United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1997 U.S. CURRENCY

Treasury’s Plans to

Study Genuine and

Counterfeit U.S.

Currency Abroad

GAO/NSIAD-97-104

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276332 

April 11, 1997

The Honorable Spencer Bachus

The Honorable John M. Spratt, Jr.

House of Representatives

Currencies are susceptible to counterfeiting, but the stability and

worldwide acceptance of the U.S. currency, in particular, have made it a

target for international counterfeiters. Although counterfeiters may engage

in this activity for direct economic gain, counterfeiting is sometimes linked

with other more nefarious criminal endeavors, such as drug trafficking,

arms dealing, and alleged terrorist activities. Widespread counterfeiting of

U.S. currency could undermine confidence in the currency. Further, if

done on a large-enough scale, this activity could reduce international

holdings of U.S. currency and have a negative effect on the U.S. economy.1

While the extent of counterfeit U.S. currency produced and circulated in

foreign countries is difficult to determine, an evaluation of the threat can

be used to allocate scarce resources and to assess the effectiveness of

measures to combat counterfeiting.2

 In the past, the Secret Service (a

Treasury Department bureau) used its detection data3

 to reflect the actual

amount of counterfeits abroad. However, as we reported in February 1996,

these data have limitations that raised questions about their usefulness for

illustrating counterfeiting activity.4

 In April 1996, Congress passed the

1

When U.S. currency remains in circulation, it essentially represents an interest-free loan to the U.S.

government. The Federal Reserve has estimated that the U.S. currency held abroad effectively reduces

the need for the government to borrow up to $250 billion a year and thus may reduce the government’s

interest costs by over $10 billion a year. If the confidence of the dollar were undermined, individuals

might switch to other currencies, which would result in losses in the amount of this benefit to the

United States.

2

Other tools may include evaluating the quality or usage of the counterfeits, the type of equipment

used, the type of perpetrator, and the connection with other crimes.

3

Secret Service counterfeit-detection data include detections made by its agents and the Federal

Reserve as well as detections made and reported by others, such as domestic and foreign law

enforcement agencies and banks.

4

In our prior work, you had asked us to assess the extent of the counterfeiting problem overseas. We

reported that the available data presented many limitations, and we questioned whether the Secret

Service had a sufficient basis to conclude either the approximate magnitude or the trend of

counterfeiting activity abroad. Some specific limitations of the data are that they (1) included only

those counterfeit detections that were reported to the Secret Service; (2) may have underreported the

occurrence of high-quality notes because those notes are difficult to detect; (3) may have reflected

factors other than increasing counterfeit activity, such as improvements in the ability to detect

counterfeits or to determine their source; and (4) may have shown fluctuations over time that were

skewed because of the occurrence of unusually large seizures. See Counterfeit U.S. Currency Abroad:

Issues and U.S. Deterrence Efforts (GAO/GGD-96-11, Feb. 26, 1996) and Counterfeit U.S. Currency

Abroad: Observations on Counterfeiting and U.S. Deterrence Efforts (GAO/T-GGD-96-82, Feb. 27,

1996).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L.

104-132) which, among other things, requires that the Secretary of the

Treasury develop an audit plan that is designed to enable the Secretary to

(1) study the use and holding of U.S. currency in foreign countries and

develop useful estimates of the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency that

circulates outside the United States each year, (2) conduct audits based on

this methodology, and (3) report triennially on the results.

In October 1996, the Secretary responded to the first requirement by

submitting the Audit Plan of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Uses and

Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency in Foreign Countries. At your request, we

reviewed the plan, as submitted, to determine whether it will enable the

Secretary of the Treasury to (1) study the use of U.S. currency in foreign

countries, (2) study the holding of U.S. currency in foreign countries, and

(3) develop useful estimates of the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency

that circulates outside the United States each year. You also asked us to

review any other information and materials that the Treasury intends to

use to conduct the audits.

Results in Brief The Secretary of the Treasury’s submitted plan does not demonstrate how

it will enable the Treasury to meet the audit plan objectives required under

the act. The plan does not clearly state the audit’s objectives or the

methodologies to achieve those objectives. Although the Treasury’s plan

identifies some elements of a methodology that could be employed to

study the use of genuine U.S. currency abroad, it does not explain how the

Treasury intends to analyze the information that might be collected. The

plan does not define the methodologies the Treasury expects to use to

study the holding of genuine U.S. currency abroad and to develop

estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency abroad.

The Treasury official responsible for developing the plan stated that the

audit objectives of the plan are the same as those stated in the act. He

acknowledged that the plan does not fully address the methods for

achieving the objectives. This official and Federal Reserve officials said

that the information obtained on genuine currency usage will be used to

describe U.S. currency flows and will be reviewed to determine whether

any of the information conflicts with their assumptions about the usage of

genuine U.S. currency abroad. The Treasury official stated that the

Treasury intends to use a recently published Federal Reserve methodology

to develop an estimate of the total holdings of genuine U.S. currency

abroad. The official also told us the Treasury would rely on an existing

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

Federal Reserve methodology to develop rough estimates or ranges of

estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency circulating outside the United States

each year.

After we outlined our concerns about the submitted audit plan to Treasury

and Federal Reserve officials, the Treasury official responsible for the plan

told us that the Treasury, with the assistance of the Federal Reserve,

planned to submit a written addendum to Congress explaining the

Treasury’s proposed methodologies in more detail, with the caveat that

these methodologies may change based on information obtained abroad

during the course of the audits. The Treasury official also indicated that

the addendum would explain the assumptions the Treasury made and

discuss the limitations associated with these estimates.

Background U.S. counterfeiting deterrence efforts are coordinated through the

Advanced Counterfeit Deterrence Steering Committee, comprised of

officials from the Department of the Treasury (including the Secret Service

and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing) and the Federal Reserve. The

Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for manufacturing and protecting

U.S. currency. The Secret Service investigates counterfeiting and

maintains counterfeit-detection data, and the Bureau of Engraving and

Printing designs and prints U.S. currency. The Federal Reserve issues U.S.

currency, pays U.S. currency to and receives U.S. currency from

authorized financial institutions in the United States (some of which may

have affiliates and/or customers outside the United States), and is

responsible for substantiating the authenticity of all U.S. currency

received. The Federal Reserve also maintains data on the amount of U.S.

currency that its customers report as shipped to and from the United

States and the amount that it detects as counterfeit.

Contents of the Treasury’s

Audit Plan

Developed in conjunction with the Advanced Counterfeit Deterrence

Steering Committee, the Treasury’s audit plan identifies data sources, sets

forth site selection criteria, lists questionnaires to be used in interviews

abroad, discusses what audit reports might contain, sets time frames, and

states that the Federal Reserve will attempt to specify and test a model of

currency usage abroad. The Treasury’s plan draws heavily on information

obtained from ongoing International Currency Awareness Program study

trips. The purpose of those trips was to meet with foreign financial

institution, government, and law enforcement officials to learn more about

the uses, distribution, and counterfeiting of U.S. currency overseas and to

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

begin to inform those abroad about the U.S. currency redesign.5 In

September/October 1996 and January 1997, first using the Treasury’s draft

and then the formally submitted audit plan, the Treasury and the Federal

Reserve took two study trips similar to those done under the International

Currency Awareness Program. As of February 1997, study trips under the

International Currency Awareness Program and Treasury’s audit plan had

been made to 18 countries or entities where U.S. currency was used or

distributed to a significant extent.6

 Under the Treasury’s audit plan, the

first audit was to begin no later than April 24, 1997, and to be completed by

September 1999. At least one audit is to be performed during each

subsequent 3-year period through April 2006. The act requires the

Secretary to submit a written report to certain congressional committees

on the results of each audit within 90 days after completing the audit.

The Treasury’s

Submitted Plan Is

Unclear and

Incomplete

The Secretary of the Treasury’s submitted plan does not demonstrate how

it will enable the Treasury to meet the audit plan objectives required under

the act. A written plan should define the audit’s objectives and the scope

and methodology to achieve those objectives.7

 The Treasury plan’s audit

objectives are not clearly stated and do not include the findings and

reporting elements that the Treasury expects to develop. Concerning

scope, the plan provides a time line for completing the audits, site

selection criteria for regions of the world, and information and data

sources. Although the plan provides some information on data gathering, it

does not fully explain the analytical methods the Treasury intends to use

to achieve the objectives. For example, the plan identifies data sources

and provides questions that may be asked of foreign financial and law

enforcement officials, but it does not fully explain how this information

will be analyzed and synthesized to address each of the audit plan

objectives under the act.

5

In 1996, the Treasury Department began issuing a newly designed U.S. currency with more security

features to deter counterfeiters both domestically and abroad.

6

As of February 12, 1997, visits were made to 18 countries or entities under the International Currency

Awareness Program and the Treasury’s audit plan, including Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Cambodia,

Egypt, England, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland,

Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai), and Vietnam.

7

The objectives are what the audit is to accomplish and can be thought of as questions that auditors

seek to answer. Objectives identify the audit subjects and performance aspects to be included, as well

as the potential finding and reporting elements that the auditors expect to develop. “Scope” is the

boundary of the audit. It addresses such things as the period and number of locations to be covered.

The methodology comprises data-gathering and analytical methods auditors will use to achieve the

objectives. See Government Auditing Standards: 1994 Revision (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General

Accounting Office, June 1994).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

The plan does not describe analytical methods for studying the holding of

genuine U.S. currency abroad and developing estimates of counterfeit U.S.

currency abroad. However, it describes elements of a methodology that

might be used to study the use of genuine U.S. currency abroad. The plan

indicates that the Federal Reserve will attempt to specify and test a model

of how the U.S. currency that is held outside the United States is used to

support or refute an assumption about currency movement outside the

United States. The assumption to be tested is that currency moves

between and among individuals and business firms in such a way that the

portion of U.S. currency held abroad that is received by the Federal

Reserve each year (at least 13 percent in 1995) through its foreign-origin

currency receipts is representative of the total amount of U.S. currency

abroad. The Federal Reserve’s model is expected to place a special

emphasis on the factors that cause certain amounts to (1) come into the

possession of financial institutions abroad, (2) be regarded as surplus to

the needs of those individual financial institutions, (3) be sold

subsequently to correspondent banks,8

 and, finally, (4) be deposited by a

correspondent bank at the Federal Reserve.9

 However, the plan does not

fully explain how the Treasury intends to analyze the information obtained

to reach conclusions about the use of U.S. currency abroad.

The Treasury Intends

to Submit an

Addendum to Better

Explain How It Will

Meet Its Audit Plan

Objectives

After we highlighted some of the plan’s shortcomings, particularly the

absence of methodologies, Treasury and Federal Reserve officials

acknowledged that the plan could be improved. The Treasury official

responsible for developing the plan stated that the audit objectives—to

study the use and holding of genuine U.S. currency in foreign countries

and develop estimates of the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency

circulating outside the United States each year—are the same as those

stated in the act. Further, the official told us that, with the assistance of

the Federal Reserve, the Treasury intends to submit a written addendum

to Congress to better explain its proposed methodologies, with the caveat

that these methodologies may change based on information obtained

abroad during the course of the audits. The Treasury official also told us

the Treasury intended to include in the addendum a description of its

8

A correspondent bank is a financial institution that regularly performs services for another in a

market inaccessible to the other. In banking there is usually a depository relationship that

compensates for expenses and facilitates transactions.

9

Information about how citizens and businesses, other than financial institutions, use U.S. currency

abroad is likely to be addressed as part of the information on how and why financial institutions obtain

U.S. currency. Financial institutions obtain U.S. currency for many reasons and from many sources; for

example, in countries with unstable currencies, traders may deposit proceeds from sales transacted in

U.S. currency.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

assumptions and the limitations associated with the use of the resulting

information.

The Treasury Intends to

Describe the Uses of

Genuine U.S. Currency

Abroad

Treasury and Federal Reserve officials explained that rather than develop

and test a model of currency usage, as discussed in the submitted plan,

they will summarize information obtained from foreign officials to

describe the uses of U.S. currency in the countries visited. They said that it

is not possible to develop a single model of how U.S. currency is used

abroad because of the numerous reasons why U.S. currency is used and

the many channels through which U.S. currency is distributed. However,

by determining and describing the process by which U.S. currency is used

in individual countries under specific conditions, they said that they may

be able to understand U.S. currency usage in other countries in similar

situations. They said that they need to interview foreign officials to obtain

information on currency usage and flows because little written data exist.

They told us that the information obtained on genuine currency usage will

also be reviewed to determine whether any of the information conflicts

with their assumptions about the usage of genuine U.S. currency abroad.

By determining how currency is used and how it flows within and between

particular regions and countries, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve

intend to support or refute the assumption that the sample of U.S.

currency returned to and reviewed by the Federal Reserve is

representative of the amount that is not returned to the Federal Reserve.

The Treasury Intends to

Develop Estimates of

Genuine U.S. Currency

Held Abroad

According to the Treasury official responsible for developing the plan, the

Treasury plans to address holdings by establishing estimates of the total

amount of genuine U.S. currency abroad. To do this, the Treasury intends

to use the Federal Reserve methodology outlined in its 1996 study.10

Synthesizing several methods and data sources, the Federal Reserve

estimated that about $200 billion-$250 billion of U.S. currency, or up to

two-thirds of the roughly $375 billion in circulation outside of banks in

1995, was abroad. As described in the study, because of the inadequacy of

measurement tools, the Federal Reserve used a range of direct and

indirect methods that provided an estimate of foreign and domestic

currency holdings.

The Federal Reserve study points out that because the data on currency

flows abroad are incomplete, cumulating them does not provide a good

10See Richard D. Porter and Ruth A. Judson, “The Location of U.S. Currency: How Much Is Abroad?”

Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D.C.:

Federal Reserve System, Oct. 1996), pp. 883-903.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

estimate of the amount of currency held abroad. Thus, the authors

combined flow data with estimates from other methods. The estimates of

foreign holdings vary depending upon which method is used. The study

concluded that between 55 percent and 70 percent of U.S. currency is held

abroad. We reviewed the study and found the method to be reasonable,

based on the given assumptions. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials

told us they intend to support or modify the estimate with information

obtained during the studies abroad and to update and publish estimates

periodically.

The Treasury Intends to

Establish Estimates of

Counterfeit U.S. Currency

Abroad

According to the Treasury, it intends to use an existing Federal Reserve

method to establish estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency circulating

abroad. The Treasury indicated that it is confident the data it already

collects are sufficient for developing these estimates. The method that has

been in use over the past few years is based on a number of assumptions

that cannot be either fully validated or disproved. Treasury and Federal

Reserve officials said that information they have obtained to date validates

the assumptions, yet they may modify this method if the information

obtained through their trips abroad make them question their

assumptions. Although they recognize that the estimates cannot be

definitive or statistically validated due to the nature of the activity, they

believe the method should provide a rough estimate or range that the

Treasury can use to assess the counterfeiting threat when taken into

consideration with other factors.

According to the Treasury, the most significant and detailed measures of

counterfeit U.S. currency circulating abroad are already contained within

the Federal Reserve’s currency receipt data and the Secret Service’s

counterfeit-detection statistics, upon which the Treasury’s estimate is

based. The Federal Reserve indicated that through its foreign-origin

currency receipts it is able to examine a significant portion of the U.S.

currency estimated to be circulating outside of the United States. Such

receipts amounted to at least 13 percent of the currency that was likely to

be outside of the United States in 1995 and may amount to 20 percent in

1996, according to the Federal Reserve. The Treasury official also stated

that the Treasury understands the limitations of the Secret Service’s

counterfeit-detection statistics and realizes that these actual detections do

not capture all of the U.S. currency counterfeit-activity that occurs

worldwide. Nevertheless, the Treasury believes that its data and

supporting evidence on actual detections suggest that the amount of

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

counterfeit U.S. currency in circulation is not much larger than Federal

Reserve statistics indicate.

With this in mind, the Federal Reserve, using its counterfeit-detection data

and taking into account the extent to which counterfeits are detected and

reported to the Secret Service by financial institutions and others before

deposits are received by the Federal Reserve, formed a rough estimate of

the value of counterfeits that may have been in circulation abroad. Some

of the figures used in this calculation are considered “restricted

information” by the Federal Reserve and thus are not provided in this

report. In general, the method used for 1996 was as follows:

• As discussed previously, the Federal Reserve estimated that two-thirds of

genuine U.S. currency circulates abroad—approximately $174 billion in

1996.

• It determined the value of all $100 notes11 processed through New York,

Miami, and Los Angeles12 Federal Reserve banks during the year from

abroad as a percentage of the value of notes estimated to be in circulation

abroad—approximately 18.6 percent.

• It established a Federal Reserve counterfeit-detection rate by determining

the number of counterfeit $100 notes detected per million notes processed

at Federal Reserve banks from abroad.

• It determined the estimated value of counterfeits in circulation abroad

based solely on the Federal Reserve detection rate for $100 notes from

abroad.

• The Federal Reserve assumed that the ratio of counterfeit $100 notes in

circulation detected by the Federal Reserve domestically compared to

those detected by financial institutions, retailers, and others domestically

(as reported to the Secret Service) is the same ratio as would be found for

counterfeit $100 notes detected abroad.

• It applied the resulting percentage to the number of counterfeits in

circulation abroad based on its own detections to come up with its

estimate of the total value of counterfeits in circulation abroad—roughly a

range centering on $21.2 million in 1996.13

11According to the Federal Reserve, the $100 note is the most heavily used abroad and has been used in

the past couple of years to estimate the total value of counterfeit U.S. currency circulating abroad.

12According to the Federal Reserve, the majority of notes from overseas come through these three

banks.

13The Federal Reserve concluded that this amount was insignificant from a macroeconomic

perspective and has no discernible effect on public confidence in U.S. currency.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

This method relied on some assumptions that can neither be fully

validated nor disproved, due to the nature of the activity. For example, it

relied on (1) assumptions about presumed overseas currency flows,

(2) counterfeit-detection data derived from currency shipments reported

as originating overseas, and (3) assumptions about detections and

reporting made prior to shipments of currency back to the Federal

Reserve from overseas. According to the Federal Reserve, information

obtained during the previous International Currency Awareness Program

trips abroad did not indicate a need to revise its assumptions. The

Treasury official told us that the evidence gathered during future trips

abroad should help reduce the risk factors associated with these

assumptions and either support or refute the Treasury’s belief in the

efficacy of its statistics. According to the Treasury, interviews with foreign

officials will provide insight, as will examination of record-keeping

procedures and local counterfeit-detection statistics. The Treasury and

Federal Reserve said that, at the very least, they may modify these

methods should they find anything in their studies of use and holdings

abroad to make them question their assumptions.

The Treasury and the Federal Reserve agree that this method, which has

been employed for the past few years, cannot be used to give the definitive

answer due to the complex nature of currency flows and the criminal

nature of counterfeiting. Rather, the results of this method may be used to

provide a rough estimate or range that the Treasury can use in its

assessment of the counterfeiting threat. Both the Treasury and the Federal

Reserve agree that this rough estimate cannot be used in isolation. They

say it must be considered with other pieces of the threat assessment such

as seizures of counterfeits and intelligence information including the

quality of the counterfeits, the types of equipment used to produce

counterfeits, the types of perpetrators, any connections with other crimes,

and other data.

Recommendation Without a clear description of the audit plan objectives, the methods to be

used to achieve these objectives, and the associated limitations, the

Treasury’s submitted plan does not have all the requisite elements of an

audit plan. More complete documentation of the audit plan would provide

a greater opportunity to determine whether the proposed plan is likely to

result in a useful report. To help assure that the Treasury corrects the

deficiencies in the submitted audit plan, we recommend that the Secretary

of the Treasury develop and submit an addendum to more fully explain the

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

objectives and the methods the Treasury intends to use, including a

discussion of assumptions and limitations associated with the use of the

resulting information.

Agency Comments The Department of the Treasury, with the input of the Federal Reserve

Board, provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The Treasury

agreed with most of the information presented and supported our

recommendation that it develop an addendum to the plan to more fully

document the objectives and methods it intends to use, including a

discussion of the assumptions and limitations associated with the use of

the resulting information. The Treasury acknowledged that certain aspects

of the submitted plan were left vague, but said that this was done in order

to leave options open for the further development of the methodology.

According to the Treasury, it, with the input of the Federal Reserve, was in

the process of developing the addendum and planned to submit the

addendum to Congress by April 18, 1997.

The Treasury indicated that the uses of genuine U.S. currency abroad are

so diverse that it cannot develop one worldwide model, and therefore it

planned to develop descriptions of U.S. currency usage in the countries it

visits. The Treasury believes this methodology is a straightforward

exercise whereby it compares responses from foreign officials. The

Treasury stated that it may use these descriptions to better understand the

usage of U.S. currency in other countries in similar situations. The

Treasury’s planned approach for studying the uses of genuine U.S.

currency abroad is less quantitative in nature than the methodologies the

Treasury plans to use to develop estimates of genuine and counterfeit U.S.

currency abroad. It relies primarily on testimonial evidence provided by

foreign officials, and it is unclear how the Treasury will reconcile any

differences in data gathered. Therefore, the methodology is dependent

upon the quality and reliability of that testimonial evidence and the

context in which it is presented.

The Treasury noted that although the methodology to be used in

developing estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency abroad may be refined,

it felt the methodology was based upon reasonable assumptions that have

been validated by all of the evidence it had collected to date and it had no

evidence to suggest that any of the assumptions were not valid. Our

position on this methodology is that the assumptions cannot be either fully

validated or disproved, and therefore caution needs to be exercised to

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

ensure that information and estimates resulting from this methodology are

provided in the proper context.

The Treasury’s comments also included technical changes and

clarifications that have been incorporated in this report where

appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to

determine its requirements for the Treasury’s audit plan. We then assessed

the Audit Plan of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Uses and

Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency in Foreign Countries (Oct. 1996) using

criteria for an audit plan as set forth under generally accepted government

auditing standards. In doing so, we determined whether the plan would

enable the Secretary of the Treasury to (1) study the use and holding of

U.S. currency in foreign countries and (2) develop useful estimates of the

amount of counterfeit U.S. currency that circulates outside the United

States each year. We collected and reviewed documents, such as currency

shipment and receipt data and counterfeiting statistics, from and

interviewed officials of the Federal Reserve, the Department of the

Treasury, and the Secret Service. We submitted written questions to the

Department of the Treasury to clarify information in the audit plan and

obtained and reviewed the written responses. We reviewed International

Currency Awareness Program summaries of trips abroad and interviewed

officials who participated in those trips and who prepared the written

summaries. We also evaluated the reasonableness of the Federal Reserve’s

paper detailing its method for estimating the total amount of genuine U.S.

currency abroad. In doing this, we reviewed the relevant literature, the

study’s methods, applications of the methods, and the study’s

assumptions; and interviewed the study’s authors.

We conducted our review from October 1996 to February 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan no

further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that

time, we will provide copies of the report to interested congressional

committees, to the Secretary of the Treasury, and to the Chairman of the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. We will also make

copies available to others on request.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
B-276332 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8984 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report were John P.

Hutton; Kathleen M. Monahan; Cheryl L. Goodman; Arthur L. James, Jr.;

and Geoffrey R. Hamilton.

JayEtta Z. Hecker

Associate Director, International Relations

 and Trade Issues

(711198) Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-104 U.S. Currency
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