schedule risk analysis primarily because the 

analysis was done without direct involvement of program officials. 

The prime contractor is implementing changes designed to address the 

manufacturing inefficiencies and parts shortages discussed earlier. These 

include (1) increasing oversight of key subcontractors that are having

problems, (2) securing long-term raw material purchase price agreements 

for both the prime and key subcontractors, and (3) implementing better 

manufacturing line processes. On this latter point, according to program 

officials, the prime contractor has taken specific steps to improve wing 

manufacturing performance—one of the most troublesome workstations. 

Defense Contract Management Agency officials noted that the contractor

Improvements in 

Manufacturing and Supplier 

Base Are Ongoing 

 11GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). Also, see

app. II for our assessment of the prime contractor’s schedule management processes. 

Page 18 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

produced the second STOVL aircraft variant with less work performed out 

of station than for the first STOVL aircraft. Also, program office and 

contractor officials report some alleviation of parts shortages and 

improvements in quality, but also believe that the effects from previous 

design delays, parts shortages, and labor inefficiencies will continue to 

persist over the near term. 

The lag time between taking action and demonstrating improvement may 

partly explain why some manufacturing performance metrics are not 

demonstrating a clear continued rate of quality improvement, as would be 

desirable and expected for a program ramping up annual production rates. 

This lag time may be evident in two important metrics—scrap, rework, 

and repair rates and manufacturing defect rates—both of which have 

increased somewhat since 2006. Program and contracting officials point 

out, however, that while this performance is not desirable, these and other

metrics compare very favorably with those of prior acquisitions at similar 

stages of development, including the F-16 and F-22A. 

Supplier costs are expected to make up an even more substantial share of

total expenses as the program moves further into production. According to

contractor officials, efforts are focused on maturing the supply base and 

working more closely and directly with key suppliers to reduce costs, 

alleviate parts shortages, and support higher production rates. Key 

suppliers have struggled to develop critical and complex parts while 

others have had problems with limited production capacity. For example, 

the supplier responsible for the advanced electro-hydraulic actuation 

system had delivered parts with missing subcomponents and parts that 

were not built to specifications. The major “team mate” supplier 

responsible for fuselage and tail assembly has experienced delays caused

by its limited machining capacity. Given these supplier issues, 

manufacturing inefficiencies, and accumulating backlog in production, we 

believe that the program’s plans to accelerate production in the near term 

adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve in a cost-effective 

manner. 

Page 19 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

DOD will make significant investments—in both dollars and the number of 

aircraft procured—before completing JSF flight testing. DOD’s proposal to 

accelerate procurement further increases financial risks in a very 

challenging test environment. DOD’s new test plan adds an extra year to 

the schedule and better aligns resources, but is still aggressive with little 

room for error, presenting a formidable challenge to complete system 

development, support initial operational testing, and, eventually, a full rate 

production decision. DOD decisions to reduce development test aircraft

and flight tests add to the risks, while any additional delays in

manufacturing test aircraft will further compress the schedule. The JSF 

has just begun development flight testing with two test aircraft and has 

already experienced some setbacks—normal in any program, but of 

special concern when assets are minimal. Some in DOD forecast that 

another 2 or more years beyond the 1-year extension just approved will 

eventually be needed to successfully prove aircraft performance and 

complete system development. The department has stated that the 

contractor’s state-of-the-art ground test labs and a flying test bed will 

mitigate risks in the flight regimen and their use will effectively substitute 

for flight testing. This approach is promising, but not yet proven. 

DOD is investing heavily in procuring JSF aircraft before flight testing 

proves that they will perform as expected. Procuring aircraft before 

testing successfully demonstrates that the design is mature and that the 

weapon system will work as intended increases the likelihood of design 

and requirements changes resulting in subsequent cost growth, schedule 

delays, and performance limitations. Also, systems already built and 

fielded may later require substantial modifications, further adding to costs. 

The uncertain environment as testing progresses is one reason why the 

prime contractor and DOD are using cost reimbursable contracts until 

rather late in procurement. Table 5 depicts planned investments—in both 

dollars and aircraft—prior to the completion of development flight testing. 

Under the accelerated production plan and using the lower procurement 

cost estimate prepared by the program office, DOD may procure 360 

aircraft at a total estimated cost of $57 billion before development flight 

testing is completed. This overlap will be further exacerbated should the 

joint estimating team’s predictions of higher cost and lengthier schedule 

prove accurate. 

The JSF’s Test Plan Is 

Improved but Faces 

Numerous Challenges 

to Complete 

Development on Time 

and on Budget 

Significant Investments 

Made before Development 

Flight Tests Are Completed 

Page 20 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Table 5: Overlap of Procurement Investments and Flight Testing

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Cumulative procurement 

(billions of then-year dollars) 

$0.9 $3.6 $7.4 $15.4 $28.2 $42.6 $57.0 $72.3

Cumulative quantity 2 14 30 62 132 241 360 506

Contract type Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost or 

fixed

Cost or 

fixed 

Cost or 

fixed

Fixed

Percentage of flight test 

program completed 

<1% <1% 2% 9% 34% 62% 88% 100%

LIMITED KNOWLEDGE GAINED FROM FLIGHT TESTING MORE KNOWLEDGE GAINED FROM 

FLIGHT TESTING

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Flight testing data reflect the percentage of total development flight tests completed at the time 

of the planned investment decision, which is expected in January of each year. 

Flight Testing Is Still in Its 

Infancy and Has Fallen 

Behind Schedule 

The JSF program had completed about 2 percent of its development flight 

testing as of November 2008. Figure 5 shows the expected ramp up in 

flight testing with most effort occurring in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. 

Past programs have shown that many problems are not discovered until 

flight testing. As such, the program is likely to experience considerable 

cost growth in the future as it steps up its flight testing, discovers new 

problems, and makes the necessary technical and design corrections. 

Page 21 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

Figure 5: JSF Planned Development Test Flights

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Test flights

Fiscal year

27

97

317

1,243

1,425

1,289

593

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

While the program has been able to demonstrate basic aircraft flying 

capabilities, it has recently experienced testing delays and has fallen 

behind the flight test plan established in 2007. At the time of our review, 

the program had flown about half of its planned 155 flight tests for 2008. 

The test program currently has two development test aircraft and an 

integrated airborne test bed, with the following experiences to date: 

• Sixty-five test flights on the original, non–production representative 

prototype contributed to discoveries in, among other things, landing 

gear door fitting, aerial refueling operations, and weapons bay 

functions. The prototype experienced a 3-month delay because of 

engine bay nacelle vent fan malfunctions that were subsequently 

resolved. 

• Initial testing of the first of 12 production representative prototypes 

began in June 2008—a STOVL variant flown in conventional mode. By 

the time of our review it accumulated 14 test flights demonstrating 

important handling qualities and reducing risks associated with, among 

other things, the landing gear, fuel system performance, and STOVL 

doors operation. Engine problems delayed full STOVL testing by 6 

months. 

Page 22 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

• Thirty-seven flights on the cooperative avionics test bed tested mission 

system software and demonstrated communication and navigation 

capabilities. 

Looking ahead, the program expects to take delivery of the remaining 

development test aircraft during 2009 and early in fiscal year 2010. In the 

same time frame, it also plans to begin flight testing 6 of its 12 production 

representative prototype test aircraft (CTOL and STOVL aircraft), 

including the first 2 aircraft dedicated to mission system testing. The first 

carrier variant development test aircraft is expected to begin full flight 

testing—including ship suitability testing—in 2010. A fully integrated, 

mission capable aircraft is not expected to enter flight testing until 2012 by

which time DOD plans to have already purchased 241 aircraft for about 

$43 billion under cost reimbursement contracts. 

Program’s Test Plan

Extends Development and 

Relies Heavily on Ground 

Testing and Simulations to 

Verify Aircraft 

Performance 

The JSF Program Office developed a new and improved test plan in the 

spring of 2008 that extended the development period by 1 year, better 

aligned test resources and availability dates, and lessened the overlap

between development and operational testing. The new plan is still 

aggressive, however, and has little room for error discovery, rework, and 

recovery from downtime should test assets be grounded or otherwise 

unavailable. The sheer complexity of the JSF program—with 7.5 million 

lines of software code, three variants, and multi-mission development—

suggests that the aircraft will encounter many unforeseen problems during 

flight testing requiring additional schedule to rework. Our past work has 

shown that programs that do not allow sufficient time to address the 

inevitable problems discovered in testing, run a greater risk of significant 

cost increases and schedule delays when problems do arise. The joint 

estimating team noted that the program’s flight test plan assumed a higher 

productivity than has been seen on recent flight test programs. As such, 

the joint team believes that flight testing will require an additional 2 years

to complete beyond the 1 year already added to development and suggests 

that more flight test hours will be necessary to test mission systems and 

the carrier variant in particular. 

The Mid-Course Risk Recovery Plan, approved in late 2007, cut two 

development test aircraft, reduced test flights, and relies more on ground 

laboratories and simulations to verify performance, adding substantial risk 

to the program. Our 2008 report12 discussed the objections from several 

 12GAO-08-388. 

Page 23 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

prominent DOD offices to the Mid-Course Risk Recovery Plan. The 

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, for example, identified risks 

in the revised verification strategy and cited inadequate capacity to handle 

the pace of mission testing and ship suitability and signature testing. This

increases the likelihood of not finding and resolving critical design 

deficiencies until operational testing, when it is more costly and disruptive 

to do so. 

The test plan relies heavily on a series of advanced and robust simulation 

labs and a flying test bed to verify aircraft and subsystem performance. 

Figure 6 shows that 83 percent of the aircraft’s capabilities are to be 

verified through labs, the flying test bed, and subject matter analysis, while 

only 17 percent of test points are to be verified through flight testing. The 

JSF program spent $5 billion on its system of simulation labs and models. 

Program officials argue that their heavy investment in simulation labs will 

allow early risk reduction, thereby reducing the need for additional flight 

testing, controlling costs, and meeting the key milestones of the program’s 

aggressive test plan. 

Figure 6: Breakdown of Verification Venues for the JSF 

5%

17%

59%

19%

Flying test bed

Flight testing

Subject matter analysis

Labs

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

The JSF program’s simulation labs appear more prolific, integrated, and 

capable than the labs used in past aircraft programs. The program utilizes 

18 labs for development whereas only 9 were used for the F-22A, 7 for the

Page 24 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

F-18, and 5 for the F-16. According to program officials, the greater 

number of labs allows engineers to work simultaneously on different 

development blocks, reducing bottlenecks that may occur in testing. In 

contrast, engineers of the F-18 and F-22A programs had to interrupt or 

shut down development on one development block while they were 

making corrections to another. Also in contrast to past programs, key JSF 

simulation labs are colocated at a Lockheed Martin plant in Fort Worth, 

Texas. The F-22A program utilized three locations and two different 

companies. According to the program office, the colocation of the key

testing labs facilitates more seamless integration of key aircraft 

components. Program officials also noted that JSF labs use the actual 

aircraft components to a greater extent than labs did in past programs and 

also have greater software processing capacity. This allows for more 

realistic data, which should reduce the need for additional flight testing. 

Further, the JSF utilizes the first fully integrated airborne test bed for 

mission system testing. According to program officials, the test bed’s 

design is geospatially proportionate to an actual F-35 aircraft, enhancing 

its ability to accurately verify aircraft performance. 

While the labs appear more prolific, integrated, and complex than those 

used in legacy programs, concerns about their extensive use in verifying

aircraft performance remain. The extent of the JSF program’s planned lab 

use is unprecedented, but the ability to substitute for flight testing has not 

yet been demonstrated. In addition, the labs have yet to be fully 

accredited. Accreditation is required to ensure the adequate capability of

labs and models to perform verification tasks. It is critical that the models 

behave like aircraft to ensure that the system’s performance requirements 

are being verified accurately. The program office said that it is on track to 

complete the accreditation of the labs in time to begin verifying system 

performance. However, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

reports that the progress of the accreditation support packages is behind 

schedule and suggests that more flight testing may be needed as the 

accreditation process reveals the limitations of the models. Some DOD 

officials are also concerned that the labs will be understaffed. The Director 

of Operational Test and Evaluation and DOD’s joint estimating team both 

reported that the program’s current resource plans reduce engineering 

staff too rapidly. Engineering and test personnel are critical to analyzing 

the data generated from the labs. Without adequate staff, there is a greater

risk that the labs will not be sufficiently utilized, which could, in turn, 

result in schedule delays or cost increases. 

Page 25 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

While the program is projecting that it will meet all key performance 

parameters, most will not be verified through ground and flight testing 

until fiscal years 2010 through 2013. In addition, a 2008 operational 

assessment by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center 

pointed out several technical challenges that it believes are likely to have a

severe operational impact if not adequately addressed. While some of the 

report’s concerns are not specific requirements, some DOD officials 

believe that the shortfalls may adversely affect the JSF’s ability to meet 

warfighter needs. For example: 

• The current F-35 power system may cause excessive damage to runway 

surfaces which could limit its ability to operate in certain locations. 

The program is still evaluating the problem and plans to gather data 

and conduct further studies when full-scale models or actual aircraft 

are available. According to a program official, changes to the aircraft’s 

design or to the current concept of operations may be needed. The 

program has alerted the services and believes it will have a better 

understanding of the problem sometime in 2009.

• Thermal management challenges hamper the ability to conduct 

missions in hot and cold environments. The Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation reported that an alternative main engine fuel pump 

to remedy this problem is under development but will not be available 

before the low-rate initial production Lot 3, which is likely to affect 

operational testing. The test team aborted a test sortie because of high 

fuel temperatures in June. 

• The JSF’s advanced integrated support system aims to improve and 

streamline aircraft logistics and maintenance functions in order to 

reduce life cycle costs. The current integrated support system for the 

JSF prohibits operating two detachments from one squadron 

simultaneously. This limitation will severely affect current operating 

practices, which include dividing one squadron of aircraft into 

subgroups to deploy and operate at different locations. 

The JSF is DOD’s largest and most complex acquisition program and the 

linchpin of efforts to recapitalize our tactical air forces. It is now in its 

most challenging phase, at a crossroads of a sort. Challenges are many—

continuing cost and schedule pressures; complex, extensive, and unproven

software requirements; and a nascent, very aggressive test program with 

diminished flight test assets. Looking forward, the contractor plans to 

complete work expeditiously to deliver the test assets, significantly step 

up flight testing, begin verifying mission system capabilities, mature 

Early Operational 

Assessment Identifies 

Several Challenges That 

May Have Operational 

Impact If Not Addressed 

Conclusions 

Page 26 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

manufacturing processes, and quickly ramp up production of operational 

aircraft. As such, the credibility of the program’s test plans, manufacturing 

capacity, and subsequent cost and schedule estimates should become 

more apparent. 

The program must move forward, but given all these challenges, 

accelerating procurement in a cost-reimbursement contract 

environment—where uncertainties in contract performance do not permit 

costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixedprice contract—places very significant financial risk on the government. 

Accelerating plans also does not equate to an ability to deliver to those 

plans. Because the program’s manufacturing processes are still maturing 

and flight testing is still in its infancy, incorporating an accelerated 

production schedule introduces even more risk and uncertainty to the 

program. Our past work has shown that programs that make production 

decisions prior to fully proving a system’s design through testing and 

demonstration of mature manufacturing processes have an increased risk 

of design and production changes and retrofits of completed aircraft.13

Until the contractor demonstrates that it can produce aircraft in a timely

and efficient manner, DOD cannot fully grasp future funding requirements. 

DOD needs tangible assurance from the prime contractor that it can meet 

expected development and production expectations. By accelerating 

low-rate production quantities before manufacturing and testing processes 

are mature, DOD accepts most of the contractors’ production and 

manufacturing inefficiencies. At minimum, the contractor needs to 

develop a detailed plan demonstrating how it can successfully meet 

program development and production goals in the near future within cost 

and schedule parameters. With an improved contracting framework and a 

more reasoned look to the future, the JSF program can more effectively 

meet DOD and warfighter needs in a constrained budget environment. 

Given the program’s ongoing manufacturing problems and nascent flight 

test program, we believe that moving forward with an accelerated 

procurement plan is very risky. This risk is reflected by the extended use 

of cost reimbursement contracts for low-rate production quantities—a 

contract mechanism that places most of the cost risk on the government. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

 13GAO’s past work has shown that manufacturing maturity is achieved when a company 

can produce a product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best practice is to 

ensure that all key manufacturing processes are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of

consistently producing parts within the product’s quality tolerances and standards.

Page 27 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

As such, to enhance congressional oversight, increase the likelihood of 

more successful program outcomes, and maintain confidence that the 

program is on track to meet planned cost, schedule, and performance 

goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two 

actions: 

1. Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics to report to the congressional defense committees by

October 1, 2009. This report should include, at minimum, 

• an explanation of the cost and other risks associated with a costreimbursable contract as compared to a fixed-price contract for 

JSF’s future low-rate production quantities, 

• the program’s strategy for managing and mitigating risks associated 

with the use of cost contracts, and 

• plans for transitioning to fixed-price contracts for production to 

include time frames and criteria. 

2. Direct the JSF Program Office to ensure that the prime contractor 

performs periodic schedule risk analyses for the JSF program to 

provide better insight into management reserve, production 

efficiencies, and schedule completion to allow for corrections as early 

as possible. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

DOD substantively agreed with our first recommendation regarding a 

report to the Congress on contracting strategy, but believed that the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should be 

responsible for the report, not the JSF Program Office as stated in our 

draft. As the milestone decision authority, the Under Secretary is 

responsible for approving the contracting strategy, contract awards, and 

the transition to full rate production. We agree with DOD and revised the 

recommendation accordingly. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD also agreed with the second recommendation and will direct that the 

prime contractor perform periodic schedule risk analysis. In coordination

with the JSF Program Office, the department intends to determine an 

optimum schedule for the contractor that will provide insight into JSF cost 

and schedule to influence key milestones and decision making. 

Page 28 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget. The report also is available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 29 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable John M. McHugh 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 30 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program’s progress in meeting 

cost, schedule, and performance goals, we received briefings by program 

and contractor officials and reviewed financial management reports, 

budget documents, annual selected acquisition reports, monthly status 

reports, performance indicators, and other data. We compared reported 

progress with prior years’ data, identified changes in cost and schedule, 

and obtained officials’ reasons for these changes. We interviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD), JSF Program Office, and contractor 

officials to obtain their views on progress, ongoing concerns and actions 

taken to address them, and future plans to complete JSF development and 

accelerate procurement. This review was the fifth and final effort under 

the mandate of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005. We were provided sufficient information to make the

assessments contained in this report. 

In assessing program cost estimates, we compared the official program 

cost estimate in the December 31, 2007, selected acquisition report to 

estimates developed by the JSF program and an independent joint 

estimating team for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Because the fiscal year 

2010 budget had not been submitted to the Congress at the time of the 

draft report, some of the report’s findings are based on preliminary cost 

projections that existed at the time of our review rather than the official

program of record. As such, the cost projections in this report may be 

different than the final fiscal year 2010 program of record. We interviewed 

members of the joint estimating team to obtain a detailed understanding of

the methodology, data, and approach used in developing their cost 

estimate and schedule risk analysis of the JSF program. We also

interviewed JSF program officials to understand the program’s cost 

estimate methodology, assumptions, and results and to obtain their 

response to the joint estimating team’s analysis. Based on this analysis, we 

were able to identify significant differences in the cost estimating 

methodologies and assumptions used by the joint estimating team and the 

program office and to determine major risk drivers in the program. 

To assess the program’s plans and risks in manufacturing and its capacity

to accelerate production from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, we analyzed 

manufacturing cost and work performance data to assess progress against 

plans. We compared budgeted program labor hours to actual labor hours, 

identified growth trends, and noted differences between future labor 

requirements and current plans to release engineering staff. We reviewed

data and briefings provided by the program and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) to assess supplier performance and ability to support 

accelerated production from fiscal years 2010 through 2015. We also 

Page 31 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

determined reasons for manufacturing delays, discussed program and 

contractor plans to improve, and projected expected impacts on 

development and operational tests. We also reviewed the prime 

contractor’s schedule estimates and compared them with relevant best 

practices1

 to determine the extent to which they reflect key estimating 

practices that are fundamental to having a reliable schedule. In doing so, 

we interviewed cognizant program officials to discuss their use of best 

practices in creating the program’s current schedule and interviewed 

officials from Naval Air Systems Command to understand their approach

and to obtain results of their independent schedule risk analysis. 

To assess plans, progress, and risks in test activities, we examined 

program documents and interviewed DOD, program office, and contractor 

officials about current test plans and progress. To assess progress toward 

test plans, we compared the number of flight tests conducted as of 

October 2008 to those in the original test plan established in 2007. We also

reviewed documents and interviewed prime contractor officials regarding

flight testing, the integrated airborne test bed, and ground testing. To 

further assess the ground labs and test bed, we interviewed DOD and 

program officials and toured the testing labs and aircraft at the Lockheed 

Martin plant in Fort Worth, Texas. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the JSF Joint Program Office, Arlington, Virginia; Lockheed Martin 

Aeronautics, Fort Worth, Texas; Defense Contract Management Agency, 

Fort Worth, Texas; Defense Contract Management Agency, East Hartford, 

Connecticut; Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Air 

Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, 

New Mexico; Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, Arlington, Virginia; and OSD 

offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation and its Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group, and the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation in Washington, D.C. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to March 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

 1

GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing Program

Costs, Exposure Draft, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, D.C.: July 2007). 

Page 32 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 33 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
A

C

ppendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

ontractor Schedule Management Processes 

Page 34 GAO-09-303 

Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

The success of any program depends in part on having a reliable schedule 

of when the program’s set of work activities will occur, how long they will 

take, and how they are related to one another. As such, the schedule not 

only provides a road map for systematic execution of a program, but also 

provides the means by which to gauge progress, identify and address 

potential problems, and promote accountability. 

In general, best practices and related federal guidance call for a program 

schedule to identify, sequence, integrate, and resource all key activities to

be performed, and to understand and proactively address activities that 

pose critical risks. More specifically, our research has identified nine 

practices associated with effective schedule estimating.1

 These practices 

are (1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all activities, (3) assigning 

resources to all activities, (4) establishing the duration of all activities, 

(5) integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically, 

(6) establishing the critical path for all activities, (7) identifying float2

between activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis, and 

(9) updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine dates. 

Prime Contractor’s

Scheduling 

Management 

Processes Meet Many 

Best Practices, but 

Program Risks Are 

Not Entirely Visible 

Of these nine practices, the JSF program either met or partially met eight 

with only one not being met. The area that did not meet the practices 

related to performing a schedule risk analysis. Specifically, the JSF 

program has not conducted its own schedule risk analysis that would 

determine the level of confidence it has in meeting completion dates. 

Further, an assessment is also critical to identifying and apportioning 

reserves for contingencies. Since the JSF program has not conducted its

own schedule risk analysis, it has limited insight into areas of risk and 

uncertainty in the schedule. Naval Air Systems Command officials did 

accomplish an independent schedule risk analysis that indicated that the

program could slip more than 2 years based on the productivity risks 

associated with software development and assembly of the various 

airframes as well as the time needed to complete all flight testing. 

In addition to a schedule risk analysis not being performed, we found 

several other schedule management concerns that further reduce the 

visibility of manufacturing risks. First, the use of best scheduling practices 

at the subcontractor level is still being developed, potentially affecting the 

integration of subcontractor schedules into the integrated master 

 1

GAO-09-3SP. 

2

Float is the amount of time an activity can slip before affecting the critical path. 

Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

schedule. Integrating prime and subcontractor schedules is critical to 

meeting program schedules and cost expectations. The prime contractor is 

working with subcontractors to increase their level of schedule maturity. 

Another area of concern is that out-of-station work made it difficult to 

identify specific span times for individual manufacturing tasks.3

 As a 

result, the detailed information related to the manufacturing work was not 

visible in the master schedule. Furthermore, because of the program’s 

enormous size and complexity, the schedule has been difficult to maintain, 

requiring manual validation processes to ensure its integrity and validity.

Ongoing JSF schedule validity will be an area that needs careful attention 

as it represents a potential weak point in the overall implementation of the 

integrated master schedule. 

Despite this shortcoming, it is also important to recognize the significant 

progress that the JSF program team has made in the area of schedule 

management. Since the previous Defense Contract Management Agency

schedule review, both the schedule and the processes to manage it have

greatly improved. For example, the schedule can track and verify activities 

associated with over 600 projects. It also successfully captures and 

sequences key activities and establishes the critical path between key 

activities, allowing the program to examine the impacts of schedule delays

and determine schedule flexibility. 

The Sheer Size and 

Complexity of the JSF 

Schedule Have Created 

Major Challenges to 

Ensuring Schedule 

Integrity and Validity 

The JSF schedule is maintained in Microsoft Project and consists of over 

600 individual projects. Because the size and complexity of the schedule is 

so immense, it has been difficult to maintain. As such, a number of manual 

validation processes are required to ensure its integrity and validity. To its 

credit, the contractor has developed custom processes and tools to help 

manage the program schedule. However, because of its enormous size and 

complexity, the JSF’s ongoing schedule validity will be an area that needs 

careful attention as it represents a potential weak point in the overall 

implementation of the integrated master schedule. 

Because the schedule was so large, we reviewed a subset of it, focusing on 

the delivery of one airframe for each variant of the F-35 being produced 

(i.e., BF4, AF1, and AF3). This subset schedule covered a time span from 

 3

It was difficult to see specific span times for individual manufacturing tasks because work 

that did not finish in its designated station was carried forward and completed at a

different station down the production line. This work was called out-of-station. 

Page 35 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

August 2006 through September 2014, and we analyzed it against our best 

practices for effective schedule estimating. See table 6 for the results of 

our analyses relative to each of the nine practices. 

Table 6: Prime Contractor Schedule Management System Compared to Best Practices 

Criterion Explanation Criterion met?aGAO analysis 

Capturing all activities The schedule should reflect all activities 

(e.g., steps, events, outcomes, etc.) as 

defined in the program’s work breakdown 

structure, to include activities to be 

performed by both the government and 

its contractors. 

Yes The program’s schedule reflected both 

government and contractor activities, 

including activities related to designing, 

developing, testing, and manufacturing the 

three variants of the F-35. 

Sequencing all activities The schedule should be planned so that it 

can meet program-critical dates. To meet 

this objective, key activities need to be 

logically sequenced in the order that they 

are to be carried out. In particular, 

activities that must finish prior to the start 

of other activities (i.e., predecessor 

activities) as well as activities that cannot 

begin until other activities are completed 

(i.e., successor activities) should be

identified. By doing so, interdependencies 

among activities that collectively lead to 

the accomplishment of events or 

milestones can be established and used

as a basis for guiding work and 

measuring progress. 

Yes The schedule included the sequencing of key 

activities, meaning that it included both the 

predecessor and successor activities and 

thus established interdependencies among 

the activities that form the basis for guiding 

work and measuring progress. The schedule 

logic was validated by numerous metrics that

were tracked on a monthly basis. For 

example, the contractor collected metrics 

that verified that logic was not maintained at

summary-level tasks, activities had both a 

predecessor and successor relationship, and 

external links were valid. Additionally, the 

metrics tracked the use of hard constraints 

so if any were found, there were procedures 

to remove any constraints that override 

schedule logic. These detailed metrics 

provided assurance in the validity of the 

schedule. They also enabled the program to 

have confidence that the sequencing of 

activities was not being overwritten by an 

overuse of constraints. 

Page 36 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

Criterion Explanation Criterion met?aGAO analysis 

Assigning resources to 

all activities 

The schedule should reflect what 

resources (i.e., labor, material, and 

overhead) are needed to do the work, 

whether all required resources will be 

available when they are needed, and 

whether any funding or time constraints 

exist. 

Partially The resources, labor, materials, and 

overhead were not loaded directly into the 

Microsoft Project schedules. Instead, the 

budgets were maintained in another system,

which was integrated with both the schedule 

and the Manufacturing Resource Planning 

(MRP) system. While not technically 

assigned to individual activities, the 

resources were integrated into the 

management of the system through the work

packages identified in the earned value 

system. The manufacturing activity resources 

were maintained in the MRP system and the 

schedule reflected the level of work 

accomplished in various production stations 

based on the status of the individual work 

cards. Program officials provided a data 

trace between the schedule, MRP system, 

and earned value system to demonstrate 

how the resources were integrated with the 

schedule. 

Establishing the duration 

of all activities 

The schedule should realistically reflect 

how long each activity will take to 

execute. In determining the duration of 

each activity, the same rationale, data, 

and assumptions used for cost estimating 

should be used for schedule estimating. 

Further, these durations should be as 

short as possible and they should have 

specific start and end dates. Excessively 

long periods needed to execute an 

activity should prompt further 

decomposition of the activity so that 

shorter execution durations will result. 

Partially The schedule established the durations of 

key activities based on historical data from 

the contractor’s experience, projected 

savings to be gained from implementing 

robust processes to maintain the flow of work

on the manufacturing floor, and expected 

savings from investing up front in modeling 

and simulation. The program tracked the 

actual start, progress, and actual finish of 

activities in the schedule, allowing for 

collection of trending information. Progress 

metrics were tracked by the contractor in the

status metric process and reported to the 

program, enabling tracking against the 

schedules. 

It was difficult, however, to see the specific 

span times for individual manufacturing tasks 

because work that did not finish in its 

designated station was carried forward and 

completed at a different station down the 

production line (this work was called out-ofstation). As a result, the detailed information 

related to the manufacturing work was 

maintained in the MRP system, but was not 

visible within the schedule itself. 

Nonetheless, the contractor demonstrated

the relationship between the specific work 

cards in the MRP system and how those 

data translated to the schedule. 

Page 37 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

Criterion Explanation Criterion met?aGAO analysis 

Integrating schedule 

activities horizontally and 

vertically 

The schedule should be horizontally 

integrated, meaning that it should link the 

products and outcomes associated with

already sequenced activities. These links 

are commonly referred to as handoffs 

and serve to verify that activities are 

arranged in the right order to achieve 

aggregated products or outcomes. The 

schedule should also be vertically 

integrated, meaning that traceability 

exists among varying levels of activities 

and supporting tasks and subtasks. Such 

mapping or alignment among levels 

enables different groups to work to the 

same master schedule. 

Yes The schedule was both horizontally and 

vertically integrated and there was a robust 

process in place to verify the traceability at 

each progress cycle. The contractor’s project 

status sheet identified where activities were

missing relationships, enabling a critical path

to be derived by the tool’s critical path 

analysis. Relationships were maintained 

across the 600+ individual projects and 

verified through periodic schedule health 

checks. The contractor provided report 

outputs and demonstrated the process it 

used to identify and validate that the links 

across projects were intact. Similarly, for 

vertical integration the contractor 

demonstrated how status was rolled up from

the individual project files to the proper 

higher-level summary activities so the overall

schedule reflected the proper dates and 

status. 

An area of concern was with the integration

of the subcontractors’ schedules into the 

integrated master schedule. The issue was 

not as much the integration of the data, but 

the use of scheduling best practices at the 

subcontractor level. The contractor was 

working with its subcontractors to increase 

the level of scheduling maturity. Moreover, 

given the massive size of the integrated

master schedule and number of files being 

utilized to integrate it, this was an area that 

needed continual monitoring to verify 

compliance. 

Establishing the critical 

path for all activities 

Using scheduling software the critical 

path—the longest duration path through 

the sequenced list of key activities—

should be identified. The establishment of 

a program’s critical path is necessary for 

examining the effects of any activity 

slipping along this path. Potential 

problems that may occur on or near the 

critical path should also be identified and 

reflected in the scheduling of the time for 

high-risk activities. 

Yes The program’s critical path was defined using

scheduling software. Critical paths were 

defined by individual airframes and were also 

calculated at the total program level. The 

contractor provided output from the critical 

path analysis and demonstrated the process

it used to produce the critical path. Given the

large number of files and overall size of the 

integrated master schedule, it was not 

possible to validate the critical path through 

independent analysis. 

The contractor’s metric process performed 

during each status cycle helped to maintain 

and validate the critical path produced by the

tool. In the subset schedule we reviewed 

there were no hard constraints, that is, we 

found no “must start” or “must finish” on

dates that could override the critical path 

analysis and cause invalid results. 

Page 38 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

Criterion Explanation Criterion met?aGAO analysis 

Identifying float between

activities 

The schedule should identify float—the 

time that a predecessor activity can slip 

before the delay affects successor 

activities—so that schedule flexibility can 

be determined. As a general rule, 

activities along the critical path typically 

have the least amount of float. 

Yes The contractor’s overall schedule process 

enabled good visibility into the float between

activities and demonstrated that float is 

actively managed. The metrics tracked by 

the contractor clearly identified where there 

were issues with the amount of float on an 

activity, including which tasks had negative 

float. The contractor had defined processes 

for tracing and understanding what was 

driving that float. In addition, the tracking and 

removal of hard constraints in the schedule 

enabled the tool to generate the float via the 

critical path analysis. 

Conducting a schedule 

risk analysis 

A schedule risk analysis uses a good 

critical path method schedule and data 

about project schedule risks as well as 

Monte Carlo simulation techniques to 

predict the level of confidence in meeting 

a program’s completion date, the amount 

of time contingency needed for a level of 

confidence, and the identification of highpriority risks. This analysis focuses not 

only on critical path activities but also on

other schedule paths that may become 

critical. A schedule/cost risk assessment 

recognizes the interrelationship between 

schedule and cost and captures the risk 

that schedule durations and cost 

estimates may vary because of, among 

other things, limited data, optimistic 

estimating, technical challenges, and lack 

of qualified personnel. As a result, the 

baseline schedule should include a buffer 

or a reserve of extra time. Schedule 

reserve for contingencies should be

calculated by performing a schedule risk 

analysis. As a general rule, the reserve 

should be held by the project manager 

and applied as needed to those activities 

that take longer than scheduled because 

of the identified risks. Reserves of time 

should not be apportioned in advance to 

any specific activity since the risks that 

will actually occur and the magnitude of 

their impact is not known in advance. 

No The contractor did not perform a schedule 

risk analysis that would have determined the

level of confidence in meeting the program’s 

completion date and identified reserves for 

contingencies because it did not have time to

do this analysis. The contractor spent much 

of the past year rebaselining its schedule so 

it would be more realistic and meet best 

practices and said that it intended to do 

schedule risk analyses in the future. 

Naval Air Systems Command conducted an 

independent schedule risk analysis that 

indicated that the program could slip more 

than 2 years based on productivity risks 

associated with software development and 

assembly of the various airframes as well as

the time needed to successfully complete all 

flight testing. Based on the command’s 

results, the contractor does not have an 

adequate amount of schedule reserve to 

mitigate testing and production risks. This 

low reserve means that any delays in these 

areas would have an immediate impact to 

the overall project completion date. 

Moreover, there was concern from outside 

experts that savings gained from 

implementing robust manufacturing 

processes and relying more on modeling and 

simulation may not be achieved as they 

exceed anything done before. Both the 

contractor and the JSF Program Office 

disputed the findings of the command’s 

schedule risk analysis primarily because the 

analysis was done without direct involvement 

of program officials. 

Page 39 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix II: GAO Assessment of Prime 

Contractor Schedule Management Processes 

Criterion Explanation Criterion met?aGAO analysis 

Updating the schedule 

using logic and durations 

to determine the dates 

The schedule should use logic and 

durations in order to reflect realistic start 

and completion dates for program 

activities. The schedule should be 

continually monitored to determine when 

forecasted completion dates differ from 

the planned dates, which can be used to 

determine whether schedule variances 

will affect downstream work. Maintaining 

the integrity of the schedule logic is not 

only necessary to reflect true status, but 

is also required before conducting a 

schedule risk analysis. The schedule 

should avoid logic overrides and artificial 

constraint dates that are chosen to create 

a certain result on paper. To ensure that 

the schedule is properly updated, 

individuals trained in critical path method 

scheduling should be responsible for 

updating the schedule status. 

Yes The contractor demonstrated that it relies on

logic and duration to determine the dates 

when it updates the status of its schedule. 

For example, the contractor showed us how 

it monitors the schedule on a weekly basis to

ensure that start and completion dates are 

realistic and to identify where there are 

variances between planned and actual

progress. The contractor also demonstrated

how it verifies that all hard constraints have 

been removed so that the schedule depicts 

actual conditions. Moreover, the personnel 

responsible for maintaining the schedule 

demonstrated a strong understanding of 

critical path method scheduling, adding to 

our confidence that the schedule is being 

properly updated in accordance with best 

practices. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a “Yes” means that the program provided documentation demonstrating satisfaction of the criterion. 

“Partial” means that the program provided documentation demonstrating satisfaction of part of the 

criterion. “No” means that the program has yet to provide documentation demonstrating satisfaction of 

the criterion. 

Page 40 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 44 GAO-09-303 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Michael Sullivan (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members made

key contributions to this report: Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Ridge 

Bowman; Charlie Shivers; Georgeann Higgins; Matt Lea; Karen Richey; 

Tim Boatwright; and Greg Campbell.

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Joint Strike Fighter
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require 

Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the 

Acquisition Environment. GAO-08-782T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2008.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.

GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks. 

GAO-08-569T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks. 

GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment 

Strategy. GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter 

Engine Program. GAO-07-656T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007. 

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. GAO-07-360. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter 

Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis. 

GAO-06-717R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience 

Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons

Systems Investments. GAO-06-585T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006. 

Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by 

Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. GAO-06-487T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006. 

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006. 

Page 45 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
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Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process. 

GAO-06-364. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006. 

Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications 

for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-519T. Washington, D.C: 

April 6, 2005.

Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike 

Fighter Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

(120742) Page 46 GAO-09-303 Joint Strike Fighter
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