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HUMAN RIGHTS IN XINJIANG: 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

ROUNDTABLE 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

(II) 

CO N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening statement of Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, CongressionalExecutive Commission on China ........................................................................ 1 

Grob, Douglas, Cochairman’s Senior Staff Member .............................................. 2 

Reger, Amy, Researcher, Uyghur Human Rights Project .................................... 3 

Turkel, Nury A., Attorney with Kirstein and Young, PLLC ................................ 6 

Kaup, Katherine Palmer, Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair, 

Department of Asian Studies, Furman University ........................................... 10 

Greve, Louisa, Program Director for East Asia, National Endowment for 

Democracy ............................................................................................................. 13 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Reger, Amy ............................................................................................................... 27 

(1) 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN XINJIANG: 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2009 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, 

Washington, DC. 

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., 

in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte OldhamMoore, Staff Director, presiding. 

Also Present: Douglas Grob, Cochairman’s Senior Staff Member; 

Kara Abramson, Advocacy Director; and Toy Reid, Senior Research 

Associate. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, 

STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION 

ON CHINA 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Good morning. My name is Charlotte 

Oldham-Moore and I am Staff Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [CECC], which is chaired by Senator 

Byron Dorgan. I am joined by Douglas Grob, Senior Staff Member 

to Cochairman Representative Sander Levin. 

Today we are very fortunate to have an expert panel to discuss 

‘‘Human Rights in Xinjiang: Recent Developments.’’ We also have 

in the audience Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. We welcome her and thank her 

so much for attending this morning. 

Today our panel of witnesses will examine recent developments 

in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, an area inside China’s 

northwest border, which is home to a Muslim Turkic Uyghur population and several other ethnic groups. 

As many of you may know, human rights abuses in the region 

have long been severe. The CECC has noted in its Annual Reports 

that the government has used anti-terrorism campaigns as a pretext for enforcing repressive security measures and for controlling 

expressions of religious and ethnic identity, especially among the 

Uyghur population. 

Last year, in our annual report on human rights and rule of law 

developments in China, we noted an increase in repression in 

Xinjiang amid security preparations for the summer Olympic 

Games in Beijing and elsewhere in China. This involved intensive 

anti-terrorism campaigns in the region and heightened social controls following protests among ethnic minorities in China. 

In Commission monitoring of news in the aftermath of these 

events, in part based on reports by the Uyghur Human Rights 

Project and, of course, the Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service, which 

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does fine work, we have found the government continues to implement an array of security measures in Xinjiang while maintaining 

policies aimed at promoting ethnic assimilation. 

I am going to turn to Doug Grob, who will introduce our distinguished guests, and then after they have made their statements, 

we will turn to the audience for the question-and-answer session. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS GROB, COCHAIRMAN’S SENIOR 

STAFF MEMBER 

Mr. GROB. Thank you very much, Charlotte, and thank you all 

for joining us here today. It is a great pleasure to introduce our distinguished panel to you. First, I have the honor of introducing you 

to Ms. Amy Reger. Ms. Reger is Researcher at the Uyghur Human 

Rights Project. She has authored numerous reports and publications on Uyghur human rights issues, and also has spoken on these 

issues at government forums, both in the United States and 

abroad. Her reporting has significantly raised awareness of Uyghur 

issues both among congressional staff and Members of Congress, as 

well as among staff and officials within the Executive Branch. We 

are very pleased and honored to have her here today to speak on 

recent developments in Xinjiang, including information on education policies and security campaigns in the region. 

Also, to my left, is Mr. Nury Turkel, an attorney with the law 

firm of Kirstein & Young, PLLC. Mr. Turkel is a gentleman with 

extraordinary expertise in Uyghur human rights issues, and many 

years of experience working to promote the rule of law in China 

and Central Asia. He has written commentaries on public policy 

and legal matters in major U.S. publications, and has appeared on 

numerous news and public affairs programs. His testimony today 

will focus on current trends affecting the Uyghur people in areas 

including freedom of religion, cultural rights, freedom of movement, 

and China’s global influence. 

To my right, I have the privilege of introducing to you Professor 

Katherine Palmer Kaup, Associate Professor of Political Science 

and the Chair of the Department of Asian Studies at Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina. Professor Kaup is also the 

Director of China Programs at the Richard W. Riley Institute of 

Government, Politics, and Public Leadership. Professor Kaup is the 

author of the book ‘‘Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China,’’ 

and she is the author of several articles on the impact of state policy and of administrative divisions on ethnic identity and mobilization in China’s southwest regions as well as in Xinjiang. And in 

2005, she served as a Special Adviser on Minority Nationality Affairs at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. So we 

are very pleased to have you back today to provide us with information on the Chinese Government’s ethnic minority policies in 

general, and toward Xinjiang in particular, and to discuss broader, 

long-term trends in the region. 

Finally, also to my right, I have the honor of introducing to you 

Ms. Louisa Greve, who is Program Director for East Asia with the 

National Endowment for Democracy. The National Endowment for 

Democracy makes grants to democracy and human rights organizations in more than 80 countries. Ms. Greve has studied, worked, 

3 

and traveled in China since 1980, and has testified before congressional committees on human rights in China and democracy promotion in Asia. Her work has been of extraordinary importance 

and impact, and has made a significant contribution to this Commission’s understanding of conditions in China. She will speak 

today on the connection between developments in Xinjiang and 

China’s broader human rights and rule-of-law development, and 

also will look at issues including China’s rights defense movement 

and ethnic claims in transitioning societies. 

So, with that, I would like now to turn the floor over to Amy 

Reger. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF AMY REGER, RESEARCHER, UYGHUR HUMAN 

RIGHTS PROJECT 

Ms. REGER. I would like to thank the CECC and Charlotte 

Oldham-Moore and Doug Grob for holding this panel and providing 

such a rare opportunity for us to have a public forum to discuss 

Uyghur human rights issues. And I especially want to thank Kara 

Abramson, who I know has worked really hard on putting this together, and who is always very helpful to us in our work, and it 

is really an honor for me to speak on this panel with Kate Kaup 

and with Louisa and Nury, both of whom I consider as great mentors. 

Members of the Chinese Government delegation asserted during 

this week’s Universal Periodic Review process that there is no ethnic conflict in the People’s Republic of China [PRC], except for conflict stemming from a very few individuals backed by foreign forces 

aiming to split China. However, the reality for the Uyghur people 

is much different from this rhetoric. The past year marked a period 

of extreme oppression for Uyghurs, marked by a sharp increase in 

arrests for state security crimes and security crackdowns aimed at 

the broader Uyghur population. 

The Chinese Government intensified its use of the war on terror 

to persecute Uyghurs through mass arrests, detentions, and executions, the mobilization of armed police and security forces to the region, and ideological campaigns aimed at stamping out the ‘‘three 

evil forces’’ of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. 

Remarks in just the past two months by top officials in East 

Turkistan indicate a stepped-up security drive and an intensified 

crackdown on peaceful expressions of Uyghur identity and dissent. 

On January 11, Provincial Party Secretary Wang Lequan told 

members of the People’s Armed Police Forces that the ‘‘three evil 

forces’’ appeared to be preparing a series of attacks in the region. 

Deputy Communist Party Secretary Nur Bekri was quoted in official Chinese media as telling 500 government delegates on January 

7 to be on guard against the ‘‘three evil forces’’ and to be prepared 

for a long-term battle against these elements. 

In September of last year, Nur Bekri delivered a lengthy speech 

accusing Western countries of instigating terrorism, separatism, 

and extremism in East Turkistan. Bekri’s remarks are consistent 

with previous Chinese Government assertions linking outside 

forces with alleged domestic terrorism. In line with earlier official 

claims regarding Uyghur terrorism, Bekri did not offer any evidence to substantiate his assertions. 

4 

Chinese officials, led by Wang Lequan, have consistently attempted to link human rights organizations with terrorism and 

alleged terrorist groups in order to discredit their human rights efforts. In recent months, both Nur Bekri and Wang Lequan have 

also frequently resorted to character assassination with respect to 

Uyghur democracy leader Rebiya Kadeer in a clear attempt to demonize her and discredit her human rights advocacy. In his speech 

in September, Bekri directly targeted the World Uyghur Congress, 

a German-based organization led by Ms. Kadeer that promotes democracy, human rights, and freedom for the Uyghur people. 

Following a series of violent attacks in and around the cities of 

Kucha and Kashgar that took place during the Olympic period, 

Wang Lequan announced a life-or-death struggle in East 

Turkistan. While PRC authorities claimed the security measures 

implemented in the pre- and post-Olympic period were aimed at 

punishing individuals involved in the violent attacks that occurred, 

the scope of the crackdown represents a broad, far-reaching campaign of intimidation and fear aimed at the Uyghur community. 

Security measures carried out during this period included the arrest of 160 Uyghur children aged 8 to 14 years old for participating 

in so-called illegal religious activities. Religious restrictions were 

implemented during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in 2008 

at an unprecedented level. Students and government employees 

were not permitted to fast during Ramadan this year or attend 

mosques in general. Restaurants were also forced to open during 

fasting hours. 

Since the events of September 11, 2001, PRC authorities have 

used the war on terror as a pretext for cracking down on religious 

and political dissent in the region. Tens of thousands of Uyghurs 

are believed to have been detained and hundreds executed in the 

years since 2001. Individuals caught up in this campaign include 

Tohti Tunyaz, a Ph.D. scholar who was released this past Tuesday 

from prison after serving an 11-year sentence for conducting historical research in East Turkistan deemed subversive by government 

officials; and Nurmemet Yasin, a young Uyghur poet and intellectual who was imprisoned for writing an allegorical story that was 

viewed as separatist. 

Uyghurs in East Turkistan suffer a broad scope of abuses to 

their civil, political, economic, and social rights, including the fierce 

suppression of their religion; arbitrary detention, torture, and execution; PRC Government support of the influx of huge numbers of 

Han Chinese economic migrants into East Turkistan; the forced 

transfer of young Uyghur women to inland China to work in very 

poor conditions; discrimination in hiring practices; unequal access 

to healthcare services; and the elimination of Uyghur language 

schools under the current ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy. 

‘‘Bilingual education’’ is a very symbolic aspect of a governmentdriven project to assimilate Uyghurs by attacking and diluting 

their culture. Drives to expand ‘‘bilingual education’’ have paralleled heightened campaigns to promote security and battle separatism. The recent announcement of a plan to train another 16,000 

bilingual teachers for elementary schools over the next six years coincides with the recent remarks made by Wang Lequan and Nur 

Bekri regarding the need to battle the ‘‘three evil forces.’’ 

5 

According to Chinese Government propaganda, ‘‘bilingual education’’ is being put into place throughout East Turkistan to improve 

educational and employment opportunities for Uyghur children. 

One of the major problems with this type of justification is that ‘‘bilingual education’’ is not bilingual at all but, rather, monolingual. 

Another factor that challenges the Chinese Government’s official 

assertions regarding its motivations of providing a truly bilingual 

education is the removal of Uyghur children from their cultural environment and placement into Chinese language ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ 

located in 12 inland Chinese cities. This program is widely viewed 

in the Uyghur community as an attempt to Sinify young Uyghurs. 

The ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy has been pursued for the past 

decade, but with increasing intensity since 2002. The ultimate goal 

of ‘‘bilingual education’’ appears to be to replace Uyghur language 

instruction with Chinese language instruction in all areas of East 

Turkistan and to phase out the use of the Uyghur language among 

young Uyghurs. From 2002 to 2005, ‘‘bilingual education’’ was implemented in universities, high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools. And in 2005, the ‘‘bilingual education’’ push was 

expanded into East Turkistan’s preschools. 

The motivations behind the Chinese Government’s implementation of the ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy and the Xinjiang classes are 

varied and complex. While Wang Lequan himself is quoted as saying that the chief goal of Xinjiang classes is political thought training, not academic preparation, the Chinese Government likely 

hopes to eliminate any sense of a unique identity on the part of 

Uyghurs that it perceives would contribute to opposition to government policies. Because of the centralized nature of this and other 

Chinese Government policies, Uyghurs remain excluded from planning and decisionmaking processes in East Turkistan. This is extremely convenient to the government in a region that has vast 

mineral wealth, which is exploited for the benefits of China’s eastern 

boomtowns. 

Without working toward the mitigation of growing social, economic, and political challenges that face Uyghurs in East 

Turkistan, and without implementing any mechanisms by which 

Uyghurs may address their grievances, the ‘‘bilingual education’’ 

policy will not create stability in the region, nor will it improve the 

livelihood of Uyghurs. The continued application of this policy will 

have the inevitable result of further alienating the Uyghur people. 

Mr. GROB. Thank you very much, Amy. Now I would like to turn 

the floor over to Mr. Turkel. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reger appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF NURY A. TURKEL, ATTORNEY WITH KIRSTEIN 

AND YOUNG, PLLC 

Mr. TURKEL. First, I would like to commend the Commission for 

placing a strong emphasis in its 2008 report on the worsening 

human rights situation in East Turkistan. The Uyghur people 

greatly appreciate any efforts that contribute to promoting and protecting their democratic freedoms, including the right to be Muslim. 

In January 2003, Chinese Communist Party Xinjiang Secretary 

Wang Lequan said, ‘‘Xinjiang will always keep up the intensity of 

its crackdown on ethnic separatist forces and deal them devVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:58 Apr 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48222.TXT DEIDRE
6 

astating blows without showing any mercy.’’ As promised, Chinese 

leaders have ruthlessly punished the Uyghurs, even those who 

have peacefully expressed dissent and opposed China’s ongoing onslaught against Uyghurs’ ethno-national identity. These aggressive 

policies are mostly targeted at Uyghurs’ religious and cultural identity. 

China’s Constitution and many of its laws contain guarantees of 

religious freedom, but Uyghurs only have as much religious freedom as local and national authorities allow at any given moment. 

A primary purpose of this highly repressive regulatory framework 

is the enforcement of loyalty to the Communist Party and the Chinese state. On the one hand, Uyghurs believe in freedom of worship and don’t care for Communism. Public expression of dissent or 

deviance from the Party line can be grounds for charges such as 

‘‘harming national unity,’’ ‘‘disuniting nationalities,’’ or even ‘‘harming state security.’’ These charges carry very heavy penalties and 

punishments under China’s criminal law. 

China implements much stricter religious policy with respect to 

Uyghurs compared to other Muslims, particularly Hui Muslims. 

Also, non-Uyghur groups in East Turkistan aren’t perceived as presenting a secessionist threat, as Uyghurs are. The reason for this 

is that China sees Uyghurs’ ethno-national identity as a threat and 

Islam is perceived as feeding Uyghurs’ ethnic identity. So the subordination of Islam to the Chinese state is used as a means to ensure the subordination of Uyghurs as well. As such, China strictly 

controls and manages all mosques and stifles religious traditions 

that have formed a crucial part of the Uyghur identity for centuries. 

As a result, devout Uyghur Muslims experience harassment in 

their daily lives. Observing religious holidays, studying religious 

texts, or showing one’s religion through personal appearance are 

strictly forbidden in schools, government offices, and even public 

places. The government has instituted controls over who can be a 

clergy member, what version of the Qur’an may be used, where religious gatherings may be held, and what may be said on religious 

occasions. For example, government officials, state employees, children under 18, and women are prohibited from entering mosques 

and conducting religious activities. Violations of these regulations 

can result in expulsion, heavy fines, negative entries into Uyghurs’ 

personal dossiers, and administrative punishment, including detention and imprisonment. 

Religious figures with the leadership qualities, separatist tendencies, or disloyal political views had faced harsh punishment, 

including imprisonment. For example, a number of young and progressive-minded imams have been removed or even imprisoned because of their refusal to use mosques to praise the motherland and 

the Party. In June 2008, a mosque near Aksu city was demolished 

because of its refusal to put up signs in support of the Beijing 

Olympics. 

According to the media reports, including ones reported by Radio 

Free Asia Uyghur Service broadcast during the month of Ramadan 

in 2008, prayer in public places outside the main mosque was forbidden and imams’ sermons were limited to a half-hour. Local authorities required some Uyghur-owned restaurants to remain open 

7 

during the day, when Muslims normally fast. Free lunches forced 

Uyghurs to break their fasting and, most importantly, identified 

believers. Government employees were told to shave their beards, 

and police ordered women to remove their veils. 

For most Uyghurs the overriding issue isn’t religion per se, but 

the perceived threat that religious repression poses to their distinct 

identity, coupled with their acute feeling of being colonized. 

Uyghurs view the tight restrictions placed by the Chinese authorities on Uyghur Islam as an attempt to debase their very identity, 

as Islam is an essential component of their traditional identity and 

values. 

China’s attempt to suppress Islam as a motive force for separatism by confining it to tight state control not only profoundly violates human rights principles, but also further alienates the 

Uyghurs, drives religious expression further underground, and encourages the development of more radicalized and oppositional 

forms of religious identity. If the current trend continues, moderate 

voices that could mediate tensions between the Chinese state and 

Uyghurs are likely to shrink. 

China effectively exploited the post-9/11 climate that followed the 

attacks in the United States. The arrests of some Uyghurs in Afghanistan/Pakistan helped China to consistently and successfully 

portray Uyghurs as the source of a serious terrorist threat in 

China. This perception seems to have now become dominant among 

the Chinese public. The lack of a free media has made it almost 

impossible to compare sources of information and to make independent judgments about these claims. It is mind-boggling that 

some Western media organizations also helped to further this perception with reports that lacked a careful examination of Chinese 

claims. 

The hasty designation of East Turkistan Islamic Movement 

[ETIM] as a terrorist organization gave a ‘‘green light’’ to China to 

intensify its crackdown on political dissent in the region. China has 

used the ETIM designation as a propaganda tool to ‘‘confuse’’ the 

Uyghur populations by suggesting that the United States is helping 

China to destroy Uyghurs’ ethno-separatist aspirations. Also, China 

opportunistically used the post-9/11 environment to make the outrageous claim that individuals disseminating peaceful religious and 

cultural messages in East Turkistan are terrorists who have simply 

changed tactics. Many devout Uyghur Muslims have been subjected 

to arrest, imprisonment, torture, and even execution. 

China’s cultural repression of the Uyghurs is not reactive—it is 

rather a deliberate policy to control, monitor, and sterilize Uyghur 

culture so that it cannot be a vehicle for self-rule. Late last August, 

Wang vowed ‘‘preemptive strikes’’ on Uyghurs. He has been also 

advocating a ‘‘reeducation’’ drive to enhance Uyghurs’ ‘‘identification with the Chinese nation and culture.’’ Han Chinese people 

treat Uyghurs as inferiors and look down on Uyghur culture. Two 

top Chinese officials in Urumchi have helped to create a public perception that Uyghurs’ cultural heritage is ‘‘outdated’’ and inferior 

to that of the Chinese, saying that, ‘‘Uyghurs must embrace the 

Han Chinese culture and language.’’ For example, Wang said that 

the adoption of Chinese will ‘‘improve the quality of ethnic minorities, because indigenous languages are out of step with the 21st 

8 

century.’’ Uyghur education is under the current ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy, which is in theory a monolingual/Chinese-languagebased education system. The program is designed to assimilate 

Uyghurs by attacking and diluting their culture. 

The Chinese Government arbitrarily detains and imprisons 

Uyghur historians, poets and writers; burns books on Uyghur history and culture; and shuts down Uyghur publishing houses, for example, closure of the Kashgar Uyghur Publishing House. Targets 

also include ‘‘terrorism in the spiritual form’’—which targets 

Uyghur intellectuals, writers, and musicians. Journalists are arrested for ‘‘advocating separatism.’’ 

Funding for Uyghur cultural reservation and promotion programs 

have been limited or reduced. Discriminatory hiring practices are 

implemented that openly discourage Uyghur applicants who otherwise possess the necessary education, experience, and skills. Some 

Uyghurs feel that being a Uyghur isn’t such a great thing. 

Some Uyghurs share the sentiment, expressed by the Dalai 

Lama, that a form of cultural genocide is taking place in East 

Turkistan akin to that of Tibet. The apparent problem is that 

China lacks the appreciation of a culturally diverse society. Eventually, China will create a new generation of Uyghurs who won’t 

appreciate their own cultural and ethnic heritage. 

The Chinese Government has restricted Uyghurs’ domestic and 

international freedom of movement. Large numbers of Uyghurs 

were evicted from major Chinese cities before the Olympics, and 

most of them were not allowed to return after the Olympics. Racial 

profiling and targeting of Uyghurs because of their ethnicity, appearance, and origin are common in inner Chinese cities. Basic 

services such as lodging, transportation, and even public bathhouses are not available for the Uyghurs in inland Chinese cities. 

For example, ‘‘No Uyghurs in our Hotel and Bathhouse’’ ‘‘[I]n compliance with a request from the local PSB substation, starting 

today, investigations will be carried out on the lodging circumstances of all individuals of Tibetan and Uyghur ethnicity 

residing at inns and bathhouses of the Haidian District. Reinforce 

inspection and verification of any lodger matching the description 

above and report all cases to the local dispatch station.’’ 

China discriminatorily implements its passport law. Uyghurs’ 

passports have been almost universally confiscated since early 

2007. Chinese citizens can obtain passports through a fairly simple 

process, but Uyghurs and Tibetans face much greater hurdles obtaining a passport. Article 1 of China’s passport laws, enacted on 

January 1, 2007, guarantees PRC citizens the rights of exiting and 

entering China and promotes international travel and cultural exchange with foreign countries. Article 6 instructs the authorities to 

process and issue a passport within 15 days after receiving an application. If an application is not approved, the authorities should 

give the applicant a written explanation and inform him of his 

right to apply for an administrative review or to lodge an administrative lawsuit. Also, authorities deny the issuance of a passport if 

they believe that the person leaving China will do harm to state 

security or that their departure will result in serious losses to the 

benefit of the state. This has prevented family unifications and visits overseas. For example, parents could not attend significant 

9 

events such as weddings and funerals. The restriction on Uyghurs’ 

freedom of movement and travels reminds us of the Jewish experience in Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. 

China has dissuaded governments historically sympathetic to 

Uyghurs. Case in point, Uyghur democracy leader Rebiya Kadeer’s 

visa issues—at the request of the Chinese Government, Turkey has 

rejected her visa applications, even for attending National Endowment for Democracy’s [NED] democracy conference in Istanbul in 

spring 2006. Last week, a Turkish MP requested an explanation 

from the Foreign Minister on this issue. South/Central Asian countries have participated in the deportation, extradition, or rendition 

of Uyghurs to China. Most of them have been executed and many 

are serving long prison terms. For example, Uzbekistan deported a 

Canadian Uyghur to China in 2006. He was sentenced to life in 

prison in 2007. To date, the Canadians don’t have access to him. 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] assists China in 

suppressing Uyghurs’ aspirations for self-rule. The SCO fights 

against the ‘‘three evil forces’’—separatism, terrorism, and religious 

extremism. Uyghur citizens of central Asian countries cannot openly sympathize with the Uyghur freedom movement, because of concerns for their own safety. This has effectively created Uyghur resentment toward and disappointment in other Turkic peoples in 

Central Asia. 

China has effectively pressured and stopped countries that may 

have provided humanitarian assistance to Guantanamo Uyghurs. 

Despite being cleared for release as early as 2003, the Guantanamo 

Uyghurs are still languishing in prison because no country is willing to take them. Reportedly, the U.S. State Department reached 

out to over 100 countries, but none agreed to accept the Uyghurs. 

The economic and diplomatic threat of straining relations with 

China by accepting the Uyghurs has been enough to scare a number of governments away from taking them. 

I would like to make a quick recommendation to wrap up my 

testimony. First, China should revisit and acknowledge failed minority policies, particularly in East Turkistan and Tibet. Second, 

recognize that harsh treatment will not help achieve security. It 

never worked in world history. Stop the propaganda campaign 

against Uyghurs and provide channels for legitimate grievances to 

be heard. Last, restore Uyghurs’ religious and cultural rights, and 

stop coerced abortions carried out on Uyghur women. 

The role of the United States is extremely important in that she 

needs to be the Uyghurs’ main source of hope. To do that: President Obama should publicly express serious concerns over the deteriorating human rights situation in East Turkistan and allow the 

17 Guantanamo Uyghurs to resettle in the United States. The 

emptying of the Guantanamo prison cannot be achieved without 

the cooperation of America’s allies, and that cooperation cannot be 

realized without America’s firm leadership. And President Obama 

is in a very good position to do so. Freeing the 17 Uyghurs in the 

United States primes the pump and removes Europeans’ reluctance 

to help. It also gives tremendous hope and sends a positive message to the Uyghurs in East Turkistan that the United States is 

not helping the Chinese Government to suppress Uyghurs’ democratic aspirations. Also, a senior State Department official should 

10 

visit the region to meet with dissidents and family members of political prisoners. The United States should appoint a Special Coordinator for Uyghur affairs at the State Department. The United 

States should also encourage China to grant Uyghurs cultural and 

religious rights. 

Uyghurs rightfully could ask ‘‘If you prick us, do we not bleed? ’’ 

But they shouldn’t fall into the traps that the Communist leadership has intentionally set up. They should continue to condemn all 

acts of violence. Uyghurs should remember Ghandi’s quote: ‘‘There 

is a limit to violent action and it can fail. Non-violence knows no 

limits and it never fails.’’ Continuing to build grassroots support 

among youth is critically important. They should carry out public 

education through media. They should also work with Western democracies to prevent China’s misuse of its global influence. 

Uyghurs should also encourage critical thinking about CCP messages regarding Uyghurs and other minorities. Most importantly, 

Uyghur should work to raise awareness among Chinese democratic 

activists and democratic-minded Chinese about PRC policies. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Turkel. 

For those of you who are interested, the full text of Mr. Turkel’s 

remarks will be included in the roundtable record, and any points 

you want to address with him, you can do it in the Q&A session. 

Mr. GROB. Thank you very much, Mr. Turkel. 

Now I would like to turn the floor over to Professor Kaup. 

STATEMENT OF KATHERINE PALMER KAUP, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT 

OF ASIAN STUDIES, FURMAN UNIVERSITY 

Ms. KAUP. Thank you. And my thanks also to the Commission 

for inviting me to speak today. 

There is no doubt in my mind that there are serious flaws in the 

Chinese Government’s minority policies. Policies in Xinjiang need 

to be changed. Unfortunately, however, there are no simple solutions to resolving ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. There are numerous 

competing interests at stake in the region. 

Numerous human rights organizations, including those presenting here today, have well documented the extensive human 

rights violations occurring in Xinjiang. Precisely because the impacts of these policies are felt so dramatically by individuals living 

within the region, discussion of human rights conditions in 

Xinjiang often turns polemical. The Chinese Government hurls accusations of widespread international terrorism activity among the 

Uyghurs, while critics of the regime accuse it of using terrorism 

purely as a pretext to annihilate the Uyghur culture. There is a 

tendency on both sides to oversimplify the situation and assume 

that the other is simply intransigent and unwilling to implement 

or accept proper policies. 

Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to resolving ethnic 

tensions in Xinjiang. Nor is there agreement on what proper policies might be. There are, instead, numerous competing interests at 

stake in the region. Failure to recognize the complexity of the 

issues facing the Chinese Government and failure to place these 

policies into broader context hinders human rights activists’ ability 

11 

to engage the Chinese Government in any kind of constructive dialogue. 

Though the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law is supposed to guarantee the minorities a number of rights, even properly implemented the law alone cannot protect minority rights in Xinjiang. 

Only mutual trust can enable the minorities and the central government to co-exist. 

China is a self-proclaimed, unitary, multinational state, and autonomous areas are required, as noted by Article 7 of the Regional 

Ethnic Autonomy Law, to ‘‘place the interests of the state as a 

whole above anything else.’’ Natural resources throughout the 

country belong to the central government. Though the head of the 

government of each autonomous area must be a member of the titular minority, as elsewhere in the country, these leaders are not 

popularly elected at the county or the provincial level, nor are 

there mandates for ensuring minority representation within the 

Communist Party, where most power remains. 

It is, therefore, only through building mutual trust that the 

minorities and the central government can learn to co-exist and 

recognize any mutual interest. The current policies, along with 

widespread rhetoric equating ethnic activism and international terrorism, are weakening whatever trust exists, even as Xinjiang’s 

economic indicators as a whole are improving. The Chinese Government’s current policies in Xinjiang are working at odds with its 

own goals. 

In my time remaining, I would like to divide my comments into 

three parts. First, I will address why resolving ethnic tensions in 

Xinjiang is at once so important and yet so challenging to the central government. I will then illustrate how two fundamental assumptions inform all of the Chinese Government’s minority policies 

and lead to policies that tend to exacerbate rather than alleviate 

ethnic tensions in the region. Finally, I will conclude with some 

brief recommendations for improving ethnic relations in Xinjiang. 

First, why is resolving ethnic tension in Xinjiang at once so important and yet so challenging to the Chinese Government? It is 

important to remember that the Xinjiang question is much bigger 

than just Xinjiang. Mishandling policies in Xinjiang could have 

dramatic impact throughout the country. More than 125 million 

residents of the PRC are officially classified as ethnic minorities. 

Integrating them and ensuring their loyalty to a unified Chinese 

state has not been easy. 

Minorities are spread across two-thirds of China’s land mass, 

often in the most resource-rich areas of the country. Despite living 

in these resource-rich regions, minority educational levels fall overwhelmingly below those of the Han Chinese, as do numerous other 

socioeconomic indicators. Income levels are, on average, less than 

half that of the Han Chinese. 

Many of the minorities do not speak Mandarin Chinese and have 

traditions as well as legal and customary practices that at times 

conflict with state laws. Finding a proper balance on how best to 

protect individual citizens and minority groups while developing 

the nation as a whole has been a complex challenge for the central 

government. 

12 

Resolving ethnic tensions in Xinjiang has been particularly challenging for the central government. Xinjiang accounts for one-sixth 

of China’s total land mass and is home to vast coal, oil, and natural 

gas reserves. Though there was a period of relatively loose control 

in Xinjiang in the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 

alarmed the Chinese Government and heightened its interest in 

keeping the minority territories under control. 

Xinjiang borders eight countries, several of which were once ethnic republics under the Soviet Union. The expansion of oil exploitation in the region in the early 1990s only increased tensions over 

exactly who should benefit from these state-owned resources. Han 

Chinese were sent to the region in increasingly large numbers to 

exploit the oil, which Uyghurs were arguably not positioned to do 

yet due to the dearth of trained Uyghur technicians and engineers. 

Two large-scale protests against restrictive ethnic policies in 

1990 and 1997 further strained relations and resulted in increased 

government crackdowns over expressions of Uyghur ethnic identity. 

The government responded to these protests by cracking down 

harshly on dissent, further fueling ethnic tensions. 

Chinese efforts to alleviate these ethnic tensions and integrate 

the country are grounded on two key assumptions: First, the government assumes that economic development is the key to resolving 

all ethnic problems; and, second, that Han Chinese are inherently 

more politically reliable than minorities. Grounded in Marxist theory, the Chinese Communist Party has continuously asserted that 

development is, in the words of Hu Jintao, ‘‘the key to solving all 

problems of China and the key to solving the difficulties and problems in ethnic regions.’’ 

The Chinese Government is wary of minority leaders’ intentions 

and has sent by its own admission tens of thousands of Han cadre 

into minority territories specifically to combat what it calls ‘‘domestic and foreign forces’ vain attempts to stir up ethnic separatism.’’ 

Rapid economic development in Xinjiang and exploitation of the 

vast natural resources requires more technically trained personnel 

than the local population can currently provide. In order to rush 

economic development in hopes of solving ethnic tensions, the government offers incentive packages to educated personnel from the 

interior, predominantly Han, territories. The intent may be to increase the region’s economic development as a whole, but the fact 

remains that the best positions in Xinjiang are overwhelmingly 

dominated by Han Chinese, and the government pays those coming 

from the interior more than locals holding similar positions. This 

is specifically mandated by government policy. Central government 

intentions may not be pernicious but the policies, nonetheless, lead 

to ethnic resentment and increased tensions in the region. 

So where do we go from here? 

First, it is crucial to recognize that there are no clear-cut solutions on how best to protect minority rights while simultaneously 

ensuring the territorial integrity of a unitary Chinese state. Better 

acknowledging the challenges facing the Chinese Government 

while continuing to urge the government to ease restrictions on 

Uyghur identity may lead to a more constructive dialogue. 

I would like to propose four recommendations that the U.S. Government might encourage the Chinese Government to consider. 

13 

First, the Chinese Government should consider reducing its 

encouragement of mass migration to Xinjiang. Until educational 

levels in Xinjiang are raised and Uyghurs are able to compete more 

equally with Han Chinese, the Uyghurs will only resent those offered higher salaries and better positions and will discount any of 

their contributions. 

Two, the Chinese Government should consider further increasing 

investments in the educational system within Xinjiang. Long-term 

success in Xinjiang depends on providing the Uyghurs the tools 

they need to participate fully in the region’s economic development. 

The pace of development needs to be better managed, probably 

even slowed, until Uyghurs can play a more crucial and central 

role in the process. 

Three, the Chinese Government should consider offering incentives to well-educated Uyghurs willing to remain in Xinjiang. Policies encouraging the transfer of skilled labor from Xinjiang to the 

interior should be halted immediately. 

Four, the Chinese Government should recruit more minorities 

into the Chinese Communist Party and promote them to positions 

of real leadership. Though the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law requires the head of each autonomous area to be drawn from the titular minority, real power in the country remains in the hands of 

the Communist Party. Policies barring religious believers from 

party membership should be waived to encourage greater minority 

participation and enable those with real ties in the local communities to succeed within the party. 

In conclusion, properly recognizing the complexities facing the 

Chinese Government may enable more constructive dialogue on 

human rights issues in Xinjiang. The Chinese Government hopes 

to ease ethnic tensions through rapid economic development and 

assuring that Han Chinese retain control of key government and 

party positions. These two policies, however, are exacerbating rather than alleviating tensions. Combined with strict security policies, 

these policies may eventually radicalize a currently peaceful minority. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GROB. Thank you very much, Professor Kaup. 

And now I would like to turn the floor over to Ms. Louisa Greve. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF LOUISA GREVE, PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR 

EAST ASIA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Ms. GREVE. Thank you. My topic today is the relationship of the 

situation in Xinjiang to that in the rest of China. In a word, it is 

a yawning chasm. The gulf between trends in Xinjiang and trends 

elsewhere in China is dramatic, particularly in the areas of rule of 

law, civil society development, personal freedoms, transparency, 

and governance, as you have heard. 

I will give several illustrations of this gulf and then go on to give 

some forward-looking observations. 

The first illustration is the subjective or experiential dimension 

of living as a Uyghur and, in some cases, other minorities in 

Xinjiang. If you talk to Uyghurs about any of the human rights 

abuses that are common in China, throughout China, that the 

14 

CECC frequently documents in its reports, the Uyghurs will talk 

about it differently, the experience differently. They are a distinct 

minority. The things that threaten their families, their choices in 

life, their personal freedoms, are not just violations of individual 

rights, but in many cases they feel it threatens their existence as 

a national group, that is, an ethnic group, their ability to choose 

their own cultural development. 

Several have been mentioned today. I will mention one more: the 

one-child policy. Of course, the one-child policy applies throughout 

China, and as an officially designated minority, Uyghurs technically are able to live under a more lenient provision, where, for 

example, they might be able to have two children, where a Han in 

the same situation would be able to have one child. But the 

Uyghurs experience this not, again, as a limitation on individual 

autonomy but, rather, as a state-sponsored policy that limits people’s choices about family and, in fact, effectively limits the growth 

of the people who belong to this identity and, as a way to control 

the ethnic group as well as individuals. 

Another example of this subjective dimension is to look at freedom of information and political discussion in China. We know that 

despite all kinds of Internet censorship, nonetheless a very lively 

discussion of very interesting ideas goes on, partly because of the 

Internet and blogging. You talk to Uyghurs and they say, ‘‘There 

is just no comparison between what intellectuals and students and 

activists are able to do in heartland China compared to what we 

would be able to do.’’ The same thing goes for the ‘‘weiquan,’’ or 

rights defense, legal movement, networks of environmental 

NGOs—nothing like that is possible for Uyghurs who would like to 

organize on any of these public policy issues that affect their lives. 

The second dimension of the gulf is the prominence of ethnicity. 

Government-supported racism is a daily fact of life for Uyghurs 

and other minorities, with openly discriminatory job announcements and the rest. Restrictions on Uyghurs’ ability to check into 

hotel rooms in inner China, heartland China, is a blatant example, 

and quotas restricting hiring of Uyghurs in government positions 

as well, in the party and the government. There are even lists indicating the ethnicity of the chairman and the deputy chairman positions, which should be Han, which should be Uyghur, and vice 

versa, in different cases. These last are not open but ‘‘neibu,’’ confidential documents. 

The third dimension is government rhetoric. The PRC’s ‘‘patriotic 

education’’ campaigns have been fairly intense, especially since 

1989. But the content of ‘‘patriotic education’’ has a very different 

flavor in Xinjiang compared to other places in China and other minority regions. Great emphasis, of course, on ethnic unity. Great 

emphasis, of course, particularly since 9/11, on anti-terrorism and 

the military imagery that goes along with that. And, third, overall, 

the language just feels very old. When you look at the billboards, 

you read what the newspapers say, it will feel like China of 15 or 

20 years ago with lots of language about the ‘‘motherland,’’ as was 

quoted already. 

One example: In 2004, Xinjiang celebrated the 50th anniversary 

of the ‘‘liberation’’ of Xinjiang, and below the statues featuring lots 

of Mao, displays featuring Mao as, you know, a wonderful figure 

15 

in Xinjiang’s history and China’s history—that doesn’t occur very 

much elsewhere in China. The slogan was, ‘‘Fifty years of harmony 

between the Uyghur and Chinese people.’’ In other words, a very 

Orwellian flavor to public propaganda. 

Fourth, I wanted to mention some structural things about 

Xinjiang governance that make it stand out and are not found elsewhere. Of course, people know about the Xinjiang Production and 

Construction Corps, which is a frontier mechanism modeled, of 

course, in part, on some historical means used by Chinese empires 

in settling and cultivating and securing, garrisoning frontier land. 

This happened after the establishment of the People’s Republic of 

China. Few people know it was actually abolished in 1975 and was 

brought back in 1981 with the explicit objectives of countering Soviet encirclement, countering the East Turkistan independence 

movement—remember, this is 1981 and therefore, long before the 

1990s incidents that we all think about—countering Islamic fundamentalism and, of course, the cultivation of frontier lands and 

economic development not found elsewhere. The Corps employs 2 

or more million people out of a population of over 18 million. 

Governance. Wang Lequan, Party Secretary of the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party 

of China, and first political commissar of the Xinjiang Production 

and Construction Corps, has been in that office since 1994. Students of elite politics in China can tell us a little bit about what 

it means that he has been in that position for 14 years and is not 

subject to the same rotation rules as governors elsewhere or party 

chairmen. 

And the fifth dimension really is about the scale and types of 

human rights violations. This has been mentioned already this 

morning. I will just mention the statistic reported in January in 

the official Chinese press, that almost 1,300 state security-related 

arrests had been carried out in Xinjiang from January to November 

2008. The Dui Hua Foundation’s research shows that about onehalf of all trials in China related to the crime of endangering state 

security takes place in Xinjiang. The crime of ‘‘endangering state 

security’’ includes trafficking in state secrets, separatism, espionage, subversion, and so on, and it does carry the death penalty. 

If half of these arrests take place in Xinjiang, that is another dimension where you are seeing something very different happening 

in Xinjiang than the rest of China. 

Now, I did promise to give some forward-looking observations. I 

will make them brief. More Han Chinese need to acknowledge the 

gulf. Things really are different. Too often you talk to Chinese 

human rights activists, and they say, ‘‘Well, Han suffer human 

rights violations, too.’’ And that is true. But there are differences, 

and that needs to be acknowledged. 

Related to that, even very active Chinese democrats, liberal 

thinkers, people who want constitutionalism in China, are infected 

by the propaganda and think that any Uyghur who is an activist, 

politically active, is advocating for an independent country. In a 

public presentation, a Uyghur will say, ‘‘We are looking for human 

rights,’’ and give all kinds of details, and the question from a Han 

audience member will begin, ‘‘Well, since you’re asking for independence, . . .’’ and they cannot hear the difference. 

16 

Second, Han and Uyghurs have to think more about the future: 

federalism, governance, how to resolve tensions. 

Third, those who are outside China, Chinese and international 

human rights NGOs, should focus on where they can make a difference, and I am afraid to say that recommending things to the 

Chinese Government is a very long-term project. In the shorter 

term, it is possible, as Nury mentioned, to do more to enable 

Uyghurs who are not in China to receive protection. For example, 

it is important to ensure that third-party governments are not 

bullied by the Chinese Government into returning Uyghurs who 

have applied for political asylum or have refugee status to China, 

to face terrible mistreatment, imprisonment, and even execution. 

And then, finally, I do want to say that raising international 

awareness, as the CECC has done so much to do, I think, again, 

in the long term can make a big difference. People who have the 

courage to speak should do so. People in China cannot. And many 

Chinese intellectuals have blinders on that make it hard for them 

to look at it. Eventually, with more discussion and careful documentation, I believe that this will filter through and enable Chinese activists who themselves are intellectuals and lawmakers who 

are the ones who are going to have to force the solutions, we want 

to help them by getting the information out there so that they can 

eventually learn from it. 

Mr. GROB. Thank you very much, Ms. Greve. 

And now, as we turn to the question-and-answer period of today’s 

roundtable, I have the great pleasure of introducing to you Ms. 

Kara Abramson, senior staff specialist on Xinjiang with the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. I would like to thank 

you, Kara, for your hard work putting this program together. And 

just so all of you know, aside from being a Harvard-trained lawyer 

and a historian, Kara also is a linguist who reads, writes, and 

speaks Mandarin, Japanese, and Uyghur. I would like to turn to 

her to kick off the Q&A session—in English. [Laughter.] 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Dr. Kaup discussed several strategies for engagement in her testimony, and I’d like to continue discussing this 

issue. Given the political sensitivities of this issue, given that the 

government has ramped up rhetoric against ‘‘Western hostile 

forces’’ infiltrating China in the name of human rights, and given 

that Xinjiang authorities continue to vilify Uyghur rights advocate 

Rebiya Kadeer, is there even an opening to begin to talk about 

these issues and engage with the Chinese Government? In addition, could some type of engagement also come from within China? 

I’d like to pose this question to all the panelists. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Brief answers so we can go right back to 

the audience. Thanks. 

Ms. KAUP. I agree with Louisa that this is certainly a very longterm strategy, and the Chinese Government is extraordinarily reluctant to talk about these issues, particularly to talk about 

Xinjiang. I am not suggesting we are going to sit down and say ‘‘we 

feel your pain’’ and, the Chinese Government is then going to ask 

to sit down to chat about what to do in Xinjiang. That is just not 

going to happen. 

That said, I think that presuming to understand the intentions 

of the Chinese Government and accusing it of using terrorism simVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:58 Apr 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48222.TXT DEIDRE
17 

ply as a pretext to annihilate Uyghur culture is, frankly, just not 

productive. Whether or not you believe it to be true, it is simply 

not productive to make such harsh accusations, and the tone immediately puts the Chinese Government on the defensive. 

It would be much more constructive to say instead that the current policies are working at odds with the central government’s 

own goals, and are driving into a corner those who would otherwise 

not find violence at all appealing. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Just very quickly, for those who did not 

hear the question, Kara asked: How can the United States and others constructively engage China on this issue? 

Ms. ABRAMSON. And the second part—and these questions are for 

all of the panelists—if it is hard to engage from our end, or in addition to doing it from our end, is this type of engagement possible 

from within China and by whom? 

Ms. GREVE. It is a very good question. In fact, at the National 

Endowment for Democracy [NED], we have thought this needs a 

lot of encouragement. We ourselves have conducted a series of 

meetings, starting in about 2004, with people of various ethnicities 

coming together. It is very hard, even when you get a group of committed, pro-democracy activists who have sacrificed their own lives, 

some of them served time in prison, they still find it very hard. So, 

one, realize that multi-ethnic dialogue is important and is going to 

be difficult, and it can start with anybody. Nobody can do it—if you 

get it started anywhere, those people can then be ambassadors in 

an otherwise very bleak picture of people willing to listen and truly 

engage with people from another point of view. 

Second, the blogosphere, the alternative press, is one place to 

start things that can filter through, and certainly NED has been 

encouraging the more than half a dozen Internet-based publications which are not subject—which are maintained on servers outside of China so they cannot be literally shut down, and then readers 

inside China can access them through using proxies. That kind of 

people, people are trying to push the boundaries of freedom of expression and getting away from the constraints of censorship inside 

China. This has to be one of the topics that is on the agenda for 

them. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Nury, please. 

Mr. TURKEL. There are a lot of things that the United States can 

do. The fundamental problem is that the leaders of the free world 

have not expressed strong concerns publicly over Uyghurs 

sufferings, particularly on the ongoing onslaught against Uyghurs. 

People just mention Uyghur issues in passing and, as far as I 

know, no one yet brought up a list of specific issues to the Chinese 

and asked them to make improvements. President Obama and Secretary Clinton could say to the Chinese that it is okay to be Muslim and Uyghur, there is nothing wrong with it, and you need to 

respect their religious and cultural rights. I don’t think anyone has 

said that to the Chinese yet. And the United States is in the best 

position to do that. It has been done on behalf of the Tibetans in 

the past. As a result, the Chinese Government is fairly careful in 

their dealing with the Tibetans inside China. 

Number two, the United States should send a high-level official, 

perhaps Secretary Clinton, to East Turkistan and deliver a speech 

18 

that the United States cares about the Uyghurs. That would be 

very powerful because it will give Uyghurs a hope that there will 

be a light at the end of the tunnel. We have heard President 

Obama’s message of hope to the nation in the last two years, and 

some of that hope needs to be delivered to the Uyghurs. 

Finally, the State Department and the other government offices 

here in Washington need to have someone with a full-time responsibility working on the Uyghur issues. Again, the Chinese are not 

taking Uyghur issues seriously because there is not much work 

done on behalf of the Uyghurs. 

Ms. REGER. I would just like to say it is very important for American officials to consistently raise Uyghur issues, like Nury was 

talking about, both inside China and in the United States when we 

have a forum to talk with Chinese officials. The U.S. Government 

should consistently raise Uyghur human rights issues. At the very 

least, this will bring hope to the Uyghur people, and despite the 

difficulty of perhaps effecting broader policy changes in the PRC or 

in East Turkistan, at the very least we can hope to achieve small 

victories. 

For instance—and perhaps this is not a small victory, but without the intervention and the pressure exerted by U.S. officials, Ms. 

Kadeer would not have come here a few years ago. Just a few 

months ago, U.S. Congressmen and other officials raised the issue 

of forced abortion in East Turkistan, particularly focusing on the 

case of Arzigul Tursun. She was six months’ pregnant, and in contravention of Chinese law, local officials attempted to force her to 

have an abortion. But after U.S. officials raised concerns about her 

case, she was allowed to return home and continue with her pregnancy. 

And I also would like to point out—I am not normally in a position to comment on U.S. policy issues, but I believe it would be in 

the best interests of the United States to foster support and engagement with Uyghurs considering that they are among the most 

pro-American and pro-Western Muslims in the world, since they 

live across the border from a very volatile region. So it would make 

sense if the United States would express support for this population. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Nury has one more comment, and then I 

want to say something, too. 

Mr. TURKEL. I forgot to mention that there is a large Uyghur 

population outside China, and how the United States handles the 

Uyghur issue, how much support the U.S. Government gives to the 

Uyghurs have a direct impact on the lives of the Uyghurs living in 

Central Asia, Europe, and other parts of the world. To me, the 

countries that have Uyghur populations have been shaping up 

their Uyghur policies based on the United States’ Uyghur policies. 

So it is, like Kate said, the Uyghur issue is not a simple domestic 

issue in China. Rather, it is a cross-broader and geopolitical issue. 

So the United States should also actively engage in and talk with 

other players, particularly countries in Central Asia that have a 

sizable Uyghur population, to urge those governments to grant civil 

rights to their own Uyghur citizens and stop harassing the 

Uyghurs residing or visiting their respective countries. That would 

be a tremendous help. 

19 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I want to follow up on what Nury said because it is important to note the efforts of some Members of Congress who have worked on the Uyghur issue. They include Senator 

Sherrod Brown, who has introduced a resolution concerning 

Uyghurs, Senator Inhofe, and Representative Ros-Lehtinen, among 

others. 

[Inaudible, off microphone.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Thank you very much. Nury, please? 

Mr. TURKEL. On the issue of self-determination, it is very hard 

to get a real sense of what people really want for their nation because there is no freedom of expression in China. It is hard to poll 

public opinions among the Uyghurs to find out what they really 

want. 

But the pressing issue for the Uyghurs both inside and outside 

China is how to save the Uyghurs as a distinct ethnic group or nation, if you will. That is the most important, paramount issue. And, 

of course, Uyghurs would like to run their own national, political, 

and economic affairs. But prioritizing what needs to be done, the 

Uyghurs are highly focused on preservation of their cultural heritage at the moment. 

On your second question, the answer is yes and no. Yes, because 

Tibetans have built such a strong, worldwide grassroots movement. 

That is something that the Uyghurs can and should learn. And no, 

because, in my view, Tibetans should know it better, but I do believe that Tibetans’ genuineness, offers, and efforts are not being 

appreciated by the Chinese. And I think that is a good lesson to 

learn, but I do not think it is something good for the Uyghurs to 

follow. 

The Chinese Government did not show any good intentions. 

Some Tibetans believe that the dialogue is something that should 

be continued and it helps to further publicize Tibetan issues. Of 

course, it gets lots of media attention, media coverage. But I have 

not seen and/or heard specific improvements made as a result of 

the ongoing dialogue with the Chinese. As for the last question, the 

concerns about the other minorities are well understood, but as I 

point out in my statement, the Chinese Government’s policy toward 

those minorities, including the Kazakhs and others, are not as 

nearly oppressive as they have been to the Uyghurs. So the 

Uyghurs always have been a target for China’s oppressive policies. 

So-called minority conflict in East Turkistan is a modern phenomenon. As you may know, in 1944 there was a multi-ethnic, republican system of government established in East Turkistan, and 

the head of the government was Uzbek, and some of the most senior military leaders were Kyrgyz and Kazakh. It is fair to say that 

there was no ethnic conflict between various groups in East 

Turkistan before the Chinese took over the region. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. Thank you very much. 

Please, in the back. 

Ms. MCCOY. Jenny McCoy, China Aid. Thanks for your comments. I have a question about how to advocate on behalf of political prisoners in Xinjiang. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Excellent. 

Ms. GREVE. Again, an often overlooked element of your press list 

would be the Chinese language publications that try to reach ChiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:58 Apr 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48222.TXT DEIDRE
20 

nese readers so that they, too, can become aware of how to speak 

about political and religious prisoners in the ethnic minorities area, 

whether it is Mongol or Tibetan, Uyghur or Kazakh, Uzbek, and so 

on, in universalistic human rights terms. In general, that is something that Chinese civil society and intellectuals are still learning, 

and certainly about people in Xinjiang. So I would say always 

please include on your list all Chinese language publications. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That is great. 

Ms.PERKINS. This is a question for all panelists. What do you 

think about the approach of empowering Uyghur minority groups 

on the ground? Can we provide funding? I understand that we have 

some restrictions on U.S. funding to groups on the ground in 

China. But we also have some exceptions, including funding programs that preserve culture and environment for other ethnic 

groups, such as Tibetans. Do you think this approach would work 

well in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region? 

Ms. GREVE. It has been done. The Congress has taken up for Tibetans this kind of funding to support education and entrepreneurial grassroots economic development that is well distributed 

and so on. And it is absolutely to be encouraged to have the Congress explore this for Xinjiang. I think Nury would be able to speak 

better to the particular circumstances. And, in fact, in Tibet, it is 

very hard, as you know, to get the work done, lots of blocking of 

programs and very suspicious local government wanting to check 

everything, and that would go probably 10 times for Xinjiang. But 

it is absolutely worth trying. 

Mr. TURKEL. What immediately can be done? I agree with Louisa. What immediately can be done is that the U.S. Congress sets 

up a scholarship for Uyghur college graduates to come here to enroll in graduate programs and return afterward. And that would be 

tremendously helpful. 

Ms. REGER. I just wanted to add one thing—it is, of course, important to foster civil rights for Uyghurs in East Turkistan. One 

additional thing that the United States and other governments can 

do that have ethnic Uyghur populations is provide programmatic 

and financial support for groups that are—or Uyghur organizations 

forming to preserve and maintain the Uyghur language and culture 

and historical documents and materials. I believe that there is one 

such organization that is forming in the Washington area, so that 

is another sort of program that could be developed. 

Ms. KAUP. I wonder if I could combine a couple of the questions 

to frame my comments. I think the question that was raised about 

how many Uyghurs want self-determination illustrates the importance of recognizing the complexities facing the Chinese Government while pressing it to change its treatment of minorities in 

Xinjiang. Current policies clearly repress and prohibit any discussion of claims for self-determination, but there is a legitimate concern on the Chinese Government’s part about what happens when 

those controls are loosened. And if we just discount that, whether 

‘‘we’’ be the U. S. Government or international rights organizations 

or scholars, if we just discount it and continue to claim that the 

Chinese Government is being entirely unreasonable and has no legitimate concerns and is just interested in annihilating the Uyghur 

culture, I think we miss an opportunity to engage in dialogue. We 

21 

miss an opportunity to discuss with the Chinese Government how 

we have handled dissent, or how other countries have, or indeed 

how any nation can handle demands for self-determination without 

exacerbating the tensions and inequities inspiring such demands. 

How can the Chinese Government protect freedom of expression 

and, precisely through protecting such freedoms, therefore show 

Uyghurs that they can flourish within a unified state? This is the 

question we want to address. 

I would also like to respond to the earlier question of what can 

be done by those working within China. Security is so tight right 

now that one can barely even talk about issues in Xinjiang in 

China. 

So I think that if movement is going to come from within China, 

it has to be done in areas that the Chinese Government is going 

to find acceptable. It can be very difficult to cooperate with the Chinese Government in this area, particularly if one objects strongly 

to its policies. But there are certain policy arenas, education, for 

example, in which the Chinese Government is willing to allow 

international participation. I think Nury’s recommendation that 

the U.S. Government provide scholarships to Uyghur students to 

study in the United States is an excellent idea. It is also important 

to work with NGOs strengthening educational opportunities for minorities within Xinjiang. The central key to alleviating ethnic tensions in Xinjiang is not breakneck-rate economic development, but 

enabling and empowering the Uyghurs to participate in their own 

cultural and economic development within the PRC. Improving 

educational opportunities can move us one step in this direction. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. Anybody else? Yes, please. 

[Inaudible, off microphone.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. She asked: How have other Muslim minorities responded to the persecution—persecution by whom? I am 

sorry. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Of the Uyghurs. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Of the Uyghurs. 

Mr. TURKEL. I would love to respond to that question. Muslim 

countries have been unfavorable and they don’t seem to care about 

their fellow Uyghur Muslims. It is ironic. The Uyghurs have been 

persecuted by the Chinese in China and ignored by the West mostly because they happen to be Muslim. You know, being a Muslim 

is not such a great thing in these days. And Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and many others, to that extent, 

are collaborating with the Chinese. For example, Pakistan has 

rounded up Uyghurs who were sympathetic to the Uyghur cause or 

involved in Uyghur political activities. Pakistanis repatriated many 

of those Uyghurs to China where they were tortured, imprisoned, 

or executed. 

Another Muslim country, Uzbekistan, arrested a Uyghur Canadian, a Canadian citizen in Tashkent. And he was deported to 

China and sentenced to life in prison. To date, Canadians have not 

been granted counselor access to him despite personal involvement 

of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. 

And other countries in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia politicized 

pilgrimage issue. Saudis will not issue visas to the Uyghurs unless 

they have pre-approval or clearance from the Chinese. That has 

22 

subjected the Uyghurs to Chinese harassments and humiliations. 

As far as I am concerned, Saudis don’t apply the same restrictions 

to the Muslims from other countries. Last year, nearly 1,000 

Uyghurs in Pakistan demonstrated in front of the Saudi Embassy 

and applied for visas. Their applications were denied and one individual died during the demonstration. With the help of U.S. Government officials and Members of Congress, Saudis allowed the 

Uyghur Muslims to travel to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage. I mean, 

the situation for the Uyghur cannot be worse than this. Often 

times, people think, ‘‘Oh, Uyghurs are Muslims, so they are getting 

all the help from the other Muslim states or Arab states or Middle 

Eastern states.’’ That’s not the case at all. Actually, it is the opposite. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Yes, sir, please? 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. I’d like to ask panelists to discuss educational and cultural issues, including the threats we face through 

‘‘bilingual education’’ and the challenge of protecting our culture. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. The CECC agrees with you that the education issue is an extremely important one, and I want to draw 

your attention to our Xinjiang reprint from the 2008 report. An extended addendum is dedicated to bilingual education in Xinjiang 

and goes into quite a lot of depth on the very issues you are raising. So thank you very much for your point. 

Kate, please? 

Ms. KAUP. I would like to pick up on your mention of cultural 

issues. We have been talking quite a bit about what might be done 

both within and outside of China to help protect Uyghur rights and 

the Uyghur culture. One very important contribution that I think 

the Uyghur diaspora movement could make is to introduce the 

world to Uyghur culture rather than focusing almost exclusively on 

human rights violations in Xinjiang. The Tibetan movement has 

drawn more attention than that of the Uyghur people in part because people are interested in Tibetan culture. They think it is 

‘‘cool,’’ to use Nury’s word. I think very few Americans, very few 

people outside of Xinjiang, in fact, know what Uyghur culture is. 

We certainly need good monitoring of human rights issues and violations in Xinjiang. But instead of hammering on human rights 

atrocities exclusively, let’s learn instead about Uyghur food, or 

Uyghur short stories, or Uyghur art. Let’s hear more about why it 

is so important to preserve Uyghur culture, not just that it is difficult to do so. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, thanks. Dennis Halpin, and then Toy 

Reid, and then I think we may need to close. 

Mr. HALPIN. [Off microphone]. [Inaudible]. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Dennis, it should be noted, does an enormous amount of heavy lifting in the U.S. House of Representatives 

on behalf of human rights issues that concern China, so it is an 

honor to have him here today. 

Do any of our panelists want to take his question—yes, please? 

Mr. TURKEL. From what we know, the Uyghur issue is already 

on President Obama’s desk because of the Guantanamo Uyghurs. 

There are some valid criticisms that have been made on Bush’s 

overall detention policies but we should acknowledge the fact that 

23 

the Bush Administration successfully resisted the pressure from 

the Chinese on their request to repatriate the Guantanamo 

Uyghurs. While maintaining close relations with China, the United 

States did not give into the pressure to ship the Uyghurs back to 

China. That worked. 

Also, one other thing that the United States did in the last several years was to refuse to designate additional Uyghur groups as 

terrorist organizations. That also worked. 

And President Obama is in a very good position to do something 

for the Uyghurs at the moment; that is to release the Uyghurs into 

the United States. It would be a symbolic step that would eventually help Obama to empty the prison camp in Guantanamo. Also, 

by doing that, he can show to the Chinese that he knows what is 

right and what is wrong. He can explain to the Chinese that his 

administration did whatever was necessary after careful review 

and investigation, along with judicial process and found no evidence that the Uyghurs pose a security threat to the United States. 

That would be a very specific and important thing that the U.S. 

Government can do in the foreseeable future for the Uyghurs. 

The other benefit is that it will help President Obama to encourage other governments in Europe, European allies to help to take 

the rest of the cleared detainees who cannot return to their countries. There are about 60 detainees out of 250 prisoners in Guantanamo who cannot go back to their country. Of those, 17 are 

Uyghurs. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Toy Reid, you have the last remark—a question, I hope. 

Mr. REID. It is a question. Thank you. I am Toy Reid with the 

CECC. The prominent question is this: why should we allow the 

Chinese Government to define the terms of this discussion and set 

limits on what topics it is willing to discuss? As I was listening to 

some of the views expressed, there were a couple of themes that 

I picked up on. 

One thing I noticed was when we talk about this issue within the 

Chinese framework, the Uyghur people, along with many other nationalities, are typically referred to as ‘‘ethnic minorities.’’ I often 

think about whether or not these groups perceive of themselves in 

those terms. To the best of my knowledge, even in Chinese, the 

term ‘‘ethnic minorities’’ or ‘‘shaoshu minzu,’’ is a relatively new invention. The 1920s is the earliest reference that I know of to the 

term. And so, I wonder if there aren’t historical and political reasons that might cause us to reflect critically on the use of that terminology. 

In addition, it was also mentioned that getting the Chinese to 

talk about these issues at all is quite difficult. It is regarded as a 

non-starter. And I understand that frustration and difficulty. But 

I also wonder, are we giving up too much by allowing the Chinese 

authorities to unilaterally set the terms of what is and is not a 

proper subject for dialogue? Does our use of PRC Government terminology reinforce their claim that Uyghurs are an ethnic minority 

within China, that Xinjiang is completely a domestic issue, and 

therefore, we have no right to get involved? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. There is a question in there. I know there 

is. 

24 

Mr. REID. The question is: should we allow the PRC Government 

to set the terms of what they are willing to talk about? And should 

we be more careful about adopting various terms that they use to 

describe the situation—terms that may not be universally embraced by those who are being described by such terms? 

Ms. KAUP. Good questions. You have clearly been very well 

trained. [Laughter.] 

I actually hope that is not the message you took from my comments, though. I am not at all suggesting that we should let the 

Chinese Government set the parameters of our discussion with 

them. I am saying that it is dangerous within China to raise 

Uyghur issues. There are just certain topics that can be discussed 

safely and others that cannot. One can raise certain issues about 

minorities. One can talk about economic development strategies for 

minorities. One can talk about minority languages within certain 

frameworks. It is just not wise, however, within China to be publicly raising questions about Uyghur rights at this moment. But I 

am not at all suggesting that we should let the Chinese Government tell those of us outside of China what topics are taboo to 

raise, discuss, or promote. 

You also asked about the use of the term ‘‘minzu’’ and whether 

we should use the Communist Party’s classification system of labeling minorities. The term ‘‘minzu’’ has been used for at least 100 

years, and the concept has been adopted by most minzu themselves. I actually wrote a book called ‘‘Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic 

Politics in China,’’ that looks exactly at this question of how many 

minorities have adopted and utilized the state’s classification categories to promote their own interests. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, Amy, please. 

Ms. REGER. I just wanted to make a short comment, which is 

that ‘‘minzu’’ has been used, as Kate noted, for a long time to describe so-called ethnic minorities, among them Uyghurs. But in 

Chinese, it has a rather ambiguous meaning, which could mean 

ethnic minorities or ethnic nationalities. And what we have been 

seeing in recent years is that they are sticking with—the Chinese 

Government is sticking with the use of the word ‘‘minzu’’ in Chinese, but in English, they are being very sensitive to using ‘‘nationality’’ instead of ‘‘ethnic minority.’’ So, for instance, the Central 

Minority Nationality University in Beijing—I hope I got that 

right—they just recently changed the name to Central Minzu University. It seems like they are trying to ward off any sort of perception that the people, you know, the students attending the school 

or the nationalities being learned about at that school are, in fact, 

a unique nationality as opposed to a minority in the context of the 

greater PRC. And I think it is important for us to—it is important 

for any nation or any people to be able to define themselves according to their own definition. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. A last remark. 

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you. This is not completely related to what 

we have been talking about this morning but I would like to make 

something really clear here on the name of the Uyghurs. The 

Uyghurs have only one name: Uyghurs. No adjective, no adverb is 

needed. It is not Chinese Muslims, not Muslim Uyghurs. We have 

been hearing or reading a bunch of different descriptions of the 

25 

Uyghurs. But I believe they are all unnecessary. Uyghurs are 

Uyghurs. Again, no adverbs or adjectives are required. And as all 

of you know, there is another separate Muslim group called Chinese Muslims in China. Sometimes they are also called Hui Muslims. Uyghurs do not represent them or the other Muslim groups 

in China. We are just Uyghurs. I want to make that very clear, especially to the people from the press. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Thank you so much. I want to thank 

all the panelists for coming today and offering us unique perspectives and information on this issue. Amy Reger, Nury Turkel, 

thank you for your overview of recent developments; Katherine 

Kaup and Louisa Greve, thank you for providing a broader context, 

and also for some excellent recommendations on moving forward. 

Have a great day. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the roundtable was concluded.] 

(27) 

A P P E N D I X 

28 

PREPARED STATEMENT

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMY REGER

FEBRUARY 13, 2008

During this week’s Universal Periodic Review of China at the UN, a member of 

the Chinese delegation asserted that there is no ethnic conflict in the People’s Republic of China. Chinese ambassador Li Baodong emphasized what he called ‘‘preferential policies’’ for Uyghurs and other minority nationalities, citing lower score requirements for university entrance exams. According to the Chinese delegation, the 

only discontent that exists among Uyghurs is sown by hostile foreign forces aiming 

to split China—and this discontent does not represent the happy majority. 

Unfortunately, the reality for Uyghurs in the PRC is much different than the Chinese delegation’s rhetoric would have us believe. It is hard to reconcile these remarks with security clampdowns that have been ongoing in East Turkestan (also 

known as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) in the past year, and a human 

rights situation for Uyghurs that is more severe than it has been in many years. 

The year 2008 was one of disappointment for those who hoped that the Olympics 

might expand freedoms for Uyghurs.Underlining the PRC’s massive campaign 

against Uyghurs in 2008 was a rise in reported arrests for terrorism, extremism and 

other state security charges in East Turkestan. According to an official Chinese 

newspaper report, nearly 1,300 people were arrested in East Turkestan on state security crimes in 2008, marking a steep increase over previous years. The 2008 figures marked a very sharp increase over 2007, which saw only 742 people arrested 

on state security crimes throughout the entire PRC. Under Chinese law, individuals 

can be prosecuted for ‘‘endangering state security’’ if they are believed to have engaged in subversion, ‘‘splittism,’’ and ‘‘illegally providing state secrets to overseas 

entities,’’ all charges that are of a highly subjective nature in the PRC. 

The PRC government has undertaken a fierce campaign of repression in East 

Turkestan since the Olympic Games period, when a series of violent attacks took 

place in and around the cities of Kashgar and Kucha. Xinjiang Party Secretary 

Wang Lequan announced a ‘‘life or death struggle’’ in East Turkestan on August 14, 

as well as a hardening of measures designed to manage Uyghur issues. 

One of these measures, according to the Hong Kong-based Information Center for 

Human Rights and Democracy, was the deployment of around 200,000 public security officers and armed police to East Turkestan to ‘‘prevent terrorist attacks’’ in the 

post-Olympic period. News reports have indicated the implementation of intensified 

ideological campaigns throughout the region in subsequent months. 

While PRC authorities claim the security measures are aimed at punishing individuals involved in the violent attacks that took place during the Olympics period, 

the scope of the crackdown represents a broad, far-reaching campaign of intimidation and fear aimed at the Uyghur community. 

Security measures carried out in 2008 targeted large numbers of Uyghur civilians, 

including many not suspected of involvement in any crime, in contravention of both 

Chinese law and international law. Particularly in the period leading up to and during the Olympics, UHRP noted a widespread clampdown among Uyghurs and a corresponding rise in arrests and detentions. These included the arrests of more than 

1,000 individuals in security sweeps in the cities of Kashgar and Kucha, and the 

arrest of 160 Uyghur children, aged 8 to 14 years old, for participating in ‘‘illegal 

religious activities.’’ Authorities also used the tactic of detaining family members 

and associates of alleged attackers in an attempt to bring in suspects. 

Emerging evidence has undermined the basis for the PRC’s government’s repression in East Turkestan. Chinese Government officials accused a number of Uyghurs 

of conducting the attacks in the Kashgar and Kucha areas, adding that the suspects 

had received substantial assistance from international terror groups. However, no 

evidence has ever been produced to support the allegations of international assistance in the attacks. 

A September 29 New York Times article cast doubt on Chinese Government 

claims about the deadliest of the attacks, in which 16 people reportedly died in 

Kashgar. Independent photographs suggest that events did not occur as the Chinese 

Government claims. The photographs show men in police uniforms carrying out the 

attack against other policemen, casting doubt on Chinese Government claims that 

a vegetable seller and a taxi driver were responsible. 

29 

In the first half of 2008, the PRC government issued a series of specific Olympicsrelated terrorism claims, without providing evidence to support its accusations. 

These included an alleged plot by a young Uyghur woman to blow up or crash an 

airplane on its way to Beijing on March 7, and the arrest of some 45 people in April 

on suspicion of planning to kidnap athletes and carry out suicide bomb attacks to 

sabotage the Olympics. 

Since the events of September 11, 2001, PRC authorities have used the ‘‘war on 

terror’’ as a pretext for cracking down on religious and political dissent in the region. Tens of thousands of Uyghurs are believed to have been detained in the years 

since 2001, and hundreds are believed to have been executed. Individuals caught up 

in this campaign include Tohti Tunyaz, a Ph.D scholar who was released this week 

from prison after serving an 11-year sentence for conducting historical research in 

East Turkestan deemed subversive by government officials, and Nurmemet Yasin, 

a young Uyghur poet and intellectual who was imprisoned for writing an allegorical 

story that was viewed as separatist. 

Uyghurs in East Turkestan suffer a broad scope of abuses to their civil, political, 

economic and social rights, including the fierce suppression of their religion, the use 

of the legal system as a tool of repression against Uyghurs who voice discontent 

with the government; PRC government support of the influx of huge numbers of 

Han Chinese economic migrants into East Turkestan; the forced transfer of young 

Uyghur women to work in poor conditions in eastern China; discrimination in hiring 

practices; unequal access healthcare services; and the elimination of Uyghur language schools under the current ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy. 

‘‘Bilingual’’ education in East Turkestan has evolved in an increasingly repressive 

political environment, as one aspect of a government: driven project to assimilate 

Uyghurs by attacking and diluting their culture. It was conceived around the time 

of the founding of the post-Soviet Central Asian states in 1991, a turning point in 

the PRC’s view of East Turkestan, when the government began to become obsessed 

with ‘‘security’’ and ‘‘stability’’ in the region. Drives to expand ‘‘bilingual education 

have paralleled heightened campaigns to promote security and battle separatism. 

For instance, in 2004, the year in which a particularly harsh ‘‘strike hard, extreme 

pressure’’ campaign aimed at repressing ‘‘the three evils’’ of ‘‘separatism, extremism, 

and terrorism’’ resulted in the arrest of hundreds of Uyghurs, the rate at which ‘‘bilingual’’ education was eliminating Uyghur from East Turkestan’s schools increased 

dramatically. 

A recent Xinhua news article described the policy as aiming ‘‘to encourage 

Xinjiang native teachers to teach both languages as a way to safeguard culture and 

promote the national standard.’’ According to Chinese Government propaganda, ‘‘bilingual education’’ is being put into place throughout East Turkestan to improve 

educational and employment opportunities for Uyghur children. One of the major 

problems with this type of justification is that ‘‘bilingual education’’ is not ‘‘bilingual’’ at all, but rather monolingual. Another situation that challenges the Chinese 

Government’s official assertions regarding its motivations of providing a truly bilingual education is the removal of Uyghur children from their cultural environment 

and their placement into Chinese-language ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ located in 12 inland 

Chinese cities. This program has not been well-received among Uyghurs in East 

Turkestan, who view ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ as an attempt to Sinify young Uyghurs, 

while there exists no parallel effort to educate young Han Chinese students in the 

Uyghur language and culture. A third challenge to the official portrayal of the ‘‘bilingual education’’ program lies in the relative lack of access to English-language 

instruction for Uyghur students at the high school and university level. Uyghur 

high school students who study at ‘‘minkaomin’’ schools (schools in which they receive Uyghur-language instruction) are not given any English-language instruction, 

while English-language instruction is widespread at ‘‘minkaohan’’ schools (schools in 

which courses are all taught in Chinese). Uyghur university students are required 

to study Chinese as their second language, and not English. 

The ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy has been pursued for the past decade, but with 

increasing intensity since 2002. Past policies were more egalitarian and allowed 

Uyghur parents more of a choice in their children’s languages of instruction. Over 

the past seven years, government efforts at eliminating Uyghur language schools 

have accelerated dramatically, as compulsory Chinese language education has been 

expanded at every educational level and every township in East Turkestan. The ultimate goal of ‘‘bilingual’’ education appears to be to replace Uyghur language instruction with Chinese language instruction in all areas of East Turkestan, and to 

phase out the use of spoken Uyghur among the young Uyghur population. 

30 

Since 2002, with the exception of Uyghur languages and literature, classes at 

Xinjiang University have been taught solely in Chinese, virtually removing Uyghur 

as a language of instruction at the region’s most prestigious university. Local governments have committed to eliminating Uyghur language instruction, even in 

areas with large majority Uyghur populations. ‘‘Bilingual education’’ was implemented in high schools, middle schools and elementary schools, and in 2005, the ‘‘bilingual’’ education push was expanded into East Turkestan’s preschools. 

At least one official newspaper reported that the number of students in ‘‘bilingual 

education classes’’ in East Turkestan grew from 5,533 students in 1995 to 294,000 

in 2007, and the number of schools offering ‘‘bilingual classes’’ grew from 220 in 

1995 to 8,788 in 2007. Official sources reported recently that within the next five 

years, the state would provide free training to 11,264 bilingual pre-school teachers, 

and within the next six years, the XUAR would recruit around 16,000 teachers to 

supplement the current pool of bilingual primary school teachers. Xinhua reported 

that since 2003, China has invested 130 million yuan, or 19 million U.S. dollars, 

to train bilingual teachers for elementary and high schools. Xinhua also reported 

that there were 18,000 ‘‘bilingual teachers’’, 5,000 bilingual classes and 150,000 bilingual pupils in East Turkestan in 2008. 

The bilingual teachers who are set to be trained in the next several years will 

almost certainly be drawn from the Han Chinese population, and many Uyghur 

teachers who cannot pass stringent language tests may be expected to lose their 

jobs. Many Uyghur teachers throughout East Turkestan have already been fired 

from their jobs, and many others have been forced to completely stop teaching their 

students in Uyghur and use only Chinese, even if all of the students are Uyghurs. 

Remarks by Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan at the National Party Congress in March 2008 indicate that provincial authorities, with the support of the 

central government, plan to invest 3.7 billion yuan in order to implement ‘‘bilingual 

education’’ programs in 85% of the region’s kindergartens in the next three to five 

years. 

As the Han population has increased, Han individuals have also received a greater share of the economic benefits from East Turkestan’s growth, including economic 

and employment opportunities not available to Uyghurs. While the Chinese Government asserts that ‘‘bilingual education’’ will provide ethnic Uyghurs with the Mandarin language skills necessary to succeed in China’s competitive job market, many 

Uyghur graduates who are fluent in Mandarin Chinese report facing employment 

challenges due to rampant ethnic discrimination among employers. As one former 

Uyghur teacher recalled, when he traveled with his Chinese-speaking Uyghur students to job fairs, they observed signs flatly stating ’we don’t want minority people’. 

The program of the ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ mentioned above was established in inland 

Chinese cities in 1997. ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ remove top minority students in East 

Turkestan from their cultural environment and enroll them in classes with Chinese 

language instruction in high schools in large inland Chinese cities. Parents of such 

students report being pressured into sending their children. 

Official media have quoted Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan as saying that 

the chief goal of ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ is ‘‘political thought training’’, not academic preparation, and other government officials have described the program as a way to 

‘‘deepen national feelings’’ and ‘‘strengthen correct political attitudes’’ as part of a 

‘‘long term important strategic policy decision... to protect the unity of the motherland and safeguard the nation’s long and peaceful order’’. 

In some of these schools speaking Uyghur is prohibited, even in student dormitories, where pupils are watched by an on-site monitor. Children from one 

‘‘Xinjiang class’’ in Qingdao were forbidden to communicate in Uyghur, even when 

visited by an officially approved ethnic Uyghur journalist. By 2006, ‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ had been expanded from 12 to 26 Chinese cities and had a total enrollment of 

over ten thousand students. 

By forcing Uyghur children to study in a language other than their mother 

tongue, the PRC government is in clear violation of its own laws and agreements, 

including Article 4 of the PRC’s Constitution, Compulsory Education Law and Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law. The PRC is also a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 

both of which guarantee minorities protection of their language rights. In addition, 

the PRC’s ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy, as it is being implemented, serves to increase 

tensions between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in East Turkestan. 

The PRC should end its current policy of eliminating Uyghur language education 

from East Turkestan and, at a minimum, return to the policy of allowing for both 

Uyghur and Chinese language education systems. ‘‘Bilingual education’’ will work 

only if authorities support schools in which both Uyghur and Chinese are recognized 

as important regional languages and serious academic classes are offered in both 

31 

languages. Government support of the Uyghur language would both improve ethnic 

relations and contribute to economic growth in East Turkestan. Many observers 

have noted that language issues play a large role in the ethnic tensions of the region. A commitment to Uyghur language on the part of the government would ultimately contribute to the goal of stability by easing an area of serious Uyghur discontent. 

Æ