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i 

44–669 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–126] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST AND STATUS OF 

SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 5, 2008 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 5, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request and Status of Space Activities ....................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 5, 2008 ..................................................................................... 17 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST AND STATUS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 4 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command, U.S. 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 5 

Large, Hon. Scott, Director, National Reconnaissance Office .............................. 8 

Payton, Hon. Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space 

Programs ............................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert ..................................................................................... 21 

Large, Hon. Scott .............................................................................................. 61 

Payton, Hon. Gary E. ....................................................................................... 47 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 94 

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 79 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST AND STATUS OF SPACE 

ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2008. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The hearing will come to order. 

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive testimony on national security space activities from General 

Robert Kehler, the Commander of Air Force Space Command; Mr. 

Gary Payton, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for 

Space Programs; and Mr. Scott Large, the Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

I want to thank each one of our very distinguished witnesses for 

being here today. 

This hearing is an important opportunity for the subcommittee 

to consider the posture of our Nation’s space assets, their importance to our warfighters, and to reflect on the fragility of our space 

systems. 

I want to warn everybody this is a long statement—not warn 

them, because it is not an important statement—but we are at a 

time now when we believe on the subcommittee, and in the Congress generally, that space is one of the most important issues that 

we need to be looking at, and understanding, and have oversight 

for. 

I want to congratulate my colleague, Mr. Everett, my Ranking 

Member, for all of his work over the many years on space; and to 

make it clear that one of the reasons why this is going to be a long 

statement is that we really want to highlight the work that is done, 

not only by our fabulous men and women in uniform, but by the 

amazing cadre of civilians that have done this work quietly, without a lot of fanfare, without a lot of attention, for decades. 

So, as I was saying, we want to reflect on the fragility of our 

space systems. This fragility was highlighted recently by the failure 

of an experimental NRO satellite early in its mission, and by the 

President’s decision to destroy that satellite before it reentered the 
2 

atmosphere with 1,000 pounds of frozen hydrazine fuel in a titanium tank. 

By successfully intercepting the failed satellite about 130 miles 

above the Earth’s surface—just above the upper edge of the atmosphere—our Nation took responsibility for eliminating a risk to 

human populations that we, ourselves created. At the same time, 

the United States executed the intercept consistent with international norms discouraging creation of dangerous space debris; 

the vast majority of debris created by the intercept has already reentered the Earth’s atmosphere, or will reenter in the coming days 

and weeks, and disintegrate. 

I also applaud the open and transparent manner in which our 

military leadership has explained and executed this mission. I 

know that each of our witnesses today played a key role in this effort, and each of you, as well as your whole team, should be commended for a job very, very well done. 

The recent U.S. intercept stands in sharp contrast to the secretive anti-satellite (ASAT) test that the Chinese performed a year 

ago, last January. Without alerting other spacefaring nations, as 

required by international norms, they destroyed one of their own 

aging weather satellites over 500 miles above the Earth’s surface, 

creating a debris field with thousands of lethal objects that will remain in low earth orbit (LEO) and threaten satellites, the Space 

Shuttle, and the International Space Station for decades to come. 

As a Nation critically dependent on space, I would like to ask our 

witnesses today to address the following question concerning our 

space posture: If our space assets are attacked, do we have the appropriate contingency plans for closing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gaps that our warfighters would 

experience? 

Last year, testifying as commander of United States Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM), General James Cartwright, who is 

currently Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), commented that not every problem in space requires a solution in 

space. He went on to express concern about a possible arms race 

in space. 

Last week, we received testimony from Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Vickers who stated, ‘‘DOD seeks to promote compliance with existing legal regimes, acceptance of international debris 

mitigation guidelines, and development of additional voluntary 

guidelines for safe and responsible space operations.’’ 

In this context, I would also like to hear what each of our witnesses thinks about the merits and drawbacks of establishing additional international rules of the road to govern operations in space. 

Let me be clear: I want to make sure that my subcommittee, as 

well as the Department of Defense (DOD), is doing everything we 

can to ensure that our warfighters retain the advantage of spacebased systems and that this advantage is not degraded by the Chinese test or any future attacks. 

But we must be prepared for more than just the possibility of a 

direct ascent ASAT. Future attacks may come from a ground-based 

laser or electronic jammers. An enemy might directly attack the 

ground-based components used by satellites, or an adversary may 

use cyberspace to attack vulnerabilities in our satellite systems. 
3 

One of the most basic requirements for protecting our satellites, 

which I am concerned does not receive sufficient attention, is to 

know their current status and to understand the threats they face. 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA), as it is known, has not always 

received the attention it deserves in competition with the desire to 

field new space systems with improved capabilities. 

It was with this concern in mind that our subcommittee advocated for and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 

Fiscal Year 2008 directed the development of a national space protection strategy. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the 

Director of National Intelligence (DNI), must prepare a strategy focused primarily on protection and space situational awareness requirements by July of this year. 

Today, I would like to ask our witnesses to discuss the Administration’s progress toward establishing a space protection strategy 

and, just as importantly, to address this question: Do you think we 

have struck the right balance in the fiscal year 2009 budget between investing in new systems and efforts to improve Space Situational Awareness? 

With an aging generation of systems on-orbit, the national security space community has been struggling to develop and field new 

systems for the past decade. In that regard, I know our witnesses 

must be proud of the payloads that were successfully delivered onorbit this past year, including the last Defense Support Program 

satellite, the first Wideband Global SATCOM Satellite, and two additional Global Positioning System (GPS) birds. 

And I want to congratulate each of our witnesses, today, on the 

56th consecutive successful launch of a medium or heavy payload 

that took place on December 10th last year, launching into orbit a 

satellite developed by the NRO. 

Yet, as we well know, even with these successes, we face potential gaps in key satellite capabilities during the next decade. Many 

of the replacement systems, such as Spaced Based Infrared System 

(SBIRS), the Defense Support System (DSP) replacement, have 

been plagued by inaccurate cost estimates and optimistic predictions of technical maturity. 

More generally, I am concerned that the space acquisition system 

is fundamentally broken and would ask our witnesses to discuss 

what is being done to fix the process. In particular, how can we be 

confident that the back-to-basics strategy that you have adopted 

will result in better acquisition outcomes? 

I am well aware of the benefits space-based assets provide to the 

warfighter, and I am committed to maintaining these capabilities 

without any gaps. Over the past few years, Congress has slowed 

the development of selected systems through the budget process 

due to concerns about the pace of these new programs and the emphasis on transformational systems designed to skip a technological generation. 

While the Administration adopted the back-to-basics approach 

partly in response to congressional concerns, this year we are concerned that you may well have overcorrected by delaying fielding 

of the transformational communications satellite (TSAT) by at least 

two years. TSAT will be required to provide the necessary bandwidth to support protected communications on the move for sys-
4 

tems, such as the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS). We hope 

that our witnesses today can help us understand why $4 billion 

previously designated for TSAT was removed from the five-year defense plan. 

While we have many questions, I want to assure you that the 

Congress is committed to working with the Department and the intelligence community (IC) to put our national security space programs on an affordable, sustainable track; one which accounts for 

the change in the threat environment and will protect our 

warfighters and the American people. 

Before we proceed, I would like to remind my colleagues and the 

witnesses that we are in open session and to take care to keep our 

questions and your answers unclassified. 

With that, I would like to thank the witnesses again for being 

here today, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Now, let me recognize my very good friend and colleague, Mr. 

Everett of Alabama, the Ranking Member of this subcommittee, for 

any comments that he might have. 

Mr. Everett, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Chairman Tauscher. 

I also want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses for appearing before us today. 

Welcome back, General Kehler, and congratulations on your new 

position. 

I am privileged to welcome Mr. Payton and Mr. Large in your 

first appearances before the subcommittee. 

Let me start out by congratulating our witnesses for their successful interception of a disabled NRO satellite last week. This mission was not one you had envisioned or had much time to prepare 

for, yet you did a great job, and you safeguarded the public from 

potential harm. I commend the transparent manner in which these 

plans were executed. 

This will continue to be a challenging budget year. We have immense budget pressures and competing defense priorities. However, 

I cannot stress the point enough that our modern military force is 

dependent on space, and our investment in space cannot be shortchanged. 

A case in point—the chairman mentioned this—TSAT is the only 

STRATCOM system planned to provide wideband-protected communications. Over the next few years, over 200 Army-Marine units 

will be reliant on unprotected communications, as will the Army’s 

Future Combat System brigades once they come online. 

Each Predator, Reefer, Warrior, Global Hawk unmanned aircraft 

system (UAS) fielded by the services will be unprotected communications. These forces are the most susceptible to jamming, yet the 

Department has chosen to cut $4 billion from TSAT. I do not want 

to take anything away from Wideband Global Satellite (WGS), it is 

a great capability, but I do want to know why protected communications is not a priority requirement. 
5 

I understand that the Department is revisiting this. I would ask 

you to come back and brief this committee once your analysis is 

complete. 

We are now a year away from the Chinese ASAT test. Last year, 

this committee asked for a comprehensive space protection strategy 

to guide the investments. This year’s budget should be the Department’s first opportunity to make changes in the Space Situational 

Awareness and space protection budgets. I hope you can discuss efforts in this area. 

In addition to capability investments, I also remain concerned 

about how our military would operate in a space threat environment. For instance, do war games and exercises include space denial, and has there been a deliberate hard look at our war plans? 

General Kehler, as you had mentioned last year, if you take 

away space from the fight, the impact on our forces is a reverse 

time machine. 

Under the chairman’s leadership, our committee has continued 

its strong oversight of space acquisition. I appreciate your assessment of current state-of-space acquisition, and the status of some 

key programs in this year’s budget—GPS III, SBIRS, Space Radar 

(SR), and Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). 

Before closing, I want to thank you again for your service and 

leadership in the space community. I think space—in particular national security space—is one of the most exciting things this Nation 

and this Congress does. 

I thank you, Chairman. This is an extremely important budget 

year and hearing to have. So thank you for calling the hearing, and 

for your leadership. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett, very much. 

General Kehler, Commander of the Air Force Space Command, 

welcome; and we appreciate the fact that you have an extensive 

and comprehensive statement you have submitted for the record. If 

you could summarize that, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General KEHLER. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very, very 

much. Congressman Everett. Members of the subcommittee. 

Yes, I have appeared before this subcommittee before, a year or 

so ago, but this is the first time as the commander of really magnificent 39,000-plus men and women who are active-duty airmen. 

They are guardsmen, they are reservists, they are government civilians, and they are contractors, and they are doing a spectacular 

job. And I am very, very proud to be associated with them. 

So thanks so much for inviting us here today, and thank you for 

the subcommittee’s support of this subject. 

Madam Chairwoman, I think you have summarized it very well, 

and I am not going to say anything more in terms of an opening 

statement, other than to completely agree with you. 

Space is a very, very important place for the United States military, for the national security apparatus, and for the United States 

of America in general. There is no question that space is an important place for us militarily, economically, and it has really been 

woven now into the social fabric of how we all conduct our daily 
6 

lives; something that should not be lost on any of us as we think 

about the potential of space as a contested environment in some future conflict. 

We believe that the evidence is clear. What we observe today 

with many, many actors around the world shows to us that there 

are those determined adversaries out there who will seek to remove 

the advantages that the United States has with its space capabilities in some future conflict. 

We do not just see that in evidence through the Chinese ASAT 

test of a little over a year ago, but as you pointed out, we have seen 

jamming all the way back to Saddam Hussein attempting to jam 

GPS. We have seen the proliferation of jammers for GPS and other 

communications signals. We know that the jamming activity will 

be there in a future conflict, just as they have already been in a 

past conflict. 

We have seen the demonstration, in some cases the development, 

of other potentially troubling anti-satellite kind of things, as well; 

ground-based things that we have seen, in terms of laser development and other activities, that could serve to blind our assets or 

otherwise disrupt those, as well as some of the things that we have 

now seen in evidence with the Chinese kinetic anti-satellite test. 

These are not necessarily new threats, and certainly the Chinese 

test, while very troubling, was not a surprise. 

So the question now becomes: If this is going to be a contested 

domain, what do we do about that? And that was the first of the 

questions that you posed. Do we have gaps? And I would answer, 

quite frankly, in some cases, we do. We know that there are some 

of our assets today that are more susceptible to some of these 

threats than others. 

In some cases, our space assets are very well protected today, because we knew during the Cold War that we would face the same 

kind of a determined adversary—saw the same kind of evidence out 

of that adversary—and so we prepared ourselves, in some cases, to 

deal with that kind of an adversary. And the result of that preparation are systems that are on-orbit today that are quite effective 

against some of the threats that we see developing. 

In other cases, that is not true, and we will need to address 

those. In some cases, we have done that programmatically; and so 

programs like GPS III, programs like Advanced Airborne Electronic 

Attack (AEA), Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), and 

some of the other activities that we have ongoing are designed to 

try to deal with some of these threats. 

The number one concern that we have is to improve our Space 

Situational Awareness, and that you will see—although those are 

not large budget dollars when you consider the overall scope of the 

budget, in fact—has had a budget increase from fiscal 2008, the 

budget that you enacted; to the request that we have sitting before 

you today. 

My opinion about Space Situational Awareness is that perhaps 

the most effective use of the money that we can have this year is 

to make better use of the sensors that we have. And so you will 

see a request for some improvement in things that do not sound, 

on the surface, to be very compelling or appealing, but we think 

will go a long way toward helping us improve our SSA early on. 
7 

Thank you for your comment about the very large joint team that 

conducted the successful intercept. I will tell you the lesson that I 

took away from that was the value of high-quality Space Situational Awareness because, if you have high-quality Space Situational Awareness and high-quality space surveillance, we can begin 

to characterize—in this case, we were able to characterize with 

very high precision—what was actually going on with an object in 

space, what it looked like in terms of tumble, et cetera; all things 

that would be important for us in the future as we look at understanding what is happening to us in space, discriminating whether 

or not it is a natural event that we have just experienced or a determined attack, and being able to attribute those kinds of differences. All of those are important to us. 

And so let me just conclude by, again, thanking you. We look forward to the rest of your questions. I certainly look forward to your 

questions. I will not try and go down that entire list right now, but 

you certainly have whet our appetites for a further dialogue. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 21.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, General Kehler. 

Under Secretary of the Air Force Payton, welcome. Your statement is put in the record, and if you could summarize, the floor is 

yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS 

Secretary PAYTON. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome. 

Secretary PAYTON. Again, Chairman Tauscher, Mr. Everett, I 

greatly appreciate the opportunity to talk about military space with 

the committee today. We have a superb relationship with this committee, and we view it very highly. 

Let me answer one of your questions in my opening statement, 

maybe save a little time that way. You asked about evidence that 

back-to-basics was working. I would point to the GPS III program, 

a program that is, at its heart, designed to counteract enemy potential adversary degradation of GPS service. We call it NAVWAR. 

The evidence that we have that back-to-basics is working is because a critical part of back-to-basics is what I call a block approach: Incremental deliveries bite off smaller chunks of new capability, build on proven technology before we start full-scale development of the new system. 

GPS III is a perfect example of how we have done that in a program. We worked with the combatant commanders, as represented 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and directly with Strategic Command, 

and the services, and in the GPS case, even Department of Transportation (DOT), other Federal agencies, because GPS serves such 

a wide variety of users. We identified those first critical, most important new functionalities that the GPS III constellation should 

supply. We packaged that into something called Block A of the GPS 

III program. 

This spring, we should be able to award the full-scale development contract for Block A of the GPS III program. We have already 

defined a tentative Block B that would come after Block A, and 
8 

then finally a Block C that is the definitive end state of the GPS 

III constellation. And so to me, that is evidence that we are making 

progress in back-to-basics. 

We have the proven technology for the GPS III A acquisition. We 

have been spending two years proving those component technologies. We have competitive bidders with their designs for that 

spacecraft under evaluation right now, and we should be able to 

award a full-scale development contract for the GPS III A program 

this spring. 

And so, again, it is an example, a near-term example, of how we 

think the back-to-basics acquisition strategy is showing success. We 

are not out of the woods. There are still several programs. I am 

sure we will turn up rocks with lizards underneath them. But 

there are some promising signs that back-to-basics is working. 

And, again, thank you for the invitation today, and I look forward to your other questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Payton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Under Secretary Payton. 

The Director of National Reconnaissance Office, Mr. Scott Large, 

welcome. It is your first appearance before the committee. 

Mr. LARGE. Thank you. Yes, it is, thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Congratulations on your appointment. 

Mr. LARGE. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. Your testimony is put in the record, 

and please summarize. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT LARGE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Mr. LARGE. Very good. 

Madam Chairman, Mr. Everett, other members, thank you very 

much for the opportunity. As the chairman said, this is my first opportunity to address the subcommittee. 

Hopefully, by seeing the three of us up here together, you may 

get some insight and a good feeling for the state of integration 

across what I will term national security space. There is a lot going 

on in the national security space environment, as both General 

Kehler and Mr. Payton have described. 

The NRO is a strong and integral member of that national security space team. And while today’s setting is an unclassified setting, and I will not be able to go into great details and particulars 

to some of the questions you may have, what I would like to stress 

is that we are what I believe is a vital part of direct support to the 

warfighters; a member of the team addressing space protection, 

which of course, is one of the most important topics we are discussing today. But, also, as far as acquisition, the back-to-basics, 

the NRO is on a path that we have charted over the last year or 

so to try to move past some of the challenges we have faced in the 

last several years. And I think we are making progress. 

In a future setting with the committee, the subcommittee, I 

would like to go into great detail on exactly what we are doing to 

try to recover our position in effective acquisition of space systems. 

The other thing that I would leave with you quickly is that, 

while we talk about space protection, we talk about acquisition. We 
9 

also are concerned where we are going in the future, the investments in research and development (R&D), and the fact that we 

are jointly involved with our other spacefaring agencies within the 

DOD, and actually the civilian community in pushing forward some 

of the limits of space R&D. 

With that, I look forward to answering your questions. Hopefully, 

we can address some of the specific issues you have today. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Large can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Director. 

I will tell the committee that we are working with our own 

schedule to have a classified briefing with the director and others. 

Perhaps General Kehler and Mr. Payton could also attend. It will 

be as soon as we can find the time, and it will be, as I said, a classified hearing. 

I want to get back to one of the questions I asked, because I 

think it is fundamentally what we really care about the most, and 

that is about what we would do if our assets were attacked. Do you 

have appropriate contingency plans for closing the ISR gaps that 

our warfighters would experience, regardless of who attacks us and 

what method they use? Do you feel confident that we have an appropriate Plan B? 

And, second, how would you judge the process of the Operational 

Responsive Space program’s efforts to develop systems that might 

fill these potential gaps? 

General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Ma’am, thank you. 

First of all, let me describe that as the Commander of Air Force 

Space Command, we are a force provider to the Commander of 

Strategic Command, who really is the one who deals with the question of operational planning and contingency planning. 

Having said that, however, there are operational plans that are 

certainly contingency plans, not only with U.S. Strategic Command, but across the regional combatant commanders as well, for 

dealing with a number of potential outcomes here. What I cannot 

do today is sit here and say that as we look to the future that we 

always have in place a way to compensate for the loss of space assets. 

What I can tell you is we are working on that very hard, and we 

believe that that is a central piece of our strategic approach to how 

we would deal with the potential loss of our space assets. In some 

cases, we are very confident today that we have alternative ways, 

if not to completely address the loss of a space asset, to certainly 

compensate for that in warfighting terms. 

In other cases, we do not have as much confidence as we look to 

the future—for example, GPS. I mean, that is why we are looking 

to improve the GPS constellation in incremental blocks as we go 

forward, as Mr. Payton described. 

In some cases, we think that we have fairly good capability today 

to accomplish some of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions with air platforms and other things, but that is situationally dependent also. And so what I do not want to leave you 
10 

with is the impression that all of our concerns are addressed. They 

are not. 

I also do not want to create the impression that we are not working on this and, in some cases, I cannot go into the specific details, 

but what I can tell you is that a key part of our strategy as we 

look to the future and we think through how do we address the notion of space becoming a contested domain or space capabilities becoming challenged in one way or another, a large part of this is understanding how we can use the assets in all of the domains in 

order to bring to the combatant commanders the full range of capabilities that then makes this very difficult for an adversary to address. 

We do not want to be one dimensional, for sure. On the other 

hand, there are some things that we do best, and in some cases, 

can only do from space for our warfighters. And so in those cases, 

we are going to have to pay particularly close attention to make 

sure that we have addressed those needs and have appropriate 

compensation measures; perhaps even an operationally responsive 

way to replace or augment those capabilities if, in fact, they are 

threatened. That is where ORS begins to come in. 

Now let me take just a second, if I might, to describe to you that 

operational responsiveness in our mind is not just about small platforms and small launch vehicles. Operational responsiveness starts 

on the ground, and we believe that, in many cases, we can get more 

operationally responsive with changes that we make on the ground 

using our existing assets, and that is where we always start. 

But as we look in the tool bag of things that we would want to 

have available for the future, one of those tools needs to be a way 

to put smaller, single-purpose, shorter-lived platforms on-orbit in 

response to a specific warfighter need, or in response to an augmentation request or in response to a reconstitution request. So we 

are looking at ORS as if it is a national strategic capability for the 

future, and today, what we are doing is we are working on the 

building blocks to make it so. 

So, as we work our way through this budget, we are going from 

fall to walk to, I hope, run by the end of this time period, this fiveyear time period, so that we can present to the combatant commanders, in our case through the Commander of U.S. Strategic 

Command, an appropriate way to supplement, or replace, or reconstitute critical assets when those are absolutely necessary. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Okay. 

Under Secretary, Director, do you have anything to add to that? 

Mr. LARGE. I would suggest the ORS program is doing both 

enablers for ground control or new sorts of spacecraft, plug-andplay spacecraft in particular. We are continuing the TacSat series; 

we flew TacSat–2; we are going to launch TacSat–3 within a few 

months; and we are designing TacSat–5 right now to demonstrate 

one of the critical enablers, which is that notion of rapidly assembling from flight quality parts already on the shelf, a plug-and-play 

spacecraft that can be fine-tuned to the combatant commanders’ 

needs. Tentatively, that is one of the objectives of TacSat–5. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. LARGE. So we are making progress. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I appreciate that. 
11 

We have just been notified that we are going to have a series of 

four votes. 

Mr. Everett, I am going to go to you, and perhaps we can quickly 

get through some questions. 

Four votes sometimes turns into 45 minutes very quickly, although that is not the way the clock is meant to work. 

Mr. Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you. Chairman, I am specifically going to 

touch on TSAT. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Sure. 

Mr. EVERETT. That is something you have already covered in 

your opening statement, but it concerns me that—and, General 

Kehler, we have talked about this—in a few years when TSAT is 

scheduled to come online, we could have as many as 400 units, Marines, ground folk that would be using unprotected communications, and I am wondering if there is any workaround on that. 

Should we slow walk some of the stuff like Future Combat Systems, the UASes that would depend on TSAT for protection com 

work? And, as we know, UASes are becoming extremely important 

in our warfighters’ plans, as well as ISR. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I—— 

Mr. EVERETT. So I guess my first question is: Should we slow 

walk some of these other systems? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I think it is premature to slow walk that. 

Let me back up here for a second. Military satellite communications, as you all know, are critically important to us, and today, we 

get satellite communications with a large participating from commercial satellite companies and providers, and they do a spectacular job. In fact, over half support what we do today through satellite communications is done through commercial communications, 

and so that mixture, we believe, at some level, will have to continue into the future. 

At the same time, we have just started to deploy WGS, the first 

of six satellites, which is going to be critically important for expanded wideband communications, and we are within a year, we 

believe, of launching the first AEHF. So we are progressing. 

The question then becomes: How do we then get to the next most 

important issue that the warfighters have raised, and that is protected communications. The decisions that we made last year on 

TSAT, which were made largely in response to the need to purchase a fourth AEHF satellite, rippled through the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP). But, at the same time that ripple occurred, we were asked to participate with a team inside the Department to come back and take a hard look at how this should 

now go forward, given the fourth AEHF, and how we keep all these 

pieces together, and address the warfighter needs. 

That review is going on as we speak today, and I cannot tell you 

what the answer is yet about how we intend to address the 

warfighter needs. What I can tell you is the warfighters are at that 

table; and as we look to come back to you, we will look to come 

back to you with a balanced way forward that addresses their 

needs synchronized with when those needs are and, again, we 

know that there is growth coming out there, both in terms of bandwidth, and we know that there is growth coming in terms of our 
12 

requirement to do protected communications. What we do not have 

yet is a revised answer in light of the insertion of the fourth AEHF 

in the net flow, and that answer we owe you. 

I think, at this point, sir, it would be premature for us to try to 

decide that there was some different phasing out there. I think our 

first objective is to come back and see if we can come up with a 

plan that continues that phasing the way the other services are requiring it. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Chairman. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Everett, I think we all have the same concern about TSAT. Perhaps we will ask General Kehler when he has 

that answer to give us a call, and we will have a small informal 

meeting. 

If you do not mind, sir, we would like to have you come back, 

and we will gather as many people as possible. 

General KEHLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But we do think that before the bill that we are 

writing gets built any further, we need to have an answer to that. 

Mr. Larsen of Washington. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Kehler, can I just put a finer point to paraphrase what 

you just said, see if I understand it? Regarding TSAT, the original 

launch was scheduled 2016, but since there has been $4 billion or 

so, at least from our analysis, taken out of TSAT, you do not know 

what that date is. It might be 2016. It might be later. You just do 

not know whether this fourth AEHF is going to fill that need until 

such time we can get to TSAT. Is that—— 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. I think that is a good—— 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. I understand? Okay. Thanks. 

Regarding international opportunities, I am not sure who to ask. 

Perhaps I will start with Secretary Payton. Last week—and 

Madam Chair mentioned this in her testimony. Last week, Mr. 

Vickers discussed voluntary guidelines and rules of the road. Now, 

in his answers to questions, someone asked whether or not the Administration at least had a plan in mind for rules of the road in 

space, or whether this is just some sort of general discussion about 

rules of the road and there is really nothing yet more behind it. 

Do you have any idea, thoughts on the merits of rules of the road 

in space, or other international regimes, short of treaties, that just 

sort of discuss the Coast Guard rules like, make sure you have a 

green light on the right of your boat and a red light on the left of 

your boat? 

Secretary PAYTON. In some regards, there already are tacit 

agreements amongst most spacefaring nations. 

For instance, one of the biggest sources of debris is spent upper 

stages that still have propellant on board. The United States, Europe, as a routine for that last rocket stage that is in orbit near 

the satellite, we take that and vent the propellants out of that 

rocket stage so there is much, much less likelihood of that rocket 

exploding a few years from now. 

Up at geosynchronous (GEO), the geosynchronous belt is a very 

high-value piece of space real estate. Again, tacit agreements. As 

upper stages deposit a spacecraft there, that upper stage then 

moves higher than geosynchronous so that it does not become a 
13 

navigation hazard. And also operators of geosynchronous spacecraft, whether they are commercial or government, as the spacecraft runs out of propellant for station keeping, they tend to dispose of them in a higher graveyard orbit, again, so that they do not 

present a navigation hazard. 

So some of the problem becomes convincing all spacefaring entities to abide by those rules. I believe China has just recently 

bragged about how they can do that with their last uppers, their 

last stage, from one of their geosynchronous launches. 

So those are tacit agreements that have been developed out of 

best practices and shared amongst the reputable space operators. 

So there are some valuable, critical rules of the road, if you would, 

already in place. Now the first step, I would contend, is a function 

of getting all players to abide by those tacit agreements. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. 

Another question about international opportunities: In 2007, the 

Australian Government agreed to invest in the Wideband Global 

System. Are there other opportunities across the space portfolio for 

greater international cooperation? 

Secretary PAYTON. Yes, sir. In fact, on the AEHF program, we 

have participation from the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 

and Canada, and then the—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you discuss what they will get out of that, or 

is that something we need to discuss—— 

Secretary PAYTON. I believe it is rolled up in conjunction with the 

North Atlantic Treaty Orgnization (NATO) communications agency, 

and how those countries contribute to NATO’s communications 

bandwidth, and they do it through AEHF; and we are always looking at other opportunities because geography counts, especially in 

Space Situational Awareness, geography counts. 

Mr. LARSEN. Madam Chairman, that is where I will end here. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. Franks from Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 

I thank all of you for everything that you do. I do not know how 

the country would survive without your cutting-edge focus, and we 

really appreciate it. 

General Kehler, I might say to you—and carbon copy everyone 

else that had anything to do with it—this satellite shootdown continues to be a real source of excitement on the part of a lot of us. 

I do not want to use the word pride because that is when we get 

in trouble, but—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You can feel proud of it, Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. I just think that you all did a magnificent job. And 

I think one of the things it did, in my mind, is that it demonstrated 

the inextricable and intrinsic relationship between national security space and missile defense. Because, in a sense, we saw a missile defense asset accomplish a space mission. And with all of the 

things that you have to juggle, as it were, whether it is cyberspace 

challenges or the missile defense capabilities, could you give us 

some perspective on the cooperation between the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) and the Air Force Space Command, and why it is 

important to make sure that there are not only cooperation there, 
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but you have the flexibility to interact in these areas without us 

creating any artificial barriers? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

First of all, let me say that, again the Air Force Space Command’s piece of this activity was a piece of a much larger activity 

that was a joint activity extended into the Missile Defense Agency, 

et cetera, under the command of the Commander of Strategic Command. And so, first, I think we should feel very gratified that the 

joint team did what the joint team we know can do when they come 

together. It also extended elsewhere in the government. Of course, 

Mr. Large’s organization and others were deeply involved, NASA as 

well. And so this was a very large team of folks that came together 

to make this happen. 

Our piece of this primarily in Air Force Space Command was 

space surveillance; and the space surveillance network that we operate on behalf of the Nation, when combined with the sensors that 

the Missile Defense Agency has put out, in combination with other 

government sensors, proved to be a decisive advantage for us. And 

so I would offer that the single largest lesson that I took out of this 

was the value of us being able to use sensors that were created for 

different missions together, and that is a model that we are going 

to try to follow as we get to better, and better, and better Space 

Situational Awareness. 

It really is the combined use of all of the sensors together, being 

able to display the information from the sensors, and make that 

useable for decision makers that enabled this to happen, and that 

does not take anything away from anybody on the team who had 

many, many, many different roles to play. It certainly takes nothing away from the great United States Navy, but it was a large 

team. 

And what I take away from this, in terms of cooperation with Air 

Force Space Command and Missile Defense Agency, was the use of 

the sensors, the command and control, and the networking that 

was done. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just one other question, Mr. Large. 

Mr. LARGE. Sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Within the constraints of an open meeting here, I 

am trying to make sure that I couch this question in a way that 

does not put you in any awkward position at all. 

I have several open letters here from Admiral Keating, from others, that delineate some capability that the Space Radar has that 

are pretty unique and pretty irreplaceable. With that in mind, you 

know that Congress made some significant cuts in that regard, and 

we cited, you know, affordability, and program scope, and technological—— 

Mr. LARGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS [continuing]. And a lot of things. So my question to 

you is, within the limitations of an open session here, can you discuss the measures that you and the Department of Defense have 

taken toward defining a Space Radar program that effectively balances cost, risk, and performance? I mean, are we on the right 

track here, given the importance of this system. 
15 

Mr. LARGE. Sir, within the constraints of the situation where we 

are right now, I would say that between both the Department of 

Defense and the intelligence community, the DNI, I believe we 

have mapped out what we believe is an alternative approach that 

addresses, first of all, the Congress’s concerns about affordability, 

scope, timelines, and so on. We are in the process of socializing 

that certainly between both communities, the IC and the DOD, so 

that we are prepared to bring that forward to you. 

We believe we have a solution set. We are working with the Air 

Force acquisition piece, the Department of Defense, other acquisition pieces, and the interests of, certainly, the DNI and his acquisition requirements. But I am uncomfortable going beyond that at 

this point. 

Mr. FRANKS. Close enough. 

Thanks, all of you, for what you do. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

Director Large, can you give us a sense for when the scoping 

memo that you are talking about may be prepared and when we 

could actually get access to it? Are we talking 45 days? 

Mr. LARGE. I am hoping that within 45 days we will be able to 

come back to the committee with more details of what the plan is. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good. We will see you in 46 days. 

Mr. LARGE. Yes, ma’am. I will write that down. [Laughter.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service. 

Thank you for the leadership you provide to the tens of thousands 

of people that work in your area of responsibility (AOR) and under 

your command, and the civilians and the contractors, many people, 

as I said earlier, who are without thanks, who work very anonymously, and do great service to the American people, and certainly 

advance our cause protecting the warfighter and making sure that 

we are safe here at home. 

We have four votes. It will take us about 45 minutes. So we are 

going to relieve you of duty, right now. Thank you very much for 

being here. We expect to see you in a classified session in 45, 46 

days or so. 

Thank you very much, again, for your service and thank you for 

appearing before the committee. 

[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 5, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 5, 2008 

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

MARCH 5, 2008 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how would you describe the rationale for the February 20th intercept of the failed U.S. satellite? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The President directed the satellite intercept to mitigate risk to human life from the 1,000 pounds of toxic hydrazine fuel 

onboard the non-controllable U.S. satellite that was about to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere. In a controlled satellite reentry, risk is managed by causing the reentry 

to occur over the ocean or sparsely populated areas. This satellite was non-functional and unable to be commanded or controlled, making it impossible to predict 

the exact time or location of satellite reentry/impact. 

Modeling and analysis gave high confidence that the intercept would be successful. The time, location and geometry of the intercept were carefully chosen to maximize the success of fragmenting the hydrazine fuel tank, minimize the risk of reentering debris hitting populated areas, and to minimize the risk of debris to other 

space objects. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, Please describe Air Force Space 

Command’s role in the February 20, 2008 satellite intercept. 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) operators provided high quality space surveillance and space situational awareness 

(SSA) information to USSTRATCOM via the Joint Functional Component Commander-SPACE (JFCC-SPACE) Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). 

AFSPC’s Space Surveillance Network provided tracking and characterization data 

that enabled prediction of the satellite’s location and relative position. This data was 

fused with other sensor data and forwarded to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

and Navy to support the engagement. 

AFSPC Overhead Non-imaging Infrared sensors provided information during engagement and reentry to include IR detection of the hit/kill and prediction of potential earth impact for any large pieces of debris. 

After the satellite intercept, the Space Surveillance Network tracked the resulting 

debris and provided both piece count and positional data to support analysis of the 

debris field. Data was used to predict potential hazards to active satellites, perform 

conjunction analysis for satellite owner operators (to include commercial and foreign 

entities), and monitor decay of debris reentering the earth’s atmosphere. That tracking continues today. 

Finally, the 30th Space Wing’s (Vandenberg AFB) HAZMAT team was on standby 

to support potential recovery operations as part of the Consequence Management 

Response Team. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the Pentagon’s annual China military modernization report will be released March 3rd and is expected to build upon last year’s report that China continues to develop a multi-dimensional counterspace program. What implications do these developments have on 

our national security space posture? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The number of space faring nations is 

growing and it should be noted China is not the only country to possess 

counterspace capabilities. We now operate in a contested space domain and, therefore, Space Situational Awareness and Space Protection are high priorities for National Security Space (NSS) systems. While some of our space capabilities are protected, we realize that we will likely face a wider range of threats to not only the 

satellites, but also their ground infrastructure and the links that control/connect 

these systems 

The most recent National Space Policy reinforces our commitment to the peaceful 

use of space, yet acknowledges the fact that we have a right of self-defense. Because 

of the growing number of threats, we need an integrated National space protection 

strategy that synchronizes the many disparate vulnerability assessment and protection activities across the NSS and that addresses these multi-dimensional threats 

through a holistic and systematic process across all NSS capabilities. 

To address these issues, Air Force Space Command and NRO established a Space 

Protection Program (SPP) on 31 March 2008, to help make informed decisions about 

how to best preserve our space capabilities via comprehensive vulnerability assess-
80 

ments, protection strategies and concepts, protection technologies investment, and 

protection capstone requirements definition with roadmaps to define integration of 

protection capabilities into future systems. Additionally, we are increasing our efforts to develop Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) capabilities to allow us options in the future to quickly replace or augment existing satellite capabilities. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how should the investment strategy be restructured across the Air Force and NRO space portfolios to 

avoid single-point vulnerabilities as highlighted by the Chinese ASAT test last year? 

Does the 2009 budget request reflect any programmatic or operational changes? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. We recognize space is a contested environment and considered this in our investment strategy. The Air Force is exploring 

what methods we need to ensure survivability of space capabilities. In the FY09 

budget request, we have programs like Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) which 

seeks to develop the capability to rapidly augment, replenish or replace space capabilities, when necessary. Additionally, Air Force Space Command formed a Space 

Protection Office in conjunction with the NRO that is dedicated to mapping a way 

ahead for this effort. We also increased our investment in space situational awareness, especially in areas that will help make better use of existing sensors and their 

supporting systems. Additionally, the FY09 budget request includes funding for a 

vulnerability assessment center and additional intelligence analysts to provide more 

timely support to space operations centers. 

Outputs of these efforts will be reflected in integrated space architectures produced by the National Security Space Office (NSSO) as well as in future budget requests for the DOD and the IC. Integrated Space Architectures, which cover the 

next 10 to 20 years, are intended to optimize investments across the National Security Space Community, while the National Security Space Plan (NSSP) will identify 

those investments required in the near term to achieve the architecture vectors. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, we understand the 

Chinese ASAT test was a good example of how intelligence was ‘‘operationalized’’ 

to provide near real-time support to military users. As threats to space increase, so 

too will the demand for greater space intelligence support and resources. How does 

the Department plan to address this requirement? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. This question properly falls to the NRO 

and we defer to Mr. Large. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the FY 2008 National 

Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to develop a space protection strategy. What do you see as the 

key challenges in this area? Are they material or non-material? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. We see several challenges and opportunities, both material and non-material. The key challenges to developing a National 

Space Protection Strategy will be in integrating the DOD and Intelligence Community requirements, establishing the minimum space capabilities that need to survive 

and operate through an attack, and prioritizing protection requirements and investment decisions. A key element will be to remain agile and responsive to emerging 

threats, while maintaining the proper balance between the space, ground, and communication link segments. This will require integrating the capabilities across the 

National Security Space (NSS) Community, both DOD and Intelligence Community 

(IC), in new and in some cases unprecedented ways. 

Another key element, will be fostering collaboration among the military and intelligence organizations within the NSS, as well as ensuring civil, commercial and Allied representation. To enable this, Air Force Space Command and the NRO have 

established a Space Protection Program (SPP), which in addition to developing the 

Congressionally directed Space Protection Strategy, will serve to consolidate multiple protection efforts, conduct comprehensive NSS vulnerability assessments, and 

identify alternatives for senior leadership to consider. The recommended options 

from the SPP will span both materiel and non-materiel capabilities. These could include changes in space system designs or changes in the way these systems are operated. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is the Department’s overall protection strategy for assured access to space? How does DOD examine and analyze the benefits and cost of different strategies? Given the historical 

experience during the Cold War, can space systems be cost-effectively protected? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The National Security Space Office’s 

(NSSO) architecture process includes analysis of various alternative architectures, 

including assessments of performance benefits and costs. The NSSO has worked 

with stakeholders to produce the Protection for Space Mission Assurance (PSMA) 

architecture. PSMA identified a number of steps (classified) the U.S. could take in 

the near-, mid-, and far-terms to cost effectively protect space systems. The Air 
81 

Force Space Command and NRO Space Protection Program (SPP) and other initiatives have begun incorporating PSMA findings and recommendations into their efforts. 

For cost effectiveness, it is not only space systems that require survivability, but 

more importantly the space capability architectures. Through an architectural combination of protection features (safeguard, avoid, preempt, suppress, restore) and an 

intelligent strategy for the assumption of acceptable risk, sufficient mission assurance can be achieved in a relatively cost effective manner. In this regard, Operationally Responsive Space efforts are working to provide the ability to rapidly augment 

or reconstitute space capabilities. Because of the evolving nature of the threats, protection architectures must also be flexible and adaptable. As a result, protection features will not always be unique to the individual systems but must be considered 

part of the NSS enterprise. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, historically, SATCOM 

requirements exceed the capacity of our government systems. To make up the difference, the military spends over $400 million a year for commercial SATCOM. In 

Operation Iraqi Freedom over 80% of our military SATCOM requirements were met 

by commercial carriers. Does national security require the development of a Commercial Satellite Communications Policy much like the National Remote Sensing 

Policy? What are we doing to ensure our warfighters are getting the necessary communications capability in a timely and cost effective manner? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Additional policy is not needed at this 

time. Our SATCOM needs require varying levels of protection and security based 

on the information being transmitted and the mission being supported. Much of that 

need can be, and has been, satisfied by commercial providers. 

To ensure timely and cost effective communications capabilities are provided to 

the warfighter, we are currently fielding Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite, and will begin launching Advanced EHF satellites in FY09. WGS provides 

DOD-controlled wideband communications, while AEHF will provide a 10-times increase in bandwidth for secure, anti-jam, Low Probability of Intercept/Detection 

(LPI/LPD) communication to replace the Milstar constellation. At the same time, we 

are working to reduce risk in preparation for the development of the next-generation 

Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) satellite. 

These systems will continue to be augmented with commercial satellite communications, where the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks, and Information Integration (ASD(Nll)) provides acquisition policy and oversight and the Defense Information Systems Agency provides acquisition procedures, lifecycle oversight, and a 

qualified workforce to acquire quality products and services that satisfy our 

warfighters’ needs at fair and reasonable costs to the government. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is your assessment of the synchronization between the launch of military SATCOM systems and 

the fielding of compatible user terminals? How are you ensuring that user terminals 

are fielded to keep pace with new capabilities introduced on WGS (already on-orbit), 

AEHF (1QFY09), and the Navy’s MUOS (FY 2010)? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The majority of AEHF, WGS, & MUOS 

users will initially utilize the backwards compatibility services found on these new 

satellites to bridge the transition period from the legacy systems to the new networks. 

— Since the first WGS launch last year, over 885 currently fielded terminals, 

including Ground Multi-band Terminal (GMT) and the Air Force Wideband 

Enterprise Terminals (AFWET), are able to use the system’s legacy X-band 

capability. At the time of the sixth and final WGS launch, 4,586 joint terminals capable of using the new WGS Ka-band capability are programmed to 

have been fielded. 

— At the time of the first AEHF launch, over 1,290 currently fielded, joint terminals will be able to use the system’s legacy MILSTAR-like capabilities. The 

first Air Force terminals to start using the Extended Data Rate (XDR) capability from AEHF will be the Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminals (SMART-Ts) in FY10. At the time of the fourth AEHF launch, 83% of 

programmed joint terminals utilizing the new AEHF waveform are programmed to have been fielded. 

— At the time of the first MUOS launch, over 61,000, currently fielded, joint terminals will be able to take advantage of the system’s legacy UHF Follow-on 

(UFO)-like capabilities. At the time of the fifth MUOS launch, 1,300 Joint 

Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals, capable of UHF SATCOM, will have 

been fielded. These JTRS terminals will be able to take full advantage of the 

new MUOS capability. 
82 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, how are space assets modeled in 

warfighter operational plans (OPPLANS) and contingency plans (CONPLANS)? How 

do OPPLANS and CONPLANS account for scenarios where our space assets are attacked or denied? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) has primary responsibility for the mission of space protection and 

works with all combatant commanders on the use of space assets in various 

OPPLANS and CONPLANS; Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) provides space 

forces to USSTRATCOM for inclusion in USSTRATCOM OPPLANS and 

CONPLANS. USSTRATCOM models space assets within its OPPLANS in accordance with the Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, dividing space forces into four 

types; Space Control, Space Force Enhancement, Space Support, and Space Force 

Application. USSTRATCOM then goes on to identify several capabilities available 

for each type of space force and generally how they will be used in each phase of 

an operation. Detailed planning of the use of space forces and how they will be used 

to support the Combatant Commanders is done by USSTRATCOM in their 

CONPLANS. USSTRATCOM CONPLANS, through the Joint Force Component 

Commander for Space, plan for three types of space control operations; defensive operations, offensive operations, and space situational awareness (SSA) operations. 

SSA capabilities allow U.S. forces to be knowledgeable of ongoing activity in space 

and the location of various assets which provides us with the knowledge and battlespace awareness needed to more clearly identify when our space assets are threatened or attacked. SSA operations provide the foundation for effective action in defensive and offensive operations. SSA information directly feeds activities under 

USSTRATCOM CONPLANS to account for the threat of attacks or denial of freedom of action through the use of a Space Threat Conditions system. Additionally 

CONPLANS include possible course of actions (COAs) for dealing with GPS jamming, communications link jamming, laser attacks on satellites, attacks on our 

ground stations, and various types of ASAT weapons. Taken together these plans 

provide USSTRATCOM, the Combatant Commander, and the President or SecDef 

with multiple COAs for ensuring freedom of action for U.S. and friendly nations for 

operations in and through space. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, to what degree do current military exercises and wargames incorporate scenarios where our space assets are neutralized or attacked, and scenarios where redundancies or alternatives are exercised? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) units 

and personnel participate in approximately 35 exercises and wargames annually. In 

these exercises and wargames, we support Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), other Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), Air Force, other Services and our own AFSPC training objectives. We undertake these exercises and wargames both in the Continental United 

States (CONUS) and in other Combatant Commanders areas of responsibility 

(AORs) because AFSPC is specifically charged to communicate its mission and provide support to all military Services and Combatant Commands. 

Let me give you some examples from some recent exercises and our most recent 

Schriever series wargame. In exercises TERMINAL FURY 08 and in BLUE FLAG 

07-2 our space events included: Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming, satellite 

communication (SATCOM) system interference and jamming, laser dazzling of optical surveillance satellites, an attack by an anti-satellite system, satellite anomalies 

requiring the use of other capabilities, space weather effecting space capabilities and 

other space control missions. We also relocated our forces in order to be able to continue operations as we demonstrate annually during the USSTRATCOM GLOBAL 

Series exercises. All of these actions are taken by our forces in the field and obviously some of these events were simulated. 

Schriever wargames postulate actions that could be taken by an adversary; we 

then determine available countering courses of action. Our most recent example 

from the Schriever IV Wargame, set in 2025, explored U.S. and Allied reaction to 

space attacks by a near-peer space power. These space attacks attempted to take 

away U.S. and Allied space capabilities. We responded with an Operationally Responsive Space concept to preserve and restore lost space capabilities. The findings 

from Schriever IV are being used to further develop concepts for defense of space. 

This includes exploring expanded cooperation with Allies, investigating senior-level 

policy and decision-making in response to space attacks, and developing a Space 

Campaign Plan to ensure a proactive, unified response to space attacks. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what is our military’s response 

posture and options for various attack or denial scenarios? For example, what ac-
83 

tions and response would the military take if its SATCOM system, Wideband Global 

System (WGS), were jammed? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. United States Strategic Command has 

primary responsibility for the mission of space operations and protection and works 

with all Combatant Commanders on the use of space assets. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) provides space forces through 14th Air Force (14 AF) to 

USSTRATCOM. The 14th AF is also the Joint Functional Component Command for 

Space and manages day-to-day operations of joint space forces provided to 

USSTRATCOM. Working with the various Combatant Commanders, joint space 

forces continue to identify ongoing denial of service problems; not only communications, but also Global Positioning System, and warning data. Space forces have developed tactics, techniques and procedures to overcome these situations. The first 

action is determining the source and who is responsible. Next, we take into account 

the strategic situation, whether the jamming is hostile or non-hostile, if it was intentional or unintentional and the source. Based on this understanding and the impact of the jamming, the Combatant Commander recommends the best response option. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what are the warfighters’ capability needs and priorities in space and how are these shaping the Air Force and 

NRO space investment strategies? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. At Air Force Space Command, we are focused on meeting the warfighters’ ongoing and future needs. We do this through a 

delicate balance of sustaining and maintaining our enduring capabilities, and fielding new or emerging capabilities as early as possible. The warfighting commands 

express their needs in several mission areas to include: intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance; precise position, navigation, and timing; military communications; space situational awareness; and nuclear deterrence to name a few. The Air 

Force provides all of these on a daily basis. Every year, the Combatant Commanders 

develop an Integrated Priority List stating what capabilities need focus or attention. 

We utilize these documents heavily in determining our overall investment strategy 

as we leverage and integrate space capability across the National Security Space enterprise, to include organizations within both the Department of Defense and the 

Intelligence Community. Today, our investment strategy follows three basic principles: win the war; take care of our people; recapitalize for the future. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what plans do you have to meet 

these needs and how are they reflected in the FY 2009 budget request? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Our Integrated Planning Process (strategic planning process) is the methodology we use to focus our capabilities on the 

warfighter needs. These needs are identified by our COCOM (USSTRATCOM) in the 

form of an Integrated Priority List, Operations Plans and Joint Capability Documents. We analyze the COCOM requests and assess what current and future programs are required to provide the desired capabilities. This is communicated back 

to USSTRATCOM for consideration in their Function Solutions Analysis, which is 

submitted to the JROC. 

One of the products generated through this process is the Warfighter Required 

Force. This document provides an unconstrained force structure view in satisfaction 

of COCOM priorities. We understand this view is fiscally un-attainable; however it 

is used as a guide for POM development. Ultimately, we aim to provide the required 

capabilities within the constrained resources available. 

The FY 2009 budget request optimizes our investment to support COCOM priorities and to provide those required capabilities to the warfighter. For example, 

among other capabilities, the budget request supports missile warning, through 

plus-up of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program; warfighter positioning, navigation and timing requirements, through additions to Global Positioning System (GPS) programs; and warfighter communications requirements, 

through investment in the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) programs. Let me assure you, Air Force Space 

Command is focused on delivering space capability to the warfighter. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, last year’s defense authorization 

bill added $125.0 million for advanced procurement of AEHF–4 to mitigate the risk 

of a protected communications gap. The FY 2009 request contains no funds to complete procurement of AEHF–4. Why were no funds requested? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Gap analyses on Milstar and AEHF 1– 

3 showed there was no urgency to procure SV4 in FY09. Funding AEHF-4 in FY10 

allows the Department to meet Congressional intent to produce the 4th AEHF and 

maintain communications capability. There is an on-going study within the Department of Defense to determine the MILSATCOM way-ahead within fiscal constraints. 
84 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, TSAT is a keystone system in 

the DOD’s future communications architecture providing wideband protected communications and communications-on-the-move capabilities. However, this year, the 

DOD and the Air Force have removed $4.0 billion out of the TSAT program and 

delayed the launch date from FY 2016 to FY 2018.What has changed in the Air 

Force portfolio that TSAT is no longer a critical program? What were the higher priority needs that required the funds from TSAT? Describe the planned users of 

TSAT. What impact do the $4 billion cut and schedule delays have on planned users 

of TSAT? Given the proliferation of SATCOM jamming systems, how important are 

the protected communications features of TSAT? Can these features be incorporated 

into other SATCOM systems? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Department remains committed to 

acquiring the communications capabilities required to achieve the 21st Century netcentric warfighting vision. Responding to Congressional direction, the FY09 President’s Budget Request provides full funding for AEHF-4 in FY10 while remaining 

committed to providing future TSAT capabilities. The on-going MILSATCOM study 

will provide us with a roadmap to address future communication requirements, especially as the needs of the planned users continue to evolve. The planned users include all Services—Army ground forces, Navy and Marine forces and airborne ISR. 

While the reduction to the TSAT baseline delays first launch until the 2018 timeframe, strategic users requiring survivable and endurable communications have 

worldwide coverage until 2021 using the Milstar and AEHF constellations. The 

transformational capabilities provided by TSAT, including communications on the 

move, more protected communications, greater number of and higher rate communications paths and finally net-centric capabilities, will be delayed. However, the 

MILSATCOM study continues to evaluate various options to address these issues. 

Today’s commercial SATCOM systems plus DOD assets such as the WGS system 

are susceptible to intentional jamming by relatively unsophisticated, inexpensive 

means. Ensuring the DOD satellite communications capabilities are endurable and 

survivable have long been a requirement of strategic SATCOM users. These users 

require systems that provide anti-jam communications, nuclear survivability, and 

Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection communications. These capabilities are built into the Milstar satellites on orbit today and the AEHF system 

planned for 2009 first launch. TSAT will provide continuity beyond Milstar and 

AEHF for these users and also significantly increase the quantity and capability of 

protected SATCOM links to strategic and tactical users. Incorporating the features 

planned for TSAT onto the WGS or AEHF satellites would be very expensive and 

result in delays to deployment of these next generation systems as both systems are 

far beyond the design phase. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please describe the 

problems encountered on the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High program. 

What are the plans to resolve these problems and what are the schedule and cost 

impacts? Would a schedule delay increase the risk of a missile warning gap? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. In late summer 2007, shortcomings in 

the SBIRS flight software subsystem (FSS) were identified, requiring a realignment 

of functions between two flight computers and software code rework. Additionally, 

both internal and independent teams determined that streamlining the code logic, 

i.e. deleting code not required for the operation of the SBIRS satellite, could improve 

the efficiency and timeliness of code execution. 

The flight software subsystem (FSS) recovery plan is divided into two blocks. 

Block I code was delivered on May 17, 2008 and is currently in test. An Interim 

Design Review for the Block II code was completed on April 2, 2008 and the development team is now proceeding with Block II coding. Block II code delivery is scheduled for August 28, 2008. 

With regard to the schedule and cost impacts, the FY2009 President’s Budget 

(PB) projects launch of the first GEO satellite for December 2009, which is an approximate one year delay to the previous launch date. As a result, the FY2009 PB 

includes approximately $400M across the FYDP (FY09-13) to account for this one 

year delay to the overall program completion. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the planned launch 

for the first GPS–III satellite has slipped one year from FY 2013 to FY 2014. What 

caused this delay and what is the risk of a potential GPS gap between the last 

GPS–IIF launch and first GPS-III launch? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The first launch for GPS IIIA has slipped 

from FY13 to FY14 due to a delay in the GPS IIIA contract award to May 15, 2008 

(first launch is scheduled 72 months following contract award). Key factors were the 

finalizing requirements for the incremental acquisition and resolution of a potential 

contractor dispute regarding the prior MUOS source selection. 
85 

The risk of a PNT gap between the last GPS IIF and first GPS IIIA is low. The 

launch of the first GPS III satellite is currently scheduled approximately 6 months 

after the launch of the last GPS IIF satellite in October 2013 and Air Force Space 

Command has developed Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) that could be 

employed to further mitigate risk. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, last year the Air Force proposed 

acquiring GPS III capability in three blocks. Has the acquisition approach been finalized and agreement reached with the user community on the capabilities in each 

block? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The GPS III program of record, as approved by OSD(AT&L), is based on acquiring three blocks of satellites. GPS III requirements are documented in the GPS III Capabilities Development Document 

(CDD) approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in July 2007, 

as updated by the interim CDD (iCDD) which the JROC approved in October 2007. 

These documents validate requirements for GPS IIIA and define the desired capabilities for GPS Blocks IIIB and IIIC. 

Requirements for GPS Blocks IIIB and IIIC will be reviewed prior to initiating 

development on each respective block and, if necessary, the Air Force will update 

the CDD to reflect any required changes and bring the new/modified requirements 

to the JROC for validation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the committee understands the Space Radar program has been restructure in response to Congressional 

concerns about affordability, requirements, technology maturity, and concepts of operation (CONOPS). Please describe your view of the restructure, the level of commitment from the DOD and intelligence community, and the status of the analysis of 

alternatives study requested in the FY08 defense authorization bill. 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. We are working closely with our Intelligence Community (IC) partners to leverage the lessons learned and the solid technology maturation performed to date. Any Joint Future Overhead Radar Program 

must meet the requirements of the DOD, IC, and coalition partners, while being acquired in affordable increments of capability. Additionally, we must ensure that the 

system can provide the high-quality and timely information needed to support senior leaders. 

The Intelligence Collection Architecture (ICA) process we are participating in offers a vehicle to analyze user needs and acquisition options to include the possibility 

of a tiered architecture similar to the one recently recommended for Electro-Optical 

systems. A tiered approach works best when all tiers are synchronized. Each element provides commonly accessible information while appropriately optimizing (or 

focusing) on the primary consumer of that tier. 

The jointly led ICA, co-chaired by USD(I) and ODNI, plans to report the results 

of this radar needs study this summer. These inputs will inform an analysis of the 

available alternatives to satisfy the identified and revalidated user needs. The results of the analysis of alternatives are scheduled to be finalized before the end of 

FY08. 

We are committed to developing this capability, as are our IC mission partners. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please describe the 

potential operational concepts and value that ‘‘operationally responsive’’ space (ORS) 

solutions provides to the joint forces. What is your assessment of the ORS program 

office implementation and its responsiveness to warfighter needs? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The ORS Office is developing architectural and system concepts to enable rapid reconstitution or augmentation of space 

capabilities, to support the warfighter. For example, the ORS Office is developing 

a modular, open systems architecture for spacecraft that should greatly reduce the 

cost and time required to integrate new space capabilities. The ORS Office is also 

maturing the supporting ORS enabling capabilities, including launch systems, 

ranges, payloads, satellite buses, and Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, 

and Dissemination (TCPED) that are critical components in delivering responsive 

space capabilities to warfighters. 

The current ORS office structure is well suited to performing dual missions of: 

1) responding to current Joint Force Commander’s needs, as prioritized by Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and 2) building a national strategic capability to 

responsively provide a robust space reconstitution and augmentation capability by 

2015. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, do you believe the current management reporting chain for the ORS program office provides the greatest flexibility 

or should they be moved under Air Force Space Command to better reflect the 

warfighter’s requirements? 
86 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The current management reporting chain 

for the joint ORS Office provides great flexibility as well as a clear tie to warfighter 

requirements. As Congress intended, the ORS Office operates under the authority, 

direction, and control of the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent (EA) for 

Space, with the Director of the ORS Office reporting directly to the DOD EA for 

Space. Additionally, the ORS Office works closely with United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), whose Commander is responsible for validating and 

prioritizing the ORS requirements of all Combatant Commanders. 

The focus of ORS is on developing architectural concepts and enabling technologies to responsively provide a robust national space reconstitution and augmentation capability by 2015. The joint office with an abbreviated chain of command 

provides the opportunity to maximize the contributions of the services and agencies. 

At the same time, the ORS Office continues to provide support to USSTRATCOM 

in identifying alternatives and actions required to support the Urgent Operational 

Needs of the warfighters. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, space acquisition has 

a poor history of performance. What is your assessment of the current state of space 

acquisition and what indicators do you use to make this assessment? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The state of space acquisition is improving. Over the last 12 months, we have several demonstrated successes: a new record 

of 58 consecutive successful Medium and Heavy National Security Space (NSS) 

launches; deployed the first Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) for operational use; 

and launched and begun operations on two GPS IIR–M satellites. In October 2007, 

we implemented a new GPS ground segment with no impact to PNT services. 

We recognize challenges remain with cost growth and schedule impacts in some 

areas of space acquisition and are actively pursuing solutions. Our efforts are guided by a Back-to-Basics philosophy identifying clear requirements and applying disciplined systems engineering and effective management/planning, while providing 

the program manager the appropriate resources to ensure success. 

Historically, programs perform better when they have clear, stable requirements, 

technology at the appropriate level of maturity, and high-confidence cost estimates 

early in the acquisition process. We continue to focus on these areas, and are starting to see indications that this approach is working. For example, GPS IIIA and 

FAB-T recently completed independent technology assessments supporting their 

transition to Preliminary Design Phase. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, affordability and 

executability of space programs is a bipartisan committee concern. Do you think the 

National Security Space programs have adequate funding to make sure they can be 

executed in a timely manner in support of the various missions? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Yes, the funds requested for National Security Space programs in the FY09 President’s Budget reflect our commitment to 

ensuring continuity of mission across the entire portfolio. Specifically, the FY09 

budget request supports the near-term delivery of additional capabilities in Missile 

Warning, MILSATCOM, Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), and Space Situational Awareness. Simultaneously, the FY09 budget request continues investment in 

transformational MILSATCOM and next-generation PNT to ensure we can meet 

growing joint warfighter demand for these services. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what do you see as 

the limiting technology in future conflict scenarios? How are space science and technology investments addressing this need? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Air Force Policy Directive 61–1, ‘‘Management of Science and Technology,’’ requires Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 

to provide requirements and recommended program guidance/direction to the Air 

Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) for consideration in planning and programming 

for Space Science and Technology (S&T) investments. To meet this requirement, 

AFSPC produces a Space S&T guidance document that identifies the limiting technologies needed to acquire the warfighting capabilities necessary to meet AFSPC’s 

vision and also prioritizes technologies for AFRL consideration. AFSPC’s most recent Space S&T guidance identified key limiting technologies in space situational 

awareness (SSA); the ability to provide rapid, responsive space capabilities; strategic 

deterrence; and next-generation pervasive space technologies. As AFRL’s proposed 

Space S&T investments ultimately make their way forward for Air Staff consideration and incorporation into the annual President’s Budget request, AFSPC, Space 

and Missiles Systems Center (SMC), and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) all 

have an opportunity to assess how these planned investments address future technology needs as identified by AFSPC. 

Currently, Air Force S&T investments provide for a range of technologies to find, 

fix, characterize, and track new and existing space objects in support of SSA; con-
87 

centrate on plug-and-play technologies, spacecraft autonomy, and automated design 

tools closely integrated with the Operationally Responsive Space vision to enable responsive space capabilities; focus on developing and demonstrating more reliable, 

more accurate, and less expensive guidance components/systems, coupled with research in advanced propulsion, plasma effects and mitigation, and seismic data, to 

provide for strategic deterrence; and support a variety of pervasive technologies to 

include radiation-hardened electronics/processors, solar cells, focal plane arrays and 

cryocoolers, high-temperature materials, and guidance, navigation, and control. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Space and Missile Systems 

Center is looking at standing up an organization with new acquisition processes 

that will focus on technical and operational demonstrations while emphasizing innovation and flexibility. Please describe this organization further, the expected value 

and benefits, and tell us where you intend to put this organization. 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Space and Missile Systems Center 

(SMC) is actually consolidating early demonstration activities into the existing Development Planning (SMC/XR) office at Los Angeles AFB and the Space Development and Test Wing (SDTW) at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, rather than standing 

up a new organization. SMC/XR and the SDTW will leverage current and future efforts, to include the Space Test Program and Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 

efforts. The acquisition processes these offices will follow are not new, but represent 

a disciplined, structured approach of complete, up-front concept and systems engineering prior to program initiation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, in 2007, the Australian Government agreed to invest in the Wideband Global System (WGS). Where 

are there other opportunities across the space portfolio for greater international cooperation? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Historically, Australia (AUS), United 

Kingdom (UK) and Canada (CAN) have all been involved with the Air Force in 

many facets of the space mission, dating back to the late 1950s, early 1960s. These 

Allies, along with others, participate in missile warning; space situational awareness; positioning, navigation and timing (PNT); and communications systems. 

The U.S. has a long history of missile warning cooperation with all three partners. 

We have mutual defense cooperative agreements covering existing Defense Support 

Program and Space-based Infrared Systems and Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack 

Assessment agreements. 

In addition to the success of the Wideband Global SATCOM System arrangement 

with Australia, we have active Allied participation with the UK, CAN and the Netherlands regarding the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communication 

system. Additionally, over the years the U.S. and the UK have shared capacity on 

the UK SKYNET and the U.S. Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) 

programs. 

Positioning, navigation and timing are extremely critical and GPS is the world 

standard. To foster further collaboration on this essential capability, we have integrated officers from AUS, CAN, Germany and France into GPS Program Office. Additionally, there are numerous efforts underway in the area of GPS equipment development and CONOPS cooperation, with interoperability and coalition warfighter 

support as key ingredients. 

Finally, regarding Space Situational Awareness we have longstanding relationships with several of our key Allies (UK, CAN) and are building the foundations 

with others to cooperate and integrate resources in this mission area. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what are the merits 

of ‘‘rules of the road’’ in space or other international regimes to promote the safe 

and responsible use of space? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The U.S. carefully upholds its obligations 

under the four principle international agreements on space—the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability Convention and the Registration 

Convention. In fact, we have advocated universal adoption of these measures. We 

believe that there is no need for any additional treaty on space and do not see any 

problems for arms control to resolve. Given that the use of space is growing and 

likely will continue to grow, we believe there is value in exploring ways that the 

various users can act responsibly in space. Rather than using the term ‘‘rules of the 

road,’’ which implies legally binding terms, we instead support efforts being considered through the UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) 

to look at ‘‘best practice guidelines’’ for safe space operations. We believe that the 

community of space-faring nations could constructively share their ‘‘best practices’’ 

and together a set of voluntary guidelines would serve the broad interests of all nations. 
88 

While we are determined to keep sufficient flexibility to protect national security 

interests, we also recognize that some emerging challenges to space activities can 

require new forms of international cooperation with allies, friends, and other responsible space-faring nations to preserve the principle of unhindered access to, and operations in and through, space by all nations for peaceful purposes. We are witnessing a period of unprecedented cooperation in space. As a result, we believe that 

the establishment of best practice guidelines is the appropriate tool. 

Pursuing best practice guidelines avoids the rigid and drawn out negotiation processes that are often characterized by undercurrents of differing political agendas. A 

notable success in the establishment of best practice guidelines is in the area of debris mitigation. This stands in sharp contrast to difficulties in international negotiating settings like the Conference on Disarmament where for years the progress on 

key objectives has been held hostage by a small number of countries linking unrelated issues. There is considerable dynamism in space operations as a result of the 

inexorable march of technology. The best practice guidelines approach has the flexibility to evolve in step with technical advancements. 

Today there is a rich array of space operators from individual nations, international consortia to commercial operators large and small. Pursuing best practices 

guidelines provides a setting within which all participants who have something to 

offer can contribute. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) is developing the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and has 

other ongoing space activities. How is your office involved in coordinating MDA’s 

space programs with the rest of the Department? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Air Force has a close relationship 

with the Missile Defense Agency on multiple levels. The Under Secretary of the Air 

Force is the Air Force principal at the Missile Defense Executive Board, the senior 

DOD body on ballistic missile defense. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is also 

a co-chair, along with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the 

Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space, and Cyber Operations, and the MDA 

Director, on the AF-MDA Board of Directors (BoD). The BoD keeps the Air Force 

leadership fully informed of MDA activities and serves as a forum for addressing 

AF-MDA issues. 

AFSPC is engaged with MDA in preparing STSS experimentation plans for space 

situational awareness, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and annual 

AFSPC/MDA focus days further promote collaboration on space activities. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, MDA has developed or plans to 

develop several land, sea, and space-based sensors, such as the Sea-Based X-band 

(SBX) radar, Upgraded Early Warning Radars, and STSS. What utility might these 

sensors have for providing space situational awareness? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The new MDA X-band radars have the 

ability to enhance the space situational awareness (SSA) mission. In particular, the 

Sea-Based X-band radar has two possible benefits for SSA; it is well-suited toward 

characterizing space objects and it can be positioned geographically where we currently have no SSA ability. 

Additionally, the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) program is upgrading 

both the PAVE Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS) and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars that currently support the SSA mission. The UEWR program adds the potential for improved space object characterization, while also adding multi-mode flexibility which will enable those radars to perform their missile defense and SSA missions simultaneously. Used in conjunction 

with the Global Sensor Integrated Network (GSIN) initiative and a MDA net-centric 

architecture, the UEWR sites could inject data directly into the AFSPC net-centric 

services to tie legacy and non-traditional sensors together in an interoperable unified framework. AFSPC is currently funding the SSA sensor fusion, data dissemination, and command and control efforts through the Integrated Space Situational 

Awareness (ISSA) and Space C2 programs. The end goal is to evolve current SSA 

fusion demonstrations into tailored products for end users. 

MDA is also developing the Space-based Tracking and Surveillance System 

(STSS) to track, surveil and self-cue space events, enabling us to gain custody of 

new launches very early in the process and alert/cue other sensors sooner. 

To aid future system development, AFSPC is constructing a National SSA Roadmap to be used as an interim SSA architecture in response to National Space Policy 

guidance. This effort includes MDA and the contributions their sensors will bring 

to an integrated solution. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Air Force is undergoing a 

‘‘force shaping’’ effort to downsize its personnel by 40,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 

2009. Operations personnel will see a nine percent reduction and Acquisition per-
89 

sonnel will see a four percent reduction. How does this personnel reduction impact 

the space operations and acquisition missions? To what extent will your contractor 

support workforce be affected? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. We were able to mitigate the impact of 

Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720 reductions to the Command’s operations and 

acquisition missions. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) reduced active duty end 

strength by 1,670 positions, and incurred a civilian reduction (180 positions) and a 

contract dollar reduction in excess of $1.03B across the Future Years Defense Plan 

(FYDP). We mitigated the impact to the operations and acquisition missions by 

shifting the reductions to other career fields. Only eight percent of our active duty 

manpower reduction were incurred in the operations/acquisition specialties—100 

space operator positions and 55 acquisition officer and civilian billets were deleted. 

While only 55 Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) acquisition billets were cut, 

124 acquisition-qualified officers accepted voluntary separations. 

The dollar reductions also impacted our contractor workforce. Advisory and Assistance Services and Systems Engineering Technical Advisory contracts were particularly impacted at SMC locations. Our AFSPC wings also suffered, as they rely 

on Operations and Maintenance contracts for base operating and mission support. 

While this drawdown does cause temporary turmoil, it is necessary to ensure resources are available to recapitalize our air and space systems. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how would you describe the rationale for the February 20th intercept of the failed U.S. satellite? 

Mr. LARGE. The satellite in question failed shortly after its launch in December 

2006, an uncontrolled reentry was inevitable. The rationale for the 20 February 

2008 intercept of the satellite was always to mitigate the potentially harmful effects 

of the 1,000 pounds of hydrazine propellant aboard the spacecraft. There was a significant concern that the titanium propellant tank and much of the full load of toxic 

fuel would survive the uncontrolled reentry, posing a very real danger to human life 

across much of the inhabited portions of the Earth. For that reason the President 

of the United States decided to take proactive action, appropriate for a responsible 

space-faring nation, to reduce the risk to people and property by ordering a missile 

intercept of the non-functioning, decaying satellite under strictly controlled conditions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Large, what you can tell us about the failure of the satellite? 

Has DOD been able to ascertain why it failed so quickly after reaching orbit? 

Mr. LARGE. No. After an exhaustive formal failure investigation, and three different independent review team investigations, the cause of the failure and what 

failed was not determined. The failure signature suggested that abrupt, multiple 

failures occurred. The formal investigation was conducted over a ten month period 

and included over 30 different organizations from government, industry, national 

labs and academia. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Large, do you see technical and/or design problems associated 

with the recently destroyed U.S. satellite that can be fixed in future satellite system 

designs? 

Mr. LARGE. Although our exhaustive analysis of the spacecraft design and test 

program did not identify the root cause of the failure, it did identify several opportunities to make improvements in mission assurance standards which have been addressed in the requirements for current and future satellite programs. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the Pentagon’s annual China military modernization report will be released March 3rd and is expected to build upon last year’s report that China continues to develop a multi-dimensional counterspace program. What implications do these developments have on 

our national security space posture? 

Mr. LARGE. Space capabilities have become integrated into our daily lives and are 

vital to our national security and the global economy. At the same time, potential 

adversaries continue to seek means to counter the advantages we obtain from space 

and to use space capabilities against us. Our space capabilities face a wide range 

of growing threats including radio frequency jamming, laser blinding and anti-satellite systems. The threat exists end-to-end and requires a new way of thinking and 

a new way of addressing the challenges facing the space community. 

The maturation of these threats, including China’s anti-satellite capability, require a broad range of capabilities, from diplomatic to military, to protect our interest in space. We are working with the interagency to assess the strategic implications of China’s maturing counterspace capabilities in the context their overall military modernization effort. The recommendations from this on-going assessment are 

carefully factored into our space systems architecture planning and resulting investment priorities. Our investment strategy for space and space-related activities is a 

balanced approach to achieving these capabilities. Our space control investment 
90 

strategy, for example, balances the need for space situational awareness, protection 

of our space capabilities and protection of terrestrial forces and the homeland from 

threats posed by adversarial use of space. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, how should the investment strategy be restructured across the Air Force and NRO space portfolios to 

avoid single-point vulnerabilities as highlighted by the Chinese ASAT test last year? 

Doe the 2009 budget request reflect any programmatic or operational changes? 

Mr. LARGE. The operational and programmatic implications of China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test and other counterspace capabilities require thorough and deliberate examination. Our space capabilities face a wide range of threats including 

radio frequency jamming, laser blinding, as well as ASAT systems. The maturation 

of these threats, including China’s anti-satellite capability, require a broad range of 

capabilities, from diplomatic to military, to protect our interests in space. Such a 

manifest approach to address counterspace threats requires a national-level strategy. 

For our part, the National Space Policy acknowledges that space is vital to U.S. 

National security and directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop capabilities, plans, and options to address these threats to our national security space systems. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is working with U.S. Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM) and the Intelligence Community (IC) to better understand the nature of the threat to our space systems. The assessment of the strategic 

implications of China’s maturing counterspace capabilities is currently on-going. 

Once complete, the recommendations of this assessment will be carefully factored 

into the national security space systems architecture—including both Air Force and 

NRO programs—and their associated investment priorities. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Large, what type of space situational awareness (SSA) and 

space protection capabilities do you think will be needed in the future to combat 

threats to space? 

Mr. LARGE. A broad range of capabilities, from diplomatic to military are required 

to protect our interest in space. The National Space Policy directs the DOD to develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space. In implementing this National Policy, the DOD will continue to: 

— Encourage all nations adhere to established principles outlined in current 

treaties and international agreements for the peaceful use of space by all nations; 

— Promote responsible behavior and safe space operations by supporting space 

situational awareness needs of all peaceful space users; lead efforts to develop 

guidelines for responsible behavior in space such as guidelines for debris mitigation and collision avoidance; and cooperate with other counties on the 

peaceful uses of outer space; 

— Modernize space situational awareness capabilities to ensure ample waning 

of hostile acts and improve protection plans to ensure required capabilities 

are available in a contested space environment—includes the use of groundbased radars, optical telescopes, low Earth orbiting systems with capability 

to detect small objects out to geosynchronous orbit; and means of making each 

satellite its own sensor and capable of monitoring its health and status and 

detecting any anomalous activity; 

— Develop architectural solutions, including Operationally Responsive Space 

concepts, to ensure capabilities are available when needed; 

— Establish an operations posture, to include appropriate planning and exercises, to respond to attacks on U.S. space interests and to ensure required 

space capabilities are available in a contested environment; and 

Ensure capabilities are available to deny adversaries the use of space advantages 

to ensure our terrestrial forces and homelands remain safe. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, we understand the 

Chinese ASAT test was a good example of how intelligence was ‘‘operationalized’’ 

to provide near real-time support to military users. As threats to space increase, so 

too will the demand for greater space intelligence support and resources. How does 

NRO plan to address this requirement? 

Mr. LARGE. One significant step in space protection is the key role the NRO is 

taking, in concert with USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command, in laying the 

foundation for defensive space capabilities. Such capabilities, while vital to our 

space systems survival, have also helped establish a framework for further cooperation. 

The complete protection picture also requires we take a careful look at the 

vulnerabilities on the ground as well as those in space; these vulnerabilities take 
91 

many forms. As the NRO plays an increasingly visible role in the defense of our Nation, we can also expect to increasingly become a target as well. The NRO is committed to protecting the information and assets that help us maintain our Nation’s 

freedom and security. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the FY 2008 National 

Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to develop a space protection strategy. What do you see as the 

key challenges in this area? Are they material or non-material? 

Mr. LARGE. Our nation currently is completing a comprehensive protection and 

survivability strategy for space—one that spans the defense and intelligence communities and addresses policy and strategy, architecture planning, system acquisition and requirements definition, science and technology development, and training 

and operations—and is to be delivered to Congress in July 2008. The implementation actions for this strategy cover material and non-material initiatives. 

— The key challenges in the development of a space protection strategy include: 

— Balancing all appropriate elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic)—to reduce risks in all domains (land, sea, air, 

space, and cyber) and deter the deployment of threatening capabilities; (Material & Non-material) 

— Lack of funded requirements for protection of all essential National space assets; (Material) 

— Congressional oversight over this issue is fragmented among the Science, Defense, International Relations, and Intelligence Committees; and (Non-Material) 

— New or additional legal regimes or arms control agreements related to space 

‘‘weaponization’’ may complicate our ability to protect U.S. national security 

interests. (Non-Material) 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is the Department’s overall protection strategy for assured access to space? How does DOD examine and analyze the benefits and cost of different strategies? Given the historical 

experience during the Cold War, can space systems be cost-effectively protected? 

Mr. LARGE. A. What is the Department’s overall protection strategy for assured 

access to space? 

Defer to Air Force Space Command 

B. How does DOD examine and analyze the benefits and costs of different strategies? 

Benefit and cost analyses are based on capabilities derived from user needs, 

technical maturity/viability, and the analytical community’s assessments of 

the threats that must be mitigated. These recommendations are done at the 

architectural level and shared with the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council and Mission Requirements Board and then implemented by the appropriate program offices. 

C. Given the historical experience during the Cold War, can space systems be cost 

effectively protected? 

Cost effectiveness is related to national security consequences that are realized if no protection action is taken. 

A broad range of protection options covering diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions can be employed in cost-effective manner. Experience shows that if a design requirement is added to a system at the earliest stages of concept design costs are manageable; however introduction 

late in development results in cost increasing dramatically. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, historically, SATCOM 

requirements exceed the capacity of our government systems. To make up the difference, the military spends over $400 million a year for commercial SATCOM. In 

Operation Iraqi Freedom over 80% of our military SATCOM requirements were met 

by commercial carriers. Does national security require the development of a Commercial Satellite Communications Policy much like the National Remote Sensing 

Policy? What are we doing to ensure our warfighters are getting the necessary communications capability in a timely and cost effective manner? 

Mr. LARGE. To provide additional communications capability to the warfighter, we 

are building and launching secondary payloads on our National Systems to transmit 

critical intelligence information directly to deployed forces. Using this approach, we 

can deliver the communications capability in a very cost-effective manner. 
92 

NRO/COMM provides Tactical Communications to warfighter with use of the Exercise and Operational Communications System (XOCOMM) and Integrated Broadcast Service Simplex (IBS–S). 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what is your assessment of the synchronization between the launch of military SATCOM systems and 

the fielding of compatible user terminals? How are you ensuring that user terminals 

are fielded to keep pace with new capabilities introduced on WGS (already on-orbit), 

AEHF (1QFY09), and the Navy’s MUOS (FY 2010)? 

Mr. LARGE. Defer to General Kehler and/or Mr. Payton. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please describe the 

problems encountered on the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High program. 

What are the plans to resolve these problems and what are the schedule and cost 

impacts? Would a schedule delay increase the risk of a missile warning gap? 

Mr. LARGE. We respectfully defer to the Air Force. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the planned launch 

for the first GPS–III satellite has slipped one year from FY 2013 to FY 2014. What 

caused this delay and what is the risk of a potential GPS gap between the last 

GPS–IIF launch and first GPS–III launch? 

Mr. LARGE. Defer to Air Force Space Command. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, the committee understands the Space Radar program has been restructure in response to Congressional 

concerns about affordability, requirements, technology maturity, and concepts of operation (CONOPS). Please describe your view of the restructure, the level of commitment from the DOD and intelligence community, and the status of the analysis of 

alternatives study requested in the FY08 defense authorization bill. 

Mr. LARGE. The NRO is working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the Space Radar 

restructure. Support for the restructured way ahead has been strong within both 

the DOD and the IC. 

This restructure includes standing up a Joint Future Overhead Radar (JFOR) program office within the NRO, examining application of commercial and international 

radar data and/or systems meeting some DOD requirements and other near-term efforts. The JFOR activity is being defined through ongoing efforts including the Integrated Collection Architecture (ICA) and Radar Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) studies. 

The ICA GEOINT Balance Team (GBT) will be providing interim results and data 

that will enable us to kick-off the Radar AoA in May. The remainder of the GBT 

activity and the AoA are expected to provide results in September 2008. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, please describe the 

potential operational concepts and value that ‘‘operationally responsive’’ space (ORS) 

solutions provides to the joint forces. What is your assessment of the ORS program 

office implementation and its responsiveness to warfighter needs? 

Mr. LARGE. The Implementation Plan (approved by DepSecDef 28 Apr 2008) identifies the DOD processes and staffing resources for operationally responsive space 

(ORS) and serves as the initial charter for the ORS Office. To make an assessment 

on the ORS Office’s implementation and responsiveness maybe be a bit premature. 

Since its establishment and standup in FY 2007, the ORS Office has been engaged 

with the IC, DOD, and the Services on ORS proposals to develop space based solutions to support the Warfighter’s urgent needs. Over time, the Warfighter will be 

able to truly assess ORS Office’s effectiveness and its ability to rapidly respond to 

the Combatant Commanders (COCOM’s) needs as well as facilitating integrated 

ORS concepts and solutions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, space acquisition has 

a poor history of performance. What is your assessment of the current state of space 

acquisition and what indicators do you use to make this assessment? 

Mr. LARGE. The era of Acquisition Reform is over. It has left the NRO in a fragile 

state with a poor history of performance. 

Recently the space community has recognized its shortcomings and has pulled together to set new standards and strengthen acquisition execution, with emphasis on 

gated processes, mission assurance, and test-like-you fly verification. As these measures take effect, we will monitor the number of problems that surface after the control gate that should have caught them and focus on further process improvements 

to discover and resolve issues earlier in the acquisition lifecycle. 

In addition, the NRO has taken action to internally establish a strong corporate 

governance model to support critical business processes. The first priority was our 

acquisition management and the system engineering processes. This process definition is coupled with clearly defined leader roles, responsibilities, authority, and ac-
93 

countability. These actions will begin to reverse the damage brought by acquisition 

reform. Clearly our recovery from ten plus years of acquisition reform will take 

time, but I’m confident that our people and contractors will meet this challenge. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, affordability and 

executability of space programs is a bipartisan committee concern. Do you think the 

National Security Space programs have adequate funding to make sure they can be 

executed in a timely manner in support of the various missions? 

Mr. LARGE. The NRO operates under the DNI guidance by funding programs to 

the DNI Cost Analysis Improvement Group Independent Cost Estimate (ICE). For 

current NRO programs, adequate funding is available to cover the ICEs. The current FY 2009 President’s Budget also contains programs in early acquisition stages 

where an ICE has not yet been performed. Emerging programs are adequately funded in the request and will be subsequently addressed when ICEs are performed. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what do you see as 

the limiting technology in future conflict scenarios? How are space science and technology investments addressing this need? 

Mr. LARGE. History cautions us to be wary of defining future conflict scenarios. 

If there is one thing we can be sure of, it is the fact future conflicts will take unexpected paths. For this reason, our space science and technology investments are 

structured to anticipate the unexpected and to produce capabilities that will serve 

the broadest needs of our warfighters, civil agencies, and national decision makers 

in the widest range of contingencies. 

As uncertain as the future may be, we can anticipate several technology challenges. Among these challenges will be the evolution to more cyber, more wireless, 

and more encryption—along with the continuing demand for more bandwith. All of 

this will occur at a pace of more rapid evolution/revolution against a backdrop of 

less defined actors, targets that are more agile and more deeply imbedded, less predictable threats, and less sanctuary in space. 

To address these challenges, we have developed a science and technology investment strategy that emphasizes the development of capabilities embracing fundamental attributes that will allow us to deliver timely, accurate information in an 

adaptive, secure and survivable environment. Our portfolio includes technologies to 

increase overhead persistence, enhance area coverage and crate value-added preprocessing. Our Science & Technology (S&T) investment program establishes the 

framework for integration of the entire intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

enterprise in a service oriented architecture that fosters multi-INT collaboration and 

processing, while providing user access to required content with necessary security 

and confidence levels on timelines that support mission objectives. 

Some examples of these technology thrusts include investments in information 

technologies multi-INT services, the development of light weight optics and electronically steerable arrays. These capabilities could improve collection access, help 

the integration of multi-INT virtual mission centers to connect our expanding base 

of customers, and enhance collaboration with mission partners to solve the largest 

and most difficult intelligence problems. 

In summary, we’re preparing for a challenging, unpredictable future by developing technologies to transform our processes from individual collection stovepipes 

to a services oriented architecture delivering timely, accurate information in an 

adaptive, secure and survivable environment, and enabling insertion of new capabilities on rapid timelines. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, in 2007, the Australian Government agreed to invest in the Wideband Global System (WGS). Where 

are there other opportunities across the space portfolio for greater international cooperation? 

Mr. LARGE. Defer to National Strategic Space Office within OSD. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Mr. Large, what are the merits 

of ‘‘rules of the road’’ in space or other international regimes to promote the safe 

and responsible use of space? 

Mr. LARGE. Our National Space Policy (NSPD–49) sets out specific policies which 

guide our use of space. Inherent within the policy are principles for safe and responsible space operations established by treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. These 

international regimes include the Outer Space Treaty which sets a number of general operating principles for signatory countries that operate within space, and the 

Liability Convention which establishes specific rules for assessing damages within 

space and as a result of interference. These treaties are familiar to the countries 

which operate within space, and they generally abide by them. However, outer space 

has become a more complicated operating environment and we have learned a great 

deal about safe operating practices since those treaties were established nearly four 

decades ago. 
94 

Today globalization is driving nations to modernize technologically and connect 

with the international community to achieve commercial and security goals. Space 

capabilities are seen as a means for states to benefit from commercial growth, improve national security, and obtain global prestige. As the ‘‘space club’’ grows there 

will be an inevitable increase in the amount of ‘‘space traffic’’ generated over time 

leading to a need among international stakeholders to conduct their space operations while ensuring that people, property, and goods are adequately protected. 

Satellites are generally costly and delicate instruments subject to interference both 

natural and man-made. 

‘Rules-of-the-Road’ can help reduce the prospect of operational misunderstandings 

arising between nations from instances where apparently provocative or threatening 

actions are observed but not readily explained. Similarly, rules can help reduce the 

possibility of on-orbit collisions and proliferation of deadly space debris. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Large, despite being originally set up for national-level users, 

today more than 80% of the data that comes from the systems built by the NRO 

provide direct support to the warfighter. That is unlikely to change anytime soon. 

How does NRO ensure that its national intelligence satellites are integrated with 

the military’s tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) infrastructure and processes to ensure timely support for battlefield intelligence? How 

does NRO ensure that warfighter requirements are met and receive sufficient advocacy and funding during the development of new systems? 

Mr. LARGE. Since the lessons learned from the first Gulf War, the NRO has focused on delivering its data and data products to the Warfighter on responsive 

timelines. These efforts accelerated dramatically with beginning of the global war 

on terrorism following 9/11, first through the fielding of more operational prototypes, followed by the Strategic Framework published in 2005, and now through the 

effort to transform the entire NRO focused on improving the content, access to, and 

timeliness of what we deliver. 

Our Mission Partners, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and National Security Agency (NSA), have also had transformational efforts underway focused on the same goals delivering intelligence to that tactical user on more responsive timelines. We are working in close partnership with them to move toward an 

increasingly integrated ground system for tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination, following guidelines, standards, and policies handed down 

from the joint efforts between the DNI and USD(I). Throughout these efforts, we 

are working across multiple systems engineering activities to ensure that our systems join seamlessly and securely to the DOD architectures (DCGS and the GIG) 

in which they are investing billions of dollars to deliver data worldwide to 

Warfighters. 

Regarding requirements for acquisition of systems, we work continuously with 

NSA’s and NGA’s community efforts to understand, document, and validate 

(through the IC’s and DOD’s processes) the requirements for each acquisition before 

it is approved. We also carry out extensive user engagement to educate the 

Warfighter on our capabilities, and understand the context in which they use our 

data. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Large, do you think that the current joint space programs 

with the intelligence community are supporting the warfighter’s intelligence requirements? How would you change the investment strategy to better support the 

warfighter in theater? 

Mr. LARGE. Yes. While we are not in a position to speak for the Joint Staff or 

STRATCOM as to how well their intelligence requirements are being met or what 

changes they recommend, I defer to the aforementioned entities to answer these 

questions. In response to the second question, NRO is now doing all things possible 

to invest in those programs that will deliver to the Warfighter continuously improving access, content and timeliness. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT 

Mr. EVERETT. General Kehler and Mr. Large, I understand the Chinese ASAT test 

was a good example of how intelligence was ‘‘operationalized’’ to provide near realtime support to military users. As threats to space increase, so too will the demand 

for greater space intelligence support and resources. How does the Department plan 

to address this requirement? 

General. KEHLER. The space intelligence community coalesced to meet the operational challenges presented by the Chinese ASAT test. There remain a number of 

materiel and non-materiel measures that are being taken or considered in order to 

meet the future threat. 
95 

Several initiatives have been taken to address the need for more and better qualified space intelligence analysts. Recent billet additions at AFSPC, NASIC, DIA and 

CIA have taken place through internal reallocations and external over guidance approval. NSA has reprioritized for better space analysis and USSTRATCOM J2 is reestablishing space analysis. Overall analytic resources will remain insufficient, despite the improvement cited above, and will require active efforts to increase efficiency and collaboration. 

AFSPC is hosting an interagency forum to review/refine intelligence shortfalls and 

to seek interagency solutions. AFSPC has also conducted a review of its sensors and 

capabilities to provide Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and has created a road 

map for improvement. Studies are underway to determine all potential contributors 

that will provide information and intelligence to support the characterization portion of SSA. 

A number of efforts are underway to make space collection and analysis more efficient. The Defense Intelligence Space Threat Committee under NASIC leadership 

has been established to oversee and coordinate a wide variety of complex space/ 

counterspace analytical activities. The Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency has begun the process of incorporating Air Force Space Command sensors and capabilities into an intelligence master plan. In addition, processes to automate space intelligence preparation of the battlespace and to transition 

to predictive battlespace awareness are well underway. Space/counterspace intelligence requirements have been revaluated and are now being reprioritized and rewritten to more clearly focus the intelligence community. 

Training is also a critical element of Air Force efforts to address adversary space 

threat. AFSPC recently expanded the Space Professional Development Program to 

include the Air Force intelligence community. The National Space Security Institute 

(NSSI) has begun a comprehensive review and expansion of Air Force Space Command’s space professional training courses in close cooperation with the HQ AFSPC/ 

A2 (ISR Directorate) and intelligence community at large. 

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, describe the planned users of 

TSAT. What impact do the $4 billion cut and schedule delays have on planned users 

of TSAT? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The $4 billion reduction to the TSAT 

baseline delays initial launch capability approximately two years. Users requiring 

survivable, anti-jam, strategic communications will continue to have worldwide coverage through the Milstar and AEHF constellations through 2021, while the fielding 

of the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) constellation will greatly increase DOD’s 

organic wideband communication capability. Particular impacts from the delay of 

TSAT’s additional capabilities, including high data rate protected communications 

(XDR+) and protected Comm On The Move (COTM) for ground forces, are being assessed as part of the Deputy Secretary of Defense-directed MILSATCOM Investment Strategy study. This study was initiated to reassess when the specific communication capabilities planned for TSAT are needed by the user community and to 

determine if there are solutions available to realistically deliver these capabilities 

in a more affordable manner than the current TSAT program. The Services and 

Combatant Commands are involved in this study, and findings and recommendations are expected to be briefed to the Deputies Advisory Working Group in June 

2008. 

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, given the proliferation of SATCOM 

jamming systems, how important are the protected communications features of 

TSAT? Can these features be incorporated into other SATCOM systems? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. Critically important. Proliferation of 

SATCOM jammers and the understanding of their value in warfare is a growing 

threat. For relatively little money an unsophisticated adversary can put much of our 

unprotected communications at risk, with potentially grave consequences. Our most 

essential communications must be protected from jamming and, as our warfighting 

forces’ information dependence grows, the requirement for anti-jam communications 

grows with it. Next year, the Advanced EHF system will begin supplanting Milstar 

to provide an order of magnitude increase in protected SATCOM capability. However, even that will fall short of needs within a decade and we must do more. TSAT 

will be sized and phased according to results of the ongoing DOD MILSATCOM investment strategy study to meet that greater need and to enable a leap forward in 

net-centric warfighting concepts. That study is considering whether some portion of 

the protected SATCOM mission can be satisfied by other programs. The Air Force 

will continue to meet warfighter requirements for protected communications via the 

SATCOM architecture the Department determines to be optimum. 
96 

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, space acquisition has a poor history of performance. What is your assessment of the current state of space acquisition and what indicators do you use to make this assessment? 

Secretary PAYTON and General KEHLER. The state of space acquisition is improving. Over the last 12 months, we have several demonstrated successes: a new record 

of 58 consecutive successful Medium and Heavy National Security Space (NSS) 

launches; deployed the first Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) for operational use; 

and launched and begun operations on two GPS IIR–M satellites. In October 2007, 

we implemented a new GPS ground segment with no impact to PNT services. 

We recognize challenges remain with cost growth and schedule impacts in some 

areas of space acquisition and are actively pursuing solutions. Our efforts are guided by a Back-to-Basics philosophy identifying clear requirements and applying disciplined systems engineering and effective management/planning, while providing 

the program manager the appropriate resources to ensure success. 

Historically, programs perform better when they have clear, stable requirements, 

technology at the appropriate level of maturity, and high-confidence cost estimates 

early in the acquisition process. We continue to focus on these areas, and are starting to see indications that this approach is working. For example, GPS IIIA and 

FAB–T recently completed independent technology assessments supporting their 

transition to Preliminary Design Phase. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Payton and Mr. Large, the Pentagon’s 2008 China military 

modernization report finds that China continues to develop a multi-dimensional 

counterspace program, ‘‘China’s space activities and capabilities, including ASAT 

programs, have significant implications for anti-access/area denial in Taiwan Strait 

contingencies and beyond.’’ What implications do these developments have on our 

national security space posture? Do our military operational and contingency plans 

account for these potential space-based ‘‘anti-access/area denial’’ scenarios and their 

implications for surface, air, and other forces? Do military war games and exercises 

include such scenarios and are potential redundancies or alternative capabilities exercised? 

Secretary PAYTON. The number of space faring nations is growing and it should 

be noted China is not the only country to possess counterspace capabilities. We now 

operate in a contested space domain and, therefore, Space Situational Awareness 

and Space Protection are high priorities for National Security Space (NSS) systems. 

While some of our space capabilities are protected, we realize that we will likely face 

a wider range of threats to not only the satellites, but also their ground infrastructure and the links that control/connect these systems 

To address these issues, Air Force Space Command and NRO established a Space 

Protection Program (SPP) on 31 March 2008, to help make informed decisions about 

how to best preserve our space capabilities via comprehensive vulnerability assessments, protection strategies and concepts, protection technologies investment, and 

protection capstone requirements definition with roadmaps to define integration of 

protection capabilities into future systems. Additionally, we are increasing our efforts to develop Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) capabilities to allow us options in the future to quickly replace or augment existing satellite capabilities. 

Combatant Commands (COCOMs) consider space based ‘‘anti-access/area denial’’ 

scenarios and implications in their military deliberate/contingency planning. 

COCOMs are required by their Unified Command Plan and other Strategic Guidance to consider employment in all domains (to include space) as they develop their 

operational concept(s). 

Multiple war games include exploration of concepts associated with space 

vulnerabilities. Examples include: Unified Engagement, the Air Force Future Capabilities Wargame, and the Schriever Wargames (held by Air Force Space Command, 

with Joint and Coalition partners). These war games specifically look at space 

vulnerabilities and impacts of denied capability. A common theme of all these activities is the absolute criticality of bolstering fidelity of space situational awareness. 

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Payton and Mr. Large, the Pentagon’s 2008 China military 

modernization report finds that China continues to develop a multi-dimensional 

counterspace program, ‘‘China’s space activities and capabilities, including ASAT 

programs, have significant implications for antiaccess/area denial in Taiwan Strait 

contingencies and beyond?’’ What implications do these developments have on our 

national security space posture? Do our military operational and contingency plans 

account for these potential space-based ‘‘anti-access/area denial’’ scenarios and their 

implications for surface, air, and other forces? Do military wargames and exercises 

include such scenarios and are potential redundancies or alternative capabilities exercised? 

Mr. LARGE. Note: This response is broken into three parts below. 
97 

Part 1: Space capabilities are vital to our national security. At the same time, potential adversaries continue to seek means to counter these advantages. Our space 

capabilities face a wide range of growing threats. The threat exists end-to-end and 

requires a new way of thinking and a new way of addressing the challenges facing 

the space community. 

The recommendations from on-going assessments are carefully factored into our 

space systems architecture planning and resulting investment priorities. Our investment strategy for space and space-related activities is a balanced approach to 

achieving these capabilities. Our space control investment strategy, for example, 

balances the need for space situational awareness, protection of our space capabilities, and protection of terrestrial forces and the homeland from threats posed by adversarial use of space. 

Part 2: The complete protection picture requires that we take a careful look at 

the vulnerabilities on the ground as well as those in space; these vulnerabilities 

take many forms. The NRO is committed to protecting the information and assets 

that help us maintain our Nation’s freedom and security from any threats. Unfortunately, the unclassified nature of this forum precludes me from discussing any specific details. Any further details must be discussed in a closed session. 

Part 3: Our military wargames and exercises have developed and matured over 

decades resulting in a robust capability that includes a wide variety of scenario. Any 

further detail must be discussed in a closed session. 

Mr. EVERETT. General Kehler and Mr. Large, I understand the Chinese ASAT test 

was a good example of how intelligence was ‘‘operationalized’’ to provide near realtime support to military users. As threats to space increase, so too will the demand 

for greater space intelligence support and resources. How does the Department plan 

to address this requirement? 

Mr. LARGE. I respectfully defer to General Kehler. 

Æ