No

No. 97-212

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 177

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

SCOTT DALE MILLER, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Missoula,

The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

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For Appellant:

Michael F. Bailey, Doreen D. Antenor, Bailey & Antenor, Missoula, Montana

For Respondent:

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; 

Robert L. "Dusty" Deschamps, Missoula, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 18, 1997

Decided: July 16, 1998

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Scott Dale Miller (Appellant) appeals from a jury verdict, judgment, and sentence 

of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, convicting him of mitigated 

deliberate homicide. We affirm.

¶2 We restate the issues as follows:

¶3 1. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant’s motions for dismissal and 

entry of judgment as a matter of law on the basis of insufficient evidence?

¶4 2. Was Appellant denied a fair trial as a result of alleged improper comments 

made by the prosecutor during his closing argument?

¶5 3. Did the District Court err in requiring Appellant to register as a violent 

offender without issuing findings concerning Appellant’s violent offender status, and 

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without providing Appellant a hearing to present contradictory evidence regarding 

his status?

BACKGROUND

¶6 This case arose out of the death of James Mitchell (Mitchell). During the morning 

hours of September 16, 1995, Mitchell, his wife Wendy, Brent Bovee (Bovee), and 

Pamela Songer (Songer) began drinking alcohol. At about noon, having consumed a 

fifth of liquor, Mitchell and Bovee decided to go to Appellant’s home to borrow 

money for more alcohol. The Mitchells, Bovee, Songer, and Appellant all lived in the 

same trailer court. Appellant and the Mitchells had known each other for five years. 

At Appellant’s home, Appellant, Mitchell, and Bovee drank beer for about an hour, 

and then Wendy and Songer arrived. Mitchell and Bovee then left to buy more 

alcohol. Appellant stayed behind and continued drinking. When Mitchell and Bovee 

returned an hour later, they appeared more intoxicated than when they had left. 

Appellant, the Mitchells, Bovee, and Songer resumed drinking together.

¶7 Later that afternoon, Appellant and Mitchell left in Appellant’s car. Soon 

thereafter, the two women left, but Bovee remained at Appellant’s home sleeping on 

the couch. Appellant and Mitchell returned at about 5:00 p.m. and Wendy returned 

15 minutes later. Appellant sat in a chair and Mitchell sat on the couch. Bovee was 

passed out on the couch. Appellant then cleaned his pipe and began smoking 

marijuana. Mitchell leaned over, touched Appellant on the arm and asked Appellant 

for the pipe. Appellant responded, "Don’t touch me." Mitchell pressed Appellant 

again for the pipe and asked him what was the matter. Appellant again told Mitchell 

to quit touching him. Appellant "went ballistic" and an argument erupted between 

the two. Appellant ordered Mitchell to get out of his house. Mitchell refused to leave. 

Appellant went to his bedroom and Mitchell followed apparently wanting to know 

why Appellant was so upset. Wendy remained in the living room. 

¶8 While in the bedroom, Appellant obtained a pistol. Wendy heard scuffling in the 

hallway. Appellant and Mitchell ended up in the bathroom where the only means of 

entry and exit was the bathroom door. Wendy did not know who entered the 

bathroom first, but evidence suggested that Mitchell forced open the bathroom door. 

Wendy then went to the bathroom to convince Mitchell to leave. Several times 

Wendy heard Appellant order Mitchell to "get out of here." She heard Appellant 

exclaim, "If you don’t get out of here, I’m going to shoot you," and "I’m going to fire 

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a warning shot." Wendy testified that Appellant did not say these words in a way 

that would suggest he was begging Mitchell to leave him alone. Wendy then heard 

the warning shot. Evidence showed that Appellant fired the warning shot from the 

back wall of the bathroom, where the bathtub was located, toward the door. Again, 

Wendy heard Appellant tell Mitchell to leave or he would shoot Mitchell in the foot. 

Wendy heard the gun fire again. Appellant had shot Mitchell in the mouth at close 

range, killing him instantly.

¶9 After the shot was fired, Appellant left the bathroom and told Wendy to telephone 

9-1-1. Appellant went next door where his mother, Rose Miller (Rose), lived. Rose 

testified that Appellant was upset and that he stated to her, "I couldn’t let him keep 

hurting me . . . why did he make me do this?" He also stated that he didn’t know 

where exactly Mitchell was shot. Rose telephoned 9-1-1 and reported the incident. 

Appellant spoke with the 9-1-1 operator and mentioned being beaten. Officers soon 

arrived at Rose’s house and took Appellant into custody. The officers administered a 

blood test on Appellant and the state forensic pathologist administered a blood test 

on Mitchell’s body. Appellant’s blood sample indicated a blood alcohol content 

(BAC) of .20 and presence of the drug tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Mitchell’s blood 

sample indicated a BAC of .25. 

¶10 A trial by jury was held October 29-31, 1996. Wendy testified that Mitchell and 

Appellant experienced physical disabilities. Mitchell once had a broken neck, he had 

undergone three separate surgeries for herniated discs in his back, and he was about 

to have reconstructive surgery on his knee. Appellant had "a problem with his 

shoulder." Appellant was a sawyer by trade. Wendy testified that Mitchell was not 

working and was collecting social security disability benefits. She further testified 

that both Mitchell and Appellant drank heavily and smoked marijuana occasionally. 

Wendy testified that Mitchell and Appellant had argued several times in the years 

they had known each other, but that only one of these arguments resulted in a 

physical altercation. She further testified that in the months preceding the date of 

Mitchell’s death, the friendship between Mitchell and Appellant had changed. She 

stated that Appellant was angry at Mitchell for "hanging out" with his ex-wife. 

Wendy admitted that she once had an extramarital affair with Appellant. On the day 

of the shooting, Appellant told Wendy he was having a bad day and everything was 

going wrong. Appellant mentioned that his saw was broken and that he had a 

problem with his ex-wife.

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¶11 Rose testified that although her son and Mitchell got along well, she thought 

Mitchell was argumentative and combative, and she did not welcome Mitchell in her 

home. Rose stated that Mitchell’s reputation among residents of the trailer court was 

"not good" and that most residents would have nothing to do with him.

¶12 Songer testified that Mitchell had fought with her boyfriend and brother-in-law. 

She testified that Appellant’s usual disposition when drunk was that he got mouthy 

and wanted to "roll around in the dirt." Songer stated that in a prior argument at 

Appellant’s home, Appellant and Mitchell were engaged in pushing and shoving but 

Mitchell left upon Appellant’s request. Songer further testified that during the 

afternoon on the date of Mitchell’s death, Appellant and Mitchell appeared to be 

getting along well.

¶13 Nadine Jensen (Jensen), a resident of the same trailer court and an employee at a 

local bar often frequented by Appellant and Mitchell, testified that she had known 

Appellant and Mitchell for 8 or 9 years. She stated that on several occasions she 

heard the two men arguing outside her home at night. Jensen recounted one day, 

long before the incident at issue, when Appellant was drunk, approached her on her 

porch, mentioned the Mitchells, and briefly stated he should just shoot Mitchell. 

However, Jensen stated that Appellant’s demeanor at the time he made the statement 

was such that she thought he was joking. Jensen testified that the Mitchells often 

picked fights at the bar and that they were no longer welcome there. She testified 

that she never had any problems with Appellant while at the bar. 

¶14 Sheriff’s Deputy Patrick Turner (Turner), one of the first officers to respond to 

the 9-1-1 call, transported Appellant to the police station. Turner testified that 

Appellant was cooperative, that Appellant communicated effectively, that he 

understood every word Appellant was saying, and that Appellant followed 

instructions completely. In booking Appellant, Turner took his measurements and 

reported that Appellant was six feet two inches tall and weighed 190 pounds.

¶15 Lynn Kurtz (Kurtz), a forensic scientist with the state crime lab, opined that 

Appellant’s BAC of .20 impaired Appellant’s judgment and reasoning functions, and 

created an unsafe condition for handling a firearm.

¶16 Doctor Gary Dale (Dr. Dale), a pathologist with the state forensic science 

division, performed the autopsy. Dr. Dale testified that Appellant’s gun was in direct 

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contact with Mitchell’s skin when it discharged. The barrel of the gun was pointed at 

an angle of 55 degrees so that the primary direction of the bullet was upwards 

relative to the position of Mitchell’s body. Dr. Dale stated that the gunshot wound 

was in an unusual location for a homicide. Appellant’s attorney asked the following 

question of Dr. Dale:

Given the number of homicide victims that you have autopsied and the angle 

to the path of the bullet, is it not conceivable that the deceased, in driving 

himself into the upper body of the Defendant and the Defendant raising his 

hands to protect himself from blows, with the gun in one of those hands, that 

the deceased drove his face into the gun at the time of the discharge of the 

firearm?

Dr. Dale responded:

Based on the angle? Again, the best way to answer that is just using the -- that 

angle. If you can create a scenario where the firearm discharges at that angle, 

it’s possible.

Dr. Dale measured Mitchell’s body and testified that Mitchell was six feet four and one 

half inches tall and weighed 202 pounds. 

¶17 Sheriff’s Detective Scott McDonald (McDonald) was assigned to investigate the 

crime scene. McDonald testified that he found broken glass in the living room but 

that it was possible the broken glass may have predated the shooting. He testified 

that the bathroom door was broken at the hinges but that Wendy told him she "had 

been in the house before and knew the door was kind of that way." McDonald 

testified that Mitchell’s blood and cap were found in the bathtub. McDonald also 

testified that firing the type of gun used by Appellant required only slight pressure, 

two and one half to three pounds. McDonald testified that during his interview with 

Appellant, Appellant stated he had been injured and complained of a sore shoulder 

from being pushed into a wall by Mitchell. Photographs of Appellant’s shoulders 

were entered into evidence. McDonald acknowledged that Appellant’s right shoulder 

was disproportionate in size from his left, but stated he did not know whether this 

condition stemmed from a pre-existing injury. Wendy had earlier testified that 

Appellant suffered from a disability, "a problem with his shoulder."

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¶18 Appellant neither testified nor presented any witnesses to testify on his behalf. 

However, based on his attorney’s opening statement, closing argument, and crossexamination of the State’s witnesses, it was apparent that Appellant was asserting 

justifiable use of force as an affirmative defense. Appellant claimed he was trapped 

in the bathroom with no means of escape, that he fired a warning shot, that Mitchell 

lunged at him, and that in order to protect himself from serious bodily harm, he 

raised his hands at which point Mitchell drove his face into the barrel of the gun and 

it discharged.

¶19 At the conclusion of the State’s case, Appellant moved the court for dismissal of 

the charge on grounds that the State had not proven its case. That motion was 

denied. Appellant then informed the court that he would call no witnesses to testify 

on his behalf and rested his case. The jury returned a verdict finding Appellant 

guilty of mitigated deliberate homicide after which Appellant moved the court for 

judgment as a matter of law. The motion was denied. Appellant appealed to this 

Court. Additional facts will be provided as necessary to dispose of the issues raised.

DISCUSSION

Issue 1

¶20 Did the District Court err in denying Appellant’s motions for dismissal and entry of 

judgment as a matter of law on the basis of insufficient evidence?

¶21 It is within the sound discretion of the District Court whether to dismiss an 

action at the close of the State’s case for insufficient evidence. Section 46-16-403, 

MCA. We will not disturb the District Court’s ruling unless Appellant shows an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Miller (1988), 231 Mont. 497, 509, 757 P.2d 1275, 1282. 

We have held that a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence "should be granted 

only where there is no evidence upon which a trier of fact could base a verdict." 

Miller, 231 Mont. at 509, 757 P.2d at 1282 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). 

This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, upon 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Miller, 231 Mont. at 509, 757 P.2d at 1283. 

¶22 Appellant was charged and convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide pursuant 

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to § 45-5-103(1), MCA. That statute provides:

A person commits the offense of mitigated deliberate homicide when the 

person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being but 

does so under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distress for which 

there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of the 

explanation or excuse must be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable 

person in the actor’s situation. 

"Purposely" is the most culpable mental state and implies an objective or design to engage 

in certain conduct, although not particularly toward some result. Sections 45-2-101(63) 

and -201(2), MCA; Compiler’s Comments to § 45-5-102, MCA, p.163. "Knowingly" 

refers to a state of mind in which a person acts, while not toward a certain objective, at 

least with full knowledge of relevant facts and circumstances. Sections 45-2-101(34) and -

201(2), MCA; Compiler’s Comments to § 45-5-102, MCA, p.163. A finding of "extreme 

emotional or mental distress for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse" will not 

lie where the only mitigating circumstances asserted are the defendant’s anger and 

intoxication. State v. Williams (1993), 262 Mont. 530, 541, 866 P.2d 1099, 1106 (citation 

omitted).

¶23 Justifiable use of force, or self-defense, is a complete affirmative defense to 

mitigated deliberate homicide. Section 45-3-115, MCA. Although the State retains 

the burden of proving the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

defendant who raises justifiable use of force as an affirmative defense assumes the 

"burden of producing sufficient evidence on the issues to raise a reasonable doubt of 

his guilt . . . ." State v. Daniels (1984), 210 Mont. 1, 16, 682 P.2d 173, 180-81. To 

establish justifiable use of force, Montana law requires that a defendant show that: 

(1) he was not the aggressor; (2) he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger 

of unlawful harm; and (3) he used reasonable force necessary to defend himself. 

Sections 45-3-102 and -105, MCA; State v. Demers (1988), 234 Mont. 273, 280, 762 

P.2d 860, 865. 

¶24 Appellant does not contest that he purposely or knowingly caused the death of 

Mitchell. However, Appellant contends that he acted in self-defense. Appellant 

argues that he was not the aggressor; that he reasonably believed he was in imminent 

danger of unlawful harm; that he used reasonable force necessary to defend himself; 

and that given the facts and circumstances surrounding the shooting, no rational 

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trier of fact could have concluded otherwise. The State counters that while Appellant 

presents one version of the events, the evidence and testimony presented at trial 

clearly support another version of the events, that Appellant committed mitigated 

deliberate homicide. We agree with the State.

¶25 In State v. Bower (1992), 254 Mont. 1, 8, 833 P.2d 1106, 1111, we stated:

The fact that the defendant’s testimony conflicted with that of the State’s 

witnesses does not, by itself, render the evidence insufficient to support his 

conviction. The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are 

exclusively within the province of the trier of fact; when the evidence 

conflicts, the trier of fact determines which shall prevail. 

It is the jury’s prerogative to accept or reject a defendant’s claim of self-defense. State v. 

Crazy Boy (1988), 232 Mont. 398, 401, 757 P.2d 341, 343. Here, the jury weighed the 

evidence, assessed the credibility of witnesses, and found that the State’s version of the 

incident was more credible than Appellant’s. Such a finding is supported by the evidence.

¶26 The State produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that 

Appellant shot Mitchell under extreme mental or emotional stress. Appellant’s usual 

disposition when drunk was that he became mouthy and wanted to "roll around in 

the dirt," yet on the day of the shooting, when Mitchell touched Appellant’s arm, 

Appellant "went ballistic" and ordered Mitchell out of the house. Appellant’s and 

Mitchell’s arguments were usually resolved nonviolently, yet on the day of the 

shooting, Appellant got a pistol from his bedroom. After the shooting, Appellant told 

his mother, "I couldn’t let him keep hurting me . . . why did he make me do this?"

¶27 The State also produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could find 

reasonable explanation or excuse for Appellant’s extreme mental or emotional stress. 

Wendy testified that the friendship between Appellant and Mitchell had recently 

become strained due in part to her admitted love affair with Appellant and the fact 

that Mitchell was spending time with Appellant’s ex-wife. On the date of Mitchell’s 

death, Appellant told Wendy he was having a bad day because of problems with his 

ex-wife and his broken saw. Mitchell’s usual disposition when drunk was that he was 

argumentative and combative. In a prior argument at Appellant’s home that 

involved pushing and shoving, Mitchell left Appellant’s home upon request. 

However, on the day of the shooting, Mitchell refused to leave upon Appellant’s 

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request and instead followed him into the bedroom and bathroom. Evidence showed 

that Appellant’s level of intoxication impaired his judgment and reasoning. Given 

these circumstances, the jury was justified in finding Appellant guilty of mitigated 

deliberate homicide because there existed other mitigating circumstances besides 

Appellant’s intoxication and fear of being assaulted.

¶28 We next consider Appellant’s contention that he produced sufficient evidence 

from which a jury could find that he acted in self-defense. Whether a defendant 

meets the requirements necessary to support his theory of self-defense is a question 

of fact for the jury. State v. Crabb (1988), 232 Mont. 170, 174, 756 P.2d 1120, 1123. 

We have held that the degree of force a person uses to defend himself must be 

commensurate with the threat of harm the person faces. See State v. Stone (1994), 

266 Mont. 345, 347, 880 P.2d 1296, 1298. A person is justified in the use of deadly 

force "only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent 

death or imminent bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the commission of 

a forcible felony." Section 45-3-102, MCA. Deadly force is "force likely to cause 

death or serious bodily harm," and includes the firing of a firearm in the direction of 

a person, even though no purpose exists to kill or inflict serious bodily harm. Section 

45-3-101(1), MCA. A "felony" is an offense punishable by either death or 

imprisonment exceeding one year, and a "forcible felony" is a felony involving the 

use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. Section 45-2-101

(22) and (23), MCA. A person’s belief of imminent death or imminent serious bodily 

harm may be reasonable even if it is mistaken. State v. Bashor (1980), 188 Mont. 397, 

425, 614 P.2d 470, 485-86.

¶29 The record shows that Mitchell weighed only twelve pounds more and measured 

only two and one half inches taller than Appellant. Mitchell was unarmed and 

suffered several physical disabilities. When Appellant told Mitchell to leave or he 

would shoot, Appellant did not say these words in a way that would suggest, as 

Appellant claims, that he was begging Mitchell to leave him alone. Although 

Appellant claimed the loose hinges on the bathroom door showed that Mitchell 

forced it open in pursuit of Appellant, Wendy told Officer McDonald that the "door 

was kind of that way." Although Mitchell had an argumentative and combative 

disposition, Appellant and Mitchell usually resolved their arguments nonviolently. 

Upon these facts, any rational trier of fact could have found that Mitchell would not 

or could not have carried out a threat to kill or seriously injure Appellant, and that 

Appellant’s belief of imminent death or serious bodily harm, or his belief that a 

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forcible felony was about to be committed, was unreasonable. The absence of a 

reasonable belief as to imminent death or serious bodily harm renders Appellant’s 

use of deadly force unreasonable. Section 45-3-102, MCA. 

¶30 We hold there existed sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that 

Appellant shot Mitchell under extreme mental or emotional distress for which there 

is reasonable explanation or excuse, and that Appellant was not justified in the use of 

deadly force against Mitchell. We determine the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Appellant’s motions to dismiss and for judgment as a matter of 

law on the basis of insufficient evidence.

Issue 2

¶31 Was Appellant denied a fair trial as a result of alleged improper comments made by 

the prosecutor during his closing argument?

¶32 During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 

statement to the jury:

Like [Dr.] Gary Dale said, there’s any number of possible ways you could 

arrange these bodies and have things come out the way they did. One thing we 

do know, there’s no blood on the Defendant. This guy is looming over the top 

of him, how come the Defendant wasn’t covered with blood?

Appellant objected to this statement claiming that "this was not introduced at trial" and 

"there’s evidence to the other effect," but did not request the court to admonish the jury or 

give the jury a cautionary instruction. The court overruled the objection.

¶33 Appellant alleges prosecutorial misconduct in that the prosecutor not only 

improperly commented on facts not in evidence, but mischaracterized those facts. As 

support for his allegation, Appellant points to defendant’s Exhibit D, a forensic 

science division examination report describing evidence that had undergone testing 

by the forensic serologist. Exhibit D indicated that the serologist found blood stains 

on Appellant’s blue jeans, but that the results obtained for genetic typing of these 

blood stains were inconclusive. Appellant chose not to offer Exhibit D into evidence. 

On appeal, Appellant attached Exhibit D to his brief as proof that the prosecutor 

improperly commented on facts not in evidence. Without citation to authority, 

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Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s statement was highly prejudicial and 

amounted to a denial of his right to a fair trial.

¶34 Appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not reviewable. Appellant's 

action in placing before this Court a document that was not admitted into evidence 

and which is not part of the record violates Rule 9, M.R.App.P. It is well-established 

that this Court will not consider any evidence not contained in the record on appeal. 

Johnson v. Killingsworth (1995), 271 Mont. 1, 3, 894 P.2d 272, 273. The prosecutor's 

statement to the effect that "[we know] there's no blood on the defendant" may have 

been an exaggerated inference based on the state of the record before the District 

Court. However, based on the record before us, it is impossible to conclude that the 

prosecutor's statement was an outright misrepresentation of fact. We cannot 

consider Appellant's argument relating to prosecutorial misconduct.

¶35 In addition to the above claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Appellant alleges the 

State engaged in several other acts of prosecutorial misconduct including 

misstatements of fact and law; impermissible appeals to law, order, and community 

safety; and inflammatory remarks designed to appeal to the jury’s emotions. 

Appellant did not make timely objections to these alleged errors. Appellant concedes 

that § 46-20-104(2), MCA, precludes this Court from reviewing an alleged error 

unless the complaining party made a timely objection at trial or meets one of the 

exceptions outlined in Montana’s plain error statute, § 46-20-701(2), MCA. State v. 

Swoboda (1996), 276 Mont. 479, 483-84, 918 P.2d 296, 299. Appellant also concedes 

that § 46-20-701(2), MCA, is inapplicable as he does not meet any of the exceptions 

set forth therein. However, Appellant urges this Court to invoke its discretionary 

power of common law plain error review claiming that the alleged prosecutorial 

misconduct denied him his fundamental right to due process.

¶36 We clarified the common law plain error doctrine in State v. Finley (1996), 276 

Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208. We held:

[T]his Court may discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate a 

criminal defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights, even if no 

contemporaneous objection is made and notwithstanding the inapplicability of 

the § 46-20-701(2), MCA, criteria, where failing to review the claimed error 

at issue may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled 

the question of the fundamental farness of the trial or proceedings, or may 

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compromise the integrity of the judicial process.

Finley, 276 Mont. at 137, 915 P.2d at 215. In determining the applicability of the common 

law plain error doctrine, we consider the totality of circumstances of each case. Finley, 

276 Mont. at 134, 138, 915 P.2d at 213. However, we note that the common law plain 

error rule is reserved for "exceptional cases" and is to be used sparingly. State v. Sullivan 

(1996), 280 Mont. 25, 31, 927 P.2d 1033, 1036. See also State v. Arlington (1994), 265 

Mont. 127, 152, 875 P.2d 307, 322.

¶37 Having reviewed the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we determine 

that it does not present the exceptional case envisioned to invoke the common law 

plain error doctrine. Many of the alleged misstatements of fact and law were either 

taken out of context of the prosecutor’s argument, or later cured by the jury 

instructions. The appeals to law, order, and community safety, and alleged 

inflammatory references to Appellant, although overbroad and dramatic, did not 

render the trial unfair. See State v. Long (1986), 223 Mont. 502, 512, 726 P.2d 1364, 

1371. We conclude that none of the alleged errors, standing alone, or taken together, 

resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice, left unsettled the question of the 

fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or compromised the integrity of the 

judicial process. Accordingly, we decline to address the constitutional issues relating 

to prosecutorial misconduct.

Issue 3

¶38 Did the District Court err in requiring Appellant to register as a violent offender 

without issuing findings concerning Appellant’s violent offender status, and without 

providing Appellant a hearing to present contradictory evidence regarding his status?

¶39 The District Court sentenced Appellant to commitment to the Department of 

Corrections (Department) for a term of forty years with twenty years suspended. The 

court determined that the treatment and security needs of Appellant could be met 

through the pre-release and intensive supervision programs of the Department 

rather than confinement. As part of Appellant’s sentencing, the court ordered 

Appellant to register as a violent offender with the Department of Institutions, Chief 

of Police, and Sheriff in the county where Appellant resides, pursuant to §§ 46-23-

504, -505, and-506, MCA. 

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¶40 Without citation to authority, Appellant claims that the court’s order requiring 

him to register as a violent offender infringed his fundamental right to due process. 

Appellant bases the alleged due process violation on the court’s failure to make 

specific findings regarding his violent offender status, and the court’s failure to hold 

a hearing to allow Appellant an opportunity to present contradictory evidence 

regarding his status. Appellant further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his designation as a violent offender, noting that the court relied on the 

Department’s presentence investigation report which indicated the following: (1) 

Mitchell was the primary aggressor; (2) at the time Mitchell was shot, Mitchell was 

in the process of assaulting Appellant; (3) Mitchell did not heed a warning shot fired 

by Appellant before his assault of Appellant; (4) Appellant had no prior criminal 

history; and (6) pre-release and intensive supervised probation adequately addressed 

the security needs of Appellant. Appellant argues that the these facts support a 

finding that he was not a violent offender.

¶41 It appears Appellant has misconstrued the court’s role in designating a 

defendant as a violent offender. Violent offender status is determined purely by 

statute. Section 46-23-504, MCA, provides:

(1) A sexual or violent offender:

(a) shall register immediately after conclusion of the sentencing hearing if the 

offender is not sentenced to confinement or is not sentenced to the department 

and placed in confinement by the department.

A "violent offender" is defined as a person who has been convicted of a violent offense. 

Section 46-23-502(7), MCA. Mitigated deliberate homicide is a violent offense. Section 

46-23-502(9), MCA. On its face, the violent offender registration statute clearly does not 

vest a district court with the discretion to designate defendants as violent offenders. The 

statute does not prescribe a notice and hearing procedure for determining violent offender 

status, nor does it require a district court to issue findings based on evidence regarding a 

defendant’s violent offender status. Rather, a defendant’s designation as a violent offender 

is triggered merely by conviction of a violent offense. Appellant’s challenge as to the 

sufficiency of the evidence is irrelevant. Because Appellant was convicted of a violent 

offense, by definition he is a violent offender and, therefore, must register as such. We 

conclude that the District Court did not err in requiring Appellant to register as a violent 

offender without issuing findings concerning Appellant’s violent offender status, and 

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without providing Appellant a hearing to present contradictory evidence regarding his 

status.

¶42 Appellant raises the issue of a due process violation, but fails to cite specific 

authority for his argument as required by Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. We dispose of 

this issue by noting the following:

Montana recognizes that due process applies to sentencing, but the 

defendant’s liberty interest during sentencing is less than that interest during 

trial. The process that is due, therefore, is not as great as that required by the 

substantive criminal charges. The defendant is entitled to reasonable notice 

and an opportunity to be heard during sentencing. Notice of the sentencing 

hearing itself provides sufficient notice of potential dangerous offender 

designation because the statute requires the sentencing court to consider the 

issue. As a practical matter, the criminal defendant is always on notice. 

State v. Krantz (1990), 241 Mont. 501, 512, 788 P.2d 298, 305 (citations omitted). 

Although Krantz concerned the process due for dangerous offender designation under § 

46-18-404, MCA, a statute which has since been repealed, the analysis and holding of 

Krantz is no less applicable. Applying Krantz to the instant case, the process due 

Appellant for designating him a violent offender was reasonable notice and an opportunity 

to be heard during sentencing. Notice of the sentencing hearing provided Appellant with 

reasonable notice of his violent offender status, and Appellant was given an opportunity to 

be heard at his sentencing. We conclude that Appellant was afforded due process at his 

sentencing.

¶43 Affirmed.

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

 We Concur:

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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No

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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