2020 IL App (1st) 192430-U

FIFTH DIVISION

Order filed: August 14, 2020 

No. 1-19-2430 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

MARK P. STEVENSON, for the Benefit of the Chapter 

13 Bankruptcy Estate of Mark P. Stevenson and Yolanda 

J. Stevenson, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DHIRAJ SHARMA D.D.S, RAUF ABDUL YOUSEF, 

D.M.D., AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATES, LTD., 

and ARCHER DENTAL SPECIALISTS, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 19 L 8241 

Honorable 

Kathy M. Flanagan, 

Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Rochford and Delort concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We reverse the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of 

the defendants on the basis of judicial estoppel because there exists a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff’s failure to disclose his cause of 

action to the bankruptcy court was inadvertent or an intentional act of deception. 
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¶ 2 The plaintiff, Mark Stevenson, for the benefit of the chapter 13 bankruptcy estate of Mark 

P. Stevenson and Yolanda J. Stevenson, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook 

County, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Dhiraj Sharma, D.D.S., Rauf 

Abdul Yousef, D.M.D., American Dental Associates, Ltd., and Archer Dental Specialists, Inc. 

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment 

in the defendants’ favor because his claim was not barred by judicial estoppel. For the reasons 

that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 The following facts and procedural history were derived from the pleadings, affidavits, 

depositions, and supporting evidentiary materials. 

¶ 4 The underlying case stems from dental work the defendants performed on the plaintiff. In 

March 2014, the plaintiff consulted with Drs. Sharma and Yousef about his interest in receiving 

permanent implant dentures. He agreed to undergo the procedure, and the defendants performed 

the dental work over the next few months. Sometime in September 2014, the plaintiff

complained to the defendants that he was experiencing issues with his permanent implants and 

lower denture. 

¶ 5 On August 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed a 12-count complaint against the defendants, 

alleging professional negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 

misrepresentation. The complaint sought damages “in excess of $50,000” for pain and suffering

and loss of a normal life, as well as emotional distress.

¶ 6 Prior to setting forth the pertinent procedural facts from the circuit court, we find it 

necessary to address the plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings. On May 7, 2013, three years before 

filing the instant lawsuit, the plaintiff and his wife (the Stevensons) jointly filed for chapter 13 
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bankruptcy protection in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The 

Stevensons were represented by counsel during their bankruptcy proceedings. The Stevensons’

bankruptcy petition included various “schedules” that contained their assets and liabilities. One 

of the disclosures in Schedule I, which covers current income, indicated that the plaintiff was 

unemployed and earned no income and that his wife earned $5433 per month as a teacher. The 

Stevensons electronically signed the disclosures under penalty of perjury. 

¶ 7 As part of the bankruptcy petition, the Stevensons also filed a statement of financial 

affairs, which indicated that the plaintiff earned no income from any trade, profession, or 

operation of a business in the past two years. The Stevensons were also asked to list any lawsuits 

in which either was a party within the one year immediately preceding the filing of the 

bankruptcy case and they listed two: State Farm v. Mark Stevenson and Wooten Orlando v. Mark 

Stevenson. They also answered “none” when asked to identify all businesses in which either was 

an officer or partner, or in which either was “self-employed in a trade, profession, or other 

activity either full or part-time within the six years immediately preceding the commencement of 

[the] case.” The Stevensons electronically signed the statement of financial affairs under penalty 

of perjury.

¶ 8 The bankruptcy court requires that every compensation agreement between a debtor and 

an attorney for the debtor be in writing, signed by the debtor, and filed with the court. The 

Stevensons’ chapter 13 contract with their counsel was filed together with a retention agreement.

The Stevensons both signed the retention agreement, which provides, in relevant part:

AFTER THE CASE IS FILED 

THE DEBTOR AGREES TO: 
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* * * 

5. Contact the attorney immediately if the debtor loses employment, has a 

significant change in income, or experiences any significant change in financial situation

***. 

6. Notify the attorney if the debtor is sued or wishes to file a lawsuit (including 

divorce).” 

¶ 9 On August 2, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order placing the Stevensons on a 

five-year debt repayment plan with monthly payments in the amount of $707. During that fiveyear period, the plaintiff did not inform the bankruptcy court of any new assets, liabilities, or 

diminished earnings. The Stevensons continued making the required monthly payments and, on 

July 31, 2018, the bankruptcy court discharged the Stevensons’ debts. The case was closed on 

October 4, 2018. The Stevensons had $136,399.35 in unsecured debt discharged in bankruptcy. 

¶ 10 As previously stated, the plaintiff’s complaint in the instant case was filed on August 18, 

2016. During discovery, the plaintiff answered interrogatories propounded on him by Drs. 

Sharma and Yousuf, which he certified to be true and correct pursuant to section 1-109 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2016)). In his answers, the plaintiff

stated that he earned $65 to $85 per hour as a vessel captain and worked as a maritime 

consultant. He stated that he missed days of work after treating with the defendants due to pain, 

inability to talk, and medical appointments. He estimated that, as a result, he lost a total of $4000 

in income. 

¶ 11 The plaintiff was deposed on January 25, 2017. He testified that, as of January 2017, he 

had been self-employed as a ship’s captain for about 15 years and worked under the business 
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name Captain Mark Stevenson, Inc. According to the plaintiff, his work as a ship’s captain was 

seasonal, from April 15 to October 31 each year, and, during the remainder of the year, he 

worked as a marine consultant. He stated that he earned between $600 to $1200 per day as a 

vessel captain. He estimated that he lost 20 to 25 days of work on account of the defendants’ 

alleged negligence. The plaintiff was also asked if he had ever been sued, and he replied that he 

had not. When asked if he had ever filed another lawsuit, the plaintiff replied that he had filed a 

civil lawsuit against an individual named Daniel Wang as a result of a dispute over water damage 

to a storefront.

¶ 12 Discovery in the instant case was completed on May 8, 2017, and the circuit court set a 

March 11, 2019 trial date. 

¶ 13 On March 6, 2019, the defendants filed a joint emergency motion for involuntary 

dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)), alleging that 

they recently learned of the plaintiff’s bankruptcy, which was pending when he filed his 

complaint in the instant case, and that he did not list the claim as an asset in bankruptcy court. 

They argued that, as a result, the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because (1) he lacked 

standing to bring the suit since the claim had accrued before the bankruptcy proceedings were 

closed and was, therefore, the property of the bankruptcy estate and (2) his claim was barred 

under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because he had failed to disclose the claim as a potential 

asset during the bankruptcy proceedings. 

¶ 14 At the hearing on the defendants’ emergency motion, the plaintiff’s counsel tendered an 

affidavit from the plaintiff stating that he was not aware he had an obligation to report the 
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lawsuit to the bankruptcy court or trustee and that his nondisclosure was inadvertent and not 

intended to deceive. 

¶ 15 On March 11, 2019, the circuit court entered an order placing the matter on the law 

division bankruptcy stay calendar instanter and continuing the motion for involuntary dismissal 

until the plaintiff reopened the bankruptcy case, amended the bankruptcy schedules to include his 

claim against the defendants, and received a determination from the chapter 13 trustee as to 

whether the lawsuit should proceed for the benefit of the estate or be abandoned. 

¶ 16 That same day, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s emergency 

motion to reopen the bankruptcy case to amend the schedules to disclose his claim against the 

defendants. The bankruptcy court also ordered the plaintiff to continue prosecuting the claim on 

behalf of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of an affidavit of compensation pursuant to Rule 

2016(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b)), which the 

plaintiff filed that same day. On April 18, 2019, the Stevensons filed amended schedules listing 

the instant lawsuit as an asset. 

¶ 17 On July 26, 2019, the circuit court removed this case from the bankruptcy stay calendar 

and returned it to the law division over the defendants’ objections. The circuit court also ordered 

that “Mark Stevenson, for the Benefit of the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Estate of Mark Stevenson 

and Yolanda Stevenson” be substituted as the plaintiff. On August 5, 2019, the plaintiff filed an 

amended complaint with the new party names listed. 

¶ 18 On August 26, 2019, the defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment, once 

again arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because 

he had failed to disclose the claim as a potential asset during the bankruptcy proceedings. The 
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defendants also argued that the evidence established that the plaintiff intended to deceive when 

he failed to disclose this cause of action to the bankruptcy court. Specifically, the defendants 

argued that the following facts established that the plaintiff intended to deceive: (1) the plaintiff 

disclosed two lawsuit filed against him in the bankruptcy proceedings, but he failed to amend his 

schedules to disclose the instant claim and another civil suit they discovered that he filed in 2014

(Stevenson v. Tikiboat Chicago, 2014 M1 136168); (2) in his deposition in the instant case, the 

plaintiff testified that he had never been sued, but he previously disclosed two lawsuits against 

him in the bankruptcy proceedings; (3) the plaintiff failed to disclose the 2014 suit he filed 

against Tikiboat Chicago during his deposition when asked if he had ever filed a lawsuit; (4) the 

plaintiff stated that he earned no income in the bankruptcy schedules and also in a sworn 

application in the 2014 civil case against Tikiboat Chicago to proceed as an indigent plaintiff, 

but, in this case, he testified during his deposition that he earned between $600 to $1200 a day 

working seasonally as a boat captain and provided answers to interrogatories in which he 

estimated his lost income as a result of the defendants’ professional negligence to be $4,000; and 

(5) the plaintiff’s retainer agreement with his bankruptcy counsel required him to inform his 

counsel if he wished to file a lawsuit, indicating that he knew he was required to disclose this 

cause of action. 

¶ 19 In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants attached, inter alia, the 

bankruptcy schedules filed by the Stevensons, a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition in this 

case, the plaintiff’s interrogatory answers, and a signed copy of the plaintiff’s application and 

affidavit to sue as an indigent plaintiff from the 2014 civil suit he filed against Tikiboat Chicago. 
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¶ 20 On September 16, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants’ joint motion for 

summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that he was not required to amend his bankruptcy 

schedules to include this lawsuit under the relevant provisions of federal bankruptcy law; his 

alleged inconsistent statements were “ammunition for cross-examination,” but were not 

probative to the court’s judicial estoppel analysis; and the defendants’ evidence was insufficient 

to establish that he intended to deceive or mislead the court. In support of his response, the 

plaintiff attached an affidavit once again averring that he was not aware he had an obligation to 

disclose the lawsuit and that he did not intend to deceive or mislead. 

¶ 21 On October 30, 2019, the circuit court entered an order granting the defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment. In so holding, the court found that all five elements of judicial estoppel 

had been met in that the plaintiff (1) took two positions (2) that were factually inconsistent 

(specifically, that no claim existed and that the claim existed) (3) in separate judicial proceedings 

(4) intending for the trier-of-fact to accept the truth of the alleged facts and (5) succeeded in the 

first proceeding and received a benefit from the factual position taken (namely, the plaintiff’s 

debts being discharged without giving his creditors knowledge of his potential to recover a 

money judgment). The court also found that the evidence established the plaintiff intended to 

deceive or mislead the bankruptcy court, citing the following evidence: the agreement between 

the plaintiff and his bankruptcy counsel that required him to inform his counsel if he wished to 

file a lawsuit; the plaintiff’s disclosure of the two cases against him while failing to disclose two 

lawsuits he was prosecuting; and the plaintiff’s financial motive for concealment of a money 

judgment from his creditors. Regarding the plaintiff’s affidavit, the court found that it was 

“conclusory and without supporting facts or evidence.” This appeal followed. 
No. 1-19-2430 

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¶ 22 On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in granting the defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment because (1) the elements of judicial estoppel were not met since 

he was under no obligation to file an amended bankruptcy schedule according to the plain 

language of the bankruptcy statutes; and (2) there was insufficient evidence that he intended to 

deceive or mislead the court.

¶ 23 Summary judgment is appropriate if no material fact is in dispute; if reasonable persons 

could not draw differing “inferences from the undisputed material facts;” and if reasonable 

persons could not “differ on the weight to be given the relevant factors of a legal standard.” 

Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42. In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, 

we strictly construe the record against the movant and view it liberally in favor of the nonmoving 

party. Id. ¶ 49. Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should only be granted if the 

movant’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Id. ¶ 42

¶ 24 In determining whether to bar a claim on grounds of judicial estoppel, the trial court must 

first determine whether the prerequisites for application of judicial estoppel have been met. 

Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 47. In this respect, the party to be estopped must have done the 

following: “(1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or 

quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of 

the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from 

it. ” Id. We review the presence of the judicial estoppel factors de novo. Id. ¶ 49. 

¶ 25 If all these prerequisites have been established, the trial court must then determine 

whether to apply judicial estoppel. Id. Multiple factors may inform the court’s decision, among 

them the significance or impact of the party’s action in the first proceeding, and “whether there 
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was an intent to deceive or mislead, as opposed to the prior position having been the result of 

inadvertence or mistake.” Id. The court’s ultimate decision on whether to apply judicial estoppel

is an action requiring the exercise of discretion. Id. ¶ 47. 

¶ 26 Here, the plaintiff argues that the first and fourth elements of judicial estoppel were not 

met because he was not required to amend the bankruptcy schedule to disclose his cause of 

action against the defendants under the relevant provisions of federal bankruptcy law.

Specifically, the plaintiff points to the text of Rule 1007(h) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 

Procedure. 

¶ 27 Rule 1007(h) provides, in relevant part:

 “(h) Interests acquired or arising after petition

If, as provided by § 541(a)(5) of the [Bankruptcy Code], the debtor acquires or

becomes entitled to acquire any interest in property, the debtor shall within 14 days after 

the information comes to the debtor’s knowledge or within such further time the court 

may allow, file a supplemental schedule in the *** chapter 13 individual debt adjustment 

case ***.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(h). 

¶ 28 Section 541(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code states the following: 

 “(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title 

creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located 

and by whomever held: 

*** 
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(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such 

interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, and that 

the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date--

 (A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance; 

(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, or of 

an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or 

(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.” 11 

U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (2006). 

¶ 29 According to the plaintiff, his “interest in a contingent, unliquidated personal injury

lawsuit does not fit any of these categories, and thus he was under no duty to file a supplemental 

schedule” pursuant to rule 1007(h). He, therefore, contends that the elements of judicial estoppel 

were not met because, in the absence of an obligation to amend his bankruptcy schedules, he 

“cannot be deemed to have taken an inconsistent position or intended the [bankruptcy court] to 

have relied on it by failing to file a supplemental petition.” The defendants respond that the 

plaintiff’s argument goes against the “overwhelming weight of federal precedent.” We agree 

with the defendants. 

¶ 30 Our own supreme court has recognized that the vast weight of authority holds that a 

debtor has a continuing obligation to disclose postpetition causes of action. See Seymour v. 

Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 52 (citing In re Kemp, No. 03-52422, 2011 WL 3664497, at *3 

(Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 19, 2011)) (“[I]t has been said that federal courts have uniformly held 

that Chapter 13 debtors are obligated to disclose postpetition causes of action.”) Our own 

research confirms that there is a consensus among federal courts that the plaintiff had an
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obligation to disclose this cause of action to the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Moses v. Howard 

Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“This means that a debtor is under a duty both 

to disclose the existence of pending lawsuits when he files a petition in bankruptcy and to amend 

his petition if circumstances change during the course of the bankruptcy.”); Jethroe v. Omnova 

Sols., Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[The debtor] was under a duty both to disclose 

the existence of her [claim] when she filed her petition and to disclose her potential legal claims 

throughout the pendency of that petition.”). Indeed, as one district court noted, even though 

“[n]either the Bankruptcy Code nor the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure explicitly require 

a debtor to report post-petition causes of action ***, [n]evertheless, courts have uniformly held 

that a Chapter 13 debtor is obligated to disclose post-petition causes of action.” In re Kemp, No. 

03-52422, 2011 WL 3664497, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 19, 2011). This consensus appears to 

be built around the notion that the accuracy and completeness of bankruptcy schedules is 

important “[i]n order to preserve the requisite reliability of disclosure statements and to provide 

assurances to creditors regarding the finality of plans which they have voted to approve.” Guay 

v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey 

Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir.1988)). As such, we decline the plaintiff’s invitation to break 

with the overwhelming weight of authority and, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff had a 

continuing obligation to disclose his postpetition cause of action. 

¶ 31 Having determined that the plaintiff was obligated to disclose his cause of action against 

the defendants to the bankruptcy court, we now turn to whether the elements of judicial estoppel 

were met. We conclude that they have been. As to the first and second prerequisites, it is clear 

that plaintiff took two factually inconsistent positions by not disclosing this cause of action as an 
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asset in the federal bankruptcy proceedings, which essentially amounted to ignoring the claim's 

existence, and then subsequently bringing this action in the circuit court. The third prerequisite is 

also clearly satisfied where the first proceeding, which was in federal bankruptcy court, is 

separate from the instant personal injury lawsuit that was filed in the circuit court of Cook 

County, a state court. 

¶ 32 We also find that the fourth prerequisite is satisfied where the plaintiff intended the court 

to accept his alleged facts as true. The plaintiff’s disclosures in bankruptcy court were signed 

under oath. Additionally, the plaintiff in this case filed a claim in the circuit court attesting that 

he had a cause of action against the defendants. Clearly, he intended both courts to accept those 

facts as true. Lastly, the fifth prerequisite, that he succeeded in the first proceeding and received 

some benefit from it, is satisfied in that he received a benefit from the bankruptcy proceeding by 

having $136,399.35 of his unsecured debt discharged without having to increase his payments to 

his creditors in light of the claim. Accordingly, all of the prerequisites for judicial estoppel have 

been met. 

¶ 33 The only remaining question is whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion 

by applying judicial estoppel to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment. As 

previously mentioned, multiple factors may inform the court’s decision in this regard, among 

them the impact of the party’s action in the first proceeding and “whether there was an intent to 

deceive or mislead, as opposed to the prior position having been the result of inadvertence or 

mistake.” Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 47. Primarily, courts look to whether the plaintiff had an 

intent to deceive or mislead, which our supreme court has deemed “a critical factor in the 

application of judicial estoppel.” Id. ¶ 54. 
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¶ 34 The plaintiff contends that his failure to amend his bankruptcy schedule to include his 

claims against the defendants was inadvertent. In support, he attached his own affidavit in which 

he avers that he was not aware that he needed to disclose the claim and that he did not intend to 

deceive the court. He argues that his affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact. The 

defendant responds that there is considerable evidence to establish that the plaintiff has a “pattern 

and practice of giving different information in different court cases to suit his purposes,” such as 

inconsistent statements regarding his income in bankruptcy, his deposition in this case, and his 

application to file as an indigent plaintiff in the 2014 case. 

¶ 35 To begin, we note that “[a] party’s intent when acting is a question of fact.” Borchers v. 

Franciscan Tertiary Province of Sacred Heart, Inc., 2011 IL App (2d) 101257, ¶ 30. As 

summary judgment must be reserved for cases in which there is no question of material fact (735 

ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2018)), it generally should not be used when a party’s intent is a central 

issue in the case (Schroeder v. Winyard, 375 Ill. App. 3d 358, 368 (2007)). Indeed, we have 

repeatedly held that “summary judgment is particularly inappropriate where the inferences which 

the parties seek to have drawn deal with questions of motive, intent[,] and subjective feelings and 

reactions.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Williams, 321 

Ill. App. 3d 310, 314 (2001). Nevertheless, even factual matters may be decided via summary 

judgment if the movant puts forward evidence as to a material fact that would entitle it to 

judgment and the nonmovant does not counter by pointing to contrary evidence. Schroeder, 375 

Ill. App. 3d at 368.

¶ 36 Here, the defendants point to several pieces of evidence that they contend establish that 

the plaintiff’s failure to disclose his professional negligence claim to the bankruptcy court was a 
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deliberate attempt to mislead or deceive the court and his creditors, as well as the court and the 

defendants in this case. This evidence includes the plaintiff’s agreement with his bankruptcy 

counsel requiring him to inform his counsel if he wished to file a lawsuit; the plaintiff’s

bankruptcy schedule indicating that he had no income and his deposition testimony in this case 

stating that he earned $600 to $1200 a day as a boat captain and also worked as a marine 

consultant during the off season; and his application to proceed as an indigent plaintiff in the 

2014 case in which he averred that he was unemployed. The defendants contend that these are 

not innocent misrepresentations, especially in light of the fact that the plaintiff had an obvious 

financial motive to deceive in each instance just as he did in this situation. 

¶ 37 For his part, the plaintiff insists that he did not know he was required to disclose the 

cause of action and amend his bankruptcy schedules and that he did not intend to deceive. He 

notes that the agreement with his counsel only obligates him to inform his counsel if he is 

considering filing a lawsuit, it does not require him to inform the bankruptcy court. He also 

argues that his disclosure of the two cases filed against him that were pending at the time he filed 

his bankruptcy petition are evidence that he was not intending to conceal anything from the 

bankruptcy court. Lastly, he contends that his failure to disclose the Tikiboat Chicago claim to 

the bankruptcy court is further proof that he did not know of his obligations to the court. 

¶ 38 After reviewing the record and the evidence provided by the defendants, we conclude that 

all of the circumstantial evidence provided by the defendants is sufficient to raise a credibility 

issue regarding whether the plaintiff inadvertently failed to disclose this cause of action or it was 

an intentional act of deception, and such credibility issues are properly resolved by the trier of 
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fact. In other words, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

plaintiff intended to deceive by failing to disclose this cause of action. 

¶ 39 In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the defendants’ argument that we should 

reach the same conclusion as the circuit court did regarding the plaintiff’s affidavit: It is selfserving and conclusory. However, realistically speaking, most affidavits by a party submitted in 

opposition to a motion for summary judgment are, in some fashion, self-serving. Moreover, 

when confronted with an issue such as intent, it is difficult to imagine an affidavit that the 

plaintiff could provide that would not be self-serving in nature. This is precisely the reason why 

“matters of intent are generally inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage.” 

Thomson Learning, Inc. v. Olympia Properties, LLC, 365 Ill. App. 3d 621, 635 (2006). 

¶ 40 For these reasons, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, 

finding that there exists a question of fact on the issue of whether the plaintiff’s failure to 

disclose this cause of action to the bankruptcy court was intentional or inadvertent; and we 

remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to: (1) enter a summary determination of 

major issues in favor of the defendants, pursuant to section 2-1005(d) of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(d) (West 2018)), that the plaintiff had a continuing obligation to 

disclose this cause of action to the bankruptcy court; and (2) conduct further proceedings 

consistent with the views expressed herein.

¶ 41 Reversed and remanded with instructions.