United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1997 TERRORISM AND

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Responsibilities for

Developing Explosives

and Narcotics

Detection Technologies

GAO/NSIAD-97-95

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276298 

April 15, 1997

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The ability to detect hidden explosives and narcotics is important to U.S.

national security. The problems of finding a small quantity of explosives

concealed aboard an airplane or a shipment of narcotics smuggled through

U.S. ports of entry are tremendous challenges to the technology

community. While various technologies can be used to detect both

explosives and narcotics, relatively little equipment has been deployed at

airports and U.S. ports of entry. Recent events, such as recommendations

of a presidential commission on aviation security, raise questions as to

how well U.S. government agencies responsible for developing

technologies to detect explosives and narcotics are working together.

As you requested, we have examined how the U.S. government is

organized to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics.

This report discusses (1) the roles, responsibilities, and authority of

agencies that establish policy, provide funds or oversee funding requests,

and develop explosives and narcotics detection technologies;

(2) mechanisms used to coordinate the joint development of technologies;

and (3) efforts to strengthen detection technology development.

This report is one of a series you requested dealing with explosives and

narcotics detection. The first report discussed the threats of terrorist

attacks on civil aviation and of narcotics trafficking into the United States,

strategies developed to meet those threats, and planned deployments of

detection technologies to combat terrorism and interrupt the shipment of

narcotics.1

 Another report in the series discussed explosives and narcotics

detection technologies that are available or under development.2

 This

report completes our work dealing with explosives and narcotics

detection technologies. We also testified before various congressional

1

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

2

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

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committees on technology’s role in addressing vulnerabilities in aviation

security and issued two classified reports on the threat of terrorism.

Background Terrorism and drug trafficking exact a tremendous cost from society.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the estimated cost

of one bombed aircraft is about $1 billion, including the price of litigation

for the loss of human lives and property loss. This estimate does not

include the cost to national security in terms of U.S. military and law

enforcement response or terrorism’s psychological effect on

society—neither of which has been measured. FAA is expected to spend an

estimated $281 million on aviation security during fiscal year 1997 for

research and development, the purchase of detection technology

equipment, regulatory enforcement, and policy- and rule-making.

The annual social cost3

 of narcotics, according to the Office of National

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is estimated to be about $67 billion, mostly

from the consequences of drug-related crime. This cost does not include

what Americans spend to purchase illegal drugs, estimated at $49 billion

for 1993, the last year for which data is available. Federal agencies are

expected to spend about $15 billion during fiscal year 1997 on drug control

activities, including research and development, law enforcement, demand

reduction, interdiction, and international programs.

Results in Brief Numerous federal organizations—supported by a variety of working

groups, panels, and committees—are involved in developing technologies

for detecting explosives and narcotics. The Federal Aviation

Administration is the key agency responsible for developing explosives

detection technologies for civil aviation security. In response to the

explosion of TWA flight 800, the President established the White House

Commission on Aviation Security and Safety to recommend ways of

improving security against terrorism. The Commission’s recommendations

included assigning a new role to the U.S. Customs Service in screening

outbound, international cargo for explosives. In September 1996, Congress

gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to develop governmentwide

standards for canine teams.

Regarding narcotics detection, the Office of National Drug Control Policy

is responsible for coordinating federal counterdrug technology efforts and

3

These social costs include the expense of health care for addicts, extra law enforcement, crime, and

lost productivity resulting from substance abuse.

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assessing and recommending detection technologies. In addition,

Customs, with technology development support and funding from the

Department of Defense, ultimately decides which technologies will be

developed and deployed at U.S. ports of entry. Customs has not deployed

some technologies, developed at a cost of about $30 million, because it did

not believe that they were affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its

needs. In addition, Customs and the Office of National Drug Control Policy

have differing views regarding the types of detection technologies needed

along the southwest border.

Joint technology development is important because the types of

technologies used to detect explosives and narcotics are similar. The

developers of narcotics detection technologies have not always

participated in committees that oversee the development of explosives

detection technologies. In the future, Customs plans to participate in these

committees. At the direction of Congress, an interagency working group

on counterterrorism plans to spend $19 million to develop a system for

detecting explosives that Customs may possibly use in a seaport

environment to detect drugs.

The following efforts are underway to strengthen development of

explosives and narcotics technologies, including the use of canines:

• The Federal Aviation Administration and Customs are preparing a

memorandum of understanding setting out how they will share

information and possibly conduct joint research and development projects

regarding detection technologies of mutual interest.

• The Federal Aviation Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms are cochairing a group reviewing certification standards for

explosives detection canines.

• Customs and the Office of National Drug Control Policy are working on a

5-year plan to develop new detection technologies, and Customs intends to

develop a deployment plan acceptable to the Office of National Drug

Control Policy.

• Customs will participate in the interagency development of a relocatable

explosives detection system that may have counterdrug application, thus

possibly benefiting both the counterterrorism and counterdrug

communities.

Despite these efforts, we found that the cognizant agencies have not yet

agreed to formal understandings on how to establish standards for

explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and

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deploying canine teams at airports. In addition, they have not agreed on

how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability.

Furthermore, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic

comprehensive reports on the aggregated efforts of the various

government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics

detection technologies. To address these issues, we have included a

recommendation to the involved agencies and a matter for congressional

consideration.

Organizations

Involved With

Developing

Explosives Detection

Technologies

Four organizations—FAA, the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of

Transportation—are responsible for overseeing or developing explosives

detection technologies. FAA has the primary responsibility for the

development of explosives detection technologies used to protect

commercial aircraft. From fiscal year 1992 to 1996, FAA provided about

$131 million, or an average of $26.2 million per year, for detection

technology development.

NSC established the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) in 1986 to

oversee and coordinate counterterrorism research and development,

including explosives detection technology.4 TSWG funding for explosives

detection efforts totaled about $14.3 million during fiscal years 1992-96.

OMB and the Department of Transportation play more limited roles in

overseeing the FAA budget dealing with explosives detection technologies.

OMB officials explained that OMB’s role is limited because of the small size

of FAA’s explosives detection technology development program. The

Department of Transportation has played a somewhat more active role in

FAA and interagency working groups that assess the capabilities of the

technologies to detect explosives.

In the aftermath of the TWA 800 explosion in July 1996, the President

established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.

The Commission recommended, among other things, that Customs assume

an enhanced role in screening outbound international air cargo for

explosives. In September 1996, Congress provided the Secretary of the

Treasury the authority to establish scientific certification standards for

explosives detection canines and to provide for the certification of canines

used for such purposes at U.S. airports. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

4

The Department of State provides overall policy guidance to and oversees the operations of the

TSWG. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy cochair the TSWG. All three agencies fund the

TSWG program, with DOD providing most of the funding.

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and Firearms (ATF) has assumed responsibility for this effort. In

February 1997, the Commission recommended that ATF continue to work

to develop governmentwide standards for canine teams.

History of FAA Technology

Planning and Development

Senior FAA officials have stressed that delays in deploying advanced

explosives detection technology are, in part, a function of the history of

their technology planning and development efforts. FAA was criticized in

1990 when it announced plans to mandate the deployment of a specific

technology5

 for screening checked baggage on international flights

following the December 1988 crash of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie,

Scotland. At the time, the technology could not detect the amount of

explosives that blew up Pan Am 103 without an unacceptably high rate of

false alarms. The airline industry objected to the technology’s high cost,

large size, slow speed in processing baggage, and high rate of false alarms.

The Aviation Security Improvement Act (P.L. 101-604 of 

Nov. 1990) provided a framework for FAA’s technology planning. The act

prohibited FAA from mandating a particular technology until it was

certified as capable of detecting various types and quantities of explosives,

using certification procedures developed in conjunction with the scientific

community.6

 In addition, the act required that FAA establish a scientific

advisory panel7

 to review its counterterrorism research and development

program and recommend future program areas, including the need for

long-range research to prevent catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft

by the next generation of terrorist weapons.

FAA’s scientific advisory panel recently recommended, among other things,

a reallocation of 1997 research and development funds to provide an

immediate increase in resources for long-term research to identify and

counter emerging terrorist threats. In response, FAA increased its request

for fiscal year 1997 funding for aircraft hardening and chemical weapons

detection.

5

The technology, known as Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA), uses low-energy neutrons to probe

targets for the presence of nitrogen in explosives.

6

FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 allows FAA to deploy commercially available equipment on an

interim basis until the certified equipment is operationally tested, if the Administrator determines the

deployment will significantly enhance aviation security.

7

The panel is referred to as the Security Research and Development Subcommittee of the Research,

Engineering, and Development Advisory Committee.

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In its final report dated February 12, 1997, the White House Commission

on Aviation Safety and Security addressed the question of whether FAA is

the appropriate government agency to regulate aviation security. The

Commission concluded that because of its extensive interactions with

airlines and airports, FAA is the appropriate agency. However, the

Commission also stressed that the intelligence and law enforcement

agencies’ roles in supporting FAA must be clearly defined and coordinated.

NSC Provides

Coordinating Forums

NSC provides a number of forums for coordinating explosives detection

technology issues. As the primary agency responsible for aviation security,

FAA sought interagency support within one of NSC’s forums in early 1996 for

a proposal to improve aviation security. Another forum, TSWG, has been

involved in developing detection technology for countering the threat from

terrorist use of explosives for several years.

In January 1996, FAA briefed the NSC’s Coordinating Sub-Group on

Terrorism8

 on threats to civil aviation and the need for a high-level

national policy review on ways of increasing domestic aviation security.

FAA used this forum because it believed that the threat of terrorism in the

United States was not limited to aviation and responsibilities for

countering terrorism crossed federal agency lines. Although FAA discussed

the possible use of a presidential commission to obtain consensus and a

legislative mandate on increasing aviation security domestically, it was

agreed instead to establish a working group within FAA to review the threat

against aviation and recommend options for increasing security in the

United States.

On July 17, 1996, FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee9

 formed a

Baseline Working Group to examine everyday security measures at U.S.

airports and recommend specific initiatives to strengthen those measures.

On December 12, 1996, the group recommended several immediate and

long-term improvements, including expansion of FAA’s research and

development efforts for explosives detection.

TSWG has an Explosives Detection Technology Subgroup, chaired by an FAA

representative, to ensure compatibility between TSWG and FAA research and

8

The Special Assistant to the President (NSC) chairs the Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism, which

is comprised of officials at the level of assistant secretary or the equivalent and convenes regularly to

review ongoing counterterrorism issues in policy, program, and operational areas.

9

Following the explosion of Pan Am 103, the Secretary of Transportation established the Aviation

Security Advisory Committee in April 1989 to advise FAA on the operational impacts of aviation

security initiatives.

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development programs in the explosives detection technology arena. TSWG

funds explosives detection technology projects near the $2.9 million level

annually.

NSC uses TSWG to develop coordinated views regarding the development of

explosives detection technologies. For example, in August 1996, the NSC

Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism requested the State Department’s

Coordinator for Counterterrorism10 to review research in explosives

detection equipment and to determine whether additional funds should be

invested in such research. The Coordinator directed TSWG to undertake

this task. In October 1996, TSWG recommended (1) accelerating the

development of methods that reduce or eliminate the human element from

the initial threat detection process, (2) increasing the emphasis on and

funding for explosive detection research and development, and

(3) improving the interagency exchange of information. According to an

NSC official, the first two recommendations have been implemented

through increased funding. Regarding the third, he pointed out that

improved information exchange is the constant goal of all agencies.

Customs Given an

Enhanced Role in

Screening Air Cargo for

Explosives

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

recommended new roles for Customs in screening outbound international

air cargo for explosives, including updating and acquiring technologies to

do that screening. Customs had previously not been involved in developing

explosives detection technologies, although it had developed technologies

to screen cargo for various types of contraband. Consequently, it had not

worked closely with FAA, the airlines, or TSWG on specifically developing

explosives detection technologies.

In response to the Commission’s recommendations, Customs is using

$16 million to develop a system to identify high-risk cargo for closer

inspection and $34 million to purchase detection technologies. Customs is

now determining how to develop an automated targeting system to

process outbound cargo information. In addition, Customs may develop a

new X-ray technology for examining pallets or improve other technologies

before acquisition.

10The Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism is the Vice Chairman of NSC’s

Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism. Through the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism,

which the Coordinator chairs, and through various functional interagency sub-working groups, which

report to the Coordinator (including the Technical Support Working Group), the Coordinator ensures

that U.S. government counterterrorism programs, strategies, and activities are developed, coordinated,

and executed.

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Customs’ new role presents challenges in coordinating its efforts with FAA

and the aviation industry. For example, the Customs’ targeting system may

be adapted to enable FAA to screen domestic cargo shipments transported

within the United States. In addition, Customs may be required to ensure

that its narcotics detection technologies can meet FAA standards for

screening cargo for explosives. To date, Customs and FAA have held

informal discussions on technical issues but have not prepared a

memorandum of understanding setting out their respective roles to help

meet these challenges.

As a part of its new role, Customs must also enter into agreements with

the airline industry for the joint use of the detection technologies.11 In a

letter to the Commission dated January 13, 1997, Customs stated that a

memorandum of understanding is being established with FAA to coordinate

the identification and deployment of the “joint use” screening equipment.

Customs has decided that such an agreement will be limited to sharing

information and to possibly developing joint research and development

projects. FAA strongly believes that such a memorandum of understanding

should include standards for the use of explosives detection systems,

development of a joint-use strategy, the resolution of liability concerns,

and the development of profiling and targeting systems to identify

potentially threatening passengers and cargo.

ATF’s New Role in

Developing Standards for

Explosives Detection

Canines

Although FAA has used canines for explosives detection at airports since

the 1970s, in September 1996 Congress authorized the Secretary of the

Treasury to develop governmentwide explosives detection certification

standards for canines and to certify such canines for use at airports. ATF

has assumed responsibility for this effort, and an interagency working

group has been established to develop uniform standards. FAA believes that

a memorandum of understanding is needed with ATF to address the

deployment of canine teams at airports.

Both FAA and ATF have canine programs. As of February 25, 1997, FAA’s

program had 81 certified explosives detection canine teams deployed to 

31 airports. FAA requires intensive training in aviation environments on

aircraft, in terminals, and around baggage, airport vehicles, and cargo. In

fiscal year 1997, FAA received $8.9 million for certifying an additional 

114 canines.

11The Omnibus Appropriations Act for 1997 provides funds for the purchase and installation of

advanced cargo inspection equipment technology for the joint use of air carriers, airports, or other

cargo authorities and Customs.

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ATF has certified 115 explosives and firearms detection canine teams for

use by 7 foreign countries in support of the Department of State’s

Antiterrorism Assistance Program. According to an ATF official, these

ATF-certified canines are trained to perform preblast detection duties in

various overseas environments, including airports. In fiscal year 1997, ATF

received $7.5 million, of which $3.5 million was specifically earmarked for

construction and expansion of a canine training facility. Congress also

authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish scientific

certification standards for canines and to certify, on a reimbursable basis,

canines employed by federal agencies at airports in the United States.

In 1996, the House Appropriations Committee expressed concern about

multiple and possibly duplicative or wasteful programs for training dogs to

detect explosives. The Committee directed that ATF establish a pilot canine

explosives detection program with FAA to foster cooperation, coordination,

and consistency between their two programs. The two agencies are

working out the details for the pilot program.

In August 1996, the Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism requested a

study on the use of canines for counterterrorism purposes. As a result, a

joint effort was begun by FAA and ATF, which agreed to rely principally on a

group comprised of various agencies’ chemists and canine trainers to

make recommendations to them. Since 1992, TSWG has used its own funds,

as well as funds provided by DOD, FAA, and ONDCP, for canine research

projects.

The White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security

recommended that FAA establish federally mandated standards for security

enhancements, including the deployment of explosive detection canine

teams. FAA believes that a memorandum of understanding is needed with

ATF to address standards for deploying canine teams at airports because

ATF has assumed responsibility for establishing governmentwide

certification standards for explosives detecting canines.

OMB Oversees Explosives

Detection Technology

Funding Requests

OMB officials said that they play a limited role in overseeing FAA’s

explosives detection technology development program because of the

small amount of funding for that program relative to funding for all of FAA.

They also told us that the extent of their oversight has traditionally been to

ensure that the FAA budget meets presidential priorities and is adequately

justified.

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However, OMB became more active and participated in FAA’s Baseline

Working Group because of the increased threat of terrorism. Several FAA

officials stated that OMB participation was important because the cost of

improving security was being estimated at billions of dollars and

consideration was being given to shifting the responsibility of funding

from the airlines to the government. An OMB official expressed the view

that the government might need to be more concerned about research and

development efforts if it has to pay for equipment resulting from such

efforts.

In addition, OMB prepared the President’s fiscal year 1997 antiterrorism

proposal, including incorporating the recommendations of the White

House Commission. As such, OMB worked with FAA on such issues as

pricing explosives detection technologies that FAA would purchase with

the additional funding.

Agencies Involved

With Developing

Narcotics Detection

Technologies

Four agencies—ONDCP, Customs, DOD, and OMB—are primarily responsible

for coordinating or developing narcotics detection technologies. The

congressionally established Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center

(CTAC) within ONDCP is responsible, among other things, for coordinating

federal counterdrug technology efforts and assessing and recommending

narcotics detection technologies. Customs, because of its mission to

interdict drugs at U.S. ports of entry, is ultimately responsible for deciding

on the types of technologies to be developed and used. As congressionally

directed, DOD has been primarily responsible for funding and developing

most of the innovative narcotics detection technologies for Customs.

Recently, OMB became involved in overseeing Customs’ plans for

developing and deploying narcotics detection technologies.

Agencies have not always agreed on the most appropriate technologies to

detect narcotics at U.S. ports of entry. Two technologies funded at about

$30 million have been developed but not deployed. More recently, differing

views between ONDCP and Customs regarding the type of systems needed

along the southwest border led to varying directions from congressional

committees. These differing views between ONDCP and Customs stem, in

part, from recommendations presented in a congressionally mandated

study on costs and benefits of specific technologies. These differences

may be resolved as Customs, in coordination with ONDCP, develops a

methodology and a 5-year plan for transitioning technologies from

development to deployment.

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CTAC Coordinates

Development of Narcotics

Detection Technologies

CTAC coordinates the counterdrug technology research and development

efforts of 21 federal agencies. In addition, CTAC funds its own development

projects to address gaps in technologies that provide the greatest support

to the various counterdrug activities of federal, state, and local agencies.

During fiscal years 1992-96, CTAC funding for detection technologies

amounted to about $8.4 million, or an average of about $1.7 million per

year.

In coordinating the counterdrug research and development program, CTAC

attempts to prevent duplication of effort and to ensure that, whenever

possible, those efforts provide capabilities that transcend the needs of any

single agency. CTAC relies on its interagency Science and Technology

Committee to help prioritize projects supported with CTAC funds. The

projects are generally managed by a member agency. In addition, a

Contraband Detection Working Group was established under this

Committee to provide an interagency forum to focus other agencies’

research activities on technology areas that support the contraband

detection requirements of law enforcement agencies.

In August 1996, the Director, ONDCP, committed to revitalizing the Science

and Technology Committee and its working groups. Among other things,

the Director proposed that the Committee act as a steering body with

membership at a level senior enough to make commitments to research

and development policy decisions. An ONDCP official informed us that the

Committee is currently focusing on developing a 5-year technology plan.

Customs Relies on DOD to

Develop Most Narcotics

Detection Technologies

While Customs has the operational need for detection technologies,

Congress tasked DOD to develop most of these technologies because DOD

was already developing technologies that could be adapted for narcotics

detection. During fiscal years 1992-96, DOD funded detection technologies

for about $73 million, or an average of about $14.6 million per year. Over

the same period, Customs funded detection technologies amounting to

about $3.1 million, or an average of about $620,000 per year.

In 1990, the House Appropriations Committee tasked DOD, in coordination

with Customs, to develop a comprehensive plan for developing drug

detection technology for use in inspecting cargo containers. The

Committee cited cargo containers as a major threat for the import of

illegal drugs into the United States and identified specific technologies

that should be pursued.

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In April 1994, DOD began testing a high-energy X-ray system12 capable of

penetrating fully loaded containers, at a specially constructed port in

Tacoma, Washington. DOD and CTAC viewed the system as a key step

toward the development of effective, nonintrusive cargo inspection

technologies.13 The tests showed that high-energy X-ray technology could

be an effective tool in detecting drugs in a broad range of vehicles and in

containers carrying varying types of cargo. DOD spent about $15 million for

facility construction and system testing. However, ONDCP, Customs, and

DOD agreed in December 1994 to dismantle the site because Customs did

not believe that the system was affordable, safe, or operationally suitable

for its needs.

Based on experiences with the Tacoma high-energy system, Customs and

DOD entered into a restructured development program to ensure that DOD

would develop only those technologies that would be transitioned by

Customs into an operational environment. Based on this understanding,

DOD also discontinued work on a Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis project14

after spending about $15 million because Customs was likewise concerned

about its affordability, safety, and operational suitability.

OMB Oversees Narcotics

Detection Technology

Funding Requests

For fiscal years 1996 and 1997, OMB questioned Customs’ funding requests

for truck X-ray systems to be placed at U.S. ports of entry along the

southwest border. These systems use a low-energy X-ray source15 capable

of penetrating empty trucks and other conveyances. OMB limited Customs’

use of the funds until certain conditions were met, citing its concern that a

low-energy system had limited capabilities for inspecting fully loaded

containers. OMB requested a comprehensive border technology plan that

would focus effective inspection technologies in the areas of greatest

need.

12The system scans a target with X-ray at an energy level of 8 million electron volts, or about 50 to 70

times the energy of a typical airport passenger X-ray.

13Nonintrusive inspection technology refers to a variety of advanced systems that will permit Customs

officials to inspect cargo and conveyances for the presence of narcotics without physically opening or

entering the shipment.

14Like the TNA mentioned on page 5, the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis probes targets, using neutrons,

for the presence of explosives or narcotics. However, unlike TNA, it uses high-energy neutrons as

opposed to low-energy neutrons, allowing reliable detection of carbon and oxygen found in narcotics

as well as nitrogen found in explosives.

15Rated at 450 thousand electron volts, about three or four times the energy of a typical passenger

X-ray system at an airport.

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In response, Customs prepared a plan favoring the use of fixed-site truck

X-ray systems as well as mobile or relocatable systems. Customs stated

that the large number of empty trucks crossing the southwest border

presents a very high threat because they sometimes carry drugs. As a

result, Customs wanted a system to inspect for drugs concealed within the

structure of the truck. Customs stated that the low-energy X-ray system

has been effective in detecting drugs concealed in these empty trucks, is

safe, and fits into available space. In addition, acquisition costs are

estimated at $3 million, operating expenses are low, and training

requirements are minimal compared to the high-energy X-ray system built

at Tacoma and the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system.

OMB continues to believe that Customs needs a range of technologies for

the southwest border. Thus, OMB plans to stay informed on issues dealing

with the development of those technologies and has started attending

ONDCP meetings on developing narcotics detection technologies so that it

can become aware of emerging issues.

Effect of Differences

Between ONDCP and

Customs on Congressional

Direction

Congressional committees have provided differing direction regarding the

development and acquisition of narcotics detection technologies. One

committee, supporting Customs needs, recommended funding for a certain

technology, while another committee, responding to ONDCP concerns,

directed a moratorium on the purchase of such technology. The

differences stem, in part, from recommendations presented in a

congressionally mandated study on costs and benefits of specific

technologies.

In September 1994, Congress mandated a study on the cost and benefit

tradeoffs in different nonintrusive inspection systems. The study, released

in September 1996, concluded that Customs should accelerate the

development and implementation of an automated system for screening

documents to target cargo for further inspection. For land ports, the study

recommended that only the automated targeting system be deployed.

Conferees on the National Defense Appropriations Act for 1997 provided

DOD with $6 million for DOD’s purchase of low-energy truck X-ray systems

to be used by Customs. Conferees to the 1997 Treasury, Postal Service,

and General Appropriations Act stated that they were aware of the

tradeoff study’s conclusion that deployment of advanced technology at

land sites and seaports can make a significant improvement to drug

interdiction efforts. The conferees directed a moratorium on the purchase

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of the low-energy systems until Customs reevaluated its plans regarding

the automated targeting system and to both low- and high-energy systems.

They further directed that Customs present Congress with an integrated

plan responding to the recommendations in the tradeoff study.

Customs issued a response February 6, 1997, which stated that empty

trucks crossing the southwest border are a very high threat. As a result,

Customs wanted a system to examine trucks returning empty to the

United States. Customs also stated that it would work with DOD and ONDCP

to identify and evaluate new inspection technologies that would

complement the capabilities of the low-energy system. According to ONDCP,

a promising technology currently under development may be as effective.

This system, which will be mobile, is expected to cost about one fifth the

estimated $3 million cost of the low-energy system. Over the next few

months, Customs and DOD will evaluate this new technology to inspect

empty trucks.

Customs Supports a

Methodology for

Deployment and a Plan for

Development

Development of the current generation of narcotics detection technologies

is nearing completion, but Customs does not have a detailed methodology

for determining which technologies should be acquired. Nonetheless,

Custom’s future development efforts are expected to be a part of the

Director of ONDCP’s recent proposal for a 5-year technology plan for

developing narcotics supply and demand reduction technologies.16

The congressionally mandated tradeoff study recommended that Customs

adopt a methodology similar to the one it used for assessing procurement

options. The study also pointed out that the variation among the ports

require a port-by-port analysis to assess the need for specific technologies

at each port. Customs has acknowledged that a methodology was needed

but noted that the methodology presented in the study was only one of

several possible approaches and did not realistically consider personnel

and funding constraints.

ONDCP and other federal agencies are creating a 5-year technology plan. As

part of this plan, the agencies will prepare a road map for developing

nonintrusive inspection technologies and upgrading existing systems. For

example, Customs and DOD are expected to set out their plans for

16Supply technologies are used for interdiction, including detection, while demand reduction

technologies focus on education, training, prevention, and rehabilitation.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298 

developing mobile or relocatable high-energy systems17 for drug

interdiction. Both Customs and DOD plan to evaluate the capabilities of the

high-energy X-ray system for its ability to detect narcotics concealed in

cargo containers. ONDCP plans to review the results of this evaluation.

Coordination of

Detection Technology

Development Efforts

We reported earlier that various technologies, with modifications, can be

used to detect both explosives and narcotics.18 During work on this report,

we found that formal coordination between developers of explosives and

narcotics detection technologies was not a two-way street. We did find,

however, that results of research and testing are shared among the

technology developers and overseers through personal contacts or

through symposiums. In addition, Customs and FAA have done joint work

on systems such as TNA and trace detectors. Canines provide a special

opportunity for coordination because they can be trained to respond in

specific ways to smells of explosives and narcotics.

The developers of explosives detection technologies are active

participants on committees that oversee the development of narcotics

detection technologies. FAA has participated in ONDCP’s Science and

Technology Committee and its Contraband Detection Working Group

since their inception to provide a linkage between explosives and

narcotics detection technology development. However, the developers of

narcotics detection technologies have generally not been included in

committees that oversee the development of explosives detection

technologies. Customs has not been a member of the scientific advisory

panel that reviews FAA’s research and development program and

recommends ways to improve the program. Based on our inquiries, an FAA

official said that including Customs on the panel may add some additional

insight from the developers of narcotics detection technologies. FAA

included Customs as a member of the panel effective February 13, 1997.

Although Customs is a member of TSWG, it has not participated in the

explosives detection subgroup. Officials agreed that Customs would

benefit from participating in this subgroup because of its interagency

coordination activities. Customs says that it plans to begin participating in

the subgroup.

17High energy systems are defined as having an energy level of at least 2 million electron volts, about

13 to 18 times the energy of a typical X-ray system found at an airport.

18Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298 

The relocatable Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system is an example of a

technology development that may benefit from closer coordination. In

fiscal year 1996, Congress provided TSWG with $6.2 million to evaluate the

capabilities of a relocatable Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system to detect

explosives hidden in cargo. This evaluation will cover a 30-month period

and eventually cost about $19 million. As noted earlier, this technology

was developed to detect narcotics concealed in large containers but was

not adopted for use by Customs because it did not believe that the system

was affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its needs.

Customs advised TSWG that it wants to participate in the development of

the system. A Customs official said that should the system meet concerns

about safety and other operational issues, they would support its

installation at a seaport where fully load containers are of concern and its

performance could be assessed for both counterdrug and

counterterrorism applications.

Opportunities to

Strengthen Detection

Technology

Development

Our work identified efforts underway that if successfully completed could

significantly strengthen development of explosives and narcotics

technologies. For example, in explosives detection technology

development, FAA is working closely with Customs and ATF, both of which

have new roles to play. In narcotics detection technology development,

Customs is working with ONDCP on a 5-year technology plan and with TSWG

on an explosives detection system that may have application to narcotics

detection. However, these agencies have not yet established formal

understandings on how to develop standards for aviation security

enhancements and numerous related issues. Moreover, comprehensive

reports on the U.S. government’s efforts to develop explosives and

narcotics detection technology are not periodically provided to key

decisionmakers.

Regarding explosives detection technology development, we found that:

• FAA and Customs are preparing a memorandum of understanding setting

out how they will share information and possibly conduct joint research

and development projects regarding detection technologies of mutual

interest.

• ATF has assumed a new role to develop governmentwide standards for

explosives detection canines and has begun a joint effort with FAA by

cochairing a policy group. They agreed to rely principally on a group

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298 

comprised of various agencies’ chemists and canine trainers, including a

representative from TSWG, to make recommendations to the policy group.

FAA strongly believes that memorandums of understanding are needed

with Customs and ATF for developing standards for aviation security

enhancements, including the use of explosives detection systems,

development of a joint-use strategy, resolution of liability concerns,

development of profiling and targeting systems to identify potentially

threatening passengers and cargo, and deployment of canine teams at

airports. However, to date, little or no progress has been made in

achieving such understandings, and the involved agencies have not

developed a coordinated approach for handling such issues.

Regarding narcotics detection technology development, we found the

following:

• ONDCP and Customs disagree on the appropriate methodology for deciding

which technologies to transition from development to deployment.

According to ONDCP, the methodology should require a port-by-port

analysis to assess the need for specific technologies at each port. On the

other hand, Customs prefers a methodology that does not add to its or

industry’s data-reporting requirements. Nevertheless, both agencies are

working on a 5-year technology plan to develop new detection

technologies, and Customs told us that it intends to develop a

methodology that is acceptable to ONDCP.

• Customs advised the NSC’s TSWG that it would participate in the

development of a system that may have counterdrug application. In

addition, a Customs official has been informally monitoring the system’s

development. However, as now being developed, the system will not

include requirements unique to a narcotics detection application. ONDCP

believes that Customs’ involvement with the system will be a worthwhile

effort.

Our review indicated that no one in the executive branch has aggregated

into a single report information on the totality of what is being done on the

development of explosives and narcotics detection technology, the nature

and extent of resources that the various agencies are applying, the

informal coordination and integration efforts, and the types of emerging

issues that must be addressed. Currently, no reports are periodically

provided to key decisionmakers in the executive branch or Congress.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298 

Conclusion We generally endorse the actions being undertaken by the agencies as the

initial steps to strengthening the coordination of explosives and narcotics

detection technology development. However, FAA, Customs, and ATF need

to work closer as a team to solve complex technological issues.

Establishing memorandums of understanding among the agencies could

help define the agencies’ roles and enhance cooperation in resolving the

numerous issues associated with the development of standards for

aviation security enhancements. Further, the resolution of differences in

views between ONDCP and Customs on needed technology should help

serve as a springboard to acting jointly on the broader problems. In

addition, joint development of technology may prove beneficial for both

explosives and narcotics detection. Periodic reports to oversight

authorities can help keep focus on the efforts being taken to develop and

deploy technologies at ports of entry, including airports.

Recommendation In line with the White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security’s

call for more clearly defining and coordinating the roles of law

enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA, we recommend that the

Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury establish a memorandum

of understanding on how FAA, Customs, ATF, and other agencies are to

work together in establishing standards, including the use of explosives

detection systems, development of a joint-use strategy, resolution of

liability concerns, development of profiling and targeting systems to

identify potentially threatening passengers and cargo, and deployment of

canine teams at airports.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Because no single agency in the executive branch has aggregated into a

single report information on what is being done on the development of

explosives and narcotics detection technology, Congress may wish to

direct the Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury and the Director,

ONDCP, to jointly provide to appropriate congressional oversight

committees an annual report on all of the government’s efforts to develop

and field explosives and narcotics detection technology.

Agency Comments NSC, the Departments of State and Transportation, FAA, ATF, ONDCP,

Customs, DOD, and OMB reviewed a draft of this report and provided oral or

written comments. They generally agreed with the facts presented, and

their suggested technical corrections have been incorporated where

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298 

appropriate. The written comments of State, FAA, Customs, ATF, and DOD

are presented in appendixes I, II, III, IV, and V, respectively.

In responding to a draft of this report, FAA, Customs, and ATF have taken

varying positions on how to develop standards for aviation security

enhancements and address numerous related issues. We have therefore

modified the report to recommend that the department secretaries

establish a memorandum of understanding for FAA, Customs, ATF, and

other agencies to work together on these issues.

Scope and

Methodology

Based on previous work,19 we initially focused on five agencies that play

the largest roles in developing detection technologies. During the course

of our work, we identified other agencies that are beginning to play larger

roles in technology development.

For our work on agencies involved with developing explosives detection

technologies or coordinating their development, we contacted officials of

the Departments of Transportation, Defense, and State; FAA; NSC; OMB;

Customs; and ATF. We interviewed officials to identify processes and

mechanisms to resolve conflicts when establishing policy, setting

priorities, selecting projects, and requesting funding. We also obtained and

reviewed key documents, such as FAA’s research and development plan,

and identified circumstances surrounding cases in which agencies

disagreed on technology development.

For our work on agencies involved with developing narcotics detection

technologies or coordinating their development, we contacted officials of

ONDCP, Customs, DOD, and OMB. We again interviewed officials to identify

processes and mechanisms to resolve conflicts when establishing policy,

setting priorities, selecting projects, and requesting funding. We also

obtained and reviewed key documents, such as the ONDCP’s counterdrug

research and development plan, and identified circumstances surrounding

cases in which agencies disagreed on technology development.

To identify mechanisms for coordinating joint development, we

interviewed officials and gathered information from the NSC’s TSWG and FAA

on the committees that oversee explosives detection technology

development efforts. In addition, we interviewed officials and gathered

information from ONDCP on similar committees that oversee ONDCP’s

19Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298 

narcotics detection technology development efforts. We analyzed the

membership of these committees to see if there is representation from

both the explosives and narcotics detection technology development

communities. We also examined the minutes of the committees’ meetings

to verify that member agencies from both communities participated in

these meetings. In addition, we gathered information on a particular

technology to show the benefits of coordination between the two

communities. Finally, we asked about attendance at various symposiums

or other professional forums.

Based on our objectives, we identified efforts being initiated to strengthen

coordination of detection technology development and opportunities to

enhance that development.

OMB did not provide us with all the information we requested. OMB officials

met with us but did not provide documentation on its interactions with

other federal agencies responsible for developing explosives and narcotics

detection technologies. As a result, we relied on other agencies’ records to

document OMB’s role. In addition, NSC officials declined to meet with us to

clarify its interaction with the other agencies.

We performed this phase of work between October 1996 and

February 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of other appropriate congressional committees; the

Secretaries of the Treasury, State, Defense, and Transportation; the

Directors, OMB, ONDCP, and ATF; the Administrator, FAA; and the

Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please call me on

(202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of State

24

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Federal Aviation

Administration

29

Appendix III 

Comments From the

U.S. Customs Service

32

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and

Firearms

36

Appendix V 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

38

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

40

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Contents

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

CTAC Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center

DOD Department of Defense

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

MOU memorandum of understanding

NSC National Security Council

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

TNA Thermal Neutron Analysis

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on page 4.

See comment 1.

Now on page 4.

See comment 1.

Now on page 4.

See comment 2.

Now on page 6.

See comment 2.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on page 6.

See comment 2.

Now on page 7.

See comment 2.

Now on page 7.

See comment 2.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on page 7.

See comment 2.

Now on page 19.

See comment 2.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated March 20, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. We have not shown the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and

Energy as agencies responsible for overseeing or developing explosives

detection technologies. Instead of showing these agencies separately, we

have grouped them under the National Security Council’s Technical

Support Working Group (TSWG). Specifically, we state on page 4 that the

Department of State provides overall policy guidance to and oversees the

operations of TSWG and that DOD and the Department of Energy cochair

TSWG. We also state that all three agencies fund the TSWG program, with DOD

providing most of the funding.

We also have not shown the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF) as an agency responsible for overseeing or developing explosives

detection technologies. In the introduction to the explosives section, we

say that ATF and Customs have assumed new roles. We believe that the

reference to ATF at this point is sufficient.

2. We have modified the report to reflect this comment.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix II 

Comments From the Federal Aviation

Administration

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix II 

Comments From the Federal Aviation

Administration

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix II 

Comments From the Federal Aviation

Administration

The following are GAO’s comments on the Federal Aviation

Administration’s (FAA) letter dated March 28, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. We have incorporated FAA’s technical comments in the text where

appropriate.

2. We have modified the report to reflect these comments.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

Now on pages 3

and 16.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Now on page 7.

See comment 3.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

Now on page 8.

See comment 4.

Now on page 13.

See comment 3.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Customs Service letter

dated March 20, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. In a letter dated January 13, 1997, to the White House Commission on

Aviation Safety and Security, Customs stated a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) is being established with the FAA to coordinate the

identification and deployment of “joint use” screening equipment. The

letter further stated that a strategy for the joint-use resources is being

developed, with a target date of January 30, 1997, for completion. Based

on Customs’ response to a draft of this report, we have concluded that

Customs has changed its position on establishing an MOU on joint-use.

In its response to our draft report, FAA supports the establishment of such

an MOU covering a number of issues. As a result, there appears to be

disagreement between Customs and FAA as to how they should address

these important issues. We have therefore modified the report to

recommend that the department secretaries establish a MOU for FAA,

Customs, ATF, and other agencies to work together on these issues and

have also suggested that Congress may wish to require the involved

agencies to periodically report on these efforts.

2. We have modified the report to state that Customs and FAA are

developing an MOU for sharing information and possibly conducting

joint-use research and development projects.

3. We have modified the report to reflect this comment.

4. FAA has informed us that it may adapt the Customs’ targeting system for

screening domestic cargo shipments transported within the United States.

FAA pointed out that the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and

Security’s report, dated February 12, 1997, states that Customs and FAA are

working with an FAA contractor to study technical issues associated with

converting Customs’ targeting system, which was originally designed for

sea cargo analysis, to air cargo analysis.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms

The following is GAO’s comment on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearm’s letter dated March 25, 1997.

GAO Comment 1. We have incorporated ATF’s technical comments in the text where

appropriate.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is GAO’s comment on DOD’s letter dated March 24, 1997.

GAO Comment 1. We have incorporated DOD’s technical comments in the text where

appropriate.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David E. Cooper

Ernest A. Döring

Charles D. Groves

John K. Harper

John P.K. Ting

(707220) Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
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