NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAQUEL STOCKDALE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-16626 

D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00504-KJN 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kendall J. Newman, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 13, 2023**

San Jose, California

Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Claimant Raquel Stockdale timely appeals the district court’s order affirming 

an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying social security disability 

insurance benefits. We review de novo the district court’s ruling and may set aside 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 15 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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the ALJ’s denial of benefits only for legal error or lack of substantial evidence. 

Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm. 

1. The ALJ permissibly weighed the medical opinions in the record. 

Claimant filed her disability claim before revised rules governing the weighing of 

medical opinion evidence took effect. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Accordingly, if the 

opinion of a treating or examining doctor is contradicted by another doctor’s 

opinion, the ALJ could reject it only “by providing specific and legitimate reasons 

that are supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

a. The ALJ appropriately assigned little weight to the opinion of treating 

physician Dr. Anita Heart. Other non-treating physicians contradicted Dr. Heart’s 

check-box assessment that Claimant faced severe physical and mental limitations 

during a typical eight-hour workday. The ALJ properly provided specific and 

legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Heart’s opinion, and substantial evidence 

supported those reasons.

First, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Claimant’s reported activities of 

daily living were inconsistent with Dr. Heart’s assessment. Although Claimant 

cites portions of the record showing that she struggled with certain tasks, the 

record also shows that she fed and bathed her pets, performed a variety of 

household chores, and conducted online job searches. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 
3 

1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that “[a] conflict between a treating physician’s 

opinion and a claimant’s activity level is a specific and legitimate reason for 

rejecting the opinion” (citing Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 

2001))). 

Second, the ALJ reasonably concluded that no evidence supported Dr. 

Heart’s opinion regarding Claimant’s limited ability to sit, stand, walk, or move her 

head. Although Claimant was treated for back and neck pain, her symptoms 

improved with treatment, and the treatment notes are not consistent with the extent 

of Dr. Heart’s proposed limitations. 

Third, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the medical evidence did not 

support Dr. Heart’s assessment that Claimant’s physical and mental limitations 

would result in Claimant’s missing more than four days of work per month. The 

ALJ permissibly noted inconsistencies between Claimant’s complaints of mental 

limitations and the objective evidence, such as treatment notes from Claimant’s 

mental status examinations reporting normal mood and behavior. See Tommasetti 

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an ALJ may reject a 

treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with medical records). The ALJ 

also relied on evidence in the record showing that Claimant’s prescribed treatment 

adequately managed symptoms from irritable bowel syndrome and anemia. 
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b. The ALJ properly assigned partial weight to the opinions of nonexamining medical consultants Dr. Paula Kresser and Dr. C. W. Kang. Dr. 

Malancharuvil’s testimony contradicted those opinions as to Claimant’s ability to 

maintain a schedule and regular attendance, and the objective medical evidence in 

the record supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Claimant would otherwise have 

greater mental limitations than Dr. Kresser and Dr. Kang found. 

2. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding is supported by 

substantial evidence, and properly incorporated mild to moderate mental 

limitations, as well as certain physical limitations. The ALJ’s conclusion that 

Claimant could perform “semi-skilled routine work” is not inconsistent with those 

limitations. 

3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination at step four that 

Claimant could perform her past relevant work. The vocational expert testified 

that an individual with the same limitations as in Claimant’s RFC could work as an 

outpatient admitting clerk and as an insurance clerk. 

4. Finally, Claimant argues that substantial evidence does not support the 

ALJ’s alternate step-five finding. But that argument assumes that the ALJ erred in 

concluding at step four that Claimant could perform her past relevant work. As 

explained above, the ALJ did not err at step four.

AFFIRMED.