alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-21-00069-CR

IN RE WILLIAM CHARLES WEBB

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-678-C2

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this original proceeding, relator, William Charles Webb, complains about the 

trial court’s purported refusal to rule on his January 8, 2021 Chapter 64 motion for DNA 

testing.1 Relator has filed two other matters that are related to this one—appellate cause 

1 Relator also appears to request that we order the trial court to grant his January 8, 2021 Chapter 

64 motion for DNA testing. We cannot do so. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at 

Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (stating that an appellate court can only compel a 

trial court to rule on a pending motion by writ of mandamus; it cannot compel the trial court to rule in a 

certain way).
In re Webb Page 2

numbers 10-18-00170-CR and 10-20-00292-CR. Both of these matters are still pending in 

this Court.

In any event, we abated and remanded appellate cause numbers 10-18-00170-CR 

and 10-20-00292-CR to the trial court to locate relator’s prior Chapter 64 motion for DNA 

testing filed on May 2, 2018, among other things. In its order in response to our abatement

order, the trial court indicated that relator’s May 2, 2018 Chapter 64 motion for DNA 

testing has been lost, but that relator’s January 8, 2021 Chapter 64 motion for DNA testing 

is an accurate copy of the May 2, 2018 motion. On May 7, 2018, the trial court originally 

denied relator’s May 2, 2018 motion. Moreover, on March 5, 2021, the trial court adopted

its prior May 7, 2018 order denying relator relief under Chapter 64. Accordingly, because 

the effect of the trial court’s March 5, 2021 order was to deny relator’s January 8, 2021 

Chapter 64 motion for DNA testing, we dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus 

in this appellate cause number for want of jurisdiction.

2

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice

2 We further note that our holding in this case is limited to relator’s complaint about the trial court’s 

purported refusal to rule on his January 8, 2021 Chapter 64 motion for DNA testing. We do not address 

the propriety of the denial of relator’s Chapter 64 motion in this proceeding. Moreover, in light of our 

disposition, we dismiss as moot all other pending motions in this matter.
In re Webb Page 3

Before Chief Justice Gray

Justice Neill,

and Senior Justice Scoggins3

Petition dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed May 19, 2021

Do not publish

[OT06]

3 The Honorable Al Scoggins, Senior Justice of the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment 

of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-80144-CR-SMITH/MAYNARD(s)(s)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOFF STENN WROY PHILOSSAINT,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO BRING

ELECTRONICS INTO COURTHOUSE FOR TRIAL

The undersigned counsel for defendant respectfully moves to bring a laptop computer to 

court for trial in this matter. This will be a document intensive trial, and almost all evidence in

this case is electronic. Accordingly, the undersigned requests the Court’s permission to bring a 

laptop computer into the courthouse for purposes of trial. On January 24, 2023, AUSA Marc 

Osborne informed the undersigned by email that the Government has no objection to this motion. 

WHEREFORE, counsel respectfully moves to bring a laptop computer into court for trial 

in this matter.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this motion has been electronically filed via CM/ECF

providing notice to all counsel of record on February 1, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICES OF IAN GOLDSTEIN P.A.

Counsel for Defendant Philossaint

330 Clematis Street, Suite 209

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Tel: (561) 600-0950

Email: ian@iangoldsteinlaw.com

/s/ Ian J. Goldstein

IAN J. GOLDSTEIN, ESQUIRE

Florida Bar No. 0085219

Case 9:22-cr-80144-RS Document 188 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2023 Page 1 of 1
§ 155.130 Exemptions. ( a ) The Commandant grants an exemption or partial exemption from compliance with any requirement in this part if: ( 1 ) A ship operator submits a written request for an exemption via the COTP or OCMI thirty (30) days before operations under the exemption are proposed unless the COTP or OCMI authorizes a shorter time; and
( 2 ) It is determined from the request that: ( i ) Compliance with a specific requirement is economically or physically impractical;
( ii ) No alternative procedures, methods, or equipment standards exist that would provide an equivalent level of protection from pollution; and
( iii ) The likelihood of discharges occurring as a result of the exemption is minimal.
( b ) If requested, the applicant must submit any appropriate information, including an environmental and economic assessment of the effects of and the reasons for the exemption and proposed procedures, methods, or equipment standards.
( c ) The exemption may specify the procedures, methods, or equipment standards that will apply.
( d ) An oceangoing ship is not given an exemption from the requirements of subpart B of this part unless the ship is a hydrofoil, air cushion vehicle or other new type of ship (near-surface craft, submarine craft, etc.) whose constructional features are such as to render the application of any of the provisions of subpart B relating to construction and equipment unreasonable or impractical. The construction and equipment of the ship must provide protection equivalent to that afforded by subpart B of this part against pollution, having regard to the service for which the ship is intended.
( e ) An exemption is granted or denied in writing. The decision of the Commandant is a final agency action.
Note to § 155.130 :
Additional exemptions/temporary waivers related to *salvage* and *marine firefighting* requirements can be found in § 155.4055.
[CGD 75-124a, 48 FR 45714, Oct. 6, 1983, as amended by CGD 86-034, 55 FR 36254, Sept. 4, 1990; USCG-1998-3417, 73 FR 80648, Dec. 31, 2008]
1 | Complaint Andre G. Raikhelson, Esq.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

ASSEMGUL MUKHANBETZHANOVA

Plaintiff, Case No.: 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

vs.

ZHANIYA DYUSSEMBAYEVA and DANA DYUSSEMBAYEVA.

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, ASSEMGUL MUKHANBETZHANOVA, (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), states 

his complaint against Defendant, ZHANIYA DYUSSEMBAYEVA and DANA 

DYUSSEMBAYEVA (hereinafter “Defendants”), and states the following:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 

1. At all times material hereto both defendants reside at 702 SE 3rd Ave, Suite 204, 

HALLANDALE BEACH, Florida 33009.

2. Plaintiff is an individual who is a resident of Kazakhstan. 

3. The parties are completely diverse.

4. This action is one where the claimed value of the subject property exceeds 

$75,000.00. 

5. Venue is properly laid because the property is situated in Broward County, Florida. 

0:22-cv-61626

Case 0:22-cv-61626-WPD Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2022 Page 1 of 3
2 | Complaint Andre G. Raikhelson, Esq.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6. On January 15, 2021, a document was created that appeared to transfer ownership 

in the property located at 702 SE 3rd Ave, Suite 204, HALLANDALE BEACH, 

Florida 33009 (“Subject Property”).

7. This document was a forgery, and no factual or legal transfer should have taken 

place. 

8. The notary turned out to be a step daughter of the grantor, who was not in the 

United States of America when this document was signed, and step sister of 

Defendnats.

9. The last time the grantor was in the United States was September 24, 2018.

COUNT I – FRAUD, FORGERY, AND UTTERING OF A FALSE INSTRUMENT

10. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in paragraph 1-9, and further states:

11. Defendants made a false instrument in writing the regarding the warranty deed.

12. Defendants had the intent to transfer property that did not belong to them. Plaintiff 

knowns there was the requisite intent because the grantor was not in the country, 

and the notary public was an individual who is step daughter the grantor and step 

sister of Defendnats. 

13. The Quit Claim deed is the kind of instrument that is capable of effectuating a 

fraud. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks the Court to find in Plaintiff’s favor for Fraud, Forgery, 

and Uttering against the Defendant, and void the deed, returning the property in grantor’s 

rightful possession.

Case 0:22-cv-61626-WPD Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2022 Page 2 of 3
3 | Complaint Andre G. Raikhelson, Esq.

Date August 31, 2022.

Respectfully submitted, 

By:

TRAYBER RAIKHELSON LAW GROUP

Counsel for Plaintiff

2750 NE 185th St, Suite 206

Aventura FL 33180

Telephone: (954) 895-5566

Primary Email: arlaw@raikhelsonlaw.com

Secondary email: a.raikhelson@icloud.com

/s/ Andre G. Raikhelson

Andre G. Raikhelson, Esq.

Bar Number: 123657

Case 0:22-cv-61626-WPD Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2022 Page 3 of 3
§ 25.135 Processing and settlement of claims in foreign countries. ( a ) In certain countries, the Department of Defense has assigned single-service responsibility for the settlement of claims arising under the Foreign Claims Act, Military Claims Act, Nonscope of Employment Claims Act, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, and Federal Claims Collection Act.
( b ) In a country where single-service claims responsibility has been assigned, claims against the United States cognizable under the acts referenced in paragraph (a) of this section are processed and settled by the service assigned responsibility.
( c ) A list of countries assigned to a single-service is available from the military attache at any United States embassy or consulate.
( d ) In a country not assigned to a single-service, the rules for presenting claims may be found in § 25.111, and the claim will be settled by the Coast Guard.
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Loan Agreement



 Exhibit 10.3 
 AGREEMENT 
 The parties hereto agree as follows: 

1. Stephen Williams (“Williams”) agrees to loan to Pioneer Bankshares, Inc. (“Pioneer”), the sum of Two Million US. Dollars
($2,000,000.00). This loan shall bear interest at the rate of 4% per year. Pioneer agrees to pay all accrued interest (thereon either monthly, quarterly or annually as Williams may choose. In addition, Pioneer shall pay $400,000.00 each year on
principal. The loan shall be paid in full in 5 years, and may not be prepaid without Williams consent. 
 2. This loan will be evidenced by a
promissory note in the principal amount of $2,000,000.00 payable to Williams or his Order, signed by Pioneer, in a form acceptable to Williams’s attorney. 
 3. Williams shall fund the loan when requested to do so by Pioneer but in no event later than July 31, 2012. Interest shall start to run at the time the loan is funded. 

4. Williams understands that this loan is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other governmental or private entity.

  

							
	WITNESSETH the following signatures and seals:
				
	By:	 	 /s/ Stephen Williams
	 		 	6/29/2012
			
	Stephen Williams	 		 	
			
	Pioneer Bankshares, Inc.	 		 	
				
	By:	 	 /s/ Thomas R. Rosazza
	 		 	6/29/2012
			
	Thomas R. Rosazza, its President
#### CAROLINA OBERLANDER and CHARLES OBERLANDER, Appellants, *v.*CONSTANTIN ROSSWOG, and another, Respondents.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on the report of a referee, dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint, with costs.

This action is upon false representations made by the defendants, respecting certain bonds, by which the plaintiffs were induced to accept them as payment in part for real estate sold to the defendants.

The court, after a very careful examination of the evidence, concluded that the statement of the defendant that *“*as far as he knew the bonds were good,” was substantially a statement that they were worth their face, and as he in fact then knew that' they were selling very much below par, that such statement was intended to convey, a false impression, especially as the bonds were assumed, in the arrangement for the sale of the real estate, to represent their par value.

*Henry D.*Beman, for the appellants.

*Stephen H. Olin,*for the respondents.

Opinion by

Daniels, J.

Davis, P. J., and Brady, J., concurred.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, costs to abide event.
#### Jones v. Lucas.

January, 1823.

Depositions — Objections—When They Should Be Made.†

—Where, on a trial at law, a deposition is introduced. taken regularly under a commission, and an objection is made to some of the questions as leading questions, the court cannot suppress the improper questions and answers, after the jury is sworn; but the objection should be made to the court before the jury is sworn, and the improper questions and answers suppressed.

Lucas brought an action of trespass on the case, in. the superior court of Mecklenburg county, against Jones, for a fraud_ in selling him an unsound negro. At the trial, the plaintiff offered in evidence, the deposition of Amy B. Jones, taken under a commission. The defendant moved the court to exclude from the jury, certain answers contained in the deposition, to questions which were leading ones. The court overruled the motion, and permitted the answers in question to go to the jury; to which opinion the defendant excepted. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, and judgment accordingly. The defendant appealed to this court.

The case was submitted without argument.

†

-Depositions — Objections—When They Should Be Made. — In Electric Supply, etc., Co. v. Consolidated Light, etc., Co., 42 W. Va. 584, 26 S. E. Rep. 188, it is said: “One assignment of error is that the court allowed the plaintiff to read a deposition of a witness whose deposition had already been taken, the objection being that no leave of court .was given to retake the deposition; but this objection ought to have been made the ground of an exception before the trial, and not first made when offered at the trial. This would work a surprise. Dickinson v. Clarke, 5 W. Va. 280; Jones v. Lucas, 1 Rand. (Va.) 268; Foster v. Sutton, 4 Hen. & M. 401: Long v. Perine, 41 W. Va. 314, 23 S. E. Rep. 611; Peshine v. Shepperson, 17 Gratt. 472; Bart. Ch. Prac. 758; Bart. Law Prac. 439; Doane v. Glenn, 21 Wall. 35. It was held that where objections do not go to the testimony of the witness, but to defects which might have been obviated by retaking, the objection made at the trial will not be heard. Such objections should be noted when the deposition is being taken, or be presented by motion to suppress. ” For further information on this subject, see mono-graphic *note*on “Depositions” appended to Field v. Brown, 24 Gratt. 74.

JUDGE BROOKE,*

*January 21. — delivered the opinion of the court.

The court is of opinion, that the objections taken in the bill of exceptions, to the deposition referred to, came too late. Although the questions were leading questions, calculated to inform the witness of the answers expected by the party propounding them, and therefore improper; yet, after the jury were sworn, it would have been irregular to suppress the deposition, there being no objection to the competency of the witness. Before the jury were sworn, on motion, the questions and answers objected to ought to have been suppressed by the court. Afterwards, and upon the trial, the objections could only go to the credit of the witness. The judgment is, therefore, to be affirmed.

*

 Judge Cabell absent.
```

[111th Congress Public Law 14]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[[Page 123 STAT. 1602]]

Public Law 111-14
111th Congress

                                 An Act

 
  To designate the United States courthouse under construction at 327 
South Church Street, Rockford, Illinois, as the ``Stanley J. Roszkowski 
    United States Courthouse''. <<NOTE: Apr. 23, 2009 -  [S. 520]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE.

    (a) Designation.--The United States courthouse under construction, 
as of the date of enactment of this Act, at 327 South Church Street, 
Rockford, Illinois, shall be known and designated as the ``Stanley J. 
Roszkowski United States Courthouse''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the United States 
courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the ``Stanley J. Roszkowski United States Courthouse''.

    Approved April 23, 2009.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 520:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 155 (2009):
            Mar. 3, considered and passed Senate.
            Mar. 25, considered and passed House.

                                  <all>
```
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

TOWN CENTER AT BOCA RATON TRUST

, Appellant,

v.

DOROTHY JACKS, as Palm Beach County Property Appraiser, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 2572

[ May 6, 2021 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Scott R. Kerner , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2019

- CA

- 005792

- XXXX

- MB

.

Paul S. Figg and Mitchell W. Berger of Berger Singerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Jay R. Jack nin and Neil B. Jagolinzer of Jacknin & Jagolinzer , P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee Dorothy Jacks.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert P. Elson, Senior Assistant Attorney General of the Office of the Attorney General, Revenue Litigation
Bureau, Tallahassee, for a ppellee Intervenor Florida Department of

Revenue.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

W ARNER
, D AMOORGIAN and F ORST , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ACMAT Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Henry W. Nozko,
Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

      /s/ Henry W. Nozko, Jr.
      -----------------------
      Henry W. Nozko, Jr.
      Chief Executive Officer
      November 15, 2004
Director 

Office of International Aviation 

US Department of Transportation 

400 Seventh Street SW 

Room 6402 

Washington DC 20590 

USA 

261

h May 2015 

Reciprocity Statement 

Transport Malta 

Malta Transport Centre 

Marsa, MRS 1917 

Malta 

Tel: (356) 2122 2203 

Fax: (356) 2125 0365 

Email: info.tm@transport.gov.mt 

www.transport.gov.mt 

This letter is to confirm that the Civil Aviation Directorate within the Authority for Transport in Malta 

will grant permission to US air carriers to conduct fifth, sixth, and seventh freedom charter 

operations on the basis of reciprocity. 

Sincerely, 

George BORG MARKS 

Director General for Civil Aviation 

Transport Malta is the Authority for Transport in Malta set up by AG XV of 2009
Foreign Production Falling, Consumption Rising in 1999/2000




pounds.

Will California’s 1999 upland yield fall within this range? Only time will tell once again, but

planting progress has been proven to play a significant role in influencing yields in California. A

year ago, yields were examined when planting progress was reported 95 percent complete near

May 10. During the 5 years where applicable, yields were within the range three of those years

and above the upper bound during the remaining two years. Therefore, based on past history and

the assumption of “normal” weather for the remainder of the 1999 growing season, implications
U.S. COTTON SUPPLY AND USE ESTIMATES




----------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:22-cv-23074-BB   Document 114-1   Entered on FLSD Docket 03/29/2023   Page 1 of 1