Report to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

AFGHANISTAN 

SECURITY 

U.S. Programs to 

Further Reform 

Ministry of Interior 

and National Police 

Challenged by Lack of 

Military Personnel and 

Afghan Cooperation 

March 2009 

GAO-09-280 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior 

and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military 

Highlights of GAO-09-280, a report to the Personnel and Afghan Cooperation 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives 

The United States has invested more 

than $6.2 billion in the Afghan 

Ministry of Interior (MOI) and 

Afghan National Police (ANP). The 

Department of Defense’s (Defense) 

Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), 

with the Department of State (State), 

leads U.S. efforts to enhance MOI 

and ANP organizational structures, 

leadership abilities, and pay systems. 

This report assesses the status of 

U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1) 

restructure MOI and ANP, (2) 

retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI 

and ANP personnel, and (4) 

enhance MOI and ANP pay 

systems. GAO reviewed Defense, 

State, and United Nations (UN) 

data and met with officials in the 

United States and Afghanistan. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretaries of Defense and State (1) 

provide dedicated personnel to 

support creation of additional police 

mentor teams to expand and 

complete the FDD program and (2) 

consider provisioning U.S. 

contributions for police wages to 

reflect the extent to which U.S. 

agencies have validated MOI and ANP 

personnel. Defense concurred with 

the first recommendation and State 

noted it is prepared to recruit 

additional personnel. State concurred 

with the second recommendation but 

Defense asserted that it would unduly 

penalize MOI. GAO maintains that 

the recommendation could encourage 

greater ANP cooperation and help 

ensure that only legitimate personnel 

receive U.S.-subsidized wages. 

U.S. agencies and Afghanistan have achieved their goals of restructuring and 

reducing a top-heavy and oversized MOI and ANP officer corps, modifying 

police wages, and planning a reorganization of MOI headquarters. These 

efforts are intended to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by 

professional staff that can manage a national police force. U.S. agencies and 

MOI cut the officer corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000, reduced the 

percentage of high-ranking officers, and increased pay for all ranks. MOI is 

scheduled to implement a U.S.-supported headquarters reorganization. 

CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP units through its Focused District 

Development (FDD) program, which is intended to address district-level 

corruption that impeded previous efforts to retrain individual police. FDD is 

achieving promising results, according to Defense status reports. In February 

2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of FDD-retrained units as capable of 

conducting missions, 25 percent as capable of doing so with outside support, 

31 percent as capable of partially doing so with outside support, and 25 

percent as not capable. However, a lack of military personnel is constraining 

CSTC-A’s plans to expand FDD and similar programs into the rest of 

Afghanistan by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 

1,500 military personnel needed to expand FDD and similar police 

development programs. CSTC-A has previously obtained military personnel 

for ANP training by redirecting personnel from its Afghan army training 

program. However, the army program’s demand for personnel is likely to 

increase as the Afghan army grows from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. 

MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State, but the full extent 

of the screening is unclear because State did not systematically compile 

records of its efforts. The screening effort was intended to improve the 

professionalism and integrity of the officer corps through testing by CSTC-A 

and background checks by State. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of the nearly 

17,800 officers who took the tests passed, according to CSTC-A. State was 

unable to provide us with statistics concerning the results of background 

checks because it did not systematically compile its records. 

U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to validate MOI and ANP 

personnel rosters and ensure that wages are distributed reliably. Despite 

progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation 

and a shortage of banks. U.S. contractors have validated almost 47,400 MOI 

and ANP personnel but have been unable to validate almost 29,400 

personnel—who were paid in part by $230 million in U.S. contributions to a 

UN trust fund—because of a lack of cooperation from some ANP 

commanders. As of January 2009, 97 percent of all reported MOI and ANP 

personnel had enrolled in an electronic payroll system and 58 percent had 

enrolled to have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts. 

However, growth of the direct deposit system may be constrained because 

almost 40 percent of ANP personnel lack ready access to banks. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-280.

For more information, contact Charles 

Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 

johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Background 2

U.S. Agencies Have Helped Restructure the MOI and ANP Officer 

Corps and Plan the Future Reorganization of MOI Headquarters 7 

Expansion of New Approach to Training Afghan Police 

Constrained by Shortage of Military Personnel 11 

U.S. Agencies Screened MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not 

Systematically Compile Records of Background Checks 18 

Efforts to Enhance MOI and ANP Pay Systems Face Challenges of 

Limited Cooperation and Lack of a Nationwide Bank System 22 

Conclusion 31 

Recommendations for Executive Action 31 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31 

Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology 33 

Appendix II Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan 

National Police 35 

Appendix III Organizational Chart for the Ministry of Interior 

and Afghan National Police 36 

Appendix IV MOI and ANP Nonofficer Pay Rates before and 

after Pay Reform 37 

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 38 

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Justice 40 

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of State 42 

Page i GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46 

Tables 

Table 1: Number of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank before and 

after Rank Reform 9 

Table 2: MOI and ANP Officer Monthly Pay Rates before and after 

Pay Reform 10 

Table 3: Test Passage and Failure of MOI and ANP Officers by 

Rank 19 

Figures 

Figure 1: The Afghan Ministry of Interior 3 

Figure 2: MOI and ANP Authorized Personnel Levels 5 

Figure 3: Attacks on Afghan Security Forces (2003-2008) 6 

Figure 4: ANP Killed in Action from January 2007 to November 

2008 7 

Figure 5: MOI and ANP Officer Corps Structure before and after 

Rank Reform 9 

Figure 6: ANP Unit Members after Returning to Their District 13 

Figure 7: Model FDD Police Mentoring Team 14 

Figure 8: Initial FDD Districts in Relation to the Ring Road 16 

Figure 9: Validation Status of Applicants for Identification Cards, 

November 2008 25 

Figure 10: Sample ANP Identification Cards at MOI’s Headquarters 

in Kabul 26 

Figure 11: Workstation Used to Process Identification Card at MOI 

Headquarters 27 

Figure 12: Servers Used to Store Identification Data at MOI 

Headquarters in Kabul 28 

Figure 13: LOTFA Electronic Payroll Training Class at MOI 

Headquarters in Kabul 29 

Figure 14: Enrollment in Electronic Payroll System, as of January 

2009 29 

Figure 15: Enrollment in Electronic Funds Transfer System, as of 

January 2009 30 

Page ii GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Abbreviations 

ANP Afghan National Police 

CENTCOM Central Command 

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

Defense Department of Defense 

EUPOL European Union Police Mission 

FDD Focused District Development 

IDR In District Reform 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 

MOI Afghan Ministry of Interior 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

SIU Special Investigative Unit 

State Department of State 

UN United Nations 

UNAMA UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 9, 2009 

The Honorable Howard Berman 

Chairman Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan National Police 

(ANP) face a wide range of problems that include a history of corruption, 

weak pay systems, and attacks by insurgents. Afghanistan is a very poor 

and underdeveloped country that needs professional and competent police 

to help defeat security threats to its homeland, including widespread 

narcotics trafficking as well as a growing insurgency. The MOI and ANP 

have a combined authorized personnel level of 82,000. The United States 

has invested more than $6.2 billion since 2002 to help professionalize the 

MOI and ANP, including $230 million for police wages contributed to the 

United Nations (UN) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). 

U.S. efforts to help reform the MOI and ANP are led by the Department of 

Defense’s (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A) in conjunction with the Department of State (State). 

The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan National Police 

(ANP) face a wide range of problems that include a history of corruption, 

weak pay systems, and attacks by insurgents. Afghanistan is a very poor 

and underdeveloped country that needs professional and competent police 

to help defeat security threats to its homeland, including widespread 

narcotics trafficking as well as a growing insurgency. The MOI and ANP 

have a combined authorized personnel level of 82,000. The United States 

has invested more than $6.2 billion since 2002 to help professionalize the 

MOI and ANP, including $230 million for police wages contributed to the 

United Nations (UN) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). 

U.S. efforts to help reform the MOI and ANP are led by the Department of 

Defense’s (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A) in conjunction with the Department of State (State). 

This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of 

Afghanistan (1) restructure the MOI and ANP, (2) retrain selected ANP 

units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP 

identification and pay systems. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed a wide range of Defense and 

State documents and briefings concerning U.S. efforts to reform the MOI 

and ANP, including Defense’s National Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, 

CSTC-A’s monthly assessments of the capabilities of ANP districts 

participating in a focused development effort, and weekly situation reports 

prepared by State-contracted police mentors. We also reviewed 

documents concerning ANP reform efforts supported by LOTFA and by 

the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). To supplement our 

review of these materials, we traveled to Afghanistan, where we discussed 

MOI and ANP reform efforts with CSTC-A, State, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), LOTFA, MOI, and ANP officials. We also visited 

ANP training facilities and an ANP base in Afghanistan’s Chapahar district, 

where we met with State contractor personnel. In addition, we spoke in 

the United States with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of 

To address these objectives, we reviewed a wide range of Defense and 

State documents and briefings concerning U.S. efforts to reform the MOI 

and ANP, including Defense’s National Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, 

CSTC-A’s monthly assessments of the capabilities of ANP districts 

participating in a focused development effort, and weekly situation reports 

prepared by State-contracted police mentors. We also reviewed 

documents concerning ANP reform efforts supported by LOTFA and by 

the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). To supplement our 

review of these materials, we traveled to Afghanistan, where we discussed 

MOI and ANP reform efforts with CSTC-A, State, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), LOTFA, MOI, and ANP officials. We also visited 

ANP training facilities and an ANP base in Afghanistan’s Chapahar district, 

where we met with State contractor personnel. In addition, we spoke in 

the United States with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of 

Page 1 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security tan Security 
 

the Secretary of Defense, Defense’s Central Command (CENTCOM), State, 

DEA, and UNAMA. See appendix I for a complete description of our scope 

and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Afghanistan is a very poor and underdeveloped country that has suffered 

from instability and war for three decades. The United States and its allies 

removed the ruling Taliban regime following the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks on the United States. The new Afghan government 

inherited a country with limited capacity to govern and a poorly developed 

infrastructure. About 70 percent of the population is illiterate. According 

to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the world’s fifth most 

corrupt country.1

 Its police do not respect human rights, according to the 

Fund for Peace. The MOI and ANP have a history of corruption, and much 

of Afghanistan lacks a functioning judicial sector. 

Background 

The United States and other international partners agreed in 2006 to 

establish a professional Afghan police service committed to the rule of 

law, shortly after the United States assumed the lead in reforming the MOI 

and ANP. U.S. goals for the MOI include ensuring that it is competent and 

efficient, provides strong and effective leadership, and has the 

organizational structures needed to reform, manage, and sustain the 

police. U.S. goals for the ANP include ensuring that it is fully constituted, 

professional, and functional; trained and equipped to uphold the rule of 

law; and able to effectively meet Afghan security needs, including 

controlling movement across Afghanistan’s borders. In 2006, the United 

States, Afghanistan, and other international partners outlined goals for the 

ANP in the Afghanistan Compact. The stated goals of the compact include 

the establishment of, by the end of 2010, a professional and functional 

 

1

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks more than 150 countries 

in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and 

opinion surveys. 

Page 2 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

ANP that can meet the security needs of the country effectively and be 

increasingly fiscally sustainable. The United States views an effective 

Afghan police force as critical to extending rule of law in Afghanistan and 

improving Afghan security. 

U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan reform the MOI and ANP are directed by 

Defense through CSTC-A, which is also charged with training the Afghan 

National Army. State provides policy guidance for CSTC-A’s police 

program and oversees civilian contractors to implement police training. To 

date, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion to train and equip 

the ANP. 

Figure 1: The Afghan Ministry of Interior 

Source: GAO.

To achieve U.S. goals, CSTC-A has set objectives for institutional, 

organizational, and individual reform: 

• Institutional reform is intended to ensure that MOI is run by a professional 

and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a national police 

force. 

Page 3 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

• Organizational reform is aimed at ensuring ANP units have sufficient 

capacity to maintain domestic order and are responsive to the local 

population’s needs. 

• Individual reform seeks to ensure that the MOI and ANP consist of trained, 

competent, and credible individuals dedicated to public service who are 

accountable and transparent in their actions. 

The United States works with several international partners in supporting 

reform, including the following organizations: 

• The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is intended 

to bring together European national efforts to support police reform in 

Afghanistan. 

• LOTFA was established by the United Nations Development Program in 

May 2002 and provides funds for ANP salaries. As of November 2008, 

LOTFA had received about $653.4 million from 20 international donors, 

including the United States. 

• UNAMA assists in leading international efforts to rebuild the country. 

The MOI and ANP have a total authorized force level of about 82,000. The 

ANP consists of six components. As shown in figure 2, the largest of these 

is the Afghan Uniformed Police, which serve as local police and perform 

routine policing duties in Afghanistan’s 365 police districts. These districts 

are organized into five regional zones (North, East, West, South, and 

Central) and a sixth zone for the capital city of Kabul. According to State 

and Defense, the zone commanders report to the Chief of the Afghan 

Uniformed Police, who reports to the Deputy Minister of Interior for 

Security. (See apps. II and III for further information on the structure of 

the MOI and ANP.) 

Page 4 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 2: MOI and ANP Authorized Personnel Levels 

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

Afghan police and other security forces are facing increasing attacks by 

insurgent forces. As shown in figure 3, attacks on Afghan security forces 

(including the ANP and the Afghan National Army) increased sixfold from 

October 2003 to October 2008, according to DOD. The number of attacks 

rose nearly threefold in 1 year, from 97 attacks in October 2007 to 289 in 

October 2008. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

Total authorized MOI and ANP force level: 81,956

0.5%

Counter Terrorism Police

(406)

4.6%

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

(3,756)

4.9%

Criminal Investigative Division

(4,009)

Afghan Civil Order Police

(5,365)

Ministry of Interior Headquarters

(5,943)

Afghan Border Police

(17,676)

Afghan Uniformed Police

(44,801)

7.3%

21.6%

6.5%

54.7%

Page 5 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 3: Attacks on Afghan Security Forces (2003-2008) 

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Number of attacks per month

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

Year

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

May

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

Oct.

The ANP has suffered significant casualties in recent years. According to 

Defense, at least 3,400 police have been wounded or killed in action since 

January 2007. In June 2008, a Defense official testified that ANP combat 

losses during 2007 were roughly three times more than those of the Afghan 

National Army. Defense data indicate that the ANP suffered between 19 

and 101 fatalities per month over a recent 23-month period (see fig. 4)—an 

average of 56 police killed in action per month. 

Page 6 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 4: ANP Killed in Action from January 2007 to November 2008

2007 2008

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

ANP deaths

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov.

U.S. agencies have helped Afghanistan restructure the MOI and ANP 

officer corps, modify ANP pay rates, and plan a reorganization of MOI 

headquarters. CSTC-A has also acted to better coordinate international 

mentoring of MOI officials. These efforts were intended to help ensure that 

the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully 

manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The officer 

corps reform program reduced the oversized MOI-ANP officer corps from 

about 17,800 to about 9,000 personnel, reformed the ANP’s top-heavy rank 

structure, and increased police pay. In a separate effort, CSTC-A and MOI 

worked together to develop a plan for increasing MOI’s efficiency by 

restructuring the ministry and reducing its staff. In addition, CSTC-A and 

other international partners have adopted a plan to address problems 

affecting their efforts to build MOI staff capacity through mentoring. 

U.S.-supported efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP are intended to 

promote institutional and organizational reform and to help ensure that 

the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully 

manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The programs 

have been aimed at addressing problems concerning the size and pay 

U.S. Agencies Have 

Helped Restructure 

the MOI and ANP 

Officer Corps and 

Plan the Future 

Reorganization of 

MOI Headquarters 

Goal of MOI-ANP 

Restructuring Programs Is 

to Promote Institutional 

and Organizational Reform 

Page 7 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps, MOI’s organization and 

capacity, and mentoring of MOI officials. 

• According to U.S. officials, the MOI-ANP officer corps was top heavy. It 

consisted of nearly 18,000 individuals, including more than 3,000 generals and 

colonels. ANP personnel were also paid less than Afghan National Army 

personnel, creating recruitment and retention challenges for the ANP. 

• MOI headquarters suffers from numerous organizational deficiencies, 

according to U.S. officials. The U.S. Embassy concluded in 2007 that MOI 

suffered from corruption, limited control over provincial police structures, 

and low institutional capacity at all levels. CSTC-A reported in 2008 that 

MOI lacked a clear organizational structure, basic management functions, 

and an overall strategy for policing. CSTC-A also reported that MOI’s 

departments did not have clearly defined missions and did not 

communicate and coordinate with one another. State has reported that 

MOI lacks a culture of accountability and transparency. According to State 

police contactors, MOI’s organization has contributed to pervasive 

violations of its chain of command and to a lack of accountability in ANP 

districts and provincial commands. MOI’s lack of clearly defined lines of 

authority and areas of responsibility weakens its ability to combat fraud 

through effective internal controls.2

• To help address MOI’s weak institutional capacity, the United States and 

other international partners initiated efforts to mentor individual MOI 

officials but did not coordinate these efforts. CSTC-A reported in 2008 that 

international partners provided more than one mentor to some officials—

despite a limited number of available mentors—while providing none to 

others. For example, one MOI commander had four mentors from two 

different countries at a time when four senior-level MOI officials had none. 

CSTC-A also found that donors had not always aligned mentor skills with 

the needs of MOI officials and had not established a single communication 

chain to share information and coordinate mentor activities. 

The United States and MOI have restructured and reduced the rank 

structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps while increasing police pay 

scales. The rank reform program cut the total number of officer positions 

from about 17,800 to about 9,000 and reduced the number of the highest 

ranking officers (generals and colonels) by nearly 85 percent. A board of 

MOI and ANP Officer 

Corps and Pay 

Restructured 

 

2

See GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 8 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

MOI officials selected officers for retention with help from CSTC-A and 

U.S. Embassy officials. The rank reform program significantly altered the 

structure of the officer corps, as shown in figure 5. 

Figure 5: MOI and ANP Officer Corps Structure before and after Rank Reform 

Lieutenant

(first, second,

and third)

Captain

Major

Lt. Colonel

Colonel

General 

Number before rank reform Number after rank reform

319

2,712

2,140

2,598

3,779

4,263

159

310

403

626

1,507

6,013

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

Lieutenant

(first, second,

and third)

Captain

Major

Lt. Colonel

Colonel

General 

Note: CSTC-A was not able to identify the rank of 11 percent (1,985) of the officers in the officer 

corps as it existed before rank reform. This figure does not include these individuals. 

Table 1: Number of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank before and after Rank Reform 

Ranka

Number of 

officers before 

rank reform 

Percentage of total 

officer corps before 

rank reform

Number of 

officers after 

rank reform

Percentage of total 

officer corps after 

rank reform 

Net percentage 

change in officers

General 319 2 159 2 0

Colonel 2,712 17 310 3 -14

Lieutenant colonel 2,140 14 403 5 -9

Major 2,598 16 626 7 -9

Captain 3,779 24 1,507 17 -7

Lieutenant (first, 

second, and third) 

4,263 27 6,013 67 40

Othera1,985 11 N/A N/A N/A

Total 17,796 100 9,018 100 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

a

CSTC-A informed us that it could not identify the rank of 11 percent (1,985) of the officers in its 

records of the officer corps as it existed prior to rank reform. 

Page 9 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

The reduction in the MOI and ANP officer corps was accompanied by 

substantial increases in ANP pay, as shown in table 2. The new pay rates 

are on a par with those of the Afghan National Army. 

Table 2: MOI and ANP Officer Monthly Pay Rates before and after Pay Reform 

Officer rank 

Monthly rates 

before pay reform

Monthly rates after 

pay reform 

Percentage 

increase in salary

Lieutenant general $107 $750 601

Major general 103 650 531

Brigadier general 95 550 479

Colonel 92 400 335

Lieutenant colonel 88 350 298

Major 83 300 261

Captain 78 250 259

First lieutenant 69 200 233

Second lieutenant 66 180 218

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

Note: Nonofficer pay was also impacted by pay reform. See appendix IV for changes to nonofficer pay. 

The MOI Has Approved 

U.S.-Supported Plan to 

Restructure MOI 

Headquarters 

In 2008, CSTC-A, MOI, and international partner officials developed a plan 

for restructuring MOI headquarters. Their goals in developing the plan 

included increasing efficiency, streamlining organization, improving 

coordination, creating conditions to mitigate corruption, and reducing 

headquarters staff by 25 percent. 

The plan’s implementation was delayed by political resistance within MOI, 

according to CSTC-A. MOI was originally to have begun implementing the 

restructuring plan in September 2008. However, CSTC-A informed us that 

some MOI departments were concerned that they would lose power and 

personnel as a result of restructuring. The plan’s implementation was 

further delayed by the removal of the former Minister of Interior, 

according to CSTC-A. The plan was approved in late December 2008 by the 

new Minister of Interior and implementation is scheduled to begin in 

March 2009. As approved, the restructuring plan provides for a 7 percent 

reduction in staff, rather than the 25 percent reduction goal originally set 

by CSTC-A, MOI, and the international partners. 

Page 10 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

CSTC-A and other international partners have agreed on a plan to better 

coordinate U.S. and international efforts to mentor MOI officials. CSTC-A 

and other international partners sought to define mentor roles and 

required skill sets, outline the international partners best suited to support 

mentoring requirements, establish a personnel management process to 

facilitate mentor assignments, and identify information and reporting 

requirements for mentors. The goal of their effort was to reach an 

agreement to support an integrated mentor program within MOI’s 

headquarters. In the final plan, which was approved in January 2009, 

CSTC-A and other international partners agreed to provide an 

organizational framework to manage the mentoring program, agree on the 

allocation of mentors according to rationally derived priorities, and 

optimize the match between mentors’ skill sets and position requirements. 

CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP through its Focused District 

Development (FDD) program, which is intended to build professional and 

fully capable police units. FDD is achieving promising results in most 

participating districts, according to Defense status reports. In February 

2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of units retrained through the FDD 

program as capable of conducting primary operational missions, 25 

percent as capable of conducting primary operational missions with 

international support, 31 percent as capable of partially conducting 

primary operational missions with international support, and 25 percent as 

not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions.3

 However, a 

shortage of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A’s plans to expand 

FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. 

Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel to 

expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A has 

previously obtained military personnel for the FDD program and ANP 

training by redirecting such personnel from resources intended for its 

Afghan National Army training program. However, the Afghan army 

program’s demand for military personnel is likely to grow due to the 

recent decision by the United States, Afghanistan, and international 

partners to increase the Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 individuals. 

International Partners 

Have Approved Plan to 

Better Coordinate MOI 

Mentoring 

Expansion of New 

Approach to Training 

Afghan Police 

Constrained by 

Shortage of Military 

Personnel 

 

3

According to Defense, the role of the ANP encompasses a wide range of policing, law 

enforcement, and security missions. 

Page 11 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

The goal of the FDD program is to enhance ANP organizational and 

individual capability by training all uniformed police in a district as a unit.4

According to State and Defense officials, corruption and local loyalties 

hampered past efforts to train individuals. Under the previous approach, 

the effects of individual training were diluted when trainees returned to 

corrupt police stations staffed by poorly trained personnel with little 

loyalty to the central government. We reported in 2005 that some returning 

trainees had been forced by their commanders to give their new 

equipment to more senior police and to help extort money from truck 

drivers and travelers. In 2008, State reported that the effects of previous 

police training had been diluted when newly trained police were 

reinserted to an unreformed environment. 

Goal and Structure of 

Focused District 

Development Program 

The FDD program differs from previous efforts to train ANP because it 

focuses on retraining entire districts and not individuals. In implementing 

the FDD program in a district, CSTC-A assesses the district’s organization, 

training, facilities, and judicial infrastructure before removing the police 

unit from the district for 8 weeks of full-time training.5

 During the training 

program, the unit receives basic training for all untrained recruits, 

advanced training for recruits with previous training, and management and 

leadership training for officers. 

 

4

As described in the background section of this report, enhancing MOI and ANP 

organizational and individual capability are two of CSTC-A’s reform objectives. 

5

A force of Afghan National Civil Order Police maintains order in the district during the 

unit’s absence. 

Page 12 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 6: ANP Unit Members after Returning to Their District 

Source: GAO.

An embedded police mentor team accompanies the unit when it returns to 

its home district. According to CSTC-A officials, a standard police mentor 

team includes two civilian police mentors, four military support personnel, 

and six military security personnel (see fig. 7). While State provides the 

civilian police mentors, CSTC-A is responsible for providing the 10 military 

support and security personnel. According to CSTC-A, the police mentor 

team provides the unit with continued on-the-job training following its 

return to its home district and assesses the unit’s progress toward 

becoming capable of independently performing basic law and order 

operations. 

Page 13 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 7: Model FDD Police Mentoring Team 

1 x police chief

1 x training officer

2 x Linguist

1 x team chief

1 x Operations

1 x Personnel

1 x Logistics

Military

Civilian police advisers

6 Security team members

Sources: Defense (data); Copyright © Corel Corp. (clip art). All rights reserved.

Initial FDD Program 

Efforts Report Positive 

Results 

The FDD program has shown positive initial results, according to Defense. 

In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of the units retrained 

through the FDD program as capable of conducting primary operational 

missions, 25 percent as capable of conducting primary operational 

missions with international support, 31 percent as capable of partially 

Page 14 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

conducting primary operational missions with international support, an

25 percent as not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions.

In contrast, in April 2008 all of the districts enrolled in FDD were only 

partially capable of independent action.

d 

Police mentor teams are required to send monthly capability assessment 

ce. 

 the 

Although Defense assesses the FDD program to be demonstrating 

ecome 

 road 

 

6

forms to CSTC-A as part of CSTC-A’s effort to monitor and assess the FDD 

program. The assessments rank the units on a variety of competencies, 

including personnel actions and pay reform, equipment accountability, 

maintenance, formal training, crime-handling procedures, and use of for

Mentor teams also address disciplinary issues and observe units for signs 

of drug use. According to Defense, in 2007, 29 FDD participants were 

identified as drug users, removed from the program, and released from

police force. 

promising initial results, FDD districts have required more time to b

fully capable than CSTC-A had originally projected. CSTC-A had projected 

that FDD units would reach full capability in 9 months. However, only 4 of 

the first 7 units to undergo the FDD program reached full capability within 

10 months, according to CSTC-A. CSTC-A informed us the program has 

been affected by growing security threats. Also, CSTC-A responded to 

concerns of international partners in Afghanistan by initiating FDD in 

districts that faced relatively greater security threats than originally 

anticipated. These initial districts included several on or near the ring

that links the major cities in Afghanistan, as shown in figure 8.7

6

We have not included the number of FDD units because Defense controls this information 

as For Official Use Only. We plan to issue a For Official Use Only annex to this report. 

7

For more information about the ring road, see GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: 

Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a 

Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 

2008). 

Page 15 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 8: Initial FDD Districts in Relation to the Ring Road 

Mazar-e-Sharif

Kabul

Gardez

Jalalabad

Kandahar

Herat

Bamiyan

Konduz

CHINA

Kabul

Regional

Command 

West

Regional

Command

South

Regional

Command

Central

Regional

Command

North

Regional

Command

East

Regional

Command

Kabul

Mazar-e-Sharif

Kabul

Herat

Jalalabad

Baghlani Jadid

Kandahar

Farah Dilar am

Sources: GAO analysis of Defense data; Map Resources (map).

Regional Highway System

Ring road

Initial FDD Districts

PAKISTAN

INDIA

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

AFGHANI S TAN

Page 16 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

CSTC-A currently lacks the military support and security personnel 

resources to expand FDD into the rest of Afghanistan.8

 Senior CSTC-A 

personnel informed us that Defense has not provided CSTC-A with 

dedicated personnel designated to serve as police mentors. As a result, 

CSTC-A redirected to the police program personnel that would have been 

used to mentor Afghan National Army units. CSTC-A staff informed us that 

they redirected the personnel because the police training program used 

prior to FDD was not succeeding at a time when the Afghan army training 

program was making progress. 

Existing Personnel 

Constraints Are Impeding 

Timely Expansion of FDD 

Program 

CSTC-A intends to retrain the uniformed police in all districts in 

Afghanistan using FDD and other similar district-level reform programs.9

To do so, CSTC-A estimates it would need a total of 399 police mentor 

teams—365 district teams and 34 provincial level teams. CSTC-A informed 

us that its preference is to complete FDD using a 3-year planning model 

that would have 250 police mentor teams fielded by the end of December 

2009 and the remaining 149 teams fielded in districts by October 2010. This 

schedule, however, would not allow Defense to complete FDD training 

and mentoring in time to meet the Afghanistan Compact’s goal of 

achieving a fully functional and professional Afghan National Police by the 

end of 2010. Defense has reported that it would need about 1,500 

additional military personnel to expand FDD and similar police 

development programs. 

The FDD program faces the likely possibility of increasing competition for 

these personnel from CSTC-A’s program to fully train the Afghan National 

Army. In the past, FDD and other ANP training programs have relied on 

U.S. military personnel that had been intended for use for Afghan army 

training programs. However, the demand for personnel for use in Afghan 

army training programs is likely to increase because Afghanistan, the 

 

8

One similar district police reform program was the In District Reform (IDR) program, 

which used the same basic training program as FDD but relied on U.S. Marines to provide 

security in the district when half of the local police force was removed for training. When 

the first half of the force finished with the training, it was returned to active duty and the 

other half of the police force went to training. Marines became part of the IDR police 

mentor teams, along with contractor personnel and other trainers. 

9

CSTC-A informed us in January 2009 that FDD-like district-level police retraining 

programs could draw on personnel from international forces or U.S. forces other than the 

U.S. Army. For example, U.S. Marine Corps personnel are supporting efforts to reform 

several police units in their districts. 

Page 17 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

United States, and other international partners have agreed to increase the 

Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. 

In November 2008, CSTC-A officials stated they may propose that Defense 

use U.S. combat units, provincial reconstruction teams,10 and international 

forces to help address the shortage of personnel. The officials later 

informed us that six FDD police mentor teams had been staffed using 

personnel provided by international forces. However, according to 

Defense officials in headquarters, Defense has not altered its guidance to 

CSTC-A for staffing the FDD program. 

MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State as part of a 

rank reform program intended to promote institutional and organizational 

reform, but State did not systematically compile records of background 

checks conducted as part of the screening effort. The screening effort 

included testing by CSTC-A of MOI and ANP personnel on police 

practices. At least 55 percent of the almost 17,800 officers tested passed, 

according to data provided by CSTC-A. The screening effort also included 

background checks based on information from State and UNAMA. 

However, U.S. officials were unable to provide us with detailed 

information concerning the number of individuals whose backgrounds had 

been checked and the results of those checks. ANP recruits are endorsed 

by local elders and officials and, according to CSTC-A, screened by MOI. 

Members of certain small elite units receive additional screening by U.S. 

agencies or high-ranking MOI officials. 

Efforts to screen MOI and ANP personnel are intended to promote 

institutional and organizational reform. The goals of U.S.-supported 

screening efforts are to help ensure that (1) MOI is run by a professional 

and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a national police 

force and (2) ANP units, under MOI control, have the capacity to maintain 

domestic order while remaining responsive to the needs of the local 

population. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported in 2007 that the 

effectiveness of the police had been seriously impeded by “corrupt and/or 

incompetent” MOI and ANP leadership. The State and Defense inspectors 

general reported in 2006 that then-current ANP screening efforts were 

U.S. Agencies 

Screened MOI and 

ANP Officers but Did 

Not Systematically 

Compile Records of 

Background Checks 

Screening Intended to 

Promote MOI and ANP 

Institutional and 

Organizational Reform 

 

10See GAO, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, GAO-09-86R 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008). 

Page 18 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

ineffective and that verifying the suitability of police candidates in 

Afghanistan is difficult because of (1) the strength of Afghan ethnic and 

tribal ties and (2) the lack of reliable personnel and criminal records in 

Afghanistan.11

MOI and ANP Officers 

Were Tested in Connection 

with Rank Reform 

According to CSTC-A, nearly 17,800 MOI and ANP officers took tests on 

human rights and policing values that were required for consideration in 

the reformed MOI and ANP officer corps.12 At least 9,797 (55 percent) of 

these officers passed. Higher-ranking officers below the rank of general 

passed the tests at higher rates than lower-ranking officers (see table 3).13

Table 3: Test Passage and Failure of MOI and ANP Officers by Rank 

Rank Passed Failed Percentage passed

General Not available Not available Not available

Colonel 2,097 615 77

Lt. colonel 1,459 681 68

Major 1,624 974 63

Captain 1,997 1,711 53

First lieutenant 858 1,061 46

Second lieutenant 857 1,457 37

Third lieutenant 32 69 32 

Othera 873 1,112 44

Source: GAO analysis of CSTC-A data. 

a

CSTC-A informed us that it could not determine the ranks of 1,985 officers who were tested. 

 

11Inspectors General, Departments of State and Defense, Interagency Assessment of 

Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington, D.C., and Arlington, Va., 

November 2006). 

12An ANP general informed us in May 2008 that senior officers were administered written 

and oral tests while field officers were generally tested orally. 

13CSTC-A informed us it does not have data concerning the number of generals who passed 

or failed the tests. The officer corps included 319 generals before rank reform and 159 

generals after rank reform. 

Page 19 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

MOI and ANP officers were also subject to background checks as part of 

the rank reform process. The background checks were based on 

information from State and UNAMA. State officials informed us that the 

Department of State screened officers for rank reform by using its 

procedures for vetting foreign security personnel in connection with U.S. 

law.14 In doing so, it made use of background checks conducted at the 

State Department in Washington, D.C. State officials in Washington said 

that the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan provided them with lists of names 

and associated biographical information. The officials then used the 

information to search both a governmentwide database containing 

sensitive information and various nongovernment databases. UNAMA 

officials informed us that background checks concerning more than 18,000 

names15 were based in part on information collected locally by UNAMA. 

According to a UNAMA official, UNAMA found no detailed information for 

“more than 10,000” names and varying degrees of information about the 

remaining names.16

State Checked 

Backgrounds of MOI and 

ANP Officers but Did Not 

Systematically Compile 

Records 

State has not systematically compiled records of the background checks. 

A U.S. Embassy official informed us that the embassy did not maintain a 

database of the officers that had been checked. State officials in 

Washington, D.C., informed us that they had retained copies of the 

embassy’s requests and their responses but had not systematically 

compiled the information contained in them. 

Because they had not systematically compiled their records of the 

background checks, State officials could not provide us with the number 

of officers whose backgrounds they had checked or with detailed 

information concerning the results of the background checks. A U.S. 

 

14A recent amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act states that “no assistance shall be 

furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of 

the security forces of another country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that 

such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.” Pub. L. 110-161, Div. J, Title VI, 

sec. 651 codified at 22 U.S.C. 2378d. Prior to passage of this amendment, similar language 

(known as the “Leahy Amendment”) was regularly incorporated into annual foreign 

operations appropriations measures. 

15A UNAMA official informed us that some of the names screened by UNAMA may have 

been duplicates. 

16UNAMA officials told us they no longer provide background information because MOI 

officials had wrongly informed some officers that they had been rejected because of 

UNAMA. UNAMA informed us that it would require a formal request from the Afghan 

government to resume such efforts. 

Page 20 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Embassy official provided us with a partial list of embassy screening 

requests. The list indicates that the embassy had asked State to check the 

backgrounds of 2,514 unidentified individuals in late 2007. State officials in 

Washington, D.C., told us they may have screened as many as 4,000 names 

during the rank reform program. One State official in Washington, D.C., 

estimated he found derogatory information about fewer than two dozen 

individuals. The officials in Washington, D.C., said their screening efforts 

were hampered by the frequent lack of adequate data about an individual’s 

identity and date of birth. (Many Afghans use a single name, according to 

U.S. officials, and birth records are often lacking.) 

The U.S. Embassy provided us with documents indicating that UNAMA 

found negative information—including assertions of involvement in drug 

trafficking, corruption, and assaults—on 939 (38 percent) of 2,464 officers 

it reviewed during late 2007. A UNAMA official informed us that UNAMA 

had raised concerns about human rights abuses, ties to insurgent groups, 

corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking in “several hundred” cases. 

He stated MOI may have selected some officers despite negative UNAMA 

information because of factional influence, patronage, or possible 

corruption. 

ANP Recruits Screened by 

Local Authorities and MOI, 

While Elite Units Receive 

Additional Screening 

ANP enlisted recruits are endorsed in groups by village elders or local 

government officials and vetted by local police chiefs. According to CSTCA, the recruits are also screened by MOI’s medical, intelligence, and 

criminal investigative departments, under MOI procedures established in 

2004 and in “full implementation” as of December 2008.17

Recruits in certain elite units receive additional screening, according to 

U.S. officials. These units’ authorized personnel levels constitute about 7 

percent of all authorized MOI and ANP personnel. 

• The 56 members of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police’s Special 

Investigative Unit (SIU) are given periodic polygraph exams, tested for 

drugs, and screened for human rights violations and drug-related offences, 

according to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials. DEA 

 

17The State and Defense inspectors general reported in 2006 that MOI procedures were not 

always used and had been bypassed by recruiters at one U.S.-supported regional training 

center. See Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, 

Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness (Washington, 

D.C., and Arlington, Va., November 2006). 

Page 21 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

officials stated that in 2008 DEA repolygraphed 21 SIU members and 

eliminated 7 based on the results. DEA noted this one-third failure rate is 

greater than that of SIUs in other countries. 

• The 185 members of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police’s National 

Interdiction Unit are initially tested for drug use and screened for human 

rights violations and drug-related offenses, according to DEA officials.18

• The commanding general of the Afghan National Civil Order Police 

informed us that he personally interviews all applicants for his force. In 

our meeting with him in Kabul, the general stated he had dismissed 120 

recruits MOI had sent to him due to allegations of drug use and other 

abuses.19

U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to (1) validate the status of 

reported MOI and ANP personnel rosters and (2) help ensure that MOI and 

ANP wages are distributed reliably and fairly. Despite some progress, 

these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a 

shortage of commercial banks. Although U.S. contractor personnel have 

validated the status of almost 47,400 current MOI and ANP personnel, they 

have been unable to validate the status of almost 29,400 additional 

personnel—paid in part by U.S. contributions to LOTFA—because of a 

lack of cooperation from certain ANP commanders. As of January 2009, 

about 97 percent of reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in a 

new U.S.-supported electronic payroll system, and 58 percent had enrolled 

in a new electronic funds transfer system to have salaries deposited 

directly into their bank accounts. However, nearly 40 percent of personnel 

may have difficulties using this system because they are not located within 

15 miles of a commercial bank. 

U.S.-supported pay system reform efforts are intended to promote 

individual reform. Unverified personnel lists and weak pay distribution 

systems are closely linked to corruption in the ANP, according to U.S. 

agencies. Corrupt pay practices jeopardize U.S. funds provided by State 

and Defense to LOTFA in support of MOI and ANP wages. The United 

Efforts to Enhance 

MOI and ANP Pay 

Systems Face 

Challenges of Limited 

Cooperation and Lack 

of a Nationwide Bank 

System 

Goal of Pay System 

Projects Is to Promote 

Individual Reform 

 

18DEA officials stated that the National Interdiction Unit’s authorized strength is 288. 

19The Afghan National Civil Order Police is scheduled to reach its full strength of 5,365 in 

March 2011. 

Page 22 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

States has contributed $230 million to LOTFA as of November 2008, which 

constitutes more than one-third of the $653 million received by LOTFA. 

The number of actual MOI and ANP personnel is unclear. While LOTFA 

data indicate that 78,541 personnel were on MOI and ANP payrolls as of 

January 12, 2009, CSTC-A informed us that MOI does not have an accurate 

personnel manning roster or tracking system. The inspectors general of 

State and Defense stated in 2006 that reports of the number of police were 

inflated and that ANP salaries were being delivered to police stations 

based on the number of police listed on the rolls. Further, the U.S. 

Embassy in Kabul reported in 2007 that police chiefs had inflated 

personnel rosters by creating “ghost policemen”—allowing chiefs to 

obtain illegal payments. In 2008, we reported that a 2007 Defense census of 

ANP in several provinces could not confirm the existence of about 20 

percent of uniformed police and more than 10 percent of border police 

listed on MOI’s payroll records.20

Weak pay distribution systems have also fostered corruption. The U.S. 

Embassy reported in 2007 that MOI’s use of “trusted agents” to deliver 

payrolls allowed district chiefs and other officials to take cuts from 

patrolmen’s pay. The embassy also noted that problems remain in 

regularly and routinely providing pay to outlying districts and closing off 

opportunities for corruption. In 2006, the State and Defense inspectors 

general concluded that MOI’s “completely broken” pay disbursement 

system was one cause of the systematic corruption associated with the 

police. They also found that senior police officials routinely skimmed the 

salaries of junior police.21

More examples of problems with ANP pay distribution processes can be 

found in the weekly reports of U.S. civilian police mentors. During a 2-

month period in 2008, the mentors reported a variety of financial 

irregularities and fraud, including the following: 

• Police in several districts reported that they had not been paid. 

• Some individuals continued to receive officers’ wages after having been 

demoted to noncommissioned officers. 

 

20GAO-08-661. 

21Inspectors General, U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Interagency Assessment of 

Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. 

Page 23 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

• A district commander had lied about the number of ANP personnel in his 

district to obtain additional funds. He then used some of these funds to 

hire civilian friends to “help out” at the station. 

• A finance officer reported concerns that district chiefs were forcing their 

men to pay the chiefs part of their wages. 

• An ANP acting provincial financial chief reported that several district 

police chiefs had threatened to kill him if he continued to work with the 

international community on pay matters. 

• Another ANP provincial financial chief was removed for allegedly 

conspiring to embezzle funds intended for the families of ANP personnel 

who had been killed. 

State and MOI have attempted to validate the status of more than 103,000 

applicants for police identification cards by positively identifying all 

police, building a computerized police database, and issuing identification 

cards for use in paying police salaries. The identification card program 

began in 2003. State contractor personnel informed us that the validation 

process is being executed by joint contractor-MOI validation teams that 

were created because ANP regional zone commanders did not respond to 

requests to validate the status of applicants in their zones. State informed 

us in November 2008 that nearly 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel had 

received identification cards after the validation teams confirmed these 

applicants had not retired, been killed, or otherwise left the MOI or ANP 

(see figure 9). MOI and State contractor validation teams also determined 

that another 26,700 applicants had retired, been killed, or had otherwise 

left the MOI or ANP, including about 14,200 who had received 

identification cards before they retired, were killed, or otherwise left the 

ANP. State informed us that the validation process had been completed in 

two regional zones in early October 2008. 

Effort to Validate Police 

Databases Challenged by 

Lack of Full ANP 

Cooperation 

Page 24 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 9: Validation Status of Applicants for Identification Cards, November 2008

However, according to State, these teams have been unable to validate the 

extent to which another 29,372 applicants—about 37 percent of the total 

reported MOI and ANP workforce of 78,541—are active and eligible to 

receive identification cards. State informed us that three ANP zone 

commanders are not cooperating with efforts to validate the status of 

these applicants and that plans to complete the validation process have 

been put on hold until MOI persuades the commanders to cooperate.22

According to CSTC-A and State contractor personnel, the identification 

cards will eventually be used to identify MOI and ANP personnel for pay 

purposes. We were informed by contractor personnel that each card has a 

bar code with specific information concerning each individual’s salary 

group, name, and service number. The card also contains a fingerprint and 

a digital photograph that can be scanned into a facial recognition program 

(see fig. 10). 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

Total: 103,398

Active with ID card

(47,325)

Retired, killed, or otherwise left

ANP or MOI

(26,701)

Awaiting validation

(29,372)

 

22In commenting on a draft of this report in February 2009, Defense stated that MOI had 

recently formed provincial inspection teams that will attempt to verify personnel 

throughout the country. We were not able to independently confirm whether these teams 

will validate the status of identification card applicants. 

Page 25 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 10: Sample ANP Identification Cards at MOI’s Headquarters in Kabul 

Data collected from individuals are processed by MOI personnel and 

stored in servers located at MOI headquarters (see figs. 11 and 12). 

According to State contractor personnel, the cards use a variety of optical 

features to discourage counterfeiters. 

Source: GAO.

Page 26 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 11: Workstation Used to Process Identification Card at MOI Headquarters 

Source: GAO.

Page 27 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 12: Servers Used to Store Identification Data at MOI Headquarters in Kabul 

According to Defense and State, the goal of the new electronic payroll and 

funds transfer systems is to reduce corruption in pay distribution by 

establishing fair and reliable pay processes. LOTFA and CSTC-A officials 

stated the electronic payroll system is intended to replace slow, paperbased processes with an automated system that creates a monthly payroll 

for police and allows MOI to track individual payments. LOTFA has 

sponsored training programs to familiarize MOI personnel with the new 

payroll system (see fig. 13). As shown in figure 14, LOTFA data indicate 

that 97 percent (76,343) of 78,451 reported MOI and ANP personnel were 

enrolled in the electronic payroll system as of January 2009. 

Source: GAO.

Shortage of Banks 

Impedes Progress in 

Expanding Direct Deposit 

Pay System 

Page 28 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

Figure 13: LOTFA Electronic Payroll Training Class at MOI Headquarters in Kabul 

Source: GAO.

Figure 14: Enrollment in Electronic Payroll System, as of January 2009 

Source: GAO analysis of LOTFA data.

Enrolled in electronic payroll system

3%

Not enrolled in electronic payroll system

97%

Page 29 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

The electronic funds transfer system is intended to help reduce MOI’s use 

of corruption-prone salary distribution methods by depositing wages 

directly into the bank accounts of individual MOI and ANP personnel. As 

of May 2008, LOTFA’s stated goal was to enroll 80 percent of MOI and ANP 

personnel by September 2008. However, as of January 2009, only 58 

percent (about 45,200) of 78,451 reported MOI and ANP personnel were 

enrolled in the system, according to LOTFA (see fig. 15). 

Figure 15: Enrollment in Electronic Funds Transfer System, as of January 2009 

Source: GAO analysis of LOTFA data.

Enrolled in electronic funds transfer system

Not enrolled in electronic funds transfer

58% system

42%

CSTC-A and LOTFA attributed the lack of greater enrollment in the 

electronic funds transfer system to the absence of a nationwide Afghan 

banking system. According to CSTC-A and LOTFA data, only about 61 

percent (47,900) of reported MOI and ANP personnel live and work within 

25 kilometers (about 15 miles) of a commercial bank. In November 2008, 

CSTC-A informed us that the expansion of the electronic funds transfer 

program was being limited primarily by the impact of security concerns on 

efforts to open new banks, as well as by the slow installation of automated 

teller machines, a lack of reliable power at remote locations, and ANP 

officials who have not yet embraced the program. CSTC-A officials are 

exploring the possibility of using cell-phone companies in lieu of 

commercial banks to provide direct access to wages. 

Page 30 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

While Defense and State have worked with Afghanistan and other 

international partners to initiate and support reform programs that have 

the potential to help resolve some of the most significant challenges facing 

the development of a fully professional MOI and ANP, the agencies have 

not overcome persistent obstacles that will affect the success of the 

programs. These obstacles include a lack of dedicated personnel for use in 

creating new mentor teams to support focused development of police 

districts. Without dedicated personnel resources, the FDD program’s 

ability to achieve its goals is in jeopardy because it must compete with an 

expanding Afghan National Army training program. In addition, the 

Departments of Defense and State have not overcome the resistance of 

ANP regional commanders who are not cooperating with efforts to 

validate almost 29,400 names registered to receive ANP identification 

cards. The United States, Afghanistan, and the international community 

need a validated database of ANP personnel to help ensure that 

contributions to LOTFA to pay the wages of Afghan police are not being 

used to pay nonexistent or inactive personnel. 

• To help ensure that the FDD program can achieve its goals, we 

recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State undertake a 

coordinated effort to provide dedicated personnel to support the creation 

of additional police mentor teams needed to expand and complete the 

FDD program. 

• To help ensure that the United States does not fund the salaries of 

unverified ANP personnel, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense 

and State consider provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOFTA to 

reflect the extent to which U.S. agencies have validated the status of MOI 

and ANP personnel. 

The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice provided written 

comments on a draft of this report (see apps. V, VI, and VII). In addition, 

Defense provided technical suggestions, which we have incorporated as 

appropriate. 

Defense concurred with our recommendation that Defense and State 

identify and provide dedicated personnel to support the creation of 

additional police mentor teams needed to expand and complete the 

Focused District Development program. Defense stated it is considering 

possible solutions to the shortfall of police mentor teams. The agency 

added that it plans to deploy about 17,000 additional forces to Afghanistan 

and to use some of these forces on police mentoring missions. State noted 

Conclusions 

Recommendations 

for Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 31 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
 

our recommendation and informed us that it is prepared to recruit 

additional civilian police mentors for new police mentor teams. 

State concurred with our recommendation that State and Defense consider 

provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOFTA to reflect the extent to which 

U.S. agencies have validated the status of MOI and ANP personnel. State 

added that U.S. contributions to LOTFA should reflect the extent to which 

MOI and ANP personnel have been validated. Defense did not concur with 

this recommendation. It asserted that the recommendation would unduly 

penalize MOI by significantly reducing police pay and that CSTC-A is working 

with MOI to identify and validate all personnel on the payroll. We disagree 

with Defense’s comment on our recommendation. Given that the ANP 

identification card program has been under way for more than 5 years, we 

believe it is not too soon for Defense to work with State to consider whether 

to link future U.S. contributions to LOTFA to the number of verified ANP 

personnel. Our recommendation, if implemented, could help encourage 

uncooperative ANP commanders to cooperate with U.S.-backed verification 

efforts and help ensure that only legitimate ANP personnel receive wages 

subsidized by the United States. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and to the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice. The 

report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr. 

last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix VIII. 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 32 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of 

Afghanistan (1) restructure the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan 

National Police (ANP), (2) retrain selected ANP units, (3) screen MOI and 

ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP identification and pay 

systems. 

To assess the status of U.S. efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP, we 

reviewed the Department of Defense’s (Defense) Afghan National 

Campaign Plan, a draft joint mentor coordination plan prepared by 

Defense’s Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) 

and the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan, and CSTC-A’s MOI 

Development Plan. We also reviewed briefings from CSTC-A on the MOI 

restructuring program and the mentoring program. In addition, we 

reviewed Department of State (State) documents, including situation 

reports from State contractors in Afghanistan. We supplemented this 

information by meeting with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and State’s bureaus of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and South Central 

Asian Affairs. In Kabul, we met with CSTC-A officials tasked with MOI 

reform, including officials who were mentoring MOI personnel, as well as 

MOI officials. We also observed a weekly MOI restructuring task team 

group that was attended by representatives of CSTC-A and the 

international community. 

To assess the status of U.S. efforts to retrain selected ANP units, we 

reviewed numerous monthly capability assessments for the district police 

units included in the Focused District Development (FDD) program’s first 

round. We also reviewed weekly situation reports submitted over several 

months by State-contracted civilian police mentors in Afghanistan. In 

addition, we reviewed numerous CSTC-A, OSD, and State briefings that 

outlined the program’s goals, objectives, implementation plans, and overall 

status. In addition, we met with agency officials to discuss the progress 

made and the challenges faced by the FDD program. In Washington, D.C., 

we met with JCS, OSD, and State officials. We also spoke with officials at 

the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. In 

Kabul, we met with officials from CSTC-A tasked with implementing the 

FDD program, and visited the CSTC-A Central Training Facility near Kabul 

and the Jalalabad FDD regional training center. In the Chapahar district, 

we visited an ANP operating base to see a police unit that had been 

reinserted into its district after FDD training. 

To assess the status of U.S. efforts to screen MOI and ANP personnel, we 

reviewed documents and briefings obtained from State, the U.S. embassy 

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 34 GAO-09-280 

in Afghanistan, OSD, CSTC-A, and the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA). In addition, we met with U.S. and other officials to discuss the 

screening processes for MOI and ANP personnel. In Washington, D.C., we 

met with officials from Defense, State, and DEA. We also spoke with 

CENTCOM officials located in Tampa, Florida. In Kabul, we met with State 

officials at the U.S. Embassy. We also met with DEA officials to discuss 

an. 

e 

-A, and 

d 

nel 

r 

Any information on foreign law in this report is not a product of original 

ces. 

screening issues pertaining to the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanist

In addition, we spoke with officials at the United Nations Assistanc

Mission to Afghanistan. 

To assess the status of U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP identification 

and pay systems, we reviewed data and documents from the United 

Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), CSTC

State-contracted mentors in Afghanistan. We also met with State 

contractor, CSTC-A, LOTFA, and U.S. Embassy personnel in Kabul. To

determine the reliability of the data we collected concerning the 

identification card and electronic pay systems programs, we compare

data collected from multiple sources to assess their consistency and 

obtained written descriptions from LOTFA and State contractor person

concerning the processes they used to compile and check the data. We 

concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of ou

review. 

analysis but was instead derived from interviews and secondary sour

 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix II: Structure of the Ministry of Appendix II: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police 

Interior and Afghan National Police 

Component Description 

Ministry of Interior Responsible for the enforcement of the rule 

of law. 

Afghan Uniformed Police Assigned to police districts and provincial 

and regional commands; duties include 

patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and 

general policing. 

Afghan Border Police Provides broad law enforcement capability 

at international borders and entry points. 

Afghan National Civil Order Police Specialized police force trained and 

equipped to counter civil unrest and 

lawlessness. 

Criminal Investigative Division Leads investigations of national interest, 

those with international links, and

concerned with organized and white-collar 

crime. 

 those 

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan Law enforcement agency charged with 

reducing narcotics production and 

distribution in Afghanistan. 

Counter Terrorism Police Leads police and law enforcement efforts to 

defeat terrorism and insurgency. 

Source: U.S. Department of Defense. 

Page 35 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the 

Ministry of Interior and Afghan National 

Police 

Deputy Minister

for

Counter Narcotics

Deputy Minister

for

Security

Operations

Chief

Special

Counter 

Narcotics

Units

Regional

and Provincial

Counter 

Narcotics

Chief

Border Police 

Chief

Afghan

National

Civil Order 

Police

Chief

Deputy 

Uniformed

Police Chief

Anticrime

Chief

Special

Operations

Chief

Plans and

Operations

Chief

Intelligence

Chief

Public Guard

Source: Department of Defense.

Minister of Interior

Regional 

Commander 

South

Regional 

Commander 

North

Regional 

Commander

East

Regional 

Commander

West

Regional 

Commander 

Central

Kabul

Regional 

Commander

Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the

Ministry of Interior and Afghan National 

Police 

Page 36 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix IV: M

Rates before and after Pay Reform 

OI and ANP Nonofficer Pay

Page 37 GAO-09-280 

Rank 

Monthly rates 

before pay reform

Monthly rates after 

pay reform 

Percentage 

increase in salary

First sergeant $62 $190 206

Second sergeant 62 170 174

Third sergeant 62 145 134

First patrolman 70 110 57

Second patrolman 70 100 43

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

Appendix IV: MOI and ANP Nonofficer Pay

Rates before and after Pay Reform 

 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department Appendix V: Comments from the Departmen of Defense t 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department Appendix VI: Comments from the of Justice 

Department of Justice 

Page 40 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 41 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VII: Comments from the Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 42 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of State 

See comment 1. 

Page 43 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of State 

Page 44 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of State 

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of State’s letter dated 

March 3, 2009. 

1. As noted in our report, we use the term “screening” to include both the 

testing and background checks that were undertaken to accomplish 

the goals of the rank reform effort. 

GAO Comment 

Page 45 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

 addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 

Fen

ma

In

Director), Pierre Toureille, Christopher Banks, Lucia DeMaio, Mattias 

ton, Cindy Gilbert, Mark Dowling, Lynn Cothern, and Jena Sinkfield 

de key contributions to this report. 

Page 46 GAO-09-280 Afghanistan Security 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320570) 
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