NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0342n.06 

 No. 16-4213 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

JERRY A. GLASGOW, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

 BEFORE: KEITH, BATCHELDER, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. 

 PER CURIAM. Jerry A. Glasgow appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the 

denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 

benefits. 

In 2011, Glasgow filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income benefits, alleging that he became disabled on April 15, 2006. After the Social 

Security Administration denied the applications, Glasgow requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ conducted a hearing and denied Glasgow relief. The 

Appeals Council remanded for further consideration. The ALJ conducted a second hearing and 

again denied Glasgow relief. The Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district 

court affirmed the denial of Glasgow’s applications. 
No. 16-4213, Glasgow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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On appeal, Glasgow makes two arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by discounting the 

opinions of three examining psychologists and crediting the opinions of two reviewing 

psychologists and the testimony of a medical expert; and (2) the ALJ erred in assessing the 

medical opinion of an examining physician. “Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to 

whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are 

supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 

2009). Substantial evidence exists if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 406. We review de novo the district court’s conclusions 

on each issue. Id.

Glasgow first argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the medical opinions of 

examining psychologists Dr. Gary Wolfgang, Dr. James Spindler, and Dr. Elvin Coblentz and 

crediting the opinions of reviewing psychologists Dr. Paul Tangeman and Dr. Tonnie Hoyle and 

the testimony of Dr. Douglas Pawlarczyk, an impartial medical expert. The examining 

psychologists opined that Glasgow has numerous work-preclusive functional limitations, 

including impairments to his ability to understand and carry out instructions, interact with others, 

maintain concentration and pace, and respond to pressure in a work setting. In contrast, the 

reviewing psychologists concluded that Glasgow could perform simple, repetitive tasks in a 

static work environment where interaction with others is superficial. Dr. Pawlarczyk similarly 

testified that Glasgow could perform simple, low-stress work that involves no more than 

occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors and no interaction with the public. 

 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing of the opinions at issue. The ALJ 

reasonably gave little weight to the opinions of Dr. Wolfgang and Dr. Spindler on the basis that 

nothing in their examination notes supported the severity of their proposed limitations aside from 
No. 16-4213, Glasgow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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Glasgow’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ found to be unreliable given the inconsistencies 

between Glasgow’s statements and other evidence concerning his prior drug use, his legal and 

educational history, and his daily activities. In addition, the severity of the proposed restrictions 

conflicted with the conclusion of a vocational evaluator, who determined that Glasgow was 

prepared for community employment based on his performance of several jobs over an eight-day 

assessment period. The ALJ also reasonably discounted Dr. Coblentz’s opinion on the basis that 

he relied in part on Glasgow’s unreliable subjective complaints, Glasgow was not taking his 

psychiatric medication at the time of the examination, and Glasgow was able to testify and 

answer questions at his hearing without any of the psychological symptoms that were present 

during his interview with Dr. Coblentz. And the ALJ reasonably credited the testimony of Dr. 

Pawlarczyk and the opinions of the reviewing psychologists, despite the fact that they did not 

have access to the entire record, because their conclusion that Glasgow retained the capacity to 

work was supported by the totality of the medical and vocational evidence in the record. See 

McGrew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an ALJ 

may rely on a state agency physician’s opinion that is not based on all of the medical evidence in 

the record if the ALJ takes into account any evidence that the physician did not consider). 

Glasgow also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the opinion of examining physician 

Judith Brown. Dr. Brown reported that Glasgow was unable to stand on his right leg alone, walk 

on his heels, walk on his toes, walk heel-to-toe, or squat and that Glasgow’s muscle testing 

results were unreliable because of “too much variation.” Dr. Brown opined that, based on her 

findings, Glasgow’s ability to perform work-related activities such as squatting would be at least 

mildly affected and that Glasgow could probably perform sedentary work. Glasgow contends 

that the ALJ failed to adequately explain the extent to which he credited Dr. Brown’s opinion 
No. 16-4213, Glasgow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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and erred by failing to take into account Dr. Brown’s determination that Glasgow is limited to 

sedentary work and cannot squat. 

Despite Glasgow’s argument to the contrary, the ALJ adequately explained that he was 

accepting Dr. Brown’s personal observations during the examination but discounting her opinion 

because it was based in part on Glasgow’s unreliable subjective complaints and his inconsistent 

effort during the examination. And substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Given Dr. 

Brown’s determination that Glasgow’s muscle testing results were unreliable due to too much 

variation, the ALJ could reasonably conclude that Glasgow was not putting forth a consistent 

effort during the examination, thereby undermining Dr. Brown’s conclusions concerning 

Glasgow’s functional limitations. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.