UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4640

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS DENORRIS ARNOLD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Thomas D.

Schroeder, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00322-TDS-1)

Submitted: April 22, 2010 Decided: May 13, 2010

Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eugene E. Lester, III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, PA, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Paul Alexander Weinman, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following trial, a jury convicted Travis Denorris 

Arnold of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) 

(2006). Arnold was sentenced as a career offender to 230 

months’ imprisonment. Arnold’s counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

that, in his opinion, there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal, but questioning the admission of certain evidence. 

Arnold has filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing: (1) his 

arrest was illegal and his subsequent confession was fruit of 

the poisonous tree; (2) his confession was involuntary; (3) he 

was denied the right to a speedy trial; (4) his indictment was 

defective; (5) his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to suppress his confession; and (6) the testimony of 

Masear and Shulenberger was not credible. The Government has 

elected not to file an appellate brief. We affirm. 

Counsel for Arnold asserts that the district court 

erred (1) in admitting the portion of Arnold’s confession 

stating that wearing ski masks and kicking in doors is not 

Arnold’s “MO”; (2) in allowing Detective Shulenberger to testify 

as to Shulenberger’s understanding of the meaning of the term 

“MO”; and (3) in identifying Masear as a probation officer. He 

contends that these evidentiary rulings violated Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b), and were unfairly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009), petition 

for cert. filed, __ S. Ct. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Nov. 23, 

2009) (No. 09-617). 

Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides 

that “[e]vidence of other crimes . . . is not admissible to 

prove the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith.” The evidence may, however, be admissible 

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, 

preparation, plan, or knowledge. Basham, 561 F.3d at 326. 

“Rule 404(b) is an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of 

other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only 

criminal disposition.” Id. (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 

provides that “relevant evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice.” The damage that probative evidence can 

inflict on a defendant’s case is no basis for excluding the 

evidence, however; only when the evidence results in unfair 

prejudice, such as an appeal to the jury’s emotion, and that 

prejudice “substantially outweighs the probative value of the 

evidence,” must it be excluded. Id. at 327. Where the jury is 

given a limiting instruction, any fear that the jury will 

improperly use the evidence subsides. United States v. Branch, 
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537 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943

(2009).

We find the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the disputed portion of Arnold’s 

statement to police, or in allowing Detective Shulenberger to 

testify as to his understanding of the term “MO.” This portion 

of Arnold’s confession constituted an explanation of the 

planning and preparation of the bank robbery, and therefore was 

admissible under Rule 404(b). Further, there was no inordinate 

prejudice from its admission under Rule 403. As to Detective 

Shulenberger, Arnold contests his brief explanation that the 

term “modus operandi” can be used to describe “the way someone 

acts or evidence they leave behind when they commit a crime.” 

This testimony was probative, in that it helped explain part of 

Arnold’s confession, and was not unduly prejudicial. The 

district court gave a limiting instruction, directing the jury 

that it was not to assume the truth of the current charged 

conduct in light of any prior bad conduct. Therefore, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this 

evidence.

The district court also strictly controlled the 

testimony of Masear, Arnold’s probation officer for a prior

offense. The district court instructed Masear outside the 

presence of the jury that she “should not indicate at any time 
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that [she is] a probation officer with respect to defendant in 

any way,” although she could reveal that she worked as a 

probation officer. No reference was made during Masear’s 

testimony to the fact that she was Arnold’s probation officer. 

The district court instructed the jury: “You must not conclude 

from the fact that Ms. Masear is employed as a probation officer 

that the defendant may have committed a crime or engaged in any 

bad conduct in the past.” Further, the district court repeated 

this warning in its final instructions to the jury. Therefore, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

disputed evidence. 

Arnold alleges in his pro se supplemental brief that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

to suppress his confession on the bases that it was obtained as 

a result of an unlawful arrest and that it was involuntary. 

Because the record does not conclusively establish that 

counsel’s performance in failing to file a motion to suppress 

Arnold’s confession was deficient, this claim is not cognizable 

on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 

(4th Cir. 2008). We have reviewed the other issues raised in 

Arnold’s pro se brief and find them without merit.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 
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This court requires that counsel inform his client in writing of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED