Filed 9/22/16 Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JOSAFAT RODRIGUEZ, JR.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF SANTA CRUZ et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 H042280

 (Santa Cruz County

 Super. Ct. No. CV173783)

When former Santa Cruz Police Officer Josafat Rodriguez, Jr., applied to the City 

of Santa Cruz (the City) for industrial disability retirement in 2010 alleging psychiatric 

disability due to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the City denied Rodriguez’s 

application. That denial led to a petition in the superior court for a writ of mandate to set 

aside the City’s determination, and eventually to an appeal in this court. In a published 

decision, we concluded that the superior court had applied an incorrect standard of review

and remanded the matter for reconsideration of Rodriguez’s petition under the proper

standard. (Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1443 (Rodriguez).) 

On remand, the superior court found that Rodriguez was substantially 

incapacitated from performing the duties of a police officer due to PTSD when his 

employment with the City’s police department ended. The court issued a peremptory 

writ of mandate directing the City to set aside its prior decision and to enter a new 

decision granting Rodriguez disability retirement benefits. 
2

In this appeal, the City challenges the superior court’s decision as unsupported by 

substantial evidence due to the court’s reliance on medical opinions that purportedly were 

based on misleading and incomplete information. We find the court’s assessment of the 

medical opinion evidence was reasonable and its overall determination supported by 

substantial evidence. We will affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Rodriguez’s Military Service

Rodriguez joined the United States Marine Corps in 1989 after graduating from 

high school. He deployed to the Persian Gulf and served as a demolition specialist in a 

five-man infantry fire team during the First Gulf War. Rodriguez and his team patrolled 

the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. A mortar attack killed three of his team 

members and severely injured the fourth. After the attack, Rodriguez had to collect his 

comrades’ body parts and put them into body bags. Rodriguez was immediately assigned 

to another fire team. He was involved in multiple fire fights and battles and witnessed 

soldier and civilian deaths. Rodriguez did not receive services during or after his return 

from the war to help with the emotional impact of his experiences. The Marine credo 

was “adapt and overcome.” 

Rodriguez was discharged from the Marines in 1993. 

2. Employment with the Santa Cruz Police Department

Rodriguez joined the Santa Cruz Police Department in 1995 and became a 

member of a county-wide narcotics enforcement team in 1998. As part of that team, he 

was involved in more than 50 house raids reminiscent of the raids he performed during 

 

1 Much of the relevant factual and procedural background was summarized in 

Rodriguez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pages 1445 through 1450. We revisit those facts, 

derived from the administrative record and hearing transcripts, providing more detail 

where needed in order to evaluate the City’s substantial evidence claim.
3

the war. He also performed dangerous undercover work. Rodriguez received 

commendations and positive performance evaluations in his first few years. 

On a nighttime raid in January 2000, Rodriguez fell several feet through an 

unfinished doorway, injuring his back and leg. He was unable to work for approximately 

one year as a result of the injury. Rodriguez returned to work in a modified position as a

police station duty officer because his back injury prevented him from doing field work. 

He was assigned to the investigations unit as a detective on gang and drug crimes, which 

involved maintaining gang intelligence files, conducting interviews, and reviewing crime 

scene photographs and evidence. 

In November 2005, Rodriguez had back surgery and was cleared to return to the 

police station duty officer role in July 2006. Rodriguez declined to return, saying he was 

physically unable to perform the duties of police station duty officer. At about the same 

time, in August 2006, Rodriguez filed an application for industrial disability retirement 

on the basis of disability affecting his back, hands, and wrist (first disability retirement 

claim).2

His superiors at the police department tried to engage Rodriguez in an interactive 

process to learn what the City could do to accommodate him. Rodriguez returned to 

work for two weeks in late March and early April 2007, after being ordered to do so or 

face termination. During those two weeks, Rodriguez asked to go home repeatedly due 

to pain. He stopped showing up for work and was again warned that he faced 

termination. On June 7, 2007, Rodriguez resigned for “health reasons.” 

 

2

The City denied the first disability retirement claim in February 2008, following 

a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in which the ALJ found that 

Rodriguez was not credible in several respects and was not substantially incapacitated 

from performing the duties of police station duty officer. 
4

3. Second Industrial Disability Retirement Claim for PTSD

After his resignation from the police force in 2007, Rodriguez discovered a local 

Department of Veterans Affairs clinic. He met with a counselor and learned for the first 

time about PTSD. The counselor encouraged Rodriguez to apply for veteran’s disability. 

Rodriguez was evaluated by a Department of Veterans Affairs psychologist twice in 2008

and by a psychiatrist in 2010. Rodriguez reapplied to the City for industrial disability 

retirement in June 2010, this time claiming disability caused by PTSD (second disability 

retirement claim).

At the October 2011 administrative hearing on that application, Rodriguez 

testified that he began having anxiety, difficulty sleeping, and nightmares about combat 

while serving on the narcotics enforcement team early in his police career. He did not 

tell anyone but tried to “adapt and overcome” as in the Marines. He began drinking to 

fall asleep. Rodriguez feared that admitting his distress would show weakness and raise 

doubts in the police department about his abilities and mental fitness. 

The sleep disturbances improved during the year that Rodriguez was on leave for 

his back injury. But when he returned to work as a detective in the investigations unit, 

Rodriguez experienced increasing difficulty sleeping and had nightmares and flashbacks 

to the war. He felt “lost,” struggled with his assignments, and feared he was losing his 

mind and could not do the job. During a gang homicide case, Rodriguez was asked to go 

to the autopsy of the victim and refused. During interviews that he conducted in 

interview rooms at the police station, he “always feared” that the person he was 

interviewing was a “hit person.” Hearing police sirens he “would—just automatically 

started thinking about, you know, like sirens out in—in Kuwait,” and “just hearing the 

radio, . . . Code 3, which means emergency response, . . . I’d start getting startled, just 

always looking over my shoulder and just feeling, um, this—this feeling anxious and real 

panicky.” When alcohol did not suffice to help him sleep, he would mix it with his pain 
5

medication. He never discussed his worsening issues with his wife, who eventually filed 

for divorce. His relationship with his children suffered.

Rodriguez attributed his performance and disciplinary failures in 2006 and 2007 to 

PTSD, though he did not know it at the time and understood only the pain of his physical 

conditions. Rodriguez did not speak to anyone about his symptoms even though he was 

in counseling. According to Rodriguez, his counselor, Dr. Malis, was not a veteran and 

did not have experience working with veterans. During therapy, he did not talk about the 

war except on one occasion when he shared a disturbing memory of a close-range 

shooting with an Iraqi soldier. Rodriguez never advised anybody at the police 

department that he could not perform his tasks except due to physical pain. He testified 

that he had a lot of problems remembering the period from 2001 to 2005 or 2006. 

Two of Rodriguez’s supervisors with the Santa Cruz Police Department testified 

about his performance.3 Deputy Chief Steven Clark testified that he assigned Rodriguez 

to the investigations unit because he had “high expectations” based on the skills and 

capabilities that Rodriguez had demonstrated as a patrol, narcotics enforcement, and 

undercover officer. But Rodriguez was dissatisfied and “never engaged” in the same way 

that he had when he was working in the field. Deputy Chief Clark explained: 

“[Rodriguez] didn’t like his assignment. It was that clear. He did not want to be working 

in . . . what we refer to as a light-duty position, . . . . [H]e wanted to be out there in the 

field working.” Deputy Chief Clark also testified that Rodriguez at one point told him 

that “the job assignment was bullshit . . .” and went so far as to ask, “ ‘How much of a 

pain do I need to be with the city before they give me medical retirement?’ ” Deputy 

 

3 By stipulation of the parties at the October 2011 administrative hearing, the 

transcript of the deposition testimony of Deputy Chief Sapone was admitted as direct 

evidence. 
6

Chief Clark believed that Rodriguez “knew how to work the system, and he was looking 

for an avenue to do that.” 

Retired Deputy Chief Patricia Sapone testified that after Rodriguez declined to 

return to the police station duty officer position in 2006, she began an interactive process 

to find out what the City could do for him. But Rodriguez offered nothing “to show what 

had changed or what was different” from his ability to perform the police station duty 

officer role in the preceding years. Deputy Chief Sapone recommended termination in 

November 2006 after Rodriguez failed to come to work. She explained: “[Rodriguez] 

had nothing to show that he could not show up for work and had provided nothing to the 

city or myself to show that he . . . had any lawful reason not to show up to work or to 

violate a direct order.” Although the 2006 termination notice was rescinded, Rodriguez 

returned to work for only two weeks in 2007 after which “[h]e basically walked off the 

job without following any city or department procedures.” Deputy Chief Sapone could 

not recall Rodriguez having ever disobeyed an order or having failed to perform his 

assigned work before that period.

Rodriguez also testified as to his activities outside of police work. He obtained his 

real estate license sometime around 2002. He affiliated with a broker and was a “team 

leader” in 2006, though he was unable to recall any details about the work. Rodriguez 

earned $95,000 from real estate work in 2005 and $24,000 in 2006. He testified that he 

had not sold any real estate since 2006. He at one point purchased between five and 10 

investment properties, which he rented out and managed.4 His superiors at the police 

department were aware of and allowed the real estate work as long as it did not interfere 

with police work. 

 

4 While admitting that five to 10 properties was a wide spread, Rodriguez could 

not provide more specific information other than stating that he lost the properties either 

during his divorce or in bankruptcy. 
7

Rodriguez also helped found a volunteer nonprofit organization called the Central 

Coast Gang Investigator Association sometime before 2001. He served on the original 

board of directors. In February 2011, the group’s Web site identified Rodriguez as a 

member of its advisory council, though he testified that he had not been involved with the 

group since 2006 or 2007. 

Between 2004 and 2007, Rodriguez formed two corporations and a family trust. 

He testified that he had no memory of doing so. He also discovered that he had increased 

his life insurance during that time to umbrella policies worth millions of dollars. When 

asked about his lack of memory, he stated, “Bringing it all together I just think that I 

was—I was going insane during that time.” 

In 2009 or 2010, Rodriguez started his own private investigation business after 

passing a state license exam. He testified that he works infrequently, primarily doing 

court record searches and helping with bilingual interviews or Spanish translation. He 

only helps with civil cases and has refused offers to work on criminal matters. Rodriguez 

also volunteers as a mentor for at-risk youth. 

4. Medical Evidence Presented at the 2011 Disability Hearing

Reports from six medical professionals were admitted at the administrative 

hearing. 

Marsha Malis, Ph.D.

Marsha Malis, Ph.D., a marriage and family therapist, treated Rodriguez for an 

unspecified duration while he was a police officer. Dr. Malis stated in a January 2008 

report that in recent therapy Rodriguez “has repeatedly mentioned his concern over his 

physical and psychological health” and that he “exhibits signs of anxiety, depression, fear 

and pain over the issues related to continued police work.” Dr. Malis attributed that 

anxiety to Rodriguez’s physical pain and his resulting inability to perform his job duties. 

Dr. Malis recommended that Rodriguez “be relieved of all participation with police 
8

work” due to “his current levels of depression, anxiety, fear and pain that are a direct 

result of his police work . . . .” She made no mention of PTSD.

Peter Berman, Ph.D.

Peter Berman, Ph.D., of the Department of Veterans Affairs, evaluated 

Rodriguez for PTSD in February 2008. Dr. Berman diagnosed Rodriguez with 

“significant symptoms” of PTSD and secondary depression and alcohol abuse in an 

attempt to self-medicate for PTSD. According to the report, Rodriguez was working 

for an event company at the time of his interview but was struggling to keep the job. 

Dr. Berman opined, “It is clear that [Rodriguez] has been suffering from severe 

symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder . . . .” 

Dr. Berman conducted a review examination in August 2008 and concluded that 

Rodriguez’s PTSD symptoms had worsened. According to the report, Rodriguez was 

fired from his event planner job and from his previous job as a police officer because of 

an inability to focus or follow discipline. Dr. Berman described Rodriguez as “[o]ne of 

the more impaired people I have seen.” 

Carla Galloway, M.D.

Carla Galloway, M.D., also affiliated with the Department of Veterans Affairs, 

conducted a PTSD review examination of Rodriguez in December 2009. Dr. Galloway 

determined that Rodriguez was not “capable of substantially gainful employment at the 

present time without further treatment.” Her report documented Rodriguez’s 

“post-military trauma history,” specifically Rodriguez’s recall of a gunfight when 

working as a police officer, having “had guns pulled on him,” including once by a 

12-year-old boy, and having had problems “when he smelled blood on the job.” 

Dr. Galloway summarized Rodriguez’s comments on his police employment, noting that 

“initially his job performance was good, until 2006 and 2007 when he was having 

significant problems with insomnia and intrusive thoughts of the Gulf War” and was 

eventually fired for not showing up and not following orders. 
9

James Bryant, Ph.D.

James Bryant, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, performed psychological tests on 

Rodriguez in August 2011 at the request of Mark A. Snyder, M.D., who was retained by 

the City in connection with Rodriguez’s second disability retirement claim. Dr. Bryant 

reported that Rodriguez “responded to the test items in a consistent and reliable manner” 

and did not present “any symptom magnification or fabrication.” His scores indicated in 

pertinent part “a patient who is being defensive and unwilling to acknowledge 

psychological distress” and whose “physical symptoms reflect not only massive 

overcontrol but also the shifting of attention away from anxiety-loaded topics onto 

somatic symptoms.” Dr. Bryant diagnosed Rodriguez with PTSD and generalized 

anxiety disorder. 

Trent E. Cornell, Ph.D.

Trent E. Cornell, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist retained by Rodriguez, diagnosed 

Rodriguez with PTSD in a report dated September 13, 2011. Dr. Cornell based that 

diagnosis on two hour-long sessions with Rodriguez in July and August 2011, a 

conversation with Dr. Malis, Dr. Berman’s reports, Dr. Galloway’s report, documents 

from the Santa Cruz Police Department, and the results of Dr. Bryant’s psychological 

testing. Dr. Cornell opined that Rodriguez’s PTSD was exacerbated by his police work, 

particularly his work in narcotics enforcement, which involved dangers and violence 

reminiscent of those he faced in combat. 

In a second report dated October 5, 2011, Dr. Cornell opined that Rodriguez was 

substantially incapacitated from performing the duties of police station duty officer at the 

time that he resigned and that “any form of ‘police work’ would intensify his [PTSD] 

symptomatology.” 

Mark A. Snyder, M.D.

Mark A. Snyder, M.D., interviewed Rodriguez for two-and-a-half hours in 

June 2011. He also reviewed Dr. Bryant’s psychological test results, records from the 
10

Santa Cruz Police Department, and various medical records, including the Department of 

Veterans Affairs’ reports. In his first report, dated September 6, 2011, Dr. Snyder 

diagnosed Rodriguez with PTSD. Dr. Snyder explained that he had requested 

psychological testing due to concerns about Rodriguez’s credibility, given Rodriguez’s 

failure to disclose his symptoms to the police department, his family, or Dr. Malis. 

Dr. Snyder also noted that “significantly delayed onset of . . . Post Traumatic Stress 

Disorder,” as described by Rodriguez, is “infrequent.” Nevertheless, Dr. Snyder 

concluded that Rodriguez’s failure to report any symptoms was consistent with the 

psychological test results, which indicated that Rodriguez was in denial about his 

psychological problems, and that his difficulty organizing his thoughts and his fear that 

he was “going crazy” motivated him “to keep matters private.” 

According to Dr. Snyder, the PTSD “was a consequence of [Rodriguez’s] 

experiences in the Police Department and his experiences in the Marine Corps,” and the 

disorder was “awakened” from a “latent” and “repressed” state by life threatening police 

work. Dr. Snyder also diagnosed Rodriguez with panic disorder without agoraphobia, 

generalized anxiety disorder, and a personality disorder. Dr. Snyder concluded that 

Rodriguez “is substantially incapacitated and unable to perform . . . the duties of a Police 

Station Duty Officer because even such an environment provides a sufficient number of 

cues that provoke memories of disturbing events and stimulate [Rodriguez] to develop 

anxiety.” Regarding possible treatment, Dr. Snyder summarized Rodriguez’s preference 

to “handle his problems himself” and not engage in therapy or accept medication. “This 

tendency is part of the basis for his non disclosure of the upsetting difficulties he was 

experiencing while working in the police force. The patient wants to manage things 

himself, does not wish to discuss matters which are upsetting, and wishes to control the 

pace at which such matters might be discussed.” 

The City asked Dr. Snyder to reconsider his findings based on additional 

documents. The City provided Dr. Snyder with the ALJ’s proposed decision denying 
11

Rodriguez’s first disability retirement claim and a printout from the Central Coast Gang 

Investigator Association Web site listing Rodriguez as a member of its advisory council. 

In a second report, dated September 28, 2011 (second report), Dr. Snyder 

concluded that Rodriguez was not credible. Dr. Snyder noted that Rodriguez had not 

disclosed his real estate work and the substantial income it generated, the corporation he 

had formed (which Dr. Snyder characterized as “a second job”), or his role with the 

Central Coast Gang Investigator Association. Dr. Snyder repeated the ALJ’s findings in 

connection with the first disability retirement claim that Rodriguez’s testimony was not 

credible insofar as he claimed to not remember significant details about his real estate 

work and other engagements. Dr. Snyder also pointed to Rodriguez’s failure to inform 

the police department about his psychological problems, inconsistencies between what 

Rodriguez told physicians and his deposition testimony,5and Rodriguez’s uncooperative 

behavior toward the police department despite the department’s efforts to accommodate 

him. 

Dr. Snyder determined in his second report that “on the basis of [Rodriguez’s] lack 

of credibility coupled with the fact that, while claiming disability, he [was] able to work 

as a real estate agent, start a corporation, [and] be on the board of a community 

organization,” Rodriguez was not substantially incapacitated from a psychiatric 

standpoint from performing the duties of police station duty officer. 

B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. December 13, 2011 ALJ Decision 

In a 13-page decision, the ALJ concluded that Rodriguez failed to establish that he 

was substantially unable to perform the duties of police station duty officer as a result of 

 

5

The subject deposition was in connection with Rodriguez’s first disability 

retirement claim and is not included in the October 2011 administrative hearing record or 

the record on appeal.
12

a psychiatric condition at the time he stopped working for the City. The ALJ did not 

doubt the accuracy of Rodriguez’s PTSD diagnosis. However, she concluded that despite 

his “harrowing” wartime experiences, Rodriguez “was able to return home, be employed 

successfully as a police officer for many years, obtain a real estate salesperson license, 

engage in the real estate business, start another business, manage properties, perform 

many volunteer activities, and . . . establish his own, albeit new, business as a private 

investigator, after taking and passing a licensure examination.” The ALJ stated that 

Rodriguez’s “lack of memory (not shown to be a symptom of or attributable to PTSD) of 

his activities outside his police work and his failure to provide all the relevant facts and 

information to the medical professionals examining him negatively affected his 

credibility.” 

The City adopted the proposed decision of the ALJ and denied the second 

disability retirement claim on January 12, 2012. 

2. Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate and Appeal

Rodriguez filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside 

the City’s decision. The superior court denied the petition on August 27, 2012, stating in 

a written decision that while there appeared to be “no reasonable doubt” that Rodriguez 

suffers from psychiatric disorders, there was “sufficient evidence” to uphold the ALJ’s 

finding that Rodriguez lacked credibility and was not incapacitated from working as a 

police station duty officer. 

On appeal, this court reversed and remanded the matter for the superior court to 

reconsider the petition under the independent judgment standard of review. (Rodriguez, 

supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1454-1455.) In concluding that the trial court likely did 

not apply the proper standard, we noted the court had not articulated any “independent 

finding regarding Rodriguez’s credibility, stating only that there is sufficient evidence to 

support the ALJ’s finding that he lacked credibility” and in so doing “may have 
13

disregarded Rodriguez’s testimony based solely on the ALJ’s credibility finding.” (Id. at 

p. 1454.)

3. Reconsideration of the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate

On remand, the trial court considered the written and oral arguments of counsel, 

and the administrative record, including the medical opinions that were admitted at the 

October 2011 hearing and the transcripts of Rodriguez’s testimony and that of Deputy 

Chief Clark and Deputy Chief Sapone. 

Applying its independent judgment, the trial court determined that Rodriguez was 

incapacitated from performing his police officer duties due to PTSD at the time of his 

resignation in June 2007 and thereby was eligible for special disability retirement benefits 

within the meaning of the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (Gov. Code, § 20000 

et seq.). 6 The court specifically found that three medical reports offered substantial 

evidence of Rodriguez’s disability based on PTSD. These were the two reports of 

Dr. Cornell and the first report of Dr. Snyder. The court also found that Dr. Snyder’s 

reversal of medical opinion in his second report was not justified by the information cited 

and, therefore, did not constitute substantial evidence. 

On April 6, 2015, the trial court granted a peremptory writ of mandate that the 

City set aside its prior decision and enter a new decision granting Rodriguez disability

retirement benefits. The City timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This court previously noted that Rodriguez’s claim involved a “ ‘fundamental 

vested right to a disability retirement pension if he in fact was disabled.’ ” (Rodriguez, 

 

6

The City does not challenge the trial court’s construal of the term “incapacitated 

for the performance of duty,” which means “ ‘the substantial inability of the applicant to 

perform his usual duties.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451, quoting 

Mansperger v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 873, 876.)
14

supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452, quoting Quintana v. Board of Administration (1976) 

54 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1023.) This required the trial court to exercise its independent 

judgment in reviewing the administrative agency decision, essentially making “its own 

findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s findings.” (Fukuda v. City of 

Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 818 (Fukuda); Rodriguez, supra, at p. 1451.)

7

 

When the trial court has exercised its independent judgment in examining an 

administrative decision involving a fundamental right, the standard of review on appeal is 

the substantial evidence test. (Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 

839, 851; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10; see also Fukuda, supra, 20 

Cal.4th at p. 824.) The City does not contend that the trial court on remand failed to 

adhere to the independent judgment standard. Accordingly, our review of the trial court’s 

findings is limited to a determination “whether, on the entire record, there is substantial 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support” the trial court’s findings. 

(Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874, italics omitted (Bowers).) 

Under the substantial evidence test, we “ ‘ “resolve all conflicts and indulge all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the party who prevailed in the trial court.” ’ ” 

(Rodriguez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452; Worthington v. Davi (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 263, 277.) Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence that a rational trier of fact 

could find to be reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (Seibert v. City of San Jose

 

7 We explained the trial court’s task in this regard in Rodriguez, supra, 227 

Cal.App.4th at page 1451: “ ‘In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must 

afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and 

the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court 

that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.’ ([Fukuda, 

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 817].) However, the court also has the ‘responsibility to weigh the 

evidence at the administrative hearing and to make its own determination of the 

credibility of witnesses.’ (Guymon v. Board of Accountancy (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 1010, 

1016.)”
15

(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1064, quoting Pedro v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 229 

Cal.App.4th 87, 99.) 

B. ANALYSIS

The City challenges the foundation for Dr. Cornell’s conclusions and Dr. Snyder’s 

first-report conclusions as inadequate due to their basis in a misleading and incomplete 

patient history provided by Rodriguez. The City argues that because these reports were 

not based on a complete record, they “cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence.” 

(Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zuckerman (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1135 

(Zuckerman).) The City argues that Dr. Snyder’s second report, in contrast, is the only 

medical opinion based on complete and accurate evidence, including the administrative 

record from the first disability retirement claim, which revealed Rodriguez’s endeavors 

outside of police work while he was claiming disability on the basis of his physical 

problems. 

Rodriguez responds that on appeal from the trial court’s exercise of independent 

judgment, it is not enough that Dr. Snyder’s second report is favorable to the City’s 

position, so long as substantial evidence, disputed or not, exists in the record to support 

the trial court’s ruling.8(See Bowers, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874 [“If such 

substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other 

evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary 

conclusion.” (italics omitted)]; In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 595 

[appellate review for substantial evidence “ ‘accept[s] the evidence most favorable to the 

 

8

The City points out that Rodriguez filed his respondent’s brief one day late after 

having received time extensions twice. Under the California Rules of Court, if a 

respondent’s brief is not filed within the period granted by an extension, this court may 

impose the sanction of excluding the respondent’s brief from consideration and deciding 

the appeal based only on the record, the appellant’s opening brief, and any oral argument 

by the appellant. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a), (c), (d).) Here, we have elected to 

consider the respondent’s arguments. 
16

order as true and discard[s] the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be 

accepted by the trier of fact’ ”].)

The trial court explained the basis for its determination in an oral, tentative ruling 

at the October 2011 hearing: “[A]fter reviewing all of the records and considering the 

arguments of counsel, I do believe that Mr. Rodriguez was substantially incapacitated due 

to his posttraumatic stress syndrome when he retired in 2007. I think that Dr. Snyder’s 

second report, the credibility of his opinions in his second report were undermined by the 

fact that he did change his opinion. I think that the basis for his change of his opinion 

with respect to Mr. Rodriguez earning money from being involved in real estate, earning 

money from creating a corporation where he managed real estate and sold real estate 

during 2007 with his family members and managed some rental properties and then 

service on a nonprofit board, I don’t believe that those job functions were inconsistent or 

demonstrated that the work history that was told by Mr. Rodriguez at the time that he was 

initially interviewed by Dr. Snyder are of such a significant level that would justify the 

change of his opinion. [¶] And so based upon this Court’s independent review of the 

evidence, . . . I believe that the conclusions and opinions that were stated by Dr. Snyder 

initially reflecting that his work as a police station duty officer triggered his posttraumatic 

stress syndrome and that it was because he was in fact suffering from posttraumatic stress 

syndrome as provided by both Dr. Snyder and Dr. Cornell in his initial report, that he was 

substantially incapacitated due to his posttraumatic stress syndrome at the time of his 

resignation, and so that would be the finding of the Court.” 

1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Determination

While “substantial evidence” “ ‘ “cannot be deemed synonymous with ‘any’

evidence” ’ ” (Bowers, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 873, quoting People v. Bassett (1968) 

69 Cal.2d 122, 139) we find substantial support in the record for the trial court’s findings, 

including that Dr. Snyder’s change of opinion was entitled to little weight. Although the 
17

trial court’s statement of decision focused specifically on the reports of Dr. Cornell and 

Dr. Snyder, our review encompasses the entire record. (Bowers, supra, at pp. 873-874.) 

Substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination includes

Rodriguez’s testimony about his combat experiences during the First Gulf War, the 

absence of military or other support services to help address the psychological impact of 

those experiences when he returned from the war, his assignments as a police officer that 

recalled many of his experiences during the war, and the fear, panic, and anxiety that 

manifested even while he worked in the modified police station duty officer position. 

The testimony of Deputy Chief Sapone and of Deputy Chief Clark corroborated 

certain aspects of Rodriguez’s story, such as his exceptional performance in his first years 

on the police force contrasted with his disappointing performance as a police station duty 

officer—which Deputy Chief Clark attributed to Rodriguez’s lack of motivation and 

enthusiasm for non-field work, and his failure to disclose to anyone that he was suffering 

mentally. Deputy Chief Clark testified that he was “very attuned to mental health issues 

that affect job performance” but observed nothing in Rodriguez’s conduct that suggested 

psychological distress. But Deputy Chief Clark supervised Rodriguez only until about 

2002. Consistent with Rodriguez’s testimony about his detective assignment, his 2003

and 2004 performance reviews state that Rodriguez assisted in investigations of 

“numerous high priority cases including several homicides and gang shootings” and a 

“gang homicide.”

Deputy Chief Sapone’s correspondence with Rodriguez in October 2006, as part 

of the interactive process to negotiate his return to the police station duty officer position, 

illustrates Rodriguez’s inability to provide any rational reason for his refusal to return to 

work, even though his doctors had cleared him for the modified position. Deputy Chief 

Sapone wrote: “During our conversation, you advised that you felt you could not 

perform the job duties due to the level of pain you are in on a daily basis. You stated that 

your ‘life is pain.’. . . I asked you about the type of medications you take in order to get a 
18

sense of possible impairment caused by medication. You weren’t certain . . . . [¶] . . . I 

asked you if you were currently doing any secondary employment or selling real estate 

and you said no. . . . [¶] . . . [Y]ou did not provide us with any medical information 

regarding restrictions because of your medication, nor did you provide any 

documentation as to why you are unable to perform the essential functions of the Police 

Station Duty Officer.” Deputy Chief Sapone testified that Rodriguez’s failures to report 

to work or respond to messages that she left for him was “[o]ut of the ordinary” for a 

police officer. 

The two reports by Dr. Cornell and the first report by Dr. Snyder offer an 

explanation for Rodriguez’s conduct from a medical standpoint. In reviewing the 

medical opinion evidence, we are mindful of certain basic principles, which both sides 

contend support their position here. First, “[t]he value of opinion evidence rests not in 

the conclusion reached but in the factors considered and the reasoning employed.” 

(Zuckerman, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1135.) A conclusion based upon “assumptions 

which are not supported by the record . . . , or upon factors which are speculative, remote 

or conjectural, . . . has no evidentiary value.” (Ibid., citing Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co.

(1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 325, 338-339.) The trial court’s acceptance of an expert’s ultimate 

conclusion therefore must be predicated on “critical consideration” of the expert’s 

reasoning and the facts relied upon. (Zuckerman, supra, at p. 1136; People v. Bassett,

supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 144 [“ ‘the opinion of an expert is no better than the reasons upon 

which it is based’ ”].) 

Dr. Cornell relied on several sources of information about Rodriguez, including 

two in-person consultations, a half-hour conversation with Dr. Malis, and Dr. Bryant’s 

report. Dr. Cornell described factors in Rodriguez’s police service that contributed to the 

“escalation of [Rodriguez’s] anxiety and discomfort.” Dr. Cornell explained that “[o]ne 

of the most significant factors in understanding [PTSD] revolves around the intensive 

psychological distress at the exposure to internal or external cures [sic] that symbolize or 
19

resemble an aspect of the primary event.” Dr. Cornell addressed Rodriguez’s failure to 

disclose his problems to the police department in terms of the psychological test results, 

which “confirm[] the self-medicating behavior” as well as “Rodriguez’s need to present 

an image that diminishes the overt observation of the difficulty he may be experiencing.”

Dr. Cornell also reported that Dr. Malis told him that Rodriguez “minimized many of the 

difficulties he was having in therapy with her,” which Dr. Cornell also found consistent 

with his conclusions. 

In his October 2011 report, Dr. Cornell reviewed the police station duty officer job 

description. While Rodriguez’s war experience was the primary trauma behind his 

PTSD, Dr. Cornell estimated that Rodriguez’s police work was a 90 percent contributing 

factor due to the triggers that were activated, in particular by the narcotics enforcement 

and undercover work. Dr. Cornell opined that the police station duty officer role 

“suggests further hazards” due to the seriousness of Rodriguez’s untreated disability and 

fact that “conscious as well as unconscious associative processes” can activate his 

“ ‘traumatic triggers.’ ” Dr. Cornell stated: “It is likely that any form of ‘police work’ 

would intensify [Rodriguez’s] Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptomatology.” 

Dr. Snyder drew similar conclusions in his first report, stating that Rodriguez 

“has had and currently has a psychiatric disability that precludes him from working 

for the Police Department.” For this report, Dr. Snyder interviewed Rodriguez for 

two-and-a-half hours and reviewed the same material as Dr. Cornell, as well as extensive

records from the police department documenting the efforts to communicate with 

Rodriguez and to establish an appropriate modified work environment in response to his 

claims based on physical pain. Dr. Snyder provided detailed examples of “stress events”

during Rodriguez’s service on the narcotics enforcement team and while undercover. 

Rodriguez reported to Dr. Snyder that by 2006, “when he knew he was being 

terminated,” he was having daily “ ‘panic attacks’ ” during which “he feels as though he 

is ‘dying.’ His eyes ‘puff up’ and become dry. His heart rate increases, he sweats, he has 
20

shallow and rapid breathing and he doesn’t know what to do. He feels ‘numb.’ . . . He 

felt his only ‘recourse was to figure out how to leave the Police Department.’ ” 

Dr. Snyder also addressed the issue of Rodriguez’s credibility, noting that 

“psychological problems in the police force were not mentioned” anywhere in the police 

records, that Rodriguez similarly failed to disclose his psychological problems related to 

police work to the Veterans Administration, and that “[t]he patient wasn’t communicating 

to others that he was having these experiences,” not even to his therapist. But after 

reviewing Dr. Bryant’s report, Dr. Snyder concluded that Rodriguez’s reasons for not 

telling anyone about his symptoms “fits quite well with the psychological test results of 

Dr. Bryant who noted that the patient is very concerned about maintaining a state of 

denial about his psychological problems.” Dr. Snyder restated Dr. Bryant’s finding that 

Rodriguez “was not fabricating or magnifying his symptoms and the testing clearly 

indicated that he was suffering from severe anxiety secondary to a Post Traumatic Stress 

Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.” 

Dr. Snyder concluded: “Working for the Police Department would expose the 

patient to external cues that do remind him of the dangers that he faced while working as 

a police officer, and the dangers that he faced while serving in Iraq, re-evoking the terror 

and anxiety that he experienced when involved in these life threatening situations.” Dr. 

Snyder opined that Rodriguez was unable “to perform the duties of a Police Station Duty 

Officer because even such an environment provides a sufficient number of cues that 

provoke memories of disturbing events and stimulate the patient to develop anxiety.” 

We are not persuaded that the trial court unreasonably relied on the reports of 

Dr. Cornell and the first report of Dr. Snyder. Far from failing to engage in critical 

consideration of these reports—which the record shows expressed careful reasoning and 

were based on extensive evidence—the trial court instead found that Dr. Snyder’s 

reasoning in his second report was flawed and not justified by the information contained 

therein. Thus, this is not a case in which the trial court improperly accepted an expert’s
21

opinion “without any critical assessment of the reasoning employed and the assumptions 

relied upon.” (Zuckerman, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1136.) 

2. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support 

Dr. Snyder’s Reversal of Opinion

Dr. Snyder highlighted eight factual grounds for concluding in his second report

that Rodriguez was not credible and therefore not substantially incapacitated from a 

psychiatric standpoint from working in a modified police station duty officer position.9

These may be summarized as: (1) Rodriguez failed to disclose to Dr. Snyder his outside 

engagements in real estate, with RLX Corporation, and with the Central Coast Gang 

Investigator Association; (2) Rodriguez allegedly misreported to doctors that he was in 

narcotics enforcement during the time that he was a police station duty officer; 

(3) alleged inconsistencies between Rodriguez’s statements to physicians and those in his 

November 2006 deposition taken in connection with his first disability retirement claim; 

and (4) Rodriguez’s failure to disclose his psychological stress to the police department 

or his police work triggers to the Veterans Administration, and his unwillingness to work 

with the police department in its effort to identify an appropriate accommodation.

 

9

The eight grounds expressed in Dr. Snyder’s second report were: “[1] 

[Rodriguez] did not report to me that he was a real estate agent or that he made 

significant amounts of money while working as a real estate agent. [¶] [2] [Rodriguez] 

did not report to me that he created a company, RLX Corporation, and that he, therefore, 

had a second job that he was undertaking. [¶] [3] [Rodriguez] did not report to me that he 

was on the Board of Central Coast Gang Investigator Association. [¶] [4] [Rodriguez] 

reported to physicians while he was actually assigned to the police station as a Police 

Station Duty Officer that he was in Narcotics Enforcement. [¶] [5] [Rodriguez] did not 

disclose to the Veterans Administration the fact that he was suffering (if true) a Post 

Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of his work experiences in the Police Department. 

[¶] [6] [Rodriguez] did not disclose to the Police Department that he was suffering from 

psychological problems as a result of PTSD. [¶] [7] [Rodriguez] demonstrated multiple 

inconsistencies between his statements to physicians and those in his deposition. [¶] 

[8] [Rodriguez] demonstrated, over a period of time, an uncooperativeness and an

unwillingness to work with others in establishing a workable job situation in the Police 

Department (by not responding to communications, and by not attending meetings).” 
22

On the basis of these apparent inconsistencies, Dr. Snyder reversed his opinion, 

noting the conclusions expressed in his first report were based on his assumption that the 

history Rodriguez had provided was credible. We find the trial court’s assessment of the 

factual bases for Dr. Snyder’s change of opinion as not inconsistent with the evidence 

presented by Rodriguez or “of such a significant level that would justify the change of 

[Dr. Snyder’s] opinion” was reasonable in light of errors in Dr. Snyder’s analysis and the 

indistinct relevance of Rodriguez’s engagements outside of the police force to the 

evidence specifically linking his PTSD to police work at any level. Most important, in 

exercising its independent judgment, it was the trial court’s “ ‘responsibility to weigh the 

evidence at the administrative hearing and to make its own determination of the 

credibility of witnesses.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451.) 

a. Endeavors outside of the police force

Dr. Snyder opined after reviewing the medical reports and findings of the ALJ in 

connection with the first disability retirement claim that Rodriguez was not being 

“straight forward” about his work capabilities. Dr. Snyder noted, for example, that 

Rodriguez apparently testified in his November 2006 deposition that RLX Corporation 

was “an investment and consulting company he started and developed over the prior two 

years” but testified at the administrative hearing on his first disability retirement claim 

that he had no current involvement with the corporation. Rodriguez also provided vague 

and seemingly evasive testimony at that administrative hearing, stating that he did not 

remember supervising or having a business relationship with certain individuals on his 

brokerage team and could not describe the tasks he had to perform for his real estate 

work. Dr. Snyder further noted that Rodriguez “was not credible with me as he did not 

indicate that he had been working as a real estate agent, nor that he was making a 

significant income as a result.” And Dr. Snyder noted that a printout of the Central Coast 

Gang Investigator Association Web site listed Rodriguez as an advisory council member, 

though Rodriguez did not report that “job” to him. 
23

Viewed in light of the entire record, the trial court’s determination that “I don’t 

believe those job functions were inconsistent” with Rodriguez’s claims is supported by 

the evidence. Rodriguez testified that his real estate work afforded him “some relief or 

some sanity” from the triggers that arose through his police work. And though Rodriguez 

did not offer information to his medical evaluators about these endeavors, neither does it 

appear that the doctors who interviewed Rodriguez in connection with the second 

disability retirement claim asked him about work outside of the police force.10 Since

these medical evaluations all occurred between 2008 and 2011, and Rodriguez testified 

that he had had no engagement with real estate, RLX Corporation, or the Central Coast 

Gang Investigator Association since 2006 or 2007, this omission is unremarkable.

Furthermore, the trial court could have concluded that Rodriguez’s testimony at 

the October 2011 administrative hearing was credible regarding his inability to recall 

basic details about these endeavors. Rodriguez testified that he understood his memory 

lapse was hard to believe: “Just trying to connect the dots, you know, even found out 

from the insurance—old insurance exchange, that I had increased my life insurance 

during that time, . . . [to] umbrella policies over millions of dollars. Bringing it all 

together I just think that I was—I was going insane during that time.” 

In addition, the medical evidence that Rodriguez’s PTSD cues or triggers were 

tied to his police work was substantial. Dr. Cornell and Dr. Snyder both indicated that 

Rodriguez was susceptible to “exposure to internal or external cures [sic] that symbolize 

or resemble an aspect of” his wartime trauma and that “conscious as well as unconscious 

 

10 The City argues that Dr. Snyder’s second report reads: “The patient denied any 

simultaneous or subsequent employment to his department job . . . . [¶] The patient is 

again not being straight forward. . . .” Read in context, however, this statement suggests 

that the denial occurred in 2003 between Rodriguez and Dr. Conrad, who interviewed 

Rodriguez and noted that he had a real estate license and was working at the time of the 

evaluation for a broker, and not as a result of any inquiry by Dr. Snyder into Rodriguez’s 

work during those years. 
24

associative processes” related to his police work can activate those cues or triggers. 

There is no evidence in the record—nor does Dr. Snyder suggest in his second report—

that Rodriguez’s PTSD should have similarly disabled him from engaging in non-police 

work. The trial court reasonably inferred that Rodriguez’s ability to engage in real estate 

and other non-police work was not inconsistent with an inability to perform police work. 

Because we “ ‘ “resolve all conflicts and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

party who prevailed in the trial court” ’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452), 

we decline to impose a contrary inference here. 

b. Police station duty officer position

Dr. Snyder emphasized in his second report that Rodriguez misreported to the

doctors evaluating his first disability retirement claim that he was in “narcotics 

enforcement” when “he was actually assigned to the police station as a Police Station 

Duty Officer.” The City concedes that this assessment by Dr. Snyder was erroneous

because Rodriguez was assigned to the investigations unit as a narcotics and gang 

detective for at least a substantial part of his tenure as a police station duty officer. The 

City contends, however, that although Dr. Snyder was mistaken on this point, other

evidence pertaining to Rodriguez’s detective assignment supports Dr. Snyder’s 

conclusion that Rodriguez was not substantially incapacitated from police work prior to 

his resignation. The City points to Deputy Chief Clark’s testimony that Rodriguez was 

capable of fulfilling and even excelling at his detective assignment but did not apply 

himself because of his dissatisfaction with “light-duty” work.

We find that the trial court’s conclusion is substantiated by the evidence here as 

well, given that Dr. Snyder was mistaken about Rodriguez misreporting the nature of his 

police station duty officer assignment. Although Deputy Chief Clark’s testimony invites 

a contrary inference about Rodriguez’s abilities during the time that he served as a police 

station duty officer (i.e., Rodriguez could have fulfilled the duties of the position but was 

not motivated and instead chose to exploit the option of a disability retirement), it does 
25

not alter the body of medical opinion evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that 

Rodriguez was suffering from PTSD while serving in the police station duty officer role. 

That the trial court could reasonably have reached a contrary conclusion based on Deputy 

Chief Clark’s testimony does not alter the outcome here. (See Bowers, supra, 150 

Cal.App.3d at p. 874 [“reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for 

those of the trial court”].) 

c. Inconsistent testimony

Dr. Snyder’s second report recites several instances in which Rodriguez’s 

statements to the doctors for his first disability retirement claim were apparently 

inconsistent with his deposition testimony. As both sides acknowledge, Rodriguez’s

deposition testimony is not in the record. Dr. Snyder’s interpretation of that testimony 

primarily reflects statements in Dr. Conrad’s medical reports, however, which are in the 

record. Dr. Conrad, an orthopedist, submitted five medical evaluations between 2003 and 

2007 regarding Rodriguez’s complaints related to his back, hand, and wrist pain. Dr. 

Conrad’s first report from May 2003 noted that Rodriguez had left the questionnaire 

section about simultaneous employment blank, causing Dr. Conrad to be “somewhat 

surprised” when he learned through the deposition transcript and his subsequent 

interview with the patient that Rodriguez had a real estate license and worked with a 

brokerage. Dr. Conrad’s January 2005 report stated that Rodriquez “was carefully 

questioned regarding his simultaneous job as a real estate agent” and found that work was 

“sporadic and non-intensive,” though in a November 2006 report Dr. Conrad reported 

that Rodriguez acknowledged spending “6-15 hours per week” on real estate work. 

The inconsistencies cited by Dr. Snyder thus primarily relate to issues already 

discussed, including Rodriguez’s engagement in real estate work. While these 

inconsistencies might have been particularly relevant to Rodriguez’s first disability 

retirement claim because they raised questions about his claimed inability to work as a 

police station duty officer due to physical limitations, their relevance here is more limited 
26

to the issue of Rodriguez’s credibility. The City asserts that it is apparent from his 

testimony at the October 2011 administrative hearing that Rodriguez did not disclose 

“obvious facts” pertaining to his outside employment and which “are adverse to his case 

and would show that he was very capable of handling all of the administrative aspects of 

his job” as a police station duty officer. 

There is no evidence that the trial court failed to weigh these factors in considering 

Rodriguez’s testimony at the October 2011 hearing, alongside the extensive 

administrative record—including Dr. Conrad’s and other medical reports from 

Rodriguez’s first disability retirement claim, as well as the first and second ALJ’s 

credibility determinations. Once again, it was the province of the trial court to weigh the 

evidence from the administrative hearing and to make its own credibility determinations

(Rodriguez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451), which we find here were supported by 

substantial evidence. 

d. Failure to disclose his psychological condition or cooperate with 

police department efforts to accommodate him

Dr. Snyder’s second report also cites Rodriguez’s failure to disclose his 

psychological stressors as evidence that he was not credible and not substantially 

incapacitated by PTSD while at the police department. The City asserts that Rodriguez’s 

failure to disclose his alleged PTSD symptoms cannot be reconciled with his willingness 

to disclose his physical pain and physical limitations, thus magnifying his credibility 

problem. 

There is no dispute that Rodriguez did not disclose his psychological problems to 

anyone at the police department or in his personal life at that time. The extent of 

Rodriguez’s failure to disclose his PTSD symptoms, as related to his police work, to the 
27

Veterans Administration doctors is less clear.11 But even assuming the fullest extent of

Rodriguez’s failure to disclose his police work-related symptoms to the Veterans 

Administration, Dr. Snyder’s conclusion in his second report about Rodriguez’s 

nondisclosures directly contradicts his specific treatment of the issue in his first report.

In the September 2011 report, Dr. Snyder noted his concerns about Rodriguez’s 

credibility and reported that Rodriguez claimed he did not reveal his traumas at the police 

department, and his subsequent symptoms, because “he was desperately trying to 

suppress (repress) his memories of these events and not think about them. He was trying 

to ‘numb’ himself to the effects of these events and wished to keep his troubles and his 

worries that he was going ‘crazy,’ a matter of private concern and something that he 

managed himself.” After reviewing the psychological test results in detail, Dr. Snyder 

concluded that Rodriguez’s pattern of failing to report his problems was consistent with 

the psychological test results that showed Rodriguez experienced extreme anxiety and 

feared he was “going crazy,” was “very concerned about maintaining a state of denial 

about his psychological problems,” and moreover “was not fabricating or magnifying”

his PTSD symptoms.

The evidence that Rodriguez was uncooperative and unwilling to find a workable 

job situation in the police department similarly found a possible explanation in Dr. 

Snyder’s first report. In reviewing Dr. Berman’s comments about Rodriguez’s failure to 

 

11 Dr. Galloway’s report indicates at least one instance of disclosure to the 

Veterans Administration, noting under the category “POST-MILITARY TRAUMA 

HISTORY” that Rodriguez had experienced a gunfight when he was a police officer, had 

problems when he smelled blood on the job, and “had guns pulled on him,” including 

once by a 12-year-old boy. But as the City points out, when Rodriguez was awarded 

veteran’s disability compensation beginning in January 2010, the report and disability 

rating do not reflect any PTSD arising out of or related to his prior employment with the 

Santa Cruz Police Department. 
28

follow discipline and orders before being “fired from that job,”12 Dr. Snyder noted in his 

first report that Rodriguez’s “uncooperativeness may have been a manifestation of 

psychiatric problems.” In his second report, Dr. Snyder does not address Rodriguez’s 

lack of cooperativeness from a psychiatric standpoint, instead repeating only the fact of 

his uncooperativeness—which was well established in Rodriguez’s self-reported medical 

history—and his own conclusion that “[i]n sum, despite the evidence that [Rodriguez] is 

not magnifying his symptoms on the psychological testing . . . , the overwhelming 

evidence is such that he is not credible.” 

Insofar as Rodriguez’s failures to disclose his symptoms and failure to cooperate 

with the police department were addressed in Dr. Snyder’s first report from a psychiatric 

standpoint as related to or possibly the result of Rodriguez’s PTSD, we find Dr. Snyder’s 

reference to these same behaviors as a basis for reversing his opinion in his second report 

to be unconvincing. The reasoning set forth in Dr. Snyder’s second report simply does 

not substantiate this reversal. (See Zuckerman, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1135.) We 

conclude that the trial court acted reasonably in assigning little weight to Dr. Snyder’s 

second report. 

3. Substantial Evidence Also Supports the Disability Determination as it 

Relates to Timing and Job Duties

The City raises two additional arguments in favor of reversal. First, the City 

contends that Dr. Cornell’s reports do not discuss how Rodriguez is unable to perform the 

particular administrative tasks of the police station duty officer position, as opposed to 

 

12 Dr. Berman’s follow-up evaluation of Rodriguez for purposes of his veteran’s 

disability claim reports that Rodriguez “got fired from” his job as a police officer. Dr. 

Galloway’s evaluation similarly reports that Rodriguez “was fired from [his police job] 

for not showing up for work and not following orders. . . .” The City argues these 

statements offer another example of Rodriguez providing false information to medical 

professionals, since he actually resigned and was not fired. Rodriguez’s perception of his 

resignation, however, appears to be that he actually lost his job because he was about to 

be fired, which is supported by the record and the testimony of Deputy Chief Sapone.
29

police work generally. The City points to Rodriguez’s two-week return to the police 

station duty officer position in late March 2007, at which time he performed various 

administrative functions such as data entry of police reports and phone calls with the 

public about crime or incident reports, as an example of the administrative tasks that 

Rodriguez could fulfill. 

This argument fails to address the impact of Dr. Cornell’s opinion about any type 

of police work, which necessarily includes administrative tasks performed at the police 

station. Before reversing his medical opinion in the second report, Dr. Snyder also had 

concluded that any work for the police department was likely to trigger Rodriguez’s 

PTSD. Dr. Snyder opined, “Working for the Police Department would expose the patient 

to external cues that do remind him of the dangers that he faced while working as a police 

officer, and the dangers that he faced while serving in Iraq, . . . . Any such exposure 

would, and does, stimulate a worsening of his symptoms . . . .” Rodriguez’s testimony at 

the administrative hearing was consistent with the doctors’ conclusions on this point. 

Rodriguez testified that the sound of a siren, the sight of a police car, police in uniform, 

and talk of police work were triggers that would cause him to have panic attacks. 

The evidence also shows that Rodriguez’s two-week return to work in 2007 was 

fraught with problems. A letter from Deputy Chief Sapone to Rodriguez dated May 7, 

2007, reviewed this brief period and noted, for example, that “in three days you received 

documented oral counseling for failing to obey orders and/or policy” and that only a 

week later, Rodriguez “left work” without following protocol or even updating his time 

card or his immediate supervisor. This contrasts sharply with Deputy Chief Sapone’s 

testimony that prior to late 2006, when Rodriguez first failed to return to work, she was 

not aware of any incidents in which Rodriguez had refused to perform assigned work or 

violated department rules or administrative directive. Rodriguez’s stated reason for going 

home at the time was that he was “in extreme pain” and needed “to go home and take my 

prescribed medications . . . .” Rodriguez’s testimony at the administrative hearing, 
30

however, suggests that his inability to perform the required tasks were as much a result of 

“mental pain” as physical pain, though he did not understand that at the time. 

We find the sum of this evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Rodriguez 

was substantially unable to perform any aspect of the police station duty officer position, 

including the administrative tasks. The same body of evidence supports the finding that 

Rodriguez was unable to perform his job duties at the time that he resigned from the 

police department. The City’s second argument, contending that substantial evidence 

does not support a finding that Rodriguez was disabled on or before he left the police 

department in June 2007, as statutorily required for eligibility for a disability retirement 

(Gov. Code, § 21154, subd. (d)), thus fails on the evidence in the record.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
Premo, J.

WE CONCUR:

Rushing, P.J.

Grover, J.

Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz et al.

H042280