[Cite as State v. Booker, 2022-Ohio-3433.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 111222

v. :

DOMINIC BOOKER, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 29, 2022

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-20-649048-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Jeffrey Schnatter, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Jonathan N. Garver, for appellant. 

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

In this delayed appeal, defendant-appellant, Dominic Booker 

(“Booker”), appeals his sentence for rape, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, 

burglary, and having weapons while under disability. He challenges the 
constitutionality of his sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act and contends his 

sentence is contrary to law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In April 2020, Booker was charged in a 14-count indictment. Counts 

1-3 charged him with rape. Count 4 charged him with kidnapping. Counts 5, 7, and 

10 charged him with aggravated burglary. Counts 6 and 13 charged him with 

burglary. Counts 8 and 11 charged him with having weapons while under disability 

(“HWUD”). Count 9 charged him with theft. Count 12 charged him with attempted 

theft. Count 14 charged him with theft.1 The charges arise from incidents involving 

three victims — Jane Doe (Counts 1-6), T.G. (Counts 7, 9, 10, 12), and J.L. (Counts 

13 and 14).

In May 30, 2020, Booker entered into a plea agreement with plaintiffappellee, the state of Ohio (“State”). Booker pled guilty to an amended Count 1 

(rape) by the deletion of the sexual violent predator specification, an amended Count 

4 (kidnapping) by the deletion of the sexual motivation specification and the sexual 

violent predator specification, Count 5 (aggravated burglary) as charged, an 

amended Count 7 (aggravated burglary) by the deletion of the one-year firearm 

specification, Count 8 (HWUD) as charged, an amended Count 10 (aggravated 

burglary) by the deletion of the one- and three-year firearm specifications, and 

Count 13 (burglary) as charged. Counts 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, 12, and 14 were nolled. Booker

1 Each of Counts 1-4 carried a sexually violent predator specification. Count 4 also 

carried a sexual motivation specification. Count 10 carried both a one- and three-year 

firearm specification.
also agreed that the offenses were not allied offenses of similar import. The trial 

court advised Booker that Counts 1, 4, 5, and 7 would fall under the Reagan Tokes 

Act and that he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime 

registration.

Booker was sentenced at a hearing in June 2020, and a nunc pro tunc 

sentencing entry was filed on September 1, 2020. The court held a resentencing 

hearing in October 2020 because the original sentencing hearing did not include a 

sentence on Count 5. The trial court sentenced Booker to

3 year(s) on the specifications to be served prior to and consecutive 

with a minimum prison term of 10 year(s) and a maximum prison term 

of 15 year(s) on the underlying offense(s). The total stated prison term 

is 23-28 years[.]

Count 1: F1, an indefinite minimum prison term of 10-15 year(s), 5 

years mandatory post release control. 

Count 4: F1, an indefinite minimum prison term of 10-15 year(s), 5 

years mandatory post release control. 

Count 5: F1, an indefinite minimum prison term of 10-15 year(s), 5 

years mandatory post release control. 

Count 7: F1, an indefinite minimum prison term of 10-15 year(s), 3 year 

firearm specification, 5 years mandatory post release control. 

Count 8: F3, 36 month(s), up to 3 years discretionary post release 

control. 

Count 10: F1, a definite minimum prison term of 10 year(s), 5 years 

mandatory post release control. 

Count 13: F2, a definite minimum prison term of 8 year(s), 3 years 

mandatory post release control. 

Count[s] 1 and 4 to be served consecutively.
The court imposes prison terms consecutively finding that consecutive 

service of the prison term is necessary to protect the public from future 

crime or to punish defendant; that the consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct and to the 

danger defendant poses to the public; and that, at least two of the 

multiple offenses were committed in this case as part of one or more 

courses of conduct, and the harm caused by said multiple offenses was 

so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses 

committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects 

the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. 

* * * 

** Defendant is a Tier III sex offender. **

(Trial Court’s Judgment, Oct. 30, 2020.) The trial court also “considered all 

required factors of the law [and found] that prison is consistent with the purpose of 

R.C. 2929.11.” Id. 

It is from this order that Booker appeals, raising the following two 

assignments of error for review.

Assignment of Error One: [Booker’s] sentencing under the Reagan 

Tokes law violated the constitutional guarantees of due process of law 

and equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, 

Sections 2 and 16 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.

Assignment of Error Two: The twenty-three (23)-year base prison 

term imposed by the trial court is excessive, unsupported by the record, 

and contrary to law.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Reagan Tokes

In the first assignment of error, Booker recognizes that in State v. 

Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.), this court already determined 

that the sentencing provisions under the Reagan Tokes Act are constitutional, but 
challenges the constitutionality of the Act since the issue has not yet been resolved 

by the Ohio Supreme Court.

However, in light of our en banc decision in Delvallie, which found 

the Reagan Tokes Act to be constitutional, we overrule the first assignment of error.

B. Booker’s Sentence

1. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews felony sentences under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2). State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 

649, ¶ 27, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 

1231. Relevant to the instant appeal, under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), an appellate 

court “may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter * * * for resentencing” if it “clearly and 

convincingly” finds “[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

“A sentence is contrary to law if it falls outside the statutory range for 

the offense or if the sentencing court fails to consider the purposes and principles of 

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.” 

State v. Angel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110456, 2022-Ohio-72, ¶ 8, citing State v. 

Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103444, 2016-Ohio-5926.

2. R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12

R.C. 2929.11 addresses the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, 

while R.C. 2929.12 addresses factors that are to be taken in account when imposing 

a sentence. Jones at ¶ 18-19. Under R.C. 2929.11(A), the overriding purposes of 
felony sentencing are to (1) “protect the public from future crime by the offender and 

others”; (2) “punish the offender”; and (3) “promote the effective rehabilitation of 

the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish 

those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local 

government resources.” Additionally, the imposed sentence must be 

“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct 

and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar 

crimes committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

R.C. 2929.12 provides the sentencing court with the discretion to 

determine the best way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set 

forth in R.C. 2929.11 when imposing a sentence. State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 107281, 2019-Ohio-1769, ¶ 10. R.C. 2929.12 sets forth a 

nonexhaustive list of factors a trial court must consider in determining the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the likelihood of recidivism, including the 

offender’s history of criminal convictions, whether the offender has responded 

favorably to sanctions previously imposed for criminal convictions, whether the 

offender has demonstrated remorse, and any other factors relevant to achieving the 

purposes and principles of sentencing. R.C. 2929.12(A), (D)(2)-(3), and (D)(5).

Although the sentencing court must consider the factors in R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12, the court is not required to make specific findings on the 

record regarding its consideration of those factors, even when imposing a morethan-minimum sentence. Bridges at ¶ 11, citing State v. Keith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
Nos. 103413 and 103414, 2016-Ohio-5234; State v. Rouse, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

107379, 2019-Ohio-708. Indeed, consideration of the factors is presumed unless the 

defendant affirmatively shows otherwise. State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, 108 

N.E.3d 1109, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). (The “trial court’s statement in its sentencing journal 

entry that it considered the required statutory factors is alone sufficient to fulfill its 

obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”) Id., citing Keith, citing State v. 

Sutton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 102300 and 102302, 2015-Ohio-4074, and State v. 

Clayton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99700, 2014-Ohio-112. 

3. 23-Year Base Sentence

Booker argues his 23-year base sentence exceeds the minimum 

sentence that can be legally imposed. He contends that there are three important 

mitigating factors not reflected in his sentence: (1) “minimal” criminal history 

consisting of a third-degree felony burglary offense in 2016 and a fourth-degree 

felony receiving stolen property offense in 2011; (2) he apologized and expressed 

remorse for his misconduct; and (3) Jane Doe told the court that she had forgiven

him. He additionally contends that the presence of the city of Cleveland’s Ward 1 

Councilman at his sentencing hearing was a highly unusual occurrence and the 

Councilman’s statements appear to have impacted his excessive sentence.

Booker’s argument, however, does not dispute the legality of the trial 

court’s term of incarceration, nor does it dispute the trial court’s findings supporting 

consecutive sentences. After the Ohio Supreme released its decision in Jones, our 

review of a sentence imposed by the trial court under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is limited 
to the legality of the sentence, meaning was it imposed after consideration of the 

statutory factors and is it within the range authorized by the Revised Code. See State 

v. Olsen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110740, 2022-Ohio-1402, ¶ 18. “Nothing in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in 

the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the 

sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones, 163 

Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 42. In particular, “R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to conduct a freestanding 

inquiry[.]” Id. 

In the instant case, a review of the record reveals that at the 

sentencing hearing in June 2020, the trial court heard from the victim of Counts 1-

6 and the city of Cleveland’s Ward 1 Councilman, as well as Booker, defense counsel, 

and the state. The victim asked the court for justice and stated that she forgave 

Booker. (Tr. 37, June 23, 2020.) The Councilman advised the court that he was 

present because this incident not only impacted the victim but the neighborhood. 

(Tr. 38, June 23, 2020.) He stated that “[w]ord had got out that there was a rapist 

trying to break into people’s houses. * * * I just come before you today on behalf of 

the citizens of the Lee/Harvard Ward 1 area asking * * * you, Judge, to sentence him 

to the fullest lengths possible. This type of crime against women and children and 

terrorizing the neighborhood is absolutely unacceptable[.] And to come to find out 

that he is now a predator because he has done this on multiple occasions.” (Tr. 38-

39, June 23, 2020.) 
During its recitation of the facts, the state noted that counts involving

the victim arose from Booker breaking into her home while she was asleep. Booker 

wore a black ski mask and vaginally, anally, and orally raped the victim. He kept her 

from leaving her home. (Tr. 40, June 23, 2020.) The next day, the victim came back 

to her home (she was living with her mother at the time) and found that the house 

was broken into again. Booker broke in through a back window, and when doing so,

he cut himself and left blood on the window shades. The blood was linked to Booker

through DNA testing. (Tr. 42-43, June 23, 2020.) 

The state also described the details regarding the burglaries listing 

T.G. as the victim. The burglaries were captured on surveillance cameras. In one 

burglary, Booker took a television, some cash, and a comforter. With the other 

burglary, it appears that Booker was nervous because the camera captured him 

talking with his accomplice and they left without taking anything. (Tr. 43, June 23, 

2020.) Regarding the burglary listing J.L. as the victim, the state advised the trial 

court that this burglary was also captured on video surveillance. Booker took a 

television, a sound bar, and possibly some cash. (Tr. 43-44, June 23, 2020.) 

The state also quoted from a text-message conversation between 

Booker and another individual before and after the rape of Jane Doe. During the 

conversation, Booker sent and replied to the following messages:

[Booker:] I want to break in and steal some p***y[.]

[Reply:] LMAO. You got to be careful with that; might like it.

[Booker:] LOL. I want to tell you but goddamn.
* * * 

Grr. I can’t even scare no one. Baby like you look good. Why you got 

to be mean. I give it to you. I be — goddamn —

[Reply:] LMAO. That’s what I’m trying to tell you, they just got to go 

with it and give a little fight.

[Booker:] S**t crazy. I’ll tell you about it later.

[Booker:] S**t, I just took somebody’s pride. Hee-hee. Rape, rape, 

rape. LOL. I’m crazy for real.

(Tr. 45, June 23, 2020.) 

Defense counsel asked for an 8-year prison term, noting that Booker 

does not have a lengthy history of assaultive behavior or sexually oriented behavior. 

Booker then apologized to the court, wishing he “could take it back.” (Tr. 52, June 

23, 2020.) 

Prior to announcing its sentence, the trial court indicated that it 

considered the overall facts of the case, noting the facts were horrific. (Tr. 52, June 

23, 2020.) The court also indicated it considered all the purposes and principles of 

the Ohio Revised Code section relating to sentencing, the statements made by all the 

parties, and the medical report, noting it gave “this case a great deal of thought” prior 

to imposing the sentence. (Tr. 54, June 23, 2020.)

The trial court found that consecutive sentences were “necessary to 

protect the public from future crime and to punish [Booker]; that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of [Booker’s] conduct, and 

that the danger [he] pose[s] to the public; and furthermore, that [the crimes] were 

committed while [Booker was] on community control sanctions.” (Tr. 56-57, June 
23, 2020.) The trial court also found that two of the multiple offenses were 

committed as part of one or more courses of conduct by burglarizing Jane Doe’s 

house twice, and that the harm caused “was so great or unusual that no single prison 

term for any of the offenses committed as part of the courses of conduct adequately 

reflects the seriousness of [Booker’s] conduct[.]” (Tr. 57, June 23, 2020.) The trial 

court further noted that Booker did have prior felony convictions and that 

consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime 

committed by him. (Tr. 57, June 23, 2020.)

At the resentencing hearing in October 2020, the trial court again 

indicated that it considered all the purposes and principles of the Ohio Revised Code 

relating to sentencing. (Tr. 64, Oct. 22, 2020.) The court also reiterated its reasons 

for ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. (Tr. 65-66, Oct. 22, 2020.) In 

the corresponding sentencing entry, the court also incorporated its consideration of 

all the required factors of law, its determination that prison was consistent with R.C. 

2929.11, and its findings supporting consecutive sentences. (Trial Court’s 

Judgment, Oct. 30, 2020.) 

Booker asks this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial 

court’s regarding how the principles and purposes of sentencing should have applied 

and what sentence was appropriate. We decline to do so. Booker committed 

multiple burglaries, rape, and then returned to burglarize his rape victim the next 

day, while he was on community-control sanctions. Moreover, Booker’s texts reveal 

that he was going to commit the rape and then joked about it afterwards. 
When applying the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) to the 

instant case, we find that Booker’s sentence of 23-28 years is within the statutory 

range, and the record reflects the trial court had considered the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 

2929.12. Furthermore, the trial court’s sentencing journal entry indicates that it 

“considered all required factors of the law,” which this court has held to be enough 

to find that the court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing 

set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. 

Keith at ¶ 11. 

Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

We find that Booker’s sentence is not unconstitutional under the 

Reagan Tokes Act. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the trial court 

imposed Booker’s sentence after consideration of the statutory factors, and his 

sentence is within the range authorized by the Revised Code.

Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to 

the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR

N.B. Judge Anita Laster Mays is constrained to apply Delvallie’s en banc decision. 

For a full explanation of her analysis, see State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 

N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.) (Laster Mays, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).