United States Government Accountability Offi ce

GAO

March 2009

GAO-09-306SP

Report to Congressional Committees

NASA

Assessments of 

Selected Large-Scale 

Projects
Highlights of GAO-09-306SP, a report to 

congressional committees

 United States Government Accountability Offi ce

Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found

The National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) 

plans to invest billions in the 

coming years in science and 

exploration space fl ight initiatives. 

The scientifi c and technical 

complexities inherent in NASA’s 

mission create great challenges 

in managing its projects and 

controlling costs. In the past, 

NASA has had diffi culty meeting 

cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives for some of its projects. 

The need to effectively manage 

projects will gain even more 

importance as NASA seeks to 

manage its wide-ranging portfolio 

in an increasingly constrained fi scal 

environment. 

 Per congressional direction, this 

report provides an independent 

assessment of selected NASA 

projects. In conducting this work, 

GAO compared projects against 

best practice criteria for system 

development including attainment 

of knowledge on technologies and 

design as well as various aspects of 

program management. The projects 

assessed are considered major 

acquisitions by NASA—each with a 

life-cycle cost of over $250 million. 

No recommendations are provided.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-306SP. 

For more information, contact 

Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.

GAO assessed 18 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than 

$50 billion. Of those, 10 out of 13 projects that had entered the implementation 

phase experienced signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth. For these 

10 projects, development costs increased by an average of 13 percent from 

baseline cost estimates that were established just 2 or 3 years ago and they 

had an average launch delay of 11-months. In some cases, cost growth was 

considerably higher than what is reported because it had occurred prior to 

the most recent baseline. Many of the projects we reviewed experienced 

challenges in developing new technologies or retrofi tting older technologies as 

well as in managing their contractors, and more generally, understanding the 

risks and challenges they were up against when they started their efforts. 

GAO’s previous work has consistently shown that reducing the kinds of 

problems this assessment identifi es in acquisition programs hinges on 

developing a sound business case for a project. In essence, this means 

establishing fi rm requirements, maturing technologies, and assuring other vital 

resources, such as time and funding, are suffi cient before making long-term 

commitments to acquisitions. NASA has acted to adopt practices that would 

ensure programs proceed based on a sound business case and undertaken an 

array of initiatives aimed at improving program management, cost estimating, 

and contractor oversight. Continued attention to these efforts should help 

maximize NASA’s acquisition investments.

James Webb Space Telescope

Mars Science Laboratory

Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope 

Dawn

Source: Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral. JWST Project Office; NASA/JPL/McREL; Background: 

William K. Hartmann, UCLA: Mars Science Laboratory. 

March 2009

NASA

Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Contents

Page i GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Foreword 1

Letter 

A Sound Business Case Underpins Succesful Acquisition Outcomes 6

NASA Has Made Efforts To Improve Its Acquisitions 8

Project Assessments 10

Our Observations 11

Assessments of Individual Projects 15

 Aquarius 17

 Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) 19

 Dawn 21

 Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) 23

 Glory 25

 Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission 27

 Herschel 29

 James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) 31

 Kepler 33

 Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) 35

 Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) 37

 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) 39

 NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) 41

 Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) 43

 Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) 45

 Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) 47

 Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) 49

 Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) 51

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 53

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

 Administration 57

Appendix II: NASA Life-Cycle For Flight Systems Compared To A

 Knowledge-Based Approach 60

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 63
Page ii GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 70

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 72

Table

Table 1: Assessment of Challenges for NASA Projects in the 

 Implementation Phase 12

Figure

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a 

 Knowledge-Based Approach 60

 

Abbreviations

AFB Air Force Base

AFS Air Force Station

AIA Atmospheric Imaging Assembly

APS aerosol polarimetry sensor

ASI Argenzia Spaciale Italiana (Italian Space Agency)

CCD charged-coupled device

CDR critical design review

CERES Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System

CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle

CONAE Comision Nacional de Actividades 

 Espaciales (Space Agency of Argentina)

CrIS Cross-track Infrared Sounder

CSA Canadian Space Agency

DCI data collection instrument

DLR German Aerospace Center

DPR dual-frequency precipitation radar

EO-1 Earth Observatory Satellite

ESA European Space Agency

EVE Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment

GBM gamma-ray burst monitor

GLAST Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope 

GMI GPM microwave imager
Page iii GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

GPM Global Precipitation Measurement (mission)

HIFI Heterodyne Instrument for the Far Infrared

HMI Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager

IPO Integrated Program Offi ce

JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

KDP key decision point

LAT large area telescope

LCROSS Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite

LDCM Landsat Data Continuity Mission

LRO Lunar Reconnaisance Orbiter

MEP Mars Exploration Program

MSL Mars Science Laboratory

NAR nonadvocate review

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NIR near infrared (bands)

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements

NPOESS National Polar-Orbiting Operational 

 Environmental Satellite System

NPP NPOESS Preparatory Project

OCO Orbiting Carbon Observatory

OLI Operational Land Imager

PA&E Offi ce of Program Analysis and Evaluation (NASA)

PDR preliminary design review

PICA phenolic impregnated carbon ablator

SDO Solar Dynamics Observatory

SDR system defi nition review

SOFIA Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy

SSS sea surface salinity

TIM total irradiance monitor

TIRS Thermal Infrared Sensor

TRL technology readiness level

TSIS Total Solar Irradiance Sensor

USGS U.S. Geological Service

VIIRS Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

United States Government Accountability Offi ce

Washington, DC 20548

March 2, 2009

Congressional Committees

In response to congressional direction, this report provides our assessment 

of large-scale NASA projects. NASA is at a critical juncture. The agency is in 

the midst of phasing out the Space Shuttle program and beginning another 

major undertaking, the Constellation program—which will create the next 

generation of spacecraft for human spacefl ight and is expected to cost 

upward of $230 billion. This massive effort, unparalleled since the transition 

from the Apollo program to the Shuttle program, presents the agency with 

myriad complex and interdependent challenges.

NASA is taking on this endeavor against a backdrop of growing national 

government fi scal imbalance and budget defi cits that continue to strain all 

federal agencies’ resources. While NASA’s budget represents less than 2 

percent of the federal government’s fi scal discretionary budget, the agency 

is increasingly being asked to expand its portfolio to support important 

scientifi c missions including the study of climate change. Therefore, it is 

exceedingly important that these resources be managed as effectively and 

effi ciently as possible.

In the past, this has not always been the case. NASA has had diffi culty 

meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for some of its 

projects, and in fact, it had to cancel prior attempts to replace the Space 

Shuttle, after billions had already been spent, in the face of cost overruns 

and program management problems. However, to its credit, NASA 

has developed a comprehensive plan to address systemic acquisition 

management weaknesses and is in the initial stages of implementing the 

plan. Moreover, as we have urged it to do, NASA recently incorporated best 

practice criteria for system development in its acquisition policy, though our 

review shows more needs to be done to ensure the policy is followed. To 

maximize NASA’s ability to invest in science and space exploration, senior 
Page 2 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

leaders should focus attention to adopting best practices and demonstrate 

a willingness to fi x and/or terminate projects that are not performing well. 

This assessment should support such efforts.

Gene L. Dodaro

Acting Comptroller General

 of the United States
Page 3 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

United States Government Accountability Offi ce

Washington, DC 20548

March 2, 2009

Congressional Committees

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) extensive 

portfolio of missions ranges from sending robotic vehicles to Mars, to 

scientifi c study of Earth from space, to assembling and supplying the 

International Space Station. Some of these missions, such as the Hubble 

Space Telescope and NASA’s earth science efforts, have literally changed 

the way we view our planet and the universe. The technology that NASA 

developed has resulted in numerous spin-off products that are used across a 

wide range of technical and commercial fi elds. 

However, NASA has also had its share of challenges. For example, the 

X-33 and X-34 programs, which were meant to demonstrate technology for 

future reusable launch vehicles, were cancelled due to technical diffi culties 

and cost overruns after NASA spent more than $1 billion on them. More 

recently, the Mars Science Laboratory, which was already over budget, 

announced a two-year launch delay. Current estimates suggest the price 

of this delay may be $400 million—which drives the current project lifecycle cost estimate to $2.3 billion, up from its initial confi rmation estimate 

of $1.6 billion. GAO and others have also reported on overruns on many 

other NASA programs over the past decade. What is common among these 

and other programs is that whether they succeed or fail, they cost more to 

build and take longer to launch than planned. As a result, NASA is able to 

accomplish less than it plans with the money it is allocated, and it is forced 

to make unplanned trade-offs among its projects—shorting one to pay for 

the mistakes of another.

Congress has expressed concern about NASA’s performance and has 

identifi ed the need to standardize the reporting of cost, schedule, and 

content for NASA research and development projects. In 2005, Congress 

required NASA to report cost and schedule baselines—benchmarks against 

which changes can be measured— for all NASA programs and projects with 

estimated life-cycle costs of at least $250 million that have been approved 

to proceed to implementation.1

 It also required that NASA report to 

Congress when development cost is likely to exceed the baseline estimate 

by 15 percent or more, or when a milestone is likely to be delayed by six 

1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-

161, §103; 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b)(f)(4).
Page 4 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

months or more.2 In response, NASA began establishing cost and schedule 

baselines in 2006 and has been using them as the basis for annual project 

performance reports for Congress provided in its annual budget submission 

each year.

The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations 

accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 directed GAO 

to prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA programs, 

projects, or activities. This report responds to that mandate by assessing 

18 NASA projects, each with a life-cycle cost over $250 million. The 

combined life-cycle cost for these 18 projects exceeds $50 billion. Each 

assessment is presented in a two-page summary that analyzes the project’s 

cost and schedule status and project challenges. We also provide general 

observations about the performance of NASA’s major projects and the 

agency’s management of those projects during development. 

NASA provided updated cost and schedule data as of December 2008 for 

13 of the 18 projects.3

 We reviewed and compared that data to previously 

established baselines for each of those 13 projects. We took appropriate 

steps to address data reliability. 

Our approach included an examination of the phase of a project’s 

development and how each project was advancing within this framework. 

Each project we reviewed was in either the formulation phase or the 

implementation phase of the project life-cycle. In the formulation phase, the 

project develops and defi nes the project requirements—what the project 

should be able to do—establishes a schedule, estimates costs and produces 

a plan for implementation. In the implementation phase, the project carries 

out these plans, performing fi nal design and fabrication as well as testing 

components and system assembly, integrating these components and 

testing how they work together, and launching the project. This phase also 

includes the period from project launch through mission completion. We 

assessed each project’s cost and schedule and characterized growth in 

either as signifi cant if it was greater than the thresholds established for 

Congressional reporting. 

2 42 U.S.C. § 16613(d).

3 NASA also provided preliminary estimates in the form of cost ranges for three projects in 

the formulation phase. Since the values provided were ranges, rather than specifi c values, 

we did not include these projects in our analysis. Further, the agency did not provide 

schedule baselines for these projects so we could not determine any schedule changes they 

experienced.
Page 5 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Based on discussion with project offi cials and drawing on GAO’s established 

criteria for knowledge-based acquisitions and on other GAO work on 

space and weapon system acquisitions, we identifi ed fi ve challenges that 

can contribute to cost and schedule growth in these projects: technology 

maturity, design stability, complexity of heritage technology, contractor 

performance and development partner performance. To assess technology 

maturity, we examined the projects’ reported critical technology readiness 

levels—a measure that NASA devised and that is now used at other 

agencies as well. We looked at the technology readiness level at the time of 

the project’s preliminary design review, which occurs just before it enters 

the implementation phase, and compared that against the level of maturity 

that best practices call for at that stage to minimize risks. To assess design 

stability, we examined the percentage of engineering drawings completed 

or projected to be completed by the critical design review—which is usually 

held about mid-way through the project’s development. We asked project 

offi cials to provide this information and we compared it against GAO’s 

best practices’ metric of 90 percent of drawings released by the critical 

design review. Finally, based in part on our discussions with offi cials for 

the individual projects, we identifi ed the extent to which project cost and 

schedule were negatively impacted by challenges integrating heritage—or 

pre-existing—technology into their projects. We also discussed the extent 

to which contractors’ and development partners’ challenges in developing 

and delivering project hardware impacted overall project cost and schedule. 

In this review, these challenges were largely apparent in the projects that 

had entered the implementation phase.

This list of challenges is not exhaustive; we believe these challenges will 

evolve and change as we continue this work into the future. Our objectives 

are to expand on the importance of developing a knowledge-based 

acquisition strategy and to provide decision-makers with an independent, 

knowledge-based assessment of individual systems that identifi es potential 

risks and allows them to take actions to put projects that are early in the 

development cycle in a better position to succeed. This report and the 

challenges we discuss in it are a starting point for our future work in this 

area. The individual project offi ces were given an opportunity to comment 

on and provide technical clarifi cations on our assessments prior to their 

inclusion in the fi nal product.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain suffi cient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
Page 6 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. Appendix III contains detailed information on 

our scope and methodology. We do not provide recommendations in this 

report.

The major projects that NASA undertakes range from highly complex and 

sophisticated space transportation vehicles, to robotic probes, to satellites 

equipped with advanced sensors to study the earth. In many cases, NASA’s 

projects are expected to incorporate new and sophisticated technologies 

while operating in harsh, distant environments. Many of its projects are 

also one time articles, meaning there is little opportunity to apply 

knowledge gained to the production of a second, third, or future increments 

of spacecraft. Moreover, NASA often partners with other space-faring 

countries, including several European nations, Japan, and Argentina. These 

partnerships go a long way to foster international cooperation in space, but 

they also put NASA projects in a vulnerable position when partners do not 

meet their obligations or run into technical obstacles they cannot easily 

overcome. While space development programs are complex and diffi cult by 

nature, and most are one-time efforts, we are convinced that NASA would 

benefi t from a more disciplined approach to its acquisitions. The nature of 

its work should not preclude NASA from achieving what it promises when 

requesting and receiving funds. 

The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for 

these projects can provide early recognition of challenges, allow managers 

to take corrective action, and place needed and justifi able projects in a 

better position to succeed. Our studies of best practice organizations show 

the risks inherent in NASA’s work can be mitigated by developing a solid, 

executable business case before committing resources to a new product 

development.4

 In its simplest form, this is evidence that (1) the customer’s 

needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the 

chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing 

resources—that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate 

funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when needed. A program 

should not go forward into product development unless a sound business 

case can be made. If the business case measures up, the organization 

4 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System, 

GAO-07-376 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business 

Case Key for Future Combat System’s Success, GAO-06-564T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 4, 2006) ; NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 

Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2005); NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 

Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 28, 2005).

A Sound Business 

Case Underpins 

Successful Acquisition 

Outcomes
Page 7 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

commits to the development of the product, including making the fi nancial 

investment. Our best practice work has shown that developing business 

cases based on matching requirements to resources before program start 

leads to more predictable program outcomes—that is, programs are more 

likely to be successfully completed within cost and schedule estimates and 

deliver anticipated system performance.5

 

At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to product 

development that is a best practice among leading commercial fi rms. 

Those fi rms have created an environment and adopted practices that put 

their program managers in a good position to succeed in meeting these 

expectations. For a program to deliver a successful product within available 

resources, managers should demonstrate high levels of knowledge before 

signifi cant commitments are made. In essence, knowledge supplants risk 

over time. This building of knowledge can be described over the course of a 

program, as follows:

• When a project begins development, the customer’s needs should match 

the developer’s available resources—mature technologies, time, and 

funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of the 

technologies needed to meet customer needs—referred to as critical 

technologies. If the project is relying on heritage—or pre-existing—

technology, that technology must be in appropriate form, fi t, and 

function to address the customer’s needs within available resources. 

• Then, about midway through the product’s development, its design 

should be stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting performance 

requirements. The critical design review takes place at that point in time 

because it generally signifi es when the program is ready to start building 

production-representative prototypes. If design stability is not achieved, 

but a product development continues, costly re-designs to address 

changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges can occur.

• Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be 

shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and 

have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate that 

it performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. Lack of 

testing increases the possibility that project managers will not have 

information that could help avoid costly system failures in late stages of 

development or during system operations. 

5 GAO-05-242.
Page 8 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Our best practice work has identifi ed numerous other actions that can 

be taken to increase the likelihood that a program can be successfully 

executed once that business case is established. These include ensuring 

cost estimates are complete, accurate and updated regularly; holding 

suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their product through 

such activities as regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of 

quality and delivery; and holding program managers accountable for their 

choices. Moreover, we have recommended using metrics and controls 

throughout the life-cycle to gauge when the requisite level of knowledge 

has been attained and direct decision makers to consider criteria before 

advancing a program to the next level and making additional investments.

The consequence of proceeding with system development without 

establishing and adhering to a sound business case is substantial. GAO 

and others have reported that NASA has experienced cost and schedule 

growth in several of its projects over the past decade, resulting from 

problems that include failing to adequately identify requirements and 

underestimating complexity and technology maturity. For example, the 

X-33 and X-34 programs both were terminated because of signifi cant cost 

increases caused by problems developing the necessary technologies and 

fl ight demonstration vehicles. Neither program fully assessed the costs 

associated with developing new, unproven technologies. Additionally, 

in 2005, GAO reported on the lack of an established sound business case 

for NASA’s Prometheus I—a project that faced challenges in identifying 

preliminary requirements, establishing fi rm cost estimates and maturing 

critical technologies. After concurring with GAO’s recommendation that 

NASA establish a fi rm business case for the project, NASA identifi ed more 

realistic requirements for Prometheus I and reduced the project’s requested 

funding by nearly $2.4 billion through 2010.

In 2005, we reported that NASA’s acquisition policies did not conform to 

best practices for product development because they lacked major decision 

reviews at several key points in the project life-cycle, which would allow 

decision makers to make informed decisions about whether a project 

should be authorized to proceed in the development life-cycle. Based, in 

part, on our recommendations, NASA issued a revised policy in March 20076

 

that institutes several key decision points (KDP) in the development lifecycle for space fl ight programs and projects. At each KDP, a decision 

authority is responsible for authorizing the transition to the next life-cycle 

6 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA 

Spacefl ight Program and Project Management Requirements (Mar. 6, 2007). (Hereinafter 

cited as NPR 7120.5D (Mar. 6, 2007).

NASA Has Made 

Efforts to Improve Its 

Acquisitions
Page 9 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

phase for the project.7 In addition, NASA acquisition policies also require 

that new technologies be suffi ciently mature at the preliminary design 

review, the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full-scale 

fabrication, assembly, assembly, integrating and test at the critical design 

review, and the system can be fabricated within cost, schedule and 

performance specifi cations. These changes brought the policy more in line 

with best practices for product development. A more detailed discussion of 

NASA’s acquisition policy and how it relates to best practices is provided in 

appendix II of this report.

Further, in response to GAO’s designation of NASA acquisition management 

as a “high risk” area,8

 NASA developed a corrective action plan to 

improve the effectiveness of NASA program/project management.9

 The 

approach focuses on how best to ensure the mitigation of potential issues 

in acquisition decisions and better monitor contractor performance. The 

plan identifi es fi ve areas for improvement—program/project management, 

cost reporting process, cost estimating and analysis, standard business 

processes, and management of fi nancial management systems—each 

of which contain targets and goals to measure improvement. As part of 

this initiative, NASA has taken a positive step in improving management 

oversight of project cost, schedule, and technical performance with 

the establishment of a baseline performance review with NASA’s senior 

management. Through monthly reviews, NASA intends to highlight 

projects that are predicted to exceed internal NASA cost and/or schedule 

baselines, which are set lower than cost and schedule baselines submitted 

to Congress, so the agency can take pre-emptive actions to minimize the 

projects’ potential cost overruns or schedule delays.

While these efforts are positive steps towards achieving successful project 

outcomes and ensuring that decision makers are appropriately investing 

the agency’s resources, they will be limited if project offi cials are not 

held accountable for demonstrating that elements of a knowledge-based 

business case are demonstrated at key junctures in development. It is 

critical that project offi cials not only have a high level of knowledge about 

a project at key junctures, but also that this information is used by decision 

makers to make decisions on whether to invest additional resources and 

allow a project to proceed through the development life cycle.

7 NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 2.4.5 (Mar. 6, 2007).

8 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007).

9 NASA, Plan for Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of Contract Management

(Oct. 31, 2007).
Page 10 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

We found several factors that occurred throughout the various projects we 

reviewed that can contribute to project cost and schedule growth. These 

factors—characterized as project challenges—were mostly present in the 

projects that had reached the implementation phase of the project lifecycle. They, along with a profi le of each project we reviewed, are described 

in a two-page assessment for each project. The project profi le presents a 

general description of the mission objectives for each of the projects; a 

picture of the spacecraft or aircraft; a schedule timeline identifying key 

dates for the project; a table identifying programmatic and launch 

information; and the baseline year cost and schedule estimates and 

December 2008 cost and schedule data. 

The remainder of the assessment analyzes the project challenges and the 

extent to which each project faces cost, schedule, or performance risk 

due to these challenges. They are based on past GAO work on elements 

of a successful acquisition business case—technology maturity, heritage 

technology complexity, and design stability. Additionally, through our 

review, we identifi ed two more challenges—contractor performance 

and development partner performance—that had an impact on cost and 

schedule performance of the NASA projects. Contractor performance 

impacts NASA’s ability to deliver a project within cost and schedule 

baselines because the agency depends on the expertise of the contractor 

to deliver what it promises. Similarly, NASA sometimes relies on other 

domestic and international organizations to provide key instruments, 

the spacecraft, and/or launch services for collaborative projects; the 

performance of these partners can impact NASA’s performance for a 

project. When a development partner cannot deliver an instrument or 

integrate it on schedule, the impact is felt by NASA. Specifi cally, since often 

there is no exchange of money between partners, the cost of any delays to 

the project must be assumed by each partner. 

For each individual project assessment, we provide a table showing the 

challenges relevant to the project and a project status narrative. This is 

followed by a narrative of the project challenges we identifi ed relevant to 

each project. 

NASA project offi ces were provided an opportunity to review drafts of the 

individual two-page assessments prior to their inclusion in the fi nal product. 

The projects provided both technical corrections and more general 

comments. We integrated the technical corrections as appropriate and 

characterized the general comments on the second page of each two-page 

assessment.

Project Assessments
Page 11 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

NASA provided cost and schedule data for 13 projects in the implementation

phase of the project life-cycle.10 Ten of those 13 projects experienced 

signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth from their project baselines.11 

Based on our analysis, development costs for projects in our review 

increased by an average of almost 13 percent from their baseline cost 

estimates—all in just two or three years—including one project’s cost that 

increased by over 50 percent. It should be noted that a number of these 

projects had experienced considerably more cost growth before they were 

baselined in response to the statutory reporting requirement.12 Our analysis 

also shows that projects in our review had an average delay of 11 months to 

their launch dates. The lack of knowledge at key junctures during project 

development, as well as the complexity of using heritage hardware—

systems with characteristics similar to the one being developed—and 

working relationships with contractors and development partners 

contributed to the cost and schedule growth. Table 1 depicts the 13 

projects we reviewed that had entered the implementation phase, the 

challenges they faced or are currently facing, and the cost and schedule 

changes they experienced.

10 We also reviewed the James Webb Space Telescope, but NASA did not provide cost or 

schedule data for that project even though it is in implementation.

11 For purposes of our analysis, signifi cant cost and schedule growth occurs when a project’s 

cost and/or its schedule growth exceeds the thresholds established for Congressional 

reporting.

12 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b).

Our Observations
Page 12 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projets

Table 1: Assessment of Challenges for NASA Projects in the Implementation Phase

Note: Shading indicates project exceeded cost and/or schedule baseline. A blank cell 

indicates the challenge does not apply to that particular project or the project did not supply 

data or make a projection of the data. 

a

The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter exceeded its schedule threshold by 5 months and 25 

days, but the table shows 6 months due to rounding. 

We did not specifi cally correlate individual project challenges with specifi c 

cost and/or schedule changes in each project. The degree to which 

specifi c challenges contributed to cost and schedule growth varied across 

the projects in this review. Nonetheless, since previous GAO work has 

demonstrated the impact of these challenges on cost and schedule growth 

and our discussions with NASA project offi cials identifi ed the additional 

challenges we discuss as contributing to cost and schedule growth, we are 

NASA Projects

Technology 

Maturity

Design 

Stability

Complexity 

of Heritage 

Technology

Contractor 

Performance

Development 

Partner 

Performance

Development 

Cost Change

Launch

Delay

(months)

Aquarius • • 6% 10

Dawn • • -2% 0

Gamma-ray Large 

Area elescope Space T •• • • 5% 9

Glory ••• • 53% 6

Herschel • • • 13% 20

Kepler • • 25% 9

Lunar 

Reconnaissance 

Orbiter • 0% 6a

Mars Science 

Laboratory ••• 26% 25

NPOESS 

Preparatory 

Project ••• • 19% 26

Orbiting Carbon 

Observatory • • 18% 5

Solar Dynamics 

Observatory • •• 1% 17

Wide-field Infrared 

Survey Explorer • -1% 0

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data.

Stratospheric 

Observatory for 

Infrared 

Astronomy • • 3% 9
Page 13 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

confi dent in our characterization of them for the purpose of this specifi c 

review.

Four of the thirteen projects in our assessment for which we received data 

and that had entered the implementation phase did so without fi rst maturing 

all critical technologies.13 Further, three of those four projects had also not 

matured their critical technologies before continuing to assembly, 

integration, and testing. This means that needed knowledge about these 

technologies remained unknown well into development thereby adding 

potential cost and schedule risk to the projects. For example, fi ve of the 

eight critical technologies for one instrument and three of the fi ve critical 

technologies for another instrument identifi ed by the Herschel project offi ce 

were immature when the project moved into implementation. Almost two 

years later at the critical design reviews, four of the thirteen critical 

technologies for these two instruments were still immature, yet the project 

proceeded. When complex development programs proceed without 

understanding whether technologies can work as intended, they end up 

facing unanticipated technical problems that have costly, reverberating 

effects on other aspects of the program.

The majority of the projects in our assessment that held a critical design 

review did so without fi rst achieving a stable design. GAO best practices 

recommend completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the 

critical design review to provide evidence that the design is stable. Though 

NASA’s acquisition policy does not specify how the project should achieve 

design stability by the critical design review, NASA’s system engineering 

handbook adheres to GAO’s metric. Of the projects we were able to assess 

that had reached that point in their life-cycle, none had achieved design 

stability by the time they proceeded into assembly, integration, and testing. 

All of the projects in our assessment that had reached their critical design 

review and that provided data on engineering drawings experienced some 

growth in the total number of design drawings after their critical design 

review. Growth ranged from 8 percent to, in the case of two projects, well 

over 100 percent. Some of this increase can be attributed to change in 

system design after the critical design review. For some projects, design 

changes after the critical design review were necessary due to problems 

in maturing technologies or issues found during testing. For example, the 

Mars Science Laboratory required several design changes to address various 

issues, including redesign of the plumbing for the propulsion system, which 

13 Appendix IV provides a description of the metrics used to assess technology maturity in 

this review.

Technology Maturity

Design Stability
Page 14 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

increased the drawing count by 67 percent from the critical design review 

to the time of our review.

More than half the projects in the implementation phase—8 of them—

encountered challenges in integrating or modifying heritage technologies. 

Additionally, two projects in formulation—Ares I and Orion—also 

encountered this challenge. We found that the projects that relied on 

heritage technologies underestimated the effort required to modify them to 

the necessary form, fi t, or function. According to NASA offi cials, heritage 

technologies are not the same as critical technologies because, in their 

opinion, critical technologies are not based on existing—or heritage—

technology. Generally, the project offi cials said that the technology they 

were using was not considered “new” if it had been demonstrated in a test 

environment or used on a prior mission, even if there needed to be a change 

or customization in confi guration or design. Yet, these projects all failed to 

build in the necessary resources for technology modifi cation. For example, 

the Kepler project offi ce did not identify any critical technologies since all 

had fl own on earlier missions, but viewed their modifi cation as a design 

challenge for the Kepler mission. However, the project underestimated the 

effort required to modify the photometry array and, as a result, this 

challenge contributed to a 25 percent—or $78 million—cost overrun and 

Kepler’s launch schedule being delayed by nine months. 

Six of the seven projects that cited contractor performance as a challenge 

also experienced signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth. Through our 

discussions with the project offi ces, we were informed that contractors 

encountered technical and design problems with hardware which disrupted 

development progress. Additionally, contractors lacked the experience in 

space systems that was required for the projects, which may be the 

underlying reason for these development challenges. For example, the 

Dawn contractor had no experience in deep space missions. Offi cials from 

the company acknowledged they had diffi culty developing the spacecraft 

wiring. They also encountered problems developing the ion propulsion 

system for the spacecraft. 

Contractors also faced workforce or corporate issues, such as closing 

facilities, lack of resources, and management ineffi ciencies. For example, 

the Glory project manager cited management ineffi ciencies with the 

instrument contractor. According to Glory project offi cials at NASA, among 

the drivers of these management ineffi ciencies were senior leadership 

changes, a loss of core competencies due to plant closure, and a lack of 

proper decision authority. The contractor agreed that the plant closure 

and the need to re-staff were major project challenges. In this case, as with 

Complexity of Heritage 

Technology

Contractor Performance
Page 15 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

others in our review, the contractors forfeited their contract fees or spent 

the fee they had received from NASA to cover project costs. 

Five of the thirteen projects we reviewed encountered challenges with 

a development partner. In these cases, the development partner could 

not meet their commitments to the project within planned timeframes. 

This may have been a result of issues within the specifi c development 

partner organization or as a result of issues faced by a contractor to 

that development partner. For example, NASA is collaborating with the 

European Space Agency (ESA) on the Herschel space observatory. While 

NASA has delivered its two instruments to ESA, ESA has encountered 

diffi culties developing its instruments and has delayed Herschel’s launch 

by 14 months. Because of this delay, NASA has incurred about $39 million 

in cost growth due to the need to fund component developers for a longer 

period of time than originally planned.

Our assessments of all 18 individual projects follow.

Development Partner 

Performance

Assessments of 

Individual Projects
Page 16 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

(Page intentionally left blank.)
 Page 17 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Aquarius

 

Source: Aquarius Project Office (artist depiction). 

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

 (FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $241.8 $253.1 4.7%

Formulation Cost $35.5 $35.6 0.3%

Development Cost $192.7 $204.5 6.1%

Operations Cost $13.6 $13.0 -4.4%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 7/2009 5/2010 10 months 

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

International Partner: Argentina's National Committee of 

Space Activities (CONAE)

Major Contractors: in-house development

Projected Launch Date: May 23, 2010

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 3 years for Aquarius mission 

 5 years for SAC-D (CONAE) mission

Formulation

Formulation

start

(12/03)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Preliminary 

Design Review

(6/05)

Critical Design 

Review 

(9/06)

Launch Readiness 

Date

(5/10)

Implementation

Project Status

The launch for Aquarius has been delayed 10 months, 

from July 2009 to May 2010 because of delays in CONAE’s 

spacecraft development activities. The launch delay 

prompted NASA to report to the Congress that the Aquarius 

project exceeded its development schedule threshold and 

caused NASA to experience a $10.7 million cost increase. 

Based on the cost-sharing arrangements with CONAE, 

NASA will also bear its own costs associated with future 

delays. NASA has continued its development of the Aquarius 

instrument, which is currently scheduled for completion 

in March 2009 and shipment to CONAE in June 2009 for 

integration with the Argentine-developed spacecraft.

Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA 

and the Space Agency of Argentina (Comisión 

Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, CONAE) to 

investigate the links between the global water cycle, 

ocean circulation, and the climate. It will measure 

global sea surface salinity. The Aquarius science 

goals are to observe and model the processes that 

relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the 

global cycling of water and to understand how these 

variations influence the general ocean circulation. By 

measuring salinity globally for 3 years, Aquarius will 

provide an unprecedented new view of the ocean's 

role in climate.

Aquarius
 Page 18 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Aquarius

Detailed Project Discussion

The only critical technology the project office identified was the Aquarius instrument itself, which 

includes the scatterometer and the radiometer components. The project deemed the instrument mature 

at the preliminary design review because the instrument uses heritage technologies, even though those 

technologies were brought together in a different form, fit, and function for use on Aquarius. The instrument 

design, however, was not stable at the critical design review (CDR) as the Aquarius project had released 

only 16 percent of the engineering drawings. Project officials told us that some detailed parts were either 

not accounted for or not very mature at CDR, and they needed a follow-on review to clear up the issue. For 

example, details in the design of a connector arm of a reflector to the instrument were lagging. In addition, 

project officials said that the Aquarius instrument design was far ahead of development of CONAE’s 

spacecraft, so the project could not finalize and release all the instrument drawings until CONAE finished 

the spacecraft design. To help minimize project risk in the interim, project officials said NASA provided 

CONAE with an engineering model to work with as the Argentines developed the spacecraft. All engineering 

drawings have now been released.

Aquarius’ schedule slipped 10 months, prompting NASA to report to the Congress that the Aquarius program 

has exceeded its development schedule threshold. According to project officials and budget documents, a 

delay in development of the spacecraft bus by CONAE is the primary reason for the schedule slip. Project 

officials said that CONAE is using some newer and unfamiliar technologies on the spacecraft, such as 

lithium-ion batteries for power storage. NASA’s review of CONAE’s proposed schedule indicated that 

CONAE had made several high-risk decisions in order to meet a planned launch date of September 2009. 

For example, CONAE decided to begin flight model fabrication before completing adequate testing of the 

engineering models. Subsequent discussions between NASA and CONAE led to a decision to set a new 

launch date of May 2010. The spacecraft will also house several instruments for CONAE science missions. 

According to project officials, those instruments all appear to be on schedule, but officials added that none 

of those instruments are needed for NASA’s Aquarius mission and that the mission would launch without the 

CONAE instruments if any were delayed.

NASA expects the Aquarius instrument to be completed in March 2009 and held until June 2009 when it will 

ship to Argentina to be integrated with the spacecraft. Since no funds are exchanged between the U.S. and 

Argentina for this project, NASA bears its own costs associated with any further delays for its portion that 

could occur. Project officials indicated that the schedule slip increased NASA’s cost by $10.7 million. They 

also noted that this cost increase does not include increased launch vehicle costs because of the delay or 

Delta-II launch site maintenance costs at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Project Offi ce Comments

The Aquarius project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. Project officials also commented that Aquarius had changes to its baseline due to slips by 

its development partner, the CONAE, and that they believe the NASA contribution to this mission is on 

schedule for completion in March 2009. They added that the benefit of the international partnership, plus 

the groundbreaking information about the Earth’s climate, out weigh the additional costs, which NASA 

has chosen to absorb within its budget. Project officials said that NASA will continue to closely monitor 

progress and work with its development partner to minimize impacts.

Aquarius
 Page 19 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: CLV

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

Source: Ares Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest

 (Jan. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* $17,000 to $20,000

*This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation 

and there is still uncertainty in the value as design options 

are explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning 

purposes. This estimate is for the Ares I vehicle only.

_______________________________________________

Launch Schedule 3/2015

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Marshall Space Flight Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Alliant Techsystems, Pratt and Whitney, 

Rocketdyne, Boeing

Projected Launch Date: March 2015

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla. 

Launch Vehicle: Ares I

Mission Duration: N/A

Formulation

Formulation

start

(9/05)

Critical Design 

Review

(3/10)

Preliminary 

Design Review

(9/08)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(3/15)

Implementation

Project Status

Contract costs for the development the Ares I increased 

by $304 million since initial award and the first manned 

launch has slipped from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 

2015. The Ares I had planned to begin developmental 

flight testing in April 2009. However, delays to the 

planned Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission have 

impacted the project’s ability to modify the launch pad 

needed to support planned testing, resulting in at least 

a 3-month delay to the first Ares I developmental flight 

test.

NASA’s Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, as part of the 

Constellation Program, is the next generation human 

spacecraft that will carry the Orion Crew Exploration 

Vehicle into low Earth orbit. The mission of the Ares 

I project is to deliver a safe, reliable, and affordable 

launch system for space exploration. Ares I will 

feature a 24.5-metric ton lift capability to carry 

crew to the Moon or deliver crew and cargo to the 

International Space Station.

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
 Page 20 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: CLV

Detailed Project Discussion

Because of the use of heritage systems and technology in system designs, Ares I project officials said they 

did not identify any critical technologies. However, we found that all three major elements of the Ares I 

system—the first stage, upper stage, and upper stage engine—face significant development challenges. 

The first stage draws heavily from existing Space Shuttle systems, but requires modifications such as 

incorporating a fifth segment that is likely to affect flight characteristics. In addition, modeling indicates 

that thrust oscillation within the first stage could cause unacceptable structural vibrations throughout the 

Ares I and Orion vehicles which could adversely affect crew safety if left unmitigated. NASA is considering 

solutions including incorporating tuned vibration absorbers into the Ares I first stage or adding a composite 

structure between the first and second stages. Thrust oscillation was again identified as a risk during the 

September 2008 preliminary design review, and the project has scheduled another review in the fall of 

2009 to fully incorporate design solutions. The upper stage design includes a shared bulkhead between the 

hydrogen and oxygen fuel tanks, even though experience from the Apollo program shows that common 

bulkheads are complex and difficult to manufacture. The J-2X upper stage engine represents a new engine 

development effort that is likely to encounter problems during development; NASA estimates that J-2X will 

require 29 rework cycles to address problems, which they state is less than the number experienced during 

the development of other rocket engines. 

NASA has not released official cost and schedule estimates to complete the Ares I program. NASA officials 

stated that these estimates will be made available when the project moves into implementation, or at the 

conclusion of the Constellation Program’s non-advocate review. However, the value of various development 

contracts for the Ares I have increased by $304 million since initial award, and the first manned launch has 

slipped from 2014 to 2015.

The project has already experienced schedule delays that they attribute to funding instability in fiscal years 

2007 and 2008 and launch pad availability. Constellation’s integrated risk management system also indicates 

there is a high risk that funding shortfalls could occur in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in 

planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Further, the delayed Hubble Space 

Telescope servicing mission has caused the first planned Ares I developmental flight test—Ares I-X—to slip 

at least 3 months from April 2009 to July 2009. Since the Hubble mission will have a back up Shuttle for crew 

rescue purposes, thus utilizing both launch pads, the Ares I project cannot modify launch pad 39B for its use 

until the Hubble servicing mission is complete. NASA continues to develop an integrated schedule based on 

how the Hubble mission will impact pad modifications for the Ares I-X mission, as well as joint scheduling 

of a mobile launch platform and space in the Vertical Assembly Building. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The Ares I project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe the project has made 

progress in maturing the Ares I design and associated elements, and that all planned reviews have been 

executed on a schedule that supports the initial operating capability commitment. They added that the 

project is responding to technical and programmatic challenges, and they feel that all major element 

contracts are in place and are performing to plan.

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
 Page 21 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Dawn

Source: NASA/JPL/McREL; Background: William K. Hartmann, UCLA (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Partners: Los Alamos National Laboratories, German 

Aerospace Center (DLR) with the Max Planck Institute for 

Aeronomy, Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI)

Major Contractors: Orbital Sciences Corporation

Launch Date: September 27, 2007

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 8 Years

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $460.4 $465.0 1.0%

Formulation Cost $99.3 $106.6 7.4%

Development Cost $273.7 $269.4 -1.6%

Operations Cost $87.3 $89.0 1.9%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 9/2007 9/2007 none

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(4/01)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Implementation

Preliminary Design

Review

(10/03)

Critical Design

Review

(6/04)

Launch Readiness

(9/07)

Project Status

Dawn launched on September 27, 2007. The spacecraft 

is scheduled to begin the survey of Vesta on August 18, 

2011 and then survey Ceres beginning February 18, 2015.

The Dawn mission is on a journey to the two largest 

asteroids in our solar system, Vesta and Ceres. 

Launched from Cape Canaveral in September 2007, 

the Dawn spacecraft will encounter and orbit Vesta 

4 years later, then travel an additional three years 

to reach and orbit Ceres. The Dawn spacecraft will 

use solar-electric (ion) propulsion to reach and 

orbit Vesta for 7 months and Ceres for 5 months 

while performing scientific investigations at various 

altitudes and lighting conditions. Dawn will use 

imaging, spectroscopy, and gravity measurements 

to characterize the two asteroids---measuring their 

mass, gravity fields, principal axes, rotational axes, 

and moments of inertia.

Dawn
 Page 22 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Dawn

Detailed Project Discussion

The Dawn project has been beset with funding issues. The project was approved for early formulation in 

January 2001, but was delayed nine months as NASA did not have the funds to proceed. Budget issues also 

caused a delay in the project as it moved through the formulation phase. The mission objectives were then 

modified to a baseline mission to Vesta with travel to Ceres as an extended mission. During the project’s 

second confirmation review, NASA added the travel to Ceres as a primary mission objective. The project 

was also told to increase reserves to 25 percent to comply with JPL design principles which, according to 

project officials, were not written when the Dawn project was first proposed, causing the project to be descoped and under-funded at the beginning of implementation. Project management expended $25 million in 

project reserves in the first year of implementation attempting to meet a June 2006 launch date, but the use 

of reserves was not conveyed to the mission directorate. In the subsequent year, the project experienced 

significant cost overruns. The project stopped development activities between October 2005 and January 

2006 during a review by an Independent Assessment Team (IAT). The IAT reported technical issues with 

the project, recommended management changes, and stated a need for an additional $57 million and a 12 

to 18 month extension to complete implementation. According to project officials, NASA’s Science Mission 

Directorate terminated the project in February 2006, but it was reinstated on appeal and resulted in a launch 

readiness date slip to June 2007. Ultimately, this one year launch delay cost the project an additional $54 

million. 

JPL indicated that contractor performance led to several problems during Dawn’s development, generally 

stemming from a lack of technical and corporate experience on the part of the prime contractor with regard 

to complex space systems, such as the ion propulsion system which contractor officials agreed was new to 

them. The IAT noted that JPL did not provide enough oversight of its contractor, which had no system-level 

planetary project implementation experience, to assure hardware delivery schedules would be met and 

software development activities could be accomplished on time and within budget. Project officials told us 

that other sub-contractors on the project also experienced development and testing issues. For example, 

a sub-contractor working on development of the ion propulsion system encountered problems that led to 

deficient workmanship and component failures, while another subcontractor had issues with development 

of the xenon tank for the ion propulsion system; both the flight tank and spare failed testing. As a result 

of these issues and other system level implementation issues, the project experienced cost overruns and 

the overall launch readiness date for the system slipped 15 months. Subsequently, the prime contractor 

suggested forfeiting part of their contract award fees to keep the project on cost and its mission intact, and 

NASA agreed.

The initial project proposal for Dawn assumed a high level of heritage technology for the ion propulsion 

system from the Deep Space One mission. According to project officials, inheritance reviews were 

conducted early in the life cycle for Dawn and the design was generally correct. A study performed during 

formulation should have derived that the cost and schedule assumptions of using heritage technology were 

not valid, but officials told us the study was not accurate. Problems with the heritage technology, however, 

were discovered in implementation, resulting in significant cost growth. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The Dawn project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials said that NASA agrees that there were funding issues but 

points out that they were initially externally driven, which necessitated changes to project scope during 

the project life cycle and resulted in the prime contractor giving up their fee prior to confirmation. Project 

officials also agreed that there were technical challenges faced by both prime and by some sub-contractors, 

some of which were due to a higher expectation of heritage hardware than was actually the case.

Dawn
 Page 23 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: GLAST

Source: Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, Fl IMG RSC-08PD-1637.

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

Partners: U.S. Department of Energy, France, Germany, 

Japan, Italy and Sweden

Major Contractors: Stanford University, General Dynamics

Launch Date: June 11, 2008

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla. 

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $723.3 $774.5 7.1%

Formulation Cost $97.4 $98.7 1.3%

Development Cost $403.3 $423.0 4.9%

Operations Cost $222.5 $252.8 13.6%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 9/2007 6/2008 9 months

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(7/99)

Preliminary

Design Review

(6/03)

Critical Design

Review 

(9/04)

Launch Readiness

 (5/08)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Project Status

GLAST successfully launched into low Earth orbit on 

June 11, 2008.

The Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope 

(GLAST) seeks to improve understanding of the 

structure of the universe. By measuring the direction, 

energy, and arrival time of celestial high-energy 

gamma rays, GLAST will map the sky with 50 

times the sensitivity of previous missions. GLAST’s 

scientific payload includes two instruments: the 

Large Area Telescope (LAT) and the Gammaray Burst Monitor (GBM). The mission has four 

objectives: (1) understanding the mechanisms of 

particle acceleration in astrophysical environments; 

(2) determining the high-energy behavior of gammaray bursts; (3) resolving and identifying point sources 

with known objects; and (4) probing dark matter 

and the extra galactic background light in the early 

universe.

Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST)
 Page 24 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: GLAST

Detailed Project Discussion

 Prior to launch in June 2008, the GLAST project experienced several schedule delays because of conflicts 

over test facilities, launch pad time, and engineering issues. These delays resulted in NASA’s reporting to 

the Congress that the GLAST project exceeded its schedule baseline by 8 months. Project officials told us 

that the spacecraft vendor gave priority to Department of Defense projects for thermal vacuum testing at 

its test facility. This action forced GLAST to be moved to the Naval Research Labs for testing. In order to 

accommodate GLAST, the alternate test facility required some minor modification. According to NASA 

officials, this resulted in a 3-month delay. A busy launch schedule at Cape Canaveral then made it difficult 

for GLAST to re-schedule its launch date, contributing to the remainder of the project’s overall schedule slip. 

Project officials said schedule slippage can also be attributed to heritage technology engineering problems. 

At the project’s preliminary design review, GLAST had matured its one critical technology, while the rest 

were considered heritage technologies. The project considers the Large Area Telescope (LAT) a new 

instrument, though it is made up of several heritage technologies. According to a project official, the LAT 

has experienced both engineering design and electrical parts problems that resulted in schedule delays and 

the need for additional funding. Likewise, officials told us that a component of GLAST’s command and datahandling system also features a new combination of heritage technology. Because of software and hardware 

problems, project officials said that the prime contractor had to bring this work, which had been outsourced 

to a sub-contractor, back in-house. 

The project also identified partner issues that contributed to an increase in project cost. According to 

project officials, France initially was responsible for significant instrument integration work; however, the 

French were unable to complete that work and, as a result, the project office transferred it to the Naval 

Research Laboratory. This transfer increased costs by about $5 million. In addition, officials said that Italy 

originally was supposed to supply the GLAST ground station with X-band communications. However, 

in 2003, Italian officials informed the project they could not keep this commitment. The antenna on the 

GLAST spacecraft now uses Ku-band communications instead. Italy also used an inexperienced contractor 

to produce GLAST’s tracking towers, a situation that resulted in contamination problems. Project officials 

stated that these partner issues combined to increase the cost of the GLAST project and contributed to the 

$45 million increase. 

The GLAST project’s design was not stable at critical design review as the project had released only 76 

percent of its drawings and experienced a 31 percent growth in the number of drawings after the critical 

design review. Project officials attributed the growth to the withdrawal of the French partners, the change to 

a Ku-band transmitter and ground system, and the change in facility for producing the solar arrays. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The GLAST project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe the principal project 

challenge was the loss of development partners, and that the eight month launch slip was caused by 

contractor performance and launch vehicle development issues. They did not consider design stability or the 

complexity of heritage technology as issues for this project.

Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST)
 Page 25 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Glory

Source: Glory Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Design Stability

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, 

University of Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric and 

Space Physics, Orbital Sciences Corporation

Projected Launch Date: June 2009

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Taurus XL 

Mission Duration: 3 years (5 year goal)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $266.1 $347.9 30.7%

Formulation Cost $70.8 $70.5 -0.4%

Development Cost $168.9 $259.1 53.4%

Operations Cost $26.4 $18.3 -30.7%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 12/2008 6/2009 6 months

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(9/05)

Preliminary

Design Review

(9/05)

Critical Design

Review 

(7/06)

Launch Readiness

Date

(06/09)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Project Status

The Glory project reported to the Congress that it 

exceeded its development cost threshold by 31 percent 

from its baseline, requiring the Congress to reauthorize 

Glory. The project is waiting for delivery of the APS, 

which is now projected for February 2009. The delivery 

of this instrument is over one year behind schedule. The 

launch date for Glory, originally scheduled for June 2008, 

is now scheduled for June 2009. The launch delay may 

require the project to report to the Congress that it will 

also exceed its development schedule baseline.

The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that 

will contribute to the U.S. Climate Change Science 

Program. The satellite has two principal science 

objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of 

aerosols and black carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere 

and climate systems and (2) collect data on solar 

irradiance. The satellite has two main instruments-

--the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the 

Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)---as well as two 

cloud cameras. The TIM will allow NASA to have 

uninterrupted solar irradiance data by bridging the 

gap between NASA’s Solar Radiation and Climate 

Experiment and the National Polar Orbiting 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) missions.

Glory
 Page 26 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Glory

Detailed Project Discussion

The Glory project has experienced significant delays because of late delivery of the Aerosol Polarimetry 

Sensor (APS), which is based on heritage technology. At its preliminary design review in September 2005, 

the Glory project had one immature technology: the APS. At that review, the project estimated that the 

APS would be delivered by September 2007. According to the APS contractor, the instrument is now 

forecasted for delivery in February 2009---over one year behind schedule. The project identified contractor 

performance as the top risk facing the mission. Despite the contractor’s performance, NASA has kept work 

on the APS with the company because the project believes it is more cost effective than starting a new inhouse development project of this instrument. NASA estimated that an in-house development effort would 

cost an additional $78 million and delay launch until February 2010. Glory project officials stated that the 

APS development problems do not stem from technical issues, but from the contractor’s inability to plan 

and execute the work. The officials outlined several causes for the project’s issues with the contractor, 

including the company consolidating its workforce and a resulting loss of APS corporate design knowledge. 

Contractor officials told us that along with moving the APS development effort from one facility to another, 

they made the decision to finish building the instrument with the new team rather than doing a complete 

design analysis. They said this led directly to cost and schedule increases as they had to perform more 

testing concurrent with the development of the instrument.

At the critical design review, the project’s design was not stable as it had released only 70 percent of its 

drawings. As of GAO’s review, 99 percent of total drawings have been released. However, Glory’s drawing 

count increased by 27 percent after the critical design review. This increase is attributed to the modification 

of drawings for heritage parts for Glory’s unique configuration. 

Since Glory was baselined in fiscal year 2008, the project’s development costs have increased by 31 percent. 

As a result, NASA has reported to the Congress that Glory has exceeded its development cost threshold, 

requiring the Congress to reauthorize the project. Uncertainty in the project prior to its mission confirmation 

in 2005 delayed the launch readiness date from June 2008 to December 2008. More recently, the project’s 

scheduled launch date has slipped from December 2008 to June 2009, which could cause the project to 

also have to report the slip to the Congress. According to project officials, Glory’s recent cost and schedule 

issues are driven solely by the late delivery of the APS. The project has taken several steps to mitigate the 

cost increases caused by the delayed delivery of the APS and to improve the contractor’s performance. The 

project has eliminated requirements, simplified the instrument design, provided NASA engineering and 

management resources to the contractor, and involved both NASA and contractor executives in addressing 

the problems. According to contractor officials, the company has used its award fee to cover the costs on 

this project. The company has also provided its own funding to help off-set cost overruns. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. Project officials also commented that since filing the threshold report, NASA has continued 

to pursue the baseline plan for the Glory implementation. They added that performance at the APS 

instrument supplier continues to be slow, but the instrument technical performance evaluated at each major 

developmental gate has been excellent. In addition, they believe the engineering design and the technical 

performance of the APS instrument have never been issues, and the programmatic issues have all been 

connected with the supplier’s manufacturing and management.

Glory
 Page 27 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: GPM

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(7/02)

Preliminary

Design Review

(11/08)

Critical Design

Review 

(11/09)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Core

Spacecraft 

(7/13)

Launch

constellation

Spacecraft

(11/14)

Source: GPM Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ None Currently Identifi ed

Project Essentials

NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: Janpanese Aerospace Exploration 

Agency (JAXA)

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace

Projected Launch Date: July 2013

Launch Location: Tanegashima Island, Japan

Launch Vehicle: H-IIA (Japan)

Mission Duration: 3 years (5 years consumables)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest

 (Jan. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* not provided

*NASA suggested it will provide baseline estimates for 

this project when it proceeds from formulation into 

implementation.

_____________________________________________

Launch Schedule 7/2013

Project Status

GPM is in the formulation phase and is expected to enter 

implementation after its mission confirmation review 

in the spring of 2009. Recent project budget changes 

show reductions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. These 

reductions caused a project re-plan and delayed the 

scheduled development of the second GMI instrument 

by 1 year and delayed the launch of the Low-Inclination 

observatory by 5 months. The re-plan schedules a 

July 2013 launch of the core spacecraft at the latest as 

requested by JAXA.

The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) 

mission, a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace 

Exploration Agency (JAXA) project, seeks to improve 

the scientific understanding of the global water cycle 

and the accuracy of precipitation forecasts. The 

GPM is composed of a core spacecraft carrying two 

main instruments: a Dual-frequency Precipitation 

Radar (DPR) and a GPM Microwave Imager (GMI). In 

addition, the GPM project includes a second LowInclination spacecraft with a second GMI instrument. 

The GPM builds on the work of the Tropical Rainfall 

Measuring Mission, and will provide the first 

opportunity to calibrate measurements of global 

precipitation.

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission
 Page 28 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: GPM

Detailed Project Discussion

The GPM spacecraft and its components are being designed to be demiseable---they will burn up during 

re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere to limit orbital debris---which poses a challenge for the project in the 

integration of the propellant management device with the craft’s aluminum composite propulsion tanks. 

Neither the propellant management device nor the aluminum composite tanks are new technologies, but the 

integration of the two is the challenge. Currently, the integration of the propellant management device and 

the aluminum composite tank is not expected to be mature until after the preliminary design review. If the 

project is unable to sufficiently mature this technology, it will use a titanium propellant management device 

and/or tank that is less demiseable.

The GPM project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability based on our 

metric. The project currently has released 17 percent of its engineering drawings, but expects to have 

released only 70 percent of drawings at the critical design review. According to project officials, the two 

main instruments—the JAXA-supplied Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar (DPR) and the NASA-supplied 

GPM Microwave Imager (GMI)—are based on heritage technology and therefore are not considered critical 

technologies. However, the DPR and GMI will have to be adapted to the GPM spacecraft design for this 

mission. In addition, the DPR instrument includes a Ka-band radar that the project identified as a new 

design. 

Project officials told us that JAXA has been frustrated by NASA’s uncertainty over funding the GPM project 

and questioned NASA’s commitment to the project. According to a March 2008 report from NASA’s Inspector 

General, budget reductions to the GPM project in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 led to a 2-year delay in 

the contract for the development and delivery of the GMI. These reductions caused the launch of the core 

spacecraft to be delayed from 2007 to 2013 and the cost estimate to rise from $600 million to over $1 billion. 

In early 2008, NASA signed a launch vehicle agreement with JAXA. Subsequently, the preliminary design and 

critical design reviews were scheduled for the project.

The project’s budget was recently reduced for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Following these cuts, NASA 

directed the project to re-plan with two constraints: 1) maintain the core spacecraft launch date of June 

2013 but let the Low-Inclination spacecraft slip as necessary and, 2) accept increased programmatic risk 

from low contingency funds in fiscal year 2009. The re-plan presented maintains the core spacecraft to a July 

2013 launch date requested by JAXA, but the start of work on the second GMI instrument is delayed by one 

year and the launch of the Constellation observatory is delayed by 5 months. As a result of the reduction 

in funding levels, NASA considers fiscal year 2009 as a high-risk year for the project since it now has low 

contingency reserves of approximately 5 percent. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. Project officials said that following the numerous mission delays that drove the launch date 

from 2008 to the current July 2013, the sustained funding increases the GPM project has received since the 

fiscal year 2008 budget has enabled steady progress towards mission confirmation and implementation in 

fiscal year 2009. They added that JAXA has been satisfied with this progress, including the formal agreement 

concluded in early 2008 between NASA and JAXA on the use of the H-IIA launch vehicle to launch the 

Core Observatory. Project officials believe they will have a stable design since they plan to have necessary 

hardware manufacturing drawings released by the critical design review.

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission
 Page 29 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Herschel

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(1998)

Preliminary

Design Review

(7/00)

Critical Design

Review 

(7/01)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch

Readiness

(04/09)

Source: ESA/AOES Medialab (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Design Stability

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

International Partner: European Space Agency (ESA)

Major Contractors: in-house development

Projected Launch Date: April 2009

Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana

Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied)

Mission Duration: 3 years (5 year goal)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $325.4 $276.8 -14.9%

Formulation Cost $10.4 $10.4 0.0%

Development Cost $117.0 $131.7 12.6%

Operations Cost $198.0 $134.7 -32.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 8/2007 4/2009 20 months

Project Status

Since Herschel’s baseline was established in 2007, 

ESA slipped the Herschel launch schedule three 

times because of scope changes and challenges with 

integration of the instruments onto the spacecraft. A 

recent slip resulted in a project cost increase of $43 

million and required NASA to report to the Congress that 

it exceeded its schedule baseline. The project is currently 

behind schedule by about 50 days, a delay that has 

caused a fourth launch date slip from its current October 

2008 date to April 2009.

The Herschel Space observatory, a collaborative 

project between NASA and the European Space 

Agency (ESA), will seek to discover how the first 

galaxies formed and how they evolved to give rise 

to present day galaxies like our own. Herschel has 

the largest mirror ever built for a space telescope. At 

3.5 meters in diameter, the mirror will collect longwavelength radiation from some of the coldest and 

most distant objects in the Universe. It will be able 

to observe dust-obscured and cold objects that are 

invisible to other telescopes. Additional targets for 

Herschel will include clouds of gas and dust where 

new stars are being born, disks out of which planets 

may form, and cometary atmospheres packed with 

complex organic molecules.

Herschel
 Page 30 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Herschel

Detailed Project Discussion

NASA has completed the development of components for two Herschel instruments---the Heterodyne 

Instrument for the Far Infrared (HIFI) and the Spectral and Photometric Imaging Receiver (SPIRE) 

instrument---and delivered them to ESA. However, during both the preliminary and critical design reviews, 

some of the critical technologies for these elements were considered immature. At the preliminary design 

review (PDR) for HIFI, five of the eight critical technologies were immature. Later, at critical design review 

(CDR), two of the eight HIFI critical technologies were still assessed as immature. SPIRE had a similar 

record. At SPIRE’s PDR, three of the five critical technologies were assessed as being immature. Two 

years later at CDR, two of five SPIRE critical technologies were still assessed as immature. Regardless of 

this, the project proceeded. After delivery of NASA’s components, problems were found during testing of 

the equipment in Europe. According to the project office, the HIFI failed in thermal cycling during testing 

and SPIRE had problems with the wiring that connects its detectors. The technical issues with the two 

instruments cost $3.9 million to resolve.

In addition to technology maturity issues, NASA committed to developing components for the HIFI and 

SPIRE instruments before achieving design stability for the instruments. At the CDR for both the HIFI and 

SPIRE instruments, NASA had released less than 10 percent of the engineering design drawings. According 

to the project office, this was primarily due to the fact that ESA’s interface drawings were in preliminary 

format. The office also said that the lack of timeliness in the submission of design drawings is a challenge 

when the project has to depend on multiple partners for input.

Herschel’s $43 million growth in life cycle costs can be largely attributed to technical integration problems, 

which resulted in launch delays. Those delays are also the primary cause of overall schedule slippage. ESA’s 

contractor could not complete development of its instruments or integrate Herschel instruments in a timely 

manner, prompting ESA to pull the integration work in-house. While NASA faced some technical problems 

with development of components for the HIFI and SPIRE instruments, resulting in about $3.9 million of 

cost growth, project officials said the remaining increase of about $39 million is due to the three slips in 

Herschel’s launch date since the project’s baseline was established in February 2007 since the project must 

maintain a workforce to support testing and integration activities. Based on the 14-month delay in launch 

date, NASA reported to the Congress in February 2008 that the Herschel project has exceeded its schedule 

baseline. Herschel’s launch schedule has now slipped even further. The project office stated that Herschel is 

currently behind schedule by about 50 days, which caused the launch date to slip from its current October 

2008 date to early in calendar year 2009. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The Herschel project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that although NASA did have some technical 

issues with their hardware contributions which did cause an increase to the NASA cost in order to correct 

the problems, the majority of the cost increase to NASA has been due to technical problems on the 

European side which have caused the launch to slip several times in the last several years.

Herschel
 Page 31 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: JWST

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(3/99)

Preliminary

Design Review

(3/08)

Critical Design

Review 

(7/09)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch

Readiness Date

(6/13)

Source: JWST Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ None Currently Identifi ed

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: European Space Agency (ESA), 

Canadian Space Agency (CSA)

Major Contractors: Northrop Grumman

Projected Launch Date: June 2013

Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana

Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied)

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest* (Jan. 2009)

Total Project Cost Not provided

Formulation Cost Not provided

Development Cost Not provided

Operations Cost Not provided

*NASA suggested it will supply the baseline estimates 

for this project when it provides them to Congress in the 

FY10 Budget Request. 

_____________________________________________

Launch Schedule 6/2013

Project Status

The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after 

a $1 billion cost increase—$3.5 billion to $4.5 billion—

and a 2-year schedule delay on the project. A major risk 

that continued to affect the project following this replan was the low level and late phasing of contingency 

funding budgeted, despite 12 percent of the $1 billion 

cost growth being used to increase such funding. 

Although JWST passed its preliminary design review, 

the project still has to address several issues related to 

testing.

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large, 

infrared-optimized space telescope that is designed 

to find the first galaxies that formed in the early 

universe. The focus of scientific study will include 

first light, assembly of galaxies, origins of stars 

and planetary systems, and origins of the elements 

necessary for life. JWST's instruments will be 

designed to work primarily in the infrared range of 

the electromagnetic spectrum, with some capability 

in the visible range. JWST will have a large mirror, 

6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a sunshield the 

size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade 

will not fit onto the rocket fully open, so both will 

fold up and open once JWST is in outer space. JWST 

will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million kilometers 

(1 million miles) from the Earth.

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)
 Page 32 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: JWST

Detailed Project Discussion

The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion cost increase and a 2-year schedule 

delay on the project. About half of the cost growth was because of a 1-year schedule slip, resulting from a 

delayed decision to use an ESA-supplied Ariane 5 launch vehicle and an additional 10-month slip caused by 

budget profile limitations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Changes in requirements and a 12 percent increase 

in the program’s contingency funding accounted for the remainder of the growth. Despite this increase in 

contingency funding (i.e., reserves), the level and phasing of contingency funding budgeted for the project 

continues to be a major risk. An independent review team expressed concern over the contingency funding, 

stating that it is too low and phased in too late. Further, it stated that a contingency fund of 25 percent to 30 

percent would be appropriate for a project through implementation. Goddard Space Flight Center policies 

also require reserves of 25 percent through Phase D, Implementation. NASA directed its Science Mission 

Directorate to address the JWST reserves issue at the project’s confirmation reviews in the summer of 2008. 

The project budgeted for 5 years of operation for JWST, instead of 10 years of mission operations, which, 

according to the JWST Deputy Associate Director, saved the project approximately $300 million. 

Prior to the re-plan in fiscal year 2006, the JWST project was set to proceed into development with 

immature technologies. Because of substantial cost growth on the project and as part of the 2006 re-plan, 

NASA decided to invest additional time and resources in maturing JWST’s critical technologies prior to 

the preliminary design review. JWST held a technology non advocate review in January 2007 to assess the 

maturity of its ten critical technologies. At that time, all but one of the critical technologies was assessed 

as mature, the remaining critical technology—the cryocooler—has since been matured. Maturing critical 

technologies on the project prior to entering implementation was a significant step to reducing risk. The 

JWST project office also had 53 percent of its design drawings released at its preliminary design review in 

March 2008 and anticipates that it will have 94 percent of its design drawings released by the critical design 

review in June 2009. 

Although JWST passed its preliminary design review, the project still has to address several issues related to 

testing. One concern is that the project plans to do only one test at the highest level of assembly possible in 

the cryogenic vacuum chamber at the Johnson Space Center. The review panel advised JWST to add another 

test cycle to its schedule. Further, the board recommended the addition of a center of curvature test on the 

Optical Telescope Element and was also concerned that the project was not planning to test the sunshield at 

the highest level of assembly in the cryogenic vacuum chamber. The project is still working through how to 

address such testing issues. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The JWST project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. Project officials said they generally agree with the assessment as presented. Project officials 

commented that the specific concern expressed by the review team was that the project's baseline plan 

only included one cryogenic thermal vacuum test opportunity at the integrated level of assembly, but the 

officials added that the specific tests that will be conducted during that one cryogenic thermal vacuum test 

opportunity are numerous and comprehensive. Project officials said to address the review team’s concern in 

this regard, the project has accounted for the cost of the additional cryogenic testing, should it eventually be 

required.

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)
 Page 33 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Kepler

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(12/01)

Preliminary

Design Review

(10/04)

Critical Design

Review 

(10/06)

Implementation

GAO Review 

(12/08)

Launch

Readiness 

(2/09)

Source: Ball Aerospace.

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp.

Projected Launch Date: March 2009

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 3.5 years

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $497.5 $594.8 19.6%

Formulation Cost $138.1 $141.2 2.2%

Development Cost $312.8 $390.3 24.8%

Operations Cost $46.6 $63.3 35.8%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 6/2008 3/2009 9 months

Project Status

Since being baselined in fiscal year 2007, NASA has 

reported to the Congress that both Kepler’s development 

costs and schedule have exceeded the baseline. During 

that time, Kepler’s development costs have increased by 

about $78 million---or 25 percent---and its schedule has 

increased by 9 months, despite a reliance on heritage 

technologies. Kepler project officials attribute the 

cost and schedule growth to contractor performance 

problems, cost overruns, and the disruption caused by a 

$35-million budget reduction in fiscal year 2005.

The Kepler mission has been designed to discover 

Earth-like planets in orbit around stars in our galaxy. 

The goal is to detect tens or even hundreds of Earthsize planets in the habitable zones of stars similar 

to our own sun. The habitable zone is the region 

around a star where the temperature of a terrestrialtype planet can be expected to allow water to 

exist in liquid form on the planet's surface, thereby 

increasing the probability of life. Kepler will explore 

the structure and diversity of planetary systems by 

conducting a census of extra-solar terrestrial planets 

using a photometer in heliocentric orbit to observe 

the dimming of starlight caused by planetary transits.

Kepler
 Page 34 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Kepler

Detailed Project Discussion

None of Kepler’s technologies were identified as critical by the project management office because all of 

Kepler’s technologies have flown on other missions and are therefore considered heritage. However, the 

project office acknowledged that the customization of some of Kepler’s instruments, and the reliance on 

heritage technology has proven to be a challenge to Kepler’s development. Project officials told us that 

Kepler’s large photometry array added to the complexity of the project because photometers of Kepler’s 

sensitivity have not flown before and proved more difficult to adapt than anticipated; an adaptation that 

contributed to cost growth. Officials added that the Kepler photometer requires a low noise level in its 

signal chain in order to detect changes in the brightness of stars. This made developing the electronics for 

the focal plane array a challenge. The focal plane array is the largest ever flown in space and has stringent 

requirements. Coupled with the high density of elements and electrical and thermal attachments, this makes 

the assembly and tests of this element a key challenge for the project.

We were unable to determine if Kepler’s design was stable at its critical design review. According to the 

project office, the prime contractor, Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, implemented a new 

drawing management system called Agile, and the project did not have any way to recover the forecast 

drawings count at the critical design phase in October 2006. However, the project reports that 96 percent of 

its engineering design drawings have been released to the manufacturer.

Kepler’s total cost and overall schedule have increased significantly. Since being baselined in fiscal year 

2007, Kepler’s development costs have increased by about $78 million—or 25 percent—and its schedule 

has increased by nine months. NASA has reported to the Congress that both Kepler’s development costs 

and schedule have exceeded the baseline. The project office attributes the cost and schedule growth to 

contractor performance problems, which occurred because the prime contractor was unable to execute 

the project planned activities within the cost and schedule they proposed, despite a reliance on heritage 

technology. Contractor officials agreed that they underestimated the complexity and the effort required 

to modify the existing these technologies. Both the Kepler project manager and contractor officials also 

believe that a $35 million funding cut in the program because of funding constraints in fiscal year 2005 was a 

significant contributor of the project’s delays. This funding instability, according to a NASA project official, 

contributed to an overall 20-month delay in the project’s schedule and about $169 million in cost growth. 

Both the project office and the prime contractor made changes to ensure that the project remained 

executable with sufficient reserves. The project office shortened the operations period by 6 months and 

accepted additional project risk when it cancelled or de-scoped several tests. For example, the flight 

segment vibration test was reduced to an acoustic test, and the vibration tests of the solar panel were 

removed. Additionally, the prime contractor put new management personnel in place and according to 

contractor officials, agreed to commit $7 million of its projected award fee to a cost performance incentive 

that may allow the contractor to earn the fee later in the project’s life cycle.

Project Offi ce Comments

The Kepler project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that Kepler instrument uses existing 

technology components in a new and complex instrument design, and that the contractor underestimated 

the complexity and effort required to develop the instrument system and subsystems. They added that 

after the 2006 re-baselining of the project, the contractor continued to have problems with the instrument 

development resulting in additional cost and schedule overruns. They said the project was able to absorb 

this cost increase by de-scoping elements of the program, delaying the guest observer science program and 

reducing the mission duration by 6 months.

Kepler
 Page 35 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: LDCM

Source: General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (artist depiction).

Project Essentials

NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center 

Partner: U.S. Geological Service (USGS)

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies 

Corp., General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, 

The Hammers Company

Projected Launch Date: December 2012

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 years propellant)

Project Challenges

➢ None Currently Identifi ed

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest*

 (Jan. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* $730 to $800

*This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation 

and there is still uncertainty in the value as design options, 

are explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning 

purposes.

____________________________________________

Launch Schedule 12/2012

Formulation

Formulation

 Start

(10/03)

Preliminary

Design Review

(11/08)

Critical Design

Review 

(8/09)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch

Readiness Date

(12/12)

Project Status

The LDCM project shifted its estimated launch date 

from July 2011 to December 2012 after it completed 

its Initial Mission Confirmation Review in September 

2008. The LDCM project is on an aggressive 39-month 

development schedule for the main instrument. The 

LDCM instrument payload consists of a single science 

instrument, the Operational Land Imager (OLI); however, 

NASA is considering the addition of another science 

instrument—a decision that could exacerbate the already 

aggressive schedule and add cost.

The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), a 

partnership between NASA and the U.S. Geological 

Service (USGS), seeks to extend the ability to detect 

and quantitatively characterize changes on the global 

land surface at a scale where natural and man-made 

causes of change can be detected and differentiated. 

It is the successor mission to Landsat 7. The Landsat 

data series, begun in 1972, is the longest continuous 

record of changes in the Earth’s surface as seen from 

space. Landsat data is a unique resource for people 

who work in agriculture, geology, forestry, regional 

planning, education, mapping, and global change 

research.

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
 Page 36 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: LDCM

Detailed Project Discussion

The LDCM instrument payload consists of a single science instrument—the Operational Land Imager (OLI). 

The project considered the addition of two other science instruments—the Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) 

and the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS). The project has decided not to add TSIS, but will continue 

studying whether TIRS will be included. The project hopes to receive funding for completion of the TIRS 

instrument in spring 2009. The spacecraft is being designed to accommodate TIRS and both the spacecraft 

and OLI developers are studying the impacts of adding TIRS. According to a project official, Goddard Space 

Flight Center would develop and build TIRS in-house, a process that would take approximately 48 months. 

If TIRS is added to the LDCM mission, however, it could delay launch by over a year and, according to a 

project official, cost about $5 million for the redesign of the spacecraft to accommodate the instrument. This 

design cost does not include the cost of integrating the instrument onto the spacecraft. Project officials have 

indicated that LDCM has already undertaken an aggressive 39-month OLI development schedule. According 

to the contractor for the OLI instrument, this aggressive schedule was necessary because of delays in the 

procurement process. The LDCM project delayed its estimated launch date from July 2011 to December 2012 

after it completed its Initial Mission Confirmation Review in September 2008. While a launch after January 

2012 could jeopardize the continuity of Landsat data, project officials said recent reliability analyses show 

that the Landsat 7 satellite may be operational until 2017, lessening the likelihood of a data gap.

The project office has identified four critical technologies for the OLI instrument. Three of the four critical 

technologies—the wide field of view optics, linear arrays, and modular sensor chip assemblies—are 

considered fully mature as they have been fully validated by the Earth Observing Satellite (EO-1) mission 

through scene comparisons with Landsat 7. The sensor assembly chips for the OLI are considered mature 

since prototypes were included on the Advanced Land Imager that flew on EO-1. The project does not 

anticipate that there will be any additional critical technologies for the spacecraft because most of the 

technology used to build the spacecraft will be commercial off-the-shelf items that have flown on other 

missions.

Because LDCM has not yet reached its critical design review, we were unable to assess design stability 

of the project at this time. The project office anticipates having over 95 percent of the flight design and 

manufacturing drawings complete by the critical design review currently scheduled for August 2009. The 

spacecraft contract was awarded in April 2008, and the project office anticipates releasing the spacecraft 

drawings after design maturation. Formal cost and schedule baselines will be established for the project at 

the Mission Confirmation Review in 2009.

Project Offi ce Comments

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. The project office also commented that NASA and the OLI instrument vendor are making 

steady progress on the OLI instrument on the planned schedule. The project is developing detailed 

schedules now to ensure sufficient schedule reserve is applied to the critical hardware developments.

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
 Page 37 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: LRO

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(5/04)

Preliminary

Design Review

(2/06)

Critical Design

Review 

(11/06)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(4/09)

Source: LRO Project Office.

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

Partner: Boston University, University of California Los 

Angeles, Southwest Research Institute, Russian Institute for 

Space Research, Arizona State University, Naval Air Warfare 

Center

Prime Contractors: in-house development

Projected Launch Date: April 24, 2009

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 

Mission Duration: 1 year (then science mission)

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

 (FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $540.1 $540.1 0.0%

Formulation Cost $93.3 $94.8 1.6%

Development Cost $420.8 $422.4 0.4%

Operations Cost $25.8 $22.9 -11.2%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 10/2008 4/2009 6 months*

*Actual launch delay is currently 5 months and 25 days.

Project Status

LRO’s original schedule with a launch date by the 

end of 2008 placed the project on a challenging and 

aggressive development schedule. This schedule is 

driven by the need to provide data for the Orion and Ares 

I hardware designs and mission planning efforts for a 

human lunar mission by 2020. The project experienced 

challenges modifying instruments for the moon’s thermal 

environment. These challenges, along with a decision by 

the launch authority to re-prioritize the LRO launch on its 

manifest, contributed to a launch slip to April 2009.

The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) is NASA’s 

first mission in the implementation of the Vision for 

Space Exploration, the plan to return to the moon 

and beyond. LRO’s mission is to orbit the moon for 

one year measuring lunar topography, resources, and 

thermal and radiation environments. This data will 

be used to select a landing site for future manned 

missions to the moon and to ensure astronaut 

safety. The LRO has a scientific payload of six main 

instruments and one technology demonstration 

instrument. LRO’s launch vehicle contains a 

secondary payload, the Lunar Crater Observation and 

Sensing Satellite (LCROSS), which will investigate 

lunar surface volatiles such as water.

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
 Page 38 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: LRO

Detailed Project Discussion

The project did not identify any critical technologies. Each of the project’s major instruments is based 

significantly on heritage technology. However, the project manager said the project had underestimated the 

difficulty of the modifications needed. For example, the project manager said the Lunar Reconnaissance 

Orbiter Cameras needed some technical work to adapt their designs for the lunar thermal environment as 

well as some redesign when areas needing reinforcement were found during testing. The Lunar Orbiter 

Laser Altimeter, while similar to laser altimeters that have flown on previous Mars and Mercury missions, 

had issues with the electronics that time the laser pulses of the altimeter, which, according to the project 

manager, took more time to resolve than originally expected. The Diviner Lunar Radiometer Experiment 

instrument is almost a copy of an instrument on Mars now, but experienced motor failures, which the 

project manager said took extra time and money to recover from. Finally, the Lyman-Alpha Mapping Project 

instrument, a copy of the Pluto Alice instrument, was slightly delayed because of a detector failure during 

thermal vacuum testing. According to the project manager, most instruments required additional design and 

analysis of their thermal control designs to operate reliably on the mission. Redesign was necessary because 

the lunar environment presents a harsher thermal environment than the environment faced by earth-orbiting 

missions. 

The project did not measure design stability by percentage of drawings completed at the critical design 

review (CDR), and therefore was not assessed according to this metric.

Project officials said NASA gave LRO more reserve funding because of the aggressive schedule on the 

project to compensate for schedule slippages. Most challenges faced by the project occurred prior to the 

confirmation review, so officials stated that the project will probably finish at about only 3 percent above the 

confirmation cost estimate. However, late delivery of instruments from project partners and a decision by 

the launch authority to slip the LRO launch date both contributed to the project’s launch date being delayed 

6 months from October 2008 to April 2009.

Project Offi ce Comments

The LRO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. Project officials also commented that the change in launch date from December 2008 to 

April 2009 was made to accommodate other launch priorities and as well as technical problems with the 

launch vehicle. Project officials noted that, while LRO’s schedule was aggressive, schedule reserve had been 

built in to accommodate late instrument deliveries and the project was on track for a December 2008 launch. 

They added that the additional time afforded by the new April 2009 launch date is being used by the project 

to perform additional testing and mission simulations.

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
 Page 39 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: MSL

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Design Stability

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Partners: U.S. Department of Energy, Centre Nationale 

d'Etude Spatiale (France), Russian Federal Space Agency, 

Centro de Astrobiologia (Spain), Canadian Space Agency

Major Contractors: none — in-house development

Projected Launch Date: October, 2011

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 1 year - travel, 2 years - operations

Source: Mars Science Laboratory (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $1642.2 $1899.6 15.7%

Formulation Cost $515.1 $515.5 0.1%

Development Cost $968.6 $1225.0 26.5%

Operations Cost $158.5 $159.1 0.4%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 9/2009 10/2011 25 months

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(11/03)

Preliminary

Design Review

(6/06)

Critical Design

Review 

(6/07)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(10/11)

Project Status

Since the project was baselined, MSL has experienced 

significant cost growth—over $200 million thus far, 

or more than a 26 percent increase in development 

costs—because of technological and engineering 

problems. While the project has overcome design and 

weight growth issues, it continues to face other technical 

challenges that contributed to MSL’s launch delay from 

October 2009 to October 2011. This launch delay will 

result in about $400 million in cost growth as the project 

works to resolve its remaining technical risks.

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) is part of 

the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). The MEP 

seeks to understand whether Mars was, is, or can 

be a habitable world. To answer this question the 

MSL project will investigate how geologic, climatic, 

and other processes have worked to shape Mars 

and its environment over time, as well as how they 

interact today. The MSL will continue this systematic 

exploration by placing a mobile science laboratory 

on the Mars surface to quantitatively assess a local 

site as a potential habitat for life, past or present. The 

MSL is considered one of NASA’s flagship projects 

and will be the most advanced rover ever sent to 

explore the surface of Mars.

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
 Page 40 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: MSL

Detailed Project Discussion

At the project’s preliminary design review, the project assessed all seven of critical technologies as immature 

resulting from late development challenges encountered. At the critical design review a year later, three 

of the seven critical technologies had been replaced by backup technologies with two of the seven still 

assessed as immature, including one of the replacement technologies. In addition, MSL’s design was never 

stabilized at the critical design review. Several design changes were required to address various issues. 

For example, the plumbing for the propulsion system was redesigned because it was determined that MSL 

needed larger, rigid lines for the system than were previously used on smaller Mars rovers. These thicker 

lines inadvertently became load-bearing components, which caused the project to redesign part of the 

structure to account for the loads and shift them to MSL’s primary structure. 

MSL has relied on several heritage technologies that have had to be re-designed, re-engineered, or replaced 

for use on the lab. For example, the heatshield made of a super light-weight ablator that had flown on 

previous missions was considered nearly ready at the critical design review, but it suffered a significant 

setback in testing and could not be proved for use on MSL. The project had to select a new and less mature 

technology—phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA). According to the MSL project office, the impact 

of this change was approximately $30 million in cost growth and a nine-month delay in delivery of the heat 

shield. 

Significant weight growth has occurred during MSL’s development brining the spacecraft to 90 percent of 

its mass threshold according to MSL project officials. For example, MSL’s project manager said that the 

project wanted to implement a dry lubrication scheme with lightweight titanium gears for the actuators, or 

motors that allow the lab to function autonomously. During fabrication, however, it was discovered that the 

lightweight titanium gears did not provide the durability needed for MSL, causing the project to revert to 

the heavier stainless steel gear system with wet lubricant used by prior projects. To keep the lubricant from 

freezing in Martian temperatures, the project also had to add heaters to the actuators, adding even more 

mass to the rover. 

The project cost has grown by over $200 million in the last year—more than a 26 percent increase in 

development costs—and will increase even more due to the launch delay from October 2009 to 2011. The 

project could not meet its original schedule due to difficulty in meeting delivery milestones for actuators, 

key avionics, and flight software while maintaining its full testing program. Since Mars launch windows are 

optimally aligned every 26 months, the project has to delay its planned launch to October 2011. As a result of 

the launch delay, project officials state that costs will likely grow by an estimated $400 million bringing the 

project’s life-cycle cost to $2.2 to $2.3 billion.

Project Offi ce Comments

The MSL project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. The project also commented that while most of the system development is on track, MSL 

cannot meet its October 2009 launch date due to a few critical elements that are lagging. Project officials 

said the MSL launch is now scheduled for the fall of 2011, which is the next opportunity for an optimally 

aligned Earth-Mars transit.

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
 Page 41 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: NPP

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Design Stability

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

Partner: National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration 

and U.S. Air Force

Major Contractors: Northrop Grumman Electrical Systems 

and Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp.

Projected Launch Date: June 2, 2010

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 5 years

Source: Ball Aerospace.

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $672.8 $794.6 18.1%

Formulation Cost $47.3 $47.0 -0.6%

Development Cost $593.0 $703.7 18.7%

Operations Cost $32.5 $43.9 35.1%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 4/2008 6/2010 26 months

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(11/98)

Preliminary

Design Review

(1/03)

Critical Design

Review 

(8/03)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(6/10)

Project Status

Due primarily to the late delivery of a key instrument 

being developed by project partners, the NPP project 

has experienced nearly $111 million in development cost 

growth and a 26-month delay in its launch readiness date 

since being baselined in fiscal year 2007. As a result, 

NASA has reported to the Congress that the NPP project 

has exceeded both its cost and schedule thresholds. 

The NPP project office is monitoring the risk of further 

instrument delivery delays.

The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint 

mission with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration and the U.S. Air Force. The 

satellite will measure ozone, atmospheric and sea 

surface temperatures, land and ocean biological 

productivity, and cloud and aerosol properties. 

The NPP mission has two objectives. First, NPP 

will provide a continuation of global observations 

following the Earth Observing System missions Terra 

and Aqua. Second, NPP will provide the National 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS) with risk-reduction demonstration 

and validation for the critical NPOESS sensors, 

algorithms, and ground data processing.

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
 Page 42 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: NPP

Detailed Project Discussion

The NPP project office identified six critical technologies for the project—the spacecraft and all five 

instruments. Five of the six critical technologies were assessed as immature at the preliminary and critical 

design reviews. The Clouds’ and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) instrument was the only 

mature technology, and according to project officials this instrument was only added back to the mission 

when it was determined that development of other instruments would cause a significant launch delay. Many 

of the spacecraft’s components and subsystems have flown on previous missions and are therefore mature. 

The NPP project office now considers all critical technologies to be mature. 

The project’s design was unstable at the critical design review (CDR). Two instruments being developed 

by the Integrated Program Office (IPO), which is composed of National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration and Department of Defense officials, are the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) and the 

Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). Both had to be redesigned because of failures that were 

detected during testing after the CDR. The project office said a 31 percent increase in new engineering 

drawings was largely attributed to the redesign of the VIIRS and CrIS stemming from testing failures. 

According to a project official, the CrIS structure development multiple fractures during testing and needed 

to be stripped to its components and rebuilt. The project official also said the VIIRS could not meet its 

science requirement of detecting ocean color because of the poor quality of its filters. The official indicated 

a problem exists with the system’s requirements and not the ability of the contractor to produce the correct 

filters. An official for the contractor building the VIIRS instrument said the original requirement was 

unachievable and the filters will be improved for the second VIIRS instrument, which will be a part of the 

NPOESS mission. 

Since NPP was baselined in fiscal year 2007, the project’s development costs increased by about $111 

million, or almost 19 percent, and its schedule has increased by 26 months. As a result, NASA has reported 

to the Congress that the NPP project has exceeded both its cost and schedule thresholds. The project office 

attributes almost all of the cost and schedule changes to the late delivery of the VIIRS instrument by the 

project partners. The instrument is now scheduled to be delivered in April 2009. An official for the VIIRS 

instrument contractor cites the presence of multiple government customers and ongoing requirements 

changes as the reasons for the delay and increase in cost. Neither the IPO nor the NPOESS prime contractor, 

according to NASA’s NPP project manager, provided adequate oversight of the VIIRS contractor during the 

development of VIIRS. While there is no contractual relationship between NASA and the VIIRS contractor, 

project officials told us NASA now has two engineers at the prime contractor’s facility to oversee the design 

and development of the instrument. Additional delay in instrument delivery could result in observatory 

integration delays, cost increases, schedule slips, and possible gaps in data continuity. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The NPP project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. The project also commented that the NASA-developed instruments did not experience 

challenges with design stability, rather it was NASA’s partners’ instruments. They added that the VIIRS 

performance requirements have remained stable since the critical design review and the primary drivers 

of the schedule delay are issues found during fabrication and testing of the engineering and flight models. 

Project officials said the VIIRS instrument continues to incur delays during environmental testing which 

will likely result in a delay in NPP launch readiness beyond June 2010. NASA has provided the NPOESS IPO 

additional expertise to help provide more oversight to attempt to minimize additional delays and increase 

the likelihood of VIIRS meeting performance goals.

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
 Page 43 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: OCO

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

➢ Contractor Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. and Orbital 

Sciences Corp.

Projected Launch Date: February 23, 2009

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Taurus XL 

Mission Duration: 2 years

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $235.2 $273.1 16.1%

Formulation Cost $31.0 $32.5 4.8%

Development Cost $186.4 $219.7 17.9%

Operations Cost $17.8 $20.9 17.4%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 9/2008 2/2009 5 months

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(12/03)

Preliminary

Design Review

(7/04)

Critical Design

Review 

(8/06)

Implementation

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(2/09)

Project Status

OCO’s launch date slipped from September 2008 to 

February 2009, and NASA reported to the Congress that 

the project’s development cost increased 18 percent from 

the baseline established in fiscal year 2008. On February 

24, 2009, OCO launched but failed to reach orbit. 

NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) 

seeks to enable more reliable forecasts of climate 

change. It will make the first global measurements 

of atmospheric carbon dioxide with the precision 

and resolution needed to characterize production 

and loss rates. These measurements will improve 

mankind’s understanding of the processes that 

regulate atmospheric carbon dioxide. The OCO 

payload consists of a single unit instrument with 

three high resolution grating spectrometers. Each 

of these spectrometers records the intensity of 

radiation over one of three very narrow Near Infrared 

bands that are sensitive to the presence of carbon 

dioxide and oxygen. The observatory will fly in loose 

formation with other satellites to enable synergy and 

to complement the science return. 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO)
 Page 44 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: OCO

Detailed Project Discussion

The only critical technology for OCO, its three-channel grating spectrometer, was considered mature 

at the mission’s preliminary design review. However, technical problems arose for the instrument after 

its critical design review (CDR) in August 2006. Testing results showed that the detectors used in the 

instrument suffer from a residual image problem when they transition from a bright-to-dark image. This is 

an inherent characteristic of the detectors and the error in data will be corrected by ground-based software. 

In addition, OCO’s design was not stable at CDR as the project reported that it had only released 66 percent 

of its engineering drawings. Following CDR, the project also experienced a 15 percent increase in the total 

number of drawings expected. According to project officials, the increase was attributed to the changes 

made in the system design to address structural issues. The project has since released all of its engineering 

drawings.

According to project officials, the contractor developing the three-channel spectrometer underestimated 

the cost to develop the instrument. In December 2005, OCO project management began providing its own 

personnel to augment the contractor’s workforce in order to mitigate schedule slippage. Reviews of the 

instrument design identified areas that would not withstand launch and/or flight forces—a finding that 

necessitated a redesign of the instrument structure. According to the deputy project manager, the contract 

was modified to bring responsibility for the instrument’s integration and testing activity in house. Project 

management stated that the contractor did not receive its award fee because of its poor performance, but 

will still be eligible for on-orbit award fees.

OCO has experienced cost increases and schedule delays, and NASA has reported to the Congress that 

OCO has exceeded its development cost baseline. According to project officials, the project did not receive 

funding to begin its preliminary design phase in 2003, resulting in a one year schedule delay and an increase 

to the estimated mission cost of approximately $60 million. In addition, the movement of the instrument 

work in-house in October 2006 led to an increase in development costs and an inability to maintain the 

planned September 2008 launch date. NASA recently reported to the Congress an 18 percent increase in 

development cost from the baseline established in fiscal year 2008 and a schedule slip to December 2008. 

OCO was ready to launch in December but a delay at Vandenberg Air Force Base pushed the launch into 

2009.

Project Offi ce Comments

The OCO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. In addition, project officials commented that they believe the instrument and mission design 

were stable at the critical design review and neither have experienced significant changes to the CDRapproved design. They added that the project did experience problems during instrument development, 

assembly, and testing which prompted the project to be rebaselined. Since then, they stated that the project 

has stayed within its planned cost and schedule and was prepared to launch in December 2008, but was 

delayed because of unavailability of the launch range and launch vehicle certification issues.

Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO)
 Page 45 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: CEV

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest

 (Jan. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* $20,000 TO $29,000 

* This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formation 

and there is still uncertainty in the value as design options 

are explored, NASA uses these estimates for planning 

purposes. This estimate is for the Orion vehicle only.

____________________________________________

Launch Schedule 3/2015

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Johnson Space Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Lockheed Martin

Projected Launch Date: March 2015

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla

Launch Vehicle: Ares I

Mission Duration: Varied based on destination

Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems (artist depiction).

Formulation

Formulation

Start

(7/06)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Preliminary

Design Review 

(3rd Qtr 2009)

Implementation

Critical Design

Review

(4th Qtr 2010)

Initial Operational

Capability

(3/15)

Project Status

NASA is currently working toward a preliminary design 

review (PDR) for the Orion vehicle. As a result of several 

issues including unexpected weight growth, the PDR has 

been delayed by at least 9 months into fiscal year 2009. 

Additional schedule movement is under consideration 

to allow more time for integration of preliminary design 

products across the Orion organization to assure 

acceptable risk for completing the PDR with the right 

vehicle design. 

NASA’s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), 

as part of the Constellation Program, is the nextgeneration spacecraft to carry crew and cargo to 

the International Space Station and to the Moon. 

The Constellation Program includes the CEV and a 

launch system that will replace the Space Shuttle, 

which is slated to retire in 2010. The five-meter 

diameter Orion capsule is to be launched by the Ares 

I Crew Launch Vehicle. Orion will carry up to six 

astronauts to the International Space Station or four 

astronauts to the Moon after linking up with a lunar 

lander. The capsule will return to Earth and descend 

on parachutes to the surface. Orion has three main 

elements—the crew module (capsule), service 

module/spacecraft adapter, and launch abort system.

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
 Page 46 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: CEV

Detailed Project Discussion

The Orion project identified three critical technologies for the spacecraft: the phenolic impregnated carbon 

ablator (PICA) heat shield, which was used on Stardust, NASA’s comet sample return mission, landing 

airbags, and landing parachutes. The project identified a backup heat shield technology for PICA. Project 

officials said that both heat shield technologies have some heritage to earlier NASA missions, but both 

technologies have distinct risks. According to officials, PICA must be built and applied to Orion in sections 

creating gaps between the sections that need to be filled, similar to Space Shuttle tiles. The backup is 

lighter than PICA, but more difficult to manufacture. The PICA material is the chosen technology for the 

thermal protection system, but project officials said that they will select a single technology at PDR based 

on performance, how difficult it is to produce, weight, and cost. The project expects that all technologies 

will be mature by the preliminary design review. We found, however, that the heat shield development and 

manufacturing schedule is at risk and may impact Orion’s test schedule. In addition, Orion faces challenges 

in the development of the attitude control motor for the launch abort system. While similar attitude 

control motors have been demonstrated before, Orion’s motor design is complex, and any failures during 

developmental testing may cause unexpected delays.

Although the Orion project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability based 

on our metric, NASA recognizes that continued weight growth and requirements changes are contributing 

to instability in the Orion design. For example, according to agency officials, continuing Orion weight 

growth led NASA to redesign the Orion vehicle in fall 2007. As a result of engineering trade-offs that were 

made during this process, NASA modified the requirement for landing on land to landing in water, which 

would reduce vehicle mass. The Orion project is still working on these issues and has not yet finalized 

requirements or design. 

At the time of our review, NASA had not released cost and schedule estimates for completing the Orion 

project. NASA officials stated that these estimates will be made available at the conclusion of the 

Constellation Program non-advocate review, which takes places after PDR, when all NASA projects establish 

an integrated cost and schedule baseline. According to the Constellation program’s risk database, there is 

a high risk that Orion could face funding shortfalls in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned 

testing not being completed in time to support schedule and milestones. Furthermore, schedule delays have 

already occurred as a result of unexpected efforts to resolve mass, power, and other architecture issues and 

because the project needed sufficient time to attain an acceptable level of design risk.

Project Offi ce Comments

The Orion project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. The project office also commented that they believe steady progress has been 

made in all technology areas and appropriate technology readiness will be achieved prior to PDR in late 

summer 2009. They also believe that the Orion project has achieved stability in requirements growth and 

that NASA will continue to narrow design options as the project moves toward a confirmed baseline design. 

Project officials added the project is on schedule to finalize the choice of material for the heat shield by 

March 2009.

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
 Page 47 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: SDO

Formulation

Formulation

start

(12/01)

Critical Design 

Review

(4/05)

Preliminary 

Design Review

(3/04)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(1/10)

Implementation

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

➢ Contractor Performance

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Stanford University, Lockheed Martin 

Solar Astrophysics Laboratory, University of Colorado

Projected Launch Date: January 2010

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal)

Source: SDO Project Office (artist depiction). 

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $785.5 $817.0 4.0%

Formulation Cost $78.0 $85.8 10.0%

Development Cost $623.7 $629.6 0.9%

Operations Cost $83.8 $101.6 21.2%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 8/2008 1/2010 17 months

Project Status

SDO has experienced significant launch schedule delays. 

Funding cuts in fiscal year 2005 caused the project to slip 

SDO’s launch date from April to August 2008. Subsequent 

test scheduling issues and spacecraft parts problems 

caused a further delay until December 2008. A crowded 

launch manifest has now forced a 13-month delay to 

January 2010.

NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) will 

investigate how the Sun's magnetic field is structured 

and how its energy is converted and released into 

the heliosphere in the forms of solar wind, energetic 

particles, and variations in solar irradiance. The 

primary goal of the SDO mission is to understand 

the solar variations that influence life on Earth and 

humanity’s technological systems. It seeks to do 

this by determining how the Sun’s magnetic field 

is generated and structured, and how this stored 

magnetic energy is released. Analysis of data from 

SDO’s three instruments—Atmospheric Imaging 

Assembly (AIA), Extreme Ultraviolet Variability 

Experiment (EVE), and Helioseismic and Magnetic 

Imager (HMI)—will improve the science needed to 

enable space weather predictions.

Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO)
 Page 48 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: SDO

Detailed Project Discussion

The SDO project reported that its only critical technology—a 4K x 4K array of charge-coupled devices 

(CCD) to be used in both the HMI and AIA instruments—was mature at the project’s preliminary design 

review. The United Kingdom originally led development of the CCD camera systems, but dropped out of 

the project before the preliminary design review. Project officials also stated that SDO was purposefully 

designed to use existing technology components, but recognized that some technologies—such as the Kaband transmitter, high-speed bus, and high-gain antenna system—required modifications to be used on SDO. 

For example, the existing technology for the Ka-band transmitter required a new design for integration with 

SDO. Project officials told us that originally Northrop Grumman was to build the Ka-band transmitter, but its 

development was brought in house after contractor performance issues arose.

SDO’s design was not stable at the critical design review (CDR). Following this review, the project 

experienced nearly a 1,200 percent increase in the number of releasable drawings expected. Project officials 

said only drawings for in-house structures such as propulsion systems, electronics, instrument ports, the 

high-gain antenna system, and the spacecraft were considered at CDR. Drawings for the instruments were 

not included and flight drawings were only in draft form at CDR. Project officials indicated that flight 

drawings did not need to be ready so far in advance of the project’s launch readiness date since there was 

enough time to build these components. 

SDO also experienced several problems during testing of flight hardware. The project suffered a technical 

setback in 2007 when the thermal vacuum chamber being used to test the high gain antenna overheated, 

resulting in the need to completely rebuild the antenna. Several other risks to the project were identified 

during testing. For example, testing identified a part on the spacecraft’s high-speed bus that, under certain 

circumstances, could cause the spacecraft to reset itself, which could mean failure to meet science data 

quality and completeness requirements. 

At the time of its critical design review in April 2005, the SDO project budget was reduced by one third for 

fiscal year 2005 because of other funding priorities. As a result, the project underwent a replan that delayed 

the project’s launch readiness date from April 2008 to August 2008. Subsequent scheduling issues for testing 

of the AIA instrument and other spacecraft parts problems caused further delays and cost increases: the 

launch date slipped to December 2008 resulting in a cost increase of $18.1 million. Because of launch 

manifest issues, SDO’s launch date has since slipped to January 2010. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The SDO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. The project office commented that all of the problems they found during testing have been 

corrected, and that they believe the SDO design has been relatively stable and drawing releases occurred as 

planned. Project officials also said the project combined technology components in new ways in a new type 

of design, but the technologies themselves were not modified. They reported that SDO has been integrated 

and tested and is awaiting launch. Officials said the current delay and resulting cost increase is due to a 

crowded launch manifest. 

Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO)
 Page 49 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: SOFIA

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Dryden Flight Research Center

International Partner: German Space Agency (DLR)

Major Contractors: L3 Communications, MPC Products 

Corporation, University Space Research Association

Projected Operational Capability: August 2009

Aircraft: Modifi ed 747SP

Sortie Location: Dryden Flight Research Center, Calif.

Mission Duration: 20 years of science mission fl ights

Source: SOFIA Program Office. 

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $2954.5 $2580.8 -12.6%

Formulation Cost $35.0 $35.0 0.0%

Development Cost $919.5 $946.4 2.9%

Operations Cost $2000.0 $1599.4 -20.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 12/2013 9/2014 9 months

Formulation

Formulation

start

(10/91)

Initial Operational 

Capability 

(8/09)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Full Operational 

Capabiltiy

(9/14)

Implementation

Project Status

SOFIA plans to have its first science flight in 2009. The 

SOFIA project was rebaselined in fiscal year 2007; its 

development costs have grown to almost four times 

its original estimate. The rebaseline sought to achieve 

science objectives earlier than previously planned, but 

resulted in a 9 month delay in full operational capability. 

Cost growth is in part because of challenges with the 

modification of the aircraft used as the platform for 

SOFIA. Project officials said the aircraft modification 

proved to be more complex job than anticipated. 

SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the 

German Space Agency (DLR) to install a 2.5 meter 

telescope in a specially modified Boeing 747SP 

aircraft. This airborne observatory is designed to 

provide routine access to the visual, infrared, farinfrared, and sub-millimeter parts of the spectrum. Its 

mission objectives include studying many different 

kinds of astronomical objects and phenomena, 

including star birth and death; the formation of 

new solar systems; planets, comets, and asteroids 

in our solar system; and black holes at the center 

of galaxies. Interchangeable instruments for the 

observatory are being developed to allow a range of 

scientific measurement to be taken by SOFIA.

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA)
 Page 50 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: SOFIA

Detailed Project Discussion

We could not assess the technology maturity or the design stability of the overall project as NASA did not 

provide information related to the aircraft modification. Data provided for development of the instruments 

that will fly on SOFIA generally indicates a high level of technology maturity. Many of these technologies 

have already been used on ground-based telescopes, and the early instruments are essentially finished and 

have been waiting for the observatory to be completed. Similarly, we could not assess design stability of the 

instruments since the drawings were still preliminary at the critical design review.

NASA experienced challenges with the modification of the aircraft used as the platform for the SOFIA 

project, which led to significant cost overruns. Contributing to this challenge, according to project officials, 

was the aircraft manufacturer’s refusal to provide the blueprints for the 747SP. The plane had to be 

reverse engineered, making the modifications more difficult. Project officials also said that the contractor 

responsible for the aircraft’s modification and integration had limited experience with this type of work and 

did not fully understand the statement of work, further contributing to cost overruns. 

The SOFIA project also experienced problems related to the original prime contractor’s performance 

earlier in development. The SOFIA program manager said the original prime contractor was tasked to lead 

the project and NASA would purchase the raw data collected by SOFIA from the contractor. According to 

another NASA official, that contractor had neither the project management experience nor the design-build 

expertise necessary for the project—a situation that contributed to some of the SOFIA project’s problems. 

Consequently, NASA brought overall management of both development and operations of SOFIA in-house 

to achieve stronger technical, cost, and schedule controls. Project management was restructured and 

operational responsibility now resides with NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center, while NASA’s Ames 

Research Center manages the project’s science. The original contractor is still under contract for some 

science operations and instrument development. 

As a result of ongoing cost growth early in development, the SOFIA project underwent a review in 2006. The 

project was slated for cancellation in 2006, and no funds were allocated to it in that fiscal year. However, 

later that year, SOFIA was reinstated. In 2007, it was redesigned and, in July of that year, rebaselined. This 

new plan sought to be more responsive to the science community and achieve science objectives earlier 

than previously planned by performing science flights while still maturing the aircraft and telescope, but 

resulted in a 9-month delay in full operational capability. SOFIA’s current development costs are estimated to 

be about $950 million, almost four times the estimated development costs in 1997. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. The project office also commented that since its rebaselining in July 2007, the SOFIA project 

has not experienced cost or schedule growth.

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA)
 Page 51 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: WISE

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies 

Corporation, Space Dynamics Laboratory

Projected Launch Date: November 1, 2009

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 6 months

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $311.4 $310.5 -0.3%

Formulation Cost $99.5 $99.6 0.1%

Development Cost $192.1 $190.9 -0.6%

Operations Cost $19.8 $20.0 1.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 11/2009 11/2009 none

Formulation

Formulation

start

(3/03)

Critical Design 

Review

(6/07)

Preliminary 

Design Review

(7/05)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Launch Readiness

(11/09)

Implementation

Project Status

The WISE project is currently on schedule to meet its 

November 2009 launch date. However, the failure of a 

structural model of the flight cryostat during vibration 

testing prompted a design change to add a soft-ride 

system to the launch vehicle, a solution that cost about 

$2.6 million. This failure has caused the project to descope some testing in order to regain lost cost and 

schedule margin.

The WISE mission is designed to map the sky in 

infrared light and search for the nearest and coolest 

stars, the origins of stellar and planetary systems, 

the most luminous galaxies in the universe, and most 

main-belt asteroids larger than 3 kilometers. It is 

also intended to create a catalog of over 300 million 

sources that will be of interest to future infrared 

studies, including the upcoming James Webb Space 

Telescope mission. During its 6-month mission, WISE 

will use a four-channel imager to take overlapping 

snapshots of the sky. The WISE telescope optics will 

be cooled below 20 degrees Kelvin to keep it colder 

than the objects in space it will observe so that WISE 

can see the dim infrared emission from them rather 

than from the telescope itself.

Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE)
 Page 52 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: WISE

Detailed Project Discussion

Though the project is currently on track to meet its launch readiness date, the WISE project encountered 

schedule delays early in its life cycle. According to a project official, the project was not initially confirmed 

to proceed because of cost and technical concerns. As a result, the official said the project designed a 

smaller telescope and matured the technology that had concerned the review board. The preliminary design 

review for WISE was held in July 2005, and the project had its initial confirmation review in November 

2005; however, there was a lack of funding in the NASA budget for the WISE project at that time so the 

formulation phase was extended. At this point in the project, the launch readiness date had slipped from 

2008 to June 2009. A second confirmation review was held in October 2006, at which time the launch 

readiness date was set for October 2009. Although the second confirmation review happened one year later, 

the launch readiness date set at the original confirmation review only slipped 4 months since, according to a 

project official, the project was able to make progress during that year. 

WISE project officials identified two mission critical technologies---the solid hydrogen cryostat and the 

long wavelength infrared detector multiplexer---both of which were assessed as mature at the project’s 

preliminary design review. The solid hydrogen cryostat is a modification of a heritage technology. It is of 

similar design and construction and manufactured by the same contractor that produced cryostats for 

previous NASA missions. A project official said the project did not encounter any challenges with the 

development of the cryostat. WISE’s design, however, was not stable at the project’s critical design review. 

At the time of that review, the project had released only 70 percent of its engineering drawings. A project 

official stated that the drawing count and additional analyses, prototypes, and engineering models were 

used at the critical design review to evaluate the project’s design stability. The project has since released the 

remainder of the engineering drawings. 

The project did encounter some challenges during testing, which impacted the spacecraft’s design. The 

thermal-mass-dynamics-simulator, a structural model of the flight cryostat, failed during structural testing. 

According to a NASA official, analyses done by NASA and the cryostat’s contractor did not predict this 

problem. To mitigate this problem, the project added a soft-ride system to the launch vehicle to reduce loads 

on the cryostat. The failure also caused the project to accept more project risk by de-scoping two test events 

in order to regain reserve margin. According to the project office, the remedy cost $2.6 million, but the 

overall project schedule was not affected.

Project Offi ce Comments

The WISE project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe that development of a 

complex cryogenic instrument from heritage technology was more challenging to the project than its design 

stability. 

Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE)
Page 53 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

We provided a draft of this report to NASA for review and comment. In 

written comments, NASA recognizes that its goal is to improve its cost 

estimating and schedule and indicates that it will work hard to improve its 

performance.

The actions NASA has taken to address our past recommendations are 

positive steps toward achieving successful project outcomes and ensuring 

that decision makers are appropriately investing the agency’s resources. 

However, NASA asserts that its projects are typically high risk, one-of-akind missions that do not readily fi t into the knowledge-based framework 

associated with best practices in system acquisition. NASA’s own studies 

and those of others have shown that the challenges discussed in this report, 

as well as other project management challenges, have plagued the agency 

for decades. Given the fact that most of the projects we reviewed in this 

study breached congressional thresholds within a 2- to 3-year period, 

we remain convinced that NASA would benefi t from a more disciplined, 

knowledge-based approach to its acquisitions. 

NASA sought to provide clarifi cation and additional context to the 

information we provided in our observations. The agency indicated that the 

growth we reported for the 10 projects in implementation was a forwardlooking estimate, rather than actual growth. For this review, NASA provided 

us baseline cost and schedule estimates for most projects and then 

provided us updated estimates for those same projects. We assume that 

the estimates NASA provided are projections based on costs incurred and 

schedule completed to date, as well as realistic assumptions about future 

costs and schedule plans. 

NASA also stated that cost and schedule growth for some projects was due 

to factors outside of the agency’s control. Specifi cally:

1. Two NASA missions—the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and Solar 

Dynamics Observatory—experienced delays to their launch dates due 

to U.S. launch manifest prioritization. While NASA maintains that the 

launch slips for LRO and SDO were beyond its control, we believe 

that greater discipline in these and other acquisitions can still alleviate 

the impact of these factors. Specifi cally, given the launch manifest 

constraints that the agency is and has been experiencing, it would be 

prudent to adequately plan for such launch delays when determining 

cost and schedule reserves.

2. NASA believes that Aquarius, NPP, and Herschel projects experienced 

cost growth and schedule delays due to partner performance beyond its 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 54 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

control. We believe that having the suffi cient amount of insight into the 

partner’s activities and schedules may have allowed NASA to become 

aware of the issues earlier and to actively manage the issues throughout 

the development process.

3. NASA stated in its comments that not all cost growth is reported from 

the time of the NASA commitment to Congress for the performance, 

cost and schedule of its projects, as is the case with the James Webb 

Space Telescope. This project was just confi rmed in the fall of 2008. 

Nonetheless, NASA provided GAO data for projects as late as December 

2008. Since NASA develops baseline estimates for its projects at the 

confi rmation review that are formal commitments, we would have 

expected NASA to report that data to us in December 2008.

4. NASA stated that it underestimates the complexity of developing fi rstof-a-kind missions. While we recognize the nature of NASA projects, 

as stated in our report, we remain convinced that a knowledge-based 

approach will allow the agency to better plan for and address these 

complexities. 

We are pleased that NASA recognizes our desire to assist the agency in 

improving its cost and schedule estimating and look forward to continuing 

to work with it to improve performance in these areas. NASA’s comments 

are reprinted in appendix I. NASA also provided technical comments, 

which we addressed throughout the report as appropriate and where 

suffi cient evidence was provided to support signifi cant changes. 

We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 55 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offi ces of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours, 

Cristina Chaplain 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

 
Page 56 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski

Chairman

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science,

 and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan

Chairman

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, 

 and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Olson

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

Committee on Science and Technology

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 57 GAO-09-306 Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 58 GAO-09-306 Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 59 GAO-09-306 Assessments of Selected Projects
GAO has previously conducted work on NASA’s acquisition policy for spacefl ight systems, and in particular, on its alignment with a knowledge-based 

approach to system acquisitions. The fi gure below depicts this alignment.

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based Approach

Concept and technology development Production

Management decision reviews

Pre-NAR = preliminary non-advocate review SDR = system definition review

NAR = non-advocate review PDR = preliminary design review

Techincal reviews

KDP = key decision point CDR = critical design review

KDP E KDP F

CDR

KDP A KDP B KDP D

SDR PDR

KDP C Program start

Knowledge-based approach

NASA’s life cycle for flight systems and ground support projects

Formulation

PreNAR NAR

Implementation

Pre-phase A

Concept

studies

Phase A

Concept

development

Phase B

Preliminary

design and 

technology

completion

Phase C

Final design 

and fabrication

Phase D

System assembly, 

integration and test, launch

Phase E

Operations and 

sustainment

Phase F

Closeout

Product development

Knowledge point 1 (KP1)

Technologies, time, funding, 

and other resources match 

customer needs 

Knowledge point 2 (KP2)

Design performs as expected

Knowledge point 3 (KP3)

Production meets cost,

schedule, and quality targets

Integration Demonstration

Source: NASA data and GAO analysis.

Appendix II: NASA Life Cycle For Flight 

Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based 

Approach

Page 60 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix II: NASA Life Cycle For Flight 

Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based 

Approach

As the fi gure shows, NASA’s policy defi nes a project life cycle in two 

phases—the formulation14 and implementation15 phases, which are 

further divided into incremental pieces: phase A through phase F. Project 

formulation consists of phases A and B, during which time the projects 

develop and defi ne the project requirements and cost/schedule basis 

and design for implementation, including an acquisition strategy. During 

the end of the formulation phase, leading up to the preliminary design 

review (PDR)16 and non-advocate review (NAR)17 , the project team 

completes its preliminary design and technology development. NASA 

Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project 

Management Requirements, specify that the project complete development 

of mission-critical or enabling technology, as needed, with demonstrated 

evidence of required technology qualifi cation (i.e., component and/or 

breadboard validation in the relevant environment) documented in a 

technology readiness assessment report. The project must also develop, 

document, and maintain a project integrated baseline which includes 

the integrated master schedule and baseline life-cycle cost estimate. 

Implementing these requirements brings the project closer to ensuring that 

resources and needs match, but it is not fully consistent with knowledge 

point 1 of the knowledge-based acquisition life cycle. Our best practices 

show that demonstrating technology maturity at this point in the system 

life cycle should include a system or subsystem model or prototype 

demonstration in a relevant environment, not only component validation. 

14 NASA defi nes formulation as the identifi cation of how the program or project supports 

the Agency’s strategic needs, goals, and objectives; the assessment of feasibility, technology 

and concepts; risk assessment, team building, development of operations concepts and 

acquisition strategies; establishment of high-level requirements and success criteria; the 

preparation of plans, budgets, and schedules essential to the success of a program or 

project; and the establishment of control systems to ensure performance to those plans and 

alignment with current Agency strategies. NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1 a. (Mar. 6, 2007).

15 The implementation phase is defi ned as the execution of approved plans for the 

development and operation of the program/project, and the use of control systems to ensure 

performance to approved plans and continued alignment with the Agency’s strategic needs, 

goals, and objectives. NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1 c. (Mar. 6, 2007).

16 According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the PDR demonstrates that the 

preliminary design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost 

and schedule constraints and establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. It 

shows that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been identifi ed, and 

verifi cation methods have been described. Full baseline cost and schedules, as well as risk 

assessments, management systems, and metrics are presented.

17 According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the PDR demonstrates that the 

preliminary design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost 

and schedule constraints and establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. It 

shows that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been identifi ed, and 

verifi cation methods have been described. Full baseline cost and schedules, as well as risk 

assessments, management systems, and metrics are presented.

Page 61 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix II: NASA Life Cycle For Flight 

Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based 

Approach

As written, NASA’s policy does not require full technology maturity before a 

project enters the implementation phase. 

After project confi rmation, the project begins implementation, consisting 

of phases C, D, E, and F. During phases C and D, the project performs 

fi nal design and fabrication as well as testing of components and system 

assembly, integration, test, and launch. Phases E and F consist of 

operations and sustainment and project closeout. A second design review, 

the critical design review (CDR),18 is held during the implementation phase 

toward the end of phase C. The purpose of the CDR is to demonstrate that 

the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full 

scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. Though this review is not 

a formal decision review, its requirements for a mature design and ability 

to meet mission performance requirements within the identifi ed cost and 

schedule constraints are similar to knowledge expected at knowledge point 

2 of the knowledge-based acquisition life cycle. Furthermore, after CDR, 

the project must be approved at KDP D before continuing into the next 

phase.

The NASA acquisition life cycle lacks a major decision review at knowledge 

point 3 to demonstrate that production processes are mature. According to 

NASA offi cials, the agency rarely enters a formal production phase due to 

the small quantities of space systems that they build. 

18 According to NPR 7120.5D, appendix A (Mar. 6, 2007), a non-advocate review (NAR) 

is comprised of the analysis of a proposed program or project by a (non-advocate) team 

composed of management, technical, and resources experts (personnel) from outside 

the advocacy chain of the proposed program or project. It provides agency management 

with an independent assessment of the readiness of the program/project to proceed into 

implementation.

Page 62 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Our objectgives were to report on the status and challenges faced by 

several NASA systems with life-cycle costs greater than $250 million and 

to discuss broader trends faced by the agency in its management of system 

acquisitions.

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and identifi ed 

challenges for each of 18 major projects19 included in this report. 

We summarized our assessments of each individual project in two 

components—a project profi le and a detailed discussion of project 

challenges. We did not validate the data provided by the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). However, we took 

appropriate steps to address data reliability. Specifi cally, we confi rmed 

the accuracy of NASA-generated data with multiple sources within NASA 

and, in some cases, with external sources. Additionally, we corroborated 

data provided to us with published documentation. We determined that 

the data provided by NASA project offi ces were suffi ciently reliable for our 

engagement purposes.

We developed a standardized data collection instrument (DCI) that was 

completed by each project offi ce and returned by December 2008. Through 

the DCI, we gathered basic information about projects as well as current 

and projected development activities for those projects. The cost, schedule 

and performance data estimates that NASA inputted were the most recent 

updates as of December 2008. At the time we collected the data, 4 of the 

18 projects were in formulation and 14 were in implementation. However, 

NASA only provided cost and schedule data for 13 of the projects. To further 

understand performance issues, we talked with offi cials from each project 

offi ce and NASA’s Offi ce of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E).

The results collected from each project offi ce, Mission Directorate, and 

PA&E were summarized in a two-page report format providing a project 

overview; key cost, contract, and schedule data; and a discussion of the 

challenges associated with the deviation from relevant indicators from 

best practice standards. The aggregate measures and averages calculated 

were analyzed for meaningful relationships, e.g. relationship between cost 

growth and schedule slippage and knowledge maturity attained both at 

critical milestones and through the various stages of the project life cycle. 

19 According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the CDR demonstrates that the 

maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, 

assembly, integration, and test, and that the technical effort is on track to complete the 

fl ight and ground system development and mission operations in order to meet mission 

performance requirements within the identifi ed cost and schedule constraints. Progress 

against management plans, budget, and schedule, as well as risk assessments are presented.

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 63 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

We identifi ed cost and/or schedule growth as signifi cant where, in either 

case, a project’s cost and/or its schedule exceeded the thresholds for the 

Congressional reporting requirement.

To supplement our analysis, we relied on GAO’s body of work over the past 

years that has examined acquisition issues across multiple agencies. These 

reports cover such issues as contracting, program management, acquisition 

policy, and cost estimating. GAO also has an extensive body of work related 

to challenges NASA has faced with regard to specifi c system acquisitions, 

fi nancial management, and cost estimating. This work provided the context 

and basis for much of the general observations we made with regard to 

the projects we reviewed. Additionally, the discussions with the individual 

NASA projects helped us identify further challenges faced by the projects. 

Together, this contributed to our development of a short list of challenges 

discussed for each project. The challenges we identifi ed and discussed do 

not represent an exhaustive or exclusive list. They are subject to change and 

evolution as GAO continues this annual assessment in future years.

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 

D.C. In addition, we visited NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in 

Huntsville, Alabama, Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards Air 

Force Base in California, and Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 

Maryland to discuss individual projects. We also met with representatives 

from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, California and three NASA 

suppliers.

NASA only provided specifi c cost and schedule estimates for 13 of the 18 

projects in our review. Agency offi cials believe that because one project, the 

James Webb Space Telescope, will not formally release its baseline cost and 

schedule estimates until the fi scal year 2010 budget submission to Congress, 

they are not required to provide those estimates to GAO. For three of the 

projects that had not yet entered implementation, NASA provided internal 

preliminary estimated total (life-cycle) cost ranges and associated 

schedules, from key decision point B (KDP-B), solely for informational 

purposes.20 NASA formally baselines and commits itself to cost and 

schedule targets for a project with a specifi c and aligned set of planned 

mission objectives at key decision point C (KDP-C), which follows a nonadvocate review (NAR) and preliminary design review (PDR). KDP-C 

refl ects the life-cycle point where NASA approves a project to leave the 

formulation phase and enter into the implementation phase. NASA 

explained that preliminary estimates are generated for internal planning and 

20 These missions include: Ares I, Landsat Data Continuity Mission and Orion.

Data Limitations

Page 64 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

fi scal year budgeting purposes at KDP-B, which occurs mid-stream in the 

formulation phase, and hence, are not considered a formal commitment by 

the agency on cost and schedule for the mission deliverables. NASA offi cials 

contend that because of changes that occur to a project’s scope and 

technologies between KDP-B and KDP-C, estimates of project cost and 

schedule can change signifi cantly heading toward KDP-C. Finally, NASA did 

not provide data for the Global Precipitation Measurement mission because 

NASA offi cials said it did not have a requirement for a KDP-B review, 

because it was authorized to be formulated prior to the requirements of 

NPR 7120.5D were in place.

This section of the two-page assessment outlines the essentials of the 

project, its cost and schedule performance and its status. Project essentials 

refl ect pertinent information about each project, including, where 

applicable, the major contractors and partners involved in the project. 

These organizations have primary responsibility over a major segment of 

the project, or in some cases, the entire project.

Project performance is depicted according to cost and schedule changes in 

the various stages of the project life cycle. To assess the cost and schedule 

changes of each project we obtained data directly from NASA PA&E and 

from NASA’s Integrated Budget and Performance documents. For systems 

in implementation, we compared the latest available information with 

baseline cost and schedule estimates set for each project in the fi scal year 

2007 or 2008 budget request.

All cost information is presented in nominal “then year” dollars for 

consistency with budget data.21 Baseline costs are adjusted to refl ect the 

cost accounting structure in NASA’s fi scal year 2009 budget estimates. For 

the fi scal year 2009 budget request, NASA changed its accounting practices 

from full-cost accounting to reporting only direct costs at the project level.

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, which is 

defi ned as the number of months between the project start, or formulation 

start, and projected or actual launch date.22 Formulation start generally 

refers to the initiation of a project; NASA refers to project start as key 

21 Due to changes in NASA’s accounting structure, its historical cost data is relatively 

inconsistent. As such, we used “then-year” dollars to report data consistent with the data 

that NASA reported to us.

22 Some projects reported that their spacecraft would be ready for launch sooner than the 

date that the launch authority could provide actual launch services. In these cases, we 

used the actual launch date for our analysis rather than the date that the project reported 

readiness.

Project Profi le Information 

on Each Individual 

Two-Page Assessment

Page 65 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

decision point A, or the beginning of the formulation phase. The preliminary 

design review typically occurs during the end of the formulation phase, 

followed by a confi rmation review which allows the project to move 

into the implementation phase. The critical design review is held during 

the fi nal design period of implementation and demonstrates that the 

maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full scale 

fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. Launch readiness is determined 

through a launch readiness review which verifi es that the launch system 

and spacecraft/payloads are ready for launch. The implementation phase 

includes the operations of the mission and concludes with project disposal.

We assessed the extent to which NASA projects exceeded their cost and 

schedule baselines. To do this, we compared the project baseline cost and 

schedule estimates with the current cost and schedule data reported by the 

project offi ce in December 2008.

To assess the project challenges for each project, we submitted a data 

collection instrument to each project offi ce. We also held interviews with 

each of the project offi ces to discuss the information on the data collection 

instrument. These discussions led to identifi cation of further challenges 

faced by NASA projects. These challenges were largely apparent in the 

projects that had entered the implementation phase. We then reviewed 

pertinent project documentation, such as the project plan, schedule, risk 

assessments, and major project reviews.

To assess technology maturity, we asked project offi cials to assess 

the technology readiness levels (TRL) of each of the project’s critical 

technologies at various stages of project development. Originally developed 

by NASA, TRLs are measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning 

with paper studies of a technology’s feasibility and culminating with a 

technology fully integrated into a completed product. (See appendix IV 

for the defi nitions of technology readiness levels.) In most cases, we did 

not validate the project offi ces’ selection of critical technologies or the 

determination of the demonstrated level of maturity. However, we sought to 

clarify the technology readiness levels in those cases where the information 

provided raised concerns, such as where a critical technology was reported 

as immature late in the project development cycle. Additionally, we asked 

project offi cials to explain the environments in which technologies were 

tested.

Our best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 

6— demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype in a realistic 

environment—is the level of maturity needed to minimize risks for space 

Project Challenges 

Discussion on Each 

Individual Two-Page 

Assessment

Page 66 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

systems entering product development. In our assessment, the technologies 

that have reached technology readiness level 6 are referred to as fully 

mature due to the diffi culty of achieving technology readiness level 7, 

which is demonstrating maturity in an operational environment—space. 

Projects with critical technologies that did not achieve maturity by the 

preliminary design review were assessed as having a technology maturity 

project challenge. We did not assess technology maturity for those projects 

which had not yet reached the preliminary design review at the time of this 

assessment.23

To assess design stability, we asked project offi cials to provide the 

percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion 

by the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of our current 

assessment.24 In most cases, we did not verify or validate the percentage 

of engineering drawings provided by the project offi ce. However, we 

collected the project offi ces’ rationale for cases where it appeared that 

only a small number of drawings were completed by the time of the design 

reviews or where the project offi ce reported signifi cant growth in the 

number of drawings released after CDR. In accordance with GAO best 

practices, projects were assessed as having achieved design stability if they 

had released at least 90 percent of all projected drawings by the critical 

design review. Projects which had not met this metric were determined 

to have a design stability project challenge. Though some projects used 

other methods to assess design stability, such as computer and engineering 

models and analyses, we did not analyze the use of these other methods 

and therefore could not assess the design stability of those projects. We 

could not assess design stability for those projects which had not yet 

reached the critical design review at the time of this assessment.

23 According to NASA offi cials, projects that were in formulation at the time of the agency’s 

2007 revision of its project management policy are required to comply with that policy. 

Projects that had already entered implementation at the time of the revision were directed 

to implement those requirements which would not adversely affect the project’s cost and 

schedule baselines.

24 In our calculation for the percentage of total number of drawings projected for release, 

we used the number of drawings released at the critical design review as a fraction of the 

total number of drawings projected, including where drawing growth occurred. So, the 

denominator in the calculation may have been larger than what was projected at the critical 

design review. We felt that this more accurately refl ected the design stability of the project.

Page 67 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

To assess the complexity of heritage technology, we interviewed project 

offi cials about the use of heritage technologies in their projects.25 We asked 

them what heritage technologies were being used, what effort was needed 

to modify the form, fi t, and function of the technology for use in the new 

system, and whether the project encountered any problems in modifying the 

technology. Heritage technologies were not considered critical technologies 

by several of the projects we reviewed. Based on our interviews, review of 

cost and schedule data from the data collection instruments, and previous 

GAO work on space systems, we determined whether complexity of 

heritage technology was a challenge for a particular project.

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with contractor 

performance, we interviewed project offi cials about their interaction and 

experience with contractors. We also interviewed contractor offi cials 

from Orbital Sciences Corporation, Ball Aerospace and Technologies 

Corporation, and Raytheon Space Systems about their experiences 

contracting with NASA. We were informed about contractor performance 

problems pertaining to their workforce, the supplier base, and technical 

and corporate experience. We also discussed contract fees and situations 

in which NASA and a contractor agreed that the contractor would use their 

award fee to cover project cost overruns. We assessed a project as having 

this challenge if these contractor performance problems, as confi rmed by 

NASA and, where possible, the project contractor, caused the project to 

experience a cost overrun, schedule delay, or decrease in mission capability. 

For projects which did not have a major contractor, we considered this 

challenge not applicable to the project.

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with development 

partner performance, we interviewed NASA project offi cials about 

their interaction with international or domestic partners during project 

development. Development partner performance was considered a 

challenge for the project if project offi cials indicated that domestic or 

foreign partners were experiencing problems with project development 

that impacted the cost, schedule, or performance of the project for NASA. 

These challenges were specifi c to the partner organization or caused by a 

contractor to that partner organization. For projects which did not have 

25 NASA distinguishes critical technologies from heritage technologies. NASA offi cials do 

not believe that heritage technologies are the same as critical technologies because they 

believe critical technology does not rely on existing technology. GAO best practices describe 

critical technologies as those that are required for the project to successfully meet customer 

requirements, regardless of whether or not they are based on existing or heritage technology. 

For the purposes of this review, we distinguish between the two types because NASA did not 

report heritage technologies as critical technologies in our data collection instrument.

Page 68 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

an international or domestic development partner, we considered this 

challenge not applicable to the project.

The individual project offi ces were given an opportunity to comment on and 

provide technical clarifi cations to the two-page assessments prior to their 

inclusion in the fi nal product.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain suffi cient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives.

Page 69 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Technology readiness level Discription Hardware Demonstration Environment

1. Basic principles observed 

and reported.

Lowest level of technology 

readiness. Scientifi c research 

begins to be translated into applied 

research and development. 

Examples might include paper 

studies of a technology’s basic 

properties

None (paper studies and 

analysis)

None

2. Technology concept and/or 

application formulated. 

Invention begins. Once basic 

principles are observed, practical 

applications can be invented. The 

application is speculative and there 

is no proof or detailed analysis to 

support the assumption. Examples 

are still limited to paper studies.

None (paper studies and 

analysis)

None

3. Analytical and experimental 

critical function and/

or characteristic proof of 

concept.

Active research and development 

is initiated. This includes analytical 

studies and laboratory studies 

to physically validate analytical 

predictions of separate elements 

of the technology. Examples 

include components that are not yet 

integrated or representative.

Analytical studies 

and demonstration of 

nonscale individual 

components (pieces of 

subsystem).

Lab

4. Component and/or 

breadboard. Validation in 

laboratory environment.

Basic technological components 

are integrated to establish that the 

pieces will work together. This is 

relatively “low fi delity” compared 

to the eventual system. Examples 

include integration of “ad hoc” 

hardware in a laboratory. 

Low fi delity breadboard. 

Integration of nonscale 

components to show 

pieces will work 

together. Not fully 

functional or form or 

fi t but representative 

of technically feasible 

approach suitable for 

fl ight articles. 

Lab

5. Component and/or 

breadboard validation in 

relevant environment. 

Fidelity of breadboard technology 

increases signifi cantly. The basic 

technological components are 

integrated with reasonably realistic 

supporting elements so that the 

technology can be tested in a 

simulated environment. Examples 

include “high fi delity” laboratory 

integration of components. 

High fi delity breadboard. 

Functionally equivalent 

but not necessarily 

form and/or fi t (size 

weight, materials, etc). 

Should be approaching 

appropriate scale. May 

include integration of 

several components 

with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems 

to demonstrate 

functionality. 

Lab demonstrating functionality 

but not form and fi t. May include 

fl ight demonstrating breadboard 

in surrogate aircraft. Technology 

ready for detailed design studies.

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 70 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Technology readiness level Discription Hardware Demonstration Environment

6. System/subsystem model 

or prototype demonstration in 

a relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype 

system, which is well beyond the 

breadboard tested for TRL 5, is 

tested in a relevant environment. 

Represents a major step up in 

a technology’s demonstrated 

readiness. Examples include 

testing a prototype in a high fi delity 

laboratory environment or in 

simulated realistic environment.

Prototype. 

Should be very close 

to form, fi t and function. 

Probably includes the 

integration of many 

new components and 

realistic supporting 

elements/subsystems if 

needed to demonstrate 

full functionality of the 

subsystem.

High-fi delity lab demonstration 

or limited/restricted fl ight 

demonstration for a relevant 

environment. Integration of 

technology is well defi ned.

7. System prototype 

demonstration in an realistic 

environment.

Prototype near or at planned 

operational system. Represents a 

major step up from TRL 6, requiring 

the demonstration of an actual 

system prototype in a realistic 

environment, such as in an aircraft, 

vehicle or space. Examples include 

testing the prototype in a test bed 

aircraft. 

Prototype. Should be 

form, fi t and function 

integrated with other 

key supporting 

elements/subsystems 

to demonstrate 

full functionality of 

subsystem. 

Flight demonstration in 

representative realistic environment 

such as fl ying test bed or 

demonstrator aircraft. 

Technology is well substantiated 

with test data.

8. Actual system completed 

and “fl ight qualifi ed” through 

test and demonstration.

Technology has been proven to 

work in its fi nal form and under 

expected conditions. In almost all 

cases, this TRL represents the 

end of true system development. 

Examples include developmental 

test and evaluation of the system 

in its intended weapon system 

to determine if it meets design 

specifi cations.

Flight qualifi ed hardware Development Test and Evaluation 

(DT&E) in the actual system 

application

9. Actual system “fl ight 

proven” through successful 

mission operations. 

Actual application of the technology 

in its fi nal form and under 

mission conditions, such as those 

encountered in operational test 

and evaluation. In almost all 

cases, this is the end of the last 

“bug fi xing” aspects of true system 

development. Examples include 

using the system under operational 

mission conditions.

Actual system in fi nal 

form

Operational Test and Evaluation 

(OT&E) in operational mission 

conditions

 Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 71 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In additional to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant Director; 

Greg Campbell; Richard A. Cederholm; Brendan S. Culley; Neil D. Feldman; 

Leon S. Gill; Rachel L. Girshick; Kristine R. Heuwinkel; Deanna R. Laufer; 

Shelby S. Oakley; Kenneth E. Patton; Sylvia Schatz; and Letisha T. Watson 

made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

(120699) Page 72 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects
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