IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-30128

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JOHNNY JUNE MASON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:17-CR-62-1

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Johnny June Mason, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of failure to register 

as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act. Mason was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and five years of 

supervised release. Concerning the latter, the district court imposed a variety 

of special conditions; Mason challenges the special conditions that restrict his

access and exposure to persons under the age of 18 (the special conditions).

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 17, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Mason contends the special conditions are not reasonably related to the 

pertinent sentencing factors because there is no indication he is a danger to 

minors, and his only prior sexual offense is remote and involved a member of 

his “peer group”. He additionally maintains the special conditions that impose

residency and locational restrictions involve a greater deprivation of liberty 

than is reasonably necessary to achieve the statutory sentencing goals. 

(Although Mason also references an occupational restriction, he has not 

identified any such condition he seeks to contest on appeal.) 

Mason did not raise a sufficient objection in district court to the special 

conditions. See United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 272–73 & n.1 (5th 

Cir. 2015); United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation 

omitted) (“[T]he touchstone is whether the objection was specific enough to 

allow the trial court to take testimony, receive argument, or otherwise explore 

the issue raised”.). Because he did not do so, review is only for plain error. E.g., 

United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that 

standard, Mason must show a forfeited plain (clear or obvious) error that 

affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 

(2009). If he does so, we have the discretion to correct the reversible plain 

error, but should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id.

In reviewing special conditions, our court must review, inter alia, a 

defendant’s history and characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Therefore, a 

prior conviction may be considered, United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 

153 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); and we may uphold sex-related 

conditions based on a remote and single sex offense if there is a connection 

between the offense and the conditions, United States v. Prieto, 801 F.3d 547, 

555–56 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 804 (5th Cir. 

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2015). Here, the circumstances and facts of Mason’s previous offense – which 

involved the commission of aggravated rape and aggravated crimes against 

nature against a 17-year-old high-school student, when he was 19 – show the 

conditions are not clearly or obviously unconnected to his history and 

characteristics. See United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 861–62 (5th Cir. 

2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1180 (2018); Fields, 777 F.3d at 803–04. Also, 

given Mason’s past noncompliance with his registration obligations and other 

conditions of release meant to protect the public from recidivism by sex 

offenders, the conditions were warranted by the need to advance deterrence 

and protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); Prieto, 801 F.3d at 555–56;

Fields, 777 F.3d at 804. He has not shown the district court plainly erred in 

imposing the special conditions. Fields, 777 F.3d at 806–07.

Mason also has not established plain error for his assertion that the 

residential and locational special conditions involve a greater deprivation of 

liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The residency condition is considered first.

That condition, which applies to limited locations, is not absolute; the 

condition does not absolutely bar him from residing near the locations listed in 

the condition but, rather, prohibits him from residing in “direct view” of those 

sites. Mason has failed to show plain error concerning how this tailored 

condition – which is limited to five years and is intended to prevent him from 

accessing persons under the age of 18 at places where such persons would be 

present and likely vulnerable – involves a greater deprivation of liberty than 

is reasonably necessary to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public. 

See id.; United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 915 (5th Cir. 2016).

For his challenge to the locational restriction, Mason likewise fails to 

show plain error. Although he contends the special condition bans him from 

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libraries, the condition provides he may not frequent or loiter within 100 feet 

of places primarily used by persons under the age of 18 including, inter alia, 

libraries. Accordingly, the condition – which has a limited duration and 

restricts his access to places often visited by people under the age of 18 – does 

not completely deny him access to the library. Fields, 777 F.3d at 806 & n.33. 

Therefore, the condition is not broader than necessary to deter criminal 

conduct and protect the public. Id. at 806. As stated, Mason has not shown 

plain error. Id. at 806–07.

AFFIRMED. 

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