Operational Culture

for the

Warfighter

Principles and

Applications

Barak A. Salmoni

Paula Holmes-Eber

Foreword by

General James N. Mattis, USMC

Operational Culture for theWarfighter:Principles and Applications

is a comprehensive textbook, reference, and planning tool. It addresses the critical need of the Marine Corps to provide operationally

relevant cultural teaching, training and analysis. This book links social science paradigms to the needs of Marines,using an applied anthropology approach.The text links fundamental features of culture

(environment, economy, social structure, political structure and belief systems) to the challenges of military operations in different cultures around the globe.

Drawing on the research and field experiences of Marines themselves, Operational Culture for theWarfighter uses case studies from

around the world to illustrate the application of cultural principles

to the broad expeditionary spectrum of today and tomorrow’s Marine Corps—combat operations,counterinsurgency,stability and reconstruction operations,humanitarian affairs and disaster relief,and

training and operating with foreign allies and partners.

Operational Culture for theWarfighter is intended for use by Marine

leaders at all levels,in professional military education,planning,and

operating.

Barak A. Salmoni is Deputy Director of the Marine Corps Center

for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University, and has taught at Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Naval Postgraduate

School. In addition to developing professional military education

programs for the schools of the Marine Corps,he has developed and

participated in training for Marines and soldiers deploying all over

the world.

Paula Holmes-Eber is Professor of Operational Culture at Marine

Corps University, where she teaches culture courses for all four PME

schools. She holds a PhD in Anthropology from Northwestern University. Previously she taught at the University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee as an Assistant Professor of Anthropology and as a Visiting

Scholar at the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington.

Operational Culture for the Warfighter Salmoni and Holmes-Eber
Operational Culture

for the Warfighter

Principles and Applications

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

QUANTICO,VIRGINIA

2008

Dr. Barak A. Salmoni

Deputy Director

Marine Corps Center for

Advanced Operational Culture Learning

Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber

Professor of Operational Culture

Marine Corps University

Contents

Foreword.......................................................................................vii

By General James N. Mattis, USMC

Acknowledgments........................................................................ix

Introduction ...................................................................................1

Purpose of the Book..................................................................2

Framing the Problem: “Irregular” Warfare and.........................3

the Significance of Culture

Back to Clausewitz.....................................................................4

Integrating Culture in the Military Domain...............................6

Purpose and Structure................................................................8

As We Cross the Line of Departure...........................................9

Part I

Terms of Reference

Chapter One: Context.................................................................15

A Historical Approach to Culture in Operations ....................15

The Conceptual Context ..........................................................22

The Five Operational Culture Dimensions .............................24

Chapter Two: Defining Culture.................................................29

Military Definitions of Culture .................................................29

Culture: An Operational Definition.........................................36

From “Culture” to “Operational Culture” ................................43

iii
Part II

Five Operational Culture Dimensions for

Planning and Execution

Chapter Three: Dimension I –

The Physical Environment..................................................53

How Culture Groups Relate to their Environments ...............53

Features of the Physical Environment.....................................55

Water

Land

Food

Materials for Shelter

Climate and Seasons

Fuel and Power

Chapter Four: Dimension Two – The Economy ....................73

Formal and Informal Economic Systems ................................74

Goods and Services in the Informal Economy

People Who Participate in the Informal Economy

Economy as a Dynamic Network of Exchange......................86

Egalitarian and Communal Distribution

Direct Reciprocal Exchange

Symbolic Directional Exchange

Economy as a Way of Structuring Social Relationships .........94

Pastoralism

Agriculturalism

Industrial Production

Chapter Five: Dimension Three – The Social Structure.....103

Understanding Social Structures............................................105

Factors Affecting Position Within the Social Structure.........110

Age

Gender

Kinship and Tribal Membership

Class

Ethnicity and Ethnic Membership

Religious Membership

iv
Chapter Six: Dimension Four – The Political Structure.....147

Political Organization.............................................................149

Political Structures Defined....................................................151

Bands

Tribes

Chiefdoms

States

Who Holds Power: Cultural Forms of Leadership................155

Formal and Informal Leadership

Leadership in Acephalous Societies

Episodic Leaders

Councils and Oligarchies

Hereditary Leadership

Dictators and Strongmen

Elected and Selected Leadership

Conflicts Over Power: Challenges to

Existing Political Structures....................................................161

Chapter Seven: Dimension Five – Belief Systems ...............167

Some Features of Belief Systems...........................................169

History,Imagined Memory, and Folklore

Icons

Symbols and Communication

Rituals

Religious Beliefs .....................................................................193

Formal Religion

Informal Religion

Part III

Toward Applying Operational Culture

Chapter Eight: From Models to Dimensions to

Observable Realities ..................................................................203

Case Study I Nigeria: Oil and Burgeoning Insurgency ........206

Case Study II Darfur: Environment,

Economy, Ethnicity, and War............................................213

v
Philippines: Kinship Politics and the GeographicReligious Divide ................................................................220

Chapter Nine: Operational Culture Learning ......................237

in Training and Education

Initial Issues for Consideration..............................................238

Learning Domains ..................................................................240

Samples of Operational Culture Learning

Across the Domains ...............................................................248

Keying Operational Culture Learning ...................................251

to the Appropriate Domains

Professional Military Education

Pre-Deployment Training

Metabolizing Operational Culture .........................................265

Who Teaches ..........................................................................267

Conclusion..................................................................................273

Militaries as Cultures: The Marine Corps ..............................274

Principles of Military Doctrine: Congruence with

Operational Culture................................................................282

Doctrinal Considerations are Operational Culture Themes

Doctrine Misused is Operational Culture Misconstrued

Appendices

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms ............................................295

Appendix B: Culture Operator’s Questions..........................307

Bibliography...............................................................................321

vi
Foreword

Today the U.S. and our allies face a complex but earnest threat.

Certainly combat will continue to demand timeless warfighting

qualities of initiative, aggressiveness, combined arms skills, ethical

decision-making, and more.

Yet, history tells us that a military force unwilling to change, wanting to fight in the old-fashioned way, is doomed to defeat, regardless of the bravery of its soldiers.

Our Marine Corps has proven to be highly adaptive. During Chesty

Puller’s lifetime, our Corps shifted from what can be described as

naval infantry dispersed in ships’ detachments, to trench warfare assault troops, to small wars practitioners, to combined-arms amphibious assault troops, to extended land operations alongside our

comrades in the Army, to counterinsurgency troops—always maintaining the Corps’ ability to defend our country.

This adaptation continued in the 1990s as Marines anticipated and

prepared for the three-block wars we have been fighting in Iraq

and Afghanistan since 2001.

Fundamental to our adaptation to today’s conflict will be the intelligent initiative of all Marines when the enemy hides among innocent people. This demands a keen understanding of culture—the

sort of skill practiced by Chesty and his shipmates in the jungles of

Haiti and Nicaragua when they served as advisors to non-U.S.

forces.

Furthermore, in today’s information age, we must recognize that

the essential “key terrain” is the will of a host nation’s population.

This has been demonstrated by our troops in al-Anbar, Iraq, and

permits us to gain the trust of skeptical populations, thus frustrating the enemy’s efforts and suffocating their ideology.

This superb textbook, a collaboration between our Corps’ Center

for Advanced Operational Culture Learning and the Marine Corps

vii
University, enables today’s Marines to continue their never-ending

adaptation to war, keeping our Marines at the top of their game and

able to confront and defeat our enemies. Integrating operational

cultural principles into the specific conditions where Marines operate in the future will bring depth to touchstones such as “No better friend, no worse enemy,” and “First, do no harm.” Culturally

savvy Marines are a threat to our enemies, so study, challenge, and

implement the principles you study in this text. Your buddies, your

Nation, and our way of life call on your ability to adapt in the finest

traditions of Chesty Puller.

J. N. MATTIS

General, U.S. Marine Corps

viii
Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement

of several people in the preparation of Operational Culture for the

Warfighter. These include Gen James N. Mattis, LtGen Keith

Stalder, LtGen Richard Zilmer, BGen James Laster, BGen James

Toolan, BGen David Garza, and Dr. Jerre Wilson. Extensive discussions with LtGen Joseph Dunford, Col W.B. Crowe, Col Matthew

Lopez, Col Brennan Byrne, Col Daniel Hahne, Col (ret.) Jerry Durrant, LtCol (ret.) Nicholas Vukovich, LtCol Athony Abati USA, LtCol

Jan Horvath USA, LtCol Michael Eisenstadt USAR, Maj Seth Folsom,

Maj David Vacchi USA, Maj Remi Hajjar USA, Maj Joseph Lee, Capt

Matthew Danner, Capt Barrett Bradstreet, Capt Seth Moulton, Capt

Jason Goodale, and MGySgt (ret.) Richard McPherson, led to the

germination of ideas that became sections of this book. We also

acknowledge the insights of international colleagues, to include

Col Bill Monfries and LtCol Daryl Campbell, both of the Australian

Army; Dr. Karen Carr, Director of the United Kingdom Defence

Academy’s Centre for Human Systems; and Dr. Charles Kirke, also

at the U.K. Defence Academy.

Several individuals read drafts of this book, providing constructive

criticism and input. These include BGen Richard Lake, Col (ret.)

Jeffery Bearor, Dr. Montgomery McFate, Dr. Kerry Fosher, Col (ret.)

Henri Boré French Marines, LtCol Pat Carroll, and Adam Sikes, in

addition to members of the senior subject matter staff of the

MAGTF Staff Training Program. We wish to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Wendy Overton, Dr. Patrice M. Scanlon, and

Stase L. Rodebaugh, as well as the stewardship of this project by

the Marine Corps History Division Director, Dr. Charles Neimeyer.

Finally, we extend our gratitude to Marine Corps University and

the students of its schools for reading and providing essential feedback on an earlier draft of Operational Culture for the Warfighter.

Their insights and experiences proved fundamental to the book’s

preparation.

ix

Introduction

Marines know better than anyone else that the challenges of today

and tomorrow are more diverse than ever before, running the

gamut from high-intensity, combined arms combat to peacekeeping, democracy building, and disaster relief at home and abroad.

The diversity of these challenges is accompanied by their simultaneity; Marines have to deal with many different kinds of operating conditions and requirements, all at the same time.

In the 1990s, Marine leaders referred to this diversity of simultaneous actions as a “three-block war.”1 Since then, commanders and

strategists have spoken of “irregular warfare” and irregular threats,

to emphasize that American armed forces, and Marines in particular, will confront challenges very different from the force-on-force

battles of the twentieth century.2 In the twenty-first century, formal

states and regular armies will no longer dominate armed conflict or

monopolize coercive force. Our enemies are just as likely to be insurgents whose networks cross national boundaries; warlords who

dominate portions of a country or several countries; or international drug and human trafficking cartels. Likewise our potential

partners may include foreign militaries or police; local tribal leaders; or people whose long-term ideological agendas differ from

ours, but whose near-term interests provide opportunities for pragmatic partnering.

As our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us, war in

the twenty-first century will require a U.S. military that is as capable of operating through successful enduring relationships with

local sheikhs as it is at combined arms operations. Our wars will

be “wars amongst the people”—not wars against the people, and

not wars oblivious to people.3 Particularly in the operating environments of today and tomorrow—characterized by insurgencies

and political structures under threat from non-state actors—long

after hostile military hardware has been destroyed, long after the

“high ground” has been taken, Marines will continue to operate

with and around people. The quality of our relationships with

1
people, in and out of uniform, is of paramount importance

in determining mission success. As a master of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory has affirmed, “the battle for the population is

a major characteristic of revolutionary war [COIN].”4

In order to succeed in the current operating environment, therefore, Marines need to be able to work in foreign Areas of Operation (AOs) with peoples from cultures that are significantly different

from our own. Interaction with a growing variety of peoples makes

understanding culture a basic component of operational planning,

training, and execution. Simply put, the Marine Corps needs

Marines to creatively think of, understand, and employ what we

call “operational culture.”

Purpose of Operational Culture for the Warfighter

This textbook is designed to help Marines link concepts of culture

to the realities of planning and executing military operations

around the world. The book has three primary goals:

● To provide a theoretically sound framework of five basiccultural dimensions, based on clear, academically accurate definitions, which are relevant to military missions.

● To apply these basic cultural principles to actual environments

to which Marines and other members of the U.S. military have

deployed, or may deploy in the future, showing how the principles of Operational Culture can be applied across the geographic and kinetic spectrum of operations.

● To develop a capacity among Marines at all levels to think

systematically about culture, and to apply that thinking to learning about culture in both professional military education and

pre-deployment training.

This book is of equal utility to company-grade and field-grade officers, as well as for staff non-commissioned officers (SNCOs). It

is to be used in the classrooms of the Marine Corps, and will also

2 Operational Culture
serve as a reference tool in the fleet. Finally, it can help commanders and planners to incorporate culture in every step of the

road prior to and during deployment, from unit training, to planning, to the ongoing commander’s evaluation of the battlespace.

These capabilities are particularly germane in current and future

operating environments.

Framing the Problem: “Irregular” Warfare and the Significance of Culture

In recent years, “Irregular Warfare” (IW) has been the framework

through which the U.S. and allied militaries have thought about

military operations. However, a Marine with fleet experience since

the end of the Cold War is likely to consider the “irregular” to be

the regular mode of operating. This emerges from current definitions of IW, which

...has as its objective maintaining or undermining... the

credibility and/or legitimacy... of a political authority by

the application of indirect approaches and non-conventional means to defeat an enemy by subversion, attrition,

or exhaustion rather than [through] direct military confrontation,... though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric

advantages, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.5

As a Marine reader will see, these modes and domains of military

activity are “irregular” only when compared to traditional doctrines

and uses of armed force.6 Likewise, a Marine with experience in

the operating environments of the past decade will understand that

no matter where operations are located on the spectrum of

violence, they are about people. Hostile, neutral, or friendly,

people are the center of gravity in what militaries do. As recent joint doctrine attests, IW “is about winning a war of ideas and

perception. Its battles are fought amongst the people and its outcomes are determined by perceptions and support of the people.”7

Introduction 3
In this operational mode, Marines of all ranks and billets will face

simultaneous, diverse challenges. Among these diverse challenges,

the human element will be at least as important as technological

and physical elements. In recognition of this, today’s senior Marine leadership conceives of the Corps’ operational domain as “hybrid wars.” Here, Marines will continue to be “the world’s finest

expeditionary warriors,” and will need to combine “equal parts

tenacity, courage, and agility” with “the cultural awareness to excel”

in the most demanding situations.8

To do this effectively, Marines of today and tomorrow need to combine existing know-how and experience-based common sense with

a new framework which integrates culture in thinking, planning,

and operating at all levels.

Recent history also attests to the centrality of culture in operations.

Since WWII, all major U.S. engagements, at all parts of the kinetic

spectrum, have involved people in or from regions different from

the United States. In Korea, U.S. forces fought against Asians and

alongside Asians. In Vietnam, we fought against Southeast Asians,

and alongside various peoples from that region. In the operations

of the 1980s, in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama, U.S. military personnel always functioned in areas more or less different from those

to which Americans are accustomed. Operations Desert Shield,

Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort, as well as deployments to the

Balkans and the Caucasus, all signaled what Operations Enduring

and Iraqi Freedom drove home: The U.S. military operates

mostly among people, and these people live in environments

different from what Americans usually encounter.

In fact, from the Barbary Pirates campaign, through the Banana

Wars, up through current operations in the Horn of Africa, Iraq,

and Afghanistan, Marines have always operated in foreign cultures.

It is not enough, however, to recognize that culture is a factor in

military operations. Rather, in order to succeed in the expeditionary environment of today and tomorrow, Marines at all levels

have to understand culture in a military sense.

4 Operational Culture
Back to Clausewitz

To apprehend the centrality of culture to warfare, one can begin by

considering Karl von Clausewitz, perhaps the towering figure of

military thinking in the past two centuries. In the years of the

Napoleonic wars of conquest—what we might consider the modern era’s first global war against an ideological movement of terrifying proportions for existing states—Clausewitz strove to save

Prussia from the French onslaught. In this respect, he may be considered a Foreign Area Officer. Donning the Czarist Army’s uniform after the surrender of the Prussian armies, he worked with the

Russians, then went on to advise the Prussians while still in Czarist

uniform. Marines can also think of Clausewitz as an irregular

warfighter: from Konigsberg in 1812-13, he armed the local population as a popular, semi-guerrilla army to fight the French.9

Having engaged in warfare nearly continuously from 1792 to 1815,

it was as a military thinker reflecting on these years that Clausewitz

became most useful to us now. What occupied his thinking was

how the French military could fight so successfully and continuously under Napoleon. After all, it was not equipped as well as the

Germans, was not generalled as well at levels subordinate to

Napoleon, and did not rely on a socially elite, professional force,

depending instead on ill-trained conscripts. And, it took on Russia, Prussia, and Britain, among other armies.

Inspired by Gerd von Scharnhorst, his mentor at the Prussian War

College, Clausewitz came to the conclusion that the French military

success was produced by changes in French society and culture

since 1789. The emergence of the ideas of nationalism and citizenship had so motivated French soldiers, that their new identities

and motivations had propelled them to great sacrifice and victory

at war.

In short, French culture produced French fighting, and in order to

understand one’s enemies, factors beyond traditional military concern needed to be considered. These included history, beliefs, ideology, demographic changes in social structure, and physical as

well as environmental resources: the culture of a people. And,

Introduction 5
though Clausewitz did not use the word “culture” in particular, the

human aspect and attitudes of the population were significant

enough for him to include them as a member of his “remarkable

trinity” constituting warfare: the people, the army, and the government. Since any warfighter “who ignores any one of them...

would conflict with reality to such an extent... [as to] be totally

useless,”10 Marines must study the human environment—culture—

and incorporate it in operational planning and execution.

Integrating Culture in the Military Domain

As Marines increasingly engage in multi-national operations and

train friendly foreign militaries, our interaction with a growing

variety of foreign peoples and societies will require us to

make understanding culture a basic component of training,

education, operational planning, and mission execution. In

order to integrate culture as a basic component of Marine activities,

we must first clarify thinking and then apply it to the military domain in a way attuned to the operational needs of Marines at all levels. The alternative is to miss out on the “so what” of culture and

fail to make it an operationalized concept applied on the battlefield.

The Marine Corps cannot tolerate that kind of failure, because our

national security for the foreseeable future requires Marines to understand the cultural dynamics in different corners of the world,

and to operate in and among foreign environments with peerless

professionalism.

This capability is not, in principle, at odds with existing military

doctrine. In preparing for military operations, there are standard

considerations during the mission planning phase. These come

under the rubric of METT-T: Mission, Enemy, Troops and support

available, Terrain and weather, and Time.11 In some cases, particularly in urban environments, METT-T becomes METT-TC, for Civilian considerations. This approach has served American warfighters

well.

In a world of COIN, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Disaster Relief,

6 Operational Culture
etc—all those things that add up to Irregular and Hybrid Wars where

“the population... becomes the objective”— METT-TC becomes

most useful if we recast it slightly.12 Thus, C becomes “civilian cultural considerations.” Additionally, Marines must consider MC—

the “military culture” of forces against and alongside which they

operate.

The Irregular Warrior must therefore plan and operate while

accounting for the whole spectrum of METT-TC-MC considerations.

Approaches to doctrine and planning re-emphasized in the past several years enshrine this need. Students in schools, and planners at

the regimental through Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level,

now think in terms of DIME—Diplomacy, Information, Military, and

Economics—or, particularly at the MEF and combined, joint levels,

PMESII—Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information. No mater what the “alphabet soup,” all these elements

are embedded in local cultures. As Lines of Operation (LOOs), it

is impossible to pursue them in an integrated, holistic fashion absent an understanding of cultural dynamics.13

Just as doctrine has a place for culture, the term “Operational Culture” itself is not entirely new. Though the term has not been

prominent in the social sciences, the well-known sociologist Ward

Goodenough used it to refer to a set of norms and behaviors that

people switch into, or activate, given the group they are in for any

given purpose. People thus “operationalize” whatever culture they

need.14 This already hints at an important factor in the military domain: Culture for military people is useful only if we can render it operationally relevant.

This text will define “operational culture” in subsequent chapters,

presenting a flexible way of thinking about a continually changing

operational environment. As a start, however, Marines need to understand that Operational Culture as a skills set comprises:

● Knowledge of considerations at play in human societies globally.

Introduction 7
● Capability to function among diverse peoples.

● Understanding of specific human societies to which

one deploys.

● Ability to successfully integrate this knowledge and

understanding into operational planning and mission execution.

Purpose and Structure

This text is intended to orient Marines’ minds to operational culture

in the context of expeditionary and irregular operations: the bread

and butter of what Marines do.

It seeks to do so by furnishing a framework for thinking about how

“people-as-center-of-gravity” can be a factor in military operations.

We have chosen the following structure:

Part I: Terms of Reference

Chapter 1 puts “operational culture” in the context of historical,

current and emerging military challenges, and examines the utility

to the Marine of cultural anthropological approaches.

Chapter 2 questions some commonly accepted definitions of culture, suggesting the difficulties they present to military users. It

also provides a more precise, conceptually sound set of definitions

related to culture, appropriate to the military profession.

Part II: Five Cultural Dimensions for Marine Operations

Chapter 3 starts the process of explaining the Five Operational Culture Dimensions for planning and operating, with a focus on the

physical environment.

8 Operational Culture
Chapter 4 explores the economic dimension.

Chapter 5 looks at social structures applicable to the warfighter.

Chapter 6 examines political structures.

Chapter 7 considers the impact of beliefs and symbols on operations.

Part III: Towards Applying Operational Culture

Chapter 8 looks at the linkages among these five dimensions,

through examination of case studies.

Chapter 9 develops a framework for culture learning in education

and training, according to accepted taxonomies of learning.

The Conclusion ties definitions and dimensions of culture together

by looking at militaries as cultures, and by showing the congruence of Marine Corps doctrinal principles with those of Operational

Culture.

As We Cross the Line of Departure...

As we begin this exploration of cultural principles, dimensions, and

applications in the military domain, we need to bear in mind two

major considerations. First, understanding foreign cultures is by

nature difficult. Becoming competent as an actor in a foreign environment is even more challenging, requiring much study and

time. It is not a perfect science, and there are no guarantees about

what understanding some aspects of a culture portends in terms of

success—military or otherwise—in that culture. Studying concepts,

tools, and considerations as we do in this text, however, remains

a core part of preparation for the irregular warfare world. This is

because in future military operations, Marines will need to orient

their minds to the human aspects of the battlefield, to make cultural

knowledge truly “operational.”

Introduction 9
Second, this text is a learning tool, for use in schools of the Marine

Corps and as a reference for reflection in the fleet. It is not a doctrinal publication directing you how to act or prescribing procedures. As such, it is not a quick or simple read. The broad and

deep phenomenon of how diverse human realities influence—and

are influenced by—military operations cannot be reduced to a

quick and easy read. Consider the words of Clausewitz in this regard, who felt we must avoid the temptation of looking for a “kind

of truth machine” allowing Marines the “mechanical application of

a theory.”15 This book is designed as an educational text:

Read slowly, think much, and derive conclusions that you

can implement in an operational environment characterized

by diversity and uncertainty.

Notes

1 Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block

War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999. 2 U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, Multi-Service Concept for

Irregular Warfare (version 2.0, August 2006), at http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/.

For the doctrinally approved definition of IW, see Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) Version 1.0, 11 September 2007: IW is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the

relevant populations. IW favors the indirect and asymmetric approaches,

though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order

to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

3 See Gen Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern Word

(New York: Knopf, 2007), Part III in particular.

4 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport,

Conn: Praeger Security International, 1964 [2006]), 4.

5 See Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, 5-6. 6 For the regularity of “irregular” warfare, see Barak Salmoni, “The Fallacy of ‘Irregular’ Warfare,” Royal United Services Institute Journal, August 2007. 7 Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, 5-6. 8 LtGen James N. Mattis (USMC) and LtCol Frank G. Hoffman (USMCR, ret), “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2005, 18-19.

9 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

10 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

10 Operational Culture
Introduction 11

11 See MCRP 5-1a: Doctrinal References for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare

(HQMC, 2002). 59-66 in particular.

12 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 74. 13 See Joint Pub 5-00.1: Doctrine for Campaign Planning (25 January 2002);

Joint Pub 5-00.2: Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (13 January 1999); Joint Pub 5-0: Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006); Robert

D. Steele, Information Operations: Putting the “I” Back into DIME (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Inst. of the Army War College, 2006); Kris A. Arnold,

PMESII and The Non-State Actor: Questioning the Relevance (Ft Leavenworth,

KS: Army Command and General Staff College – School of Advanced Military

Studies, May 2006); Maj Robert Umstead and LtCol David R. Denhard, USAF,

“Viewing the Center of Gravity through the Prism of Effects-Based Operations,”

Military Review Sept-Oct 2006, 90-95. 14 Ward Goodenough, Culture, Language, and Society (Reading, MA: AddisonWesley, 1971).

15 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, 168, 150.

Part I

Terms of Reference

Upon visiting or deploying to a foreign country in a military capacity, it might be tempting to fall victim to two different ways of

initially coming to terms with the unfamiliar area. One method is

to mirror-image: to assume that things do—or worse yet, should—

operate just as they do “back home,” and that the people do—or

again, worse yet, should—act like Americans do, and interpret

events just as would Americans.1 Mirror-imaging, in effect, involves

blindness to difference from culture group to culture group.

The second temptation is to view understanding the new culture

group as an impossible project. In this approach, “difference from”

comes across as the most prominent, defining characteristic of foreign areas: the people speak a different language; they have unfamiliar customs; and they seem to act in unpredictable ways.

Symptoms of this view include avoidance of cultural dynamics as

a consideration—“I can’t do anything about it, so why care;” overfixation on culture as a hot potato—“They’re so different and I still

can’t do anything about it, so I have to watch out;” or simply limited faith in the possibilities of inter-cultural bridging—“I’m me,

he’s him, and never the twain shall meet.”

In this book, we offer a third, more productive approach to culture:

viewing culture as a logical system which can be understood using

theories and principles developed during more than 150 years of

research and study by social scientists. Although people are, by nature, variable and unpredictable, they still need to work with others in social and cultural groups. These groups—and their

associated beliefs and structures—are organized according to logical, understandable principles that every person living in the culture must understand, at least intuitively, in order to get along with

each other. With some basic study, Marines can also recognize and

understand these principles and apply that understanding to their

operations.

13
This book does not assert that culture is linear or predictable or that

militaries should expect culture learning to provide instant answers

or formulas. But, in the following chapters, we do offer Marines

fundamental tools and conceptual models to understand, operate

in, and when possible, influence his or her area of operations. Part

I of Operational Culture begins by presenting basic terms of reference for understanding culture.

In Chapter One, we discuss the influence of culture in historical

military operations, and also examine attempts throughout history

to understand culture in a way useful to each era’s expeditionary

operations. In Chapter Two, we move onto a discussion of useful

and unprofitable ways to think about culture and culture groups

from the standpoint of military operations. This prepares us to define fundamental terms and core terms of reference at the end of

Chapter Two.

Note

1 For more on mirror-imaging, see Herbert Kelman, “Social-Psychological Dimensions,” in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques

edited by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Ramussen (Washington, DC.: United

States Institute of Peace, 1997); Daniel Druckman, “Social-Psychological Factors

in Regional Politics,” in Werner Feld and Gavin Boyd, eds., Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries (New York: Pergamon Press 1980); Frank Watanabe, “How

To Succeed in the DI: Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts,” Studies in Intelligence (1997): http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/97unclass/axioms.html. Also

see “Peacebuilding: Social Psychology,” part of the School for International and

Area Studies Conflict Management Toolkit, located at: http://cmtoolkit.saisjhu.edu/index.php?name=pb-socialpsych.

14 Operational Culture
15

Chapter 1

Context

The Introduction to Operational Culture demonstrated the centrality of culture to current and future operations, and indicated specific skill sets required for Marines to integrate culture into planning

and operations. This may suggest that “culture” is a new area of

thinking and study for the military. In light of the last two-hundred years of military history, however, that is not the case. Rather,

as we will show in this chapter, military operations of the past two

centuries have been a driver of interest in foreign cultures, both in

academia and military circles. In fact, one could argue that there

had been a military-cultural studies partnership that endured from

the nineteenth century until the 1960s. This partnership produced

advances in the field of anthropology, but also led to certain simplistic models and misunderstandings of actual cultural dynamics in

foreign areas.

After surveying these developments, we will introduce a more rigorous conceptual approach to cultures which can serve Marines’

needs today and in the future. Based upon accepted anthropological models but adapted to concerns of operators, this approach

amounts to a framework for examining cultures in a military context. This framework is called the Five Operational Culture Dimensions, which permit the Marine to understand global cultures

in a fashion suited to mission planning and execution.

Before we can begin this discussion, however, we need to establish a basic definition of “operational culture.” This initial definition

will prepare us to develop a more comprehensive one in subsequent chapters.

Operational Culture: Those aspects of culture that influence the

outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military actions

that influence the culture of an area of operations.
Though in this book we focus primarily on the first part of the definition—“aspects of culture that influence military operations”—

both aspects of operational culture are important, and we will

incorporate them both into our discussion when appropriate.

A Historical Approach to Culture in Operations

As Marine leaders speak today of IW, Distributed Operations (DO),1

and the importance of culture to warfighting, we must remember

that it is not the first time militaries have done something

new—or considered human and cultural factors in planning

and operating. In fact, at various times in history, armies have engaged in what, compared to previous generations, appeared “irregular.” The first time Greek armies faced a phalanx, that was

irregular compared to past experiences; the operations of Caesar’s

or Augustus’ armies in Gaul and the Rhineland were, compared to

Rome’s past, “distributed” operations. Every generation has a way

of warfare, and every era has a revolution in military affairs.2 Likewise, as we saw above with Clausewitz, these changing ways of

thinking about and executing operations include considering

human and cultural elements.

Especially over the past 250 years, as European militaries expanded

their operations into non-Western regions such as Africa, Asia, and

the Middle East, it became evident that traditional military techniques were not adequate to deal with the new military environment. As a result, British, French, and Dutch operators and thinkers

began to include local cultural behaviors and beliefs in their military planning and operations. As military personnel began to operate overseas in a sustained fashion, theories about society began

to emerge, linked to problems in overseas Areas of Operation

(AOs).

Through the middle of the nineteenth century and continuing into

the twentieth century, European scholars followed their armies, or

sometimes went with them, collecting data about the peoples

among whom their armies operated. Often ancient history was attractive, as it could supposedly “capture the soul” of a foreign peo16 Operational Culture
ple. This is one reason that the French Institute d’Egypt emerged

in the wake of the French Expedition to that country under

Napoleon.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, then, it was accepted

that to know and command an AO, one had to understand the people in that area. The more that colonial officers and overseas administrators got into foreign environments, the more they found

that they were outnumbered compared to indigenous warriors and

peoples, and had to work “in the system,” and make the local people function for them.

This was the era when, in North Africa, the Levant, South Asia, Central Africa, and Indochina, British and French officers at the tip of

the colonial spear confronted disadvantageous troop-to-task ratios.

In only very few places did European military leaders attempt to replace local leaders. Instead, they relied on local points of contact.

In order to do this, they needed to know very basic, structural information: Who in this town is the headman? What does the tribe

look like? How does justice work here? Who are the medicine

men or ritual leaders? In short, military personnel and civilian

administrators charged with providing stability and security in foreign areas needed to know how, in order to meet economic, political, military, and psychic needs, cultures organized

themselves into institutions: What were the structures, how did

they function, and how did colonial officers imagine they could

“guide” and “manipulate” the cultural environment?

As the uniformed and civilian irregular warriors of the early twentieth century worked out the nuts and bolts of these matters on the

ground in far off lands, European scholars, often acting in conjunction with colonial powers, turned attention to the kin and social structures of local cultural groups as well as trying to

understand their symbols, religions and rituals.3 Anthropological

studies of communities—termed ethnographies—began to emerge

on these same topics, implicitly inspired by the challenges their soldiers faced. This is when field work yielded detailed studies of

groups, leadership practices, power structures, and economic netContext 17
works among foreign peoples—almost always assumed to reside in

“far-off,” “exotic” lands.

In the meantime, the U.S. military was facing its own cultural challenges, as it grappled with the problems of settling the west and the

resulting wars with Native American groups. U.S. scholars, faced

with a confusing myriad of Native American languages and cultures, began to study the symbolic meanings of words in languages.4

Later, particularly from the 1920s through the 1960s, when the era

of insurgency and COIN was in full swing, the ideologies of ethnicity, nationalism, and third-worldism motivated the largely successful efforts to break free of colonial rule. In fact, just as the

nineteenth century had been the period when Europe had witnessed the era of nationalism, the post-WWI era saw nationalism

explode in the non-European world.

Policy makers in a world of burgeoning nation states then began to

ask how different cultures might affect how people in different nations acted. Was there such a concept as a “national culture” or “national character?” If so, what did that mean for issues of diplomacy,

politics, economic policies, approaches to warfare, and even tactical preferences?

Working with the military in WWII, anthropologists embarked upon

a sadly misguided program to simplify cultures into an easily predictable system. This approach, later termed the study of “Culture

and Personality,” attempted to reduce the complexity of culture by

proposing that cultures create people with similar mindsets or personalities. The effort to profile “national personalities” or “national

characters” resulted in simplistic and stereotypical explanations for

the way people acted in other nations.5 Such studies produced

overly generalized descriptions of cultural groups resulting in

sweeping statements such as:

● Japanese children’s swaddling and toilet training led to a

national Japanese character of internal repression of personal

desires and subservience to elders.6

18 Operational Culture
● Due to the nature of the Arabic language, Arabic culture is

given to formulaic, rhetorical expression, so that as thinkers and

actors Arabs are less capable of concreteness and commitmentfulfillment.7

● Russians are intransigent negotiators because Russian swaddling (!) techniques make them tight-fisted.8

Although “Culture and Personality” studies were immensely popular in the 1950s, anthropologists soon realized that blanket statements about a cultural mindset failed to capture the important social

structures, belief systems, and competing agendas of people within

a cultural group. The “Culture and Personality” approach was then

abandoned for more sophisticated research that focused on the

complex and evolving nature of cultures, providing a richer and

more accurate view of the way that people in diverse cultures

viewed the world. This new approach coincided with a parting of

the ways between anthropologists—who became more concerned

with understanding cultures from a policy and development point

of view—and the military, which focused its energies on a high

tech “star wars” approach to warfare as the result of the Cold War.

Unfortunately, in the general population, as well as in the U.S. military, the idea that “culture = mindset = national psychology” continued to be popular long after anthropologists had turned to other

more fruitful studies. The military’s continued interest in the idea

of a cultural mindset reflected its belief that somehow culture itself

and the people within a culture were a code to be cracked. Military efforts to understand foreign cultures continued to work on

the premise that if one cracks the code, one can then work the culture like a computer program to determine peoples’ responses to

our actions. Just like there is a Microsoft operating system different from the Macintosh operating system, the “culture = mindset =

national psychology” framework reinforced the fantasy that there is

an “Arab operating system,” an “Asian operating system,” or a

“Western operating system.”

One very popular psychologist who has applied the “Culture and

Personality” approach to business and management studies is Geert

Context 19
Hofstede. His cross-cultural studies on different management styles

and their relationship to national cultures began in the 1960s and

have continued up to recent years.9 Using survey responses of IBM

business leaders, he constructed a model of management styles as

they relate to a simplified schema of “national culture.” His work

posits a list of psychological dimensions that differentiates business

leaders around the world: individualism  collectivism; power distance; uncertainty avoidance; relationship focus  deal focus; and

long term short  term time orientation.

Hofstede’s studies are grounded in psychology, not anthropological or sociological studies of foreign cultures. His work compares

the psychological predispositions of business leaders, and the differences in their management styles. This is all a far cry from explaining an entire culture and the people in it. Furthermore, his

dimensions were posited to explain psychological difference along

a continuum; not offer black and white dichotomies. For example, cultures are not either individualistic or collective, but lay

somewhere along a continuum between these two extremes: hence

our choice of “ ” and not “vs.” in the previous paragraph.

However, because a “this or that” approach fits easily with the U.S.

military’s “go or no-go” schema, military people have read Hofstede’s analysis in black and white, “yes-or-no” terms. As a result,

Hofstede’s dimensions have become almost as a prescriptive checklist, and a misinterpretation of it has spread across the services. His

and other similar approaches have therefore gained a deceptive

appeal as a “silver bullet” to understanding foreign peoples.

Unfortunately, Hofstede’s dimensions—which focus on specific

personality traits in business—offer only limited applicability to a

Marine who is working with local people in a foreign AO, whose

experiences and concerns are radically different from the business

people in Hofstede’s studies. Hofstede’s dimensions focus on

human traits, themes, and attitudes, but do not examine or account

for the main drivers of social, economic, and political life and belief systems for culture groups. In effect, concepts such as collectivism vs. individualism, or uncertainty avoidance, may have

relevance in certain situations such as understanding cross-cultural

20 Operational Culture
negotiations or child-raising practices, but they do not describe the

fundamental challenges that drive the lives of people in foreign cultures.

In fact, misuse of Hofstede and similar psychological studies, when

rendered simplistically, produces prejudices and cultural stereotypes rather than better cultural understanding. Such stereotypes

disadvantage Marines in a foreign environment, making it difficult

to respond to the actual situation and individuals at hand. This is

because “this vs. that” mindsets tempt people to react to new situations with a formulaic understanding obscuring important details.

Put simply, fixation on “the Arab mind” will obscure the character

of the real Arab with whom one deals. Likewise, focus on the

“Latino mentality” makes it difficult to get to know the real Latin

American in front of a Marine.

All this will undermine mission success. This is because while in

the information age culture seems to be the “collective programming of the mind” and the “mental software” of a “national culture,”10 Marines must not consider people programmed into

cultures, and thus locked into certain kinds of behaviors.

Such an approach creates simplistic stereotypes based on misplaced ideas of a “typical American” vs. “median Arab” or “average

Middle Eastern male.”

This is a problem because it could cause Marines and others operating in a region to fail to grasp the true complexity of the cultural

situation, resulting in poor analysis and ineffective operational planning. Indeed, in operating environments where culture has been

a central factor, such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Iraq, the messiness

of operations has shown this mechanistic perspective to be of

little utility to operators, who are likely to agree that cultures

themselves are “messy,” or a “fuzzy set,” defying patterns.11

All of the historical approaches to culture reviewed above have

their problems, by either focusing on too much of one thing, or by

taking questions to a point of blind, racist belief. Still, thinking

about them is useful to the irregular warrior of today, permitting us

to sum up what we have encountered thus far: Irregularity in milContext 21
itary operations is not new, and thinking about, examining, planning, and operating according to the changing human environment

is as much a part of the military profession as is learning to fire a

rifle. Further more, when Marines seek to incorporate operational

culture into warfighting, they need to do so within an intellectually

sound framework.

The Conceptual Context

In arriving at a framework to understand cultures globally, the Marine need not arrive at the fight alone. Today, more sophisticated

social scientific approaches to culture furnish the Marine with upto-date, relevant and useful ways of analyzing culture during both

planning and execution. From the point of view of the Marine operating in a foreign context, three major anthropological models

should be integrated into the irregular warfighter’s practice:

● An “ecological model” which focuses on the relationship

between cultures and the physical environment.

● A “social structure model” which examines the way that the

social structure of a group affects the roles, status and power of

the various members.

● A “symbolic model” which studies the beliefs, symbols and

rituals of a cultural group.12

By integrating these models into warfighting, the operator can move

beyond mere description in order to explain, and if possible influence, human behavior.

The Ecological Model. This analytical method focuses on the

ways that the physical environment affects the economic and social

relationships within a cultural group. Emerging from American and

British studies of the linkages between the political structure of a

society and its economic system, The Ecological Model analyzes

the relationship between available physical and social resources

(such as water and land, fishing and hunting of game, or even im22 Operational Culture
portant hi-tech commodities such as oil and the Internet) and the

consequent social and political structures of a culture.

Thus, The Ecological Model understands conflict as a logical outcome of competition over important limited resources. Hence,

poverty, starvation and underdevelopment are seen as precipitating

factors in many of the conflicts in Africa, Asia and South America

in the past century. Likewise, land pressures due to an increasing

population are linked to many of the wars in Europe in earlier centuries.

The Social Structure Model. This examines how people organize political, economic, and social relationships, and how that

method of organization determines roles, rights, and privileges of

a group’s members. Most societies do not distribute power and resources evenly. The Social Structure Model thus allows the culture

operator to evaluate which groups hold authority and power in an

AO.

In particular, The Social Structure Model can pinpoint:

● Tenuous alliances that generate power structures

● The rivalries within these alliances

● Changing dynamics of power within and among groups

● Challenges to existing power structures, either by included

or excluded groups within a society

As such, unlike The Ecological Model, The Social Structure Model

explains conflict and war, as Marines see it from the theater- to the

company AO-level, in terms of the structure of a society. In this

model, losing groups (whether an ethnic minority or social class) battle existing systems in order to negotiate better access to goods or to

shift their position within the power structure. The Social Structure

Model is particularly instructive in understanding insurgencies, such

as the current situation in Iraq, in addition to most of the contingencies into which Marines have been drawn over the last two decades.

Context 23
The Symbolic Model. Beginning in France in the middle of the

twentieth century, in recent years this approach has become popular in the U.S. as well. For The Symbolic Model, physical geography and social structures do not illuminate central features of a

culture. This paradigm, or method, concentrates on culture’s symbolic or ideological nature. In this model, culture is the product of

thought and humanly constructed belief systems and values.

Human behavior is therefore explained through ideals which guide

a person’s choices.

Due to its ideological nature, The Symbolic Model has been particularly suited to the analysis of religion, as well as to the study of

semantics. It can help to explain the symbolic, psycho-emotional

meaning of concrete, practical reasons behind conflict. In short,

this model can explain why problems that could be solved “if only

people would sit down and talk” do not go away. It shows how

factors such as history, identity, and the symbolic meaning of space

and events can become part of—if not the fixation of—negotiations, replacing dialogue.

In the realm of military engagement, consider how each of these

three pillars of the thinking and planning framework for operational culture would explain conflict:

The Five Operational Culture Dimensions

Models on their own remain too abstract and general to help the

warfighter. These three, however, have the particular military merit

of furnishing five specific cultural dimensions of the battlespace that Marines can examine and incorporate into plan24 Operational Culture

Models and the Explanation of Conflict

1 Ecological War is related to battles over limited

resources.

2 Social Structure Conflict results from vying plays for power in

an unequal social structure.

3 Symbolic War is an inevitable conflict over identity and

ideology between competing systems.
ning and execution. Although we will cover the specific human

dimensions of the battlespace relevant to Marines in more concrete

detail in Part II, we summarize them below, illustrating their connection to the three models discussed in this chapter.

Context 25

From Anthropological Models to

Operational Culture Dimensions

Ecological Model

Dimension 1:

The Physical

Environment

The way that a cultural group determines the

use of the physical environment. Who has

access to important physical resources (water,

land, food, building materials etc.) and how the

culture views these resources (e.g. land is

owned or free to everyone)

Dimension 2:

The Economic

The way that people in a culture obtain,

produce and distribute physical and symbolic

goods (whether food, clothing, cars or cowrie

shells).

Social Structure Model

Dimension 3:

The Social

Structure

How people organize their political, economic,

and social relationships, and the way this

organization influences the distribution of

positions, roles, status, and power within culture

groups.

Dimension 4:

The Political

Structure

The political structures of a culture group and

the unique forms of leadership within such

structures (bands, acephalous societies, councils,

hereditary chiefdoms and tribal structures,

electoral political systems etc.). The distinction

between formal, ideal political structures versus

actual power structures.

Symbolic Model

Dimension 5:

Beliefs and

Symbols

The cultural beliefs that influence a person’s

world view; and the rituals, symbols and

practices associated with a particular belief

system. These include also the role of local

belief systems and religions in controlling and

affecting behavior.
These dimensions will be referred to henceforth as the Five Operational Culture Dimensions. These Dimensions are distinctly

different from anthropological models recently used by the military, such as Hofstede’s construction of dimensions of national culture, which we have discussed above.13

Conclusion

This chapter has briefly introduced the Five Operational Culture

Dimensions. We will return to them in much more detail throughout this book, as they will anchor our exploration of the relationship between culture and military operations. Before we can do

that, however, we will need to look at some existing definitions of

“culture” in the next chapter. After critiquing them in terms of their

validity for both real human environments and military operations,

we will present a series of definitions of culture and associated

terms that accord with these five dimensions.

Notes

1 See “A Concept for Distributed Operations,” Dept of Navy, Headquarters

USMC, 25 April 2005; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Questions and Answers about Distributed Operations:”

http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/SV/DO%20FAQs%2016%20Mar%2005.pdf; “Marine

Air-Ground Task Force Distributed Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette Oct 2004,

34-36.

2 Recent expressions of the evolution of forms of warfare can be found in T.X.

Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: War in the 21st Century (Osceola, WI: Zenith

Press, 2004); idem., “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,” Military Review, May-June 2007; Gen Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of

War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007). 3 For further reading, see E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Kinship and Marriage Among

the Nuer (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951); idem., The Nuer (Oxford: Clarendon,

1940); C. Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (Boston: Beacon,

1969); B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native

Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Malanesian New Guinea (London: Routledge, 1922); idem., Magic, Science and Religion (New York: Doubleday, 1954); A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society

(London: Cohen and West, 1952).

4 For Further Reading, see F. Boas, Race, Language and Culture (New York:

26 Operational Culture
Context 27

Macmillan, 1940); Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956); Edward Sapir, Culture, Language, and Personality: Selected Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 5 For an early presentation of ideas later used in “culture and personality” studies, see Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); associated with this perspective are Victor Barnouw, Culture and Personality

(Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1963); and Geert Hofstede, “National Cultures

Revisited,” Behavior Sciences Research 18 (1983), 285-305. 6 Ibid. (Barnouw). 7 See Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (Long Island, NY: Hatherleigh Press, 2002

[1973]).

8 For discussion and critique of these cultural explanations of Russian negotiating techniques, see Jerrold R. Schechter Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998). 9 See Geert Hofstede’s Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (Cambridge, UK: McGraw Hill, 1991); and his Culture’s Consequences: International

Differences in Work-Related Values (Sage Publications, 1980). 10 Ibid. 11 H. Spencer-Oatey, Culturally Speaking: Managing Rapport through Talk

Across Cultures (London: Continuum, 2000), 4. 12 These methods correspond to well accepted analytical approaches in academic anthropology:

“The Ecological Model” = Ecological Anthropology

“The Social Structure Model” = Structure-Functionalism

British Social Anthropology

“The Symbolic Model” = The Symbolic Approach

For a more complete discussion of these approaches in academic anthropology,

see Alan Barnard, History and Theory in Anthropology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jerry D. Moore, Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Alta Mira

Press, 2004); Paul A. Erickson and Liam D. Murphy, A History of Anthropological Theory, 2nd ed. (Broadview Press, 2003); Philip Carl Salzman, Understanding Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theory (Long Grove, IL:

Waveland Press, 2001); John Monaghan and Peter Just, Social and Cultural Anthropology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,

2000).

13 See Geert Hofstede, “National Cultures Revisited;” Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on

Man (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 65-70 in particular.

29

Chapter 2

Defining Culture

In the previous chapters we have discussed the importance of understanding culture in military operations; the historical relationship between the military and the study of culture; and theoretical

models and a framework of culture that are relevant to military operations. In this chapter we turn our discussion to the actual subject of this book: What is and what is not “culture”? First, we

examine several of the ways that military writers have already defined culture, and we evaluate common misconceptions associated

with these concepts. Next, we explore some of the ways that anthropologists define culture, developing an operational definition

of culture that is both conceptually accurate and applicable to military needs. We focus on several essential characteristics of culture

that Marines need to grasp in order to successfully plan and undertake operations in foreign areas of operation. In the final section, we provide definitions of cultural concepts relevant to Marine

operations.

Military Definitions of Culture

Currently there are many definitions of culture in use by US military organizations. Most of these definitions reflect understandable

preferences for a) simple, generalized abstractions that can be applied quickly to any situation; b) information reducible to easily

followed check-lists; and c) presentation of information in ways

that conform to ways of knowing and communicating in other domains of military affairs. Definitions of culture meeting these criteria may appear appropriate to the Marine. However, when applied

in the field they are not likely to be effective, because they are fundamentally flawed conceptually—in short, they are misleading as

to the nature of culture, and its influences on military operations.

In essence, these approaches to culture are much like handing a
Marine armored platform that looks great, but has no engine, no

brakes, and no steering mechanism.

Below we discuss some of the more common military understandings of culture and examine their limitations. In the following

sections, we then offer more accurate—although perhaps less

“comfortable”—definitions of culture.

Many definitions of culture borrowed by recent military writing are

so broad as to present abstractions tiptoeing in the direction of

stereotypes. Even more important, upon closer examination, many

of these definitions are conceptually muddled: mixing terms and

concepts without understanding their relationships or meanings.

Consider these examples:

● One recent article defined culture as the “origins, values,

roles, and material items associated with a particular group.”1

However, calling culture as “origins... of a group” confuses

cause and effect, while “values” is too abstract a term. Such definitions are too theoretical for application to the military context.

● Another speaks of culture as the “total shared, learned behavior of a society or a subgroup.”2 Here, “culture” emerges as

so expansive that it is nearly impossible to analyze, consider,

plan for, and operationalize.

● In yet another place, we find culture as “an integrated system of learned behavior patterns that are characteristic of the

members of any given society... the total way of life,”3 and the

“outward expression of a unifying and consistent vision brought

by a particular community.”4 These constructions imply “culture” is the “what you see” of something that all people in a

place and time agree on, act in terms of, and pass on as a coherent whole to the next generation. The role of individual

agency and action is neglected in such a homogenizing approach.

These definitions have the merit of using terms appealing to mili30 Operational Culture
Defining Culture 31

tary readers. Yet, they tend to focus on abstract, conceptual aspects

of culture which are difficult for a Marine to observe and evaluate.

In terms of current anthropological understandings of culture, such

definitions have several serious problems:

1. These definitions tend to present culture as somehow separate from people: as if culture is a thing that “exists somewhere

out there” forcing people to behave in certain ways. However,

culture is the product of human interaction and thought, not a

mysterious force with its own purposes and agendas.

2. Underlying these definitions is an assumption that culture is

homogenous and static. The definitions imply that there is

something called an Arab or Japanese culture which has made

all Arabs and Japanese behave the same way for the past 2000

years. This assumption underlies the military mentality that we

can somehow create computer simulations which will predict

how an Arab or a Japanese person will behave or act. As we

discuss below however, culture is far from static and not all

people in the same culture act or think the same.

3. The reader of such definitions gets the sense that culture is

a magic “black box” composed of strange, abstract terms such

as values and ideals or ways of life. Unable to open the black

box, the Marine is likely to dismiss culture as indecipherable

and hence irrelevant to operations. Although culture is indeed

complex, it is not unintelligible. From the point of view of anthropological study, the social relationships, structures, meanings and processes underlying the cultures we observe can be

analyzed and explained just as well as the functioning of the

components of an engine can be described and predicted.

4. Finally, in the military context, these definitions leave the

reader with a “so what, what do I do with all this” reaction, because they fail to describe real people, real social dynamics,

and the real environment that Marines must navigate.

While the definitions above suffer from too much abstraction, at the

other extreme are military definitions of culture which can describe
the rocks, the pieces of sand, and the leaves on the plant, but still

miss the full picture of the landscape. They provide concrete and

easily understandable terms for the military, but provide little conceptual guidance, so that culture simply becomes a huge list of disorganized information of little use to the operator. For example:

● A recently published text meant for military readers defines

culture as “a shared set of traditions, belief systems, and behaviors. Culture is shaped by many factors, including history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality.”5 This definition,

which is typical of military definitions, confuses broad categories

with their components. Like much of the literature being rapidly produced by military writers, culture is defined in terms of

a random “shopping bag” list of items that seems relevant to operations, but that has no logical theoretical or conceptual relationship between items.

● A recent military definition of culture characterized it as one

among several political-military factors:“...Learned and shared

attitudes, values, and ways of behaving in a society. Culture includes customs, folkways, manners, mannerisms, etiquette, behaviors, body language, gestures, celebrations, milestones, dress,

outlooks, perceptions, and thought patterns. It is embodied in

history, art, myths, legends and heroes. It addresses appropriate

responses to situations. It determines the circumstances and

quality of apology, retribution, reward, punishment, equity, commiseration, disdain, shame, guilt, congratulations and pride. It

selects and applies social sanction and reward. It expresses itself

in superstitions, outlooks, perspectives, conventional knowledge

and points of view. It encompasses the sense of time, individuality, possessions, sharing, self-worth and group-worth. It establishes the social hierarchy, defining roles by sex, age,

position, religion, wealth, family and profession. In essence, culture defines what is and is not okay, accepted, and normal.”6

Given this kind of a laundry list, planners will struggle, often in

vain, to collect accurate data to fill in all the blanks. Ultimately, no

matter how detailed the data, a checklist of information on a culture offers very little conceptual understanding to a warfighter.

32 Operational Culture
Such a list is not the same as understanding the meaning of the

data for the people who live in the region.

It is important that Marines distinguish between long lists of cultural

data (which may overwhelm the planner with too much irrelevant

information) and cultural understanding (which requires the ability to interpret and use the data appropriately). Collecting a long

list of cultural facts about history, manners, etiquette, dress and superstitions may look impressive. However, as many Marines today

can attest, knowing whether or not one should show the soles of

one’s feet in Iraq does not provide much guidance in planning operations in a foreign culture. In order to move from “cultural sensitivity” to operational culture, Marines need to understand the

underlying meaning and organization of social relationships

and behaviors within a cultural group.

In addition to overly abstract or overly concrete definitions of culture, a third way that culture is defined in U.S. military circles is in

terms of a very popular military metaphor: the “Human Terrain.”7

“Human terrain” does possess some useful applications at the tactical through strategic level. First, the warfighter already thinks in

terms of topography, terrain, maps, etc. This means that by using

“human terrain” as a term, and speaking of “culture” in terms of

“terrain,” soldiers and Marines can talk about culture in a way that

makes it sound familiar to the military: graphically representable,

quantifiable, and geographically measurable.

Second, there are aspects of culture that one can map. These include demographic features (population density, age distribution,

distribution of income, diffusion of services, etc.); social features

(kin, ethnic, religious affiliations, etc.); and the location of physical items of symbolic and ideological value to local populations

(churches, mosques, shrines, cemeteries, sacred rock formations,

etc.). In short, these are all things that one can literally pin on a

map.

Defining Culture 33

Information and data

might diminish operational

culture ability

Understanding and know-how

can increase cultural situational

awareness

=
However, “human terrain” as an applied concept can also harm a

warfighter’s situational awareness and operational execution. This

occurs when “human terrain” is considered more than a metaphor

with certain, limited applications. When “human terrain” instead

becomes what a Marine thinks culture is, and causes him to believe

that mapping is the way to analyze culture, then “human terrain”

has misled a Marine.

Although human terrain maps can communicate information

quickly and simply, a two-dimensional representation does not account for dynamic socio-cultural conditions. Such maps fail to

grasp the important interconnections and overlapping relationships

among both groups and individuals within the groups.

This leads us to a definition of human terrain:

● Those cultural aspects of the battlespace that, due to

their static nature, can be visually represented on a geographic map. Human terrain is static with respect to

change over time; rigid with respect to fluid human relationships; and limited to representing behavior in only

two dimensions.

Example: Downside of Taking “Human Terrain” Too Far

A Marine tasked to create a human terrain map of a rural area of southern

Morocco might produce a map with blocked out areas indicating distinct

“Berber” and “Arab” tribes associated with specific geographic areas. Such

a two dimensional map would suggest to the reader that certain areas are

“Arab” or “Berber” and that there is little overlap or interaction between

the groups. It might also mark out areas of demographic friction, where

potential for disturbances would exist because one ethnic group border

touched another. However, the realities are far more complex, and such an

interpretation would be inadequate.

First, due to intermarriage, some of the so-called Arab households include

Berber husbands and wives and vice-versa, resulting in a number of kinship ties which cross-cut ethnic and tribal links and bind the region in relationships of obligation and honor. Second, as a result of labor migration,

both to urban areas in Morocco and internationally to France, a large percentage of the male population lives far away from the region.

34 Operational Culture
Example: Downside of Taking “Human Terrain” Too Far, continued.

Research has shown that these migrants tend to cluster in the new cities or

countries, in essence re-creating their cultural community of origin far from

home.8 Men in these migrant communities continue to send remittances

back home, marry wives from their home communities, and retire back in

the region.

These dynamic urban-rural exchanges also cannot be captured on a two dimensional map, which gives the reader a sense that local tribal groups are

discrete, disembodied settlements bounded in one area, rather than dynamic fluid communities that span not only national but international

boundaries.

Second, a map that color-codes “Arab and “Berber” will tell the operator

nothing about whether the color-coded “Berber” feels “Berber,” or identifies with that community’s cultural and political aims. This is important:

during the colonial era in Morocco and Algeria, French authorities wishfully

thought Berbers were unlike Arabs in ethnicity and even religion, and were

thus more pro-French.9 French colonists went so far as to attempt to cultivate a different identity among Berbers, so as to use them to lessen the influence of Islam and Arabism in north Africa. Berber difference never

became a cultural “rule,” however, with some Berbers prominent antiFrench nationalists.

Finally, a human terrain map focusing on “Berbers” and “Arabs” cannot account for other criteria for differentiating or uniting people, that in any

given time and place might be more prominent than ethnicity. For example, one might argue that in Tunis, Fez, Algiers, or Paris, well-educated, financially comfortable, leftist Berbers and Arabs have more in common with

each other (and with well-educated, financially comfortable, leftist French

Parisians) than they do with their co-ethnics, back home or in Paris.

In the absence of appropriate social science definitions and explanations guiding the military decision making process, “human

terrain”—as either a catch phrase or series of maps—will become

inappropriately fused with kinetic military mental models, and result in simplistic understandings of the operational environment.

Instead of cultural aspects of the battlespace appearing as dynamic

and fluid (see below), it will be too tempting to view humans as

“the green order of battle.”10

Defining Culture 35
Culture: An Operational Definition

In contrast to military definitions, academic definitions of culture

are often more theoretically sound. They are, however, just as

often too complex, abstract, and ambiguous for military uses. As a

token of this problem, literally hundreds of definitions of culture

can be found in the academic community.11 Still, despite the confusing array of definitions, most contemporary scholars agree that

culture includes the following key factors:

● Culture is shared.12

● Culture underlies our world view: what we perceive and

think about the people and events surrounding us, and how we

interpret and understand those people and events.13

● Culture is interconnected and holistic; each dimension of

culture is intimately related to the others.14

● Culture is varied—over time, over space, and among individuals.

● Culture is fluid and dynamic; humans are active agents, and

not passive recipients.15

In academic terms the way that culture shapes and forms our perceptions of the world is referred to as a world view; how people

organize their political, economic, and social relationships is referred to as a social structure. If Marines can understand the world

views and social structures of a culture, they will be more able to

make sense of the resulting actions and choices of people in that

AO.

Focusing on an operational basis for understanding culture, in

this book we define culture as:

Culture: The shared world view and social structures of a group

of people that influence a person’s and a group’s actions and

choices.16

36 Operational Culture
This definition emphasizes that cultural beliefs and social structures

influence people’s actions and choices. By focusing on the outcome of cultural beliefs and structures—the actions that people

take—the definition gives the Marine an observable behavior

(rather than just an unobservable belief system), which can be incorporated into operational planning.

The word “culture” not only refers to the meanings and beliefs that

people hold, but sometimes to a specific group. To distinguish this

meaning, we also need to define a culture group.

Culture Group: A group of people whose common world view

unites them in a system of social structures and shared behaviors.

Again, it is important to recall key terms just presented.

World View: The way that culture shapes and forms our perceptions of the world.

Social Structure: How people organize their political, economic,

and social relationships

From these basic foundational definitions of “culture” and “culture

group,” one can proceed to grasp key aspects about the nature of

both. In order to plan and operate successfully according to sound

cultural principles, Marines need to recognize and contemplate the

implications of the following characteristics of the phenomenon

called “culture.” We will now examine each of these characteristics in detail.

Characteristic One: Culture is shared. In a sense culture serves

as a shared “language” among people. Those people who belong

to a cultural group understand the language—the social symbols

(whether it is a star upon a collar or a Christmas tree), the meanings attached to certain behaviors (for example what a salute communicates about status and rank) and the importance of

relationships to people in the group (the authority of a Colonel

versus the friendship of a fellow boot camp recruit; we return to

symbols and their social meaning in Chapter Seven).

Defining Culture 37
Included in this concept of culture is the notion that, like language,

culture is learned. As soon as a child is born, he or she is taught

not only what behaviors are appropriate for that group, but also the

meaning of those interactions with others. People can learn about

and become members of other cultural groups at any time in their

lives. Marines, for example, generally are socialized into the Corps

as adults. As with the Marine Corps, this learning process is both

explicit and implicit.

Because culture is shared, individual beliefs, ideals and meanings

that are unique to a specific person do not constitute culture.

Sometimes we mistake the unique characteristics of a person from

a foreign culture to be representative of that group as a whole. In

working with people from different AOs, Marines must distinguish

between those behaviors and attitudes that are shared by most people in the culture, and those that reflect individual preferences.

Characteristic Two: Culture underlies our world view: what

we perceive and think about the people and events surrounding

us, and how we understand those people and events. As such,

our way of thinking about the world, of organizing and evaluating

our experiences is framed by our cultural background.

However, although world view influences the way a person thinks

about his or her world, it does not determine a person’s actions.

Culture is not a thing that exists somewhere outside of people: Individuals have a vote, and they interact with received ideas through

the prism of their experiences.

Example: Behavior as the Product of Adjustment to Reality

In many areas, Marines encounter a “culture of theft”—a cultural attitude

that seems to condone stealing as an acceptable social behavior. But what

they really see is peoples’ reactions to specific conditions, such as the

scarcity of basic commodities, the breakdown of normal commercial methods of exchange and currency, and low levels of inter-personal trust. Each

of these factors in turn results from conditions—such as government inability to provide economic and food staples in sufficient quantities, based

on a state-run system of production which underpays employees.

38 Operational Culture
Example: Behavior as the Product of Adjustment to Reality; continued.

These conditions are produced by market forces regionally within the country, and also globally, as the price for fuel, transportation, etc., increases, the

national balance of trade becomes negative and so on.

So, global economic forces interact with political/economic conditions in

a country and local region to create specific circumstances to which people react in a way that manifests in a “culture of theft” which Marines see.

As this example shows, to be useful in a military sense, it must be

understood that “culture” or cultural factors alone do not determine how people act. Instead, forces which humans encounter

create physical conditions and events. People then respond

to these conditions and events, based on their culturally determined world view of possible acceptable ways to act. Marines

thus see the product of physical conditions interacting with

culture to influence behavior and social conditions.

Characteristic Three: Culture is interconnected and holistic;

each dimension of culture is intimately related to the others.

This means two things. First, culture is not an amorphous black

box, but composed of interconnecting beliefs, behaviors, social

structures and relationships. These various aspects or dimensions

of culture must be analyzed and understood in relationship to each

other. Changes in one dimension, such as the economy, can have

profound effects on another dimension, such as political structure

and power.

Secondly, culture is holistic; each of the parts is intimately related

to the others. Changes in one part of a culture (its economic system for example) may thus have profound effects on another part

(the political structures).

Culture is a phenomenon greater than and different from the sum

of its parts—just as salt (Sodium Chloride, NaCl) is greater than and

different from Na mixed with Cl. Therefore, culture cannot be a

“check in the box” list of items or behaviors, but must be treated

as an integrated way of looking at the world.

Defining Culture 39
Characteristic Four: Culture is varied—over time, over space,

and among individuals. Culture is not a homogeneous system

that everyone follows without thinking. Within a culture group

there will be much variation in terms of what people actually believe and do. Not all people within a culture group will have the

same cultural knowledge or experiences.

Along with this internal variation, individuals themselves are culturally varied. They belong to many cultural groups and hold ties

across social and cultural groups. As such, an individual’s attitudes

and choices reflect personal choices about competing cultural ideologies and memberships. Put differently, there is not just one

culture per person. In fact, one person can be a member of

many cultures or sub-cultures. There are thus multiple pieces

in the jigsaw puzzle of the “culture” a person presents to others.

Each of these pieces influences how a person processes and acts

in the world.17

Example: I.M. Marine

Consider a U.S. Marine, whom we will call “I.M. Marine.” If he is from a

family of Hindi-speaking immigrants, he has been partially socialized

through his upbringing in an Indian family. If that family is Muslim, that socializing element has also been at play. Growing up in Tennessee and attending a very large public high school have also played into his cultural

formation, as has the socialization process of Boot Camp, the School of Infantry, and fifteen years of a career on the West Coast, for example.

In the table on the next page, we see multiple possibilities for one’s family, language, national, etc., memberships. In this case, “I.M. Marine” possesses the cultural affiliations in bold type.

As we see here, “I.M. Marine” has many cultural jigsaw pieces to

his personality puzzle. It is by understanding his particular cultural complexion, and his own choices and preferences, that we

can understand him. More broadly, the case of “I.M. Marine”

shows us that while we should not confuse culture with individual

personality, “for any individual, culture always comes in the plural.”18

40 Operational Culture
Cultural influences are not only found in traditional organizations,

such as the family, ethnic groups, religious communities, or tribes.

Modern workplaces also have their own cultures, as do schools, activist groups (such as Greenpeace), and even subversive groups

(such as the Mafia).

Example: Cultural Influences Beyond Traditional Categories

A unique international culture has emerged among people who have attended elite universities and then pursued a career in the foreign service of

a country. These people frequently speak several languages, have friends

from many countries and often have spent more time away from their home

country, than in it. This could be referred to as the “diplomatic elite culture”

of a country, and in general it crosses national borders. As another example, The five services of the U.S. military all have definable “corporate cultures,” consisting of self-image, ways of doing business, material means,

rules, histories, and mental models.

Further, each service posesses identifiable communities, such as intelligence

officers, aviators, infantrymen, special operators, etc. In these cases, a recognizable culture has emerged from institutions or among a group of people with common experiences and aspirations. Though not based on

“religion,” language, ethnicity, or elements commonly assumed to constitute

culture, they have indeed culturally influenced people.

Defining Culture 41

Table 1: I. M. Marine: Multiple Cultural Memberships

Family 1 Generation

Immigrant

Language Hindu

Nation India

Religion Muslim

Gender Male

Region Tennessee California Massachusetts Florida

Schooling Public HS

Job Marine

Specialty Infantry

Dwelling S California
These examples also illustrate that culture is by no means homogeneous. Generalizing about mass populations does not help

the warfighter, because such generalizations miss the important

multilayered and multifaceted nature of human existence. By reducing individuals to a single tribal group or ethnic group we fail

to grasp the important interconnections between individuals and

groups—information that could be critical in understanding insurgent networks, the movement of illegal goods, or ties of power

and alliance in a region.

Characteristic Five: Culture is fluid and dynamic; humans are

active agents, and not passive recipients. Since culture is the product of human thought and behavior, each person and each generation redefines and recreates the culture of their group. Through

their responses to and attitudes towards events, people create culture, and not the other way around. As a result, each individual

and each generation will redefine and recreate their culture.

Likewise, although people may share a certain core set of cultural

beliefs and attitudes, that does not mean every person agrees with

or behaves consistently according to those ideals and values.

Warfighters should not assume cultures remain constant over time.

Cultures are made and remade as culture-influencing parameters

squeeze and remold societies. For example, in 2007, the culture

of the middle-class, educated Muslim Iraqi from Baghdad is likely

notably different in certain key operationally-relevant respects from

what it was in 1988—not to mention what it was like in the days

of T.E. Lawrence or Gertrude Bell.

For the warfighter, the cultural dynamics that matter change from

week to week, neighborhood to neighborhood, and mission to

mission. When Marines think about culture in a way to use it

on the battlefields of today and tomorrow, it is important

that experiences in previous operating environments not

limit their thinking.

42 Operational Culture
Example: Iraqi Cultural Changes Since 2003

There are various instances of change in behavior, attitude, and demographics since the beginning of OIF. Some are very small. Whereas before

2003, the thumbs-up sign was not widespread among Iraqis and had an obscene connotation, repeated use of it by American personnel in a positive

way has led some Iraqis, particularly younger ones, to use it in a positive

way when communicating with coalition personnel. Likewise, certain military or technical terms which had been used by Iraqis in Arabic have now

come to be used in English; conversely, British usages (such as “lorry”) are

being replaced by American usages (such as “truck”).

More fundamental changes have resulted from rising inter-communal violence. While use of the female headscarf (hijab) was noticeable in Iraq before 2003, the rise of Islamist violence and intimidation has led to a much

greater incidence of Iraqi Muslim—and sometimes Christian—females wearing hijab, to either avoid intimidation and abduction, or assert a belonging

(even if fictional). Similarly, Sunni and Shi‘i men and women have been

changing their names to seem less Sunni (‘Umar, ‘Uthman, etc.), or Shi‘i

(‘Ali, Haydar, Zaynab, etc.), thus reducing the utility to coalition forces of

names as ethno-religious markers.19

Finally, the ethno-sectarian map of Iraq has changed, rendering earlier

“human terrain” maps obsolete. In Kirkuk, the proportion of Kurds to Arabs,

and their locations, have been changing, as Kurdish rulers in the city pressure Arabs to leave and facilitate Kurdish return. In Baghdad, mixed SunniShi‘ite neighborhoods are re-aligning, such that Sunnis are moving out of

Shi‘ite areas, Shi‘ites are leaving Sunni areas, and Christians are emigrating.

Therefore, Iraqi culture has changed over the course of OIF: in terms of

body language, verbal language, dress, and demographics.

From “Culture” to “Operational Culture”

It is tempting for Marines to accept descriptions of culture that

seem to crack into the “mindset” of people. Such approaches portray culture as a special potion, or silver bullet that gives Marines

secret knowledge. However, simplistic descriptions of culture that

explain a person’s behavior based upon the notion that he is from

a “Confucian civilization,” or has an “Arab mind” are of little use to

the operator. They can result in operational plans hinging on static

assumptions about culture as a code to be cracked, or a behaviorDefining Culture 43
predictive blueprint, akin to the doctrine of the other side’s “green

order of battle.”

In this text we argue that culture shapes our world view; it is composed of a pattern of relationships and structures and is varied and

dynamic; It is not a check-the-block factor that can be reduced to

a map and predicted with scientific certainty. Yet despite its complexity, culture can be understood and included in operational

planning, training, and execution. When that occurs, the result is

“operational culture,” which we define here.

In Chapter One, we began our discussion of operational culture

by calling it “those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military actions

that influence the culture of an area of operations.” This

phrasing recognizes that many items not within the civilian or academic understanding of culture are indeed of concern to the

warfighter. This brings us to a fuller definition.

Operational Culture: Governed by a particular operation’s goals

and material assets, as well as the functions of personnel associated

with a particular operation, Operational Culture consists of

● Operationally relevant behavior, relationships and perceptions of indigenous security forces against or with whom Marines

operate; civilian populations among whom Marines operate; indigenous communities or groups whom Marines wish to influence; international partners in coalition operations.

● Dimensions influencing operationally-relevant behavior,

conduct, and attitudes. These Operational Culture Dimensions

involve the physical environment, the economy of a culture, social structures, political structures, and the beliefs and symbols

of a culture group. These dimensions emerge from three major

models of cultural analysis: the ecological, social structure, and

symbolic models.

● Historical trends that influence the interaction among those

cultural dimensions

44 Operational Culture
● Capability to successfully plan and execute across the operational spectrum, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; pre-hostility; shaping operations; successive

campaign phases; and post hostilities, to include reconstruction

and stabilization, as well as peace making/keeping.

For the Marine, Operational Culture is not simply a thing, or feature of the battlespace, outside him or her. Rather, it is a continual process of individual and collective learning about

contemporary and future operations:

Operational Culture Learning: Learning about cultural concepts

and dimensions, across the spectrum of pre-deployment training,

professional education and formal schools, and individual professional development.

● In the predeployment phase, scaled to rank and billet and

focused on the AO as aligned with mission goals: study of a

specific AO’s culture, to include expressed behaviors and attitudes, as well as the interaction among Operational Culture Dimensions which produce these behaviors and attitudes; training

in operation- as well as billet-focused language domains; attendance of command-provided distance learning, function-focused

face-to-face seminars, field exercises, and situational training;

and self-study, to ensure learning in the cognitive, psychomotor and affective domains.

● In PME, reflecting the responsibilities of Marines at the

completion of each stage of PME: study of the fundamental concepts and Dimensions of culture in generica; development of

skills to function successfully in various geographical and diverse human environments; examination of human, print, and

electronic resources for learning about operational culture; exploration of the historical role of the Five Operational Culture

Dimensions in the battlespace through study of past areas of operation; and introduction to the application of concepts and

skills to the current operating environment.

Defining Culture 45
46 Operational Culture

● In the career continuum, appropriate to MOS, phase of career, and leadership responsibilities: study of emerging operating

environments; maintenance of capabilities with respect to regions of past or likely future areas of operation; monitoring service- and DOD-provided training and educational resources for

culture learning; fostering within units and commands continued

culture learning and an atmosphere supportive of individual

Marines’ study of foreign cultures; recording culture-relevant observations about areas of deployment.

Likewise, one who recognizes the nature and significance of operational culture, and engages in continuous operational culture learning, embraces the identity of a “culture operator.”

Culture Operator: A warfighter who engages in military functions

at the tactical, operational, and strategic level within his AO through

continually re-reading the changing cultural and human aspects

of the battlespace as they impact military operations; by tracking

the dynamic interaction among the Operational Culture Dimensions of environment, economy, social structure, political structure,

and beliefs and symbols; and by considering the impact of Marine

operations as a new physical condition of human existence for indigenous people in the AO, influencing local behaviors and attitudes.

Finally, whenever possible, a “culture operator” engages in “culture

operations.”

Culture Operations: Utilizing the full complement of kinetic and

non-kinetic effects, “Culture Operations”

● Include cultural and human factors in operational planning,

while considering possible responses of people in an AO to Marine actions during operations, and evaluating cultural outcomes

of tactical and operational measures. In culture operations, culture operators weigh cultural outcomes of tactical and operational measures against mission objectives, and develop

innovative courses of action allowing commanders previously

unrecognized opportunities.
Defining Culture 47

● Culture Operations, based on contextually appropriate

knowledge of the local culture group, allow the Marine to frame

Marine planning and execution in order to create conditions facilitating conduct by indigenous people commensurate with tactical or operational goals. Marines can thus select most

appropriate operational methods for short-, medium-, and longterm purposes; whilst mitigating local peoples’ objections to necessary actions which contravene local cultural norms.

Planning and execution of Culture Operations must recognize that

Marine actions are merely one among many factors influencing

human conditions in the battlespace. Marine actions rarely control

the many cultural and other factors that interact with each other

across the phases of engagement in the AO.

Furthermore, while Marine actions might influence behaviors or

mechanisms producing behaviors, they are unlikely to craft or determine people’s behaviors. Likewise, Marine actions cannot determine how people respond to Marine influences on their

conditions of existence.

These definitions and related considerations indicate what

constitutes operational culture, what understanding it can do,

and what are its limitations. We have here also articulated

what it means to be a Marine who integrates culture in professional learning, pre-deployment training, and individual

growth. Furthermore, these definitions, as well as earlier

chapters, imply that to be a Marine capable of operations in

hybrid environments, one must be a culture operator.

Conclusion

Beyond definitions, Operational Culture Learning, or Culture Operations, deal with the concrete world, and human features which

Marines encounter while deployed. To get to the substance of this

concrete world, a Culture Operator must remember the three anthropological models discussed in Chapter One which possess util-
48 Operational Culture

ity in military operations. To review, these were the ecological

model concerning the relationship between cultures and the physical environment; the social structure model examining the influence of social structures on peoples’ status and power; and the

symbolic model studying a group’s beliefs, symbols and rituals.

As we saw, these three models produce the five dimensions of operational culture: the physical environment, the economic system, the social structure, the political structure, and beliefs and

symbols. In Part II of this book, we turn to an examination of each

of these dimensions in detail, to include their components. As we

have suggested up until now, the interaction among these dimensions, and the intermingled nature of their effects on human societies, will be a central matter of concern.

Notes

1 Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” Military Review March-April

2005, 62-63.

2 Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux, The Study of Culture at a Distance

Berghahn Books, 2000 [1953]), 22.

3 Edward Hall, quoted in Peace Corps Information Collection and Exchange,

Culture Matters: The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook (Washington, DC:

United States Government Printing Office, n.d.), 18.

4 Ibid., 15.

5 William D. Wunderle, Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US

Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (Ft Leavenworth,

KS: Combat Studies Inst. Press, 2006), 9.

6 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Operations and International Studies: Political-Military Analysis Handbook

(Fort Bragg, NC, 2004), 13/1.

7 The term “Human Terrain” appears to have been first used in a militarily

meaningful fashion by Ralph Peters, in “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” Parameters Spring 2000, 4-12: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00spring/peters.htm.

8 Janet Abu Lughod, “Migrant Adjustment to City Life: The Egyptian Case,” in

Ibrahim Saad and N.S. Hopkins, eds., Arab Society in Transition (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1977), 391-405.

9 See Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in

Colonial Algeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). 10 Author’s interview with Brigade Combat Team Deputy Commanding Officer,

Baghdad, January 2008. Our critical comments here focus on misuses of the
Defining Culture 49

term and concept of human terrain. This is very different from “Human Terrain

System.” This is (as of 2008) a joint program in its initial stages of development, sponsored by U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Human Terrain System provides operational ground force units at the battalion-and-higher

level with social scientists, field researchers, and cultural analysts with military

backgrounds (Human Terrain Teams), in order to assist commanders and staffs

in every stage of battlespace evaluation, mission analysis, and course of action

development, in the specifically non-lethal lines of operation. For more on this

see “‘Academic Embeds’: Scholars Advise Troops Abroad,” Talk of the Nation

(National Public Radio), 9 October 2007:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15124054. For an example of Human Terrain Teams deployed, see “Policing a Whirlwind,” The Economist 13 December 2007:

http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10286219 and

David Rhode, “Anthropologists; Scholars embedded in Afghanistan” The International Herald Tribune, (October 6, 2007),3. 11 For example, Kroeber and Kluckhohn collected more than 160 definitions of

culture in their classic work: A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Visalia CA: Vintage Press, 1954). 12 See Gary Ferraro, Cultural Anthropology: An Applied Perspective. 5th edition.

(Belmont CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004) and Bailey Garrick and James Peoples, Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 1999). 13 Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures (N.Y.: Basic Books Classics, 2000). 14 See Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (N.Y.: Mariner Books, 2006); Bailey

Garrick and James Peoples, Introduction to Cultural Anthropology. 15 See Jerry Moore, Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists (Lanham, MD: Alta Mira Press, 1997). 16 This definition, which includes the concept of social structures, leans heavily

on a British Social Anthropological perspective. In the U.S., American symbolic

and structuralist analyses have become the norm in recent years, led by anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz and Marshall Sahlins. See, for example,

Geertz’s Interpretation of Cultures and Sahlins’ Islands of History (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1987). Current American structuralist approaches

are strongly informed by post-modernist debates focusing on the nature of

knowledge and its meaning, particularly in light of the role of the ethnographer’s culture in understanding the “Other.” The authors acknowledge the extent and importance of current American structuralist thinking—in particular its

contribution to the notions of identity, meaning, process and symbolic communication. And throughout the text, we emphasize the dynamic and symbolic nature of culture and rely heavily on American structuralist approaches. However,

the definition of culture in this book focuses on the concept of social structure

since the British Social Anthropological approach is more concrete, and its applications more clear for Marines operating in conflict zones and other deployed areas.

17 Jean.-Claude Usunier, Marketing Across Cultures (New York: Prentice Hall,

1996).

18 Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution (Washington, DC: USIP Press,
50 Operational Culture

1998), 15.

19 Deborah Amos, “Iraqi Women Fight for Voice in New Iraq,” Morning Edition

(National Public Radio), 3 July 2003:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1319135; Jamie Tarabay,

“What’s in a Name? In Iraq, Life or Death,” All Things Considered (National

Public Radio), 9 May 2006: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5394090.
51

Part II

Five Operational Culture Dimensions for

Planning and Execution

Gaining a complete and accurate understanding of a culture requires spending years living in the region, learning the language

and interacting with the local people. These are things that the

majority of Marines cannot do—and focus on warfighting functions

at the same time. However, what a Marine can and should come

to recognize is that despite their seeming diversity, all cultures are

organized according to a predictable set of categories or dimensions. Although the specific details will vary (often drastically) from

one culture group to the next, these dimensions can be found in

any culture anywhere in the world. For reference purposes we

summarize these five dimensions here.

The Five Operational Culture Dimensions of the Battlespace

1. Environment. All cultures have developed a unique interdependent relationship with their physical environment.

2. Economy. All cultures have a specific system for obtaining,

producing and distributing the items that people need or want to

survive in their society. This system (which does not necessarily

require money or banks) is called the economy of a culture.

3. Social Structure. All cultures assign people different roles, status and power within the group. The way that people organize

themselves and distribute power and status is called their social

structure.

4. Political Structure. All cultures have a system that determines

who leads the group, and how they make decisions about its welfare. How a group is ruled (and it may not be by a specific person
52 Operational Culture

or set of people) is referred to as the political structure of a culture.

5. Belief Systems. All cultures have a shared set of beliefs and

symbols that unite the group.

In Part II, we will discuss the Five Operational Culture Dimensions

of the battlespace that Marines can examine and incorporate into

planning and execution. Chapter Three will focus on the relationships among the environment, culture and military operations.

Chapter Four examines three forms of economic relationships from

a cultural and military perspective. Chapter Five looks at social

structures of different cultures, focusing on six factors that affect

one’s status, role and power. Chapter Six analyzes power and authority in political systems, emphasizing cultural concepts of leadership. Finally, Chapter Seven discusses the impact of cultural

beliefs on operations.
53

Chapter 3

Dimension I

The Physical Environment

This chapter begins to explain the Five Operational Culture Dimensions in detail, by focusing on the physical environment of a

culture. Each of the following chapters will then discuss the remaining four dimensions. Part III will then provide case studies

from ongoing or historical conflict areas, demonstrating the dynamic interaction among cultural dimensions, as well as the implications for Marine operations and planning. We will then examine

the integration of culture into Marine learning.

As seen in subsequent chapters, each Operational Culture Dimension sets the stage for, or exists in recursive relationship with, other

Dimensions. Put simply, human phenomena—like other elements

in the battlespace—are intermingled, and artificially separating

them out in operational planning might provide a deceptively tidy

sight picture. In this and following chapters, therefore, we will

refer to multiple dimensions allowing the reader to begin to trace

out the linkages on his/her own.

How Culture Groups Relate to their Environments

Since ancient times when man first depended on the environment

to hunt and gather food, human groups have created unique relationships with the physical geography of a region. The availability of food, water, and material for shelter has determined the

location of villages and towns. Nomadic herding routes have traditionally followed the availability of food and water for animals.

And even today, most roads and the cities along them are built on

ancient trade routes that trace the easiest passage along rivers and

through mountain passes.
54 Operational Culture

In preparing an operational plan that includes cultural factors,

Marines need to understand the close relationship between a local

community and its environment. Fundamentally, Marines need to

determine what features of the local physical environment are used

by people in their daily effort for survival. This is because how

Marines use the physical environment in the course of operations

influences the ability of indigenous humans in that AO to survive.

Likewise, how people already use the physical environment will inform the range of options available to Marine forces entering an

area.

Example: Operational Impact on Physical Environment

Cedar and Birch trees are prevalent along the Northwest Coast of the

U.S. and Canada, ranging from Washington to Alaska. Indigenous

Native Americans such as the Tlingit, Kwaikutl, Haida and Susquatch

in these areas have traditionally dried the bark from these trees, and

then beaten it into a material from which they construct baskets,

mats, and bent-wood boxes. These products are highly prized for

their beauty and workmanship and command high prices in art and

tourist stores across the U.S.

The physical environment’s trees, therefore are used by indigenous

people to create income upon which the community depends. If

Marine forces were to choose a section of the Washington or

Alaskan coastline for air-naval gunfire and amphibious exercises,

they might either clear the coast of the trees, fire upon them, or at

the least, declare it a zone closed to civilian traffic. In this case, Marine operations would impact the physical environment, with negative consequences for the life, and material survival, of people in

the local culture group. Operations would also create potentially

hostile attitudes towards the Marine presence.

Physical features of an environment often possess a significance

that goes far beyond their mere physicality, however. Sometimes

people in culture groups attach to an item or feature of the physical environment an importance different from or greater than its

physical value; or, they might use that physical thing in a way different from its obvious physical usefulness. As important as ma-
Physical Enviroment 55

terial survival, the symbolic importance of physical features of an

AO is a core matter of concern to Marines. We will encounter this

topic again in Chapter Seven.

Example: Physical Environment and Symbolic Value

Mats, baskets, and boxes constructed from cedar and birch bark in the Pacific Northwest have a local cultural significance beyond economic exchange. Traditionally, local Native American tribal leaders have

communicated status through demonstrations of hospitality, known as potlatches, or gatherings where food and gifts are distributed. High-status gifts

which tribal leaders can bestow during potlatches have included boxes,

and in particular, baskets, constructed from cedar or birch. Logging in areas

used by local Native American groups would thus negatively affect the availability of cedar, birch, and the products derived from them. More important symbolically, logging would make it more difficult for tribal leaders to

demonstrate patronage and status in traditional terms.1

This would drive a shift in the groups in society who have status, and how

they demonstrate it. If amphibious exercises also impacted the availability

of these physical features with symbolic significance, they might influence

the attitude of traditional local group leaders towards the Marine presence.

Operationally Relevant Features of the Physical

Environment

Water. Perhaps no other physical resource is more precious than

water. Since ancient times, man has fought to the death over access

to and control of water. In much of the developing world today,

getting access to water (and in particular, safe, drinkable water) is

a serious issue. In some arid areas, such as the Arabian Peninsula

and the Horn of Africa, local peoples may spend up to half of their

day hauling water from wells or watering holes to their homes and

fields.

Because water is so precious, many societies have intricate and

often unspoken rules that regulate the use of water. For example

historically, across the Arabian Peninsula different tribes controlled

the watering holes or oases scattered throughout the desert. For
56 Operational Culture

centuries in India, a specific caste has held the responsibility for

bearing and selling water. And in the U.S. today, carefully detailed

laws regulate how and when water is distributed for irrigation of

crops in eastern Washington and Oregon.

Clearly, water is a major source of conflict around the world.2 Conflict over water often has a technical or access-related aspect to it,

particularly to external observers. Beyond the technical aspects,

however, cultural and political elements are often at play, involving notions of access, control, and use, as related to ideas of sovereignty, historical rights, and past feuds—items we shall discuss

later, in Chapters Six and Seven, when we examine political structures and beliefs.

Example: Water, Access, and Status

During the 1980s-90s, Turkey was in conflict with Syria and Iraq over the

Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Turkey had planned to dam the rivers since

the late 1970s, and in the 1980s began to do so, in order to increase hydroelectric power and economically develop southeastern Anatolia. This

“South-Eastern Anatolia Project” sought to effect better standards of life,

provide investment and employment opportunities in a long-neglected region, increase government control of the area, and lessen the local Kurdish

population’s attraction to separatist terrorism. However, damming the Tigris

and Euphrates reduced the water flow downstream to already waterstrapped northern Syria and Iraq. These were the technical aspects of the

water dispute.

Perhaps of more enduring significance to relations among these countries

were the cultural issues over-laying the technical matters. As a large regional state with a large army and industrial potential, Turks at a popular

level thought they deserved to use waters which were sovereign Turkish resources. As the headwaters were located in Turkey, the water was “their”

patrimony. By contrast, Syrians and Iraqis considered Turkey a ham-fisted

interloper into the region—different ethnically, divergent in interpretations

of religion, and the inheritor of a “bad attitude” based on the previous Ottoman empire’s imperial pretensions.

As a response to Turkey’s water use, therefore, Iraq and Syria both supported separatist Turkish Kurdish movements with training bases, safe passage, and weapons. This in turn evoked nationalist ire among Turks in and

out of government, who could point to “Arabs” stabbing them in the back

again, as they had in WWI during the “Arab Revolt” in the Hijaz.
Physical Enviroment 57

Example: Water, Access, and Status; continued.

Thus, opposition from the Arab states to Turkey about the physical asset of

water was often equally related to cultural notions of empowerment, control, sovereignty, and historical memory (see Chapter Seven), thus rendering sensible technical solutions at times irrelevant to the “real” issues at

stake.3

Culture Operator’s Questions: Water

Marines therefore need to ask certain questions about water as a

physical resource in the AO:

● What are the cultural rules about water’s use?

● What roles are expected of Marine personnel with respect

to water use and provision?

● What is the relationship between water use and ritual?

● What is the symbolic significance of water?

● Who customarily has what functions with respect to water?

● Who, in the AO, has customarily controlled access to water,

and how have they used that for power, influence, etc.?

● What is the scarcity of water in relation to intensity of use?

● What operational considerations are influenced by water, or

override cultural aspects of water as a physical resource?

Land. Land, like water, has been the source of conflict between

people for thousands of years. From a cultural perspective, land

is much more than the physical geography. For many cultural

groups, certain places hold a symbolic meaning that is significantly

greater than the simple physical features of terrain. For the Navajo

Indians of the American Southwest, for example, many of the
58 Operational Culture

strange rock formations on their reservation have stories and legends connecting the Navajo to their mythical beginnings. These

rocks serve as centers of sacred ceremonies and are considered

the heart of their culture. Likewise, in many parts of Central Asia,

gravesites of wandering mystical preachers (dervishes) who

brought Islam to the region between the eleventh and eighteenth

century have become shrines, to which people make pilgrimage to

pray and study. The land, in these instances, has become associated with holy personages, and is assumed to have sacred properties.4

Sometimes the symbolic significance of land means that some people are allowed to be on a certain patch of ground, whereas others are not. Arabia, and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in

particular, have traditionally been off-limits to non-Muslims. The

influx of U.S. personnel into Saudi Arabia after 1990 has caused

cultural animosity among some Saudis. Likewise, in traditional

Jewish culture, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem has been off-limits

to Jews, since its holiness requires its access to be limited to the

High Priest of the (defunct) Temple Cult. Marines must therefore

consider the symbolic importance both of their presence on particular patches of land, and their conduct on that land. For example, in the opening phases of OIF, coalition forces passing through

Kut and Amarra restored the British military cemeteries in these locations. This was interpreted by local Iraqis as Americans following in British footsteps to assume the role of imperial conquerors.

The cemeteries were in some instances subsequently re-desecrated.

Land may not only have symbolic meanings that outsiders do not

recognize, but the use and ownership of land may be viewed differently by other cultures. For certain groups around the world, the

idea of landownership is foreign to their cultural world view. For

the Mongolians, for example, land is communal. Out in the Gobi

Desert there are few fences, no walls and no “keep out” signs. Instead the land is shared and used as needed by each household.

Following their herds of animals in search of food, Mongolian families move their gers (or round tent homes) across the desert. They

put up their tents where it is convenient, and move on when the

animals need fresh grazing pastures.
Physical Enviroment 59

By contrast, in some socialist, communist, and even monarchical

countries, land is owned by no one but the state, though use is

(theoretically) open to all. Therefore, understandings of ownership, use, and legal status of land are culturally coded, with potential operational ramifications.

Example: Land Ownership, Land Use, and Cultural Conflict

Different notions of ownership and proper use can cause conflicts between

cultural groups. In early 20th-century Palestine, European Jewish settlers

purchased land titles from absentee landowners, often living in what is

today Lebanon. According to European ideas of landownership, those who

purchased title to a parcel of land owned that land, and could determine

who farmed on it and how.

By contrast, the Palestinian peasants living on and farming the land did not

adhere to a system of individual landownership. Rather, they had been

communally farming lands. “Title”—a new-fangled practice from the faraway imperial capital in Istanbul—meant little to them. When the new

Jewish owners arrived and began occupying the land, they assumed that

the Arab peasants were invading their rightfully owned space. These two

different understandings of ownership led to disagreements, bloodshed,

and an aggravation of Arab-Jewish relations.

Likewise, among the Galilee Bedouin, it had been common to reap from

fields cultivated by others. Picking a reasonable, limited amount of fruits

and vegetables from the margins of fields was considered acceptable in the

local Bedouin culture. Zionists, however, considered it brigandage or outand-out attacks on their lands, with the (political and ethnic) purpose of destroying the new Jewish agricultural settlements. These different cultural

practices with respect to land, and the misunderstanding they caused, made

political and armed conflict worse between Arabs and Jews.5

The culturally-coded nature of approaches to land also holds true

for understandings of international boundaries and borders. While

these might appear important on a political map, in many regions,

these are mere products of grease pencils on a canvas, not at all

matching local social or economic reality. One Marine attached to

Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa found in 2004 that

Ugandans and Kenyans saw very little relevance in the Britishdrawn international border between them. One day, a Kenyan cit-
60 Operational Culture

izen, living in Kenya, asked the Marine, “How are things [over

there] in Kenya?” He felt that he was in the land of Uganda as he

saw it; he felt more connected to the kin group in Uganda, and did

not care where Kenya started.6

Thus, an AO’s political map is usually broken down further into administrative subregions, often at odds with the tactical map, which

often follows a topographical logic. First, a Marine should grasp

an area’s principles of division, as well as the relationship between

these dividing lines and access to resources—tangible and symbolic. Then, one can understand how people relate to places in

their attitudes and aspirations.

Of course, political powers can use boundaries creatively in spite

of cultural realities. This is because geography unites and divides

people, resources, and power, as it breaks national states into

smaller units, from province to neighborhood. Local, regional, and

national powers take advantage of specific interests and internal/external disputes related to geography and resource access.7

This creates bizarre cartographic contortions, which might cause

complications for Marine operations.

Example: “National” Borders and Cultural Realities

Soviet leaders in Moscow regularly gerrymandered internal republics’

administrative borders in ways that had nothing to do either with local

linguistic or cultural groups’ understandings of what patch of ground

belonged to which group, or with the local geography of economic

exchange. Soviet leaders did this to counter nationalist sentiment in an

empire that had no ethno-linguistic commonality. Gerrymandering was

particularly widespread in Central Asia, as well as the Baltics. The postSoviet republics of Central Asia have inherited these maps, and have not

changed them, causing some quite strange relationships between peoples’

modes of survival and the administrative requirements of “national”

territories.

Parts of Central Asian states today are surrounded by other states’ territories.

Farmers in the Uzbek enclave of Shakhimardan, for example, which is fully

encircled by Kyrgyzstan, now have to pass through Kyrgyzstan to get to

the rest of their country. As a result, they must pay fees and maintain

documents, in order to do business over borders that have no meaning to
Physical Enviroment 61

Example: “National” Borders and Cultural Realities; continued.

them. This encourages lying, bribery to corrupt border officials, increased

prices due to customs duties, and a shadow area conducive to organized

crime and terrorist transit.

Similar Soviet practices in Armenia and Azerbaijan caused a shooting war

between those two countries in 1991-3 over Nagorno-Karabakh, and a

stalemate since then that is perfect fodder for extreme politicians in both

countries, as well as for international terrorists from surrounding areas.

Be it in undertaking kinetic operations in a new area, setting up

firm bases, or conducting civil-military and reconstruction operations, Marines need to understand both the value that local peoples

place on land they use, and local perspectives on “what is mine,

what is yours.”

Culture Operator’s Questions: Land

● What are the symbolic meanings of certain sub-districts in

the AO, and how do groups within the AO view this symbolism

differently?

● What are particular land formations that are visually striking, with local significance?

● What land in the AO is/is not appropriate for certain groups

of people to use?

● Who, locally, has legitimate ability to determine outsiders’

access to land?

● What are the local conventions of private, communal, and

state ownership/use of land?

● What is the relationship between the political map’s national/regional boundaries, and what people living in the AO

see as the boundaries that matter, in political, economic, genealogical, and security terms?
62 Operational Culture

● What are the geographic area’s principles of division, and

relationship between dividing lines and access to both tangible

and symbolic resources?

Food. For much of the developing world, obtaining and preparing food is a highly labor intensive task. Most importantly, because

of the scarcity of food in some regions, cultures may eat creatures

and plants that most Americans would not even consider to be

food.

In pastoral societies, such as the Masai of East Africa, food comes

from the herds of animals, which are the lifeline of the group. In

the case of the Masai, the precious cows are not killed, but bled

and milked daily to provide a nourishing drink made from a mixture of blood and milk. In China and parts of Southeast Asia, rats,

snakes, scorpions and even grasshoppers form the basis of local

diets. And in Poland, a popular pastime is gathering berries and

mushrooms from the forests—a practice that often provided

needed food during Communist times when stores had empty

shelves and thousands went hungry. Marines need to recognize

the many items that may serve as the basis of local diets. In their

operational plans they should include the impact that their actions

will have upon the ability of local peoples to obtain this food.

Food also often serves important ritual and symbolic purposes in

other cultures. Some foods may be forbidden, such as meat from

a cow in Hindu societies or pork in Muslim and Jewish communities. Other foods may be essential in ritual ceremonies such as the

kava drink in Polynesia. And most societies have foods that are

served only on special occasions or to special guests. Marines need

to be aware of local food taboos, particularly when providing food

to a community. They should also be prepared to gracefully accept certain dishes (such as sheep’s heads and intestines in North

Africa) in order not to offend the host, who may have gone to great

lengths to offer this honor.

As part of the physical environment, people can limit access to

food, particularly in the context of conflict. Food is thus of explicit
Physical Enviroment 63

significance to Marine operations. Control of food during times of

scarcity is a central lever of influence in counterinsurgency (COIN)

and other hybrid war conditions. This is because food scarcity can

be real or created, in order to control people and their loyalties.

For example, during 1932-33, a famine in the Ukraine killed over

six million people. The Soviet government caused it, to eliminate

nationalist sentiment and segments of the peasant population opposed to collectivization.

In related fashion, Marine personnel involved in provision of food

in a disaster relief or COIN environment will find that local communities have expectations with respect to food availability and

distribution. These expectations relate to quantity, kind of food,

and who should provide it. Fulfillment of local people’s expectations can determine legitimacy of outside forces. In OEF, for example, Afghan National Army soldiers have come to expect food

provision from the coalition. However, Afghan soldiers do not respond well to MREs, with some considering this an indication of

American condescension.8

Culture Operator’s Questions: Food

● What are the local staples, and what is the required labor

to grow, prepare, and serve them?

● What kinds of locally-accepted foods are considered

strange, dangerous, or not even food to less-traveled Marines?

● What foods—eaten either by U.S. personnel or by local

people—are so out of place as to raise concerns about health or

sanitation?

● What foods are served by whom, to indicate the status of

server or guest?

● How do Marine operations or logistics impact the ability of

local people to obtain essential foodstuffs?
64 Operational Culture

● What foods have which kinds of ritual significance?

● What are the time- or calendar-related roles of what kinds

of foods?

● Which foods are strategic commodities, inasmuch as controlling access to them influences one’s coercive or political

power?

● What, in local terms, is considered food sufficiency, food

scarcity, and the proper role of external forces in providing food?

Materials for Shelter. Around the world, people build their homes

to fit their environment. Even in the U.S., builders prefer to use local

materials that are easily obtainable and suited to the climate. Thus,

people in the Pacific Northwest build homes out of pine and cedar—

wood that is plentiful, affordable, and allows homes to breathe in a

wet climate. In contrast, in southern California and the Southwest,

where trees are hard to obtain and the climate is dry, the preference

is for adobe houses which stay cool in hot climates.

Not only do cultures use local materials suited to their climate, but

building styles and locations reflect experience in living in the region. In areas subject to floods for example, people have learned to

put houses on stilts or to live inland away from the shore. In some

desert areas, local people may build their houses with doors and

windows facing away from prevailing winds to reduce the amount

of dust infiltration. In constructing buildings in an area of operations,

Marines should observe local building techniques to avoid unanticipated disasters, such as setting up a base in a traditional flood zone.

Likewise, particularly in civil-military operations (CMO), commanders need to choose or contract for materials available (and thus maintainable) locally—and that the local climate can sustain. It is also

usually better to use materials and workers based on the entirely

local economy, because especially at the company and battalion

level of operations in the expeditionary and irregular environment,

it is the local indigenous population who has the vote of most importance to the success of Marine activities.
Physical Enviroment 65

Example: Materials, Sustainability, and Credibility

After the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, U.S. forces let out contracts

for the reconstruction of Afghan towns and villages. A focus involved

schools and clinics. The hope was that better education and health, and

the positive attitude towards the U.S. they would bring, would deter a Taliban resurgence. However, the company building the schools and clinics in

a particular province used materials procured from outside Afghanistan, and

laborers from outside the province.

Furthermore, they selected building sites ill-attuned to the local interaction

between climate and terrain. Therefore, what were built as shiny, modern

classrooms and clinics, within less than a year, had sunk into soil unable to

accommodate them, had been eroded by snows and rains, were too heavy

to warm, and then started to disintegrate, becoming useless hulks of buildings a year later.

At the same time, their construction had not improved local incomes, and

the people who were to inhabit them—doctors, nurses, and teachers—were

not from the area, and were disinclined to leave their home provinces or

cities.

Ultimately, the message to the illiterate though intelligent local Afghans was

that the priority of the coalition in Afghanistan was not Afghans, and that

coalition forces were similar to previous here-today-gone-in-a-few-years outside occupiers. Thus, ignorance of local climate, terrain, and building materials had concrete effects of hampering local education and health, and

second-order effects of undermining U.S. credibility in the province.

Using locally manageable and legitimate materials will gain greater

credibility not only for Marines in the AO, but for the overall operational plan; conversely, one can sink in the mud of good but

misunderstood intentions if the physical environment’s materials

for building and shelter are not considered.

Beyond the functionality of buildings and building materials,

shapes and architectural styles also communicate culturally-coded

messages about proper use of buildings, and status of the occupants or owners. For example, in different cultures, certain building can or cannot be used for certain activities.
66 Operational Culture

Example: Culturally-Coded Building Use

In Christianity, churches are legitimate places to mark life-cycle events:

birth, baptism, marriage, and death. So, weddings, funerals, and so on, are

supposed to occur in churches. Likewise, the purity of a church is not violated by the introduction of things like blood or corpses into that church.

This also means that in Christianity, events that occur in churches are less

likely to occur, or less accepted when they do occur, outside of churches

or church-like atmospheres. An indoor basketball court, for example, is a

less preferred site for a wedding, funeral, or confirmation.

By contrast, in Judaism and Islam, synagogues and mosques are places of

worship and study of scripture and law. In these religious traditions, they

are not locations to mark life-cycle events. In traditional Judaism and Islam,

therefore, weddings, funerals, circumcisions, etc., are not to occur in

mosques or synagogues, while they can occur in general-purpose buildings appropriately decorated—a cleaned up, decorated indoor basketball

court, for example.

Likewise, prayer places are to be kept pure; meaning it is improper to use

them as infirmaries, catacombs, or in extremis morgues—unlike in certain

South East Asian ritual sites. So, in different cultures, different buildings

have different functions.

Building styles and the use of architectural space, particularly in

the urban environment, are important cultural aspects of the AO

with significant tactical and operational implications. As just one

example, house architecture, building uses, materials strength, and

construction styles became essential squad-level knowledge during

the combat in Fallujah in 2004. Marines developed this knowledge

themselves and integrated it into battle planning and operations.ix

Culture Operator’s Questions: Materials for Shelter

● How do structures fit the geographic, climatic, and physical aspects of the environment?

● What do the internal and external appearances and materials used in structures communicate about building purpose,

occupant status, etc.?
Physical Enviroment 67

● What materials for building, repair, and maintenance are

local to the AO?

● What are the central tactical implications of building styles,

neighborhood layout, etc?

Climate and Seasons. Climate and the changing seasons may not

only affect local building styles, but also cultural lifestyles and activities. In hot climates, such as Mexico and Greece, the social pattern of the noon-day “siesta” sets a daily rhythm that keeps people

out of the sun during the middle of the day. Most economic and

social activities in these countries occur during the morning and

evening instead.

Accustomed to our American pattern of intense work from “nine to

five,” Marines may find these cultural patterns frustrating—especially when hiring local people for work projects. However, if

Marines can include a cultural group’s daily rhythms into their operational plans, local people may be much more cooperative. Realistic expectations can be set regarding the hours local people are

willing to work, and schedules and target dates are more likely to

be adhered to by partners in the AO.

Like climate, seasons often have a major effect on cultural rhythms.

In cultural groups that are closely tied to the land, spring and fall

may bring specific activities such as planting and harvesting. For

groups that herd animals, such as the Bakhtiari of Iran or the cowboys of the American west, spring may be the time of migration to

greener pastures high up in the mountains. Even industrial societies

have their seasonal rhythms. In Europe every government organization and business empties out in the summer as people head off

on their summer vacations.

Marines need to understand these seasonal variations in order to

plan operations that depend on the labor of local peoples. Otherwise, they may suddenly discover that all the able bodied men

have disappeared for the harvest, just when a major Marine construction project is about to begin.
68 Operational Culture

Likewise, Marines need to consider both season and climate when

planning operations with indigenous forces, or when fighting

against local armed groups. As just one example, U.S. personnel

in Afghanistan frequently notice a drop in insurgent activity during

the winter. Over time, they have come to understand that this is

related less to diminished insurgent enthusiasm for anti-Afghan violence, and much more to the local cultural disinclination to fight

during the winter months in high altitude. Conversely, the upsurge

in violence over the summer and autumn is seasonally driven, and

not necessarily a function of greater insurgent zeal.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Climate and Seasons

● How does the climate influence local attitudes to—and capabilities for—work, business, and combat?

● What is the relationship between climate and season, on

the one hand, and battle rhythm and operational tempo, on the

other?

● What, in local terms, passes for good weather, bad weather,

etc?

Fuel and Power. All societies need fuel to cook, to heat, and to

provide light. As the taste for Western goods such as satellite TVs,

cars and washing machines spreads to the most remote corners of

the globe, obtaining power—and in particular electricity and gasoline—has become a major concern of most communities.

Today every state is expected to supply electricity and gasoline to

its inhabitants, at least in urban areas. However, electric and gasoline supplies are frequently unpredictable in developing countries—and even occasionally in highly developed countries.

Shortages of gasoline can leave cars stranded, and power outages

are a common occurrence in many countries. People living in

these conditions often view the state as incapable, thus reducing

not only the state’s prestige, but also its legitimacy and then authority, as well.
Physical Enviroment 69

In addition, many third-world cities have large populations of unofficial squatters that surround the city, living in conditions of extreme poverty without electricity, heat, water or sewage. Mumbai,

in India, is a perfect example of this. At the same time, these “unofficial urbanites” surrounding cities can tap into electricity and

fuel grids to power TVs, refrigerators, and even internet cafes. This

reduces the amount of power available to the city, and creates

semi-legal facts on the ground that governments have difficulty

changing.

As an example, the Gecekondus (squatter settlements “put up over

night”) surrounding Turkish cities have developed over the past

generation into their own established quarters with material desires associated with legal urban areas. Some have attained legal

status; overall, the building materials are poor, the stress on the

power grid is great, and in times of power outage or earthquake

(as in 1999), the political regime is held accountable.10

This means that inadequate and unequal provision of power is frequently a cause of frustration for local inhabitants who blame the

power failures on the corruption and ineptness of the government

(not without good reason). The opposite is also true: Availability

of power, but no way to use it, can cause just as much frustration

with governments. In Turkmenistan, for example, oil is extremely

cheap, as it is produced locally in great amounts. Turkmenis can

thus buy it for a pittance. Yet, so few have cars, and so few can

open businesses able to take advantage of cheap fuel for long-distance travel, that the same effect of a shortage of fuel can be seen

in economic and political terms.

When deployed and conducting civil-military or humanitarian operations, the ability (or inability) of Marines to provide predictable

power may become a symbol of the U.S. military’s power—or willingness—to control essential resources upon which local people

depend. Recognizing the symbolic importance of power in providing legitimacy to the local government or military, insurgent

groups may target power plants in order to disrupt service and discredit U.S. operations in the region.
70 Operational Culture

Facing an environment of unpredictable (or in remote regions,

non-existent) power, many communities rely upon traditional solutions to their fuel needs. Wood continues to be an important

source of heat and fuel for people both in cities and the countryside around the world. Cultural groups that live in arid regions

with little wood, such as the Masai of eastern Africa or the nomads

of Mongolia, use the dried dung of their cattle or camels to ignite

cooking fires. And the Inuit (Eskimos) of northern Canada as well

as some remote Scandinavian communities burn dried peat to heat

their homes. Since wars frequently destroy local forests and resources, Marines need to assess the effect of military actions on the

ability of local peoples to gain access to essential fuel sources.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Fuel and Power

● What are the locally found, or locally produced sources of

power and fuel?

● What is the relationship between local elites and access

to/provision of fuel and power?

● How does the larger government authority provide, or control, access to power?

● What do local people expect of outside forces in terms of

power/fuel provision and protection?

● What are local work-arounds to deal with shortages of

power and fuel, and how do Marine operations impact them?

● What local issues regarding power and fuel are overshadowed by more pressing operational considerations?
Physical Enviroment 71

Notes

1 See David Michaelson, “From Ethnography to Ethnology: A Study of the Conflict of

Interpretations of the Southern Kwakiutl Potlatch,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,

New School of Social Research, 1979.

2 See, for example, Elisha Kally and Gideon Fishelson, Water and Peace: Water Resources and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993);

R. Hrair Dekmejian and Hovann H. Simonian, Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the

Caspian Region (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003). 3 John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1991). 4 Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007).

5 Neville Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine,

1917-1939 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Issa Khalaf,

Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948 (Binghamton, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991).

6 For more on local relationships to land in Africa of concern to U.S. Forces, see

Major Christopher H. Varhola (U.S. Army Reserves) and Lieutenant Colonel Laura R.

Varhola (U.S. Army), “Avoiding the Cookie-Cutter Approach to Culture: Lessons

Learned from Operations in East Africa,” U.S. Army Military Review (December

2006): 73-79; Christopher H. Varhola, “The Multiple Dimensions of Conflict in the

Nuba Mountains of Central Sudan,” U.S. Army Military Review (May-June 2007): 46-

55.

7 J. Wolch and M. Dear, eds., The Power of Geography: How Territory Shapes Social

Life (Unwyn Hyman, 1989). 8 “Debrief of BN-ETT to Afghan National Army, May 2005,” Conducted by Barak

Salmoni (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, May 2005).

9 Catagnus, Edison, Keeling, and Moon, “Infantry Squad Tactics,” Marine Corps

Gazette, September, 2005. 10- Umut Duyar-Kienast, The Formation of Gecekondu Settlements in Turkey: The Case

of Ankara (Lit Verlag [ABC], 2006).

73

Chapter 4

Dimension II

The Economy of a Culture

All cultural groups have a specific system for obtaining, producing,

and distributing items (food, clothing, cars, houses, etc.) and services (medical care, education etc.) that people need or want to survive in their society. This system is called the economy of a

culture.

When Americans think of the word “economy,” we tend to think

of money, stocks, international banking and trade, and perhaps the

national debt. These words all describe aspects of one kind of

economic system: a system based on the exchange of symbols

(such as money, checks or credit card numbers) for goods (such

as cars, food, clothing) and services (such as dental care or a college education).

Typically this system is regulated, taxed, and measured by our government. In short, this is a completely monetized, industrial economy. In fact, in its latest stage of development emphasizing high

technology, intellectual capital, electronic finance, and the disregard of international boundaries in the definition of “economic interests,” etc., one can consider the West as exhibiting characteristics

of a “post-industrial economy.”1

What people growing up in the industrial or post-industrial West

recognize most readily can be termed “the formal economy.” The

formal economy is the subject of study for an entire discipline

called “Economics.” However, in the context of operational culture

for the expeditionary warfighter functioning among many cultural

groups, this approach to economy will not be the focus of the current discussion. Here, we instead examine the many other ways

that economies are structured, using a cultural perspective.
74 Operational Culture

As this chapter illustrates, there are numerous economic exchanges

that never use money. Furthermore, much of human economic interaction is not regulated, taxed, or measured by national governments. For the Marine working in a foreign AO, understanding and

working with these other forms of economic exchange may be critical to success in local operations.

There are three important models of economic systems that are

significant for a Marine working in a foreign AO:

● Formal and informal economic systems

● Economy as a network of exchange

● Economy as a way of structuring social relationships

Each of these models provides a different approach to understanding economic relationships. As a result, all three models can

be seen as explaining economic behavior using complementary

rather than mutually exclusive perspectives. This means that in any

AO:

1. There will be an informal economy

2. The informal economy will exist intertwined with the formal

economy

3. Economies will work as networks of exchang

4. Economic interactions will structure social relationships

Thus no one approach that we will examine here provides a complete picture, and Marines will probably find they use all three

methods of analysis when working in a new region.

Formal and Informal Economic Systems

Much has been written about the formal versus informal economy.

Although a multitude of descriptions exist, for the purposes of this

discussion we use the following definitions:

Formal Economy: Those economic interactions and exchanges that

are regulated, taxed, tracked and measured by a state government.
Economy 75

Informal Economy: Those economic interactions and exchanges

that are not recognized, regulated, controlled, or taxed by a state

government.

The concept of an “informal economy” is based on certain assumptions, which influence the way that people view economic

systems around the world. Some of these assumptions:

● There is a “formal,” governmentally regulated, proper economy. “Informal” economic activities are outside of this realm—

in other words, these economic activities are “not formal” and

often “illegal.”

● The formal economy is somehow the “real” or “legitimate”

or “valid” economy, while the informal economy is a marginal,

aberrant system that exists illegally on the periphery of society.

● The informal economy is the sign of a weak state that is unable to bring the economic activities of its inhabitants under its

control and supervision.

● In an ideal world, a strong state would have no informal

economy and be free of the many illegal and extra-legal economic activities that currently occur outside of its control.

In this chapter, we provide an alternate model of the economic

system of modern states, arguing that informal economic activities are actually a permanent and normal feature of all

human behavior. In fact, “informal” economic ways of interacting have always existed in parallel to—and sometimes have even

been central to and animated—the formal, governmentally preferred system.

These conclusions are obvious when one realizes that formal states

with the ability to control the economic activities of their populations have existed, at best, for only a few hundred years—and then

only in specific locations for limited periods of time. Yet people

have been living in groups, and obtaining and exchanging the food

and other goods and skills they need for survival, for millions of
76 Operational Culture

years. On the human time scale, people have been actively maintaining non-formal economic exchange systems for millennia before states developed to try to regulate them.

Contrary to the way scholars have labeled these systems, formal

economies are in many ways the exception to the rule—they arose

late in human development and were superimposed upon existing

“informal” systems. Today people continue to use these non-formal

systems, despite the efforts of states to impose new, externally controlled systems. Why, then, would we maintain the reverse view

that the formal economy is the true and optimal economy? The answer lies in looking at the needs of the state, and the answer’s components are all important to a Marine.

First, from the state’s perspective, unregulated activities are untaxed activities; hence a state with a large informal economy and

a small formal economy will lose much of its potential tax revenue

to an unregulated, untaxed system. In civil terms, the state will

lose the capacity in those very areas important for its legitimacy:

provision of welfare, essential services, and a society-oriented

safety net.

As the successful British provision of land, building materials,

schools, medical care, and subsidized local governance to (particularly ethnic Chinese) civilian Malayans during the “Malay Emergency” in the 1950s showed, these are all things that give people

a stake in the state, or status quo, as opposed to other options. By

contrast, the Egyptian state’s inability to provide a social safety net

during the Islamist insurgency of the 1990s resulted in an apathetic

citizenry, so that the state had to rely on high levels of force, and

a hope that the Egyptian “nature” was more opposed to violence

than it was to a harsh state.

Second, in military terms, unregulated economic activities mean

that the state will have less funding at its disposal to raise and

sustain military forces—the state will have lost the financial component of “the people” from Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity”

which we discussed in the Introduction and Chapter One of this

book.
Economy 77

Third, and most significant for the Marine, unregulated economic

activities pour money, goods, and power into non-state sectors (including but not limited to drug cartels, crime rings, and insurgent

movements) which can act as a threat to state stability.

Marines working in a foreign AO will find that two important features of the informal economy may have a significant impact on

operations:

● The goods and services provided in the informal economy

● The people who participate in the informal economy

Goods and Services in the Informal Economy

There are three categories of goods and services in the informal

economy:

● Illegal goods and services forbidden by the state

● Quasi-legal goods and services

● Goods and services that are ignored by the state

Illegal Goods and Services. For the Marine, the informal economy is especially significant since all illegal goods and services

move through this system. It is important to note here that the distinction between illegal and legal goods and services is not always

easily defined. A gun sold in a sporting goods store with a license

is a legal good; yet when smuggled across the border to be sold to

an insurgent group it is an illegal good. Certain goods or services

may be forbidden in one country but permitted in the neighboring

country. Alcohol is forbidden in Saudi Arabia but permitted in

Egypt. As another example, prostitution and marijuana are legal in

Holland but illegal in France.

Furthermore, even within the same country, regional differences

exist in the willingness of officials to prosecute people for selling

certain forbidden goods or engaging in illegal services. In parts of

California, for example, the possession of small quantities of marijuana has historically been ignored, although the U.S. national gov-
78 Operational Culture

ernment forbids the drug. Finally, some goods may be illegal and

then circulate through the economy to become “legal.” Stolen

goods that emerge in pawn shops and second-hand stores fall into

this category.

The ambiguous nature of illegal goods and services often can lead

to confusion in military operations. Marines need to be familiar

with local laws and customs regarding the legality of certain goods

or behaviors.

One category of illegal services provided through the informal economy is especially relevant to Marine operations: bribery. Bribery, in

economic terms, is the purchase of a service (obtaining a government document, getting medical care, getting out of jail) from an official representative who does not have the right to charge for such

a service. In the U.S., bribery is considered a serious crime. However

in many countries, bribery is an accepted, and perhaps necessary,

way of doing business.

Example: Bribery as Accepted Business as Usual

During the Communist era in the Soviet Union, many basic goods such as

food and clothing, and services such as medical care and building repair, were

extremely scarce. In the Communist economic model, all workers earned the

same minimal pay regardless of their skill or effort. As a result, an informal

economy developed where virtually every worker earned their survival pay

from their day job, and then supplemented their income through informal

activities. For many, their “real income” came from the bribes they received

due to their strategic position in their jobs. Storekeepers accepted bribes to

inform individuals of the arrival of new goods; doctors accepted bribes to offer

individuals urgently needed medical care; and government officials took bribes

to help individuals locate scarce housing. Despite the end of the Communist

model of economics, Russia today continues to operate on this dual system of

day job supplemented by “special pay or tips for services rendered in the

course of doing one’s job. Bribes continue to be a necessary part of daily life.

In many developing countries, the extreme red tape and bureaucracy

involved in obtaining governmentally required papers and documents

is often accompanied by the practice of officials accepting “donations” to speed the process. This expensive and slow system is often
Economy 79

a causal factor in creating the exchange of quasi-legal goods and services in the informal economy.

Example: Government, People, Illegal and Legal Economy

The interaction between legal job and informal illegal activity can be seen

in modern India. The Indian constitution grants almost iron-clad job

security to employees of the India Administrative Service (IAS). It is almost

impossible to fire them. Therefore, Indians of all castes—even those who

have been abused by the Service—would like a job in it. It is thus normal

for aspirants or their parents to pay a “fee” for admission to the IAS. Once

in the IAS, civil servants find they have a guaranteed paycheck, which,

however, is lower than that of private-sector professionals.

IAS employees therefore have every incentive to require “fees” from Indians

who come to them to receive services that are supposedly a part of normal

IAS duties. The IAS is in fact chock-full of license-, permit-, quota-, and

reporting requirements, and each one of these is an opportunity for a citizen

to bribe an IAS member for good favor.

Additionally, IAS officials use their formal economic and legal authority not

to constrain the informal economy, but to enter into it for material benefit.

For example, the state has authorized 99,000 permits for bicycle rickshaws

in New Delhi (for which people often have to pay bribes). However, more

than 500,000 rickshaws are being operated. Rather than raising the quota

to reflect reality, or confiscating the illegal rickshaws, the IAS and Police

ensure that over 100,000 Indians work illegally—in return for regular bribes.

The same is true with the city’s 600,000 street hawkers. It’s not clear if this

is a legal or illegal practice, but in spite of middle class citizens’ complaints

about street-hawkers, very few are arrested. Rather, they regularly pay a

“fee” for occupying public space, and the police regularly raid these

peddlers, “confiscating” their goods—which often make it back onto the

street in sales networks that pay kickbacks to the IAS and Police.2

Quasi-Legal Goods and Services. These are items and labor that

are not illegal in principle. However, like the rickshaws we saw

above, in order to be permitted by the state, they require taxation,

registration, and regulation. For example, the sale of food and clothing on the street by a licensed and taxed vendor in New York City

is legal. However, since licenses are limited and may be too expensive and difficult to obtain for an individual starting without
80 Operational Culture

much capital, many street vendors offer their goods without licenses.

In much of the developing world, a significant percentage of the

labor force (up to 40-50% in some countries) works in this informal sector, providing unregulated goods and services that in theory could be legal.3 Any Marine who has traveled outside of the

Western world has observed vendors on the side of the road or in

open air markets selling anything from home-made bread to used

clothing to car parts. The majority of these vendors provide their

goods without government regulation.

Studies suggest that a major reason vendors do not obtain licenses

is the difficulty and expense of going through the governmental

bureaucracy.4 Added to this is the common expectation of paying

bribes to move one’s paperwork through the system in many countries, making the application for licenses almost futile to all but a

few influential members of society. For example, in Lima, Peru, it

took almost 300 working days—thirty-two months of income in

the local minimum wage—to register a business with only two

sewing machines!5

Like the sale of small scale goods, many of the services provided

in developing—and for that matter developed—countries fall under

this category of quasi-legal status. Frequently these services are

provided by categories of people who are marginalized from the

formal economic structure. In the U.S., for example, Americans

often hire new immigrants for services without asking them if they

are licensed or taxed by the state. These immigrants can be found

working as maids, gardeners, construction workers and agricultural

laborers, among other jobs.

Goods and Services Ignored by the State. Due to the impossibility of regulation and the view by the state that certain economic

activities are insignificant or not recordable, certain goods and services are deliberately ignored by the state. In the U.S., for example,

teenage babysitting is generally ignored. Unpaid labor—such as

seasonal agricultural work by family members or a wife’s management of the books of her husband’s business—also is largely unregulated in America.
Economy 81

The weaker the state, and the greater the distance between a community and the taxing/regulating center, the more goods and services go unregulated. One sign of a partial or complete state failure

in a region is the lack of effort to tax or regulate goods and services in that area. This is not to imply that local residents get a free

ride. To the contrary, often a criminal, warlord, etc., steps in to fill

the taxation gap, extorting “payments” from the locals in the region

in exchange for the security and protection that the state no longer

provides.

People Who Participate in the Informal Economy

The informal economy is populated by people who, due to traditional social roles, legal strictures, or the prevailing ethno-religious

balance of power at the formal/state level, do not dominate in the

visible, monetized economic spectrum. Four categories of people

are commonly found in the informal economy:

● Women

● Children

● Non-Citizens and Illegal Immigrants

● Ethnic/Religious Minorities.

Women. Women commonly work in the informal economy because many informal economic activities are compatible with their

domestic duties. A woman can take in wash, bake bread or other

food for the market, grow vegetables in her garden, baby-sit, and

even do piecework and sewing in her home while watching her

children and taking care of the house. In communities which practice the seclusion of women (as in many Muslim regions; see Chapter Five), such home-based work has the added advantage of

allowing the woman to earn money while remaining out of “public view.” Since these domestic activities are sporadic and not easily monitored by the nation-state, such home-based activities

typically fall under the quasi-legal status of the informal economy.
82 Operational Culture

Example: Women as Informal Economic Agents

Many studies of the Middle East and North Africa suggest that women have

the lowest rates of employment in the world. Current estimates suggest that

women form only 4-22% of the labor market in the Middle East and North

Africa; this is less than half of the rate for women in Europe and the U.S.

These figures, however, overlook the significant roles that women play in

the informal economy in the region.

In North Africa, for example, women not only provide unrecognized labor

in agriculture, but also produce handicrafts and food that are sold by males

in the market (see Chapter Five); run small businesses from their home

(such as sewing and hairdressing) and offer traditional services to other

women (as midwives, soothsayers, teachers and traditional hennanas). Such

work provides essential income to their households without challenging

the man’s culturally-mandated need to appear as the sole breadwinner and

supporter of the household.6

Therefore, in a foreign environment, Marines may encounter

women working at home, performing economic roles that appear

exploitative, as they receive little or no pay. Other factors, however, such as attitudes, social relationships, and locally-accepted

economic practices, might in fact make it better for women to work

from home, in the informal economy.

For example, if Marine forces were to establish a formal factory

setting for sewing, where women could obtain regulated employment and be protected by the state (or civil affairs unit), U.S. personnel might think they had prevented exploitation of women.

Instead, they might discover that women do not come to the factory. This could be because working out of the home was more

expensive for the woman, for many reasons. At the same time, a

sewing factory that takes women out of the home would disturb

local economic relations in the region based on a set of attitudes

and practices.

Children. Since many countries forbid child labor, children’s economic activities tend to be restricted to the informal economy. Although we frequently assume that child labor is a sign of poverty

in developing countries, the reality is that many children in the U.S.
Economy 83

also participate in the informal economy. Running lemonade

stands, mowing the neighbor’s lawn, and babysitting are all economic activities in which American youth engage without paying

taxes or obtaining the necessary licenses from the state.

In many developing countries, however, children’s income or labor

contribution is often essential to the survival of the household.

Children help in the harvest, sell products in the market, or work

in family businesses such as rug weaving. This income is counted

upon for the family budget. Although we may not approve of child

labor, in planning, Marines should still evaluate whether their actions could unexpectedly restrict children from engaging in economic activities that support their families, and, as we will see in

the next chapter, reflect different cultural notions of age-appropriate behavior.

Illegal immigrants. Like children, illegal immigrants are also

forced to work in the informal economy because the state forbids

their participation in the formal economy. Paradoxically, while all

nation states make laws forbidding certain individuals to work

within their borders, the formal economies of virtually every country around the world depend upon the labor of illegal workers. Illegal immigrants generally undertake the work that legal residents

of the country find distasteful or undesirable, whether it be ditch

digging, cleaning toilets, or picking fruit. Without the participation of illegal immigrants, these jobs would not be filled—again,

formal and informal economies interact, the former requiring the

latter.

Because illegal immigrants are not protected by state laws, employers are able to pay these workers at low wages and ignore

benefits and protections that legal citizens enjoy. Although such

arrangements are clearly exploitative, the formal economy of the

country gains from the lower costs of products and services that are

provided from this cheap labor.

Due to their marginal nature in society, as well as their greater mobility, illegal immigrants are also a target recruit pool for illegal

labor activities ranging from prostitution to drug dealing to arms
84 Operational Culture

smuggling. As an immigrant group grows, migrant sub-communities based on region of origin often develop in certain areas. Due

to their marginal economic and social status, migrant enclaves may

serve as excellent recruiting grounds for insurgents. As we will

see in Chapter Six, illegal immigrant laborers are by definition left

out of the political structure, and thus may seek to challenge it.

Ethnic and Religious Minorities. Like immigrants, ethnic and religious minorities may turn to the informal economy because cultural prejudices or laws make it difficult for these groups to work

in the formal economy. In order to avoid special taxes or licenses

due to their ethnicity or religion, members of such minorities may

choose to engage in work away from the regulation or control of

the formal government.

Particularly in areas where ethnic and religious groups may cluster in specific quarters or regions, a strongly independent non-regulated informal economy may develop on the lines of religion or

ethnicity. Although a few larger businesses in the community will

follow the state rules, the community as a whole may engage in

business and economic transactions—such as the sale of imported

or homemade goods, offering of traditional cultural services, or

provision of illegal labor—that are predominantly unregulated by

the state. Sometimes these communities become specialized in

certain economic niches—for example the Sikh taxi driving communities in the U.S.—that mix formal governmental activities (registered taxis) with informal personal economic exchanges and

family ties, as we discuss in the following section. Often, groups

such as this are doubly driven to disadvantaged informal economic

relationships, as both minorities and immigrants.

Example: Illegal Minority Immigrants in a Formal-Informal Economy

Throughout the U.S. Chinese restaurants functioning in the formal economy

employ people from the informal, unregulated, semi-legal economy. In

particular, the coastal province of Fujian, China, is a hub for immigrants to

New York. Many of these immigrants are undocumented, and arrive to the

U.S. through human smuggling networks. People who run these networks

charge about $70,000 to transport an aspiring worker to the U.S.
Economy 85

Example: Illegal Minority Immigrants in a Formal-Informal Economy;

continued.

Once here as an illegal immigrant with no English skills, a Fujianese cannot

benefit from American legal, economic, or social welfare protections.

Instead, they rely on an informal, semi-legal labor exchange, taking the

form of listings on chalkboards in restaurants and transient dwelling areas.

Negotiating directly with restaurant employers, they then rely on an

informal transportation network, of cars and vans that reaches from New

York to the Midwest, to arrive at restaurants for menial work, or work as

chefs. These new laborers, unregulated by the state or local authorities, live

in groups, often nearby or on the second floor of restaurants, working sixday weeks at twelve-to-fourteen hours a day.

This intensity of work usually burns out laborers after several months. They

then return to New York, beginning the cycle again, since it will take up to

ten years to pay off the debt for being smuggled to the United States.

Thus, an actor in the formal economy, in this case a Chinese restaurant in

New York, Chicago, or Columbus, will have subordinate economic actors,

some of whom are legal immigrants, and others of whom are illegal ethnic

minority immigrants, whose entire economic and social welfare net hinges

upon the informal, semi-legal economy.7

Culture Operator’s Questions: the Informal Economy

In a foreign AO, Marines will need to ask the following questions,

engaging in relationships with local people based on the answers:

● What categories of people work in the informal economy?

● On what commodities/services does the informal economy

focus?

● What is the relationship between the informal economy,

on the one hand, and unregulated movement of people, crime,

and violence, on the other?

● How will Marine operations impact the informal economy

and the people in it?
86 Operational Culture

● How will the Marine impact on the informal economy influence attitudes of certain sectors of the population to the Marine presence?

● How does the formal economy rely upon the informal

economy, and what abuses of the AO’s population does this

cause?

● What opportunities exist for the population, based on the

formal economy’s relationship with informal economic practices?

● What are formal/informal economic actors’ expectations of

the state or over-arching political-military authority, with respect

to involvement in or disregard for economic activity?

● What is considered an “illegal” good or service in the AO,

on what basis?

● What goods/services are legal, but culturally frowned upon?

Who deals in these goods/services?

● How will Marine expenditure in the local informal economy, or employment of local informal economic actors, influence the socio-economic balance of power in the AO?

Economy as a Dynamic Network of Exchange

At the center of cultural analyses of economic systems is the concept of exchange. One of the seminal scholars on economic systems, Mauss,7 proposed the idea that in order to survive, people

are bound in an intricate web of exchange and obligation. This

network of exchange or trade creates a set of social relationships

(whether equal or unequal) between people. These relationships

in turn form an economic system through which needed goods

and services flow. Ultimately, the pattern of exchanges determines

who has access to—and control and possession of—important

economic resources or wealth. As we will see in our next Chapter, this distribution of wealth is related to social structure.
Economy 87

Economic exchange systems are generally characterized by the

degree to which exchanges are reciprocal or even. In highly reciprocal or balanced exchange systems, each person in the group

owns a similar amount of possessions or wealth. At the other end

of the spectrum are unequal or directional exchange systems

where the wealth and resources of the community are concentrated in the hands of a group of individuals.

Below, we discuss three common economic exchange patterns

that Marines are likely to encounter in their operations around the

world:

● Egalitarian or communal distribution

● Direct reciprocal exchange

● Symbolic directional exchange systems

Egalitarian and Communal Distribution. An egalitarian or

communal economy is perhaps the simplest economic system

known to man. All of the group work together to create the food,

clothing, housing, or other items necessary for living, and then

these goods are distributed evenly to each person. This may seem

like a utopian and rather unrealistic system, and yet it continues

to be common around the world today, even in countries that are

clearly based on a monetary system. Communism in its idealistic

form (not as it was practiced) was based on the ideals of such a

system. Today, the kibbutz in Israel, for example, uses an egalitarian distribution system: All members of the kibbutz work together communally and equally share the profits of their labor.9

Example: Communal Distribution in the Civilian World, and the Marine

Corps

In her landmark book All our Kin, Carol Stack describes the communal

distribution system of an urban black poor community in the U.S.10 In order

to survive in a world of limited resources and poverty, members of the

community participated in a web of communal distribution.

Reciprocal or

Balanced

Unequal or

Directional
88 Operational Culture

Example: Communal Distribution in the Civilian World, and the Marine

Corps; continued.

In this community, communal distribution meant borrowing food, clothing,

and money when needed, and giving these items away to other people

whenever extra was available in one family.

Stack observed a unique feature of this poor black community which

characterizes all egalitarian distribution systems: No one member or

household accumulated more goods or money than any other. These

systems therefore functioned as a leveling mechanism. As a result, even

when one household in Stack’s community would suddenly receive a

financial windfall (an inheritance, a significant tax refund, winning the

lottery), it was impossible for the household to hold on to it. Within a few

days all of the household’s kin, neighbors, and friends would stop by to

claim a piece of the windfall, which was considered a legitimate practice,

and which resulted in a rapid egalitarian distribution of the goods

throughout the community.

Marines should intuitively understand egalitarian economies, since they also

practice such a system. When actively involved in field operations, all

Marines work together towards a common goal and equally share their

resources. They receive the same allotments of clothing and personal items,

sleep on the same beds in the same tents or buildings, eat the same food,

and generally have equal access to prized resources such as the Internet and

movies. Marines also receive equal access to critical services such as medical

and dental care, education and training, and transportation. Indeed, this

unique egalitarian philosophy of the Corps extends to officers, who, unlike

in other militaries, will often wait until after all their men have eaten to

serve themselves and generally refuse to sleep in better conditions or

quarters than their men.

In planning, Marines need to understand that people whose economic beliefs or practices are based on communal or egalitarian

distribution might react negatively to both what they perceive as

unequal effort in commodity development, and what appears to

them to be unequal sharing of scarce resources. In some operational environments requiring uneven distribution of resources in

order to meet the requirements of the most needy, exposed, or

work-engaged groups of people, Marines will need to balance this

requirement with local attitudes towards egalitarian distribution.
Economy 89

In operations where Marines do not recognize egalitarian or communal distribution, they may be distracted by apparent “corruption” of people with whom they work. “Corruption” can

sometimes be explained by a communal distribution system. This

is because such a system is based on the principle that if goods or

money enter the group at any one point, they will be distributed

in an understood manner among the members of the group.

American personnel with deep experience working with Arab and

Kurdish tribes in Iraq have commented that corruption is often in

fact a necessary part of tribal functions.11 Typically, in tribal systems which tend to be based on principles of communal distribution, there is an expectation that whatever one individual receives

(whether it is a large sum of money to build a school, or a set of

guns for cooperating with the military, etc.) must be shared among

the members of that group. As an outsider, a Marine may not see

or understand the socially required distribution of goods within the

tribe.

For example, when Marines provide weapons to a police chief for

use solely within the unit and in specific situations, they may discover later that the weapons have not made it to all the police offers, but have wandered into the hands of civilians of a certain

tribal background. The Marine’s frustration is understandable. But

if the communal distribution system had been factored into operational planning, the Marine may have found that the police chief

was a prominent member of a local tribe, and thus had a cultural

obligation to communally distribute some of the weapons—to tribal

kin, more than to police officers of other tribes.12

Direct Reciprocal Exchange. Like communal distribution systems, economies based on reciprocal exchange are extremely simple. Two or more people or groups come together, each offering

goods or services, and exchange them. The net result from the

exchange is even: In most cases, both parties in the exchange walk

away feeling that they have ended up with goods or services of

equivalent value.

Unlike communal distribution, which requires an ongoing sharing
90 Operational Culture

of goods throughout the group, in principle, reciprocal exchange

can be a closed-ended interaction. The parties in the exchange

trade their goods or services, and the interaction is over. This, for

example, is the classic case of local markets, where people bring

their goods for sale and barter or trade them for items of similar

value. In such a system money is not necessary, as long as the parties feel that the exchange is fair.

Most Marines who have been deployed to Third World countries

are intimately familiar with economic patterns of barter and trade

with the locals: cigarettes in exchange for information; medical care

in exchange for the return of stolen truck parts. In fact, barter and

trade are typically the logical outcome of failed economies in failed

nation states. In an instable monetary system where inflation runs

rampant and local currencies quickly have no value, local people

will resort (or return) to more direct ways of obtaining the goods

they need.

For example, in Communist Russia, goods were scarce and the government unable to provide even basic services. As a result, an informal barter and trade system sprang up, in which skilled city

dwellers would head to the countryside on the weekends and trade

their services for fresh food unavailable in the city: repairing the

farmer’s plumbing in return for eggs; or trading electronic parts for

vegetables.13

While closed-ended reciprocal exchange systems are common

around the world, more significant for the Marine are open-ended

systems. In these economic systems, goods or services are

exchanged over time, creating networks of reciprocity and

obligation. Open-ended systems are based on the principle that an

item or service offered today will be returned in an appropriate

manner at a later date. Open-ended systems are frequently preferred by people in close relationships, since they carry an obligation that one can call upon at a later date. In the U.S., for example,

friendly neighbors may be happy to give food or tools to the people down the street, knowing that when they run out of eggs or

need a hoe, they can count on their neighbor to be obliged to return the favor.
Economy 91

In fact, the motivating principle behind many U.S. military engagements is open-ended reciprocity and obligation. We extend

military aid, loan guarantees, or grants to foreign governments

based upon the expectation that they will support us diplomatically and join in military alliances and coalitions. We train foreign

militaries so that they may act as partners or proxies. We build

bases for foreign governments so that we may use them in time of

need. We engage in civil-military operations in the hope that local

populace will have a positive view of the U.S. All these are examples of open-ended reciprocal relationships, and as in such relationships, the U.S. feels justifiably short-changed if the foreign

partner does not reciprocate.

Symbolic Directional Exchange Systems. Because barter and

trade only succeed when the parties involved have items that they

each want, the system can easily fall apart: If you come to market

with chickens hoping to trade for a cow, you might go home

empty handed if the owner of the cow wants to buy a camel, not

chickens. As a result, many cultures have developed a form of

symbolic exchange—of which the most familiar is money.

In symbolic exchange all parties involved agree that a certain symbolic item, such as paper money or coins, has a value greater than

its physical usefulness. For example, many cultural groups value

objects—such as cowrie shells and pigs in Polynesia or special

woven cloths in parts of West Africa—that seem totally unimportant to someone outside the culture. These items are used not only

for their functional value, but for their symbolic value as a form of

“money” that can be used in transactions.

This discussion makes an obvious fact of American life—the exchange of a symbolic item (money) for goods and services—seem

very strange. But, in fact, upon meeting the white man for the first

time, certain remote cultural groups such as the Yanamamo of

Brazil were completely unimpressed with the silly wads of green

and colored paper that the white man carried with such respect.

They could not understand why anyone could kill for this strange

paper called ‘money’ which one could not eat, wear or use to make

weapons.14
92 Operational Culture

Symbolic exchanges are based on two critical principles. First,

the symbolic item must be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the

people. History is scattered with cases of failed governments

whose currency suddenly became worthless—the Confederate dollar after the Civil War, the German Mark after World War I. The key

matter in a cultural sense is that coin and paper money do not get

their symbolic value and thus utility from the soundness of a system or economic plan relying on monetary exchange. Rather, in

the modern era, it is the legitimacy of the physical currency and the

economic/political system behind it that are essential to the viability of monetary symbolic exchange systems. In many places to

which Marines deploy, this legitimacy has already been undermined to a degree.

Example: De-Legitimized Symbolic Exchange Systems

Marines will remember a similar instance in the aftermath of the fall of

Saddam Hussein. The Ba‘th-era Bank of Iraq had been printing dinars for

quite some time, and they had been in circulation as a relatively valued

currency. After Saddam fell, these “Saddam dinars” lost value and

legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis, even though they could have still been used

as the basis of a monetary system.

In the interim, material exchange, and alternative currencies—such as the

dollar, British pound, and Euro—had greater value in the eyes of Iraqis.

While Marines found “Saddam Dinars” to be great souvenirs to send home,

it was the dollar (or bottle of water) that got them further as a currency.

However, continuing this practice too long would have resulted in

undermining the new post-Saddam currency of the Iraqi state.

Second, symbolic exchange makes it possible for certain individuals to accumulate large amounts of the symbolic item (money,

stocks, or cowrie shells, etc.). This permits concentration of wealth

in the hands of individuals or groups. Likewise, as individuals gain

wealth, their exchanges and relationships with others become unequal. Consequently, wealthier individuals have greater access to

goods, control of goods, and power within the community. As a result, symbolic exchange systems are often characterized by a directionality of interactions: Goods and services tend to flow in one
Economy 93

direction and concentrate among certain groups, rather than moving in a circulating fashion among all members of the group.

In working in a foreign AO, Marines need to look for alternative

non-monetary symbolic exchange systems. In the Horn of Africa,

for example, cows are considered more valuable than money in

some areas. In some countries, cigarettes serve as an alternative

symbolic currency. And in certain areas, guns and illegal substances

such as drugs may be a more powerful currency than money. Particularly in countries where the government’s financial system is

unstable and failing, these alternative currencies may actually form

the backbone of the economic system.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Economy as a Network of

Exchange

In planning an operation, Marines need to ask the following questions about the economic systems employed by local cultural

groups:

● How are important physical resources (food, clothing, shelter, cars etc.) obtained by local peoples?

● How do people gain access to critical services such as medical care, transportation, or education?

● Would a specific operational plan improve or block access

to critical goods and services?

● What is the degree of (in)equity in the distribution of goods

and services among the population?

● Who seems to control the distribution of goods and services, and how? Would a planned operation change this distribution pattern?

● Along with or instead of money, what do local peoples rely

on to obtain and exchange goods in the region?
94 Operational Culture

● If money is not the primary economic system, how could

the operational plan be adjusted to use the existing alternate

economic systems effectively?

Economy as a Way of Structuring Social Relationships

So far in this chapter we have discussed two distinct ways of looking at economies in cultural groups around the world: by examining the formal versus informal economy, and by looking at

economies as networks of exchange. There is a third approach to

examining economic behavior: a structural approach which examines the ways that economies are related to the environment in

which a group lives, and how these economies structure social relationships between people. Though Chapter Five will deal

squarely with the social structure of a culture group and how that

social structure can influence political relationships, it is important

here to begin the discussion of how economic structures and relationships set the conditions for certain kinds of social structures.

We will continue this discussion in Chapter Five, extending it to political structures in Chapter Six.

As Chapter Three showed, all people need certain basic physical

and social items to survive, including, but not limited to: food,

water, clothing, shelter, medical care and safety or protection. On

the simplest level, these items derive from the physical environment in which humans live. Not surprisingly, then, the economy

of a cultural group (the way that people obtain and distribute

goods for survival) is intimately related to its physical environment.

For this reason, our discussion of the physical environment preceded this chapter. Anthropologists have identified four main economic systems of people based on the environments in which they

live: hunter-gathering,15 pastoralism, agriculture, and industrial production. Since hunter-gatherer groups are small and generally not

important to the Marine in his or her daily work, we will restrict our

discussion to the other three economic forms.

Pastoralism. Pastoralism is based on the herding of animals. Certain cultural groups have long obtained food, clothing, shelter,
Economy 95

medicines, and protection (consider the military implications of

horses) from the animals they herd. Although pastoral groups are

dwindling today, they continue to subsist around the world in regions that are typically not fertile or useful to other groups. Thus,

we find the greatest concentration of pastoralists in mountain regions (such as Central Asia) and in steppe and semi-arid to desert

regions (such as the Horn of Africa, the lowland Middle East, etc.).

Because of the low fertility of the lands in which pastoral groups

graze their animals, virtually all pastoralists are nomadic—meaning

they move around and follow their herds. Frequently, pastoral

groups have seasonal nomadic patterns, something that Marines in

an AO can easily observe and for which they can prepare.

Adventurers in the Middle East, such as T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude

Bell, and John Baggot Glubb, may have portrayed pastoralists such

as the Bedouin as the “heart of the nation” based on quaint Victorian imaginations.16 In contrast, pastoral groups are typically

viewed by formal state societies as military and security threats.

Because of their mobility, pastoral groups tend to ignore state

boundaries; their movements are difficult to regulate; and their economic activities are all but impossible to tax. The informal economy is thus ideally suited to them.

Frequently, pastoral groups use their mobility to engage in activities not regulated by the state: smuggling legal and illegal items, including drugs, guns, and people across state borders. The Algerian

War challenged France so because Bedouin and Berbers in Tunisia

and Morocco could smuggle fugitives out of Algeria and weapons

into Algeria, in line with age-old economic practices.17 Likewise,

the smuggling of funds, vehicles, and “foreign fighters” into Iraq

from Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia results from organized militant groups taking advantage of economic practices of the nomadic

tribal networks that straddle the borders. In this case, the pastoralists are engaging in “normal” economic activities or non-ideological criminal activity, which is then used by terror groups to their

own advantage.
96 Operational Culture

Pastoral peoples are often rugged fighters and scouts as a result of

their years of camping and traveling in harsh physical conditions

through a range of environments. Many pastoral groups, such as

the Masai of East Africa and the Mongols of Central Asia, are famed

throughout the world for their warrior cultures and fierceness in

battle.

This has two implications. First, though we will deal with matters of identity and belief in Chapter Seven, it is significant that pastoralists cleave to these images of themselves and their character,

even after they have begun to sedentarize or urbanize. In fact,

Marines will most likely not find a nomadic vs. sedentary divide;

rather, they will find former pastoralists somewhere along a spectrum of partial sedentarization, perhaps dwelling in a solid structure for part of the year and a tent-like one nearby during other

parts of the year; or perhaps taking advantage of all the modern

technological tools, such as computers, cell-phones, pick-up trucks,

etc., in order to continue a form of nomadism.

Second, traits of self-reliance, independence, and the élan of

“knowing the land” can be quite attractive to the governments and

militaries of settled states. But it is clearly a love-hate relationship.

Throughout its history the Jewish state of Israel has enlisted certain

Bedouin communities into the Israel Defense Forces as scouts, sappers, and border police, counting on the “Bedouin sixth sense.”

However, in the Negev and Sinai regions, this same “sixth sense”

has been used by Bedouin in both Israel and Egypt to collaborate

with criminal gangs and terrorists in the sale and smuggling of

weapons and explosives, eluding Egyptian authorities in particular.

In recent cases of terrorist attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh, for example,

Egyptian terrorists were supported and transported by local

Bedouin communities at odds with the state.18

As we will discuss in the following chapters, the economic system

of a cultural group is intimately related to its social and political

structure. Because there is a limit to the number of people and animals that the environment can support, most nomadic pastoral

groups number between 50-150 people. The small size of such a

group, the difficulty of transporting large numbers of goods, and
Economy 97

the dependence of the members upon each other for survival

means that the economic relationships between the members must

be fairly egalitarian. Although some members of the group may

own a few more animals or possessions, in general all of the members of the group are concerned about the welfare of the members,

and needy families will receive support from the group.

Typically, most pastoralists organize themselves along kinship and

tribal lines—social structures we will examine in the next chapter.

Leadership, authority, wealth, and status in the group are based on

one’s inherited position within the tribe. Due to reliance upon the

group for survival and movement over large distances, many pastoral groups do not accept the concept of belonging to a country

or place—i.e., citizenship as we think of it—nor do they recognize

the sovereignty of state governments that try to control or subdue

them. Instead, most pastoralists view their primary affiliation to

their tribal group. Even today, despite the efforts of many states

to settle nomadic groups, the values of an egalitarian group that

governs itself and makes its own decisions persist among former

nomadic groups. The many independent tribal groups in

Afghanistan and Iraq today reflect this mentality of fierce independence and allegiance to their tribe, rather than to some amorphous state.

Agriculturalism. Agriculturalists produce their food, clothing,

shelter and materials for exchange from the crops that they grow.

In contrast to nomadic pastoralists, agricultural societies have an intimate relationship with the land they farm and are sedentary (settled) people. In an agricultural society, land becomes an important

physical and symbolic commodity that is essential for survival. Conflicts over the use and inter-generational transmission of land are

a logical outcome of this economic system.

Unlike pastoralists, sedentary agricultural communities are able to

accumulate and store physical possessions. Agricultural societies

therefore develop more complex ways of distributing goods, including inheritance of wealth and land along kinship lines. Frequently, in agricultural societies certain individuals and kinship

groups accumulate a larger share of the community’s wealth. This
98 Operational Culture

leads to a social structure in which individuals and families become

stratified according to access to and control of goods, especially

land. As we will discuss in Chapter Six and again for the Philippines

case in Chapter Eight, this unequal distribution has important implications for the distribution of power and the resulting political

structures of a society.

Another significant feature of agricultural societies is their pattern

of the weekly market. In many parts of the world, people bring

the food they have grown to sell in local outdoor markets. Vendors

from the area come, set up a stall in an open plaza or marketplace,

and spend the day selling produce or other wares to locals. Commonly, these markets have a predictable time-based pattern with

different neighboring villages holding their markets on different

days.

For example, on the island of Djerba in Tunisia, the market in

Houmt Souk is held on Thursday; it is held on Saturdays in al-May

which is 20 kilometers away; and on Sundays in the Berber village

of Ajim, another 30 kilometers to the south. Similar to a trade show

in the U.S., the same vendor will move from village to village,

neighborhood to neighborhood, as the market itself moves.

Though it may be tempting to consider these “semi-nomadic agriculturalists,” they are often sedentarized people.

While many vendors may be “legitimate,” in the sense of being

legally licensed by the state to occupy certain stalls, often an informal economy of vendors exists on the periphery of such markets. These vendors may simply not possess the state approved

licenses, or they may be selling stolen or otherwise suspect goods.

Weekly markets are an important place for socializing, exchanging

information and goods, and creating and maintaining social networks. In many instances, these non-economic functions appear

just as important to the market-goers as do purchasing and selling

(think of shopping malls in the U.S.). As such, markets can assist

Marines to create relationships with local vendors, who provide a

source of local gossip (or rumor intel; “rumint”), in addition to

knowledge about events and attitudes in a region. Of course, since
Economy 99

vendors undertake a circuit from one market to the next over the

period of a week or two, markets are also an excellent place for

Marines to observe the flow of goods and services in a region.

Therefore, if a unit operating in the area were to impose a curfew

or movement restrictions in order to interdict the flow of illegal

goods through the market, this measure would also interdict the

livelihoods of large numbers of producers, vendors, and consumers; at the same time it would shut off a source of rapportbuilding and information for Marines.

The weekly market is just one of many calendar-dependent social

and economic events in agricultural societies. Because of the nature of planting and harvesting, agricultural societies have important observable rhythms. One of the ordering factors of people’s

lives is time, especially in agricultural societies. Frequently, religious and belief systems emerging from agricultural economies and

societies incorporate time, the seasons, and the agricultural cycle

itself in their rhythms and rituals. Weekly, seasonally, and yearly,

people establish or are socialized to a “time-clock of life” which appears natural in that community.19

For example, in traditional Jewish communities, the entire day is organized as to prayer times; the entire week is aligned to the FridaySaturday evening Sabbath; and the entire year’s holiday calendar is

regulated according to ancient Near Eastern harvest seasons. In

Jewish communities that maintain an economic and ritual calendar

tied to those planting and harvesting schedules, therefore, doing

business during the fall harvest season is not possible, just as there

are interruptions in the spring as well.

This means that a culture group whose environment supports agriculture will become sedentarized, as did the Ancient Hebrews as

they abandoned nomadism. Settled agriculturalists are also dependent on the calendar for planting, harvesting, and marketing.

Social norms and religious practices will therefore also gradually

align with a sedentarized agricultural economy, and develop a

closer relationship to the calendar. This is the story of Pharaonic

Egypt and Ancient Mesopotamia.
100 Operational Culture

Industrial Production. In both agricultural and pastoral societies,

there is an intimate relationship between people and their physical environment. Although there may be some specialization

(someone is a weaver, someone else is a carpenter), most people

still produce at least some of the food they eat, the clothing they

wear, and the buildings in which they live. To a large degree, cultural groups with these economies are fairly self-sufficient, producing and consuming what they need to survive.

In contrast to agricultural and pastoral economies, in industrial production each member of society specializes in a certain skill or

task. Rather than creating everything he or she needs to survive,

each person contributes a small step in a much larger economic

process. By pooling their many skills, people can collectively produce a much greater variety of goods—far more than necessary for

day to day survival. As a result, industrial economies create enormous surpluses.

Competition over control, movement, and sale of these enormous

surpluses results in industrial economies tending to produce highly

stratified social systems. Not only do industrial economies have

the capacity to generate great wealth, but the social systems they

create exhibit great differences in the distribution of wealth. This

wealth may be distributed on the basis of one’s skills, education,

or family connections. As we will discuss in the following chapters, these disparities in wealth are also often connected to class,

ethnic, and even religious differences.

Industrial economies, just like pastoralism and agriculture, are ultimately dependent on the physical environment. Rather than access to land or water, however, industrial production today is

highly dependent on the availability of natural resources, especially

energy. Likewise, many contemporary disputes between and

within states center around obtaining or controlling essential natural resources. For example, though communist south Yemen and

monarchist north Yemen had reunited in the late 1980s, a new civil

war broke out in the mid 1990s when oil was discovered in one

portion of the country, igniting suspicions of future economic exclusion in other regions. This continuing instability in Yemen pro-
Economy 101

vided a welcome environment to extremist elements.20 All areas of

resource dispute are likely future regions of Marine deployment,

not only because of the instability they cause in key choke-point

regions, but also because America’s access to oil is an ever-present

strategic concern.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Economy as a Way of

Structuring Social Relationships

In planning and operating, Marines should consider the following

issues about local economic systems:

● What are the main economic systems in place in the region

(pastoralism, agriculture, industrial production—all three may be

present simultaneously)?

● What are the economic rhythms of the community (migration seasons, planting and harvesting, market day, work hours)?

● What are the important features of the environment that

determine the economy of the AO?

● How is wealth distributed? Does wealth seem to be concentrated in the hands of certain individuals or groups? On what

basis?

● How do local economic structures reflect the relationship of

the group to the larger political and state system?

Notes

1 See Charles Hecksher, et al, Agents of Change: Crossing the Post-Industrial Divide (London: Oxford University Press, 2003). 2 Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: the Strange Rise of Modern India (New

York: Doubleday, 2007), 78-9.

3 International Labor Organization, “STAT Working Paper No.1–2002: International Labor Organization Compendium of Official Statistics on Employment in

the Informal Sector,”

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/compla.pdf.
102 Operational Culture

4 Ralf Hussmans, “Measuring the Informal Economy: From the Employment in

the Informal Sector to Informal Employment,” International Labor Organization: Policy Integration Department (2005). 5 M. Estellie Smith, “The Informal Economy,” in Stuart Plattner, ed., Economic

Anthropology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 309. 6 Paula Holmes-Eber, “Gender in the Informal Economy,” Encyclopedia of

Women in Islamic Cultures Vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill NV, 2003). 7 Margot Adler, “Chinese Restaurant Workers Protest Lost Wages,” (Audio

Recording) Morning Edition, National Public Radio, May 8, 2007:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10089965.

8 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies

(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954).

9 Julia Chaitin, Inside-Out: Personal and Collective Life in Israel and the Kibbutz

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007).

10 Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies For Survival in a Black Community (New

York: Harper and Row, 1974).

11 William Macallister, “Models of Tribal Engagement,” Presentation at Center for

Advanced Operational Culture Learning, 20 June 2007.

12 “Debrief of Director, ISF Cell of 1st Marine Division,” TCMEF, January 2005. 13 Author’s personal communication with Russian city dwellers, St Petersburg,

Russia, October 2003.

14 Napoleon A. Chagnon, The Yanomamo (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing,

1996).

15 Hunter-gatherer groups gain their food and other essential items by hunting

animals and gathering fruits, nuts, berries and roots.

16 See Rory Stewart, “The Queen of the Quagmire,” The New York Review of

Books 54:16 (October 2007). 17 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: NYRB

Classics, 2006); M. Alexander, M. Evans, J.F.V. Keiger, eds., The Algerian War

and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, and Testimonies (New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

18 See Khairi Abaza, “Sharm al-Shaykh Bombings: The Egyptian Context,” The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 12, 2005: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2355.

19 Eviatar Zerubavel, Hidden Rhythms: Schedules and Calendars in Social Life

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

20 Stephen C. Caton, Yemen Chronicle: An Anthropology of War and Mediation

(New York: Hill and Wang, 2005); Robert D. Burrowes, “Oil Strike and Leadership Struggle in South Yemen: 1986 and Beyond,” The Middle East Journal 43:3

(Summer 1989).
103

Chapter 5

Dimension III

Social Structure

Every culture group organizes the relationships among people. The

way of organizing relationships then defines the kinds of interactions people can have with each other. The resulting pattern of relationships can be described in terms of a structure. This structure

places boundaries on people’s behaviors, and limits access to certain people. This structure also connects individuals and groups,

and defines the kinds of interactions they can have. What we have

described here is a social structure of a culture group.

Although social structures are not immediately visible to an outsider, one can begin to grasp this concept in any environment by

using the analogy of a physical structure, such as a building. In the

structure of a building one finds walls—these are like social boundaries. Physical structures also possess corridors—these are like

channels of social access. In both physical and social structures,

these features separate people from one another or allow specific

access.

Buildings are also composed of rooms which define what kinds of

activities occur among what kinds of people; similarly, social structures define the kinds and nature of activities among groups of

people. Likewise, physical structures often have different levels or

floors; in the same way, social structures separate people into varying levels or hierarchies of position and status.

For the purposes of this book, we need to define “position” and

“status.”

Position: the symbolic place one holds relative to others in a social structure.
104 Operational Culture

Status: the meaning and value accorded by members of a social

structure to a particular person occupying a specific position in

that social structure. That meaning and value derives from social

attitudes to the position itself; from specific individual qualities of

the person; or from both.

The above discussion of social structure, using the building motif,

might suggest that structures are static and that humans’ social

structures do not change. If Marines were to think this, they would

be mistaken and have a false impression of culture groups as being

socially rigid and inflexible.1 Just as buildings frequently undergo

remodeling (on purpose or by accident) where rooms are added,

combined, or removed, and new spaces created, so too, social

structures constantly evolve and change whether through deliberate or accidental processes.

This tendency of a social structure to change will in fact accelerate

in areas exposed to sustained and extreme political, military, and

economic breakdown—as we saw from our discussion in Chapter

Two of Iraq in the 1920s, 1980s, 1990s, 2003, and 2006. Since

Marines tend to deploy to these kinds of places, they should not

assume that an AO they have seen earlier in their career will exhibit the same social structure characteristics over time—even one

year later!

Why are social structures difficult for an outsider to grasp immediately? Typically, understanding, belonging to, and functioning

within a social structure occurs through socialization, often as a

child. By the time a child reaches adulthood, he or she understands how relationships work in that society, and is able to navigate appropriately within various social structures. Returning to

the analogy of a building, socializing a child is like conducting that

child through the rooms of the house and letting him/her observe

the paths through rooms and the activities in them—as well as the

rooms that are off-limits. In this process, a youth is in effect built

into the house—the child learns the social structures and then becomes part of them.
Social Structure 105

However, rules and structures that a child learns as he/she becomes

an adult are generally unclear to a foreigner. In effect, the foreigner did not grow up in the same building as did the indigenous

person—he is not in the same way a part of the structure of the

house, and does not understand how to move through that house

as well. Finishing the analogy, the foreigner is not a member of the

social structure, and he does not know how to move through the

social structure of that group.

Inter-cultural miscommunication is frequently the result of the inability of people from different cultures to understand each others’

implicit social structures and behave accordingly. Therefore, for

Marines, learning to recognize the social structures of a culture

group is critical to working effectively within local political, military, economic, and social systems. This chapter will examine a

number of the basic components of a social structure that Marines

will encounter while deployed. It will illustrate that understanding

social structures also enables one to explain axes of current as well

as potential conflict among groups of people in a region.

Understanding Social Structures

Around the world, there are many different types of social structures

that organize the way people interact with each other. Some of the

more common social structures include: kinship (or familial) structures; business and economic organizational structures; political

structures; age-grade structures; religious structures; legal structures;

military structures; class structures; and social networks. Though it

is tempting to think of each category (religion, economy, politics,

kin, etc.) as a conceptually discrete aspect of “culture”—and though

other chapters of this book address them from different perspectives—all of these categories are in fact primarily social structures.

All social structures have certain features in common:

● Social structures consist of a set of organized relationships

or ties among people. In structural diagrams, these ties are often

drawn as lines.
106 Operational Culture

● Individuals within the structure occupy a position or specific place in relation to other people. This position is usually associated with certain activities or work tasks, and is often

described by a title, such as “president,” “secretary,” “priest,”

“mother,” or “third grader”—note however, that we are not

speaking here of the position’s political, religious, economic, or

personal aspects. We focus here on the location that the position occupies in the social hierarchy. These positions are usually represented in structural diagrams by boxes or circles and

are connected by the ties described above.

● Each position in the social structure is associated with a

specific role. As in a play, a social role requires a person to act

in certain socially appropriate ways. In the U.S. for example,

General Officers are expected to be authoritative and make decisions; while fourth graders are expected to sit in their seats

and fidget occasionally as they listen to the teacher. A General

Officer that behaved like a fourth grader might lose his position

and title; a fourth grader that acted like a General Officer would

probably cause his teacher to discuss the strange behavior with

his parents and send him to counseling.

● Many, although not all, social structures are organized in a

hierarchical fashion: Some people occupy positions of higher

status and power, while others hold lower positions of deference or obedience to those above them.

● Social structures exist independently of the specific individuals within them. People may come and go but the structures, positions, and roles continue on as new people replace

those who leave. This is because a society’s functionality over

time depends on the endurance of relatively stable social structures—that is why conflict, war, and crisis result in destabilized

social structures, which then aggravate those very conflicts and

crises.

● Social structures and the positions in them are thus more

important to society than are the individuals themselves who occupy them. For example, though personality and command style
Social Structure 107

do make a difference, it is still the case that the relative social

importance of, and behavior towards, a Commanding General

remain constant over time, regardless of the occupant of the billet and his/her personality. If this were not true, the unit’s structural integrity and capability would diminish.

As this last point implies, a familiar social structure for many

Marines is the military social structure. Typically, this is represented

by a Military Organizational Chart. This chart symbolizes—on

paper—the structure of the relationships between the people in

charge of a unit and their subordinates. This social structure is not

a physical reality. Yet, the organizational chart represents a social

reality that is very clear to the Marines in a unit, and dictates the

way that people within that unit interact. People in a military unit

generally know who is formally in charge (we discuss the informal

lines of power in the following chapter), who reports to whom,

and what work they should be performing in the position they

hold within the structure of the organization. They also know what

is acceptable behavior for their position and rank, and understand

the consequences for their position within the unit of appropriate

and inappropriate conduct. This is because a military unit with

command relationships and staff sections is also a social structure

with clear positions, relationships, roles, and accepted modes of interaction.

Although it is probable that most Marines have seen an organizational chart of their unit, such a diagram is not necessary or required for the Marine to know how to behave. In fact, all Marines

are socialized, starting with boot camp or Officer Candidates

School, to learn the rules of Marine social structure and organization. In the early months of Marine socialization they learn to recognize rank and are taught the appropriate way to respond to

officers, NCOs and others above them—they are being built into

the house that is the Marine Corps.

Likewise, people in different societies are socialized to learn the

appropriate behaviors for their position in society and to recognize the differences in status and rank of others in their social structure. Fathers and mothers, for example, do not need kinship
108 Operational Culture

diagrams to understand their status in relation to their children:

they understand their role from years of living in a family.

At this point it bears emphasizing that social structures are not

physical things one can touch. However, they do have a direct relationship to physical structures that humans make. For example,

houses around the world are laid out in ways that reflect the culturally-coded structure of the family living in it—American houses

tend to be single family homes with individual rooms for family

members (when income permits), whereas Asian houses are built

for extended families with many people sharing one room. The

former are built for nuclear family structures, while the latter reflect

a social structure of inter-generational cooperation and co-location.2

As another example, business and military organizations arrange

office size, space, and location according to the differential status

and rank of the occupants, in order to dictate behavior—whether

it be controlling access, granting privacy, or providing amenities

to people based upon their social importance and functional roles.

The physical structure is thus built to support social roles

and the overall social structure.

The second part to this is that physical structures influence social structures. They can do this in at least three ways. First,

physical space can perpetuate over time the relationships that

emerge from the social structure itself. We can call this the physical environment’s role in social reproduction.

Second, one can intentionally build a physical structure to create

a social hierarchy and certain modes of interaction—one can use

a physical space to create a social structure. Third, in the absence

of intent, ad hoc or poorly designed physical structures can impede or change the social relations and power balance among people.

This last point is important, because if a Marine builds a physical

structure for people in a foreign AO according to Western ideas of

how people interact in social structures, they could 1) inhibit local
Social Structure 109

interactions, thus preventing efficient work; 2) change the local

pattern of interactions and thus social structure (not always a bad

thing as long as it is done with intentionality and according to a

mission-aligned purpose); or 3) discover that local people reject

either the structure, or the work meant to be done in it—or both—

thus reducing the legitimacy of the Marine presence.

Just as it may take months or even years for Marines to fully understand the rules, behaviors, and hierarchy of rank in the Corps,

they must realize that understanding local social structures and appropriate interactions in a foreign AO requires time and patience.

People are often not consciously aware of the rules and structures

of the groups to which they belong, and they may have difficulty

explaining this to an outsider. By way of analogy, knowledge of

social structures is like understanding grammar. People who grow

up speaking a language can use the grammar effectively, but are

often unable to explain it systematically—either to themselves or to

foreigners. This level and fidelity of explanation often require

someone who has learned the language as an outsider and has had

to explicitly learn grammar.

Furthermore, as a member of the foreign culture’s social structure,

the native interlocutor is enmeshed in all the local conflicts, feuds,

and assumptions about themselves and outsiders. This means that

the “local guy” in an AO is often not the best authority on his own

culture. He may implicitly know the rules, and know how to act

appropriately, but he may not be able to make them explicit to a

foreigner—he is too “in it” to step outside for the purposes of

analysis, and he is too “of it” to be unbiased in explanations of

who occupies what social positions in the AO. Local “cultural advisers” have too many explicit agendas and unconscious biases to

be objective, and it is important for a Marine to inoculate him/herself against a “cultural Stockholm Syndrome” while deployed.

From a Marine perspective, it is worth considering that sometimes,

outsiders who have systematically studied a foreign culture are

more able to explain its social structures to foreigners. Again, to

use the language analogy, that outsider to the foreign culture group

speaks the language of his own group, so that he knows how to
110 Operational Culture

translate the new language he has learned to those who speak his

native language.

Despite these challenges, there are a number of factors that are

commonly used to organize social relationships into specific social

structures around the world. This chapter will examine the central

social factors that typically affect the status and position of people

within social structures.

Factors Affecting Position within the Social Structure

Social structures not only determine the relationships and roles of

individuals within a group, but may also organize groups into specific positions within their society. Class and caste structures, for

example, generally organize entire groups of people (lower class,

middle class, upper class) into specific economic and social relationships with other groups. The organization of certain social/cultural groups (such as ethnic, religious, or tribal groups) into

positions of relative power over other groups has very important

implications in understanding conflict and war.

Although in the U.S. people (ideally) earn their status or position

on the basis of their skills and abilities, in many parts of the world

this is not necessarily the case. In fact, in many culture groups, a

person’s roles, status and power are frequently determined by his

or her biological characteristics (gender, age, race or skin color) or

membership in a social group (such as tribal membership, ethnic

identity, religious affiliation, or social class). As a result, a person’s

options in life may be dependent, not on his individual success or

achievement, but on the relative status of his social or biological

group. In such a situation, the most effective option for moving up

in the social hierarchy may be to challenge the existing social hierarchy and/or to advocate for the better position of one’s entire

social group. Often the result is conflict—among classes, ethnic

groups, religious groups, etc.—as one group challenges the existing system and tries to obtain greater status and power within the

society. We will return to this in Chapter Six.
Social Structure 111

In order to operate effectively in a region, Marines need to be able

to understand the social structure of their local communities. By

understanding the roles, positions, and status of various groups

and key individuals, Marines can determine which group(s) are in

power due to their place in the social structure, and can also locate

those individuals and groups who are in a position to influence

power holders. Likewise, it becomes possible to make an estimate

of those individuals and groups in the battlespace who might challenge existing power structures through either overt or covert

measures, because of their disadvantaged place in a social structure

that is too rigid to permit mobility.

Although there are many possible ways to categorize people, most

societies around the world differentiate among people on the basis

of the following characteristics:

● Age

● Gender

● Kinship and Tribal Membership

● Class

● Ethnic Membership

● Religious Membership

In the previous chapter, we discussed how these characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, and so on) can affect the economic roles and opportunities of people. In this chapter, we extend the concept to

examine how a person’s social characteristics determine not only his

or her economic position, but also their position in the social structure as a whole. As the reader is probably beginning to realize, economy and social structure are intimately linked. In the following

chapter, we will extend the discussion to look at how one’s position

in the social structure then determines one’s power and position

within the political structure.

Thus, a culture’s relationship to the environment affects its economic

structure; the economic structure is linked to and reinforces the social

structure; and the social structure, in turn, determines the political

structure. Finally, as we will discuss in Chapter Seven, belief systems

reinforce and perpetuate economic, social, and political relationships.
112 Operational Culture

Age. Virtually every culture group around the world assigns different roles, status and tasks to people on the basis of their age. Although it would seem obvious that small children are not expected

to undertake the same roles as adults, not all cultural groups define age, and age-appropriate roles, in the same way. In the U.S.

and Europe for example, people are considered children until the

age of eighteen or even twenty-one. Generally, until a child reaches

the age of sixteen they are also required to go to school, and not

allowed to work except under special circumstances. Until children become legal adults, their parents have the right and responsibility to make decisions for their children and to support them. In

contrast, in many parts of the world, children are sent out to earn

money as early as age six or seven. In some cultures, girls may be

married by the age of twelve or thirteen.

Example: Age, Labor, and Schooling

In many societies, youth are taken out of school, or perhaps never sent to

school, so that they can contribute important labor to the family. This is

often the case in societies where either the subsistence- or export-oriented

economy of the masses is labor intensive, seasonally or year round.

In Egypt since the eighteenth century, subsistence agriculture at the village

level required the labor contribution of all able-bodied members of the

family, particularly during sowing and harvesting seasons. Twentiethcentury governmental initiatives to establish schools and compulsory

attendance in the rural periphery thus ran into opposition from two social

groups. The first of these were the provincial grandees who had acquired

great tracts of land from the 1840s, and who used local families’ labor to

produce crops—often cotton—for export. In addition to this sometimes

absentee landholding class, the second group to react poorly to schools

and compulsory schooling were the agriculturalists themselves. Indebted

to the landowners for seed and tools, families needed every available hand

during several months out of the year. Student registrations remained low

through to the 1950s, and attrition from schools remained the rule beyond

then.

Capital city administrators complained about the “ignorant peasant” who

wanted to keep his children as unschooled, illiterate, and superstitious as

his father and grandfather had been. By contrast, the small number of well

educated school planners of rural origins chose to focus the Education

Ministry on the damaging influence of rural landowners who sought to

prevent schooling in the provinces, as it would undermine their agricultural
Social Structure 113

Example: Age, Labor, and Schooling; continued.

profits. It was only when these younger educational planners began to

adapt the schedule, calendar, and curriculum of rural schools to the patterns

of the agricultural laboring class that interest in schools began to rise, along

with a more positive value put on education.3

To extrapolate into a modern context, a schooling initiative resulting in no

one coming to schools built by Marines in Kenya or Djibouti as part of

stability operations would be judged a failure by Americans, and it might

be tempting to view the local people as anti-American. In fact, what would

be going on was that U.S. forces undertook an initiative directed at a certain

age-based stratum in the culture, for whom schooling was viewed as less

essential by higher status (older-in-age) members of that culture group.

Not only do children often work at a young age, but they may also

participate in military and insurgent activities at ages that most

Americans would consider completely unacceptable. In many culture groups around the world being a warrior is associated with

manhood or adult status; boys as young as age eight or ten may be

encouraged to assist in military activities—in some cases, youth at

this age may indeed do so voluntarily as a way to assert manhood,

or as a result of adolescent peer pressure to show manliness.

These activities may range from running errands for soldiers in the

field to using their small size to crawl into holes and set explosives, or carrying weapons and fighting alongside soldiers three to

four times their age.4

Along with paying attention to the roles of children, Marines must

also evaluate the cultural roles of adults and the elderly. In contrast

to many Western cultures that value youth and newness as possessing the potential for innovation and progress, many societies

revere the elderly. This is particularly true in Asian countries. In a

culture group where the elderly are respected for their wisdom and

experience, Marines have discovered that initially, local elders are

unwilling to negotiate with young captains or even majors who do

not have enough gray hair to command respect. In such cases,

U.S. forces have at times seen benefit in including an older (and

preferably grey haired) member on their negotiating team. Even

when the older member was not central to the negotiations, or was
114 Operational Culture

a senior SNCO or WO as opposed to commissioned officer, his

presence has been felt to assure local elders that the Marines take

the matter seriously.

An important social structure based on age is what anthropologists

call “age grades” or “age cohorts.” Age-grade or age-cohort structures exist in many societies, including in the U.S. To begin to understand this, consider how Marines who went through Officer

Candidates School or The Basic School together often view each

other as members of the same grouping or cohort. These bonds

can often be useful in the informal ways Marine officers facilitate

formal interactions, assistance, or exchanges of information.

“Age cohorts,” however, go beyond that. These structures group all

people who are born within a certain time period (commonly one

to five years). This group then moves through the life cycle together

as a social unit, gaining status, prestige, and new roles as they graduate from one stage to the next. In the U.S. we use age-grading in

our school systems to move children from infancy to adulthood,

by sending them to a “new grade” with new tasks, roles, and expectations every year. Once the group graduates from high school

or college, it is admitted to adulthood and granted new privileges,

including the right to vote, to marry, and to own a credit card.

Example: Age Cohort, Identity, and Entitlement

In many African cultural groups in a belt running through the Sahel from

Senegal to Ethiopia, men or women born within a certain number of

seasons move as an age cohort through the life cycle. Age is not counted

by a birth certificate but by the general time period (so many moons or

seasons) when a certain set of children were born. In some regions in East

Africa, the age group is so important that each group is given a specific

name that all members bear through their lives. The group then grows up

together; it goes through manhood or womanhood initiation ceremonies

together; becomes eligible for marriage and parenting at the same time;

and eventually moves into leadership positions in their village or tribe as a

council together. Such age groups play a major role in African society, both

in terms of power in the community and through networking. First, because

all of the individuals in an age-cohort grow up together, bonding through

various life-experiences, their childhood connections remain strong, even

if they move as adults to other regions or urban areas.
Social Structure 115

Example: Age Cohort, Identity, and Entitlement; continued.

These connections then serve as important networks of power, providing

access to goods, information, and people.

Secondly, each age group knows their position relative to each other in the

social structure. A member of a younger age group will be expected to

show deference to someone from an older age-cohort. The older agecohorts work together as respected community leaders, making decisions

for the village. Even if a person from a younger age-cohort is smart and

energetic, it is understood that he will not be permitted into the closed

inner circle of the older leading group.5

Today these age-cohort structures are beginning to break down in urban

areas. Even so, Marines need to be aware that decision making still tends

to be concentrated in specific age groups. In some areas, such as Chad, in

fact, local people have a term for senior decision making males, whom they

term “gray backs”—referring to the silver stripe on the back of a senior

gorilla.

In order to plan a successful operation, Marines need to find out

local cultural attitudes regarding acceptable roles for different age

groups.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Age

● At what age is someone considered a child or adult?

● What specific ceremonies mark the transition to adulthood?

● Which new social privileges are granted to men and

women when they pass these manhood or womanhood rituals?

● What are locally accepted or expected economic roles for

what U.S. society considers children?

● How should Marines prepare to respond to children that act

as soldiers in militaries or insurgencies, or participate in violent

activities against U.S. forces?
116 Operational Culture

● What special status or roles are accorded to the elderly?

● Is there an age grading system that stratifies people according to their age and stage in the life cycle? And if so, what

rights, roles, and duties do people have at each stage?

Gender. As we saw in Chapter Five with respect to informal

economies in particular, with very few exceptions, every culture assigns different roles and work to men and women. Although this distinction would seem to be a natural biological one, the roles that men

and women are assigned around the world vary vastly. In Europe and

the United States, for example, it is assumed that women are naturally

less strong than men, so that physically demanding jobs (construction, moving heavy objects, etc.) tend to be done by men. In contrast, women in a number of sub-Saharan African culture groups are

believed to have much better balance and stronger heads than men.

Thus, it is considered natural that women, rather than men, should

carry extremely heavy loads for miles in baskets on their heads.

Labor in many societies is divided by gender, with some jobs viewed

as “male work” while others are considered almost exclusively “female

work.” In some culture groups, men may refuse certain tasks such as

cooking, washing clothes, or taking care of children because they are

considered female work and demeaning. In other regions, taboos and

beliefs about women (especially women who are menstruating or

pregnant) may mean that women are forbidden to work with or touch

certain objects such as knives or brooms or to engage in activities

such as heavy lifting.

These beliefs and attitudes may affect the kinds of work local populations are willing to undertake for Marines. They may also affect the

attitudes of local people towards the work that male and female

Marines undertake. In cultures that view cooking as a female task, for

example, a male Marine cook may be viewed as effeminate by local

populations.

Attitudes about the appropriate work for men and women may not

only affect Marines’ interactions with foreign local populations, but

also with their militaries. Although the U.S. has recently begun to
Social Structure 117

include women in the military—and then not in the infantry—many

other culture groups hold a long and ancient tradition of women

as warriors, including as weapons-bearing combatants. The list of

female combatants and military leaders is not short, including such

legends as the Amazon women, Celtic women including Bodicea,

and even ‘A’isha, the wife of the Prophet Muhammad, who led the

famed Battle of the Camel against ‘Ali. In many culture groups

today, women continue to serve not only in military support but as

armed combatants.

Women’s combat roles are not just a historical memory but a recent

reality. For example, in Mozambique from 1954-1964, girls and

young women participated side by side with men in a guerrilla insurgency against the Portuguese colonists. They not only undertook intelligence and support activities but actively engaged in

armed combat—a role that posed challenges for the Portuguese

military.6 As the case of Mozambique illustrates, in certain military

contexts, Marines need to be prepared for the legal and ethical issues that can arise from conflicts involving female combatants or

in engaging with militaries that employ women in roles not permitted within U.S. forces.

Marines should also take into planning and operational consideration the possibility that in extreme situations, such as war, men and

women may sometimes “step out of character” and take on “nontraditional roles.” In the Algerian war (1954-1962), for example,

women joined the resistance movement, carrying weapons under

their robes and even engaging in combat. This, however, did not

necessarily imply a change in attitude towards women’s rights or

roles, as the current situation in Algeria poignantly illustrates.7

There are two implications for Marines of “in extremis gender role

alteration.” First, crisis situations will influence the social roles, access, and behavior of men and women, changing them from the

“traditional” roles with which Marines may be familiar, and permitting new kinds of interactions between men and women, to include Marines. Second, the change during extreme times often

does not signal a sustained change to the over-arching social order

with respect to gender. Here, what a Marine might see at one point
118 Operational Culture

during a deployment might not necessarily indicate that the social

rules have changed.

Not only does gender affect the kinds of labor men and women are

willing to perform, but in a particular AO, communities will follow

an acknowledged or implicit consensus about how everyday participation in society should be gender-coded. Specific social activities are often considered “male” or “female” activities. In many

Midwestern and Western U.S. states, for example, drinking alcohol

in the local tavern is primarily a male activity. Similarly, many

Americans view shopping to be a “female” activity. A man who

hangs around the mall on a weekday would probably be considered strange and perhaps dangerous, just as a woman without an

escort could expect to receive a lot of stares if she stopped in the

local tavern in Ovando, Montana.

Example: Gender and Activity in a Small Area

In the weekly markets in southern Tunisia, there appears to the casual

observer an undifferentiated jumble of males and females of all ages who

sell, transport, and shop. However, there is a clear gender division of

activities. Men generally bring the goods to market and do the selling.

They move goods to market in cooperation with adult brothers, cousins,

and perhaps brothers-in-law, while adolescent males often move the goods

around the open air market precincts, and run to get food for the vendors.

Women do most of the shopping. In some regions, purchasing is also

gender-differentiated—though not according to “male goods” and “female

goods,” but according to category of commodity, such as clothing vs.

produce. Often a particular sales spot will be run by several men from the

same family. Although not visible to the outsider, however, women also

play an important role in preparing goods for the market. The bread sold

by the man at the booth was probably baked by his wife; the pickled

vegetables on the table were most likely grown and pickled by the women

of the family; and women typically make the rugs and blankets for sale.

This situation offers several implications for Marines at the tactical level. A

Marine patrol at the outskirts of a market such as these observing women

milling about might determine that it is a space inappropriate for American

males to enter, or that since there are mostly women, there would not be

good opportunities for rapport-building and information/intelligence

gathering. This would be an incorrect assumption.
Social Structure 119

Example: Gender and Activity in a Small Area; continued.

Conversely, detaining all the male vendors in a certain area of the market

would economically injure the interests of specific geographic communities

in the surrounding area, while leaving younger male family members who

were not in the immediate vicinity at the time without a ride home, but

with a bad attitude. It would also negatively impact any civil affairs efforts

to develop rural cottage industries providing economic opportunities to

females.

Along with general gender-coding of activities, certain kinds of formal organizations and informal groups will often be gender-segregated, and specific purposes will be served by organizations

dominated by men or women. In much of Africa, for example, organizations to combat HIV are dominated by female community

members and medical personnel. Understanding what formal and

informal bodies are dominated by which gender for which purposes will help to smooth Marine interactions with an AO’s populace.

In this respect, Marines also need to recognize the implications of

placing a male or female in charge of a project or group that is

predominantly populated by one gender. A male Marine will probably not have much success if assigned to head up a sewing co-operative in Thailand. Likewise, a female Marine may encounter

serious resistance if appointed as the chief point of contact for a

predominantly male run construction project in Bolivia.

Gender not only affects the work and social activities of women

and men in a culture, but it may also influence the spaces that each

sex may use. Across a large region ranging from West Africa to

Central and South Asia, men and women are traditionally physically

separated. Gender separation, often referred to as purdah or seclusion, describes the practice of dividing space into a female realm

(typically indoors such as the home), and a male space (commonly

an outdoor or outside space such as the streets or cafes).

In working in such gender segregated societies, it is important for

Marines to understand which spaces are primarily “female” and
120 Operational Culture

therefore off-limits to male Marines in most circumstances. Similarly, female Marines working in gender segregated societies will

find that their presence in “male spaces,” such as street cafes in

some Middle Eastern countries, will often be uncomfortable. The

important point here is that gender segregation not only restricts

women to certain spaces, but that as a result, men are also limited

to the spaces that are acceptable for them to enter.

In most social structures, gender differentiation has implications

for dress as well. In many gender segregated societies women will

cover their heads and bodies when they move into outdoor male

spaces such as the streets. This practice, which Westerners refer to

as veiling, is very foreign to Americans today, who are accustomed

to the free mixing of the sexes and very liberal dress codes.

There are many reasons why women cover their heads and bodies in other cultures, and a complete discussion is beyond the

scope of this book. However, veiling is not necessarily imposed

upon unwilling women by oppressive men nor is it necessarily a

sign of religious fervor. A number of studies show, for example,

that the recent resurgence of the hijab (a pan-Islamic head covering) appears to be a popular political and social statement by

women of their Muslim non-Western identity, rather than an expression of deepening religious attitude.8

Covering hair, face, body, or hands can also be a practical way for

Muslim women to affirm their modesty and virtue when working

or studying with strange men. In other words, by putting on this

new head covering, women are making the statement, “I am not a

loose Western woman.” Rather than symbolizing separation from

the outside world on religious principle, this covering can actually

facilitate modernist and more open interaction with the (male) public domain.9

This observation is borne out by recent field observations by the

authors in Muslim Tunisia, where several young women wearing

the hijab were observed walking past the mosque during Friday

prayer eating ice creams. Not only were they not praying during

one of the major prayer times in Islam, but they were openly dis-
Social Structure 121

playing their disregard for Islamic norms and conventions. Overall, it is important to recognize that there are as many reasons behind the clothing choices of men and women in foreign areas as

there are behind the (often bewildering) clothing decisions of

Western males and females.

The division of labor, social activities, space, and dress according

to gender may lead the Marine working in a foreign AO to conclude that in other societies women are not politically or socially

significant. The absence of women from the streets in Muslim

countries, the apparently subservient roles of women in many

Asian countries, and the low participation of women in the formal

economy or political systems in many countries seems to suggest

that women have little power or influence in foreign regions. This,

however, is a misconception.

In many regions—and in particular in areas such as the Mediterranean and Latin America, where concepts of male machismo are

important—the public display of male dominance is often critical

for a man’s sense of masculinity. In such societies, a man’s honor

depends on his ability to demonstrate authority and control over

his family and, in particular, over the sexual behavior of his

women. Although it may appear to the outsider that women are

passive and dependent upon males in these societies, cultural research challenges these images of powerless females.

It is important for a Marine to understand that in these cultural

groups, the public display of authority and power is critical

for men. However, outside of the public view, in the home,

women often play extremely powerful and influential roles.

In fact it is commonly accepted in many Arab and Latin American

countries that while the man does the public negotiating and represents his family or kin group in formal occasions, agreements

are often not final until he returns home and gets the support of

the female members of his household.10

Since modern industrial economies require men to be away from

home for the day (or even for months), women often take on the

role of social networking. By maintaining critical economic, polit-
122 Operational Culture

ical, and social ties, women create a network of social support that

serves as a source of information and power within the community,

as well as a channel of access to critical economic resources.11 As

Marines working in Iraq have discovered, Muslim women may be

key figures in illegal distribution networks. Equally important,

these networks create a social web of obligation and exchange,

holding groups together.

Example: Women and Networks

During his Relief-in-Place (RIP), a Marine commander in Iraq received

a map of tribal lines of influence. It included only the males of the

AO—women, he had been told, were of negligible social influence, and

in any event should be considered “off-limits” to (mostly male) Marine

units. This new commander was short on male troops, however, and so

elected to use his female personnel outside the wire, for civil affairs

patrols, searching of Iraqi females, and controlled cordon-and-knocks.

When he did this, his patrol debriefs combined with human intelligence

leads began to provide an entirely different picture of family

connections, lines of influence, alliances, and sources of sensitive,

exploitable information about the community’s leaders. The new map

included which males were having extra-marital relationships with

which females (who are also sisters, wives, and mothers of high-interest

males); which males were impotent, sterile, or known deviants; which

males, females, and families were disappointed with marriage alliances

or felt cheated economically in the contraction of marriage alliances;

and which men (and their women) were secretly supportive of the

coalition presence or were covert allies in the struggle for

democratization, but who could not speak out, either based on a

campaign of murder and intimidation, or because of compromising

information that fellow members of the community possessed about

their personal lives.

This Marine commander was able to alter the actions of his patrols

accordingly, tacitly assisting those supportive of the Marines, and using

compromising information as a blocking or controlling mechanism.

Returning to the United States, this Marine commander understood the

integral role of women in all networks, even gender-differentiated

ones.12
Social Structure 123

Related to the social networking role of women, in negotiating with

“formal leaders” in countries that emphasize male machismo,

Marines need to be aware of women’s potentially important roles

in backroom political negotiations. Due to the need to publicly

display power and authority, men in such countries may be unable

or unwilling to be seen negotiating and making compromises with

rival tribal, religious or ethnic leaders. Not bound by such restrictions, women may serve as hidden go-betweens, making informal

visits and proposing informal deals between rival groups.13 Conversely, in some situations, a male ethic of magnanimity to

“weaker” people can work to the advantage of negotiating or planning teams that possess appropriately “feminine” female Marines.

There have been cases where foreign male interlocutors felt unable

to say “no” to a U.S. female, or were predisposed to be more agreeable, either based on a gender-coded sense of honor, or on a

(false) supposition of future personal benefits.14

As all of these examples illustrate, the critical issue here is not what

men do or what women do—because so much of that is region-,

personality-, and context-specific—but understanding the gendered, complementary, and symbiotic relationship between them.

Thus, in planning for operations in a region, Marines need to assume that both genders will play meaningful roles that affect operations. Indeed, as seen above, to be successful (particularly in

Muslim and Latin American cultures), Marines may find that including both males and females in their operational teams will

allow them access to critical domains and activities that single sex

teams cannot enter.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Gender

● What work, roles, activities, and spaces are assigned predominantly to men and women?

● Who undertakes which tasks and where?

● How must operational plans change to account for different work, roles, and spaces assigned to men and women?
124 Operational Culture

● What roles do women play in local militaries and insurgencies? Do they engage in armed combat?

● If women are not visibly observable, what roles and tasks

do they undertake “behind the scenes?”

● How can operational plans and assignment of manpower

include gender to maximize effectiveness of the unit?

Kinship and Tribal Membership. Virtually every culture group

around the world identifies members as belonging to a family or

kin group. In the United States, when we refer to family, most

Americans mean the nuclear family. However, even in the U.S.

most people would consider their family to include extended relatives: grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, in-laws and so on.

In many non-Western culture groups, the concept of family is extended even further. Distant relatives—such as the children of

one’s great grandfather or even the relatives of one’s mother’s

brother—are considered important members of a person’s kin

group. In such cultures, an individual may view him or herself as

being related to hundreds or even thousands of people. Languages

reflect this phenomenon as well. From Morocco to Western China,

languages have different words for extended family members—

cousins, uncles, etc.—depending on what side of the family they

are from and their generation.

Not only may other culture groups hold a wider definition of who

is in one’s family, but the way that people are considered “related”

is culturally based. In the U.S. we consider family to be a biological concept: one has to be biologically descended from a common

ancestor for people to be “related.” In other culture groups, people can become related by undergoing special ceremonies (adoption is essentially the Western version of such ceremonies); by

sharing trials or ordeals; by co-residence (someone lives in the

household long enough that everyone assumes “Uncle Frank” is

really an uncle); or even by sharing a cultural symbol (or totem)

such as the Bear or Eagle. A number of Northwest Coast Native

American groups, for example, count all people belonging to a
Social Structure 125

specific clan, such as the Bear clan, as relatives. There may be no

biological relationship between members of the Bear clan, but because they are considered relatives, members of the same clan may

not marry.

Beyond this, in different cultures the meaning, or value, placed on

being “related” to someone differs. We can call this the “the social

valence of kin relationships.” In many cultures, a brother-in-law is

more important emotionally and in terms of moral compulsion than

he is in the United States. At a more basic level, the significance

of being a brother or sister, in terms of care and obligation, shifts

from culture to culture, given size of families, age split among siblings, the degree of urbanization, legal conditions, and even education. In short, how much and in what way people care about

relatives is variable across cultures. Finally, certain kinds of kinbased relationships have specific implications and culturally-based

expectations.

Example: Cultural Expectations of Kinship Relationships

In Turkey and many Middle Eastern and North African countries, the

relationship of a son to his mother is typically stronger and takes

precedence over the relationship of a man to his wife—definitely in the

eyes of the mother, and often in the eyes of the son as well. The

daughter-in-law does very little for the mother except to compete for

the affections of the son; by contrast, a son can ensure his mother’s

material wellbeing, emotional support, and social status due to his

accomplishments. As a result, young wives frequently are placed in

conflict with their mothers-in-law over control of their husbands/sons.xv

Historically, among the Navajo Indians, a woman’s brother often

played the major “father figure” to his sister’s children. Husbands—

who had ongoing economic and social relationships and obligations to

their sisters and mothers—frequently spent more time with their family

of birth, than with their wives and children. As a result, in traditional

Navajo society, the father-child relationship was much weaker and far

more distant than the uncle-niece/nephew relationship.14
126 Operational Culture

Sometimes a kin group is held together by the idea that everyone

is descended from one common ancestor—a mythical great-greatgreat-great- grandfather or grandmother. Groups that count their

lineage from and even call themselves by the name of this greatgreat relative are sometimes called tribes. In the Middle East and

Central Asia, for example, many people will have a personal name,

a family name, and a tribal name—based on the name of a fictive

or real common forebear.

It is important, however, to realize that simply because groups consider themselves descendants from a common ancestor, this does

not mean they are tribes. Tribes have a number of critical features

that separate them from other large kinship groups.

First, tribes must have a corporate identity; they must not only recognize that they share a common real (or fictive) ancestor, but also

consider that their common lineage bonds them together as a functioning group.

Second, people must use this corporate identity as a structuring

principle for their group. Individuals must be given a position and

role within the tribal structure according to their place within the

lineage, some lines of the tribe being considered of lower or higher

status than other lines. Third, the group will have a formal leader

or set of leaders, designated to speak for the group, who are selected, at least in part, on the basis of their inherited position within

the tribe.17

In many countries, kinship and tribal membership are major factors

in a person’s ability to find a job, get a promotion, rise to a position of power or authority, or even to gain access to essential goods

and services such as water or medical care. Not only may relatives

offer important connections, but specific kin groups may also control access to important physical resources such as land, water

holes, mountain passes, farmland or grazing areas, and even the

right to raise certain crops or harvest trees such as coconut or date

palms. As discussed in Chapter Three (Environment), land and

water and other physical resources often become intimately connected to culture. When operating in a foreign AO, Marines need
Social Structure 127

to be aware of the way that kinship relationships organize and control access to physical and social resources in the community.

Strangely enough, kin groups may also possess special rights to

certain kinds of knowledge, skills or beliefs. In Greece and Italy,

for example, the right to care for a religious site or shrine, or to perform religious duties, may be inherited from generation to generation within a family. And among the Navajo Indians, certain

sacred healing knowledge is passed along kinship lines and restricted to members of shaman families.

In recent years, due to American engagements in Iraq and

Afghanistan, tribal organization has become of central concern to

the U.S. military. Much imprecision remains, however, in how we

approach tribes. Particularly in crisis-burdened areas, Marines are

unlikely to find tribal structures intact. Whereas U.S. personnel

might expect to see this:

Figure 5.1

Tribes as They are Supposed to Be

it is quite likely they will encounter something different, that looks

rather like this:
128 Operational Culture

Figure 5.2

Tribes as They Often Are

It is essential to avoid pre-conceived notions about tribes as social

structures and nodes of social control, based either on romantic

ideas, or one’s last deployment.

Example: Tribes and Change

Iraqi tribes have been manhandled by the state for over a century. The

Ottomans worked to sedentarize them, turning their sheikhs into absentee

landholders, thus injuring the sheikh-tribe consultative relationship. The

British then assumed sheikhs were like Victorian landed gentry. They

exaggerated their waning social power, and used them as (often ineffective)

nodes of authority and coercion in the countryside, while building certain

ones up economically—separating them even more from their tribes. The

Iraqi monarchy then used laws, schools, and conscription among other

things to strip sheikhs—and tribes—of all power to get in between citizen

and regime, and distanced sheikhs further from their regions by providing

them parliamentary sinecures and stipends.

The policy of the post-1958 Republican governments was avowedly antitribe, since they considered them barriers to Iraqi citizens who would

identify with regime and Arab nation. Though using Tikriti and Al Bu Nasr

tribal connections to attain power and eliminate rivals, Saddam continued

this broad policy of reducing tribes to political insignificance.

By the 1980s, this, as well as increasing rural-to-urban migration, had

resulted in sheikhs at every level with much diminished power, and often

a legitimacy deficit and eroding social esteem; fragmented tribal structures;

and state-, religion-, or region-based identities.
Social Structure 129

Example: Tribes and Change; continued.

This reality of fragmented tribes and enervated tribal leaders has led some

U.S. commentators and commanders to consider tribes in Iraq as “bad,”

“backwards,” or simply no longer significant. However, this neglects two

important points, one historical, the other conceptual.

First, after the Gulf War, seeing the need for some social support in Iraq,

Saddam permitted people to use tribal names, and in areas where local

leaders were overtly supportive of him and willing to exert social control

on the Ba‘th’s behalf, he provided funds, empowered leaders, and permitted

some legal autonomy to tribal leaders—many of whom he appointed. This

was all supposed to create a neo-tribal structure with Saddam at the apex.

Second, in spite of the reality of fragmented tribes whose powers of social

cohesion and control are much enervated, many Iraqis—even those who

are detribalized, or in cities—identify themselves as members of tribes, and

identify with tribal modes of support, power, and justice—either as

necessary evils or as positive values.18

This all means three things. First, a history of tribes does not

mean a Marine will wade ashore into a present tense of tribes and

all that means for social power. Second, and related, although

kinship and tribal affiliation are significant in some cultures,

Marines should not assume that tribes are the only or even main

factor in determining social structure and power around the world.

Other cultural features such as ethnicity, gender, or class may be

far more relevant than kinship in defining a person’s status and

power in a certain region, or in a certain situation. Third, decayed

or dead tribes do not mean that a tribal identity or tribal norms

have also gone away.

Beyond these immediate issues, due to our current experience with

Afghanistan and Iraq, we tend to find “tribes” in regions that do not

have tribes, but other kinds of kinship relationships. Recent military writing on the Philippines, for example, has begun to describe

the system of political dominance by prominent families in terms

of tribal identity. This is a serious mistake which obscures the significantly different yet equally important nature of a central oligarchy based on elite families.19 Recent scholars have shown that
130 Operational Culture

same mistake has been made in post-1991 analyses of Central

Asian political alliances.20

Marines also need to realize that due to marriage between kin

groups, in any specific community a person may belong to more

than one tribe or kin group. Hence “tribal affiliation” is not a fixed

status but a fluid and changing concept. These cross linkages between kin groups can be especially significant in creating bridges

of communication between the groups; the same cross-linkages,

however, can place individuals in positions of conflict or jeopardy

when alliances are tested or broken.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Kinship and

Tribal Membership

● How are land, water, or access to certain goods and resources

concentrated in the hands of specific kin groups or tribes?

● How will our operations in the region support certain kin

groups and enhance their power; or conversely undermine these

groups?

● What are the possible outcomes of an operation that will challenge the power or control of resources by certain kin groups in the

region (war, insurgency, increased stability, greater/lesser access to

important goods and services)?

● How does a Marine’s choice of local points of contact interact

with or disturb local kin relationships, thus influencing the degree

of success of Marine initiatives?

Class. Around the world almost every culture group organizes members on the basis of the three previous categories of age, gender and

kinship. As societies become larger and more complex, they begin to

stratify and distinguish among people through a fourth category: class.

Class is a complex concept that is much more difficult for a Marine to

recognize than age, gender or even kinship. This is because though

one is often born into a class, this concept is not based on biology.
Social Structure 131

Although class is often related to wealth, other cultural factors such

as education, one’s occupation, parentage, region of origin, or even

the way one acts and speaks may all be components of class. Class

is culturally variable and the definition of class will vary from country to country. For example, in the U.S. one’s class is largely based

on one’s wealth, and to a lesser degree on one’s education and

occupation (which are generally correlated with wealth).

In Europe, on the other hand, class continues to be defined by inheritance and proper breeding, and class definitions based on

wealth are frowned upon. In England an aristocratic family that

has “fallen upon hard times” is still considered upper class, even

if the members cannot afford the lifestyles of the rich and famous.

In contrast the “nouveau riche”—who have lots of money but no

manners or breeding—are generally excluded from upper class

British society regardless of how many yachts or castles they buy.

For the purposes of this book we define class in a particular way.

Class: A way of stratifying groups of people according to their

economic status and power in a society. Certain social characteristics such as the accumulation of goods or other forms of wealth;

education; occupation; region of origin; lineage; and social behavior may all be indicators of class. However, since these indicators are culturally coded, class will be based on different

characteristics in different societies.

This definition of class has three implications. First, class may be

based on a single variable or a combination of factors. Second, a

Marine cannot assume that his or her understanding of class differences in one culture will apply to another culture. In other

words, what factors indicate “class” in one culture group may not

indicate “class” in another—or have the same weight as a determinant of class level. Thus it is important to understand the AO

first and avoid an a priori assumption of what class means. Third,

the variables listed above may determine one’s class; conversely,

one’s class may influence one’s ability to access to some of the factors, such as education, occupation, and wealth.
132 Operational Culture

An important feature of class systems is that they are based on a

clear hierarchical stratification system. This stratification is directly

related to the wealth, power, access to goods and privileges of the

members of each class. At the top of the social structure are the

privileged elite who control the wealth and political structure, while

at the bottom are the poor and marginalized members of society

who have virtually no power or control over the social structure.

Some class systems offer upward mobility to the lower members

through education, hard work, or other incentives. Other class systems are rigid (for example the aristocracies of Europe) and do not

permit movement or marriage between classes. Generally, societies

whose members feel they can attain upward mobility from working within the system are more stable than societies with rigid class

systems, whose members may perceive no opportunities for insystem mobility. In order to keep the lower classes silent, rigid

class systems require stronger militaries, greater control of the

wealth, education and social resources of society by the upper

classes, and numerous social structures (especially religious structures) that support and justify control of society by a select elite.

Example: Class and Conflict

Many of the world’s conflicts today seem to be related to ethnic or religious

issues. In Europe, however, class has served as probably the greatest cause

of recent conflict. The French Revolution was clearly a class based

revolution, as the peasants and merchant class sought to overthrow the

aristocracy. The American Revolution was also a conflict of class: colonists

challenged the right of a distant aristocracy to rule and tax them and

developed a Declaration of Independence founded upon the equality of

all citizens. The American cultural dislike for class systems (although the

U.S. does indeed have a class system) reflects these anti-class principles

first set down in the Declaration. The Communist Revolution in Russia at

the turn of the twentieth century was yet again a class conflict. In this case,

however, the aristocracy was not only removed, but a clear anti-class

philosophy called Communism was adopted. Bringing together class,

ethnicity, and religion, in parts of the Balkans in the late nineteenth century,

Greek and Slavic Christian nationalists hoped to agitate their agricultural

peasant communities against Ottoman Muslim landholders and political

overlords. Changing the names, similar dynamics uniting class, ethnicity,

and religion could be seen a century later in this region.
Social Structure 133

Note that in our discussion of rigidity and stability in class systems,

as well as in our example above, a key element is perception. A

class system might in fact be rigid, not permitting extensive upward mobility—or there might be objective avenues for movement.

More important, however, is the perception of disadvantaged sectors with respect to opportunities for mobility. Likewise, just as

important in determining stability of a society is individual’s and

groups’ judgment as to the possibility of in-system—as opposed to

system-breaking—mobility.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Class

● How is class defined in the AO: on the basis of wealth, education, region of origin, inheritance, or other factors?

● What are the privileges (economic, political, social, religious) of members of the upper class?

● How is access to essential resources for survival (food, shelter, clothing, water) determined by class?

● How does the concentration of wealth (through corruption,

graft, or legitimate means) in the hands of an elite upper class

relate to resource or power access?

● If creating a plan to support lower class groups, will funds

and resources have to pass through the hands of the upper class

first (and consequently disappear)?

● What is the reality of upward mobility in the AO’s class system, and what do local people consider to be their potential for

in-system upward mobility?

● How will Marine measures that influence different groups’

social mobility be viewed by those groups, or by other, competing groups?
134 Operational Culture

Ethnicity, Ethnic Identity, and Membership. Ethnicity is probably one of the most discussed and least understood forms of cultural identity and membership. In Chapter Seven we will discuss

ethnicity as a form of identity. In this chapter, however, we will

concentrate on ethnicity as a form of group membership. Although

the symbolic and psychological dimensions of ethnic identity are

extremely interesting, the Marine working in an AO requires a concrete, if simplified definition of ethnic identity. We provide one

here to assist Marines in recognizing and identifying ethnic groups

and differences fairly quickly upon arriving in a region.

Ethnicity: identification of an individual with a unique subgroup

in a society, which is distinguished by specific behaviors, characteristics, and social symbols that can include, but do not require, a

language specific to the group; symbols reflecting group membership or carrying hidden meaning for group members; unique traditions, rituals and holidays; clothing or dress unique to the group;

a shared sense, or memory of history—often enshrined in mythical

stories or folk tales; attachment to a place or region that holds symbolic meaning.

Although each of these are factors that may describe an ethnic

group, Marines must keep in mind that not all ethnic groups will

display all of the behaviors or characteristics above. Likewise, individuals in the group will vary significantly in the degree to which

they actively reveal their ethnic membership to others. Although

some members may speak only the language of the group, wear

traditional dress and never leave their community of origin, others

may live a “double life”: wearing clothing typical of the majority

group in the region, speaking the national language and working

far away from their home community. Such ethnic members may

express their identity only at special holidays or when they return

to their village of origin.

In the same way, a Marine must remember that there is nothing

specifically or scientifically “ethnic” about language use, historical

memory, etc. What is important is that people who identify themselves with an ethnic group—or identify others as parts of ethnic

groups—tend to use these characteristics to describe their or oth-
Social Structure 135

ers’ ethnic membership. It is exactly this malleability of ethnic

identity that makes ethnicity difficult to pinpoint. For unlike gender or age, which are usually fixed identities, ethnic identity is

context specific, expressed or hidden according to the political

expediency of the situation.

Although in theory a person is born into a specific ethnic group

and remains a part of that group for life, in reality, people have

quite a lot of choice in the degree to which they affiliate with a specific ethnic group. Due to intermarriage, for instance, a person

may belong to more than one ethnic group. It is not uncommon

in Pakistan, for example, for a child to be raised in a household

where several languages are spoken—Urdu by the Karachi-born

father, Pashto by the Peshawar-born mother, and perhaps Persian

by the grandmother whose family migrated from Iran—all reflecting the differing ethnic heritages of his or her parents. As an adult,

he or she then has the option of claiming one or more ethnic affiliation—a choice that can be used to advantage in getting jobs,

immigrating, or gaining political power.

For example, though growing up in Diyarbakir in eastern Anatolia

and likely of Kurdish parentage, Ziya Gokalp chose Turkish as his

identity and language, becoming one of the ideological fathers of

modern Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21

Example: Ethnic Identity as Created and Malleable

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a curious case of the malleability of ethnic

identity. People on both sides of this conflict created the idea of an

ethnicity. They then found or created bases (linguistic, historic, territorial,

etc.) for an identity related to that created ethnicity, and used that identity

to restructure the local power structure.

On the Israeli side, there had never been an “Israeli nation,” though there

had been kingdoms of Israel and Judea, which were monarchies supported

by a priestly caste. People living in these kingdoms were called Hebrews

by outsiders, with the explicit understanding that their religion focused on

a Temple cult in Jerusalem.
136 Operational Culture

Example: Ethnic Identity as Created and Malleable; continued.

After destruction of the final Judean kingdom in 70 CE, there emerged a

Diaspora religion of rabbinical Judaism. Only in the late nineteenth

century, when secularized and sometimes even anti-religious German and

Russian speaking Jews espoused a European-style nationalism, did Zionism

emerge, as a reaction to European nationalisms and anti-Semitism.

Zionism is thus a modern nationalism of Diaspora Jews who used symbols

of the religion, yet sought to create a secular identity focused on a re-cast

notion of the strong Hebrew farmer, pioneer, and warrior—the antithesis of

the Diaspora Jew’s reality. Palestine was chosen as the territorial locus,

where a political state could be built.

We thus have a pseudo-ethnic reconstruction of Judaism, at the same time

as it was a rejection of the mainstream body of Jewish religious writing and

belief, which saw return to Zion as an end-of-days messianic affair.

Notably, Zionism was also the effort of a particular social group—Central

European white-collar urban intelligentsia—to overturn their status of social

and political exclusion from both the traditional rabbinical hierarchy and the

Christian mainstream, by redefining who they were, teaching other Jews to

instead become Hebrews.

New Hebrews would speak a new language—partially recreated by

German Zionists—instead of German, Russian, etc; they would have a

“national flag” borrowing religious symbols, but with no historical pedigree;

and they would remember “Hebrew” history and “Hebrew” holidays, in a

way totally averse to traditional Jewish understandings. They would do all

this in a land which none of their forebears had known for a millennium—

while living in regions of that land outside major demographic centers of

the kingdoms of old. The presence of another people—perceived as

enemies rejecting national re-birth—furthered this pseudo-ethnic solidarity,

based on traditional biblical or Jewish ideas, such as “Jacob vs. Esau,” “the

few against the many,” etc., which were used now for modern political

nationalism.

On the Palestinian side, though Arab cartography had long referred to a

“Filistin”—as had the Romans and Byzantines before them—it cannot be

said that the Christian and Muslim Arabic-speaking inhabitants of the Holy

Land came into the twentieth century conscious of being a nation—an

entirely European concept just infiltrating into Ottoman lands—nor were

they conscious of a unifying Palestinianess. Rather, identity was

universalist—Islamic/Ottoman—or hyper-local, based on local town or

region (Nablus, Hebron, etc.), or religious sect.
Social Structure 137

Example: Ethnic Identity as Created and Malleable; continued

To the extent that there was another local solidarity, it is likely to have

been Levantine—the Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham) of Palestine, Lebanon,

and Syria. Only after the first decade of the twentieth century did this begin

to change. The encounter with Zionism—a self-consciously ideological,

pseudo-ethnic, and linguistic nationalism—occurred at the same time as

the educated Arabs of Palestine were influenced by Turkifying currents of

thought and policy emerging from Ottoman Istanbul. The same currents

had also spurred a growing, though minority body, of Arab nationalist

thought and literature, which had influenced some Arabs of Palestine.

It should also be said that both Arabism and Palestinianism bore with them

a certain social revolt among younger, better educated, and urbanizing

Palestinian men, who were chafing at the dominance of the traditional

grandees within Palestinian society.

It was only after the political dismemberment of Bilad al-Sham into British

controlled Transjordan and Palestine and French-controlled Syria and

Lebanon, and the emergence of embryonic states in all but Arab Palestine,

that a sense of separate Palestinianess began to crystallize. This sense was

furthered by conflict with the Zionists.

Complete Arab defeat in 1948; the removal of traditional Arab elites from

the Palestinian scene; the attempts of Arab states to restrain the activities of

the Palestinian refugees; and an Israeli campaign to erase any traces of

Palestinianess from the new State of Israel combined to spur a defensive

movement of Palestinian identity, politics, and violence.

Part of this was the creation of a particularly Palestinian notion of

nationhood, re-writings of the “Palestinian” past, and sustained campaigns

to establish a Palestinian political presence, both within remaining parts of

the British mandate-era Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), as well

as in Arab states and Europe. As with the Zionists, flags, anthems, particular

memories of historical events, and the creation of heroes served to

strengthen an ethnic identity of Palestinian national group membership—

though to this day, it has not entirely disentangled itself from the circles of

Arabism, Islam, and now, Islamism.

Modern ethnic and ethno-national identities across the world share much

in common with that of the Zionists and Palestinians, as they are created

in the midst of social and political conflict for specific aims, and can evolve

over time, even in the midst of conflict—note the increasing Jewishness of

Israeli identity over the past twenty-five years, along with the growing

Islamicness of what it means to be a Palestinian.22
138 Operational Culture

This malleability in ethnic expression adds up to four responsibilities for Marines. First, they must do their best to identify the

different ethnic groups in their AO. Ethnic membership (and its

correlate, religious identity—see below) is at the heart of many of

the world’s current conflicts, and understanding the various ethnic

groups in a region is often central to operational success. Not

only must the Marine identify the groups that consider themselves

ethnically distinct in the region, but he or she must also evaluate

the interrelationships between the various groups: their exchanges,

shared claims to resources, and actual or potential conflicts.

Second, the “malleability” of ethnicity means that people carry

with them several potential ethnic affiliations. They select a particular affiliation according to specific opportunities and challenges

they face. Therefore, the Marine must not think that “this person

is only and always a member of that group.” Recalling “I.M. Marine” from Chapter Two, one can also see that a Marine can be an

American, Texan, southerner, or Marine—given the appropriate

time, circumstance, and social need. Marines must thus be open to

the idea that different ethnic or quasi-ethnic memberships are activated by people in an (often unconsciously) opportunistic fashion to improve positioning or access within a fluid social structure.

Third, this means that it is essential not to take a checklist approach whereby ethnic groups are identified—or ignored—based

solely upon the factors indicated above. In many cases, ethnic

identity is based upon the group’s own view of itself, and its symbols and characteristics are based upon what it—or its opponents—

choose. Likewise, for reasons we have seen here, color-coded

maps with clear dividing lines may be of little help in understanding the AO confronting the Marines. This means better knowledge

of the AO in the cultural and human sense must take the place of

checklists.

Although it is easy to blame ethnic conflicts on “cultural differences,” the reality is that ethnicity, like gender and age, often relegates members of an ethnic group to certain limited roles with an

associated status and power within the larger society. At the heart

of most ethnic conflicts then, is a challenge to the existing power
Social Structure 139

and status structure—an issue that we will discuss in further detail

in Chapter Six. Though it is about positioning in the social structure, ethnic identity thus becomes used as an ideological rallying

cry to fight for a restructuring of the social order which would give

the ethnic group more power, status or autonomy.

Fourth, Marines must understand that although maps of a region

which block out the location of different ethnic groups are visually

appealing and simple, as we indicated above, geography does not

link to ethnicity in an obvious two-dimensional pattern. As mentioned above, many people belong to more than one ethnic group:

a fact that is obscured by two-dimensional maps. Likewise, many

people have a physical place of residence, but also a spiritual or

psychological “home” which may not match where they live. The

Armenians outside of Armenia would be a case in point, as are

even non-Zionist, but traditionally-minded Jews. Particularly for

groups that have been expelled from their “homeland” this psychological home has strong meaning—leading often to decades of

conflict or war; yet military maps fail to capture this concept.

Additionally, humans move, and national lines also move over

time. Although the world is divided up according to countries with

official borders, ethnic groups may be split across these borders. As

a result, in many states, people are loyal to groups across the border: citizenship is no obstacle to loyalty to ethnically similar groups

in other countries. This means that groups can be members of the

social structure of more than one state, occupying different positions of prestige or influence in the two states.

Example: Colonial Powers’ Maps and Ethno-Social Realities

Colonial powers often draw maps of their territories ill-attuned to ethnic

groups and the social structures of which they are a part. Sometimes this

occurs through ignorance of local dynamics or in order to placate local

benefactors during decolonization. One of these cases is Ogaden, currently

in Ethiopia. This area is ethnically Somali, and religiously Muslim, at odds

with the majority social and political order of Ethiopia (Ethiopian

Christians). Ogaden only came under Ethiopian political control at the end

of the nineteenth century, when Britain was unprepared to venture beyond

British Somaliland.
140 Operational Culture

Example: Colonial Powers’ Maps and Ethno-Social Realities; continued.

However, after the Italian fascists lost their portion of Somaliland to Britain,

the latter moved to take over the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden. Ultimately,

Britain failed, so that Muslim, Somali Ogaden has remained part of Ethiopia,

while Somalia has been a rival of Ethiopia under successive governments.

Over the past thirty years, Ogaden Somalis have often raised the banner of

secession, at times helped by the Somali government across the border. In

this case, Somalis in Somalia consider their Ogaden cousins part of their

social structure and group; governments in Mogadishu have attempted to

use this feeling to counter Ethiopian meddling in Somalia, and Ogadenians

consider themselves part of the social structure of Somalia, though they

seek an independent state through continuing insurgent actions.23

At other times, colonial powers intentionally create borders out of sync with

local ethnic dynamics—particularly when the colonized areas are included

into the expanding state itself, which hopes to prevent coherent social units

that could be politically potent. The Soviet Union regularly gerrymandered

internal republics’ administrative borders to counter nationalism. Parts of

Central Asian states today either contain pockets of people from different

ethno-linguistic groups, or are surrounded by other states’ territory.

For example, Samarkand, part of Turkic Uzbekistan, is in fact historically

ethnically Tajik and linguistically Persianate. The city has been the site of

tensions between the two groups, thus prolonging until today the Soviet

policy of weakening both national movements. Likewise, while the Czars

and Soviets exported Russians to Kazakhstan, at the end of the Soviet era,

thousands of them moved back across the border, fostering a managerial

and technical brain drain from the new state (the more than one million

Kazakhs in China seem to just be an accident of imperial expansion).24

Although we think of a world of nation-states, most places where

Marines operate have people who exhibit sub-national loyalties to

something other than the state—down to the hyper-local level. In

these cases, group membership, or ethnicity as a vehicle to jockey

for position in the social structure, can be subdivided even down

to the sub-company level. It is for all these reasons that the term

“human terrain,” though so congruent with military ways of thinking about tactical and operational matters, is, as we saw in Chapter Two, “static with respect to change over time; rigid with respect

to fluid human relationships; and limited to representing behavior

in only two dimensions.”
Social Structure 141

Culture Operator’s Questions: Ethnicity

In order to include ethnicity in military planning, Marines need to

consider the following questions:

● What is the relationship between particular ethnic groups

and control of professions or positions of power?

● How do groups that are barred from these positions of

power challenge the system (breeding grounds for insurgents,

theft and bribery, civil war)?

● What are local assumptions about U.S. and western biases

and partisanship with respect to ethnic group struggles?

● How will a Marine alliance or dealings with a particular

ethnic group affect those in power?

● What are possible reactions of those groups that are ignored?

● In this AO, what kinds of processes have historically activated which ethnic identities and feelings of group membership?

Religious Membership. In many ways, religious membership can

be considered a special form of ethnicity—in fact, often those who

affiliate with religions as social communities may have difficulty in

practice distinguishing their religious membership from something

akin to ethnicity. Religious membership, here, needs to be distinguished from religious belief systems. It is entirely possible for

someone to hold a specific religious belief system and never belong to a religious community. And, although in theory this should

not happen, there are many people who belong to a religious community, attend church or other formal religious activities, and yet

have little personal faith or connection to the belief system. Therefore we define religious membership as being part of a group of

people that considers itself united by religious faith.
142 Operational Culture

Frequently membership in a religious community is demonstrated

by many of the same markers that distinguish ethnic groups. People in a specific religious group may wear specific forms of dress,

for example the saffron robes of Buddhist monks. Members will

share special traditions and rituals that they celebrate at specific

times of the year, such as Christmas and Easter for Christians. They

may speak and study a unique language such as Aramaic for

Chaldean Christians. And often religious groups have a spiritual

connection to a physical place, such as Mecca for Muslims.

Finally, like ethnic groups, members of a religious group may be

limited to undertaking certain jobs or tasks within the larger society. Interestingly, long after economic restrictions have been removed from the religious group, they may continue to work in

certain occupations which they consider to be more “religiously

identified” with their group.

As with ethnic groups, religious groups have vied throughout history for political power and influence. We are used to seeing these

conflicts as outright war; as in the Reformation Wars in Europe and

the post-1992 hostilities in the Balkans; as sectarian strife of an intermittent kind, as between Sunnis and Shi‘is in Pakistan; or subnational sectarian war, as between Sunnis and Shi‘is in Iraq.

However, less obvious but just as important, political power plays

between competing religious groups of the same sect are worthy

of note, as they can cut through economic or government bodies

in much of the world where Marines will deploy.

Example: Legitimate Religious Groups in Competition

In Western and Sahelian Africa, mystical religious brotherhoods abound.

These brotherhoods are outside official Islam but still legitimate in the eyes

of Sunnism. Some of these orders have traditionally been socially

prominent, with members occupying important positions in politics and

economics. These Sufi orders are thus inclined to competition for social

prestige, based on the status of their members. In Senegal, the Tijaniyya

and Mouride Sufi orders continually jockey for social influence. This

competition spans politics, economics, and military authority, with the

prestige of one or the other orders increasing as their representatives attain

power, to include the presidency.
Social Structure 143

Culture Operator’s Questions: Religious Membership

When creating an operational plan in a region where diverse religious groups are in conflict, Marines should look past the religious

rhetoric to examine the economic, territorial, political, and power

motives that may fuel the religious groups’ agendas:

● How do people define and express their religious membership in the region?

● What roles and status do the various religious groups or

sects hold in the larger society?

● What is the meaning of geography for religious groups in

an AO?

● What effects would a planned Marine operation in the region have upon the power, status, and access to critical resources of the various religious groups or sects?

● How will the Marine operations influence indigenous peoples’ views of Marine or U.S. biases towards different religious

groups of the social structure?

Notes

1 Robert Layton, An Introduction To Theory in Anthropology (Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

2 See Setha M. Low and Denise Lawrence-Zuaniqa, eds., The Anthropology

of Space and Place: Locating Culture (Boston, MA: Blackwell Publishing

Limited, 2003).

3 Amir Boktor, School and Society in the Valley of the Nile (Cairo: Elias’ Modern Press, 1936); idem, The Development and Expansion of Education in the

U.A.R. (Cairo: AUC Press, 1963). 4 “Debrief: 2nd BN 7th MAR CAP Plt,” TCMEF, Nov 2004, 29 Palms MCB.

5 For this phenomenon in different parts of Africa, see Deborah Durham,

“Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 and 2,”

Anthropological Quarterly 73:3 (July 2000), 113-120; Susan Rasmussen, “Between Several Worlds: Images of Youth and Age in Tuareg Popular Performances,” Anthropological Quarterly 73:3 (July 2000); P.T.W. Baxter and U.

Almagor, eds., Age, Generation, and Time: Some Features of East African
144 Operational Culture

Age Organizations (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1978). 6 Harry G. West, “Girls With Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of Frelimo’s “Female Detachment” Anthropological Quarterly 73:4 (2000): 180-

194.

7 Susan Slyomovics, “Hassiba Ben Bouali, If You Could See Our Algeria:

Women and Public Space in Algeria,” Middle East Report (January-February

1995): 49-54.

8 See, for example, Arlene Elowe MacLeod, Accommodating Protest: Working Women, The New Veiling, and Change in Cairo (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1991).

9 Sharifa Zuhur, Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992). 10 See, for example, Evelyn Early, Baladi Women of Cairo: Playing With an

Egg and Stone (London: Lynne Riener, 1993); Suad Joseph, “The Neighborhood Street in Lebanon,” in Lois Beel and N. Keddie, eds., Women in the

Muslim World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 541-558;

idem, “Working Class Women’s Networks in a Sectarian State: A Political

Paradox,” American Ethnologist 10:1 (1983): 1-23; Diane Singerman, “Where

Has All the Power Gone? Women in Politics in Popular Quarters of Cairo,”

in Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East, eds. Fatma M. Göçek and Shira

Balaghi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 174-200.

11 See, for example, Early, “Baladi Women of Cairo;” Singerman, “Where

Has All the Power Gone?”; Paula Holmes-Eber, Daughters of Tunis: Women,

Family, and Networks in a Muslim City (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2003). 12 Anonymous Members of I MEF Headquarters Group, Interview by Dr.

Barak Salmoni, Al Anbar Province, Iraq, October 2006.

13 Joseph, “The Neighborhood Street in Lebanon”; Idem., “Working Class

Women’s Networks in a Sectarian State.”

14 Interview with anonymous CAG Team Leader; 3rd CAG Cultural Debrief,

TCMEF, Sept 2004.

15 Jenny White, Money Makes us Relatives (Austin, TX: University of Texas

Press, 1994), 70-86; and Margaret Meriwether, The Kin Who Count: Family

and Society in Ottoman Aleppo (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,

1999).

16 Clyde Kluckhohn, Dorothea Leighton, Lucy Wales Kluckhohn, and

Richard Kluckhohn, The Navajo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1992).

17 Garrick Bailey and James Peoples, Introduction to Cultural Anthropology

(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1999).

18 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Amatzia Baram,

“Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies, 1991-96,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29:1 (Feb. 1997): 1-31; Faleh A. Jabar,

“Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes

under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998,” and Hosham Dawood,

“The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: the Case

of Iraq,” both in Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle
Social Structure 145

East, edited by Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawood (London: Saqi,

2003); Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, “The Transformation of

Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in Central and Southern Iraq, c.

1870-1958,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 15:4 (1983), 491-

505.

19 Mina Roces, “Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: The Lopez Family,

1945-1989,” Modern Asian Studies 34:1 (Feb. 2000): 181-221. 20 Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central

Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007). 21 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Routledge, 1999); Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and

Teachings of Ziya Gokalp (New York: Hyperion Press, 1979). 22 Meir Litvak, “A Palestinian Past: National Construction and Reconstruction,” Memory and History, 6:2 (Fall/Winter 1994), 24-56; Tarif Khalidi,

“Palestinian Historiography: 1900-1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 10:3

(Spring 1981), 58-70; Beshara Doumani, “Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine:

Writing Palestinians into History,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 21:2 (Winter

1992), 5-28; Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the

Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1997); Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1998); Gershon Gorenberg, The End of Days: Fundamentalism and

the Struggle for the Temple Mount (New York: Oxford University Press,

2002); Aviezer Ravitztky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism, trans. Michael Swirsky and Jonathan Chipman (Chicago: University

Of Chicago Press, 1996); Neville Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Before

World War I (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Meron

Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land Since

1948 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 23 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia (London: James Currey,

1991).

24 Hugh Pope, Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World (New York:

Overlook TP, 2006); Rob Johnson, Oil, Islam, and Conflict: Central Asia since

1945 (London: Reaktion Books, 2007).

147

Chapter 6

Dimension IV

Political Structure

We have seen in Part II of Operational Culture for the Warfighter

that cultural dimensions are related to each other. In particular,

Chapter Four showed that environmental factors produce economic structures, while Chapter Five demonstrated that economic

dynamics determine the social structure—or status, position, and

relationships among people and groups—in a society. In this chapter we turn to investigate political structures in cultural terms, allowing us to see how they are the product of a culture group’s

social structure.

Simply put, economic and social structures shape the distribution of power and authority in a group. The map of that

ower and authority reveals a group’s political structure, expressed in political mechanisms and relationships.

We define political structure as:

● The way that power and leadership are apportioned to

people, and exercised, according to the social structure of the society.

This suggests that for the culture operator, “politics” is not the study

of presidents and political groups. Rather, it focuses on something

more nuanced:

● The way that a culture group determines who has power

and control (who is a leader and what admired traits of a leader

are).

● How that power is legitimized and exerted over whom.
148 Operational Culture

● How and why conflicts over power and control emerge

within and between groups.

A central term of reference in this chapter is “power,” which should

be distinguished from “authority.”

● Power is the ability to control or influence the behavior of

individuals or groups of people.

● Authority is the legal or popularly granted permission to

exercise power. It is legitimacy in the exercise of power.

For the Marine, two caveats are in order here. First, one needs

to remember that authority does not always equal power—one

who holds authority does not always have the means to exercise

power. For example, south of the Texas border with Mexico, there

are districts where the legitimate authority held by the Mexican police in no way translates into the power to control illegal movement

of people and narcotics.1

Second, in mapping the dynamics of power and authority in a society, it is important to distinguish between formal political structures—often created by an outside force, such as an occupying

military—and local political organizations developed from within

the cultural group. Externally-imposed power structures are often

viewed as illegitimate by local peoples and can result in a “weak

state” with little effective power or authority over local communities. Likewise, in such situations, formal, or “modern” political

structures can be animated by informal, “traditional” practices and

norms reflecting existing social structures.

The British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan bear this out.

When British forces installed Shah Shuja on the “Afghan throne” in

1839, he possessed absolutely no legitimate authority. Likewise,

the Najibullah government installed by the Soviets in the mid-1980s

possessed no legitimacy. When the Soviets withdrew from

Afghanistan, Najibullah’s regime crumbled as rival factions fought

for power in regions of the country, based on political alliances

emerging from social structures of kin networks.2i
Political Structure 149

Our discussions, therefore, will focus on indigenous, culturally generated political structures in communities, rather than formal and

often artificial states. In this context, the following facets of a political structure are most significant:

● The cultural control of power and resources: political organization

● Who holds the power: cultural forms of leadership

● Conflicts over power: challenges to existing political structures

For a Marine operating in a new AO, understanding a) the influence of economy and social structure on politics; b) the existing

power and authority structure; and c) how to work with the individuals within that structure are critical to operational success.

Political Organization

The various models of political organization offered by anthropologists share a common theme: the political structures and political

norms of cultural groups can be characterized by their degree of

egalitarianism versus stratification.3 One can thus consider political structures and norms as constituting a spectrum, based on the

following definitions:

Egalitarianism: Resources, power, and decision-making are not

concentrated in the hands of any specific individual or sub-group,

but are spread relatively evenly across members of the group.

Stratification: Resources, power, and decision-making are limited

to certain categories of people within a community, based upon

their—or their group’s—status, entitlement, and rank. Society is

thus multi-leveled, with groups enfranchised or disenfranchised according to their place in lower or higher social levels.
150 Operational Culture

Egalitarian Highly stratified

Bands Tribes Chiefdoms States

At one end of the continuum are cultural groups that share power

and authority more or less equally, and are highly flexible in their

leadership structures. At the other end of the continuum are highly

stratified cultural groups that restrict access to goods and resources

to certain groups.

The above diagram includes four kinds of political structures. In

an operational culture sense, not only does each category possess

a distinguishing set of features as regards structure and function,

but more importantly, they constitute the over-arching categories

encompassing many of the political arrangements which Marines

will encounter. These four structures include bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states.

In examining the following definitions, bear in mind three

caveats. First, these descriptions of political structures are archetypal models, and the political structures flowing from them rarely

exist in such a “pure” form. Second, none of these political structures is hermetically sealed off from the preceding one. At each

point across the spectrum, structures will bear some features of

each other. Some tribes look like bands, some chiefdoms look like

tribes, and some states conduct themselves more like chiefdoms,

etc. Like we saw with “formal” and “informal” economies in Chapter Four, there are also informal political practices and patterns of

behavior. And, just as we saw that formal economies are enmeshed with informal economies, so too, the “formal” political

structure of a state can be animated by “informal” practices associated with tribes or chiefdoms. Tribes or chiefdoms themselves

are not informal or illegitimate; rather, in a state context, practices

associated with them are often considered so.4

Third, although the political structures of different culture groups

can be placed along a continuum, the Marine should not assume

that this model means that societies progress through one stage to
Political Structure 151

the next. It is not necessarily the case, for example, that a band will

metamorphose into a tribe; in fact, many bands are simply absorbed into state societies. By contrast, it appears that the surge in

tribal groups in the past half century is actually the result of the disintegration of larger state organizations and the failure of centralized colonial power in certain regions.5 As states fail, governance

falls back on local communities which turn to pre-existing kinship

and social structures to determine leadership and authority—all

with implications for egalitarianism and stratification within society.

There is no “first comes this, then comes that” in the life of political structures.6

Political Structures Defined

Bands. A band is a small group of people who all know each

other face-to-face, and work closely together for a unified purpose

of survival. Their dependence on each other to reach a goal requires cooperative work, thus militating against hierarchies beyond

those of age and gender. As a result of this egalitarian social structure, leadership is determined on the basis of skill. Leaders emerge

in response to specific challenges or opportunities, and decisions

are often made by a council of more respected band members.

From this perspective, groups operating in the initial stages of an

insurgency often reflect the characteristics of a band. It is exceedingly difficult to profile them in terms of command and control

structures. It is just as difficult to shut them down through decapitation strikes—if leadership is event-specific and episodic, the

group can always live to fight another day, unless everyone is neutralized.

Tribes. The Marine who has worked in Iraq or Afghanistan might

be surprised to note that tribes are considered relatively egalitarian

in their distribution of political power. As we saw in Chapter Five,

a tribe is a group based on the internal assumption of kinship. This

kinship binds members together as a functioning group, in terms

of economic, political, and social relationships. The feeling of kinship solidarity imposes on people these relationships and obliga-
152 Operational Culture

tions. The kinship-based political structure creates lines of authority and decision-making in which leadership is determined by

inheritance of a lineage-based position of power. For example, a

close (male) descendant of a tribal leader usually succeeds the

leader.

While in theory power is position-based, in fact, power will flow

inter-generationally through competition within a small core group

of people related to the previous leader, who have the legitimacy

to contend for leadership. For example, though a tribal leader’s

first son is “supposed” to succeed him, his lower intelligence, or the

greater popularity and economic success of the second son, may

render the latter more suitable for leadership.

If we look at the way a tribe functions as a corporate group that

looks out for the welfare of its members, we realize that most tribes

have a fairly simple tiered structure, with leadership shared by (formal or informal) councils. As we saw in our discussion of communal distribution in Chapter Four, there is a strong expectation

that goods and services will be distributed through the tribe—those

who acquire goods will look out for those under them. In fact, in

the absence of external destabilizing factors—such as political manipulation or interaction with the global economy—the degree of

social and economic differentiation between the poorest and richest members in a tribe is generally very small in comparison to the

extreme differences of wealth that occur in state societies.

Tribal structures also tend to have a “checks and balances” system

in which several tribes or sub-tribal units in a region all maintain

an uneasy balance of power and control. While one tribe may gain

the ascendancy for a period of time, no one group gains complete

control over the others. This tense, conflict-prone equilibrium is a

clear contrast to state systems where power is concentrated in a

central node of leadership.

Of course, this equilibrium is often subjected to external manipulation, by outside political regimes, by leaders whose legitimacy

among tribal members is based on alternate belief systems, or by

the mechanisms of the global economy.7
Political Structure 153

Chiefdoms. In contrast to bands and tribes, chiefdoms are political structures with a centralized chief, who possesses a subordinate

council of advisors and functionaries—unlike a tribal leader’s subordinates or council members who are lineage-based and do not

have specific, stabilized “billets.” Rather, in a chiefdom, people

have official, named positions. To a great extent, these subordinates’ power is based on their “billet,” at least as much as on their

name.

Chiefdoms also centralize authority, decision making, and administrative structures. They do not exhibit egalitarian political structures—they are stratified, and “first among equals” is anathema.

However, unlike states which are backed by powerful militaries,

chiefdoms must rely on the support of subordinate chiefs and

groups, often through patron-client relationships, in order to legitimize the role of the chief. Tributes from subordinates, and exchanges of goods, wives, and land with the subordinate leader

cadre, are essential to maintain the power and position of the

leader.

If the chief is unable to maintain these exchanges of goodwill or

favors, one or more contenders for the chiefdom are likely to challenge the authority of the chief and attempt to seize the throne.

As in all patron-client relationships, the patron needs to have

clients, and keep them happy, as much as the client needs the patron, and needs to serve his interests.

As such, a fair amount of the chief’s effort is devoted to ensuring

the loyalty of subordinate leaders, as his position is maintained

through his own personal charisma and ability to provide or deny

material welfare and social success. Chiefdoms thus have tension

built into them, with constant threat of snowballing destabilization.

Not only the Taliban, but other “warlords” in Afghanistan, exemplify chiefdom characteristics.

States. In anthropological and operational culture terms, a state is

characterized by centralized authority and control, possesses defined territorial boundaries, exerts power through security forces,

and controls access to resources.
154 Operational Culture

To elaborate, first, states possess a highly centralized government

over which there is no contention. This means that while people

might disagree over how good the ruler is, no one is under the impression that he is not the ruler. Also, the state may not be effective, but no one questions the existence of the state, or that it is the

state which needs to be effective. In 1789, French revolutionaries

judged Louis XVI to be inadequate, but they did not question the

existence of France, or that the state should be the dominant political player on French territory.

Second, states also have defined territorial parameters—states are

not “moveable feasts” as bands, tribes, or chiefdoms may be.

Third, states possess regularized security structures (military, police, etc.) that are loyal to the state itself, and not something outside the state’s boundaries. Militaries might make coups against the

regime, but they do not revolt against the idea of the state itself. In

fact, in states, the security forces are the major legitimizing tool for

the state to effectively assure its power over the people.

Fourth, states monitor and control the allocation of important

physical and social resources. These include elements of the environment, such as food and water, as well as aspects of the economy, to include finances, currency, transportation, and

communications. Social resources monitored, regulated, or controlled by the state include education, medical services, social welfare mechanisms and—sometimes—religion, either as doctrine,

hierarchies, or public expression. Control of these physical and

social resources is often linked to the perception of a state’s legitimacy—in the eyes of the people, government, and even the international community. Hence a state’s concern for its formal

economy, as seen in Chapter Four.

There are several factors related to states. From the outset, in anthropological terms it is essential not to confuse regime with state.

A regime is a ruling government. While some regimes may portray themselves as representing or being the state, a regime is no

more than the current group ruling a country. A Republican-controlled U.S. administration is not the United States; it is merely the

government of the day.
Political Structure 155

Further, regardless of terms commonly used synonymously in the

United States, states are not nations. A state is a political structure;

a nation, however, is a socially-created community based on an

ideology and a claim to certain territories and rights. A “nation” is

an identity. There might be several nations within one state. For

example, think of Arabs and Jews in Israel; Kurds and Turks in

Turkey; or Serbians, Bosnians, Croats, Montenegrins, and Macedonians in pre-1991 Yugoslavia. Conversely, not everyone in the state

might necessarily view a particular nation as an objective reality

(Turks considering Kurds)—though no one debates the existence

of a state.

Finally, while we have been considering bands, tribes, chiefdoms,

and states separately, in many parts of the world—particularly in

regions to which Marines deploy—all these political structures coexist, even in areas considered by outsiders and local regimes as

states. What makes these kinds of operations so complicated at the

squad-through-MEF level is that areas where Marines operate have

so many kinds of political structures vying with each other at the

same time. Also, while Marines see a particular overt structure—

such as a state with a parliament and national leader—this formal

structure likely masks the functioning of other informal structures

upon which “state” leaders rely in order to have power. If this

were not the case, Marines would not be there!

Who Holds Power: Cultural Forms of Leadership

Western states’ citizens are accustomed to a hierarchical political

system run by a clear formalized leader. Yet many societies around

the world do not have centralized leadership systems. Indeed, they

may not have an obvious leader at all. Furthermore, even if a formal leader is designated, he or she may not be the actual effective

leader—in the sense of the person who gets things done or issues

directions for people to follow. Instead, someone else in the group

may serve as the real informal leader, while the formal leader is

merely a figurehead. An obvious example of the latter is the royal

sovereign in the United Kingdom, who has formal figurehead authority, yet lacks the effective authority of the Prime Minister.
156 Operational Culture

Marines should thus begin with the realization that often there is a

distinct difference between the person who is designated to lead

versus the person who actually leads.

Formal Leaders. These kinds of leaders receive official recognition by the political structure and community. Often, formal leaders have titles such as “mayor” or “colonel” or “police chief” and

may wear symbols (badges, special clothing, etc.) indicating their

status within the community (see Chapter Seven). Typically formal

leaders have special offices or places to receive guests and receive

various legitimate financial and other regularized benefits from their

position. As we saw in Chapter Five, part of this is due to their and

their position’s status in the social structure.

In political terms, formal leaders can claim the power that comes

with their position regardless of their knowledge, background, or

skills at accomplishing their duties—the system made them the

leader, and their authority comes from their position. However, depending on the personality of the person in the position, and the

political structure’s strength, formal leaders may not actually have

much control over the community.

Informal Leaders. Contrasted to formal leaders, informal leaders

may not carry titles and symbols indicating their status, and their

offices and spaces may not obviously indicate a person of power

to an outsider. Or they may hold a formal position or status that is

significantly lower or different from their actual authority and

power. However, despite their lack of official trappings, informal

leaders may carry more power and have more influence over the

community than formal leaders.

Informal leaders may gain status through working with people and

undertaking their leadership tasks. Alternatively, some informal

leaders gain influence in a formal system because the community

already recognizes their status, prestige, or skill. As a result, they

are generally highly respected by members of the community.

And, as any Marine who has been around quality SNCOs and

CWOs will attest, typically in order to “get anything done,” one

needs to have the approval and support of the informal leader(s).
Political Structure 157

In the previous section, we examined four main forms of political

structure. These structures are related to different forms of leadership that Marines need to look for when they enter a new AO.

Like political structures, some forms of leadership will overlap or

be appropriate to more than one political structure. Thus, instead

of an “if this, it must be that” approach to grasping political structures and their relationship to leadership forms, it will benefit the

Marine to embrace a flexible “if this, then it might be a little bit of

that and the other” analytical method.

Marines should understand their AO in terms of these cultural

forms of political leadership:

Leadership in Acephalous Societies. Acephalous (literally meaning: “without-a-head”) societies are groups that have no one formal

designated leader. As we saw above, many bands, for example,

have no obvious designated leader. Since such groups are small

(ranging from 10-25 individuals) most social behavior and decision

making is communal or made along lines of gender or age.

A Marine who tries to negotiate with the “leader” of an acephalous

cultural group is most likely to discover that any agreements made

with this “leader” are unlikely to be recognized by the rest of the

group. For example, negotiating with the self-described “leader”

of an emergent insurgent or criminal gang will produce “agreements” to which neither the “leader” nor the gang feels obligated.

Episodic leaders. Episodic leaders can be found in all political

structures, whether bands, tribes, chiefdoms or states. These leaders arise to undertake a specific purpose, whether to lead an attack

on an opposing group or to run the PTA’s soccer fundraising event.

Episodic leaders have no formal official control or power other

than that which is given to them for undertaking the specific task

at hand. Once the goal has been achieved, episodic leaders step

down to continue on with the normal routine of their daily lives.

Episodic leaders are not foreign to the U.S. military. Ad hoc task

force commanders, for example, might be battalion operations officers or even company commanders. After they have completed
158 Operational Culture

the specific mission for which the task force was assembled, their

attachments will return to parent units, and the task force commander will reassume lesser, regular duties.

Councils and Oligarchies. Councils and oligarchies (rulership

by an elite group) are extremely common forms of leadership for

tribal groups. They are also fairly common in states and chiefdoms.

The unique feature of a council is that no individual bears the right

to make a final decision or to implement a course of action. The

decision must be considered and shared among all leaders. During the conflicts between Native Americans and the U.S. military,

failure to understand the importance of tribal councils led to many

misunderstandings. In some situations, U.S. military leaders negotiated treaties with individuals who had no right to make individual decisions for their tribe. Such inappropriate negotiations led to

invalid treaties and, in some cases, unexpected warfare.

As this example shows, councils and oligarchies may share characteristics in common with acephalous or episodic leadership systems when it comes to their interaction with external entities.

However, what distinguishes acephalous and episodic forms from

councils and oligarchies is the permanency and uncontested authority of the latter, as well as their regularized meetings, deliberations, and decision-making mechanisms. For example, though

the Roman Republic had rotating consuls, the system itself was not

episodic.

Hereditary Leadership. For much of the history of the world,

leadership has been inherited along family lines. Since a family, by

definition, is generally of a common ethnicity, religion, socio-economic class, and regional origin, by default, hereditary leadership

concentrates power in the same ethnic, religious, socio-economic,

and regional groups. Hereditary leadership therefore discourages

political mobility by reinforcing existing social structures and stratification: The same groups continue to be included in decision

making, while others are excluded generation after generation.

Since hereditary leadership focuses on maintaining power within a

group, women as well as men may have the opportunity to rule,
Political Structure 159

even in highly patriarchal societies. This is obvious in the case of

Britain. Queen Elizabeth II is the sovereign of the United Kingdom

because the House of Windsor is the ruling family. This characteristic explains paradoxes in the Muslim world related to gender

and political power. In Pakistan, for example, the Bhutto family

has been an important political dynasty for over two generations.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had been Prime Minister until General Zia alHaqq overthrew him in 1977. Several years later, it was the popularity of the Bhutto family, and the loyalty of its entourage, that

led to the election of Benazir Bhutto—a woman—as president of

a socially conservative Muslim state. In Benazir’s case, kinship reinforced by class considerations carried more weight than gender.8

Dictators and Strongmen. Dictators and strongmen obtain

power through coercion, and remain in power as long as they are

backed by that force, which possesses the means to intimidate and

coerce others in the community. As a result, their power can last

only as long as they can manage the military and police sectors of

a society, while eliminating or coopting any other potential nodes

of competition.

A strongman’s power does not originate from the legitimate investment of authority on the part of the people or organs of state.

Therefore, though they might exert great coercive and cooptative

efforts to get the institutions of the state to legitimize them, both the

durability of their personal legitimacy, and the inter-generational

continuity of their rule is always in question.

Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, for example, came to power through a coupwithin-a-coup, and was forced to combine authoritarianism with

cooptation and self-legitimization to ensure his continued rule, as

well as that of his son.9 Thus, while some might refer to dictators

as “kings” or “monarchs” and point to sons succeeding fathers,

these methods are different since a royal family has an in-built legitimacy.

As the case of Syria (or Iraq) suggests, dictators and strongmen typically emerge in societies where the traditional leadership and political system has become unstable. Although this form of
160 Operational Culture

leadership may fill in a gap for a period of time, it is usually very

short lived, lasting, at best, as long as the dictator or strongman’s

inner circle wishes to remain loyal to his chosen successor. This

political instability, for example, brought about the coup by General-turned President Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, who, like other

Pakistani leaders, might prove to be short-lived.10

Elected and Selected Leadership. Over thousands of years of

world history, the practice of voting for a major formal leader as a

condition of him/her taking office is extremely recent. However, selecting a leader on the basis of his or her skills and experience has

been practiced for centuries in many economic guilds and organizations. The key feature of elected and selected leaders is that

their ability to remain in a position of power is limited to their perceived effectiveness in carrying out their work. This accountability

on the part of elected and selected leaders is not typical of many

other forms of leadership.

Accountability, in most basic terms, means pleasing the relevant

people. Therefore, elected or selected leaders are constrained by

popular preferences in their decision-making. This will have implications for Marines and other U.S. authorities, because elected

leaders can only accommodate foreign wishes as much as their

electors or selectors will allow them.11

Culture Operator’s Questions: Leadership

The following questions can guide a Marine in understanding the

leadership structure in a foreign AO:

● How is decision-making organized, and who makes decisions?

● What are the principles and processes governing policy deliberations and decision-making?

● Whom do leaders have to consult; to whom must they answer?
Political Structure 161

● How is leadership obtained and passed on (by election, inheritance, demonstration of skill, membership in a certain age or

social group, by force)?

● Who are the official formal leaders and what symbols indicate their status?

● To whom do people turn to actually get something done?

● What is the relationship between the formal and informal

leader?

Conflicts over Power:

Challenges to Existing Political Structures

For the Marine, who works predominantly in situations of conflict,

understanding the cultural organization of power is critical for identifying the source and nature of conflict in a region. By allotting

power to certain groups and individuals, all but the most egalitarian political structures marginalize or exclude other groups from

the power structure.

The losers in the political structure may accept their lower position

for a period of time. However, ultimately in all societies, marginalized members will seek to challenge the authority and position of

the leading groups. Although leaders of highly centralized political structures, such as states, may effectively suppress the claims

of excluded and oppressed groups for years or even centuries, at

some point the locus of power in any political structure shifts. It is

during these periods of instability of the ruling group that oppressed and marginalized groups recognize an opportunity to challenge the existing distribution of power. Typically the result is

insurgency, conflict and/or warfare.

Many of the conflicts that we, in the U.S., attribute to “tribal,” “ethnic” or “religious” differences are in reality conflicts about the relative power of two or more groups within the political structure of

a society. In order to understand these conflicts, the Marine needs
162 Operational Culture

to understand who the winners are and who the losers are in the

current political structure of his AO—even down to the neighborhood level.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in many regions of the

world, power and status are distributed on the basis of social characteristics such as class or kinship or membership in a tribe, an

ethnic group, or a religious group. As a result, in many parts of the

world certain classes, tribes, or religious and ethnic groups control

the society. These privileged groups then enjoy greater wealth,

better access to desired goods and career opportunities, and may

have the right to control the behavior of lower status classes, tribes,

and religious or ethnic groups.

Example: Power, Leadership, and Kinship in Europe

Differential access to goods and opportunities based on social group is not

simply an issue in the culturally “foreign” non-West. Historically in Western

Europe, for example, power and leadership were concentrated among

specific upper class Christian families. Non-Christians and families that did

not belong to the aristocracy almost never held positions of authority in the

monarchies of the region. As seen in Chapter Five, the French and Russian

Revolutions were both challenges to the class and kinship basis of power

in Europe at the time (although not to the religious structure).

Both revolutions resulted in restructuring of power, in which kinship and

aristocratic class were no longer the primary basis of political authority. In

the case of Communist Russia, religion was removed as a form of social

and political identity.

Although certain social characteristics can determine one’s status

and power in society, it is important to remember that most people hold multiple and fluid identities. Remembering the example

from Chapter Two of “I.M. Marine,” it should not surprise us that

people frequently belong to more than one ethnic group or tribe,

claim a greater or lesser degree of affiliation with their religious

group (or in some cases, may change their religion) and may move

between social classes. When a certain ethnic or tribal or religious

group suddenly claims its right to power (or challenges the exist-
Political Structure 163

ing power structure), cultural divisions that may normally have

been unimportant may become critical. If the conflict becomes extremely divisive, individuals in the society may be forced to select

one identity and renounce their membership in other groups. Cultural lines then become drawn and social identities are suddenly

rigidified.

European colonial powers often deliberately created rigid tribal or

ethnic lines in their colonies as they chose to become allies with

one particular group. This polarization of groups had catastrophic

outcomes that persisted long after the outside power left.

One of the critical features of conflicts over power by competing

social groups is that each group seeks to attract as many members

as possible. This explains why a serious genealogy of any tribe will

uncover many non-biological descendants of the mythical ancestor.

Particularly in times of violent conflict, people living in a particular region may find they are forced to affiliate with the dominant

ethnic, tribal, or religious group for protection, regardless of

whether or not they have an actual biological or social connection

to that group.

Interestingly, as the balance of power shifts, so also will the “immutable” tribal or religious or ethnic identity of individuals in the

area. Marines need to keep this fact in mind in their intelligence

collection. Far too often we presume that the particular identity

claimed by a person in a region is indeed their only identity, and

is somehow “real and genetically” based.

We will return to matters of religion, belief, ideology, and identity

in much more detail in the next chapter. For now, however, as we

consider matters of political association, organization, and power,

we need to recognize that in order to swell their ranks, social, religious, and ethnic groups will often call upon an imagined history, making claims to a remembered past and culture to unite their

members. Although this rhetoric may seem convincing and is often

extremely effective in mobilizing group members, Marines must

not be deluded into thinking that the imagined culture and history

constitute a permanent reality. It is very easy to explain religious
164 Operational Culture

or social conflicts by reducing the issue to: “It’s all about religion/ethnicity/tribalism. The Sunni and Shi‘i have been fighting

since the beginning of time.”

The reality is that if one examines the history of the conflicting

groups, typically there are periods of time of relative peaceful coexistence, alternating with periods of hostility. At different times

in history, for example, Sunni and Shi‘i have intermarried, shared

political positions of authority, and even worshipped together

within certain Sufi brotherhoods. The history that is remembered,

then, is the one that supports the political agenda and claims of the

group, not necessarily the reality of their past.

As such, Marines are served best by listening to what people in an

AO say about themselves and their memberships and identities.

But that is not enough, as it might serve as a static smokescreen for

evolving realities. Ultimately, then, a focus on resources, groups,

power, and inclusion as well as exclusion is just as important.

What does this all mean? Every AO to which a Marine will deploy

will possess “have-nots”—or else it would be unlikely that a Marine

would be there. This “have/have-not” dynamic is built into virtually all political structures which Marines will encounter.

In such AOs, Marines are usually there because the bare minimum

of political, social, and economic enfranchisement has not been

granted to the “have-not” population, and the ability of “haves” to

enforce their writ and coerce obedience has diminished to the

point that “have-nots” have gained some hope of changing the system.

In deploying to these areas, knowing who is included and excluded from political and economic power will be key to understanding, managing, and resolving conflicts. Just as important will

be understanding the issues of contention for inclusion and exclusion. Often, understanding these issues—the who and the what—

will be much more relevant than ethnicity, religion, or even

ideology, which often act as the garb in which concrete group interests are clothed.
Political Structure 165

Finally, in order to manage or resolve conflict, be it for a week or

a year-long deployment, Marines and associated U.S. agencies will

need to provide the base-line enfranchisement for “have-nots”—or

the purpose for conflict will remain, and U.S. personnel will be

seen as part of the problem.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Conflicts over Power

For a Marine in a foreign AO the following questions should be

asked:

● What are the most important cultural characteristics that determine one’s position and power in the community (age, class,

gender, tribal identity, ethnicity, religion)?

● What is the degree of polarization in the region with respect to religious/ethnic/tribal identities?

● What is the amount of flexibility and interaction between

religious/ethnic/tribal groups?

● Which groups hold power, and to what degree of concentration?

● Which groups are excluded, and along which axes?

● What is their degree of consciousness of exclusion?

● How possible do these groups’ leaders think it is to challenge the system?

● How do marginalized and losing groups gain access to valued goods, resources, and opportunities (black market, theft,

raids, insurgency)?

● How will alliance with one group affect Marine relationships with the other groups?
166 Operational Culture

Notes

1 John Burnett, “Violence Surges Along the U.S.-Mexico Border,” (Audio Recording) All Things Considered, National Public Radio, February 12, 2006:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5203014.

2 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics,

and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001),

91-133; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and fundamentalism in

Central Asia (New Have, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Robert D. Crews and

Amin Tarzi, eds., The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 2008).

3 For an introduction to the field, see Elman Service and Ronald Cohen, Origins

of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution (Institute for the Study of

Human Issues, 1978).

4 This phenomenon is explored quite well in Lawrence Rosen, The Culture of

Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 2002). See in particular Chapter Four, “Constructing Political Institutions in a Political Culture of Personalism,” 56-74.

5 Donald Kurtz, Political Anthropology: Paradigms and Power (Boulder CO:

Westview Press, 2001).

6 This is in contradistinction to the positivist notion of linear societal development and progress, which underpins much nineteenth- and twentieth-century

Western social thought, and American political norms today. See Kenneth Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought (London:

Sage Publications, 2006), 26-32, 127-47, 224-44 in particular.

7 For a discussion of tribes bridging social patterns and political practices, see

Lawrence Rosen, The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life, Chapter Three: “What is a Tribe, and Why does it Matter,” 39-55. 8 See Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and Anne

Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar,

Straus & Giroux, 2002); Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With

Militant Islam (New York: Columbia university Press, 2007). 9 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997); Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, Ill.: University Of Chicago Press, 1999);

Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 2002). 10 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington D.C.:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

11 See the now classic treatment of this by Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization

42:3 (1988).
167

Chapter 7

Dimension V

Belief Systems

All culture groups have a shared set of beliefs that unite individual

members. A belief is a certainty, learned through inherited group

experiences and practices, about the substance and meaning of

phenomena and human activity. An individual’s beliefs are relatively immune to influence by personal experiences and the environment. Beliefs work in many ways. As a start, two concern us

here. First, beliefs influence the way people perceive their world,

resulting in a specific world view that structures and affects the

way that people in the group interact with each other.

A second point is equally important, though perhaps less obvious

at first blush. While it is easily accepted that a group’s beliefs

cause behavior, the reverse is also true: behavior causes

group beliefs.1 How does this happen? People create relationships with each other, among groups, and with the environment.

These relationships emerge and evolve in the form of structures—

social and mental. Subsequently, in a group of people these relationships and structures need to be explained or justified as normal

and proper. Cultural beliefs perform this function. Finally, these

beliefs condition the way later generations of the group understand

the substance and meaning of phenomena and human activity as

related to their particular relationships and structures.

This second point is quite significant. As the environment, behavior, and social structure of a culture change, cultural beliefs will

also shift to support the new reality. For example, in the 1920s in

the U.S., cultural beliefs dictated that the appropriate role for

women was wife and mother, and that work outside of the home

should be done by men. During World War II, however, as men left

the U.S. to fight in the war, women began taking the place of men

in factories, businesses and even state-side military activities. The
168 Operational Culture

new social reality of women in the workforce (along with other social and economic changes at the time) forced Americans to adjust

their cultural beliefs; and over the next sixty years, many Americans

adopted a new attitude, which was more tolerant of women working outside the home.

However, this new group belief about the role of women did not

occur overnight—it has taken generations. This is because individuals’ retention of beliefs retards the pace of change in group beliefs. Thus, in an area of operations, Marines should never assume

that changing realities on the ground are reflected in meaningful

change to beliefs during their tour. People with whom Marines interact will cling to beliefs that seem out of sync with realities that

Marines and they themselves created. Put differently, Marines will

find that indigenous people will preserve beliefs that appear out of

step with their own evolving behaviors.

When a Marine enters a new AO, he or she is unlikely to understand the peoples’ beliefs quickly in the absence of significant, region-focused study and experience. However, cultural beliefs and

ideals are ultimately expressed at least partially through observable words and actions: through historical stories and myths; symbols, rituals and icons; and taboos governing acceptable or

forbidden behaviors.

Americans often associate beliefs and ideals with formal religious

systems as reflected in religious writings, ceremonies, and traditions. However, both in the West and many other parts of the

world, informal religious systems, practices, and groupings illuminate a community’s beliefs and ideals. Even more important, the

Marine must remember that neither organized religions nor informal religious practices are the only producers of beliefs

and ideals, nor are they the only place where beliefs or ideals are

found.

Furthermore, though all culture groups have shared beliefs uniting

members, Marines interacting with real live members of a group in

a foreign environment should remember that not everyone in that

group has all of the same beliefs. As we emphasized in Part I of
Belief Systems 169

Operational Culture in particular, people, though members of culture groups, have freedom of choice and belief. Therefore, by approaching cultural beliefs from a more pragmatic position of

evaluating observable behaviors and writings, rather than trying to

“get into the mind of the Arab or Muslim,” for example, Marines

can begin to understand the day to day local cultural ideals where

they work, and the variability of beliefs and attitudes among the actual people there.

Some Features of Beliefs and Symbols

History, Imagined Memory, and Folklore. Most basically, history is what happened in the past. The history of an AO is important to Marines. However, in an operational culture sense,

history is not important because of what happened in the past.

Rather, it is how people selectively remember their past, and what

meanings they choose to derive from that past, that are of primary

concern to the Marine. The selective remembering of events, and

belief-influenced attribution of meaning to them, is known as

imagined memory. In a group context, imagined memory can be

called collective memory.

2

Historical stories (and quasi-historical tales such as myths, legends

and folklore) are important keys to revealing underlying cultural

themes and beliefs. In simple terms, folklore is a group’s collection of stories, sayings, and narratives of history passed down

through the generations. Each generation receives this inheritance,

imbues it with new meaning, and adds new narratives based on

new collective experiences.

Several ways of evaluating the cultural meaning of history are useful for Marines to consider:

Memory as Constructed. Memories come into being because someone sees an historical event and then gives it meaning and importance. Indeed, events can be remembered even though they did

not happen, because they serve a psychic purpose.
170 Operational Culture

For example, a famous story from the Spanish-American War about

the Battle of San Juan Hill describes Theodore Roosevelt charging

up San Juan Hill on a horse. Historians today point out that Roosevelt and his “Rough Riders” actually ran (not rode) up the nearby

Kettle Hill—and some suggest that Roosevelt never even made it

to the top. The former memory, however, serves the psychic need

for an image matching the late nineteenth-century American self

perception of being a nation epitomized by the physically tough

“every man” who could tame nature and beast while conquering

foreign (and foreign-sounding) realms, in effect extending manifest

destiny beyond the shores of the Pacific Ocean.

Memory as Ideological Fabrication. Sometimes, outside authorities build stories around real or fake events, in order to fabricate a

memory that supports their agendas. These often involve ideas of

continuous existence on a patch of land; ethnic or biological resemblances among all people of the “true” nation; or the celebration of a significant historical personality or event that embodies all

desired traits among members of a community.

For example, the Italian Fascist regime of Mussolini chose as its

symbol the ancient Roman Fasces, attempting to associate the

1920s-40s Italy with the Ancient Roman Empire, and Mussolini with

the Roman Emperors. Likewise, the cry “Remember the Maine!”

helped foster support for the 1898 Spanish-American War. The saying implied Spanish treachery as the reason for the explosion of the

USS Maine. In fact, an accident resulted in a coal bunker explosion.

The Event Evokes the Memory and the Meaning. Since historical

events have more than one part to them, the same event can have

more than one meaning for people, as they choose to focus on individual components and attribute particular meanings to them. In

thinking of the importance of history as a reservoir for memory

creation, therefore, it is important for the Marine not to assume a

single meaning behind each story.

Likewise, memories are activated in the here and now based upon

which particular event confronts a person. There is no particular
Belief Systems 171

history-driven logic determining what people choose to call upon

in their past in the course of daily life. Rather, the logic of memory is almost wholly related to the present tense—challenges, opportunities, and interpretive needs that individuals and

communities face today.

In the same fashion, what people consider useful about a past

event, and how they choose to remember it—the lessons they find

in the past—is all about what they seek in the present tense. In an

operational culture sense, “history” is a tool at the disposal of actors in the present. Marines therefore must learn history, not for

its own sake, but in order to understand what groups within an

AO might use that history; potential values placed on that history;

and circumstances in which those meanings and uses can be put

into action for present-oriented goals.3

Example: Events and People Make the Memory’s Meaning

On the tenth day of the Arab-Islamic month of Muharram in 680 C.E.,

Hussein bin ‘Ali traveled with a reinforced platoon-sized band of warriors

from Medina eastwards to Kufa in Iraq, to raise an army against political

opponents in Damascus. On the way to Kufa, he was met by the entire

army of the Umayyad dynasty. In a lopsided battle at Karbala, Hussein was

defeated and his entire army massacred.

Hussein was the son of ‘Ali, who in turn was the son-in-law of the Prophet

Muhammad. Upon the death of Muhammad, some Muslims felt that ‘Ali, as

a relative of the Prophet, should become the successor (caliph) to lead the

Muslim community. ‘Ali, however, was passed over and ‘Umar, a close

companion of Muhammad, was selected instead. Those who supported ‘Ali

formed a faction (shi‘a), arguing that righteous leadership of the Muslim

community should be based on descent from the Prophet’s family. Part of

this faction lived in Kufa in Iraq. They invited ‘Ali to Kufa, and promised to

raise an army to restore the rightful family line to power in Islam. However,

the army never formed, and it is thought that Kufans had lost nerve, and

were afraid to rise up against their opponents.

“Karbala,” therefore, has many meanings, depending on who remembers it,

and for what purposes. At different times, Lebanese, Iranian, and Iraqi

Shi‘ites have remembered Karbala as a time when a righteous Muslim—

Hussein—stood up for justice and the straight path, even against obviously

insurmountable odds.
172 Operational Culture

Example: Events and People Make the Memory’s Meaning, continued.

Particularly in Iran and Iraq, Shi‘i leaders could tap into this memory of

Hussein and Karbala to rally their flocks against the secular Shah or Ba‘thist

Saddam, both of whom possessed a monopoly of brutal force.

A different association with Karbala exists as well. It is the more traditional

one associated with the holiday commemorating the event, ‘Ashura (tenth

of Muharram). Here, Shi‘is remember the cruelty of the material world of

the present tense, emphasizing the need for loyal piety while awaiting the

return of Islam’s messianic figure. Furthermore, ritual self-flagellation, and

retelling the entire Karbala story, highlight the infidelity of weak-hearted

Kufans who failed to stand up for what is right, and did not come to

Hussein’s aid. This, in effect makes all Shi‘ites complicit in the Kufans’

crime, but is also a challenge to Shi‘is today to do better than their

forebears.

There are, then, multiple ways to remember Karbala. The key point,

however, is that the conditions of the present tense often color how it is

remembered. Why, for example, remember Karbala in the absence of

violence and political exclusion? Likewise, whether an Iranian Shi‘ite is

inspired by the Hussein martyrdom part or the Kufan infidelity part of

Karbala is determined by what challenges they face on any given day.

It is thus no coincidence that the relevance people find in Karbala has

grown in the past fifty years. This awareness is not culturally “embedded”

or “programmed;” but rather results from evolving political agendas and

social trends. In Lebanon, for example, Shi‘ite political maturation

progressed in the midst of political exclusion during the 1970s–80s. Since

the 1980s, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar have seen growing awareness

on the part of minority Shi‘ite populations of their own disenfranchisement

and abilities to destabilize unyielding regimes.

The ideological invigoration as well as politicization—and now armed

power—of Iraq’s Shi‘ites could only occur after the post-1991 weakening

of the Ba‘thi regime in Baghdad. Just as important in that evolution was the

Iranian revolution of 1979. At that time, the Ayatollah Khomeini had called

upon Iranians to rise up like Hussein, and their positive response was

possible because secular Iranian intellectuals had re-popularized HusseinKarbala as an appeal for equality and political awakening (1960–70s).

After 2003, internal Iraqi changes came together with ideological changes

since Khomeini’s call to empower the Shi‘ites of Iraq—who could now

assume the role of the collective “Hussein,” in order to claim their rightful

place against both the minority Sunni elites and the foreign (Christian)

occupier.4
Belief Systems 173

Like history, folklore often reveals underlying cultural values and

ideals. These ideals are passed down from generation to generation through oral as well as written traditions: in folktales, legends,

and popular sayings and expressions. While the analysis of the

folklore of a cultural group can take a lifetime, Marines can easily

pick up some of the more important local cultural values just by listening to commonly repeated sayings, expressions and stories.

In the U.S. for example, the Puritan notion that we can control our

lives and experiences through hard work is repeatedly emphasized

through such common sayings as:

“Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise.”

“God helps those who help themselves.”

These sayings contrast significantly with popular expressions in the

Middle East, which emphasize submission to God’s will and acceptance of a divine plan that one cannot control:

Insha’allah

“If God wills it.” (Arabic, Turkish, Persian)

Im yir-tzei HaShem

“If God wills it.” (Hebrew)

Agar reza-ye Khuda bashet

“If it finds the favor of God.” (Persian)

Keh deh khoday reza wi

“God-willing.” (Pashto)

Allah A‘lam

“God knows [the outcome—not I].” (Arabic)

Allah ma‘a al-sabirin

“God is with the patient.” (Arabic)

Significant for Marines, particularly those working in Information

Operations, is the way that popular folktales, sayings, and imagined

histories are used in propaganda to rouse popular sentiment. The

Marine contemplating an IO campaign based on folklore, however,

would be well-served to remember that folktales and memories

possess different meanings and significances for different commu-
174 Operational Culture

nities within an AO. We will return to this shortly in our discussion of icons.

When operating in a specific area, it is important for Marines to

grasp its history—not for what happened, but for how people think

of it: what the collective memories are and how they color attitudes to Marine actions. Similarly, Marines need to track the way

that folktales, legends and sayings are used in an AO to reflect local

perceptions of Marine behavior in the region.

Culture Operator’s Questions: History, Imagined Memory,

Folklore

● Several questions that Marines should ask when working in

an unfamiliar region are:

● What are the pivotal historical stories that all people in the

community share?

● How do different groups in the AO give different significance to the same historical stories?

● What are the daily sayings and folktales that everyone

refers to in common conversation?

● How are these remembered histories, folktales, and sayings

used to emphasize or teach important values and ideals?

● How are these histories, folktales, and sayings used to support propaganda for or against Marine and U.S. activities in the

region?

Icons. Prominent in both folktales and remembered histories are

icons: individuals who become larger than life and symbolize many

of the positive (or negative) values of a society. Historically, icons

were physical objects felt to represent a deity or holy person. In

the Orthodox Christianity of Byzantium (and later Greece and Rus-
Belief Systems 175

sia), ikonos were objects with representations of the Virgin Mary,

Jesus Christ, or other saints, through which people channeled

prayer.

Today, icons are often heroes with almost superhuman abilities—

the mere mention of their name can evoke a shared memory and

inspire certain kinds of actions or attitudes among a group of people. The icons thus become role models, helping members of a

cultural group to learn—often without being aware of it—the values of that group.

While we will consider the Marine Corps as a culture group in the

Conclusion, a perfect example of an icon in the Marine sense is

Gunnery Sergeant Basilone—“Manila John”—who during WWII received the Medal of Honor for heroic and selfless actions in killing

the enemy and saving Marine lives, ultimately giving his own life

in his last efforts, winning the Navy Cross.5 A recent example similar to Basilone is Corporal Jason Dunham, awarded the Medal of

Honor for diving on a grenade in western Iraq April 2004 in order

to save his fellows. Both are held up as exemplifying all it means

to be a Marine: mission oriented to the last, dismissive of danger,

and committed to their fellow Marines to the point of the ultimate

sacrifice. Icons like Basilone and Dunham are role models, showing recruits and young Marines what it means to be “of” the Marine Corps.

Even more so, there are phrases and maxims associated with particular Marine icons, including Lloyd Williams, “Chesty” Puller,

“Howlin Mad” Smith, and Dan Daly, for example. These maxims

furnish core components of the creed of what it means to be a Marine:

“Retreat? Hell, we just got here.” (Williams)

“We’re surrounded. That simplifies the problem.” (Puller)

“They are in front of us, behind us, and we are flanked on both

sides... they can’t get away from us now.” (Puller or Lewis)
176 Operational Culture

“Come on, you sons of bitches! Do you want to live forever?”

(Daly)

Such icons become not only larger than life, but longer-lived than

their lives: Marines recite Lejeune’s birthday message every anniversary, and are known to say, “Goodnight Chesty Puller, wherever you are.”

Icons are not, however, single-valued—just like historic events, or

stories, have different meanings depending on who is doing the

reading, or depending on the current circumstances. A single icon

can be a villain, hero, or role-model for certain values, all at the

same time. This is because icons, like remembered history, ultimately tell us more about the identity and the values of the culture

that remembers it than the facts narrated.

Example: Multi-Valent Icons

Ghengis Khan led Mongol hordes out of Inner Asia in the beginning of the

1200s, wreaking havoc through Central Asia, Iran, the Fertile Crescent, the

Levant, and into Eurasia and Central Europe. For Central and Eastern

Europeans in particular, even naming Ghengis Khan continues to evoke

horror, and like “Huns,” can be used to tar opponents. Both names are

associated with barbaric torture and devastating destruction of peoples and

cities they conquered as they moved Westward from Mongolia. In

European movies and folklore, Ghengis Khan epitomizes a ruthless,

merciless, greedy, uncivilized man who is the antithesis of genteel European

civilization, stooping to almost animal-like behavior in his gratuitous

violence and debauchery, treatment of his enemies, and his disregard for

the art and architecture of the cities he demolished.

Ghengis, however has a second history recounted by the Mongolians who

see him as a source of national pride. For the Mongolians, Ghengis Khan

is the epitome of a brilliant, strong, fierce, and strategic leader. Songs sung

today around hearths in Mongolian tents recount his brave deeds and

legendary conquests. For a Mongolia long colonized by Chinese, Russians,

and Soviets, Ghengis—who also emerged from a land dominated by

others—is an icon for physical/national strength, and worthiness of

independence as well as respect for past accomplishments.
Belief Systems 177

Example: Multi-Valent Icons; continued.

There is also a third way to remember Ghengis—in this case Cengiz Han.

In contemporary Turkish official memory, Cengiz’s onslaught was a

“Mongol-Turk” empire-making effort. Cengiz and his “Mongol-Turk” tribal

warlords built a state that restored stability to the Middle East, resuscitated

regional economic exchange, and developed the bureaucratic, political,

military, and intellectual superstructures of how states needed to work in

Eurasia. As such, the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps even the Turkish

Republic, are now using some of those very state-making tools of Cengiz

Han, the “Mongol-Turk head of state.” It is in the comparison of these three

views that we find the contrasting values of the three societies, as well as

the near-similarities of the latter two.

In entering a new Area of Operations, Marines can learn much

about local beliefs by determining who are the important icons—

historical figures, mythical figures, and present-day heroes.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Icons

The following questions can be helpful, particularly for those working in Information Operations:

● Who are the local heroes? What important qualities do

these heroes embody?

● Who are the local villains? Why are they villainous (what

makes them evil)?

● Are the heroes or villains compared to Marines or Americans?

● What do the comparisons illustrate about local attitudes towards the U.S. and the military?

Symbols and Communication. One of the unique characteristics of humans is their ability to communicate using symbols. Symbols can be physical, such as a flag; verbal, as in a spoken language
178 Operational Culture

(which is a symbolic string of sounds); or behavioral, as in non-verbal communication such as smiling. The unique feature of symbols

is that they have meanings that are culturally dependent. The word

“Achoo” in English, for example, symbolizes a sneeze. In Latvian

it means “Thank you.” To symbolize purity, an American woman

wears a white wedding dress; her Chinese counterpart wears a red

gown. Whether physical, verbal, or non-verbal, symbols communicate essential information about the beliefs and identities of local

people. In order to understand and work with local communities,

Marines need to understand the basic symbols around them.

Physical Symbols. Physical symbols include any physical objects

that hold a symbolic meaning greater than their practical utility for

the people in a group. Frequently, physical symbols, both natural

and man-made, mark out status and/or identity. Clothing, material

adornment, and symbolic objects may all indicate one’s social

membership and identity, as do physiognomic elements such as

hair, piercing, or scars. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, facial

scars on adult males distinguish Gorani tribes from Fulani, or Tuareg, and are a matter of status. Stars on a Marine’s collar also

communicate status—as a General Officer.

Not only do symbols provide information about status and roles to

members within a group, but they also indicate who is in and who

is out of a group. Within the Marine Corps, for example, a second

lieutenant reads a gold oak leaf in order to know who is a major,

and how s/he is to act toward that major. Outside the U.S. Marine

Corps, however, a French major may not be able to read the gold

oak leaf of a U.S. Marine major—he and the Marine thus know

they possess different group membership. As such, physical symbols may also serve as visual indicators of certain aspects of social

structure. For example, an Afghan male who displays a ball-point

pen in the breast pocket of his shalwar kameez may be indicating

his status as a member of the literate, educated elite, with certain

expectations of deference and treatment. We discussed these elements of social structure in Chapter Five.

Just as a new Marine quickly learns to read the meaning of symbols on his commanding officer’s collar, Marines in foreign AOs
Belief Systems 179

need to be able to recognize the physical symbols that distinguish

individuals within the community in order to operate effectively.

As we alluded to in our discussion of the environment in Chapter

Three, physical symbols can also serve to mark space symbolically:

indicating ownership or membership, or a religiously important

place. Heaps of stones may symbolize a sacred spot in Tibet. A

flag planted on the moon symbolizes U.S. presence there. A fence

symbolizes a boundary which one should not cross. In many

cases, the “symbology” might not appear in images to which

Marines are attuned: the pile of rocks might look more like

unarranged refuse; a symbol of local sovereignty might look more

like tangled twigs. Still, it is essential to remain alert for indications

of physical symbols, to develop a more nuanced sight picture of

the environment, reflecting the views of indigenous people.

Perhaps one of the most extraordinary sets of physical symbols

created by man is written language. While an outsider may only

see a bizarre set of twisted lines, to someone in China the many

characters convey important meanings. Written symbols are everywhere in our modern world. Signs on stores, political ads, social

announcements, and even graffiti all tell the reader important information. Indeed, for a Marine operating in China, some symbols

such as the ones representing male and female on the doors of

bathrooms are definitely worth learning.

While characters themselves are a form of communication through

symbols, that is only one aspect of the symbology of the written

word. For example, red ink in the margins of a written text symbolizes something immediately quite understood by western readers—it is critique and/or correction. Likewise, a note jotted in

pencil on a piece of photo-copy paper has a very different significance from something written in ink on very heavy card stock

paper embossed with the author’s initials.

Again, even though Persian uses the Arabic alphabet, a foreign

speaker of Arabic or a semi-literate Arab will immediately recognize

the particular Arabic font normally used in Persian as symbolizing

something linguistically and culturally foreign. Thus, when coali-
180

180 Operational Culture

tion forces in Iraq inadvertently used the Persian font in their Arabic-language IO flyers, they did not achieve their intended effect

on the anti-Iranian local Sunni population.6

Verbal Symbols. Most of us take language for granted. But speech

is an extraordinarily complex interchange of sounds that hold symbolic meaning. As any Marine who has spent time in a foreign region knows, the ability to communicate in the local language opens

up an entire world of understanding that is closed to foreigners

who do not understand the language. Though foreign language

fluency need not be a skills set resident within all individual

Marines or Marine units, it is important to operational success to

consider what foreign languages are spoken in what parts of the

AO. Further, there are certain baseline language skills required in

a unit to communicate needed messages to indigenous partners or

neutrals. Likewise, within one’s unit, or an adjacent unit, there are

often heritage language speakers.

Many languages feature both the standard language and several dialects, spoken in different parts of a country; they can indicate regionalism, rich vs. poor, schooled vs. uneducated, male vs. female.

Understanding these differences, and knowing how to look for

them, will better help Marines to know who their interlocutors are,

who belongs, and who is a “stranger.” For example, though a Semitic language, the Aramaic of Christian Baghdad sounds different

from Iraqi Arabic. Without even knowing Iraqi Arabic, Marines

have sometimes distinguished Iraqi Christians from other ethnic

and social groups based on the sound and cadence of the language

they hear.

Furthermore, in a cultural group there may be sub-groups who use

sub-group-specific terminology or jargon—as is clear from the U.S.

Army’s “huwa” or the U.S. Marine Corps’ “oo-rah.” In fact, these

“non-standard” usages or terms can tell the Marine much about the

background, affiliations, or aspirations of the indigenous person

with whom he or she is interacting.7
Belief Systems 181

Example: Language as Symbolic Signaling

In parts of North Africa, native speakers of Arabic make a conscious effort

to speak French with authorities or foreigners, in order to indicate their

education and credibility. Even if that person’s knowledge of French is

clearly defective, he/she will use it whenever possible, dropping words of

it into their Arabic, or switching back into it if the other speaker uses

Arabic—even if that fluent Arabic speaker is a foreigner who knows no

French.

In these cases, it is not the subject of the communication that drives use of

French; rather, the North African is signaling status, outlook, and, to an

extent, group membership. If a Marine knows this, he might be able to

accord the North African the status and treatment that would make him

positively inclined to the Marine.

This would be particularly true for Marine interactions with Tunisian (or

Algerian) military officers, for example. While one might be inclined to

study Tunisian Arabic before an exchange visit with the Tunisian military,

by using that dialect with a Tunisian officer, a Marine might in fact

communicate what would appear to be an assumption that the Tunisian

was uneducated or “uncultured.” The Marine might also communicate that

he himself was uneducated, and unworthy of the Tunisian’s time. So in this

case, learning some French, and using it with military counterparts from an

Arabic-speaking country, would be an appropriate verbal symbol of the

Marine’s status, education, and the positive value he/she puts on working

with the Tunisian military.

Non-Verbal Communication and Symbols. In addition to the physical and verbal symbols of communication, people around the

world have developed unique non-verbal, behavioral symbols that

convey important meaning in social contexts. Some of these nonverbal symbols such as smiling and laughing and crying appear to

be shared across virtually all societies around the world. Other

non-verbal symbols, however, vary from culture group to culture

group. Indeed, some symbols have very different meanings in different cultural contexts. For example, the practice of forming an ‘O’

by joining the thumb and index finger is a positive sign indicating

‘OK’ in American society. In some parts of Asia, however, it is an

offensive sexual symbol.
182 Operational Culture

Example: Non-Verbal Symbolic Communication

Among some Russian communities, clasping one’s hands and shaking them

over each shoulder a few times simulates hugging a good friend. It is thus

a symbol of amicability, though when Khrushchev did it in front of the U.S.

press, it was seen as a warlike, provocative move.

As a second case, in certain European circles, attending a political event

with a large black umbrella is an accusation that the political leader is

surrendering to the opposition. This relates back to Neville Chamberlain,

British Prime Minister at the 1936 Munich Summit with Nazi Germany, who

appeased Hitler. Emerging from the summit with a black umbrella, he

declared “Peace in our Time.” In fact, when Israeli diplomats came to the

United States after signing the 1993 Oslo Accords with the PLO, Americans

who opposed the Accords would open black umbrellas during the Israeli

leaders’ appearances.

In this case, most Americans had no idea what the black umbrella meant;

the Jewish Israelis, however, with a memory of the Holocaust, fully grasped

the political point.8

Non-verbal symbolic communication is often described in terms of

body language such as hand and facial gestures. However, spatial

dynamics can also be a central part of the non-verbal component

of communication: How people place themselves and where can

often create the context or provide substance of communication.

Seating patterns, the order or arrival of guests, the sequence of

greeting guests, who is served first and who does the serving—all

of these establish, reflect, and reinforce social hierarchies. Non-verbal communication therefore plays an important role in meetings

and social interactions such as negotiations, celebrations, funerals.9

Non-verbal behavior is also significant in communicating ideals

such as bravery, fear, or honor. For example, The U.S. military tactic of firing from cover, considered operationally prudent, is considered in some areas, such as Chad and Afghanistan, as cowardly.

Put differently, actions communicate—intent, desire, attitude, and,

indeed, ideals and values. Not only is it incumbent upon a Marine

to learn about these from AO to AO, but it is also essential to understand the implications of Marine actions—from how one sits to
Belief Systems 183

how one arranges vehicles—as communication. Most fundamentally, the Marine must remember, and train his or her Marines to remember, that every action is IO.

However, because cultures are not homogeneous; because communication is human and therefore imperfect; and because at different times different people mean different things through their

body language and non-verbal communication, even within the

same culture group, people can misinterpret symbolic communication involving body language. For this reason, while “do-thisdon’t-do-that” approaches to extremely visible, “performable skills”

might be given to check lists in a military training context, it is important to realize that symbolic communication through body language is not an exact science: One does not get it “right,” and it

ought not to be a central issue of planning and operating, compared to the larger, more conceptual issues under discussion in this

and other chapters.

Example: The Checklist Approach to Non-Verbal Communication

During his pre-deployment training, a Marine commander had been

instructed not to wear sunglasses when talking to interlocutors of his social

rank in Iraq. One day in Iraq, while meeting a police chief in the street,

the Marine commander took off his sunglasses to greet him. The Iraqi,

who left his own sunglasses on, responded by saying, “It’s hot and the sun’s

glaring. Why would you take off your sunglasses?” This same commander

had been instructed not to use a very firm American grip when shaking

hands. When he greeted an Iraqi civil leader with a soft handshake, the

Marine in fact made an impression of physical weakness and boredom.

Likewise, when an Iraqi officer clapped him on the back with his left hand,

the commander assumed this meant the Iraqi disliked him, because he had

been told that the left hand signified contempt in “Islamic” culture.

Contempt was, however, the opposite of what the Iraqi had intended.10

The micro-level fixation with observable “do’s and don’ts” that can

be catalogued as performance tasks might obscure the larger implications of symbolic communication. In many cases, commanders have missed symbolic communication’s more fundamental

importance, as they focus on minute details of a specific behavior
184 Operational Culture

assumed to be culturally “loaded.” We will return to this discussion

in the context of training and education in Chapter Nine.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Symbols and Communication

In order to successfully communicate and negotiate with local people in a foreign AO, Marines should consider the following questions:

● What physical symbols (clothing, headdress, scarification,

insignia) indicate membership or status in the ethnic, religious,

and social groups of the region?

● What physical and written symbols (signs, graffiti, fences,

spiritual markers) are important to be able to recognize in order

to navigate and understand what is happening in the region?

● What words or phrases are essential for basic communication with local people?

● What non-verbal behaviors may be misinterpreted by local

people? Which non-verbal behaviors are important to understand in meetings and negotiations?

Rituals. Rituals also offer the Marine a window into cultural values and ideals. Rituals are often characterized by the notion that

the actions in the ritual themselves must be performed a special

way to be valid. For example, during a change of command the

honor guard, reading of command authorization, and passing of

flag of command—each of which is a single, specific ritual—all

have to be performed properly for the change of command to be

considered valid.

Also of note, in religious rituals, the necessity to perform every

step of every ritual correctly is related to the conviction that the

spiritual soundness—or metaphysical validity—will only be preserved if each step of that ritual is performed correctly. In these
Belief Systems 185

cases, not only is imperfect performance shoddy, but it also violates

holiness itself.

For a Marine, rituals and ceremonies are not just quaint local traditions but important for three key reasons:

● Knowledge of ritual performances in the AO will allow

commanders to ensure proper measures are taken by Marines to

show respect and understanding towards indigenous people.

● The enactment of rituals reflects and reaffirms the values

and identity both of the person performing the ritual and of the

community of which he or she is a part. Therefore, Marines can

observe rituals to know, according to local people, “who we

think we are” and “who is not a part of us.” This is all about

group membership.

● Knowledge of rituals is important, because of their sociopolitical context and meaning to those involved—and to those

observing from outside the community.

Example: Ritual as Social and Political Communication

Earlier in this chapter, we examined the culturally important meaning of

the Karbala/‘Ashura story for Shi‘ites in Iraq and beyond. Understanding the

importance of the annual ‘Ashura ritual-enactment itself is equally important

for Marines. Every year at ‘Ashura, tens of thousands of Shi‘ite pilgrims

descend on Karbala.

They re-enact the tragedy of Hussein through passion plays, with some

participants engaging in acts of self-flagellation. First, knowledge of these

rituals permits commanders to prepare for the pilgrimage and deploy forces

in the proper fashion so as not to inhibit ritual performance while providing

sufficient security and force protection.

Second, as we saw earlier in this chapter, on a yearly basis, ‘Ashura recommits Shi‘ites to their self-identity as persecuted martyrs for the cause of

righteousness. It would certainly assist a commander to understand that the

self-perception of a group of Shi‘ites he is addressing during the ‘Ashura

season is informed by a sense of persecution and dispossession by

outsiders, and that certain rituals reaffirm this self-perception.
186 Operational Culture

Example: Ritual as Social and Political Communication, continued.

Finally, the commander and ground-level Marine need to grasp that the

mere performance of the ‘Ashura rites is in itself a political act and

statement, both within the Shi‘ite community—and to those outside the

Iraqi Shi‘ite community, meaning Iraqi Sunnis. Several times in Iraq’s

history, most recently under Saddam, ‘Ashura was forbidden by the

(wealthier, more politically connected) Sunni minority.

One could therefore argue that the externally-directed communication of

the ritual is even more important, to the effect that “we Shi‘ites are here, we

are taking what is our due... in religious, social, and political terms.” This

knowledge helps Marines to see the ‘Ashura ritual as a statement of Shi‘ite

communal-political prominence—a statement that is contested by Sunni

Iraqis.11

Culture Operator’s Questions: Rituals

When observing a local ritual or ceremony, a Marine can learn

about local cultural values by asking the following questions:

● What behaviors and actions are important in the ritual or

ceremony, and what does this reveal about cultural ideals and

values?

● Who participates in the ritual, and what roles do the participants play?

● What does presence of participants, or the nature of their

participation, say about their membership and status in the

group?

● What does the public performance of the ritual communicate to outsiders?

● How is this performance potentially a politically charged

statement about the group’s status and rights within the larger

society?
Belief Systems 187

● What activities, not related to the ritual or ceremony itself,

occur at ceremonial gatherings, due to the social status of the

participants?

Norms, Mores, and Taboos. All cultural groups have written or

implicit rules about what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Frequently, in military cultural training seminars, these norms

are emphasized, often to the exclusion of many other aspects of

Operational Culture. Understanding the do’s and don’ts in a new

region can be important in creating goodwill with the local peoples. And in this text, we encourage Marines to learn the proper

social etiquette in an area. However, we caution Marines to recognize that a few courses on the correct way to serve tea in

Afghanistan are unlikely to give leaders the full spectrum of cultural

knowledge necessary to develop a successful operation. Despite

this caveat, successful Marines should have a basic cultural understanding of an AO’s social norms, mores, and taboos.

Social Norms. Social norms are cultural expectations about how

one ought to behave in a given situation. Norms can be seen as

social guidelines that most people usually follow. However, norms

are not rigid, and people may accidentally or deliberately ignore

the norms with only minor repercussions (such as disapproving

looks, avoidance by others).

In the U.S. for example, Americans try to adhere to the norm of

punctuality for meetings. The accepted norm is that people will arrive at a meeting at a specified time, and use that specified time—

and only that time—for that specified purpose. However, while the

U.S. military adheres fairly rigidly to this norm, it is understood

that for personal meetings people may show up late, or sometimes

not at all. Although others may complain or criticize someone for

being late, except in extreme cases, people are not severely punished for their tardiness. Americans do not jail or kill people for failing to adhere to the norm of punctuality. In short, a norm is the

“proper thing to do,” but disregarding a norm is not a fundamental social transgression.
188 Operational Culture

Norms are often an obvious point of failure in inter-cultural communication—after the fact. For example the Western belief in individual efforts and meritocracy can conflict with ideas of

collective, kin-based solidarity, where standing apart from the tribe

contravenes the local code of honor. In Zimbabwe, the U.S. Embassy “Foreign Service National of the Year” award was quite unpopular among indigenous people, who felt singled out, contrary

to a creed of group loyalties. After more experience in the region,

U.S. Foreign Service Officers have moved away from this practice,

realizing it is not in accord with local norms.

Yet even within the same region or culture, attitudes about acceptable behavior and values are often variable. In the U.S., “bravery,” “justice,” and “security” are examples of values that are

understood differently based on people’s different “standards”—

or interpretations based on past experiences and constraints. For

example, understandings of acceptable levels of “law and order” in

southern California cities are very different from those in towns

along the Texas-Mexico border, given different experiences and

capabilities.

Mores. A more (pronounced mor-ay) is an implicit or explicit rule

regarding permissible or forbidden behavior. In contrast to norms,

violations of a cultural more usually provoke serious repercussions.

Social ostracism, physical attacks, or even death may result from

challenging mores. Cultural mores vary over time and place, and

Marines should not assume that behaviors and ideals that are accepted in the U.S. will be regarded in similar ways around the

world.

As an example of a more with serious cultural and physical repercussions, in Mediterranean countries a high value is placed on the

virginity of an unmarried woman. Historically in Italy, Spain and

Greece, and today in a number of the countries of North Africa

and the Levant, an unmarried woman who gets pregnant is considered a disgrace to her family. The punishment for this transgression (men are rarely punished) can range from the girl being

cast out from her family to death. Clearly this is not a norm that can

be disregarded as “bad form;” rather, it is a more whose violation
Belief Systems 189

bears severe consequences in a particular culture group. This is in

contrast to American culture, where premarital virginity is considered a norm, but not necessarily a more.

Mores may include codes of honor—though codes of honor may

also communicate norms. These codes often provide a basis for assumptions about how things should/do work in an area, just as

they influence people’s judgments of events. Though Afghan Pashtuns are Muslim, for example, it is often the Pashtunwali, an unwritten code of behavior based on an exaggerated sense of

personal honor, which trumps religion in interpreting events and

determining proper actions in the region. As a code of honor,

Pashtunwali includes honor (nang), revenge (badal) for injury to

honor; and asylum (nanawatey), or granting of hospitality to those

who seek refuge. Pashtunwali is therefore an unwritten, culturally-coded list of mores.12

Taboos. Taboos are activities or the use of physical objects that are

explicitly forbidden. Taboos are generally based on religious notions of permissible and impermissible objects and activities. In

contrast to mores, taboos are rarely about “what you should/must

do,” but are about “what you should/must not do.” In a seeming

paradox, however, broken taboos may not always carry the heavy

repercussions of violations of a social more. This may, in part, be

attributed to the notion that God or the powers that be will strike

down the offender, so that others in the society need not enforce

the requirement of observance.

In this sense, the factor of public restraints vs. private freedom is

at play: with respect to taboos, it is often the public violation of

them that causes the particular disgust of society. In more secular

Muslim societies, significant numbers of Muslims choose not to fast

during the month of Ramadan. Respecting the norms and taboos

of Islam, however, they ensure that their personal choice does not

become a publicly visible practice. In Tunisia, for example, it is

widely known that some people do not fast during Ramadan.

However, public violation of the fast elicits strong displeasure and

sometimes social ostracism. For example, even though he was fabulously popular as the hero of North African nationalism, Tunisian
190 Operational Culture

President Habib Bourguiba’s drinking of orange juice on state television still received considerable public censure—or praise as an

iconoclast—in Tunisia and beyond.13

In addition to the public-private difference with respect to taboos,

there are also different levels of taboo. Clearly, drinking orange

juice during Ramadan cannot be compared to the taboo of incest—

which, though defined differently in different cultures, is never considered acceptable “behind closed doors,” and is legally and/or

physically punishable in most cultures.

Probably the most obvious taboos that a Marine will encounter are

taboos regarding food and drink. Many cultural and religious

groups around the world have rules regarding forbidden foods.

Muslims forbid drinking alcohol and eating pork (plus a host of

other “unclean” animals) and require that animals are killed according to certain hallal rules. Likewise Jews, Hindus, Buddhists

and certain Christian groups have their own dietary restrictions.

Other equally important taboos center around notions of physical

purity and cleanliness. Many cultural groups have taboos forbidding “unclean” individuals from participating in certain social activities. Traditionally in India, the Untouchable caste was not

permitted to socialize or interact with other castes due to their unclean work as garbage cleaners. And in parts of East and West

Africa, menstruating women cannot prepare food or participate in

the community’s social life due to notions of their impurity.

This discussion of norms, mores, and taboos has not touched upon

laws or the legal system of a country. This is because culture

groups in AOs to which Marines will deploy may not have formal

legal systems or codified laws unto themselves—though they might

have sub-national norms, mores, and taboos that are unique to

them. Legal systems are a product of a state society, and—in the

model most recognizable to westerners—are imposed upon all residents of the state, regardless of the sub-national culture group’s

practices and traditions. However, since state legal systems do not

account for all local norms, often local culture groups disregard

laws that do not reflect their beliefs, or develop “understood” laws
Belief Systems 191

to enforce their mores and taboos. Conversely, there are cases

where the state itself recognizes the validity of—or must accept—

alternative local legal norms, practices, or structures.

Example: Legal Systems within Legal Systems – The Native American Case

Many governments have struggled with how to apply laws to indigenous

cultural groups, whose beliefs and traditions are different from those of the

people governing the state. One solution has been to allow indigenous

groups (particularly differing religious groups) the right to apply their own

laws in matters not affecting the state. Like other pre-modern dynastic states,

the Sunni Muslim Ottoman Empire, for example, governed according to the

millet system, which granted a certain amount of legal autonomy to groups

whose religious faith differed from that of the regime.14

At the other end of the Muslim world, the administration of British India

permitted significant legal and governmental autonomy to the tribal groups

of the far northwest of the sub-continent. The Pakistani government—often

because it is unable to exert power in this area—has prolonged this

arrangement, in today’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.xv

Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of this tolerance of

indigenous legal systems is the patchwork of laws and rights that govern the

many Native American reservations in the U.S. During the U.S. expansion

across the country to the West, the U.S. government signed many treaties

with the Native American groups that it defeated. These treaties not only

gave the Native American groups rights over certain lands, but also gave

them sovereign rights to self-government. As a consequence, today the

U.S. could be considered a nation state with mini-Native American states

scattered within it.

This arrangement has resulted in an unusual dual legal system on most

Native American reservations. Although all Native American groups are

subject to the national laws governing the U.S., while on their reservations

Native Americans are also subject to their own indigenous laws. Each Native

American tribe can regulate, judge, and punish their own members

according to their own cultural and religious traditions.

Complicating the picture is the issue of the uneven and inconsistent agreements that were made by the U.S. government with each individual tribe.

Since treaties were made with different tribes at different times in history by

different U.S. representatives, few treaties are alike. The result is a confusing array of legal relationships between the U.S. and the hundreds of tribes

scattered across the country.
192 Operational Culture

Legal Systems within Legal Systems – The Native American Case; continued.

In recent years, a number of Native American tribes have used their political and legal autonomy to their own advantage. Thus we find that while

many U.S. states forbid the sale of fireworks and gambling, many Native

American tribes permit these activities, attracting much business particularly around the Fourth of July.

The Ottoman case demonstrates the unique legal and regulatory arrangements when the dynastic regime does not have a tradition of enforcing its

faith-based legal writ over far-flung, religiously diverse populations. The

Pakistani situation case emerges when the over-arching state lacks the legitimacy or coercive power to enforce control far from the capital. By

contrast, the Native American case illustrates the complex and challenging problems that even a strong, organized state faces in dealing with a

legacy of conquered indigenous peoples. Marines can expect that such

problems only multiply in weak states whose power and authority over

indigenous populations is marginal at best.16

The disconnect between state law and local law and practice is by

no means total, however. In most societies, the state’s legal system

is significant, in cultural terms, because it reflects larger principles

based on that society’s norms, mores, and taboos. For Marines,

the implications are three-fold. First, a Marine must work to

grasp the norm, or more, behind the explicit law of the land. Second, a Marine will find that it is not enough to ensure that actions

align with law; in a cultural sense, they must also adhere to local

norms, mores, and taboos in order to obtain that legitimacy often

necessary in the kinds of operations Marines undertake among foreign peoples.

Third, though U.S. or coalition forces seeking to establish stability in the AO may establish laws, decrees, or procedures, if they do

not adhere to the local norms and mores, people are unlikely to

follow these external laws and decrees. Though resultant indigenous behavior might be “illegal,” that does not imply that the local

people are lawless—rather, the externally-imposed legal order has

inadequate legitimacy according to local norms and mores.
Belief Systems 193

Culture Operator’s Questions: Norms, Mores, and Taboos

In preparing for work in a foreign AO, Marines should try to determine answers to the following questions:

● What food and behavioral taboos exist in the region?

● What norms should Marines, even though they are foreign

to the AO, observe?

● What underlying allegiances or codes of honor could influence the success of an operation?

● What activities in the area are considered serious violations

of social mores and could carry serious punishments, including

death?

● What beliefs or assumptions exist locally about American

practices as regards local norms, mores, and taboos?

● What might the local people think (or have been propagandized to think) Marines are likely to disregard in terms of

local norms, mores, and taboos?

Religious Beliefs

It is not uncommon for most people to assume that cultural beliefs

are the result and reflection of religious beliefs—that religion determines the culture. Yet frequently, the reverse is true: that religious beliefs are adjusted to fit into local cultural beliefs—that

cultural beliefs and practices influence the manifestation of religion.

In fact, particularly in areas without the mass communications,

printing presses, etc., which can overwhelmingly influence belief

systems, “syncretism” emerges quite often. Syncretism is the

amalgamation of local cultural traditions, indigenous religious beliefs, and formal religious systems to create a synthesis of beliefs
194 Operational Culture

and traditions, which, when compared to the “proper” religion of

scriptures, clergy, and capital-city seminaries, looks “strange” and

“incompatible” with the “real” religion.

Example: Syncretism as Social Reality

A classic example of syncretism is the practice of Catholicism by the Indians

of Peru. In the high Andes, Catholicism (which arrived with the Spanish)

is mixed with ancient Native American traditions based on the Incan

calendar and seasons. In a mix of Catholic religion with pre-existing local

cultural practices, prominent figures in the ancient Indian religious stories

and traditions suddenly become revered Catholic saints. These “Catholic”

saints are worshipped by local Highland Quichuas, with their own saint

days and festivities. Naturally, the Vatican does not recognize these saints,

but has had little to no success in demoting the local religious figures in the

local Peruvian communities.17

In discussing culture and religion, most anthropologists distinguish

between the “Great Tradition” (the formal, written canonic version

of a religion) and the “Little Traditions” (the local, informal, daily

practices of a religion, which vary from region to region and even

community to community).18 In working in an AO, Marines need

to be able to distinguish between what people in a community

do—their daily observance and practice of their religion—and what

the formal priestly religious authorities say that a “good Muslim or

Christian or Jew or Buddhist” should do. As most Marines with experience in a foreign AO will attest, there is often a huge gulf between the two.

In fact, people from an AO reporting to Marines about religious

practices and beliefs there will often tell Marines what people

should do, as opposed to what they do do; conversely, often what

people do do is passed off as the proper ought-to-be-done. Marines

need to understand that in any given AO, both dynamics are underway.

As important, Marines need to recognize that local practice (rather

than formal religious edict) ultimately has much more power to influence local peoples’ behaviors and beliefs. For this reason, be-
Belief Systems 195

fore deployment to a new area, it is not enough to study the “religion” as understood in texts, rules, or sacred histories of the orthodox community. Rather, it is through studying religion as

locally lived human performances and a locally manifested

cluster of beliefs and attitudes that a Marine can come to understand religion as s/he will see it and as people feel it in an

AO.

Recognizing the gap between the formal and informal practice of

religion is also immensely instructive in illustrating areas of potential tension and conflict. Below we briefly describe the important

features of both formal and informal interpretations of religion:

Formal Religion. Formal interpretations of religion (regardless

of whether the religion is Christianity, Confucianism, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, or any other major world religion) are

typically characterized by the following features:

● Texts, religious debates, and commentaries are written and

passed down over time.

● Study occurs in religious schools that frequently (although

not always) teach an officially composed and accepted doctrine.

● “Ownership” of the religion rests with an elite educated

class of religious specialists (priests, rabbis, ulama, monks etc.)

who are authorized to provide “official” interpretations, laws,

and religious proclamations for the “flock.”

● Differences between religious leaders and schools may lead

to formally recognized schisms within the Great Tradition

(Catholicism versus Protestantism; Shi‘i versus Sunni Islam).

● The general populace has little role in the leadership, interpretation, or direction of the formal religious system; it is

guided, but does not guide.

Informal Religion. Mingled with but in contrast to formal religion, informal traditions are predominantly folk interpretations of
196 Operational Culture

the Great Tradition. By “folk” we mean those developed through

the prism of popular practices, beliefs, aspirations, and needs.

“Folk” religion emerges outside formal, clerical, or “orthodox”

structures, and its authenticity thus rests upon its resonance with

the people, as opposed to textual justifications. Part of this authenticity, of course, reflects “folk religion,” or the syncretistic mixture of indigenous beliefs, traditions, and practices found in Little

Traditions. Marines will encounter these Little Traditions. These

practices and beliefs will differ sometimes from town to town, and

will factor into indigenous conduct towards Marines.

Little Traditions are characterized by:

● A predominantly mouth-to-ear method of inter-generational

transmission of information about the religion.

● Hyper-localized variety in religious practice and interpretation, as the oral information becomes connected to other local

traditions and beliefs.

● Religious prestige mingles with existing, often hereditary

social structures, as folk religious leaders inherit position and

knowledge from relatives or mystical teachers.

● Religious leaders become vested with almost superhuman

powers, since their authority is based on both “secret” oral

knowledge not obtainable through formalized learning methods, as well as on lineage relationships.

● Religious interpretations and daily practices are frequently

based upon local traditions, beliefs, superstitions, and taboos,

all reinforcing existing cultural norms.

● Power and authority are based on popular support and

charisma.

● Local popular religious movements (such as the early Sufi

movements in Islam, or Hasidism in Judaism) are perceived as

challenges by the formal religious authorities.
Belief Systems 197

Example: Folk Religion as Religious Transgression

Expressions of religion in many areas are often written off by people who

say, “That’s not the religion, it’s only the culture.” It is important that

Marines see what goes on in front of them, however, as an interpretation

of the religion in the local culture in a way that creates a meaningful

spiritual and social existence. In monotheistic religions, amulets exemplify

this dynamic.

From Kenya to Senegal, many African soldiers wear amulets under their

utilities for protection against natural and man-made violent forces. This

inanimate object is believed to have the power to affect humans and nature.

For soldiers who are Muslim—or Christian—this is prohibited in the formal,

orthodox faith, as it implies that something other than the omnipotent God

influences natural events and men’s actions. Yet, soldiers who are Muslim

see no disconnect between the use of amulets and the Islamic prohibition

against worshipping any object or spirit other than God; instead, they see

it as part of their Islam.

Lest this be thought the case only for primitive, semi-monotheistic Africans,

throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, Christians, Jews,

and Muslims wear amulets such as nazar charms (eyes), hamsas (stylized

hands), or boxes with mystical parchment in them to ward off the evil eye.

Though none of this is sanctioned by the canonical texts of religion, even

“orthodox” members of the faith use them, with related expressions

prevalent in the spoken, even secular languages. Jews say “bli ‘ayin ha-ra‘”

(without the evil eye); Muslims, Christians, and Jews say “ma sha’llah” (as

G-d wills it [so the evil spirit will not taint it]), etc.

In fact, much of performed religion that Marines will see in an AO is part

of the Little Tradition, proscribed by “orthodox religion.” Beating oneself

on ‘Ashura is frowned upon by Shi‘ite religious authorities trained in the

seminaries—just as clergy in the Philippines forbid—but look the other

way—when Catholics nail themselves to crosses on Good Friday. Ecstatic,

continuous bowing during prayer—visible in any traditional Jewish

synagogue service—is considered improper decorum in strict

commentaries, while the whirling of Sufi dervishes is thought libertine and

excessively sensual by the Islam of the ulama. But it continues, because it

speaks to peoples’ needs and often is layered upon pre-existing norms and

practices.

Remember: there is what is supposed to be—believed, performed—

and then there is what really is. Often, what is has more meaning
198 Operational Culture

for people who actually live the religion on a daily basis than what

is supposed to be. Similarly, belief and creed systems are not sealed

off from each other. Grasping these realities will allow ground

level operators as well as information operations personnel to effectively incorporate these beliefs and practices—all narratives—

into their operational planning.

Culture Operator’s Questions: Religious Beliefs

Questions that Marines can use to guide their evaluation of the role

of religion should include:

● Who is the actual leader of the local religious community?

● How do religious leaders relate to the educated elite vs.

popular groups, etc.?

● What is the basis of authority for a “religious” leader in the

AO: book learning, lineage, charisma, etc.?

● What are the actual (versus theoretical/textual) religious

practices in the specific AO where the Marine operates?

● How do local practices of a religion the Marine has encountered elsewhere differ from what that Marine thinks the religion is “supposed” to look like?

● What power and role, if any, does the formal religious system play in local peoples’ daily lives?

● What conflicts or disagreements exist between the formal

religious system and the local religious practices of the AO?

● How prominent is “religion” as an explanatory factor for

people in current events, and in reference to history, or historical trajectories?
Belief Systems 199

● What is “the way the world is supposed to be” according

to locally-held religious beliefs, and how does the Marine presence impact that?

Notes

1 “Group beliefs” should be distinguished from “individual beliefs.” The former

are open to influence by behaviors and structured relationships; the latter are

much less so.

2 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory intro. and ed. By Lewis A. Coser

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); also see discussion in the introductory chapters of Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the

Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press,

1997).

3 For a discussion of this in the context of Egypt, see Barak Salmoni, “Historical

Consciousness for Modern Citizenship: Egyptian Schooling and the Lessons of

History under the Constitutional Monarchy,” in Goldschmidt, Johnson, Salmoni,

eds., Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919-1952 (Cairo: American University in Cairo

Press, 2005), 164.

4 Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2005); Vali Nasr,

The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York:

W. W. Norton , 2007); Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi‘a in the

Modern Arab World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ali Allawi,

The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT:

Yale University Press, 2007).

5 See Jim Proser and Jerry Cutter, “I’m Staying with My Boys...” The Heroic Life

of Sgt. John Basilone, USMC (Lightbearer Communications Company, 2004). 6 Personal observation by author, RCT 5 HQ, Camp Falluja, Iraq, October 2006.

7 Zdenek Salzmann, Language, Culture, And Society: An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006). 8 Douglas McCollam, “The Umbrella’s Shadow,” Foreign Policy (online), October 2006; also see Jack M. Holl’s comments about the umbrella’s symbology

into the 1950s in American political culture: “The New Washington Monument:

History in the Federal Government,” The Public Historian 7:5 (Autumn 1985), 9-

20; also see the excellent recent book by Jeffrey Record, The Specter of Munich:

Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books,

2007).

9 Technical terms for these ideas include “haptics,” “tesics,” “proxemics,” among

others. For more on this topic in general, see Muriel Saville-Troike, The Ethnography of Communication: An Introduction (Boston, MA: Blackwell Publishing

Limited, 2002); Joy Hendry, An Anthropology of Indirect Communication (London: Routledge, 2001).

10 BN CO from 1st MarDiv, interviewed by author, OIF II, TCMEF, April 2005.
200 Operational Culture

11 For a Lebanese example of this dynamic, see, Augustus Richard Norton,

“Ashura in Nabatiya,” Middle East Insight 15:3 (May-June 2000), 21-28. 12 Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Afghanistan: Operational

Culture for Deploying Personnel (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Training and Education Command, 2006), 51-61. 13 See Hussain Haqqani, “Head Scarves and History: For Clumsy Secularism,

Deadly Rewards,” International Herald Tribune 22 Dec 2003; John P. Entelis,

Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997); Fred Halliday, “Tunisia’s Uncertain Future,” Middle East Report No. 16 (Mar-Apr 1990), 25-27; “The Art of Plain Talk,” Time Magazine 29

Sept 1967.

14 See Halil Inalcik, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” Studia Islamica 2 (1954);

idem., The Ottoman Empire in the Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973); Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The

Structure of Power (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), 216-51; Benjamin

Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The

Functioning of a Plural Society (Princeton, NJ: Holmes and Meier, 1982); Ira

Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge University

Press, 2002). For the dilemmas that millet-like arrangements created for modern Middle Eastern states, see Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (London:

Oxford University Press, 1993).

15 For journalistic coverage of the Pakistan and its Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA), see Mary Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and

Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002); as well as Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); also see

Benedicte Grima, Secrets from the Field: An Ethnographer’s Notes from Northwestern Pakistan (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2004). 16 See N. Bruce Duthu and Colin Calloway, eds., American Indians and the Law

(New York: Viking Press, 2008); Robert N. Clinton and Carole E. Goldberg, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal System, Fifth Edition (Matthew

Bender: 2007).

17 Michael D. Sills, “Christianimism: Catholic Syncretism in the New World,”

Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, http://www.sbts.edu/pdf/ChristiAnimism.pdf; Dora G. Lodwick, “Reviewed Work(s): Peru: When the World

Turned Dark,” Teaching Sociology 19, number 1 (January 1991): 117-119. 18 For descriptions and explanations of Great and Little Traditions in the context

of formal versus informal religious systems see Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed:

Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago, Ill.: University of

Chicago Press, 1968); Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An

Anthropological Approach (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, [1981]

1998).
201

Part III

Toward Applying Operational Culture

In Part I of this book, we described and defined the basic features

of culture in terms of their relevance for the Marine. In Part II we

moved from the more abstract concept of “culture” to five specific

dimensions of culture that affect Marine operations, providing examples from different regions of the world where Marines have

operated and may deploy. Ultimately, however, theories and principles of culture are only relevant for the Marine if they can be applied to actual operations.

It is not the purpose of Operational Culture to provide a doctrinal

manual with specific steps that Marines are expected to follow in

applying culture to military operations. Indeed, to the contrary,

throughout this book we have emphasized that Marines must use

principles of culture in a flexible and creative manner in order to

achieve operational success. There is no one formula or checklist

that can serve Marine purposes across the spectrum of military activities around the world. “One size fits all” does not suit the application of culture to the spectrum of Marine involvement in

foreign AOs. Just as operational and strategic planning requires

an intuitive understanding of the process, incorporating culture into

operations is as much an intellectually-informed “art” as it is a “science.”

In Part III, therefore, we turn our discussion to the “art” of applying principles of culture to Marine operations and activities. Chapter Eight applies the Five Operational Culture Dimensions to three

case studies: Nigeria, Darfur and the Philippines. In each case, we

examine the way that all five dimensions interact to create specific

conditions in the region, and discuss the impact that these sociocultural conditions could have on potential Marine operations in

the region. Chapter Nine then turns to the issue of teaching cultural principles to Marines, both in Professional Military Education

(PME) and during pre-deployment training (PTP). In order to pro-
202 Operational Culture

vide an effective framework for military education, we use Bloom’s

Taxonomy of learning to evaluate the appropriate kinds and levels of culture learning necessary at different ranks, billets, and functions.
203

Chapter 8

From Models to Dimensions

to Observable Realities

In Part II of Operational Culture for the Warfighter, we examined

the three core models of operational culture, and then we moved

on to the five dimensions through which a culture operator can

understand, plan for, and work in an area of operations. We examined the ways these dimensions have practical and concrete relevance to Marine operations by discussing the components of the

various dimensions and the relationships that connect them.

“Relationship” is the focal word here: in culture groups, none of

these models, dimensions, or components exists in isolation from

one other. Rather, they are all integrated. In every case, a culture

group’s realities in one dimension set the stage for conditions in the

next dimension; while for some of these dimensions, the cause and

effect relationship goes in two directions. The same is true for the

components of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions.

It is essential to grasp the integrated nature of cultural dimensions

in order to fully understand and take advantage of cause and effect within an AO. This is not unlike the combined operations of

a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The presence of the

Wing, Combat Services Support, Logistics, Ground Combat Element, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets is not enough in and of itself. Each can interrupt the lines of

operation of the other if they are not fully integrated so as to be

mutually supportive in pursuit of a common operational or theater-level goal. It is the role of command, control, and communications—C3, and of course, good commanders—to provide such

integration and ensure proper battle management.

In the same vein, in the absence of an integrated understanding of

culture, Marine actions, be they kinetic, civil affairs, information
204 Operational Culture

operations, or intelligence collection, will be contradictory and undermine each other. Most importantly, these un-integrated actions

can often cause the opposite effect from the one intended on the

local civilian population, opponents, and indigenous partners. This

means that an un-integrated approach to integrating culture in

operations will undermine the mission itself: It will turn culture into a barrier confronting battle management.

In Part I of this book, we introduced the Five Operational Culture

Dimensions as emerging from three analytical models based on

twentieth-century anthropology. The diagram below refreshes our

memory of this. Just as important, the connecting lines demonstrate the interrelationships, or backwards and forwards lines of influence, among the Operational Culture Dimensions themselves.

More broadly, the diagram shows that the Ecological, Social Structure, and Symbolic analytical models are tightly interlaced. This interlaced, recursive nature of Operational Culture should inspire a

Marine’s analytical methodology when examining cultures in the

operational planning and execution phases.

Figure 8.1

Operational Culture: From Models to Dimensions

Model Dimension

Ecological Model

Social Structure Model

Symbolic Model

subset

inter-relationship

Physical Enviroment

Economic System

Social Structure

Political Structure

Beliefs and Symbols
Observable Realities 205

Part II described how each Operational Culture Dimension contains several components, which also emerge in the battlespace in

dynamic interaction with each other. The diagram below depicts

this relationship, both among Operational Culture Dimensions and

their Components.

Figure 8.2

Operational Culture: From Dimensions to Components

Dimension Component

Environment

Economic

Social

Political

Beliefs

Water

Land

Food

Materials for Shelter

Climate and Seasons

Fuel/Power

Formal/Informal Systems

Systems of Exchange Networks

Relationship Systems

Age

Gender

Class

Kinship

Ethnicity

Religious Membership

Political Organization

Cultural Forms of Leadership

Challenges to Political Structures

History, Memory. Folklore

Icons

Symbols and Communication

Ritual

Norms, Mores,Taboos

Religious Beliefs
206 Operational Culture

These diagrams do not merely illustrate theoretical linkages; dynamics in historical and contemporary cultures bear them out. In

this chapter therefore, we examine three case studies that show

how in contemporary operating environments, cultural dimensions

and their components are in fact tightly integrated, producing either the conditions for conflict, or the conflicts themselves to which

Marines will deploy.

Case Study I – Nigeria: Oil and Burgeoning Insurgency

In the 1950s, Nigeria was like many other Central/West African

countries emerging from colonialism, in this case British. It was

poor by Western standards, and possessed an economic system

based on agriculture. In the Niger Delta in particular, an environment of intense wetlands, creeks, rivers, and mangroves facilitated

cultivation of palm oil and cacao beans, while fishing was prevalent as the Delta opened onto the Atlantic Ocean. This environment permitted an economic system supporting a relatively

self-sufficient subsistence based on cultivation and trade of local

foods, with barter playing a role equal to that of currency. Currency in circulation locally tended to be used more for purchase of

survival commodities, as opposed to capital accumulation, investment, or development of capacity for migration or absentee forms

of ownership.

The environment therefore provided economic livelihoods to small

communities whose social structures were in turn organized

through kinship systems. These kinship systems—or tribes—were

also associated with hyper-local ethnic groups, such as the Ijaw,

Igbo, Igoni, and Osoko—often labeled by previous colonial rulers.

These groups, sometimes tribal, sometimes ethnic, identified

closely with their local territories, though they were citizens of a

political state whose boundaries were drawn by exiting colonial

rulers—and which included other, majority ethnic groups such as

the Yoruba, Hausa, and Fulani, who were from the northern, more

Muslim part of the new state. In the Delta, therefore, social structures producing political structures of hereditary tribal leadership
Observable Realities 207

resulted in local identities, though local kinship network-based

rulers possessed much less coercive or economic power than did

the central government, dominated from the 1960s by the military.

This “cultural ecosystem”—linking environment to economy, social structure, and political structure—began to evolve from the

early 1960s, when oil began to emerge from the Niger Delta in

commercial quantities. In the ensuing fifty years, though Nigeria

has become an oil giant of strategic significance to the U.S., Europe,

China, and Japan, the economic changes have driven political, environmental, and social structural deformities throughout Nigeria.

Spanning across all Five Operational Culture Dimensions discussed

in Part II, these deformities are most evident in the Delta itself, resulting in communal conflict and proto-insurgent conditions, in

turn threatening U.S. and Western strategic interests through potential military conflicts and shocks to industrial economies reliant

on African oil.

Oil is often considered an economic commodity, which it is. However, it is in the first instance a component of the natural environment—and its uses will thus have significant impacts on the

environment as well as the economy of a culture. As we have suggested, not only does the economy of a culture influence its social

structures, but political developments can ripple through the social,

economic, and even environmental dimensions of operational culture. This has been the case in Nigeria over the past fifty years.

The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Nigeria came at

roughly the same time that post-colonial Nigeria experienced a series of military coups by officers who had been trained by the

British during their imperial control of the region. In the main, the

coups were motivated by the desire for power and control of resources, but also reflected competition among the three Islamized

majority ethnic groups from the north of the country, the Yoruba,

Igbo, and Hausa-Fulani. For none of these were the minority

ethno-religious groups of the Niger Delta a priority.
208 Operational Culture

These military rulers, from 1966 through 1999, were to an extent

also influenced by currents of third-world nationalism. Here, natural resources—such as oil—were the property of no individual or

sub-region, but rather were the patrimony of the government-asnation. In 1971, the military-led Nigerian government nationalized

the oil industry, so that all revenues from oil export come to the

government, which would then dole out revenues to regions. In

effect then, an aspect of the environment with economic implications became part of both politics as well as ideological belief systems, such that political agendas influenced the economy.

Like other oil-rich states, Nigeria prioritized the oil industry at the

expense of more traditional agriculture and hunting and gathering—practices that put less of a stress on the environment and

were also able to sustain the economic and social structures of

small chief-led communities in the Niger Delta. The oil economy

has physically deformed the environment of the Delta. Mangroves,

in whose swamps fish collected, have been stripped away so that

oil pipelines could criss-cross the Delta. The pipelines, as well as

new roads ploughed through marshlands, have reduced areas for

fish to spawn.

Like their food for survival, fishing communities themselves have

been physically uprooted and moved to other parts of the Delta,

to make room for fuel storage tanks and natural gas plants. In

these same areas, forests have been uprooted, and no longer provide natural wind and rain blocks for local communities. Families

thus find their thatched roofs rained through and ruined much

more frequently, with replacement becoming increasingly costly.

Also, the burning oil flares have released greenhouse gasses, heating up the climate and causing acid rain that corrodes roofs, hurts

crops, and leads to respiratory illnesses.

Finally, the increased large vessel traffic and terminal construction

on the Delta coast have changed wave patterns, resulting in soil

erosion. Remaining fish stocks are thus found farther out to sea

than in the past, and few Nigerians on the coast can afford boat engines powerful enough to permit them to reach their traditional

sources of food and economy. The agricultural and fishing econ-
Observable Realities 209

omy is now swept away, along with the environment that supports

it—some towns have seen their populations drop by 90% in the

past 30 years, while Nigeria is now forced to import food. If a

Deltan wants fish, he must purchase frozen fish shipped in from

abroad—if he can afford it.

The new economy is the oil economy, and it has influenced the

local social and political structures. The government in Abuja, even

after the return of civilian rule in 1999, has prioritized areas outside

the Delta for expenditure based on oil revenues. At the same time,

it has helped the dominant tribal and ethnic groups—Yoruba,

Hausa-Fulani, and Igbo—to find jobs in the Delta’s oil economy,

thus economically excluding the local peoples as a corollary of

their political exclusion.

Further, the new economy impacted the local village- and tribal

chief-based political structures. The Abuja government, as well as

foreign oil companies, have offered irresistible amounts of money

to local chiefs in order to obtain drilling rights—rights which are

traditionally not those of the chief to grant unilaterally, given the

social structural dynamics of tribalism as seen on Chapter Five.

Other, economically depressed chiefs without agricultural or fishing resources, are now able to remain well-off by supporting the

oil economy through road-building crews or sand-dredging.

In both cases, social status and political power of chiefs are no

longer based on a now-weakened social compact with a kin group;

rather, local leaders are reliant on the government and foreign economic agents who produce and extract oil. Chiefs are thus weaker

than before as nodes of socio-political control and local mobilization.

What remains? Unemployed people in the fifteen-to-fifty age

bracket. Disenfranchised politically, economically, and ethnically

by the state, they constitute a sector of society which because of

its mere positionality in Nigeria, is bound to challenge the existing

political structure. They confront much weakened local social and

political structures, therefore unable to restrain them.
210 Operational Culture

In this environment, new belief systems have become popular, including local versions of Protestant Christianity—adding another

complicating element to the north-south ethno-religious divide.

New belief systems also emerge through social structures, such as

church communities and preachers, whose moral suasion might

rival that of tribal leaders on the decline.

These new social groups also have their historical memories and

icons: In 1990, the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa founded the Movement

for the Survival of Ogoni People. The organization demanded control of the oil on local lands and an end to environmental damage.

In 1993, a quarter of a million locals rallied in support. The military government retaliated by charging Saro-Wiwa and others with

murder on ethno-tribal bases. Saro-Wiwa and eight others were

hanged by the state in 1995.

Such events, and the beliefs and symbols they generate, have set

the stage for the most threatening new development in the social

and political structure: a local insurgency. The Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger Delta and other lesser-known groups

have emerged, led by people much lower in the traditional social

scale, with less education, and at times from traditionally less prominent branches of tribes. These groups have in the past few years

attacked local oil infrastructure, local police and military forces, and

representatives of American and European oil companies.

In the latter case, the Movement and shadier groups can tap into

the memory of Nigeria’s colonial history to tar the companies—

and the Abujan government—as complicit in re-instituting imperialist control of the nation’s local resources. Ironically, rebel groups

can use against the government an ideological axis—control of the

nation’s natural resources against foreigners—that the post-independence political regime itself had made popular.

The Nigerian army has responded by destroying villages, expelling

Deltans from Military Zones, and engaging in mass round-ups of

young men. In the process, international oil companies have been

forced to reduce work—also harmful to the local economy now

dependent on French, Italian, and American firms—while Western
Observable Realities 211

countries themselves have begun to consider the implications of

Nigerian Delta insurgency for strategic stability and terrorism.1

Considering this case in light of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions studied in Part II of this book, we see that an insurgency

of concern to Western governments today results from the highly

integrated nature of environment, economy, social structures, politics, and belief systems. The economic changes, in conjunction

with political changes at the national level in Nigeria, altered the

local environment, economy, social structure, and political dynamics in the Niger Delta. Likewise, these changes were reflected

in new ideologies, methods of mobilization, and ultimately new

and dangerous political-military processes. This all threatens stability in a key African state, potentially endangers energy supplies

for the West, and might at some point require US intervention.

Without considering these local cultural dynamics in an integrated

fashion, a Marine commander will be unprepared to deal with the

challenges and opportunities he will face. This is because he and

his Marines will likely encounter local leaders who are of questionable residual legitimacy, and cannot guarantee the loyalty of

“their” people. If intervening to support foreign oil companies,

Marines will automatically be associated with the imperial legacy

and foreign companies in collusion with an alien ethnic, religious,

and political regime from Abuja.

Marines will also find military-aged males, whom it is inappropriate—in an operational culture sense—to label as “good,” “bad,” or

“evil;” rather, their mere positionality in the social, economic, and

political structures has pushed them into a destabilizing role. These

Niger Deltans will have suffered injustices at the hands of other

uniformed people—the Nigerian military—and will thus feel quite

justified in engaging in destabilizing activities.

Conversely, though some of the leaders of these groups might be

able to enforce quiet among their followers and ethno-religious

kinsmen in areas of operation where their kinsmen form majorities,

the Nigerian state or foreign oil companies would be likely to oppose the granting of legitimacy to these “terrorists.”
212 Operational Culture

Further, likely local partners in stabilization or security operations

will be police and army leaders who are ethnically and religiously

alienated from the communities being secured and stabilized—they

will also be strikingly corrupt, as an oil economy in an authoritarian state turns representatives of the state into extractive agents in

society. It will also be a military that is somewhat ethnically and

geographically divided, and does not trust itself, given its memory

of spawning several military coups and counter-coups.

Other possible partners—the UK, France, or Italy—might be associated in local minds with the foreign oil companies that have been

complicit with the regime in wrecking environment and economy.

A task force commander and his subordinate commanders will also

encounter severe humanitarian and civil affairs needs, from medical problems to malnutrition, from low levels of education to unemployment as the rule. Providing funds to village leaders to see

to these needs will likely result in little amelioration of conditions.

These leaders have less sway over communities than an American

is likely to assume a tribal “leader” would have. Further, these

local leaders have become accustomed to social and political structures where the state or foreign oil companies dole funds out to

them, but do not hold them accountable for the conditions of their

villages.

Finally, returning to the environment, because of soil erosion and

weakening of terrain and ecosystems, speedy mounted movement

might be difficult, except by negotiating use of roads for fees with

locally compromised leaders—or insurgent bands, whose notions

of honor, law-and-order, etc., are distinctly different from those of

traditional local leaders. Further, extended amphibious operations

will aggravate ongoing environmental destruction, as will mounted

patrols in tracked vehicles, seven-ton trucks, and other heavy

equipment currently in use in urban contexts. In these vehicles,

Marines will be seen as part of the problem.

A Marine commander without this understanding cannot function

effectively as the “culture operator” discussed in Chapter Two.

However, equipped with the analytical method laid out in the past
Observable Realities 213

several chapters, he can plan and equip his force appropriately;

mitigate false impressions about his force; locate proper local

points of contact and influence; conduct operations in a way lessening impact on the local people; and begin to provide for some

of their needs on the environmental, economic, and political levels. The commander, in this case, can also in a more informed

fashion balance concerns about culturally appropriate conduct with

force protection and use of kinetic effects, all in the service of

achieving the task force’s mission end state.

Case Study II – Darfur: Environment, Economy, Ethnicity,

and War

Darfur is a region of western Sudan. It has been the site of a local

insurgency, and government-backed or government-run counterinsurgency, since 2003. It is often cast as an Arab ethnic cleansing campaign against Africans. The realities and roots, however, go

back to the 1980s. Here too, the Five Operational Culture Dimensions have been at play.

Up until the 1980s, the physical environment of Darfur had been

divided between fertile lands and rocky outcroppings, hillsides,

and ridges. Though not at Mediterranean or European levels, rainfall was seasonally constant, with water absorbed by plants and alluvial soil. Therefore, while not supporting modern

communications or transportation—and thus urban industrial

economies—this physical environment did generate two dominant

modes of economic life, co-existing symbiotically. One of these

was agriculture, the other pastoral nomadism.

On the fertile plots, farmers cultivated crops that supported a subsistence economy, providing for regional peoples’ needs when

rainfall was adequate. On the hillsides and crags separating the

cultivable plots, nomads grazed their animals. The two economic

lifestyles interacted, as farmers and nomads shared wells, with the

former purchasing goods and animals from the latter, and the nomads gathering in harvested crops that the agriculturalists left behind for them, as part of a conscious tradition of symbiosis.
214 Operational Culture

Darfur’s social structure is revealed in the meaning of the word

“Darfur”—“land [or abode] of the Fur,” with Fur being the largest

agriculturalist tribe in the region. Both nomads and farmers possessed social relationships based on tribes, with these tribes being

associated with particular geographic—and thus agricultural or migratory—sub-regions, or dars, in the area. Social structure was

thus kinship-based, with identities revolving around three related

axes—economic mode of life (farmer or nomad), tribe, and lands

ancestrally associated with that tribe (dar).

Ethnic labels also exist, but they related to economic and territorial

realities and not ehno-religious divides or a sense of difference.

Rather, to be “black” or “African” meant to be a settled farmer; to

be “Arab” meant to be a nomadic pastoralist. In the same way,

“African” areas were no more than the dars of the settled farmers;

the “Arab” areas were the dars of the nomadic pastoralists.

“Africans” and “Arabs” are not racially distinct in Darfur, though

there are language differences. Significantly, then, environmental

parameters produced modes of economic life, which were reproduced through social structures that sustained a system of identities.

It follows then that changes to the environment would produce alterations to the way other Operational Culture Dimensions manifested themselves in Darfur. Along with political dynamics in

Khartoum, it was these changes—and not “age-old cultural animosities” between “Arabs” and “Africans,” or desires to “ethnic

cleanse” Africa for the sake of “Muslim Arabs”—that produced and

prolong the Darfur crisis.

In the late 1970s, seasonal rains began to fail in Darfur. Farming

therefore became harder, sand blew into once-fertile lands, and existing alluvial soil was washed away by the rare rains. “African”

farmers began to fence off lands once open to the herds of “Arab”

nomads, and did not supply them with agricultural produce.

As the environment became incapable of supporting two economic

systems, nomads had the choices of flight to equally drought-ridden areas; selling off herds and taking up farming on marginal
Observable Realities 215

plots—against the grain of their social identities as free nomads living in pastoral dars; or raiding and encroachment into the dars of

sedentarized agricultural tribes. In increasing instances, “Arab” nomads chose the latter: The environmental change spurred economic conditions forcing lifestyle choices that interacted with

cultural identities to create political problems and violence.

In the 1980s, groups of landless nomads began to raid and occupy

“African lands.” The political and military leadership in Khartoum,

without any roots in Darfur or relationships to agriculturalists there,

encouraged the nomads to think of themselves as ethnically Arab,

fighting against the Africans who unjustly kept them from lands

and sustenance. In the late 1980s, ideologically encouraged by the

state, the “Arab” nomads attacked the farmers, provoking farmernomad clashes in greater numbers.

On both sides, new social structures such as marauding bands

emerged, as did political structures, with leadership at times drawn

from sons of traditional tribal leaders or offshoots of traditionally

significant families. Political manifestos encouraged by the state

were paralleled by networks of nomads based on tribal and ethnic

lines reaching to Khartoum, in order to appeal for and receive support from the political leadership there.

As more farmer villages and nomadic camps were burned in conflicts related to environment and economic challenges, both sides

began to see themselves—and be seen by both the Khartoum elite

and the outside world—in ethnic, racial, and sometimes religious

terms. Fighting continued into the 1990s, so that by this time people on both sides began to “remember” “age-old” rivalries not only

on tribal lines, but ethno-tribal lines as well. When nomadic tribes

in Darfur found that the state would be responsive to “Arab” complaints, they advertised themselves as Arab, and encouraged their

tribal members to do the same. In 1994, the government in Khartoum redistricted Darfur into three sub-regions, putting people

from nomadic “Arab” kin networks in power. The new administrators used their power to territorially and economically marginalize the agricultural “black African” tribes, such as the Fur, Zagawa,

and Masalit.
216 Operational Culture

In 2003, as the north-south civil war drew to an end in Sudan, a

rebellion broke out in Darfur. This was an insurgency led by the

settled farmers in the “African” dars against a state they considered neglectful of the region, and supportive of the nomadic

groups raiding the agricultural areas—to the point of turning a deaf

ear to farmers’ complaints; ideologically inciting the “Arab” nomads; and providing arms to them.

The Sudanese state then launched its counterinsurgency, in the

main employing proxy fighters—the poorer, most dispossessed

nomad tribesmen—organized into a militia known as the Janjaweed, based on a social and ethnic idea of “Arabness” against

“black Africanness.” A new, state-created political structure had

thus come into being along with a related social identity, and for

the first time in the long course of Darfuri history, geographic, social, and political relationships came to be perceived by protagonists as being drawn along ethnic lines. That this was a new

phenomenon, artificially grafted onto previous economic relationships and social identities, can be seen from the fact that the “Arab”

tribes who had suffered least in terms of land possession and economic livelihoods were also those least interested in being Janjaweed.

For their part, the “African” insurgents also developed new social

relationships and networks within groups, at the same time as new

political structures emerged in the form of political groups-cumrebel militias. The foremost groupings have been called the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement.

Their leadership has somewhat followed geographic and tribal

lines, as have their differences of opinion.

From the 1970s through 2006, therefore, environmental changes

drove changes to the economic conditions, which restructured social relationships and caused political unrest. Economic and political difficulties, manipulated by the state, took on a racial hue, as

people were encouraged, either directly by the state or in response

to state actions, to assume ethnically-based identities.
Observable Realities 217

These conditions then produced insurgency and counterinsurgency, where the underlying material interests that sparked the difficulties became layered over by ideology, ethnicity, and notions of

tribal warfare. These circumstances also lead to complications at

the international level. Given the Sudanese government’s flirtations

with Islamism and Bin Laden in the 1980s and 1990s, after 11 September 2001 it became very easy for Western leaders and activist

groups to view the Darfur conflict through the prism of the War on

Terror and Arab (Muslim) brutalization of “black Africans.” There

have thus been recurrent calls for intervention in Darfur to prevent

ethnic cleansing and genocide against “African farmers” abused by

“Arab Janjaweed,” even though none of these categories really

apply, and the “Africans” themselves began the insurgency.

At the same time, Darfuri agricultural tribes’ refugee flight to their

linguistic and ethnic kinsmen farther west has entangled neighboring Chad in the conflict. Chadian security forces have made

intermittent forays into Darfur, and the government in N’Djamena

has threatened economic boycott or harsher measures against

Sudan in the name of security, though with an undertone of tribal

and ethnic animosity. The United States has had a low-level

though important security relationship with Chad for some years.

It is also the east flank of the strategically significant Sahel region

of Sub-Saharan Africa. This, combined with U.S. concerns regarding Sudan, Ethiopia, and then Somalia, might at some point make

U.S. intervention in Sudan a possibility.2

If Marine forces were sent to intervene, they would likely have

multiple missions: They would have to separate conflicting parties,

interdict weapons smuggling routes, and in some cases use force

to protect targets of attack. They would also need to dissuade

Chad from intervening—or work with Chadians and other African

militaries as partners. Commanders at all levels would also have

to plan and execute sustained humanitarian operations, to include

population relocation, medical care, physical reconstruction, building of shelters, and temporary job creation. They would need to

do all this in collaboration with an unwilling Khartoum government, international aid agencies, non-governmental organizations,

and residual African Union military forces.
218 Operational Culture

A Marine commander, accustomed from Iraq and Afghanistan deployments to think that tribes have specific “AORs,” and are also

of specific ethnic and religious groups, would not be well served

by these ideas. He would need to grasp that there are no static

“tribal lay-downs” geographically, and that even his native interlocutors would be telling him only what they remember, or wished

to be true. Rather, people, groups, and notions of “who’s who”

have been on the move over the last decade. At the same time, a

Marine may well encounter groups of people who feel connected

to parcels of land. These parcels could either be new areas to

which they have been forced as displaced persons but now do not

want to leave, or ancestral dars from which they have been ejected,

but still consider “their” lands. These feelings of connectedness

will be based on a combination of symbolic and economic value.

Further, Marines would have to understand that “African,” “black,”

“Arab,” and “Islamist” are often used as convenient labels not reflecting actual local causes of conflict. In fact, Marine commanders at all levels will need to detect initial material causes for the

clash of needs and interests, providing inducements in the form of

cash, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction, to reduce the

basic drivers of conflict—i.e., those things that will cause conflict

no matter who is “African” or “Arab.” Commanders will have to

provide these inducements in such a way as to strengthen traditional kin authorities, along tribal and dar lines—thus sidestepping

at times official Sudanese “Arab” authority chains—even if this

means a fair amount of corruption and skimming by tribe leaders.

Corruption, theft, and unresponsiveness to measures which “objectively” would help Darfuris will at least partially reflect egalitarian economic notions about the need to spread wealth among

many unseen segments of a group, so as to meet traditional welfare responsibilities. The need to maintain tribal leaders’ prestige,

or shore up their waning social esteem, will also drive corruption.

Finally, since cultural groups exposed to prolonged arbitrary conduct by governmental powers often exhibit low levels of trust in

both the future and anyone beyond close-in networks, there will

be added corruption as well as skepticism or apathy towards Marine initiatives.
Observable Realities 219

Still, Marines will have to determine when new labels have taken

on meaning for protagonists in the conflict. In this case, a Marine

leader will find that in addition to government incitement, sometimes enduring material interests—access to livelihood through

land—cause violence, whereas at other times violence is prolonged

because new ethnic labels take on a meaning of their own, and

then create interest groups and conflict.

Furthermore, because ethnicity, tribe, and territory have become so

entangled, a Marine will need to recognize that seemingly impartial U.S. actions which his forces take—separating combatants, arresting marauders, etc.—will be perceived by different protagonists

as the U.S. taking sides and supporting one group over the other.

Conversely, efforts to remain neutral and not intervene too aggressively on any one side will also be perceived by one or the

other protagonists as bias.

Also, due to years of mutual bloodletting among people who

mostly do not wear uniforms, distinctions among “civilian,” “military,” “combatant,” and “neutral” will be irrelevant in local terms.

Darfuris from one tribe, dar, or “ethnic” group will consider it legitimate to target unarmed members of other groups, as they are

all potential enemies. Attempting to break this mental mold will be

futile for Marines.

In the same vein, years of conflict will have produced a social stratum of male adolescents and young adults who have come to associate manhood with carrying a weapon. This will manifest itself

in many legitimate “targets” being young by American standards,

thus raising challenges for rules of engagement. Likewise, resistance to disarmament will be articulated as desire to guard local

cultural understandings of manhood.

This will not be the only issue of gender relevant to Marines. Due

to mutual raiding and state use of Janjaweed to attack settled areas,

there will be many mothers whose husbands have been killed or

cannot provide livelihoods. Likewise, it is possible that women

who otherwise would be married have remained single due to

fewer men to marry. They might engage in work that is considered
220 Operational Culture

culturally inappropriate to women in Darfur, requiring particular

Marine awareness and precautions. Rape will have produced illegitimate births as well as social stigma for these women. Attempting to help them, find jobs for them, or regularize their legal status,

might associate Marines with moral laxity.

Finally, a hypothetical Marine force will not be the only legal armed

force on the ground. African Union troops, other Western forces,

and perhaps the Khartoum government’s own forces will be operating in the area, potentially cooperating in a coalition format, or

perhaps coexisting through tacit understandings. Negotiating such

formal and informal agreements will require the kind of interactions necessitating attentiveness to the symbolic meaning of words

and actions.

Furthermore, no force from within the region or country will be

“above the fray”—they will all have political, ethnic, perhaps even

religious or class-based attitudes to the “Africans” and “Arabs” in

Darfur. In the opposite direction, Darfuris will have opinions, presumptions, and anxieties about the intentions and biases of international forces in the area, so that the Marine commander will need

to bear in mind what messages he sends by working with certain

security forces or relief organizations.

The Marine who can balance these local cultural concerns with his

tactical and operational imperatives is not guaranteed success—

remember, the enemy always has a vote. However, he will be

preparing his Marines to have more effect. The Marine presence

will also be more sustainable, because it will be considered legitimate by sectors of the local population, whilst permitting Marines

the situational awareness and clarity to take coercive measures

when needed.

Case Study III: The Philippines – Kinship Politics and the Geographic-Religious Divide

As in Nigeria and Darfur, the physical geography and environment

of the Philippines frame the historical and cultural features of the
Observable Realities 221

region. Stretching from Taiwan in the north to Malaysia and Indonesia in the south, the Philippines consist of over 7,100 islands

connected by water, not land. As a starting point, therefore, it bears

noting that there is no “Philippines” in the sense of a territoriallydelimited nation after the Western model. Though Western powers from the sixteenth through twentieth century—the Spanish,

Portuguese, Dutch, and Americans—may have drawn map lines

and made alliances with local leaders amounting to a “Philippines,”

local diversity shows “Philippine nationess” to be an external construct, aiding local grandees of the Philippine state as well as international political and economic interests. As for the peoples of

the Philippines, “state” and “nation” have historically been meaningful only as external intrusions into their daily and communal

lives.

For centuries, due to their physical isolation from each other, most

of the islands of the modern-day state of Philippines were politically, socially and economically independent. As a result, many of

the islands developed their own unique identities, based upon environmental parameters, language diversity, economic relationships, and the political implications of local social structures. As

just one example, today, it is estimated that over 100 languages are

spoken in the Philippines, by a tremendous array of self-identifying ethnic groups. Not only do languages possess status, but when

a person from a particular social grouping chooses to speak in a

particular language, he/she is engaging in symbolic communication. Memories of functional independence, and diverse identities, influence local, regional, and national politics today, at times

informing the way national leaders seek to manage crisis at the

local level.

Migration and labor flows from both the west and northeast increased the cultural complexity of the region from the eighth

through nineteenth century. This movement of people had

tremendous and lasting influence on the economy, social structure,

and belief systems of the islands. In particular, sea traders, first

from India and China, and later from the Arab world, brought with

them a variety of religions.
222 Operational Culture

Religious importation began with Buddhism and Hinduism. Next

came Islam, which effected a peaceful though substantial demographic shift in Mindanao, Basilan, Jolo, and the Sulu archipelago

(and Borneo) as local populations converted over time. Each of

these religions was incorporated into local languages and social as

well as cultic practices. Local Islam, for example, emerged in syncretistic versions as people mixed indigenous “Little Traditions”

with the major “Great Traditions.”

As such, the physical geography of the country—an archipelago

of separate islands—both causes and mirrors the ethnic, cultural,

linguistic and religious diversity of the region. Environmental factors have led to challenges of transportation and communication

among the islands. These challenges in turn have engendered a

tendency to physical separatism and isolation based on hyper local

social structures. Over the past five hundred years, these cultural

dynamics have undermined successive efforts by the Spanish, the

U.S. and the twentieth-century Philippine government to create a

united centralized political system. In the Philippines, political

structure reflects the environment, social structure, economy, and

religion.

In 1565 the Spanish arrived, adding Catholicism to the complex

belief system of the region. Spanish colonization and political control resulted in the conversion of many of the residents of the

northern islands to Catholicism. The southern islands, however,

which were culturally and religiously far more similar to the neighboring islands of Malaysia, remained staunchly Muslim. Unable to

convert the southern islands, the Spanish colonists struggled for almost four centuries against a violent Muslim insurgency from their

stronghold in Zamboanga. More broadly, the arrival of politicallysupported Catholicism established a system of social stratification

among foreign Christians, indigenous converts, pagans, and Muslims, which was layered over by existing linguistic, kin-based, and

geographic strata.

It is during this time that the Muslims of the southern Philippines

received the label “Moro.” This is a pejorative term based on the

word “Moors,” which Spaniards had used for Arab and North
Observable Realities 223

African Muslims whom they had ejected from the Iberian peninsula

in the fourteenth century. Along with this being a nice illustration

of “mirror-imaging,” this label, and the ensuing centuries of Spanish-Muslim friction, also created new identities and the collective

memories associated with them. Many Christianized Filipinos in

the central and northern islands, particularly those who had intermarried with Spanish soldiers and administrators over several generations, came to view the Muslims as a violent social group, with

this image captured in local folklore and folk drama.

Over time, Muslims, for their part, came to put a positive valuation

on martial fierceness, though in their folklore, it was related more

to brigandage and banditry, rather than to any ideological warfare

for the sake of jihad. Part of this can be explained by the fact that

concepts of “jihad” did not exist per se among Muslims in this region during this era—there is no direct ideological bridge between

Muslim violence in the pre-twentieth-century era and that of today.

More fundamentally, and true to the pre-existing cultural dynamics, conversion to Islam did nothing to end the geographic, linguistic, and social disunity of the peoples of the southern islands.

Put differently, Islam distinguished Muslims from others, but did

little to unify them—a trend which has continued until today.

The arrival of the Spanish also caused a shift in both residence patterns and economy for the people in the Philippines islands, particularly in the central and northern islands. Prior to Spanish

colonization, most people resided in simple bamboo huts scattered

along the ocean or rivers. Some earned a living by fishing, but most

were either tenant farmers or ran their own small independent

farms. With the Spanish came Catholic missions and the appearance of mission town complexes built around a central plaza. Rural

inhabitants were encouraged to move to the towns which offered

such attractions as the availability of a greater variety of local and

imported goods, free Catholic school for children, and urban

amenities. As geographical and physical space was altered, new

patterns of movement and socialization emerged. As we will see

soon, these new spatial and geographical patterns would serve to

strengthen a local politics based on elite families.
224 Operational Culture

The Spanish also introduced a variety of new crops intended for

export, including sugar cane, tobacco and abaca—a strong fiber

used to make twine. The new export crop economy decreased

previously independent small farmers’ abilities to engage in successful subsistence agriculture. As in other areas, the new economy was accompanied by the development of large haciendas

supported by a tenant farmer population. This new economy concentrated wealth in the hands of an elite group of families. These

family groupings emerged as the nodes of formal political power

in local government positions. Locally, and later, nationally, these

families formed a loose oligarchy, or governing council. Economic

power thus became intimately linked to political power in a hierarchical social structure based on kinship.

Complicating the cultural picture was the development of a parallel religious power structure: the Catholic Church. Missions owned

large tracts of land and played a major role in the agricultural economy of the colony. Although priests could not govern, they held

great power over their parishes. As a result, a parallel power system operated side by side with the formal government, and the

Catholic clergy often acted as informal leaders in many regions.

Initially only Spaniards could be ordained, concentrating religious

power in the hands of the colonizers. Since there were far fewer

Spanish priests than available positions, many regions—especially

the more rural areas and remote islands—went without formal religious leadership or training. As a result, Catholicism in the more

remote and rural regions was a complex mix of local superstitions

and traditions interspersed with fragments of Catholic teaching. Of

course, because traditional Islam has no clerical hierarchy and because of the communal disunity of the region’s Muslims, no parallel religious power structure emerged among the Muslims.

After the 1898 U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War, control

over the Philippines was ceded to the U.S. Although never effectively ruled by the Spanish, the southern islands, including the

major island of Mindanao, were included in the cession. In contrast to British, French and Dutch colonial regimes which focused

on centralizing political authority and power, U.S. policy in the
Observable Realities 225

Philippines supported the formation of a decentralized state. This

reflected American notions of governance, including a strong bias

for local autonomy placing limits on the power of a central authority.

This American bias unwittingly supported the indigenous tendency

towards decentralized local bosses; a political system run by powerful local kin groups or oligarchies; and private police and militaries whose allegiance was to regional, rather than national,

powers. Such a system was highly open to corruption and political

abuse, since no centralized political authority had oversight or control over the economic, social, or political activities of the local

bosses.

With the majority of power and wealth concentrated within an elite

group of families, clear class differences continued to emerge.

These class differences became even more severe as the economy

shifted from a primarily agricultural base to an industrial one. Factories sprung up to process the cane sugar prior to export; abaca

and other plants were processed in textile factories for the growing world market; and rice was processed and cleaned prior to export from growing industrial cities such as Manila and Luzon. Long

involved in Philippine trade, Chinese and Indian merchants began

to settle in large numbers in these cities, creating a sizeable urban

immigrant population.

The growing economic disparities between the wealthy elite and

the poor tenant farmers and factory workers led to the development of several socialist and Communist parties and movements

from the 1930s to 1950s. The most famous of these was the HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon or National AntiJapanese Army), nicknamed the Huks. Allegedly organized to fight

the Japanese during World War II, this group was actually a political arm of the Philippine Communist Party. Challenging the class

and kinship systems that had controlled most of the political and

economic power of the country for several centuries, these Communist groups gained much popular support among the poor and

economically marginalized groups of the country. Among Muslims, however, the appeal of communist associations has been less,
226 Operational Culture

not only because of Marxist atheism, but also because these groups

emerged from within the Christian Filipino community.

U.S. policies not only supported and entrenched existing kin and

class structures, but they also increased religious polarization in

the country, which has manifested itself in several ways. First, unlike the Spanish, the U.S. administrators possessed something like

a language policy, in that they encouraged the spread of English,

which ultimately became an official language, along with Tagalog.

The public education system and press in the northern islands promoted English, allowing cross-community bonds to develop, particularly as rural to urban migration increased in the era of

industrialization.

The Muslims, however, did not benefit to nearly the same extent

from English language education or media. Rather, different Muslim communities, while increasingly learning Tagalog, persisted in

the use of their highly localized regional languages, such as Yakan,

Samalan, and Tausug. Identity divisions followed the geographiclinguistic fault lines, creating yet another barrier to both Muslim

unity in the south and an effective Muslim political voice in Manila.

While Tagalog and English are today shared languages among Muslim leaders in Mindanao and Sulu, Tagalog has come to be closely

associated with the Christian Filipinos. Therefore English is a less

loaded common language, for foreigners as well.

Second, in order to stabilize the southern Muslim islands, the U.S.

encouraged settlement by non-Muslims from the north. This policy

was supported by a series of Public Lands Acts, which removed

many of the ancestral lands from local Moros and redistributed

them to incoming Christian settlers. Increasing the sense of disenfranchisement, the government encouraged the establishment in

the south of large corporations, whose primary purpose was to create factory products for export. As a result, the government shifted

the economic base of land and industry away from the Moros and

into the hands of outsiders. Economic and political structures thus

ensured the crystallization of a heretofore latent Muslim-Christian

fault line among indigenous people.
Observable Realities 227

In 1946 the Philippines became independent. The new government faced a daunting legacy: an enormous archipelago composed

of almost one hundred diverse cultural and linguistic groups. For

both Muslims and Christians, governance was concentrated in the

hands of specific elite families that also controlled most of the land

and business activities of their regions. Either as mayors, landowners, governors, or police chiefs, hereditary local leaders represented

the interests of economically advantaged families, who lackadaisically enforced the central government’s writ while creating webs of

patron-client relationships. Into the 1960s and 1970s, both to protect family interests and as a hedge against potential Muslim-Christian violence, local leaders relied on militias to support their

political disputes.

Local disputes were often expressed through the idiom of the two

main national-level political parties. Still, disputes reflected regional

factional interests, and bore no relation to the ideological coloring

of those parties. Attempts in the 1960s by groups such as the Muslim Independence Movement to transcend the hyper-local orientation did not succeed in uniting Muslims, but did keep embers of

Muslim insurgency smoldering.

The lack of effective and impartial centralized authority provided

much opportunity for corruption at both the local and national

level. Despite efforts by various regimes to challenge the economic

and political bases of power in the country, the Philippines remained hostage to politica de familia, or kinship politics, throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While Ferdinand Marcos abrogated the

constitution and ruled by decree from 1972 in the name of increasing the efficacy of the state and rooting out corruption, he did

not in fact do this. Instead, his family replaced previous kin groups

as holders of political and economic power.

National-level representation of Muslim Filipinos did increase during this period, along with greater levels of education and attendance of the national university in Manila. However, the Marcos

years further marginalized the Muslim Filipinos of the south, who

were also disadvantaged through the new labor arrangements of an

export-oriented agricultural and industrial economy. The regime’s
228 Operational Culture

moves to extend the army’s control of the south also caused a

growth in violence. Central Mindanao and Sulu were targeted by

successive campaigns, during which Jolo was razed and Basilan

hit very hard. These anti-insurgent moves set in train refugee flows

to more central parts of the country and Manila, creating a new social group that would become important in the 1990s and beyond.

While bringing violence and a visible state coercive presence, these

efforts did not hinder lawlessness or the proliferation of non-state

armed agents. By the end of the 1970s, therefore, the Marcos

regime agreed in principle to regional autonomy in the southern regions, but groups in the Muslim south opposed the agreement.

This disagreement was expressed in Islamic and political terms, yet

was in fact related to local political feuding and ethnic differences

among the area’s Muslims.

The 1986 “EDSA Revolution”3 that unseated Marcos in favor of

Corazon Aquino also did not break this pattern of politica de familia either at the local or at the national level. Descendants of the

elite families who came into the first post-1898 legislature continue

to dominate in parliament, though now they have brought celebrity

actors, singers, and athletes into their families to shore up their political power. This kind of politics, whereby party affiliation became meaningless, limped along into 2001, when the president of

the day sought to use his patron-client connections with parliamentarians to defeat a looming impeachment. Public backlash

emerged again, resulting in the “2001 EDSA Revolution.” The nature of politics, based on a specific kin-based social structure that

emerged from economic relationships, has not changed since.

The 1980s-1990s did witness evolution in the geographic, social,

and organizational bases of Muslim insurgency in the south. In

the 1970s, a series of Muslim movements emerged in the region,

often breaking away from existing groups based on regional, linguistic, or ethnic differences. Some of these groups, in the 1980s,

were led by younger, more modern-educated leaders who sought

to challenge not only Christian Filipino rule, but the traditional

Muslim elites. And though the heretofore dominant group, Moro

National Liberation Front (MNLF; its armed faction is the Bangsa
Observable Realities 229

Moro Army) had agreed by the late 1980s and early 1990s to negotiate for an autonomous region, other groups demanded independence instead.

In 1995, an attack on the Christian town of Ipil on Mindanao heralded the emergence of a new group, much more militant in nature, that has become connected to international Islamist terrorism.

Known as the Abu Sayyaf Group, their social base is unlike any of

the existing Muslim groups. Emerging from the Christian city of

Zamboanga, it could call upon the large numbers of displaced

young Muslims whose homes were destroyed during the state’s

campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. These refugees had been removed from both their ethnic and linguistic homes, and suffered

from unemployment and a certain amount of social exclusion in

the urban area.

The MNLF, led by secular Muslims with university educations, was

not of the same social stratum as these younger refugees, and did

not speak in the same political idiom. Other groups, such as the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front, represent the established social

elites, with no connection to this new demographic group whom

both the state and traditional Moro society have excluded.

By contrast, the Abu Sayyaf Group’s use of militant, non-compromising Islamist rhetoric, and the more puritanical ideological leanings of its first leader, Abubakar Janjalani (since killed by Philippine

forces), have been able to attract these Filipinos. This attraction has

been able to transcend enduring ethno-linguistic divisions among

Muslims in the area, attracting Magindanao, Maranao, and Yakan

and Tausug people—the latter having long been rival communities.

Abu Sayyaf’s particular appeal is possible not only because economic and political conditions created new social formations, but

also because Abu Sayyaf is a break from existing class- and ethnicity-based movements among the Muslims. Furthermore, it can

tap into the “outlaw” motif that has long been a part of islanders’

identities.
230 Operational Culture

Since 2001, the southern Philippines has been part of Operation

Enduring Freedom. U.S. special operations forces and Marines

have trained and logistically supported Philippine forces in the

south, who have racked up notable successes in arresting or killing

insurgents. Perhaps of more enduring counterinsurgency value,

U.S. civil affairs assistance has permitted the Filipino forces to build

schools, wells, and markets, often after they have been destroyed

by terrorists. This has earned the local military some credit in the

eyes of the non-combatant southern Muslims.

As we have seen here, long-term solutions to both political instability and southern insurgency are contingent on more enduring issues. The problems are not simply related to corruption or an

inefficient democratic political system—and are not, in the main, a

function of “fundamentalist” or “jihadist” ideology. Rather, challenges in the Philippines result from the unique interactions among

the Five Operational Cultural Dimensions presented in this book.

In this perspective, the geographical conditions of island isolation

reinforce local power and frustrates the national government’s capacity to exercise leadership at the local level. Social structures of

kinship and class concentrate economic and political power among

a select set of elite families, while multiple linguistic and ethnic

group memberships are used to reinforce concentrations of power

and demarcate excluded groups. Not only have geographic, linguistic and historical factors resulted in religious differences between the northern and southern islands, but these same kinds of

differences among the Muslims of the south frustrate attempts at

Muslim unity.

Finally, the way the Operational Culture Dimensions of environment, economy, social structure, and political structure interact with

each other has resulted in political and economic marginalization

of the south, and the organized expression of resistance to these

conditions—the MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf Group have relied

on evolving social groups for a basis of support. Today, identities

associated either with group memberships; themes in local folklore; memories of recent and “age-old” history; or ideas of privilege

vs. dispossession have ensured that only sustained engagement of

,
Observable Realities 231

Filipino leaders at the national and local level, supported by the

U.S., will lead to a long-term solution in an area of vital concern to

American interests.4

Likely Marine missions in the Philippines include mobile training

teams focused on a particular Philippine branch of service or element; battalion-size exercises with the Armed Forces of the Philippines; civil affairs support; or humanitarian affairs and disaster relief

operations. The likelihood of large scale stability or counter-insurgent operations in which U.S. forces are a lead element is low

at this time. Still, there are particular cultural considerations to bear

in mind, no matter what kind of deployment.

The first is very practical. Given the large number of hyper-local

languages in the southern islands of the Philippines, and the ethnic, religious, and political overtones associated with several of

them, a commander will need to determine what languages to

focus pre-deployment training on, and what languages to ensure

interpreters know. Though Tagalog will be tempting, use of this

language may associate U.S. forces too closely with the Christian

political leadership in Manila. Therefore, when communicating

with indigenous civilians, English may in fact serve best.

Second, in the context of humanitarian affairs, disaster relief, or

civil affairs projects, a commander will interact with local political

and economic leaders. These leaders’ positions will all be contested, and as such their decisions will need to integrate hyperlocal, kin-based considerations. As such, American assistance will

become part of local power-plays. Yet, absent the integration of

local leaders, be they elite, uneducated, Islamist, or even outlaws,

U.S. initiatives may lack legitimacy, the essential factor permitting

enduring success.

Either way, any interaction with local Filipinos, in the context of

contracting, humanitarian support, or mentorship of governance,

will put Marines in a position to witness corruption, misuse of

funds, and misuse of authority. In local terms, this corruption will

be necessary for leaders—or would-be leaders—to create, maintain, and expand partially kin-based patron-client networks.
232 Operational Culture

Third, Marines may encounter elevated levels of crime. It will be

important to distinguish between “criminal” crime and insurgent

activity. Particularly as motifs in local folklore and self-identity put

a positive valuation on “wanted” people, “outlaws,” “bandits,” etc.,

commanders at every level will need to consider how American

norms differ from local views on this issue. This will assist to avoid

tarring all organized criminal activity as pro-Abu Sayyaf.

Of course, since the effect of such activity may be to reduce confidence in state authorities to the point that insurgent groups appear as better alternatives, Marines will need to encourage local

forces to engage in the kinds of counter-crime operations that increase security while earning enough local credit to diminish local

support for insurgency. In the same vein, information operations

planners will need to pay particularly close attention to these local

folk motifs, to ensure that IO, executed either by U.S. personnel or

by indigenous forces, aligns with local motifs.

Fourth, a commander will need to consider who his forces are associated with in the eyes of multiple constituencies in the region.

Twentieth-century American colonialism benefited the north more

than the south, and brought with it more exploitative economic relations in the south. Local insurgents or contending kin groups

might seek to activate this memory among Filipinos, tarring the

U.S. forces as neo-colonizers. Close attention to Philippine state

sovereignty will thus be essential, though it may result in Philippine

actions that are inefficient or counter-productive from a counterinsurgency perspective.

Conversely, ongoing U.S. economic interests in the region, and a

track-record of supporting political leaders who have not helped

the south, might aggravate a memory of American collusion with

local oppressors. Too close an association with the Philippine government and security forces may decrease local inclination to work

with the U.S.. This all argues for a hyper-local focus with respect

to points of contact and cooperation—though a heretofore intrusive

state may not prefer this focus on local people at the expense of

Manila.
Observable Realities 233

A fifth training, planning, and operational consideration has more

to do with the commander’s Marines than it does with the Filipinos.

It is likely that many of the deploying troops will have served in

Iraq or Afghanistan. They will have worked with, or fought

against, Muslims. They will have learned about Islamist extremism

and encountered its propaganda. It will be tempting for these

Marines to view the culture of their current deployment in terms of

the Muslim culture of previous deployments. Abu Sayyaf may thus

appear entirely through the prism of al-Qaida, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Mahdi Army, Taliban, or other violent groups from Arab

lands or South Asia. It will be extremely important to focus

Marines at all levels away from these previous experiences, and

focus them on the particular ethnic and linguistic dynamics in the

Philippines.

Likewise, rather than “seeing mooj,” Marines at all levels will need

to learn about the specific social strata which are likely to be excluded economically, socially, and politically, so that indigenous

attraction to Abu Sayyaf, as members, readers of propaganda, or in

other ways, will be seen for what it is, and not layered with experiences in OIF or Afghanistan.

By the same token, in order to have the proper mental orientation

to establish rapport with Filipino Muslims, commanders will need

to ensure that their troops do not perceive a common cause with

Christians based on shared religion. After all, a tradition of syncretism has led to a Philippine expression of Christianity different

from that in the U.S.

This impartiality will not only be important to preserve, but potentially difficult to do. As Marines train with, support, and build

relationships with Philippine police and military, they will be interacting predominantly with a Christian force. These soldiers’ families are either from the north or, worse, from contested regions

where Muslim-Christian friction has resulted in bloodshed. These

soldiers also may have experiences of fighting “Muslim terrorists”

during their or their relatives’ military service. It is even more likely

that there are memories in their families of “age-old” conflicts with

Muslims. As interlocutors or indigenous sources about south
234 Operational Culture

Philippine culture therefore, Marines’ Philippine army brethren

would provide a biased picture.

Conclusion

The above case studies show that the Five Operational Culture Dimensions—physical environment, economic system, social structure, political structure, and beliefs and symbols—do in fact

illustrate dynamics at play in areas to which Marines might deploy.

Without surveying an area of operations in terms of these dimensions, and searching for the linkages among them, a Marine will not

have an integrated cultural picture of the operating environment,

and any cultural knowledge he does glean will thus remain incomplete and misleading as to cause, effect, and proper measures

to take.

Notes

1 Jeffrey Tayler, Angry Wind: Through Muslim Black Africa by Truck, Bus, Boat,

and Camel (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2005); Idem., “Worse Than Iraq?”

The Atlantic Monthly (April 2006); Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in

Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003); Tom O’Neill “Curse of the Black

Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta,” National Geographic (February

2007); Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and

Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006);

Rotimi T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

2 Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (London:

Zed Books, 2006); Stephan Faris, “The Real Roots of Darfur,” The Atlantic

Monthly (April 2007); Mahmood Mamdani, “The Politics of Naming: Genocide,

Civil War, Insurgency,” London Review of Books 29:5 (March 2007); Ann Mosely

Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999); Douglas Hamilton Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s

Civil Wars (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003); J. Milard Burr and

Robert O. Collins, Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster (Princeton, NJ: Markus

Wiener Publishers, 2006).

3 “EDSA” stands for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a main thoroughfare in

Manila where demonstrations occurred.

4 Jose S. Arcilla, An Introduction to Philippine History (Manila: Ateneo de

Manila University Press, 2003); Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Colonial Masters, National

Politicos and Provincial Lords: Authority and Local Autonomy in the American
Observable Realities 235

Philippines, 1900-1913,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59:2 (2000): 277-306; Syed

S. Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,” Asian Survey 38:5 (1998): 441-456; Charles O. Frake,

“Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities

among Philippine Muslims,” American Anthropologist 100:1 (March 1998), 41-

54; Sheila Coronel, Yvonne Chua, Luz Rimban, and Booma Cruz, “The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress,” Philippine

Centre for Investigative Journalism, 2004; James Hookway, “U.S. War on Terror

Shows Promise in the Philippines: Local Officers Lead, with American Aid,”

Wall Street Journal 18 June 2007, A1; Idem., “Terror Cells Team Up to Survive in

the Philippines,” Wall Street Journal 22 Jan 2007, A8; Simon Montlake, “Where

the U.S. is Helping to Make Gains Against Terrorism,” Christian Science Monitor

15 February 2007, 1; Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast

Asia,” Naval War College Review 58:4 (Autumn 2005); Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf,”

Public Organization Review: A Global Journal 3 (2003), 387-401; Gary Hawes,

“Theories of Peasant Revolution: A Critique from the Philippines,” World Politics

42:2 (1990); 261-298; Mel C. Labrador, “The Philippines in 2000: In Search of a

Silver Lining,” Asian Survey 41:1 (Jan-Feb 2001), 221-229.

237

Chapter 9

Operational Culture Learning in

Training and Education

Part I of Operational Culture for the Warfighter focused on debates

and definitions. Part II went on to examine the core Operational

Culture Dimensions for planning and execution in multiple cultural

environments. In Part III, Chapter Eight presented case studies

highlighting the interaction of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions, as well as their implications for potential Marine deployments. The present chapter is both conceptual and applied.

It seeks to situate the discussion of culture learning within the twin

realms of pedagogical science and military training and education.

We begin here by presenting Bloom’s Taxonomy of learning, a

widely accepted taxonomy applicable to both academic education

and skills training. We do this to ensure that the discussion of culture learning adheres to rigorous intellectual standards, and avoids

the pitfalls of some recent academic and military writing on the

subject. We then move on to illustrate how and why this matters

to the particular field of learning about cultures for the sake of military operations.

On this basis, Chapter Nine uses Bloom’s Taxonomy as the vehicle to analyze the dominant modes of learning in the military today.

These include pre-deployment training programs (PTP) and professional military education (PME) across the phases of an enlisted

or commissioned career. In each case, we relate subject matter

and learning goals to different elements of Bloom’s Taxonomy. We

conclude the chapter by considering the kinds of subject matter

expertise and experience necessary for educators in the realm of

operational culture.
238 Operational Culture

Initial Issues for Consideration

Before we can move into the main substantive parts of this chapter, there are certain over-arching considerations to bear in

mind while reading the chapter as a whole. Some we deal with directly; others are intended as themes for consideration throughout.

First, as has been suggested throughout this book by use of terms

such as “study,” “examine,” “detect,” “investigate,” etc., operational

culture capability emerges mostly from learning, be it as an individual Marine, as an operational unit, or in the formal schools of

the Marine Corps.

In fact, learning about individual cultures, and grasping the tools

and skills to use in foreign cultures generally, is a shared responsibility. Every individual Marine in a leadership and mentoring role

must take his or her own initiative to learn about cultures and cultural concepts, based both on the prism of their own operational

experience as well as on academic and conceptual learning. The

individual Marine also has the responsibility to facilitate cultural

learning among subordinates, either as individuals or through the

schools of the Marine Corps.

While Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM)

develops curricula and standards for use in schools and the fleet,

commanders and individual Marines themselves must ultimately

participate actively in education and training, and pursue self-study

as appropriate to mission and rank. Again, in addition to ensuring

a substantive grasp among their Marines, active leadership participation in culture learning reinforces the idea among subordinates

that every Marine is a “culture operator,” just as “every Marine is a

rifleman.” This is because in any organization, the greatest change

mechanism is socialization, and in the Marine Corps, that socialization mechanism is training and education, both formal and informal.

Second, while culture learning should target specific regions when

appropriate to mission or educational goals, more fundamental and

capability-building learning focuses on the basic concepts and skills

with which to “read” any culture—in short, it is about the Opera-
Training and Education 239

tional Culture Dimensions in this book. Thus, while learning information about an AO will help for a specific deployment, a more

conceptually-focused approach to Operational Culture learning will

serve the Marine better throughout his or her career.

Most basically, this is because conceptual knowledge can literally

“travel anywhere,” and can be applied to diverse environments.

Furthermore, as Marine Corps doctrine reminds us, one of the

greatest benefits of operational preparation and planning is the

process for developing “a common understanding of the nature of

the problem,” through “a disciplined framework for approaching

problems... without restricting judgment and creativity.”1 It is

through integrated Operational Culture learning spanning PTP,

PME, and career-long learning, and based on the dimensions discussed in this book, that Marines at all levels will develop that

“common understanding” of what culture means in the battlespace,

in the form of a “disciplined framework” with respect to culture.

Finally, if pursued in this fashion, training and education will create a Marine who understands culture as a core combat competency, regardless of area of operations or any given operation’s

location on the kinetic spectrum.

Third, learning effectively about cultures in order to maintain fidelity both to the military mission and the phenomenon of “culture” itself means rethinking the military approach to training and

education—for culture learning. That is not to say that existing

models of military learning—in particular “The Systems Approach

to Training”—are not effective with respect to training and education for traditional military functions and procedures. Rather, as

we saw in Part I, due to the nature of culture as internally varied;

fluid and dynamic; and dependent on other factors in explaining

individual behavior, it is somewhat different from traditional fields

of military learning. Therefore, enduring conceptual and functional

learning about culture requires a more hybrid model for conducting and evaluating learning. We will return to this topic in subsequent sections of this chapter.2
240 Operational Culture

Learning Domains

In order to consider operational culture learning in training and

education, we begin with organizing ideas of learning into a proper

framework. To organize learning concepts, it helps to think from

the perspective of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning.3 This taxonomy has several benefits in a discussion of culture learning. First,

it has been around for quite a while, and is a commonly accepted

method. Bloom’s Taxonomy has thus established the categories

for much of the subsequent literature on learning taxonomies in the

fields of education and psychology. Second, this taxonomy also

works well with the Marine Corps’ Systems Approach to Training,

though it also proves useful for hybrid fields of learning, such as

culture.

Third, this taxonomy renders more systematic and disciplined our

thinking. This is important because recent attempts to fit culture

into a framework of learning for military applications have used

words—such as “consideration,” “awareness,” “knowledge,” “understanding,” and “competence”—to describe knowledge hierarchies. These terms and hierarchies are then assigned to ranks

across the force.4

This all sounds scientific, and with the help of an accompanying

pyramid diagram and rank correlations, this method helps us to visually pattern culture learning in a way that is easily digestible—

particularly to military readers. However, these terms are not

linked to any meaningful and accepted taxonomy of learning, so

that their definitions are arbitrary, as are their rank correlations.

We thus choose to use Bloom’s Taxonomy as a guide to our discussion.

According to Bloom’s Taxonomy, learning is divided into three

chief domains termed cognitive, psycho-motor, and affective. To

define these terms briefly:

Cognitive Skills: The mental processes for gaining knowledge and

comprehension. These skills involve thinking, recalling, and judging. At higher levels, cognition assists imagination and planning.
Training and Education 241

Psycho-Motor Skills: These behavioral skills involve movement

of the body in order to perform actions based upon input from the

brain.

Affective Skills: These skills are based on feelings and emotions

that are subjective, and emerge from one’s own mind and attitudes

towards observable events and data. Affective skills involve how

a person relates to and interacts with what they learn, and how

they come to own it both intellectually and psycho-emotionally.

As a shorthand:

Cognitive domain = thinking domain

Psycho-Motor domain = doing domain

Affective domain = feeling domain

Each of these domains yields several ascending skills, developed

according to one’s native capabilities and exposure to material.

Figure 9.1: Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning

Domain Ascending Levels of Learning

Cognitive

1 2 3 4 5 6

Psycho

Motor

Affective

Knowledge

Application

Analysis

Synthesis

Evaluation

Comprehension

Imitation

Precision

Articulation

Naturalization

Manipulation

Receiving

Valuing

Organization

Values Complex

Responding
242 Operational Culture

This taxonomy is useful not only because of the characteristics of

each descriptor across the domains, but also because it posits a hierarchy of learning—keyed to the learning activity itself, and not

rank, age, or other arbitrary criteria. We will now describe each domain in detail, beginning with an explanation of the meaning of

each descriptor in the domains.

Table 9.1: Cognitive Domain Descriptors and Characteristics

Cognitive Domain of Learning

Descriptor Characteristics

1 Knowledge

Remembering previously learned material by

recalling information

2 Comprehension

Grasping meaning of material through

explaining or summarizing, and estimating

consequences of actions

3 Application

Using learned material in new/concrete situations, by applying rules, methods, concepts,

and principles

4 Analysis

Breaking down material into its component

parts to grasp its organizational structure and

the relationship among its parts

5 Synthesis Putting parts together to form a new whole,

as a plan or classification system

6 Evaluation

Judging the value of material according to

internally-generated or externally-provided

criteria
Training and Education 243

Table 9.2: Psycho-Motor Domain Descriptors and Characteristics

Psycho-Motor Domain of Learning

Descriptor Characteristics

1 Imitation

Repeating an act that has been demonstrated

or explained, with trial and error until

achieving appropriate response

2 Manipulation

Practicing a particular skill until it becomes

habitual and can be performed with some

proficiency, but not certainty

3 Precision

Proficiency through smooth performance

without hesitation, which can be complex

4 Articulation

Precision so well developed that movement

patterns can be modified to fit special

requirements or problems

5 Naturalization

Response is automatic, permitting new motor

acts or ways of manipulating materials out of

understandings and skills developed

Table 9.3: Affective Domain Descriptors and Characteristics

Affective Domain of Learning

Descriptor Characteristics

1 Receiving Willingness to receive learning through

awareness and selected attention

2 Responding Active participation with sufficient

commitment to a subject or activity to seek it

3 Valuing

Seeing worth /value in subject, motivated by

commitment to underlying and clearly

identifiable value guiding behavior

4 Organization

Bringing together values, and beginning to

build an internally consistent value system

related to already held values, in a dynamic

equilibrium dependent upon events at

specific points in time

5 Value Complex

Internalization of values in the individual’s

value hierarchy, creating a characteristic “life

style” that is pervasive
244 Operational Culture

The above description of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning lays out

the basic principles and levels of learning across different skill domains. It is thus suited to learning about culture for military applications, for several reasons. First, because use of culture in a

military context requires both “hard” and “soft” skills, effective culture operations require learning across all Bloom’s domains: Knowing “stuff” is not enough; neither is simply being able to perform

tasks, or feeling some sort of disorganized, mission-unrelated empathy for foreign peoples. Likewise, operational culture learning

needs to occur across these domains simultaneously, and in a graduated fashion throughout one’s career.

Second, learning in these domains is characterized by certain skills

and mental approaches, some of which—particularly the cognitive

and psycho-motor skills—are observable. Third, different learning contexts—professional military education, pre-deployment

training, or individual regional expertise—require particular focus

on specific domains or skills.

Fourth, and of tremendous significance, Bloom’s Taxonomy includes the affective domain of learning. This is extremely important to culture learning. In the military, training and education

explicitly embrace and value a learning model based on the cognitive—“what do you know”—and psycho-motor—“what can you

do”—domains. However, there is a third kind of intelligence less

associated with traditional military competencies, but which is essential for the kinds of missions Marines will undertake today and

in the future. This trait, developed through learning in the affective domain, is Social Intelligence.

Resulting from experiences, learning, and intuition, Social Intelligence is not a sub-discipline of intelligence as an MOS, such as air

intelligence, signals intelligence, etc. Rather, it is used to connote

certain capabilities not usually taught in school or trained through

task performance, but which develop through a cascading process

of combining experience, reflection, and self-knowledge. Social intelligence refers to the intellectual ability to understand oneself and

others in social interactions.5 Others have described this ability as

“emotional intelligence”—the ability to understand and regulate
Training and Education 245

one’s own emotional/mental state and reactions to stressful events,

and also to better perceive the emotional state of others with

whom one interacts.6

Social and emotional intelligence include certain traits—some trainable, and some gained through experiential learning—quite significant for operational culture learning and for extended

operations among foreign peoples and with foreign partners:

1) Emotional Self-Awareness 2) Independence

3) Inter-personal relationships 4) Empathy

5) Stress Tolerance 6) Impulse Control

7) Flexibility 8) Problem Solving

Further, educators and researchers emerging from psychology, international business, and learning sciences relate concepts of social intelligence to the ability to function in other cultures. These

writers refer to this ability as “cultural intelligence.” 7 Since the U.S.

military also uses this term, but with the connotation of information and intelligence about foreign cultures, we will here refer to

these concepts as “cross cultural effectiveness.” Cross cultural effectiveness involves a cluster of cognitive and performative skills:

Perceptual Skills: Open-mindedness, tolerance of uncertainty,

non-judgmentalness

Relational Skills: Flexibility, sociability, empathy

Adaptive Skills: Ability to demonstrate behaviors from a

repertoire gained through experience of

multiple cultures, as well as the particular

one at a given time

Any Marine who has mentored Iraqi, Afghan, or other countries’ security personnel—or for that matter recruits and junior Marines—

will look at the above lists and see qualities that have proven

necessary for operational success. They can thus attest to the importance of social intelligence. In effect, to successfully integrate

culture learning in operations, a Marine should combine social intelligence with prudent evaluation of tactical considerations.8
246 Operational Culture

In order for individual Marines to gain the necessary social and

emotional intelligence to be culturally successful in the cognitive

and psycho-motor domains—as well as when deployed—their socialization as recruits, training in units, experience at schools, and

mentorship of fellow Marines should incorporate culture into the

affective domain of what it means to be a Marine. At the same

time, these experiences must incorporate the affective domain into

culture learning.

The affective domain of learning, as well as social and emotional

intelligence, are also essential to an additional capability which is

also distinct from Operational Culture: cross-cultural competence.

Recent efforts in the Military to measure the ability to function successfully in other cultures have resulted in a number of studies and

programs on this topic.9 Educationally, it is important to understand that cross-cultural competence focuses on an “intelligence”

(as in knowledge ability) and its measurability in terms of testable

scales. It is a psychological concept focusing on the Marine or service member being deployed. Cross cultural competence scales are

popular with the military because a) they are measurable; b) one

might be able to teach and train to them; and c) a good scale

should provide some predictive ability about who will and will not

adjust well in another culture.

It is important here to note that cross-cultural competence is not a

synonym for Operational Culture, nor is it an alternative way of

understanding culture as a concept, or culture groups around the

world. Operational Culture, as described in this book, is an anthropological approach which focuses not on the Marine going

overseas but on the people s/he will meet, and the environments

in which s/he will meet them. Put differently, cross cultural competency focuses on the adaptability of a person to a culture, while

Operational Culture focuses on the ways to understand, plan for,

and operate in those cultures to which Marines may have to adapt.

As a set of concepts that can be applied in planning and operating, Operational Culture can help the Marine evaluate conditions

in foreign areas in terms of commander’s intent and desired effects.

Using these concepts, a Marine can develop effective courses of action based on cultural factors affecting planning and operating.
Training and Education 247

Operational Culture and cross-cultural competency are neither opposing approaches to culture nor divergent capabilities. Education and training emphasizing affective-domain learning will more

likely cultivate both cross-cultural competence and an inclination

to think and operate in terms of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions. Absent this cross-cultural competence, the likelihood of

possessing the social and emotional intelligence to function in foreign environments will be lower, and the affective component of

Operational Culture Learning will be much diminished. Still, without learning about foreign cultures in terms of the Five Operational

Culture Dimensions, one is unlikely to have the skills necessary to

plan and execute foreign area operations.

Any framework for culture learning must address the affective domain. Programs and measures which evaluate and develop

Marines’ cross-cultural competence skills will preserve the capability of Marines to be America’s high-intensity force of unmatched

lethality and speed, while granting them the social intelligence to

plan and function successfully in foreign cultures.

Example: The Affective Component Makes an Effective Marine

If we consider the culture group known as “Marines” from the perspective

of the Operational Culture Dimension of beliefs and icons, we see that they

are unique. As a high-intensity force of unmatched lethality and speed,

“Magnificent Bastards,” “Ugly Angels,” and “Devil Dogs” know how to “get

some” and have proven adept at it, and attitudinally predisposed to do so,

from Belleau Wood to the “Frozen Chosin” to Fallujah.10

This unmatched lethality, destructive capability, and speed do not solely or

mostly come from a combination of gear, training, and doctrine. Rather,

one could argue that most important in making a Marine is the attitudinal

predisposition to be lethal, destructive, and fast—and better at it than

anyone else. That is why men and women choose the Corps. Is is also

what recruits are socialized not only to know, but to believe and feel as

“who I am.” In brief, Marines are good at what they do because they really

want to do it, and want to become it, even at the expense of other elements

of life—Marines incorporate “Marineness” into the affective dimension of

their conduct, explicit learning, and implicit socialization, and this

guarantees cognitive and psycho-motor success in the FMF.
248 Operational Culture

Example: The Affective Component Makes an Effective Marine; continued.

Furthermore, through screening officer candidates and recruits, and while

at Boot Camp and OCS, Marine learning implicitly emphasizes experiences

meant to cultivate traits of emotional intelligence. Traits of emotional

intelligence that receive focus in Marine entry level training include

independence; inter-personal relationships; stress tolerance; impulse

control; flexibility; and problem solving. Whether it be the Crucible or the

Small Unit Leader Evaluation (SULE II), Marine training in fact puts a high

value on emotional intelligence along with affective learning—though no

Marine would admit to emotions!

Samples of Operational Culture Learning Across the

Domains

Before we move on to consider different kinds of learning settings

from the standpoint of Bloom’s domains, we first need to give these

domains some context with respect to both culture and military

operations. Therefore, we will review Bloom’s descriptors here, including concrete examples of what they would entail for Marines

learning about a specific cultural environment, in this case a Muslim one in the Middle East.

As these tables below show, it is indeed possible to develop concrete training and education about cultures in a graduated fashion

across the domains of learning. Within each domain of Bloom’s

Taxonomy, not only does the learning build upon preceding learning outcomes, but each stage requires a higher level of capability

and understanding. These higher levels of capability in the cognitive and psycho-motor domain, in turn, demand equal progress

through the rungs of the affective domain. On this basis, we can

now proceed to a discussion of Operational Culture Learning in

both pre-deployment training and professional military education.
Training and Education 249

Cognitive Domain of Learning

Descriptor Characteristics

Knowledge

Enumerating numbers of prayer times in Islam

Remembering the tribal map of the AO

Comprehension

Explaining main activities in Muslim prayer

Estimating implications of detaining family heads

Application

Applying understanding of Muslim prayer and

mosque architecture to determine roles of

Marines and indigenous security forces in

entering a mosque, dialoguing with leaders,

searching men and women

Determining which indigenous participants

in a meeting are leaders, and whose authority is

based on religion, family leadership, coercive

power, etc.

Analysis

Grasping interrelationship of religious

membership and ethnicity, and how relates to

politics, crime, and challenges to stability

Deconstructing AO’s social structure in terms of

age, gender, class, kin, ethnicity

Synthesis

Assessing AO in terms of mission objectives,

bringing together considerations of environment,

economy, and social structure to assemble

operational plan achieving mission while

strengthening desired political structures and

earning local legitimacy

Evaluation

Critiquing higher or subordinate level’s analysis in

terms of both mission and grasp of local

environment

Judging the bias, interests, and utility of

indigenous interlocutors’ input about the AO

Table 9.4: Cognitive Learning in Cultural Context
250 Operational Culture

Table 9.5: Psycho-Motor Learning in Cultural Context

Psycho-Motor Domain of Learning

Descriptor Characteristics

Imitation

Repeating after instructor the rank-appropriate way to

say and wave “hello”

Practicing locally legitimate posture to demonstrate

balance of Strength/approachability

Manipulation

Rehearsing staff-level introductions to indigenous

partners for team/mission legitimacy

Conducting mock informal informational interviews with

role-players, repeating exercise based on feedback from

role players

Precision

Without need of guidance from higher, performing

cordon-and-knock on house with multi-generational

family, separating males and females; according

culturally proper treatment to male leaders, including

phrases in local language; deploying female personnel

appropriately

As small unit, present hard target earning confidence of

local families/deter escalation of force by local agitators

Articulation

Immediately assuming appropriate social intimacy with

local interlocutors; demonstrating comfortable use of

pleasantries, honorifics, spatial dynamics, expressions of

emotion and solidarity

Shifting among adversarial/conciliatory negotiation

styles given significance of topic, public vs private

nature of interaction, seniority of the local interlocutor

and his evolving responses, considering overall

impression one wishes to cultivate of strength and

personality

Naturalization

Conducting proceedings for local communities in such

fashion as to exhibit complete mastery of culture

group’s understandings of social hierarchies, beliefs, and

unacknowledged biases, while exhibiting fluency with

local ways
Training and Education 251

Keying Operational Culture Learning to the Appropriate

Domains

Up to now, we have discussed theories of learning as related to

both the military as an organization, and to the nature of culture as

a field of study and practice. With the exception of some concrete

examples, our examination of these topics has not focused on speAffective Domain of Learning

Descriptor Characteristics

Receiving

Exhibit particular focus on cultural topics related to

individual Marine’s tactical functions

Belief that cultural training or cultural curricula in PME

are legitimate aspects of learning

Responding

Active participation in seminars/scenario-based training,

volunteering through questions/demonstration of skills

Pursuit of individual reading and computer-based

learning about the culture of the AO, and about crosscultural interactions in general, even though it may not

be directly related to the immediate information needed

Valuing

Believing that awareness of the culture of the AO is

essential for tactical success and proper psychological

and mental orientation to the mission

Evaluating other Marines based on cultural conduct

towards indigenous people and attitudes to the

integration of culture in operational planning and

execution

Organization

Preferring culture-heavy approach to planning and

execution because it accords with what one feels to be

their own natural approach

Drawing parallel between culturally appropriate

operational conduct, and military ethics, law of war, and

human compassion befitting Marines

Value Complex

Un-self-conscious lifestyle viewing battlespace through

Operational Culture Dimensions at tactical, operational,

and strategic levels; is attitudinally disinclined to see it

otherwise

Table 9.6: Affective Learning in Cultural Context
252 Operational Culture

cific geographic regions. As we indicated in the introduction to this

chapter, it is important to distinguish between the study of specific

regions and cultures, and the study of cultural concepts and principles, such as the Five Dimensions. These latter are applicable

across regions and kinds of deployments. The realm of learning

about broad cultural concepts, principles, and dimensions is professional military education (PME). By contrast, PTP requires specific regional focus.

Professional Military Education. In order for operational culture learning to occur successfully in PME, it must integrate multiple domains of learning. PME is not, however, concerned with

learning about specific regions or particular culture groups. Rather,

at every level, PME’s primary focus is on developing rank-appropriate intercultural skills and conceptual grasp appropriate to any

area of operations: It seeks to develop a frame of mind, or outlook, among Marines facilitating effective culture operations globally. As such, it is not concerned with “knowledge” in the cognitive

domain, as informational learning and data recall do little to assist

in skills and conceptual learning. Likewise, as so much of culture

learning in the psycho-motor domain is by necessity region- and

AO-specific, PME in the formal schools is an inappropriate environment to focus on it.

Instead, at the initial levels of structured military learning, be it enlisted Entry-Level Training and Marine Combat Training or Officer

Candidates School and The Basic School, new Marines must encounter experiences, mentorship, and instruction which render

them willing to learn about culture as a mainstream part of being

a Marine and preparing for Marine activities. This requires learning in the affective domain up to the level of “receiving,” which in

turn will prepare them to “receive” and “respond” affectively to

training in the PTP context when they are young enlisted or company grade Marines.

Cognitively, at the level of second lieutenants at The Basic School

and sergeants in EPME, Marines need to gain a rudimentary grasp

of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions. It is also necessary

that they begin to understand the consequences of their actions at
Training and Education 253

the ground level in terms of these dimensions—hence, cognitive

“comprehension.”

Figure 9.2: Bloom’s Taxonomy in PME: ELT, TBS, Sgts

As Marines proceed into the next levels of PME in Expeditionary

Warfare School and as SNCOs, learning should elicit a desire to

seek out more education about culture in military operations, both

as a subject of study as well as from the standpoint of a Marine’s

duty as an educator and mentor to his younger charges. In this

sense, curriculum developed appropriately, and teaching executed

effectively, will cultivate “responding” among Marines. This affective “responding” will evolve gradually into “valuing,” wherein a

Marine will become committed to continuous culture learning as

part of the responsibilities as a career Marine.

As a Marine will have by this point encountered non-regional specific culture learning in earlier PME experiences in conjunction with

AO-specific culture training prior to deployments, s/he will now

gain the cognitive ability to estimate future operational trends with

respect to culture. This is a higher order of “comprehension,”

which will prepare him for “application” of the ideas and concepts

animating this book to new contexts, situations, and questions, as

appropriate to senior company grade and junior field grade offiDomain Ascending Levels of Learning

Cognitive

1 2 3 4 5 6

Affective

Knowledge

Responding

Valuing

Organization

Values Complex

Application

Analysis

Synthesis

Evaluation

Comprehension

Receiving
254 Operational Culture

cers, as well as staff sergeants and gunnery sergeants—meaning at

the company and battalion staff levels.

Further cognitive learning is appropriate to the experience level

and educational settings of mid- and top-level PME. At Command

and Staff College, for example, majors should learn how to fully

disassemble culture groups into the Five Operational Culture Dimensions, thus grasping the meaning and interrelationships among

the environment; economic, social, and political structures; and beliefs and symbols—as relates to military operations in the planning

and execution stages. Such learning foci correspond to “analysis”

and “synthesis” in the cognitive realm, and relate clearly to the

functions majors and lieutenant colonels will need to perform on

battalion, regimental, and division staffs.

Successful learning at these stages, combined with successive PTP

and experience gained through deployments, will permit particularly gifted commanders at the battalion level and above to judge,

weigh, and balance the cultural, operational, and tactical issues at

stake in his AO through the continuous Marine Corps Planning

Process. As suggested above, successful integration of operational

culture during the Mission Analysis, Commander’s Battlespace Area

Evaluation, and COA Comparison and Decision phases will permit

the commander to approach the “evaluation” level of the cognitive

Domain Ascending Levels of Learning

Cognitive

1 2 3 4 5 6

Affective

Knowledge

Organization

Values Complex

Application

Responding

Valuing

Analysis

Synthesis

Evaluation

Comprehension

Receiving

Figure 9.3: Bloom’s Taxonomy in PME: EWS and SNCOA
Training and Education 255

domain, relying on specific subject matter expertise within his planning team.

Higher levels of “synthesis” and the realm of “evaluation” are, however, more suited to the experience and study of the gifted FAO

who, when part of the Operational Planning Team as the subject

matter expert, can apply what s/he has learned even beyond their

primary region.

In the same vein, top-level school and further military educational

opportunities can build upon experience to foster the basics of an

internal value system integrating operational culture understanding

with military considerations, when senior Marines encounter challenges at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Thus, PME

at the uppermost levels can aspire to producing “organization” in

the affective domain, principally because likely future deployments

will require it, as the case studies in Chapter Eight have implied.

A final note about PME is in order here. We have emphasized the

need for this kind of learning to be non-region focused—PME

should develop Marines who are competent as planners and operators no matter where the AO. However, there is a need for

some regional context to conceptual learning. Throughout this

Domain Ascending Levels of Learning

Cognitive

1 2 3 4 5 6

Affective

Knowledge

Values Complex

Application

Responding

Valuing

Analysis

Organization

Synthesis Evaluation

Comprehension

Figure 9.4: Bloom’s Taxonomy in PME: Mid- to Top-Level

Receiving
256 Operational Culture

text, in fact, we have used examples from specific regions or culture group, in order to illustrate broad cultural dynamics. Likewise, applying principles of culture to specific regions in PME

permits the learner to understand those principles better. In this

case, regional learning is not primarily for the purpose of a profound, deployment-ready capability in any region itself, but for the

sake of better understanding and applying the concepts and principles of Operational Culture in general.

Pre-Deployment Training (PTP). By contrast, PTP must be region focused by its very nature, and its goal is deployment-ready

capability in the current operating environment (COE). For specific

AOs, it is necessary as a basis to encounter basic cultural information, recall it, and enumerate it. This factual information is found

in culture guides and materials associated with cultural intelligence,

and corresponds to the “knowledge” component of the cognitive

domain. As such, it is a quite basic initial foundation for deeper

skills across all three domains.

Real capability in cultural PTP can only result, however, from

higher-level learning. Cognitively, this means explaining cultural

facts and processes in an AO in a fashion related to rank and billet, and then going on to consider consequences of Marine actions.

For more advanced learners, or for those whose deployments will

require more intense interaction with indigenous people, they will

need to learn how to adapt their understandings of the culture to

new likely scenarios through application of principles they have

begun to derive.11

For example, a Marine might have learned about the social structure and its relationship to the civilian administration of a disasteraffected area, but he or she might have to adapt that learning to a

mission focusing on assisting the local police or army in disaster relief and counter-narcotics. Thus, in the cognitive domain of PTP,

Marines need to develop skills in the “knowledge,” “comprehension,” and “application” areas. To expect capabilities at the higher

cognitive levels is not realistic, given time constraints for pre-deployment training and likely skills of in-unit and external subjectmatter experts.
Training and Education 257

Because functioning with cultural competence also requires performing certain tasks, psycho-motor learning is at the core of

PTP, particularly for the younger-to-mid-level Marine. This means

learning how to replicate culturally appropriate actions that have

been demonstrated through seminars and computer-based settings.

As in other military training, this learning will often be through

trial, error, and evaluation by qualified personnel—Marines will

have to perform the task of a town hall meeting, or establishment

of an observation post in an occupied residence, several times in

training until they do it in accordance with performance standards.

Some of these tasks will need to become habitual, in that a Marine

will need to learn how to do them several times in different settings

with a proficiency convincing to indigenous people—for example,

he or she will need to know how to say hello with proper combination of words, body language, etc., to elicit the desired response

and attitude on the part of indigenous people. However, a Marine

in most cases will not need to, or be able to, perform tasks so

smoothly as to show no hesitation.

Therefore, with respect to the psycho-motor domain, while PTP

should target “imitation” and “manipulation” in a mission-, rank-,

and function-appropriate way, it is unrealistic to expect Marines to

achieve “precision” or higher level skills in PTP. “Precision” in psycho-motor tasks can be aspired to by the foreign area officer (FAO)

who combines academic learning about a particular region with

extensive experience there.

For pre-deployment training’s lessons to truly endure throughout

a deployment, training must also touch upon the affective domain. Here, a Marine must be willing to actually pay attention to

training, and “take it on board.” Further, they need to be taught in

a way that ensures active participation in training, so that they actively seek out such training. After successive exposures to PTP

where material covered demonstratively assists in missions, Marines

will begin to see intrinsic value in such learning. This means that

PTP must embrace the affective domain, to ensure that Marines

“receive,” “respond” to, and “value” operational culture. Higher

level affective learning is not necessary in the PTP environment.
258 Operational Culture

The value of PTP culture learning reaching the “application, “manipulation,” and “valuing” levels of Bloom’s taxonomy is not limited to training for tactical functions in a field exercise context at

the battalion and lower level. For MAGTF staffs at the MEU

through MEF level, accomplishments in the domains of learning

express themselves best at mission readiness exercises (MRX).

Here, the cognitive ability to assess the operating environment in

terms of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions can be fully developed to the point of “application,” and tested as well. Likewise,

the process of planning and conducting MAGTF staff activities creates the shared situational awareness that drives the affective learning process of staff-level PTP to reach “valuing.”

Domain Ascending Levels of Learning

Cognitive

1 2 3 4 5 6

PsychoMotor

Affective

Naturalization

Analysis

Articulation

Precision

Manipulation

Imitation

Values Complex

Organization

Responding

Receiving

Valuing

Synthesis

Evaluation

Application

Knowledge

Comprehension

Figure 9.5: Bloom’s Taxonomy in PTP
Training and Education 259

Finally, simulated interaction with coalition and indigenous partners is an essential aspect of psycho-motor “manipulation.” Therefore, MRX planners and participants must include culture learning

through both seminar and simulation, lest the battle staff itself be

out of sync with subordinate maneuver elements with regards to

Operational Culture Learning.

To consider the matter from an alternative perspective, in the PTP

realm, there are particular substantive cultural learning “building

blocks” to integrate into unit as well as individual training. These

building blocks overlap with the cognitive and psycho-motor domain. They also establish a progression of subject matter learning

as a Marine or unit approaches deployment. Furthermore, these

building blocks incorporate attention to the Five Operational Culture Dimensions, and how they apply in the specific AO. These

“building blocks” of operational culture learning include:

Conceptual Grasp of the Principle: Understanding the reasons

for, and implications of, a cultural concept, as well as the implications of our actions for that concept.

Understanding the Operational Culture Dimensions at Work:

Detecting the components of specific Operational Culture Dimensions present in the AO, as well as their interactions, with respect

to the cultural concept under study.

Concrete Information: Data about how a specific culture group

within the AO demonstrates behaviors, structures relationships, and

manifests beliefs regarding the cultural concept at hand.

Measurable Skills: Psycho-motor tasks the Marine must perform

when operating among people from a specific culture group.

These measurable skills provide individual training standards (ITS)

and collective training standards (CTS), aligned with the culture,

rank/billet of operator, security considerations, and overall mission

goals.
260 Operational Culture

Example: Culture Learning Building Blocks in PTP – Gender

When learning about gender in a Muslim Middle Eastern AO during predeployment training, conceptual grasp of the principle would mean

understanding that relations between Muslim males and females, and

particularly between “stranger” males and local females, are very different

from those found in the U.S.. Further conceptual grasp would lead one to

see that our treatment of indigenous women in what is considered a “tooaggressive” fashion will result in negative attitudes towards Marines as

harsh, lascivious, and disrespecting of females, who collectively represent

national honor and purity.

Understanding the Operational Culture Dimensions at Work would

mean learning that in this Middle Eastern AO, the change in work patterns

and economic conditions (Operational Culture Dimension Two: Economy)

meant that more women entered the formal economy, thus undermining

indigenous males’ sense of provider-manhood, and increasing the incidence

of male-female contact (the “gender” component of Operational Culture

Dimension Three: Social Structures).

Over time, this economy-driven change in the social structure further

increased males’ desire to protect and seclude females related to them (the

”norms, mores, and taboos” component of Operational Culture Dimension

Five: Beliefs and Icons), while it also drove more females to dress in a more

conservative fashion, thus permitting greater interaction with non-related

males outside the home. Likewise, because previous imperialist powers

focused on “liberating” women as a main component of their efforts to

“modernize backward colonies,” local (male) leaders will likely be quite

sensitive to how U.S. forces act towards indigenous women, while those

same indigenous women might resent being “liberated” from “restrictions”

they themselves assumed.

Concrete information would mean knowing that in the more urbanized

area of a particular country, the strictures regarding male-female interaction

were lessened due to westernization, wealth, or higher incidence of nonmajority religion populations. Concrete data would also tell the operator

that the influence of patriarchic extended families and non-exposure to

Western ways meant that the strictest gender-mixing rules applied.

Measurable skills would ensure that the Marine knew how to walk near,

speak to/about, motion towards, and look at women in a particular place

and time; was able to consider all the tactical functions that may be

influenced by gender relations in that particular place; and knew whether

and how to alter tactical functions in order to still accomplish mission

according to commander’s intent.
Training and Education 261

It is helpful to think about this all as a process applying through

time, where the starting line is the beginning of a pre-deployment

work-up, and the finish line is the early stages of the deployment

itself.

One might think that conceptual grasp, understanding societal conditions, concrete knowledge, and measurable skills are unique to

one rank level or place in command hierarchy. This is not the

case.

These building blocks of operational culture knowledge

apply to all personnel. Given the challenges of the contemporary global operating environment, it is no longer enough

for the Marine to know what to do/not do, yet with no concern for why they must/must not do it.

Pre-deployment

cycle beginning

Deployment

begins

Conceptual

Grasp

Understanding

Dimensions

Concrete

Information

Measurable

Skills

Figure 9.6: Cultural PTP on Road Through Deployment
262 Operational Culture

Example: Learning Building Blocks Apply to all Ranks

In the Central African Republic, a French Marine lance corporal on patrol

far from base had been instructed not to search clergy. When he

encountered a local missionary, not only did he refrain from searching him,

but he initiated a rapport. This rapport yielded much intelligence about

local networks of power and influence, and improved the unit’s relationship

with the indigenous people. If the LCpl had only been instructed not to

search the clergy, but was not informed that the clergy have important

family, economic, and political relationships, he might not have established

the rapport that benefited the entire company.

As Chapter Eight implies, there are a few additional considerations

that need to be addressed in the process of conceptualizing and executing cultural PTP. Though not related directly to the issue of

learning domains, we raise them here, as they help to produce the

framing questions in developing cultural PTP.

The identity of the Marine in terms of rank and billet. The identity

of the Marine in functional and rank terms, and the identity of

his/her unit in terms of location and role, are important considerations in PTP. Only after considering these matters can an instructor develop and execute PTP suited to the individual Marine

and unit receiving training.

Most basically, in any operation, a corporal or sergeant will not be

doing the same thing as will a lieutenant colonel or colonel. Thus,

in terms of the Operational Culture Dimensions, the former will

need different kinds of knowledge and skills than will the latter.

Significantly, it is not a matter of more or less, but different.

Example: Rank, Billet, & Operational Culture Learning in PTP

As an example of different learning requirements at different levels and

functions, in a counterinsurgency environment, a squad leader will need to

know what kind of body posture and weapons positioning communicates

strength, security, threat, lack of aggressive intent, respect, and openness to

passers-by, fathers of families, etc.
Training and Education 263

Example: Rank, Billet, & Operational Culture Learning in PTP; continued.

He will also need to know gender-appropriate performance at vehicle

check points and house searches, as well as what the culture’s social structures mean for Marine interactions with family leaders, females, youth, and

religious representatives.

Likewise, if working with local police or soldiers, the young Marine will

need to grasp culturally-coded patterns of officer interactions with enlisted,

and the importance of age, rank, and wealth in a small unit environment.

They will also need to understand how environment and economy—levels of education, health, and nutrition—influence the tactical capability and

attentiveness to detail of local security personnel. Marines in these roles

will also need to be able to use a certain category of phrases in the local

language, in addition to non-verbal symbolic communication appropriate

to interaction at his level of society.

While the commander at the battalion level or above does not require “in

the weeds” awareness of these matters, he does need to know the overarching environmental, economic, and social parameters which have caused

the behavior and actions that his units will encounter. Not only will he

need to grasp history, but he will require an even closer understanding of

the local memory of it. This is because his likely interlocutors will be influenced more by the latter in a negotiation and planning context.

And, though he need not be fully versed on all the AO-specific manifestations of the Operational Culture Dimensions, the commander must have a

comprehensive grasp of how these dimensions work and interact conceptually, as well as a basic knowledge of how they play out in the battlespace. In this way, he can effectively conduct his Commander’s Battlespace

Area Evaluation (CBAE), determine his areas of interest and influence, and

articulate his Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). He will then be

able to direct his subordinates to fully examine the AO in terms of the Operational Culture Dimensions, through intelligence preparation of the battlefield and course of action development.

Given his conceptual grasp of cultural dimensions and his baseline understanding of the AO itself, the commander can then select the appropriate

COA in terms of both culture and mission. The commander also needs to

know the significance of certain kinds of Marine conduct, and the way to

use certain culturally-attuned measures for leverage.

As for demonstrable skills, both the squad leader and the commander need

to understand approaches to time and spatial relations. The former will display his understanding in the context of street stops.
264 Operational Culture

Example: Rank, Billet, & Operational Culture Learning in PTP; continued.

The latter will instead display competency relative to meetings and negotiations, through space concepts; understandings of time; as well as non-verbal communication and the biographical backgrounds of key leadership

points of contact. Leaders at both levels will not only need to be proficient

in these demonstrable skills, but they will need to learn how to mentor

their immediate subordinates, both in the performance of these skills, as

well as in the affective integration of culture into the overall Marine combat schema.

Billet thus matters. An infantry squad leader needs to understand

certain particular aspects about the culturally-coded observable

human conduct, in order to quickly assess threat level and atmospherics, etc. An NCO in the same battalion’s intelligence section

requires a broader grasp of the cultural components and human

patterns at play, but not at the same “in the weeds” level as required by the squad leader.

Likewise, the Marine civil affairs sergeant requires a grasp of the

culturally-coded dynamics of inter-personal relations, methods for

consensus building, hyper-local governance issues, and approaches

to economic exchange. So, not only rank, but billet also is at play

in determining the operationally relevant components of culture.

The nature of the operation along the kinetic spectrum. From port

call, humanitarian action, and disaster relief, up through thermonuclear confrontation, different aspects and a different degree

of cultural consideration in the planning and operating process

apply. Some feel that high-intensity combat need not take a region’s culture into consideration: Goals are concrete, kinetic, and

suited to force-on-force conventional metrics.

Still, in this context, culture does play a role, forcing Marines to

consider the opposing military’s cultural warfighting proclivities.

As a few examples, these culturally-coded preferences in warfighting include how the civilian and military social structures, political

structures, norms and mores influence military hierarchies. Further, the cultural background of hostile and friendly foreign military
Training and Education 265

personnel will influence civil-military relationships, approaches to

operational initiative, information sharing, preference for tactics,

and many other aspects about the military profession. These factors about a foreign military’s cultural complexion will still influence the kinetic phase and need to be considered in planning and

operating.12

Metabolizing Operational Culture

Whether it addresses culture as a concept or cultures in specific geographical contexts, much of the writing and teaching in the field

of culture has been undertaken by academicians, and goes on in

the college classroom. As such, there has rarely been concern for

functional capabilities as a learning outcome. However, for operational culture learning to be true “training” in a pre-deployment

environment, it must provide Marines with psycho-motor capabilities. Marines must learn skills that can be demonstrated as

the performance of tasks, which can in turn be evaluated by subject matter experts according to reasonably objective standards that

mesh both tactical and operational needs with cultural considerations.

Of course, performance of tasks need to be related to rank and

function, but the essential point is that pre-deployment culture

training which does not teach military intercultural skills,

but confines itself to informational briefs or motivational exhortations, is not learning. Marines need to deploy with concrete skills in the realm of culture.

These skills need to emerge from cognitive “comprehension” and

“application,” and will have to be flexible as to circumstance, particular missions, and rank as well as billet. As we indicated in the

introductory comments of this chapter, an over-weaning focus on

performing the same tasks without the cognitive under-girding

does not create culture operators at the tactical level; rather, it results in unthinking automatons. Likewise, appropriate task performance in the psycho-motor realm needs to be influenced by

the affective hunch of the sufficiently trained Marine.
266 Operational Culture

This renders standardized criteria for task performance evaluation

extremely difficult to determine, and perhaps a futile effort—different situations reward different ways of performing tasks. Here,

a training program runs the risk of evaluating performance according to standards that are more related to what the evaluator

wants than they are to the actual operating environment and the

people in it.

This is no marginal point. The tendency of military training is towards the hyper-concrete, observable, gradable, and replicable.

This training bias produces good results in the tactile sense: if a

Marine is trained to fire his weapon in five different positions; disassemble it down to the last bolt against a stop-watch while blindfolded; clean it to the point of immaculateness; reassemble it again

as fast as s/he disassembled it, and then expertly fire the weapon—

s/he will be able to do it with equal excellence in Norway, the

Philippines, and everywhere between. S/he will do it the same regardless of whether s/he is a lance corporal or a colonel, logistician

or infantryman.

Understanding culture, and performing in different cultures, however, cannot be conceived of in that fashion. Every AO is different culturally, and the cognitive as well as psycho-motor

requirements for effective culture operators change from AO to

AO, rank to rank, and MOS to MOS. In training terms, this means

that “tasks” will remain the same only if we define them so generically as to require interpretation into much more specific tasks as

per AO and mission and billet. More than that, “conditions” will

constantly change, and in many cases, “standards” will as well.

Therefore, overzealously locking culture learning into a systematized straitjacket will force learning targets into sterile

abstractions of the lowest common denominator, permit

mediocre subject matter expertise on the part of instructors, and—

worse still—divert Marines’ focus away from the broader understanding at the conceptual level which this book has

communicated throughout.
Training and Education 267

Put differently, excessive concentration on applying conventional

military training concepts to Operational Culture Learning might

serve the structural and psychological needs of the military training establishment; more to the point, however, it will do violence

to actual understanding of cultures on the part of Marines, and

their functional competence in them. As suggested above, the resulting training and education programs will end up being more

about “us”—the military establishment—than it will be about

“there” and “them”—the actual, continually evolving cultural environment to which Marines will deploy, and the people in it.13

If, for example, experienced Marines talk of the need to “metabolize” operational culture in the fleet,14 and build capabilities associated with “emotional intelligence,” how can one systematize that

learning, or test it through replicable, performable tasks? And who,

aside from the indigenous person with whom the Marine actually

interacts while in an AO and functioning in a specific mission, is

suited to judge the effectiveness of the Marines’ Operational Culture learning?

In short, culture must be integrated into Marine operations, and

into education, training, and planning for those operations. Yet,

Marines will fail culturally if this topic is treated mechanistically, just like all other military skills. This is because Operational Culture mixes military with non-military concerns, intuition

with certainty, and knowledge with skills.

Who Teaches?

This raises the matter of who should instruct culture in the PME

and PTP realm. While this is the subject of a separate study, we

can here note a few points. First, the person who develops curriculum for culture and teaches it either regionally or conceptually

must possess a superior level of subject matter expertise. Experience operating in foreign environments and among foreign peoples is a necessary—but insufficient—condition, since experience

is not to be confused with expertise.
268 Operational Culture

Rather, in the context of region-specific cultural training and education, the instructor must have thoroughly studied the region according to the Five Operational Culture Dimensions, and must be

able to apply them in both conceptual and concrete terms to the

audience s/he is teaching, in order to cover learning throughout

the domains encountered above.

In the context of non-region specific PME, specialization in a region is still helpful, for without a concrete regional context and expertise, the Operational Culture Dimensions remain sterile and

without meaning, for the teacher or student. Of course, this regional knowledge must be based on a profound grasp of the concepts covered in this book. Further, it must be combined with a

clear understanding of the overall purposes of each level of PME.

As we saw in Chapter Seven, it is also important that the instructor have at least a rudimentary grasp of the language of the AO, to

be able to discuss the social significance of language, and Marine

use of language.

Second, since culture learning is neither briefing nor preaching,

but rather teaching, the trainer-educator must know how to teach.

In addition to attendance of the Formal Schools Instructors Course,

observation of military and non-military instruction in subjects related to operational culture is essential to forming the basic skills

foundation to teach in the cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor

realm. In short, the trainer-educator must be a pedagogue.

These two points might seem obvious, yet they cut against the

grain of some training and education in the military. Since every

Marine is a rifleman, and every SNCO and officer a mentor and

teacher, it is regularly the case that Marines with some knowledge

of a topic will be called upon to teach it, usually from a scripted

program of instruction. This idea can be summarized as “if he’s in

that billet, or if he’s done it, he must know it, and if he knows it,

he must be able to teach it.”

Whereas this works for conventional military skills, it is not appropriate to culture learning. To use the example of language
Training and Education 269

again, just because a person has been in France, that doesn’t mean

they know French. And just because they can speak French, that

doesn’t mean they know how to teach it.

Third, beyond subject matter expertise and pedagogical capability, the instructor must be able to integrate culture into the military

schema. He thus must speak in an idiom and use examples that

are relevant to activities and practical concerns of Marines—this

means grasping the Marine Corps (audience), understanding the

reason Marines are deploying to an AO (mission), and diagnosing

which aspects of the local environment are relevant to the particular functions of the Marines attending instruction (rank and billet).

This, of course implies a final requirement: that the instructor be inclined to continuous learning, both about the realm of operational

culture and the evolving Marine mission. Both kinds of learning

drive the conscientious subject matter expert to listen to Marines.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we articulated a triangular relationship linking culture, military needs, and the science of learning. We also emphasized that culture learning for operational utility is a shared

responsibility among schools, units, and individual Marines. While

sharing this responsibility, Marines must ensure that training or education focus on the cognitive, psychomotor, and affective learning appropriate to one’s rank and billet. Indeed, affective learning

resulting in emotional intelligence may be the essential bridge between culture and military applications. Finally, while the military

traditionally favors a method of developing curricula and assessing

learning suited to concrete, quantifiable skills, the nature of Operational Culture requires a more nuanced method that accounts for

the diversity of human phenomena and cultural behaviors, even

in a single battlespace.
270 Operational Culture

Notes

1 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, Planning (Washington, DC: United States

Government as Represented by the Secretary of the Navy, 1997), 15, 17.

2 For discussion of needed approaches to learning for “post-modern” operational

environments of the future, see LtGen Sir John Kiszely, “Post-Modern Challenges

for Modern Warriors,” published in Shrivenham Papers Number 5, December

2007: http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/documentlistings/monographs/shrivenham_paper_5.pdf. For broad coverage of the range

of issues related to training, education, and learning for current and future operational envirnments, see “Conference Proceedings – Pedagogy for the Long War:

Teaching Irregular Warfare (29 Oct – 1 Nov 2007),” compiled and edited by Barak

A Salmoni (Marine Corps Training and Education Command). In particular, see

Col Bill Monfries, “Initial Officer Training in the Australian Army,” 84-85, and

idem., “Excerpts from Key-Note Comments,” 93-97; in addition to panel recommendations, 98-114.

3 The literature on Bloom’s Taxonomy has continued to evolve over the past fifty

years, with additions and revisions. For a small sample, see Benjamin Bloom,

Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook 1: Cognitive Domain (Boston,

MA: Addison Wesley Publishing, 1956); Benjamin S. Bloom, David R. Krathwohl,

and Bertram B. Masia, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Book 2 Affective Domain (New York: Longman, 1999); Bryant J. Cratty, Psycho-Motor Behavior in Education and Sport (Charles C. Thomas Pub Ltd, 1974); also see Lorin W.

Anderson and David R. Krathwohl, A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (Boston, MA:

Allyn and Bacon, 2000); E.J. Simpson, The Classification of Educational Objectives

in the Psychomotor Domain (Washington, DC: Gryphon House, 1972); Anita Harrow, A Taxonomy of Psychomotor Domain: A Guide for Developing Behavioral

Objectives (New York: David McKay, 1972). 4 William D. Wunderle, Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for U.S.

Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (Ft. Leavenworth:

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 10-12.

5 See J.F. Kihlstrom and N. Cantor, Social Intelligence (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000).6 See H. Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (New York: Basic Books, 1983); David Goleman, Emotional Intelligence

(New York: Bantam Books, 1995); P. Salovey and D.J. Sluyter, eds., Emotional

Development and Emotional Intelligence: Educational Implications (New York:

Basic Books, 1997).

7 See D.A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as A Source of Learning and

Development (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984); P.C. Earley, “Redefining

Interactions Across Cultures and Organizations: Moving Forward with Cultural Intelligence,” Research in Organizational Behavior 24, 2002, 271-99; D.C. Thomas

and K. Inkson ̧ Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for Global Business (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2004). Also see D.C. Thomas, G. Stahl, E. Ravlin, E.

Pekerti, et al., “Cultural Intelligence: Domain and Assessment,” International

Journal of Cross-Cultural Management (Forthcoming: 2008).
Training and Education 271

8 Barak Salmoni, “Debrief of 5th CAG Falluja CMOC Director,” Falluja, Iraq, August

2005; “Debrief of I MEF (fwd) G-2,” interview by Dr. Barak Salmoni, al-Anbar

Province, Iraq, October, 2006; Final Report: I MEF Headquarters Group (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, 2006);

Final Report: Team Phoenix (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Advanced

Operational Culture Learning, 2006). For exploratory discussions of social and

emotional intelligence in a military context, see LtCol Sharon M. Latour, USAF,

and LtGen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF (ret.), “Emotional Intelligence: Implications

for all United States Air Force Leaders,” Air and Space Power Journal Winter 2002:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/apj/apj02/win02/latour.html;

Holly Livingstone, Maria Nadjiwon-Foster, Sonya Smithers, “Emotional Intelligence and Military Leadership,” Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 11 March

2002: http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/CFLI/engraph/research/pdf/08.pdf; also

see LtGen Sir John Kiszely, “Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors.”

9 See Brian R. Selmeski, Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and

Individual Development Royal Military College of Canada, Centre for Armed

Forces & Society. Occasional Paper Series #1: 16 May 2007; Allison Abbe, “Developing Cross-Cultural Competence in Military Leaders,” in Pedagogy for the

Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare – Conference Proceedings, 71-72; idem.,

with Lisa M.V. Gulick, and Jeffrey L. Herman, Cross Cultural Competence in Army

Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Study Report 2008-01, October 2007.

10 Dick Camp, Leatherneck Legends: Conversations with the Marine Corps’ Old

Breed (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2006); Larry Smith, The Few and the Proud:

Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words (New York: W. W. Norton,

2007); Thomas Ricks, Making the Corps (Scribner, 1998). 11 See Col Bill Monfries, “Initial Officer Training in the Australian Army,” 84-85,

and idem., “Excerpts from Key-Note Comments,” 93-97.

12 For more on culture learning in PTP, and the specific Marine Corps Approach

executed by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, see Barak

Salmoni, “Advances in Pre-Deployment Culture Training: the USMC Approach,”

Military Review (Nov-Dec 2006). For advances in the U.S. Army, see, in the same

issue, Maj Remi Hajjar, USA, “The Army’s New TRADOC Culture Center.”

13 See Papers by Allison Abbe, Charles Kirke, Col Bill Monfries, and Paula

Holmes-Eber in “Conference Proceedings – Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching

Irregular Warfare (29 Oct – 1 Nov 2007),” compiled and edited by Barak A

Salmoni, as well as related panel recommendations.

14 Personal communication, Col B.P. McCoy, April 2006; “Debrief of I MEF (fwd)

G-2;” Final Report: I MEF Headquarters Group.

273

Conclusion

This book has shown that Operational Culture considerations are

relevant across the geographic and operational spectrum. Particularly in the hybrid and irregular operations characterizing the contemporary and future expeditionary environment, cultural

considerations will be paramount. As such, Operational Culture

for the Warfighter has pursued two major objectives. Our first objective has been to provide clarity of thinking with respect to defining and understanding culture—as a warfighting and operational

competency relevant at all ranks and levels of command. This was

broadly the focus of Part I.

Our second objective, and the focus of Part II, has been to provide

a systematic, intellectually rigorous framework for understanding

cultures globally, in a way attuned to operational needs. We did

this by presenting and examining the Five Operational Culture Dimensions, including with them questions that should be asked by

Marines in an evolving fashion through the phases of planning and

execution. In Part III we demonstrated that these Dimensions indeed do animate the drivers of conflict in regions of strategic interest to the U.S., and to which Marines might deploy. We then

suggested a way to think about learning in the realm of culture, to

ensure that training and education—as an individual Marine, in

schools, or in the fleet—provide the needed skills and mental orientation to benefit operations.

In preparing this text, the authors were struck by two recurrent

phenomena. First: military organizations—and particularly the

U.S. Marine Corps—are themselves culture groups, which can be

analyzed across most aspects of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions. That is why we opened this text with METT-TC-MC,

with C-MC standing for Civilian culture and Military Culture considerations. Second: key concerns regarding culture in the military

domain are mirrored by Marine Corps doctrine’s concerns, particularly with respect to planning and warfighting. In this conclusion, therefore, we will begin by discussing militaries as cultures,
274 Operational Culture

taking advantage of knowledge the reader will likely already possess. We will then complete our inquiry into Operational Culture

for the Warfighter through a review of some central conceptual

considerations in the doctrinal literature on planning and operating,

as a vehicle to summarize central ideas in making culture of utility

to the warfighter.

Militaries as Cultures: The Marine Corps

Scholars of armed forces have come to think of “military culture...

as the ‘bedrock of military effectiveness’ because it influences

everything an armed service does.”1 Likewise, researchers with

military backgrounds have come to see service cultures as the main

factor in facilitating or inhibiting change—educationally, structurally, or operationally.2 Numerous works, both popular and academic, have emerged of late to examine military culture.3

An American soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine will likely consider

it obvious that militaries have cultures. “Army values,” “Naval traditions,” “Marine leadership principles and traits,” etc., are all explicitly cultural markers of our services. Indeed, we frequently

encounter Marines who explain why they do what they do by saying “it’s a Marine culture thing.” For this reason, this book has at

times illustrated cultural phenomena by referring to the Marine

Corps itself.

Still, in understanding their own service, or in coming to grips with

the ways of other U.S. services and coalition partners, Marines require a guide to systematically analyzing militaries as culture

groups. This is possible to do, through the very same Operational

Culture Dimensions applicable to the battlespace as a whole. “Militaries as cultures” could easily be the subject of an entire book.

Here, therefore, rather than a systematic investigation, we will very

briefly survey the topic, using the Marine Corps for examples.

Since the authorization to establish two battalions of Marines in

1775, the Corps has functioned in two distinct physical environments: a maritime and amphibious existence coupled with austere
Conclusion 275

and grueling ground conditions. Originally intended to be used as

boarding parties, sharpshooters, and ship-board police, the Marine

Corps later became a port and sea installation guard force. During WWI, it began to engage in large scale conventional military

operations akin to those of the U.S. Army. Still, even after that,

the Corps retained maritime and amphibious operations as an environmental constant. From Tarawa to Iwo Jima in WWII, the Marine Corps was a sea-based assault force, both doctrinally and in

practice.

This maritime condition has continued, from Inchon (1950) to the

current generation—in fact, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

is the most recent doctrinal and operational incarnation of a maritime environmental reality. This water-based aspect of the Corps’

environment is clearly translated into the language and identity of

the Corps. For example, Marines refer to land based facilities using

maritime terms. From “head” to “deck” to “overhead,” “ladder” to

“bulkhead,” Marines often cultivate an identity of being ship-borne,

even while on land.

The Marine Corps is also an expeditionary land force, ready to operate in any land environment, from desert to mountain, from the

Arctic to the tropics. Marines expect to operate under extremely

difficult physical conditions, with few amenities. As a result, the

Marine Corps has developed a culture of hardiness, extreme physicality, and austerity. In Boot Camp and Officer Candidates School,

Marines are selected and trained for physical strength, endurance,

resilience, and tolerance for pain and discomfort, going through

one of the most rigorous training programs of any military in the

world. They quickly learn to operate in Spartan environments using

minimal equipment, and to be prepared to adapt to whatever situation they may face.

Even more than other U.S. services, Marines engage in, and are socialized to value, hard labor—as one SNCO commented, “working

stupid-hard beyond the necessary.”4 Physical exercise—perennial

“PT”—is quite prominent in the Marine’s day, both as personal development, and as articulation of values. Sweat, and its smell, are

thus quite familiar to the Marine and those who work with them.5
276 Operational Culture

This cultural notion of austerity and hardiness combines with the

Marine maritime legacy through the tightness of space associated

with vessels. Quonset huts and squad bays are small, so Marines

must “use, reuse, and reuse again,” while being perennially tidy

and “squared away”—able to “pack our trash,” as scarcity of resources and space, as well as the expeditionary imperative, permit

nothing else. In a rear environment, this condition translates into

norms such as “hot-racking” computers, whereby several Marines

use the same computer with separate log-ins—and this is perceived

as normal, even when there are additional computers waiting in

boxes.

Recently, the dominant aspect of a Marine’s physical environment

has been the desert, from Afghanistan to Iraq. But this reinforces

the same practices and norms of austerity. For example, Marines

live in “camps,” not the Army’s “forts,” and operate from “combat

outposts,” as opposed to “forward operating bases.”

The Marine Corps’ cultural identity as an austere service is also reflected and reinforced in its economic relationships with the larger

U.S. military structure. As a sub-component of the Naval Service,

and in a competition for resources with both the Navy and the

much larger U.S. Army, the Marine Corps has regularly faced shortages of basic items, and has often had to content itself with handme-downs from other services. This was the case before WWII, but

events then seared a sense of scarcity onto Marine historical memory. During the second day of the Guadalcanal campaign, Navy

vessels departed the area—along with most of the Marines’ logistical and heavy equipment support. For the next four months, Marine forces had to use captured Japanese equipment and food to

survive.6 This historical memory fed into the ways Marines attitudinally encountered recurrent shortages in the 1950s and 1970s.

This scarcity and austerity continue to be seen today in conscious

as well as unconscious practices. For example, from file folders to

ammunition magazines, material items are used over and over,

often to the point of destruction, before replacement. And, in

many places, Marines go without—most comically, in restrooms

(heads), where there are frequently no paper towels!
Conclusion 277

Their small size and sometimes unclear position within the U.S.

military’s social and political structure has further reinforced the

notion of scarcity. Throughout its history the Corps has repeatedly

had to justify its very existence. From the 1920s through to the

1960s, many in the executive branch of government, Army, and

Air Force questioned the need to have a Marine Corps as a separate service. The Corps’ successes in WWII, particularly at Iwo

Jima and Okinawa, ironically hurt its image as a separate, unique

service: It could take on high intensity ground combat—as could

the Army—and it possessed carrier- and ground-based aircraft—

as did the Navy and the new U.S. Air Force.7

This ambiguous economic, social, and political position within the

U.S. military has led to a belief that the Corps as institution is always under threat, and must show that it can always do all things,

better than other services. As a result, Marines have been characterized as exhibiting a clannishness and healthy skepticism towards

other services—and even at times for the civilians they protect.8

The cultural attitude that Marines are separate, standing above all

others is reflected in their icons. The globally most recognizable

Marine icon is the flag raising atop Mt. Suribachi on Iwo Jima, on

23 February 1945. Marines—and sailors—who landed by naval

vessels raised an American flag, both culminating and expressing

extreme physicality, literally raising the flag beyond anyone’s individual reach.

As the afore-going shows, the Marine Corps environment and its

role within the U.S. military structure have implications for its beliefs, icons, and historical memory. This environment—or the way

it is re-remembered daily—also has implications for the Marine

Corps’ own internal economy—or ways of structuring labor and

exchange—and social as well as political structure. Most basically,

one could argue that the Marine Corps exhibits a mixture of egalitarian distribution, informal exchange, and industrial production.

Likewise, the Marine Corps as an institution, and individual

Marines, often exhibit industrial-era attitudes to human resources

and manpower uses. Finally, though more egalitarian than other

U.S. military services, the imperatives of a mass-manpower, military-bureaucratic organization create social structures and political
278 Operational Culture

relationships that are quite hierarchical when compared to civilian

society, but which are characterized by a fair amount of formal and

informal mobility.

As for distribution and exchange, given conditions of scarcity, in

broad terms, no particular group of Marines is due more material

goods than any other group by dint of status or position. Food is

shared equally; residential quarters—while different from enlisted

to company grade and field grade officers—are remarkably alike;

and quality of clothing, medical treatment, and amenities of life is

broadly the same throughout the Corps. To the extent that access

to and quality of material differs, it is due to billet and function—

the weapons, optics, and gear harnesses of Logistics Marines will

differ from those of Force Reconnaissance Marines because of mission requirements, and not status.

At the same time as relatively egalitarian distribution, however,

scarcity has elicited less formal practices. One of these is networks

of informal acquisition and exchange. Senior SNCOs and Warrant

Officers—or even LtCols—can create “mafias” to “arrange” acquisition of needed goods—particularly for matters directly related to

warfighting or troop welfare for youngest Marines. It is here that

the social structure feature of age grades, or cohorts of graduates

form Marine Corps schools, has implications for economy. These

informal networks are even used in personnel assignments, as people who know each other work through or outside the system to

adjust its impersonal bureaucratic functioning. Over time, the ties

of informal reciprocal obligation work to ensure that compensation is found.

A second, less formal practice is related to acquisition. Along with

the explicitly socialized idea of “take only what you need,” Marines

have been known to hoard goods such as folders, toilet paper,

MREs, magazines, etc., as the rainy day—or existential threat to the

unit or Corps—might be around the corner. In its most extreme

manifestation, this takes the form of going into a kit, or full set of

gear, and yanking out those parts which one needs, leaving the

rest behind.9 As the Marine aphorism goes, “there’s only one thief

in the Marine Corps. Everyone else is just getting their stuff back.”10
Conclusion 279

This collectivist, egalitarian distribution is also reflected in labor

practices. Common work for a common cause is required for success in a world of scarcity, austerity, and danger—hence the explicit socialization to group-orientation: “there is no ‘I’ in team.”

Generally, all hands engage in field days, and most Marines, officers and enlisted, have to pull twenty-four hour guard duty on a

randomized schedule.

This collectivism is also inspired by the de-personalization of an industrial organization. On the one hand, this is exemplified by the

maxim, “every Marine’s a rifleman.” This attests to reality of manpower scarcity and need for adaptability, as well as the ethos that

the Corps is a warfghting organism, no matter what the specialty

of its individuals.

On the other hand, de-personalization reflects a late nineteenthand twentieth-century bureaucratic, mass-based approach to manpower use: people are, like parts of a machine, interchangeable

and moldable. This is not a criticism; rather, it reflects the institutional egalitarianism, denigration of individualism, and industrial

machine-like nature of the Marine Corps—which, carved in the

crucible from Belleau Wood through to Khe Sanh, differs from

many twenty-first-century approaches to labor and individual

worth.

Finally, the modern Marine Corps has become a mechanized, industrial organization. Tracked and wheeled movement; computerized land navigation; technology-based IED-defeating devices;

and an increasingly sophisticated air wing have required higher

levels of education and cognitive/psycho-motor problem solving

skills—but have also been reflected in economies and ethos:

Marines often buy over-large sports-utility vehicles, motorcycles,

and gadgets, and are rarely found in hybrid automobiles.

Other aspects of the Marine Corps’ social and political structure

contradict egalitarianism, here reflecting its heritage as a military organization of the western European, British tradition, and as a social structure containing people of vastly different educational

backgrounds and competencies. In this sense, the Marine Corps is
280 Operational Culture

highly stratified. Most obviously, there are officers and enlisted.

Some of the former actually articulate it thus: “Enlisted do; officers

tell [enlisted what] to do.”11 Though this might be an exaggeration, there is a clear difference between officers and enlisted

Marines.

Other elements of stratification include military occupational specialty (MOS). The Marine Corps is a self-consciously combat

arms—and infantry-centric—organization. For many, there is infantry, and then everything else. While the U.S. Army is much better known for MOS-based identity, in the Marine Corps too, there

is a major differentiation between combat arms—highest in social

status—and all else, beginning with intelligence, then logistics, then

administration, etc. Within the combat arms, infantrymen consider

themselves superior to armor and artillery—and a world apart from

the aviator community. As an artifact of these differences, a lexicon of colloquial terms has emerged, both to identify oneself and

others.12

Like other culture groups, the U.S. military reflects dynamics in

larger American society—demonstrating again that culture groups

are not impermeable compartments. Thus, the Marine Corps has

grappled with matters of gender and ethnic minorities. For some

time, both groups were consigned to lower social status and access

to power. For female Marines, there are structural limitations imposed by U.S. law: excluded from the ground combat arms, they

cannot access key billets of power in the Marine Corps. However,

as they have moved into the Air Wing and intelligence, this has

begun to alter. Furthermore, in recent operations in gender-differentiated areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, female Marines have

begun to demonstrate a unique utility, while also engaging in more

infantry-like activities.

At both the tactical and operational level, therefore, female Marines

have gained greater prestige, status, and influence—hence, a concrete reality has begun to change a cultural belief, reflected institutionally in the emergence of female General Officers up to the

three-star rank.13
Conclusion 281

The same is true for ethnic minorities. Historically, the Marine

Corps was largely white in its demographic complexion. Through

to the 1960s, it was not a culture group congenial to African Americans or other ethnic groups.14 Yet, as American society has

changed, and as educational levels have risen among ethnic minority groups, more Marines from diverse ethnic backgrounds have

demonstrated their indispensable skills to the Corps from Somalia

to Afghanistan, Iraq to Indonesia.

Therefore, the Marine Corps has come to positively value diversity, both for its own sake, and because “every Marine’s a rifleman”

and an ethos of “mission, mission, mission.” Indeed, in its selfrepresentation—epitomized by recruitment drives—the Marine

Corps has begun to highlight its diversity, and target specific ethnic groups.15 The social and political structure of the Marine Corps

has therefore begun to evolve. Battalion commanders from South

Asia and regimental commanders from Hispanic backgrounds have

joined African American General Officers at the three-star rank, and

a Jewish Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.16

Finally, the Marine Corps possesses a sacred symbolic geography.

“Holy sites” include Tun Tavern, Belleau Wood—“Bois de la

Brigade de Marine”—Iwo Jima and its memorial in Washington

D.C., as well as the Marine Corps Barracks at 8th and I streets in

Washington. The Marine Corps also puts much focus on institutions—one might call them temples or churches—of explicit socialization and indoctrination; a caste of socializers (or priests); and

a corpus of doctrine (scripture), accompanied by semi-canonical literature meant to continue the socialization process.

The temples are Boot Camp, OCS, School of Infantry, and TBS (as

well as other PME institutions); the priests are the Drill Instructors,

OCS instructors, and TBS instructors—as well as the SNCO Corps,

as a sort of lay clergy that ministers both to younger enlisted

Marines as well as to company grade officers. Marine Corps Doctrine, from the 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations,17

1940 Small Wars Manual, up through the Marine Corps Doctrinal

Publications of the late 1990s and early 2000s,18 is a Marine’s corpus of scripture, while supporting books are the folk texts of the
282 Operational Culture

Marine Corps religion,19 which Marines read along with texts from

the great sages of the Corps.20

Ultimately, every rank insignia and every ceremony, to include

graduation from Boot Camp or OCS, promotions, changes of command, and culminating with the Marine Corps Pageant and Birthday Ball every 10 November—all these are the rituals that teach

Marines what it means to be a Marine, and articulate identity, aspirations, and even anxieties to insiders as well as outsiders, ensuring the reproduction of ideology and social structure. And, as

with other culture groups’ belief systems, there are particular rites

of passage, to include The Crucible for enlisted recruits, and

“Quigley” as well as SULE II for officer candidates.21

Our brief survey of the Marine Corps as a culture has admittedly

been “wave-tops” and incomplete. There are also elements of it

with which an outside observer or Marine might justifiably disagree. However, its essential point has been to demonstrate that

not only are militaries themselves cultures, but that they can also

be systematically analyzed as such, according to principles aligned

with the Five Operational Culture Dimensions. When contemplating operations against foreign militaries—or when planning interactions with other service branches or friendly foreign

militaries—such an analytical approach should be borne in mind

by the culture operator.

Principles of Military Doctrine: Congruence with Operational Culture

The correspondence between the Marine Corps’ approach to planning and operating and our approach to Operational Culture can

be seen in the following two passages from Marine Corps doctrinal publications:

War is not a single problem, but a complex system of interdependent problems, the solution to each of which affects the

outcomes of all the others.22
Conclusion 283

In war, no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather, each

episode merges with those that precede and follow it—shaped

by the former and shaping the conditions of the latter—creating a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity.23

Parts I and II of this book, and in particular the examination of the

Operational Culture Dimensions and their related case studies,

have strongly argued the same point with respect to culture and the

role of culture in military operations. We could have easily paraphrased the first quote above to say:

Culture is not a single and isolated component of the AO, but

a complex system of interdependent dimensions, the dynamics and impacts of each of which affect the dynamics of all the

others.

Likewise, Chapter Eight clearly demonstrated that the second quote

too can be paraphrased:

In culture groups, no dimension can be viewed in isolation.

Rather, each dimension and component of culture merges with

those that precede and follow it—shaped by the former and

shaping the conditions of the latter—creating a continuous,

fluctuating flow of activity in the culture groups Marines will encounter.

Doctrinal Considerations are Operational Culture Themes.

Given this background, it is significant that many principles and

animating tenets of Marine corps doctrine also hold true for how a

Marine should approach integration of culture into their thinking,

planning, and execution. We review a few doctrinal considerations here.

Humans as Central to War. Marine Corps doctrine on warfighting

teaches us that “the human dimension is central in war. It is the

human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors.”24 This idea serves as the foundational requirement for integrating culture into military learning, planning, and execution. It

is also the cornerstone of the concept of “war amongst the people,”
284 Operational Culture

the dominant mode of operations today and in the future. As we

have shown in this book, failure to consider the “human dimension” will prevent commanders from arriving at full answers to

questions such as “which factors are critical to the enemy? Which

can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him

most quickly to our will?”25 These are questions related to “the

center of gravity” in military operations, and in the operations of

today and tomorrow, that center of gravity will be the “human dimension.”26

Leadership Involvement. No matter what the level or rank, the commander cannot be aloof from his battlespace. As doctrine reminds

us, “Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The

commander... must drive the process,” as an active participant setting the overall intent and parameters, and making decisions.27

This principle is equally important to effective integration of operational culture in planning and operations. The commander should

possess a thorough grasp of the influence of cultural factors within

his AO, and articulate a vision, through commander’s intent, for

how to accommodate or use the cultural realities of the people and

opposing forces in the battlespace. Fundamentally, absent the

commander’s demonstrated and consistent concern for cultural factors during planning, a planning team and subordinate commanders will encounter difficulty integrating it among “traditional”

warfighting considerations, and the unit might have a lackadaisical

approach to culture in training and operating.

This means leadership must also be integrally involved in Operational Culture Learning—both in their own experience of it, and in

their prioritization of it among their subordinates. This is because

commanders possess the ultimate moral authority to inspire subordinates to embrace affective learning, along with more traditional

modes of military learning.

The Integrated Battlespace. As has been demonstrated throughout

this text, neither the dimensions of culture nor their components

are isolated from each other. In doctrinal terms, “events in one

part of the battlespace can have profound and often unintended ef-
Conclusion 285

fects on other areas and events, [so] therefore a commander must

always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity,”28 since “no

episode can be viewed in isolation.”29 As with warfighting, so with

culture. Parts II and III of this book showed that events concerning one Operational Culture Dimension, for example the political

structure, will almost certainly have profound effects on another

Dimension, such as the economy or social structure. Likewise, the

dynamics of a culture group in one geographic area will influence

cultural dynamics in another area as well. Therefore, the Single

Battle Concept is as cardinal a principle for culture as it is for one’s

overall scheme of maneuver.

Integrated Preparation. Just as the Five Operational Culture Dimensions are so integrated as to require the Single Battle Concept,

proper planning using these dimensions needs to be systematic

and thorough, meaning it must address all relevant dimensions

throughout the planned operation’s stages. One must apply a systematic, coordinated, and thorough approach,... through a planning team composed of subject matter experts... to consider all

relevant factors.”30

Planning involving culture must also be coordinated. A force therefore must consider not only their own actions, but the combined

effects of several other components—friendly, neutral, and hostile—in the AO. Finally, effective integration of culture into operations and planning requires inclusion of cultural subject matter

experts on planning teams.

A Common Mental Model and Operational Schema. “The process

of planning itself should provide a common understanding of the

nature of the problem and so support communication and cooperation. In other words planning is a way of exploring the situation... [as] a basis for unity of effort.”31

By establishing a “common understanding” for how to look at culture groups in any AO and in any kind of operational context, the

Operational Culture Dimensions permit Marines to “explore” an

emerging situation together through a “unity of effort.” By working through operational culture considerations as a planning team,
286 Operational Culture

that team will develop the necessary shared situational awareness.32

In other words, culture-integrated planning as a team, conducted

in conjunction with operational culture PTP, will develop the essential psycho-mental cohesion of the planning and operating staff.

Through the vehicle of considering cultural considerations as an

integrated team, that planning team will gain in self-awareness, battlespace awareness, and mission awareness, all of which will benefit the planning staff as it transitions into execution.

Shapes the Thinking While Embracing Fluidity. Part I of Culture for

the Warfighter demonstrated the need for a disciplined way of

thinking about culture and defining its core terms; we also showed

how without such discipline, culture can have no utility to the

warfighter. Marine Corps doctrine speaks in similar terms about

planning. “Planning can provide a disciplined framework for approaching problems.... The key is to adopt a method that provides

helpful structure without restricting judgment and creativity.”33

Therefore, the systematic intellectual approach put forth in Part II

can structure Marines’ thinking about the cultural dynamics of any

AO, and allow them to relate culture to the mission itself. However, as we have suggested throughout this text, and in particular

in Chapter Nine dealing with training and education, understanding cultural dimensions in the battlespace is never meant to be

mechanistic (if-this-then-that), nor is it meant to restrict the military judgment or intellectual creativity of the planner or operator.

Rather, Operational Culture is meant to facilitate creativity through

the proper framework. This well-framed creativity is essential for

the kind of operations of today and tomorrow, which “take place

in an atmosphere of uncertainty... [which] pervades battle.”34

Warfare as Art. Though quantifiable knowledge and measurable

skills are important in warfighting, “an even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the realm of art, which is the employment

of creative or intuitive skills.” It is the combination of the two kinds

of intelligences that make Marines effective at “the situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and experience.”35 The same could be said of culture in military operations.

It is for this reason that this book, and the Five Operational Culture
Conclusion 287

Dimensions, have focused on concepts and emphasized the need

for emotional intelligence in affective learning. Only this can bring

art and an “intuitive ability” to the conduct of “culture operations”

as we encountered them in Chapter Two.

Processes as Opposed to Procedure. “We should think of planning

as a learning process—as mental preparation which improves our

understanding of a situation.”36 “The true value... is the process itself, vice the product (‘the plan’) it generates.... [The process is] developmental stages, rather than steps, that are progressive in nature

yet interwoven, overlapping, and often falling back on one another.”37

This is very much the thrust of considering culture in planning,

training, and operations. The true utility of Operational Culture

and Operational Culture Learning is not in “products” such as

“human terrain maps,” manuals, or “cultural” tactics, techniques,

and procedures. In fact, Operational Culture is not something that

is; rather, it should be considered something one does. It is the

process of thinking about the dimensions, their components, and

the interwoven, overlapping nature of them all that provides an

accurate—though one need not presume precise—vision of the relationship between proposed military actions and the cultural environment in which they will occur. The proper mental

preparation, which emerges from combining operational culture in

PTP and planning, will contribute most effectively to the overall

developmental stages of evolving planning and operating.

Doctrine Misused is Operational Culture Misconstrued. In a

similar fashion, the misuses of doctrine need to be borne in mind

when applying Operational Culture. These misuses include:

Attempting to Forecast and Dictate Events. Though there may be

a “natural desire to believe we can control the future,” human beings—and the enemy—all have a will of their own.38 Understanding the culture of an area does not permit a Marine to predict what

indigenous people will do in anticipation of or response to Marine

actions. In the same way, Operational Culture offers no explanatory silver bullet for why individuals or groups of people do what
288 Operational Culture

they do: A Marine’s (and even an indigenous person’s) cultural understanding of the AO will always remain partial, and neither Operational Culture Learning nor “cultural intelligence” provide the

kind of blueprint to how other cultures think or act which could

permit a Marine to predict or dictate events.

Imposing Clarity on an Unpredictable Environment. The “natural

desire to leave as little as possible to chance” should not lull the

Marine into forgetting that the battlespace and the people who

make up the culture of it are all about chance.39 One cannot plan

out in too much detail matters related to the environment, economic system, political system, etc., because it is individuals’ and

groups’ interaction with these cultural dimensions that result in

conditions Marines face.

It is legitimate and proper to apply the Operational Culture Dimensions to an AO for the purpose of “anticipatory adaptation”

through “evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance,...

and thinking through the consequences of certain potential actions

in order to estimate whether they will bring us closer to the desired

future.”40 However, to think that culture can be “nailed down” in

detail, or that one can fully map it—hence the problem with

“human terrain” and “human terrain mapping”—is to misunderstand the nature of both culture and operations.

Scripting Processes—Friendly and Enemy. If operational planning

or Operational Culture are considered as tools to script military action or peoples’ activities—civilian or in uniform—Marine initiative

will be lost, and we will fail to recognize indigenous peoples’—

friendly neutral, or hostile—right of initiative or independent action. As such we will have disrespected our indigenous enemies

and potential friends, to our operational peril.41

Inflexible Thinking with Emphasis on Procedures. While both Marine Corps Doctrine and the Five Operational Culture Dimensions

seek to provide a disciplined framework to think about and engage in planning, educating, and operating, they are not intended

as a rule book prescribing an order of steps. To remove flexibility of thought and action from planning or from the mental process
Conclusion 289

of addressing the AO through the prism of Operational Culture is

to “reduce those aspects of planning that require intuition and creativity to simple processes and procedures.” Even appropriate procedures “naturally tend to become rigid over time.”42 Be it in

relation to culture or warfighting, such an approach neglects the

principle of “uncertainty and fluidity” enshrined in Marine Corps

doctrine.43

We should consider these statements in light of concerns encountered earlier with respect to training and education. As we saw in

Chapter Nine, there is a need for Operational Culture Learning to

communicate specific concrete capabilities in the cognitive and

psycho-motor domain. However, an excessive application of set

procedures and rigid informational targets in the cognitive domain,

as well as an insistence on scripted performance of tasks in the

psycho-motor domain, will fail to grasp the nuanced role of culture

and cultural competency in military operations. For this reason, we

discouraged a mania for tasks, conditions, standards, learning objectives, etc., be it in PTP and PME, and encouraged instead a more

flexible approach that would deter rigidity and lockstep thinking or

acting.

***

Be it in high-intensity warfare or the kinds of operations requiring

Marines to interact with foreign cultures in a variety of roles, “the

problem will evolve even as we are trying to solve it.”44 Likewise,

matters involving culture and military operations epitomize the

“wicked” problem set, wherein problems are interdependent, and

solutions to one part aggravate dilemmas in another part of the

problem—at the same time as grappling with such problems is unavoidable.45 Therefore, just as operational planning and decisionmaking are iterative, evolving processes continuing even during

the course of operations, a well-framed but flexible consideration

of culture must also continue throughout the phases of mission

preparation, training, planning, and execution. That has been the

goal of this book: a truly “operational” vision of culture.
290 Operational Culture

Notes

1 See Allan English, “The Influence of Our Military Culture on What is Taught in

Our Professional Military Institutions,” in Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching

Irregular Warfare – Conference Proceedings, edited by Barak Salmoni (Marine

Corps Training and Education Command, 2008), 38.

2 See Charles Kirke, “Change and Military Culture,” in Pedagogy for the Long

War: Teaching Irregular Warfare – Conference Proceedings, 36-37; R. M. Cassidy, “The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture,” Military Review (May 2005). At its base, John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup

with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2004), is a study of how the historical memory of

military operations, as well as organizational culture, influenced the nature of

U.S. and U.K. operations, and their willingness as well as methods to learn in

new circumstances. For more on U.S. military culture, see Adrian R. Lewis, The

American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II

to Operation Iraqi Freedom (London: Routledge, 2006). 3 For the Marine Corps, see Terry Terriff, “Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing

the U.S. Marine Corps for Future Warfare,” Contemporary Security Policy 28:1

(2007); idem., “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational

Culture in the U.S. Marine Corps,” Defence Studies 6:2 (2006); Paula HolmesEber, “Mapping Cultures and Cultural Maps: Representing and Teaching Culture

in the Marine Corps,” in Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare – Conference Proceedings, 73; idem., with Barak Salmoni, “Marine Officers’

Imagined Self-Identities: Ethnographic Insights for Cultural/Psychological Training,” 1st International Operational Psychology Conference, IDF Military Psychology Center, Herzliya, Israel, 01 Dec 2006. For an intimate and frank exploration

of the culture of a Marine ground unit during high-intensity combat, see Maj

Seth W.B. Folsom, USMC, The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander

in Iraq (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006). A more journalistic work is

Thomas Ricks, Making of the Corps. Journalistic reportage is often a strong

source of learning about foreign military cultures. As examples, see Anna

Politkovskaya, Putin’s Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy (Holt, 2003); idem., A

Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 2003). Militaries of the Middle East are covered with quite varying quality. Among the best are Eyal Ben Ari, Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions,

and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (London: Berghan Books, 1995); Uri

Ben Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), on the relationship among Zionism, the Israeli state, civil society, and the military; Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the

Turkish Armed Forces (London: IB Taurus, 1991) covers the Turkish officer

corps as well as his sources, access, and self-censorship would permit in the

mid 1980s. Norville D’Atkine’s “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Review of

International Affairs 4:1 (2000) is of basic utility in descriptive terms, though

with very little analytical merit, given its reliance on a Patai/“national character”
Conclusion 291

model. It has, in any event, been superseded by experiences and observations

of U.S. and coalition personnel operating in Iraq. John Poole, Tactics of the

Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Posterity Press, 2004), is of

no utility, based on stereotypes, bias, and no empirical observation or research.

4 Conversation with Marine Gunnery Sergeant, Quantico, VA, 2006.

5 Conversation with battalion operations officer, al-Taqaddum Iraq, August 2005.

Also see Evan Wright, Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America

and the New Face of American War (New York: Penguin, 2005). 6 See Richard Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (New York: Random House, 1990); Samuel B. Griffith, The Battle for

Guadalcanal (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1963). 7 See James A. Warren, American Spartans – The U.S. Marines: a Combat History from Iwo Jima to Iraq (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 97-118, 183-206. 8 See Thomas Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Scribners, 1998), 21-23, 162-

63, 200-202, 274-79.

9 This practice is known colloquially as “rat-fucking.”

10 Interview with Marine Aviator, al-Asad, Iraq, 2008. 11 Discussion with Marine Officer, of prior enlisted and service academy background, Monterey, CA, 2005.

12 As examples: “knuckle-draggers” is used for Marines generally, but particularly for infantrymen; “lanyard-pullers” can be used semi-affectionately for artillerymen; “go swing with the wing” can be used by ground combat arms

Marines derisively about the aviator community, while aviators themselves can

use it to signal their self-admiration. “Pogue” is a derisive term used to refer to

administration Marines, though combat arms Marines can use it to refer to other

combat arms Marines who have not left a rear-echelon environment for some

time. “Leaf-eaters” is a new term used for civil affairs and psyops, with both

negative and positive connotations. These are just a few examples.

13 See James E. Wise and Scott Baron, Women at War: Iraq, Afghanistan and

Other Conflicts (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006); Kirsten Holmstedt, Band of Sisters: Women at War in Iraq (Stackpole Books, 2007). The covers of both these books depict female Marines in Iraq, in full combat gear.

14 See Melton A. Mclaurin, The Marines of Montord Point: America’s First Black

Marines (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). One could

extend this comment to non-Christians: although Joseph W. Bendersky, The

“Jewish Threat”: Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army (Basic Books, 2001) is not

about the Marine Corps, it does record certain comments and attitudes of Marine General Officers during the 1940-50s. See 411-18.

15 See Richard Whittle, “Uncle Sam Wants U.S. Muslims to Serve,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 Dec 06; on Marine Corps Recruitment Command’s efforts,

under then-BGen W.E. Gaskin, to target Jews of Middle Eastern extraction, see

Shelomo Alfassa, “Is Uncle Sam Confused,” The Jewish Press, 24 Oct 05. 16 See Suzanne Kurtz, “Semper Chai: General Robert Magnus,” Hillel News 21

Feb 2007: http://www.hillel.org/about/news/2007/feb/magnus_2007Feb21.htm.

17 Re-titled Tentative Landing Operations Manual (Navy Department, 1935). 18 These are the Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCDP) 1 to 5, and the

associated Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP), as well as Marine
292 Operational Culture

Corps Reference Publications (MCRP).

19 A very short list of examples includes Kenneth W. Estes, The Marine Officer’s

Guide, 6th edition (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996); U.S. Marine Guidebook of Essential Subjects (Dept. of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program / Apple Pie Pub, 1998); K.W. Estes and R.D. Heinl,

Handbook for Marine NCOs, fourth edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute

Press, 1995); Guidebook for Marines, 18th rev. ed. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps

Association, 2001).

20 A key example is LtGen Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the

U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999). 21 See James B. Woulfe, Into the Crucible: Making Marines for the 21st Century

(Presidio Press, 1999).

22 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5: Planning (United States Government

as Represented by the Secretary of the Navy, July 21, 1997), 22. Henceforth

MCDP 5.

23 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting (United States Government as Represented by the Secretary of the Navy, July 21, 1997), 9. Henceforth MCDP 1.

24 MCDP 1, 13. 25 MCDP 1, 46. 26 For more on this in the context of the contemporary and future operating environment, see United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment: Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force through 2030 (Norfolk,

VA: USJFCOM, December 2007); also see LtGen Sir John Kiszely, “Learning

About Counter-Insurgency,” RUSI Journal 152:1 (December 2006); idem., “PostModern Challenges for Modern Warriors,” published in Shrivenham Papers

Number 5, December 2007. Though using different words, Frank Kitson, Low

Intensity Operations (London, Faber and Faber, 1971) focuses on the same

issue, as does Gen Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the

Modern World (London, Penguin, 2005). 27 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1: Marine Corps Planning Process

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 24 Sept 2001), 1-2. Henceforth

MCWP 5-1.

28 Ibid. 29 MCDP 1, 9. 30 John C. Berry, Jr, “An Assessment of the MCPP,” Thoughts on the Operational

Art (Marine Corps Combat Development Command: Marine Corps Warfighting

Lab, Oct 2006), 25-6.

31 MCDP 5, 15. 32 For shared situational awareness as a central function and goal of planning as

a process, see Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 December 2006), I-13, 14.

33 MCDP 5, 17 34 MCDP 1, 7 35 MCDP 1, 18.

36 MCDP 5, 4. 37 John C. Berry, Jr, “An Assessment of the MCPP,” 27; Steven A. Hardesty, “Re-
Conclusion 293

thinking the Marine Corps Planning Process: Campaign Design for the Long

War,” in Thoughts on the Operational Art, 65. 38 MCDP 5, 24. 39 Ibid. 40 MCDP 5, 4, 14.

41 Rupert Smith, towards the end of The Utility of Force, laments this as a characteristic of today’s operational approach among post-industrial militaries.

42 MCDP 5, 25. 43 MCDP 1, 9, 19. 44 John C. Berry, Jr, “An Assessment of the MCPP,” Thoughts on the Operational

Art, 27. 45 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,”

in N Cross (ed), Developments in Design Methodology (Chichester, UK: Wiley

and Son, 1984), 135-144. These “wicked” problems differ from “tame” problems

of, for example, mathematics.

295

Appendix A

Glossary

Note: words in italics indicate a term defined elsewhere in this

glossary.

Acephalous Societies: Literally meaning “without-a-head;” groups

that have no one formal designated leader.

Affective Domain: Domain of learning associated with Bloom’s

Taxonomy, whose descriptors are “receiving,” “responding,” “valuing,” “organization,” “values complex.” Affective skills involve how

a person relates to and interacts with what they learn, and how

they come to own it both intellectually and psycho-emotionally.

Authority: the legal or popularly granted permission to exercise

power; legitimacy in the exercise of power.

Band: Small group of people who all know each other face-to-face,

and work closely together for a unified purpose of survival. Mutual dependence requires cooperation, militating against hierarchies

beyond those of age and gender. Egalitarian social structure tends

to leadership selection on basis of skill.

Belief: A certainty, learned through inherited group experiences

and practices, about the substance and meaning of phenomena and

human activity. An individual’s beliefs are relatively immune to influence by personal experiences and the environment.

Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning: Taxonomy of educational objectives and skills. Proposed in 1956 by Benjamin Bloom, an educational psychologist at the University of Chicago. Bloom’s

Taxonomy divides educational objectives into Affective, Psychomotor, and Cognitive domains. Taxonomy is hierarchical. Taxonomy’s intent is to motivate educators to focus on all three

domains, creating holistic form of education.
296 Operational Culture

Chiefdom: Political structure with centralized chief, subordinate

council of advisors and functionaries, not necessarily lineage-based.

Subordinates’ power is based on “billet” at least as much as on

name. Chiefdoms are stratified, but centralize authority, decision

making, and administrative structures.

Class: A way of stratifying groups of people according to their economic status and power in a society. Certain social characteristics

such as the accumulation of goods or other forms of wealth; education; occupation; region of origin; lineage; and social behavior

may all be indicators of class. However, since these indicators are

culturally coded, class will be based on different characteristics in

different societies.

Cognitive Domain: Domain of learning associated with Bloom’s

Taxonomy, whose descriptors are “knowledge,” “comprehension,”

“application,” “analysis,” “synthesis,” and “evaluation.” Cognitive

skills refer to the mental processes for gaining knowledge and comprehension, and involve thinking, recalling, and judging. At higher

levels, cognition assists imagination and planning.

Collective Memory: A group’s selective remembering, and beliefinfluenced attribution of meaning to historical events, most often

with a present-oriented utility for that group.

Councils and Oligarchies: Seen in tribes, councils and oligarchies

(rulership by an elite group) are also common in the leadership

structures of states and chiefdoms. In a council no one individual

bears the right to make a final decision or to implement a course

of action. The decision must be considered and shared among all

the leaders. May share characteristics in common with acephalous

or episodic leadership systems as per interaction with external entities. However, councils and oligarchies possess permanency, uncontested authority, and regularized decision-making mechanisms.

Culture: The shared world view and social structures of a group of

people that influence a person’s and a group’s actions and choices.
Appendix A Glossary 297

Culture Group: A group of people whose common world view

unites them in a system of social structures and shared behaviors.

Culture Operator: Engages in military functions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level by continually re-reading the changing

cultural and human aspects of the battlespace as they impact military operations; by tracking the dynamic interaction among the Operational Culture Dimensions of environment, economy, social

structure, political structure, and beliefs and symbols; and by considering the impact of Marine operations as a new physical condition of human existence for indigenous people in the area of

operations, influencing local behaviors and attitudes.

Culture Operations: Operations which include cultural and

human factors in planning; consider possible responses to Marine

actions during execution, while evaluating cultural outcomes of tactical and operational measures; weigh cultural outcomes of operational measures against mission objectives; develop innovative

courses of action that allow commanders avenues of action previously unrecognized. Culture Operations emphasize planning and

execution in order to create conditions facilitating indigenous conduct commensurate with tactical or operational goals, yet recognize that Marine actions are merely one among many factors

influencing human conditions in the battlespace, and are unlikely

to craft or determine people’s behaviors.

Dictators and Strongmen: Obtain power through coercive force,

and remain in power as long as they are backed by that force,

which possesses the means to intimidate and coerce others in the

community. Power can last only through the military and police

sectors of a society, while eliminating or coopting any other potential nodes of competition. A strongman’s power lacks legitimate

investment of authority on the part of the people or state.

Distributed Operations: A form of maneuver warfare where

small, highly capable units across a large area create an advantage

over an adversary through deliberate use of separation and coordinated, tactical actions. Units use close combat or supporting arms

to disrupt the enemy’s access to key terrain and avenues of ap-
298 Operational Culture

proach. Focuses on energetic training of small units and more robust communications and tactical mobility assets for those smaller

units. Greater focus also placed on language and cultural training.

Economy of a Culture: Specific system for obtaining, producing

and distributing the items that people need or want to survive in

their society (food, water, cars, houses etc.).

Egalitarianism: Resources, power, and decision-making are not

concentrated in the hands of any specific individual or sub-group,

but are spread relatively evenly across members of the group.

Elected and Selected Leadership: Voting for leaders is extremely

recent; selecting a leader on the basis of skill and experience has

existed for centuries. Elected and selected leaders remain in a position of power based on effectiveness in carrying out their work—

hence accountability on the part of elected and selected leaders,

who are constrained by popular preferences in their decision-making.

Emotional intelligence: Connotes capabilities not usually taught

in school or trained through task performance, but which develop

through a cascading process of experience, reflection, and selfknowledge. Includes following traits: emotional self-awareness; independence; empathy; inter-personal relationships; stress tolerance;

impulse control; flexibility; problem solving.

Episodic leaders: Found in all political structures, whether bands,

tribes, chiefdoms or states. Arise for specific role, and have no formal official control or power other than that which is given to them

for undertaking the specific task. Once the goal has been achieved,

episodic leaders step down to continue on with their normal routine.

Ethnicity: Identification of individual with a unique subgroup in a

society, distinguished by specific behaviors, characteristics, and social symbols. Include a language specific to the group; symbols

reflecting group membership or carrying hidden meaning; unique

traditions, rituals and holidays; dress unique to the group; shared
Appendix A Glossary 299

sense, or memory of history—often enshrined in mythical stories or

folk tales; attachment to a place or region that holds symbolic

meaning.

Folklore: A group’s collection of stories, sayings, and narratives of

history passed down through the generations. Each generation receives this inheritance, imbues it with new meaning, and adds new

narratives based on new collective experiences.

Formal Economy: Economic interactions and exchanges that are

regulated, taxed, tracked and measured by a state government.

Formal Leaders: Receive official recognition by the political structure and community, often with formal titles, and may wear symbols indicating status within the community. Typically have special

offices and receive various legitimate financial and other regularized

benefits. Can claim power that comes with their position regardless

of their knowledge, background or skills.

Great Tradition: The formal, written canonic version of a religion.

Hereditary Leadership: Leadership inherited along family lines.

By default, concentrates power in the same ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, and regional groups. Hereditary leadership discourages

political mobility by reinforcing social structures and stratification:

the same groups continue to be included in decision making, while

others are excluded generation after generation.

History: What happened in the past.

Human Terrain: Those cultural aspects of the battlespace that,

due to their static nature, can be visually represented on a geographic map. Human terrain is static with respect to change over

time; rigid with respect to fluid human relationships; and limited to

representing behavior in only two dimensions.

Icons: Individuals who become larger than life and symbolize

many of the positive (or negative) values of a society. Prominent

in both folktales and remembered histories. Originally were phys-
300 Operational Culture

ical objects felt to represent a deity or holy person. In Orthodox

Christian communities, “ikonos” were objects with representations

of the Virgin Mary, Jesus Christ, or other saints, through which people channeled prayer.

Imagined Memory: The selective remembering, and belief-influenced attribution of meaning to historical events.

Informal Economy: Economic interactions that are not recognized, regulated, controlled, or taxed by a state government.

Informal Leaders: May not carry titles and symbols indicating their

status, and spaces may not obviously indicate a person of power to

an outsider. Or, may hold a formal position significantly lower or

different from actual authority and power. Despite lack of official

trappings, informal leaders may carry more power or influence over

the community than formal leaders. Informal leaders gain status

through skills in working with people and undertaking leadership

tasks. Alternatively, can gain influence in a formal system because

community already perceives their status, prestige, or skill. Typically in order to “get anything done,” one needs to have the approval and support of informal leader(s).

Irregular Warfare: Use of violent or non-violent means to maintain or undermine the credibility and/or legitimacy of a political

authority by the application of indirect approaches and non-conventional means to defeat an enemy by subversion, attrition, or exhaustion rather than through direct military confrontation. May

employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek

asymmetric advantages, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

Little Tradition: The local, informal, daily practices of a religion,

which vary from region to region and even community to community.

Mores: Implicit or explicit rules regarding permissible or forbidden behavior. In contrast to norms, violations of a cultural more

are usually accompanied by serious repercussions.
Appendix A Glossary 301

Nation: Idea of a commonality of identity and destiny among a

group of people, often with political implications. Based on shared

traits such as (but not limited to or requiring) language, ethnicity,

history, religion, memory of past, aspirations for future. Nationalism is the ideology motivating political movements on the basis of

these traits.

Non-Verbal Symbolic Communication: Use of body language,

dress, physical positioning, design of structures, in order to communicate status, desire, mood, etc; usually based on symbols, values, ideals, images accepted or known among a particular culture

group. All non-word-based intentional communication.

Operational Culture: Operationally relevant behavior, relationships and perceptions of indigenous security forces against or with

whom Marines operate; civilian populations among whom Marines

operate; indigenous communities or groups whom Marines wish to

influence; international partners in coalition operations.

Dimensions influencing operationally-relevant behavior, conduct,

and attitudes. These Operational Culture Dimensions involve the

physical environment; the economy of a culture; social structures;

political structures; and the beliefs and symbols of a culture group.

These dimensions emerge from three major models of cultural

analysis: the ecological, social structure, and symbolic models.

Historical trends that influence the interaction among those cultural dimensions.

Capability to successfully plan and execute across the operational

spectrum, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; prehostility; shaping operations; successive campaign phases; and post

hostilities, to include reconstruction and stabilization, as well as

peace making/keeping.

Operational Culture Learning: In pre-deployment phase, scaled

to rank and billet and focused on the AO as aligned with mission

goals: study of a specific AO’s culture, to include expressed behaviors and attitudes, as well as the interaction among Operational

Culture Dimensions which produce these behaviors and attitudes;

training in operation, as well as billet-focused language domains; attendance of command-provided distance learning, function-focused
302 Operational Culture

face-to-face seminars, field exercises, and situational training; and

self-study, to ensure learning in the cognitive, psycho-motor and affective domains.

In PME, reflecting the responsibilities of Marines at the completion of each stage: study of the fundamental concepts and Dimensions of culture “in generica;” development of skills to function

successfully in various geographical and diverse human environments; examination of human, print, and electronic resources for

learning about operational culture; exploration of the historical role

of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions in the battlespace

through study of past areas of operation; and introduction to the application of concepts and skills to the current operating environment.

In the career continuum, appropriate to MOS, phase of career,

and leadership responsibilities: study of emerging operating environments; maintenance of capabilities with respect to regions of

past or likely future areas of operation; monitoring service- and

DOD-provided training and educational resources for culture learning; fostering within units and commands continued culture learning and an atmosphere supportive of individual Marines’ study of

foreign cultures; recording culture-relevant observations about areas

of deployment.

Physical Environment: The physical, non-human features of an

environment, to include physical terrain, climate, and man-made

structures.

Physical Symbols: Any physical object that holds a symbolic

meaning greater than its practical utility for the people in a group.

Frequently physical symbols, both natural and man-made, mark out

status and/or identity. Clothing, headgear, material adornment, and

symbolic objects may all indicate one’s social membership and

identity. So do physiognomic elements such as hair, piercing, or

scars. Symbols provide information about status, roles, etc., to

members within a group, and indicate who is in and who is out of

a group.

Political Structure: The way that power and leadership are apportioned to people according to the social structure of the society.
Appendix A Glossary 303

Position: The symbolic place one holds relative to others in a social structure.

Power: The ability to “control” or “influence” the behavior of individuals or groups of people.

Psycho-Motor Domain: Domain of learning associated with

Bloom’s Taxonomy, whose descriptors are “imitation,” “manipulation,” “precision,” “articulation,” naturalization.” Psycho-Motor skills

involve movement of the body in order to perform actions based

upon input from the brain.

Regime: Ruling government, not to be confused with state or nation.

Religious Membership: Being part of a group of people that considers itself united by religious faith.

Rituals: Often characterized by the notion that the actions in the

ritual themselves must be performed a special way to be valid. In

religious rituals, the necessity to perform every step of every ritual

correctly is related to the conviction that the spiritual soundness—

or metaphysical validity—will only be preserved if each step of that

ritual is performed correctly. In these cases, imperfect performance violates holiness itself.

Social Environment: Those features, processes, and interactions

in an AO that structure human relationships and guide interactions

among people.

Social Norms: Cultural expectations about how one ought to behave in a given situation. Social guidelines that most people follow most of the time. However, norms are not rigid; people may

accidentally or deliberately ignore with only minor repercussions.

Social Structure: How people organize their political, economic,

and social relationships.

State: Characterized by centralized authority and control, defined
304 Operational Culture

territorial boundaries, legitimate power through militaries, police or

other militias, and control of access to resources. Often possess a

highly centralized government over which there is no contention,

and defined territorial parameters—unlike bands, tribes, or chiefdoms. States possess regularized security structures loyal to the

state itself, and not something outside the state’s boundaries. The

security forces are major legitimizing tool for the state to effectively

assure its power over the people.

Status: the meaning and value accorded by members of a social

structure to a particular person occupying a specific position in that

social structure. That meaning and value derives from social attitudes to the position itself; from specific individual qualities of the

person; or from both.

Stratification: Resources, power, and decision-making are limited

to certain categories of people within a community, based upon

status, entitlement, and rank. Society is thus multi-leveled, with

groups enfranchised or disenfranchised according to their place in

lower or higher social levels.

Symbols: A unique characteristic of man, facilitating communication. Symbols can be physical such as a flag; verbal as in a spoken

language; or behavioral as in non-verbal communication. Symbols

have culturally dependent meanings.

Syncretism: The amalgamation of local cultural traditions, indigenous religious beliefs, and formal religious systems to create a synthesis of beliefs and traditions, which, when compared to the

“proper” religion of scriptures, clergy, and capital-city seminaries,

looks “strange” and “incompatible” with the “real” religion.

Taboos: Activities or uses of physical objects that are explicitly

forbidden. Generally based on religious notions of permissible and

impermissible. In contrast to mores, taboos are rarely about “what

you should/must do,” but are about “what you should/must not

do.” Broken taboos may not always carry the heavy repercussions

of violations of a social more. This may be attributed to the notion

that God or the powers that be will strike down the offender, so
Appendix A Glossary 305

that others in the society need not enforce the requirement.

Tribe: A specific type of kinship group based on a shared real (or

fictive) ancestor and structured around a clear corporate identity.

This corporate identity creates a sense of unity and belonging

among members of the tribe; and structures relationships among

tribal members. Individuals within the tribe are assigned specific

roles, positions and power according to their place within the lineage; some tribal lineages being considered of lower or higher status than others. Tribes have a formal leader or council of leaders,

designated to speak for the group, who are selected, at least in part,

on the basis of their inherited position within the tribe. It is important to note that many kinship groups are not tribes.

World View: The way that people perceive and think about

their world.

307

Appendix B

Culture Operator’s Questions

Below are the “Culture Operator’s Questions” for each component

of the Five Operational Culture Dimensions.

Dimension 1: Environment

Water

● What are the cultural rules about water’s use?

● What roles are expected of Marine personnel with respect to water

use and provision?

● What is the relationship between water use and ritual?

● What is the symbolic significance of water?

● Who customarily has what jobs, roles, and functions with respect

to water?

● Who, in the AO, has customarily controlled access to water, and

how have they used that for power, influence, etc.?

● What is the scarcity of water in relation to intensity to use?

● What kinds of operational considerations are influenced by water,

or override cultural aspects of water as a physical resource?

Land

● What are the symbolic meanings of certain sub-districts in the AO,

and how do groups within the AO view this symbolism differently?

● What are particular land formations that are visually striking, with

local significance?
308 Operational Culture

● What land in the AO is/is not appropriate for certain groups of

people to use?

● Who, locally, has legitimate ability to determine outsiders’ access

to land?

● What are the local conventions of private, communal, and state

ownership/use of land?

● What is the relationship between the political map’s national/regional boundaries, and what people living in the AO see as the

boundaries that matter, in political, economic, genealogical, and

security terms?

● What are the geographic area’s principles of division, and relationship between dividing lines and access to both tangible and

symbolic resources?

Food

● What are the local staples, and what is the required labor to

grow, prepare and serve them?

● What kinds of locally-accepted foods are considered strange,

dangerous, or not even food to less-traveled Marines?

● What foods—eaten either by U.S. personnel or by local people—

are so out of place as to raise concerns about health or sanitation?

● What foods are served by whom, to indicate the status of server

or guest?

● How do Marine operations or logistics impact the ability of local

people to obtain essential foodstuffs?

● What foods have which kinds of ritual significance?

● What are the time- or calendar-related roles of what kinds of

foods?
Appendix B Culture Operator’s Questions 309

● Which foods are strategic commodities, inasmuch as controlling

access to them influences one’s coercive or political power?

● What, in local terms, is considered food sufficiency, food scarcity,

and the proper role of external forces in providing food?

Materials for Shelter

● How do structures fit the geographic, climatic, and physical aspects of the environment?

● What do the internal and external appearances and materials

used in structures communicate about building purpose, occupant status, etc.?

● What materials for building, repair, and maintenance are local to

the AO?

● What are the central tactical implications of building styles, neighborhood layout, etc?

Climate and Seasons

● How does the climate influence local attitudes to, and capabilities for work, business, and combat?

● What is the relationship between climate and season, on the one

hand, and battle rhythm and operational tempo, on the other?

● What, in local terms, passes for good weather, bad weather, etc?

Fuel and Power

● What are the locally found, or locally produced sources of power

and fuel?

● What is the relationship between local elites and access to/provision of fuel and power?
310 Operational Culture

● How does the larger government authority provide, or control

access to power?

● What do local people expect of outside forces in terms of

power/fuel provision and protection?

● What are local work-arounds to deal with shortages of power

and fuel, and how do Marine operations impact them?

● What local issues regarding power and fuel are overshadowed

by more pressing operational considerations?

Dimension 2: Economy

Informal Economy

● What categories of people are active in the AO’s informal economy?

● On what commodities/services does the informal economy

focus?

● What is the relationship between the informal economy, on the

one hand, and unregulated movement of people, crime, and violence, on the other?

● How will Marine operations impact the informal economy and

the people in it?

● How will the Marine impact on the informal economy influence

attitudes of certain sectors of the population to the Marine presence?

● How does the formal economy rely upon the informal economy, and what abuses of the AO’s population does this cause?

● What opportunities exist for the AO’s population, based on the

formal economy’s relationship with informal economic practices?
Appendix B Culture Operator’s Questions 311

● What are formal/informal economic actors’ expectations of the

state or over-arching political-military authority, with respect to

involvement in or disregard for economic activity?

● What is considered an “illegal” good or service in the AO, on

what basis?

● What goods/services are legal, but culturally frowned upon?

Who deals in these goods/services?

● How will Marine expenditure in the local informal economy, or

employment of local informal economic actors, influence the

socio-economic balance of power in the AO?

Economy as a Network of Exchange

● How are important physical resources (food, clothing, shelter,

cars etc.) obtained by local peoples?

● How do people gain access to critical services such as medical

care, transportation, or education?

● Would a specific operational plan improve or block access to

critical goods and services?

● What is the degree of (in)equity in the distribution of goods and

services among the population?

● Who seems to control the distribution of goods and services,

and how? Would a planned operation change this distribution

pattern?

● Along with or instead of money, what do local peoples rely on

to obtain and exchange goods in the region?

● If money is not the primary economic system, how could the operational plan be adjusted to use the existing alternate economic

systems effectively?
312 Operational Culture

Economy as a Way of Structuring Social Relationships

● What are the main economic systems in place in the region (pastoralism, agriculture, industrial production—all three may be

present simultaneously)?

● What are the economic rhythms of the community (migration

seasons, planting and harvesting, market day, work hours)?

● What are the important features of the environment that determine the economy of the AO?

● How is wealth distributed? Does wealth seem to be concentrated

in the hands of certain individuals or groups? On what basis?

● How do local economic structures reflect the relationship of the

group to the larger political and state system?

Dimension 3: Social Structure

Age

● At what age is someone considered a child or adult?

● What specific ceremonies mark the transition to adulthood?

● Which new social privileges are granted to men and women when

they pass these manhood or womanhood rituals?

● What are locally accepted or expected economic roles for what

U.S. society considers children?

● How should Marines prepare to respond to children that act as

soldiers in militaries or insurgencies, or participate in violent activities against U.S. forces?

● What special status or roles are accorded to the elderly?
Appendix B Culture Operator’s Questions 313

● Is there an age grading system that stratifies people according to

their age and stage in the life cycle? And if so, what rights, roles

and duties do people have at each stage?

Gender

● What work, roles, activities and spaces are assigned predominantly to men and women?

● Who undertakes which tasks and where?

● In what ways must operational plans be adjusted to account for

the different work, roles, and spaces assigned to men and women?

● What roles do women play in local militaries and insurgencies?

Do they engage in armed combat?

● If women are not visibly observable, what roles and tasks do they

undertake ‘behind the scenes’?

● How can operational plans and assignment of manpower include

gender to maximize effectiveness of the unit?

Kinship, Clan, and Tribal Membership

● How are land, water, or access to certain goods and resources

concentrated in the hands of specific kin groups or tribes?

● How will our operations in the region support certain kin groups

and enhance their power; or conversely undermine these groups?

● What are the possible outcomes of an operation that will challenge the power or control of resources by certain kin groups in

the region (war, insurgency, increased stability, greater/lesser access to important goods and services)?

● How does a Marine’s choice of local points of contact interact

with or disturb local kin relationships, thus influencing the degree

of success of Marine initiatives?
314 Operational Culture

Class

● How is class defined in the AO: on the basis of wealth, education,

region of origin, inheritance, or other factors?

● What are the privileges (economic, political, social, religious) of

members of the upper class?

● How is access to essential resources for survival (food, shelter,

clothing, water) determined by class?

● How does the concentration of wealth (through corruption, graft,

or legitimate means) in the hands of an elite upper class relate to

resource or power access?

● In creating a plan to support lower class groups, will funds and

resources have to pass through the hands of the upper class first

(and consequently disappear)?

● What is the reality of upward mobility in the AO’s class system,

and what do local people consider to be their potential for in-system upward mobility?

● How will Marine measures that influence different groups’ social

mobility be viewed by those groups, or by other, competing

groups?

Ethnicity

● What is the relationship between particular ethnic groups and

control of professions or positions of formal or informal power?

● How do groups that are barred from these positions of power

challenge the system (breeding grounds for insurgents, theft and

bribery, civil war)?

● What are local assumptions about U.S. and western biases and

partisanship with respect to ethnic group struggles?
Appendix B Culture Operator’s Questions 315

● How will a Marine alliance or dealings with a particular ethnic

group affect those in power?

● What are the possible reactions of those groups that are ignored?

Religious Membership

● How do people define and express their religious membership in

the region?

● What roles and status do the various religious groups or sects

hold in the larger society?

● What is the meaning of geography for religious groups in an AO?

● What effects would a planned Marine operation in the region

have upon the power, status and access to critical resources of the

various religious groups or sects?

● How will the Marine operations influence indigenous peoples’

views of Marine or U.S. biases towards different religious groups

of the social structure?

Dimension 4: Political Structures

Leadership

● How is decision-making organized, and who gets to make make

decisions?

● What are the principles and processes governing policy deliberations and decision-making?

● Who do leaders have to consult, and to whom must they answer?

● How is leadership obtained and passed on (by election, inheritance, demonstration of skill, membership in a certain age or social group, by force)?
316 Operational Culture

● Who are formal leaders and what symbols indicate status?

● If one needs to get something done, to whom do people turn?

● What is relationship between the formal and informal leader?

Conflicts over Power

● What are the most important cultural characteristics that determine one’s position and power in the community (age, class, gender, tribal identity, ethnicity, religion)?

● What is the degree of polarization in the region with respect to religious/ethnic/tribal identities?

● What is the amount of flexibility and interaction between religious/ethnic/tribal groups?

● Which groups hold power, to what degree of concentration?

● Which groups are excluded, and along which axes?

● What is their degree of consciousness of exclusion?

● How possible do group leaders think it is to challenge the system?

● How do marginalized and losing groups gain access to valued

goods and resources and opportunities?

● How will alliance with one group affect Marine relationships with

the other groups?

Dimension 5: Beliefs and Icons

History, Imagined Memory and Folklore

● What are the pivotal historical stories that all people in the community share?
Appendix B Culture Operator’s Questions 317

● How do different groups in the AO give different significance to

the same historical stories?

● What are the daily sayings and folktales that everyone refers to

in common conversation?

● How are these remembered histories, folktales and sayings used

to emphasize or teach important values and ideals?

● How are these histories, folktales and sayings used to support

propaganda for or against Marine and U.S. activities in the region?

Icons

● Who are the local heroes? What important qualities do these

heroes embody?

● Who are the local villains? Why are they villainous (what makes

them evil)?

● Are the heroes or villains compared to Marines or Americans?

● What do the comparisons illustrate about local attitudes towards

the U.S. and the military?

Symbols and Communication

● What physical symbols (clothing, headdress, scarification, insignia) indicate membership or status in the ethnic, religious and

social groups of the region?

● What physical and written symbols (signs, graffiti, fences, spiritual markers) are important to be able to recognize in order to

navigate and understand what is happening in the region?

● What words or phrases are essential for basic communication

with local people?
318 Operational Culture

● What non-verbal behaviors may be misinterpreted by local people? Which non-verbal behaviors (such as seating patterns) are

important to understand in meetings and negotiations?

Rituals and Ceremonies

● What behaviors and actions are important in the ritual or ceremony and what does this reveal about cultural ideals and values?

● Who participates in the ritual, and what roles do the participants

play?

● What does presence of participants, or the nature of their participation, say about their membership and status in the group?

● What does the public performance of the ritual communicate to

outsiders?

● How is this performance potentially a politically charged statement about the group’s status and rights within the larger society?

● What activities, not related to the ritual or ceremony itself, occur

at ceremonial gatherings, due to the social status of the participants?

Norms, Mores, and Taboos

● What food and behavioral taboos exist in the region?

● What norms should Marines, even though they are foreign to

the AO, observe?

● What underlying allegiances or codes of honor could influence

the success of an operation?

● What activities in the area are considered serious violations of

social mores and could carry serious punishments including

death?
Appendix B Culture Operator’s Questions 319

● What beliefs or assumptions exist locally about American practices as regards local norms, mores, and taboos?

● What might the local people think (or have been propagandized

to think) Marines are likely to disregard in terms of local norms,

mores, and taboos?

Religious Beliefs

● Who is the actual leader of the local religious community?

● How do religious leaders relate to the educated elite vs. popular groups, etc.?

● What is the basis of authority for a “religious” leader in the AO:

book learning, lineage, charisma, etc.?

● What are the actual (versus theoretical/textual) religious practices in the specific AO where the Marine operates?

● How do local practices of a religion the Marine has encountered

elsewhere differ from what that Marine thinks the religion is

“supposed” to look like?

● What power and role, if any, does the formal religious system

play in local peoples’ daily lives?

● What conflicts or disagreements exist between the formal religious system and the local religious practices of the AO?

● How prominent is “religion” as an explanatory factor for people

in current events, and in reference to history, or historical trajectories?

● What is “the way the world is supposed to be” according to locally-held religious beliefs, and how does the Marine presence

impact that?

321

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