Comptroller General

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

of the United States

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to a

GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been

approved for public release.

 

Decision 

Matter of: VT Griffin Services, Inc. 

File: B-299869.2 

Date: November 10, 2008 

Richard J. Conway, Esq., David M. Nadler, Esq., and David Y. Yang, Esq., Dickstein 

Shapiro LLP, for the protester. 

Drew A. Harker, Esq., and Jill Newell Chung, Esq., Arnold & Porter LLP, for BAE 

Systems Technology Solutions & Services, an intervenor. 

Maj. Timothy A. Furin, Department of the Army, for the agency. 

Jonathan L. Kang, Esq., and Ralph O. White, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, 

GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision. 

DIGEST 

1. Protester’s challenge to the evaluation of its key personnel experience is denied

where the resume for a proposed individual did not list employment that

demonstrated compliance with the minimum experience requirements. 

2. Protester’s challenge to the evaluation of its staffing plan is denied where agency 

reasonably determined that the protester did not propose sufficient higher-skilled 

personnel, and also reasonably determined that the proposal’s cross-utilization 

staffing approach did not address this weakness.

DECISION 

VT Griffin Services, Inc., of Alpharetta, Georgia, protests the award of a contract to 

BAE Systems Technology Solutions & Services by the Department of the Army under 

request for proposals (RFP) No. W912CN-05-R-0090, for logistical support and 

services. The protester contends that the Army’s evaluation of its technical proposal 

was flawed, and that, as a result, the selection decision was unreasonable. 

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND 

The RFP was issued on June 16, 2006, and sought proposals to provide logistics 

support and services for all Army organizations in Hawaii. The RFP identified four
primary areas of services to be provided: supply services, transportation, 

maintenance, and satellite facility operations. The RFP anticipated award of a costplus award fee contract with a 5-month base period, five 1-year option periods, and 

three 1-year award term periods. 

The RFP stated that offerors would be evaluated based on the following six 

evaluation factors: (1) technical resources, which had four subfactors--staffing and 

planning, key personnel qualifications, transition planning, and contingency 

planning; (2) technical approach, which had two subfactors--processes and 

procedures, and contingency support; (3) performance risk; (4) quality control, 

which had two subfactors--quality control techniques, and preventative measures; 

(5) small business program support, which had three subfactors--small and 

disadvantaged business (SDB) participation, small business participation, and past 

performance compliance; and (6) cost. The RFP stated that subfactors one and two 

were of equal importance, and that subfactors three through five were of lesser 

importance and were listed in descending order of importance. These combined 

non-cost factors were “significantly more important” than cost. RFP at 66. 

As relevant here, the RFP identified six key personnel positions, each of which had a 

minimum experience requirement. RFP at 54. These six key positions were to be 

assessed under the key personnel qualifications factor of the technical resources

evaluation factor. Offerors were required to submit resumes that identified the 

proposed individuals’ employment history and relevant experience. 

For the staffing and planning subfactor of the technical resources evaluation factor, 

offerors were required to “provide and describe a comprehensive Staffing Plan that

will be followed during contract performance.” RFP at 53. Offerors were required to

describe “the labor categories proposed, the number of hours proposed for each 

labor category per year, the number of personnel assigned to each labor category, 

and their job descriptions, authority/responsibility and functions.” Id. The RFP also 

stated that offerors could propose to “cross-utilize” proposed personnel, as follows: 

“Describe methods and procedures, if any, for cross-utilization of assigned personnel 

within and between major functional areas.” Id.

The Army received proposals from seven offerors by the initial closing date of 

September 8, 2006. The agency convened a source selection evaluation board 

(SSEB) to evaluate the offerors’ proposals, and established a competitive range of

the two most highly-rated proposals, consisting of VT Griffin and BAE. The agency 

conducted discussions with both companies, and requested and evaluated final 

proposal revisions (FPRs). The Army awarded the contract to BAE on May 31, 2007. 

On June 11, 2007, VT Griffin filed a protest with our Office, and on July 11, the 

agency took corrective action. Because the agency’s corrective action rendered the 

protest academic, it was dismissed on July 13, 2007. 

Following dismissal of the protest, the Army provided both VT Griffin and BAE with

a debriefing. The agency then conducted an additional round of discussions with the 

Page 2 B-299869.2
offerors and requested a second FPR. As relevant here, VT Griffin’s second FPR 

substituted certain of its key personnel, and also revised its proposed staffing for the 

maintenance portion of the work requirements. In its evaluation of the protester’s 

second FPR, the Army identified concerns under both the key personnel 

qualifications, and the staffing and planning subfactors of the technical resources

evaluation factor. With regard to key personnel, the agency concluded that the 

individual substituted for the maintenance manager position did not meet the 

requirement of having “[t]en years of current Army management logistics 

experience.” Agency Report (AR), Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, at 10. With regard 

to the revisions to the staffing plan, the agency found that the protester had reduced 

its proposed number of higher-skilled motor vehicle mechanics and heavy equipment

mechanics, and increased the proposed number of lower-skilled automotive 

workers. Id. at 14. 

The results of the revaluation of VT Griffin’s proposal were as follows:

1

VT GRIFFIN 

(Rating/Risk) 

TECHNICAL RESOURCES

Staffing and Planning Marginal/Moderate

Key Personnel Qualifications Marginal/Moderate

Transition Planning Very Good/None 

Contingency Planning Exceptional/None 

TECHNICAL APPROACH

Processes and Procedures Satisfactory/Moderate 

Contingency Support Exceptional/None 

PERFORMANCE RISK Exceptional/Minor 

QUALITY CONTROL

Quality Control Techniques Exceptional/None 

Preventative Measures Exceptional/None 

SMALL BUSINESS SUPPORT

SDB Participation Very Good/Minor 

Small Business Participation Very Good/Minor 

Past Performance Compliance Satisfactory/Moderate 

MOST PROBABLE COST $195,142,184 

AR, Tab 87, Revised SSD, at 2-3. 

 1

 The issues in this protest concern only the Army’s evaluation of VT Griffin’s 

proposal. Our discussion in this decision therefore addresses only the evaluation 

ratings assigned by the agency to the protester.

Page 3 B-299869.2
On July 28, the Army again selected BAE’s proposal for award. Id. at 43. The agency 

concluded that although BAE’s most probable cost was higher, at $205,467,025, its

more highly-rated technical proposal merited the cost premium. The agency 

provided VT Griffin a debriefing letter along with the notice of award. This protest

followed. 

DISCUSSION 

VT Griffin challenges the Army’s evaluation of its proposal under both the staffing 

and planning and the key personnel qualifications subfactors of the technical 

resources evaluation factor. The protester also argues that, based on these alleged 

evaluation errors, the source selection decision was unreasonable. For the reasons 

discussed below, we find no merit to these arguments.

The evaluation of an offeror’s proposal is a matter within the agency’s discretion. 

IPlus, Inc., B-298020, B-298020.2, June 5, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 90 at 7, 13. In reviewing a 

protest of an agency’s evaluation of proposals or quotes, including technical 

evaluations, our Office will examine the record to determine whether the agency’s 

judgment was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and 

applicable procurement statutes and regulations. See Shumaker Trucking 

& Excavating Contractors, Inc., B-290732, Sept. 25, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 169 at 3. A 

protester’s mere disagreement with the agency’s judgment in its evaluation of the 

relative merit of competing proposals or quotes does not establish that the 

evaluation was unreasonable. C. Lawrence Constr. Co., Inc., B-287066, Mar. 30, 2001, 

2001 CPD ¶ 70 at 4. 

Key Personnel Qualifications Evaluation

VT Griffin argues that the Army unreasonably concluded that its proposed 

maintenance manager did not meet the minimum experience requirements. For the 

reasons discussed below, we disagree. 

As discussed above, the RFP required offerors to submit resumes for six key 

personnel positions, and to address, as relevant here, the individuals’ employment

history and relevant experience. The RFP advised that “[f]ailure to provide the 

required information will impact the Government’s evaluation of offeror’s 

proposals.” RFP at 54. For the position of maintenance manager, key personnel 

candidates were required to have “[t]en years of current Army management logistics 

experience.” Id.

Under the key personnel qualifications subfactor, the Army rated VT Griffin’s initial 

proposal and first FPR as exceptional/no risk. AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, 

at 9. In its second FPR, however, VT Griffin had replaced several of its proposed key 

personnel, including the maintenance manager. In its evaluation of the second FPR, 

the Army stated that the proposed maintenance manager’s resume did not “reflect 

Page 4 B-299869.2
that he meets the minimum requirement of ten years of current Army management 

logistics experience.” Id. at 10. Specifically, the agency concluded that the list of 

positions held by the individual showed only 9 years of experience. Based on this 

weakness, the Army rated VT Griffin’s second FPR for the key personnel subfactor 

as marginal/moderate risk. Id. at 9; AR, Tab 87, Revised SSD, at 2, 5.

The resume for VT Griffin’s proposed maintenance manager listed three positions, as

follows: 

US Army, 2006-Present -- [deleted] 

US Army, 2002-2006 - [deleted] 

US Army, 1999-2002 - [deleted] 

AR, Tab 75, VT Griffin Second FPR, at 63. 

Additionally, the resume stated that, apart from the three positions listed above, the 

proposed individual had the following experience: “Over 23 years of experience in 

support of direct US Army logistics Management operations as a US Army 

Maintenance Warrant Officer.” Id. at 65. 

Although the Army reviewed this resume and concluded that it did not demonstrate 

10 years of experience,2

 VT Griffin argues that the Army erred because the resume 

states that the individual had “[o]ver 23 years of experience” in Army logistics 

management. We do not think this statement, standing alone, demonstrates that the 

individual met the RFP’s experience requirements. In this regard, the RFP required 

offerors to detail the employment history and relevant experience of key personnel, 

and we think the agency reviewed the experience and reasonably concluded that it 

did not meet the RFP’s minimum experience requirements. It is well-settled that it is

the offeror’s duty to include sufficiently detailed information to establish that its 

proposal meets the solicitation requirements, and that blanket statements of full 

compliance are insufficient to fulfill this duty. IVI Corp., B-310766, Jan. 23, 2008, 

2008 CPD ¶ 21 at 3; see also Lincoln Prop. Co., B-247664, May 22, 1992, 92-1 CPD 

¶ 469 at 4-5. On this record, we conclude that VT Griffin’s arguments lack merit.3

 2

 The resume was submitted with VT Griffin’s second FPR on September 17, 2007--

thus, at that time, the individual’s listed experience was from an unspecified date in

1999 until the date of the FPR, i.e., between 7 and 8 years. At the time of the new 

contract award in July 2008, following the corrective action, the individual’s 

experience was between 8 and 9 years. 

3

 VT Griffin also argues that because the individual holds the rank of a CW4-grade 

warrant officer, a position which is consistent with having a minimum 12 to 14 years 

of in-grade experience, the Army should have considered him to have the requisite 

(continued...) 

Page 5 B-299869.2
Staffing and Planning Evaluation 

Next, VT Griffin argues that the Army’s evaluation of its proposal under the staffing 

and planning subfactor of the technical resources evaluation factor was 

unreasonable. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. 

The Army rated VT Griffin’s first FPR under this subfactor as satisfactory/moderate

risk. As discussed above, VT Griffin’s second FPR revised its proposed staffing by 

reducing the number of higher-skilled mechanics, and increasing the numbers of

lower-skilled automotive workers, as follows:

First FPR Second FPR 

Motor Vehicle Mechanics [deleted] [deleted]

Heavy Equipment Mechanics [deleted] [deleted]

Motor Vehicle Mechanic Helpers [deleted] [deleted]

Automotive Workers [deleted] [deleted]

AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, at 14. 

In evaluating VT Griffin’s second FPR, the Army concluded that the protester’s

“proposed maintenance staff and its cross utilization approach to staffing would not

accomplish Army maintenance standards adequately based on the density and type 

of equipment in the RFP.” Id. at 12. The agency further stated that “[a]lthough . . . 

[VT Griffin’s] second revised proposal significantly increased its total maintenance 

staffing from their previous proposals, it does not provide the necessary mix of 

skilled mechanics and less skilled workers and helpers to ensure its cross utilization 

approach to accomplishing the maintenance workload will succeed.” Id. at 14. 

Based on these concerns, the Army lowered VT Griffin’s rating under this subfactor 

to marginal/moderate risk. 

 

(...continued) 

10 years of experience. Protester’s Comments on AR at 5. We think this argument 

lacks merit as well. An individual’s military rank does not necessarily indicate the 

individual’s experience; for example, the rank does not demonstrate that the 

individual spent any particular time performing the type of Army management 

logistics required by the solicitation. The protester also argues that, because the 

individual was in active duty service, the Army could have verified the individual’s 

experience by reviewing his personnel records. Id. at 6. We think this argument also 

lacks merit because it is an offeror’s obligation to fully detail how a key personnel 

resume meets the RFP requirements. Even assuming this type of detailed 

information exists here, there is no obligation for an agency to search its own 

personnel records for information that an offeror failed to include in its proposal. 

SGT, Inc., B-294722.4, July 28, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 151 at 13-14. 

Page 6 B-299869.2
The protester challenges the agency’s evaluation of its proposed staffing for the 

maintenance requirements in four areas: (1) the agency’s conclusion that the 

protester had not proposed a sufficient number of higher-skilled mechanics to 

perform the work; (2) the agency’s conclusion about the inadequacy of the proposed 

cross-utilization of personnel across different work requirements; (3) the agency’s

evaluation of the protester’s staffing levels under two areas of the performance work 

statement, left behind equipment (LBE) maintenance, and non-Stryker vehicle (NSV) 

maintenance; and (4) the reasonableness of the marginal/moderate risk rating for 

this subfactor in light of more positive ratings under other evaluation factors.

As a preliminary matter, the Army noted in its evaluation that because VT Griffin’s 

proposal did not define its proposed positions, the agency relied upon the definitions

issued by the Department of Labor under the Service Contract Act. These definitions

explain the duties of heavy equipment mechanics, motor vehicle mechanics, and 

automotive workers. There is no dispute in this record that the Service Contract Act 

definitions for these positions set out a decreasing level of expertise and experience 

as the definitions move from heavy equipment mechanic to motor vehicle mechanic 

to automotive worker. See AR, Tab 75, Revised SSEB Report, at 13. 

(1) Staffing with higher-skilled personnel 

First, the protester argues that the RFP’s maintenance requirements did not require 

as many higher-skilled personnel as the agency believed, and that, therefore, its

proposed staffing plan was adequate. The Army’s evaluation cited two examples of 

vehicle maintenance requirements to illustrate its general concern regarding VT 

Griffin’s proposed labor mix: the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle 

(HMMWV) and the heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT). Id. at 14. In 

the revised SSEB report, the agency created two exhibits which listed types of 

maintenance work that the agency believed required heavy equipment mechanics 

and motor vehicle mechanics, and would not be appropriate for performance by 

lower-skilled automotive workers. Id. at Exhs. 1 and 2. 

As a general matter, VT Griffin disputes the Army’s conclusions about which of these 

requirements are appropriate for lower-skilled automotive workers. The protester, 

however, simply asserts that “even a cursory review” of the requirements indicates 

that the “vast majority” of them are appropriate for performance by automotive 

workers. Protesters Comments on AR at 9. We do not believe the protester’s general 

characterizations demonstrate that the agency’s evaluation was unreasonable. 

With regard to the specific HMMWV and HEMTT maintenance tasks, the agency 

concluded that the “list of maintenance and repair tasks is extensive and each 

requires the skills of Heavy Equipment Mechanics and/or Motor Vehicle Mechanics, 

rather than Automotive Workers and Helpers, to ensure it is successfully completed 

to Army standards.” AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, at 6. With regard to the 

specific requirements, the agency distinguished the skills appropriate for higher and 

Page 7 B-299869.2
lower-skilled workers on the following basis: 

 

The type of work required, based on equipment type, density and Army

maintenance standards, clearly require skilled mechanics with 

knowledge of diesel engines, hydraulic systems, electrical systems,

power trains and diagnostic skills to troubleshoot, diagnose and repair

the sophisticated equipment. Automotive workers lack these skills. 

AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, at 7. 

VT Griffin argues that the HMMWV and HEMTT maintenance requirements cited by 

the agency are also appropriate for lower-skilled automotive workers. We disagree. 

The tasks cited by the agency involve services not included in the automotive 

helper’s work description. See id. at 13. For example, the requirements for 

maintaining these vehicles include diagnostic evaluations and repairs of 

transmission, fuel, cooling, and hydraulic systems. AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB 

Report, Exhs. 1-2. In this regard, the duties of a heavy equipment mechanic include 

analyzing problems, conducting diagnostic tests, and repairing and maintaining 

heavy equipment; a motor vehicle mechanic performs similar complex tasks for 

automobiles, such as repairing and rebuilding of major assemblies, and diagnosing 

problems with the vehicles. In contrast, an automotive worker performs “minor 

repairs and services” or automobiles, such as checking and replacing batteries, 

cleaning the interior and exterior of vehicles, and assisting on major jobs; the 

automotive worker does not perform diagnostic work or work on complex systems

in heavy equipment. On this record, we find no merit to the protester’s challenge to 

the agency’s interpretation of the RFP requirements, nor do we find any basis to 

question the agency’s criticism of the reduced levels of higher-skilled workers 

proposed by the protester in its second FPR. 

 (2) Cross-utilization approach 

Next, VT Griffin argues that the Army’s conclusion that its cross-utilization approach 

posed a risk to successful performance was not reasonable; moreover, the protester 

argues that its approach should have addressed the agency’s concerns regarding the 

adequacy of its proposed staffing levels. 

As discussed above, the RFP permitted offerors to propose cross-utilization of

personnel. In its proposal, VT Griffin stated that it would cross-utilize personnel 

amongst the divisions of work assigned to perform the maintenance requirements of 

the RFP, as follows: 

We will cross utilize personnel between [deleted], to ensure maximum 

response and flexibility, e.g., [deleted]. Cross Utilization within the

[deleted] will be managed by the [deleted] in conjunction with 

Page 8 B-299869.2
[deleted]. Persons cross utilized will have the proper training and 

certification to perform the job to which they are assigned. 

AR, Tab 75, VT Griffin Second FPR, at 42. 

The protester further explained that the cross-utilization approach would be used to 

“support temporary increases in workloads due to contingencies, deployments,

emergencies, etc.” Id. at 126. 

As discussed above, the Army recognized that VT Griffin had proposed an overall 

higher number of FTEs in is second FPR, but expressed concern that the new labor 

mix contained fewer higher-skilled FTEs, and more lower-skilled FTEs. The Army 

concluded that the mix of labor proposed in VT Griffin’s second FPR “represents a 

serious reduction in skill level and creates a risk that its cross utilization approach to 

maintenance staffing will [not] succeed.” AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, at 15. 

Although the agency recognized that the protester had proposed a cross-utilization 

approach that would allow for personnel assigned to one area to be temporarily 

reassigned to a different one, the agency nonetheless expressed concern about 

whether enough higher-skilled workers would be available. In this regard, the 

agency stated that “[w]hile the [deleted] mechanics [proposed] are fully capable of 

performing the type of work performed by the [deleted] automotive workers and 

helpers, the reverse is not the case.” Id. at 14. 

We think the Army’s evaluation was reasonable in light of the agency’s concerns 

regarding the work required, i.e., the complexity of the tasks and need for higherskilled workers. In this regard, the record shows that VT Griffin reduced the two 

higher-skilled positions from [deleted] to [deleted] full-time equivalent (FTE) 

personnel, and increased the two lower-skilled positions from [deleted] to 

[deleted] FTEs. Although VT Griffin repeatedly argues that a cross-utilization 

approach was permitted by the solicitation, the protester does not explain how its

approach to staffing addresses the agency’s overall concern that VT Griffin proposed 

too few higher-skilled FTEs. Moreover, the protester’s cross-utilization approach

states that it is intended “to ensure maximum response and flexibility,” and to

“support temporary increases in workloads due to contingencies, deployments,

emergencies, etc.” AR, Tab 75, VT Griffin Second FPR, at 42, 126. The protester has

not explained, and its proposal does not demonstrate, how the cross-utilization 

approach addresses the apparent shortfalls in NSV staffing, or does anything more 

than allow for reallocation of personnel from one area to another to address

temporary contingencies or emergencies. 

(3) Left behind equipment/Non-Stryker vehicle maintenance staffing 

Next, VT Griffin argues that the Army’s concerns regarding its proposed staffing for 

LBE/NSV maintenance were not reasonable. The protester contends that the agency 

overestimated the skill level required for the work, and also argues that the agency 

Page 9 B-299869.2
also did not understand the protester’s approach to cross-utilization for these 

specific requirements. 

In its second FPR, VT Griffin’s summary of its proposed personnel for all 

maintenance requirements listed [deleted] FTEs for “heavy equipment mechanics, 

lead,” and [deleted] FTEs for “heavy equipment mechanics,” for a total of [deleted] 

heavy mechanics. AR, Tab 75, VT Griffin Second FPR, at 51-52. With regard to the 

specific allocation of FTEs for the maintenance requirements, the protester 

identified the following assignments: [deleted] lead heavy equipment mechanics for 

the LBE requirements; [deleted] lead heavy equipment mechanics for the NSV 

requirements; and [deleted] heavy equipment mechanics for a third category of 

maintenance requirements, construction and materiel handling equipment (CMHE). 

Id. at 43-46. 

The Army expressed concern that VT Griffin’s second FPR reduced the number of

heavy equipment mechanics proposed for LBE/NSB maintenance from [deleted] to 

[deleted] FTEs, while increasing the number of automotive workers from [deleted] 

to [deleted]. AR, Tab 85, Revised SSEB Report, at 14. The agency concluded that the 

level of heavy equipment mechanics was “not sufficient to support LBE/NSV 

requirements, especially in the NSV area.” Id. at 15. With regard to the NSV 

requirements, the agency noted that “NSV maintenance requirements include 

significant amounts of heavy/construction equipment and the low number of Heavy 

Equipment Mechanics is insufficient to accomplish successfully this maintenance 

approach.” Id.

VT Griffin contends that the Army should have understood its proposal for staffing 

heavy mechanics for the LBE/NSV requirements to have included not only the 

[deleted] FTEs explicitly assigned to that work category, but the [deleted] FTEs 

assigned to the CMHE requirements as well, for a total of [deleted] FTEs. In this 

regard, the protester argues that its cross-utilization approach anticipated that 

personnel from one work area could also be assigned to other work areas, and that

the agency should therefore have understood that all [deleted] heavy mechanics

proposed for the maintenance requirements were available to staff the LBE/NSV 

requirements. 

We think that the Army reasonably concluded that VT Griffin proposed [deleted]

heavy mechanics for the LBE/NSV requirements. The protester’s proposal stated 

that the FTEs assigned to the LBE, NSV, and CMHE requirements were all full-time 

personnel. Thus, we do not agree with the protester that the agency should have 

understood that the [deleted] FTEs assigned to perform the CMHE requirements on 

a full-time basis were also available to perform the LBE/NSV requirements.4

 

 

(continued...) 

4

 VT Griffin argues that the Army should have known that the protester had 

overstated its CMHE staffing, and would therefore have excess capacity for staffing 

the LBE/NSV requirements. Protester’s Response to GAO Questions, Oct. 30, 2008, 

Page 10 B-299869.2
Additionally, as discussed above, we think the protester’s cross-utilization approach 

addressed the ability to “support temporary increases in workloads due to

contingencies, deployments, emergencies, etc.” AR, Tab 75, VT Griffin Second FPR, 

at 126. Thus, we do not think the protester’s cross-utilization approach addresses 

the agency’s concern regarding the overall numbers of higher-skilled personnel 

available to perform the work. 

VT Griffin also challenges the Army’s conclusion that it had proposed too few heavy 

mechanic FTEs to provide maintenance for the “significant amounts of

heavy/construction equipment” under the LBE/NSV requirements. AR, Tab 75, 

Revised SSEB Report, at 15. The protester notes that the solicitation lists 

4,180 pieces of equipment, of which 1,011 are heavy/construction pieces. The 

protester argues that this “amounts to only 24-percent, which by definition, is not a 

significant amount of heavy equipment relative to the overall number of equipment

pieces requiring maintenance.” Protester’s Comments on AR at 7. We do not think 

that the agency’s use of the term “significant” with regard to almost one-quarter of 

the relevant requirements was unreasonable. Put differently, we think the 

protester’s argument lacks merit because it would require us to conclude that an 

agency could not reasonably define a 24-percent requirement as “significant.” The 

agency’s conclusion that VT Griffin did not propose enough heavy mechanics is

reasonable and supported by the record. 

(4) Consistency of evaluation ratings 

Finally, VT Griffin argues that its rating of marginal/moderate risk under the staffing 

and planning subfactor was inconsistent with its ratings under other evaluation 

factors. Specifically, the protester notes that it received a rating of exceptional/ 

minor risk under the performance risk evaluation factor, and ratings of 

exceptional/no risk under the quality control techniques and preventative measures 

subfactors of the quality control evaluation factor. VT Griffin contends that the 

lower ratings are inconsistent with the higher ratings because, under those higher 

ratings, the agency found that the protester had a high likelihood of successfully 

performing the contract requirements. 

We think this argument lacks merit because the various evaluation factors and 

subfactors cited by the protester measured different aspects of the offerors’

proposals. The staffing and planning subfactor required offerors to address “how 

personnel will be staffed for all functions identified in the performance work 

statement.” RFP at 55. In contrast, performance risk evaluation factor stated that 

the agency would assess “performance risk based on the degree to which current 

 

(...continued) 

at 2-3. We find no merit to this argument, as the protester’s proposal did not state 

that the CMHE requirements had been intentionally overstaffed to permit cross

utilization. This position simply appears unreasonable on the record. 

Page 11 B-299869.2
and previous . . . contract efforts indicate the probability of the offeror successfully 

accomplishing contract requirements throughout the performance period.” RFP 

at 65. Also in contrast to the staffing and planning subfactor, the quality control 

subfactor stated that the agency would evaluate “the degree to which an offeror’s 

quality control process would present a risk of nonperformance of services, maintain 

quality of service, and enhance service stability by implementation of proposed 

methods.” Id. at 66. 

The record shows that the RFP’s evaluation scheme and the agency’s evaluation 

appropriately treated the staffing proposal, performance risk, and quality control 

evaluation factors and subfactors as distinct elements of the evaluation. Thus, we do 

not think it was inconsistent for the Army to criticize the adequacy of VT Griffin’s 

staffing and planning proposal, while also expressing confidence in the likelihood of

successful performance within the specific context of past performance and quality 

control plans. 

The protest is denied. 

Gary L. Kepplinger 

General Counsel 

Page 12 B-299869.2