PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1151

DANA CLARK, on behalf of herself and all others similarly 

situated; DAVID CLARK, on behalf of himself and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

ABSOLUTE COLLECTION SERVICE, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:12-cv-00400-BO)

Argued: October 30, 2013 Decided: January 31, 2014

Before DIAZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Joseph F. ANDERSON, 

Jr., United States District Judge for the District of South 

Carolina, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Deepak Gupta, GUPTA BECK, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellants. Sean T. Partrick, YATES, MCLAMB & WEYHER, LLP, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Craig M. 

Shapiro, KEOGH LAW, LTD., Chicago, Illinois; Joseph A. Bledsoe,

THE BLEDSOE LAW FIRM, Fayetteville, North Carolina; Gregory A. 

Beck, Jonathan E. Taylor, GUPTA BECK, PLLC, Washington, D.C., 

for Appellants. Jennifer D. Maldonado, William T. Kesler, Jr.,
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YATES, MCLAMB & WEYHER, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.
3

PER CURIAM:

This case involves a putative class action under the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et 

seq. Dana Clark and David Clark (“the Clarks”) sued Absolute 

Collection Service, Inc. (“ACS”),1 on behalf of themselves and 

all others similarly situated, for its actions in attempting to 

collect a debt. The Clarks alleged that ACS’s collection notice 

violated section 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA by stating that 

debtors only could dispute the validity of their debt in 

writing. ACS moved to dismiss the Clarks’ lawsuit, contending 

that the collection notice complied with the FDCPA because 

section 1692g(a)(3) contains an inherent writing requirement. 

The district court granted the motion, and the Clarks appealed. 

For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the district court's 

judgment and remand the case for further consideration.

I.

The Clarks incurred two debts at a health care facility in 

Raleigh, North Carolina. When the Clarks were unable to pay, 

the health care facility referred the debts to ACS, a thirdparty collector. In its efforts to collect, ACS sent separate 

 1 ACS changed its corporate name on June 29, 2012, after 

this case was filed. Although the defendant now is called 

FKAACS, Inc., we refer to it as ACS throughout.
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collection notices to the Clarks at their home in Raleigh. In 

both collection notices, a disclosure statement provided that:

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS CLAIM SHALL BE ASSUMED VALID 

UNLESS DISPUTED IN WRITING WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS; IN 

WHICH CASE, VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT OR A COPY OF THE 

JUDGMENT WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU. IF THE ORIGINAL 

CREDITOR IS DIFFERENT FROM THE ABOVE NAMED CREDITOR, 

THE NAME OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR WILL BE PROVIDED 

UPON REQUEST.

J.A. 11, 12.

The Clarks sued ACS in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh, alleging 

that its collection notice failed to comply with the FDCPA. 15 

U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The Clarks asserted that ACS violated 

their right to challenge their debt orally under section 

1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA because the collection notice stated 

that the debt would be “assumed valid unless disputed in 

writing.” They also contended that ACS’s imposition of a 

writing requirement amounted to the use of “false representation 

or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” 

in violation of section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA. 

ACS moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that 

section 1692g(a)(3) contains an inherent writing requirement and 

that the Clarks, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. The district court agreed, dismissing 
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the complaint. In its reasoning, the district court stated that 

permitting an oral dispute of the validity of a debt under 

section 1692g(a)(3) would leave consumers “with fewer 

protections and in a potentially far more confusing station than 

if a writing is required.” J.A. 26. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant 

the motion to dismiss. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 

(4th Cir. 2008). We also review de novo questions of statutory 

construction. Stone v. Instrumentation Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 

242-43 (4th Cir. 2009). 

A.

As in all statutory construction cases, our inquiry begins 

with the language of the statute. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 

U.S. 526, 534 (2004). “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, 

the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition 

required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to 

its terms.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Congress enacted the FDCPA with the goal of eliminating

abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. 15 

U.S.C. § 1692. Among its safeguards against abuse and 

deception, the FDCPA requires a debt collector to send written 

notice to consumer debtors with whom it communicates in 
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connection with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.

Section 1692g(a) provides that the written notice must contain:

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty 

days after receipt of the notice, disputes the 

validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the 

debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt 

collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt 

collector in writing within the thirty-day period 

that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, 

the debt collector will obtain verification of the 

debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer 

and a copy of such verification or judgment will be 

mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written 

request within the thirty-day period, the debt 

collector will provide the consumer with the name 

and address of the original creditor, if different 

from the current creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)–(5). 

Pursuant to section 1692g(b), if a consumer “notifies the 

debt collector in writing” that the debt is disputed, the debt 

collector must “cease collection of the debt, or any disputed 

portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification 

of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification . . . is 

mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(b).
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On appeal, the Clarks ask whether section 1692g(a)(3) 

permits consumers to dispute the validity of a debt orally, or 

whether it imposes a writing requirement. This is a matter of 

first impression for this Court. The Third Circuit has held 

that section 1692g(a)(3) must be read to include a writing 

requirement, finding any other reading contrary to the purposes 

of the FDCPA. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir.

1991). In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits have found 

that the plain text of section 1692g(a)(3) permits oral 

disputes, and that such a reading results in a logical, 

bifurcated scheme of consumer rights. See Hooks v. Forman, 

Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013); Camacho 

v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005).

In line with the Second and Ninth Circuits, we find that 

the FDCPA clearly defines communications between a debt 

collector and consumers. Sections 1692g(a)(4), 1692g(a)(5), and 

1692g(b) explicitly require written communication, whereas 

section 1692g(a)(3) plainly does not.2

 ACS asks that we 

disregard the statutory text to read into it words that are not 

there. We decline to do so. “[W]here Congress includes 

 2 We also note that the term “dispute,” as commonly used, 

contemplates oral communication. See, e.g., Random House 

Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 569 (2d ed. 2001) (“to argue or 

debate about; discuss”).
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particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 

inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 

16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B.

Accepting that section 1692g(a)(3) does not contain an 

explicit writing requirement, ACS argues that it must be read as 

imposing an inherent writing requirement or else the procedure 

would be inconsistent with the other debt dispute mechanisms

under section 1692g. In ACS’s view, allowing oral disputes 

under section 1692g(a)(3) serves only to confuse consumers. ACS 

also points out that a writing requirement preserves the core 

protections of sections 1692g(a)(3) through 1692g(b), and all 

other rights consumers have under other sections of the FDCPA. 

Without it, ACS argues, “consumers may be led to believe that an 

oral dispute triggers the further protections” of sections 

1692g(a)(4), 1692g(a)(5), and 1692g(b) when, in fact, those 

protections are waived if not invoked in writing. Appellee’s 

Br. at 21.

We find ACS’s arguments unavailing for several reasons. 

First, like the Second and Ninth Circuits, we are not persuaded 

that the plain language of section 1692g(a)(3) leads to absurd 

results, which would have permitted a search for meaning beyond 
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the statutory text. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. As written, 

section 1692g(a)(3) triggers statutory protections for consumers 

independent of the later sections 1692g(a)(4), 1692g(a)(5), and 

1692g(b). For one, once a consumer disputes a debt orally under 

section 1692g(a)(3), a debt collector cannot communicate that 

consumer’s credit information to others without disclosing the 

dispute. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8); see Hooks, 717 F.3d at 285; 

Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082. Also, if a consumer owes multiple 

debts and makes a payment, a debt collector cannot apply that

payment to a debt that has been disputed orally. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692(h); Hooks, 717 F.3d at 285–86; Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082. 

Because we conclude that the plain language of section 

1692g(a)(3) does not lead to absurd results, we decline to

insert additional language.

Second, under well-established principles of statutory 

construction, this Court must “give effect, if possible, to 

every clause and word of a statute.” United States v. Menasche, 

348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If possible, a court should avoid an interpretation that renders 

any “clause, sentence, or word . . . superfluous, void, or 

insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 

Relying on the writing requirements in sections 1692g(a)(4), 

1692g(a)(5), and 1692g(b) to give effect to section 1692g(a)(3)
10

would violate these principles, leaving section 1692g(a)(3) with 

no independent meaning. 

As a result, we find that section 1692g(a)(3) permits 

consumers to dispute the validity of a debt orally, and it does 

not impose a writing requirement. 

III.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court 

that dismissed the plaintiff's complaint and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED