UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-23192-CIV-ALTONAGA/Damian 

PABLO ROGER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GC SERVICES LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP, 

Defendant.

_________________________/ 

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant, GC Services LP’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 5], filed on October 26, 2022. Plaintiff, Pablo Roger, filed a 

Response [ECF No. 14], to which Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 15]. The Court has 

considered the Complaint [ECF No. 1], the parties’ written submissions, and applicable law. For 

the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a single debt collection letter. Plaintiff alleges Defendant sent him a 

defective and misleading letter (the “Letter”) to collect on a debt. (See Compl. ¶¶ 29–33). The 

Letter was undated, causing Plaintiff to be “misled” regarding the debt. (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant’s failure to date the Letter violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (the “FDCPA”). (See generally Compl.). 

Plaintiff is a Florida resident who, at some point prior to December 31, 2021, incurred a 

debt to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 21). Defendant is a debt collection company whose 

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primary business “is to attempt to collect debts alleged to be due to itself or another.” (Id. ¶¶ 8–

9). 

Defendant tried to collect the debt owed to Wells Fargo by mailing Plaintiff the Letter

during the month of August 2022. (See id., Ex. A, Letter [ECF No. 1-1] 2; Mot. 6–7 (stating the 

Letter was “mailed to Plaintiff on or about August 18, 2022”)).1 The Letter warned Plaintiff that 

he had an outstanding debt to Wells Fargo, which Defendant sought to collect. (See generally 

Letter). The Letter informed Plaintiff that “[a]s of December 21, 2021, [he] owed” $4,111.78. (Id. 

2 (alterations added)). It also stated that “[b]etween December 31, 2021 and today[,]” he had been 

charged $0.00 “in interest” or “in fees[,]” and he was “paid or [] credited” $0.00 toward the debt. 

(Id. (alterations added)). The Letter summed up the “[t]otal amount of the debt now” as $4,111.78. 

(Id. (alterations added)). 

The Letter provided Plaintiff information regarding how he might dispute the debt, as well 

as the timeline for doing so. (See id.). Plaintiff was instructed to “[c]all or write to [Defendant] 

by September 30, 2022” if he wished to “dispute all or part of the debt[;]” otherwise Defendant 

would “assume that [its] information [was] correct.” (Id. (alterations added)). The Letter further 

informed Plaintiff that, should he reach out to Defendant to dispute the debt or other information 

in the Letter, Defendant “must stop collection until [it] sent[t] [Plaintiff] information [showing] 

[Plaintiff] owe[s] the debt.” (Id. (alterations added)).

According to Plaintiff, because the Letter was undated, it was impossible “to determine 

from the Letter which date ‘today’ and ‘now’ refer to[.]” (Compl. ¶ 32 (alteration added)). This 

alleged “with[olding] [of] a material term” of the debt made the Letter “seem illegitimate[,]” 

“suspicious [and] “misleading,” and ultimately caused Plaintiff to “expend[] time and money in 

1 The Court relies on the pagination generated by the Case Management/Electronic Case Files system, 

which appears in the header on all filings.

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an effort to mitigate the risk of future financial and reputational harm[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37, 39, 58 

(alterations added)). Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 30, 2022 seeking relief from 

Defendant’s allegedly illicit “debt collection practices[.]” (Id. ¶ 63 (alteration added)).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s failure to date the Letter violated four sections of the 

FDCPA. (See id. ¶¶ 64–85). First, Plaintiff asserts that the Letter’s omission of the date 

“harass[ed], oppress[ed] or abuse[d]” [him] in connection with the collection of a debt[,]” in 

violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692d (“Count I”). (Id. ¶ 66 (alterations added)). Second, Plaintiff 

alleges the described conduct was a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with the collection of [the] debt[,]” in violation of section 1692e (“Count II”). (Id. ¶ 

71 (alterations added)). Third, Plaintiff states the conduct was an “unfair or unconscionable means 

to collect” the debt, in violation of section 1692f (“Count III”). (Id. ¶ 76). And fourth, Plaintiff 

alleges the Letter failed to provide the necessary information required by section 1692g (“Count 

IV”). (See id. ¶¶ 80–85).

Defendant now moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim to relief. (See 

generally Mot.). Defendant argues that the Letter does not violate any provision of the FDCPA, 

because it “fully and accurately stated the amount of the debt and otherwise complied with all 

requirements of the [statute].” (Id. 5 (alteration added)). Most importantly — according to 

Defendant — the Letter “conforms exactly to” the model form letter (the “Model Form”) for debt 

collection communications provided by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”)

under 12 C.F.R. section 1006.34(d)(2). (Id. 13). Defendant insists that this compliance necessarily 

means it is sheltered within the safe harbor that CFPB regulations provide to debt collectors who 

use the Model Form. (See id. 10–11). Even if that were not the case, Defendant further argues 

that it is not a violation of the FDCPA for the Letter to not be dated. (See id. 13). 

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In response, Plaintiff asks the Court to ignore the CFPB’s safe harbor provision and asserts 

that the existence of the undated Letter suffices to state plausible FDCPA claims. (See generally 

Resp.). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration added; quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading withstands a motion to dismiss if it 

alleges “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The mere possibility 

the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. 

Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), abrogated on other 

grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). A complaint’s “well-pled 

allegations must nudge the claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more 

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe 

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations as true. 

See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 

SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).

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III. DISCUSSION

Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the Complaint primarily on the ground that the Letter 

“conforms exactly to [the] Model Form” at 12 C.F.R. section 1006.34(d)(2). (Mot. 10 (alteration 

added)). Defendant further argues that the Model Form aside, no provision of the FDCPA requires 

that the Letter be dated. (See id. 5). 

 The Court agrees with Defendant in part. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a violation of 

15 U.S.C. section 1692d, and Count I is due to be dismissed. But that is the extent of the Court’s 

agreement; Plaintiff’s other three claims survive. Defendant’s reliance on the Model Form 

overstates both the meaning and scope of the regulatory safe harbor provided by the CFPB. And 

under the “least-sophisticated consumer” standard, Plaintiff has alleged plausible claims for relief 

in Counts II, III, and IV. The Court explains. 

A. Applicable Statutes and Regulations 

To start, the FDCPA governs this action. Plaintiff alleges violations of that statute, while

Defendant insists that it has complied with both the statute and its corresponding regulatory 

provisions. Further, Plaintiff is a “consumer” protected by the FDCPA; the debt is covered by the 

FDCPA; Wells Fargo is a “creditor” under the FDCPA; and Defendant is a “debt collector” under 

the FDCPA. (Compl. ¶¶ 8; 23–25). Neither party disputes that the FDCPA controls. (See 

generally Mot.; Resp.). 

The FDCPA protects consumers from “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection 

practices[,]” and is meant to “eliminate” those practices “by debt collectors[.]” 15 U.S.C. §§ 

1692(a), (e) (alterations added)). As relevant here, the FDCPA prohibits debt collection tactics 

that “harass, oppress, or abuse” the debtor, id. § 1692d; are “false, deceptive, or misleading 

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representation[s] or means in connection with [a] [debt’s] collection[,]” id. § 1692e (alterations 

added); or are “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect” a debt, id. § 1692f. 

In addition to the preceding prohibitions, the FDCPA also requires that a notice of debt 

sent by a debt collector provide certain information regarding the debt and a debtor’s rights to 

dispute it. See id. § 1692g. The required information includes the “amount of the debt[]” and “the 

name of the creditor[.]” Id. §§ 1692g(a)(1)–(2) (alterations added). Section 1692 also requires the 

notice to state a debtor’s rights to dispute the debt amount or creditor information “within [30] 

days after receipt of the notice[.]” Id. § 1692g(a)(3) (alterations added). Should a debtor do so, 

the debt collector shall obtain and provide the necessary evidence to verify the notice, see id. §§

1692g(a)(4)–(5); and the collector “shall cease collection . . . until [it] obtains verification” of such 

and provides it to the debtor, id. § 1692g(b) (alterations added). Finally, “[a]ny collection activities 

and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the 

disclosure of the [debtor]’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original 

creditor.” Id. (alterations added).

The FDCPA is not the only authority governing the interaction between creditors, debtors, 

and debt collectors. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 

No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), established the CFPB, an executive agency “authorized to 

exercise its authorities under [f]ederal consumer financial law to administer, enforce, and 

otherwise implement the provisions of [f]ederal consumer financial law.” 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a)

(alterations added). The CFPB has implemented certain regulations interpreting the FDCPA’s 

statutory requirements, see generally 12 C.F.R. § 1006, including regulations interpreting each 

FDCPA statutory provision Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated, at: 12 C.F.R. section 1006.14, 

interpreting 15 U.S.C. section 1692d; 12 C.F.R. section 1006.18, interpreting 15 U.S.C. section 

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1692e; 12 C.F.R. section 1006.22, interpreting 15 U.S.C. section 1692f; and 12 C.F.R. section 

1006.34, interpreting 15 U.S.C. section 1692g. 

Defendant relies primarily on 12 C.F.R. section 1006.34 (see generally Mot.), and thus the 

Court focuses its attention there. Section 1006.34 expands on the notice requirements listed in 15 

U.S.C. section 1692g and provides more specific instructions regarding the necessary 

information — referred to as the validation information — that a debt collector must provide a 

debtor. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 1006.34. This includes the debt’s amount, the original creditor, 

and a debtor’s rights to dispute the debt. See generally id. Most relevant here, section 1006.34 

contains a safe harbor provision. See id. § 1006.34(d)(2). The safe harbor provides a Model Form

for debt collectors to use that “contains the validation information required by” the regulations. 

Id. § 1006.34(d)(2)(i). If a debtor collector uses the Model Form, it has “complie[d] with the 

information and form requirements of [section 1006.34]. Id. (alterations added). 

 B. The Model Form

To escape potential liability, Defendant relies primarily on the fact that it used the Model 

Form from section 1006.34(d)(2)(i). (See generally Mot.). According to Defendant, because “the 

Letter is encompassed in the safe harbor and the Letter is not in violation of the FDCPA[,]” 

Defendant cannot be liable under any provision of the statute. (Id. 10 (alteration added)). Plaintiff, 

by contrast, argues that the CFPB’s regulations, including the safe harbor provision, erroneously 

interpret the FDCPA’s unambiguous statutory language, and so the Court need not defer to them 

under Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). (See 

generally Resp. 9–15). 

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The parties’ competing arguments about the validity of the CFPB’s regulations largely miss 

the point. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant violated any CFPB regulations; he alleges 

violations of the FDCPA. (See generally Compl.). 

Admittedly, 12 C.F.R. section 1006.34 was “intended to clarify [section] 1692g of the 

FDCPA[.]” Collectional Pros., Inc. v. McDonough Dist. Hosp., No. 4:22-cv-04078, 2022 WL 

7454116, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2022) (alterations added). And Count IV of the Complaint 

alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g. (See Compl. ¶¶ 79–85). But nowhere within 12 

C.F.R. section 1006.34 does the CFPB state that compliance with the regulation’s 

requirements — by use of the Model Form or otherwise — suffices as compliance with the 

corresponding statutory requirements of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g; indeed, the regulation states that 

use of the Model Form means only that that a debt collector has “complie[d] with the information 

and form requirements . . . of this section.” 12 C.F.R. § 1006.34(d)(2)(i) (alterations and emphasis 

added). In other words, while use of the Model Form might be sufficient to provide the information 

required by 12 C.F.R. section 1006.34, it does not guarantee compliance with the requirements of 

15 U.S.C. section 1692g.2

 

Moreover, even if use of the Model Form might provide a safe harbor for some of section 

1692g’s statutory requirements, a safe harbor for the form of provided information is different 

from a safe harbor for the substance of that information. See Tims v. LGE Cmty. Credit Union, 

935 F.3d 1228, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2019) (using a regulatory agency’s model form provides a safe 

harbor only for the “form” of providing required information, but not as to the “substance” of the 

underlying statute’s required information). In Tims, the safe harbor was at least created by statute,

2 Notably, in other regulations, the CFPB has explicitly linked regulatory and statutory compliance. See 12 

C.F.R. § 1006.6(d)(3) (describing information and procedures which the CFPB deems sufficient to satisfy 

certain FDCPA statutory requirements). The CFPB has not done so here. See generally id. § 1006.34.

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see id.; here, the safe harbor Defendant relies on is created by a regulation which explicitly states 

it only provides coverage for regulatory — not statutory — compliance, see 12 C.F.R. section

1006.34(d)(2). Defendant identifies no authority, within the regulation or otherwise, for its 

assertion that this limited regulatory safe harbor was also intended to be a broader statutory one. 

(See generally Mot.; Reply). 

Defendant’s reliance on the Model Form to escape liability from Plaintiff’s other three 

claims — the claims not asserting violations of section 1692g — suffers from a further flaw: a 

regulation prescribing additional requirements under 15 U.S.C. section 1694g has little, if 

anything, to say about the separate statutory requirements of sections 1692d, 1692e, or 1692f. See 

Collectional Pros., Inc., 2022 WL 7454116, at *1. And section 1006.34(d)(2) makes clear that the 

Model Form only establishes that Defendant “complie[d] with the information and form 

requirements of [section 1006.34.]” 12 C.F.R. § 1006.34(d)(2)(i) (alterations added). If 

compliance with that specific regulation’s “form” does not per se equate to compliance with its 

corresponding statutory “substance,” Tims, 935 F.3d at 1244–45, it surely does not equate to 

compliance with a different statute’s substance. Defendant seemingly concedes its own awareness

that use of the Model Form only speaks to regulatory compliance with 12 C.F.R. section 1006.34. 

(See Mot. 7 (“The Letter follows the [Model Form] which ensures . . . complian[ce] with [section] 

1006.34(d)(2).” (alterations added)).

 At bottom, Defendant’s arguments regarding use of the Model Form are inapt here; use of 

the Model Form alone does not provide a per se bar to Plaintiff’s claims.

C. Counts II, III, and IV state plausible claims for relief. 

Putting the Model Form aside, the Court next addresses those claims that survive 

Defendant’s Motion — Counts II, III, and IV — before turning to the one claim in Count I that 

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does not. Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth claims allege, respectively, violations of 15 U.S.C. 

sections 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. (See Compl. ¶¶ 69–85). As discussed, section 1692e prohibits 

debt collectors from using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in 

connection with [a] [debt’s] collection[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (alterations added); section 1692f 

prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to 

collect” a debt, id. § 1692f; and section 1692g requires that debt collectors provide certain 

information in their initial communications with a debtor, including “the amount of the debt[,]” id.

§ 1692g(a)(1) (alteration added).

Aside from reliance on the Model Form, Defendant’s arguments for dismissing the 

remaining claims are summary at best. (See generally Mot.; Reply). Nonetheless, Defendant 

attempts to argue they should be dismissed for failing to state plausible claims for relief. (See Mot. 

11 (“Neither the CFPB or [sic] FDCPA require [sic] the letter to be dated[.]” (alteration added)); 

id. 12–13 (discussing “least sophisticated consumer standard” applied to FDCPA claims)). In 

response, Plaintiff argues that the Letter, because of the missing date, establishes plausible 

violations of the FDCPA. (See Resp. 15–19). 

To prevail on a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the plaintiff has been 

the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector 

as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by 

the FDCPA.”3

 Bohringer v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235 (S.D. Fla. 

2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, 

LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). Courts apply the “least-sophisticated consumer” test 

in evaluating whether a debt collector’s communication violates section 1692e, 1692f, or 1692fg

3 The parties do not dispute the first two elements are satisfied here. (See generally Mot.; Resp.). 

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of the FDCPA. LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193–94, 1200 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(footnote call number, quotation marks, and citation omitted); see also Howard v. Client Servs., 

Inc., No. 0:17-cv-62425, 2018 WL 10345280, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2018); Leonard v. Zwicker 

& Assocs., P.C., 713 F. App’x 879, 882 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that while this Circuit has not 

definitely “extended that standard to” section 1692g claims, there is “no reason to disagree with 

[the] other circuits” that have already done so (citations omitted; alteration added)).

Under the least-sophisticated consumer standard, “[t]he inquiry is not whether the 

particular plaintiff-consumer was deceived or misled; instead, the question is whether the ‘least 

sophisticated consumer’ would have been deceived by the debt collector’s conduct.” Green v. 

Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, 766 F. App’x 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration added; 

citations and quotation marks omitted). “The least sophisticated consumer can be presumed to 

possess a rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a collection 

notice with some care.” LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

test has an objective component: “while protecting naive consumers, the standard also prevents 

liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient 

of reasonableness.” Id. (alterations adopted; citations and quotation marks omitted). Even when 

section 1692g is violated, “the absence of one or more of [section 1692g’s] statutory 

requirements . . . is actionable as a violation of” sections 1692e and 1692f only “if the variance is 

one that would tend to mislead the least sophisticated consumer.” Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, 

LLC, 755 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2014) (alterations added; citing Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 

760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir.1985)).

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i. Count IV

Because a violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g can itself serve as a predicate for violations 

of sections 1692e and 1692f, see Caceres, 755 F.3d at 1303, and because Count IV alleges a 

violation of section 1692g (see Compl. ¶¶ 79–85), the Court addresses Count IV first. Plaintiff 

alleges in Count IV that the Letter “[f]ail[ed] to properly provide the amount of the debt, by 

pegging it to an unknown date” and by “engaging in collection activities and communication 

during the 30-day period that overshadowed and/or was inconsistent with the disclosure of 

[Plaintiff]’s right to dispute the debt.” (Id. ¶¶ 82, 84 (alterations added)). Defendant states it 

complied with section 1692g because the Letter makes it “clear the amount of the debt had not 

changed and there was no additional interest or fees added to the original balance.” (Reply 3–4). 

The Court does not agree with Defendant’s interpretation of the Letter. Plaintiff has plausibly 

plead a straightforward violation of section 1692g(a)(1).

“To satisfy [section] 1692g(a), the debt collector’s notice must state the required 

information clearly enough that the recipient is likely to understand it.” Leonard, 713 F. App’x at 

882–83 (alteration added; quoting Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, 825 F.3d 317, 321 

(7th Cir. 2016); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)). Section 1692(g)(a)(1) 

requires that a debt collector provide, either in the original communication to the debtor or “within 

five days after” that initial communication, “the amount of the debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)

(alteration added). 

It is true that “strict compliance with the FDCPA’s mandate that a debt collector’s initial 

communications state ‘the amount of the debt’ is often impossible, especially where variable 

interest and other items accrue day-to-day.” Gesten v. Phelan Hallinan, PLC, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 

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1387 (S.D. Fla. 2014). And “[e]ven if the statement is accurate when the letter is drafted and sent, 

it may not be accurate by the time it is received.” Id. at 1387–88 (alteration added). 

The undated Letter here could be easily interpreted by a reasonable consumer, let alone the 

least-sophisticated consumer, see LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194, as not stating the full amount of the 

debt. The Letter informs Plaintiff of the amount of debt he owed “[a]s of December 31, 2021[.]” 

(Letter 2 (alterations added)). It then lists the amounts in interest and fees he was charged 

“[b]etween December 31, 2021 and today[;]” as well as the amount he “paid or [was] credited 

toward the debt[.]” (Id. (alterations added)). Finally, it lists the “[t]otal amount of the debt now[.]” 

(Id. (alterations added)). Defendant insists this suffices, as “the Letter clearly states the amount 

that is owed and due” (Mot. 13), and “it is clear the amount of the debt had not changed and there 

was no additional interest or fees added to the original balance” (id. 7). 

But the Letter does not contain the information Defendant relied on to reach this 

conclusion, nor is it alleged that Defendant provided that information “[w]ithin five days” of 

sending the Letter. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (alteration added). Even if the amount of the debt had 

not yet been altered, the Letter provides no means by which Plaintiff might assess whether, and by 

how much, the debt might increase in the future if he did not promptly pay Defendant. See Gesten, 

57 F. Supp. 3d at 1388 (noting that the FDCPA “would have [been] satisfied” if the defendant had 

“provided [the] [p]laintiff with a payoff amount as of the date of the letters and supplied the 

information required to calculate the payoff amount for some reasonable number of days into the 

future” (alterations and emphasis added)); (see also Compl. ¶ 33 (“Plaintiff was [] misled as to 

the . . . debt for it was not associated with a particular date.” (alterations added))). 

While “[t]he least sophisticated consumer can be presumed to possess . . . a willingness to 

read a collection notice with some care[,]” LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194 (alterations added; quotation 

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marks and citation omitted), even a careful reading of the Letter does not reveal whether, and by 

how much, the debt might increase (see generally Letter). If the Court finds it difficult to

determine this basic, critical information regarding the “amount of the debt[,]” 15 U.S.C. §

1692g(a)(1) (alteration added), it is neither “bizarre [n]or idiosyncratic” for the “least sophisticated 

consumer” to face a similar issue, see LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194 (alteration added; citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

At bottom, the Letter makes multiple references to a timeline against which Defendant 

assessed the debt, including interest and fees. (See Letter 2). But the Letter provides no date or 

corresponding information, aside from the initial date when the debt was incurred — December 

31, 2021. (See id.). That “withholding [of] the date” both “misled” Plaintiff and “made it 

confusing for him to understand the nature of the [] debt.” (Compl. ¶¶ 33, 39 (alterations added)); 

see also Leonard, 713 F. App’x at 882–83. It is more than reasonable to infer from, and even

agree with the plausibility of Plaintiff’s allegations, that a recipient of the Letter would be misled 

as to the amount of the debt. See Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining 

that courts “draw[] all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff’s favor” when evaluating a motion to 

dismiss (alteration added; citation omitted)). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the means by which the Letter did not provide 

“the amount of the debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). Count IV states a claim for relief. 

ii. Counts II and III

The plausible violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g also serves to establish plausible 

violations of sections 1692e and 1692f. As discussed, section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from 

using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with [a] [debt’s] 

collection[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (alterations added); and section 1692f prohibits debt collectors 

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from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect” a debt, id. § 1692f. 

A section 1692g violation can establish violations of sections 1692e and 1692f if the violation is 

“one that would tend to mislead the least sophisticated consumer.” Caceres, 755 F.3d at 1303 

(citation and footnote call number omitted); see also LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1193–94, 1200 

(applying least-sophisticated consumer test to section 1692e and section 1692f claims). 

As explained, the undated Letter might plausibly “mislead[]” the least-sophisticated 

consumer with regard to the outstanding amount of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (alteration added); 

see also id. § 1692g(a)(1). “[D]raw[ing] all reasonable inferences” in Plaintiff’s favor, Bailey, 843 

F.3d at 480 (alterations added; citation omitted), the least-sophisticated consumer could have been

plausibly misled as to the amount of the debt by the Letter’s lack of a date (see Compl. ¶ 72).

For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the undated Letter also suffice to 

state a plausible violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692f. While the Letter may not fit neatly into the 

potential examples listed in sections 1692f(1)–(8), the statute cautions that those examples are not 

intended to “limit[] the general application” of the prohibition on “unfair or unconscionable 

means” of debt collection. Id. (alteration added). And that general application reaches broadly. 

See LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1200 (“The plain meaning of ‘unfair’ is ‘marked by injustice, partiality, 

or deception’ . . . ‘[A]n act or practice is deceptive or unfair if it has the tendency or capacity to 

deceive.’” (alterations added; other alteration adopted; citation and footnote call number omitted)). 

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Letter’s misleading nature might very well be 

“unfair or unconscionable” to the least-sophisticated consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The undated 

Letter allegedly obscured the full amount of the debt (see Compl. ¶¶ 69–78), and “disadvantage[d] 

[] Plaintiff from making an educated decision regarding the [] debt[” (id. ¶ 77 (alterations added)). 

Once more, it would be neither “bizarre [n]or idiosyncratic” for the “least sophisticated 

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consumer[,]” LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194 (alterations added; citation and quotation marks omitted), 

to view this “deceptive” practice (Compl. ¶ 63) as, at the very least, “unfair[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f 

(alteration added); see also LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1200. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to state plausible claims for relief in Counts II, III, 

and IV for violations of sections 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g, respectively. 

D. Count I is dismissed. 

 The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s first claim, which alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. section

1692d. (See Compl. ¶¶ 64–68). Defendant arguesthat undated debt collection letters do not violate

section 1692d. (See Mot. 12 (discussing Byes v. Telecheck Recovery Servs., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 421, 

425 n.6 (E.D. La. 1997))). Plaintiff, by contrast, insists that Defendant violated this section when 

it “failed to properly advise Plaintiff of the total amount of the debt at issue by tying the amount 

owed to ‘today’ but wholly failing to provide any indication as to what date ‘today’ represented.” 

(Resp. 19). Plaintiff’s arguments do not persuade, and Count I is due to be dismissed. 

Section 1692d prohibits debt collectors from “engag[ing] in any conduct the natural 

consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection 

of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (alteration added). Unlike Plaintiff’s other alleged FDCPA 

violations, a section 1692d claim is not assessed under the “least-sophisticated consumer” 

standard; rather, this claim is addressed under an “adapted” standard, that is, “from the perspective 

of a consumer whose circumstances makes [sic] him relatively more susceptible to harassment, 

oppression, or abuse.” LeBlanc, 601 F.3d 1185, 1201 n.33 (emphasis omitted; quoting Jeter, 760 

F.2d at 1179). To state a violation of section 1692d, “[i]t is not enough that a debt collector’s 

actions caused the consumer ‘embarrassment, inconvenience, and further expense,’ but rather

those actions must ‘manifest a tone of intimidation[.]’” Middlebrooks v. Sacor Fin., Inc., 775 F. 

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App’x 594, 597 (11th Cir. 2019) (alterations added; quoting Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A., 

791 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015)). 

The parties make no attempt to address this adapted standard. (See generally Mot.; Resp.; 

Reply). The Complaint provides little information regarding Plaintiff’s circumstances beyond his 

Florida residency, his alleged debt, and his receipt of the Letter. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 21, 29). 

Plaintiff’s Response does not provide further details and only invokes the least-sophisticated 

consumer standard. (See generally Resp.). Even if the parties had referenced the proper standard, 

the factual allegations provide the Court with no information to determine whether Plaintiff is a

“consumer whose circumstances make[] him relatively more susceptible to harassment, 

oppression, or abuse.” Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179 (alteration added); see also id. (“Whether a 

consumer is more or less likely to be harassed, oppressed, or abused by certain debt collection 

practices does not relate solely to the consumer’s relative sophistication[.]” (alteration added));

Middlebrooks, 775 F. App’x at 597–98 (applying adapted standard).

Count I suffers from a further deficiency. Plaintiff has not provided any factual 

allegations — let alone plausible ones — demonstrating “harass[ment], oppress[ion], or abuse” by 

Defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (alterations added). While Plaintiff need only state a plausible 

claim for relief, it is not enough “to plead that the defendant broke the law and injured [Plaintiff]

in doing so.” Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 933–34 (11th Cir. 2020)

(alteration added; quotation marks omitted). The Court will not fill in the gaps where Plaintiff has 

alleged little more than a “mere[] . . . reiteration of the statutory violation.” Id. at 934 (alterations 

added). 

Plaintiff again relies on the Letter’s lack of a date as the basis for the alleged violation. 

While the Letter may have plausibly deceived Plaintiff, “[d]eception[s] or falsehood[s] . . . [are]

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wholly different from the conduct condemned in . . . [section] 1692d.” Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179 

(alterations added). Plaintiff provides no allegations in his Complaint, or authority in his 

Response, to support the notion that a single, undated Letter — and nothing more — rises to the 

level of “intimidation” by Defendant. Middlebrooks, 775 F. App’x at 597 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). Plaintiff’s summary accusation that “Defendant’s debt collection efforts 

attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated . . . 15 U.S.C. [section] 1692d” (Compl. ¶ 

65) is not enough. An undated letter, with little else, is not “the type of coercion and delving into 

the personal lives of debtors that [section] 1692d in particular[] was designed to address.” 

Miljkovic, 791 F.3d at 1305 (alterations added; citations omitted). 

Even “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences” in Plaintiff’s favor, this is not a plausible 

violation of section 1692d. Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480 (alteration added; citation omitted). And when, 

as here, a claim lacks “sufficient factual matter” to be “plausible on its face[,]” it will not survive 

a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration added; citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Count I is thus due to be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff plausibly alleges violations of 15 U.S.C. sections 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g, but 

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a violation of section 1692d. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Count I is dismissed. Counts II, III, and IV remain.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 9th day of February, 2023.

 _______________________________________

 CECILIA M. ALTONAGA

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record 

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