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SIX YEARS LATER (PART III): INNOVATIVE

APPROACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 14, 2008

Serial No. 110–183

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

——— ———

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

PETER WELCH, Vermont

——— ———

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on February 14, 2008 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Meese, Colonel Michael J., Ph.D., professor and head of the Social

Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point; Angel

Rabasa, Ph.D., senior policy analyst, Rand Corp.; Amitai Etzioni, Ph.D.,

University professor, George Washington University; and Daniel L.

Byman, Ph.D., director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University ............................................................................................. 5

Byman, Daniel L. ...................................................................................... 43

Etzioni, Amitai .......................................................................................... 32

Meese, Colonel Michael J. ........................................................................ 5

Rabasa, Angel ............................................................................................ 16

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Byman, Daniel L., Ph.D., director, Center for Peace and Security Studies,

Georgetown University, prepared statement of .......................................... 46

Etzioni, Amitai, Ph.D., University professor, George Washington University, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 35

Meese, Colonel Michael J., Ph.D., professor and head of the Social

Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 8

Rabasa, Angel, Ph.D., senior policy analyst, Rand Corp., prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 18

(1)

SIX YEARS LATER (PART III): INNOVATIVE

APPROACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISTS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Yarmuth, Van Hollen,

Welch, Duncan, and Marchant.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy

Wright, professional staff member; Christopher Bright and Janice

Specter, minority professional staff members; A. Brooke Bennett,

minority counsel; Mark Lavin, minority Army fellow; Todd Greenwood, minority legislative assistant; and Jeanne Neal, minority intern.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank all of you for coming here this

morning. I also want to thank all of our witnesses for being with

us this morning, for all preparation in advance and sharing your

opening statements with us as well.

A quorum is present, so the Subcommittee on National Security

and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ‘‘Six Years Later (Part III):

Innovative Approaches to Combating Terrorists,’’ will come to

order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, that is so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee can

be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without

objection, that is so ordered.

I am going to start with a brief opening statement on the record.

Mr. Marchant will also have the opportunity to present one as well.

Then we will go to questions, 5-minute rounds of each of the witnesses. Some of you have testified before, and you know the drill.

We will be as lenient as we can be on the 5-minutes without going

too far along. We would like to get to some questions and answers.

I think that is the best way to elicit information.

Before we start today, I want to take just one moment to have

a moment of silence for our friend and colleague, Tom Lantos, who

not only was a member of the full Committee on Oversight and

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Government Reform, but also was a member of this subcommittee.

He had an incredibly distinguished service in Congress for many,

many years, including as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well. He also served as ranking member for many years and

had an admirable life. If we could just take one moment, a moment

of silence, please.

[Moment of silence observed.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Tom Lantos always had such a record on human rights. I think

one of the pleasures of being in Congress is being around somebody

like that, that comes with such passion from their heart to stand

up and address the floor on those issues. I hope that we can do no

better honor to him than having a good hearing this morning and

get the information I know he would have wanted people to become

aware of.

This hearing marks our third in a series of hearings focused on

long-term U.S. national security strategy more than 6 years after

September 11th.

We are very fortunate to have such a distinguished group of witnesses here this morning. They are on the cutting edge of understanding the best way to deal with Al Qaeda or other groups associated with terrorists, as we move forward.

Since September 11, 2001, we have struggled to develop a coherent and effective national security strategy to defeat the global

jihadist movement that is most closely symbolized by Al Qaeda but

certainly not restricted to them.

Notwithstanding the U.S.’ counter-terrorism efforts, the lives

lost, and the vast amounts of resources and money expended, our

intelligence community recently reported an alarming resurgence

and strengthening of Al Qaeda. A July 2007 national intelligence

estimate stated very clearly that Al Qaeda had ‘‘protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including:

a safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas

[FATA], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.’’

These are troubling findings, obviously, and they were reaffirmed

just last week in congressional testimony by Mike McConnell, the

Director of National Intelligence, and General Michael Hayden, the

Director of Central Intelligence. According to Director McConnell,

Al Qaeda is ‘‘gaining strength from its refuge in Pakistan and is

steadily improving its ability to recruit, train and position

operatives capable of carrying out attacks inside the United

States.’’

One of the most constructive roles this oversight committee can

play in this generational struggle is to continuously assess performance and strategy and to explore emergent thinking and analysis

in combating international terrorism.

The cold war called on us to bring forth the best innovators from

every segment of society. The same effort has been lacking, unfortunately, since September 11th. Over these last years, I have been

critical, and I think others have as well, of the administration for

its failure to fully engage the public, including our wealth of resources among academic researchers, international business people,

non-governmental organizations, educators and technical leaders,

in this vital effort.

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Our country’s strength has always been characterized by our

unique mix of optimism, pragmatism, creativity, work ethic and

true grit that has led to our great engine of innovation. And now

we need to focus this ingenuity squarely on the task of defeating

Al Qaeda and other terrorists. Today we will try to highlight some

of the best of this emergent thinking and analysis.

First, unlike the cold war, do we not face a threat posed by a

competing superpower. Instead, we are fighting loose networks of

terrorist cells willing to fight unconventional warfare, including declaring open season on civilians. Today, based on documents captured on the battlefield, we will explore sophisticated analyses of

the potential vulnerabilities of Al Qaeda’s networked organizational

structure.

Second, Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and copycats thrive in environments with the absence of government as well as sympathetic local

populations. We have spent several hearings focused on the troubling phenomenon in Pakistan’s tribal ares, and today we will more

fully explore the nature of these ungoverned spaces and the best

way to drain these swamps.

Third, Al Qaeda and the other jihadists benefit from widespread

anti-Western sentiment across the Muslim world. Despite increased

resources on public diplomacy in the Muslim world, poll after poll

continues to show abysmal levels of anti-American sentiment.

Today we will explore new approaches in thinking on how best to

fight the war of ideas in the Muslim world.

I look forward to engaging in this enlightening—and overdue—

discussion. Again, I welcome and thank our witnesses and ask Mr.

Marchant if he would care to make an opening statement.

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for continuing the examination of our national strategies.

As you know, this subcommittee has been investigating U.S. national security strategies since 2001. I am pleased that we are continuing this important work, and focusing now on the public enemy

No. 1: Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden’s organization, Al

Qaeda, existed before September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, prior to

that fateful day, the U.S. Government did not have an adequate

terrorist threat assessment or a coordinated strategy to deal with

the threat, and our Government was not properly organized to

counter terrorism.

We are still locked in a war against a fanatical enemy, 6 years

and 5 months from the day which defined our generation. Our

brave men and women are in harm’s way and are deployed around

the world, trying to prevent further attacks on our Nation. We

thank them and their families for their sacrifice.

One of our greatest Presidents, Ronald Reagan, understood extremists such as Al Qaeda. He knew they had political goals and

strategic ambitions. President Clinton believed terrorism to be a

law enforcement matter. After September 11, 2001, the United

States decided to confront terrorism and engage in a combat

against those who oppose peace and security. This was the day we

placed our military on the front lines.

The facts show that we have been doing something right. Has it

been perfect? No. Can more be done and changes be made to adapt

and confront these fanatics? Absolutely. It has been said repeatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:38 Aug 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51567.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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edly, we must get more than our military involved. We need to accelerate the diplomatic effort and consider every consequence before committing U.S. forces to combat.

This subcommittee has held multiple hearings that explored the

development of a comprehensive strategy to address the security

threats that we face as a Nation. We have heard frequently that

we rely too much on military power, and have neglected traditional

instruments of soft power. Today, we will hear how to focus these

efforts against such known enemy organizations. We will hear how

to combat terrorist organizations in order to exploit weakness.

What we will see is that their weakness is neither easily measured nor exploitable with military might alone. Our enemies can

and will be defeated. It will take time and dedication, but we will

prevail. As we have seen in Iraq, the world will rebel against Al

Qaeda for their brutality and lack of restraint against innocent

people in all countries. As reported yesterday, the U.S. military’s

strict rules of engagement underscore a sharp contrast between its

conduct and that of Al Qaeda.

The American soldier carries the banner of freedom for the

United States. General Petraeus’ spokesman said this plainly 2

days ago when he asked, ‘‘where else do we see a soldier, sailor,

airman or marine fight incredibly hard 1 minute and then show

the greatest depths of compassion the next, against those they are

trying to protect as well as those they have just fought against?‘‘

History has shown the world that the United States offers the

idea that everyone is bestowed with inalienable rights. The protection of these rights rests with the government of the people. The

specifics of the structure of the government must be determined by

the people and unique to their culture. A government must protect

the rights of its people and the sovereignty of its neighbors. In such

a world, in which free people choose their governments under a

blanket of security, there is no place for extremism and an organization like Al Qaeda.

With this in mind, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony from our distinguished witnesses and thank each of them for

being here today.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Marchant.

I would like to begin by introducing our witnesses. Today we welcome Colonel Michael J. Meese, or Dr. Meese, whichever he prefers, Professor and Head of the Social Sciences Department at the

U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Colonel Meese is also co-author of ‘‘Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al Qaeda’s Organizational Vulnerabilities,’’ published by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.

Angel Rabasa, Ph.D., senior policy analyst at the RAND Corp.

and co-author of ‘‘Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.’’

Amitai Etzioni, a Ph.D. as well, University professor at George

Washington University and author most recently of ‘‘Security First

for a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy.’’

And Dr. Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., director of the Center for Peace

and Security Studies at Georgetown University. Professor Byman

is also a former staff member of the 9/11 Commission and author

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of the recently published book, ‘‘The Five Front War: The Better

Way to Fight Global Jihad.’’

I want to welcome all of you good doctors with us here this morning. It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear all our witnesses

before you testify, so I will ask you to please stand and raise your

right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that all indicated in

the affirmative.

Again, we ask you to keep your statements, if you can, reasonably to within 5 minutes. I had the opportunity last night to read

your statements, and I can’t imagine that most of those statements

would be done in 5 minutes. So you might try to give us a little

synthesis of that, if you would. We would love to get some questions in as well.

Dr. Meese, why don’t we start with you.

STATEMENTS OF COLONEL MICHAEL J. MEESE, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND HEAD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT

AT THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT; ANGEL

RABASA, PH.D., SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP.;

AMITAI ETZIONI, PH.D., UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, GEORGE

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY; AND DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D.,

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES,

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

STATEMENT OF COLONEL MICHAEL J. MEESE

Colonel MEESE. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, Representative Marchant, distinguished members of the committee. It

is an honor for me to be here to address this important topic, and

I will try to summarize my statement and ask that it be put into

the record.

Within the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military

Academy, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has a

unique, critical and innovative approach to understanding, teaching and contributing to terrorism policy. I should note that, while

I am proud to represent the Center, our new distinguished Chair,

General Retired John Abizaid, who now works at West Point, I

should note that these remarks are my own and not necessarily

those of the Army or any other agency of Government.

While some have said that this war against Al Qaeda and other

terrorists is new, and old lessons don’t apply, in reality I think

there are many aspects of this war that are very similar. For example, the President said, ‘‘We face a hostile ideology, global in scope,

ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration.’’ While that could

have been President Bush talking about Al Qaeda, it was actually

President Eisenhower describing the communist threat.

As Eisenhower was President when the last long war started, it

is important to recognize four key similarities with the current

struggle against Al Qaeda. First, as was mentioned in both of the

opening statements, this is not just a military war. Like the cold

war, it is also, and perhaps more importantly, intellectual and ideological. Second, it is absolutely essential that we understand the

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enemy. Third, as in the cold war, it will take all of the resources

of this Nation to engage with the enemy, not just the Armed

Forces.

That is where the Combating Terrorism Center comes in. We are

both a military and an academic institution. We can play and have

played a critical role linking academics that may or may not be

willing participants supporting the kinds of causes that the Government does as well as military organizations that are not used

to working with academic institutions. I like to call that linking the

dot.mil address with the dot.edu addresses.

Fourth, we must concentrate our efforts against the core of the

enemy, the ideas of the radical jihadists that enable Al Qaeda to

spread even after its leaders are captured or killed. With this brief

description of the war as I see it, let me now describe what we are

doing to engage in a strategic and intellectual war against terrorists. We have employed some of the best experts in academia to

study Al Qaeda’s own writings. We are truly trying to do what the

title of one of our first publications said, steal Al Qaeda’s playbook

by reading what they have written.

We also leveraged the great repository of information that has

been captured from terrorists. Captured documents in the Defense

Intelligence Agency’s Harmony database. By linking the intelligence finds on the battlefield with the academic scholars, we can

understand the enemy, identify the weaknesses and its organization and ideology and expose its hateful, extremist world view.

Our Harmony series of reports, which several of you have, and

you see before you, includes in the first part of it, our analysis in

part 1, which is a very good academic argument with lots of footnotes and that kind of thing. What is more important is part 2,

where we actually present the captured documents in English and

Arabic forms, so that other scholars from other academia can engage and study those documents and propel the intellectual study

of terrorism forward.

I have references to the specific documents in my testimony and

I would encourage anybody who’s interested in them to go to our

Web site, ctc.usma.edu. We have found that ‘‘a’’ is very frank in

their documents and candid about their strengths and

vulnerabilities. By reading them, we have great success. Last May,

we had an unlikely confirmation that we were effective from actually Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda, when he released his video tapes. Hopefully, this will play and I will speak

over the tape just a little.

[Video shown.]

Colonel MEESE. This is Zawahiri’s video tape. He actually

cropped our symbol from our Web site and is reading from one of

our reports where we talked about strategies to encourage moderate, mainstream Salafis. He decries what we are saying to do.

He is citing it, the graphics are actually very good, too. So what

we see is the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda reading our writings. That

is a good indication, the fact that this subcommittee is reading our

writings is also a good indication. And as we see it, if more people

in and out of Government can take a look at what Al Qaeda is saying for themselves, we will all be better off and understand them

better.

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Thanks to farsighted West Point graduates like Vinnie Viola,

George Gilmore and others whose private funding established the

Combating Terrorism Center and those in Special Operations Command who support our research, we have been able to understand,

analyze and ultimately counter the ideology of Al Qaeda. Douglas

MacArthur told the Corps of Cadets at West Point that their mission is to win our Nation’s wars. At the Combating Terrorism Center, we strive to link the scholars and the warriors to understand

terrorists and exploit that knowledge to help defeat the enemy.

We will continue to do everything that we can to equip our graduates so that they will always be able to win our Nation’s wars.

I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Meese follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Colonel.

Dr. Rabasa, would you please give us a statement as well?

STATEMENT OF ANGEL RABASA

Mr. RABASA. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank you, the ranking member and

the subcommittee, for inviting me to testify at this hearing. The

subject of my presentation is the security problems posed by

ungoverned territories and what could be done to address them.

This is a subject of a RAND Corp. study that came out recently.

It is summarized in my written testimony. Ungoverned territories

have also been a troublesome feature of the international landscape. They generate all manner of security problems such as civil

conflict, humanitarian crisis, arms and drug smuggling, piracy and

refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and

generate demands on scarce military resources.

After September 11th, we have also become aware of the potential of ungoverned territories to become terrorist sanctuaries, as acknowledged by the September 11th Commission’s report, to which

my friend and former RAND colleague Dan Byman was a major

contributor. Ungoverned territories are a common feature of the

international landscape, but not all of them become terrorist sanctuaries. So in our study, we analyzed the factors that make some

regions more conductive to a terrorist presence than others. We

found that a key requirement is the existence of a level of infrastructure that allows terrorist groups to perform certain basic functions, such as money transfers, personnel movements and so on.

To the extent that a territory lacks this basic infrastructure, it

is difficult for terrorist groups to organize and execute attacks. So

there is a certain tension between this need to operate in a region

that can sustain a certain operations tempo and the need to hide

from the authorities and the international security agencies. Equally important factors include a base of support among the population, willing, of course, social or cultural norms that can be exploited by terrorists, sources of income and in many cases, strategic

alliances with criminal networks.

Based on our analysis of eight case studies across four continents, we found that ungoverned territories can be classified,

broadly speaking, into three types, what we call cases of contested,

incomplete and abdicated governance. In cases of contested governance, local forces, insurgents, terrorists or whatever, they actively

dispute government control of a region in order to create their own

state-like entity.

In other places, we find incomplete governance. This is where

governments lack the resources and competencies to project effective rule into a region. In other words, the central government may

have the political will, but not the capabilities or resources to establish control. Some parts of Central America and Eastern Indonesia fall into this category.

In the third category, abdicated governance, the central government abdicates its responsibility for marginal provinces and regions. In some cases, these authorities might conclude that extending control to certain peripheral areas is not cost-effective. Or these

areas could be populated by ethnic minorities with whom the cenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:38 Aug 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51567.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tral government shares little affinity, for instance, the tribal areas

of Pakistan.

Each of these three types of ungoverned territories requires a different set of policy remedies that address the fundamental sources

of the lack of governance. For instance, in cases of incomplete governance where the central government has the political will but not

the means to extend its control, policies emphasizing official development assistance, foreign direct investment and institutional reform are the best choices.

In cases of abdicated governance, the effective approach would be

to create incentives for the central government to establish a state

presence. This assumes that the central government wants to increase the capacity of the state institutions. If, on the other hand,

the governing style and methods of the ruling group are at the root

of the problem, for instance, in the case of the Sudanese government actions in Darfur, then support for the group in power would

be counterproductive.

Where contested rule is the source of the trouble, a decision has

to be made on either supporting the incumbent government or not.

And that depends on a number of criteria, such as the strength and

representativeness of the government and of the parties contesting

its influence, the links of the opposition to international terrorism,

if any, the effectiveness of the government response and what is

the desired outcome from a U.S. perspective. A decision to support

the government might lead to policies of counter-insurgency, foreign military assistance and financing and similar options.

If on the other hand the central government is fighting a movement with substantial popular support and legitimacy, a negotiations track might be the best option. The Moro Islamic Liberation

Front insurgency in Mindanao is an obvious case in point.

The RAND study identifies more specific policy recommendations

that address in detail these two sides of the question, first, what

measures could be taken to help friendly governments expand their

presence in ungoverned territories, and second, what steps could be

taken to make it more difficult for terrorist groups to entrench

themselves in these areas. The bottom line is that in our national

strategy and defense planning, ungoverned territories need to be

considered a distinct category of security problems and not a lesser

included case of other challenges.

By and large, we do not have the policy instruments optimized

to deal with problems of ungoverned territory or we do not have

these instruments in sufficient numbers. I would be happy to elaborate on any of these points in the question and answer period.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rabasa follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Etzioni.

STATEMENT OF AMITAI ETZIONI

Mr. ETZIONI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

I particularly bemoan the loss of Congressman Lantos, having a

somewhat similar personal history. I started as a Jewish child in

Nazi Germany. From there, I learned to become a member of the

Jewish community in Palestine and engaged in terrorist acts to encourage the British to leave before they wanted to leave. So I

gained some experience in the subject at hand. And finally, I joined

what today would be called the Israeli Special Forces, though in my

days they were called commandoes and I spent 21⁄2 years.

So I feel, I not only studied the matter for 40 years, but I had

some experience in it. And my main topic for discussion is what I

see as a major mismatch between the needed priorities and the distribution of resources. The point I want to make most, I did not set

it up that way, but it so happened that nobody mentioned so far

a connection between terrorists and nuclear weapons, which I think

partly everybody looked at the subject, considered by far a greater

threat.

It does not mean that we don’t have to worry about garden-variety terrorists and regular attacks. But the best way I can quickly

make my point is that you can be all in favor of putting seatbelts

into cars and airbags and child seats, but realize there are going

to be accidents. But you do not want to have a 100,000 car pileup.

So I think our first, second and third priority should be to avoid

the connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.

That is not the way we are set up. If you think about it, as if we

are dealing with three fronts, one is hardening the targets, so if we

are attacked, the attacks will fail or will cause less damage. But

the focus is, we have so many targets, so we are trying to protect

nuclear plants, we are trying to protect dams, we try to protect

bridges and water reservoirs. We have coastlines, there is almost

an endless list of targets. And each one of them, for good reason,

argues that we need to harden this target.

But in the end, to put it bluntly, it is a bottomless pit. You read

every week in the newspaper, the last one was about reactors,

today some site, bridges not well protected. You could spend the

GDP times three and still, in a free society, be subject to some low

scale attacks.

Let me just add one to the list and move to the second front. I

must say I am not often speechless. I have many weaknesses, but

that is not one of them. But I met the former commander of the

Coast Guard, and he explained to me that there are about 2 million

recreational vessels who leave the coast and go 7 days, whatever,

deep sea fishing or touring. And they come back and they pass

through no control whatsoever.

So if we examine every suitcase and every nail clipper of somebody who comes into an airport, but those of you who did those

boats, you go behind some other island and you meet these other

boats from other countries and you exchange beers and fish stories

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and God knows what else. And you come back and nobody checks

your passport or what’s on your boat. This is just one more of the

many examples one could give, that have been given, that make it

so difficult to win this war by hardening the target.

The second front, which I strongly cherish, is we are trying to get

the terrorists before they get to us. We very much agree, there has

been considerable success on this front. Unfortunately, and we

must do that, the nature of the beast is for every one we kill, there

are two others lining up. And so that is also not a way we are

going to get a handle on the problem.

We come then to a conclusion which the chairman referred earlier to be a positive, can-do society, with a kind of innate optimism,

useful in that sense, which is very commendable and very difficult

for to accept tragic conclusions. The tragic conclusion is that probably in the longer run we will not be able to avoid the kinds of attacks we have seen in Madrid and London. And at best, we can

focus on taking out a city, turning it into a radioactive desert.

Now, if you for a moment accept that the threat front, avoiding

massive attacks, is the most important one, then you very quickly

come to a list which fortunately is a do-able list of things which we

can complete. So for instance, a Global Threat Reduction Initiative,

which tries to convert reactors which have highly enriched uranium, which is the easiest to use to make nuclear bombs, into low

enriched uranium or other means of energy; there is a limited list

of places which have that. And we in effect may have already an

inroad into them. And if we would put our resources and priorities

to that program, we could in a reasonable time lick that part of the

problem.

The challenge in Russia is larger for reasons I don’t have time

to go into. But accelerating that part of the so-called [foreign

phrase] would also serve. I realize there are many difficulties.

The PSI is playing a major role which I think deserves much

more attention and much more credit. In fact, as a model, the

whole new kind of global architecture which combines a more muscular foreign policy with one which frankly, I don’t lose sleep nights

exactly over what the United Nations says. I will admit that, growing up in the Middle East, you don’t think the United Nations is

completely sacred. But Resolution 1540 provides a blessing to the

kind of things PSI does. So by the international game, it is not only

muscular, but it is also legitimate.

So I think we need to look more, its main purpose is to stop the

trade and transport in nuclear——

Mr. TIERNEY. For the record, would you just describe PSI, using

its full name so we have that on the record?

Mr. ETZIONI. It is a Proliferation Security Initiative. It is an activity, not an organization, initiated by the United States, in which

60 nations voluntarily cooperate with the United States to prevent

the transport of nuclear weapons and nuclear material. The kind

of thing which brought the change in Libya, because they caught

a ship on its way to Libya full of nuclear stuff and missiles and

such. And that, in turn, was proof that he was engaging in a program of weapons of mass destruction. It was one of the factors. The

other was the event in New York.

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And that was really one other point I would like to make. I think

what we are calling for in the project is not inspection. The notion

that you have to leave countries what should be called dual-use facilities, which can be used both for civilian purposes and to make

nuclear weapons, and you are just going to inspect to ensure that

they will not use them for military purposes, which is all we are

asking from Iran at the moment, is a major mistake. Because the

Non-Proliferation Treaty allows you to send a letter, North Korea

did, and say, sorry, we are leaving, and 3 months later you take

with you your toys, your fully developed nuclear plan and you

make nuclear weapons very much in line with the treaty.

So what we need is a delivery model. We pack the whole thing

away and stop supporting terrorism. And that is the model we

should have in mind. I think it is apparently in North Korea, it has

not been yet applied to Iran.

I don’t want to go on, but the main point of this is, our system,

which is profoundly democratic and pluralistic, by nature, responds

to various constituencies, as it should. Each one of them feels that

they have a mission which must be attended to. As a result, our

national programs tend to have a patchwork quality. One of the

great things you could do in your committee is step back from that

a moment and look at the overarching distribution of resources and

say, is it matched to the distribution of the threat. We cannot do

everything, granted, and therefore, setting priorities is essential.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Etzioni follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I would just say that this is exactly a

point that Mr. Shays, the ranking member, and I, and other members on this committee have been talking about. What we haven’t

done, Doctor, is what you recommend about pulling back and

maybe having a hearing or series of hearings about whether or not

those are matching up. I think that is excellent advice. Thank you.

Dr. Byman.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN

Mr. BYMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Marchant, and

other members of the subcommittee.

My written testimony focuses on five aspects of U.S. counter-terrorism: the use of force, intelligence, homeland security, information campaigns and diplomacy. In my spoken remarks, I am going

to only focus on a few of these aspects in an effort to keep my remarks brief.

Let me first talk about one aspect of the use of force that in my

judgment doesn’t get enough attention, which is efforts to defeat

insurgencies linked to Al Qaeda. This comes up from time to time

when there are discussions about Afghanistan and Iraq, of course.

But it is also a problem in Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria, Pakistan

and other places. It is not a secret that the most important military

units for this are special operations forces. But what is neglected

is a tremendously important form of the use of force, because it is

not associated directly with military forces, which is police.

One of the biggest challenges is dealing with areas such as Dr.

Rabasa talked about: ungoverned spaces. In these areas, what you

want to do is develop the rule of law, develop police and security

forces, so a small group of terrorists is not able to form a large insurgency over time. That is an exceptionally difficult challenge.

And far more important at the early stage than the military is

the police. In fact, it is reasonable to say that if you have to call

out the military in large numbers, you have failed already at the

early stages. Unfortunately in our Government, no bureaucracy

wants to embrace the mission of training the police. There are scattered programs in the State Department, the Department of Justice, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. But it is not at the

core of any of these missions. As a result, the resources are not

there and the high-level attention is not there.

A second area that I believe needs attention is in homeland security. Right now, many of our analyses focus on worst case scenarios

and don’t consider the very real limits of our adversaries. Much of

our spending is done without a formal risk analysis and it looks

only at the consequences of a successful attack, rather than the

likelihood of such an attack. The result is we waste a tremendous

amount of money and also there are large opportunity costs.

Right now, the FBI is focusing far less on gangs, on domestic terrorist groups like white supremacists and on the drug trade, even

though these are extremely serious problems. Instead, we should

do several things. One of the most obvious is that we should really

try to think like the terrorists. And here, let me commend the work

that the people at the Harmony project are doing. When we think

about our own defenses, we need to think about targets that might

resonate with the audiences that jihadists care about.

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There has been a tremendous amount of attention in Congress

on port security. I have yet to see a credible plan by Al Qaeda to

focus on blowing up or doing damage to a port. As a result, we put

a lot of money into something that I believe could be better spent

elsewhere.

Also let me emphasize a point Dr. Etzioni made, which is that

we can’t and shouldn’t defend everything. If we try to defend everything, in the end we are going to defend nothing, because all our

defenses will be over-stretched.

Another important part of homeland security, though, is perception management. Right now, there is a widespread public perception that the odds of dying from terrorism in the United States are

quite high, when in fact, in reality, as we all know here, they are

exceptionally low. Unfortunately, our public debate has made this

worse, not better. A particular problem is distinguishing between

true weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons and infectious

biological weapons, and what is often lumped into this category, radiological weapons, chemical weapons and non-infectious biological

weapons. These weapons are typically far less dangerous than explosives.

At the same time, however, their psychological impact is much

greater. The anthrax attacks in 2001 had a devastating effect on

our country’s commerce and public morale, even though the number of people killed, while their deaths were tragic, was relatively

low. A constant Government message that reinforces the limited

damage that these weapons cause would be exceptionally useful.

A third part of homeland security is that the United States enjoys an overwhelming advantage over many of its allies around the

world, which is a well-integrated, highly supportive, highly loyal

American Muslim community. Any measures we take on counterterrorism at home have to factor in that alienating this community

would be disastrous. Many of the tips we have received on current

terrorism that have proven valid have come from this community.

If we lose the support of this community, we are in a far worse situation.

I will conclude with some brief remarks about information operations. As we saw from the video, Al Qaeda has an extremely effective information campaign. One of my favorite little asides was in

a recent bin Laden video. There was an al Sahab coffee mug, they

have gone to the point of branding their various information technologies.

We are nowhere near as sophisticated. And when we do counterterrorism, in general our policy seems to be, we decide our policy

and then pass it on to the people who do public diplomacy to clean

up any messes that result, when in fact public diplomacy and information operations should often be at the heart of counter-terrorism, because it is psychological.

Particularly important is going negative against the jihadists.

They are exceptionally unpopular when you look at their agenda,

whether it is their anti-democracy view, their view that many Muslims, including many practicing Muslims, are in fact apostates because they are not jihadists. Their deliberate targeting of women

and children, these are unpopular views.

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But when the debate is about U.S. policy in the Middle East,

whether it is Iraq or Israel, we are going to lose that debate. When

the debate is about their activities, there we are going to win. Unfortunately, our information operations try to defend our policies

much more than they put the jihadists on the defensive.

I will conclude by noting that I welcome a hearing like this simply because I think there has not been a broad public debate on

many of the more controversial or difficult aspects of counter-terrorism. To succeed in the next 25 years, we are going to need sustained policies that don’t change administration by administration.

And to do that, we are going to need widespread congressional support, as well as much broader public support.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I want to thank all of you, I think

those remarks were very enlightening and helpful to us.

I am going to start the rounds of questioning, we will do 5 minutes, and we may go more than one round, as long as the witnesses

have time to accommodate.

Colonel Meese, the battle against Communism was an existential

threat to the United States. Do you see this terrorist situation as

the same type of existential or a non-existential threat?

Colonel MEESE. I think it is both. And in fact, the actual attacks

that take place, whether it is Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Qaeda operating

out of bases in Pakistan or others, can reinforce the kinds of existential threat and ideological threat and garner greater support for

particular actions taken and get more recruits, more funding, more

finances. Al Qaeda exploits the kind of information, and I think

that Dr. Byman’s comments are exactly right on, they reinforce

each other. Unless you go on the offensive, both in an information

way as well as in a military operations, capture and kill those that

are actually taking the terrorist acts, you lose half of the battle

there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for that.

Dr. Rabasa, I was listening to your remarks and thinking about

the different types of areas that need to be reclaimed. The policymakers at West Point, they argue that the strategic focus should

not be aimed at prevention of ungoverned spaces, but rather denial

of the benefit. Here is what they said: ‘‘the massive troop deployment in Iraq has so far denied terrorists the use of that country

as a staging ground for attacks in the West. Meanwhile, terrorists

are denied the benefits of a potential Afghan security vacuum with

18,000 troops, while the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa

denies jihadists the use of Somalia and the rest of that region with

only 1,600 troops. In both cases, these deployments are far less resource-intensive than would be required to actually end the security vacuum.’’

Do you think that the United States is actually taking these

issues as they come up in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in

Sudan, or in Algiers, and looking into finding—right now—as to

what type of area are we looking at and what is our strategy for

that area, or do you think we are still engaged in a one size fits

all or just a totally reactive situation?

Mr. RABASA. Mr. Chairman, first let me say that I agree that denial of access and of the use of ungoverned territories definitely

should be a key priority. In fact, our approach, the approach that

we proposed, has two prongs, as I mentioned, one to help states

and governments in establishing control. The territory might not be

contested by jihadists, as in the case of the Colombian government,

for example. Nevertheless we should, for other U.S. security reasons, support them in establishing control.

The second part of the approach is to deny the jihadists the use

of these territories for their own purposes. So we agree with the

Counter-terrorism Center with that regard.

We think that the root of the problem, from the standpoint of

U.S. security policy, is that our planning documents, the strategic

planning guidance, the security corporation guidance, for example,

address certain specific issues, such as terrorism, international

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crimes, narcotics and so on. But they do not address the problem

of ungoverned territories, which are the source of these other problems that are addressed by our policies.

I think you mentioned earlier the need to drain the swamp. I

think that is a great metaphor. We cannot try to kill the mosquitos,

we need to drain the swamp in order to resolve the problem. So

what we think needs to be done, and it hasn’t been done in our policy planning process, is to make the problem of ungoverned territories, especially those that can be exploited by terrorists, a specific

category of security problems that should be addressed specifically

in the context of developing the force structure that is necessary to

address these issues, the problems generated by ungoverned territories, the type of capabilities, for instance, the cultural sensitivity

and language skills among U.S. Government agencies, so we can

develop effective, comprehensive approaches to the problem.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Dr. Byman, let me ask you a question. You talked about going

negative, so to speak, on the Salafi jihadists. I think that sounds

entirely reasonable. How do we break into their networks? How do

we do that in a way that gets to the people we are trying to reach?

I always think that is the toughest part about this whole Internet

culture out there, you somehow have to break into it so that the

network is out and the people that you want to hear your message

hear it.

Mr. BYMAN. I tend to divide the audience into three audiences.

One is the broader Muslim community, and they are bombarding

airwaves, radio and television, works reasonably well to a degree.

The second is the broader Islamist community, including the peaceful Islamist community, where there you have to be more specialized. You have to look at particular publications, you have to try

to impress particular sheiks and so on.

The hardest one is the jihadist recruiting base, which are young

males ages roughly 17 to 25. And there the Internet is tremendously important, especially when you are talking about Western

Europe. One weakness, I think, of U.S. information operations in

general is that they are TV and radio focused. I have a large number of students where the television and the radio are quaint devices to them, where everything they get is from the Internet. I

think that is increasingly true around the world. We need to put

a lot more effort into that.

But also, this is something that we can encourage other governments to take on as well. Usually propaganda, which is the impolite name for this, is best done locally. Because different audiences

will have a different understanding of what is going to play in their

area. So encouraging other governments, not only at the State

level, but also at the regional level, would also be effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Dr. Etzioni, how do you rank or rate the U.S.’ efforts so far to

prioritize threats? I think you made good points on that. As I mentioned, we have been talking about that. Do you think we have an

excellent chance, an excellent opportunity set up to do that? Are we

not addressing it at all? Are we somewhere in between? And who

is the appropriate agency, in your view, to do that?

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Mr. ETZIONI. I think that is the greatest challenge we face. I believe it is a combination of appropriate committees in Congress and

OMB. Because this is the place where the base piece is supposed

to be prioritized and aligned, after the budget, is the tool through

which we think through priorities. But given our pluralistic nature,

it is just unavoidable. I am reminded of Churchill’s famous line, it

is the best some days, but it is also flawed; we have to be aware

of the flaws so we can deal with it, is we respond to our constituencies. And I am not talking about the failures, lobbies. I am talking about people have, the people who produce helicopters really

believe that if they produce more helicopters, it is going to save us,

people who make sensors and so on and so on.

Where is the force which can weigh against it and say: we need

to look at the overarching studies. Honestly, I do not have to run

for public office, my service is to call them the way I see them. I

don’t see the answer. I don’t see where we have that body. So to

the degree that you can in any serve that, you are doing the Lord’s

work.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Marchant, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rabasa, the FATA in Pakistan is in one area where the terrorists are remaining and are likely plotting attacks, as you mentioned. Since the United States and Pakistan are going to go

through a major leadership change in the next year, what would

you recommend to these new leaders from both countries as to how

to approach the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Mr. RABASA. Sir, you have brought up probably the most intractable problem in terms of ungoverned territories in the world

today. The problem with FATA transcends the problem of administrations in the United States and Pakistan. It is an area that has

been outside of the jurisdiction of the Pakistani government for

decades. As you know, the FATA is an area that legally is not part

of the Pakistani legal system. It has its own legal code. It was administered by the British through political agents who then cut

their own deals with the local tribal leaders and this system was

inherited by the Pakistanis.

So the Pakistani state never entrenched itself as an effective government in the FATA. It was very much left to the political agents

and tribal leaders. What has happened there is that there has been

a Talibanization of the region over the last 2 years, beginning with

the agreements that President Musharraf reached with alleged

tribal elders in the tribal regions, actually Taliban commanders.

This agreement has really worsened the situation to a point where

I see it very difficult to believe it, from a standpoint of any United

States or Pakistani government. Because the agreement that was

reached at the time was allegedly to permit local leaders to prevent

attacks into Afghanistan by the Taliban and to prevent attacks by

the Taliban into Pakistan. This in fact has not taken place. The

FATA has become a platform, over the last 2 years, for attacks into

Afghanistan and not only that, but it has spearheaded a process

that I would call the Talibanization of the tribal regions, and even

outside of the tribal regions into other areas of Pakistan. So there

has been a worsening of the situation where the Pakistani governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:38 Aug 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51567.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ment has no control of the FATA outside of certain military installations, where the Taliban and its Al Qaeda allies have entrenched

themselves.

Now, what could be done about it? I would propose the following

to make the best of a very bad situation. First of all, there are two

distinct elements involved in the insurgency and the situation in

the FATA. There is the Taliban, which is essentially a Pashtunbased insurgency. And the Taliban itself is fractionalized. And then

there is Al Qaeda, which is composed of first, an outer core around

bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and their immediate followers. And also a

combination of other foreign fighters, most Uzbeks and others.

I would propose that the beginning of a strategy that might at

some point bring the FATA under control would be to try to separate Al Qaeda from some of its Taliban supporters. If that could be

done, it might be possible then to isolate Al Qaeda the way that

Al Qaeda in Iraq has been isolated. Now, this may not be possible,

because Al Qaeda and the Taliban have grown very close together

over the past few years. However, working with the tribal elders

trying to strengthen the authority of the tribal maliks, the Pashtun

leaders in Pakistan to try to separate them somehow from the

Taliban and from Al Qaeda would be the beginning of an effort.

There is also a need for a greater sensitivity to local cultural and

social norms. The Pakistani army, by and large, is composed of

Punjabis. Punjabis are about 90 percent of the officer corps in the

Pakistani army. They by and large do not speak the local language,

Pashtun. They have no rapport with the local population. So there

is a need to sensitize the Pakistanis to the cultural norm. I hope

I am not being arrogant in saying this, but there is a need to try

to establish links to buildup moderate leaders among the Pashtun

tribal groups themselves. These would require a stronger military

presence to try to prevent, of course, the coercion that is currently

taking place in the FATA.

I would say that money alone, military resources alone will not

do the job, that much more is needed than that. An integral approach that would show the people in this region that their life has

been improved through the exertions of the Pakistani government

to improve attitudes and to try to isolate the fanaticals.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Marchant, we will have another round. I know you must

have other questions as well.

Mr. Yarmuth, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all the

witnesses.

I want to pursue the psychological aspect of terrorism. I am curious as to, I don’t think any of us wants to fully understand what

goes in a terrorist’s mind, but I am curious as to what, to the extent you can, what are the metrics that terrorists use to determine

whether they are successful or not? They can blow up a building

or blow up a subway and so forth, and that is the physical side.

But in terms of the psychological warfare that they are engaged in,

what are the metrics they use? I will let anyone address it.

Colonel MEESE. We have seen from some of their writings, and

in fact, our report, Cracks in the Foundation, separates the planners who actually want to do destructiveness from the propaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:38 Aug 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51567.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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gandists led by bin Laden and Zawahiri, where a lot of their measures of merit is both the destruction as well as the psychological

impact of that destruction, both causing fear and reaction in the

targeted audiences, whether that is in the West or in what they

would describe as apostate states in the Middle East, as well as the

number of additional recruits that they get, the number of additional funding that they get, the number of additional support that

they get in Internet chat rooms and on forums like that. I think

if they were to do measures of merit, it would be funding recruits,

literally Internet hits on some 7,000 different jihadist Web sites,

those kinds of things.

Mr. YARMUTH. Does anybody else want to take a crack at that?

Mr. BYMAN. I will briefly add. When the group’s leaders, it varies

tremendously by group and by location, some of them look at issues

strategically, are they getting recruits, are they leading to a deterioration in the government and so on. But what is noticeable is

that rather quickly, the struggle itself takes on its own logic within

the group where yes, there is some emphasis on, are we achieving

our goals, is the population going our way. But there is a strong

desire for revenge that comes in as their members are killed or arrested. There is also a sense that this is what they know, this is

their world, and it is hard to take them out of it. Often these

groups dry up in some ways, because the core are arrested and recruiting stops, rather than the core give up in a more absolute

sense.

Mr. YARMUTH. I guess a followup I intended to get to is, how important are the reactions that they see in our society to what they

do, and whether that relates to the money we spend in security,

the official pronouncements of Government, any wy in which we

might react, or any country that they are targeting might react?

Colonel MEESE. I think our reactions do matter. I think that is

why Dr. Byman’s comments, I also assist the Defense Science

Board on IEDs, and it is managing things to the right of the blast,

so to speak, of what happens after an attack in terms of perceptions management and ensuring that there is a measured and appropriate discriminate reaction to what happens, but not an overwhelming psychological frenzy as a result is particularly important.

Greater information and greater understanding makes sense.

In Iraq, and I have spent 6 out of the last 12 months over in Iraq

working on General Petraeus’ staff, that was part of what we did

after any of the blasts in Iraq, was immediately demonstrate the

barbarity of these kinds of attacks, that it was in violation of Islam

to attack innocent civilians, especially as they got to softer and

softer targets, so that you make a blast a propaganda failure for

a terrorist, in that it violates what mainstream Islam is saying, instead of a victory in that it is going against either, in this case, the

Iraqi government or whatever target they happen to be isolating.

Mr. YARMUTH. I want to ask a specific question that relates to

something the President said yesterday which disturbed, I think,

a lot of people. The President of the United States, if he gets before

a microphone and says that terrorists are planning an event that

would make 9/11 pale by comparison, is that the type of reaction

that terrorists might seize on as a measure of their success in provoking fear in society?

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Colonel MEESE. Again, I think we have to be careful in terms of,

it is important to have agencies, committees like this taking a look

at the severity of things that could happen, but also making sure

that the responses to that are specific and discriminate, and not

feeding into the kinds of things that terrorists are doing.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Duncan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I really wasn’t going to ask any questions, since I was in other

meetings and didn’t get to hear the testimony. I was glancing over

some of the material and I noticed in the memorandum that we

were given, it says, notwithstanding the vast U.S. counter-terrorism efforts since 9/11, our intelligence community recently reported

an alarming resurgence and a strengthening of Al Qaeda.

I am curious about that, because a couple of years ago, what I

am wondering now, a couple of years ago I read a column by the

conservative columnist Walter Williams that said, Al Qaeda had

less than 3,000 members and they were mostly high school dropouts who lived at home with their parents. Then around that same

time, I saw in the National Journal an article which estimated

their strength at like, I think it was 1,800. I am wondering if any

of you know, were those articles way, way off? What is the situation in that regard? Are we having a big resurgence or what is the

situation? Colonel Meese.

Colonel MEESE. I will take a stab at it, then I will refer to some

of my other colleagues that have studied this in a lot more detail.

I think what has happened is specifically, some of those articles

may look at hard core individual Al Qaeda proper or Al Qaeda central senior leadership. One of the aspects of Al Qaeda in the last

several years has been that it has essentially franchised and the

associated movements have moved out so that whether it is Al

Qaeda in Iraq, whether it is the Al Qaeda cells that were involved

in the Madrid bombings in Spain, those that claim affiliation with

Al Qaeda in the London bombings, July 7th and other kinds of attacks, it has been a morphing of this. Which is why, again, going

back to the ideological and information aspects of the movement,

it is the global brand that Al Qaeda brings that is critical to being

addressed, so that global brand is not something that affiliated

movements would like to claim and stamp on what they are doing,

but instead would want to shy away from and their supporters

would shy away from.

Mr. ETZIONI. I think one needs to take into account that these

are very low-cost operations. They don’t require buildings and they

don’t require a large number of troops to do what they did on 9/

11 or to put nuclear weapons on a speedboat and drive into one of

our ports and such. So if they grow only from 3,000 to 6,000, that

is a lot of trouble. As one of them put it, you have to be lucky all

the time, I have to be lucky just once.

In terms of the odds, the odds may be low, but a good calculation

would include what the technicalists call the size of the dis-utility.

In plain English, even if you have only one in a million chances to

take out Chicago and you take out Chicago, it deserves our attention.

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Next, I think part of the answer to the question which was raised

earlier, these are really very tribal societies. When they ally themselves with a tribe or with the Taliban or any other group, they become a very serious force. So for instance, that is what is happening now in Pakistan, where they succeeded in allying themselves,

after all, we won the war in Afghanistan largely because we allied

ourselves with some of the tribes against the others. One of the

major reasons we are doing better now in Iraq is because we have

the Sunnis to work with us rather than against us.

So if you think about it in terms of not individuals, but tribal

lineups, who lines up on our side and on the other side, as was just

pointed out, the powers in Pakistan which border on Afghanistan,

the tribes turn ever more against us and the Pakistani government, that is where the major danger lies. Technically, they may

not carry an Al Qaeda postal service, but they are allies.

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask one more thing. The staff wanted me

to ask what should be the roles for Pakistan and other international partners. That reminded me and gets my curiosity too, because a few weeks ago I read in the Washington Post where all of

the international partners in this entire long war against terrorism, all they have contributed is $15.4 billion and $11 billion of

that has been in the form of loans.

They are asking us to approve that much spending in 1 month.

As a fiscal conservative, these figures just astound me. What would

you say about that? What are going to be the roles for Pakistan

and these other international partners, and are we going to start

getting some more help, or do these countries feel like these

threats are so, these threats are just not as huge as they are to

us? What do you say about that?

Mr. ETZIONI. Pakistan [remarks off microphone] causes [inaudible] guarded. But if you imagine for a moment that they turn to

the service of the Taliban [inaudible] emphasize [inaudible]. I think

partly everybody looks at it and sees that the No. 1, 2 and 3 major

[inaudible]. So I don’t see Pakistan in the near future, it is not so

much [inaudible] but it is a major source of [inaudible]. If you compare what we [inaudible] this time [inaudible] many other [inaudible] send troops [inaudible] work would be [inaudible]. You need

[inaudible] compared to the [inaudible].

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.

We have a vote on the floor, it is actually just a motion to adjourn, a procedural motion on that. I am going to continue the

hearing on, but Members who feel compelled to record their vote

might want to take note of that. There is about 12 minutes left on

that vote. We are going to proceed on here, at any rate.

Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you. I want to thank the chairman for focusing this hearing and allow us to begin the process of stepping back,

and I would like to thank the witnesses, I want to thank you as

well, because you obviously all have begun that process. So let me

just ask a few questions.

Dr. Byman, one of the questions we have is what to do in Iraq

is about the displacement of about 4 million people, 2 million internally, 2 million externally. Are there specific actions that we could

63

take to address that, not just from a humanitarian perspective, but

from a security perspective?

Mr. BYMAN [remarks off microphone.] Sir, I have fairly strong

views on this for a number of reasons. Ignoring what I feel is a serious role for [inaudible]. Refugees——

Mr. TIERNEY. Sir, is your mic on?

Mr. BYMAN. I apologize. It is on now.

Refugees can be an exceptionally destabilizing force. Right now,

the Middle East is still dealing with the Palestinian refugee problem that was created 60 years ago. The Iraqi refugees, the numbers

are staggering and they are going to places like Jordan and Syria

that have very low capacity to deal with their own social problems

let alone that of several million people. We need to have a program

for our allies, in particular, to bolster their capacity to run refugee

camps, and in particular to police them, to secure their borders so

there aren’t cross-border raids.

I would add to that, we should be encouraging our allies and

doing ourselves taking in far more refugees. What you don’t want

are large concentrations of refugees along the border there for what

could be decades. That is an exceptionally dangerous situation and

through policy, and a rather generous policy, we can minimize.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.

I want to ask each of you about Afghanistan specifically. There

has been a lot of criticism about what we should have done and did

we do it right and let’s put that behind us. Given where we are,

what is the goal that should be what we are seeking, namely right

now, it appears as though we have the notion that with the proper

amount of military, the proper amount of other resources, we are

going to be able to build that nation into a stable society that will

have then self-governance and provide security and cooperation.

Another alternative, I would think, would be to assess it from the

perspective of what do we need to do there in a minimal way to

protect American security and lives from further attack. Depending

on how you answer that question, which we are not even asking

around here, will give you a direction on your strategy. Colonel,

how about you starting on that?

Colonel MEESE. Again, our expertise is not as much in terms of

Afghanistan strategy, but to address the question, I think, the

basic strategy is to enable the Afghan government, not ourselves,

but enable the Afghan government to expand its control and its incorporation of more and more reconcilable groups that are supportive of what the Afghan central government is doing. In that sense,

it helps establish and solidify, in fact, contain some of the people

that are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan

from having deleterious impacts within Afghanistan proper and

harming our interests.

So it is really the spreading out of additional control of the

Karzai government and reinforcing that. That is done in a variety

of ways, through the provincial reconstruction team and other steps

that have been taking place.

Mr. WELCH. Let me go to Dr. Etzioni and then Dr. Rabasa.

Mr. ETZIONI. I appreciate that, because on this issue, there is

room, I guess, for different viewpoints. The very term Afghanistan

is kind of misleading. We have this notion that it is a nation, and

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then we project on it kind of western concept, we talk about training the police, the national police. And I need to remind us that

the United States doesn’t have a national police. So the notion the

Afghans are going to have a viable national police, as we see from

the record, is a dream.

These nations, they are created by arbitrary taking of tribes,

running a line around them and saying, you are a nation now. We

keep falling into this illusion where as the head of Afghanistan is

jokingly called the mayor of Kabul, because he rarely dares to leave

his town, and when he does walk inside Khabul, until recently he

was protected only by Americans. And how he has three Afghans

he can trust.

So if we would recognize that these are tribal societies, the secret

has been obvious, he is working with some of the tribes, dealing

with those who will not want to stop terrorism. We call them warlords, we are trying to replace them with nationally appointed Governors. That is part of this fantasy. If you stop calling them warlords for a moment and call them tribal chiefs, and recognize that

they have very, very sizable armies at their command, and they

provide security for their territories. For instance, they have a tradition of assigning volunteers to patrol each village, and to the degree the confrontation becomes between the Talibans and their

tribe’s volunteers, then you naturally get the divide you want. The

Talibans become isolated or limited to one or two tribes and the

rest on your side.

But earlier there was discussion of Pakistan. I asked the former

head of the CIA there, there are seven tribes, it is not one tribe.

And again, the notion of talking about them as if they were one

group is again something we have to—we have to think tribal.

Then I think we will get much closer to the reality on the ground.

There are some unpleasant choices. These guys are not beautiful

people and I wouldn’t like to have them over for dinner or date my

daughter. But initially, we have no choice but to work with them

to establish elementary security. Then we can talk about all the

other nice things.

Mr. WELCH. Dr. Rabasa.

Mr. RABASA. I will associate myself with what Dr. Etzioni said.

In fact, it is not only seven tribes, they tend to be fragmented into

sub-tribes and clans. It is very similar to the situation in Somalia,

it is basically tribal societies, the tribes, the clans are the basic

unit of society. So the authorities need to work with them to isolate

the radical elements.

What happens is that, when the tribes and the clans perceive an

external enemy, they tend to unit, which makes it very, very difficult to deal with them in the sense of using military force. So

there is a great need here again for cultural understanding, really

understanding how this society works, and then working with the

basic units of society to isolate extremist elements.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Mr. Van Hollen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for organizing this series of hearings and thank you all for your assistance.

I think many of us in Congress were justified in being critical of

President Musharraf for what is perceived to be lack of more aggressive action in the areas, Federally Administered Tribal Areas,

and of course, the cease-fire agreement that I think our intelligence

community unanimously agreed actually had allowed for greater

resurgence. But I think we focused less on the Afghanistan side,

and in fact, when President Karzai and President Musharraf were

here in Washington some time ago, sort of pointing fingers at each

other for the problem, I think many people sided with President

Karzai.

I have a question related to that, and it gets to the question

many of you have raised with respect to the tribal politics in Afghanistan. There was a piece in the Washington Post Monday entitled, ‘‘Two Myths About Afghanistan.’’ It was by Ann Marlowe, who

has been a long-time freelance journalist in the area. This is that

she said about one myth. The first is that Karzai is a good president who looks after American interests. And what she argues in

this piece is that ‘‘It is an American illusion that Karzai is Afghanistan’s bulwark against the Taliban or ethnic strife. In fact, the reverse is more likely.’’ Her argument is that because he comes originally from the Pashtun area, which is the area of course dominated

by the Taliban, that he actually has not been able to be as tough

on the Taliban as we might want him to be, because he is focused

on reelection. In fact, his margin of victory came from that area.

In fact, he got a minority of the votes from every other area, whereas he got a majority from this particular region.

So my question, and I don’t have an assessment one way or another of this article, but I am interested because for so long we

have sort of assumed, I think, here in Washington, that our interests have been not only aligned by Karzai, but that he has been

successful, somewhat, in furthering and advancing those interests.

I am interested in your assessment at this point in time as to

whether or not that is being successful or not.

Mr. ETZIONI. It depends what you define as success. If you think

that fair and free elections are a success, I think it was, I agree,

it was moving, dramatic, to see the people of Afghanistan line up

and get their fingers in ink and vote for the first time in their life

in a free election. If you see the draft Constitution, it is kind of an

odd creature, it is half Islamic and has some things written by advisors from the United States about human rights, and you see we

have a constitution which has human rights, you get a plus.

If you think that what you need is elementary security, so people

can go to work without getting killed, and that terrorists will not

find a haven, you will find that he has been appointed by the West,

that people have been appointed in Afghanistan for, we can argue

for a 1,000 years or 900 years, by outside forces. And they get immediately discredited, because they are not of us, they have been

appointed by some foreign occupying force. And you come to a rather different conclusion.

I believe that you have to have basic security before you can

have a stable society. Then there is room for building a civil society

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and democracy. I think Karzai cannot deliver. If you think about

what he has at his command, as compared with the Dutch troops

being ordered not to shot and the German troops ordered to fight

only on Mondays and concentrate themselves in the area where

there is no fighting, what does he have to put against the very

committed Talibans, of course, our forces. But our forces are not at

his command. So he doesn’t have what it takes to deliver.

I will go back to the point, we need, sadly, to look at the tribal

chiefs and those who are loyal to them if you want to build a real

coalition. They are not supportive of him. Given more time, I could

quote you tribe by tribe by tribe, what happened to Mr. Khan as

he was moved from tribal chief to Khabul to become a minister. To

the degree that we are not allowing the tribes to be the major players, we are just undermining our purpose.

Mr. RABASA. I will just add that I think it is a mistake to focus

too much on personalities in terms of our policies toward not only

Afghanistan, also Pakistan. I don’t know that anyone else would

have done any better than Karzai in Afghanistan. Maybe he is the

best there is.

I don’t think that we should have expected that Musharraf could

effectively deal with the problems in the frontier regions of Pakistan, given the limitations of his political support, so that again,

if there is an answer here, it is to go beyond these individual leaders and try to help develop a social consensus in both Afghanistan

and Pakistan against extremism. It is not a matter of tribes in

Pakistan. Outside of the tribal areas, Pakistan is not a tribal society. It is a question of a social consensus. I think this could have

been developed in the context of a democratic election. The assassination of Bhutto was a tragedy, because it really closed down an

option of a popularly elected government with a substantial popular base that could have been taking effective actions against the

extremists.

This is in my view the only effective response to the dynamics

in these two countries.

Colonel MEESE. If I could just briefly answer, and put that article

or op-ed piece in the context or the theme from this hearing, which

is approaches toward terrorism. That article kind of reflects some

of the problems that we have in that Karzai is either for us or he

is against us. And we try to make black and white distinctions between them. What we, from my experience in Iraq and reading experiences of others in Afghanistan, there are many more shades of

gray in between. And what you find is the irreconcilable elements

that are on the very most extreme edge that the Talibans who subjugate women, who have forced marriages, who chop off fingers for

smoking and those kinds of things, everybody will condemn, or a

majority of the mainstream will be able to condemn.

And we ought to exploit that and those reconcilable elements

that will not necessarily agree with 100 percent of all of the policies that we do, but will be ones that are, tribes that are in, for

lack of a better term, the gray area in between, that will turn

against the extreme terrorists and may not be exactly our models

of Jeffersonian democracy, but are ones that we can work with.

That is the kind of environment and the kind of reconcilable elements that I think we need to focus on.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

I have just a couple of questions, if you gentlemen have time on

that. One is, the mention of the importance of police, even sometimes as opposed to military people, in an area like this, seems to

make a lot of sense. But we don’t put a lot of emphasis on that

within our Department of Defense, or our State Department, or

elsewhere. We don’t promote people as readily if they are involved

in training as they might be if they are involved in combat. Would

you gentlemen or whoever feels that they want to comment on

whether or not it would make sense to have some multi-national

group undertake that particular mission as opposed to a particular

country like the United States trying to resolve that issue?

Dr. Byman, do you want to take a stab at that?

Mr. BYMAN. I will take a first stab, at least.

There is a good and a bad to a multi-national approach. The good

is that as was mentioned, the United States does not have a national police. In fact, we are not used to thinking of paramilitary

forces, police that are exceptionally well armed, that are used to

dealing with more than low level violence. A number of our allies

around the world have forces that are equipped and have the mind

set for that.

The bad though is that if it is multi-national, it is almost certainly not going to get the resources or the bureaucratic attention

it deserves.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is the same problem we have with our own

effort.

Mr. BYMAN. Absolutely. I would actually say even worse, where

needless to say, we as a country can, if there is Presidential leadership and congressional pressure, we can push a bureaucracy in the

right direction. Much harder to do with a multi-national effort.

Mr. TIERNEY. That makes sense. Thank you.

Colonel Meese, you talked in your paper about agency problems

that were confronting Al Qaeda. Can you elaborate a little bit on

that for me? You said Al Qaeda had agency problems that we

might exploit.

Colonel MEESE. Yes. The challenges within Al Qaeda is they are

similar to other organizations in that the principles that are leading Al Qaeda can’t effectively monitor what the agents do. So the

principal agent problems, as they are described particularly in our

first Harmony report, indicates that they have the kind of levels

and organization problems that can be attacked and exploited.

For example, going after finances, going after contracts that they

are establishing with individuals, and interrupting their ability to

monitor their fighters that are actually carrying out the policies as

they are going through. For example, attacking middlemen that are

transporting either supplies, material and especially money, which

is extremely lucrative. There is a lot of experienced, knowledgeable,

somewhat older middle people within the Al Qaeda organization

that are in this for a longer period of time that are attempting to

profit from it, being able to exploit their profit-oriented motives so

that Al Qaeda in the long is not effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. [Remarks off microphone.]

Mr. ETZIONI. I am not sure exactly what ungoverned spaces are.

But we sometimes talk about a failing society, so there was an efVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:38 Aug 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51567.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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fort in Bosnia to turn it around, though that was a British mandate which devoted enormous resources for 9 years to try and turn

Bosnia around. But again, their image was to turn Bosnia into a

British society. He wanted civil servants who were not corrupt, he

wanted ethnic groups to stop fighting each other. Asherton [phonetically] had this clear notion, he brought 900 Brits there, tried

to change practically every aspect of their Bosnian society. God can

do it, but nobody else.

The same thing in Kosovo. We had this idea we were going to

create a multi-ethnic society. My favorite short story is that one of

the USAID people said, we are going to make a gun-free, dark-free

society. That is something we don’t have a lot of experience with.

So the notion that we can go and turn Kosovo into some kind of

a wonderland. So what we have to get closer to the ground, you

talk about training police. We sometimes mean, people are not corrupt, or ethnically sensitive, who know the constitution by heart.

There are very high standards. It is just very difficult to get people

who have gone in a culture, gone back to their homes from a different culture to make such huge jumps.

So I think, to put it in a sentence, being a sociologist, if it becomes sociologically more real, I think we will have more success.

Mr. TIERNEY. It seems fairly obviously that we are not going to

be able to send 160,000 troops and 180,000 contractors into every

area that we think is troubled on that. So we are going to have to

have a significant amount more cooperation with other countries

and their background. Would you like to comment on establishing

foreign liaisons, particularly in intelligence areas, and how this differs from the cold war in terms of what we can share and what we

should be sharing, or should we have the same reluctance to share

that our intelligence people exhibited during the cold war phase?

Colonel MEESE. I will take a couple of very quick comments on

it. I think that there are some models that work. One that I think

would be instructive to take a look at is the U.S. leveraging the

Georgian forces that are currently in Iraq, where for a reasonable

amount of security assistance funding, the Georgians have been

fairly robust in terms of their support for individuals with two brigades that are currently serving on the Iranian border in Iraq and

are being fairly effective in that regard.

Things like that, and having worked in Bosnia with the Guardia

Nacinoal from Spain, the Caribinari, those are very effective forces

and actually, from a U.S. taxpayer perspective, are probably, if

there is some kind of a cost-sharing or burden-sharing arrangement, a fairly thing to use. Related to that, Bosnia is another good

example in that there were national intelligence centers from each

of the different countries in Bosnia that were represented in Bosnia.

So I remember taking from the U.S. national intelligence center

intel that would then be able to go over to, of all places, the Romanian National Intelligence Center, and share those effectively. I

think the intelligence community has done a good job with what

they call in the trade, tear lines, where you can have some part

above the tear line that is only releasable to certain allies, and the

stuff below the tear line is releasable more and more to our intelligence agencies, can be much more widespread with the kinds of

69

things that can be shared with allies without divulging sensitive

sources and methods. That I think is particularly important.

Mr. RABASA. Just a couple of quick comments, Mr. Chairman. I

am not aware that any international organization has a comprehensive approach to ungoverned territories. But there are cases

of international cooperation, especially in Africa, where there have

been some Nigerian-led missions to Sierra Leone during the civil

war in that country, for example. Today there is the African forces

mostly from Uganda in Mogadishu, as another example.

Most of these, many of these ungoverned territories have occurred on border spaces, and border regions. In fact, that is almost

universally the case, because these are generally in hospitable regions that lend themselves to the presence of insurgent groups that

operate on both sides of the border. So by their very nature, a lot

of the problems generated by ungoverned territories are international, which means that they call for international cooperation.

So it would make a lot of sense, and we make that recommendation in our study, first to mobilize regional organizations to the extent that is possible, for example, the African Union, the Organization of American States, etc., to play a positive role in restoring

some sort of order within these territories.

Second, where international organizations are not appropriate,

ad hoc coalitions could work. But this very much has to be done

on an international cooperative basis.

As far as intelligence cooperation is concerned, one of the things

that I have found is that some small countries have an excellent,

excellent intelligence capability within their own regions. For example, I was last year in the Horn of Africa and some parts of

former Somalia. I found that Djibouti on what is happening in the

former Somali, maybe better than ours, as far as I could say.

Singapore has very, very good sense of what is happening in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia.

So we certainly do benefit from relationship with the intelligence

agencies, especially small, vulnerable strategic countries that have

a larger stake in what is happening in the broader region. One of

the problems that I was told, and I won’t mention any country specifically, it specifically said yes, there is intelligence liaison and intelligence sharing. But sometimes we take too long in making the

information available to them. So that by the time we get it, it

might not be actionable.

So I was told by the chief of intelligence of a country that again,

I won’t mention, that please do everything you can to tell people

back in Washington that try to make this information sharing more

timely.

Mr. TIERNEY. That was the concern I had, was that we are still

under the cold war type of mentality of not sharing it until we

don’t think it is relevant any more, and then sharing it all we

want. It seems that terror is a different sort of animal that we are

dealing with here, there shouldn’t be that many bars to sharing.

Mr. Yarmuth, if you have further questions.

Mr. YARMUTH. I just have one line of questioning I want to pursue. Forgive me if it was discussed while I was over voting. But

dealing specifically now with counter-terrorism in the sense of

going after terrorists and stopping them, and I guess this is mostly

70

addressed to Colonel Meese, do we have all the skill sets that we

need to effectively pursue that activity, and do we have any structural problems that you might have recommendations for as to how

we might better organize our counter-terrorist activities? Anybody

can answer. But I thought I would direct it to you first, Colonel.

Colonel MEESE. Probably better off talking to more senior folks

in the Army staff to look at Army structural problems. But I think

some of the advances that we have made, for example, there is a

substantial, just for example at West Point, we have substantially

expanded the language instructions so that for most of our majors,

they are going from 1 year of language to 2 years of language. And

thanks to support from the Congress and others, 140 cadets are

spending a semester abroad out of West Point during their junior

year, which had never happened before.

When I was a cadet during the cold war, we had 20 international

students, and that was the total limit of international interaction

that we had. We now have 60 international students that are there

for 4 years. And that will change, I think, in the long run, the cultural sensitivities, the approach that individuals will take, obviously the language proficiency that they will have, having spent

time in Egypt studying and in Morocco studying, in China studying, in countries of the former Soviet Union studying. That will be

very helpful.

So I think structural changes, in terms of crafting the people

that we will have, because I don’t know what technology we will

have, I don’t know what organization we will have 15 years from

now. But I know what Major or Lieutenant Colonel will have, because he is the cadet that I am teaching today.

Mr. RABASA. With regard to my area of concern on ungoverned

territories, we do of course need different force mixes to deal with

the problems generated by these areas. We do make a recommendation in our report that in addition to the useful mix of

combat and combat support units that we have that what is needed

is forces optimized to restore order and also for civic actions, such

as civil engineers, military police, medical units capable of providing public health services, civic affairs personnel with expert, people with expertise in infrastructure, construction support personnel

and so on.

And this by the way seems to be the focus of the Balikatan [phonetically] of 2008 exercise in the southern Philippines which begins

on the 18th of this month, where the focus has been shifted from

the usual type of combat training to the type of civic action that

I just mentioned. And more of this is needed.

Mr. BYMAN. If I may chime in, one additional problem we have

with our Government is that the security clearance process is broken. This is not a secret. Study after study has shown this and it

has shown it for 20 years. But it still takes many people years to

get in. And it is exceptionally difficult, frankly, the more you know

and the more you are involved with foreign cultures, if you are

from a family of immigrants and you have relatives overseas, it is

going to take forever. Ironically, these are the people who would

add the most, in particular, to our intelligence services but also to

our diplomatic services. That is a tremendous problem.

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Mr. ETZIONI. I don’t know to what extent you can conduct additional sessions like this, but if you can, I would suggest that you

consider having one on this idea of reconstruction. The notion that

we can go into a country and—reconstruct by itself is a little bit

of a complicated phrase. Because Afghanistan was never constructed. So to reconstruct it is quite a challenge.

But there is a notion, there are a variety of ideas how to do it

that I don’t want to go into now. But just to flag the topic that people think that they can get goodwill and win the hearts and minds

by handing out candy and soccer balls, well, all you have to think

about is your own firmly established beliefs and your peers and you

see that this is just not going to work. We then talk about building

wells and roads and such, and there’s absolutely no reason a village in a part of Afghanistan will not be happy to take the well and

the road. But then come the Taliban, and that will not general sufficient loyalty.

So what works and doesn’t work in reconstruction deserves some

really very, very serious and difficult question. We have a lot of experienced in it, but we tend to be, again, on the overly optimistic

side.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

We do have some hearings coming up with respect to the reconstruction efforts, targeted for Pakistan. Questions about whether or

not they could be effective, whether or not there is any accountability going to be there for the money, how it gets disbursed. We may

have some assurance it actually gets to work for what is intended

and what the results are on that. So it is an excellent idea. Thank

you yet again.

Mr. Lynch, do you have any further questions you would like to

ask?

Mr. LYNCH. I do, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thanks for your good work on these hearings. One

of the things that bothers me is that when you look back, a lot of

the major attacks against the United States, the 9/11 attacks obviously, but also attacks against the embassy in Dar Es Salaam and

the attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, the attacks against the USS Sullivan, the attacks against the USS Cole, these were all centrally controlled and planned by Al Qaeda. They were done so at a period

when they had a safe haven in Afghanistan, during that era. And

now in retrospect, with all the research that has been done, we see

how it took them a while to do it and that safe haven status gave

them great flexibility to get these things done.

What I fear now is that we are seeing a safe haven develop in

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in parts of Pakistan

now. I know that the chairman and a lot of the members in this

committee, including myself, have spent a lot of time up there in

the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, that Dr. Rabasa has talked

about.

And I know, I am going to set aside the logistical problems with

my question, from a military standpoint. But from a political standpoint and I guess a long-term view, what would be the consequences if we were to decide that a concentrated but a significant

military intervention in Pakistan and the Federally Administered

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Tribal Areas was necessary? What do you think, now, put aside the

logistics for now, what would the response be politically? And like

I say, in the long-term view, what would happen there? Dr.

Rabasa, since you have addressed this in your remarks, perhaps

you could have first crack at it.

Mr. RABASA. Yes, thank you, sir.

First, I don’t believe that Al Qaeda ever lost some level of central

command and control over operations overseas. Because if you

looked at all of the British attacks, actual and potential, that have

taken place since 2003, there is always a connection back to Pakistan.

Mr. LYNCH. Just to be clear, though, it was hands-on in the early

attacks, very complicated.

Mr. RABASA. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. A bunch of guys getting on a train with a backpack

and a cell in either Madrid or Mumbai or London, that didn’t, in

my mind and in my research, didn’t reflect the type of complex

planning and long-term planning that Al Qaeda engaged in in all

those other attacks.

Mr. RABASA. No, not the same level of planning by any means,

but some level of connectivity was always there and some level of

training was always there. But you are right, not with the same

complexity.

As far as the main part of your question, what would be the consequences, I believe that the consequences of a direct U.S. intervention in the tribal areas of Pakistan would be disastrous. Because

Al Qaeda’s strategy is really to reach down into local insurgencies

and to incorporate those insurgencies into the global jihad. To the

extent that they can do that, and they have done it to some extent

in Pakistan, they are successful. To the extent they fail, as in

Mindanao, then their strategy fails.

If we were to intervene directly in Pakistan, in my opinion, what

that would do is that would enable Al Qaeda and the Taliban allies

to mobilize national sentiment against us. We would be invaders

in the Muslim country, it would validate their narrative [phonetically] of Muslims under attack. We would not be likely to receive

much support from the local population.

So therefore, the adverse consequences of that I think are much

more likely than any positive outcomes of if we were directly involved in the fighting in Afghanistan, and we had not been able to

eradicate the Taliban and its Al Qaeda associates. So the struggle

against this type of activity has to be done, I think, to the extent

possible through indirect means by empowering local governments

and moderate sectors to fight the extremists. But our own involvement, I think, would have counter-productive consequences.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Thank you.

Colonel.

Colonel MEESE. I would generally agree with that, and so consequently, then, what do you do. I think part of it is to the extent

that you can, containing the influence that they have within the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas by again, supporting local

governments, reducing the effect that they have, impeding to the

extent that it is possible working with partner governments, travel,

interdicting financial flows in and out is another aspect of it, as

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well as countering the ideology and the messaging that is out there

in sewing seeds of dissent. Because again, as has been previously

mentioned, it is not monolithic tribes. There are different subsets

of those tribes. And having disagreements among themselves will

probably be far more effective than doing the one thing that would

unite them, which is intervening directly.

Mr. LYNCH. Dr. Byman.

Mr. BYMAN. I strongly agree with that. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, that is where good policy options go to die. There isn’t really

a chance of direct intervention, I think, because it will produce exactly the reaction that we want to avoid, which is bringing people

together against us.

I think the best means would be to step up covert action to try

to work as much as possible at the local level, recognizing that,

frankly, we are lying down with dogs and there are going to be

some unpleasant things that happen when we do that.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Dr. Etzioni.

Mr. ETZIONI. I very much agree with what has been said, and I

will not repeat it. I just want to add a sentence. In our dealing with

Pakistan, we kept emphasizing limiting terrorism and not equally

limiting the distribution of nuclear weapons. So for instance, when

we caught what was called the nuclear walnut, we allowed the

Pakistanis to basically disregard it, giving the gentleman a kind of

symbolic punishment and such. We didn’t make much of an issue

out of it, because we kind of tried it, curbing the spread of nuclear

weapons, with more efforts in the tribal areas.

I think our priority should be exactly the opposite. Our No. 1, 2

and 3 priority should be sure that the technological know-how, the

instruments of nuclear weapons are not spread from Pakistan to

other places, and that the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are not

going to reach in the hands of the Taliban. Everything else should

be traded against it.

It doesn’t take away from anything else that was said, I just

wanted to add that.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question?

Mr. TIERNEY. Certainly. Go ahead.

Mr. LYNCH. We got a chance, a number of us, to get up to Peshawar and then fly up to the northwest provinces. We met with General Khazak, who heads up that frontier corps. And he was telling

us that in many cases, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

in north and south Waziristan, you have some family members,

same family, same tribe if you will, that were working for the frontier corps and then other members of the family actually working

with Taliban and Al Qaeda. They explained to me, some of these

family members, that if you work for the Pakistani government,

you get paid about $240 a month. And the pay was not consistent,

it was every so often you would get paid. But the folks with the

Taliban and Al Qaeda were getting about $300 a month, and the

pay was fairly regular.

Apart from the resource issue, there is the loyalty issue. It is

very mixed up there, where they are playing footsie with each

other. I honestly feel like Musharraf in a way is gaming us. There

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is this truce and then there is not a truce, there is a war against

them and then there is not a war against them. What is the best

policy for us to take? I think there is a lot of duplicity here going

on. I think that President Musharraf’s position is very difficult, no

question about it. I don’t know what the hell I would do differently

if I were him.

Mr. TIERNEY. The question is, what is the best policy. does somebody want to take a stab at that? Nobody?

Mr. BYMAN. I will give a view, but I suspect I may be in the minority among our group here. I think we missed an opportunity to

move Musharraf aside when Bhutto had returned to Pakistan. If

I were testifying 3 years ago, I would have said that standing by

Musharraf is our best option, because we are getting day-to-day

counter-terrorism for the most part, not ideal, but we are getting

it significant, and there is a degree of stability.

Both those statements no longer hold today. Every 6 months, it

seems another significant part of Pakistan is unstable. Every 6

months it seems that counter-terrorism cooperation degrades yet

one more level. So to me, the benefits, if you want to call it that,

of working with a dictator, are no longer there. While there is a

legitimate democratic movement in Pakistan, it might be corrupt,

it is not ideal, but it is legitimate.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, thank you. Doctor.

Mr. RABASA. The relationship between the Pakistani government

and the other forces and the intelligence services and extremist

groups in Pakistan is complicated. There are clearly links between

retired general officers in the Pakistani army, the intelligence service in particular. And not only the Taliban, but a number of extremist organizations that operate very freely in Pakistan. These

are Kashmiri jihadist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, for example, they

change names because they get banned and then they resurface

under a different name. They maintain links with these people, so

it is very difficult to know what is the real attitude, if in fact it

is at all possible to determine what is the real attitude of authorities in Pakistan and within the Pakistani intelligence service and

these other groups.

That makes our developing policy toward Pakistan very, very difficult, because basically I think they are straddling both sides of a

fence. On the one hand, they do occasionally capture some Al

Qaeda personality and hand them over. On the other hand, let me

tell you a story. We did a story of the Waziristan region about 3

years ago. There were sources that we had in Waziristan and one

of the sources went to the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He saw a truck with some Taliban members and the

truck would come from Pakistan across the border, would take

some potshots at the Afghan government groups on the hill, and

then when across the border, the Pakistani border troops did not

stop them.

Then he asked the people at these outposts, well, you know, what

is going on? They said, well, you know, we don’t have any orders

to stop them. What was clear from that and many other examples,

there was a policy at the time that the Pakistani government

would take action against clearly Al Qaeda and foreign fighters. So

that if you were an Uzbek or an Arab or a Chechyan, you were fair

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game. If you were a Taliban, that was another question. So they

did make that distinction. And I am not sure that the policy has

changed.

Now, they have been beaten with the agreements that they made

in 1995 and 1996 because they turned out to be quite counter-productive from their point of view. But there is still a great deal of

ambivalence. After all, the ISI created the Taliban. This was

hatched against Indian influence in Afghanistan. And those ties, I

don’t think, have gone away.

Mr. TIERNEY. So none of you have the complete answer here, we

are all upset. [Laughter.]

Thank you for your comments on that.

Let me just wrap this up, because I want to let you gentlemen

go by noon time here, and Members seem to have asked the questions. The response to Mr. Lynch’s question about sending armed

forces into the areas of Pakistan seems to beg the question, why

do we think that would be anything less than disastrous to send

U.S. forces into ungoverned areas in Afghanistan, Helmand province or other more remote areas? Why wouldn’t that be just as

problematic as sending them into FATA or the northwest territories?

Mr. RABASA. If I may give you a quick answer to that, of course

we were in Afghanistan because of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Historically we went there to fill the vacuum together with the Afghan government that had been created by the overthrow of the

Taliban, and we did not have a choice.

In Pakistan, one has to keep in mind that there are two separate

issues involved, they are related but separate. On the one hand,

there is the problem of the frontier region, of the Pashtun, of the

Taliban, others, Al Qaeda sanctuaries on the border. Then there is

the problem of the trajectory of Pakistan at large. Let’s not forget

that the Pashtuns and the frontier region are less than 10 percent,

maybe 5 percent, of the Pakistani population.

It is of great importance to what happens in Pakistan at large

and if we were to intervene directly in the frontier regions of Pakistan and even if we were to be successful in seeking to eradicate

the Taliban groups and extremists there, we need to think about

what would the consequences be for the rest of Pakistan, which is

as you mentioned, where the nuclear weapons are. The Taliban is

not likely to capture these weapons. They are very well-guarded,

they are dispersed.

But what happens if as a result of our intervention Pakistan becomes radicalized? At the moment, I don’t see a great prospect of

an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. This is not Iran, it is a very different country. If we were to intervene, I think all bets would be

off. I think that would improve the chances——

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t want to cut you short, but I think we all

understood that. The question really was, though, how do you distinguish from not using troops in Afghanistan? If it is not a good

idea to use them in areas like that in Pakistan, then what is the

distinction with Afghanistan?

Mr. RABASA. We are there of course with the permission of the

Afghan government. Although if you were to ask me, I think that

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we should have let the Afghans themselves restore control in their

country after Operation Enduring Freedom.

Colonel MEESE. Just very briefly, I would say the costs are higher because we have already had the negative reaction there. And

to whatever extent the unification of the Afghans against us has

already taken place, the costs are relatively lower. The benefits are

higher in that we have a relationship with the Afghan government,

and I would presume that depending upon the situation it would

be in that context that we would be deploying.

And we would also be deploying force in conjunction with the

other elements of power that are already there, coordinated by the

provincial reconstruction teams. So that would be three distinctions

that I would immediately see.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I want to thank all of you gentlemen,

I know we took up a lot more of your time than you probably had

figured on. We benefited greatly from it.

Mr. Platts, these gentlemen have been here for 2 hours now.

Would you like to ask a 1-minute question of them?

Mr. PLATTS. Not a question. I just want to thank them for the

written testimony and for coming to be with us today. Mr. Chairman, my apologies, I could not be here with you.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is fine. All of your written statements, by the

way, will be admitted into the record by unanimous consent. So

thank you all once again very much for all that you have helped

us with and continue your good work, please.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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