U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

43–111 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 109–1056 

HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: ESTABLISHING A 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 11, 2006 

Serial No. J–109–95 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 193 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 2 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 221 

Kohl, Hon. Herbert, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 219 

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Bradbury, Steven G., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C .................................................. 6 

Cobb, Paul W. ‘‘Whit’’, Jr., former Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Deposition, 

Washington, D.C .................................................................................................. 54 

Collins, Daniel P., former Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Partner, 

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Los Angeles, California ............................................. 57 

Dell’Orto, Daniel J., Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of General 

Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C ................................. 4 

Koh, Harold Hongju, Dean, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut ............ 50 

Olson, Theodore B., former Solicitor General of the United States, and Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C ............................................. 48 

Silliman, Scott L., Retired Air Force Judge Advocate, Center on Law, Ethics, 

and National Security, Duke University School of Law, Durham, North 

Carolina ................................................................................................................ 55 

Swift, Lieutenant Commander Charles D., Office of Military Commissions, 

Office of Chief Defense Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 

D.C ......................................................................................................................... 52

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Steven Bradbury to questions submitted by Senators Leahy, 

Feingold, Feinstein, Kennedy and Specter ........................................................ 72 

Responses of Paul W. ‘‘Whit’’ Cobb to questions submitted by Senator Specter 101 

Responses of Daniel P. Collins to questions submitted by Senator Specter ....... 105 

Responses of Daniel Dell’Orto to questions submitted by Senators Leahy, 

Feinstein, Kennedy, Kyl, Feingold, Schumer and Specter ............................... 109 

Responses of Harold Hongju Koh to questions submitted by Senator Specter .. 126 

Responses of Theodore Olson to questions submitted by Senator Specter ......... 127 

Responses of Scott Silliman to questions submitted by Senators Specter, 

Kennedy and Feingold ......................................................................................... 130 

Responses of Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift to questions submitted 

by Senators Leahy, Feingold, Kennedy and Specter ......................................... 139 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Bradbury, Steven G., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., statement .............................. 158 

Cobb, Paul W. ‘‘Whit’’, Jr., former Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Deposition, 

Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................................. 169 

Collins, Daniel P., former Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Partner, 

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Los Angeles, California, statement .......................... 176 

Dell’Orto, Daniel J., Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of General 

Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., statement ............. 186 

Page

IV 

Fein, Bruce, former Associate Deputy Attorney General, Bruce Fein & Associates, Washington, D.C., statement ..................................................................... 189 

Letter, July 10, 2006 to Senators Specter and Leahy from retired Military ...... 200 

Koh, Harold Hongju, Dean, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut, statement ...................................................................................................................... 202 

Olson, Theodore B., former Solicitor General of the United States, and Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C., statement ......................... 225 

Silliman, Scott L., Retired Air Force Judge Advocate, Center on Law, Ethics, 

and National Security, Duke University School of Law, Durham, North 

Carolina, statement ............................................................................................. 247 

Swift, Lieutenant Commander Charles D., Office of Military Commissions, 

Office of Chief Defense Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 

D.C., statement and attachments ....................................................................... 255 

(1) 

HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: ESTABLISHING A 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 

TUESDAY, JULY 11, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Specter, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Sessions, Graham, Cornyn, Leahy, Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, 

Schumer, and Durbin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Chairman SPECTER. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The 

Senate Judiciary Committee will now proceed to hold a hearing on 

what response should be made to the decision of the Supreme 

Court of the United States on June 29th, a week ago Thursday, 

which held that the procedures in place for the trial of certain detainees in Guantanamo did not satisfy the Constitution of the 

United States or the Geneva Convention. Shortly after 9/11, Senator Durbin and I introduced relevant legislation, as did Senator 

Leahy, Senator Graham, and others. The Constitution is explicit 

under Article I, Section 8 that the Congress has the authority and 

responsibility to establish the rules of trials of those captured on 

land or sea. And we are now proceeding to follow the requirements 

of constitutional and international law, as handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States, and to do it in a way which will 

permit us to fairly try those accused of war crimes and will permit 

us to fairly, appropriately, and judiciously detain enemy combatants in accordance with the rule of law. 

The Judiciary Committee held hearings on Guantanamo in June 

of 2005. I made a trip to Guantanamo in August of 2005, and we 

had been working on legislation and had legislation prepared in anticipation of the Supreme Court decision, which we thought would 

require congressional action. And when the Court came down with 

its decision, it was studied, and we introduced proposed legislation. 

But it is a very complex matter, and we need to consider procedures to determine what is appropriate evidence; whether hearsay 

should be allowed; perhaps not at trials for war criminals or those 

charged with war crimes, but perhaps for detainees, the issue of 

whether a detainee’s statements can be used if there is a question 

about whether the statements were voluntary or coerced; the right 

2 

to counsel, the right to classified information; where the lawyers 

are JAG officers, they are cleared; where they are private counsel, 

they are not cleared. It is more complicated. There are many, many 

questions which have to be answered. 

We have a distinguished group of witnesses today. We have the 

Principal Deputy General Counsel for the Department of Defense, 

Daniel Dell’Orto, and we have the Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Steve Bradbury, who will be 

our two lead witnesses. 

We are shooting for an 11:30 adjournment. Witnesses will have 

5 minutes, and we will have rounds of questioning of 5 minutes. 

We did not have the witness testimony submitted in a timely 

way. Some of the witnesses were notified late, and that makes it 

difficult for members to prepare adequately. But we will proceed to 

do the best we can. 

Now let me yield to my distinguished Ranking Member, Senator 

Leahy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator LEAHY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for having this hearing. In a way, we pick up where the Judiciary 

Committee started almost 5 years ago, in November-December of 

2001, when we urged the President to work with us to construct 

a just system of special military commissions. 

In fact, Mr. Chairman, you and I introduced bills with procedures that would have complied with our obligations under law. It 

would have provided the kind of full and fair trials that the President has said that he wants to provide. 

The hearing today follows the United States Supreme Court’s repudiation of the President’s military commissions. The Supreme 

Court determined that the Bush-Cheney administration’s system 

for prosecuting detainees at Guantanamo is illegal, and it told the 

President, in effect, to stop his illegal conduct. 

The decision has given our system of constitutional checks and 

balances a tonic that is sorely needed. The Supreme Court is right 

in holding that the President is bound to comply with the rule of 

law. One of our core American values is that no one is above the 

law. I commend the Supreme Court for acting as a much needed 

check on unilateral policies that stretch beyond the President’s lawful authority. 

When the President announced the creation of these commissions, Alberto Gonzales, then the White House Counsel, touted 

them as a means to dispense justice swiftly, close to where our 

forces may be fighting. Were those the results? Not hardly. 

In the last 5 years, there have been no trials and no convictions 

of any of the detainees, and no one has been brought to justice 

through these commissions. Instead, precious time, effort, and resources have been wasted. 

Remember what I said: 5 years, no trials, no convictions. 

When the Bush-Cheney administration rejected our advice, refused to work with Congress and chose to go it alone in the development of military commissions, they made a mistake of historic 

and constitutional proportions. I hope the administration will begin 

3 

today’s hearings by admitting their mistakes and acknowledging 

the limits on Presidential authority. As Justice Kennedy emphasized in his opinion, ‘‘subject to constitutional limitations, Congress 

has the power and responsibility to determine the necessity for 

military courts, and to provide the jurisdiction and procedures applicable to them.’’ 

The Supreme Court’s decision is a triumph for our constitutional 

system of checks and balances. It stands for a very simple proposition: When Congress passes a law, the President is bound to follow it. The Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

Our country adopted and is bound to abide by the Geneva Conventions regardless of whether the Attorney General still considers 

them to be, in his word, ‘‘quaint.’’ 

This President decided not to follow the law. The Court said in 

America nobody is above the law, not even the President. 

You know, what is surprising is that in the opinions the three 

Justices who claim the mantle of conservatism were so deferential 

to the President they would not stand up for the rule of law. 

I am going to put my full statement in the record, but I do want 

to make a couple other points. 

Like you, Mr. Chairman, I am a former prosecutor, and I find it 

hard to fathom that this administration is so incompetent that it 

needs kangaroo court procedures to convince a tribunal of United 

States military officers that the worst of the worst in prison at 

Guantanamo Bay should be held accountable. Military commissions 

should not be set up as a sham. They should be consistent with the 

high standard of American military justice that has worked for decades. If they are to be United States military commissions, they 

should dispense just punishment fairly, not just be an easier way 

to punish. 

For 5 years, the administration has violated fundamental American values, damaged our international reputation, and delayed 

and weakened prosecution of the war on terror—not because of any 

coherent strategic view that it had, but because of its stubborn 

unilateralism and dangerous theory of unfettered executive power, 

augmented by self-serving legal reasoning. Guantanamo Bay has 

been such a debacle that even the President now says that it 

should be shut down. But the damage keeps accumulating. 

Some still will not admit this administration’s errors. They argue 

as if the United States should measure itself against the brutality 

of terrorists. Our standards in our great country have always been 

higher than that, and I disagree with their argument when it 

comes to the rule of law. I disagree when it comes to engaging in 

torture. I disagree when it comes to honoring our legal and international obligations. Americans’ ideals are sullied whenever we resort to bumper sticker slogans about giving special privileges to 

terrorists. No one has urged that. 

The President says he is for fairness and justice. Well, so am I, 

so are you, so is everybody. But I would like to see a system that 

could determine guilt and punish the guilty. I am for a system that 

works, a system that honors the American values that have been 

part of our strength as a good and great Nation. 

Military justice is swift and effective. Courts-martial have been 

used to bring some members of our own armed forces that have 

4 

violated the law to justice. Meanwhile, not one of the prisoners at 

Guantanamo Bay, whom the President has called ‘‘the worst of the 

worst,’’ has been brought to justice. Not one. Iraq may well complete its trial of Saddam Hussein before a single Guantanamo detainee is tried. The system the administration created was fatally 

flawed. The President decided not to proceed promptly by courtsmartial against the detainees. I remain willing to work to develop 

bipartisan legislation creating military commissions that will comply with our law. That is what I proposed 5 years ago. That is what 

you proposed 5 years ago. I will still work in a bipartisan fashion 

to do that despite the 5 years in which the administration has 

made it very clear they do not want to work with us. 

We need to know why we are being asked to deviate from rules 

for courts-martial, and we also need to see a realization by this administration that it is Congress that writes our laws and that no 

office holder, branch, or agency of our Government is above the 

law. 

So, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for holding these hearings. 

I went somewhat over time. I will put my whole statement in the 

record, but I think this is an extraordinarily serious matter. 

Chairman SPECTER. Without objection, your full statement will 

be made a part of the record. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Our first witness is Daniel Dell’Orto, who 

holds a bachelor’s degree from Notre Dame, master’s from 

Pepperdine, law degree from St. John’s, and a master in law from 

the Georgetown University Law Center; colonel in the United 

States Army from 1971 to 1998; extensive background as a judge 

advocate; has been Principal Deputy Counsel since the beginning 

of President Bush’s administration. 

We welcome you here, Mr. Dell’Orto, and look forward to your 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL J. DELL’ORTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy, members of the Committee. On behalf of the Department of Defense, 

please allow me to express my gratitude for the opportunity to appear before you today and for the prompt and careful consideration 

by the Committee of necessary measures in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Mr. Bradbury will speak shortly after me, and I will tell you in 

advance that I join wholeheartedly in his statement, and I ask that 

you consider these words as a supplement to his. 

The United States military has convened criminal tribunals 

other than courts-martial since the days of the very first Commander-in-Chief, George Washington. From the Revolutionary, 

Mexican-American, and Civil Wars on through World War II and 

the present, our Nation and its military have considered these tribunals an indispensable tool for the dispensation of justice in the 

chaotic and irregular circumstances of armed conflict. The military 

5 

commission system reviewed by the Court in Hamdan fits squarely 

within this long tradition. 

Tradition, however, is not the only justification for employing 

criminal adjudication processes other than courts-martial in times 

of armed conflict. Alternative processes are necessary to avoid the 

absurd result of adopting protections for terrorists that American 

citizens do not receive in civilian courts, nor do our service members receive in courts-martial. 

The court-martial system is not well known or understood outside the military. One common misperception is that courts-martial 

must necessarily render a lesser form of justice because they fall 

outside the judicial branch. But the opposite is actually true. To 

protect in court those who protect us in battle and to avoid even 

the appearance of unlawful command influence, courts-martial are 

more solicitous of the rights of the accused than are civilian courts. 

For every court-martial rule that is arguably less protective of 

the accused than its civilian analogue, there are several that are 

indisputably more protective. For example, legal counsel is provided without cost not just for the indigent, but for all. The rights 

to counsel and against self-incrimination are afforded earlier in the 

military justice system than in civilian practice. Instead of indictment by grand jury, which convenes in secret without the defendant and defense counsel, the military justice system requires for a 

general court-martial a thorough and impartial investigation open 

to the public and to the media, at which the accused and defense 

counsel may conduct pretrial discovery and call and cross-examine 

witnesses. The court-martial process allows open and full discovery 

of the Government’s information by the accused, a process more 

open and automatic than discovery in civilian criminal prosecutions. The speedy trial rules are more strict in the military justice 

system than in the civilian system. The statute of limitations that 

applies to most military offenses is shorter than the Federal statute for terrorism offenses. And the rules for exclusion of evidence 

are more generous toward the accused than their civilian counterparts. 

While tradition and common sense, therefore, provide strong support for alternative adjudication processes for terrorists and other 

unlawful enemy combatants, military necessity is perhaps the 

strongest reason of all. It is simply not feasible in time of war to 

gather evidence in a manner that meets strict criminal procedural 

requirements. Service personnel are generally not trained to execute military combat and intelligence missions while simultaneously adhering to law enforcement standards, constraints, and 

concerns about chains of custody and authentication of evidence. 

Asking our fighting men and women to take on additional duties 

traditionally performed by police officers, detectives, evidence 

custodians, and prosecutors would not only distract from their mission, but endanger their lives as well. 

Intelligence gathering would also suffer terribly. It would greatly 

impede intelligence collection essential to the war effort to tell detainees before interrogation that they are entitled to legal counsel, 

that they need not answer questions, and that their answers may 

be used against them in a criminal trial. Similarly, full application 

of court-martial rules would force the Government either to drop 

6 

prosecutions or to disclose intelligence information to our enemies 

in such a way as to compromise ongoing or future military operations, the identity of intelligence sources, and the lives of many. 

Military necessity demands a better way. 

The Hamdan decision provides Congress and the President an 

opportunity to address these critical matters together. We look forward to working with you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dell’Orto appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Dell’Orto. 

We now turn to Steven Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel. Mr. Bradbury has a bachelor’s degree from Stanford, a law degree from the University of Michigan 

magna cum laude; practiced law with Kirkland and Ellis, where he 

was a partner for 10 years; and he has been in his current position 

in the Office of Legal Counsel since 2004. 

We appreciate your coming in, Mr. Bradbury, and the floor is 

yours. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN G. BRADBURY, ACTING ASSISTANT 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy, and 

members of the Committee. 

The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the military commissions that the President established were inconsistent 

with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. The Court’s reasoning in Hamdan may be surprising and disappointing to many of us. Certainly it is without historical analogue. But it is not my intent to reargue the case this morning. The 

administration will, of course, as the President has said, abide by 

the decision of the Court. 

It is important to point out, however, that the Court did not 

question the authority of the United States to detain enemy combatants in the war on terror, and its decision does not require us 

to close Gitmo or release any terrorist. The Court implicitly recognized that the vicious attacks of al Qaeda triggered our right to use 

military force in self-defense and that we are involved in an armed 

conflict with al Qaeda. 

The Court, furthermore, made clear that its decision rested only 

on an interpretation of current statutes and treaty-based law. The 

Court did not address the President’s constitutional authority and 

did not reach any constitutional question. Therefore, Hamdan now 

gives Congress and the administration a clear opportunity to work 

together to address the matters raised by the case, including the 

appropriate procedures governing military commissions. 

In moving forward after Hamdan, the basic question we must 

answer is how best to pursue the prosecution of al Qaeda and other 

terrorist combatants in this armed conflict. Hamdan held that Congress had restricted the President’s authority to establish procedures for military commissions. The Court read the Uniform Code 

of Military Justice to require presumptively that captured enemy 

combatants, including unlawful combatants such as al Qaeda terVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
7 

rorists, will get the same military court-martial procedures that are 

provided for the members of our armed forces. 

But in trying al Qaeda terrorists for their war crimes, it is not 

appropriate, as a matter of national policy, not practical as a matter of military reality, not required by the Constitution, and not 

feasible in protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods, to 

require that military commissions follow all the procedures of a 

court-martial. 

All the issues with military commissions identified by the Supreme Court can be addressed and resolved through legislation. 

That includes the use of hearsay evidence, for example. It includes 

the use of classified information. It includes the presence of the accused. All of these issues can be addressed through legislation consistent with the Constitution and pursuant to statute adopted by 

Congress. The administration stands ready to work with Congress 

to do just that so that trials of captured al Qaeda terrorists can 

move forward. 

In its decision, Mr. Chairman, the Court also addressed the application of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda fighters in the war 

on terror. On this point, it is important to emphasize that the 

Court did not decide that the Geneva Conventions as a whole applied to our conflict with al Qaeda or that members of al Qaeda are 

entitled to the privileges of prisoner-of-war status. The Court held, 

rather, that the basic standards contained in Common Article 3 of 

the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al Qaeda. 

The Court’s conclusion that Common Article 3 applies to members of al Qaeda is a significant development that must be considered as we continue the healthy discussion between the political 

branches about the rules governing the treatment of terrorist detainees. Of course, the terrorists who fight for al Qaeda have nothing but contempt for the rules of law and the laws of war. They 

have killed thousands of innocent civilians in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania and thousands more in numerous countries around the world. They advocate unrestrained violence and 

chaos. They kidnap relief workers, behead contractors, journalists, 

and U.S. military personnel, and bomb shrines, wedding parties, 

restaurants, and hotels. They openly mock the rule of law, the Geneva Conventions, and the standards of civilized people everywhere, and they will attack us again if given the chance. 

The United States has never before applied Common Article 3 in 

the context of an armed conflict within international terrorists. 

When the Geneva Conventions were concluded in 1949, the drafters of the Conventions certainly did not anticipate armed conflicts 

with international terrorist organizations. 

We are now faced, however, with the task of implementing the 

Court’s decision on Common Article 3. Last year, Congress engaged 

in significant public debate on the standard that should govern the 

treatment of captured al Qaeda terrorists. Congress codified that 

standard in the McCain amendment, part of the Detainee Treatment Act, which prohibits ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

or punishment,’’ as defined by reference to the established meaning 

of our Constitution for all detainees held by the United States. We 

all believed that enactment of the DTA settled questions about the 

8 

baseline standard that would govern the treatment of detainees by 

the United States in the war on terror. 

That assumption is no longer true. By its interpretation of Common Article 3 in Hamdan, the Supreme Court has opposed another 

baseline standard—Common Article 3—that we must now interpret 

and implement. 

On the one hand, when reasonably read and properly applied, 

Common Article 3 will prohibit the most serious and grave offenses. Most of the provisions of Common Article 3 prohibit actions 

that are universally condemned, such as violence to life, murder, 

mutilation, torture, and the taking of hostages. These, in fact, are 

a catalogue of the most fundamental violations of international humanitarian law, and, indeed, they neatly sum up the standard tactics and methods of warfare utilized by our enemy, al Qaeda and 

its allies, who regularly perpetrate gruesome beheadings, torture, 

and indiscriminate slaughter through suicide bombings. Consistent 

with that view, some in the international community, including the 

International Committee of the Red Cross, have stated that the actions prohibited by Common Article 3 involve conduct of a serious 

nature. 

On the other hand, although Common Article 3 should be understood to apply only to serious misconduct, it is undeniable, Mr. 

Chairman, that some of the terms in Common Article 3 are inherently vague. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bradbury, how much longer will you require? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Approximately 1 more minute. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Common Article 3 prohibits outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment— 

a phrase that is susceptible of uncertain and unpredictable application. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has said that in interpreting a 

treaty provision such as Common Article 3, the meaning given to 

the treaty language by international tribunals must be accorded respectful consideration, and the interpretation adopted by other 

state parties to the treaty are due considerable weight. Accordingly, 

the meaning of Common Article 3—the baseline standard that now 

applies to the conduct of U.S. personnel in the war on terror— 

would be informed by the evolving interpretations of tribunals and 

governments outside the United States. 

Many of these interpretations to date have been consistent with 

the reading that we would give to Common Article 3. Nevertheless, 

the application of Common Article 3 will create a degree of uncertainty for those who fight to defend us from terrorist attack. The 

meaning of Common Article 3 is not merely academic. The War 

Crimes Act makes any violation of Common Article 3 a felony offense. 

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that the standards governing the 

treatment of detainees by the United States in the war on terror 

should be certain and that those standards should be defined by 

U.S. law in a manner that will fully satisfy our international obligations. 

9 

Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding the problematic aspects of the 

Court’s opinion, the decision in Hamdan gives the political 

branches an opportunity to work as one to establish the legitimate 

authority of the United States to rely on military commissions to 

bring the terrorists to justice. It is also an opportunity to come together to affirm our values as a Nation and our faith in the rule 

of law. We in the administration look forward to working with Congress to protect the American people and to ensure that unlawful 

terrorist combatants can be brought to justice consistent with the 

Supreme Court’s guidance. 

I look forward to discussing these issues with the Committee this 

morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradbury appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Bradbury. 

We will now proceed to the 5-minute rounds for members’ questioning. 

At the outset, I would ask each of you to review Senate bill 3614, 

which was introduced on June 29th, and give us your comments, 

where you think it is appropriate. 

Mr. Bradbury has said that he believes it is not necessary to follow all the procedures from courts-martial, and Mr. Dell’Orto has 

indicated his agreement with Mr. Bradbury’s statement. We would 

like to have a specification from each of you as to which provisions 

for the rules of courts-martial you think should not apply, and we 

would ask in addition that you supply to the Committee draft legislation which you think would be adequate to meet the test of the 

Supreme Court and adequately protect the classified, secret information which you have alluded to in your opening statements. 

The opening statements contain the expected level of generalization, and if you will provide responses to what I have asked for, 

do you think 2 weeks would be sufficient, Mr. Dell’Orto? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I believe so, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bradbury. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am happy right now to 

talk about specific provisions of the UCMJ. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I am going to ask you about some, but 

I want you to respond to S. 3614 and the court-martial provisions 

that you do not think should be followed and draft legislation. We 

want to proceed expeditiously in coordination with the Armed Services Committee, and then ultimately with the House, so let’s say 

2 weeks from today to have the materials to us. 

Mr. BRADBURY. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I will provide 

responses on the draft legislation that you referenced and the specific provisions— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, let me proceed now— 

Mr. BRADBURY. But, Mr. Chairman, only the President has the 

decision to introduce legislation from the executive branch, so the 

administration stands ready to work with Congress on legislation. 

I cannot commit, as I sit here now, that the administration will 

submit a particular bill. But I know the President looks forward to 

working and moving ahead quickly with Congress— 

10 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bradbury, we understand that it is the 

President’s decision in the executive branch. What I am trying to 

do is establish the time parameters so we can get moving. 

Mr. BRADBURY. I will take that back. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Okay. 

Let me take up three issues of criminal procedure: right to counsel, evidentiary standards, and the use of incriminating statements. Is there any doubt that either of you have that there has 

to be a right to counsel in proceeding by the military commission 

trying people for war crimes? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. No doubt in my mind, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bradbury. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Of course, Mr. Chairman, that was a right that 

was provided under the military commission procedures. 

Chairman SPECTER. With respect to enemy combatants who are 

not to be tried, Mr. Dell’Orto, do you think it is necessary to give 

those individuals counsel when their status is reviewed? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I do not believe there is an absolute—there is a 

right to a detained enemy combatant to counsel to represent his interests with respect to his detention. We do provide— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, the question isn’t whether there is a 

right. The question is whether we should legislate a right. Do you 

think that Congress would be correct if we give enemy combatants 

who are detained a right to counsel so that they can have an opportunity to contest the reasons for their detention? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I would disagree that we should legislate that 

provision with respect to detention. 

Chairman SPECTER. With respect to incriminating statements 

which have been made by detainees in Guantanamo, Mr. Bradbury, 

do you think that the rules which exclude coerced confessions 

should be applied by the military commissions as they are in civilian courts? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of policy, the 

Detainee Treatment Act included provisions about statements obtained through coercive questioning and indicated in the context of 

the CSRTs, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, that the 

CSRTs should weigh the probative value of those statements, and 

they could determine— 

Chairman SPECTER. So if the statements have high probative 

value, they ought to be admitted, even if they are coerced? 

Mr. BRADBURY. It should be available to the decisionmaker in the 

CSRT process, for example, to weigh the probative value against 

the prejudice of the statements. I think that is the approach Congress took in the Detainee Treatment Act. We think that is an appropriate approach for the CSRTs— 

Chairman SPECTER. My time is about up. I want to ask one more 

question before the red light goes on. How much evidence should 

be presented to keep people detained in Guantanamo in enemy 

combatant status? I would like each of you to answer. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Do you mean the standard of proof or the level 

of evidence? 

Chairman SPECTER. Correct. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, that is a policy question. Obviously, the 

CSRTs that have been created are not required by international 

11 

law. It is a policy determination. It is open for Congress to look at 

that. We think— 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Bradbury, it is a policy question. What 

is your recommendation to Congress to establish the policy? 

Mr. BRADBURY. We think that it does not necessarily have to be 

a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that perhaps a substantial-evidence standard could be used. But that is a question that 

we believe should be left up to the Department of Defense with respect to the CSRTs. In other words, we think the approach taken 

in the Detainee Treatment Act which allows the Secretary of Defense to design standards and procedures for CSRTs and then provides for court review of CSRT determinations is an appropriate 

one. And when the Congress addresses the issue of military commission procedures, at least initially we do not think there is a 

need to revisit the question of CSRT procedures. We think that was 

decided in the Detainee Treatment Act and that is an appropriate 

approach that has not been called into question by the courts. We 

think that should stay the way it is and that what we need to address in legislation is the military commission procedures and court 

review process. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Dell’Orto, I am not going to ask you to 

answer the question because I want to move on, but just a final 

comment, Mr. Bradbury. I doubt very much that Congress is going 

to be disposed to leave these issues to the Department of Defense. 

When you talk about policy, we understand that it is a policy matter. But the Congress is going to establish the policy. That is our 

job. So I would like to have your recommendations on the policy as 

to what Congress ought to establish. We are not going to leave it 

to the Department of Defense or give the Department of Defense 

a blank check. We are going to establish the standards and the policy, but we want your input before we do it. 

Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was interested 

in listening to Mr. Bradbury. I had spoken about trying to get away 

from thinking we could put all this thing down into kind of a 

bumper sticker sloganeering on the war. 

Mr. Bradbury, you spoke at great length about the beheadings by 

al Qaeda, the murders of wedding parties, and so on, something all 

of us find reprehensible. Are you suggesting that because we do not 

resort to that same thing that the United States is at a disadvantage? 

Mr. BRADBURY. No, Senator, I am not. 

Senator LEAHY. Okay. I thought we would clear that up because 

it certainly sounded otherwise in your testimony. 

Now, this Committee, as I mentioned before, held hearings a few 

weeks after the President’s military order was released in November of 2001, 5 years ago. We asked the Attorney General and the 

administration to work with us in a bipartisan way to establish a 

fair and effective, legitimate system for trying detainees in Guantanamo Bay. We offered to remove all doubts about their legality. 

And the response we received from your administration, the BushCheney administration, was that you had all the power you needed, 

and basically you told us to take off. 

12 

Now, 41⁄2 years later, we find nobody has been brought to justice 

under that system; nobody has been convicted. The Supreme Court 

has said what the President set up on his own was illegal and that 

he is breaking the law by doing it. Is there any admission on the 

part of the Bush-Cheney administration that perhaps they were 

wrong? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, I will say that in 2001 it was completely reasonable, given the state of Supreme Court precedent, to 

approach the military commission issues the way the administration— 

Senator LEAHY. Well, I would disagree with that, Mr. Bradbury. 

We have had both Republicans and Democrats that said you need 

legislation. These are Republicans and Democrats who think about 

this a great deal, as I know you do, and who felt there was not a 

clear thing that would allow the President basically to act on his 

own, take the law into his own hands, and that is why Republicans 

and Democrats alike have told the administration let’s work on 

doing something that might actually stand up in any court. 

Now, 4 years later, we still have not seen anybody convicted. We 

have had a whole lot of litigation, a lot of wasted time. My question 

is: In hindsight, would it not have been better for the Bush-Cheney 

administration, instead of saying they would do this alone, to actually have worked with the Congress and put together something, 

as we would have, that would have stood up and, having read the 

Hamdan decision, would have been upheld? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I will say, Senator, that it has never been 

the case in the history of the country that the procedures of military commissions have been established by legislation of Congress. 

That has always been something that has been left, in time of war 

and armed conflict, to the executive branch, and that is the way 

the executive branch proceeded here. 

Now, with 20/20 hindsight, obviously we are where we are. The 

Court has now spoken. It is now incumbent, we think, on both political branches to get together. We very much want to work with 

you— 

Senator LEAHY. I am glad to hear that because that was a completely different attitude than you had 5 years ago, and had there 

been that attitude 5 years ago, we probably would not be in the situation where we are, which is not a single detainee brought to justice. 

Now does the administration intend to try any of these detainees 

through courts-martial? 

Mr. BRADBURY. No, Senator. We do not believe, at least in general, that the use of the court-martial proceedings are appropriate. 

We think— 

Senator LEAHY. We have a letter from retired judge advocates, 

including two former judge advocates general of the Navy, a former 

judge advocate general of the Army, and two brigadier generals, 

saying that we should start with the premise that we already 

have—to use their words, ‘‘start with the premise that the United 

States already has the best system of military justice in the world, 

and that throughout our Nation’s history both military commissions used to try enemies captured in war and courts-martial used 

to try our own personnel have applied the same basic procedures. 

13 

We are fortunate enough to have this tried and true system which 

would be used to bring terrorists to justice.’’ Are these retired judge 

advocates general wrong? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Mr. Dell’Orto I think can speak better than 

I to the issue. I will say from what little I know—and I will not 

question the expertise of the retired JAGs—the court-martial procedures are wholly inappropriate for the current circumstances and 

would be infeasible for the trial of these alien enemy combatants. 

Hearsay rules required by the UCMJ simply cannot be squared 

with the proceedings we are talking about here, and I will say, 

Senator, that a good example to look to is the international criminal tribunals, for example, for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, which regularly allow the use of hearsay evidence, as long as 

the evidence is probative and reliable in the determination of the 

fact finder, and as long as it is not outweighed by undue prejudice—a simple approach which is consistent with international 

practice in international criminal tribunals trying war crimes, 

which is what we are talking about here. So I think that approach 

is the approach to look to. 

We do not think it is appropriate, for example, to start with the 

UCMJ in its full panoply of procedural protections and rights and 

then talk about individual procedures that might be stripped out. 

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Dell’Orto, do you agree? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I do agree, Senator. 

Senator LEAHY. Do you think these retired JAGs are wrong? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Well, first of all, I do not know who they are, 

Senator, and I would suspect that there is going to be considerable 

disagreement with that view from other members of the uniform 

legal leadership. 

Senator LEAHY. I will put their letter in the record and make 

sure you have a copy. It is Major General John Pugh, U.S. Army; 

Rear Admiral Donald Guter; Rear Admiral John D. Hudson; Brigadier General David Brahms, U.S. Marine Corps; and Brigadier 

General James Cullen, U.S. Army, all retired. 

Chairman SPECTER. Without objection, the letter will be made a 

part of the record. 

Under our early-bird rule, we call on Senators in order of arrival, 

and they will be Senator Sessions, Senator Kyl, Senator Hatch, 

Senator Cornyn, and Senator Graham on the Republican side, and 

Senator Feinstein, Senator Kohl, Senator Feingold, Senator Biden, 

Senator Kennedy on the Democratic side. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With regard to the decision of the Court and the court-martial 

process, it seems to me that they did not require a following of the 

specific standards of the United States court-martial. Is that correct? 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. And I guess Justice Stevens suggested those 

were general procedures that would be considered in drafting, creating a legitimate procedure? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, of course, the Court only was addressing the President’s authority under existing statutes. And 

what the Court said was under existing statutes, when the PresiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
14 

dent sets up military commissions, presumptively their procedures 

have to be uniform with courts-martial unless there is a very 

strong, practical reason why they should vary from that. And they 

did not accept the President’s reasons. 

With respect to Congress and your choices in designing procedures, the Court set no limitations on that, did not speak to the 

limitations that might apply under the Constitution. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think this is a key point, and I think 

we need to focus on it. This Congress has got to be realistic. I was 

in Iraq. I talked to the team that investigates bombings, examines 

the material and the bomb explosives to identify the people who 

may have done it. They identified a bomber that had made, they 

thought, many, many bombs, and this person was released on some 

technicality. 

All I would say is this is a life-and-death matter. People are 

dying in Iraq and can die in this country on a regular basis, and 

we have got to provide people with a legitimate trial process. I 

have no doubt about that. And I do not believe we have any basis 

or legitimacy in torture, which the President has consistently rejected. 

But let’s talk about some of the practical problems of trying people captured somewhere on the battlefield in Afghanistan or in 

Iraq. They are now being held in Guantanamo. Mr. Dell’Orto, 

thinking about it from the Department of Defense’s position, have 

we got to have every witness who was present there at the time 

at the scene? We may not even know who they are, correct? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. And soldiers who go out and kick in a door 

and find bomb materials and information that implicates a certain 

person, they are not police officers; they do not maintain chain of 

custody like the average police officer is trained to do. Would they? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. That is absolutely correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. What about if there might be Iraqi citizens 

participating. Have we now got to search them out all over the 

world and bring them here because they may have been a witness 

to the events? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. It is a practical problem with respect to conducting trials away from the site of the offense. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think there are a lot of things that concern 

me about that. When we talk about coerced confessions, I am a 

prosecutor and I know how strict the rules are in the United States 

and in the courts-martial with regard to coerced confessions. But 

I have never believed—and a number of Justices on the Supreme 

Court have so dissented—that it is required you read someone the 

Constitution before you ask them questions about whether or not 

they were involved in an act, a criminal act. But we do that under 

the Miranda rules. We give them all these warnings. 

Do you think that those kind of warnings are required before 

someone should be tried under this commission process? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, under the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, the right to remain silent, the so-called Miranda rights 

kick in far earlier than they do in a civilian police apprehension 

setting. And so— 

15 

Senator SESSIONS. They are even more strict in the court-martial 

military justice system than in the court system of the United 

States. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. That is the point, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. And then we would be providing these terrorists who have been captured by untrained military officers, by soldiers who are untrained in those issues, we would be trying them 

and providing them greater privileges than are legitimate under 

the— 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Under our civilian practice. 

Senator SESSIONS. Civil law. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Yes, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. And with regard to coercion, Mr. Chairman, 

let me just say this: We do not allow any coercion. Do you remember the great burial speech case where, 5–4, the U.S. Supreme 

Court ruled that a police officer had a man in the car with him, 

he had said he wanted counsel, he said, ‘‘Well, that young child is 

out there in the snow. You ought to tell where that body is so they 

can have a Christian burial.’’ That was the statement. And he said, 

‘‘OK, turn left here,’’ and took them to the body. They struck that 

down as a coercive statement. 

We do not need to be providing that kind of privileges to people 

captured on the battlefield. I think this is very, very serious. It has 

tremendous practical implications. We want a fair trial. We want 

a just trial. We want to give people legitimate privileges that are 

necessary to a just trial. But all the provisions that are engrafted 

in the United States Code, State law, and Federal constitutional 

privileges are not required in military commissions. They never 

have been. 

So as we go forward, I just would urge that we be careful, Mr. 

Chairman, that we think this through, consider the practical implications, and I am sure you will. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

welcome, gentlemen. Let me begin by trying to get a couple of facts 

straight. What is the detainee population today, not just Guantanamo but the total detainee population today? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. We are talking about the war on terror, Senator? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I would say that it is probably on the order of 

about a thousand. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. How many of the thousand have had some 

form of hearing? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Well, all those that we have at Guantanamo 

have had their Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearings and at 

least, I believe, one Administrative Review Board hearing. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And the Guantanamo population is around 

400 today? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. It is a little bit higher than that, probably on the 

order of about 450, Senator. But, of course, it does vary. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So everybody there has had a hearing. Now, 

how many—and I do not know the correct words, but let me strugVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
16 

gle. How many convictions and sentences have been leveled from 

the hearings? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Well, those are administrative determinations, 

Senator, that determine, with respect to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, first whether those people continue to be unlawful 

enemy combatants. So that is the first—that is the second determination that is made as to the appropriateness of continuing to 

detain them. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. That is helpful. How many then 

are unlawful enemy combatants? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Well, all of those who are currently at Guantanamo have— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All 425, or whatever that— 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. All 450, 425, whatever that current number is. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. And the second review is the Administrative Review Board, which is conducted on an annual basis, to determine 

whether the person should continue to be detained. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And how many of those hearings have been 

held? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. At least one per detainee, is my belief at this 

point. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. At Guantanamo. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. At Guantanamo, we may be actually going beyond that at this point for the second round or third round of— 

probably the second round of those. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Now, this morning’s Financial Times 

is reporting that the Pentagon has reversed its policy on detainees 

and stated that the protections provided by the Geneva Conventions will be afforded to those at Guantanamo. Mr. Bradbury, in 

your written testimony, you state, and I quote, ‘‘The Supreme 

Court’s conclusions that Common Article 3 applies to members of 

al Qaeda is a significant development that must be considered as 

we discuss what standards and procedures govern.’’ 

Is the Financial Times correct? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, if I may, let me try to answer that. The 

Supreme Court spoke in Hamdan when it issued its decision. 

Based upon that decision, the Department determined that it 

would be appropriate to announce that decision to our forces and 

to ensure that what we believed to be the case prior to the decision 

was still the case, and that is that our people were being treated 

humanely. In order to ensure that that word got out and also that 

we had the opportunity to have our commanders in the field and 

others with responsibilities in this area report back that what they 

were doing was consistent with what our guidance had been previously, that memo went out. It does not indicate a shift in policy. 

It just announces the decision of the Court and with specificity as 

to the decision as it related to the commission process. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I know you regard the Geneva Conventions as vague, but let me ask it this way: Today, are the Geneva 

Conventions being carried out, Common Article 3? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. We believe that the treatment that all detainees 

are receiving under DOD control, under DOD custody, are being 

17 

treated in a manner that meets the Common Article 3 standard or 

exceeds it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So the answer is yes? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Bradbury, in reading your testimony, beginning on page 4, you say that it is not possible to provide Miranda rights, a right to counsel, to utilize rules of evidence, you 

cannot get reliable hearsay evidence, no sworn testimony. 

Based on all of the areas that you feel that provide due process 

to people are not possible to grant in a setting such as Guantanamo, do you believe that the Guantanamo facility still serves a 

useful purpose following the Supreme Court decision? Or would it 

be better to have a commission, if it was authorized by the Congress, function in surroundings closer to the availability of witnesses and evidence? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, I am not in a position to express 

a military judgment, but it is my sense that Guantanamo certainly 

provides an important function of keeping dangerous terrorists off 

the battlefield. With legislation from Congress, military commissions for those detainees held at Guantanamo can move forward 

again. And just to clarify, in my testimony I am not suggesting 

they should have no right to counsel in military commissions. I am 

simply contrasting what we believe the military commission process should be against the Uniform Code of Military Justice requirements that persons who are suspected of crimes, as soon as they 

are suspected of crimes, get their Miranda warnings and get free 

access to counsel immediately. And it is that kind of extraordinary 

access to counsel and Miranda warnings that we think, for example, would be inconsistent with simply questioning detainees to get 

vital intelligence from them. 

So that kind of access to counsel at that point in the proceedings, 

we are not saying that there should not be access to counsel for 

military commissions, absolutely not. The military commissions 

that the Secretary of Defense has set up does provide a right to 

counsel, a right, in fact, to both Government counsel provided by 

the military, a trained Government defense counsel, and the right 

to private counsel of the detainee’s choice, subject to certain conditions. And we would see no reason to change that in any legislation 

that we might talk to you about. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Senator 

Feinstein’s referral to that article in the Financial Times because 

I think it is important to clarify what the Defense Department’s position is. And as I—well, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 

that the statement of Gordon England regarding the application of 

Common Article 3 dated July 7, 2006, be inserted in the record at 

this point. 

Chairman SPECTER. Without objection, it will be made part of the 

record. 

Senator KYL. And it is very clear that what Secretary England 

was saying is the Court has spoken, and, therefore—and I am 

18 

quoting now—‘‘you will ensure that all DOD personnel adhere to 

these standards. In this regard, I request that you promptly review 

all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures under your review to ensure that they comply with the 

standards of Common Article 3.’’ 

In other words, Mr. Chairman, he is simply saying, in effect, that 

until something changes, we have got to follow what the Court said 

and just make sure that you do so, and I think that is appropriate 

under the circumstance. 

I would like to ask three questions here. First of all, to distinguish between the matter of holding detainees to prevent them 

from returning to the battlefield from a decision to prosecute them, 

just give us a sense, Mr. Dell’Orto, of why that decision is sometimes made and the rough number of people compared to the total 

detained to whom it would apply. 

And, second, I would like to have you just emphasize a little bit 

more the distinction between the rationale for our soldiers, whom 

we put in harm’s way and send into dangerous places to perform 

missions, and grant them rights under the UCMJ when they are 

accused of a crime, the rationale for the rights granted to them 

versus the rationale for treatment of terrorists captured on the battlefield, is there a rationale for treating them equally? 

And, finally, if you could be a little bit more specific in detailing 

the damage to the prosecution, damage to intelligence collection, 

and damage to intelligence protection if you apply the UCMJ to 

terrorists, and I would be happy to specify that third question if 

I have gone too far here. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. With respect to the first part of the question, 

Senator, I think you were asking what decisions are made with respect to detention versus what decisions are made with respect to 

prosecution. 

Senator KYL. Right. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. When we detain people on the battlefield, it is 

consistent with historical law of armed conflict that those people 

may be detained until the end of the conflict, whenever that may 

be. When prisoners were picked up during World War II, at the 

time of their capture they had no way of knowing how long they 

would be detained. And, indeed, we detained upwards of half a million principally German and Italian soldiers within the United 

States during World War II until the conflict ended, and even beyond, before they could be repatriated. 

And so we go through that process with respect to these people. 

They are picked up on the battlefield. They are screened on the 

battlefield. Some number of them do wind up at Guantanamo, and 

some of them do remain in Afghanistan. Those detainees can be detained under the law of armed conflict until such time as this conflict ends. Now, granted, it may take a significant period of time. 

We have already been at this longer than we were during World 

War II. 

We have taken some extraordinary steps in that we have returned some of these individuals to their countries based upon an 

assessment while the hostilities continue that they do not pose a 

significant threat to this country. 

19 

Now, there are some number of those who we believe to have 

committed acts that are so significant as unlawful combatants that 

they merit trial by military commission and for violations of the 

law of war. And so some number of those people are under scrutiny 

right now—some have been charged, others are under scrutiny—for 

the process of a military commission, whether—now based upon 

what this body proposes by way of legislation that is ultimately 

signed by the President, whatever form that might be. There are 

some number of those people, and probably on the order of right 

now I would say 50 to 80 or 100 or so who probably are serious 

candidates for commission processes. 

And so that is where we deal with those folks, and those people 

ultimately when they are tried, if they are convicted, will serve 

some sort of a sentence that is imposed by that commission. 

Senator KYL. Before the time runs out, let me forget the third 

question for right now but at least ask you to comment on the second question I asked, which is: Is there a distinction between the 

rationale for the rights provided to members of our military under 

the Uniform Military Code of Justice and the rationale for the 

rights provided to terrorists? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. We have taken great care and this body has 

taken great care to ensure that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines get the greatest protections possible in our court-martial 

process, going back to 1950, the Military Justice Act of 1950, in the 

aftermath of World War II. Given the concerns over the types of 

proceedings that were conducted by the court-martial equivalent 

during World War II, we did provide greater protections for our 

servicemembers. 

In 1968, we did the same as a result of concerns about lack of 

a trial judiciary, the role of the judge in a court-martial proceeding 

and other things, we further enhanced our system. And in 1983, we 

brought the Federal Rules of Evidence, to the extent that they can 

be applied, into that system as well—all because we wanted to ensure that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and Coast 

Guardsmen had the best possible protection when they underwent 

the disciplinary process that is part of a court-martial. 

It contains numerous rights for an accused that go well beyond 

what, as I have said, we have in our civilian courts, go well beyond 

what takes place in domestic criminal courts in other countries. It 

would be ludicrous in my estimation to accord those sorts of rights 

at that level to that degree to the sorts of people we have here who 

would get far less in the way of protections were they tried in their 

home countries, wherever those countries might be. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kyl. 

Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, in defending the need for military tribunals, the administration has claimed that the tribunals were important for 

swift justice in prosecuting enemy combatants, and yet here only 

several years later, only ten people have been charged, probably as 

a result of the questionable legal status of the tribunals themselves. 

20 

Gentlemen, can we agree that there has to be a better way to 

prosecute the terrorists in our custody and achieve the administration’s express desire for swift justice? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, I would say that certainly in the 

wake of the Court’s decision, the only way forward with confidence 

to have military commissions where we can now swiftly bring them 

to justice is through legislation that puts military commissions on 

a solid footing in the eyes of the Court. 

The Court did leave open the theoretical possibility that the 

President could come back on his own and provide more of a detailed justification for why in particular instances he thinks it is 

impractical to use the court-martial proceeding. So the Court did 

leave us that option, but, frankly, I think at this point, as you suggest, the President believes it is better to move forward jointly with 

Congress to get legislation we can all agree on to define the military commission authorization and to some extent the procedures 

so that we can move forward and be ensured that at the end of the 

day they will be upheld by the courts. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I would say that given the system that 

has been designed as structured, were this body to render its approval for that system as it is currently configured with all the 

rights that are embodied in that system and allow us to go forward 

would be a very expeditious way to move these trials very quickly. 

Senator KOHL. Gentlemen, the majority’s opinion in Hamdan has 

been characterized by some as a rebuke of this administration’s expansive theory of executive power. Do you agree with that characterization? 

Mr. BRADBURY. I actually do not, Senator, because what I emphasized at the beginning, the Court carefully, I think, made it 

clear it did not reach constitutional issues, did not address the 

President’s inherent authority under Article II, kept itself limited, 

and Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote, made it very 

clear in his concurring opinion that his joining of the majority was 

quite limited and focused to two provisions in the UCMJ and the 

Common Article 3 provision of the Geneva Conventions that we 

have discussed. And all of the Justices, all eight of them, including 

Justice Breyer, for example, in his separation opinion, made it very 

clear that all of the issues the Court addressed could be addressed 

and resolved through legislation by Congress. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I disagree with the characterization that you report, Senator. 

Senator KOHL. Gentlemen, in Hamdan, the Court said there 

were two options available for trying terrorist suspects in Guantanamo under current law: first, the administration could use the existing courts-martial system; and, second, it could use military 

commissions that comply with the requirements of the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 

Are either of these options, in your opinion, adequate? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I would say, consistent with my earlier 

answer, that the most expeditious way to do it would be to essentially ratify the process that is already in place with the military 

commissions. I think to rework, even modestly, the court-martial 

process to account for the difficulties, the real practical difficulties 

21 

in trying these particular combatants for their war crimes would 

cause probably a greater period of time, probably less productive 

debate, and ultimately cost us time in getting on with the business 

of trying these folks. And so I would urge that we move forward 

with the military commission process that the Supreme Court 

seems to—apparently, based upon what you say, has been open to 

us—has left open to us as an option. 

Senator KOHL. Mr. Bradbury. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Yes, certainly as I have said before, Senator, I do 

not think the use of the UCMJ procedures is appropriate or is feasible. And I spoke about the option of the President acting unilaterally to try to put in place, again, the military commission process. 

That would entail, in effect, going back to the courts and having 

the same discussion with the courts that we intend to have with 

the Congress about the need for each of the provisions in the military commission process, why it is impractical to use other provisions of the UCMJ, et cetera. 

I think the risk there is that you can only have that dialog after 

the fact with the Court in litigation briefs. The Court may disagree, 

and then you are right back to where we are now. So we think it 

is better at this point to have that dialog with Congress. 

We do think when the Congress looks at the current procedures 

that have been set up for the military commissions, the Congress 

will agree that there are good, sound policy reasons and practical 

need—reasons of practical necessity to have the provisions that are 

currently in there. But it is obviously up to Congress to look at 

those provisions. We think that that is something that does need 

to happen now in the wake of the court case, and we are ready, 

willing, and able to work quickly with Congress to make it happen. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Kohl. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As the Ranking Member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I 

am very concerned that classified information does not fall into the 

hands of the enemy, and that is only one of the reasons why the 

Hamdan decision troubles me greatly. 

Now, the Court stated that the rules in the manual for courtmartial must apply to military commissions unless impracticable. 

At least that is the way I interpret it. Those rules are codified in 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but that raises a number of 

questions, and Mr. Dell’Orto, you pointed out in your statement, in 

your testimony, that courts-martial are actually more solicitous of 

the rights of the accused than our own civilian courts. 

Now, let me ask both of you to comment on one example and perhaps add your own. In an Article 32 proceeding, which is the military version of a grand jury, the investigation is conducted by an 

impartial investigating officer and is open to the public. Am I 

right? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Generally, they are open to the public, Senator. 

Senator HATCH. Unless the accused is disruptive, he must be 

present and has a right to call his own witnesses and cross-examine the Government witnesses and, like I say, call his own witnesses. That is right, isn’t it? 

22 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. That is correct. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. If the accused chooses to make ‘‘an 

unsworn’’ statement at the Article 32 proceeding, it is not subject 

to cross-examination by Government counsel, right? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I am not sure about that, off the top of 

my head. Certainly at trial, with respect to sentencing, that is a 

permissible way for the accused to offer his statement to the Court. 

I am not sure that applies—I would have to go back and take a 

look at the rules. 

Senator HATCH. Would you check on that for us? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I will. 

Senator HATCH. Because that is my understanding. 

Now, does the Supreme Court’s decision not open the possibility 

that classified information presented in an Article 32 proceeding 

would be compromised and possibly fall into the hands of terrorists? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Certainly that classified information could, and 

that is a huge concern in these proceedings. 

Senator HATCH. Under the decision, will not the suspected terrorist be exposed to our classified information? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. If we proceed under a court-martial process, it 

would call for disclosure to the defendant or exclusion of the evidence so that it is not presentable in the case against him. 

Senator HATCH. So you might not be able to make the case— 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. That is possible, Senator. 

Senator HATCH [continuing].—With the evidence that you have. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Possible. 

Senator HATCH. Or is this one of the considerations that would 

make application of these court-martial procedures impracticable? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. That is one of the key considerations in my estimation, Senator. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. Now, Mr. Bradbury, do you care to comment on any of those questions or any of those comments? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I will just say quickly, Senator, that an Article 32 investigation, as it is done under the UCMJ, makes absolutely no sense in the context of a military commission prosecution. 

That is a very generous investigation procedure, much more generous and open than a grand jury proceeding. The defendant gets 

to participate fully, as you suggest, in the investigation— 

Senator HATCH. But some are interpreting this decision to require that, right? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, currently it does since it requires the President to use military commission—excuse me, court-martial proceedings if he is going to move forward with military commissions. 

And that is part of a court-martial proceeding. 

As to classified information generally at trial, the procedures 

under Article 46 of the UCMJ require the prosecution to share with 

the defendant any classified information that the prosecution intends to use as evidence in the trial, and we think that, again, that 

kind of absolute right is unworkable and inappropriate because 

there will necessarily be some cases— 

Senator HATCH. Especially in a wartime situation. 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is correct, where there is some classified information obtained, sources and methods of intelligence that simply 

23 

cannot be shared with the defendant himself who is a terrorist. But 

obviously we are talking about circumstances under the current 

rules where we do provide counsel and the counsel would have access to that information. And then the military commission panel 

itself would be able to judge whether summaries or substitutes 

should be used as evidence in the trial and exposed to the detainee 

and would be able to judge whether the exclusion of the detainee 

from any aspect of the proceedings calls into question the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. That is a judgment that has to 

be made on a case-by-case basis by the commission panel, and then 

it can be reviewed. Under the DTA, it can be reviewed by the D.C. 

Circuit. 

Senator HATCH. Let me just ask one other question. You said in 

your testimony, Mr. Bradbury, that you were concerned about the 

fact that Miranda rights would have to be given under certain circumstances, that hearsay testimony would be disallowed. Explain 

that to all of us so that people watching will understand what you 

are talking about there. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, of course, Miranda rights, as we all know, 

tell the defendant, ‘‘You have the right to remain silent. You have 

the right to a lawyer.’’ 

Senator HATCH. Right off the bat. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Right off the bat. And under the UCMJ, of 

course, it is much more protective than in civilian criminal courts. 

In civilian courts, it does not apply until the person is in custody 

for questioning, custodial questioning. Under the UCMJ, it applies 

as soon as there is a suspicion that the person may have committed 

a crime. At the first point of suspicion, articles of UCMJ require 

the Government prosecutors to inform the person of the suspicion 

and to advise the person he has a right to remain silent and he 

has a right to a lawyer and that a lawyer will be provided free of 

charge to him. 

Of course, if you did that with detainees in the war on terror, 

you are not going to get any further information out of them at 

that point. 

Senator HATCH. Well, it could make the difference between 

whether thousands die or not. 

Mr. BRADBURY. It could. You are not going to—it pretty much 

will put a stop to the questioning of the detainee for intelligence 

purposes. 

Senator HATCH. Hearsay? 

Mr. BRADBURY. In point of fact, Senator, it would obligate the 

soldier of the field, the corporal who beats down, knocks down the 

door, to advise that detainee of his rights if he believed that detainee to have committed a crime. 

Senator HATCH. Hearsay? 

Mr. BRADBURY. On hearsay, Senator, of course, that might require—prohibition on the use of hearsay might require front-line 

troops to come home from the battlefield to participate in legal proceedings. So, in other words, they will have to fight the terrorists 

not only on the battlefield, but also in the courtroom. 

In addition, it is very difficult to get all the witnesses that may 

be needed from whom sworn statements may be taken or statements that are reliable and probative may be taken on the battleVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
24 

field from other terrorists, for example, from collaborators with the 

person who is on trial. And the requirement that those persons 

have to be present in court for their statements to be received into 

evidence is not a requirement, for example, that is imposed in the 

international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia or for Rwanda, because it is understood that when you are trying war crimes, it is 

not always practicable that the people who were the witnesses to 

the acts can be brought in from the far-flung locations where the 

acts may have taken place. 

If you have reliable statements from them and they are probative—and that, again, is something that ought to be judged by 

the panel that is reviewing the evidence— 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

We are going to have to move on. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this hearing, and I want to ask a couple questions so I will 

ask that my full statement be included in the record. But first— 

Chairman SPECTER. Without objection, your full statement will 

be made a part of the record. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. The Supreme Court’s decision striking down 

the President’s military commissions is, in fact, yet another major 

rebuke to an administration that has too often disregarded the rule 

of law. The Supreme Court has once again affirmed that detainees 

must be accorded basic rights and treated humanely pursuant to 

U.S. law as well as universally respected international standards. 

It is a testament to our system of Government that the Supreme 

Court stood up against this administration’s overreaching. 

We are fortunate to live in a country where the checks and balances in Government are real. The administration’s extreme theories of executive power, its unilateral approach, and its refusal to 

listen to any dissent, including from military attorneys and experts 

in the executive branch, have been entirely counterproductive and 

have harmed our relations around the world, weakening us in the 

fight against al Qaeda and its allies. 

If this administration had not argued that detainees were not 

subject to the Geneva Conventions, if this administration had not 

argued that detainees had no right to counsel or to make their case 

in Federal court, if this administration had not insisted on trying 

those few detainees who were charged with crimes in tribunals 

lacking basic due process, and if this administration had not sought 

to exploit every ambiguity in the law to justify its unprecedented 

actions, we would not be where we are today. 

Now, in the aftermath of the Hamdan decision, we are faced with 

an important question, one that Congress and the President should 

have worked together to answer 4 years ago: 

How do we try a suspected terrorist captured overseas? 

There is one option that would allow trials to begin immediately, 

without further legislation and with the least likelihood of further 

successful legal challenges: use our long-established military system of justice. In fact, Justice Kennedy, whom Mr. Bradbury cited, 

25 

also said in his concurrence that that might be our best option 

when he said, ‘‘The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on 

standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures of the 

moment.’’ 

However we move forward, the individuals held at Guantanamo 

Bay should be tried in accordance with our fundamental American 

values and the laws of war. Unfortunately, we have already heard 

some Members of Congress argue that Congress should simply authorize the President’s existing military commission structure. I 

think that would be a grave mistake. How the Congress proceeds 

in the wake of the Hamdan decision will say a lot about how it 

views the fundamental principles that make our country great. 

Mr. Bradbury, I would like to talk to you a little bit about the 

effect of the Hamdan decision on your legal analysis of the President’s authority to direct the National Security Agency to conduct 

warrantless wiretaps in violation of FISA. The Supreme Court held 

in Hamdan that the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed 

by Congress in September 2001 did not authorize military commissions or change in any way the existing statute in the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice. Not only that, but Justice Kennedy’s opinion made clear that the President has to follow the statutes that 

Congress writes, even when he is acting under his Article II powers 

as Commander-in-Chief. 

Let me read to you what a majority of Justices on the Supreme 

Court said: ‘‘There is nothing in the text or legislative history of 

the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter 

the authorization of Article 21 of the UCMJ.’’ 

Mr. Bradbury, doesn’t the Court’s rejection of the administration’s AUMF argument apply equally to the position it has taken 

on the NSA program? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Senator, I really do not think so, and let me explain just briefly why. 

The Court in Hamdi, as you well know, held that the AUMF 

does authorize the President to detain enemy combatants in the 

war on terror, including those who are U.S. citizens. And, of course, 

the Court there addressed another statute, which the petitioner in 

that case relied on, which is 18 U.S.C. 4001(a), which says that no 

U.S. citizen shall be detained, except pursuant to an act of Congress. And the Court in Hamdi said the AUMF, even though it 

does not say anything on its face about detention or authority to 

detain U.S. citizens, did provide authority pursuant to an act of 

Congress consistent with 4001 to detain enemy—that U.S. citizen. 

Now, we have not argued with respect to the NSA program, the 

terrorist surveillance program, that the Authorization for the Use 

of Military Force altered or expanded or superseded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that part. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Instead, FISA, just like the statute at issue in 

Hamdi, says you do not do electronic surveillance under color of 

law unless authorized—except as authorized by statute. And the 

Authorization for the Use of Military Force is a statute. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I see my time is up, but let me just say, Mr. 

Chairman, that I find these arguments to be astounding. I mean, 

Justice Kennedy basically followed the principles of the steel seiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
26 

zure case, and this sort of argument that somehow there is this 

whole independent way of looking at clear statutory language flies 

in the face of reality. Even Cass Sunstein, who was one of the few 

lawyers who previously thought that the AUMF argument might 

have some basis, now has said, ‘‘After Hamdan, the defense of the 

NSA foreign surveillance program is much more difficult.’’ And I 

would hope that there would be some honest acknowledgment that 

this does have an enormous impact on what I already consider to 

be a clearly illegal program. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Mr. Bradbury, do you want to respond to that? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Yes, please, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator, I would refer the Senator to a letter we just sent this 

week to Senator Schumer in response to his questions on this exact 

point, where we laid out our current thinking. I will say that we 

are continuing to look at the opinion. We are always looking at 

legal developments. As the Chairman well knows, we are working 

closely with the Chairman, with Senator DeWine, other Members 

of Congress, on the possibility of legislation moving forward on the 

NSA program as well. But I would be happy to speak further with 

you about these issues in response to your review of the letter to 

Senator Schumer. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you for that offer. 

Mr. Chairman, I would just say to the administration that, you 

know, maybe you can come up with some argument and you can 

litigate this and take it all the way to the Supreme Court. My 

guess is you are going to lose again, and there comes a point where 

this does harm to us and our system of Government to constantly 

assert the most extreme and tortured interpretation. We should be 

working together, and I know in your last statement you did suggest that that might be a possibility. Let’s see if we can get to the 

point where we— 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feingold. Thank you, 

Mr. Bradbury. 

Moving on now to Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to see if we can achieve some common understanding as to what the Court held and what it did not hold. When 

I read the Hamdan opinion, it appears to say, the Court appears 

to say that detainees must be tried before a regularly constituted 

court, and they look to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 

as establishing that requirement, among other places. 

What the Court did not say is what the procedures that would 

apply, what they should be. In fact, as has been noted previously, 

there was an emphasis on what is practicable in terms of those 

procedures, and I want to explore that a little bit with you. 

First of all, I want to say that, you know, we have all come to 

learn in the last 5 years that the pre-9/11 mind-set where we treated terrorists as criminals only, but did not recognize the importance of intelligence gathering to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist 

activities was an important part of our ability to keep our country 

safe. Some have suggested that the Court’s reference to Common 

Article 3 was much broader than just the requirement that detainVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
27 

ees be tried before a regularly constituted court, but to suggest that 

detainees would be entitled to special privileges accorded to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention or perhaps the rights 

of an American citizen tried in a regular criminal court in the 

country. 

First of all, let me ask Mr. Dell’Orto and Mr. Bradbury, do you 

and I share a common understanding about the scope of the Court’s 

decision relating primarily to the forum and the nature of the 

forum as opposed to the procedures that must be applied to that 

trial? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Senator, if I may, actually I think it is somewhere in between. As to Common Article 3, I think the implications 

of the Court’s holding do go beyond simply the conduct of military 

commissions and the procedures that would apply to military commissions. What the Court said is Common Article 3 applies to our 

conflict with al Qaeda. The Court actually said the conflict with al 

Qaeda is not an international conflict, contrary to what the President had previously determined and, therefore, that Common Article 3, which only applies to conflicts that are not international in 

character—internal civil wars, for example—it applies. Common 

Article 3 carries with it a number of standards, both procedural but 

also, perhaps more importantly, substantive. 

Senator CORNYN. Let me ask you about, and I know the clock 

keeps ticking. The Red Cross’ own guidelines make clear, though, 

that for an individual to earn POW status as opposed to the rights 

that a detainee has to receive humane treatment, the individual 

must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, 

must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, must 

carry arms openly, and, four, must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 

Would you agree with me that the detainees at Guantanamo 

Bay, al Qaeda specifically, are not entitled to POW status for the 

reasons they do not meet those qualifications and the Court did not 

hold that they are entitled to full POW status? 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is absolutely right. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I agree, Senator. 

Mr. BRADBURY. The President made a determination on that. 

That was not an issue the Court addressed, and Common Article 

3 does not provide the full privileges of prisoner of war status. 

Senator CORNYN. And just to take the point a little further, if 

they were entitled to POW status, would they have to merely 

produce name, rank, and serial number in response to our interrogations? In other words, could we use the kind of interrogation 

techniques that have produced actionable intelligence if these individuals were entitled to the full protection of POW status? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. They would only be obligated to answer certain 

questions. That does not mean they could not be asked additional 

questions, and repeatedly asked those questions, to see if they 

would be willing to divulge the information. 

Senator CORNYN. But the kind of information that we have obtained in the course of those interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, 

have they produced actionable intelligence that has saved American lives, Mr. Dell’Orto? 

28 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. We believe they have produced that sort of information that we are using, Senator. 

Senator CORNYN. And, in fact, the Pentagon sent me a letter following one of the earlier hearings during Judge Alberto Gonzales’ 

confirmation as Attorney General, which lays out a detail of some 

of the instances where that kind of actionable intelligence has been 

obtained. And I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that 

that be made part of the record. 

Chairman SPECTER. Without objection, that letter will be made 

a part of the record. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I think there are two very legitimate and different 

paths and pieces we can focus on. One is the constitutionality 

under our Constitution of our behavior, our actions dealing with 

detainees. The second is the efficacy of the action we are taking in 

the war on terror. They may be separable. One could argue that 

something could be very efficacious and that we are doing in the 

war on terror that may be unconstitutional. One could argue that 

they have to be the same. But I would like to sort of separate these 

two arguments. 

One of my problems with the administration that concerns me 

the most is that with regard to the so-called war on terror—and 

this is a little above maybe both our pay grades. It is not your responsibility, I understand. But with regard to the war on terror, 

the administration has focused almost exclusively on tactic and not 

on strategy. And let me explain what I mean by that. 

Secretary Rumsfeld is very well known for his snowflakes, those 

memoranda he sends throughout the Defense Department that 

raise real questions. Not long ago he sent out one of his snowflakes 

that asked the question—I am paraphrasing—Are our actions creating more terrorists than we are deterring? And to me, the answer 

is clearly no, they are not deterring more terrorists than we are 

creating. 

To use a phrase that was used by Tom Friedman, he refers to 

Guantanamo as ‘‘the anti-Statue of Liberty.’’ You need only look at 

the international polling data. You need only travel the world, as 

I do as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. You need 

only visit and talk to our military people of flag rank in Iraq, as 

I did this past weekend, to understand that they think these actions are hurting us, not helping us. 

So there are separable arguments here, and so from my standpoint, I wonder whether or not, although we must focus on the constitutionality—and that is what the Hamdan case calls into question—I would argue that we are not paying a whole lot of attention 

to the larger, broader strategic question of are we winning this war 

on terror. You may get one detainee through actions that the rest 

of the world views as totally illegitimate and inconsistent with who 

we are, although arguably constitutional, and as a consequence of 

that produce four more suicide bombers coming out of Somalia. 

Does anybody here think the actions that have taken place in 

Guantanamo, does anybody here think that the actions taking 

29 

place at Abu Ghraib, does anybody think the actions that were alleged to have taken place at the hands of renegade military, American military, have not fundamentally put our troops in danger? 

Does anybody think that? 

I don’t know what planet we are on here. And yet we necessarily 

have to argue about the tactic. I got that. That is legitimate. But 

I think we should sort of just get above this about 1,000 feet and 

look down. I am telling you, guys, things ain’t good in Happy Valley. Come back to Iraq with me, my seventh trip. Speak to our military. Listen to them. Listen to them. Go around the world, every 

single capital, even those folks who were with us. 

So here is my question: The U.S. Government—the 9/11 Commission issued a report giving our country a grade of ‘‘Unfulfilled’’ 

when it comes to detainee policies. The Commission stated, ‘‘The 

U.S. Government’s treatment of captured terrorists, including detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists in military prisons 

and secret detention centers abroad, as well as reports of the abuse 

of detainees, have elicited criticism around the globe. Dissension either at home or abroad on how the United States treats captured 

terrorists only makes it harder to build the diplomatic, political, 

and military alliances necessary to fight the war on terror effectively.’’ 

It then goes on to suggest the following: ‘‘The U.S. should work 

with its allies to develop a mutually acceptable standard for terrorist detention.’’ 

Don’t you all think that is a good idea, sit down with our allies, 

beyond what we are doing here, and get a mutually agreed to way 

in which it is appropriate to treat detainees for our own safety’s 

sake? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Senator, I would say I know for a fact that good 

people at the State Department and the President are working 

hard to do just that. I would say, though, that the world we live 

in is a dangerous place. It is not Happy Valley. And the President 

has done what he thought is best to protect the country from another attack consistent— 

Senator BIDEN. But he has been so wrong so many times on so 

many things— 

Mr. BRADBURY. Consistent with the Constitution. 

Senator BIDEN [continuing].—So consistently—so consistently 

that I find it—and I realize my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I find 

it difficult for us—and I believe his motive to be pure. I find it difficult for us to buy into the notion of let’s trust the President’s 

judgment. God love him, his judgment has been terrible on Iraq. 

His judgment has been terrible on the conduct of the war. I love 

him, but I am not prepared to accept his judgment, nor Mr. Cheney’s. 

I thank you very much. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Biden. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess lessons learned from this court case is that collaboration 

is probably better than unilateral action. Do you both agree with 

that? 

30 

Mr. BRADBURY. It is always better for the branches to be working 

together, and the war effort is one that requires the work of certainly both political branches working together. 

Senator GRAHAM. And that is Justice Jackson’s opinion. Not only 

was it a wise legal decision, I think it was a good political dynamic. 

So, gentlemen, I appreciate your service to our country. I want to 

work with you. I am not going to look backward. I am going to look 

forward, and we are going to try to fix this problem. 

My goal, simply put, is to come up with a legal infrastructure the 

Nation can be proud of that will allow us to defend ourselves in an 

appropriate way and that will meet the hallmark of a fair trial. 

And I think we will be stronger as a Nation if the Congress and 

the administration come up with a work product that eventually is 

blessed by the Court because then we can go to our friends overseas and say every branch of the Government has bought into our 

new way of doing business. 

And what would that new way look like? Here is what I think 

it would look like: Justice Kennedy’s opinion to me is the most instructive of the fallacy in terms of Military Order 1. It says that 

if you are going to create a military commission that is different 

from the UCMJ, you need to show why the changes are made. Convenience is not enough, and you have to prove through some legislative history that a practical application of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice to a terrorist suspect is inappropriate. 

Do you agree with that? 

Mr. BRADBURY. No, Senator, I do not. 

Senator GRAHAM. You do not. Okay. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Justice Kennedy was talking in terms of the 

framework of the current statutes, which he read to require the 

President to use court-martial proceedings so that the President 

has to start from court-martial proceedings and work backward. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. BRADBURY. This body does not have to do that. You should 

ask yourselves what are the reasons we have the Court— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, this Senator is going to do that. 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is certainly within the rights of Congress. 

Obviously, my suggestion— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I am just one, but I think it is a good 

way to start. 

Now, my challenge to you is this: Explain to us why would the 

Congress authorize two trial forums if one size fit all. Why is there 

the mention of a military commission separate and apart from a 

normal court-martial procedure? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I would say to the extent that they 

have been recognized traditionally as being needed apart from an 

existing court-martial system, going back to—I mean, certainly 

throughout history, but going back more recently to the post-World 

War II era, I would say in light of the evolution and the development of the military justice system, the framework of the UCMJ 

and the Manual of Courts-Martial, post-World War II right to the 

present, argues even more today for a separate system to deal with 

particularly these types of offenders of the law of war, al Qaeda 

and Taliban and others. 

31 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more, and my point 

is that the reason Congress has authorized two different forums, 

one for our own troops when they violate the UCMJ, when they engage in misconduct, and another forum called the military commission for someone not covered by the UCMJ, not part of our armed 

forces, is because military necessity and legal necessity has understood for about 50 years that you have two different creatures here 

and you may need to go down one road versus the other. And in 

World War II, and before and since, when it comes to foreign 

agents, enemy combatants, they have been tried in a military commission forum. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Yes. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I agree, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. What I think Justice Kennedy is telling us and 

the way I approach this, even within Article 36 of the UCMJ, 

where it authorizes military commissions, it instructs through the 

statute that any deviations made from a court-martial needs to 

have some explanation. 

So I would suggest to the administration that the best way to 

work with Congress to solve this problem is to take the UCMJ as 

your basic guide and we work through the document, and where 

the hearsay rules are inappropriate for a military commission, let’s 

change them; where Article 32 referral pre-trial investigations are 

inappropriate, where we have classified information problems, that 

we draft a system through collaboration using military commission 

necessity, but use the UCMJ as your basic document. 

My advice to you in the next 4 seconds, if you will adopt that attitude and that approach, we can get a product that not only will 

pass Court muster but the Nation can be proud of. If you fight that 

approach, it is going to be a long, hot summer. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, we have, I think, lost some focus and attention of why 

we are concerned about rights and liberties and protection and why 

we are talking about how we are going to treat detainees, because 

what we are interested in fundamentally is how our prisoners are 

going to be treated. They have not been treated well to date, but 

this is basically about how we want our prisoners treated. And that 

is something that I think we have to continue to give focus and attention on as to how we want captured Americans to be treated. 

Over the last 5 years, the administration has taken us down a 

different path, violating the well-established checks and balances of 

the Constitution, and then in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme 

Court said that the President had gone too far. Justice Breyer 

wrote, ‘‘Congress has not issued the Executive a blank check.’’ 

So the Court’s decision is, I believe, the victory of the rule of law, 

and following the landmark decision, we have the opportunity to 

shed more light into the legal black hole at Guantanamo Bay. But 

at the outset, we should make a few things clear, and the decision 

is not a ‘‘Get Out of Guantanamo Free Card’’ for any detainees. No 

one is suggesting that any person engaging in terrorism should not 

be held accountable as a result of the decision. 

32 

The Supreme Court made it clear the President can prosecute 

terrorists. The President also has all the necessary authority to 

proceed with trials of war criminals if he does it in accord with the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. But 

instead of using that well-established authority to prosecute the detainees quickly and fairly, the administration created a system of 

ad hoc military commissions that led to extended litigation and the 

Supreme Court ruling. And as a result, more than 4 years later we 

have not yet successfully prosecuted a single detainee, and Guantanamo has become an international embarrassment. 

Under the traditional laws of war, POWs may be held until the 

end of the conflict. Certainly no one wants us to impose a standard 

that would free dangerous detainees to return to acts of terror. 

That will be one of the major challenges we face as we move forward. 

The path ahead will speak volumes about our dedication to the 

rule of law and the Constitution. It will have a significant consequence for our National security, and if our future actions are 

consistent with our Nation’s long-held values, then perhaps this 

outrageous chapter will finally come to an end. 

As we deliberate about these matters, we should take heed of the 

courageous words of Alberto Mora, the former Navy General Counsel. He urged us to care about the fate of these detainees because, 

and I quote, ‘‘A tolerance of cruelty will corrode our values and our 

rights and degrade the world in which we live. It will corrupt our 

heritage, cheapen the valor of the soldiers upon whose past and 

present sacrifices our freedoms depend, and debate the legacy we 

will leave to our sons and our daughters.’’ I thought that was an 

excellent comment. 

Let me just ask, Mr. Bradbury, in your testimony today, talking 

about Article 3, you mentioned on page 9 of your testimony that 

‘‘Article 3 prohibits ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, 

humiliating and degrading treatment,’ a phrase that is susceptible 

of uncertain and unpredictable application.’’ 

Now we have Secretary England’s memo that has just been put 

out today, and he mentions, ‘‘To this end, the following acts shall 

remain prohibited at any time, any place whatever, with respect to 

the above-mentioned persons,’’ and he uses that identical language: 

‘‘Section (c), outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, 

humiliating and degrading treatment.’’ 

Whose understanding are we supposed to use? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Actually, Senator, that is exactly the question to 

ask: whose understanding defines what that term means. That is— 

Senator KENNEDY. Let me, if I just can, because my time is running out here. You say that this language in your testimony—and 

obviously you are speaking for the administration—is not subject 

to understanding. And yet we have Secretary England using those 

exact words. Are we to assume that he does not understand it either? Or is he sharing your view? Or is this a different view? 

Mr. BRADBURY. I think the Department of Defense trains to the 

Geneva Convention standards as they have historically understood 

them. Common Article 3 is not a standard that we have applied in 

particular conflicts on a regular basis. 

33 

I think that in terms of the training at the Department of Defense—and Mr. Dell’Orto can tell you—they have an understanding 

as they approach the issues as to what it means, and they have a 

confidence in that understanding. 

My point is that it is susceptible to interpretation. It is clearly 

a vague term. It is basically the same term, the inhuman and degrading treatment term, that caused Congress to take a reservation 

to the Convention Against Torture because of the uncertainty as to 

how that term might be interpreted by foreign tribunals, for example. And it is the reservation to the Convention Against Torture 

standard, which refers back to our own constitutional precedents, 

that was adopted in the McCain administration to set a baseline 

standard for our own conduct in the war on terror. This now takes 

us back to that capacious phrase, ‘‘humiliating and degrading treatment.’’ 

We believe and I believe it can be given reasonable content and 

it can be given a reasonable interpretation, and there are many 

international sources that suggest as much. At the same time, however, there are other international sources construing that same 

phrase in a very broad way, applying it to facts that we might not 

all agree constitute the kind of misconduct that you would like to 

prohibit. And to it leaves real question marks. 

And now, as a result of the Court’s decision, it has universal application to all of the folks who are handling on our behalf detainees in the war on terror. And, moreover, as a result of that determination, it is a war crime under the War Crimes Act to violate 

that standard. 

We just think as you approach these issues, it is important for 

Congress to consider how to give definition and certainty to those 

phrases, which are now criminally enforceable, which now apply to 

all of our folks around the world in the war on terror; whereas, previously they did not apply as a matter of treaty interpretation by 

the President. 

So that is why I am saying it is a significant development. We 

may have confidence from a top-down command structure or perspective that we think we are training to it. But the folks on the 

front line are subject to it, and everything they do in handling a 

detainee may now be affected and chilled by this new standard. 

And so I would encourage the Congress to look at these issues and 

to think about how best to bring certainty to these standards so 

that we define them as a matter of U.S. law but consistent with 

our treaty obligations. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I listened to your testimony, and I cannot believe that 24 hours 

ago I was in Guantanamo sitting across the table from the chief interrogator and asked this gentleman the following question: ‘‘If I 

told you that tomorrow you had to live by the Geneva Conventions 

in terms of the detention and interrogation of detainees, what 

would change at Guantanamo? ’’ And you know what he said? 

‘‘Nothing.’’ 

34 

’’And if I told you tomorrow the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

applied to everything you did, what would change? ’’ He said, 

‘‘Nothing.’’ 

’’How about the McCain torture amendment? ’’ 

’’We are living by it.’’ 

They seem clear in their job. And when I hear suggestions from 

this panel and from our witnesses that it is impossible to wage the 

war on terrorism and stand by these basic rules and values that 

we have had for generations, I do not understand it. I cannot follow 

your thinking on this thing. 

Let me say, the thing that troubles me is this: The men and 

women in uniform who are serving us in Guantanamo have been 

the best—steadfast, professional, often heroic, working in a very 

difficult place, bleak and barren, hotter than the hinges of Hell. 

They go to work every day to watch these detainees and try to derive information. They are not using torture. They may have at 

some moment in time when this administration’s policy on torture 

was impossible to follow. You will recall the torture memo, produced by your administration and then revoked. You will recall 

when this administration did not listen to Secretary of State Colin 

Powell and decided the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the 

war on terrorism. The confusion that came out of that could not 

have been easy for our men and women in uniform trying to serve 

our country at Guantanamo and around the world. But today they 

understand it. 

I watched yesterday in a remote camera as there was an interrogation of a man suspected to be part of al Qaeda, and I will tell 

you, the pressure put on him? They handed him a Subway sandwich. He lit up and started talking. They handed him Chicken 

McNuggets, and they love it, and they start to talk. Sure, they 

could be limited to name, rank, and serial number, but they volunteer information that helps us in the war on terror. 

Here is what troubles me: We clearly have in Guantanamo a negative symbol of the United States around the world. Ask any of our 

embassies. Ask our Ambassadors what Guantanamo means, despite the best efforts of our military there. I do not blame them. 

I blame the administration for putting them in this predicament. 

I think it is time for us to close Guantanamo and transfer these 

prisoners to another place. For us to say it is a clear break from 

the past, the Supreme Court has made it clear the administration 

cannot continue to write its own laws and avoid the law. And I 

happen to agree with Senator Graham. We need a common, bipartisan starting point, and I think courts-martial, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, is that starting point. 

Can we agree on some other things? We are not going to use evidence that is a result of coercion or torture. Would you agree with 

that, Mr. Bradbury, that we should not use that in any of our 

trials? 

Mr. BRADBURY. I certainly agree we should not use any evidence 

obtained through torture. That is, in fact, a rule in our military 

commissions. It is an obligation under our Convention Against Torture. We do not use any evidence that is determined to be obtained 

through torture in any of these proceedings. As to coercion, Senator, as I indicated before, the Detainee Treatment Act addresses 

35 

that, and it provides that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 

will review the probative value of any evidence that is suggested 

to have been obtained through coercion. There are gradations of coercion much lower than torture, and those can be challenged in Article 3 criminal proceedings. So I think there is room for discussion 

on that point. There is no room for discussion on torture. 

Senator DURBIN. No room for discussion on torture. You are unequivocal. 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is right. 

Senator DURBIN. Do you believe that it should be the policy of 

our administration that we do not engage in rendition, that is, the 

transfer of prisoners to circumstances where they could be subject 

to torture or they would be subject to torture? 

Mr. BRADBURY. We do not transfer individuals to countries where 

we believe it is more likely than not that they will be tortured. 

That is a treaty obligation we have and a policy we apply on a 

worldwide basis today. Rendition itself covers a wide range of activities, many of them quite legitimate and traditionally used by 

countries all over the world to bring people to justice. 

Senator DURBIN. Do you think it should be a fundamental part 

of any type of commission or tribunal that a person is aware of the 

charges against them? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, under the military commission procedures 

that we have set up, they are aware of the charges against them 

once the proceeding begins. 

Senator DURBIN. And should they be allowed to see the evidence 

that is being used to prosecute them before any commission or tribunal? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Generally speaking, that is a good approach to 

take, and, of course, under the current procedures they do get to 

see the evidence that is used against them with a few narrow potential exceptions. 

Senator DURBIN. Do you disagree with the right to counsel so 

that those charged have representation at commissions and tribunals that we are discussing? 

Mr. BRADBURY. We provide right to counsel in the military commission procedures, and we suggest that should be included in anything that Congress is looking at. 

Senator DURBIN. So aside from the issue of coercion, which may 

be an issue of fact, and aside from questions of hearsay, which I 

can understand, what is it that you object to in basic due process 

when it comes to the creation of these commissions and tribunals? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, there has been a lot of discussion of starting with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and I think as we 

have discussed with some of the Senators, there are a lot of provisions and procedures set forth in that code and in the procedures 

that have been issued under the UCMJ. And many of them are 

simply unworkable and unnecessary in this context, and so there 

are many of them, and we have discussed some of them here today. 

Senator DURBIN. I am over my time, but I might just say in defense of Senator Graham’s position, the Supreme Court in Hamdan 

did not say you have to accept this in totality. They said as far as 

practicable. So we can make modifications to recognize the reality 

of the war on terrorism. 

36 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

Before recognizing Senator Schumer, a couple of announcements. 

One is that late yesterday I was asked to come to the White House 

to meet with the President at noon, so I am going to have to excuse 

myself. I have asked Senator Hatch to take the gavel and chair the 

hearings. I have asked Senator Hatch to adjourn the hearing at 

12:30 where we customarily on Tuesdays have our caucus meetings 

until 2:15. I do not want to cut this hearing short in any way, so 

we will resume at 2:15 with the second panel probably still being 

questioned at that time. 

I want to thank Mr. Bradbury and Mr. Dell’Orto for appearing 

here today and to re-emphasize—Senator Leahy, do you want to 

make a comment? 

Senator LEAHY. Just before you dismiss them, I have questions. 

Chairman SPECTER. They are not going to be dismissed. Senator 

Schumer is going to question them before they leave. 

We want to move, I want to repeat, with dispatch so we would 

ask you to make your comments within 2 weeks on Senate bill 

3614, on what way the Uniform Code of Courts-Martial Procedures 

should not apply, and to give us recommendations for statutory 

provisions which you think ought to apply as a matter of policy. 

But we are working in coordination with the Armed Services Committee, and I think we all agree there is a necessity to move ahead 

on trial of war crimes and also on the detention of enemy combatants as to what the procedures should be for review of detention 

status which we have embodied within 3614. And I think Congress 

would want to legislate on that matter, so at least we want your 

views on the subject. 

We do appreciate your coming in on relatively short notice, and, 

Senator Leahy, do you want to make a comment? 

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure. Are we 

going to have time to ask any followup questions here on the record 

of Mr. Bradbury and Mr. Dell’Orto? 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I think that would be advisable. 

Senator LEAHY. Because I had a couple of followups I wanted to 

do after everybody’s time. 

Chairman SPECTER. Let me see a show of hands of people who 

want to have a second round. 

Well, good. Then we will just hear from Senator Leahy on followup questions, and then we will move to Senator Schumer now. 

Senator LEAHY. And what about the Haynes nomination? I have 

been asked by some about that. 

Chairman SPECTER. We have the confirmation hearing for Mr. 

Haynes scheduled for 2:15 by the Judiciary Committee, and that 

will proceed just as soon as we finish with this hearing. 

To repeat, this is a very important hearing. We have some very 

high-powered witnesses, and we want to hear them and have a 

chance for questioning. So we will proceed until 12:30, and then we 

will reconvene at 2:15 to hear what we need to hear. And Senator 

Leahy as Ranking Member can have some followup questions following Senator Schumer. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Schumer, you are recognized. 

37 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

you for holding this hearing in a prompt manner on such an important issue. Before I ask my questions, I am going to make three 

quick points. 

First, I continue to believe the President should have every tool 

necessary to fight an effective war on terror. In times such as 

these, the balance between liberty and security may have to tip a 

little bit in the direction of security, and we have to be flexible. But 

I believe that if the process works right, you end up almost every 

time having both. When Attorney General Gonzales was here last, 

he agreed with me that Americans can demand both liberty and security. 

Second, the determination of the appropriate balance is not the 

President’s prerogative alone. The Congress has a vital role, and, 

of course, as the Hamdan decision so recently and poignantly reminded us, whether we like it or not, the courts have a role as well. 

But time and time again, Mr. Chairman, this President and this 

administration act as if they are the whole Government. Time and 

time again, the President acts like a bull in a china shop and sets 

back the war on terror. 

If the administration had asked Congress at the time for some 

flexibility, saying that we have a different war with this war on 

terror—A, our heartland can be hit; B, there are no uniforms or 

battle ranks—people would have understood that. And the administration probably would have gotten just about all of the changes 

it needed—maybe not in exactly the way it needed, but all of the 

changes it needed, because we are in a brave, new world and we 

are fighting a different type of warfare. And I for one am not rigid 

and saying, well, what was good in World War II has to be here 

now. Some people are. I am not. 

But the President should not need the Supreme Court to tell him 

to consult with Congress. There is an arrogance and an arrogation 

of power that I have not seen in my entire life in public life. And 

that arrogance and arrogation of power threatens to result in more 

catastrophic legal missteps in the future. That is why I have asked 

the Attorney General to oversee a comprehensive review by an 

independent commission of legal scholars and constitutional experts so we can anticipate any future Supreme Court problems and 

come to Congress ahead of time to avoid future problems, because 

obviously whatever our individual views are, what has happened 

with the Supreme Court has set back our mutual goals in moving 

forward in terms of the war on terror and stopping future terrorist 

acts from occurring. 

So given the administration’s headstrong attitude, we do not 

need another court blocking things that might need to be done. The 

Hamdan decision, in my judgment, shows that the administration’s 

bull in a china shop approach is actually impeding the war on terror. 

And so that leads to my first question. I am glad that the administration finally stands ready, as you said, Mr. Bradbury, to work 

with us. You say, ‘‘We would like to see Congress act quickly to establish a solid statutory basis for the military commission process.’’ 

That kind of testimony has a bit of an Alice in Wonderland quality 

38 

to it because where have you been for the last 4 or 5 years? But 

it leads to a specific question. Okay? 

Are you undertaking within the Justice Department a review of 

other decisions that are also based on the AUMF, which has been 

discredited by the Supreme Court, so that we will avoid a Supreme 

Court decision? Are you prepared not just in the issues before us 

in Hamdan but in other issues to come back to Congress now and 

say, ‘‘We need authorization from Congress’’ ? 

So, first question, is such a review being undertaken? Two, would 

the administration consider, before another court rules, coming 

back to us where you have not before on wiretapping or other 

things and saying, ‘‘We would like to work with the Congress to get 

something authorized’’ ? And as I said, in all likelihood, if you did 

you would get most, if not all, of what you wanted. Mr. Bradbury? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Thank you, Senator. We are always looking at 

developments in the law to see how they affect our legal analysis 

on any particular aspect of the executive branch activities. So to 

that extent, yes, and the Hamdan decision is something that we 

are carefully looking at and taking into account. 

It is not my decision, obviously, to say whether we are going to 

come before Congress on any particular issue and make a proposal, 

a legislative proposal. As I indicated, that is the President’s determination under the Constitution. 

Senator SCHUMER. But you are undergoing a review? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, it is my job to give legal advice to the executive branch on all manner of issues, including the types of programs we have been talking about, including programs like the 

NSA program, including issues like what does the Hamdan decision mean, how do we move forward. Obviously, we have a lot of 

folks who litigate these cases in the Department of Justice, and 

they are obviously taking account of the Hamdan decision as we 

move forward with the other major cases in the habeas litigation 

on detainees that are pending and the litigation, as you know, that 

we are facing on the NSA program. So we are looking at all of 

those issues and always taking into account those developments 

and reconsidering whether— 

Senator SCHUMER. May I just ask, who is doing this review since 

the Court decision? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I am not suggesting that there is any particular formal process of review. I am saying that it is my job always to look at developments in the law and determine how they 

may affect advice that we have given on the basis, the lawful basis 

for programs, and it is always the job of the folks in the Civil Division at the Justice Department who are handling matters in litigation to look at how cases like Hamdan may affect arguments that 

are being made in litigation. So that is a process that goes on constantly in the Department. 

Senator SCHUMER. And it has been renewed since Hamdan, I 

take it. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Absolutely. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HATCH [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

39 

I am a little bit confused in listening to you, especially in your 

answer to Senator Schumer. Mr. Dell’Orto’s earlier statement and 

answer seemed to suggest that we should simply ratify the administration’s or the President’s or the Bush-Cheney administration’s 

commissions. And, Mr. Bradbury, you seem to say in a reversal 

from the earlier position of the administration 5 years ago, that 

you are now ready to work with Congress on legislation to allow 

you to operate within Hamdan. Which is it? Are we going to be 

asked simply to ratify what the President is already doing which 

the Court found illegal? Or are we supposed to go somewhere new? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I do not think those answers are inconsistent, 

Senator. I think we would ask that you take a look at the commission procedures as they are laid out, and to the extent that you believe that they do demonstrate what the President has set out as 

the standard, that is, a full and fair trial, that you authorize those 

procedures. 

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Bradbury, is that consistent with what you 

are saying? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Oh, yes, absolutely. Even— 

Senator LEAHY. Because the reason I say this is, when we tried 

to do that before, we were rebuffed by the administration. It is interesting now, after the Supreme Court has told them to stop illegal activity, that they are willing to talk to us. And I am just trying 

to figure out which statements to follow. 

For example, before the Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision, the 

President said he was waiting on the Court’s decision to determine 

whether to close Guantanamo Bay. And then after the Court issued 

its ruling, the President said the Court had accepted and upheld 

his decision to open Guantanamo. But the Supreme Court was not 

asked to address the Guantanamo question, the legal question. 

Was this based on the Department of Justice telling the President that the—did the Department of Justice tell the President 

that the Hamdan decision was really on Guantanamo prior to it 

being released, or afterward they released it—even though neither 

would be true? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, I think as I said in my testimony, 

obviously the Court’s decision does not call into question our ability 

to hold detainees— 

Senator LEAHY. That is not my question. The President has said 

very specifically, and he said it to our European allies, that he was 

waiting for the Supreme Court decision and that would tell him 

whether he was supposed to close Guantanamo or not; afterward, 

he said the Court upheld his position on Guantanamo. In effect, it 

actually said neither. Where did he get that impression? The President is not a lawyer. You are. The Justice Department advised 

him. Did you give him such a cockamamie idea, or what? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I try not to give anybody cockamamie ideas, 

and— 

Senator LEAHY. Well, where did he get the idea? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Obviously, the Hamdan decision, Senator, does 

implicitly recognize that we are in a war, that the President’s war 

powers were triggered by the attacks on the country, and that the 

law-of-war paradigm applies. The whole case was about— 

40 

Senator LEAHY. I do not think the President was talking about 

the nuances of the law-of-war paradigm. He was saying that this 

was going to tell him whether he could keep Guantanamo open or 

not; afterward, he said it said he could. Was the President right or 

was he wrong? 

Mr. BRADBURY. It is under the law of war— 

Senator LEAHY. Was the President right or was he wrong? 

Mr. BRADBURY.—that we—the President is always right, Senator. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, you may have even heard both Republicans 

and Democrats say that there have been a few mistakes made 

here. One of the things that we tend to forget is that 9/11 did happen on this administration’s watch, and a lot of the mistakes that 

were made before are still being made. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator— 

Senator LEAHY. And, Mr. Dell’Orto, you had mentioned the—in 

fact, this follows the difficulty of getting witnesses, you know, following up on what then-White House Counsel Gonzales talked 

about, military commissions being able to dispense justice close to 

where the actions are happening. And I think you both talked 

about the fact that if people were down at Guantanamo, what are 

you going to do, bring folks back from the front to testify? 

I understand that problem. I understand that problem. Then why 

not have the commissions and why not have the people held near 

the battlefield. We have held over 350 courts-martial on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. That is close to where everything 

was going on. It enabled witnesses to be called. It seemed to work 

very well. Why transfer everybody halfway around the world to 

Guantanamo where nobody is available? Did we just set that up as 

a way to allow us to completely ignore going to any trial? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I would say that, regardless of where 

you hold the military commissions, you are going to be faced with 

that problem. You have instances where people committed crimes 

outside Afghanistan or other places that we have captured. The 

witness to those may not be in Afghanistan. We have soldiers who 

rotate back from the battlefields on a regular basis. 

Senator LEAHY. They were able to do 350 courts-martial over 

there. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Yes, Senator, and I would say that if you look 

at those 350 courts-martial, you will find they are more the traditional military offenses that involved undiscipline, disobedience of 

orders, disrespect—the more normal undiscipline cases that a military court-martial was very much designed to deal with anywhere 

around the world. 

Senator LEAHY. So bringing these people to Guantanamo was not 

to keep them from having witnesses available? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. No, sir. It was to provide principally a secure 

place to hold these folks. 

Senator LEAHY. And the people that we have sent off to other 

countries, turned them over to other countries, as we now know in 

many instances to be tortured, what was the reason for doing that? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Well, as Mr. Bradbury said, we do not send people off to other countries where we believe they— 

Senator LEAHY. But they have been. They have been. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I am not aware of that personally. 

41 

Senator LEAHY. It is in some of the information that has come 

out. It is almost as though we take the attitude like in ‘‘Casablanca.’’ I am ‘‘shocked, shocked’’ to see this is going on here. 

All right. My time is up. I will have questions to follow-up further in writing, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator HATCH. Senator Schumer. 

Senator SCHUMER. I would like to ask for a second round. I did 

not ask for one before because I had not asked my first round and 

did not know if my questions— 

Senator HATCH. Well, before you do, I notice that you wanted to 

answer some of these questions and were not given the opportunity. So if you would care to make statements, either one of you, 

before I turn to Senator Schumer—and I hope Senator Schumer 

will be the last one, unless somebody on this side feels they absolutely have to. Mr. Bradbury, we will turn to you. Any final comments you would care to make? Mr. Dell’Orto, we will turn to you 

after Mr. Bradbury. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I actually have one correction I would like to add to an answer that I gave Senator Feinstein, 

if I could. 

Senator HATCH. That would be fine. 

Mr. BRADBURY. I would just like to make two quick points, one 

for Senator Leahy. 

One of the main functions we hope to carry out in Guantanamo 

is military commission trials of those detainees who have committed war crimes, and I think what the President is talking about 

is looking for clarity from the Supreme Court as to whether he can 

move forward with those military commission procedures at Guantanamo or whether he cannot. And the Court has now said you 

cannot under the current rules, but there is a way ahead with 

working with Congress. And if we can get legislation in place 

quickly, we can move forward, and the process can work as it has 

been set up. 

The one other point I would like to quickly make is in response 

to a question that Senator Durbin raised. In February of 2002, the 

President directed the military to apply the principles of Geneva to 

the extent consistent with military necessity. So that is why in 

Guantanamo they train to Geneva, they question in accordance 

with Geneva. So it is not surprising that Senator Durbin would 

talk to the folks down in Guantanamo and say, well, this decision 

does not require any change in the procedures at Guantanamo. 

They are acting consistent with the policy that the President has 

set as a general matter for the military at Guantanamo. 

I am sorry. I just wanted to add those two points. 

Senator HATCH. You going to add to that? 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is all I wanted to say, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. Mr. Dell’Orto? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator Feinstein, when you asked earlier about 

the people who have gone through CSRTs and ARBs, one fact I— 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, would you explain those letters? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. I am sorry. The Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which is the initial board that the detainees go through to 

42 

establish that they continue to be enemy combatants, and the Administrative Review Boards, which is an annual follow-on board to 

assess threat levels and make recommendations as to whether they 

should be continued to be held. 

With respect to the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the 

CSRTs, we have probably a handful, I would say—and I am guessing, probably about five or so—people who have been found no 

longer to be enemy combatants that we still have at Guantanamo, 

they have been through the CSRT process; they are ready to be 

transferred to some location that can accept them, that certainly is 

not going to torture them, but in point of fact, some countries are 

not willing to take any of these people back because they pose problems for that country as well. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one follow-up just 

on that one point? 

Senator HATCH. Sure. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. On the point of countries that will not take 

individuals back, what then is the alternative? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. We try to find another country that is willing to 

take them, and we work through the auspices of the State Department to try to develop that and find a suitable— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And does that work? 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. On occasion it does, but it tends to be a very 

slow process. 

Mr. BRADBURY. But, Senator, if we cannot find a third country 

to take them back and they are dangerous terrorists whom we have 

captured, we are going to continue to hold them. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Clearly, and, again, the people who came 

through the CSRTs and were determined no longer to be enemy 

combatants are not high-threat people. They are not enemy combatants, and they can be returned. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. But, clearly, anybody we see who poses a significant threat through either the CSRT or certainly the ARB process, 

we are going to keep. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Senator HATCH. Well, I just want to add that I was one of the 

first to go to Guantanamo, and I went completely through the process and saw that is a reasonable, decent, honorable process, in 

spite of what some have said about it. And, frankly, everybody I 

know who has been there has come to that same conclusion, as I 

think the Senator from Illinois has. 

Senator Schumer. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bradbury, I just want to ask you, did the Hamdan decision 

come as a complete surprise to the administration? In other words, 

did you, before the Court ruled, anticipate that the military commissions might be ruled illegal by the Supreme Court? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I think there are a lot of people who have 

had a lot of different views on what might happen with the case. 

I think going into it, the beginning of this process some years ago, 

there was, frankly, a high level of confidence because of the historical practice and recognition of military commission authorities 

that it would all be upheld as crafted. I mean, it was not crafted 

43 

to push the envelope. The procedures were crafted consistent with 

historical practice, so there was every reason to think they would 

be upheld. But you will need to—I am sure the folks who were closer to the actual handling of the case and the argument of the case 

than I am had their view as to how things were going. 

I have to say I am, as I indicate in my testimony, quite surprised 

and disappointed with the reasoning in the opinion. But, obviously, 

it is what it is, and we are going to work with it and move forward. 

Senator SCHUMER. Okay. Well, I understand that. So if you were 

surprised and most of the people in the administration were surprised, you obviously guessed quite wrong, and you pursued a policy that now has been thrown out. 

Let me then repeat my question. Why doesn’t the administration 

undertake—I mean, I am glad to hear you say you are reviewing 

the other situations now in light of Hamdan, as you should. But 

why doesn’t the administration take a more formal process and review it to avoid this happening again. This makes me think, you 

know, everyone makes mistakes, but when you have made a 

lollapalooza like this one and then you say business as usual, I get 

worried. And, again, I do not come at this from a perspective that 

we have to, you know, undo everything that you think needs to be 

done. But I am just amazed at sort of the—so why isn’t there a formal review? Why isn’t it a dereliction—why wouldn’t it be the responsibility of the President, the Attorney General, the Secretary 

of Defense, to say, all right, we were wrong this first time in the 

way we could set things up, we better check everything out in a 

serious way, not just the Office of Legal Counsel reviewing it himself? Can you please answer that for me? I am totally befuddled 

here. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, all of the officials you mentioned 

at all times are always considering whether activities undertaken, 

programs, are consistent with the law, consistent with the current 

decisions of the Court. That is something that is always going on, 

and, of course, as a policy matter, in light of circumstances and 

changes in conditions, things are always being considered and reconsidered. 

Senator SCHUMER. But, sir, you made a pretty bad wrong guess. 

Mr. BRADBURY. I would say, Senator, we are not saying this is 

business as usual. We are not saying nothing has changed. The 

Court has made a very dramatic decision, and it is a historic fact 

that we are here talking to Congress about legislation to authorize 

and set up procedures for military commissions—something that 

has never happened in the history of the country. They have always been set up and handled administratively by the President 

and the executive branch throughout the history of the country. 

This is a historic change. It is not business a usual, and it is a 

result of what is a very historic and dramatic decision from the 

Court last week. 

Senator SCHUMER. But, again, why wouldn’t—give me one good 

reason why there should not be a serious formal review to look at 

other issues that might have been based—other policies that you 

are pursuing that might have been based on AUMF? You know, I 

was always befuddled by that. I voted for that resolution, and it 

was never discussed once. I don’t recall any discussion on the floor 

44 

of the Senate, privately among colleagues, with administration people, that the AUMF was supposed to influence any of these things 

which we thought was a totally different issue. Why wouldn’t you 

undergo a formal review now? Why doesn’t that make sense from 

your own point of view, from the efficacy of getting things done and 

getting it right, given that the Court says you have not? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I am saying it is part of my job to do a constant serious look at legal issues and how they may be affected by 

significant decisions by the Court like this one. So it is part of my 

job description, and that is what— 

Senator SCHUMER. Did you warn anybody that you might have 

decided wrong before? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, I guess I can plead ignorance there because 

I was not here at the beginning of this whole process. But as I tried 

to explain earlier, I think that the decisions that were made? 

Senator SCHUMER. Did anyone? Did your predecessor? 

Mr. BRADBURY. The decisions that were made in 2001 and 2002 

on military commissions and the procedures of military commissions were fully in line—in fact, went further than historical precedents. And, of course, since that time, we went through the process 

of the Detainee Treatment Act, which creates judicial review procedures, again, unprecedented in the history of the country, for military commission procedures. This is an evolution. And, of course, 

the judicial review procedures were a result of the Court’s decision 

in Rasul v. Bush, which said that the habeas statute applies to 

aliens held even in Guantanamo for purposes of review of the basis 

for their detention. 

So that, again, was an unprecedented development in the law, 

and as a result of that, we worked with Congress, and we had the 

Detainee Treatment Act. And now we are here again for the next 

step in light of the Hamdan decision. 

So it is a constant evolution and reconsideration in light of developments in the law. 

Senator SCHUMER. Are you going to come to Congress only when 

the Supreme Court tells you to in the future? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Well, Senator, obviously it is not my decision to 

come to Congress. That is not part of what I do. I just give legal 

advice to the President, the Attorney General, and the executive 

branch. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, for this record, I would say in the Department of Defense our office is constantly reviewing the advice 

we have given in light of decisions from the courts, from laws that 

are passed, and it is not a static process. We are always reviewing 

the legal advice we have given the Secretary, and he challenges us 

to do that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, may I have just a minute or 

two? 

Senator HATCH. Yes, Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. You are about to leave with some guidance 

from our Chairman to kind of work on producing a product that 

would help the Congress work with the administration to start over 

again. And I will be the first to admit this is incredibly difficult. 

This is new and uncharted territory. The legal infrastructure for 

45 

the war on terror is different than a normal war because the 

enemy is different. I am a big fan of the Geneva Convention. There 

are four treaties that make up the Geneva Convention. Common 

Article 3 is common to all four. It is a basic, mini-human rights 

procedure in all four documents dealing with civilians on land and 

sea, military personnel, non-military personnel, enemy combatants. 

And the reason that we have signed up to the Geneva Convention 

is that when our people are captured, we do not want them not 

only tortured, we do not want them humiliated; we do not want our 

troops paraded through downtown capitals and humiliated based 

on their religion or their status. We want to make sure that if our 

prisoners are tried in a court, it is a regularly constituted court as 

required by the Geneva Convention, that it is not a kangaroo court 

made up for the moment. 

So Common Article 3 makes sense in terms of the Geneva Convention. The question is: Does it make sense to apply Common Article 3 to a group of people who do not sign up to the Convention, 

who show disdain for it, who would do everything in their power 

to not only trample the values of the Geneva Convention but every 

other treaty that we have ever entered into? 

I agree with the President they should be treated humanely, and 

I believe it is incumbent upon the Congress to rein in the application of Common Article 3, Geneva Convention, to the war on terrorism within our values. 

Now, having made that speech, I believe it is incumbent upon 

the administration to understand the basic perspective of Justice 

Kennedy, and he says, ‘‘At a minimum, a military commission like 

the one at issue, a commission specifically convened by the President to try specific persons without express Congressional authority can be regularly constituted by the standards of our military 

justice system only if some practical need explains deviations from 

court-martial practices.’’ 

So my challenge to the administration is to look at this situation 

anew. I think you would be well served to forget about Military 

Commission Order 1. You would be well served to go back to the 

UCMJ and provide, where practical, changes to the UCMJ to try 

people in military commission format, because, gentlemen, the military commission source of law comes from a statute. It comes from 

a congressional enactment. The military commission’s roots come 

from the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

So, if nothing else, I hope you can leave this hearing and at least 

know where I am coming from, that Military Commission Order 1 

as the base document for us to work off of would be a mistake. The 

base document for us to work off of is the statute from which the 

military commission originates, the Uniform Code of Military Justice. And if there is a need to deviate, which there will be plenty 

of needs to deviate, we need to explain to the court through testimony and our Congressional Record why that is practical. 

Thank you for listening. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you both for coming. Did you want 

to— 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Mr. Chairman, may I respond? 

Senator HATCH. Sure. 

46 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Senator, I have many concerns about taking that 

approach, but one of them is that, when all is said and done, we 

do not so change that system of justice, as laid out in the UCMJ 

and the Manual for Courts-Martial, that it ultimately redounds to 

the disadvantage of our servicemembers going forward, because we 

are going to be creating a body of case law out of that that will 

itself be the source of much litigation. 

So I have concerns about that route, given that particular fact 

down the road. 

Senator GRAHAM. If you think that is my proposal, then you misunderstand what I am saying, and I will blame myself for not being 

articulate enough. But here we have—we are right back to where 

we started. The military commissions come from a statutory 

scheme. It is not something that you just pulled out of the air. A 

military commission is created by a statute, and you did not consult with us when you created the military commissions. The Military Rules of Evidence derive from the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

They are different in some respects, but the President has shown 

a practical need to make them different. The Manual for CourtsMartial is an executive enactment to enforce the UCMJ, the rules 

of the road of how you try somebody. 

I do not mind coming up with a manual for military commissions, but the basic problem I have with this whole philosophy is 

that you are ignoring the source of a military commission. Its being 

comes from a Congressional statute, and we are not going to respond—at least I am not going to respond to some product that was 

enacted without any consultation. To me that cannot be the base 

document. We will go backward, not forward. The base document 

has to be the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

Senator HATCH. Okay, Senator, let me just say that I recall Lincoln set up military commissions by Executive order, and others 

have done so as well. But, Mr. Bradbury, you wanted to comment? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Actually, Senator, I was just going to make that 

very point. General Washington set up military commissions in the 

Revolutionary War, and all prior Presidents have set them up primarily under Article II authority, with recognition in the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice and other statutes— 

Senator GRAHAM. Why are military commissions mentioned in 

the UCMJ? 

Mr. BRADBURY. Because they were recognized by Congress and 

provided for, and the Court has now said that you need to follow 

the restrictions that Congress has set for them. And so we are asking— 

Senator GRAHAM. What authority did you use to create Military 

Order 1? Was it the UCMJ reference to military commissions? 

Mr. BRADBURY. It was reference, I believe, to Article II of the 

Constitution, to the UCMJ, including Article 21, which preserves 

the jurisdiction of military commissions, and the Authorization for 

the Use of Military Force. 

Senator HATCH. I think you are saying you are not going to ignore the UCMJ, but the Executive does have certain powers that 

have been executed by every President since Washington. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the only the government I can 

say it— 

47 

Senator HATCH. Now, wait a minute. I am just asking a question. 

I think I am allowed to do that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir, I apologize. 

Mr. BRADBURY. That is absolutely right, and, of course, Congress 

has express authority to define and punish offenses against the 

laws of nations, which is what military commissions do. So we are 

not at all saying Congress does not have authority here, and, in 

fact, the Court has said Congress has put restrictions on the use 

of military commissions— 

Senator HATCH. And now with this Court decision, it is incumbent upon Congress to exercise its authority and come up with a 

way that does not make it impossible for us to protect our country 

and also our military. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Exactly. 

Senator HATCH. Just to mention two aspects. Well, we want to 

thank both of you for being here today. You have been excellent. 

You have given excellent testimony, and I think all of us here appreciate it very much. So with that, we will allow you to leave. 

Mr. BRADBURY. Thank you. 

Mr. DELL’ORTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HATCH. Now, we have a vote at 12:15, but I think we 

are going to start with our second panel. At least we will get to introduce you all and maybe take a few testimonies. Let’s, if we 

could, get our second panel at the table. 

[Pause.] 

Senator HATCH. All right. If we can have order, let’s have order. 

We are going to begin with Theodore Olson, who is a partner in 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher from 2004 to the present. He has a B.A. 

from the University of the Pacific cum laude; a J.D., University of 

California at Berkeley. He is former Solicitor General of the United 

States of America from 2001 to 2004. From 1981 to 1984 he was 

Assistant Attorney General, the Office of Legal Counsel. Aside from 

his time with the Reagan and Bush administrations, he has worked 

as a partner and has continued as partner at Gibson, Dunn & 

Crutcher, one of the great law firms in this country. He is a member of the President’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 

a two-time recipient of the Department of Justice’s Edmund J. 

Randolph Award. 

Harold Kohn, we welcome you as well, currently Dean of the 

Yale Law School from 2004 to the present. He has often been a witness before the Committee; Smith Professor of International Law 

from 1993 to the present. His education was at Harvard for a B.A. 

summa cum laude. Oxford University, he was a Marshall Scholar, 

a B.A., first class honors; Harvard Law, J.D., cum laude; and Oxford University master’s degree in 1996. He has had a lot of notable experience: a law clerk for Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey at 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 1980 to 1981, 

law clerk for Justice Harry Blackmun, the U.S. Supreme Court, 

from 1981 to 1982, et cetera. We welcome you to the hearing. 

Paul W. ‘‘Whit’’ Cobb is Vice President and Deputy General 

Counsel, BAE Systems, Inc., North America, from 2005 to the 

present. He has a B.A. from Duke University summa cum laude 

and a J.D. from Yale University School of Law in 1990. From 2001 

to 2004, he was Deputy General Counsel, the Office of Legal CounVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
48 

sel, the Department of Defense. From 1996 to 2001, he was a partner in Jenner & Block LLP. He has been a judicial fellow in the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. From 1991 to 1995, Office 

of General Counsel at the Department of the Army where he 

achieved the rank of captain. In 1990 and 1991, he was a law clerk 

of Judge Thomas A. Clark, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 

Scott Silliman is a professor, Duke University School of Law, 

from 1993 to the present. He has a B.A. from the University of 

North Carolina at Chapel Hill; a J.D. from the University of North 

Carolina-Chapel Hill. From 1968 to 1993, he was United States Air 

Force Judge Advocate of the General Corps, and during his career 

as a JAG attorney, Professor Silliman served as Staff Judge Advocate at two large installations and three major Air Force commands, including the Tactical Air Command and the Air Combat 

Command, where he served as General Counsel to the Commander 

of 185,000 military and civilian personnel. 

Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, we are very happy to 

have you here; defense counsel in the Office of Chief Defense Counsel at DOD, Office of Military Commissions, from 2003 to the 

present; B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy, Division Officer School 

as well in San Diego in 1985; J.D. at the Seattle School of Law in 

1994; and was educated at the Naval Justice School Basic Lawyer 

Course in 1994. He has a long history of service in the Navy, and 

we are just very grateful to have you here as well, Commander. 

Daniel Collins is a partner in Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP, from 

2003 to the present; was educated with an A.B. from Harvard College summa cum laude; First Marshall Phi Beta Kappa in 1985, a 

J.D. from Stanford University with distinction in 1988. Mr. Collins 

was Associate Deputy Attorney General, the Office of Deputy Attorney General, from 2001 to 2003. During that time, Mr. Collins also 

served as DOJ’s Chief Privacy Officer; from 1997 to 1998, adjunct 

professor of Loyola Law School, and from 1996 to 2001, again, with 

Munger, Tolles. He was Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles, law clerk 

to Justice Scalia, and attorney-advisor of the Department of Justice 

Office of Legal Counsel, et cetera. He was a note editor of the Stanford Law Review and recipient of Stanford Law Review’s Board of 

Editors Award and Order of the Coif. 

So we are happy to have all of you here. You all have tremendous distinctive records, and we are very proud to have you before 

the Committee, and if we can, we will go in that order. Mr. Olson, 

we will take you first. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THEODORE B. OLSON, FORMER SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PARTNER, 

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, WASHINGTON D.C. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished 

Committee to testify about the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which has far-reaching implications for the 

President’s ability to defend our national security and perform his 

duties as Commander-in-Chief. 

49 

No issue deserves more thoughtful consideration from our elected 

representatives than ensuring that the American people are defended from a savage terrorist enemy that deliberately targets civilians and mutilates our soldiers in an effort to destroy our way 

of life. 

I will confine myself to the 5 minutes. We have submitted written testimony, Mr. Chairman, which I assume will be a part of the 

record. 

Senator HATCH. Without objection, we will put the complete 

statements of all of you in the record. And, by the way, I want my 

statement placed in the record at the appropriate place as well, 

without objection. 

Mr. OLSON. It is altogether appropriate and necessary for Congress to consider a legislative response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan. All eight Justices who participated in the case— 

Chief Justice Roberts was recused, but he had agreed with the administration’s position as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals. But all eight Justices recognized that Congressional action 

could cure any perceived inadequacies in the military commissions 

established by the President. 

In response to the Justices’ invitation to implement a legislative 

solution, it is my opinion, first, that Congress should restore the 

status quo that existed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Rasul v. Bush and make clear that the Federal courts do not possess jurisdiction over pending or future habeas petitions filed by 

Guantanamo Bay detainees or other noncitizen enemy combatants 

detained outside the territory of the United States. 

In that Rasul case, the Supreme Court overturned a precedent, 

Johnson v. Eisentrager, that had stood for 50 years and held in 

that case for the first time that the Federal habeas statute grants 

jurisdiction to Federal courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions 

filed by aliens, noncitizens, who have never had any contact with 

the United States, captured abroad and detained beyond the sovereign territory of the United States. In the Hamdan decision, the 

Court held that legislation enacted in response to Rasul depriving, 

again, the Federal courts of jurisdiction in such cases did not apply 

to habeas corpus petitions pending when the legislation was enacted. 

Since the emergence of the writ of habeas corpus several centuries ago in English common-law courts, the writ has never been 

available to enemy aliens captured on the battlefield outside of a 

country’s sovereign territory. Indeed, by requiring the President to 

justify his military decisions in Federal courts, Rasul imposed a 

substantial and unprecedented burden on the President’s ability to 

react with vigor and dispatch to homeland security threats. 

Indeed, none of the 2 million prisoners of war held by the United 

States at the conclusion of World War II was deemed authorized 

to file a habeas petition in a U.S. court challenging the terms of 

conditions of his confinement. One can only imagine the chaos that 

would have been introduced into the effort to win World War II if 

each of these detainees, or lawyers on their behalf, had been permitted to file petitions in U.S. courts immediately upon their capture in Europe, Africa, or the islands of the Pacific Ocean. 

50 

The Rasul decision and the Hamdan decision impose a tremendous burden on our military personnel in the field. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Eisentrager, it would be difficult to devise more 

effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he has ordered reduced to submission to call him to account 

in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the 

military offensive abroad to the legal defense at home. That is the 

words of Justice Jackson, who has been frequently quoted in these 

proceedings and in related proceedings in a 6–3 decision upholding 

what had always been the law of the land. Congress should act to 

restore the pre-Rasul status quo. The Constitution places the decision to detain a noncitizen held abroad squarely within the domain 

of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Congress should restore the constitutional balance by amending the 

Detainees Treatment Act to clarify that Federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by detainees held outside the 

sovereign territory of the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, my testimony refers to the military commissions 

and makes recommendations with respect to that, and it also addresses the point with respect to the Geneva Convention. But I will 

not take your time now by referring to that because it is in the 

written testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Olson. Professor 

Koh, we will take you now. 

STATEMENT OF HAROLD HONGJU KOH, DEAN, YALE LAW 

SCHOOL, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT 

Mr. KOH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have twice served in the 

Government—in the State Department in the 1990s and in the 

Reagan administration in the 1980s at the Justice Department. I 

submitted a detailed statement that makes two points: 

First, the Hamdan decision is much bigger than military commissions. It has broad significance for the separation of powers and 

the way we conduct the war on terror. 

And, second, it suggests principles for how Congress and the 

President should work together to restore a constitutional process 

for ensuring a fair trial and humane treatment. 

Mr. Olson stated the holdings of Hamdan, but as Justice Frankfurter once said, there are some cases that are less important for 

what they hold than for what they say about a way of looking at 

the law. And as my written remarks point out, Hamdan is the 

most important case on Executive power decided since the steel seizure case, not just for what it says about military commissions, but 

for what it says about what the Constitution requires about the 

President, Congress, and the courts working together to deal with 

national crisis. And what it says is that when the President is responding to a war on terror, he should not go it alone, citing a 

broad constitutional theory and statutes which do not give specific 

authorization; rather, he should fit his actions within the scope of 

enacted laws, such as the UCMJ, and treaties that have been ratified by the United States, like Common Article 3. 

51 

With regard to Common Article 3, there are two important 

things that it is not. Common Article 3 is not about giving terrorists POW status. It is about giving them a right to minimal humane treatment that we give everybody. 

The second thing, Common Article 3 is not about them and what 

they do. It is about what we are and what we do. We give basic 

humane treatment. Some have said, well, terrorists have not 

signed Common Article 3. Well, whales have not signed the Whaling Convention. But it is about how we treat them and how we are 

obliged to treat them. 

When you look at the way that Hamdan requires the executive 

branch to behave within the framework of law, you end up rejecting, as based on the wrong constitutional vision, three recent executive branch positions: the President’s supposed freedom to authorize torture and cruel treatment in the face of the McCain amendment would be rejected; the President’s supposed freedom to authorize warrantless domestic surveillance in the face of the FISA 

would be rejected; and the President’s supposed freedom to try 

military terrorist suspects before commissions that do not meet the 

UCMJ standards should also be rejected. 

That brings me to my final point. This Congress and this Committee have two options. The first is it can hastily enact quick-fix 

legislation to reverse the holdings in Hamdan. Mr. Olson now suggests that they also reverse Rasul. Ted Olson is a great lawyer. I 

had the privilege of working with him in the Justice Department 

20 years ago. He lost Rasul. His successor lost Hamdan. And now 

they would like to reargue those cases here and get them both reversed. 

But I think that there is a better approach than relitigating 

cases that have already been lost, and that is for Congress to hear 

what the Court said in Hamdan about what a constitutional process is, to accept the notion that any detainee in our custody deserves a fair trial and humane treatment. That is what the Pentagon now seems to have accepted, according to the story in the Financial Times. And, third, we should hold hearings about what it 

takes to make hearings of these detainees truly full and fair, as the 

President said he would do in creating military commissions. 

If Congress follows option one and simply tries to undo the Supreme Court conclusion, it will place us on the wrong side of our 

own law, statutory and treaty; on the wrong side of international 

law, on the wrong side of international opinion; and we run the 

risk that the statute you pass will be struck down again by the 

courts. 

But if you accept the Hamdan Court’s holdings and work with 

them, you will place us back on the right side of the law on the 

right side of international opinion, and I believe on the right side 

of history. 

I have suggested in my statement, starting on page 12, the criteria that military commissions have to satisfy after Hamdan with 

regard to humane treatment, eligible defendants in crimes, meaningful oversight, and procedures comparable to courts-martial. I 

agree with Senator Graham that if you are to do this, you should 

start from the UCMJ process. 

52 

But let me close by saying that Hamdan has presented both Congress and the President with an opportunity to make a fresh start 

in crafting a fair and durable solution to the problem of humane 

treatment and fair trial. This body should take this opportunity to 

craft laws that satisfy the UCMJ and Article 3, and the President 

should take care that those laws be faithfully executed. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koh appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Professor Koh. 

Let’s go to Mr. Cobb next, and we will finish with Commander 

Swift. Or you wanted me to go to Commander Swift first because 

Senator—why don’t we go to Commander Swift first, and we will 

finish with you, Mr. Cobb. That is contrary to what the Chairman 

wanted me to do, but I will do it. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHARLES D. 

SWIFT, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS, OFFICE OF 

CHIEF DEFENSE COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Commander SWIFT. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, 

thank you for again inviting— 

Senator HATCH. If you would pull your microphone a little closer 

to you, I think that would help. 

Commander SWIFT. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, 

thank you for again inviting me to testify here today. As you begin 

the vitally important process of determining the necessity of a legislative response to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamdan v. 

Rumsfeld. The first question to be asked is whether the system, as it has 

been set up, should be reinstated. Based on the past 5 years, the 

answer is simply no. This is not just the view of a defense counsel 

who litigated the commission system. It is also the view of some 

of the commission prosecutors. One of the prosecutors, Air Force 

Captain John Carr, wrote that in his experience, the commission 

was, and I quote, ‘‘a half-hearted and disorganized effort by a skeleton group of relatively inexperienced attorneys to prosecute fairly 

low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged.’’ Another 

prosecutor, Air Force Major Robert Preston, lamented that ‘‘writing 

a motion saying that the process will be full and fair when you do 

not really believe it is kind of hard—particularly when you want 

to call yourself an officer and a lawyer.’’ 

Those of us who have litigated in the commission cases in Guantanamo recognized that the military commission system’s was 

flawed in both design and execution. The military commission systems’ procedures were simply inadequate to ensure that the trials 

produced accurate results. Security is always a consideration in 

trials implicating the defense of our Nation. That consideration is 

recognized by MRE 505(b) inside the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Court-Martial that allows security considerations. The 

commission security rules, however, are written in such a way as 

to invite abuse, a fact that became only too clear to members of the 

prosecution as well as the defense. Captain Carr observed to the 

chief prosecutor, ‘‘In our meeting with [a government agency], they 

53 

told us that the exculpatory information, if it existed, would be in 

the 10 percent that we will not get with our agreed upon searches. 

I again brought up the problem that this presents to us in the car 

on the way back from the meeting, and you told me that the rules 

were written in such a way as to not require that we conduct such 

thorough searches, and that we were not going to worry about it.’’ 

Captain Carr’s e-mail is reflected in the experience of the defense. 

The ability of the Government agencies to hide evidence from the 

prosecution is chilling considering that the prohibition against 

statements obtained by torture rest solely on whether such statements were obtained through torture in the judgment of the prosecutors. Absent prosecutor judgment, there are no provisions guaranteeing the defense any sort of discovery concerning the use of coercion to obtain testimony. 

Publicly, the chief prosecutor argued in the military law journal 

that such problems would be cured by the defense’s ability to argue 

the shortcomings of any evidence. Privately, Captain Carr reports 

that the chief prosecutor told him, ‘‘The military panel will be hand 

picked and will not acquit these detainees.’’ Again, the practice of 

the commissions echo Captain Carr. 

To cite just one example, prior to his selection by the Secretary 

of Defense to serve on the commission’s appellate review panel, a 

very distinguished member, William T. Coleman, met with and assisted the prosecution in their preparation and strategy for trial. 

Now, using such a member would normally be perfectly Okay to 

get the prosecution ready. But he was then appointed to serve on 

the same review panel. In any other legal system, such conduct 

would have clearly precluded Mr. Coleman from serving in any judicial capacity, but not at the commissions. 

The defense, apart from calling the accused, has no meaningful 

ability to put on a defense. The dissent in Hamdan was incorrect 

when claiming that the petitioner may subpoena his own witnesses, if reasonably available. In fact, the defense had no ability 

to issue subpoenas and, with only one exception in more than 50 

attempts, no success in obtaining witnesses through the prosecution or the presiding officer. 

Given the handcuffs this puts on his counsel, the accused is really the only one that can dispute the evidence against him. Without 

knowing what that evidence is, the accused is left undefended. Yet 

the accused is not guaranteed even the most fundamental right, 

and that is, to know what the evidence is against him. 

It should not be surprising that in previous commissions the exclusion of a nondisruptive defendant from factual precedents of his 

own trial is unprecedented. The disregard for the principles of justice in the commissions has increasingly put members of the Chief 

Defense Counsel’s Office in the position where they would either 

violate ethical requirements incumbent on their practice of law or 

face criminal charges for the violation of military orders. To do 

one’s job in an ethical manner should not require a military attorney to risk criminal sanctions. 

Senator HATCH. Lieutenant Commander, I am going to have to 

hold you to the 5 minutes so I can make the vote. 

[The prepared statement of Commander Swift appears as a submission for the record.] 

54 

Senator HATCH. We will turn to Mr. Cobb now. I am going to 

hold each of you to right on 5 minutes. Otherwise, I cannot make 

the vote. 

Mr. Cobb. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL W. ‘‘WHIT’’ COBB, JR., FORMER DEPUTY 

GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPOSITION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. COBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear here today. 

As you mentioned, Senator Hatch, I have served as an Army and 

also as a former Deputy General Counsel for Legal Counsel of the 

Department of Defense. Of course, today I am appearing solely in 

my personal capacity. 

While I was at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I had the 

opportunity to participate in drafting the military commission procedures that were at issue in the Hamdan case, and I also had the 

opportunity to work through many of the issues the Committee is 

now confronting. I hope my perspective will be helpful. 

I would like to address the five key features of war crimes courts 

that I believe are essential to justice in the broadest sense of the 

word, and my statement has more details about this, my written 

statement. 

The first key feature, it is critical to have a specialized law of 

war court designed for the circumstances of each underlying conflict. War crimes court procedures need to differ in a few significant 

ways from the procedures that have grown up around our domestic 

criminal courts, including courts-martial. Courts-martial may have 

some surface appeal, but there are significant problems with using 

courts-martial to try war crimes. First, they have been designed to 

protect military personnel in their trials for ordinary criminal offenses and require drastic modifications. And, second, as discussed 

by Mr. Dell’Orto, it is even more difficult to use courts-martial to 

prosecute war crimes violations in Federal court. 

The second key feature of any war crimes court is that it needs 

to be a function of the military. The military has the subject matter 

expertise under the law of war. It has custody of the detainees. 

And it has always conducted our war crimes trials in the past. 

The third key feature, we need to have inclusive rules of evidence 

that permit the fact finder to weigh the probative value of each 

piece of evidence. The evidence is simply not going to have the indicia of reliability in all cases that we would expect in our domestic 

criminal court proceedings. 

The fourth feature is the need for heightened protection of classified information over and above the protections in Federal courts 

and courts-martials. This is required by the fact that our war with 

al Qaeda is continuing and also the importance of information in 

that war given the fact that our enemy in the war has no fixed 

faces or other resources that we would ordinarily attack. I would 

note that most other war crimes tribunals have taken place after 

the war had ended. 

Of course, defendant’s cleared counsel should be given access to 

all information relevant to the trial, but there are going to be rare 

but important instances when the defendant cannot be given personal access. 

55 

The fifth and final key aspect to a war crimes court is the need 

for cleared and mandatory defense counsel. The accused should not 

have the right to self-representation. These war crimes courts will 

be conducted in a complicated military justice procedural environment. Also, the right to self-representation would defeat protections 

for classified information. 

Now, how should legislation implement these five key features? 

Fortunately, we are not writing on a blank slate. There is an existing forum that has each of the five qualities that I have discussed, 

namely, military commissions. Some modifications to military commissions that Congress might consider include increasing the structural independence of the military commissions, for instance, by 

specifying the appointment of military judges to preside over the 

trials, and also by articulating further the appellate process. Congress might also desire to specify statutory provisions that would 

address the court’s concerns in Hamdan with respect to Articles 21 

and 36 of the UCMJ. 

The Unprivileged Combatant Act, introduced by Chairman Specter recently, contains almost all of the five key war crimes court 

features I have discussed and is an excellent first step toward a 

legislative response to Hamdan. 

In conclusion, the existing military commission system, with appropriate modifications by Congress, is ideally suited to trying law 

of war violations. The perfect is the enemy of the good, and perfectly uniform criminal procedures are the enemy of war crimes 

prosecutions. Surely, it is better to have some war crimes prosecutions under procedures tailored for the circumstances than perfectly uniform procedures and no prosecutions whatsoever. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer the Committee’s 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cobb appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Cobb. Professor 

Silliman, we will take your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT L. SILLIMAN, RETIRED AIR FORCE 

JUDGE ADVOCATE, CENTER ON LAW, ETHICS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 

DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 

Mr. SILLIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With all due respect 

to Dean Koh, I read the decision in Hamdan a bit narrower than 

he does, as is explained more in detail in my prepared statement. 

Therefore, I urge the Committee, to the extent it deems legislation 

necessary, that it carefully tailor it to meet the specific issue raised 

by the Supreme Court. 

For example, the Court did not deal with the broader question 

of the President’s authority to detain. It said, ‘‘Hamdan did not 

challenge nor need the Court to address that question.’’ 

Also, because the Detainee Treatment Act already prescribes the 

procedure for status review determinations on detainees, that is an 

issue which, at least for now, need not be addressed. Therefore, I 

believe the Congress should address only those lists of deficiencies 

in military commissions that it pointed out. 

56 

If the Congress merely passes a law giving legislative sanction 

to the prior system from military commissions, putting everything 

back the way it was, there is no assurance that it would pass judicial muster. Further, it would obviously invite further challenges 

and lead to greater uncertainty. 

Many legal scholars believe that it is possible for this Congress 

to actually legislate around Common Article 3. However, giving 

Congressional sanction to the minimal level of due process in commissions, which was criticized as inadequate by the Supreme Court 

and which fails to satisfy a commonly recognized international 

legal standards, is, I believe, Mr. Chairman, imprudent. 

Congress could also authorize a completely new system for military commissions which remedies most of the defects with the 

Court cited, but which does perhaps allow for a more flexible standard for the admissibility of evidence. The Congress could legislate 

an exception for hearsay evidence or unsworn statements. However, in no circumstance should evidence procured by coercive interrogation techniques be admissible. 

I would also suggest that there should be a more robust and substantial judicial review, such as in the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and that that is absolutely essential. 

So Congress could build a new military justice system based on 

most of the procedures of the court-martial process but, again, 

making exceptions where the Congress needs it. That would be a 

far better step, Mr. Chairman, but not the one I advocate. 

What I urge the Committee to consider requires no new major 

legislation. The Supreme Court in Hamdan clearly implied that 

courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the type 

of trial system we do use for our own servicemen, is more than adequate and appropriate to the task. 

To those who suggest that using courts-martial would disadvantage us by taking those relatively small number of military commissions—and, again, Mr. Chairman, remember, the standard for 

detaining an individual is merely an administrative determination 

of combatant status. To bring a case before a military commission, 

there must be a specific framing of a criminal charge under the law 

of war. That is the only jurisdiction of a war court, a military commission in this case. But by adopting the same system of courts 

that we use for our own servicemen and making the minor adjustments we need, which has already been brought before this commission, Article 32 need not necessarily obtain. Article 31(b), the 

Advice of Rights, need not necessarily obtain. The authority already exists in Article 18 to use courts-martial for violations of the 

law of war. 

If we do that, Mr. Chairman, I think that we send a loud and 

clear signal to the rest of the world, particularly at this time of increasing allegations of atrocities by our own armed service personnel. We send a signal that we are a Nation under the rule of 

law, not just in rhetoric, Mr. Chairman, but in practice. 

Let me close by suggesting, as you already have here before you, 

as the Senate Armed Services Committee will have on Thursday, 

that you continue to solicit and seek the advice of those who know 

this system and these issues best. And I refer to the active-duty 

judge advocates and retired judge advocates. I believe their advice 

57 

and counsel, as you deliberate this very difficult issue, would be of 

great benefit. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Silliman appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you so much, Professor. 

Mr. Collins, we are delighted to have you back. We look forward 

to hearing you. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL P. COLLINS, FORMER ASSOCIATE 

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND PARTNER, MUNGER, 

TOLLES & OLSON, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to 

testify here today. The extent to which the use of military commissions remains available as a tool for prosecuting terrorists and 

other unlawful combatants in the ongoing war on terror is an important issue that warrants this Committee’s prompt attention. I 

believe that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdan v. 

Rumsfeld casts sufficient doubt over the manner in which such 

commissions may proceed in the absence of statutory authorization 

or clarification as to make it appropriate for Congress to supply 

that authorization and clarification. It would, I think, be ill advised 

to try to proceed without the benefit of Congress’ assistance in implementing the Court’s decision. 

Before turning to the specific recommendations that I would 

make, I did want to emphasize two points about the Court’s decision that I think are very important. 

First, despite some of the misunderstanding that I think has 

been reflected in the press and some of the commentary, the Court 

did not in any respect base its holding on the Constitution of the 

United States. It, rather, solely found that the procedures set up 

for the military commissions were not consistent with the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that the Court 

deemed to be applicable; and, second, it concluded that the structure and procedures more generally deviated from the requirements of Common Article 3, which it also believed to be applicable 

to the conflict with al Qaeda. 

The Court also, importantly, did not question that the military 

model and a military tribunal is appropriate in this context. I think 

that is also important to underscore. In discussing the subject of 

how to confront and disable al Qaeda, too many people, I think, 

seem to view the war on terror as a war merely in the rhetorical 

sense, like the war on drugs or the war on poverty. It is not. It is 

an armed conflict with an organized enemy that calls forth the 

military authorities of the Government, including the right to detain and the right to try before a military tribunal. No Justice of 

the Court questioned that. It is merely a matter of how to exercise 

the authority to try within the context of a military tribunal. 

There are four things that I think the Congress should do in response to Hamdan. 

First, I believe that the Congress should eliminate the standard 

of uniformity except as impracticable standard, which we are now 

left with. That standard is fraught with so much uncertainty that 

to attempt to implement it would just have everyone back here 5 

58 

years from now after another Supreme Court decision saying it was 

not quite right. If Congress provides the authorization, substitutes 

that standard with something else, that will provide the best and 

surest footing for proceeding with appropriate military tribunals. 

I think that what Congress should put in its place has two elements: one, it should have some substantial residuum of discretion 

for the Executive to fill out the details; and then, second, as is clear 

from the comments of many of the Senators today, there is clearly 

a desire on the part of Congress to articulate some minimum criteria that will be applied. How you draw those lines I think is a 

difficult question that will require careful study. 

Second, I think that Congress should also eliminate the uncertainty occasioned by the Court’s holding with respect to the Geneva 

Conventions, and I don’t think that Congress needs to repudiate 

the application of Common Article 3 in order to do that. I, rather, 

read the Court’s opinion, and as clarified by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, as indicating that if Congress provides the statutory authorization for this regime and sets it up in a regular fashion, then 

it will be a regularly constituted court within the meaning of Common Article 3 and will eliminate that problem. And so the Court, 

by providing a clear statutory authorization and basis for these tribunals, can cure that problem. 

I also think, third, that the Congress should provide specific statutory authorization for a war crime of conspiracy, something that 

is clearly within Congress’ constitutional authority. 

And then, fourth, I believe that Congress should also revise the 

judicial review provision so as to effectuate the original intent of 

the Detainee Treatment Act to ensure that challenges to military 

commission judgments follow the judgment and not precede it. In 

some respects, the level of deference to military tribunals under 

this decision is less than you would give in a habeas court to a 

State court judgment, and that seems inappropriate. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Collins appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you so much. We really appreciate 

all of you. I am sorry we have to hold you over until 2:15, because 

I think there will be a lot of questions of this distinguished panel. 

So, with that, we will recess until 2:15, when we will resume this 

hearing. We appreciate all of your and your patience. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 2:15 p.m., this same day.] 

AFTERNOON SESSION [2:15 p.m.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We will resume our hearing about what 

should be done to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court 

of the United States in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. I regret that I had 

to miss the opening statements, but Senator Leahy and I are ready 

to proceed with some questions. 

Mr. Olson, let me begin with you and acknowledge personally 

again my sympathy for the loss of your wife on 9/11 on the plane 

that crashed into the Pentagon. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. You have a unique perspective from many 

points of view, having been Solicitor General and very much involved in the work of Government and experienced in constituVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
59 

tional law. How many cases have you argued now before the U.S. 

Supreme Court? 

Mr. OLSON. We have to stretch our memory to remember those 

numbers, Senator, but I think it is 43. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is quite a record. 

What do you think needs to be done to have a basic compliance 

with what the Supreme Court said in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, at a very minimum, what the administration 

seems to be urging is that Congress approve the procedures that 

the President articulated in the order setting up the military commissions that he did, in 2001 I guess it was. That would be the 

minimum requirement. 

Chairman SPECTER. Do you think that would pass muster with 

what the Court had in mind on compliance with Article 3 of the 

Geneva Convention? 

Mr. OLSON. I think it would. I do think that, to the extent that 

there are other provisions that are added with respect to specific 

aspects of the process, that the most flexibility possible given to the 

President is something that should be done because, as I say in my 

written testimony, the terrorists that we are opposing are extremely resourceful. They adapt their techniques to our defenses. 

Every time we set up some sort of a system, they work their way 

around it. They train their colleagues how to lie, to cheat, and to 

commit mayhem in ways that are very, very destructive to us. And 

they take advantage. They attempt in every way possible to take 

advantage to any legal system that can be created. 

Therefore, I think it is important for the President to have the 

flexibility more than just to deviate where it is impracticable, 

which is one of the terms that is in the statute now, but to have 

some reasonable flexibility to adapt to the circumstances. 

The provision to terrorists of highly classified, sensitive information makes no sense to me, and I think that— 

Chairman SPECTER. Dean Koh, the applicability of Article 3 of 

the Geneva Convention was received with surprise in many quarters. There had been some contention over whether you needed a 

nation state, you needed uniforms, you need some regularization to 

apply the Geneva Conventions. How would you—and I know you 

favor the application of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and 

think the Court acted in accordance with the intention of the provision. But how would you square—I am on Dean Koh now. 

How would you, Dean Koh, analyze the applicability of Article 3 

of the Geneva Convention in that context? 

Mr. KOH. Well, Senator, in my oral remarks, I made two points 

about what Common Article 3 is not. It is not a provision that gives 

people prisoner-of-war status, and it is not about what they do. It 

is about what we do. It is a statement—and this is a quote from 

Will Taft, who is legal adviser, that there are certain minimum 

standards apply even to the detention of unprivileged belligerents. 

It says that they are not outside the law. It is a general principle 

of civilized society that inhumane treatment degrades the perpetrator as much as the victim. 

So what was really said in 1949 when they were crafting the Geneva Conventions was there must be a core of minimum treatment 

that we are ready to give to every country in the world, and every 

60 

country in the world respects it except for the Island of Nauru. So 

I think that the real question is does Congress want to be in a position now of passing a law which is essentially saying that the 

United States wants not to be a part of this baseline minimum 

standard. And I think that would be very, very damaging for our 

own troops, for our country to say that of all the countries in the 

world who accept this baseline minimum standard, we do not. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Olson, how would you respond to Dean 

Koh? How would you satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the 

Geneva Convention using the President’s program if Congress were 

to legislate on the matter? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, my position would be that it would be important for Congress to make clear that it agrees with the executive 

branch’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, that it does not apply under these circumstances to 

terrorists who are not acting in connection with any State, not complying with any other provision of the—not working with a contracting party, and that provision applied, as most people understood it, I believe, to conflict that was not international in nature, 

which international terrorism certainly is, confined within a contracting party, which is not what we are dealing with here. 

I think that if Congress made it clear that that interpretation of 

the Geneva Conventions and our participation in them, I think that 

that would carry important weight. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, my red light went on, so I will yield 

to Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. Lieutenant Commander Swift, in Mr. Cobb’s prepared testimony today, he argued, among other things, that special 

procedures are needed for a military commission in wartime to prevent sensitive information from being passed to detainees under attorney-client privilege or being passed from them. Do you have any 

comment about that? 

Commander SWIFT. Well, sir, I certainly agree that in Mr. 

Hamdan’s case, where I am representing him, there is a need to 

protect sensitive materials, but also in Mr. Hamdan’s case, when 

that is given a blanket application, it can lead to basically the violation of fundamental rights in a trial. The example I can give is 

that I was down at Guantanamo Bay to tell Mr. Hamdan about his 

decision. For 2 days, first we told him; then I explained to him, 

along with Professor Katyal, our strategy going forward, all the 

possible things we might do or not do. 

At the end of that meeting, he was taken back to his regular cell, 

and then his belongings were searched, and the only thing they 

took were his notes on the questions that he was to answer as the 

client on how we were to proceed. In other words, the Government 

seized the entire strategy we had going forward. And it was the 

only document they took. And I did not see how that could possibly 

implication national strategy, although it does certainly implicate 

how we will conduct the trial. 

Senator LEAHY. Also, Mr. Bradbury and Mr. Dell’Orto on the 

first panel talked about deficiencies they see in the UCMJ procedures and claim those are preventing them from moving forward 

today, without further delay, with courts-martial against those the 

President has designated for trial in Guantanamo Bay. Part of this 

61 

came after questions of mine pointing out the fact they have been 

down there for all these years and the Administration has not convicted anybody yet. I am not sure how that makes us better. What 

procedures are in place to ensure that those who have violated the 

law of war can be brought to justice under the UCMJ—and this 

sort of follows on my other question—while keeping classified information secret? And what is the military’s record of applying the 

UCMJ to suspected war criminals? 

Commander SWIFT. Is this question to me, sir? 

Senator LEAHY. Yes. 

Commander SWIFT. Yes, sir. Speaking in Mr. Hamdan’s case, if 

he were taken to a court-martial, I am well aware that 505(b) 

would permit the same sort of substitutions that you see in Federal 

courts, where they could substitute in classified information, substitute proxies, all of the things necessary to protect classified information. Also, under Article 31 Bravo, I am well aware of the decision in United States v. Lonetree that says intelligence, information that was gathered under intelligence purposes is not subject 

to Article 31(b). So I would expect a court-martial to fully address 

the concerns that have been brought up here today, and we would 

then be litigating on an even and fair playing field where the truth 

is going to come out. 

Senator LEAHY. In fact, Commander, haven’t we had trials in 

this country for years where there has been classified information 

involved and it has been handled—the courts have worked it out 

in such a way to protect both the Government and the defense? 

Commander SWIFT. Actually, I have participated in a few of 

those trials, sir. Our system is very well set up for the protection 

of classified information. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, unlike a Federal court, is permitted to be closed in a court-martial. 

And all of the members on the court-martial have security clearances. So you have a lot of flexibility, while still maintaining the 

accuseds’ right to confront the evidence against them. It is a very 

good system. 

Senator LEAHY. Dean Koh, Mr. Bradbury testified for the administration, the Justice Department witness this morning, he said the 

administration would abide by the Supreme Court’s ruling that 

Common Article 3 applies to Guantanamo detainees—not a real big 

concesssion so far as the Supreme Court did rule that way and he 

is bound to follow it. But then in something very similar to some 

of the signing statements, some of the 700 signing statements we 

have seen, he suggested Common Article 3 was ambiguous and 

hard to interpret. 

Do you find Common Article 3 that ambiguous or hard to interpret? 

Mr. KOH. No, I do not. I should point out that the White House 

spokesman, Tony Snow, was asked a similar question and gave a 

similar answer. So this sounds like it is the official administration 

position. They do not know what ‘‘humiliating and degrading treatment’’ means. I think anyone who saw Abu Ghraib knows that is 

humiliating and degrading treatment. 

I think it does mean that you might want to have a list of things, 

of tactics which are clearly in violation, which include, for example, 

waterboarding, leading people around with dog collars, threatening 

62 

them falsely with execution. Those are clearly violations of Common Article 3. 

But you have to remember, Senator, that every country in the 

world applies Common Article 3, so there is a lot of understanding 

of what practice is violated or not, and I don’t think other countries 

have found it difficult to apply. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Senator Cornyn—oh, pardon me. Senator Graham was here first. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to again 

thank you for having these hearings. The more we talk about this, 

I think, the more we can understand our differences and work to 

get a good solution. 

I guess my basic concern is shared by Mr. Olson. I have got a 

lot of concern, Dean, with all due respect, about how Common Article 3 can restrict our Nation’s ability to defend ourselves when it 

comes to the treatment. When it comes to a regularly constituted 

court, I think we could fix that pretty quickly. I think we could 

come up with a military commission model that we all could be 

proud of. And the debate I got into with our representatives from 

the administration before is maybe form over substance. 

Mr. Olson, my concern is basically that military commissions are 

spoken of in the UCMJ, so this is not an area where the Congress 

is silent. The Congress has said within the UCMJ specific things 

about military commissions. 

What restrictions do you think Congress has put, if any, on forming a military commission? 

Mr. OLSON. I listened to that colloquy this morning, and it struck 

me that maybe the point where there was ships passing— 

Senator GRAHAM. Passing of the ships? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. OLSON. It is that there have been military commissions from 

the beginning of our country, and it is not just our country; that 

they have been accepted in many instances by the U.S. Supreme 

Court. The Uniform Code of Military Justice acknowledges the existence of military commissions, and by specifying procedures for 

courts-martials, it does not, in my opinion, indicate that military 

commissions have to be conducted that way, that my understanding—and you may understand it better than I do because of 

your particular background—is that the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice is perfectly consistent with the existence and formation and 

operation of military commissions that operate under different procedures. 

Senator GRAHAM. If I could interrupt, I think that is a very good 

summary of sort of where—military commissions are mentioned in 

the UCMJ for a purpose. It created another legal venue, believing 

that in some circumstances the UCMJ may not be the proper 

venue. 

So we talk about a new creature called military commissions, 

and the reason we got to the law of Common Article 3 is the Court 

read the UCMJ, where it spoke of military commissions, and it 

says the body of law would be the law of armed conflict. Certainly 

within the body of law of armed conflict is the Geneva Convention. 

63 

It kind of went around in a circle to get to Common Article 3, and 

I think we could, if we chose, amend that statute and change it and 

define what the law of armed conflict was for military commission 

purposes and exclude the Geneva Convention if we chose to do 

that. I think we have that power. 

The question is: Should we as a Nation—and, Scott—I am just 

going to call you ‘‘Scott,’’ because you used to be my boss in the Air 

Force. I never got to do that when we were on active duty. I can 

do it now. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. Give me your opinion about how we create— 

what source document should we use after Hamdan to create a 

military commission? Should it be the UCMJ modified, or should 

we just give blessing to Military Order 1? 

Mr. SILLIMAN. Certainly not the latter, Senator. One thing that 

I think we all need to understand with regard to the history of 

military commissions, the last commissions in this country were 

the Kierin case after World War II, and I think most people do not 

know that the Attorney General actually sent a second case involving German saboteurs into Federal court. But the UCMJ was enacted by Congress in 1950 to be effective in 1951, Senator, because 

of the concerns. 

You remember the scathing dissent of Justices Rutledge and 

Murphy in the Yamashita case with regard to the very loose procedures that were used in that. It was a legitimate commission, but 

it came under caustic rebuke. 

Now, I think what Congress was saying in enacting the UCMJ— 

and, as you point out, Senator, incorporating in both Articles 18 

and 21 specific references to military commissions—is that it wanted to incorporate, and it said so in 36(b), court-martial proceedings 

as much as practicable. 

Senator GRAHAM. Uniform as practicable. 

Mr. SILLIMAN. Yes. So I would say, Senator, that we start with 

a high bar. We start with the UCMJ which, for 56 years, has been 

recognized and which the Supreme Court in effect said was fully 

compliant with Common Article 3—not that that is the test, but it 

complies. So I do believe that within minimal amendments to the 

Code, probably through Article 18 and specifically limited to war 

crimes, again, there has been no court-martial—I stand to be corrected here, but I don’t think a general court-martial has actually 

ever been implemented to prosecute a violation of law of war. 

So as you said, Senator, we are starting and building a new system for the future. If we are going to do it, I think the baseline 

ought to be the UCMJ, certainly rather than just trying to reverse 

the Court’s decision in Hamdan by ratifying, as it were, the President’s military order. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate each of you being here today and offering your expertise to us. Mr. Olson, let me ask, in your testimony you note the 

danger of requiring the Government to disclose sensitive intelligence information to al Qaeda operatives that it seeks to prosVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
64 

ecute under this ruling. I am concerned because al Qaeda consumes 

any information that it can get its hands on to help it in its cause. 

For example, al Qaeda has reviewed the military’s field manual 

to help its associates resist interrogation. Former New York terrorism prosecutor Andy McCarthy has written how he complied 

with the court requirement to turn over information to suspected 

terrorists, and that list was later used as evidence in another terrorism trial when it was learned that the list had been passed by 

al Qaeda associates through its network and was discovered in the 

Sudan. 

Can you explain how we can proceed in a way that does not turn 

over our secrets to the terrorists in a way that will empower them 

and potentially endanger the American people? 

Mr. OLSON. Senator Cornyn, I think that that subject was addressed very well in Mr. Cobb’s testimony with respect—am I correct?—to the lawyers, having cleared lawyers have the opportunity—to the extent that we have to go that far, to have cleared 

lawyers, lawyers that have been through the process to have access 

to the information, and that it need not then go to the terrorist 

under the circumstances where a determination has been made 

that it is extremely sensitive, source method type information that 

could be very, very damaging to the United States. 

I think that could be done. I have stressed in my testimony that 

it would be very important to allow this uniformity as far as practicable as an illustration of that. Historically, the courts have given 

great deference to the judgments of the President who has the constitutional responsibility as Commander-in-Chief to defend this 

country against acts of war and acts of terrorism. The judgment, 

I hope, that if this Congress codifies in some way the military commission process and sets forth a specified set of rules, that there 

will be flexibility built into it so that the President in the exigent 

circumstances, when it is necessary, when it is practical, when it 

is appropriate, can deviate from those circumstances, and that it is 

understood in the legislation, not just in the legislative history, 

that deference will be given to the President’s judgment with respect to that. He is the constitutional authority that must make 

snap, immediate decisions, and as I indicated in my testimony, to 

have those decisions second-guessed years later in the context of a 

terrorist bringing a commander to account or for a President’s decisions to be micromanaged by a judiciary years later with respect 

to the correctness of those decisions makes no sense to me. 

Senator CORNYN. Do you have reservations about if we were to 

adopt the framework of the UCMJ that it would create those problems you have just described? 

Mr. OLSON. Absolutely, and I think the testimony this morning 

was very, very clear about that, by people that know a great deal 

more about it than I do. But the idea of Miranda warnings, Brady 

rules, and search warrants before someone knocks open a door, the 

idea that we have opened the door to judicial review of the status 

of a combatant from the moment he is taken into custody, which 

is the consequence of the Rasul and Hamdan decision, has grave 

consequences with respect to the decisions that our people have to 

make when their lives are imperiled on the ground in the midst of 

a war when people are blowing themselves up to kill them. 

65 

Senator CORNYN. Professor Silliman, I gather you think we can 

start with the framework of the UCMJ and carve out exceptions 

where the application of that to servicemembers is not practicable 

when applied to terrorists. Could you describe that? 

Mr. SILLIMAN. Senator, I think we first need to understand that 

the scenario that was described would also say that when our own 

servicemen commit acts of rape and pillage, that there is a total 

vacuum of a law enforcement function, that is just not true, Senator. All we are talking about is taking an existing system where 

the members of our armed forces know well the restraints. And I 

am not talking about a Miranda type Article at 31(b). That is not 

my concern. But to suggest that the military somehow should have 

no matrix, no legal matrix outside the UCMJ at all to operate to 

fight terrorism, to me starts a very slippery slope. And I very much 

worried, sir, that we would then become much as those we call our 

enemy, and I think that is not the signal we need to send. 

That is why I do stress that I think the bar that we set, that this 

Congress sets, and in conjunction with the administration, ought to 

be high and make exceptions where needed in the wisdom of this 

body. But don’t start with a low bar. That is the wrong message 

to send, and it is not necessary. 

Senator CORNYN. My time is up, but I would appreciate it if you 

would provide me and the Committee a list of those exceptions 

where you believe they would be warranted. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

We do need to figure out how to get a proper response to the Supreme Court’s opinion and create a system which complies with 

that opinion. I am not one that thinks it is sent from heaven, but 

it is the law. So we will see if we can work for it, work with it. 

I guess, Mr. Cobb, you were counsel at the Defense Department. 

Senator Graham and I were just talking about the UCMJ. That is 

prepared by the Department of Defense and either acted on or rejected by the Congress? 

Mr. COBB. The Manual for Court-Martial. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Manual for Court-Martial? 

Mr. COBB. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. As you look at—well, let me ask, Mr. Olson, 

you were Solicitor General. You have represented the United 

States before the Supreme Court innumerable times and you speak 

for the entire Government before that Court. Why wouldn’t we 

want the Department of Defense or the executive branch to prepare 

a new commission procedure and submit it to Congress and let us 

evaluate it for appropriateness? Would that be a good step? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, that may be a very good idea. I cannot, as I 

sit here, think of any reasons why it would not be a good idea, because then to the extent that the Congress is not simply codifying 

what is already in existence, in a sense that the President set forth 

rules and procedures for the creation and implementation of military commissions, but to require—or to give the Defense Department and the administration time to go back and do it again and 

then submit it to Congress for approval by Congress is probably a 

66 

good idea. I just have to stress, though, that to the extent that it 

is too specific and too rigid and involves too much micromanagement by the courts—because I think that is something that needs 

to be done, too, that something has to be done about the habeas 

corpus statute, or you are going to have courts supervising the implementation of those procedures from the moment someone is 

taken into custody. And so I think that has to be a part of the 

package. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I could not agree more. I am thinking 

about our difficulties with immigration. We in the Senate and this 

Committee have attempted to write laws to enforce the border 

when it seems to me that if the administration is serious about border enforcement, they have the people working at it every day. 

They have got prosecutors. They have got investigators. They have 

got agents. They ought to be telling us what they need and proposing to us legislation that would fix the border. 

It strikes me, Mr. Cobb, that the military has got the responsibility to defend America, to detain dangerous criminals and not to 

release them, and to see that those who are unlawful combatants 

are appropriately tried. Shouldn’t they have the responsibility—or 

wouldn’t it be the appropriate way for us to operate for the Department of Defense to suggest how they would like to go? 

Mr. COBB. Senator, I believe that is an excellent suggestion. The 

Department of Defense has spent nearly 4 years working on these 

very issues with respect to the creation of the military commissions, and they have even encountered some of the practical difficulties that you have in the stillborn trials that have been held 

so far. And so I think that asking the Department of Defense to 

come back with a new recommendation would be a very useful 

idea. 

Senator SESSIONS. And I am thinking about the practicalities of 

it all. We get overconfident about how easy it is to prosecute cases. 

We assume that you have got a pretty good case and something is 

just going to all fall together and it is going to be successful and 

somebody will be convicted if they are guilty. But I have seen 

guilty people get acquitted. I have seen trials fall apart. I have 

seen judges say, ‘‘That is hearsay,’’ or ‘‘The chain of custody is not 

sufficient,’’ or ‘‘That item of evidence was seized unlawfully,’’ exclude the evidence and the case fell apart right there. It is one 

thing if that is a marijuana dealer. It is another thing if it is a person who makes bombs, has a plan to kill Americans, has sworn to 

destroy the United States and actually been part of a movement 

that has declared war on the United States. 

So I am troubled by it all. I know we must have and have always 

had the responsibility, morally and legally, to give people a fair 

trial. But, Mr. Olson, with regard to many of the rules that we 

have in our procedure of justice, the Miranda rule where you have 

to warn people before you ask them questions, the exclusionary 

rule that says if the constable erred, you cannot use the evidence 

against him even if it is a bloody knife that proves he was a murderer. Those kinds of things are not part of most developed nations’ 

laws, as I understand it. Can’t you have a fair and just system that 

does not provide every single protection in terms of right to counsel 

and these other issues I have mentioned? 

67 

Mr. OLSON. I agree that we can, but the idea—the thing that 

concerns me that I have been talking about is applying the Bill of 

Rights, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the Bill of Rights, in 

the context of a war where there is going to be judicial review of 

those decisions. One of the Supreme Court’s decisions this term 

had to do with a knock-and-announce rule before you could go into 

a building. Will that work in Iraq? Do you have to knock and announce and wait for the bomb to go off? 

Now, that is an extreme example, but where is the line to be 

drawn between the constitutional rights that the Supreme Court 

has articulated with respect to our citizens and the prosecution of 

crimes compared to the conduct of a war in wartime in the battlefield? And I think it is exceedingly important that we understand 

that that is a completely different environment and the people 

whose home we might be going into in Iraq because of weapons 

that are discovered there are not citizens of the United States and 

are not subject to the protections of our Constitution. They wish to 

destroy our Constitution. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, Mr. Olson, you describe the Hamdan decision as ‘‘an extremely cramped and unworkable interpretation’’ of 

the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that Congress 

passed when this war began. Similarly, as you describe, the Court 

found ambiguity in what I thought was crystal clear Detainee 

Treatment Act language regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over 

these habeas corpus lawsuits. 

What does this mean for how we respond to the Court’s decision? 

Some might want to respond with legislation that amounts to a 

very particularized, detailed, specific regulatory approach. Do we 

still have the flexibility to acknowledge the constitutional prerogatives of the President as our Commander-in-Chief? 

Mr. OLSON. I think it is exceedingly important that there has to 

be some sort of legislative response, there is no question about 

that, and I would recommend—this is just my view—that that legislative response acknowledge that during wartime the President 

must have flexibility, discretion to make decisions, of course, not in 

a lawless way, but flexibility to respond to circumstances. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force was couched in general 

language intentionally, I submit, because the Congress under those 

circumstances could not anticipate and could not prepare an 

itemized bill of particulars of every single use of authority or use 

of military force that was being authorized by that. So it speaks in 

terms of all necessary force to deal with the situation of terrorism. 

Now, I understand and I agree with some people that say, yes, 

the White House might have taken that too far under certain circumstances. I am not an expert on that. Those have to be looked 

at individually. But the President does need the authority; and the 

only way that the Supreme Court is going to accept that, given 

what the decision in Hamdan has been, is for Congress to make 

it clear wherever it can, if there are to be procedures, fine; if there 

is to be a method by which a military commission is established, 

fine; but that this body reinforce what I think it said in the AuthorVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
68 

ization for Use of Military Force, that within those ranges, within 

the limitations, as understood in the Youngstown Steel case, that 

the President has the authority to move forward and exercise discretion. 

Senator HATCH. Mr. Cobb, let me turn to you. In your testimony, 

you emphasize that we must maintain what you called a specialized law of war court that is different from domestic criminal 

courts or a court-martial. I would like you to respond to Professor 

Silliman’s argument that the President should simply use already 

established court-martial proceedings under the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice rather than separately established or constituted 

military commissions. I believe Commander Smith came to the 

same conclusion on that. And you said that notwithstanding its 

possible surface appeal, this approach would have, in your words, 

‘‘significant problems.’’ 

I would like you to expand on that a bit and perhaps respond to 

Professor Silliman’s conclusion that we must, nonetheless, as he 

put it, set the bar high and take this step to restore our international credibility. 

Mr. COBB. Well, Senator, that is an excellent question that really 

sums up a lot of what we have been discussing today, and I think 

that, you know, whatever you call the tribunal, the war crimes tribunal that we use to prosecute war crimes, it has to have certain 

key features. And if you change a court-martial into, you know, a 

new forum that has those key features, you are basically calling a 

rose by another name. 

The court-martial system, if modified, I would argue is really a 

military commission system. If you keep the court-martial system 

as it is, you are going to have a number of problems in going forward. You are going to have problems with introduction of evidence. You are going to have problems with handling classified evidence. And you are going to wind up with much fewer prosecutions. 

I am somewhat familiar with the evidence that we have with respect to the detainees at Guantanamo, and I think that if you 

ratchet up the level of procedural requirements so high, you will 

wind up having few, if any, war crimes prosecutions. I think that 

is to the detriment of us all because I think that there is an inherent value to having these prosecutions. It gives justice to the detainee, and it gives justice to the people of the United States who 

want to understand what has happened in this war on terrorism. 

Senator HATCH. Mr. Chairman, could I just possibly ask one 

more question? 

Chairman SPECTER. One more question. Proceed, Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. Mr. Collins, I would like to ask you this 

question. On the theme of reading the Hamdan decision for what 

it is rather than reading into it what we might want it to say, I 

would like you to expand on the point in your testimony that the 

Court did not find any constitutional violation. That is, the Court 

did not say that the Constitution compelled its conclusion that the 

procedures used in the military commissions created by President 

Bush were inadequate. As you pointed out, Justice Kennedy said 

in his concurring opinion that domestic statutes controlled the case. 

Now, why is this point so important? Does it mean that since you 

emphasized this is indeed a very real war, the Court was not quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
69 

tioning the President’s essential Executive authority as Commander-in-Chief to establish military tribunals? Does it give the 

Congress more flexibility with regard to how we respond to the 

Court’s decision? 

Mr. COLLINS. I think that it does. You know, we read the opinion, and it is 70-something pages, and it is hard to think that there 

were actually more issues in the case, but there were. The common 

Article 3 issue, the merits of that issue, was addressed in the last 

paragraph of the Government’s brief, the carryover paragraph from 

page 49 to 50, because there were so many other issues in the case. 

There were quite a number of constitutional challenges that had 

been raised to commissions, and the Court did not accept any of 

those arguments but, rather, seemed to operate from the premise 

that this was validly considered to be a subject of military justice, 

and it was a question of what the procedures were, and it found 

violations of a purely statutory and treaty nature. But the treaty 

one is unusual in the sense that because they essentially said the 

treaty says that you have to have a properly authorized structure, 

it is one that can also be fulfilled by legislation. 

So this is not a case where the legislation would seek to kind of 

override the treaty by statute, which is something you can do, but 

it is not something you need do here. A statutory fix will solve the 

problems identified by the Court’s opinion. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Hatch. 

Thank you all. We could continue this hearing— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, may I have just one chance? 

Senator SPECTER. Senator Feinstein, you are recognized. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Lieutenant Commander Swift, I was very interested to hear your 

testimony, largely because you are really the only one that I know 

of that has actually represented someone in this situation. And if 

I had to state where I am today, it would be that we ought to take 

the Code of Military Justice, go through it very carefully, make decisions as to what is appropriate in this circumstance and what is 

not appropriate, and codify that and add a codification of the treatment level similar to what Secretary England just did in his missive to DOD. 

My concern—and I want to ask you about this. I was at Guantanamo once with Secretary Rumsfeld and Senator Hutchison and I 

think Senator Inouye. It was early on. But I was struck by the isolation of the facility and how you put together any kind of defense, 

let’s even say appropriate defense, how you get the information, 

how you are able to talk with witnesses. And I was wondering if 

you would comment on that. 

If we were to do that with the Code of Military Justice and make 

decisions, Republicans and Democrats hopefully coming together, 

as to what would be an appropriate new bill, could that, regardless 

of what it was, be effectively carried out in the Guantanamo setting? 

Commander SWIFT. There are two parts to your question, ma’am, 

and I will start with the first part. 

I agree, in Mr. Hamdan’s case we fought very hard to get him 

a fair trial, and we know the UCMJ represents that. One should 

look at the UCMJ, not only just what is written in the statutes, 

70 

but also what CAF, the Code of Armed Forces for the Military, has 

said and what each of the service courts have said. A lot of talk 

has been out there about, for instance, Article 31 Bravo, that it 

would somehow stop prosecutions. Yet CAF has said a great deal 

about 31 Bravo, and in the United States v. Lonetree— Senator FEINSTEIN. Tell me what the 31 Bravo is. 

Commander SWIFT. I am sorry, ma’am. That is the military 

equivalent to Miranda. That has been thrown around as a real 

problem. But what was said in that particular case was that, for 

instance, for intelligence-gathering purposes, then 31 Bravo would 

not apply. It would only apply to law enforcement. 

So I think what all of that stands for is that it takes a very careful reading through, because not only is there the code, there are 

50 years of interpretation of it. And that is why a court-martial 

would work immediately now, because we would know—we as military attorneys know what the rules are. I can start the trial now 

and go forward. And I think you raise another very good point, 

ma’am. It has been 5 years, at a minimum, for a lot of this. Witnesses are disappearing on both sides very quickly. If we wait, if 

we do not move forward and do not use courts-martial, and after 

more litigation we find ourselves right back here in 4 or 5 more 

years after we have litigated through a quick fix, then what are we 

going to end up with? Neither side will ever get a fair trial, and 

both Mr. Hamdan and the United States deserve one. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right. Now, take Guantanamo. Assuming 

what you say was done, can it be effectively carried out in an isolated setting? 

Commander SWIFT. It makes it much more difficult doing it away 

from the battlefield. It is going to require that we have access to 

the battlefields. Unfortunately, that is what has happened. Can it 

be done? Well, I think anything can be done if you put the resources into it. It probably would have been easier, at least in Mr. 

Hamdan’s case, to do it in Afghanistan. We are not there now. I 

am seeking a fair trial, and if the Government gives me the resources to go through—and they have done that so far—then we 

will do the best we can. But I stress that we need to do it now, 

and by court-martial. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Just quickly—and I thank you because the 

time runs out—does anyone on the panel differ with that? And if 

so, how? Dr. Koh. 

Mr. KOH. Well, I just had an important point to make about the 

prior comment that there is no constitutional issue. As a law dean, 

I should just say that is just a misstatement of law, and this Committee should care about it. To say that Hamdan is not a constitutional decision is like saying the steel seizure case is not a constitutional decision and only involved an interpretation of the TaftHartley Act. What we all know is that the steel seizure case turned 

on which category of Youngstown Sheet and Tube it fell into. Was 

it in the highest category in which the President’s power is at its 

peak? Or is it in the lowest category because the President was acting in the face of and contrary to an existing statute of Congress? 

And what the Supreme Court said in Hamdan by a majority is 

it is in the lowest category because they did not act consistently 

with the opinion. This is Footnote 23 of the majority opinion. JusVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Apr 27, 2009 Jkt 043111 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43111.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
71 

tice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically mentions the steel seizure 

case, and Justice Thomas in his dissent also puts the case into the 

Youngstown framework, although he comes to a different conclusion. 

So it is just wrong to say that this case is about statutes only. 

There is a constitutional dimension of this case, and were this 

court to legislate, it would have to be doing it in that framework 

as well. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein. 

Mr. SILLIMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I— 

Chairman SPECTER. You want to make an additional comment, 

Professor Silliman? 

Mr. SILLIMAN. May I just add one brief comment? Military commissions and courts-martial from their very beginning were a product of Executive power under his Commander-in-Chief authority 

with the support and the assistance and enactment of legislation 

from the Congress. Now we face the same issue, that where we go 

from here, whether it be any of the options that any of us have discussed, must absolutely be a product, a joint product of the administration and the Congress. If either branch tries to do it by itself, 

it will not work, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Professor Silliman, 

and thank you all. As I had started to say a few moments ago, we 

could go on at some considerable length. We had previously scheduled the confirmation hearing of Mr. Haynes for 2:15, and we 

pushed that back to 3 o’clock, and we are a little late on that. But 

we very much appreciate your coming in, and this has been an extraordinary panel that has given us a very wide range of options 

to select from, starting with simply the congressional ratification of 

what the President has done, to a full range of rights almost equivalent to what goes in a Federal criminal trial. And we will be wrestling with the issues of the right to counsel and Miranda rights 

and access to classified information and exculpatory evidence, 

Brady, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Article 3 of 

the Geneva Convention. We will be working coordinately with the 

administration. And the Armed Services Committee and this Committee will be working jointly, and we will come up with a product. 

It is very important that we do so promptly. There are many individuals involved, and we are under direction by the Supreme 

Court. This is really perhaps as much of a classical case of separation of powers as you could find, with the intervention of Articles 

I, II, and III all together. And it is very helpful to have professors 

and deans and practitioners and defense lawyers all at the table 

to give us advice. It has been very helpful. 

We thank you, and that concludes our hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions follow.] 

72 


43111.001
73 


43111.002
74 


43111.003
75 


43111.004
76 


43111.005
77 


43111.006
78 


43111.007
79 


43111.008
80 


43111.009
81 


43111.010
82 


43111.011
83 


43111.012
84 


43111.013
85 


43111.014
86 


43111.015
87 


43111.016
88 


43111.017
89 


43111.018
90 


43111.019
91 


43111.020
92 


43111.021
93 


43111.022
94 


43111.023
95 


43111.024
96 


43111.025
97 


43111.026
98 


43111.027
99 


43111.028
100 


43111.029
101 


43111.030
102 


43111.031
103 


43111.032
104 


43111.033
105 


43111.034
106 


43111.035
107 


43111.036
108 


43111.037
109 


43111.038
110 


43111.039
111 


43111.040
112 


43111.041
113 


43111.042
114 


43111.043
115 


43111.044
116 


43111.045
117 


43111.046
118 


43111.047
119 


43111.048
120 


43111.049
121 


43111.050
122 


43111.051
123 


43111.052
124 


43111.053
125 


43111.054
126 


43111.055
127 


43111.056
128 


43111.057
129 


43111.058
130 


43111.059
131 


43111.060
132 


43111.061
133 


43111.062
134 


43111.063
135 


43111.064
136 


43111.065
137 


43111.066
138 


43111.067
139 


43111.068
140 


43111.069
141 


43111.070
142 


43111.071
143 


43111.072
144 


43111.073
145 


43111.074
146 


43111.075
147 


43111.076
148 


43111.077
149 


43111.078
150 


43111.079
151 


43111.080
152 


43111.081
153 


43111.082
154 


43111.083
155 


43111.084
156 


43111.085
157 


43111.086
158 


43111.087
159 


43111.088
160 


43111.089
161 


43111.090
162 


43111.091
163 


43111.092
164 


43111.093
165 


43111.094
166 


43111.095
167 


43111.096
168 


43111.097
169 


43111.098
170 


43111.099
171 


43111.100
172 


43111.101
173 


43111.102
174 


43111.103
175 


43111.104
176 


43111.105
177 


43111.106
178 


43111.107
179 


43111.108
180 


43111.109
181 


43111.110
182 


43111.111
183 


43111.112
184 


43111.113
185 


43111.114
186 


43111.115
187 


43111.116
188 


43111.117
189 


43111.118
190 


43111.119
191 


43111.120
192 


43111.121
193 


43111.122
194 


43111.123
195 


43111.124
196 


43111.125
197 


43111.126
198 


43111.127
199 


43111.128
200 


43111.129
201 


43111.130
202 


43111.131
203 


43111.132
204 


43111.133
205 


43111.134
206 


43111.135
207 


43111.136
208 


43111.137
209 


43111.138
210 


43111.139
211 


43111.140
212 


43111.141
213 


43111.142
214 


43111.143
215 


43111.144
216 


43111.145
217 


43111.146
218 


43111.147
219 


43111.148
220 


43111.149
221 


43111.150
222 


43111.151
223 


43111.152
224 


43111.153
225 


43111.154
226 


43111.155
227 


43111.156
228 


43111.157
229 


43111.158
230 


43111.159
231 


43111.160
232 


43111.161
233 


43111.162
234 


43111.163
235 


43111.164
236 


43111.165
237 


43111.166
238 


43111.167
239 


43111.168
240 


43111.169
241 


43111.170
242 


43111.171
243 


43111.172
244 


43111.173
245 


43111.174
246 


43111.175
247 


43111.176
248 


43111.177
249 


43111.178
250 


43111.179
251 


43111.180
252 


43111.181
253 


43111.182
254 


43111.183
255 


43111.184
256 


43111.185
257 


43111.186
258 


43111.187
259 


43111.188
260 


43111.189
261 


43111.190
262 


43111.191
263 


43111.192
264 


43111.193
265 


43111.194
266 


43111.195
267 


43111.196
268 


43111.197
269 


43111.198
270 


43111.199
271 


43111.200
272 


43111.201
273 


43111.202
274 


43111.203
275 


43111.204
276 


43111.205
277 


43111.206
278 


43111.207
279 


43111.208
280 


43111.209
281 


43111.210
282 


43111.211
283 


43111.212
284 


43111.213
285 


43111.214
286 

Æ 


43111.215