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S. HRG. 110–779 

EXAMINING THE STATE OF TRANSIT SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

EXAMINING THE STATE OF TRANSIT SECURITY 

JANUARY 18, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

( 

Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

SHAWN MAHER, Staff Director 

WILLIAM D. DUHNKE, Republican Staff Director and Counsel 

AARON KLEIN, Democratic Chief Economist 

SHERRY E. LITTLE, Republican Senior Professional Staff Member 

JOSEPH R. KOLINSKI, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator 

GEORGE WHITTLE, Editor 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2007 

Page 

Opening statement of Chairman Dodd .................................................................. 1 

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: 

Senator Shelby .................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Bennett ................................................................................................ 7 

Senator Reed ..................................................................................................... 7 

Senator Allard ................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement ................................................................................... 31 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Dannel P. Malloy, Mayor, Stamford, CT, and Trustee, The U.S. Conference of Mayors ................................................................................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

William W. Millar, President, American Public Transportation Association ..... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Warren S. George, International President, Amalgamated Transit Union ........ 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Aurelio Rojo Garrido, Operational Director, Metro Madrid, and Secretary 

General, Association of Latin American Metros and Subways (ALAMYS) ..... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Tim O’Toole, Managing Director, London Underground, Transport for London, 

England ................................................................................................................. 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

(III)

(1) 

EXAMINING THE STATE OF TRANSIT 

SECURITY 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Christopher J. 

Dodd (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DODD 

Chairman DODD. The Committee will come to order. Welcome to 

the Banking Committee. I want to thank all of you for being here 

at the inaugural meeting of the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

and Urban Affairs for the 110th Congress. I am very pleased this 

morning to address this Committee as Chairman. It has been a 

long time. I must say I was beginning to wonder if this day would 

ever arrive. My wife reminded me the other day that at age 62 I 

am the average age of a U.S. Senator. That is the good news. 

Senator SHELBY. Younger. 

Chairman DODD. Younger. Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. But I have been on this Committee for awhile. 

When I first arrived in the U.S. Senate back in January 1981, I 

was assigned to this Committee and sat in the chair where Bob 

Casey is sitting today. And it has taken a quarter of a century to 

move along these chairs here one at a time. So I am delighted to 

be here this morning in this capacity. 

Of the three major committees on which I serve, I had the pleasure to serve behind Senator Kennedy on the Health, Education, 

Labor, and Pensions Committee. I still sit in that chair next to 

him. Senator Biden on the Foreign Relations Committee, I still sit 

next to Senator Biden after 25 years, and I sat behind Senator Sarbanes as well. Little did I know when I joined the Senate a quarter 

of a century ago that each of these men would have the Constitution of a bull. And so they have been here for many, many years 

and made me wait a quarter of a century to assume this Committee chairmanship. 

Let me say a few words, if I can, of a general nature. Then we 

will proceed to the business at hand this morning. 

First I want to acknowledge my friend and colleague from Alabama, former Chairman Dick Shelby, with whom I have a longstanding and very sound and wonderful relationship. A couple of 

days after the November elections, Senator Shelby and I had 

2 

breakfast together. At that point we still did not know for certain 

which of our two parties would hold a majority in the U.S. Senate. 

But we both agreed that whatever the outcome, we would work together as we have over the years to find common ground on this 

Committee, to advance issues of mutual concern. 

That was not a difficult agreement to reach, I would tell you. 

Senator Shelby’s leadership of this Committee has been marked, in 

my opinion, first by a commitment to address the critical issues of 

the day, which he did in a stellar fashion; and, second, to work in 

a bipartisan fashion. Some people speak that language rather readily. Dick Shelby has demonstrated over and over and over again his 

understanding of how important these relationships are in terms of 

advancing the issues the American people want us to confront. 

It is my intention and hope that those two characteristics will 

continue to be identified with the leadership of this Committee. As 

I have said previously, it is my intention to focus this Committee’s 

attention on two fundamental objectives: first, strengthening our 

Nation’s ability to keep our people and businesses as secure as possible against the risk of attack from those who wish us ill; and, second, expanding prosperity for businesses and consumers throughout our Nation. 

I am deeply troubled by what has happened in our economy over 

the past several years. Men and women are working much harder. 

They are paying more for the essentials of a financially stable and 

secure life. And many are actually falling behind, as many of us 

know. Due to no fault of their own, these people have become 

trapped in a downward spiral of debt from which they have little 

chance of escape. Others are victims of unscrupulous lending practices that have stripped them of their equity and sometimes their 

entire homes. 

In addition, vast numbers of small and medium-sized businesses 

struggle to compete in a global marketplace, where our national 

leadership is doing little, if anything, to ensure that the competitive playing field is as level as possible. 

Some of our fellow citizens are doing very well in this economy, 

but most are struggling, struggling very hard every single day. It 

is my intention—and I hope the Committee’s intention—to make 

their cause the work of this Committee. On that, I am confident 

that we can find common ground as Senators and as Americans. 

In addition, I would like to pay a tribute to our former colleague, 

Paul Sarbanes. Paul is an extraordinary public servant. He certainly set a very high standard for me and others by his thoughtfulness and dedication to the public interest of our Nation. And just 

as I am committed to carrying on the qualities of leadership shown 

by Senator Shelby, so, too, am I committed to carrying forward 

many of the qualities of leadership that characterized the service 

of Paul Sarbanes of Maryland. 

I also want to acknowledge one of our colleagues who is not with 

us here today, our very good friend and the person I have sat next 

to on this Committee for many years, Tim Johnson, who has been 

a wonderful Member of the U.S. Senate. I am sure that I speak for 

everyone, not only on this side of the dais but also in this room and 

elsewhere, certainly the people of his State, in wishing him continued progress. And it has been reported to us just in the last 24 

3 

hours how much better Tim is doing every single day, involved in 

a good, strong rehab program, and all of us wish him and his family well. And he will return to his service in the Congress as soon 

as possible. I look forward to working with him throughout this 

Congress. 

With that, let me recognize my friend and Ranking Member, 

Senator Shelby, for any opening statement he wants to make, and 

I want to thank him. Someone came up when I walked in the room 

and they said, ‘‘Look at this room. You have got this redone room. 

You Democrats are already spending money up here.’’ I quickly 

pointed out that this was my good friend, this very conservative 

Republican from Alabama, who spent all this money to get this 

nice room done. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. And I thank him for his leadership and for 

turning this Committee room into a modern Committee room 

where we have the advantages of the technology that will allow us 

to have very good hearings. 

I want to point out, my colleagues may have noted that we have 

not switched sides here. In the past, when you became the majority, the majority would move over to this side of the table, because 

in the past too often cameras would gather at one side or the other. 

I am proud to say to you here that there is no longer any advantage. You all have an equal opportunity to make a fool of yourself 

with a frontal picture here because of the cameras now stationed 

in a way here that they are not going to be picking up one side of 

the room or the other. But again, Dick, I thank you immensely for 

your leadership and the floor is yours. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHELBY 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Reluctantly, I will— 

not really—congratulate you as the Chairman of the Banking Committee. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SHELBY. We kid and talk about that. We know elections 

have consequences. We hope you will not be Chairman too long. 

You never know. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SHELBY. But, in that regard, we are going to continue to 

work with you—— 

Senator BENNETT. Is that a prediction about the outcome of the 

Presidential race? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SHELBY. It could be, but we do not know, either way. 

Chairman DODD. You could call me ‘‘Mr. Secretary.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SHELBY. We could, but we are going to hold all that back 

for a while and see what happens. But I do want to sincerely congratulate you. You have worked on this Committee for many, many 

years. We have both been here through the thrift crisis and everything that goes with it. But today I want to thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

Transit security has been the focus of the Committee’s attention 

for a number of years here. Since 2001, right here we have held 

4 

a number of informative hearings. We have requested and received 

a GAO report on the matter, and we have twice marked up and reported comprehensive transit security legislation. 

Many Members of this Committee on both sides of the aisle have 

focused a great deal on the issues surrounding transit security. 

Former Senator Sarbanes and Senators Allard and Reed have been 

very active on these issues. They were instrumental in making 

transit security a priority in the Committee and worked diligently 

to ensure passage on the Senate floor, and I want to thank them 

again for their efforts. 

Past attacks on the transit system of our friends and allies have 

clearly established the nature and magnitude of the threat to our 

own transit infrastructure. Throughout our country, 14 million people board trains and buses as a part of their daily routine. I have 

long believed that we can and we should be doing more to protect 

them. There are a number of steps that we can take to increase security while preserving the accessibility that we have come to expect in this country. 

We need more bomb-sniffing dogs, more closed-caption televisions, more public address systems, and more detection equipment. Yes, we need the capability to share information about potential threats on a real-time basis, and we need additional operational funds to provide training for transit workers. In the past, 

the funds provided by the Department of Homeland Security have 

been woefully inadequate, barely scratching the surface of the 

needs. The Banking Committee’s transit security bill would have 

authorized $3.5 billion that could go directly to transit agencies responsible for systems deemed to be at risk for potential terrorist attacks. 

I applaud Chairman Dodd here today for his early focus on this 

issue, and I will support his effort to revisit the Committee’s legislation. 

We have a diverse panel of witnesses before us today. In addition 

to hearing from industry, a local mayor, and the workforce, we are 

pleased to welcome representatives from both Madrid and London. 

They, of course, can speak firsthand about the terrorist attacks in 

their own countries, as well as share the steps they have taken to 

prevent future attacks. 

I look forward to hearing today’s witnesses, and I thank you 

again for calling this hearing so soon. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby. I should 

have said at the outset but let me do it here, if I can, I want to— 

Senator Dan Akaka is with us here and back on the Committee, 

and I wanted to recognize Dan, who has served on this Committee 

before and cares deeply about transportation, financial education, 

and other issues. We have missed you on the Committee, Senator 

Akaka, and we welcome you back to this Committee and thank you 

for your service to the Banking Committee. 

Senator Sherrod Brown joins us as well, after having served six 

terms in the House of Representatives, and previously as Ohio Secretary of State. Before politics, he was a professor at Ohio State 

University. He is not yet here this morning, but I am sure he is 

coming over. He spent 4 years in Connecticut, I might point out, 

5 

at one of our colleges and universities and at Yale, and I am delighted he is a Member of the Committee. 

Bob Casey I have already referenced in that last chair over there, 

Bob, we are thrilled to have you here. You bring some wonderful 

experience. No stranger whatsoever to financial services questions, 

and we are going to look to you to make a valuable contribution 

to the work of this Committee. He served as the Pennsylvania 

Auditor General, Pennsylvania State Treasurer, an attorney, went 

to law school here in DC, and so we welcome you to the Committee 

and look forward to your service. 

Jon Tester was President of the Montana State Senate, and previously he was on the Big Sky School Board, in addition to running 

a farm and a custom butcher shop. We have got some good, practical experience from Jon Tester, who was here at the outset of the 

hearing and I know has other commitments this morning. 

So I thank our new members. Dan, we thank you for coming 

back, and the Members who I have served with on this Committee, 

I appreciate your presence here. 

Let me, if I can, just make a couple of quick opening comments 

about the subject matter here and welcome our witnesses this 

morning, and then we will get right to the testimony. 

As Senator Shelby has pointed out, the Committee examines this 

morning the state of transit security in the United States. We have 

chosen this topic as the subject of the Committee’s first hearing for 

one overriding reason: because the safety of more than 14 million 

Americans, as Senator Shelby pointed out, and the prosperity of 

our Nation is at stake. It is no secret that worldwide terrorists 

have favored public transit as a target. I would draw your attention, by the way—my staff gave me a few minutes ago a story this 

morning in Moscow where Russian authorities are sending more 

police as we gather here into the streets of Moscow. They have ordered the shutting off of all cell phones in their subway system this 

morning on a very high alert. They are worried about their transit 

systems. They have been hit by terrorist attacks and so forth. But, 

again, as we gather here, once again we are finding a major city 

around the world is being faced with the challenges that Madrid 

and London and others have been through. 

As I said, it is no secret that worldwide terrorists have found 

public transit as a very attractive target. Transit has been the single most frequent target of terrorism, in fact. In the decade leading 

up to 2001, 42 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide targeted rail 

systems or buses, according to the Brookings Institution. In 2005, 

they attacked London’s rail system and bus system, which we will 

be hearing about, killing 52 riders and injuring almost 700 people 

that day in what has been called ‘‘London’s bloodiest peacetime attack.’’ 

In 2004, the attack on Madrid’s Metro system took the lives of 

192 people and 1,500 people were injured, and Mr. Garrido from 

Spain will be talking to us about that experience and what they 

have gone through. 

Previous attacks in Moscow, what I mentioned here today, in 

Seoul, Korea, and Tokyo, not to mention many Israeli bombings 

that we have heard about with far too great a frequency, demonstrate that this is, in fact, a global threat. Anyone who believes 

6 

that America’s transit system is somehow immune from attack 

need only to consider the experiences that other nations are having 

and ask why would anyone think that we would be immune from 

this. 

Transit is frequently targeted because it is tremendously important to our Nation’s economy. Securing our transit systems and our 

transportation systems generally is a difficult challenge under any 

circumstances. Every act to increase security potentially limits the 

mobility that our citizens cherish and want. Yet the difficulty of the 

task must not thwart us from completing it. We must make certain 

that our Nation’s leaders are doing everything possible to adequately address the threats posed by terrorism on our public transit systems. 

Senator Shelby has been a leader in this effort over the years, 

and, again, I want to recognize and thank him for his excellent 

work, along with Senator Sarbanes and others, in making sure that 

the Banking Committee has been at the forefront frequently in attempts to enhance our Nation’s security systems and our transit 

systems. This issue is a clear example, in my view, of how we can 

work together on this Committee and in this Congress to achieve 

the two fundamental objectives of this Committee about which I 

spoke a moment ago: security and prosperity. 

I was proud to work with Senator Shelby, former Senator Sarbanes, Senator Jack Reed, and Senator Allard, who is with us 

today, and many others, including Senator Schumer, when we 

crafted transit security legislation, which passed this Committee 

unanimously in both the previous two Congresses. We have been 

working on this issue in a bipartisan manner for the last two Congresses and have made considerable progress. Twice we have 

passed our bill to the full Senate, and once we received a majority 

vote—53, I would point out—on the Senate floor to fully fund the 

legislation authored by Senator Shelby and the others I have mentioned. It is my hope that we can continue to work together and 

finally enact this legislation, working with our colleagues in the 

House of Representatives and additional committees here in the 

U.S. Senate. 

While this Committee has worked to meet its obligation to the 

millions of transit riders, the same cannot be said about the Congress as a whole or the current administration, I would point out. 

The need is clear for enhanced transit security. Since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Government has invested nearly $24 billion in aviation security. None of us are going 

to fault that investment. But I would point out that protecting the 

1.8 million people who fly on average every day, as important as 

that is, is not investing as much as we should in transit security. 

In transit security, compared to $24 billion, we have invested $386 

million in transit security to protect 14 million people who, every 

day, ride on non-air transit systems around the country—1.8 million, $24 billion; $386 million, 14 million. The math is not complicated. We need to be doing a far better job at this, particularly 

when you are given the statistics I have cited to you earlier. 

Put to you another way, since 2001, our Nation has spent over 

$7.50 per passenger on aviation security but less than 1 penny per 

passenger on transit security in this country. I am not suggesting 

7 

at all that we ought to be investing equally, but clearly this is not 

an appropriate balance. I do not think anyone would agree with 

that. The stakes to our Nation are simply far too high, as, again, 

the news out of Moscow points out this morning, to ignore the urgent call by Governors, mayors, fire and police chiefs, and others 

for greater national leadership in this area. 

If we are truly serious—truly serious—about keeping our Nation 

safe from the risks of terrorism, and if we are committed to economic prosperity, then I believe it is imperative that we act to 

strengthen America’s transit networks. 

With that, I want to thank again the Members of the Committee 

here today in recognizing that this first hearing is one that does 

really address the two ambitions I have for this Committee, that 

is, prosperity and heightened security for our country. 

With that, Senator Shelby, I do not know if you have any additional opening comments you want to make. If not, then let me 

turn to our witnesses, if I can here, and then we will go to our 

Members. I want to ask our witnesses—well, do you want to make 

any opening comments? I will ask my colleagues if they have any 

opening statements they want to make. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNETT 

Senator BENNETT. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to 

publicly congratulate you on your elevation to this position and tell 

you how much we look forward to working with you. 

I have ridden transit systems in many countries around the 

world and recognize how vulnerable they are, so as a cosponsor of 

the original bill, I am grateful to you for holding the hearings. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

let me congratulate you for your new position and commend Senator Shelby for the great leadership he has shown. As he mentioned, he and with many of our colleagues, particularly Senator 

Allard, have been working very diligently on this issue of transit 

security, and I see many of the panelists we have had before, and 

thank you for joining us today. 

Senator Dodd mentioned that there is a fear in Moscow, but just 

this morning CNN is reporting that the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating a suspicious spill in their subway system of mercury. An unidentified individual dropped some 

mercury, and from a surveillance camera, it could be deliberate or 

accidental. But it also could be a test of their responsiveness. And, 

frankly, it took 8 hours for the authorities to respond. 

So transit security is not a Moscow problem or a Madrid problem. It is a worldwide problem, particularly in the United States, 

and we have to be cognizant of that. And I think this Committee 

has acted under the leadership of Senator Shelby and Senator Sarbanes appropriately, but we have yet to bridge the gap. It is a $6 

billion gap between the transit security needs in this country and 

the resources available. And as Senator Dodd has pointed out, we 

have done a lot to secure aviation. We have done very little, not 

8 

enough to secure transit in this country. And as our friends from 

Madrid and from London will point out, this is one of the major 

vulnerabilities in any industrialized country in the world. 

I look forward to working with Chairman Dodd, who is my leader 

in so many things, in a bipartisan way to try to address this issue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thanks very much. 

Senator Allard. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALLARD 

Senator ALLARD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate you on your position here on the Committee, and I look 

forward to working with you. I always felt that you were willing 

to work in a bipartisan way, and I always enjoyed having an opportunity to work with you whenever that has presented itself. 

As you mentioned, I have a real interest in mass transit systems 

because of working with Senator Reed. I think we have been able 

to work in a bipartisan way on many pieces of legislation, and we 

will continue to work on those efforts. So I think it is entirely appropriate that you deal with mass transit system security. 

You will have to forgive me, Mr. Chairman, that I have to mention that in Colorado we have a test facility for trains that is unprecedented in the world, and we have been working to get that as 

part of the Security Consortium for Mass Transit, and we haven’t 

been successful. It is not anything that is in this Committee. With 

high-speed trains and everything else, it is important to have an 

open enough and isolated area where you can actually test explosives and these kinds of things, which I think is an important part 

of developing public transportation systems that are secure. You 

have to have somewhere you can test them out, and we have that 

facility in Colorado and are working on it. 

So I am very happy that you are emphasizing this as one of your 

major priorities. I think our Nation needs that leadership, and I 

am glad to see the Banking Committee step forward on that. 

I ask that my full statement be entered into the record. 

Chairman DODD. Thanks very much, Senator. 

Let me just do some housekeeping measures here. I have read 

all of your testimony, and it is very excellent testimony. I would 

ask you if you can to try and keep your testimony down to about 

5 to 7 minutes or so. Your full testimony will be part of the record, 

without any question whatsoever. But in order to get to the question period here, which is also very valuable for Members, I would 

ask you to keep that in mind. All of the opening statements that 

my colleagues have here will be included in the record as well, 

fuller statements they may have on the issue before us here this 

morning. And I am again very grateful to our witnesses. 

I am going to continue the practice that has been the practice of 

this Committee for some time, and that is to recognize Members in 

the order in which they arrive in the Committee, with the exception of the Ranking Member, which has been the custom as well 

here. 

Senator SHELBY. Then I had better be on time. 

[Laughter.] 

9 

Chairman DODD. That is all right. Nonetheless, I think it is a 

good practice you have. It is frustrating at times, but I just want 

to announce that ahead of time that we will be continuing the very 

system that Senator Shelby and, I think, Senator Sarbanes and 

others have followed over the years. 

Let me introduce our panel of witnesses, and we will get right 

to it here this morning. Again, I thank them for being with us. 

I am delighted to introduce as our first witness—and I make no 

bones about it—a very good friend of mine. He is the mayor of 

Stamford, CT, and we have known each other a long, long time. He 

has been an excellent, excellent mayor in Connecticut. He has been 

the mayor of Stamford the last 12 years and has done a fabulous 

job. He works on many issues, as all mayors do across our country, 

but transit issues have been sort of a hallmark of Dan Malloy’s 

service. He lives in and represents a city in that congested corner 

of our State not far from New York that many are familiar with, 

the I-95 corridor in there, and mass transit systems, Metro North, 

Amtrak, and the like. So he really has to struggle and grapple with 

these issues all the time, and I am very, very grateful to Dan for 

coming here this morning to talk about this issue on behalf of not 

only the city of Stamford itself but also the Conference of Mayors 

that will be gathering next week here in the city and have suggested some ideas on what we might do in this area. 

Bill Millar, the President of American Public Transportation Association, has testified before this Committee previously on transit 

security and is recognized as an expert in these areas, and we 

thank you very, very much for being with us. 

I want to welcome Warren George, again, who is no stranger to 

these issues, the International President of the Amalgamated Transit Union, founded in 1892, has a longstanding involvement with 

these important questions. ATU is the largest transit union, representing 180,000 members in 270 locals, spread across 46 States. 

He brings obviously a tremendous amount of information and talent to this discussion. 

We are very pleased to welcome Aurelio Rojo Garrido. I don’t get 

to do this very often, so bienvenido a nuestro comite. Yo hablo 

Espanol fracamento simplacer. That is pretty good. I got to do that 

once. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. From my days as a Peace Corps volunteer. I am 

not going to get a break here on this Committee no matter what 

I do here along the way. But thank you for coming and joining us 

here this morning. The Secretary General of the Association of 

Latin American Metros and Subways and the Operational Director 

of Madrid’s Metro system. We are very honored to have you at the 

Committee. 

Last, we are joined by Mr. Tim O’Toole, who is the Managing Director of the Transport for London, which operates London’s subway and bus systems, the oldest subway system in the world. 

Again, we are very grateful to both of you for being a part of this 

hearing. London and Madrid are Europe’s two largest transit systems and have been the targets, as I pointed out earlier, of terrorist attacks over the past 3 years. I hope that we can learn from 

your tragedy, and we appreciate your coming a great distance to 

10 

be before this Committee today, and all of us are deeply grateful 

to both of you for making the effort. 

Mayor Malloy, the floor is yours. We welcome your testimony and 

thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANNEL P. MALLOY, MAYOR, STAMFORD, CT, AND TRUSTEE, THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF 

MAYORS 

Mr. MALLOY. Good morning, Senator Dodd. As a fellow son of 

Connecticut, I am particularly proud to be here this morning as 

you ascend to the chairmanship of this Committee, and thank you 

for the opportunity to be with you. 

I would like to single out Ranking Member Shelby and thank 

him for all of his work with America’s mayors on behalf of transit 

systems and transit security. We greatly appreciate your friendship. 

I am Dannel Malloy. I am the mayor of the city of Stamford, CT, 

and a trustee of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and I want to certainly thank all of the members for inviting me to participate. 

On behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, we appreciate your 

interest in public transportation security and look forward to working with you as you develop legislation to safeguard America’s bus, 

rail, and ferry systems. 

One month after September 11th, the Conference of Mayors 

called an emergency homeland security summit in Washington, 

DC, and drafted a sweeping ‘‘National Action Plan for Safety and 

Security in America’s Cities.’’ The National Action Plan was updated in October of 2005 with special emphasis on transit security 

following the attacks in London’s Underground Tube system, 

aboard London’s transit buses, and certainly the Madrid strike as 

well. 

In addition, my comments originate from the conference’s ‘‘Strong 

Cities, Strong Families for a Strong America 10-Point Plan’’ which 

will be presented next week at the U.S. Conference of Mayors 75th 

Winter Meeting. 

We must strengthen our partnership with the Federal Government to make sure that our first preventers and first responders 

have the resources and training they need to succeed and that all 

necessary Federal support is ready in the event of an event that 

might attack us. 

As the American Public Transportation Association’s survey identified, Congress has allocated—and as Senator Dodd mentioned— 

only $386 million to transit security through fiscal year 2006, yet 

transit agencies have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security investment needs. 

For Stamford, securing these wide open and vulnerable systems 

is a priority—a priority on which I spend a great deal of time and 

a great deal of worry. As part of the New York metropolitan area, 

Stamford is a major transportation hub for the communities in 

Connecticut and is located on one of the busiest stretches of public 

transportation in the Nation. 

We believe that any public transportation security legislation 

should be guided by four principles: 

11 

First, the establishment of a flexible Federal transit security 

grant program. 

Second, as we have done with aviation, securing public transit is 

a Federal responsibility and should not require a local or State 

match. 

Third, transit security funds should go directly to the transit authority or the jurisdiction providing security. We must continue to 

make improvements in the grant application process and delivery 

mechanism for Federal Homeland Security resources to make sure 

that the funding quickly reaches the transit system’s first responders. 

Since the early days after September 11, 2001, mayors have expressed serious concern with a State-based system for coordinating 

preparedness and responses to acts of terrorism. 

Many mayors have positive working relationships with State and 

Federal partners, but there was a real concern from the beginning 

that a complex, Federal distribution system which involved various 

approval levels for first responder resources and training would be 

slow and result in serious delays in funding reaching the highthreat, high-risk populations and infrastructures, including mass 

transit. 

Fourth, there should be a robust funding source for transit-related security research and development technology. 

I know that our Nation has made significant progress on increasing homeland security since September 11th and that our Federallocal partnership is much stronger today, with more resources, better information sharing, and a greater level of general communication. But I fervently hope that the tragic attacks in India, the 

United Kingdom, Spain, and, as was referenced today, Moscow 

serve as a reminder that we must not settle for ‘‘good enough.’’ 

These and other attacks dramatically highlight the vulnerability of 

mass transit worldwide to terrorism and the need for an increased 

focus by the Federal Government on security for these systems. 

We must recommit ourselves to doing all that we can to make 

sure that our citizens can get on a bus, step onto a train, go to 

work, cheer at a sporting event, or just go about their daily lives 

knowing that everything that can be done has, in fact, been done 

to combat terror. 

We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. The U.S. Conference of Mayors stands ready to work with this new Congress in 

a bipartisan way to safeguard one of our Nation’s most critical infrastructures. 

I wish to thank you all once again. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Mayor. Thank you very, 

very much for that. 

Mr. Millar, thank you very much again for being here. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION 

Mr. MILLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to you. 

I have had the privilege of testifying before this Committee since 

1978, so I watched you go from there to there to there to there. 

And to Mr. Shelby, thank you so much for your leadership over the 

years and for the many courtesies and privileges you afforded me 

12 

in coming before the Committee. And I am very pleased, Mr. Chair, 

to hear that you want to carry on the tradition of this Committee 

of working in a bipartisan way and working on issues that are important to the American people. We thank you very much for that. 

I also want to thank you for—I understand yesterday you and 

Mr. Shelby and Mr. Reed and Mr. Allard sent a jointly signed letter, along with the Environment and Public Works Committee, to 

the leadership of the Senate that points out how important it is in 

resolving the 2007 appropriations issues that the levels for highway and transit funding that were included in Safety be honored, 

and I thank you again for that bipartisan leadership and approach 

on that. That is very important indeed. 

As I listened to the opening statements, as I listened to the 

mayor, I am very tempted to just sit back and say ‘‘Ditto’’ and 

‘‘Amen.’’ It is very clear that this Committee, the mayors, and so 

many others understand the issues. Today is a weekday. Thirtythree million times, Americans will board public transportation vehicles today. Almost all of the equipment that they will use has 

been federally assisted in its purchase. There can be no doubt that 

the Federal Government has a major role not only in protecting the 

lives of Americans, but in protecting the investment that the Federal Government has made over the years. 

I appreciated in the opening statements the important review of 

the history of the commitment of this Committee to transit security, and we were very pleased to work with the Committee as it 

guided—to unanimous approval by the Senate—two security bills 

in two different Congresses. And as you pointed out, unfortunately 

they never became law, but we must keep trying. It is important 

to do so. And we note with great pleasure the important symbolism 

that the very first hearing of this Committee in the 110th Congress 

is not only about security, as important as that is, but that among 

all the things in the Committee’s jurisdiction, you chose public 

transit first, and we appreciate that. Greater emphasis has to be 

placed on making our riders safer, making our employees safer, 

and making the communities in which they reside and work safer 

as well. 

As has been pointed out, while it is important to secure the Nation’s airline system, 16 times more Americans will use public transit today than will use the Nation’s airlines. They are different 

kinds of systems. The same type of security is not going to be appropriate for both systems. But as some have mistakenly argued 

that, well, you just cannot do anything to improve security in public transit, it is such an open system, that is simply wrong. Many 

things have been done. Many more things could be done. And we 

must do a much better job of training our employees. We must do 

a much better job of equipping our employees. We must do a much 

better job of making sure that there are joint law enforcement 

training exercises, that we improve the communications systems, 

that we improve the security around the perimeters of locations 

where transit vehicles and workers are. And the list goes on and 

on and on. 

We have provided to the Committee on many occasions results 

of survey work among our members. Yes, the investment levels 

would seem high and seem daunting, but the benefit is so large we 

13 

simply must do that. We do not want to be in a position of getting 

yet another wake-up call. We do not want to be in the position of 

coming back to the Congress after an incident has happened in 

America, and then funding what we knew we should have been 

funding all along. 

The transit systems of America have already invested billions of 

dollars of their own resources. They are prepared to invest additional sums. But we need the Federal Government as a full partner, and we encourage the Committee to again introduce legislation, as you have in the past, and we will be standing firmly and 

strongly with you in an effort to see that it is passed. 

My testimony includes many other very specific suggestions, but, 

again, Mr. Chair, we are very pleased to be here today. We look 

forward to working with you and the other Members of the Committee, and anything that we can do to help, we want to help. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Mr. Millar. I appreciate your time 

and your comments as well about Senator Shelby and the work of 

this Committee. And as you have pointed out, as we have all pointed out, we have been through this now on a couple of occasions 

over the last 4 years, so we have a pretty good understanding of 

the issues. There may be some new ideas that can come into this, 

but basically the fundamental principles I think that we incorporated earlier make a lot of sense to me. And I will be listening 

to Senators Shelby, Reed, and Allard as well, who have carried the 

lion’s share of the load on this thing, for any additional thoughts 

they have. But my sincere hope is that rather quickly we will mark 

up a bill here and have it available, working with the Commerce 

Committee as well, too, to have a unified bill that we can then 

present to the leadership for early consideration. So, I appreciate 

your strong comments. 

Mr. George, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF WARREN S. GEORGE, INTERNATIONAL 

PRESIDENT, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION 

Mr. GEORGE. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Dodd, 

Ranking Member Shelby, and Members of the Committee. On behalf of the members of the Amalgamated Transit Union, I want to 

thank you for giving us this opportunity to testify today on the 

ATU’s priorities and strategies for enhancing transit security. 

I applaud this Committee’s efforts over the past several years to 

work together in a bipartisan manner to address this important 

issue. 

The safety and security of our Nation’s public transit systems is 

of utmost importance to the leadership and the members of the 

ATU. 

Faced with the reality of terrorist attacks against mass transit, 

the ATU has for years worked to raise the awareness of our members and their employers to this danger and to advance real, concrete solutions and initiatives to enhance the safety and security of 

the systems operated and maintained by ATU members. 

We strongly believe that the labor community must be a partner 

in any comprehensive effort to address the security threats facing 

our industries. For that reason, we have worked closely with our 

14 

members in the transit industry and officials at all levels of Government, including many Members of this Committee. 

Many transit agencies themselves have also taken steps to securing their operations, but due in large part to funding constraints, 

they have not gone far enough. The reality is that the industry and 

the ATU cannot do this alone. The Federal Government must step 

up to the plate and provide the necessary funding, guidance, and 

even mandates to provide the level of security that transit passengers and employees deserve. 

More than 2 years ago, Congress directed the administration to 

take comprehensive steps to address transportation security risks, 

including risks faced by the transit industry. 

It was not until a little over a month ago that President Bush 

issued an order to Secretary Chertoff to draft a plan to address security issues in the transit industry. 

Two years later is not a time for drafting plans. It is a time for 

concrete action. The Federal Government must provide funding directly to transit agencies for security purposes and must ensure 

that transit employees are prepared in the event of an emergency. 

Mr. Millar has already presented a compelling case for increased 

Federal funding for transit security initiatives, which the ATU 

wholeheartedly agrees. And as such, I would like to take this opportunity to discuss another necessary component of transit security that has gone unaddressed for far too long. That is employee 

training. 

Common sense tells us that the single most important thing that 

we can do to increase transit security is to provide each and every 

front-line transit employee, including rail and bus operators, customer service personnel, and maintenance employees, with security 

and emergency preparedness and response training. 

While we should not abandon the research and deployment of 

new technologies, we need to recognize what has been proven to be 

the most cost-effective security measure: employee training. 

In the event of a terrorist attack within a mass transit system, 

the response of employees at the scene within the first few minutes 

is crucial to minimizing the loss of life and to evacuating passengers away from the incident. Transit employees are the first on 

the scene, even before police, firefighters, or emergency medical responders. They must know what to do in order to save the lives of 

their passengers and themselves. 

Front-line transit employees are also crucial in preventing attacks. They are the eyes and ears of the system and are often first 

to discover suspicious activities and threats, or the first to receive 

reports from passengers. These employees need to know how to recognize security threats and need to know the appropriate protocols 

to follow for reporting and responding to potential threats. 

Security experts and officials from the FTA and the TSA have 

publicly recognized the need for employee training. In fact, a list 

of 17 ‘‘Action Items for Transit Agencies,’’ jointly developed by the 

TSA and the FTA, includes establishing and maintaining a security 

and emergency training program for all employees. And yet little 

has been done to ensure that this training is provided. 

While many in the transit industry claim that the employees are 

being trained, this is simply not the reality. I know this because 

15 

I have talked to our members—the ones who are supposedly being 

trained—and they tell me a different story. They are scared, not 

because they know there is a threat, but because they feel out of 

the information loop, and they have no idea how to help prevent 

an incident or what to do if one occurs. 

What is most surprising is that many of the members of my 

union I hear this from are employees of the transit systems in 

major cities that are at high risk of terrorist attacks. For security 

reasons, I will not publicly disclose the names of those systems. 

FTA’s own numbers show that only a fraction of industry employees, less than 25 percent—I repeat, less than 25 percent—have 

been trained through the leading industry training program which 

is now provided at transit agencies free of cost by the National 

Transit Institute in partnership with the FTA. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you might have on it. 

I know you have my full testimony, and I will not burden the 

record any further. Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. George. We appreciate your testimony and the work that your members perform 

every single day. And the issue of training I think is one we are 

going to spend some time talking about here this morning, and I 

am very confident you are going to hear from a unanimous panel 

about the importance of that issue. So we thank you for your emphasis on it here this morning. 

Again, welcome, Mr. Garrido. Thank you for coming such a long 

distance to be with us. And please express again our sincere condolences to the people of Spain for what you have been through, and 

we are very anxious to hear your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF AURELIO ROJO GARRIDO, OPERATIONAL DIRECTOR, METRO MADRID, AND SECRETARY GENERAL, ASSOCIATION OF LATIN AMERICAN METROS AND SUBWAYS 

(ALAMYS) 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. Thank you very much. I really appreciate 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dodd, and Mr. Shelby, the Ranking Member, 

inviting Madrid Metro to share our tragic experiences in Madrid 

and also our decision that we took after this tragedy. 

Chairman DODD. I should point out, you have a program here, 

a slide presentation here for us. 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. I will show you some pictures that normally 

we do not show, but I think it is important for all of you to see 

the real situation after the explosion. 

I have some figures about Madrid Metro. The Madrid region has 

6 million citizens, and Madrid Metro now is 227 kilometers. In the 

next 5 months, we will extend 50 kilometers more. 

In relation with the attacks in Madrid, 13 bombs exploded in 4 

trains. The trains were in three different stations or close to a station. It was in the rush hour, and almost 200 people were killed 

and more than 1,500 people were injured. All the trains came from 

the Alcala de Henares Station, a city 50 kilometers from Madrid. 

Here is a picture with the crowded platform in the same hour of 

the bomb. One of the bombs exploded in this station. 

The other bombs exploded in the open surface. Here you can see 

one of the trains. In this train, the terrorists put three bombs. 

16 

Here you can see the first moment after the explosion. Here in 

this tragic picture you can see the first help. The same passengers 

tried to help the others until the members of the police and the 

emergency service came. 

More pictures inside the trains, it was very, very helpful. In the 

picture on the left is some picture of the period when the bomb exploded in the platform. 

We did some special measures quickly. We started to do inspections on the surface rail. We have 30 kilometers on surface; the 

other 200 are in tunnels. Before opening the services, we decided 

to close the bins, and we changed our patrolling systems. We also 

started to control technical areas. We started to do our awareness 

campaign in order to ask the passengers to collaborate with us and 

with the police. We raised many information about the technical 

assistance that we have in order to know our passengers this system. 

The police presence was increased. The Municipal Police, which 

is the second police in Madrid, came also for 2 months for Madrid 

Metro. And we increased also the budget to contract private security, more than 20 percent. And what was very effective is to create 

mixed patrols between national police and private security guards. 

It is very interesting for us. We decided to remove luggage racks 

in the trains to the airport, and a very important thing is to involve the staff in the supervision of security matters and the security training. All the courses, the training courses, we did one or 

2 days to share the latest knowledge in security matters in the underground. 

In relation with the management system, we decided to implement a new security post in all lines. It is a very important decision for us. We already had before the Post Command Center and 

the station and the trains. We decided to implement line security 

posts for all lines, with technical assistance to help with the security matters. 

We started to patrol also with trained dogs, some of them specialists in explosives, and also we introduced mobile bomb detectors. 

After the conversation with the police and the Spanish security, 

we feel it is very difficult to protect a huge network with 1 million 

square meters area, 100 kilometers of corridors and platforms, 

many doors. It is very difficult to close a system as underground. 

For that, we decided to implement the general level, introducing 

technical systems to help the police, the security staff, and the 

operational staff to control the space. We introduced PDA for the 

staff. In this PDA it is possible to control and to receive alarms and 

to watch the CCTV system. 

Our regional government decided to have funds to increase the 

security matters, more or less $100 million to spend in 2 years to 

improve our communication system and security system established, especially the CCTV system. 

We think now on behalf of our association, ALAMYS, the Latin 

American association, our members, the commitment of the politics 

with the leaks in the transit system will be fully adopted. We take 

the decision in order to give funds to increase the security level because the target of the terrorists is these days the transit system 

17 

more and more. And also the role of the Metropolitan Railway is 

to collaborate, coordinate, facilitate the operation with technical assistance, emergency plan, and staff preparedness. 

I think we have many plans in Europe, in the European Community, but the central government usually has the main responsibility for addressing the plans to fight against terrorism. 

Thank you very much. Sorry for taking more minutes. The message for all of you is all we can fight against terrorism if we are 

together. Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrido. I should 

have mentioned this. I know just recently you have been through 

again another round of terrorist attacks in your country. In this 

case, I think it was ETA who perpetrated these attacks. You have 

been through a lot in Spain over the last number of years, and I 

want you to know you have the support and sympathy of the people in this country. I served for a number of years as the Chairman 

of the U.S.-Spain Council, having joint meetings every year both 

here and in Spain to talk about issues of common interest, and this 

was always a subject matter, and we can learn a great deal from 

you. You have made some very solid and sound suggestions here 

that I think are going to be valuable to us as we look to our new 

legislation. But we thank you immensely again for your thoughts 

and comments. 

Mr. O’Toole, again, you have been through a great deal, and we 

are very grateful to you and the British Government for participating here today. 

STATEMENT OF TIM O’TOOLE, MANAGING DIRECTOR, LONDON 

UNDERGROUND, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, ENGLAND 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations to 

you. I hope my accent isn’t too great a disappointment to you all. 

I am the Managing Director of London Underground, and we are 

the oldest and one of the largest underground railways in the 

world. We are grateful you would include us in your consideration 

of this subject which is so important to us. As the Chairman has 

already pointed out, on the 7th of July in 2005, four young men, 

24 hours after London had just finished celebrating winning the 

Olympics, sauntered into one of my stations, Kings Cross. One of 

them got on a Circle Line train headed east. One got on a Circle 

Line train headed west. One got on a Piccadilly Line train headed 

south. And one we believe meant to get on a Northern Line train 

but got delayed, confused, and appears to have been evacuated 

from the station onto a double-decker bus. 

The three who got on the trains waited until the trains got into 

the tunnels, and then they simultaneously detonated bombs they 

carried in rucksacks on their backs. About an hour later, the man 

who got on the bus detonated his bomb. And, as the Chairman has 

already pointed out, 52 people died, 700 people were injured, many 

of them in life-changing ways. 

I am very proud of the way my staff reacted to these events. 

Within minutes, within 2 minutes, they were in the tunnels starting to attend to those trains. Within 20 minutes, we had made the 

decision to evacuate the network. We had over 500 trains in service 

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18 

work without a single injury. Within 2 hours, we had divided management into very separate tasks focused on dealing with the immediate scene, designing a new service plan, and finding ways, engineering designs to bring those sites back. 

You can imagine going through an experience like that, you learn 

a lot of lessons, but I thought I would just focus on the one, and 

the Chairman has already anticipated it. The primary lesson is 

this: You have to invest in your staff and rely on them. You have 

to invest in technology but don’t rely on it. You have to respond 

much faster than management can intervene, and the only ones 

who are going to do that are the people on the site at the time. 

My staff is competent and professional, and they are that way 

because of the drills we do—not just the drills in London Underground, but the drills with all of the agencies, the emergency services. My testimony includes a reference to the very elaborate and 

expensive drill we did at Bank Station simulating a chemical attack. But we also do them regularly on our network with the local 

fire department simulating an emergency at a local station. So my 

staff knows what to do, and what they have to learn is the complexity of the situation they are going to address. It is not just having people of a quality who have the stomach to run into a darkened tunnel where a bomb went off. It is also having a staff intelligent enough to know that they have got to split their resources, 

and half of them cannot run into the tunnel. They have got to go 

take control of the entrance, they have to take control of the gate 

line, because the people keep coming at you. They do not understand what has happened, and they will complicate the situation 

unless you have staff who are clever enough and trained enough 

to take care of the situation. 

The other great advantage of drills, which I strongly recommend, 

is the fact of the trust that builds up among the different people 

involved. There is nothing worse than having one great organization with a lot of power but does not have the competency to actually manage the situation. 

In Great Britain, we have a situation that, when an emergency 

happens, the metropolitan police assume plenary authority. I report to the metropolitan police at that point. My headquarters is 

right across the street from New Scotland Yard. Yet when these 

bombs went off, an officer didn’t come across the street to oversee 

us. The reason they didn’t is they knew what we would do. They 

knew we were trained and they could rely on us. So the people 

with different expertise can just get on with what they have to do, 

and that is a very, very important element to have in your organization. In other words, it is not just the front-line people. The entire institution has to be trained and made competent. 

The second half of that lesson is to invest in technology but don’t 

rely on it. There are certain elements that are going to fail you. 

Certainly some things are not going to survive a bomb blast. The 

mobile or cell phone network could not handle the traffic, so if you 

have a management structure that relies on getting a hold of people with cell phones, you are in big trouble. But there certainly are 

elements of technology that are useful. Certainly our CCTV system 

proved extremely useful in the attack that followed 2 weeks later 

19 

on the 21st and allowed the metropolitan police a way to arrest 

those people fairly quickly. 

The only point I want to emphasize is that whatever you invest 

in, it must be as a result of firm risk-based analysis and not be 

simply an investment that panders to the fear in society. Railways 

are extremely inhospitable environments. If you introduce a lot of 

very delicate detection equipment, all you are going to do is impose 

an extremely expensive maintenance burden on an institution that 

we know is invariably underfunded. So we have to make sure the 

things we invest in actually lower the risk for the people involved; 

otherwise, the money is better off going into making sure the trains 

are reliable. 

It was an awful day in London on the 7th of July 2005, but my 

staff performed magnificently, and I am very proud of them. Thank 

you, and I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman DODD. Great testimony. I am grateful to all of you for 

your comments. 

Let’s pick up on the emphasis that Mr. O’Toole raised here. You 

have all addressed it. Mr. George did. Certainly Dan has talked 

about it as well. Let me ask you, Mr. Garrido, to comment on the 

statement that you need technology but not to rely on it and personnel really needs to have the training and background to do the 

technology aspects of these systems, which are rugged systems, 

that go through a lot. Do you have any additional comments to 

make? Do you have anything you would add to what Mr. O’Toole 

suggested? 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. I agree with Mr. O’Toole and all the principle 

is to have a staff with commitment, with the—associated with terrorists, and the facilities, the technical assistance has to be in to 

help them to fight against terrorism, also against the other security 

departments in our networks. 

I agree also it is very difficult to implement different kinds of detectors for this. We already use the mobile detectors, decided not 

to implement fixed detectors because the cost of this system is very 

high, and as we have a huge surface, it is impossible to protect. 

The collaboration between police and our operational staff is 

very, very important. It is very important, and we run different 

meetings in order to share between them their experiences. 

I agree with Mr. O’Toole, but also I think to decide to implement 

some kind of technical services because without this assistance, our 

staff can manage some situations well, and it is very useful for the 

normal service, the level of security in Madrid Metro is now higher 

in many different fields. 

Chairman DODD. Great. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask the other panelists. Dan, do you want to comment on 

the training aspects of this and the personnel? 

Mr. MALLOY. Well, I listened to Mr. O’Toole and his comments 

about drilling, and I was thinking of how un-American that is. We 

are not used to drilling. We do not do the kind of work that other 

countries have learned is so vitally important in preventing and recovering from the kinds of incidences which he described, and I certainly applaud his performance and that of his agency. 

Listening to your first question, Mr. Chairman, I am reminded 

that interoperability, which is a huge issue, not just in transporVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:34 Mar 30, 2009 Jkt 048080 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\DOCS\0118.TXT JASON
20 

tation but in so many other areas, from recovery from natural-occurring incidences as well as terrorism, presents a huge challenge 

to America’s cities and America’s mayors. We need real leadership 

coming from the Federal Government on this issue. Interoperability 

is really a great worry, and the reality is, as I sit here today, that 

many cities and States are struggling with that issue and not including transit security in their planning. 

That is a reality. I know it to be the case. And we need leadership from this Committee to stress that importance. 

Chairman DODD. Mr. Millar and Mr. George, I would like you to 

comment on this as well. You talked about it, Mr. Millar, as well, 

and obviously, Mr. George, you represent an awful lot of people out 

there whose lives and careers are at stake. Give us some sense of 

what is happening today. Are we doing enough drilling? Is there 

enough training going on? 

Mr. GEORGE. No, Chairman Dodd. There is really not enough 

training going on. We have not even tipped the iceberg in any way 

of training. Our people are out there. They are trying to do what 

is best. They are doing it in a way that they are inexperienced. 

They think they might see something, but they do not. I think the 

transit agencies are hard-pressed for funding just to operate the 

systems. I do not think they have a desire not to do the training. 

It is just impossible for them to do it at this time, and I think it 

is just a recipe for disaster someday if we do not get on board and 

do this. We are willing to work with this. It is our lives on the lines 

at the same time as we are protecting our passengers. 

So there is a common goal here. There should never be any difference. And this is one where the transit agencies and labor and 

management completely are cooperative in doing the training. We 

just do not have the training out there in the major systems. 

Just recently here, on the Metro system where they had an accident, it took the operator to get off the train and walk through the 

tunnel back and report what it was and come back up. And there 

are all kinds of estimates of 10, 20 minutes of lost time in that. 

It is just not acceptable in today’s world. 

Chairman DODD. But I gather you are saying what Mayor Malloy 

said. Can you cite any example in the United States today where 

we are doing anything along the lines that Mr. O’Toole described, 

what is being done in London? 

Mr. GEORGE. No. 

Chairman DODD. There is not a single example of it? 

Mr. GEORGE. Not one single example. 

Mr. MILLAR. I am not sure I would 100 percent agree with that. 

Certainly, the major cities, particularly New York City has been a 

leader. But as Mr. George has said, there is no disagreement. We 

may disagree on the amount of training going on, but whatever 

that number is, it is not enough and we are in complete agreement 

that we need to be doing more training. 

As Mr. George said in his testimony, transit workers are also 

first responders. You know, to take nothing away from police or fire 

or other emergency people, but before they get there, transit workers are going to be the ones on the scene. And as Mr. O’Toole said, 

if the transit workers know what to do and begin the process of seVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:34 Mar 30, 2009 Jkt 048080 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\DOCS\0118.TXT JASON
21 

curing that scene, when the other responders are able to arrive it 

is a much different situation. 

I would also comment on the technology. I think that is a very 

wise statement Mr. O’Toole has made, that you cannot rely on the 

technology. Yet we know technology can be a big help, and the 

mayor referred to interoperability and communications, for example, as an important issue. 

Since 9/11, everyone with a different form of snake oil, if I can 

use that word in this context, a new gadget, has approached public 

transit. We have asked the Department of Homeland Security if 

they wouldn’t have their research people begin to evaluate what is 

out there. We are not the experts that they are on all the types of 

gadgets that might be helpful. And so we would need—we believe 

we also need a bigger investment in the Federal research aspects 

of this thing because there are some uses for technology and good 

uses for technology as well. 

But to your fundamental point, we agree there needs to be much 

more training. There is no system that I know of that would be 

willing to come and testify and say we are doing all the training 

that anyone should do. We would like to do more. As President 

George has pointed out, it is largely a matter of money; it is not 

a matter of will. 

Chairman DODD. My last question, I presume that the things 

that you are doing today, Mr. Garrido, in Spain, what you are 

doing today in London—to what extent is the London budget or the 

Madrid budget—or is it the national budget which has been contributing to this heightened degree of security in the wake of these 

events? Is it a local expenditure or is it a national expenditure? 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. Yes. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Well, when we participate in these drills within 

our agency, you know, we are funding our own expenses, that is 

part of our budget, as do the other agencies as well. So it is just 

part of the funding of the enterprise. 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. Now in Spain, the responsibility for regional 

transport and urban transport is for the region government. But 

the central government gives money for the general transport system in each region, but the responsibility how to spend this money 

is the regional government. In Madrid, the regional government decided to spend contract security, private agents, and to spend in facilities and in training our staff. It is a local decision. 

Chairman DODD. The region government makes—— 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. The regional. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Shelby. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Toole, you are absolutely right about what goes on in London and how cool you are and how well trained you are. I was in 

London the day of the bombings. Actually, I was in a meeting at 

Scotland Yard across the street, dealing with an area of responsibility of this Committee, that is, the terrorist financing, which we 

pursue diligently on both sides of the aisle here. And I was amazed 

at the response time, how you got people off, and then got the transit system, the Tube, moving again because a couple of days later 

I was on it. I was a little reluctant to get on it, but my wife and 

22 

granddaughter had been riding it, and I said, ‘‘If they can ride it, 

I can ride it.’’ So I commend you on that. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Thank you. 

Senator SHELBY. And I think a lot of that is training that you 

have. I have been in Madrid since the big bombing, I would call 

it—you know, all of them are big—and met with a lot of your people there, and I commend the people of Spain, and Madrid especially, for how you responded to that. 

This is a topic that Chairman Dodd has long been interested in, 

and the whole Committee, and we pushed. We have had a majority 

of the votes to fund the fight against terrorism and try to protect 

our transit system on the floor of the U.S. Senate. And we have got 

to do better because it might take 60 votes instead of a majority, 

and the Chairman understands this. 

Mr. O’Toole, we all know that there is nothing better than the 

training of the people because of this, but you use a lot of the 

closed-circuit TV. I think you had 6,000. You are adding a lot more. 

How important are they? And is that something that we should 

really push in this country? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. I think, Senator, absolutely. We had 6,000 cameras 

in July. We are rebuilding the whole system right now. We are up 

to around 8,000 now. We will get to 12,000 before this is done. 

They will all be digital. We will record for every second. 

It is very important for me to send a message that you come on 

our system, we are taking your picture. And that does not help if 

you are dealing with a 7th of July situation, a suicide bomber, but 

I have to believe it did play a role in the Madrid situation because 

they got on the commuter rail. They did not get on his Metro system directly where they would have confronted a very different situation. So if you want to get away, you are not going to come onto 

a Metro system that has CCTV. 

It plays another role, though, that I think is sometimes missed 

by people who talk against the investment. If you are trying to lead 

a society, it seems to me, you are really dealing with the phenomenon of fear. I mean, the deaths are awful, but, you know, people die from different causes all the time. It is when they die in 

this situation that causes society to panic. 

With CCTV, you are immediately able to analyze and present 

what happened. When those pictures were presented on July 22nd 

following the unsuccessful bombing attack, the underlying message 

to all of London was: Here they are, you know what will happen 

next, we are going to arrest them. 

If those pictures did not exist, it would have contributed to that 

sense of fear, they do not know what is going on, they are going 

to come back. CCTV allows you to take control of the situation and 

project this sense of control, and I think that is as important as almost any other attribute that leadership brings to one of these situations. 

Senator SHELBY. I want to pick up on what Senator Dodd was 

alluding to earlier, and that is the funding source. First, transit security or Tube security, Underground security in London, do you 

have a local or a Metro source of funds, or is it a national source 

of funds from the House of Commons? 

23 

Mr. O’TOOLE. In Great Britain, everything comes from the Chancellor, so—— 

Senator SHELBY. Chancellor Gordon Brown. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Right. So we have got the money we raise at the 

till, and then we get a grant from government. 

Senator SHELBY. OK. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. The Federal Government. 

Senator SHELBY. In Madrid, what is your funding source—national—for security of the Madrid system and rail system? 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. The budget is from the regional government. 

Regional, it is like a State here in the United States. But the central government framework, more or less 30 percent of the budget 

of the regional transit system are provided for the central government. But the regional government has the decision in which to invest, in more security, more stations, more traffic security. The political decision is taken at this moment by the regional government. 

Senator SHELBY. Are there similarities of how you run your transit security in Madrid to the way they do in London? I am sure 

there are some differences, but are there similarities? Do you have 

a lot of closed-circuit TV? You check the rails a lot, all these things. 

Is that just fundamental to security of a transit system? 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. Yes, it is similar. Before the attacks, we have 

closed-circuit TV locally in the station, but now we can record all 

the cameras, not before, and it is possible to share from the Post 

Command Center and the local security post. And in the case of 

Madrid, the police could know the moment of the terrorist in the 

underground because the terrorists travel in the underground 

using record files. And it is important because now almost 40 people are imprisoned after the investigation of the police, and they 

used many, many frequently the system of the Madrid Metro. It is 

very useful for police. 

Senator SHELBY. Mayor Malloy, tell me what you mean by a 

flexible Federal transit security grant program. 

Mr. MALLOY. I want you to get money to where it needs to be. 

Senator SHELBY. That is a great answer. 

Mr. MALLOY. That is what I want. 

Senator SHELBY. For security. 

Chairman DODD. This guy agrees with you. 

Mr. MALLOY. I know. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SHELBY. For security. 

Mr. MALLOY. For security. And, you know, this is such—you 

know, if you look at this on a national basis, these are very different systems, very different needs. Decisions need to be made 

close to the ground. But to implement those decisions, we need 

money. We need resources. Quite frankly, Senator, you need to get 

it to us, and I began my remarks by thanking and congratulating 

you for your work with us. We need your continued leadership on 

this issue. 

But the reality is that we are ready to build that system. We are 

ready to make America safer. We are ready to have safer transit. 

But, quite frankly, the resources need to come to us to allow us to 

do that. 

Senator SHELBY. I agree with you. 

24 

Mr. Millar, you have been before this Committee many times. We 

have worked with you on this very subject. How important is to 

have a funding source separate and distinct from the Department 

of Homeland Security’s transit passenger and freight rail security 

funds? 

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, we believe that having a dedicated funding 

source to public transit is essential. When you are mixed in with 

many other—— 

Senator SHELBY. For security. 

Mr. MILLAR. For security, absolutely, because if it is mixed in 

with—you need to secure the ports. You need to secure the airports. You need to secure transit. You need to secure—the list goes 

on. And if it is all in one big melange, you do not do any of them 

well. We need to set the kinds of standards that we want. 

For example, we have proposed to the Department of Homeland 

Security—APTA is a standard-setting organization—we have proposed that we would work with them to develop standards so we 

would know when you have a rail transit system, here are the 

kinds of things you ought to be doing; a bus system, these kinds 

of things. 

So a dedicated source of funding for transit security is essential. 

Senator SHELBY. Well, we hate to talk about things like this in 

public, but we have to because this is part of our obligations and 

responsibilities. 

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, sir. 

Senator SHELBY. But we have, as we all know, a great vulnerability in our passenger system, our rail system, our bus system. 

All of it goes together, and I do not think we have addressed that 

in any adequate way. 

Mr. MILLAR. I agree with you. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Well, thank you again, Senator Shelby, for your 

leadership on that, and the other individuals who have spent a lot 

of time on these issues. 

To my colleague from Rhode Island, I went through this a while 

ago, and I would be remiss at this historic moment of my new 

chairmanship not to point out that at long last I have a colleague 

who has a younger child than I do. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman DODD. I want to announce publicly here that we welcome Emily. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. I hope Julia is doing well, and congratulations 

to our good friend from Rhode Island on the new arrival. 

Senator REED. If Emily were here, it would be hard to hear anything else. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. She is now celebrating her 16th or 17th day with 

us, so thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Congratulations to you. 

Senator REED. I just want to commend again not only the Chairman and the Ranking Member but the panelists for excellent testimony. And one reason—and this echoes, I think, Senator Shelby’s 

comment—is this terrorist threat, as we have been standing still, 

25 

has been metastasizing to a much more sophisticated—and if you 

look, and I have spent some time on the Armed Services Committee, the fear today is not a bunch of 17- , 18-year-old amateurs, 

although very deadly; it is very sophisticated sole operators getting 

instructions through cyberspace, and that is why this incident in 

Los Angeles is one that is quite disturbing. A lone individual may 

have been testing the system and may have been either an agent 

or—and we hope it is nothing, but this is a threat that is very serious. And we have not yet provided the resources, the direction, and 

the coordination we need. So I hope we can do that. I am confident 

that with Chairman Dodd and Senator Shelby we will. 

Anyway, I thought all the testimony was excellent. Mr. O’Toole 

pointed out that one of the advantages they had in London was a 

centralized chain of command in a military sense. People know exactly who is in charge. Not just in your city but across the country, 

do you think at the local level there is a need for a centralized 

chain of command with interoperable communication, et cetera, so 

everyone knows who is in charge, who does what, is that your 

sense? 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Senator, I think we have made progress, but the 

reality, if we are talking about the ability of local first responders 

to cooperate, aid, and assist on a transit basis, I do not think we 

are anywhere near where we need to be. And to piggyback on the 

point that Senator Shelby made, we actually need you to set those 

priorities. I think that is why I am here. Other governments—State 

governments, governments that do not have as active or robust 

transit systems as some others will—will always set this at a very 

low priority. It will be a back-seat issue. And that is why the leadership of the U.S. Senate and the House is vitally important to setting this agenda. 

If you say it has to be done, and if you provide the funds to do 

it, it will be done. And, quite frankly, if you fail to do that, unfortunately, not because of this Committee’s work, but our government 

has failed to do it, we are not making the kind of progress that we 

need to make. 

I hope that answers your question. 

Senator REED. It does, but let me also ask another question, I 

think, that my colleagues have suggested, which is, the current 

structure of Homeland Security funding flows through the States, 

and for many reasons—and you alluded to them—that money never 

seems to get into transit because there are these other demands 

out there. 

In some respects, we have not given enough money, but in other 

respects, there is a natural kind of sponge at the State level. And 

I am not suggesting they are doing anything that I would not do 

if I was a governor, but it always seems that the last person in line 

is the transit system and a local mayor. 

Mr. MALLOY. I think that that is correct. It has been the position 

of the U.S. Conference of Mayors from December 12th on that mayors needed to be viewed as partners in building the system that 

will allow us to defeat terrorism, and certainly to recover from it 

when it strikes. 

As mayors—and the U.S. Conference of Mayors represents some 

1,200 communities with populations of 30,000 or more—we do not 

26 

believe this current system is working well for local government. It 

is delaying implementation. It is siphoning off funds that need to 

go. And to be very direct and to agree with you, Senator, one of 

the results is a lack of money and the lack of efforts on behalf of 

transit. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Millar and Mr. George, thank you for your testimony, and 

I enjoyed working with you and continue to look forward to doing 

that. Mr. O’Toole and Mr. Garrido laid out a comprehensive approach to transit security. Senator Dodd asked about training, but 

I am asking a broader question. Is there any community in the 

United States that matches the model of Madrid and London, who 

are reacting to this violence already? They have internalized it, not 

just in training but in technology, in coordination, in the whole 

gamut. Can you cite one? 

Mr. MILLAR. Certainly New York City and the agencies there 

are, in my opinion, far ahead of many other places. Here in Washington, DC, a very good job has been done as well. But much, much 

more needs to be done. 

We agree with the model. It is what we aspire to do. But for all 

the reasons we have talked about today, it has not happened yet 

to the degree it should. But we agree. 

Ironically, the day that the terrible bombings occurred in Madrid, 

my Director of Safety happened to be in London, and Madrid officials were also in London because we were all trying to learn from 

one another. There has been very good international cooperation in 

sharing experiences, and I particularly want to thank my colleagues not only for coming today at your invitation, but for sharing their experiences. They have helped us develop a model so we 

know what needs to be done. Now we need to get about the business of funding and implementing. 

Senator REED. In other words, even our most advanced municipal 

metropolitan areas have not reached the level of sort of security 

that we see in London and Madrid. 

Mr. MILLAR. That is my opinion, yes, sir. 

Senator REED. And, Mr. George, we have talked about training. 

It is so essential. And I must say, because our hearings before, particularly after our incident on 9/11, because of the spontaneous actions of transit workers in New York City and in Washington, DC, 

many, many people were saved. The transit workers in Washington 

moved trains from the Pentagon, evacuated people, kept moving, 

and there were critical decisions made by New York transit workers—your members, I presume—who at the risk of their own lives 

either moved trains out or stopped trains of their own volition, not 

going to that subway station below the World Trade Center. 

But the point I think we have all said today is we cannot count 

on just spontaneous instincts and, you know, the wisdom of—we 

have got to instill that, and I think that is your position. 

Mr. GEORGE. That is correct, and I might add, one thing that 

goes unnoticed and that we are very proud of in the Amalgamated, 

we also moved 250,000 school children safely home in yellow buses 

that day, and it gets no notoriety, and that is fine. But those members returned from their homes in that split shift in a day and 

automatically on their own, without direction, went and picked 

27 

those kids up. They thought that was their primary duty. And the 

bridges were all closed, as we know, so they had a very difficult 

time. 

Chairman DODD. But Jack’s point is that was done by instinct. 

Mr. GEORGE. Instinct. 

Chairman DODD. That was not because someone had thought 

about this ahead of time. 

Mr. GEORGE. No, it was not. And I guess really what it—the 

training aspect of it, you know, we run very good transit systems 

in this country, and we run them with really good members, my 

members and employees. This is a new ingredient that has come 

into the fold that no one really knows. And I think the leadership 

of this Committee that has to put the mandates down, we do not 

have—we haven’t reached that area of expertise where we do work 

on—like they do in Madrid and they do in London. We are far from 

that area yet. We are going at it as novice, and we have to really 

go at it with a professional type of thing. And I think that is where 

it takes the funding, and I think it takes a mandate from the Federal Government with Homeland Security to say, look, this is an 

important thing. 

I might add, I know we are talking about public transit, but we 

have our over-the-road industry which I represent, and that, too, 

is very vulnerable at the time. And those over-the-road operators 

cannot afford to do the things that some of the public transit are 

doing right at this time with the limited amount of funding they 

have. 

So it is a great concern to my members. 

Senator REED. Well, I have a great deal of respect for your members. My great-grandfather and grandfather were transit workers 

in Providence, Rhode Island, starting on the horse cars and then 

going to the electric trolleys. 

Mr. GEORGE. Very good. 

Senator REED. So this is a genetic disposition on my part. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GEORGE. Thank you. 

Senator REED. A final question, and I think I have been told to 

relinquish my time. Both Mr. Garrido and Mr. O’Toole, if you could 

just tell us the three recommendations you would make. You know, 

what are the three top things you felt you had to do immediately 

either to get the system in shape or to respond to this attack? Mr. 

Garrido. 

Mr. ROJO GARRIDO. It is necessary to balance, to manage people 

and systems, both, in our opinion, necessary, in first place, of 

course, people but with the help of the technical system. The commitment for politics that fight against terrorism in the field of public transport because in this moment one of the main objectives for 

them. And if our citizens don’t feel well in our system, our cities, 

we don’t develop in a sustainable way. And to maintain safe transit 

system, it is essential for our cities today. These are our main suggestions. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Toole. 

28 

Mr. O’TOOLE. I would say the ability to not reward these people 

with chaos and fear, and that means, number one, you have got to 

bring the system back immediately. You cannot have any delay. 

The second thing is to allow that to happen, you have to have 

a plan so that you project this sense of control. 

And I would like to add, it is not just about training everyone, 

you run here and you run there. It is also about a comprehensive 

plan, and I would like to just give you two examples that you will 

be judged by. 

Senator REED. Please. 

Mr. O’TOOLE. Number one, every transit agency better know 

where they would and how they would set up a family and victim 

assistance center. You do not get a couple of days to think about 

this. These people come at you right away, and you will be judged 

on whether or not you have those kinds of facilities. 

The second thing is your employees in a situation like this confront things people are not supposed to see in everyday life, and 

the violence we see on movies and television is antiseptic compared 

to what they will confront. You saw some of those pictures. But we 

have people going into darkened tunnels with limbs spread all over 

and stepping on pieces of humans, and it is just—this sticks with 

people. So you better know how you are going to deliver a lot of 

counseling to these people. It is not enough to call them heroes the 

next day. They need help, and you have to be able to deliver it. And 

if you don’t know how you are going to deliver it, you are going to 

be judged very harshly on that as well. 

So you really need a group to sit down and think about an incident like this all the way through and divide up the various tasks. 

It is just about kind of projecting this whole plan to the community. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. That is great testimony. I was thinking of the 

importance of that and thinking in a holistic way about all of this. 

I noted the other day, picking up on Senator Reed’s point here 

about talking about Washington, DC, the control center for the 

Metro system in Washington, DC, is just a few blocks from the 

White House. And I know that there has been an effort over the 

past number of years to try and move that center out to one of the 

more suburban areas, one of the reasons being that if you faced a 

tragedy here in the city, you could end up not only with that tragedy on your hands, but also shutting down your entire Metro system, given the proximity to some of these targets that could be attractive to these people. 

So it really does need this thinking. They cannot get the funding 

for this, by the way. That has been the problem. There is no funding to move this. So you are faced with these kinds of dilemmas. 

And you said something, Mr. O’Toole, that I want to pick up on. 

Dan may remember this. We had a meeting in Fairfield County, at 

the University of Fairfield, in fact, about a year or so ago, where 

we just were talking not about specific transit systems but what 

would happen in Lower Fairfield County, which is a highly congested area, if we had an incident on Route 95, one of these major 

problems, whether it be an accident or something more manmade. 

How is everyone going to respond to this? What happens in our 

29 

hospitals? What happens in our schools? The first responder, as 

someone pointed out, is in this case transit and transit workers. If 

it is a building, it is the employees in that building. The first responders are the people who are on the site where the incident occurs. So to what extent have you thought really getting into this 

is how do we respond to it. 

And it was very revealing, even there sitting down, saying they 

had thought about it but never in a complete enough way. And I 

wonder if we have any sense of this about first responders, in addition to what we are doing with the transit workers and the employees involved in this situation, to what extent, asking Jack’s question again, has there been any thought beyond some isolated anecdotal cases, are we really working at this, even sitting down and 

talking about it? Forget about going to a drill. Are people sitting 

down someplace and saying what do you do and what do you do 

and what do you do? 

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, that is happening, and that is recognized, and 

that is one of the important lessons we have learned from around 

the world. So, yes, that type of comprehensive approach is worked 

through, and I would venture to say that in most major metropolitan areas, that basic level has been decided. But when you get past 

that top level is where we need more work. 

Chairman DODD. Again, I thank all of you for being here. I am 

going to turn to Senator Shelby. He has got another couple of questions here. But this is a top priority for this Committee. The reason 

we had this as our first hearing, I think Mr. O’Toole made the 

point, not only responding to get things back up, it is the mentality, it is the ripple effect beyond the actual event itself that can 

have huge implications. And you end up with a good percentage of 

your people not wanting to get back onto a system. Just imagine 

what effect that is in terms of just commerce, if that goes on for 

days what happens. 

So it is fear sometimes far beyond the actual event that these 

people are trying to create, and I think it is very important, the 

prosperity aspects of this beyond the incident itself are critically 

important for our discussion. And I am very much enthusiastic 

about Dick Shelby’s concepts and ideas, and this is where we are 

focusing on where the risks are. And I was thinking here, as the 

author of the FIRE Act and the FIRE grants, these monies have 

all gone directly to the communities involved, and it has made a 

huge difference just in terms of how well a dollar gets spent and 

what the priorities are, and it has worked very well. 

Mr. MALLOY. Senator, it is a far better model than the one that 

we are pursuing on a national basis today. That is the reality. This 

is what mayors have been saying. Clearly you have heard that 

from your fire departments from across the United States. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Shelby. 

Senator SHELBY. I will reserve any questions, but I do want to 

join you in thanking all of you for your concern, your involvement, 

and also for coming a long way, from London and Madrid, you two, 

to be with us today. We will continue to work on this. 

I think we cannot alleviate all the fear and all the risk, but we 

can cut out a lot of it, and we can reassure a lot of the traveling 

30 

public that we are meeting our responsibility, that is, if we can get 

our colleagues to join us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. You bet. I would just note in the Committee, 

because this would be my first day, I looked out in the audience 

and there is a fellow by the name of Jack Hargett who is in the 

audience. Jack Hargett goes back. I have known him almost all my 

life. He worked with my father up here in the U.S. Senate many, 

many years ago. So, Jack, it is good to see a familiar face, and 

someone who is deeply involved in these issues, I might point out 

as well. So thank you for being here. 

I think all of us, with all due respect to our domestic witnesses 

here, I cannot tell you, Mr. Garrido, how much we appreciate your 

being here. And it means a great deal, Mr. O’Toole. Thank you very 

much. 

Senator SHELBY. One other comment if you would recognize me. 

Chairman DODD. Yes. 

Senator SHELBY. I think I would be remiss if I didn’t recognize 

publicly the work that Senator Reed and Senator Allard have done 

in this area. I did not know it was genetic with Senator Reed, but 

he has worked hard in transit security and all aspects of this. And 

I wanted to publicly do that for the record. 

Chairman DODD. Well, very good. Again, thanks to all of you. 

We are going to keep the record open for members who may 

want to ask some questions. We will leave it open for about a week 

because we want to get right back to a markup if we can soon on 

this bill. We want to move things along. So there may be some additional questions that colleagues would like to raise with you, so 

we will leave that availability open, and we hope you could respond 

fairly quickly to some additional questions that may come up. 

Again, I thank all of you for being here today and I thank my 

colleagues. 

The Committee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared statements supplied for the record follow:] 

31 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD 

I would like to thank Chairman Dodd for convening today’s hearing on transit security. It is an appropriate topic to be the Committee’s first issue for consideration 

in the 110th Congress. 

Every single day in America, millions of people ride public transportation, and we 

all represent transit riders. Following the tragic attacks on public transportation 

systems around the world, we have all become acutely aware of the need to 

strengthen security for American transit. 

Yet, transit systems present a unique security challenge—the success and efficiency of public transportation is predicated on open access. The security approaches 

utilized in other modes, such as aviation, would destroy the viability of a transit 

system. 

There are ways in which the unique security needs of public transportation can 

be addressed. Although part of their expertise comes from unfortunate personal experience, Mr. Garrido and Mr. O’Toole can help us learn from the Madrid and London tragedies. I sincerely appreciate their willingness to appear here today to help 

us better understand this issue. 

In my previous capacity as Chairman of the Housing and Transportation Subcommittee, I was pleased to work with my counterpart from across the aisle, Senator Reed, along with our full committee leadership, Senator Shelby and former 

Senator Sarbanes, in drafting legislation to make America’s public transportation 

systems safer. I am confident that Chairman Dodd will continue the active interest 

of Senator Sarbanes. 

In particular, I was pleased that the grant allocations were to be based on security assessments conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). They 

are in the best position to identify risks and vulnerabilities, while factoring in relevant security information, in order to prioritize needs for grant allocation. This 

would ensure that the program is as efficient as possible in meeting transit security 

needs, rather than simply becoming another pork program. 

Although our bill passed the Senate on multiple occasions, it has yet to be enacted 

into law. I am hopeful that the committee will be able to move legislation quickly, 

and I look forward to working with my colleagues and Chairman Dodd to accomplish this goal. 

Although it is not in the Banking Committee’s jurisdiction, I wanted to take this 

opportunity to mention another bill which I believe will be very beneficial to transit 

security. At the beginning of the 110th Congress, I reintroduced legislation to expand the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium to include the Transportation 

Technology Center in Pueblo, CO. This unique facility enhances technology and 

training to prevent, minimize, and respond to potential terrorist attacks. I believe 

that it is an excellent complement to the legislation that has previously passed the 

Banking Committee, and I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting it. 

I regret that I will be unable to stay for this hearing due to another hearing in 

a different committee; however, I intend to carefully review the information from 

this hearing. This is an extremely important issue, and I thank the Chairman for 

making it such a high priority. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANNEL P. MALLOY 

MAYOR OF STAMFORD, CT, AND TRUSTEE, THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

JANUARY 18, 2007 

Thank you very much for inviting me to speak with you today on behalf of The 

United States Conference of Mayors regarding the state of transit security. The 

United States Conference of Mayors is the official nonpartisan organization of cities 

with populations of 30,000 or more. There are 1,139 such cities in the country today, 

each represented in the Conference by its chief elected official, the Mayor. 

On behalf of The United States Conference of Mayors, and the hundreds of mayors we represent, we appreciate your interest in public transportation security, and 

we look forward to working with you as you develop legislation to safeguard America’s bus, rail, and ferry systems. 

The written comments delivered this morning will focus on four key transit security areas identified by the mayors: 

1. The establishment of a flexible Federal transit security grant program. 

2. Securing public transportation systems is a Federal responsibility. 

3. Transit security funds should go directly to the transit authority or that jurisdiction providing security. 

32 

1APTA’s transportation security survey identified needed enhancements costing at least $5.2 

billion in additional capital funding to maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security 

functions to meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs for security 

personnel, training, technical support, and research and development have been identified, 

bringing total additional transit security funding needs to more than $6 billion. 2 Stamford is located on the main branch of the New Haven Line on the Metro-North Railroad, the commuter rail system for northern metropolitan New York City. Stamford Station is 

the last express station in the direction of New York City, and thus serves as a major transfer 

point for faster trains into New York City. Stamford Station is also the terminus of a MetroNorth branch line that ends in New Canaan, about 15 miles away and is also a major Amtrak 

station served by the high-speed Acela trains that run from Washington, DC, to Boston. Amtrak’s Regional and Vermonter service has linked Stamford with daily trains to Virginia, 

Vermont, and intermediate points. Bus service runs along major arterial roads as well as connecting the city with New York. 3 APTA announced on January 7, 2007, that public transportation ridership has increased by 

nearly 3 percent in the first 9 months of 2006, as Americans took 7.8 billion trips on public 

transit. 

4. Robust resources for transit-related security research and development of technology. 

Overview 

One month after September 11, the leadership of the Conference of Mayors called 

an emergency homeland security summit in Washington, DC, Hundreds of mayors, 

police, fire, emergency management, and transportation officials came to that summit and drafted a sweeping ‘‘National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities.’’ That National Action Plan was updated in October of 2005 with special 

emphasis on transit security following the attacks on London’s Underground Tube 

system, aboard London Transit Buses, and Madrid’s rail system. 

In addition, my comments delivered this morning originate from the Conference’s 

‘‘Strong Cities . . . Strong Families . . . For a Strong America’’ 10-Point Plan which 

will be presented next week at The United States Conference of Mayors 75th Winter 

Meeting in Washington, DC. 

The United States Conference of Mayors and its members have dedicated themselves to making America’s cities safer by preventing possible acts of terrorism, and 

being ready to respond should terrorists strike. 

Mayors have never waited for assistance from others to act. Mayors and cities 

continue to focus on protecting their citizens from possible terrorist attacks, including attacks on mass transit. At the same time, we must further strengthen our partnership with the Federal government to make sure that our ‘‘first preventers’’ and 

‘‘first responders’’ have the resources and training they need to succeed, and that 

all necessary Federal support is ready in the event of a catastrophic event. 

To this point, the nation’s mayors believe more must be done at the Federal level 

of government to make sure that our cities are able to respond to the growing challenges of securing public transportation infrastructure. As the American Public 

Transportation Association’s (APTA) survey identified, Congress has allocated only 

$386 million to transit security through Fiscal Year 2006, yet transit agencies have 

identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security investment needs. 1

We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. 

For the city of Stamford, CT, securing these wide open and vulnerable systems 

is a priority. As part of the New York metropolitan area, Stamford, a city of nearly 

127,000, is one of the largest cities on the route between New York and Boston. It 

is a major transportation hub for other communities in the State of Connecticut and 

is located on one of the busiest stretches of public transportation in the Nation. 2

Priorities for Enhanced Public Transportation Security 

With more than 7.8 billion trips taken nationwide on public transit in the first 

9 months of 2006, 3 protecting riders from potential terrorist attacks remains a high 

priority for mayors, public safety officials, and first responders. 

We believe that any public transportation security legislation should be guided by 

four principles. 

First, the Nation’s mayors are calling for the establishment of a flexible Federal 

transit security grant program to improve security in the areas of communications, 

surveillance, detection systems, personnel, training, and research. Specifically, this 

grant program should fund security cameras onboard public transportation vehicles 

and in bus and rail stations, video surveillance and threat detection cameras, increased surveillance via closed circuit TV, and automated bus and rail locator systems. As far as infrastructure expansion, modernization and rehabilitation, the 

grant program should fund permanent chemical, biological, and explosive detection 

systems, fencing and barriers, lighting, alarms and access control for tunnels, 

33 

4The United States Conference of Mayors 231-City/50-State 2004 Third Report to the Nation 

on Tracking Federal Homeland Security Funds showed that of the cities responsible for providing transit security, one-fourth of the cities reported that their State was exercising its option 

to keep a portion of the transit security funds to complement State assets at transit sites. 

bridges, interlockings, tracks, yards and facilities, redesign of infrastructure to 

eliminate hiding places, the life safety program in New York City, and to rehabilitate existing Baltimore and Washington, DC, tunnels. 

Second, as we have done with aviation, securing public transit is a Federal responsibility and should not require a local or State match. 

Third, mass transit security funds should go directly to the transit authority or 

the jurisdiction providing security. We must continue to make improvements in the 

grant application process and delivery mechanism for Federal Homeland Security 

resources to make sure that the funding quickly reaches the transit system’s first 

responders. 

Since the early days after September 11, 2001, the Nation’s mayors have expressed serious concern with the state-based system for coordinating preparedness 

and responses to acts of terrorism. 

Many mayors have positive working relationships with State and Federal partners, but there was a real concern from the beginning that a complex, Federal distribution system that involved various approval levels for first-responder resources 

and training would be slow and result in serious delays in funding reaching highthreat, high-risked populations and infrastructures, including mass transit. 

Unfortunately, the many surveys our organization conducted proved this to be the 

case. Time and time again, our surveys showed that resources were not reaching 

our cities and the critical infrastructure quickly.4

Fourth, there should be a robust and dedicated funding source for transit-related 

security research and development technology. Recognizing the threat posed to mass 

transit systems by acts of terrorism, mayors urge increased research and development to counter these growing challenges, both by improvements to current capabilities and development of new technologies. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby and Members of this Committee, let me 

make some closing comments. 

I know that our Nation has made significant progress on increasing homeland security since September 11, and that our Federal–local partnership is much stronger 

with more resources, better information sharing, and a greater level of general communication. 

But I fervently hope that the tragic attacks in India, the United Kingdom, Spain, 

and Israel serve as a reminder that we must not settle for ‘‘good enough.’’ These 

and other attacks dramatically highlight the vulnerability of mass transit worldwide 

to terrorism and the need for an increased focus by the Federal Government on security for these systems. 

We must recommit ourselves to doing all that we can to make sure our city and 

county citizens can get on that bus, step into that train, go to work, cheer at that 

sporting event, and just go about their daily lives knowing that everything that can 

be done is being done to make them safe from terror. 

I cannot over-emphasize the critical importance of public transportation to our 

local economies and the long-term vitality of our cities and the Nation. That is why 

we must invest in transportation security. 

We are all in this together. 

On behalf of the Nation’s mayors, The United States Conference of Mayors stands 

ready to work with this new Congress in a bi-partisan way to safeguard one of our 

Nation’s most critical infrastructures, public transportation. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I look forward to questions. 

EXHIBIT A 

THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

MAYORS’ 10-POINT PLAN

Strong Cities . . . Strong Families . . . For a Strong America 

1. Energy and Environmental Block Grant (Climate Change) 

Mayors from across the Nation, working through The U.S. Conference of Mayors, 

are leading the Nation in taking action on the critical issue of global warming. Local 

34 

governments are in a unique position to implement and coordinate local action that 

will lead to significant and real reductions in energy use and its impact on global 

warming. 

When our Federal Government refused to take action on the issue of Climate 

Change, over 350 cities pledged their commitment to the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement to call attention to the global warming crisis and to begin development of local programs to reduce carbon emissions. This community-based, grass 

roots effort is key to a successful national strategy to reduce our energy dependence, 

decrease carbon emissions, and improve the environment. 

The U.S. Conference of Mayors proposes creation of an Energy and Environmental 

Block Grant, modeled after the highly successful Community Development Block 

Grant, to provide funding directly to cities and urban counties for programs that 1) 

improve community energy efficiency; 2) develop and implement community strategies to reduce carbon emissions, including but not limited to achieving ‘‘carbon free’’ 

buildings by 2030; 3) develop and implement community and transportation energy 

conservation programs; 4) encourage the development of new technologies and systems to decrease our dependence on foreign oil; and 5) promotion and development 

of alternative/renewable energy sources. Funds could also be used to support local 

non-profit organizations to meet the objectives of the program. The Block Grant 

would be distributed under a formula based on population and other factors, modeled after CDBG, and include measurable objectives. 

Initial funding for the Block Grant could come from (in part or in whole) from 

revenues derived from the proposed repeal of the 2004 tax cuts for the oil and gas 

industry and royalty payment from off-shore oil and gas leases. 

Eligible activities under the Block Grant would include, but not be limited to, development of comprehensive energy, environment, and climate protection strategic 

plans, weatherization programs, energy efficiency audits, alternative fuel infrastructure, incentives for energy efficiency technologies, promotion of public transit, methane recovery programs, conversion of alternative fuel fleets, public education, 

brownfields redevelopment, land-use policies, etc. 

2. Federal–Local Partnership on Crime Prevention (Violent Crime Rising, 

Federal Resources Cut, Trust Fund Needed) 

For a growing number of cities across the United States, violent crime is accelerating at an alarming pace. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report for 2005 showed the 

largest single year percent increase in violent crime in 14 years. This trend continued in 2006 according to a Police Executive Research Forum survey of 55 law enforcement agencies, with many cities seeing double-digit increases in murder, assault, and robbery rates. 

Mayors and police chiefs have identified a number of contributing factors for this 

rise in crime including a growing culture of violence among youth, gangs, a proliferation of illegal guns, drug activity, the re-entry of ex-offenders, and social problems related to school truancy and a lack of jobs. Funding for major Department 

of Justice law enforcement programs has been slashed in recent years, with the 

COPS hiring program (once funded at almost $1.5 billion) and Local Law Enforcement Block Grant program (once funded at approximately $523 million) both being 

eliminated. 

To address these issues, the Nation’s mayors are calling for a new crime initiative 

to restore the Federal–local partnership on hometown security. As was done under 

the 1994 Crime Bill, mayors are calling for a Federal trust fund to provide flexible 

resources for the deployment of law enforcement personnel, support local innovations, fight domestic violence, and fund technology that helps fight crime. Specifically, funding for COPS and the local block grant should be restored, and mayors 

fully support strong accountability standards tied to these grants. In addition, resources are needed to help promote crime prevention and provide positive alternatives for youth, and address the need to provide alternatives for the more than 

600,000 ex-offenders who are coming back into cities each year. 

3. Community Development Block Grants (Successful Results, Threatened, 

Double Resources) 

For 32 years, the Community Development Block Grant program has served as 

a vital resource to help cities, counties, and States meet their unique community 

development, affordable housing, and economic development needs. Since its enactment in 1974, the program has been, and continues to be, a critical affordable housing and neighborhood revitalization tool for communities. While providing essential 

services to citizens nationwide, CDBG also improves local economies. According to 

HUD, in fiscal year 2004 alone, CDBG provided funds for thousands of activities, 

assisting over 23 million persons and households. CDBG funds a broad spectrum of 

35 

activities, including: expanding homeownership opportunities, elimination of slums 

and blight, improved infrastructure such as roads, water and sewer systems, libraries, fire stations, community centers, adult day care and after school care for children, homeless facilities, employment training, transportation services, crime awareness, business and job creation. In fact, according to HUD, more than 78,000 jobs 

were created by CDBG in fiscal year 2004 alone. 

But over the last several years, CDBG formula grants have been significantly reduced. The program was also targeted for elimination at HUD, and transferred to 

the Department of Commerce along with 17 other programs at a greatly reduced 

funding level. In fiscal year 2006, the program was cut by 10 percent, and in fiscal 

year 2005, the cut was 5 percent, resulting in a 15 percent cut in 2 years. A survey 

released in March, 2006, by the Conference of Mayors and 20 other organizations 

found that the reduced formula allocations has had a substantial negative effect on 

entitlement communities and States. 

The Nation’s mayors recommend that CDBG formula funding be doubled to $8 billion. This additional funding would address the delayed projects and activities which 

have come about because of cuts to CDBG, and further build on the proven record 

of an effective affordable housing and revitalization program. 

4. Affordable Housing Fund 

Last October, the House passed H.R. 1461, the ‘‘Federal Housing Finance Reform 

Act of 2006,’’ creating a strong, world-class regulator for the Government Sponsored 

Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The legislation would also create 

a new affordable housing fund with the GSEs contributing initially 3.5 percent increasing to 5 percent of their after-tax earnings for projects in underserved areas. 

The Nation’s mayors support an affordable housing fund to be administered by 

the GSEs, (not by HUD or State housing agencies) funded by at least 5 percent of 

their profits, with local government projects eligible to be assisted. 

5. Public Housing 

Operating Subsidies 

On December 28, HUD sent a memo to public housing agencies informing them 

that they would have to operate with 76 cents for every dollar needed for their operations. This memo, announcing a 24 percent cut, did not take into account an already existing problem: HUD’s budget request was $300 million or more below what 

the public housing agencies actually needed. When the Continuing Resolution expires on February 15, the situation could actually get worse with Congress holding 

spending to the fiscal year 2006 level. This would result in an even lower funding 

level for operating subsidies. 

The Nation’s mayors support restoration of all public housing operating subsidies 

in fiscal year 2007, including funding that was not part of the budget request but 

that is now needed because of utility costs previously not anticipated. 

HOPE VI 

HOPE VI for severely distressed public housing has been targeted for elimination 

over the past several years, but has survived through nominal congressional appropriations. The Nation’s mayors support the restoration of HOPE VI to a funding 

level that returns the program to an effective national tool for public housing development. 

6. Infrastructure Tax Incentives and Bonds (Transportation, Water, Wastewater, Brownfields, Energy, Telecommunications, Schools, Affordable 

Housing) 

Congested highways, crowded schools, transit demand exceeding resources, aging 

water facilities, and a crumbling energy infrastructure are urgent reminders of the 

infrastructure crisis that is jeopardizing America’s prosperity. From transit to energy, this critical infrastructure has been neglected for far too long by the Federal 

Government and it is now deteriorating at an alarming rate. And, according to the 

American Society of Civil Engineers’ 2005 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, 

the Nation’s overall infrastructure received a D grade with the Report Card calling 

for $1.6 trillion to alleviate our Nation’s infrastructure needs. 

To address this growing infrastructure threat, the Nation’s mayors are calling for 

tax incentives, bonds, and other measures to support local and State efforts, and 

stimulate private sector participation, to improve infrastructure including transportation, water, wastewater, brownfields, energy, telecommunications, schools, and affordable housing options in America’s cities. These tax incentives and bonds would 

help create hundreds of thousands of family-wage jobs and revitalize our critical infrastructure across the country at the same time. 

36 

7. Competitive Workforce 

In this time of global competition, America’s economic health depends on the development of a skilled workforce with the knowledge and ability to adapt to an everchanging economy. Baby boomers are retiring at increasing rates, and the next generation of workers does not have the required post-secondary degree attainment nor 

the necessary technical skills to replace them. More importantly, and more alarmingly, our emerging workforce is increasingly disconnected from educational pathways and the world of work. High school dropout rates in some cities are as high 

as 50 percent, and the youth unemployment rate is at its highest level in decades. 

The U.S. Conference of Mayors believes that it is crucial to support a sustained 

commitment to local workforce development programs that produce measurable results to ensure our continued competitiveness in the 21st century global economy. 

As such, the Nation’s mayors call for timely reauthorization of the Workforce Investment Act, and full funding of its programs to ensure a significant investment in lifelong learning for every American citizen. In addition, resources are needed to help 

train and provide employment opportunities for the more than 600,000 ex-offenders 

who are coming back into cities every year. 

8. Children and Youth 

No Child Left Behind 

Mayors know that better schools make better cities. As they work to more effectively align city policies and programs that affect children and families, mayors are 

taking on an increasingly stronger leadership role on issues related to public 

schools. As such, it is critical that mayors be involved in every aspect of No Child 

Left Behind reauthorization, including discussions on full funding, teacher quality, 

performance standards, testing and evaluation, and methods of assessment and accountability. 

Children’s Health Insurance 

Mayors recognize that student achievement is inextricably linked to early childhood programs, health and nutrition, social service supports and parental involvement. As such, it is crucial that funding for programs such as Head Start, Early 

Head Start, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) be increased 

to their full authorization levels. 

Summer Youth 

And, to further address these issues, the Nation’s mayors are calling for a new 

summer youth employment initiative to provide funding directly to cities and urban 

counties for programs that 1) offer educational work experiences that provide linkage between job skills and classroom learning standards; 2) provide skills training 

and education strategies to young people as part of a local workforce development 

system that aligns with the labor market demands of local economies; and 3) establish opportunities for skills development and career exposure to young people. 

After-School Youth 

Mayors also call for an increased funding commitment directly allocated to cities 

for quality after-school programs. Most specifically, it is crucial to strengthen and 

fully fund the 21st Century Learning Centers and other after-school programming. 

9. Homeland Security (9/11 Commission Recommendations Not Completed) 

While significant progress has been made on homeland security since 9/11, more 

can and should be done to make sure that our Nation’s first responders are prepared to prevent, respond and recover from either attacks or natural disasters. We 

must continue the emphasis on key issues related to airport, port, rail, transit, and 

border security. 

Interoperable Communications 

First, a major concern is the limited funding to assist cities and their first responders to achieve full communications interoperability. The Office of Management 

and Budget estimated interoperability solutions would cost more than $15 billion, 

but since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has only awarded $2.9 billion 

in funding for State and local interoperable communications efforts. The Nation’s 

mayors are calling on a well-funded, stand-alone, Federal emergency communications grant program to carry out initiatives to improve interoperable communications, including flexible direct grants to cities and their first responders. 

Transit Security 

Second, with more than 7.8 billion trips taken on public transit in the first 9 

months of 2006, securing this critical infrastructure and protecting riders from terVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:34 Mar 30, 2009 Jkt 048080 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 S:\DOCS\0118.TXT JASON
37 

rorist attacks must be a major priority. Congress has allocated only $386 million 

to transit security through Fiscal Year 2006, yet according to the American Public 

Transportation Association, transit agencies have identified $6 billion in security 

needs. The Nation’s mayors are calling for a flexible Federal transit security initiative to improve security in the areas of communications, surveillance, detection systems, personnel, and training. As we have done with aviation, securing public transit is a Federal responsibility and should not require a local or State match. Furthermore, security funds should go directly to the operator of that system or the jurisdiction providing the security. 

Funding Mechanism 

Third, we must continue to make improvements in the grant application process 

and delivery mechanism for Federal Homeland Security resources to make sure that 

the process is user friendly, the funding quickly reaches cities, and that funding is 

flexible to meet local needs. 

10. Unfunded Mandates/Preemptions 

The passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 was a positive step 

toward restricting the ability of Congress to impose new, costly unfunded mandates 

on State and local governments, or preempt their ability to fund critical local programs. However, the issue of unfunded Federal mandates remains a major problem. 

For example, Members of Congress continue to propose legislation that would preempt local governments in areas such as internet access fee collection and wireless 

telecommunications services. 

Therefore, mayors call for new legislation to strengthen the Federal–local partnership and further restrict the ability of Congress to impose unfunded Federal mandates or preempt local authority. 

EXHIBIT B 

THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

2005 NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON SAFETY AND SECURITY IN AMERICA’S CITIES

(WORKING PAPER OF 10/24/05) 

Overview 

One month after the attacks of September 11, 2001, The United States Conference 

of Mayors brought together mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, and emergency services/health care leaders for a Summit in Washington, DC. That Summit resulted in 

the release of A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities 

focused on transportation security, emergency preparedness and Federal-local law 

enforcement—which has guided the Conference of Mayors’ advocacy efforts for the 

last 4 years. 

Upon assuming the Presidency of The U.S. Conference of Mayors in June of 2005, 

Long Beach Mayor Beverly O’Neill charged the Conference’s relevant standing committees and task forces—including the Criminal and Social Justice Committee, the 

Transportation and Communications Committee, the Homeland Security Task 

Force, and the Mayors and Police Chiefs Task Force—to review the progress that 

has been made on the National Action Plan and make recommendation on needed 

refinements and new priorities. 

This effort became more urgent following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that devastated cities in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and then Texas. As Mayor O’Neill 

and the Conference learned firsthand during a mission to the New Orleans/Baton 

Rouge/Gulf Coast area on September 15–16 to meet with New Orleans Mayor Ray 

Nagin and dozens of other impacted mayors, additional changes are needed in the 

Federal–local partnership on disaster preparedness and response. 

The discussion on these updated priorities began on September 23–24 during the 

Conference’s Fall Leadership Meeting in Long Beach, and culminated in an emergency meeting in Washington, DC, on October 23–24 of key mayors and local public 

safety personnel. Following are key recommendations and priorities that have 

emerged from these discussions in five areas: 

I. Fixing the FEMA Disaster Response System 

II. Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery 

III. Communications Interoperability 

IV. Enhanced Transportation Security 

V. First Responder Funding—A Better Distribution System Is Needed 

38 

These recommendations will be carried to Congress and the Administration, and 

will be further discussed and refined during the 74th Winter Meeting of The U.S. 

Conference of Mayors to be held in Washington, DC, on January 25–27, 2006. 

I. Fixing the FEMA Disaster Response System 

Mayors and local police, fire and emergency medical services personnel are America’s true first responders to any disaster, whether natural or man-made. 

Mayoral concerns with the state control on homeland security and disaster preparedness and response relate to what mayors experienced during Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. 

Mayors recognize the important role of FEMA, the states, and the National Guard 

in responding to disasters. But as the Conference of Mayors learned from its mission 

to the Gulf Coast area following Hurricane Katrina, the fact is that aid did not come 

in time. 

For example, in the early days of response to Hurricane Katrina, mayors were 

told by DHS that all offers of assistance to the impacted area had to be made 

through their states, and that these offers would then be coordinated through the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC, system. 

For some cities this seemed to have worked. But others found this system very 

slow to respond, and were forced to self-deploy first responder and other resources 

to the area. Mayors do not like to watch television for days after a disaster and see 

areas that reporters can get to, but seemingly no Federal resources, and then be 

told that they cannot send help. 

Virtually every municipality has entered into ‘‘mutual aid’’ or ‘‘inter-local’’ agreements for first responder activities, debris removal, etc. However, as was seen with 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, such agreements were rendered useless as almost all 

municipalities in the respective target region required full deployment of their personnel and assets. What should be explored is the ability of municipalities to enter 

into such ‘‘mutual aid’’ agreements with other cities/metro areas with geographic 

dispersion to enable regions to provide ‘‘real time’’ assistance and aid to the target 

region. 

In addition to the issue of disaster response, there are many questions that continue to be raised by cities regarding disaster recovery assistance, such as housing 

and reimbursement policies. We were pleased that Congress recently approved $750 

million in loans for hurricane hit cities, which was a major priority for our organization following our mission to the New Orleans/Baton Rouge/Gulf Coast area. However, we were outraged that Congress adopted language that would—for the first 

time—prohibit these loans from being forgivable by FEMA, even if local conditions 

necessitate. 

Therefore: 

• Congress and the Administration should implement a more focused process to 

work directly with mayors and first responders to review and make changes to 

the national disaster preparedness and recovery process. 

• Congress must reverse its decision to make loans to cities hard hit by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, under the Disaster Assistance Loan Program, non-forgivable. 

• Congress and the Administration should work with The U.S. Conference of 

Mayors to authorize a mechanism that would allow city-to-city mutual aid 

agreements to trigger reimbursement procedures and liability protection under 

the Stafford Act during an emergency. 

• The Federal Government should utilize untapped resources through the development of specialized ‘‘go-teams’’ to respond to major events who could be the 

liaisons with local mayors, EMS, police and fire departments (at the executive 

level) to assist in the response of FEMA and other Federal assets. 

• The Federal Government should support funding for training on an all-hazards 

approach by allowing local jurisdictions the flexibility to quickly adapt and meet 

local needs, we will be better prepared to respond to natural disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as terrorist attacks we hope won’t come. 

• Congress and the Administration must work with mayors to better define Federal reimbursement and other policies related to housing, transportation, and 

health and human services for evacuees from disasters—and how these policies 

are coordinated across Federal agencies. 

39 

II. Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery 

The use of military armed forces to support civilian response is conditioned by certain legal restrictions that define their possible activities. The military is precluded, 

except under certain circumstances, from conducting law enforcement operations in 

civilian setting under the Posse Comitatus Act. 

More recently, the Stafford Act has broadened the military’s role in civil support. 

Under the Stafford Act, the military may engage in: 

• Debris removal and road clearance • Search and rescue (EMS) • Sheltering and feeding • Public information • Providing advice to local government on disaster and health/safety issues 

Under the Stafford Act the military may not engage in: 

• Traffic control • Security at non-Federal facilities • Patrolling civilian neighborhoods except to provide humanitarian relief 

Clearly, there are events of a certain nature that require immediate military 

intervention and/or pre-staging. For example: 

• The detonation of a nuclear device, such as a suitcase nuclear device, would be 

expected to render the local and state government incapable of mounting adequate disaster response. 

• Widespread biological attack or disease outbreak would require national command and control measures be implemented. 

• Mega-catastrophes such as Katrina and Rita that could be reasonably anticipated to overwhelm local and state response capabilities. 

The military can also offer expertise in many areas that support disaster relief: 

• Ability to mobilize large numbers of self-sufficient personnel. 

• Advanced logistical operations support. 

• Experience with command and control methodologies just now being implemented at the local level via NIMS. 

• Capability to provide mass feeding, water, shelters and other support to disaster victims. 

• Easily move across political boundaries. 

• Provide specialized equipment and trained personnel to address incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) 

agents. 

• Re-establish critical infrastructure including communications and mass care. 

The current legal paradigm is that the military is viewed as the ‘‘resource of last 

resort’’ deployed to restore order. However, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have given 

us reason to re-evaluate this paradigm. Because of the sheer magnitude of the hurricane events recently experienced, and because acts of terrorism may spring up 

during or in the wake of such natural disasters, it is advantageous to consider an 

increased role for the military in disaster response. 

Immediately after a storm occurs is the time when the military is most needed, 

not to take over the duty or responsibility of a mayor or a Governor or a county 

commissioner—not to impose by itself martial law or make police power decisions. 

Those decisions, of course, must still be the province of elected officials. But what 

the military has is the skills, the experience, the training, the duty, responsibility 

to help restore order after there has been a disaster, and to marshal the equipment, 

training and manpower to put things back together because they have to do that 

in a time of war. 

Therefore: 

• The Federal Government should allow for greater military involvement in the 

immediate response to such overwhelming disasters, at the very least during 

the first days and weeks of response and when requested by local or state governments. 

• Cities need a mechanism to request direct assistance in form of military assets 

during a major natural disaster or terrorist attack. It is too cumbersome for cities to have to go through the state apparatus. 

• The Federal Government should identify a lead military agency to work directly 

with local governments on the deployment of Federal resources needed immediately prior to and after a disaster. 

40 

III. Communications Interoperability 

Major incidents, whether the 9/11 attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or tornadoes or floods, repeatedly show the criticality of 

first responder communications. 

Interoperable Communications 

A major concern related to communications interoperability is the limited access 

to spectrum for public safety. The limited availability of spectrum continues to force 

first responders to operate on several different and incompatible and congested voice 

channels. This continues to be identified by mayors and their first responders as an 

obstacle to achieving full interoperability—as identified in the Conference’s 2004 

Interoperable Communications Survey of 192 cities. 

For example, in our survey: 

• Of the cities with a major chemical plant, 97 percent reported that they did not 

have interoperable capability between the chemical plant, police, fire and emergency medical services. • 60 percent of the cities reported that they did not have interoperable capability 

with state emergency operations centers. • 75 percent of the cities said that limited funding was preventing achieving full 

interoperable capability. 

It is essential to have access to this spectrum to enable deployment of advanced 

mobile technologies such as images and video to police, fire and other emergency 

responders. A major barrier to public safety interoperability is cost. The Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) estimated interoperability solutions would cost 

more than $15 billion. 

According to the Conference’s 2004 survey on interoperable communications: 

• Cities under 100,000 reported an average of $4.7 million in funding is needed 

to achieve full interoperability. 

• Cities of 100,001 to 400,000 require approximately $5.4 million to achieve full 

interoperability. 

• Cities over 400,001 reported an average of $30 million is needed to achieve full 

interoperability. 

Therefore: 

• Congress must make expansion of the communications spectrum for public safety a Congressional priority by establishing a firm date for the transition of analog broadcast to digital as close to December 31, 2006, as possible. 

• Congress should provide urgent funding to assist cities and their first responders achieve full interoperability. 

• Congress and the Administration should require cellular, VOIP and other advance telecommunications to provide 911, reverse 911 (preemptive) and other 

emergency communications. 

• Congress and the Administration should provide the funding and infrastructure 

support for emergency first responder redundant telecommunications systems. 

• Congress and the Administration should work with the military to provide redundant telecommunications communications systems for first responders during emergencies. 

3-1-1 Communications 

The U.S. Conference of Mayors recognized in December 2001 in ‘‘A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities’’ that in the event of a terrorist 

attack using weapons of mass destruction a city’s 9-1-1 system could be quickly 

overwhelmed and, therefore, 3-1-1 systems should be put in place to handle the 

large volumes of incoming calls from citizens. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Authorized Equipment List currently includes under the Terrorism Incident Prevention Equipment category items such as 

data collection and information gathering software, alert/notification systems and 

hardware/software that allow for information exchange and dissemination; and 

under the Interoperable Communications Equipment category includes public notification and warning systems and computer-aided dispatch systems; and under the 

Information Technology category includes tracking and accountability systems. 

3-1-1 systems can facilitate post-incident recovery efforts by tracking damage assessment and providing a detailed accounting of clean-up efforts that is required for 

Federal or state assistance. Unfortunately, DHS recently ruled in a letter to the 

Conference of Mayors that 3-1-1 systems are not eligible under first responder funding because, ‘‘they are not specifically devoted to non-emergency situations and are 

41 

not related to the inherent homeland security mission of the Department of Homeland Security.’’ However, mayors strongly believe that dual use of homeland security 

equipment is essential for homeland security and fiscal responsibility. 

Therefore: 

• Congress and the Administration must clarify that 3-1-1 systems are an allowable cost under its homeland security grant programs and to make explicit reference to 3-1-1 systems in the Authorized Equipment List. 

IV. Enhanced Transportation Security 

Public Transportation: Bus and Rail 

With more than 9.6 billion trips logged on the Nation’s public transportation systems in 2004, securing this critical infrastructure and protecting riders from potential terrorist attacks rank as a high priority. 

Despite the fact that Americans use public transportation 32 million times each 

weekday, and with the growing number of terror attacks on bus and rail systems 

worldwide, such as the attacks this summer in London killing more than 50, and 

last year in Madrid killing 191 and Moscow killing 41, since 9/11, bus and rail public transportation have received only $400 million in Federal security grants. By 

contrast, in 2004, transit agencies identified $6 billion in security needs, including 

$5.2 billion in capital and $800 million in operating. 

Therefore: 

• Congress and the Administration should fund deployment of security and communications technologies including: 

• Voice and video interoperable communication systems; 

• Security cameras onboard public transportation vehicles and in bus and rail 

stations; 

• Video surveillance and threat detection cameras; 

• Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV; and 

• Automated bus and rail locator systems. 

• Congress and the Administration should fund security infrastructure expansion, 

modernization and rehabilitation including: 

• Permanent chemical, biological and explosive detection systems; 

• Fencing and barriers, lighting, alarms and access control for tunnels, 

bridges, interlockings, track, yards, and facilities; 

• Redesign of infrastructure to eliminate hiding places; and 

• The life safety program in New York City and to rehabilitate existing Baltimore and Washington, DC, tunnels. 

• Congress and the Administration should clarify that Federal public transportation security funding can be used for extra personnel during heightened alert 

levels, payment for overtime costs, reassignment of law enforcement officers and 

increased training for security personnel. 

• Congress and the Administration should provide flexible funding of at least $6 

billion, $2 billion per year over a 3-year period, to safeguard the nation’s bus 

and rail critical infrastructure. 

Port Security 

Not enough is being done about security at our Nation’s ports. Ports remain exposed to large-scale acts of terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction or 

other dangerous materials. For example, according to the Government Accountability Office in a May 2005 report, only 17.5 percent of containers deemed ‘‘high 

risks’’ were being inspected. 

A terrorist act involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons at 

one of these seaports could result in extensive loss of lives, property, and business; 

affect the operations of harbors and the transportation infrastructure (bridges, railroads, and highways) within the port limits; cause extensive environmental damage; 

and disrupt the free flow of trade. Port security remains largely under-funded at the 

Federal level. Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security Port Security 

Grant Program has provided $882 million for seaports. In contrast, the U.S. Coast 

Guard has estimated that ports would have to spend $5.4 billion over 10 years to 

meet Federal mandated port security enhancements. That’s on top of the more than 

$3 billion ports have to spend already annually on infrastructure improvements and 

operations, maintenance and personnel expenses just to keep pace with world trade. 

42 

Therefore: 

• Congress and the Administration should provide full and flexible funding for 

port security needs including: 

• Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Detection and Prevention Systems; 

• Video Surveillance and Threat Detection Cameras; 

• Fiber Optic Communications Connectivity; 

• Access control communications; 

• Command and control facilities; and 

• Personnel and detection dogs for screening and checking cargo and passengers. 

• Congress and the Administration should provide a Federal funding mechanism 

to sustain the significant annual operating costs for the reoccurring maintenance of the new security systems and security personnel salaries that have not 

yet been identified. 

• Congress and the Administration should direct the Department of Homeland 

Security to issue Letters of Intent for multi-year funding to ports with plans 

to carry out long-term security improvements. 

Freight Rail 

Each day hundreds of thousands of shipments of extremely hazardous materials 

such as chlorine, ammonia, phosphoric acid, and molten sulfur travel through the 

hearts of our cities and near critical infrastructure. A major break of a single tanker 

of hazardous materials can result in mass casualties. 

The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance notification for hazardous 

freight rail. Mayors recognize that there are sensitive issues that need to be addressed, such as concern that terrorists might also mistakenly gain access to such 

information, and the freight rail carriers are apprehensive about sharing their client’s proprietary commercial information. We want to work with Congress and the 

Administration to address these issues so a system of advance notification can be 

implemented. 

Therefore: 

• Congress and the Administration should direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Transportation to conduct an assessment of freight railroad notification procedures for the transport of hazardous 

materials through local jurisdictions. 

• Congress and the Administration should direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Transportation to establish a coordinated system for notifying appropriate local first responders of the transportation of rail hazardous materials through local jurisdictions, including a rail 

carrier’s comprehensive list of all hazardous materials scheduled to be transported. 

• Congress and the Administration should direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Transportation to work with railroad 

operators to increase physical security measures surrounding shipments and 

storage of hazardous materials, with such increases to include the number of 

hazardous materials inspectors employed by the Federal Railroad Administration, lighting fencing, alarms and access control for tunnels, bridges, 

interlockings, tracks, yards, and facilities. 

Airport Security 

Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which 

use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, 

and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect 

traces of explosive material vapors or residues. 

TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the 

nation’s more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA placed standalone ETD and the 

minivan-sized EDS machines—mainly in airport lobbies—that were not integrated 

in line with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency’s 

ability to initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs. 

43 

Therefore: 

• Congress and the Administration should significantly increase funding and reimburse airports at the statutorily authorized Federal share for in-line baggage 

and cargo screening system and airport facility expansion to accommodate inline systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce screening costs, 

and enhance security. 

• The U.S. Conference of Mayors reaffirms our policy calling for a fully Federalized workforce at points of passenger, baggage, and cargo inspections. 

V. First Responder Funding—A Better Distribution System Is Needed 

Since the early days after September 11, 2001, there was serious concern that an 

over-reliance by the Federal Government on a multi-layered, state-based distribution system for first responder resources and training, which then often is further 

channeled through counties, would be slow and result in delays in funding reaching 

high-threat, high-risk population cities. 

Unfortunately, the many surveys the Conference of Mayors conducted proved this 

to be the case. Time and time again, these surveys have showed that money was 

not reaching cities quickly, and when it did reach cities, it often came with Federal 

restrictions and rules that made it very difficult to spend on what was needed most, 

such as limitations on the use of overtime. 

By raising concern on this issue through the release of our studies, we were able 

to get support from President George W. Bush and former Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Secretary Tom Ridge to examine why money was ‘‘stuck’’ in many 

States. The special DHS task force created to work on this effort came up with a 

number of helpful recommendations, some of which, like a waiver from the Cash 

Management Act, have been implemented for new funding. Some additional flexibility for the use of overtime, especially for the larger cities, has also been provided. 

But the DHS task force was not allowed to even consider the issue of direct funding 

for cities. 

Congress did create a new high-threat urban areas program, called UASI (Urban 

Area Security Initiative), which ensures that some of the bigger metro areas get 

funding, but this funding is still sent through the States. And, major changes to the 

current state-based system still have not been made. 

Now, Congress is using the fact that because previous money they have appropriated is not being spent fast enough—as mayors predicted—it is now acceptable 

to cut funding. Over the last 2 years, funding has been cut by more than a billion 

dollars. 

And, the Administration and Congress have been slashing funding for key law enforcement programs like COPS and the local law enforcement block grant since 9/ 

11. Their stated argument was that cities would be getting funding from Homeland 

Security, so did not need it for law enforcement programs. But, Homeland Security 

funding cannot be used to put officers on the streets like COPS can, and the eyes 

and ears of officers on the streets can be the best defense against acts of terrorism. 

Mayors strongly support regional cooperation, and have been working across city 

boundaries to enhance mutual aid agreements and develop new concepts such as regional logistics centers for the management and deployment of resources. However, 

mayors believe that a slow, complicated, and multi-layered distribution system for 

Federal resources is not necessary, and in fact counterproductive, for fostering regional cooperation. 

Therefore: 

• Congress should increase, not decrease, funding for key first responder grant 

programs. 

• Authorizing legislation should ensure that the waiver of the Cash Management 

Act, approved by Congress for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, is made permanent, 

and made retroactive for fiscal years prior to 2005. 

• Congress and the Administration should support the establishment of regional 

logistics centers, not only those previously established under the Pre-Positioned 

Equipment Program within ODP, but also additional capabilities to be established under regional control, to help consolidate State and local assets, provide 

life-cycle management and maintenance of equipment, allow for easy identification and rapid deployment during an incident, and allow for the sharing of inventories across jurisdictions. 

• Congress should work with the Conference of Mayors to make other refinements 

needed to the first responder program. 

• Congress should restore funding for key law enforcement/homeland security 

programs like COPS and the Justice Assistance Grant program, and allow DeVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:34 Mar 30, 2009 Jkt 048080 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 S:\DOCS\0118.TXT JASON
44 

partment of Homeland Security first responder funding to be used for hiring 

and overtime for police, fire, and EMS personnel. 

• Congress should amend the current state-based system for distribution of Federal first responder assistance to provide a significant portion of the funding directly to cities and local areas. 

EXHIBIT C 

ENHANCED TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

Whereas, the issue of public transportation security is a vitalcomponent of every 

community; and 

Whereas, public transportation security in the U.S. must be maintained on the rails, 

highway and waterways; and 

Whereas, mayors are owners and/or operators of many of the major public transportation facilities and systems in the Nation and securing these systems and protecting users from potential terrorist activity is a high priority; and 

Whereas, with more than 9.7 billion trips logged on the nation’s public transportation systems in 2005, with public transportation growing at a faster rate than 

highway travel, securing this critical infrastructure and protecting riders from 

potential terrorist attacks rank as high priorities; and 

Whereas, despite the fact that public transportation is growing faster than any other 

mode of transportation, and with growing number of terror attacks on bus and 

rail systems worldwide, such as the London attacks in 2005 killing more than 

50, and in 2004 in Madrid killing 191 and in Moscow killing 41, since 9/11, bus 

and rail public transportation have received only $545 million in Federal security grants; and 

Whereas, by contrast, in 2004, transit agencies identified $6 billion in security 

needs, including $5.2 billion in capital and $800 million in operating; and 

Whereas, transit authorities have significant and specific transit security needs: 

• Based on the American Public Transportation Association’s 2003 Infrastructure 

Database survey, over 2,000 rail stations do not have security cameras; 

• According to our 2005 Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars, and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras; 

• Fewer than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems (AVLs) 

that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus when an emergency occurs; 

• Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack these AVLs; 

• Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological detection system; 

and 

• Only two transit authorities have a permanent chemical detection system; and 

Whereas, public transportation requires state-of-the-art technology (that is currently 

in the research and development stage) to detect and/or neutralize potential 

chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear attacks at our stations, on board 

our trains and buses, as well as throughout our nation’s mass transit infrastructure; and 

Whereas, such technologies must be able to interface with existing technologies and 

work effectively under the open system that mass transit operates under today; 

and 

Whereas, further, research and development can also address the rising operating 

costs associated with added security personnel; and 

Whereas, an investment in public transportation security programs, resources and 

infrastructure, provides a direct benefit in preparation and response to natural 

disasters, 

Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors urges 

the Administration and Congress to provide at least $560 million in the FY07 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill for transit security grants 

to assist public transportation systems to continue to address the$6 billion in 

security needs identified by transit agencies; and 

Be It Further Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors urges the Administration and Congress to support a robust and dedicated funding source for 

transit-related research and development technology; and 

Be It Further Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors urges the Administration and Congress to fund deployment of security and communications 

technologies including: 

• Voice and video interoperable communication systems; 

45 

• Security cameras on board public transportation vehicles and in bus and rail 

stations; • Video surveillance and threat detection cameras; • Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV; and • Automated bus and rail locator systems; and 

Be It Further Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors urges the Administration and Congress to fund security infrastructure expansion, modernization and rehabilitation including: 

• Permanent chemical, biological, and explosive detection systems; • Fencing and barriers, lighting, alarms and access control for tunnels, bridges, 

interlockings, track, yards, and facilities; • Redesign of infrastructure to eliminate hiding places; and • The life safety program in New York City and to rehabilitate existing Baltimore 

and Washington, DC, tunnels. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR 

PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

JANUARY 18, 2007 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony to the Senate 

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the security and safety of 

public transportation systems. We appreciate your interest in public transportation 

security, and we look forward to working with you. 

About APTA 

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a nonprofit international association of more than 1,500 public and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction, 

and finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and state departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public 

interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services and products. 

More than 90 percent of the people using public transportation in the United States 

and Canada are served by APTA member systems. 

Overview 

Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of the Nation’s critical infrastructures. 

We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of the service we provide in communities throughout the country. Americans take more than 9.7 billion transit trips 

each year. People use public transportation vehicles over 33 million each weekday. 

This is more than sixteen times the number of daily boardings on the Nation’s domestic airlines. 

In particular, we want to recognize and thank this committee for its leadership 

in advancing legislation that enhances the Federal role in protecting transit users 

against terrorism. The Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee has unanimously approved transit security bills in each of the last two Congresses, both of 

which also passed the Senate unanimously, and its leadership led the successful effort in the Senate to amend the port security bill last year to include a transit security authorization. We appreciate the Committee’s decision to make transit security 

a priority in the new Congress, and the work you have done with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and other committees with 

jurisdiction over homeland security. 

Safety and security are the top priority of the public transportation industry. The 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report several years ago which 

said ‘‘about one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, 

and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked.’’ Transit systems took 

many steps to improve security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts 

since then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United States 

have spent over $2.5 billion on security and emergency preparedness programs, and 

technology to support these programs, from their own budgets with only minimal 

federal funding. Last year’s attacks in Mumbai and the previous attacks in London 

and Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen security on public transit systems in the United States and to do so without delay. We need to do what we can 

to prevent the kind of attacks that caused more than 400 deaths and nearly 3,000 

injuries on rail systems in Mumbai, London, and Madrid. 

We urge Congress to act decisively. While transit systems are doing their part, 

we need the Federal Government to be a full partner in the fight against terrorism. 

46 

Terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens are clearly a Federal responsibility and the 

Federal Government needs to increase spending on transit security. In light of the 

documented needs, we urge Congress to increase Federal support for transit security 

grants to assist transit systems in addressing the $6 billion in identified transit security needs. Last year, we asked Congress to provide no less than $545 million in 

the Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Funding at that level annually would 

allow for dramatic improvement in security for the Nation’s transit users over a 10- 

year period. Federal funding for additional security needs should provide for both 

hard and soft costs as described below and be separate from investments in the Federal transit capital program. 

We also urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can in turn provide that amount in grant funding to the 

APTA security standards program which includes participation with our Federal 

partners to assist with the development of transit security standards. In addition, 

we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit 

Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC). 

With regard to improving the distribution of funds under the existing transit security programs, we recommend that the existing process for distributing DHS grants 

be modified so that funds are made directly to transit authorities, rather than 

through State Administrating Agencies (SAA). We believe direct funding to the transit agencies would be quicker and cheaper. The current process and grant approval 

procedures have created significant barriers and time delays in getting funds into 

the hands of transit agencies and thus productively used. 

As transit security is part of the larger war on terrorism, Federal funding for 

transit security grants should be provided with no state or local match requirement. 

The requirement of a local or state match would have detrimental consequences that 

would create a scenario of disparity that ensures stronger security only to regions 

with available local funding. A local match would require the approval of a local 

governing body. This approval would not be possible to obtain under the current 

DHS transit security structure, which does not allow transit providers to anticipate 

their funding levels or know what projects will be funded. Once the project to be 

funded is identified, the local governing body would need to approve funding in an 

open, public forum, where specific project information would be discussed. This 

would be problematic for security sensitive projects. 

Background 

In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine what actions they needed to take to improve security for their customers, employees, and 

facilities. In response to the survey, transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security investment needs. State and local governments and transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it 

is important that the Federal Government be a full partner in the effort to ensure 

the security of the Nation’s transit users. 

In FY 2003, $65 million in federal funds was allocated for transit systems by DHS 

for 20 transit systems. In FY 2004, $50 million was allocated by DHS for 30 transit 

systems. In FY 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150 million for transit, 

passenger and freight rail security. Out of the $150 million, transit received $135 

million. In FY 2006, Congress appropriated $150 million. Out of the $150 million, 

transit received $136 million. In FY 2007, Congress appropriated $175 million. Out 

of $175 million, transit is slated to receive $163 million. We are very appreciative 

of these efforts. However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done. 

It is important to point out that there have been significant efforts in support of 

transit security authorization legislation in the Senate. As noted earlier, the Senate 

in 2004 and 2006 unanimously passed legislation that would have provided $3.5 billion over 3 years for transit security. That legislation was reported out of this Committee, and we very much appreciate the Committee’s support in that regard. We 

look forward to working with the Committee on these and other issues important 

to the transit industry. 

Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security needs. Based on 

APTA’s 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000 rail stations do not have 

security cameras. According to our 2005 Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, 

over 5,000 commuter rail cars, and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security 

cameras. Less than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems 

(AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus if an emergency occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack these AVLs. Furthermore, 

no transit system has a permanent biological detection system. In addition, only two 

transit authorities have a permanent chemical detection system. A more robust 

47 

partnership with the Federal Government could help to better address many of 

these specific needs. 

We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $600 million for a 

Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in last year’s FY 2007 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security grants for transit, seaports, railways 

and other facilities. We are also disappointed that the Administration failed to include a specific line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to 

working with the Administration and Congress to increase transit security funding 

and better address unmet transit security needs throughout the country. 

APTA is a Standards Development Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry. We are now applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards. We have already begun to initiate our efforts for security standards development and we have engaged our federal partners from both the DHS and Department of Transportation in this process. We look forward to working with the Administration and Congress in support of this initiative. Unfortunately, DHS has not 

agreed to provide funding to APTA in this effort. We respectfully urge Congress to 

provide $500,000 to the DHS so that it can in turn provide that amount in grant 

funding to the APTA security standards program which includes participation of our 

Federal partners to assist with the development of such standards and practices 

consistent with what we have already seen through the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). Our efforts in standards development for commuter rail, rail transit, and 

bus transit operations have been significant and our status as a SDO is acknowledged by both the FTA and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The FTA 

and the Transportation Research Board have supported our standards initiatives 

through the provision of grants. 

We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of Homeland Security’s Directorate of Science and Technology to take a leadership role in advancing 

research and technology development to enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation. 

Information Sharing 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit systems across 

the country have worked very hard to strengthen their security plans and procedures. They have also been very active in training personnel and conducting drills 

to test their capacity to respond to emergencies. Also, to the extent possible within 

their respective budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their 

facilities through the introduction of additional technologies such as surveillance 

equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems. While transit systems 

have been diligent, they have been unable to fully implement programs with the 

current levels of assistance from the Federal Government. 

A vital component of ensuring public transit’s ability to prepare and respond to 

critical events is the timely receipt of security intelligence in the form of threats, 

warnings, advisories and access to informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the 

American Public Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems throughout the United 

States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2 million was provided to APTA by the 

Federal Transit Administration to establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC 

that operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various 

sources, including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems following 

a careful analysis of that information. However, given that the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate 

method of providing security intelligence through DHS’s newly created Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to 

create a useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear, however, that 

while the HSIN may become an effective resource, it does not match the 24/7 twoway communication functions provided through the Public Transit ISAC. However, 

we believe that consistent, ongoing and reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security intelligence. Therefore, we respectfully urge Congress to provide 

$600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC. 

In addition, APTA’s membership includes many major international public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with the European-based transportation association, the International Union of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia 

48 

to give U.S. transit agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address 

transit security both here and abroad. 

Cost of Heightened Security 

Following the attacks on London in 2005, APTA was asked to assist the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in conducting a teleconference between the 

TSA and transit officials to discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing 

and decreasing the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat 

levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These costs totaled 

$900,000 per day for U.S. public transit systems or an estimated $33.3 million from 

July 7 to August 12, 2005, during the heightened state of ‘‘orange’’ for public transportation. This amount does not include costs associated with additional efforts by 

New York, New Jersey, and other systems to conduct random searches. 

Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to upgrade security. For example, New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY-MTA) 

is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure the safety and security of its 

transportation systems in what are among the most extensive security measures 

taken by a public transportation system to date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000 motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter 

rail facilities as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late in 2005 with 

the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY-MTA plans to spend over $1.1 billion 

through 2009 on transit security. 

Security Investment Needs 

Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry has invested 

more than $2.5 billion of its own funds for enhanced security measures, building on 

the industry’s already considerable efforts. At the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could build upon our existing industry security practices. This included a range of activities, which include research, 

best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of how to create a more secure 

environment for our riders and the most critical security investment needs. 

Our survey of public transportation security identified enhancements of at least 

$5.2 billion in additional capital funding to maintain, modernize, and expand transit 

system security functions to meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in 

increased costs for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and 

development have been identified, bringing total additional transit security funding 

needs to more than $6 billion. 

Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for which they required additional federal investment for security improvements. Priority examples 

of operational improvements include: 

• Funding current and additional transit agency and local law enforcement personnel 

• Funding for overtime costs and extra security personnel during heightened alert 

levels 

• Training for security personnel 

• Joint transit/law enforcement training 

• Security planning activities 

• Security training for other transit personnel 

Priority examples of security capital investment improvements include: 

• Radio communications systems 

• Security cameras onboard transit vehicles and in transit stations 

• Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas 

• Automated vehicle locator systems 

• Security fencing around facilities 

Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection devices. 

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives for the 

transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit authorities beef up 

security and to take a series of precautions to set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal funding assistance. Transit systems have already carried 

out many of the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 

calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of these measures and further 

49 

diligence taken during times of heightened alert is of particular concern to us. We 

look forward to working with you in addressing these issues. 

Ongoing Transit Security Programs 

Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened level of security 

alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to address our industry’s security and emergency 

preparedness needs. In light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive 

Committee has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee 

addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our initiatives. This committee will also serve as the mass transit sector coordination council that will interface with DHS and other federal agencies forming the government coordinating 

council. 

In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA supported two 

Transportation Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Panels that identified and 

initiated specific projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to 

Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation. 

In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness tools and resources. 

Many of these resources were developed in close partnership with the FTA and we 

are presently focused on continuing that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also, APTA has reached out to other organizations and international transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information on 

our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise the bar for safety 

and security effectiveness. 

APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail, bus, and rail 

transit operations. Within the scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning. 

In keeping with our industry’s increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety 

Management Audit Programs have been modified to place added attention to these 

critical elements. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation’s heightened security needs post 9/11, we 

believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public transportation industry has made great strides 

in transit security improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. We 

need the Federal Government increase its support for transit security grants that 

will help transit systems continue to address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the 

Department of Homeland Security so that DHS can in turn provide that amount in 

grant funding to the APTA security standards program which includes participation 

of our federal partners to assist with the development of transit security standards 

and practices consistent with what we have already seen through the FTA. In addition, we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC. 

We have also found that investment in public transit security programs, resources 

and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in preparation and response to natural 

disasters as well. Again, we appreciate the Committee’s strong support for transit 

security in recent years. We look forward to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to provide testimony on these critical issues and look forward to working with you on safety and security issues. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WARREN S. GEORGE 

INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION

JANUARY 18, 2007 

Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby, and Members of the Committee, on behalf of the more than 180,000 members of the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), 

I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today on the ATU’s 

priorities and strategies for enhancing transit security. 

I applaud this Committee’s efforts over the past several years to work together, 

in a bipartisan manner, to address this important issue. 

The ATU is the largest labor union representing public transportation employees 

in the United States and Canada. ATU members are bus, van, subway, and light 

50 

rail operators, clerks, baggage handlers, and maintenance employees in urban transit, over-the-road and school bus industries, as well as paramedical personnel, ambulance operators, clerical personnel, and municipal workers. 

The safety and security of our Nation’s public transportation systems is of utmost 

importance to the leadership and members of the ATU—in particular, we firmly believe that all transit employees should receive training to prepare them to prevent 

and respond to a terrorist or other emergency incident. 

Mass transit, by its very nature, is an attractive target for crime and terrorist attacks. It brings masses of people together, is open, highly visible and familiar, and 

when threatened or attacked, it can disrupt commerce, instill fear, and bring an entire region to a grinding halt. 

The recent examples of the Mumbai, London, Moscow, and Madrid bombings—all 

within the last 3 years—are tragic examples of this reality. 

In London we saw the crippling effects that such an attack can have on an entire 

community. When four suicide bombers detonated explosive devices in the London 

Underground and aboard a double-decker bus, 56 people died and more than 700 

people were injured. In addition, the entire City of London was paralyzed as citizens 

were left with no way to or from work, and others, including tourists, steered clear 

of the city for fear of additional attacks. A separate failed attempt two weeks later 

similarly stalled normal operations in London and surrounding areas. 

A decade earlier, ongoing bombing campaigns directed at the Paris Metro resulted 

in hundreds of casualties; and the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system 

threatened the lives of between 5,000 and 6,000 people, resulting in 12 deaths and 

marking the first time chemical or biological weapons have been deployed on a large 

scale by terrorists. 

And this isn’t just happening in our rail systems. In Israel and elsewhere, buses 

have too often been the unfortunate targets of terrorist bombings. 

We would be foolish to think that similar incidents couldn’t happen on our soil, 

in our transit systems. 

The ATU’s Role in Transit Security 

Faced with this reality, the ATU has for years worked to raise the awareness of 

our members and their employers to this danger and to advance real, concrete solutions and initiatives to enhance the safety and security of the systems operated and 

maintained by ATU members. 

We strongly believe that the labor community must be a partner in any comprehensive effort to address the security threats facing our industries. For that reason, we have worked closely with our members, the transit and bus industries, the 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) and elected officials at all levels of government, including many members of 

this committee. 

Shortly after September 11, the ATU produced and distributed a security training 

video and pamphlets providing guidance to our members on how to prevent, deter, 

and respond in emergency situations. We also conducted a joint labor–management 

conference on transit security that was attended by more than 100 transit agency 

officials and employees from across the United States. We worked with DOT and 

industry security experts to develop Transit Watch, a nationwide safety and security 

awareness program that encourages the active participation and vigilance of transit 

passengers and employees. And we contributed to the design, distribution, and promotion of the National Transit Institute’s security and emergency response training 

programs for frontline transit employees. 

We have also testified numerous times before Congress on this issue, including 

on October 4, 2001, before a subcommittee of this committee. We have continuously 

advocated for increased funding for transit security enhancements, and have assisted in developing legislation, including legislation introduced by Members of this 

Committee, that would enhance transit security. 

The Need for Federal Government Action 

Many transit agencies themselves have also taken admirable steps toward securing their operations, but—due in large part to funding constraints—they have not 

gone far enough. The reality is that the industry and the ATU can not do this alone. 

The Federal Government must step up to the plate and provide the necessary funding, guidance and even mandates to provide the level of security that transit passengers and employees deserve. 

The Federal Government has not yet stepped up to the plate. 

More than 2 years ago, Congress directed the Administration to take comprehensive steps to address transportation security risks, including risks faced by the transit industry. It was not until a little over a month ago that President Bush issued 

51 

an order to Secretary Chertoff to draft a plan to address security issues in the transit industry. 

Now is not a time for drafting plans, it is a time for concrete action. The Federal 

Government must provide funding directly to transit agencies for security purposes 

and must ensure that transit employees are prepared in the event of an emergency. 

With much of the emphasis on airlines, rail, and port security, no sector of our 

transportation network has been more neglected when it comes to security than 

transit. The deficiency in security funding for this industry is staggering. While the 

industry has estimated the actual need to be $6 billion in order to adequately secure 

the network, only a sliver of that has already been provided and the budget requests 

submitted by the Administration have been woefully inadequate. 

Security Training for Transit Employees 

In addition to funding, it is the responsibility of the Federal Government to ensure that certain necessary steps are taken to enhance security. 

Common sense tells us that the single most important thing that we can do to 

increase transit security is to provide each and every frontline transit employee— 

including rail and bus operators, customer service personnel and maintenance employees—with security and emergency preparedness and response training. 

While we should not abandon research and deployment of new technologies, we 

need to recognize what has been proven to be the most cost-effective security measure: employee training. 

In the event of a terrorist attack within a mass transit system, the response of 

employees at the scene within the first few minutes is crucial to minimizing the loss 

of life and to evacuating passengers away from the incident. Transit employees are 

the first on the scene, even before police, firefighters, or emergency medical responders. They must know what to do in order to save the lives of their passengers and 

themselves. 

During the 1995 sarin gas incident in Tokyo, two transit employees unnecessarily 

lost their lives when they tried to dispose of the agent dispersal device themselves, 

instead of simply evacuating the scene. Proper training would have prevented these 

losses and possibly decreased the number of passengers who were exposed to the 

deadly gas. 

Frontline transit employees are also crucial in preventing attacks. They are the 

eyes and ears of the system and are often the first to discover suspicious activities 

and threats, or the first to receive reports from passengers. These employees need 

to know how to recognize security threats and need to know the appropriate protocols to follow for reporting and responding to potential threats. 

International security experts confirm that employee training is effective and crucial in security efforts. Rafi Ron, former Director of Security at Tel-Aviv Ben-Gurion 

International Airport recently told another Senate Committee that behavior pattern 

‘‘techniques implemented by trained security and non-security personnel have proven to be a valuable measure in the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks in 

public facilities.’’ Ron went on to observe that ‘‘training provides the skills and confidence not only to law enforcement officers . . . but also to employees who are 

present at every point in the system. No one is in a better position to recognize 

irregularities on the ground than the people who regularly work there.’’ 

The Volpe Center likewise recently concluded that ‘‘probably the most significant 

factor in determining whether a transportation employee makes a helpful or harmful decision during an emergency is training. Trained and alert transportation professionals can make the difference between success and disaster. Characteristics 

such as acting responsibly to protect the lives of the public; keeping one’s cool and 

keeping passengers calm; contacting emergency assistance authorities quickly and 

reporting the essential details accurately; working cooperatively as a member (and 

sometimes a leader) of a team with a common goal—can all be enhanced through 

proper training.’’ 

Officials from both FTA and TSA have publicly recognized the need for this training. In fact, a list of 17 ‘‘Action Items for Transit Agencies,’’ jointly-developed by 

TSA and FTA, includes establishing and maintaining a security and emergency 

training program for all employees. And yet little, if anything, is being done to ensure that this training is provided. 

While vague press releases and statements from these federal agencies and the 

transit industry claim that employees are being trained, this is simply not the reality. I know this because I have talked to our members—the ones who are supposedly being trained—and they tell me a different story. They are scared—not because they know there is a threat, but because they feel out of the information loop. 

They have no idea how to help prevent an incident or what to do if one occurs. 

52 

What is most surprising is that many of the members I hear this from are employees of transit systems in major cities that are at high risk of terrorist attacks. 

For security reasons, I will not publicly disclose the names of those systems. 

Some transit systems, including most recently WMATA here in DC, have chosen 

to train all of their frontline employees, and others are making comprehensive efforts to likewise train their employees. We applaud these systems for their commitment to security. Unfortunately, they are not the majority in the industry. 

In many cases, workers receive at most a piece of paper asking them to be ‘‘vigilant’’ and to be aware of suspicions persons or packages. Other workers have 

watched a short 10–15 minute video. These materials do nothing to prepare a worker for a real security incident. 

In testimony before a House Subcommittee, Chris Kozub, Associate Director of 

Safety and Security at the National Transit Institute (NTI), stated that ‘‘a large 

number of frontline transit employees in this country still lack proper training and 

preparedness for preventing and/or responding to incidents.’’ By FTA’s own numbers, presented in testimony before another House Subcommittee last fall, NTI’s 

training program—which is funded and developed in coordination with FTA and is 

considered to be the leading security training program in the transit industry—has 

only been provided to less than a quarter of our Nation’s transit employees. It is 

significant to point out that the NTI security training programs are available to 

transit agencies free-of-charge. 

Unfortunately, the availability of a free training program and the overwhelming 

evidence of the need for training has not been sufficient to convince many transit 

agencies to provide the necessary training. Transit systems continue to resist calls 

for training because of the operating costs to pay employees and to keep the buses 

and trains running during training sessions. 

It is time for the Federal Government to step in and to not only provide funding 

for the operating costs associated with training, but to also require all transit systems to train each and every frontline transit employee. It is the role of the Federal 

Government to ensure that this happens. Leaving it exclusively to the will of the 

industry is, as experience dictates, not sufficient. 

The Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act 

I want to applaud the members and leaders of this committee, in this Congress 

and the previous two sessions of Congress, for recognizing the need for Federal Government action in this realm. The Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act, 

which has twice passed this Committee, would go a long way toward addressing the 

needs of the Nation’s transit systems and their employees. 

Not only would this legislation provide significant funding resources for crucial 

capital enhancements, such as perimeter protection systems, communications equipment, and decontamination equipment, but it also recognizes the need for training 

and would provide dedicated funding for necessary frontline employee training, 

drills, and exercises. The ATU is very supportive of these provisions. 

In addition, we appreciate that this legislation would provide these grants directly 

to the transit agencies, as opposed to funneling the money through the states. We 

believe this will allow for more effective and efficient use of these much needed 

funds. Further, we strongly support the provisions requiring, as a condition of receiving grant funds, that transit agencies identify a security coordinator and develop 

a comprehensive plan for use of the funds. 

I would, at this time, however, urge this committee to go one step farther and 

require, as an additional condition of receiving grant funds, that a transit agency 

provide security and emergency preparedness training to all frontline employees, including vehicle operators, maintenance personnel, and customer service providers. 

Such a requirement has been included in bills introduced in the last Congress by 

the leadership of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the 

current leadership of the House Homeland Security Committee. We are currently 

working with the leadership on both of these committees to draft new legislation 

that would include a training requirement. It is my understanding that this legislation will be introduced in late January or February. 

Significantly, security and emergency preparedness training has already been required for workers in other transportation modes including, most recently, port and 

longshore workers and carriers of hazardous materials. Legislation introduced and 

passed last session by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation would likewise require training for all rail workers. 

We need to take action now to address the security needs of the transit industry— 

and most importantly to train the workers in this industry. 

We urge this Committee to act expeditiously to markup legislation that would include the necessary funding and training. Doing so now will save lives. 

53 

* ‘‘The Security Model of Madrid Metro’’—PowerPoint presentation retained in Committee 

files. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the ATU. I can 

not stress enough how important it is to include the input of transportation labor 

in this discussion. It is our members who are on the front lines of this battle and 

who know best what dangers they face everyday on the job. I appreciate your recognition of this fact and look forward to working with you to address the important 

issues raised here today. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AURELIO ROJO GARRIDO * 

OPERATIONAL DIRECTOR, METRO MADRID, AND SECRETARY GENERAL, ASSOCIATION OF

LATIN AMERICAN METROS AND SUBWAYS (ALAMYS) 

JANUARY 18, 2007 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIM O’TOOLE 

MANAGING DIRECTOR, LONDON UNDERGROUND, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, ENGLAND

JANUARY 18, 2007 

I shall provide a brief overview of the London Underground’s (LU) current performance and its security situation with particular reference to July 7, 2005—how 

we dealt with that incident, how we prepared for such an incident, and what we 

have done since. 

LU has made great strides in the past 4 years. We are carrying record numbers 

of passengers—nearly 4m journeys on 1 day in December and well over a billion 

journeys annually— and delivering more train kilometres than ever before. We are 

the oldest Underground subway in the world, and that distinction is our charm and 

our burden. We are determined to bring the system into the 21st century supporting 

London’s continuing growth. As a consequence, the system is undergoing the biggest 

transformation in its history, with a massive rebuilding and change programme. Yet 

customer satisfaction is also at an all time high. That is largely down to the professionalism and commitment of management and staff, which in turn stems from 

their training and experience. 

It is those factors which were also at the root of the Tube’s ability to withstand 

and very rapidly recover from the attacks of July 7, 2005. Also vital was the multiagency planning that was put in place following September 11 by the U.K. Government, supported by the Mayor of London. LU was fully involved in that planning, 

with a senior manager seconded to the London Resilience team since it was established, to ensure that the operational realities of a mass transport metro system can 

be properly considered in political and investment decisions. 

This team has led work in areas of planning such as evacuation of parts of London, response to chemical, biological, and radiological attacks, and most visibly has 

arranged tabletop and live emergency exercises to test preparedness for such attacks. The largest of these was a weekend exercise at Bank London Underground 

Station which simulated a chemical attack at one of the largest, most complex stations on the network. This was a multi-agency exercise which was also attended by 

political leaders. This is in addition to the regular exercises that we hold with our 

own and emergency services staff to test our readiness for a wide variety of operational emergency situations. The learning from all these exercises played a vital 

role for Underground senior managers in revising training and in their own actions 

on July 7. 

The training that all staff receive is in my view the most important factor in dealing with emergency situations. Our ability on July 7 to evacuate around a quarterof-a-million people from the network within an hour, without injury, is testimony 

to that. As is the restoration of services by the following morning. Our experience 

teaches us that you must invest in your staff and rely on them; you must investigate 

and invest in technology but do not rely on it. The professionalism and competence 

of our staff made the difference on the day. 

In terms of what can be done to secure mass transit systems, we are in a very 

different position to some other forms of transport. One has only to buy a ticket to 

secure largely unrestrained access to the public areas of the system—500 trains, 275 

stations—along with millions of fellow passengers. The phenomenon of the suicide 

bomber is one where conventional responses will not be enough. 

54 

But we have a number of ways of controlling the risk that having an open access 

system creates. CCTV is vital to managing security on the Underground. In July 

2005 we already had over 6,000 cameras, covering nearly all stations and some of 

our trains. The number is ever increasing as part of the transformation of the system, and will reach 12,000 cameras within 5 years. The quality of the equipment 

is also being upgraded where necessary. 

Work is also in place to monitor areas that are not effectively monitored at the 

moment, such as ventilation shafts, more monitoring of car parks and other potential entry points to the network; 6.3 million pounds is being spent on such investment. 

The Tube network is policed by a dedicated Transport Police force comprising 

nearly 700 police officers, the numbers having increased significantly in recent years 

thanks to additional funding for the force from the Mayor of London. 

Six thousand frontline station staff are deployed across the Tube’s stations. These 

staff work either on platforms, at ticket barriers or in station control rooms. All 

trains have a driver in their cab who is in contact by radio with a line control centre. 

All LU job applicants have to prove their identity and are subject to a level of 

criminal conviction checks. In this as with other areas we strictly adhere to the 

guidance of the U.K. security services. 

We have, in conjunction with the U.K. government, run trials of equipment at a 

small number of stations to scan and search passengers. It remains our view however that screening and checking of all those who use the Tube on a daily basis is 

impracticable. But CCTV and policing, together with the vigilance of our own staff, 

allow us to monitor the system closely. Our passengers also have a vital role to play, 

and we have encouraged them through information campaigns to be on the look out 

for, and to report, any suspicious behaviour or unattended items. 

Communications between staff, and with the Police, are vital and we are now rolling out a new radio communications network for the Tube, which will link control 

centres, trains, stations, and depots, replacing the existing systems that are less integrated and which have been too prone to failures. The new system is being put 

into operation on each Underground line once it has passed stringent validation, 

operational, and safety checks. 

Although it is worth pointing out, any radio system would be unlikely to remain 

operable at the site of an explosion with a degree of force as that experienced on 

July 7, 2005, in London. 

Since July 7 we have investigated and implemented a number of other improvements to our resilience, including better first aid kit provision at stations and new 

safety notices on trains. We have reviewed other emergency equipment in conjunction with the emergency services and other relevant experts. 

At the core of our resilience strategy is that we constantly work in close cooperation with the government, its security services, the Police, Fire and Ambulance services, and other agencies and transport operators. It is that cooperation and coordination that enables us to be aware of and respond to changing circumstances. We 

know that the threat remains high and that we need to do everything we can to 

combat it, and that we need to be ready to deal with another attack. We believe 

our greatest defence comes from our rapid response and restoration of service, denying terrorists the chaos and fear that they are seeking and thereby discouraging 

their return.