AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed December 31, 2020 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00107-CV LAURA FORD, Appellant V. SILVERADO AUTO SALES, RON QUIN LAN, SR. AND RON QUINLAN, JR., Appellees On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2019-2-075CV MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Nowell, and Evans Opinion by Justice Evans Laura Ford appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Silverado Auto Sales, Ron Quinlan, Sr., and Ron Quinlan, Jr., on Ford’s c laims arising from her purchase of an automobile. In seven issues, Ford argues th e trial court erred in allowing Silverado to claim Ford did not timely file her motion for summary judgment, striking Ford’s motion for summary judgment as untime ly, denying Ford’s motion for rehearing, allowing Silverado to give one day of notice before the hearing on the motions for summa ry judgment, and “asking for or al argument for the Summary Judgments.” Ford also appears to argue that the un derlying contract–2– was unconscionable and her moti on for summary judgment establis hed that Silverado defrauded her. We affi rm the trial court’s judgment. In April 2019, Ford filed her original petition seeking “recove ry of the purchase money for her vehicle that was wrongfully repossessed” by Silverado. The petition alleged that, on February 22, 2018, she entered into a motor vehicle retail installment contract with Silverado in connection with the purc hase of a 2013 Hyundai Sonata. Ford alleged R on Quinlan, Jr., was “the author ized agent to sell the vehicle” to Ford, and Ron Qu inlan, Sr., was the owner of Si lverado. The terms of payment were $300.00 per month beginning March 22, 2018 and ending October 22, 2022. The total purchase pr ice for the vehicle was $13,900 .00, less a $3,000.00 down payment, leaving $1 0,900.00 due and owing. Ford alleged that, while driving the 2013 vehicle off the car l ot for the first time, she noticed the Check Engine Light was on and, when she c alled Silverado to inform them of this, she was told to bring it to the Hyundai de alership to find out the problem. Ford “was told that the part that was defective was u nder warranty, but she would have to pay $264.05 in labor costs, which she in fact paid.” Ford quoted the statement in Silverado’s original answer that “We Gave Her Credit to Her First Payment and a Discount of $1,000.00 Off of Purchase Price,” whi ch Ford characterized as “a discount am ount of $1264.05” she calculated as “$264.05 repair cost and $1,000.00 discount.” Ford claimed that, from the “fir st payment date on March 22, 2018 until October 22, 2 018, [she] made 7 payments of $300 for a total–3– of $2,100.” Ford also claimed s he made partial payments, inclu ding the $1264.05 credit, of $2399.05 betw een March and the end of September 2018 . Thus, Ford argued, “when one looks at the total payments made and the tota l credits given, the amount of $2,399.05 is in excess of $299.05 the total amount ow ed of $2,100!” Ford quoted an October 25, 2018 text from Ron Quinlan, Sr., which st ated, “These are the payments you made so far: 4/ 30 $150, 5/31 $120, 6/23 $290, 8/2 $165, 9/28 $220 = $945. You should have made $2100 in payments so far.” Citing S ilverado’s ledger submitted in its original answer and the credit of $1264.05 For d received from Silverado, Ford reiterated her argument that “the actual amount paid was $2399.05.” Nevertheless, Ford argued, Silver ado repossessed the vehicle in breach of the purchase agreement. Ford asserted a claim of fraudulent induce ment and sought punitive damages and a return of all monies she paid to Silvera do. On December 3, 2019, Silverado filed a traditional and no evide nce motion for summary judgment. Silverado alleged Ford purchased the veh icle “AS IS,” financed a principal amount of $12,020.81, agreed to make 55 pa yments of $300 and a final payment of $195.84, and agreed to continuously insure t he vehicle. After the purchase, the vehicle needed repai rs, and Silverado agreed to d educt the cost of the repairs from the sale price. Silv erado alleged Ford failed to make the loan payments and failed to keep the vehicle i nsured, so Silverado repossesse d the vehicle. Attached to the motion was a copy of the retail installment con tract between Ford–4– and Silverado. The contract contained a “voluntary return of c ollateral” document signed by Ford that provided as follows: I (we) agree to voluntarily return the aforementioned vehicle, which is the secured collateral under the above referenced contract. I (we) consent to your acceptance of the collateral in full satisfacti on of the remaining indebtedness, and I (we) relinquish all rights to the vehicle. I (we) waive my (our) right to notification of disposition of c ollateral and my (our) right to required di sposition of the vehicle under Section 9-620(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code. I (we) release to [sic] you from any claim or liability, in t ort or breach of contract, or violation of the Texas Consumer Protection Act or the Texas Finance Code. Y ou agree to release me (us) from any liability with regard to our obligations under the Contract, and agree not to pursue any deficiency agai nst me (us). The contract also contained a document signed by Ford granting Silverado the right to repossess the vehicle if Ford failed “to make any paym ent in accordance with the retail installment contract” and the right to conduct the repossession at “any time of the day or night” without notice to Ford. Also attache d to the motion was a “Buyer’s Guide” document signed by Ford and stating in large bo ld type that the “warranties for this vehicle” we re “AS IS – NO DEALER WARRANTY. ” Finally, the motion contained an “agreement to provide insurance” signed by Ford and requiring Ford to maintain continuous insurance on the vehicle. In the event Ford failed to maintain insurance on the vehicle, the agreement auth orized Silverado to obtain insurance and add the premium to Ford’s next payment due under the installment contract. In an affidavit attached to the motion, Ron Quinlan, Sr. restat ed the facts as alleged in the motion and again stated that Ford failed to make the loan payments as–5– agreed and failed to keep the vehicle insured, so the vehicle w as repossessed. Also attached to the motion was a May 11, 2018 letter from GEICO ins urance company providing Silverado with notice that Ford’s insurance policy on the vehicle was terminated. Pursuant to a July 22, 2019 docket control order, any motion th at requested summary judgment under Rule 166a, dismissal, judgment as a matt er of law, or other dispositive relief as to any claim had to be filed no later tha n thirty (30) days prior to the trial date. On July 23, 2019, the trial court signed an order setting the case for trial on January 7, 2020. Thus, the deadline for Ford to file a motion for summary judgment was December 8, 2019. The July 22, 2019 order further provided, “A party opposing a m otion has 14 days (21 days for dispositive motions) from the date the motion was served in which to file a response and any supporting documents, after wh ich the Court will consider the submitted motion for decision.” The docket contro l order specifically provided, “[A]ll motions shall be considered by submission and without oral argument.” By order signed December 4, 2019, the trial court s et Silverado’s motion for summary judgment for submission on December 26, 2019. (In the clerk’s record, there is no other notice or order setting Silverado’s motion fo r summary judgment for hearing or submission on a different date). Therefore, For d’s response to Silverado’s motion for summary j udgment was due December 26, 20 19.–6– On December 19, 2019, Ford filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment, which was not supported by any affidavits. F ord did not file a response to Silverado’s motion for summary judgment. On Decemb er 31, 2019, Silverado filed a response to Ford’s motion for summary judgmen t. On January 1, 2020, Ford filed an amended motion for summary judgment. Again , the motion was not supported by any affidavits . On January 6, 2020, Silverado filed a motion to strike Ford’s original and amended motions for summary judgment as untimely filed. On January 7, 2020, instead of co mmencing trial the court heard Silverado’s motion for summary judgment and Silverado’s motion to strike Fo rd’s motion for summary judgment. The hearing began with this colloquy: THE COURT: This case is currently set for trial today but in l ight of the competing motions for trad itional and no evidence summary judgment, and defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s original and amended traditional and no eviden ce motion for summary judgment , the Court reset this case for trial and scheduled a hearing on the summary judgment motions today. Is the plaintiff ready to proc eed? [FORD’S COUNSEL]: Plaintiff is ready, yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is the defendant ready to proceed? [SILVERADO’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Very well. At the hearing, although Ford’s counsel denied personally seein g the July 22, 2019 docket control order until a few days before the hearing, he ad mitted his secretary may have had it and conceded Ford was bound by it. Nevertheles s, Ford’s counsel argued all applicable dates by counting backward from the date of trial on which the–7– trial court heard the pending motions. But when questioned by the trial court, Ford’s counsel admitted Ford’s original and amended motions for summar y judgment were not timely. The trial court stated, “[ I ]f you don’t timely file then the Court will not entertain what is untimely filed. . . .” So, the trial court g ranted Silverado’s motion to strike Ford’s original and amended motions for summary judgm ent. The trial court then heard Silverado argue its motion for summa ry judgment. Ford in turn argued from the allegations in Ford’s pleading. W hen questioned by the trial court, Ford’s counsel could not recall whether he had filed a response to Silverado’s motion for summary judgment and did not provide the trial court a copy file-marked by the clerk when the trial court asked for a copy since there was no response in the court’s file. The trial court then ruled, THE COURT: There are no affidav its or other admissible evidenc e to support the assertions set out in the paperwork. And the plain tiff did not file a response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgm ent, either traditional or no evidence setting forth through that re sponse admissible evidence contradicti ng the assertions of the defenda nt in its motion. The trial court then rendered summary judgment for Silverado. On January 15, 2020, Ford filed a motion for rehearing, which t he trial court denied the next day. On January 17, 2020, the trial court sign ed a summary judgment ordering that Ford take nothing and noting, in part, that Ford did not “file opposing affidavits or other written resp onse” to Silverado’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.–8– In her first and second issues, Ford argues the trial court err ed in allowing Silverado to claim Ford did not timely file her motion for summ ary judgment and requesting the trial court to strike Ford’s motion. In making these arguments, Ford argues her motion for summary judgment filed on December 19, 20 19 was timely because rule 166a provides that a motion for summary judgment s hall be filed at least twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing. See T EX

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. P. 166a(c). As to her deadline to file a response to Silverado’s motion, Ford argues rule 166a permitted her to file a nd serve her response not late r than seven days prior to the day of hearing. See id. We review a trial court’s enforcement of a scheduling order for an abuse of discretion. G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enters., In c. v. Reece Supply Co. , 177 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2005, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion whe n it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably without reference to any guiding ru les or principles. Id

. Rule 166 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a trial c ourt to create various deadlines to control the disposition of the various phases of a case, and provides that “such order . . . shall control the subsequent course of action [.]” T EX

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. P. 166(p); see generally Clanton v. Clark , 639 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1982) (trial court has discretion to manage its docket). Thus, the trial court’s dock et control order controlled the applicable deadlin es in this case and, under tha t order, Ford’s motion for summary judgment was untimely. See id. Ford has not shown the trial court–9– abused its discretion when it enforced its docket control order and struck Ford’s untimely motion for summary judgment. As regards the deadline for Ford’s response to Silverado’s moti on for summary judgment, rule 166a(c) provides: Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing counsel, the motion [for summary judgment] and any s upporting affidavits shall be f iled and served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for h earing. Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than sev en days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidav its or other written response. T EX

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. P. 166a(c). So, according to the rule, all deadlines are count ed back from the date of the hearing. When a movant files and sets a m otion for summary judgment twenty-one days after filing, the non-movant has only fourteen days to file a response. Here, consistent w ith considering summary judgment motions by submission, the docket control or der provided every non-movant twenty-one days within which to respond to motions for summary judgment. Furth er, the trial court set Silverado’s motion for summary judgment for submission allo wing twenty-one days from the date of its setting order for Ford to respond. O ur record does not contain a notice of summary judgment hearing on the day of tria l. Rather, the trial court, having taken the summary judgment under submission but n ot having ruled by the day of trial, heard counsel argue the pending motions at trial. Ford has not argued or cited any authority that the trial court abused its d iscretion by balancing the judicial efficiency of setting summary judgment motions for submission, and allowing all non-movants twenty-one days to respond thereby exc eeding rule–10– 166a(c)’s minimum of fourteen days to respond. We overrule Ford’s first and second issues. In her third issue, Ford argues the trial court erred by not gr anting her motion for rehearing. In making this argument, Ford repeats her argum ent that the deadlines set out in rule 166a operate in such a way that her motion for summary judgment was timely. Because we have alr eady rejected Ford’s arguments in her first two issues, we overrule Ford’s third issue. In her fourth issue, Ford argues the trial court erred by allow ing Silverado to “give ONE DAY NOTICE on January 6 before the hearing date on th e summary judgment motions wherein [Ford] had no time to respond or objec t.” Ford’s argument under this issue consists of a single sentence that co ntains no citation to authority, and she appears to complain that Silverado’s motion to strike was filed on January 6, 2019, one day before the hearing on January 7. An a ppellant's brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” T EX

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. P. 38.1(h), (i). Failure to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal. Gator Apple, LLC v. Apple Texas Restaurants, Inc. , 442 S.W.3d 521, 538 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). In addition, Ford made this ar gument to the trial court at the summary judgment hearing on the day of trial. In response to the trial court’s questions, Ford’s counsel conceded his staff may have b een aware of the–11– filings and orders in the case. We conclude nothing is present ed for our review on this issue, but if there was a sufficient argument we would rej ect it. Id. In her fifth issue, Ford argues the trial court “erred by askin g for oral argument for the Summary Judgments.” Ford complains the parties should not have appeared in court at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, an d the case should have been “resolved by submissi on.” In support of this asserti on, Ford cites rule 166a’s provision requiring that “No oral testimony shall be rec eived at the hearing.”
See T EX

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. P. 166a(c). Ford appears to conf late the appearance of counsel at trial at which the trial court listened to counsel argue about the pending motions with prohibited “oral testimony” at su ch a hearing. Ford cites no a uthority, and we have found none, that would support such an argument. In fact, rule 166a(c) specifically allows for a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc. , 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998). Also in her fifth issue, in a single sentence without citation to authority or the record, Ford asserts that her m otion for summary judgment “show ed overwhelming documented proof” that Silverado “defrauded [Ford] out of her m oney and her car.” We conclude this additional asse rtion presents nothing for our review. See Gator Apple , 442 S.W.3d at 538. As we pointed out above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Ford’s untimely filed original and amend ed motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Ford’s fifth issue.–12– In her sixth issue, Ford argues the underlying retail installme nt contract was “a Predatory Contract that is o ne-sided and favors” Silverado, and the contract was unconscionable and unlawful. In making this argument, Ford att acks Silverado’s “legal conclusion statement,” presumably made in the context of Silverado’s motion for summary judgment, that “Silverado did not wrongfully reposs ess the vehicle as a matter of law.” Silverado filed a combined tra ditional and no-evidence summary- judgment motion. See T EX

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. P. 166a(c), (i). We review no-evidence motions under the same legal sufficiency standa rd as a directed verdict. Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd. , 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018) . Under this standard, the no nmovant has the burden to produce more than a scintilla of evidence to supp ort each challenged element of its claims. Id. ; see Sandberg v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. , No. 05-18- 01360-CV, 2020 WL 1809469, at *3 (T ex. App.—Dallas Apr. 9, 2020 , no pet. h.) (“we must determine whether the nonmovant produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a fact issue on the material questi ons presented.”). In a traditional motion, the movant has the burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law. T EX

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. P. 166a(c). A defendant is en titled to summary judgment if it conclusively negates at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. Painter , 561 S.W.3d at 130. When reviewing either type of summary-judgment motion, we view the e vidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence a rea sonable jury could–13– credit and disregarding contrary evidence and inferences unless a reasonable jury could not.” Id. When a party files a hybrid summary judgment motion on both no- evidence and traditional grounds, we generally first review the trial co urt’s judgment under the no-evidence standard of review. Rico v. L-3 Commc’ns Corp. , 420 S.W.3d 431, 438-39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Should we determine s ummary judgment was appropriate under the no-evid ence standard, we need not add ress issues related to the traditional summary judgment motion. Id. at 439. Ford appears to take issue with the underlying contract’s provi sion, set forth in “exceedingly small letters,” t hat “You have thoroughly inspe cted, accepted, and approved, the vehicle i n all respects.” However, Ford does no more than point out this provision. Ford also notes there is a place for the parti es to sign the contract twelve lines into the contract, and she calls this “scamming” a nd “nicely concealed” but does not address the legal significance of this provision. Accordingly, we conclude these arguments pre sent nothing for our review. See Gator Apple , 442 S.W.3d at 538. Ford notes the “as-is” provision in the underlying contract and cites Bishop v. Creditplex Auto Sales L.L.C. , No. 05-15-00395-CV, 2016 WL 3453633, at *6 (Tex. App. June 23, 2016) as a “win for appellant.” See id. (as-is clause did not conclusively negate causation because evidence raised fact issu e regarding whether Creditplex’s fraudulent represent ation or information concealme nt induced Bishop–14– to buy car). Bishop was a case in which appellees moved for directed verdict at tr ial arguing solely that the as-is clause negated causation as a mat ter of law. Id. at *2. We note Silverado did not rely on the “as-is” provision as a ba sis for summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, we conclude Bishop is not controlling authority in this case. As argued in her brief outside t he discussion related to her en umerated issues and raised again in her sixth i ssue, Ford complains of “blank s pace” at the end of the contract. Citing section 348.112 of the finance code, Ford arg ues her acknowledgement of delivery of a copy of the retail installment contract must appear “directly above the buyer’s signature.” See T EX

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. C ODE A NN . § 348.112(a)(2). Ford argues her contract with Silverado violates this provision because the “customer’s signature is approxim ately four (4) inches below th e acknowledgment.” Ford is incorrect. The copy of the contract attached to her am ended motion for summary judgment contains the fo llowing acknowledgement in all capital letters in bold type on the first page of the contract:
BUYER’S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONTRACT RECEIPT: YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT AND ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COMPLETED COPY OF IT. YOU CONFIRM THAT BEFORE YOU SIGNED THIS CONTRACT WE GAVE IT TO YOU, AND YOU WERE FREE TO TAKE IT AND REVIEW IT. We note Ford’s signature appears directly below this acknowledg ement, and several of the letters in Ford’s signatu re actually overlap the acknowl edgement. We conclude the placement of the acknowledgement did not violate s ection 348.112 of–15– the finance code. Having reviewed Ford’s arguments, we conclud e the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Silverado. See Painter , 561 S.W.3d at 130. We overrule Ford’s sixth issue. In her seventh issue, Ford argues the trial court “erred in not finding that Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment contained sufficient fa cts, evidence and proof that Appellant, Laura Ford , documented proof that the App ellees defrauded Appellant out of her money and he r car.” In making this argume nt, Ford renews her attack on the underlying contract as predatory, one-sided, unco nscionable, and unlawful. Because we have rejected these identical arguments a gainst the underlying contract’s validity, we overrule Ford’s seventh issu e. In an argument raised outside the scope of her enumerated issue s, Ford cites the installment contract’s provi sion stating that “You will be in default if you do not pay any amount” when it is due. Ford includes a copy of Silver ado’s payment ledger showing she made only partial payments and argues these payment s were “any amount” payments, and the contract payments “had been adhered t o since ‘any amount’ was in fact paid.” Without any authority to support he r construction of this language, Ford ignores the contract’s terms of payment requirin g payments of $300.00 per month beginning March 22, 2018 and ending October 2 2, 2022. We reject Ford’s construction of t he “any amount” language contain ed in the contract.–16– We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

200107F.P05 /David Evans/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE–17– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT LAURA FORD, Appellant

No. 05-20-00107-CV V. SILVERADO AUTO SALES, RON QUINLAN, SR. AND RON QUINLAN, JR., Appellees On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2019-2- 075CV. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. Justices Myers and Nowell participating.
In accordance with this Court’ s opinion of this date, the judg ment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellees SILVERADO AUTO SALES, RON QUINLAN, SR. AND RON QUI NLAN, JR. recover their costs of this a ppeal from appellant LAURA FORD.
Judgment entered December 31, 2020.