alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

FELIZA RENTERIA,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-1869

D.C. No.

3:20-cr-00309-AJB-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 10, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON, MILLER, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Feliza Renteria appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for 

compassionate relief. Renteria pleaded guilty to knowingly importing heroin into 

the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. She was sentenced to 

seventy-two months of imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 12 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-1869

release. Approximately two years into her sentence, Renteria sought compassionate 

release based on her end-stage kidney disease and other health conditions. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the denial of a motion for 

compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 

938, 944 (9th Cir. 2022). We affirm. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Renteria’s motion 

for compassionate release. The court acknowledged Renteria’s serious medical 

conditions but found that she had failed to prove extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warranting a sentence reduction because her conditions were appropriately 

managed in prison, and the Bureau of Prisons could provide additional necessary 

care, including a kidney transplant, if Renteria met certain prerequisites for 

treatment.1 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Particularly given there was no 

binding definition of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate 

release at the time the district court decided Renteria’s motion, see U.S.S.G. 

1B1.13 (2007) (amended 2023), the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying relief. 

AFFIRMED. 

1 The district court invited Renteria to file a subsequent motion for 

compassionate release if she is refused necessary care after becoming eligible in 

the future, the district court invited a subsequent motion for compassionate release.
FIL ED U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S EL EVENTHCI RCUI T AUG 24, 2011 J OHN L EY CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE U

NITED STATE S COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 1- 10 31 8 Non -Arg um en t Ca le nd ar

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D.C. Dock etNo. 9 :1 0- cr-8 00 97 -WJZ-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us DONOVAN W ILLIS, a.k .a. Keit h Harris -Co nr ad , a.k .a. Don ov anMi ch ael W il li s, ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt forth e So ut he rnDis tri ctof F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Au gu st24 , 20 11 ) Befo re TJ OFLAT, CARNES andANDERSON, Circu itJu dg es . PER CURI AM: Arth urL. W al la ce II I, ap po in te d c ou ns el forDon ov anW il li s, h as fil edam ot io n t o wi th dr aw supp orte d b y a br ie f pr ep aredpu rs ua ntto Ander s v. Ca li fo rn ia , 38 6 U.S. 7 38 , 87 S.Ct . 13 96 , 18 L.Ed.2d49 3 (1 96 7) . Our i nd ep en de nt rev ie w of t he en ti re re co rdrev eal s tha t co un se l’s as se ss m en t o f th e rel at iv e m eri t of th e ap pe al is co rrec t. Bec au se in de pe nd en t ex am in at io n o f th e en ti re re co rd rev eal s n o a rg uabl e is su es of m eri t, co un se l’s m ot io n t o wi th dr aw is GRANTED , an d Wil li s’s co nv ic ti on an d s en te nc e are AFFIRMED .

2
EIS_Identifier Lead (tons) State County Site Name Facility Type City 9208811 0.078 RI Kent Theodore Francis Green Airport Providence 9208511 0.071 RI Newport Newport State Airport Newport 9194211 0.064 RI Washington Quonset State Airport North Kingstown 9196311 0.060 RI Providence North Central State Airport Pawtucket 9194111 0.053 RI Washington Westerly State Airport Westerly 9194311 0.035 RI Washington Block Island State Airport Block Island 10961711 0.021 RI Washington RICHMOND Airport WEST KINGSTON 3089811 0.008 RI Providence CRANSTON WPCF Wastewater Treatment Facility CRANSTON 6546611 0.005 RI Kent NEW ENGLAND UNION CO., INC. WEST WARWICK 2869511 0.004 RI Providence CUMBERLAND FOUNDRY CO., INC. CUMBERLAND

Data source: EPA's 2011 National Emissions Inventory, downloaded 10/15/15. 10 Largest Stationary Sources of Lead Emissions in Rhode IslandNAICS Code NAICS Description 48811Airport Operations 48811Airport Operations 48811Airport Operations 48811Airport Operations 48811Airport Operations 48811Airport Operations 48811Airport Operations 221320Sewage Treatment Facilities 3315 Foundries 331511 Iron Foundries
#### § 151.2010 Applicability.

This subpart applies to all non-recreational vessels, U.S. and foreign, that are equipped with ballast tanks and operate in the waters of the United States, except as expressly provided in § 151.2015 or § 151.2020 of this subpart.
§ 49.01-5 Requests for appointment of trustee. Requests for the appointment of a person or persons to receive moneys due personnel believed to be mentally incapable of managing their own affairs shall be submitted to the Commandant of the Coast Guard: ( a ) By any person or persons who believe, because of relationship, they should be appointed to receive payments on behalf of the alleged incompetent;
( b ) By the Commanding Officer of the alleged incompetent if the latter is on active duty;
( c ) By the Commanding Officer of any Armed Forces hospital in which the mentally incompetent is undergoing treatment;
( d ) By the head of any veterans' hospital, or other public or private institution in which the alleged incompetent is undergoing treatment;
( e ) By any other person or organization acting for and in the best interests of the alleged mentally incompetent.
Order entered September 26, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00793-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D.D., JR., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-10679

ORDER

We REINSTATE this appeal.

On August 22, 2018, we abated the appeal to allow the trial court an opportunity to 

conduct a hearing to determine if appellant wished to be represented by counsel and, if she did, 

to appoint counsel. The trial court was to make written findings and transmit to the Court, no 

later than September 14, 2018, a reporter’s record from the hearing and a supplemental clerk’s 

record containing the findings and any order of appointment. To date, the requested record has 

not been filed. However, by motion filed September 24, 2018, appellant informs the Court that 

the trial court sua sponte appointed Stephanie L. Pond to represent her and asks, in part, that the 

deadline for filing appellant’s brief be set. We GRANT the motion as follows. 

We DIRECT the Clerk of the Court to designate Ms. Pond as counsel for appellant and 

ORDER appellant to file her brief no later than October 8, 2018. 

/s/ ADA BROWN

JUSTICE
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Validian Corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the Form 10-KSB) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-KSB.



|Dated: April 13, 2005 |  | /s/Ronald Benn 
Ronald Benn
Chief Financial Officer
|--------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------





The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-KSB pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-KSB for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
#### § 167.1312 In the Strait of Juan de Fuca: Southern lanes.

In the southern lanes of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the following are established:

(a) A separation zone bounded by a line connecting the following geographical positions:

| *Latitude* | *Longitude* |
| --- | --- |
| 48°10.82′ N | 123°25.44′ W |
| 48°12.38′ N | 123°28.68′ W |
| 48°12.90′ N | 123°28.68′ W |
| 48°12.84′ N | 123°27.46′ W |
| 48°10.99′ N | 123°24.84′ W |

(b) A traffic lane for northbound traffic between the separation zone and a line connecting the following geographical positions:

| *Latitude* | *Longitude* |
| --- | --- |
| 48°11.24′ N | 123°23.82′ W |
| 48°12.72′ N | 123°25.34′ W |

(c) A traffic lane for southbound traffic between the separation zone and a line connecting the following geographical positions:

| *Latitude* | *Longitude* |
| --- | --- |
| 48°12.94′ N | 123°32.89′ W |
| 48°09.42′ N | 123°24.24′ W |

[USCG-2002-12702, 75 FR 70827, Nov. 19, 2010]
Exhibit 31.2  CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER,
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 I, Ronald Benn, of Validian Corporation, certify that: (1)I have reviewed this report on Form 10-KSB of Validian Corporation;  (2)Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  (3)Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operation and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  (4)The small business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:  (a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (c)Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting; and  (5)The small business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal controls over financial reporting. Date: May 18, 2007  By: /s/ Ronald Benn Ronald Benn Chief Financial Officer
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3973

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Orrington Gardner, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 15, 2010

Filed: July 20, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Orrington Gardner appeals his felon-in-possession conviction and the 120-

month sentence imposed by the district court1

 following a jury trial. His counsel has

moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), arguing that (1) the conviction was not supported by the evidence, and (2) the

district court erred in imposing a sentencing enhancement.

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and

accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to support Gardner’s conviction for being a felon in

possession of a firearm. See United States v. Coleman, 584 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir.

2009) (standard of review). Gardner stipulated to the prior-felony-conviction and

interstate-commerce elements of the offense; and there was sufficient circumstantial

evidence that he possessed a gun because police officers testified that they found a

gun that appeared to have been recently dropped in the direct path of Gardner’s 50-

yard flight from police, and only the police and Gardner were present at the scene. 

See United States v. Lofton, 557 F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 2009) (elements of offense);

United States v. Light, 406 F.3d 995, 997-98 (8th Cir. 2005) (knowing possession of

firearm may be based on circumstantial evidence). 

We also conclude that the district court did not err in imposing a 4-level

sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony

offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). In any event, we conclude that any error was

harmless because, after calculating the respective Guidelines ranges with and without

the enhancement, the court expressly stated that it would have imposed the same 120-

month sentence in either case. See United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir.

2007) (where sentencing court pronounces identical alternative sentence, error in

calculating Guidelines range is harmless if it is clear that alternative sentence is based

on identifiable, correctly calculated Guidelines range). 

Finally, after reviewing the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

_____________________________

-2-
Exhibit
32.2








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Adams Resources & Energy, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 (the “Report”),
I, Richard B. Abshire, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





/s/ Richard B.
Abshire


Richard
B. Abshire


Chief
Financial Officer





Date:
November 13, 2008
§ 25.203 Claims payable. A claim is payable under this subpart if it is: ( a ) A claim for death, personal injury, damage to or loss of real or personal property arising from a maritime tort caused by an agent or employee of the Coast Guard, or a vessel or other property in the service of the Coast Guard, including an auxiliary facility operated under specific orders and acting within the scope of such orders; or
( b ) A claim for compensation for towage and salvage services rendered to a vessel in the service of the Coast Guard or to other property under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40516 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. HUMBERTO RODRIGUEZ-LOZANO Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:04-CR-461-1

BeforeJONES, ChiefJudge, and CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Humberto Rodriguez-Lozano (Rodriguez) appeals his sentence for the revocation of his supervised release following his second conviction for illegal entry into the United States. For the first time on appeal, Rodriguez argues that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Government concedes that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. While Rodriguez did not raise this argument below, we nevertheless review this issue de novo because Rodriguez asserts that his sentence exceeds United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April 25, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-40516

2 the statutory maximum. See United States v. Del Barrio, 427 F.3d 280, 282 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2005). Rodriguez’s conviction that resulted in the term of supervised release that was revoked was for a second violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), which allows for a maximum sentence oftwoyears ofimprisonment and i s a Class E felony. See § 1325(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(5). Upon the revocation ofsupervised release that was imposed for a conviction for a Class E felony, the maximum sentence that may be imposed is oneyear ofimprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Rodriguez’s sentence of 18 months of imprisonment
exceeds the statutory maximum. See id. Accordingly, we vacate Rodriguez’s sentence and remand this case to the district court for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
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## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**71 KA 11-00857**  PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBBIE L. ALLEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 2.)

LEANNE LAPP, PUBLIC DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (MARK C. DAVISON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

R. MICHAEL TANTILLO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (JAMES B. RITTS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G. Reed, A.J.), rendered April 5, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of bail jumping in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]), and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from a separate judgment convicting him, also upon his plea of guilty, of bail jumping in the second degree (§ 215.56). We note at the outset that defendant raises no challenge to the judgment in appeal No. 1, and we therefore dismiss the appeal from that judgment ( see CPL 470.60 [1]; People v Allen , 93 AD3d 1340, 1340-1341, lv denied 19 NY3d 956). With respect to appeal No. 2, defendant challenges only the sentence, but concedes that he has been resentenced upon the judgment in that appeal. Consequently, inasmuch as “the initial sentence has been super[s]eded[,] any issue with respect to sentencing on th[at] appeal is now moot” ( People v Gannon , 2 AD3d 1214, 1214; see People v Haywood , 203 AD2d 966, 966, lv denied 83 NY2d 967).

Entered: February 8, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
§ 133.21 Records retention. ( a ) The State official shall maintain all records for ten years following completion of the removal actions.
( b ) If any litigation, claim, negotiation, audit, cost recovery, or other action involving the records has been started before the expiration of the ten-year period, the records must be retained until completion of the action and resolution of all issues which arise from it, or until the end of the regular ten-year period, whichever is later.