UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

 

Case No. 1:22 -mj-3273-DAMIAN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

vs. 

AARON THOMAS MITCHELL,

Defendant.

 / 

 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR DETENTION

Introduction

The United States of America hereby moves for the Court to order the pretrial detention of 

defendant Aaron Mitchell. As set forth below, the defendant is charged with kidnapping a minor 

in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1201(a) & (g)(1), for events which took place 

in Sierra Vista and Douglas, in the District of Arizona. On the morning of April 25, 2022, a 15-

year-old female Minor Victim (M.V.) was waiting by her middle school when the defendant, thenemployed as a Customs and Border Patrol Officer (CBPO), asked to see her documents, and then 

ordered her to get into his car, telling her he was going to take her to a police station. Instead, he 

handcuffed M.V. and drove her an hour away to his apartment where he repeatedly sexually 

assaulted her before driving her back to school several hours later. 

There is no combination of conditions that can reasonably assure the safety of the community 

or the defendant’s appearance in this case. Under § 3142(e)(3)(E), because he was charged with 

kidnapping a minor, it must be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will 

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reasonably assure the safety of the community and the appearance of the defendant. Moreover, 

the defendant cannot overcome this presumption because all of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) 

factors weigh in favor of his detention. As set forth below, there is overwhelming evidence the 

defendant committed the brazen offense charged in the indictment, and if convicted, he faces a 

minimum of 20 years and up to lifetime imprisonment, which gives the defendant an incentive to 

flee. Moreover, the nature and circumstances of his offense demonstrate a danger to the 

community. He should be detained pending trial.

I. Factual Background 

A. M.V.’s Account 

M.V., 5’3” and 94 pounds, lives in Mexico with her family. She was born in the United States 

and crosses the border by foot to attend school in Douglas, Arizona. According to M.V., on April 

25, 2022, she was waiting for school to start when the defendant, garbed in a vest emblazoned with 

“police,” drove up to her and rolled down his window. He told her he was a police officer and 

asked to see her documents. After she showed him her birth certificate, he asked for her backpack, 

which he looked through and placed on the seat. He then ordered her to get into his car so he 

could transport her to a police station. 

When they were almost out of Douglas, he pulled over and handcuffed her and restrained her 

legs. He then drove her over an hour away to Sierra Vista, where he lives. During the drive, he 

asked her age, in response to which she told him she was 15 years old. He also asked about her 

family, including their names. When they got to his apartment, he told her not to make any noise 

and made her stay in the car. He went into his apartment to get a jacket. He removed the 

handcuffs from her legs so that she could walk, and draped the jacket over her shoulders, covering 

her handcuffs. 

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When they got inside, he took M.V. into his bedroom and turned on the television. He showed 

her his badge and told her not to be afraid because he was a police officer. He put a mask over 

her mouth and a t-shirt over the mask. He told her to “do everything” he said if she did not want 

to get hurt. Over the next several hours, Mitchell repeatedly and forcibly penetrated M.V. and 

had her masturbate him. At various times she was handcuffed, gagged and blindfolded. At one 

point, Mitchell had the victim on her knees with a cover over her face and he placed his hands 

around her neck and began squeezing “hard.” She started crying and thought she “wasn’t going 

to make it home.” 

After telling the victim he was not going to return her backpack because it had his 

fingerprints on it, the defendant drove M.V. back to Douglas and dropped her off near her school. 

During the drive, he told her he was a police officer in Sierra Vista. When he dropped her off by 

her school, she immediately outcried to her friends and family, and reported the events to police 

the same day. 

B. Corroborating Evidence 

There is overwhelming evidence corroborating M.V.’s account, the most salient of which 

are: (1) medical examinations; (2) video evidence supporting M.V.’s account (and contradicting 

the defendant’s account); and (3) a screenshot of the defendant’s phone search. 

1. Medical evidence

A SANE exam was started just after midnight, the day after the assault. The medical 

examiner found possible blood in M.V.’s underwear and signs of vaginal trauma. M.V. had a 

follow-up visit on May 10, 2022, and a medical examiner found evidence of anal trauma. DNA 

results are pending. 

2. Defendant’s statement and Video evidence

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The defendant was taken into police custody the day after the incident, and he gave a 

voluntary statement. According to the defendant, on the day of the incident, while in Douglas to 

look at real estate, he saw M.V. whom he recalled from border crossing and claimed he knew, 

although he was not certain of her name. He claimed he asked her if she wanted to skip school 

and hang out, and she said yes. He admitted that he took her to his apartment, but claimed they 

only watched television. He denied handcuffing her or having any sexual relations with her. 

Video evidence, however, directly contradicts his account and corroborates M.V.’s 

account. For example, the defendant was specifically asked whether, when they got to his 

apartment, they got out together or whether she stayed in the car for “a little while.” (According 

to M.V., he made her wait in the car while he got a jacket to cover her handcuffs.). The defendant 

claimed they got out together. Video from his apartment complex, however, shows that after he 

parked, the defendant went into his apartment alone and returned to his car, carrying what appears 

to be a jacket. After opening various car doors, he made a second trip to his apartment, before 

returning to the car and opening the front passenger car door. When M.V. finally gets out of his 

car, she appears to have a jacket slung over her shoulders. 

The defendant was also asked about M.V.’s backpack. (M.V. said he told her he would 

not return it because it had her fingerprints.) The defendant claimed he did not know where her 

backpack was and denied getting rid of it. However, video evidence shows the defendant walk 

towards a dumpster with a backpack across his shoulder, throw something in the dumpster, and 

then walk back towards his apartment with no backpack. See Figs. 1 and 2.

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Fig. 1 and 2: The left screenshot captures the defendant with a backpack on his way to the 

dumpster, while the right screenshot captures him without a backpack, on the way back from the 

dumpster. 

3. Arrest and Phone Search

On the night he was arrested, officers were at the defendant’s apartment complex preparing 

to execute a search warrant. Seeing police vehicles in the parking lot of his complex as he 

returned home at approximately 10:30 p.m., the defendant accelerated and drove past his 

apartment. After being stopped by police and detained, officers seized his phone. Analysis of 

the phone revealed the following search on his phone internet browser in “private” mode: “girl 

kidnapped rape doug.” See. Fig.3. At the time, there had been no news media regarding this 

incident, and officers had not yet interviewed him about his interaction with M.V. 

When asked why he had chosen to pass his apartment complex after seeing the police 

vehicles that night, the defendant had no answer. 

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 Fig. 3: Screenshot of the defendant’s phone browser as it existed when he was taken into 

custody, prior to being interviewed. 

II. Legal Standard 

The Bail Reform Act empowers federal courts to order a defendant’s detention pending trial 

where the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a 

danger to the community or, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he represents a risk of 

flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Where, as here, there is probable cause to believe that an 

individual kidnapped a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a) & (g)(1), it must be presumed 

that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the 

person as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). See also

United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir.1985) (noting that a grand jury 

indictment provides the probable cause required by the statute to trigger the presumption.). 

Where a presumption of detention is applicable, the defendant bears the burden of production to 

rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. The 

defendant’s “obligation to come forward with evidence does not shift to the defendant the 

government’s burden of persuasion.” United v. Quartermaine, 913 F.3d 910, 916 (11th Cir. 

1990).

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Even if a defendant can meet his burden to rebut this presumption by coming forward with 

evidence that he does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight, “the rebutted 

presumption is not erased. Instead, it remains in the case as an evidentiary finding militating 

against release, to be weigh[ed] along with other evidence relevant to factors listed in section 

3142(g)” United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

The government’s burden of proof on dangerousness is clear and convincing evidence. 

Quartermaine, 913 F.3d at 917. The concept of “dangerousness” encompasses not only the effect 

of a defendant’s release on the safety of identifiable individuals, such as victims and witnesses, 

but also “the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the 

community.” United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1048 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting legislative 

history). 

The government’s burden of proof on flight risk is preponderance of the evidence. King, 849 

F.2d at 489 (citing United States v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 1985). Where the 

evidence of guilt is strong, it provides “a considerable incentive to flee.” Millan, 4 F.3d at 1046; 

see also United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (where 

“the evidence against defendants is strong, the incentive for relocation is increased”). 

Additionally, the possibility of a severe sentence is an important factor in assessing a defendant’s 

likelihood of flight. See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendants 

charged with serious offenses whose maximum combined terms created potent incentives to flee).

The Bail Reform Act lists four factors to be considered in the detention analysis, whether for 

risk of flight or dangerousness: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the seriousness of the danger posed by the 

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defendant’s release; and (4) the evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also 

Quartermaine, 913 F.2d at 916. 

III. Argument

This defendant poses a significant danger to the community and is a flight risk if released 

pending trial, such that no condition or combination of bail conditions will reasonably ensure the 

safety of the community and the defendant’s appearance before the court. Because each of the 

§ 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of the defendant’s detention pending trial, the defendant cannot 

overcome the presumption that he be detained. 

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

The nature and circumstances of the offense militate towards detaining the defendant. The 

defendant is charged with a brazen and serious crime: he abused his authority as a law enforcement 

officer, kidnapped a child who was waiting for school, drove her over an hour away to his 

apartment, and sexually assaulted her over the course of several hours. During the sexual assault, 

the defendant, at various times, gagged, blindfolded, and choked M.V. The defendant destroyed 

evidence (her backpack) and then cavalierly dropped her off at school after asking about her family 

members and warning her several times that he was a law enforcement officer. The seriousness 

of his offense is reflected in the penalties he faces – a mandatory minimum of 20 years and a 

statutory maximum of life imprisonment. 

B. Strength of the Evidence and Risk of Flight 

The overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed the charged offense and the 

associated likelihood of a lengthy sentence also weigh in favor of pre-trial detention. The 

defendant has a powerful incentive to flee. “When faced with the possibility of a significant 

prison term, defendants have a strong incentive to flee.” United States v. Edwards, 2021 WL 

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796089, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021). See also United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th 

Cir. 1988) (defendant was a flight risk where she faced numerous mandatory minimum 10-year 

sentences); United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (the defendant was a 

flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a strong 

incentive to abscond); and United States v. Khusanov, 731 F. App’x 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A] 

district court does not clearly err in concluding that a defendant facing a potentially lengthy prison 

sentence possesses a strong motive to flee.”). 

Here, if convicted, the defendant faces a mandatory minimum of 20 years and a statutory 

maximum of life imprisonment. The government preliminarily estimates the defendant’s 

guidelines range at life imprisonment. The possibility of a severe sentence—including a sentence 

lower than the one the defendant faces—can establish risk of flight. See United States v. Scali, 

738 F. App’x 32, 33 (2d Cir. 2018) (“The court reasonably determined that [the defendant]’s 

Guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment was significant enough to provide an incentive 

to flee.”).

The defendant is also a flight risk because as a former CBP officer, the defendant received 

specialized training on how the United States maintains its border, and therefore is able to more 

easily flee to another country. He is not married and has no children. 

Although the defendant has been on bond since May on the state charges, “as numerous 

courts have held, such initial cooperation by a defendant is by no means conclusive evidence of 

his future appearance.” United States v. Martin, 2017 WL 4080689, *3 (S.D. Ga, September 14, 

2017). In Martin, the court found the defendant was a flight risk despite the following: he had 

been released on state charges; he knew that federal charges were likely; he voluntarily appeared 

twice in state court; and he self-surrendered on federal charges. Id. at *1. The court found him 

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to be a flight risk because the defendant faced a minimum 10-year federal sentence, the possibility 

of mandatory life sentence, and after being federally charged, he knew the strength of the 

government’s case. Id. at *3. See also United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 1988) 

(the fact that defendant knew for six months that the grand jury indictment was imminent and 

chose to retain counsel and contest the charges rather than flee was not sufficient to overcome the 

statutory presumption of flight, as defendant faced minimum mandatory sentence and was aware 

of the government's damaging evidence against her, including a taped conversation.); and United 

States v. Oliver, 2016 WL 1746853 at * 9 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2016) (finding that the defendant 

presented too great a risk of flight - and too great a danger - for pretrial release despite the fact that 

defendant was on bond for six weeks in state system and voluntarily surrendered to federal 

authorities, given that defendant faced a 10 year to life sentence,). 

 Similarly, here, although the defendant has not fled the past three months, this initial 

cooperation does not overcome the presumption that he is a flight risk. Like the defendants in 

Martin, King, and Oliver, the defendant has powerful incentive to flee given the fact that he newly 

faces a federal charge that carries 20 years to life sentence, and now knows the strength of the 

government’s evidence. 

C. History and Characteristics of the Defendant 

The defendant does not have any criminal history, but his brazen conduct supports his 

detention. The defendant had been a CBP officer for less than a year when he kidnapped M.V. 

He abused his knowledge and training as a federal law enforcement officer when he targeted a 

vulnerable child who was waiting for school to start. He likely chose her because he knew she 

lived in Mexico and may be less likely to report him. He subtly threatened her by asking about 

her family members, and repeatedly told her he was an officer. He also directly threatened her by 

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telling her she had to do everything he said so he didn’t have to hurt her. His blatant and gross 

abuse of his authority as a federal law enforcement officer militates in favor of his detention. 

D. Danger Posed by the Defendant’s Release

Lastly, the defendant is a clear danger to the community. Because he faces a guidelines 

sentence of life and the evidence is strong, the defendant may decide he has nothing to lose by 

committing other crimes if he is released. And as the charged conduct demonstrates, the 

defendant, a trained federal law enforcement officer, is capable of tricking children into believing 

that they must accompany him as a police officer and abusing them once they are in his custody. 

Moreover, the defendant has threatened to harm M.V. because of her report to the police. 

Officers left the defendant in the interview room after he gave a video-taped statement. While 

alone, the defendant muttered to himself: “I cannot believe this shit. Fucking little bitch. Bitch 

is claiming rape. That’s so fucking crazy. That’s crazy, man. She better hope I don’t get out 

of here.” 

If the defendant is bold enough to kidnap and sexually assault a child who is waiting for 

school, cunning enough to dispose of evidence that would inculpate him, and careless enough to 

threaten to harm her when he knows he is being videotaped in a police station, there are no limits 

to what dangers he may pose to the community or to M.V. if he is released pending trial. 

Understandably, the victim and her family very much want the defendant to be detained. 

Although the defendant has been released on bond on state charges since May, it does not 

overcome the presumption that the defendant be detained. Notably, the state court did not find 

that the defendant did not pose a danger to the community or posed no flight risk; rather, the 

defendant was released because the state stipulated to his release under conditions proposed by his 

attorney. Further, at the time of that hearing, neither the parties nor the court had all of the 

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evidence summarized above. More importantly, as mentioned above, federal courts have 

detained defendants even when they cooperated or had been on bond from state charges, finding 

that federal charges changed the calculus. And the calculus indeed has changed for the defendant 

here. He newly faces a 20-year mandatory minimum, while the state charges do not carry any 

statutory minimums. In addition, the defendant did not have discovery when he was released on 

bond on state charges and likely did not know the strength of the evidence against him. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully requests that the defendant be held 

without bail pending trial. 

This brief for the United States is filed by the undersigned on behalf of Department of Justice 

Trial Attorney AeJean Cha, of the Civil Rights Division. 

Respectfully submitted,

JUAN ANTONIO GONZALEZ 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: /S/ FRANK H. TAMEN 

Assistant United States Attorney

Florida Bar No. 261289 

99 NE 4th Street 

Miami, FL 33132 

(305) 961-9022 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 29, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. 

 Frank H. Tamen

 Asst. U.S. Attorney 

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Assistant U.S. Attorney 

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