Filed 2/5/15 Tselevich v. Allstate Ins. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MAXIM TSELEVICH et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B250792
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC485650)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Steven J. Kleifield, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Mark B. Sc ott and Mark B. Scott for Plaintiffs and Appellants. MacGregor & Berthel, Gregory Michael MacGregor, Deborah A. Berthel and
Joshua N. Willis for Defe ndants and Respondents.

_____________ ____________2 This appeal presents a coverage is sue under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by Allstate In surance Company. The policy exclud es losses caused by “[w]ater or any other substance that backs up through sewers or drains” (water-damage exclusion). The trial court concluded the water-damage exclusion was unambiguo us when ruling on
Allstate’s demurrer to th e first amended complaint. 1 Following its ruling sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial c ourt entered judgment of dismissal. The homeowners, appellants Maxim Tselevich and Preston Chiaro, contend the water-damage exclusion does not apply as they have a lleged the damage to their property was not caused when water “backed up” through the sewer line, but when raw sewage in the municipal sewer line “stopped flowing in the intended direction” because of a break or
offset in the main sewer line and was “diverted above the bloc kage to another and wholly unintended path” through their sewer line and into their house and onto their property. We conclude the water-damage exclusion is unambiguous and coverage under the insurance policy is excluded. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND
1. Facts 2
Tselevich and Chiaro own a residence located at 7541 Hermes Drive in West Hollywood, California (the residence). On December 21, 2009, 3 raw sewage flowed into the residence, “entering the first floor, throug h the bathroom toilet and sink, and kitchen and bar sinks, discharging ra w sewage, throughout the entir e first floor.” Tselevich

1 The demurrer was brought on behalf of Allstate Insu rance Company, Allstate Insurance Company of California, and A llstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, Allstate).

2 For purposes of appellate review of the order sustaining the demurrer, we accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deduc tions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)

3 The complaint alleges the in cident occurred on December 19, 2009, while the first amended complaint alleges that the incident occurred two days later on December 21, 2009.3 called a plumber who responded to the emergenc y and stated the problem was in the City of Los Angeles sewer main.
Chiaro had obtained a homeowner’s insu rance policy issued by Allstate. The water-damage exclusion in the policy states: “Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverages A and B: [¶] We do not cover loss to the property described in Coverage A— Dwelling Protection or Coverage B—Other Structures Protecti on consisting of or caused by: [¶] . . . [¶] 2. Water or any other substanc e that backs up through sewers or drains.” (Bold omitted.) On December 21, 2009, Tselevich called A llstate, and the Allstate representative opened a claim. On January 4, 2010, Allstate conducte d a field inspection of the residence.
Allstate denied the claim in a letter dated Fe bruary 1, 2010 based upon the water-damage exclusion in the policy. Litigation ensued.
2. Proceedings

a. Demurrer to the Comp laint Sustained with Leave to Amend On May 31, 2012, Tselevic h and Chiaro filed a compla int against Allstate. The complaint alleged the incident as follows: “[T]here was a blockage in the Hermes Avenue sewer main which caused raw sewage from the houses on Hermes Avenue to
flow into Tselevich’s sewer lateral and disc harge sewage into the Residence and onto the lot. The raw sewage was discharged thro ughout the Residence’s first floor.” It is alleged that when Tselevich cons ulted the plumbing company that previously had repaired the plaintiffs’ sewer lateral, the plumber informed Tselevich that the “problem was at the Hermes Drive sewer main. He then told Tselevic h to call the City of Los Angeles (‘the City’) to report the Sewe r Main Damage, and make a claim to his
homeowners’ insuran ce company.”
Allstate filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend, rendering the motion to strike moot. While the parties addressed the coverage issue, the trial court was concerned that the plaintiffs did not have a copy of the in surance policy and ordered A llstate to provide one.4 Although the trial court stated on the record it did not think the complaint stated a cause of action, it gave the plaintiffs leave to amend to have the benefit of the policy to see if a
cause of action could be stated.
b. Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint Sustained Without Leave to
Amend The first amended complaint alleged th e problem with the city’s main sewer caused raw sewage to be “diverted,” not “bac ked up” through the homeowners’ sewer. It is alleged the plumber informed the Allstate adjuster that the pr oblem occurred off the property as “there was a blockage in the City ’s main sewer, in the street, and the flow of raw sewage was diverted from the main sewer in to plaintiffs’ sewer la teral, which did not have a backflow preventer, and then into th e Residence, inundating the Property.” Based on Allstate’s denial of the claim, the first amended complaint alleged causes of action for (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of policy, (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) insurance bad fa ith, (5) fraudulent concealment, suppression, non-disclosure, (6) negligent non-disclosure, and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The insurance policy was attached to the first am ended complaint, along with the denial of coverage letter.
Allstate filed a demurrer to the firs t amended complaint, asserting among other grounds that the entire first amended complain t and all causes of action alleged therein were barred by the water-dam age exclusion in the policy. 4 Relying on Cardio Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 69 ( Cardio Diagnostic ), in which the court construed a policy exclusion similar to the one at issue here, Allstate
contended that as a matter of law there was no coverage for the lo ss. The trial court agreed with Allstate, stating that the first amended complaint “does not state a cause of action because of the application of the [wat er-damage] exclusion. ” The court’s order

4 Allstate also moved on the grounds that a one-year statute of limitations in the policy barred the claims allege d in the first amended complain t, the tort claims were not pleaded with the requis ite specificity and failed to state a cause of action, and Tselevich lacked standing to assert these claims becaus e he is not a named insu red on the policy.5 states: “[T]he Court finds no coverage existe d and as such Plaintiffs Fail to State any Cause of Action against any Allstate Defendant.” The trial court entered a judgment of dism issal. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review for an order sust aining a demurrer without leave to amend is de novo. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting a ll material facts properly pl eaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Fu rther, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its pa rts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whethe r the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable po ssibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the tria l court has abused its discre tion and we reverse; if not,
there has been no abuse of discretion and we a ffirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” ( Ibid .) “To meet [their] burden of sh owing abuse of discretion, the plaintiff[s] must show how the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action. [Citation.] However, such a showing need not be made in the trial court so long as it is made to the reviewing court.” ( William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1621.) As shall be show n, appellants have not met their burden.
2. Interpretation of Insurance Policy Here, we must interpret an insurance po licy, which is a legal question that we review de novo. ( Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18.) Our resolution of this case rests on the interpreta tion of the contract language in the waterdamage exclusion in the insurance policy, wh ich excluded coverage for damage caused by: “[w]ater or any other substance that backs up through sewers or drains.”6 “ ‘While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretati on apply. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The goal of contract interpretation is to gi ve effect to the mutual intent of the parties. [Citation.] If contract language is clear and explicit, we as certain this intent from the written provisions and go no further. [Citation.] Words in an insurance policy must be understood in their ordinary sense unless given special meanings by the policy. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 837, 845.) “ ‘An ambiguity arises only if “. . . there [is] more than one construction in issue which is semantically permissibl e . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In the case of an insurance policy there must be an ‘ “uncertainty in the app lication of the policy language to the facts upon which the claim of coverage is predicated.” ’ [Citation.] ‘A claim of ambiguity cannot always be decided from the [la nguage]. It may be la tent.’ [Citation.]” ( Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Tailoring (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 884, 889.) “If there is an ambiguity, . . . it is resolved by interpreting the ambiguous provisions in the sense the promisor (i.e ., the insurer) believed the promisee understood them at the time of formation. (Civ. Code, § 1649.) If application of this rule does not eliminate the ambiguity, ambigu ous language is construed ag ainst the party who caused the uncertainty to exist. ( Id. , § 1654.) In the insurance c ontext, we generally resolve ambiguities in favor of c overage. [Citations.]” ( AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 822.) Like th e trial court, we find no unce rtainty or ambiguity in the water-damage exclusion in the insurance policy.
3. The Causes of Action Based upon the Interpretation of the Water-Damage Exclusion Fail as a Matter of Law Appellants contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers to the causes of action arising from the interpretation of the water-damage exclus ion, which include declaratory relief (first cause of action), brea ch of policy (second caus e of action), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dea ling (third cause of action), and insurance bad faith (fourth cause of action). These causes of action allege that Allstate unreasonably interpreted the water-damage exclusion, as th e exclusion should be interpreted to apply7 “only to losses resulting from back ups of th e insured’s sewage” caused by a blockage in
the insured’s sewer lateral within the insured’s control. Employing principles of cons truction, we begin with the language of the insurance policy in order to ascertain the plain me aning or the meaning a layperson would ordinarily attach to it. ( Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc.
, supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 18.) The water-damage exclusion states that a loss to the property caused by “[w]ater or any other substance that backs up through sewers or drains” is not covered under the policy. The water-damage exclusion is unambi guous and is not rendered ambiguous because appellants offer alternative constr uctions. A layperson would understand the water-damage exclusion to apply when water or any other substance comes up out of a sewer or drain due to a blockage. (See Cardio Diagnostic, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 76; Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Tailoring
, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 890, 892 [The exclusion for damage caused by “ ‘[w]ate r that backs up from a sewer or drain’ is facially unambiguous.”].)

a. No Ambiguity Exists in the Water-Damage Exclusion Appellants maintain the term “sewer” is not defined in the policy and is ambiguous because it could mean either the property owner’s sewer line or the city’s main sewer line. This argument attempts to create an ambigu ity by adding qualifying words to the insurance policy. The water-damage exclusion applies if water or any other substance backs up through sewers or drains. There is no distinction in the insurance policy between a sewer under the insured’ s control and one that is not. In a variation of the same argument, appe llants next contend that the term “backs up” as used in the water-damage exclusion refe rs only to a blockage that backed up the insured’s own sewage through the insured’s dr ain or sewer. As written, water and any other substance that backs up through a sewer or drain due to a blocka ge is not limited to any one cause or locati on of the blockage. A similar argument was raised and rejected in Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Tailoring
, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th 884. The insured ar gued that the back-up exclusion in its policy did not apply if the blockage was within the insured’s premises because the8 term “sewer” applied to the public part of th e sewer line and the part within the insured’s premises is referred to as the “plumbing system.” ( Id . at p. 893.) The court noted there was no policy language that divided the se wer into parts so as to construe the unambiguous back-up exclusion as suggested by the insured. ( Ibid .) Here, just as in Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Tailoring , there is no reasonable construction of the water-damage exclusion th at breaks the term “sewer” into parts for purposes of determining a blockage or limits th e exclusion only to a blockage caused by the insured’s raw sewage. The policy exclusion is writte n in broad terms that the appellants seek to narrow by presenting an unreasonable cons truction of this plain and unambiguous language.
b. The Water-Damage Exclusion Applie s Because the Allegations State Water or any Other Substance Backed up Through the Sewer Appellants next contend th at they have sufficiently alleged a loss under the insurance policy because the fi rst amended complaint alleges raw sewage was “diverted” and did not “back up” as ther e is no allegation in the firs t amended complaint of an accumulation of sewage originating in their se wer that caused a bloc kage in which water or any other substance backed up into their se wer or drain. Instead, “raw sewage in the City’s sewer main, which, due to a break and/ or offset in the main sewer, stopped flowing in the intended direction, and was diverted above the blockage to another and wholly unintended path, [to] plaintiffs’ sewer line, where it was able to simply flow into plaintiffs’ building.” These allegations expl ain the blockage (in the city’s sewer main) that caused raw sewage to back up through a sewer or drain and into their residence. These allegations fall within th e water-damage exclusion. In support of their distinction between wa ter that “backs up” through a sewer or drain, and water that is “diverted” and come s up through a sewer or drain, appellants rely on the definition of the term “backs up” in Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Tailoring
, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th 884. Their reliance is misplaced. Citi ng the dictionary definition of “back up,” the court noted “ ‘back up’ is an intransitive verb meaning ‘to accumulate in a congested state . . . .’ [Citation.] It also means ‘to rise and flow backward or9 overflow adjacent areas . . .’ such as ‘water checked by an obstruction.’ [Citation.]” ( Id

. at pp. 892-893.) Appellants ma intain that the diverted ra w sewage that came up through the sewer and damaged their property was no t in a “congested state,” did not rise and flow backward, and did not ove rflow. “Divert” is a transitiv e verb meaning to turn from one course, direction, or objective to anothe r. (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1971) p. 663, col. 1.) Here, raw sewage was divert ed (checked by an obstruction), causing it to change course and back up through a sewer or drain and into their residence. Appellants also rely on Cardio Diagnostic
, supra , 212 Cal.App.4th 69, but that case supports Allstate’s interpretation of the water-damage exclusion. In Cardio Diagnostic , the court construed a policy that ex cluded any “ ‘loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [w]ater that backs up or overflows from a sewer, drain or sump.’ ” ( Id . at p. 71.) The insured’s business pr emises and property were extensively damaged when water overflowed from a toilet in an upstairs suite, ev entually flooding the insured’s suite. ( Id . at pp. 71-72.) An investigation re vealed that a sewer line blockage
caused the water in the toilet to overflow. ( Id . at p. 72.) Farmers denied coverage based upon the policy exclusion. ( Ibid .) The insured argued the policy exclusion did not apply because the term “ ‘backs up or overflows from’ ” means that water “must come out of the sewer or drain” and does not include water unable to procee d down an interior drain. ( Cardio Diagnostic
, supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 74.) The court reje cted the argument, noting the insured had focused solely on the meaning of “backs up” in the exclusio n and not on the meaning of “overflows.” ( Id . at pp. 74-75.) In making this distinction, the court cited out-of-state
and federal case law that the insured relied on to highlight that the cited cases addressed policy exclusions construing “backs up,” not “ ‘backs up or overflows.’ ” ( Id . at p. 75.) In these cases, water that “backs up” from a sewer was construed to mean water that is checked by an obst ruction and cannot flow in its usual direction. 5 ( Ibid .) This is

5 Appellants cite to several of these cas es in their opening brief, including an unpublished case from the district court in Maryland ( Drutz v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. (D.Md. Feb. 28, 2012, Civ. A. No. WMN-10-3499) 20 12 U.S.Dist. Lexis 25286, *7-14), a United10 consistent with California case law interpre ting the term “backs up” in an insurance policy exclusion. (See Penn-America Ins. Co . v. Mike’s Tailoring
, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 892-893.)
The Cardio Diagnostic court noted that a laypers on would understand the term “backs up” as used in the policy exclusion to mean “wat er that comes up out of a sewer, drain, or sump,” and the term “overflows” to mean water that spills over from a sewer, drain, or sump due to a blockage. ( Cardio Diagnostic
, supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 76.) We agree with the Cardio Diagnostic court’s construction of the term “backs up,” as used in the water-damage exclusion at issue here , that is, excluding from coverage property damage caused when water or any other subs tance comes up out of a sewer or drain due to a blockage. Here, the allegations in the initial complain t allege that a blockage in the city’s sewer line caused raw sewage to flow into th e sewer lateral and come up out of a drain
and into the residence. The first amended complaint alleges additional facts uncovered during an investigation that the blockage in the sewer line prevented the flow of sewage
in its usual direction and the “diverted” ra w sewage came up out of a sewer or drain and
into the residence. 6 Accepting these allegations as true, the water-damage exclusion applies to this claim. The trial court did not err in sustaining the de murrers to the causes

States Court of Appeals cas e from the Sixth Circuit ( Front Row Theatre v. American Manufacturer’s Mut. (6th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1343, 13 48), a Colorado Court of Appeal case ( Haines v. United Sec. Ins. Co. (1979) 43 Colo.App. 276 [6 02 P.2d 901, 902]), and a Washington Court of Appeal case ( Hallsted v. Blue Mountain Convalescent Ctr. (1979) 23 Wash.App. 349 [595 P.2d 574, 575-576]). These cases construed “back-up exclusions,” in insurance policies but made no distinction between wa ter that “backs up” rather than water that is “diverted” through a sewer or drain.

6 Appellants argue the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because there are disputed facts alleged in the first amended comp laint. As previously stated, we accept as true the facts alleged. We do not, however, a ccept as true conclusions of fact or law, and therefore disregard the numerou s conclusory allegations in the first amended complaint alleging that no back up occurred.11 of action seeking declaratory relief (first cau se of action) and br each of policy (second cause of action) because the plaintiffs did no t allege a covered loss as a matter of law. Because no policy benefits were due, the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (third cause of acti on) and bad faith (fourth cause of action) also cannot be main tained as a matter of law ( Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange,
Inc. , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 35).
4. The Fraudulent Concealment Cause of Action Is Not Sufficiently Alleged Appellants contend that they have suffi ciently alleged a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based up on nondisclosure of material facts. The first amended complaint alleges that Allstate took “extraor dinary measures to conceal from plaintiffs the true facts regarding the insureds and th e existing coverages under the [p]olicy, and why the loss was not excluded ” under the water-damage excl usion. Allstate and its agents allegedly had no reasonable basis for ma king the representations to plaintiffs that the loss was caused by a “backup in plaintiffs’ lateral sewer, . . . that the loss was subject to [the water-damage exclusion], and that Allstate knew or should have known that plaintiffs would not become awar e of Allstate’s deception.”
The elements of fraudulent concealment ar e: (1) concealment or suppression of material fact, (2) duty to disclo se the fact, (3) intent to conc eal or suppress with intent to defraud, (4) plaintiff must have been unawar e of the fact and woul d not have acted in such a manner had the plaintiff known of the concealment or suppression, and (5) resulting damage. ( Jones v. ConocoPhillips (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198; Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613.) Liability for concealment is imposed where th e defendant is in a fiduciary or other relationship that imposes a duty of disclosure. ( OCM Principal Opport unities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859.) The allegations do not state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment as the first element has not been sufficiently alleged. The allegations regarding concealment of the water-damage exclusion are c ontradicted by the coverage denial letter attached as an
exhibit to the first amended co mplaint. “[T]o the extent th e factual allegations conflict12 with the content of the exhib its to the complaint, we re ly on and accept as true the
contents of the exhibits and tr eat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.” ( Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.) As of February 1, 2010, Allstate identified the water-dam age exclusion in the policy and the reason why the claim was denied. 7 Appellants take issue with the content of th e denial of coverage letter because, as alleged, the insurance adjuster either concealed the true cause of the damage that they later discovered through an inde pendent investigation, or the adjuster failed to thoroughly investigate the true cause of the damage. As previously stated, there are no specific allegations that Allstate or its adjuster either intentionally concealed, suppressed, or failed to disclose any material f acts later discovered by plainti ffs’ consultants regarding the cause of the blockage on Herm es Drive. General and conc lusory allegations are not enough to plead fraudulent concealment. (See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) 8 “[E]very element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically.” ( Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331.) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: (1) to
furnish the defendant with certain definite charges that ca n be intelligently met, and (2) to

7 The denial of coverage letter states: “S pecifically, the following facts are the basis for this decision: Based on our conversatio n at the time of my inspection & subsequent conversation with Byron at Schu[e]lke Plumbi ng, the sewage back-up through your drain line was the result of a blockage in the city’s main drain line off of your property.” Schuelke Plumbing allegedly responded to the homeowners’ call on the date of the incident.

8 Appellants rely on People ex rel. Sepulveda v. Highland Fed. Savings & Loan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1716, to argue that specificity is not required as these details are matters to be addressed in discovery, not on demurrer. In that case, the court analyzed the allegations of racketeering ac tivity based upon mail fraud and concluded the complaint sufficiently describe d the nature of the mailings and the place of mailings, along with the time, place, and content of the fraud. This was sufficient. ( Id . at pp. 1716- 1717.) In contrast, the allegations in the first amended complaint that Allstate took “extraordinary measures” to conc eal facts are devoid of any similar allegations of when, where, to whom, and by what means extr aordinary measures were taken.13 ensure the complaint is specific enough so that the c ourt can “weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings.” ( Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-217, superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227.) The fraudu lent concealment cause of action in the first amended complaint fails to meet this pleading standard, and appe llants have made no showing that this pleading defect can be cured by amendment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
5. Negligent Misrepresentation Clai m Fails as a Matter of Law Appellants assert the demurrer to this cause of action was without merit, but they do not specifically address why the negligen t misrepresentation cause of action is sufficiently alleged, referring collectively to their “nondisclosure clai ms.” The negligent misrepresentation cause of action is based upon the denial of coverage letter, and the allegations that Allstate knew the cause of the lo ss, failed to disclose the true cause of the loss, and knew the loss would have been covered under the insurance policy. A claim for negligent misrepresentation based upon the failure to disclose a
material fact is similar to fra udulent concealment, but there is no requirement of intent to deceive, only unreasonable conduct on the part of the insurer is required. (See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutte r Group 2014) ¶ 11.41, p. 11- 16.) Based upon the allegations in the firs t amended complaint, appellants cannot plead any damages arising from the denial of covera ge (for whatever reason) because we have concluded that the first amended comp laint does not allege a covered loss. 9 Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer w ithout leave to amend.

9 Like the allegations asserting a claim fo r fraudulent concealment, the allegations to support the negligent misrepresentation clai m are general and conclusory. It is unclear whether claims for negligent mi srepresentation are held to the same heightened pleading standard for fraud ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184). The Small court held the specific pleading requir ement applies to shareholder’s actions asserting negligent misrepresentation. ( Ibid .) In so holding, the Supreme Court14 6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Appellants contend that Allstate’s extrem e and outrageous conduct is sufficiently alleged to state a cause of action for inte ntional infliction of emotional distress. Liability for intentional infliction of emo tional distress extend s only to conduct by
the insurer directed at the insured “so extreme and outrageous ‘as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” ( Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5; Coleman v. Republic Indemnity Ins. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App. 4th 403, 416-417.) Delay or denial of insurance claims is not sufficiently outrageous to state a cause of action. ( Coleman v. Republic Indemnity Ins. Co.
, supra , at p. 417.) Because this cause of action is based upon Allstate’s allegedly mi srepresenting the caus e of the loss in the denial of coverage letter and denying coverage , this cause of action fails as a matter of
law.

suggested that if squarely pres ented with the issue, it might hold that the specific pleading requirement applies in other negligent misrepresentation actions. ( Ibid .)15 DISPOSITION The judgment of dismissal is affirm ed. Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

KITCHING, J.