J-E01005-17

2017 PA Super 157

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MOLLY HLUBIN

Appellant No. 951 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003205-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., 

LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and 

SOLANO, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2017

Molly Hlubin appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, following her conviction of two 

counts of driving under the influence (DUI).1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court aptly set forth the facts2of the underlying case as 

follows:

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment); 75 Pa.C.S § 3802(b) (high 

rate of alcohol; having BAC of 0.10% to less than 0.16%).

2 The parties stipulated that the following exhibits were included as part of 

the certified record for purposes of reargument:

 Exhibit 1 – West Hills DUI Task Force Policy and Procedural Guidelines

 Exhibit 2 – an unsigned sobriety checkpoint authorization form

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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[O]n September 29, 2013, police officers from the West Hills DUI 

Task Force [(“Task Force”)] conducted a sobriety checkpoint on 

Steubenville Pike in Robinson Township, Pennsylvania. The Task 

Force is comprised of municipal police officers from fifteen (15) 

jurisdictions in the western portion of Allegheny County, 

Pennsylvania, including Robinson Township and Moon Township. 

After the conclusion of the Suppression Hearing, the 

Commonwealth filed a Motion to Reopen the Record and Admit 

New Evidence [it] could introduce, as Exhibit 4, Robinson 

Township's Resolution 14-2003 that authorized [its] participation 

in the [Task Force]. This [c]ourt granted that request on May 

21, 2015.

At the Suppression Hearing, the Commonwealth presented 

testimony of Sergeant Douglas Ogden, who is a Patrol Sergeant 

with the Moon Township Police Department. Sergeant Ogden 

has been with the Moon Township Police Department since 1996 

and has been in law enforcement since 1989. Sergeant Ogden is 

the Program Coordinator and Project Manager for the [Task 

Force]. In addition to administrative tasks such as applying for 

grants and managing statistics, Sergeant Ogden organizes the 

checkpoints and road patrols and conducts training for the 

officers involved in checkpoints and DUI enforcement and 

detection. Sergeant Ogden testified that his statistical analysis 

showed that most of the DUI arrests and crashes in Robinson 

Township occurred at Steubenville Pike. The [Task Force] has 

policies in place to identify target locations for DUI checkpoints, 

which [were] admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's Exhibit 

1. The [Task Force] Policy and Procedural Guidelines require 

that the grant coordinator, or his designee, be present at all DUI 

checkpoints.

Sergeant Ogden testified that he requested a DUI checkpoint 

from September 28, 2013 at 11[:00] p.m. through September 

29, 2013 at 4:00 a.m. to coordinate with the ending time of a 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

 Exhibit 3 – a signed sobriety checkpoint authorization form

 Exhibit 4 – a Robinson Township Resolution

 Exhibit 5 – The blood test results from the county of Allegheny Office 

of the Medical Examiner.

Agreed Stipulation to Supplement the Appellate Record, 1/6/17, at 3.
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concert at the Star Amphitheater because historically Robinson 

Township has difficulty with drunk drivers following concerts at 

that venue. On September 23, 2013, Robinson Township Police

authorized this DUI checkpoint. Thereafter, Sergeant Ogden sent 

out the required press releases and the request for manpower. 

At the time the checkpoint begins, Sergeant Ogden and the 

officer in charge assign officers from each municipality specific 

tasks with the officers from the home agency who are qualified 

to administer DUI Field Sobriety Tests being assigned to the 

testing area. Generally, Sergeant Ogden, as grant coordinator, is 

in the area of the DUI trailer and testing area assisting officers 

there, however, he also can fill in where needed when manpower 

is depleted.

Sergeant Ogden was present at the September 28, 2013 DUI 

checkpoint on Steubenville Pike in Robinson Township. At 12:25 

a.m., he was filling in on the road because the line had become 

depleted of manpower. At this time, he came into contact with 

[Hlubin], who was the driver of a vehicle. After introducing 

himself, Sergeant Ogden asked for her driver's license, 

registration, and proof of insurance. [Hlubin] initially handed him 

her Target credit card. While [Hlubin] was obtaining her 

documentation, Sergeant Ogden noticed an odor [of] alcoholic 

beverages coming from the vehicle and that [Hlubin] had slurred 

speech. In addition, [Hlubin] admitted that she had a shot and a 

beer. Sergeant Ogden then escorted her to the testing area, 

explained the testing procedure, and handed her over to Officer 

Sicilia of the Robinson Township Police Department. Thereafter, 

Sergeant Ogden had no direct contact with [Hlubin].

Officer Dominic Sicilia, a police officer with Robinson Township, 

testified that he was working the testing area in the DUI 

checkpoint on Steubenville Pike in Robinson Township on 

September 28-29, 2013. He further testified that he came into 

contact with [Hlubin] while he was working the checkpoint. He 

testified that he explained that she was going to be asked to 

perform three field sobriety tests: the HGN[3]test, the walk-

____________________________________________

3 This test is known as the Horizontal Gaze and Nystagmus (HGN) test. 

Nystagmus is the rhythmic oscillation of the eyeballs in either a horizontal, 

vertical, or rotary direction. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 532 A.2d 

1186, 1188 (Pa. Super. 1987). Officers use this test to ascertain the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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and-turn test, and the one-legged stand test. [Hlubin] was given 

instructions on how to perform each test prior to administration 

of the test, and understood the directions. With regard to the 

HGN test, Officer Sicilia was looking for six (6) clues, and 

observed all six (6) clues. Further, [Hlubin] exhibited two (2) out 

of eight (8) clues for the walk-and-turn test. [Hlubin] exhibited 

one (1) out of four (4) clues for the one-legged stand test. Based 

upon his experience with intoxicated persons, his training as a 

police officer, the information provided by Sergeant Ogden, and 

his interaction with [Hlubin], Officer Sicilia formed an opinion 

that [Hlubin] was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. 

Thereafter, [Hlubin] consented to a blood draw, and was found 

to have a blood alcohol content of .152%.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/16, at 2-5 (internal citations omitted).

Hlubin was charged with the aforementioned two counts of DUI. On 

March 9, 2015, Hlubin filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, alleging that the 

sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional and that everything that flowed 

from the illegal stop should be suppressed.4 The court denied the motion 

and the matter proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Thomas E. 

Flaherty. At trial, Hlubin and the Commonwealth stipulated to the admission 

of the testimony of Officer Sicilia and Sergeant Ogden from the suppression 

hearing, as well as the results of Hlubin’s blood test. Following trial, the 

court convicted Hlubin on both DUI counts and sentenced her to thirty days 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

horizontal gaze nystagmus of a motor vehicle driver suspected of driving 

under the influence of alcohol. Id.

4

In her suppression motion, Hlubin also claimed that the implied consent 

law was violated when her blood was not drawn at an approved facility, 

probable cause did not exist to arrest her for suspected DUI, and Sergeant 

Ogden did not have the authority to detain and arrest her outside of his 

jurisdiction.
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of Restrictive Intermediate Punishment, six months of non-reporting 

probation, and fines. 

Hlubin filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. A panel of 

this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 951 WDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 6, 2016) 

(unpublished memorandum decision). However, that decision was later 

withdrawn after our Court granted reargument on December 15, 2016. The 

parties filed new briefs. On reargument, Hlubin presents the following issues 

for our consideration:

(1) Did the trial court err when it ruled that the checkpoint, 

which led to [Hlubin’s] stop, detention, and arrest, was 

lawful even though the Commonwealth failed to show 

compliance with the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act 

[(“ICA”)]?

(2) Did the trial court err when it held that Section 8953(a)(3) 

[of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act [(“MPJA”)]] permits 

officers to leave their primary jurisdiction for the purpose 

of participating in a sobriety checkpoint?

(3) Whether or not Officer Sicilia had sufficient probable cause 

to arrest [Hlubin] for the offense of DUI and to request a 

chemical test?

A. Validity of Sobriety Checkpoint and the ICA

Pursuant to the ICA: 

(a) General rule. — Two or more local governments in this 

Commonwealth may jointly cooperate, or any local government 

may jointly cooperate with any similar entities located in any 

other state, in the exercise or in the performance of their 

respective governmental functions, powers or responsibilities.
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(b) Joint agreements. — For the purpose of carrying the 

provisions of this subchapter into effect, the local governments 

or other entities so cooperating shall enter into any joint 

agreements as may be deemed appropriate for those purposes.

53 Pa.C.S. § 2303 (emphasis added). Under section 2305 of the ICA, a local 

government may enter into any intergovernmental cooperation with another 

local government upon the passage of an ordinance of its governing body. 

Id. at § 2305. In such cases, ordinances shall contain seven specific criteria 

outlined in section 2307 of the ICA.5

The Commonwealth concedes, and we agree, that the DUI checkpoint 

in the instant case did not comply with the ICA where the 15 municipalities 

____________________________________________

5 The seven criteria are:

(1) The conditions of agreement in the case of cooperation with 

or delegation to other local governments, the Commonwealth, 

other states or the Federal Government.

(2) The duration of the term of the agreement.

(3) The purpose and objectives of the agreement, including the 

powers and scope of authority delegated in the agreement.

(4) The manner and extent of financing the agreement.

(5) The organizational structure necessary to implement the 

agreement.

(6) The manner in which real or personal property shall be

acquired, managed, licensed or disposed of.

(7) That the entity created under this section shall be 

empowered to enter into contracts for policies of group insurance 

and employee benefits, including Social Security, for its 

employees.

53 Pa.C.S. § 2307.
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comprising the Task Force did not jointly cooperate by each adopting an 

ordinance in compliance with sections 2303 and 2305. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 

2315 (joint cooperation agreement deemed in force when it has been 

adopted by ordinance by cooperating local governments). While Robinson 

Township had proposed a resolution to participate with the Task Force, that 

resolution was not ratified and adopted by the other Task Force 

municipalities nor does it contain the required criteria of an ordinance under 

section 2307. See supra note 6. However, this does not end our inquiry 

with regard to whether the checkpoint was otherwise valid.

B. Constitutionality/Legality of Sobriety Checkpoint and the MPJA6

Hlubin claims that because the ICA codifies the process that local 

governmental units must follow when cooperating with each other “it 

controls the outcome of this case as well as the legality of all sobriety 

checkpoints (and all government matters) when the officers from outside the 

primary jurisdiction are utilized.” Appellant’s Brief, at 31. Moreover, she 

contends that “[o]nce it is shown that the Commonwealth failed to comply 

with the ICA, the trial court’s decision that the checkpoint at issue was 

legally constituted must be reversed [or] Article IX, § 5 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and the ICA are rendered meaningless.” Id. We disagree. 

____________________________________________

6 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8951-8954.
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As the Commonwealth notes, while the relevant sections of the local 

government code apply to “all local governments,”7 53 Pa.C.S. § 2301, the 

MPJA only applies to any “duly employed municipal police officer who is 

within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary 

jurisdiction.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a). Specifically, the MPJA enumerates a 

discrete set of circumstances under which a municipal police officer may 

exercise extra-territorial authority. See generally 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(1)-

(6). Accordingly, we do not agree with Hlubin’s claim that Article IX, § 5 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution and the ICA will be “rendered meaningless and 

municipal boundaries will be obliterated” by applying the MPJA in such 

limited circumstances as the present case. These two statutes can be 

applied concurrently; they are not mutually exclusive as they address 

different circumstances that may arise within local municipalities. See 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1933 (whenever general provision in statute shall conflict with 

____________________________________________

7 Under the ICA, “local government” is defined as:

A county, city of the second class, second class A and third class, 

borough, incorporated town, township, school district or any 

other similar general purpose unit of government created by the 

General Assembly after July 12, 1972.

53 Pa.C.S. § 2302.
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special provision in same or another statute, two shall be construed, if 

possible, so that effect may be given to both).8 

Hlubin also contends she was not lawfully arrested because the 

sobriety checkpoint was not authorized under the MPJA. Specifically, Hlubin 

asserts that the MPJA relates only to situations where a request for 

assistance is contemporaneous with the commission of a crime and that 

probable cause to believe a crime is being or has been committed is the 

fundamental purpose of the MPJA. 

Section 8953(a) of the MPJA delineates six specific situations wherein 

an officer can go outside of his or her primary jurisdiction to make arrests, 

serve warrants and perform other official functions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

8953(a)(1)-(6). Pursuant to section 8953(a) of the MPJA:

(a) General rule. — Any duly employed municipal police officer 

who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the 

territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the 

power and authority to enforce the laws of this 

Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that 

office as if enforcing those laws or performing those 

functions within the territorial limits of his primary 

jurisdiction in the following cases:

* * *

(3) Where the officer has been requested to aid or assist 

any local, State or Federal law enforcement officer or park 

____________________________________________

8 Moreover, the extent that Hlubin raises concerns with regard to 

expenditures, allocation of personnel, decisions regarding participation in 

programs and liability issues if the MPJA were applied in circumstances like 

the present, those matters are not before the court today. 
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police officer or otherwise has probable cause to believe 

that the other officer is in need of aid or assistance.

(4) Where the officer has obtained the prior consent of the 

chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by 

him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement 

agency which provides primary police services to a political 

subdivision which is beyond that officer’s primary 

jurisdiction to enter the other jurisdiction for the purpose 

of conducting official duties which arise from official 

matters within his primary jurisdiction.

9

42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(3), (4). The MPJA is not among those statutes which 

must be strictly construed and, instead, is subject to liberal construction to 

effectuate its objects and to promote justice. Commonwealth v. Peters, 

915 A.3d 1213 (Pa. Super. 2007).

One of the principal purposes of the MPJA is to promote public safety 

while placing a general limitation on extra-territorial police patrols. 

Commonwealth v. Merchant, 595 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Pa. 1991). In fact, 

one of the main objectives of the MPJA is to “promote a cohesive working 

relationship among municipal police departments.” Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

9 Although we ultimately conclude that Sergeant Ogden had the authority to 

stop Hlubin under section 8953(a)(3) of the MPJA, we also recognize that he 

may have been authorized to conduct the stop under section 8953(a)(4) 

where he had been given the consent of Robinson Township Police Chief 

Vietmeier to conduct official duties in Allegheny County as a member of the 

Task Force executing a joint DUI checkpoint. We also acknowledge the 

relevancy of section 8953(e) of the MPJA which preserves existing and future 

municipal police service agreements. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(e) (“Nothing in 

this section shall be construed to restrict the authority of any municipality to

maintain current or to enter into new cooperative police service agreements 

with another municipality or municipalities for purposes including, but not 

limited to, describing conditions of mutual aid, assigning liability and 

determining appropriate costs of these cooperative efforts.”). 
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Ebersole, 492 A.2d 436, 439 (Pa. Super. 1985). See Commonwealth v. 

Sestina, 546 A.2d 109 (Pa. Super. 1988) (the MPJA “not only encourages 

cooperative relationships among municipalities, but also between local 

municipalities and the state police;” statute addresses administrative, intradepartmental practice for state police). 

Instantly, the trial court found that the roadblock, operated as part of 

the Task Force, was a valid exercise of authority under section 8953(a)(3) of 

the MPJA. Program coordinator and project manager for the Task Force, 

Sergeant Douglas Ogden, testified that the Task Force was comprised of 15 

police departments that “bonded together to do DUI enforcement.” N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 3/13/15, at 9. Each year Sergeant Ogden applies for a 

grant and gathers statistics to support the administration of the grant; the 

statistics compiled DUI-related crashes, fatalities, and a list of the most 

common local roadways where DUI crashes occur. Id. at 10. Sergeant 

Ogden runs checkpoints, road patrols, and training for the officers involved 

in the checkpoints, as well as for those officers who are responsible for DUI 

enforcement and detection. Id. Sergeant Ogden also testified that he has 

two co-coordinators that assist him on the scene at an active checkpoint. 

Id. at 11. Finally, Sergeant Ogden testified that Steubenville Pike in 

Robinson Township, where the instant checkpoint was located, is identified 

as a DUI problem location as was reported to him by Robinson Township 

Sergeant Joel Hamilton. Id. at 11-12.
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Sergeant Ogden testified that there were established program policies 

and procedural guidelines10 associated with the Task Force that were sent to 

every member department. Id. at 14, 20 (“Every one of the members of 

my task force has a copy of it that I have sent and they have it at their 

disposal.”). In this particular case, the sobriety checkpoint was headed by 

Sergeant Hamilton; more than 25 officers were authorized to man the 

checkpoint. Id. at 15. Sergeant Ogden sent Sergeant Hamilton a sobriety 

checkpoint authorization form, requesting that he have the Robinson 

Township police chief sign the form to authorize Ogden to be out in the road 

conducting the checkpoint. Id. at 17. Robinson Township Police Chief Dale 

Vietmeier returned the signed form11 five days before the checkpoint took 

____________________________________________

10 The procedural policy and guidelines for the Task Force include the 

following information:

 Purpose of Task Force;

 Definition of Sobriety Checkpoint;

 Policy of the Task Force;

 Checkpoint Procedures, including Site Selection, Personnel Selection 

and Deployment, Training, Checkpoint Duration, and Officer 

Responsibilities;

 Checkpoint Tactics and Guidelines;

 Scheduling & Administrative Concerns; and

 External Support

West Hills Area DUI Task Force Sobriety Checkpoint Program: Policy and 

Procedural Guidelines; Commonwealth Exhibit 1.

11 The form states:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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place. Id. at 18; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3. Information regarding the 

exact location, time, officer in charge and the logistics of the checkpoint is 

also included in the form. Id. An email press release about the checkpoint 

was sent in advance to local television, radio, and print news outlets, as well 

as a designated mailing list. Id. at 23.

Based upon this testimony, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that 

the instant checkpoint was valid under subsection 8953(a)(3) of the MPJA. 

There is no statutory language in the MPJA, specifically section 8953(a)(3), 

that would impose a “contemporaneous” requirement upon an officer’s 

request for aid or assistance. In fact, subsection 8953(a)(2), often termed 

the “hot pursuit” exception of the MPJA, specifically applies to those 

instances where an officer’s chase into a neighboring jurisdiction is 

“immediate, continuous, and uninterrupted.” Commonwealth v. McPeak, 

708 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Super. 1998). Moreover, “it is noteworthy that 

the predecessor [of the MPJA] made provision for police action outside [an 

officer’s] primary jurisdiction in only one circumstance, i.e., hot pursuit.” 

Merchant, 595 A.2d at 1138-39. “The inclusion of additional instances of 

authorization indicates that the General Assembly intended to expand the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

I hereby authorize the operation of a sobriety checkpoint as 

outlined above and adhering to standard operating procedures 

that have been established.

West Hills DUI Task Force Sobriety Checkpoint Authorization Form, 9/23/13.
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powers of local police to protect the public, where such expansion would not 

adversely affect the ultimate goal of maintaining police accountability to 

local authority.” Id. at 1139. Thus, in light of the purpose and spirit of the 

MPJA, in conjunction with its liberal construction, we decline to read such a 

“contemporaneous” element into subsection (a)(3). Peters, supra.

Here, Robinson Township Police Chief Vietmeier and Officer-in-Charge 

Sergeant Hamilton authorized Sergeant Ogden, as Task Force 

representative, to operate the sobriety checkpoint in his jurisdiction and to 

“adher[e] to the standard operating procedures that have been established.” 

West Hills Task Force Sobriety Checkpoint Authorization Form, 9/23/15. 

This arrangement represents Robinson Township’s request for “aid and 

assist[ance]” from Moon Township Sergeant Ogden in carrying out a sobriety 

checkpoint that served the legitimate purpose of reducing death, injury and 

property damage resulting from motor vehicle crashes due to intoxicated or 

chemically impaired drivers from the surrounding municipalities. 

Moreover, even if the sobriety checkpoint was not valid under the 

stricture of the MPJA, suppression is not warranted under the circumstances. 

In Commonwealth v. O’Shea, 567 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1989), the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court approved of a case-by-case approach, applying the following 

factors to determine whether suppression is warranted where evidence is 

obtained in violation of the MPJA: intrusiveness of the police conduct; the 

extent of deviation from the letter and spirit of the Act; and the prejudice to 

the accused. Id. at 1030; see Commonwealth v. Chernosky, 874 A.2d 
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123 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc) (concluding that where officer’s action did 

not constitute type of behavior legislature sought to prohibit through 

enactment of MPJA, suppression not appropriate remedy; Court rejected 

absolutist approach of exclusionary rule in such cases). 

Here, the police were not intrusive in detaining motorists at the 

checkpoint. Sergeant Ogden testified that the stops generally lasted only 30 

to 45 seconds in length and involved officers first identifying themselves, 

asking for a driver’s identifying documents (license, registration and 

insurance), and posing limited follow-up questions. N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 3/13/15, at 26-27. The checkpoints furthered the purpose of the 

MPJA by “reduc[ing] the accidental death, injury and property-damage 

resulting from motor vehicle crashes involving intoxicated and chemically 

impaired operators . . . decreas[ing] the number of intoxicated and 

chemically impaired offenders on the highways of the member communities 

by conducting sobriety checkpoints.” West Hills Area DUI Task Force 

Sobriety Checkpoint Program: Policy and Procedural Guidelines, at 2. 

Finally, there was minimal to no prejudice suffered by drivers stopped at the 

checkpoints. See Commonwealth v. Worthy, 957 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. 

2008) (sobriety checkpoints do not offend Fourth Amendment because they 

are “a reasonable means of advancing a vital public interest, involving only a 

modest intrusion on the privacy and liberty of motorists”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967 (Pa. Super. 2008) (where officer 

unintentionally failed to follow appropriate MPJA procedure after detaining 
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defendant and defendant was not prejudiced, evidence should not have been 

suppressed). 

C. Probable Cause to Arrest for DUI

In her final issue, Hlubin asserts that Officer Sicilia did not have 

probable cause to arrest her for DUI. We disagree.

Probable cause for a DUI arrest is present when a police officer has 

sufficient facts at his disposal to warrant a prudent person to believe that 

the driver of a vehicle is under the influence of alcohol. Commonwealth v. 

Angel, 946 A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. 2008). The probable cause determination 

is made based upon the totality of the circumstances and “a police officer 

may utilize both his experience and personal observations to render an 

opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated.” Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

Here, Sergeant Ogden testified that when he stopped Hlubin at the 

checkpoint and asked her for her driver’s license and proof of registration 

and insurance, Hlubin’s reaction “was slow and fumbled and she . . . started 

handing me a Target credit card as opposed to a driver’s license.” N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 3/13/15, at 31. Moreover, Sergeant Ogden testified 

that he noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from Hlubin’s vehicle and 

that her speech was slurred. Id. at 32. Ultimately, Hlubin told Sergeant 

Ogden that “she may have had a shot and a beer.” Id.

Officer Sicilia, who had training in field sobriety and had conducted 

approximately one hundred prior DUI investigations, performed three field 
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sobriety tests on Hlubin at the checkpoint. Id. at 60, 62. While conducting 

the tests, Officer Sicilia noticed that Hlubin had bloodshot, glassy eyes and 

an odor of alcohol emanating from her. Id. at 63. Officer Sicilia concluded 

that Hlubin was impaired after she exhibited all six clues during the HGN 

test. Id. As a result of these findings, Officer Sicilia opined that Hlubin was 

incapable of driving a motor vehicle and placed her under arrest. Id. at 66.

Under a totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Officer Sicilia 

had probable cause to arrest Hlubin for suspected driving under the 

influence. 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b); Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 

A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding probable cause existed to arrest driver 

for DUI where driver smelled of alcohol and his speech was slurred).12

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

12 Hlubin argues in her appellate brief that without reasonable grounds to 

believe that she was driving under the influence, the police were not 

permitted to administer a blood test under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a)(1). See 

Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552 (Pa. Super. 2006). We first note 

that Hlubin does not raise this issue in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement. Thus, we could find the issue waived on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii). However, even if it were not waived, because there was 

probable cause to arrest Hlubin for DUI, this issue is meritless.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2017