v. 

Young Electric Co., et al. 

Appeal from the Court of Workers' 

Compensation Claims 

Joshua Davis Baker, Judge 

) State File No. 39751-2015 

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Reversed and Remanded-Filed September 14, 2016 

This is the second interlocutory appeal in this case arising out of an injury the employee 

alleges occurred when he lost his balance and fell while attempting to lift a shopping cart 

loaded with construction materials. Following the first expedited hearing, the trial court 

awarded medical benefits, but denied temporary disability benefits, finding the employee 

did not establish he was likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. We affirmed the 

award of medical benefits and the denial of temporary disability benefits, concluding the 

employee did not present sufficient medical proof to establish he was unable to work as a 

result of his injury. The employee subsequently filed a motion to compel temporary 

disability benefits supported by the authorized physician's responses to three written 

questions presented by the employee. Based on the physician's responses, the trial court 

awarded temporary disability benefits for the two periods in question, and the employer 

has appealed. We reverse the trial court's award of temporary disability benefits and 

remand the case for further proceedings as may be necessary. 

Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge 

Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 

Stephen Morton, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Young Electric Co. 

Michael Fisher, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, David Young 

1 
Humphreys County, Tennessee. On May 11, 2015, he worked as an 

apprentice electrician for Young Electric Company, Inc. 1 ("Employer"), 

which had contracted to perform electrical work for a Kroger store in 

Nashville undergoing renovations. On the date of the accident, employees 

were using Kroger shopping carts to transport construction materials to the 

"Conex" for overnight storage.2 Employee alleged that during the course of 

performing this work-related activity, he lifted a shopping cart containing 

forty to sixty pounds of construction materials off the ground and attempted 

to move it from the entrance to the Conex. As he did so, he lost his footing, 

fell back, and the cart fell on top of him, striking his head. A coworker, 

Mr. William Harvey, claimed in an affidavit to have witnessed the injury. 

Employee testified that he did not immediately experience enough 

pain to concern him, so he completed his shift without notifying Employer 

of the incident. Employee stated, however, that early the next morning, at 

2:00 or 3:00 a.m., he awoke in "excruciating pain." Later that day, he 

decided to visit his primary care physician, Dr. Desmond White. On his 

way to Dr. White's office, Employee alleged that he called his supervisor, 

John Boatfield, and told him "exactly what happened; that I had been 

injured at work." Employee claimed that Mr. Boatfield told him to bring a 

doctor's note when he returned to work. Mr. Boatfield testified on behalf 

of Employer at the expedited hearing and stated he did not recall this 

conversation. He further observed that his daily log did not contain any 

indication that an accident had been reported on the date of the alleged 

phone call, as would have been proper protocol. 

Over the next several days, Employee visited Dr. White's office on 

May 15 and May 20. Medical records from the May 12 and May 15 visits 

contain no evidence that Employee reported suffering a work-related injury. 

Records from the May 12 visit reveal that Employee was experiencing 

severe pain in his right shoulder which radiated down his right arm. The 

report noted "Onset: May 11, 2015," but also stated "Context: there is no 

1 The record indicates there is no familial relationship between Employee and Employer. 

2 A Conex is a trailer approximately forty feet in length. It has double doors, no wheels, and sits about 

eight inches above the ground. 

2 
Employee returned to work, but on May 19 he allegedly aggravated 

his condition while a wire. Employee did not return to work for 

Employer after May 19. On May 20, at approximately 6:00 a.m., 

Employee called Mr. Boatfield to inform him that he would be off work a 

few days due to his injury. Mr. Boatfield claimed that this phone call on 

May 20 was the first notice he received of Employee's May 11 injury. 

After the May 20 phone call, Mr. Boatfield filled out a First Report of 

Work Injury. A May 20 medical report from Dr. White reflects a change in 

the description of Employee's condition. Specifically, Employee described 

the injury as "lifting a cart at work[,] the next day shoulder started hurting, 

then reaggervated [sic] it yesterday by pulling on wire." 

Employer did not provide a panel of physicians following the 

telephone call between Employee and Mr. Boatfield on May 20, 2015. As 

a result, Employee continued to seek out medical treatment on his own. 

After seeing Dr. White in mid-May, he saw Dr. Brook Adams, who 

performed an MRI and an EMG, which revealed spondylosis, stenosis, a 

disc protrusion at the C6-7 level of the cervical spine, and radiculopathies 

at the C7-8 level. On June 9, Employee consulted Dr. Gregory Lanford, a 

neurosurgeon, who opined that Employee's work-related accident caused 

an injury to his cervical spine and recommended surgery. 

Eventually, Employer provided a panel of physicians, and on June 

27, 2015, Employee chose Dr. N.K. Singh as his authorized physician. 

However, Employer refused to schedule an appointment and denied the 

claim on the grounds that the inconsistencies in the medical records called 

into question whether the alleged accident occurred as reported. Employee 

filed a Petition for Benefit Determination on October 26, 2015 ... seeking 

temporary disability and medical benefits. After the hearing, the trial court 

issued an Expedited Hearing Order granting medical benefits but denying 

temporary disability benefits. 

3 Employee testified he received no income from May 19, 2015, to February 2, 2016, when he began 

working for Miller Electric. 

3 
4 

Our May 25, 2016 opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of temporary disability 

benefits included the following: 

Employee has not presented sufficient medical proof to establish that he 

was unable to work as a result of his injury, having come forward with no 

restrictions issued by a physician addressing his ability to work. When 

asked at the expedited hearing whether Employer would have been able to 

accommodate any restrictions, Mr. Boatfield [Employee’s supervisor] 

indicated that he was not sure what type of work could have been provided 

in light of the nature of the employment. However, Employee provided no 

actual restrictions for Mr. Boatfield to review and presented no proof to 

establish that any physician assigned work restrictions or opined Employee 

was unable to work during the relevant period of time. 

 Thereafter, Employee sent Dr. Lanford, the authorized treating physician, a letter 

requesting his opinions regarding Employee’s ability to work and whether he had any 

restrictions. The letter posed three questions, the first being “[a]s a result of this injury, 

has [Employee] been unable to work at full duty[],” to which Dr. Lanford replied “yes.” 

The second question inquired “for how long has he been unable to work or work at 

limited duty,” and Dr. Lanford replied “since injury of 5/11/15.” The last question asked 

“[w]hat work restrictions should [Employee] observe as a result of this injury,” and Dr. 

Lanford responded, “[n]o overhead work.” 

 Employee filed a Motion to Compel Temporary Benefits on July 12, 2016, asking 

the court to award temporary disability benefits for two separate time periods.4 The first 

period began on May 20, 2015, the date immediately following Employee’s last day of 

work for Employer, and ended on February 2, 2016, the date Employee began working 

for Miller Electric. The second period began on May 2, 2016, the date Employee was 

laid off from work by Miller Electric, and continued to the “present or until he is returned 

to work, whichever comes sooner.” Dr. Lanford’s responses to the June 8, 2016 letter 

were filed with Employee’s motion in support of his request for temporary disability 

benefits. 

On July 27, 2016, the trial court heard arguments from counsel addressing 

Employee’s request for temporary disability benefits. However, no witnesses were called 

to testify and no additional records were admitted into evidence beyond Dr. Lanford’s 

written responses to the three questions addressed above. The trial court issued an order 

 

4 A workers’ compensation judge “may, at the judge’s discretion, hear disputes over issues provided in 

the dispute certification notice concerning the provision of temporary disability or medical benefits on an 

expedited basis . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2015). Regardless of how a motion is styled, 

we will analyze a request for such benefits filed prior to a compensation hearing in accordance with the 

standards and procedure set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d) and any applicable 

regulations of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
worked for [Employer] on May 20, 2015, and then returned to work for another employer 

on February 2, 2016," and continued working until this employer laid him off on May 2, 

2016. 

The trial court ultimately concluded that, "[b ]ased on these facts, the Court finds 

[Employee] carried his burden of proving entitlement to temporary partial disability 

benefits for the period from May 20, 2015, through February 1, 2016 ... and from May 

3, 2016, through the date of this order." The trial court ordered Employer to pay 

$18,532.30 in accrued temporary partial disability benefits and to "continue payments 

until [Employee] is no longer eligible for those benefits." Employer has appealed. 

Standard of Review 

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court's decision is statutorily mandated 

and limited in scope. Specifically, "[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 

conclusions of the workers' compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 

the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015). The trial court's 

decision must be upheld unless the rights of a party "have been prejudiced because 

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers' compensation judge: 

(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensationjudge; 

(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 

(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 

clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 

(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material 

in the light of the entire record." 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). Like other courts applying the standards 

embodied in section 50-6-217(a)(3), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court 

absent the limited circumstances identified in the statute. 

Analysis 

Employer presents two issues for review, each questioning whether the trial court 

erred in awarding benefits for the two periods of contested temporary disability. For the 

5 
employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits, consistent with Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(l) (2014). McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 

2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. 

App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). This lesser evidentiary standard "does not relieve an employee 

of the burden of producing evidence of an injury by accident that arose primarily out of 

and in the course and scope of employment at an expedited hearing, but allows some 

relief to be granted if that evidence does not rise to the level of a 'preponderance of the 

evidence."' Buchanan v. Car/ex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. 

App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *6 {Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2015). 

To receive temporary total disability benefits, an employee must prove (1) total 

disability from working as the result of a compensable injury; (2) a causal connection 

between the injury and the inability to work; and (3) the duration of the period of 

disability. Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 955 {Tenn. 1978). As the Tennessee 

Supreme Court's Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel observed, "[t]emporary 

partial disability refers to the time, if any, during which the injured employee is able to 

resume some gainful employment but has not reached maximum recovery." Williams v. 

Saturn Corp., No. M2004-01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1032, at *6 {Tenn. 

Workers' Comp. Panel Nov. 15, 2005); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(2) (2015). 

Temporary restrictions assigned by physicians during an injured worker's medical 

treatment do not establish an entitlement to temporary disability benefits if the employee 

is able to work without loss of income. See Long v. Mid-Tenn. Ford Truck Sales, 160 

S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tenn. 2005); Vinson v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 655 S.W.2d 

931, 933 {Tenn. 1983). 

In this case, there is no medical proof in the record concerning Employee's ability 

to work during the time periods in question other than Dr. Lanford's responses to 

Employee's June 8, 2016 letter. Employee did not present to Employer any medical 

record or note indicating he had restrictions assigned by a physician, depriving Employer 

of any opportunity to make a meaningful decision to accommodate whatever restrictions 

may have been imposed for the time periods in question. In the initial expedited hearing, 

the trial court noted that "[i]t was not clear from [the supervisor's] testimony, however, 

that [the supervisor] knew of any workplace restrictions imposed on [Employee]." In the 

first appeal, we determined that "Employee [had] not presented sufficient medical proof 

to establish that he was unable to work as a result of his injury, having come forward with 

no restrictions issued by a physician addressing his ability to work." We noted that 

6 
any event, it was clear from testimony that [Employer] did not return [Employee] to 

work." Based on these determinations and Dr. Lanford's responses to the three questions 

presented to him, the trial court awarded benefits for the disputed periods of temporary 

disability. 

The question before us is whether the preponderance of the evidence supports the 

trial court's determination that Employee will likely prevail at a hearing on the merits in 

establishing entitlement to temporary disability benefits for the two periods in question. 

More specifically, the issue is whether Dr. Lanford's responses to the three questions 

posed by Employee, considered with the proof adduced at the initial expedited hearing, is 

sufficient to support the trial court's determination that, at trial, Employee would likely 

establish he was unable to work during the periods in question as a result of his injury. 

In response to the first question, Dr. Lanford opined Employee had "been unable 

to work at full duty." Responding to the second question asking "for how long has he 

been unable to work or work at limited duty," (emphasis supplied), he wrote, "since [the] 

injury of 5/11115." It is unclear from this question and response whether Dr. Lanford's 

opinion was that Employee was unable to perform any work since his May 11, 2015 

injury, or whether his opinion was that Employee could perform limited duty work from 

the date of his injury. His response to the final question, which asked what work 

restrictions "should [Employee] observe as a result of this injury," was "no overhead 

work." Stating that Dr. Lanford "prohibited [Employee] from performing overhead 

work," the trial court concluded that "because [Employee] possessed some capacity to 

perform work, his recovery lays in temporary partial disability benefits." Dr. Lanford's 

opinions were not provided to Employer until June 8, 2016, or thereafter, and it is unclear 

from those opinions during what time period Dr. Lanford felt Employee should "observe" 

an overhead work restriction. 5 

In our opinion, it is significant that Employee testified unequivocally at the initial 

expedited hearing that he was able to resume gainful employment subsequent to his May 

11, 2015 injury. Employee testified he began working with another Employer on 

February 2, 2016 "about 74 hours a week," performing work similar to the work he 

5 The third question presented to Dr. Lanford was posed in the present tense, indicating that Dr. Lanford 

was to opine about Employee's current restrictions as of the date of his response. The question did not 

ask Dr. Lanford to opine about restrictions Employee may have had prior to the date of the June 8, 2016 

inquiry. 

7 
previously noted, Employer was not provided any record of work restrictions during 

either period of contested disability, and it was never given the opportunity to consider 

accommodating whatever work restrictions might have existed. In short, the evidence 

presented to date shows that Employee has, in fact, worked at full duty for several 

months since his injury, contrary to the opinion expressed by Dr. Lanford that Employee 

has been unable to work at full duty since the date of his injury. Dr. Lanford's opinions 

are less than clear concerning whether Employee could work after his injury, whether 

Employee could perform limited or restricted work after his injury, and at what point 

Employee was to "observe" work restrictions. Considering the limited medical evidence 

presented to date and the testimony presented at the initial expedited hearing, we find the 

preponderance of the evidence addressing the disputed periods of temporary disability to 

be otherwise than found by the trial court. 

Conclusion 

For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court's decision awarding temporary 

disability benefits and remanded the case for such additional proceedings as may be 

necessary. 

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Workers' Compensation Appeals Board 

8 
 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

David Young ) Docket No. 2015-06-0860

) 

v. ) State File No. 39751-2015

) 

Young Electric Co., et al. ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the 

referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service 

on this the 14th day of September, 2016. 

Name Certified 

Mail

First Class 

Mail

Via 

Fax

Fax 

Number

Via 

Email

Email Address

Michael Fisher X mfisher@ddzlaw.com

Stephen Morton X Stephen.morton@mgclaw.com

Joshua David Baker, 

Judge

X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, 

Chief Judge

X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, 

Court of Workers’ 

Compensation Claims

X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B 

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606 

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov