Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

HIGH SPEED 

PASSENGER RAIL 

Future Development 

Will Depend on 

Addressing Financial 

and Other Challenges 

and Establishing a 

Clear Federal Role 

March 2009 

GAO-09-317 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

HIGH SPEED PASSENGER RAIL 

Future Development Will Depend on Addressing

Financial and Other Challenges and Establishing a 

Highlights of GAO-09-317, a report to Clear Federal Role 

congressional requesters 

Federal and other decision makers

have had a renewed interest in how

high speed rail might fit into the 

national transportation system and 

address increasing mobility 

constraints on highways and at 

airports due to congestion. GAO

was asked to review (1) the factors

affecting the economic viability—

meaning whether total social

benefits offset or justify total social 

costs—of high speed rail projects,

including difficulties in determining

the economic viability of proposed 

projects; (2) the challenges in

developing and financing high

speed rail systems; and (3) the

federal role in the potential

development of U.S. high speed rail 

systems. GAO reviewed federal 

legislation; interviewed federal, 

state, local, and private sector 

officials, as well as U.S. project 

sponsors; and reviewed high speed 

rail development in France, Japan, 

and Spain. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Transportation

develop a strategic vision of how

high speed passenger rail systems 

fit into the national transportation

system, and develop guidance and 

tools to improve the reliability and 

accuracy of ridership, cost, and

other forecasts for these systems.

The Department of Transportation

(DOT) said it generally agreed with 

the information presented but did 

not take a position on GAO’s 

recommendations. DOT said the

strategic plan required by the 

American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act of 2009 may

include a vision for high speed rail.

Factors affecting the economic viability of high speed rail lines include the 

level of expected riders, costs, and public benefits (i.e., benefits to non-riders 

and the nation as a whole from such things as reduced congestion), which are 

influenced by a line’s corridor and service characteristics. High speed rail 

tends to attract riders in dense, highly populated corridors, especially where 

there is congestion on existing transportation modes. Costs largely hinge on 

the availability of rail right-of-way and on a corridor’s terrain. To stay within 

financial or other constraints, project sponsors typically make trade-offs 

between cost and service characteristics. While some U.S. corridors have 

characteristics that suggest economic viability, uncertainty associated with 

rider and cost estimates and the valuation of public benefits makes it difficult 

to make such determinations on individual proposals. Research on rider and 

cost forecasts has shown they are often optimistic, and the extent that U.S. 

sponsors quantify and value public benefits varies. 

Once projects are deemed economically viable, project sponsors face the 

challenging tasks of securing the up-front investment for construction costs 

and sustaining public and political support and stakeholder consensus. In the 

three countries GAO visited, the central government generally funded the 

majority of the up-front costs of high speed rail lines. By contrast, federal 

funding for high speed rail has been derived from general revenues, not from 

trust funds or other dedicated funding sources. Consequently, high speed rail 

projects must compete with other nontransportation demands on federal 

funds (e.g., national defense or health care) as opposed to being compared 

with other alternative transportation investments in a corridor. Available 

federal loan programs can support only a fraction of potential high speed rail 

project costs. Without substantial public sector commitment, private sector 

participation is difficult to secure. The challenge of sustaining public support 

and stakeholder consensus is compounded by long project lead times, by 

numerous stakeholders, and by the absence of an established institutional 

framework. 

 

The recently enacted Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008

will likely increase the federal role in the development of high speed rail, as 

will the newly enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In 

the United States, federal involvement with high speed rail to date has been 

limited. The national rail plan required by the Passenger Rail Investment and 

Improvement Act of 2008 is an opportunity to identify the vision and goals for 

U.S. high speed rail and how it fits into the national transportation system, an 

exercise that has largely remained incomplete. Accountability can be 

enhanced by tying the specific, measurable goals required by the act to 

performance and accountability measures. In developing analytical tools to 

apply to the act’s project selection criteria, it will be important to address 

optimistic rider and cost forecasts and varied public benefits analyses. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-317. 

For more information, contact Susan Fleming 

at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 8

Economic Viability of High Speed Rail Is Affected by Many 

Corridor and Service Characteristics, but Uncertainties About 

Ridership and Other Estimates Make Viability Determinations 

Difficult 12

High Up-front Costs Are the Main Challenge to High Speed Rail 

Development, and Challenges Also Exist in Sustaining Support 

and Building Consensus 29 

Federal Leadership Has Been Limited, but Following 

Reexamination Principles Can Ensure That the Federal Role Is

Focused on Yielding Maximum Benefits 42 

Conclusions 54

Recommendations for Executive Action 55 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 55 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 59 

Appendix II Description of U.S. Rail Corridors Operating at 

Speeds Greater Than 79 Miles per Hour 64 

Appendix III Description of Current U.S. High Speed Rail 

Proposals in the Environmental Review Phase 69 

Appendix IV Description of Past Projects Florida Overland 

Express and Texas TGV Projects 80 

Appendix V Description of High Speed Rail Systems in France, 

Japan, and Spain 84 

Page i GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix VI Description of Travel Demand Forecasting 89 

Appendix VII Description of the Proposed Los Angeles, California, 

to Las Vegas, Nevada, High Speed Rail Corridor 94 

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 102 

Tables 

Table 1: High Speed Rail Projects in the United States 8 

Table 2: Estimated Construction Costs for Selected High Speed 

Rail Projects in France, Japan, and Spain, by Construction 

Cost Per Mile 23 

Table 3: Estimated Construction Costs for Dedicated Right-of-Way 

High Speed Rail Projects in the United States, by

Construction Cost Per Mile 24 

Table 4: State Funding for California High Speed Rail Authority 40 

Table 5: Timeline of High Speed Rail Development in Florida 81 

Table 6: Timeline of High Speed Rail Development in Texas 83 

Table 7: Summary of Three High Speed Passenger Rail Proposals in 

the Los Angeles to Las Vegas Corridor 95 

Figures 

Figure 1: Population of Cities Along Selected Foreign High Speed 

Rail Lines 13 

Figure 2: Population of Cities Along Selected Current and Proposed

High Speed Rail Lines in the United States 14 

Figure 3: Transportation Mode Share in Japan, by Distance 

Traveled 16

Figure 4: Future Airport Capacity, by 2025, and Selected High

Speed Rail Proposals in the United States 18 

Figure 5: Public and Private Sector Roles in High Speed Rail 

Development and Operation in Japan 36 

Figure 6: Proposed French Public-Private Partnership Contract 

Model 38

Page ii GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Figure 7: High Speed Rail Project Proposals from Los Angeles to 

Las Vegas 99 

Abbreviations 

Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Rail Corporation 

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 

 2009

DOT Department of Transportation 

FDOT Florida Department of Transportation 

FOX Florida Overland Express 

FRA Federal Railroad Administration 

FTA Federal Transit Administration 

I-15 Interstate 15 

maglev magnetic levitation 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 

PRIIA Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 

 2008 

RFF Réseau Ferré de France 

SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

 Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 

SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français 

TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act of the 21st Century 

TGV Train à Grande Vitesse 

THSRA Texas High Speed Rail Authority 

TIFIA Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 

 Innovation Act of 1998 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 19, 2009 

Congressional Requesters

Federal, state, and local decision makers have had a renewed interest in 

looking at how high speed rail might fit into our national transportation 

system and address increasing mobility constraints on the nation’s 

highways and at airports due to congestion. Although the current 

economic downturn has recently reduced the level of highway and air 

travel, projections show that intercity travel will grow again and that 

existing transportation capacity limitations will constrain mobility. The 

Department of Transportation (DOT) estimates that several intercity 

highways linking major urban markets will experience significant 

congestion by 2035. According to a recent report, capacity limitations will 

constrain air traffic at 14 airports in 8 metropolitan areas, even if planned

capacity improvements are carried out through 2025.1

 In addition, the 

dependence of growing highway and air travel on fossil fuels raises 

significant environmental concerns regarding greenhouse gas emissions. 

As a result, transportation decision makers are exploring options that not 

only expand transportation capacity and relieve increasing congestion but

also minimize the deleterious environmental impacts of increasing 

highway and air travel. The average intercity passenger train can produce 

significantly less emissions than other transportation modes. 

The National Railroad Passenger Rail Corporation (Amtrak), the nation’s 

intercity passenger rail provider, has seen nearly a 20 percent increase in 

riders in the last 2 years, in part because service enhancements in some 

intercity corridors have improved overall travel time and reliability, 

making the train more competitive with highway and air travel. Still, 

Amtrak does not offer service in many heavily traveled intercity corridors. 

Moreover, Amtrak’s service continues to have slow average speeds relative 

to other transport modes, and experiences significant delays, often 

resulting from sharing track with commuter and freight rail. Proposals for 

investment in high speed rail in the United States have existed for decades. 

However, corridor service that exceeds Amtrak’s predominant top speed 

of 79 miles per hour currently only exists on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor 

High Speed Passenger Rail

 1

The MITRE Corporation, Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, Capacity

Needs in the National Airspace System (2007-2025), an Analysis of Airports and 

Metropolitan Area Demand and Operational Capacity in the Future (May 2007). 

Page 1 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

between Boston, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., and in a few other 

corridors—including New York City, New York, to Albany, New York; 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Los Angeles,

California, to San Diego, California—and on a segment of track between

Chicago, Illinois, and Detroit, Michigan.2

 By contrast, countries in Europe 

and Asia have developed extensive rail systems with top speeds exceeding 

150 and even 200 miles per hour, which have attracted relatively high 

numbers of riders compared with other transportation modes. 

As part of a larger effort to reexamine transportation funding and decision 

making in the United States, the National Surface Transportation Policy 

and Revenue Study Commission and its Passenger Rail Working Group 

issued a report that laid out the potential for a new vision of intercity and

high speed rail development in the United States, and that called for an 

initial investment of $5 billion per year.3

 Moreover, in October 2008, 

Congress enacted the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 

2008 (PRIIA), which establishes a program to develop high speed rail 

corridors—authorizing $1.5 billion in funding for project development.4

The recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment of Act of 2009

(ARRA) appropriated $8 billion for high speed rail and intercity passenger 

rail congestion and capital grants (the latter of which were authorized by 

the PRIIA), with priority given to projects that support the development of

high speed rail service.5

 To better understand the role that high speed rail 

service could play in the U.S. transportation system, we were asked to 

assess (1) the factors affecting the economic viability of high speed rail 

projects—that is, whether a project’s total social benefits offset or justify 

the total social costs—and difficulties in determining the economic 

viability of proposed projects; (2) the challenges that U.S. project sponsors 

experience in developing and financing high speed rail projects; and 

(3) the federal role in the potential development of high speed rail 

systems. 

 2

In addition to these corridors, the long-distance route between Chicago, Illinois, and Los 

Angeles, California, operates at 90 miles per hour over portions of its route.

3

“Vision for the Future: U.S. intercity passenger rail network through 2050,” prepared by the

Passenger Rail Working Group for the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue

Study Commission, December 6, 2007. 

4

Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B, title V, § 501(d), 122 Stat. 4907, 4963 (Oct. 16, 2008), codified at

49 U.S.C. § 26106(h). 

5

Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)(ARRA). 

Page 2 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

For the purposes of this report, we use the Federal Railroad 

Administration’s (FRA) definition of high speed ground transportation, 

which is “service that is time-competitive with air and/or automobile travel 

in a given intercity corridor.”6

 This definition does not define high speed 

rail on the basis of a specific speed threshold. As a result, our review 

includes a wide range of projects, including both “incremental” projects, 

which are designed to increase the speed—above 79 miles per hour and up 

to 150 miles per hour—or reliability of rail service on existing track 

usually shared with commuter or freight railroads, and “new” high speed 

rail projects—capable of speeds above 150 miles per hour—which are 

designed to operate on their own tracks or guideway not shared with other 

rail services. Our review is also technology neutral, meaning that we did 

not analyze or consider the technical feasibility of the various rail 

technologies available, such as diesel, electrified trains, or magnetic 

levitation (maglev) trains,7

 but rather we considered only the service and 

performance aspects of these different technologies in the proposals we 

reviewed. 

We obtained information from numerous sources to address our 

objectives. Specifically, we conducted structured interviews with officials 

involved in the planning and operation of the 5 corridor rail lines that 

currently exceed 79 miles per hour, and with project sponsors for 11 

specific corridor projects in the United States that are actively being

pursued and have advanced into the environmental review phase of 

project development. (See app. I for a detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology, and apps. II and III for a detailed description of each project

we reviewed.) The 5 existing projects are all incremental improvements, 

and of the 11 proposed projects, 6 are incremental projects, and 5 are new 

high speed rail projects that would involve new track or guideways. Three 

of the latter projects are considering maglev technology. We structured the 

interviews to determine (1) the most important characteristics and factors 

that affect the project’s viability; (2) the most important challenges faced 

by project sponsors in developing the project; and (3) the roles of various 

 6

See, for example, FRA’s Notice Requesting Expressions of Interest in Implementing a High

Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Corridor, 73 Fed. Reg. 76443 (issued Dec. 16, 2008). 

7

According to FRA, maglev is an advanced transport technology in which magnetic forces 

lift, propel, and guide a vehicle over a specially designed guideway. This technology can 

reduce or eliminate the need for wheels and many other parts, thereby minimizing 

mechanical friction and permitting excellent acceleration, with cruising speeds of about 

300 miles per hour or more. See Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad 

Administration, Costs and Benefits of Magnetic Levitation (Washington, D.C.: 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

federal, state, local, and private sector entities in the development of the 

project. Also, we conducted case studies of 2 high speed rail projects that

had been terminated (the Florida Overland Express and the Texas TGV) as 

well as case studies of high speed rail in France, Japan, and Spain (see 

app. IV for more details on the terminated projects, and app. V for 

information on the high speed rail systems in France, Japan, and Spain). 

We chose the terminated projects to identify the challenges encountered 

by previous attempts to develop high speed rail in the United States, and 

we chose these countries on the basis of their experiences with the 

development and operation of high speed rail service. In addition, we 

reviewed relevant literature on high speed rail systems in these and other

countries as well as information, studies, and reports on domestic high 

speed rail proposals. Lastly, we conducted over 90 interviews with a wide 

range of stakeholders and interested parties, including academics; 

consultants involved in ridership forecasting and planning; representatives 

from private firms that invest in transportation infrastructure; engineers 

involved in developing various rail technologies; state and local 

government agencies and organizations; and officials at Amtrak, FRA, the

Surface Transportation Board, and other federal agencies involved in the 

domestic projects we reviewed. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Factors affecting the economic viability of high speed rail lines include 

expected ridership levels, construction and operating costs, and public 

benefits (i.e., benefits to nonriders and to the nation as a whole) due, for 

example, to reduced congestion. While some U.S. corridors have 

characteristics that suggest potential economic viability, decision makers 

have faced difficulties in ascertaining whether a specific proposed high 

speed rail line will be viable, due to the uncertainties of ridership 

forecasts, cost estimates, and public benefits proposed by project 

sponsors. In the United States or elsewhere, high speed rail tends to 

attract riders in corridors with high population and density, especially 

where congestion on existing transportation modes prevails. Service 

characteristics of a high speed rail line relative to other travel 

alternatives—such as trip time, frequency of service, reliability, and 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

safety—are also critical factors. High speed rail lines incur high up-front 

costs, whether built on dedicated right-of-way or as incremental 

improvements to existing right-of-way. Corridors where right-of-way is 

available for rail purposes and are relatively flat with straight track 

alignments can help lower costs. To stay within financial or other 

constraints, project sponsors must typically trade-off some level of 

ridership to reduce costs. For example, most domestic projects currently 

under consideration are incremental projects on track shared with freight 

operators—a choice that limits the travel time competitiveness and 

reliability valued by riders that would be possible on more expensive, 

dedicated track. Research on ridership and cost forecasts for 

transportation projects has shown that such forecasts are often 

significantly optimistic, and different ridership forecasting methods may 

yield diverse, and therefore uncertain, results. While all U.S. sponsors 

cited a variety of public benefits that would flow from their projects, such 

as congestion relief or environmental benefits, the extent to which 

benefits have been quantified and valued varied across projects. 

Once projects are deemed economically viable, project sponsors 

encounter several other challenges—most notably, securing the up-front

investment necessary to fund the substantial construction costs as well as 

sustaining public and political support and obtaining stakeholder 

consensus. In each of the three countries we visited, the central 

government paid the up-front construction costs of their country’s high 

speed rail lines, and did so with no expectation that its investment would 

be recouped through ticket revenues. Federal funding for rail in general, 

and high speed rail in particular, has largely been derived from general 

revenues, as opposed to trust funds or other dedicated federal funding 

sources, such as those that fund other transportation modes. 

Consequently, high speed rail projects must compete with other 

nontransportation demands on federal funds, such as national defense, 

education, or health care, as opposed to being compared with other 

alternative transportation investments or policies in a corridor. Alternative 

federal funding sources, such as authorized under the Transportation 

Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA), are available,

but in their present form can support no more than a small fraction of 

potential high speed rail project costs. State funding is also limited since 

few states have dedicated funding sources for passenger rail, and general 

revenues can be limited. Private sector participation is also difficult to 

secure without a substantial public sector commitment—both financial

and political. The financial and ridership risks associated with high speed 

rail projects can also deter private entities from investing. Sustaining 

public and political support for high speed rail development is also 

Page 5 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

challenging, particularly since uncertainties regarding ridership forecasts 

and cost estimates can undermine confidence in the benefits claimed for 

proposed projects. Long project lead times compound the difficulty in 

sustaining political support, which typically must extend over several 

electoral cycles. In addition, project sponsors must coordinate project 

decisions among numerous stakeholders and across jurisdictional 

boundaries—a difficult task, especially in the absence of an established 

institutional framework. 

Although in the United States the federal government has not historically 

exercised a strong leadership role in the development of high speed rail, 

the recently enacted PRIIA will likely increase the federal role. Following 

key principles we have developed for reexamining surface transportation 

programs would help ensure that implementation of the PRIIA and a 

possible heightened federal role is both efficient and effective. For 

example, there is currently no federal high speed rail policy. The national

rail plan required by the PRIIA provides an opportunity to identify the 

vision and goals for U.S. high speed rail and how high speed rail might fit 

into the national transportation system, as well as to identify the 

appropriate federal role in achieving the established goals. There has been

little effort previously to identify the role of high speed rail, and the 

national rail plan required by the PRIIA does not explicitly include high 

speed rail, although it must be consistent with state rail plans that are to, 

among other things, include a review of proposed high speed rail lines. In 

the countries we visited, we found that national rail plans have proven 

instrumental in guiding high speed rail development. In addition, the PRIIA 

specifies criteria for selecting high speed rail corridors and projects for 

development. The act also requires FRA to develop a schedule for 

achieving specific, measurable goals related to such things as the 

development of a national rail plan and to assess progress against these 

goals. We have previously reported on the importance of incorporating 

performance and accountability for results to help target resources to 

programs that best achieve intended outcomes and national transportation 

priorities. FRA has not yet determined how performance and 

accountability will be incorporated into the review and evaluation of grant 

applications. Accountability can be enhanced by tying the specific, 

measurable goals required by the PRIIA to performance and accountability 

measures. Furthermore, as FRA develops analytical tools and approaches 

to apply the project selection criteria, it will be important to address such 

things as optimistic ridership and cost forecasts. Obtaining forecasts from 

independent sources and subjecting forecasts to peer review are among 

the ways to potentially increase the reliability of these forecasts. Ensuring

the fiscal sustainability of high speed rail projects, both while projects are 

Page 6 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

being planned and constructed, as well as once they become operational, 

will also be important. The project selection criteria contained in the 

PRIIA will help in efforts to ensure the short- and long-term fiscal 

sustainability of federal investments in high speed rail projects. FRA is 

currently in the process of evaluating the PRIIA and preparing final rules 

for how high speed rail projects will be reviewed and selected for federal 

funding under provisions of the act.

To ensure effective implementation of the provisions of the PRIIA that 

relate to high speed passenger rail, we are recommending that the 

Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with Congress and other 

stakeholders, develop a written strategic vision for high speed rail, 

particularly in relation to the role that high speed rail can play in the

national transportation system, clearly identifying potential objectives and 

goals for high speed rail systems and the roles that federal and other 

stakeholders should play in achieving each objective and goal. We also 

recommend that the Secretary develop specific policies and procedures 

for reviewing and evaluating grant applications under the PRIIA that 

clearly identify the outcomes expected to be achieved through the award 

of grant funds and that include performance and accountability measures. 

Finally, we recommend that the Secretary develop guidance and methods 

for ensuring the reliability of ridership and other forecasts used to 

determine the viability of high speed rail projects and to support the need 

for federal grant assistance. 

We provided copies of our draft report to DOT and Amtrak for comment. 

DOT said that it generally agreed with the information presented and 

noted that with the passage of ARRA, its work on high speed rail has been 

considerably accelerated. Specifically, the act calls for FRA to submit, 

within an expedited time frame, a strategic plan to the Congress describing 

how FRA will use the $8 billion funding identified in the act to improve 

and deploy high speed passenger rail systems. DOT indicated that the 

strategic plan may include the Department’s vision for developing high 

speed rail services, criteria for selecting projects, an evaluation process 

that will be used to measure effectiveness, and a discussion of the 

relationship between the ARRA grant programs and the recently enacted 

PRIIA. DOT said it is also working to comply with statutory requirements 

to issue interim guidance in June 2009, describing grant terms, conditions 

and procedures. DOT told us that in order to provide information to the 

public and potential grantees as expeditiously as possible, it has already 

posted a set of questions and answers relating to ARRA on its Web site. 

Finally, DOT noted that the draft report does not include information 

relating to the administration’s new federal commitment to high speed rail. 

Page 7 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Specifically, as described in the President’s proposed fiscal year 2010 

budget, the administration has proposed a 5-year $5 billion high-speed rail 

state grant program. DOT indicated that this program is intended to build 

on the $8 billion included in ARRA for high speed rail and marks a new 

federal commitment to practical and environmentally sustainable 

transportation. DOT did not take a position on our recommendations. 

Amtrak said it generally agreed with our conclusions and also did not take 

a position on our recommendations. Amtrak provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

Five corridor rail lines currently exceed Amtrak’s predominant top speed

of 79 miles per hour in the United States. Proposals for high speed rail 

projects in 44 other specific corridors are at some stage of planning and 

development. Eleven of these projects have advanced into the 

environmental review phase (see table 1). 

Background 

Table 1: High Speed Rail Projects in the United States 

Corridor

Number 

of miles

Proposed type of 

improvement 

and technology to be

used

Current top speed

of existing rail 

services (miles 

per hour)

Rail corridors in current operation above 79 miles per houra

Los Angeles, California – San Diego, California 130 Incremental/Diesel 90

New York, New York – Albany/Schenectady, New York 158 Incremental/Diesel 110

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania – Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 104 Incremental/Electric 110

Boston, Massachusetts – New York, New York – Washington, D.C. 458 Incremental/Electric 150

Chicago, Illinois – Detroit/Pontiac, Michigan 304 Incremental/Diesel 95

High speed rail projects in the environmental review process 

Los Angeles, California – San Francisco, Californiab520 New/Electric 79c

Anaheim, California – Las Vegas, Nevada 269 New/Maglev No service

Victorville, California – Las Vegas, Nevada 183 New/Electric or diesel No service

Eugene, Oregon – Portland, Oregon – Vancouver, Canada 310 Incremental/Diesel 79

New York, New York – Scranton, Pennsylvania 133 Incremental/Diesel No service

Chicago, Illinois – St. Louis, Missouri 284 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota 441 Incremental/Diesel 79

Baltimore, Maryland – Washington, D.C. 40 New/Maglev 110d

Atlanta, Georgia – Chattanooga, Tennessee 251 New/Maglev or electric No service

Washington, D.C. – Charlotte, North Carolina 452 Incremental/Diesel 79

Richmond, Virginia – Hampton Roads, Virginia 108 Incremental/Diesel 79

Page 8 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Corridor

Number 

of miles

Proposed type of 

improvement 

and technology to be

used

Current top speed

of existing rail 

services (miles 

per hour)

High speed rail projects being planned that have yet to move into the environmental review process 

Phoenix, Arizona – Tucson, Arizona 119 Incremental/Diesel No service

Bay area, California – Los Angeles, California (Coastal) 476 Incremental/Diesel 79c

San Jose, California – Sacramento, California 137 Incremental/Diesel 79

Jacksonville, Florida – Orlando, Florida 140 Not specified 79

Orlando, Florida – Miami, Florida 235 Not specified 79

Tampa, Florida – Orlando, Florida 92 Not specified 79

Casper, Wyoming – Denver, Colorado – Albuquerque, New Mexico 788 Incremental/Diesel No service

Atlanta, Georgia – New Orleans, Louisiana 518 Incremental/Diesel 79

Houston, Texas – New Orleans, Louisiana 350 Incremental/Diesel 79

New Orleans, Louisiana – Mobile, Alabama 141 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Carbondale, Illinois 309 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Cincinnati, Ohio 304 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Cleveland, Ohio 373 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Grand Rapids/Holland, Michigan 212 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Green Bay, Wisconsin 217 Incremental/Diesel No servicee

Chicago, Illinois – Omaha, Nebraska 476 Incremental/Diesel 79

Chicago, Illinois – Port Huron, Michigan 319 Incremental/Diesel 95f

Chicago, Illinois – Quincy, Illinois 258 Incremental/Diesel 79

Indianapolis, Indiana – Louisville, Kentucky 111 Incremental/Diesel No service

Kansas City, Missouri – St. Louis, Missouri 283 Incremental/Diesel 79

Twin Cities, Minnesota – Duluth, Minnesota 154 Incremental/Diesel No service

Boston, Massachusetts – Montreal, Canada 330 Incremental/Diesel No serviceg

New Haven, Connecticut – Springfield, Massachusetts 58 Incremental/Diesel 79

Columbus, Ohio – Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 99 Incremental/Diesel No service

Cincinnati, Ohio – Cleveland, Ohio 260 Incremental/Diesel No service

Cleveland, Ohio – Buffalo, New York – Toronto, Canada 294 Incremental/Diesel 79

Cleveland, Ohio – Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 154 Incremental/Diesel 79

Cleveland, Ohio – Toledo, Ohio – Detroit, Michigan 154 Incremental/Diesel No serviceh

Raleigh, North Carolina – Jacksonville, Florida 446 Incremental/Diesel 79

Charlotte, North Carolina – Atlanta, Georgia – Macon, Georgia 346 Incremental/Diesel No servicei

Atlanta, Georgia – Jacksonville, Florida 321 Incremental/Diesel No service

Dallas, Texas – Houston, Texas 280 New/Electric No servicej

Dallas, Texas – San Antonio, Texas 271 New/Electric 79

Source: GAO, based on Joseph P. Schweiterman and Justin Scheidt, “Survey of Current High-Speed Rail Planning Efforts in the United

States,” interviews with project sponsors, and Amtrak schedules. 

Page 9 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

a

All of these lines have plans to improve the speed and reliability of the service. In addition to these 

corridors, the long-distance route between Chicago, Illinois, and Los Angeles, California, operates at 

90 miles per hour over portions of its route. 

b

This represents phase one of this project, starting in Anaheim, California. Phase two envisions 

extensions to Sacramento, California, and San Diego, California. 

c

Service between Los Angeles, California, and San Francisco, California, exists along the coastal 

route as well as along an inland route. The inland route requires a connection by bus between Los 

Angeles, California, and Bakersfield, California. 

d

Current service is part of the Northeast Corridor, and reaches 110 miles per hour on this segment. 

e

Service exists on this corridor from Chicago, Illinois, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, but not between 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Green Bay, Wisconsin. 

f

Current service reaches 95 miles per hour on a segment that is also part of the Chicago, Illinois, to 

Detroit, Michigan, line. 

g

Service is not direct and can only be provided through Albany, New York. Service to Albany can be 

provided through Springfield, Massachusetts. 

h

Rail service exists between Cleveland, Ohio, and Toledo, Ohio, but not between Toledo, Ohio, and

Detroit, Michigan. A bus connection is required between Toledo, Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan. 

i

Service exists between Charlotte, North Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia, but not between Atlanta, 

Georgia, and Macon, Georgia. 

j

Service is not direct, and can only be provided through San Antonio, Texas. 

Financing for the proposed projects has yet to be arranged, with the 

partial exception of the proposed Los Angeles, California, to San 

Francisco, California, system, for which voters recently approved $9.95

billion in bond funding.8

 For those projects that currently operate above 79 

miles per hour, financing came from federal or state sources. Federal 

funding for high speed rail has generally gone to improvements to rail 

service in the Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C., and Boston, 

Massachusetts, and to research and development. Some $3.1 billion has 

been spent by the federal government on the Northeast Corridor since 

1990—about 75 percent of all federal funding identified by FRA as having

been spent for high speed rail over this period. The remaining 25 percent

has primarily gone to research and development purposes related to high 

speed rail. For example, the first foray into high speed rail development 

was in 1965, when Congress provided funding to begin studying high speed

rail technologies.9

 Later, the Magnetic Levitation Deployment Program 

provided funds to begin studying maglev as a new high speed 

transportation technology and to advance a demonstration project in the 

 8

Proposition 1A, Safe, Reliable High-Speed Train Act, approved November 2008. This 

funding represents less than one-third of the total estimated project cost. 

9

High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-220, 79 Stat. 893 (1965). 

Page 10 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

United States.

10 States have also invested in high speed rail in some 

instances. For example, state funding was used to help achieve speeds 

above 79 miles per hour between New York, New York, and Albany, New 

York; Los Angeles, California, and San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois, 

and Detroit, Michigan; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Harrisburg, 

Pennsylvania. 

Several federal agencies have played a role in the planning and 

development of high speed rail projects to date, and others may potentially

be involved as projects progress. FRA has generally been the lead federal

agency—sharing that role with other federal agencies, such as the Surface

Transportation Board—regarding the environmental review process. The 

Surface Transportation Board must give its approval before any new rail

lines can be constructed that connect to the interstate rail network.11 FRA 

also designates corridors as “high speed rail” corridors, and is the agency

responsible for any safety regulations or standards regarding high speed 

rail operations. Safety standards relative to tracks and signaling 

requirements become more stringent as train speeds increase. For 

example, at speeds of 125 miles per hour or higher, highway-rail grade 

crossings must be eliminated, and trains must be equipped with positive 

train control, which will automatically stop a train if the locomotive 

engineer fails to respond to a signal. To operate at speeds above 150 miles 

per hour, FRA requires dedicated track—that is, track that can only be 

used for high speed rail service. No safety regulations currently exist for 

speeds above 200 miles per hour. In addition to FRA and the Surface 

Transportation Board, the Federal Highway Administration and the 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) may play a role if highway or other 

transit right-of-way will be used or if highway or transit funds are to be 

used for some part of a high speed rail project. The Bureau of Land 

Management is responsible for granting rights-of-way on public lands for 

transportation purposes and, thus, would be involved in any new high 

speed rail project that envisions using public lands. Various other agencies 

would be involved in the environmental approval process, including the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Environmental Protection Agency,

among others. 

 10Section 1218 of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century created a National 

Magnetic Levitation Transportation Technology Development Program, Pub. L. No. 

105-178, 112 Stat. 107, 216-219 (1998). 

1149 U.S.C. § 10901. 

Page 11 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Based on our interviews with both domestic project sponsors and foreign 

operators of high speed rail lines, in addition to a literature review, we 

identified many common characteristics that tend to lead to relatively high 

numbers of riders and resulting public benefits and to relatively lower 

costs. High speed rail tends to attract the most riders and resulting public 

benefits in corridors between roughly 100 and 500 miles with existing high

demand for intercity travel. Service characteristics relative to other travel 

alternatives—such as travel time and price competitiveness, high 

frequency, greater reliability, and safety—are also critical in attracting 

riders and producing public benefits. Costs of high speed rail tend to be 

lower in corridors where right-of-way exists that can be used for high 

speed rail purposes, and a relatively flat- and straight-alignment can be 

used. While several U.S. corridors exhibit characteristics that suggest 

potential economic viability, decision makers have faced difficulties in 

ascertaining whether any specific proposed line will be viable due to 

uncertainties in how accurately project sponsors forecast riders and 

estimate costs, and to the lack of agreement and standards regarding how

a project’s public benefits should be valued and assessed. 

Economic Viability of 

High Speed Rail Is 

Affected by Many 

Corridor and Service 

Characteristics, but 

Uncertainties About 

Ridership and Other 

Estimates Make 

Viability 

Determinations 

Difficult 

Numerous Corridor and 

Service Characteristics, 

and Trade-offs between 

Service and Costs, 

Influence a Project’s

Economic Viability 

High levels of demand for intercity travel are needed to justify a new high

speed rail line. (See app. V for a discussion of techniques for forecasting 

demand for intercity travel and riders on high speed rail.) Project sponsors 

identified high levels of population and expected population growth along 

a corridor, and strong business and cultural ties between cities as factors 

that can lead to higher demand for intercity travel. In some corridors, 

riders are expected to come from business travelers and commuters due 

to the strong economic ties between cities along the corridor; while in 

other corridors, a larger number of tourists and leisure travelers comprise 

the expected riders. Officials in Japan expressed the importance of 

connecting several high-population areas along a corridor as a key factor 

in the high number of riders on their system, to effectively serve several

travel markets, including commuters and travelers from cities along the 

corridor. The corridor between Tokyo and Osaka in Japan is unique in that 

it is one of the most populous regions in the world, with multiple urban 

areas of several million inhabitants located along the corridor. This 

corridor attracts the highest number of riders of any high speed rail line in

the world—over 150 million riders annually. In other foreign corridors we 

examined, however, population and densities were not as high, but foreign 

officials indicated that high speed rail revenues in these areas were 

sufficient to cover ongoing operating costs, although not necessarily 

sufficient to recoup the initial investment in the line. Some, but not all of 

the corridors under development in the United States today have 

Page 12 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

population levels similar to corridors in the foreign countries we examined 

(see figs. 1 and 2). 

Figure 1: Population of Cities Along Selected Foreign High Speed Rail Lines

Project Distance (in miles)

0 100 200 300 400 500

Total

distance

Source: GAO analysis of data from domestic project sponsors, foreign transportation officials, the U.S. Census Bureau, and Demographia.

Travel

time

0.3 1.6

Population (in millions)

Population (graphic representation)

City name

Distance between cities

Tokyo - Tokyo - Osaka (Japan)

Madrid Guadalajara Zaragoza Lleida Tarragona Barcelona

4.9 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 3.9

TokyoHachinohe (J chinohe (Japan)

ParisLyon (Fr Lyon (France)

MadridBarcelona(Spain)

Tokyo Yokohama Nagoya Kyoto Osaka

Paris Lyon

10.4 1.3

1.2 2.1 0.3 1.5

Omiya Fukushima Morioka Hachinohe

Tokyo -

Osaka (Japan)

320

miles

368

miles

Madrid Guadalajara Zaragoza Lleida Tarragona Barcelona

4.9 0.5 0.4 0.7 3.9

TokyoHachinohe (Japan)

ParisLyon (France)

MadridBarcelona (Spain)

Tokyo Yokohama Shizuoka Nagoya Kyoto Osaka

34.0

34.0

Paris Lyon

10.4 1.3

0.3 1.0 0.3 0.2

Tokyo/Yokoh Tokyo/Yokohama Omiya Fukushima Sendai Morioka Hachinohe

255

miles

2 hrs.,

25 mins.

2 hrs.,

56 mins.

1 hr.,

57 mins.

2 hrs.,

38 mins. 386

miles

0.7 11.0 18.0

City A City B

Page 13 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Figure 2: Population of Cities Along Selected Current and Proposed High Speed Rail Lines in the United States 

Project Distance (in miles)

0 100 200 300 400 500

Total

distance

Source: GAO analysis of data from domestic project sponsors, foreign transportation officials, the U.S. Census Bureau, and Demographia.

Travel

time

LosAngeles -

San Francisco

Washington, DC - hington, DC -

Boston

ChicagoDetroit/Ponti Detroit/Pontiac

Washington, D.C.- hington, D.C.-

Charlotte

Trenton Trenton

0.4

New York New York

18.8

New

Haven

0.8

New

London

0.3

Providence Providence

1.6

Boston

2.7 4.5

Baltimore ltimore

5.8

Wilmington, DE/ Wilmington, DE/ 

Philadelphia

5.3

Washington

D.C.

Ontario

Victorville Victorville

Barstow Primm

Las Vegas

12.9 4.1 0.1 1.8

Fresno

Chicago Kalamazoo Jackson Detroit Detroit Pontiac

9.5 0.3 0.2 4.5

Washington, D.C. hington, D.C. Richmond Richmond

Petersburg Rocky Mo Rocky Mount Raleigh Greensboro/

High Point High Point

Charlotte

4.2 1.2 0.7 1.7

12.9 0.1 4.2

183-321

milesa

304

miles

452

miles

458

miles

520

miles

Los Angeles/

Anaheim -

San Francisco

Washington, D.C. -

Boston

Los Angeles/

Anaheim -

Las Vegasa

ChicagoDetroit/Pontiac

Washington, D.C.-

Charlotte

Trenton

0.4

New York

18.8

New

Haven

0.8

New

London

0.3

Providence

1.6

Boston

2.7 4.5

Baltimore

5.8

Wilmington, DE/ 

Philadelphia

5.3

Washington,

D.C.

Los Angeles/

Anaheim

Los Angeles/

Anaheim

Ontario

Victorville

Barstow Primm

Las Vegas

12.9 4.1 0.1 1.8

Palo

Alto

Palo

Alto

Los Angeles Los

Angele

Palmdale Bakersfield Visalia Fresno Gilroy San

Jose

San Francisco San

Francisco

Chicago Kalamazoo Jackson Detroit Pontiac

9.5 0.3 0.2 4.5

Washington, D.C. Richmond

Petersburg Rocky Mount Raleigh Greensboro/

High Point

Charlotte

4.2 1.2 0.2 1.0 0.7 1.7

12.9 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.8 4.2

2 hrs., 38 mins.

6 hrs.,

45 mins.

6 hrs. -

7 hrs., 30 mins.

1 hr.,

20 mins.- 5 hrs., 30 mins.

a

3 hrs., 46 mins.

0.3 1.6

Population (in millions)

Population (graphic representation)

City name

Distance between cities

City A City B

Anaheim

a

Several proposals exist in this corridor, with varying attributes and estimated travel times. See 

appendix VII of this report for more information on the various proposals. 

High speed rail also has more potential to attract riders in corridors 

experiencing heavy travel on existing modes of transportation (i.e., 

conventional rail, air, and highways—including automobile and bus) and 

where there is, or is projected to be, congestion and constraints on the 

capacity of existing transportation systems.12 These situations lead to 

demand for an additional transportation alternative, or demand for 

expansion or improvements to existing transport modes. To attract riders

from existing transportation alternatives, a proposed high speed rail line 

 12The initial high speed rail lines in each of the three countries we visited (i.e., Paris-Lyon,

Madrid-Seville, and Tokyo-Osaka) were specifically constructed, in part, to relieve at or 

near capacity conventional rail lines. 

Page 14 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

needs to be time- and price-competitive with the alternatives, and also 

needs to have favorable service characteristics related to frequency, 

reliability, and safety. FRA and others have found that high speed rail

tends to be most time-competitive at distances of up to 500 miles in 

length.

rs of

e

ng

or

,

 

13 Existing high speed rail lines in Japan tend to be most timecompetitive and attain the highest relative levels of service in corrido

roughly similar distances (see fig. 3).14 According to foreign and domestic 

officials with whom we spoke, generally lines significantly shorter than 

100 miles do not compete well with the travel time and convenience of

automobile travel, and lines longer than 500 miles are unable to overcom

the speed advantage of air travel.15 Between 100 and 500 miles, high speed 

rail can often overcome air travel’s speed advantage because of reductions

in access and waiting times. Air travel requires time to get to the airport, 

which can often be located a significant distance from a city center, as 

well as time related to checking baggage, getting through security, waiti

at the terminal, queuing for takeoff, and waiting for baggage upon arrival 

at a destination.16 By contrast, high speed rail service is usually designed to

go from city center to city center, which generally allows for reduced 

access times for most travelers. Some travelers will have destinations

starting points outside of city centers in closer proximity to airports, thus

potentially minimizing or eliminating in some cases the access time 

advantage of high speed rail where high speed rail service does not 

13See DOT/FRA, Costs and Benefits of Magnetic Levitation, ES-6. Also see GAO, Intercity

Passenger Rail: National Policy and Strategies Needed to Maximize Public Benefits from 

Federal Expenditures, GAO-07-15 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006), which finds that 

corridor services are most competitive between 100 and 300 miles; and Ginés De Rus and

Gustavo Nombela, “Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable?” Economics of

Infrastructure and Transport, University of Las Palmas (Spain), April 2005, which finds that

the time savings of high speed rail relative to air are sufficient to offset the greater speed of 

airplanes over trains typically over distances of 120 to 480 miles. 

14In and of itself, a total travel time advantage does not guarantee that a mode is viable, nor 

superior in those terms to some alternative. 

15According to Amtrak officials, some shorter distance routes can be competitive with 

automobile travel (e.g., New York, New York, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has the third

highest Acela Express ridership of any city pair on the Northeast Corridor), depending on 

the level of traffic congestion. 

16As an example, an official with the Department of Aviation for Clark County, Nevada (Las

Vegas), told us that at Las Vegas/McCarran International Airport, it takes passengers about 

35 to 45 minutes to get to their gate from the curb. Upon arrival, a high percentage of

passengers claim a bag once they deplane, which takes an average of 22 minutes. At

nonpeak times, it will take a passenger 15 minutes to get a taxi or onto a bus connection 

and another 15 to 20 minutes to get to their hotel. This results in it taking nearly 1 hour to 

get to the Las Vegas city center once the plane has arrived. 

Page 15 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

connect to airports or other locations preferred by travelers. High sp

rail also generally has less security and waiting time than airports.

eed

e

t a

Figure 3: Transportation Mode Share in Japan, by Distance Traveled

17 On th

foreign high speed rail lines we observed, there was no formal security 

comparable to airport security, and travelers could arrive at a station jus

few minutes prior to departure.18

Share of passenger transportation (percentage)

Traveling distance (in miles)

Airplane

Ship

Automobile

Railway

Source: GAO presentation of Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism data.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

188-313 314-469 470-625 626 or more

In

be time-competitive with air travel and has relieved capacity constraints at

airports. For example, high speed rail in Japan has resulted in eliminating 

France, Japan, Spain, and elsewhere, high speed rail has been shown to 

 17Some stakeholders argue that high speed rail may require additional security that would 

increase these times for high speed rail. 

18Airports in these countries generally have fewer security delays than airports in the

United States. According to Japanese airline officials, air travelers can arrive at Japanese 

airports 15 to 20 minutes prior to a domestic departure. 

Page 16 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

one air route (Tokyo-Nagoya), while several others have lost significant 

market share to high speed rail. With the introduction of the MadridBarcelona high speed rail line in February 2008, air travel between th

cities has dropped an estimated 30 percent (from 5.0 million to 3.5 million 

air passengers), while high speed rail riders increased markedly. In 

France, high speed rail has captured 90 percent of the Paris-Lyon air

market, and Air France officials estimated that for high speed rail trips of

between 2 and 3 hours, high speed rail is likely to capture about 80 percen

of the air-rail market over time. By displacing shorter distance air travel, 

high speed rail has freed up considerable airport capacity in those cities 

for other longer distance flights. However, because high speed rail 

becomes a new competitor with short-distance air travel, airlines ha

some cases actively opposed its development. In the United States, most 

of the 16 high speed rail projects we focused on will connect metropolitan

areas with anticipated capacity constraints at nearby airports (see fig. 4).

e two

-rail

t

ve in

Page 17 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Figure 4: Future Airport Capacity, by 2025, and Selected High Speed Rail Proposals in the United States 

Seattle

SEA

San Franci an Franci n Francisco

SFO

OAK

SFO

OAK

Phoenix Phoenix

PHX

TUS

PHX

TU

Los Angeles Los Angeles

LGB

LAX

SNA

LGB

LAX

NA

San Diego

SAN

LasVegas

LAS

Minneapoli Minneapoli inneapolis

MSP

Chicago

ORD

MDW

ORD

Houston

HOU

IAH SAT

HOU

IAH

Atlanta Atlanta

ATL

Charlotte Charlotte harlotte

CLT

South Florida outh Florida uth Florida

FLL

PBI

New York New York ew York

Philadelphia Philadelphia hiladelphia

WashingtonBaltimore BaltimoreWashington, D.C.-

Baltimore

BOBS

PVD

EWR JFK

PHL

IAD

Metropolitan areas with airports that will need additional capacity in 2025, even after

planned improvements occur (8 metro areas)

Metropolitan areas with airports projected to meet capacity needs in 2025 only if

planned improvements occur (7 metro areas)

Airports projected to need capacity in 2025 even after planned improvements occur (14 airports)

Airports projected to meet capacity needs in 2025 only if planned improvements occur (13 airports)

City

City

ABC

ABC

Proposed high speed rail projects

Sources: FAA (airport capacity, metropolitan capacity); MapArt (base map).

Atlanta, GA, to Chattanooga, TN

Baltimore, MD, to Washington, D.C.

Anaheim, CA, to Las Vegas, NV

Victorville, CA, to Las Vegas, NV

Los Angeles, CA, to San Francisco, CA

Los Angeles, CA, to San Diego, CA

Portland, OR, to Vancouver, Canada

New York, NY, to Albany, NY, to Buffalo, NY

Boston, MA, to New York, NY, to Washington, D.C.

New York, NY, to Scranton, PA 

Philadelphia, PA, to Harrisburg, PA

Chicago, IL, to Detroit/Pontiac, MI

Chicago, IL, to St. Louis, MO

Chicago, IL, to Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN

Washington, D.C., to Charlotte, NC

Richmond, VA, to Hampton Roads, VA

1

1

2

2

3

3

4

5

5

4

6

9

7

6

8

8

9

16

10

11

7

12

12

13

10

14

14

15

13

16

15

Proposed high speed rail projects

LGA

Chatanooga Anaheim

Victorville

Portland

Vancouver, Canada

Albany, NY

Buffalo, NY

Scranton

Harrisburg

11 

Detroit/

Pontiac

St. Louis

Richmond

Hampton Roads

While high speed rail will generally have superior travel times compared 

with automobile or bus travel for trips greater than 100 miles—depending

on the service—it is difficult for a high speed rail service to compete with 

Page 18 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

the low price of bus travel and convenience of automobile travel and,

therefore, is not likely to attract a sufficient number of these travelers to 

have a significant effect on highway congestion and capacity in a corridor.

According to a study on high speed rail ridership forecasting, intercity bus

travel is limited and bus riders care more about price than about time. 

Therefore, to the extent that a new high speed rail line provided time 

savings at somewhat higher cost, the contribution of bus travel to a new 

high speed rail line will be insignificant.19 However, this result depends on 

how the high speed rail service is priced. If the high speed rail service is 

publicly funded, then a legitimate public policy question arises regarding

fare-setting (i.e., whether high speed rail fares should be set to maximize 

revenues or to attract higher numbers of riders from other modes). The 

study also contends that those who travel by car tend to care more about 

price and convenience (e.g., leaving when they choose, bringing additional 

passengers or cargo at no extra cost) and less about trip time. 

The effect on highway congestion of diverting automobile travelers to high

speed rail will vary based on the specific locations and times. For 

example, if high speed rail can divert travelers from making an intercity

trip through a congested highway at peak times, then it may have a 

noticeable effect on traffic. Over the long term, however, whatever trips 

are diverted on a congested corridor to another mode of travel are likely to

be at least partially replaced by other trips, since the reduced congestion 

from diversion makes it easier to travel—a phenomenon known as 

“induced demand.” Nonetheless, given the great number of trips by car, 

the diversion of a small percentage of automobile travelers to high speed

rail could have a significant impact on the number of high speed rail 

riders, and result in benefits arising from increased capacity in the 

transportation system and thus more trips being carried. For example, in 

Japan, a survey on a recently developed high speed rail line showed that 

21 percent of riders on a new high speed rail line diverted from the 

automobile mode. Similarly, in studies conducted for California’s 

proposed statewide high speed rail system, over 40 percent of forecasted 

riders are projected to be diverted from automobile travelers, but the high

speed rail line will only reduce automobile travel by an estimated 7 

percent. 

 19Daniel Brand, Thomas E. Parody, Poh Ser Hsu, and Kevin F. Tierney, “Forecasting HighSpeed Rail Ridership,” Transportation Research Record 1341 (1992), 12-18. 

Page 19 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

In the countries we visited, automobile travel also tends to be significantly 

more expensive than in the United States, resulting from tolls on intercity 

roads and higher gas prices and taxes, which makes high speed rail a more 

cost-competitive option.20 For example, according to Japanese government 

officials, to drive between Tokyo and Osaka—a distance of approximately 

318 miles by automobile—can cost almost $200 each way, including over 

$90 in tolls, and between $70 and $105 in fuel costs, depending on the fuel 

economy of the vehicle (in August 2008, the average price of gasoline in 

Japan was $6.50 per gallon).21 This cost compares with a high speed rail 

fare of about $130 per passenger. By comparison, to travel one-way 

between Los Angeles and San Francisco by automobile, a distance of 432 

miles, will require a $4 toll to cross the Bay Bridge, and roughly $25 to $40 

in fuel costs (on Jan. 27, 2009, the average price of gasoline in California 

was $2.10 per gallon, although at gas prices over $4 per gallon, at which 

they were recently, fuel costs could be over $80 and could rise over the 

long term). This cost compares with an average air fare of about $108, and 

the California High Speed Rail Authority is anticipating a high speed rail 

fare of about half the air fare, or about $60 in this example. 

Another factor that affects the competitiveness of high speed rail relative

to alternative intercity transportation modes is the extent to which it is 

part of an integrated transportation system and adequate transit services 

are available at the destination points for travelers. Foreign officials in 

France, Japan, and Spain pointed to the importance of strong transit 

access to, from, and within downtown areas to attract riders to high speed 

rail. European high speed rail stations are designed to be integrated with 

the urban transportation network, including subways, conventional rail, 

and local buses. In France, high speed rail also connects with airports. In 

Spain, high speed rail generally does not connect to airports. Japanese 

stations are also integrated with transit options, although high speed rail in 

Japan also does not connect to airports. In these countries, rail travelers 

will generally not require an automobile at the end of the rail line to get to 

 20In addition to costs associated with driving, several other factors may also influence 

travelers’ decisions between traveling by automobile or rail. For example, lower carownership rates in an area may make rail a more attractive option, whereas higher carownership rates could predispose travelers to drive rather than travel by train. 

21The level of tolls and taxation is a decision by the government to make automobile travel 

more expensive. It reflects a social commitment to divert some travel away from highways 

and toward other transport modes, such as rail. One might view the tolls and taxes as

either justified or excessive recompense for the use of public roads, depending on one’s

view of the social costs of automobile compared with rail travel. 

Page 20 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

their final destination in metropolitan areas. Most urban transit systems in

the United States are not as well developed as compared with systems in 

France or Japan. For some proposed lines in the United States, travelers 

may need access to an automobile at their destination, potentially making 

travel by high speed rail a less attractive option for those riders. However, 

a number of domestic project sponsors recognize the importance 

associated with designing and constructing their high speed rail systems to 

take advantage of existing transit connections and planned improvements. 

For example, the proposed maglev line between Las Vegas, Nevada, and 

Anaheim, California, is being designed to connect to a new intermodal 

transit terminal being built in Anaheim. In addition, in California, the bond

measure that was recently passed to help fund high speed rail

development allocates $950 million for funding toward connecting rail

transit services. 

Officials in France, Japan, and Spain also attributed their high ridership to 

the reliability and safety of their high speed rail lines, relative to 

alternative modes of transportation. In Japan, the average delay between

Tokyo and Osaka was 30 seconds per train in 2007,22 and, beginning in 

March 2009, up to 13 trains per hour will leave Tokyo for Osaka on any 

given business day. In Spain and France, delays are also minimal, although 

service is less frequent. Between 20 and 36 one-way trains run daily on the

Madrid to Seville, Madrid to Barcelona, and Paris to Lyon lines.23

Regarding safety, there have been no fatalities on Japanese high speed rail 

lines in over 40 years of service, with a similar record in France and Spain. 

By contrast, other transport modes do not have similar records of safety 

reliability, particularly at peak periods, or where capacity constraints 

exist. For example, automobile travel can be significantly delayed by

congestion at peak periods and results in tens of thousands of injuries and 

fatalities per year. Similarly, the U.S. aviation system is prone to significant 

delays. As we recently reported, 2007 represented the second worst year 

 22This is the average delay throughout the year and includes delays caused by typhoons, 

earthquakes, snowfall, heavy rain, and other natural disasters. 

23To ensure on-time performance in Europe and Japan, train operators are given strong 

incentives to stay on-time, including passengers receiving a full ticket price refund in Spain 

if the train is delayed more than 5 minutes, and driver pay deductions in Japan if the train is

delayed more than 1 minute due to human error. 

Page 21 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

on record for flight delays and cancellations, which have been steadily 

increasing since 2002.24

The economic viability of high speed rail is also affected by cost. Costs of 

high speed rail tend to be lower in corridors where right-of-way exists that 

can be used for rail purposes, and a relatively flat- and straight-alignment 

can be used, compared with corridors that require the acquisition of new 

right-of-way, substantial tunneling, or bridges. In addition, tradeoffs are 

often made relative to cost and service characteristics. For example, 

incremental projects on track shared with freight operators may be less 

expensive, but these tracks often cannot achieve the same types of travel 

time-competitiveness or reliability as dedicated track, which is not shared 

with other trains.25 The foreign high speed rail systems we reviewed 

attributed their ability to achieve the time-competitiveness, frequency, 

reliability, and safety, that we have previously described, to operating on 

dedicated track and having no at-grade highway or other crossings. These 

systems cost billions of dollars to construct, although construction cost 

per mile varied substantially (see table 2). In Spain, construction costs 

ranged from $37 million to $53 million per mile, the latter heavily 

influenced by the construction of two tunnels.26 According to Japanese 

transportation officials, construction costs in Japan are typically higher 

because of antiseismic safeguards, high land costs, and the number of 

bridges and tunnels needed to accommodate straight- and level-track 

through Japan’s mountainous terrain. 

 24GAO, National Airspace System: DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely Have a Limited 

Effect on Reducing Delays during Summer 2008 Travel Season, GAO-08-934T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008). 

25Some lines have limited shared track in metropolitan areas. 

26The 18-mile Guadarrama tunnel is the world’s fifth longest tunnel and cost about $1.5

billion to build. 

Page 22 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Table 2: Estimated Construction Costs for Selected High Speed Rail Projects in

France, Japan, and Spain, by Construction Cost Per Mile 

Dollars in millions 

High speed rail 

project

Length (in 

miles) 

Approximate

construction 

cost (per 

route mile)

Estimated 

construction 

cost (in 2008

dollars)a

Construction 

completion date

Europe 

Cordoba – Malaga 

(Spain) 

96 $37 $3,558 December 2007

Madrid – 

Barcelona – 

Figueras (Spain)b

468 39 18,223 February 2008

Paris – Strasbourg 

(France) 

186 42 7,730 June 2007

Madrid – 

Valladolid (Spain) 

111 53 5,894 December 2007

Japan

Yatsushiro – 

Kagoshima 

79 82 6,508 March 2004

Takasaki – 

Nagano 

73 143 10,403 October 1997

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by French, Japanese, and Spanish officials. 

a

The cost figures for different projects are not strictly comparable for a number of reasons including: 

provided data may be calculated according to diverse accounting conventions, outlays for a project 

may be expended at different points in time, and the schedule of such outlays was not available to us. 

Cost estimates are based on different foreign currencies with varying rates of inflation and fluctuating 

exchange rates. Cost data was converted into 2008 dollars to provide a rough approximation of the 

variation in construction costs for different projects in different countries. Also, total construction cost 

does not include the cost of the passenger rail vehicles. The International Union of Railways noted 

that, historically, one high speed rail trainset costs between $32 million and $40 million. 

b

Spanish officials noted that 82 miles of this line are still being planned and constructed. 

Four of the five new domestic projects we reviewed that were planning to

use dedicated track are also expected to cost several billion dollars to 

construct (see table 3). The Baltimore, Maryland, to Washington, D.C., 

project has the highest estimated construction cost per mile, because it

plans to use maglev technology, which is costlier to construct than lines 

using electrified, diesel, or other train technology,27 and to be built along a 

corridor that is densely populated, meaning higher land acquisition costs 

 27While construction costs of maglev systems are higher than other technologies,

proponents of this technology cite reduced ongoing maintenance and operations costs as 

an advantage that should be taken into account. 

Page 23 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

and more costly technical construction. On the other end of the spectrum 

is the Victorville, California (a city 80 miles outside of Los Angeles, 

California), to Las Vegas, Nevada, project. Factors contributing to this 

project’s relatively low estimated cost include the use of electrified or 

diesel train technologies, which operate at lower top speeds (i.e., up to 150 

miles per hour); construction along a relatively flat corridor; and starting 

service in Victorville, instead of Los Angeles proper. These factors allow 

the project to avoid the additional costs of bridges and tunnels through the 

mountain range between the Los Angeles area and Victorville, as well as to 

avoid the costs to build through the densely populated areas entering Los 

Angeles. In addition, because the project is looking to use existing 

highway right-of-way and land owned by the federal government, 

acquisition costs are expected to be lower as compared with developing

new right-of-way on privately owned land.28 However, by starting outside 

of the Los Angeles area, many stakeholders expressed significant 

uncertainty about whether travelers will use the line at the level being 

forecasted. (See app. VII for a more detailed discussion of the Los AngelesLas Vegas corridor.) 

Table 3: Estimated Construction Costs for Dedicated Right-of-Way High Speed Rail Projects in the United States, by

Construction Cost Per Mile

Dollars in millions 

High speed rail project 

Top 

speed

Average

 speed

Length 

(miles)

Approximate

construction 

cost (per

 route mile)

Estimated 

construction cost

(in 2008 dollars)a

Year costs 

were projected

Victorville, California, to Las 

Vegas, Nevada 150 125 183 $22 $3,990 2003

Anaheim, California, to Las 

Vegas, Nevada 311 150-200 269 48 12,798 2005/2006

Los Angeles, California, to 

San Francisco, California b 220 Not available 520 63 – 65 32,785 – 33,625 2008 

Baltimore, Maryland, to 

Washington, D.C. 250 125 40 132 5,267 2007

Source: GAO, from information provided by project sponsors. 

Note: The Atlanta to Chattanooga dedicated high speed rail project did not have project cost

estimates available. 

 28This project will construct new rail right-of-way to provide service, but this rail right-ofway will primarily be built in existing highway right-of-way. 

Page 24 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

a

The cost figures for different projects are not strictly comparable for a number of reasons including: 

provided data may be calculated according to diverse accounting conventions, outlays for a project 

may be expended at different points in time, and the schedule of such outlays was not available to us. 

Cost data was converted into current dollars to provide a rough approximation of the variation in 

construction costs for the proposed dedicated high speed rail projects. 

b

Only includes phase 1 of project and does not include phase 2 extensions of project to San Diego 

and Sacramento.

Incremental projects tend to cost less than new dedicated track projects. 

Construction costs per mile for the 6 proposed incremental projects that

we reviewed ranged from $4.1 million to $11.4 million per mile. Top and 

average speeds for the incremental projects, however, ranged from 80 to

110 miles per hour—substantially slower than dedicated track speeds. This 

slower speed could make these projects less competitive with other 

transportation modes and less reliable than dedicated track because of the 

need to share rail lines with other passenger and freight operations. 

Uncertainty Regarding 

Forecasts of Riders and 

Costs, and How Public 

Benefits Are Quantified 

and Valued Make 

Determinations of a 

Specific Project’s 

Economic Viability 

Difficult 

While several U.S. corridors exhibit characteristics that suggest potential

economic viability, determining whether any specific proposed line will be 

viable has proven to be difficult for decision makers. This difficulty is due 

to uncertainties with the forecasts of riders and cost estimates that project 

sponsors produce, the lack of agreement and standards regarding how a 

project’s public benefits should be valued and quantified, and the lack of 

comparison with alternative investments in highway or air infrastructure. 

Rider forecasts and cost estimates are inherently uncertain and subject to 

some degree of inaccuracy simply because they are trying to predict future 

circumstances. However, analyses and research on the accuracy of rider 

forecasts and cost estimates for rail infrastructure projects have found

that a systematic problem and incentive to be optimistic may exist—that 

is, actual riders are more likely to be lower than forecasted, while actual 

costs are more likely to be higher than estimated. For example, a study of 

over 250 transportation infrastructure projects in Europe, North America, 

and elsewhere, found that rail projects—while not all high speed—had the 

Uncertainty and Inaccuracy in 

Forecasts of Riders and Costs 

Page 25 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

highest cost escalation out of all the transportation modes studied—

averaging 45 percent higher than estimated.29 Another study that included

27 rail projects, 1 of which was a high speed rail project, from around the 

world found that rider forecasts for over 90 percent of the rail projects 

studied were overestimated, and 67 percent were overestimated by more 

than two-thirds.30

Numerous techniques are available in travel demand modeling31 (a 

common tool for forecasting riders) and, thus, different models for the 

same proposed project could have diverse results. A modeler usually 

makes choices on the theory and assumptions upon which the model is 

based, the mathematical form of the model, and the variables to be 

included. For example, a modeler may design a survey to determine how 

travelers would react to a new transportation mode, but there is a risk that 

the design or implementation of that survey could lead to biased survey 

results. Survey instruments can be scrutinized by third parties, but the 

process of data collection is less accessible to outside observers, 

especially after the fact. Furthermore, decisions on how to handle data

within a model may enable the analyst to steer the result in a preferred 

direction. For an external, disinterested reviewer, the evolution of such 

decisions is very difficult to trace. (See app. VI for more details on travel 

demand forecasting and modeling.) 

While most project sponsors in the United States cited a variety of public 

“external” benefits, such as congestion relief or environmental benefits 

that would flow from their projects, the extent to which benefits had been 

quantified and valued varied across projects. For the 16 domestic projects 

Lack of Consistency or

Standards, and Difficulty in 

Valuing Public Benefits 

Relative to Modal Alternatives 

 29Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm, and Soren L. Buhl, “Underestimating Costs in 

Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?,” Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 

68, no. 3 (2002). Fifty-eight of the total 258 transportation infrastructure projects studied 

were rail projects. 

30Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm, and Soren L. Buhl, “Inaccuracy in Traffic 

Forecasts,” Transport Reviews, vol. 26, no. 1 (2006). The study covered a total of 210 

transportation infrastructure projects. 

31In this context, a model is a mathematical equation describing a relationship among a set 

of variables. 

Page 26 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

that we reviewed, formal benefit-cost analyses32 have been conducted for 4 

of them33—although many proposed projects have not advanced to the 

stage of conducting in-depth analyses. Of these analyses, none have

formally compared the proposed project with alternative modal 

investments, such as airport or highway expansion, although the proposed

high speed rail line between Los Angeles, California, and San Francisco, 

California, has created a rough comparison of high speed rail investment 

with stated investment needs on the highway and air modes. Even if a 

formal benefit-cost analysis has not been done, public benefits of some 

domestic projects are considered in some ways within the context of the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.34 Under NEPA, the 

weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not 

be displayed in a monetary benefit-cost analysis, but an environmental 

impact statement should at least indicate factors not related to

environmental quality, which are likely to be relevant and important to a 

decision.35

Project sponsors with whom we spoke—domestically and 

internationally—cited several types of public benefits that were significant 

in determining the economic viability of proposed high speed rail lines, 

including: 

 32Benefit-cost analysis is an established method for evaluating infrastructure projects in the

United States. For example, Executive Order 12893 states that expected benefits and costs 

should be quantified and monetized to the maximum extent practicable when evaluating

federal infrastructure investments in the areas of transportation, water resources, energy, 

and environmental protection. Federal spending infrastructure programs include direct

spending and grants. Executive Order 12893, Principles for Federal Infrastructure

Investments, 59 Fed. Reg. 4233 (Jan. 31, 1994). 

33Studies of proposed domestic projects that have been conducted have found the potential

for positive public benefits. For example, a study of the proposed California statewide high 

speed rail project found that the total benefits exceeded costs by more than 2 to 1. See 

Daniel Brand, Mark R. Kiefer, Thomas E. Parody, and Shomik R. Mehndiratta, “Application 

of Benefit-Cost Analysis to the Proposed California High-Speed Rail System,”

Transportation Research Record, no. 1742, Paper 01-2959 (2001). Also see DOT/FRA, High

Speed Ground Transportation for America (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), 7-23

through 7-28, which finds numerous corridors with the potential for positive economic 

benefits. 

34Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 

3540 C.F.R. § 1502.23. 

Page 27 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

• Travel time savings: Travelers using alternative modes may experience

travel time savings as a result of reduced highway traffic and airport use 

by travelers shifting to high speed rail. 

• Environmental benefits: Environmental benefits could result from 

reducing pollution and carbon dioxide emissions, to the extent that the rail 

service reduces congestion on highways or at airports and makes use of 

fuel-efficient technology (i.e., high speed rail service using diesel 

locomotives would provide less environmental benefit than service that is 

electrified, all else being equal). 

• Traffic safety: Benefits from increased traffic safety include reduction in 

traffic accidents, to the extent that the rail service reduces congestion on

highways. 

• Economic development, land use, and employment: A high speed rail 

system that encourages relocation of households and firms, and in cities 

where passenger rail stations are located, could experience growth of 

population and business presence—increasing retail sales, rental income,

and property values. 

Government officials in the countries we studied told us that a national

policy decision had been made that the public benefits flowing from high 

speed rail are sufficient to justify some amount of public subsidy in high

speed rail systems. In other words, passenger fare revenues are not 

necessarily expected to cover the full cost of constructing, operating, and 

maintaining the system. For example, in Japan, government officials told 

us that the construction of a new high speed rail line will be built only if 

certain criteria are met, including stable public subsidies, profitability of 

the operator, and a positive benefit-cost ratio. In Spain, one of the goals of

high speed rail is to increase social and territorial cohesion. French 

officials said subsidies depend on the line—core lines like Paris-Lyon can

cover construction costs from passenger fares. 

Quantifying public benefits can be difficult, however, and the level at 

which to value some benefits can be subject to disagreement. 

Furthermore, there are currently multiple federal guidelines in the United

States for valuing public benefits, yet none have been designated for use in

analyzing proposed high speed rail projects. For example, high speed rail 

service that reduces congestion on highways or at airports and makes use 

of fuel-efficient technology may provide an environmental benefit (i.e., 

reduced pollution and greenhouse gas emissions). However, the value to 

assign to the reduction of pollution and greenhouse gas reductions is 

Page 28 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

difficult to determine, since there is no current market for pollution 

reduction in the United States.36 Thus, the valuation of pollution

reduction—defined as the public’s willingness to pay—is generally left to

economists to estimate by indirect methods. The valuation of greenhouse 

gas reductions entails additional considerations that are based on 

uncertain future benefits. Other intangible benefits, such as economic 

development impacts, are also difficult to estimate and are subject to 

disagreement. Officials in Japan told us that, although they previously 

calculated regional economic development benefits and included them in 

high speed rail decision making, they abandoned the practice because it 

was too difficult to isolate the impacts and because they believe that 

benefits accrued through revenues and passenger benefits alone are 

sufficient to meet their criteria for constructing new high speed rail lines. 

Moreover, while benefits such as improvements in economic development 

and employment may represent real benefits for the jurisdictions in which 

a new high speed rail service is located, from another jurisdiction’s 

perspective or from a national view they may represent a transfer or 

relocation of benefits. 

Once domestic projects are deemed to be economically viable, efforts to 

develop those projects will continue to encounter significant challenges in 

financing the high up-front construction and other costs. In addition, 

sustaining public and political support for project development will also 

be a challenge. Uncertainties regarding rider forecasts and cost estimates 

can undermine confidence in whether projects will actually produce 

claimed benefits. Project sponsors must also sustain political support over 

several electoral cycles and coordinate project decisions among numerous 

stakeholders in different jurisdictions, typically without the benefit of an

established institutional framework. 

High Up-front Costs 

Are the Main 

Challenge to High 

Speed Rail 

Development, and 

Challenges Also Exist 

in Sustaining Support 

and Building 

Consensus 

 36Efforts are under way to organize “cap-and-trade” markets for emission rights, but

currently participation in such arrangements is voluntary. 

Page 29 GAO-09-317 
 

Once economic viability is determined, the main challenge is securing the 

investment necessary to fund the substantial up-front capital costs, such 

as those incurred for planning and preliminary engineering, building the 

infrastructure, and acquiring train equipment. In addition, high speed rail 

projects require a very long lead time, and the lengthy development 

periods can increase the uncertainty over future costs and benefits, and 

the front-loaded nature of the required spending can increase risk. 

Passenger fares are generally insufficient to finance the capital and 

operating costs of a high speed rail system, and the public “external” 

benefits cannot necessarily be captured in a revenue stream based on 

prices. Therefore, public subsidies are generally required, at least for the 

initial investment. Domestic project sponsors for all of the proposed high 

speed rail projects we reviewed, except one,37 indicated that they have or 

will need some federal funding to develop and construct their projects. 

The PRIIA authorized annual funding—a total of $1.5 billion for fiscal 

years 2009 to 2013—for high speed rail corridor development across the 

entire United States. ARRA appropriated $8 billion for high speed rail and 

intercity passenger rail congestion and capital grants (the latter of which 

were authorized by the PRIIA). However, this funding will not likely be

sufficient to fund large-scale projects.

38 For example, project sponsors for 

the proposed high speed rail line between Los Angeles, California, and San 

Francisco, California, are anticipating $12 billion to $16 billion in federal 

funding alone, and, according to the California High Speed Rail Authority, 

total project costs are expected to exceed $40 billion if the entire system is 

constructed.

Federal funding that has historically been made available for high speed

rail has been derived from general revenues, rather than a dedicated 

funding source. Consequently, high speed rail projects must compete with 

other nontransportation demands on federal funds, such as national 

defense, education, or health care, as opposed to being compared with 

other alternative transportation investments or policies in a corridor. By 

contrast, other transportation modes are funded through federal 

programs—such as federal-aid highways, the FTA’s New Starts Program, 

and the federal Airport Improvement Program—which benefit from 

(1) dedicated funding sources based on receipts from user fees and taxes, 

(2) a format for allocating funds to states, and (3) in some cases, a 

Substantial Up-front 

Investment Requirements 

Far Exceed Limited 

Available Public Funding 

 37The proposed project between Victorville, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada, proposed by 

Desert Xpress Enterprises, expects to be financed solely with private funds. 

38Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 501(d). 

Page 30 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

structure for identifying projects to be funded. As we have previously 

reported, comparison of alternative investments in other transport modes, 

such as high speed rail, generally does not occur when decision makers 

are evaluating projects or applying for funding from any of these 

programs.39

Given the lack of dedicated federal grant funding currently available for 

high speed rail projects, project sponsors are exploring other federal 

financing mechanisms for high speed rail projects, such as federal loan

programs. Available federal loan programs, however, may be limited in 

their ability to help fund the substantial cost of high speed rail projects or 

the number of projects competing for federal loans. Two project sponsors 

told us that they plan to apply (and one project sponsor indicated it did 

not plan to apply, but elements of its project would be eligible) for credit 

under the TIFIA program, which offers credit assistance to surface 

transportation projects.40 According to TIFIA documents, the $122 million 

authorized by Congress annually for the program provides over $2 billion 

in credit assistance.41 Sponsors of high speed rail projects could request 

that amount or more for one loan, thereby constraining TIFIA’s ability to 

fund other projects in the same year, as we noted when analyzing the 

Florida Overland Express (FOX) project in 1999.

42 There may be other 

challenges as well. For example, because TIFIA assistance cannot exceed

33 percent of a project’s construction costs, project sponsors must secure 

other sources of funding to construct a project, which has proven 

difficult.43 In addition, the availability of TIFIA funds, or other federal 

funding, may be questionable since the federal government faces 

 39GAO, Highway and Transit Investments: Options for Improving Information on 

Projects’ Benefits and Costs and Increasing Accountability for Results, GAO-05-172 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2005). 

40TIFIA authorizes DOT to provide credit assistance for projects of national significance. As

of February 2008, the Federal Highway Administration had approved 15 TIFIA projects 

totaling over $4.3 billion, with individual TIFIA direct loans and loan guarantees ranging 

from $42.0 million to $916.8 million. Project sponsors did not indicate why they plan to use

TIFIA in lieu of other debt-financing mechanisms. 

41TIFIA Program Guide (January 2007), 1-2. 

42GAO, Surface Transportation: High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States, 

GAO/RCED-99-44 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 1999). 

43See 49 C.F.R. § 80.5. 

Page 31 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

significant future fiscal challenges, as we have noted in recent reports.44

Finally, as Amtrak officials suggested, the TIFIA program’s requirement 

that loans and loan guarantees be repaid may be another limitation on the

program’s usefulness in funding high speed rail projects. 

In the countries we visited, the central government generally funds the 

majority of up-front costs of their country’s respective high speed rail 

projects, and they do so without the expectation that their investment will 

be recouped through ticket revenues. The public sector’s ability to recover 

its financial investment has varied on the basis of how revenues have 

grown, but transportation officials in Japan and Spain told us that a public

subsidy was generally necessary because ticket revenues are insufficient 

to fully recoup the initial investment. In Japan, while two early lines 

developed in the 1960s and 1970s may have fully repaid the initial 

investment and debt related to their construction, three of the high speed 

rail lines built since the 1987 privatization have been able to recover 10

percent, 52 percent, and 63 percent of their construction costs through 

ticket revenues. Spanish officials told us the original high speed line in

Spain between Madrid and Seville has been profitable on an operating cost

basis but has not covered all of its costs, including the original 

construction costs. A Spanish academic researcher told us that future lines 

might not cover even their operating costs. 

State funding for high speed rail can also be limited by the lack of 

dedicated funding sources and restrictions on the use of gasoline tax 

revenues. None of the project sponsors with whom we spoke obtained

funding from a dedicated source of state funding for high speed rail; one 

project sponsor (i.e., the Virginia Department of Rail and Public

Transportation), however, noted that it had a dedicated rail funding source 

available. Since the two high speed rail projects currently being developed 

in Virginia are still in the planning stages, according to the Virginia 

Department of Rail and Public Transportation, they have not yet sought 

funds from Virginia’s Rail Enhancement Fund, which provides about $25 

million annually for both freight and passenger rail improvements. In 

addition, according to a report by the Brookings Institution, 30 states—

including states where high speed rail projects are proposed, such as 

Minnesota, Nevada, and Pennsylvania—are restricted from spending 

 44GAO, The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: September 2008 Update, GAO-09-94R 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2008). 

Page 32 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

revenues from excise taxes on gasoline, which typically is a state’s main 

source of transportation revenue.45

In lieu of a dedicated source of state funding, some project sponsors have 

sought funding directly through appropriations of state revenue or bond 

measures, which compete with numerous other state budgetary needs. 

New York State Department of Transportation officials said that 

appropriations from general state revenue and bonding measures enabled 

them to fund only incremental improvements along the New York, New 

York, to Albany, New York, corridor, not the major expansions that had 

been planned. The choice of a financing mechanism can have serious 

implications for states and local governments, which as we have 

previously reported, will face broader fiscal challenges over the next 10 

years, because of increasing gaps between receipts and expenditures.46 For 

example, in November 2008, California voters passed a ballot initiative that

would allow the state to issue $9.95 billion in bonds, $9.0 billion of which 

would go toward the construction of a statewide high speed rail system.47

According to information prepared by California, this bond issue, 

including principal and interest, could cost the state general fund about 

$19.4 billion over 30 years. Also, bonding mechanisms may cost more than 

using appropriations of general revenues. For example, we reported that a 

proposal to allow Amtrak to issue up to $12.0 billion in tax credit bonds 

over a 10-year period for capital improvements on designated high speed 

rail corridors and the Northeast Corridor would have cost the U.S. 

Treasury as much as $11.2 billion (in present value terms) in lost tax 

receipts over a 30-year period if states had financed their contribution 

from tax-exempt borrowing and Amtrak had used accumulated losses to 

offset taxable earnings in a trust fund established to repay the bond 

 45Robert Puentes and Ryan Prince, Fueling Transportation Finance: A Primer on the Gas

Tax, Brookings Series on Transportation Reform, Center on Urban and Metropolitan 

Policy, Brookings Institution (March 2003). In some states, excise taxes on gasoline and 

other fuels may be used to fund transit projects, including rail transit. 

46GAO, State And Local Governments: Growing Fiscal Challenges Will Emerge during the

Next 10 Years, GAO-08-317 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008); and, A Call For Stewardship: 

Enhancing the Federal Government’s Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st 

Century Challenges, GAO-08-93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007). 

47Proposition 1A, Safe, Reliable High-Speed Train Bond Act, approved November 2008.

Page 33 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

principal.48 This cost compared with an estimated total cost to the U.S. 

Treasury of between $7.3 billion and $8.2 billion (in present value terms) if 

annual federal appropriations of federal revenues had been used for the 

same purpose. Another possibility are tax-exempt private activity bonds,

which can be used to finance high speed rail facilities. Such bonds were 

formerly restricted to high speed intercity passenger rail facilities that 

operate at speeds in excess of 150 miles per hour and proceeds could not

be used for rolling stock (passenger rail vehicles).49 ARRA modified these 

restrictions to make eligible projects that are “capable of attaining” 

maximum speeds in excess of 150 miles per hour, rather than operating at

such speeds. This modification may increase the number of projects that 

can qualify to use tax-exempt private activity bonds for high speed 

intercity passenger rail facilities.50

Both current and former domestic high speed rail project sponsors have 

sought private financing but found it difficult to obtain private sector buyin, given the significant financial risks high speed rail projects pose. In 

February 2008, we reported that public-private partnerships can provide 

potential benefits, such as transferring some risk from the public to the 

private sector, and an increased potential for operational efficiencies. The 

level of private sector involvement anticipated by some domestic high 

speed rail projects is unprecedented, particularly given the limited private 

Attracting Private Capital 

Is Also a Challenge, 

Particularly When the 

Public Sector Does Not 

Assume Substantial

Financial Risk 

 48GAO, The High-Speed Rail Investment Act of 2001 (S. 250), GAO-01-756R (Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2001). Under the proposal, bondholders would have received tax credits 

instead of interest payments, and the principal would have been repaid from a trust fund 

established for that purpose. 

49Tax-exempt private activity bonds are used for purposes such as transportation and water

infrastructure, including high speed rail facilities. Tax-exempt means that the interest paid 

to bondholders is generally not included in the gross income of bondholders for federal

income tax purposes. Private activity bonds allow tax-exempt debt to be used by private 

entities to help finance qualified facilities. Private activity bonds used for governmentowned high speed intercity facilities are not subject to state volume caps—that is, a

maximum amount of tax-exempt bonds that can be issued during a calendar year.

However, 25 percent of private activity bonds used for privately owned high speed intercity 

facilities are subject to state volume caps. In both cases, for a government-owned high 

speed intercity rail facility or a privately owned high speed intercity rail facility, a 

government entity must approve the private activity bonds. 

50See ARRA § 1504. AARA also provides a temporary modification of alternative minimum 

tax limitations for such bonds. See § 1503. 

Page 34 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

sector involvement with operating domestic high speed rail to date.51 For 

example, the California High Speed Rail Authority is looking to the private 

sector to provide between $6.5 billion and $7.5 billion of the total cost to 

finance, construct, operate, and maintain the first phase of its statewide 

system. 

Private sector firms have expressed interest in high speed rail projects, but 

the firms with which we spoke noted that without public sector 

commitment—both financial and political— private sector involvement 

and financing would be limited, due to the financial and ridership risks of 

such projects. A good illustration of the domestic relationship between the 

public and private sectors in high speed rail is the FOX project. The 

private sector’s willingness to finance a portion of that project’s 

construction costs was predicated on an understanding that Florida would 

cover costs that could not be recouped through ticket revenues. Although

the state agreed to provide $70 million annually over a 40-year period to 

support the project, it was terminated when this support was withdrawn. 

(See app. IV for more detail on the FOX project.) Similarly, in California, 

private sector entities have expressed interest in investing in part of the

high speed rail project, but noted that they would need substantial public 

sector commitment to the project before participating. 

Efforts to develop entirely privately financed high speed rail projects in 

the United States have proven unsuccessful to date. According to the 

Texas High Speed Rail Authority, the Texas TGV project, which was 

intended to be a privately financed project in the Texas triangle (HoustonDallas-Fort Worth-San Antonio), was unsuccessful, primarily because one 

of the firms involved in the private consortium encountered financial 

difficulties. (See app. IV for more details on the Texas TGV project.) In 

Florida, an effort to pursue a privately financed high speed rail project 

during the 1980s also failed (before the FOX project). One current project, 

the Desert Xpress project, from Victorville, California, to Las Vegas, 

Nevada, is also seeking to develop an entirely privately financed high 

speed rail line, but as of February 2009, the project had not secured private 

financing.52

 51GAO, Highway Public-Private Partnerships: More Rigorous Up-front Analysis Could 

Better Secure Potential Benefits and Protect the Public Interest, GAO-08-44 (Washington,

D.C.: Feb. 8, 2008). 

52The Desert Xpress project has made progress on its planning and environmental review

studies, but has not yet started right-of-way acquisition or construction. 

Page 35 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Public-private partnerships are one means by which foreign governments 

are seeking to share the financial risks of their expanding high speed rail 

systems. In Japan—where the rail system was privatized in 1987—the 

national government and local governments still assume the financial risk 

of constructing a new high speed rail line, investing two-thirds and onethird of the construction costs, respectively (see fig. 5). With the 

government’s financial commitment, the private railroad operating 

companies undertake the operational risk and rely on ticket revenues to 

cover operating and maintenance costs.53 The railroad operating

companies’ business model, which includes various business ventures and 

nonrail revenue streams, also helps them assume this risk for rail lines 

with relatively low numbers of riders, since these additional revenues may 

be able to cover high speed rail operating losses, if they occur.

Figure 5: Public and Private Sector Roles in High Speed Rail Development and

Operation in Japan

a

According to Japanese officials, track usage fees are set at the break-even level, assuming the rail 

operator’s income is only from ticket revenues. This fee is set for a 30-year period, indirectly providing 

incentives to improve the operational efficiency of the rail operator over time. 

As France and Spain look to expand their high speed rail systems, they are 

exploring private sector participation to, among other reasons, attract 

additional financing, and, in the case of France, tap private sector 

Operations and maintenance

Public entity

Construction

Public subsidies

Local

National government

government

1/3 2/3

Private entity

Construction of high speed rail line

Lease

infrastructure

Track usage

feesa

Source: GAO.

 53DOT officials told us that certain Japanese railroads, including JR Kyushu, JR Hokkaido, 

JR Shikoku, and JR Freight are owned by the Japanese government and that the remote 

island JRs are not profitable enough for privatization. 

Page 36 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

management and technical expertise.54 France is contemplating a publicprivate partnership contract scheme where risks associated with 

financing, designing, building, and maintaining a high speed rail line are 

allocated to the private sector (see fig. 6). Under this scheme, the private

sector essentially would assume the responsibilities of the public 

infrastructure manager,55 put up the initial construction financing, take on 

the projects’ construction cost and schedule risks, and ensure that the 

infrastructure is available to a passenger rail operator for a certain 

percentage of time.56 The line must also be maintained to certain levels to 

ensure safety. The public sector assumes the risk associated with 

operating the rail service, and commits to making fixed annual payments 

to the private sector, as long as the infrastructure is available the 

prescribed percentage of time.57 French officials acknowledged that there 

is currently much uncertainty about how these arrangements will work 

and whether there will be sufficient private sector interest. At the time of 

our visit, France had not implemented a public-private partnership. 

However, a recent call for tenders on the Tours-Bordeaux line raised the 

interest of 3 French contractors. French officials expect this contract to 

close by the end of 2009. Spain was in the process of completing a publicprivate partnership for a line from Figueras to the French border. 

However, this arrangement was used to construct a portion of a high 

speed rail line in the Netherlands, and, according to an official with the 

private sector consortium that constructed this line, if there is a public 

sector commitment, the private sector can make a public-private 

partnership work. 

 54According to French documents, in 2006, a French national law authorized the national 

government and infrastructure manager to develop major national and international rail 

infrastructure projects through public-private partnerships.

55In the early 1990s, Europe adopted a scheme in which rail operations were separated

from rail infrastructure ownership and management. Under this scheme, rail operators pay 

an access fee to use rail infrastructure to provide service. This separation of rail operations 

from rail infrastructure ownership and management is not typically seen in the United 

States. 

56The availability payments begin once the private sector entity makes the rail line available 

to an operator(s) and are calculated on the basis of the percentage of time the line is 

available to the operator(s). The availability payments should cover the cost of financing,

constructing, and maintaining a high speed rail line, while providing a return on

investment. 

57A line might not be available due to such things as routine maintenance or capital 

improvements. 

Page 37 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Figure 6: Proposed French Public-Private Partnership Contract Model 

Private sectora

Responsibilities

• Financing

• Designing

• Building

• Maintaining 

National government,

local government(s),

and European Union 

Responsibilities

• Approves projects

• Enforces laws and

regulations

• Sets policy 

High speed passenger

rail provider

“public entity” 

Responsibilities

• Passenger operations

Responsibilities

• Contracting Authority

• Traffic Management

• Capacity Allocation

• Owner of Rail Network 

Infrastructure manager

“public entity”

Infrastructure

fees

Public

subsidies

Availability

payments

Source: GAO.

Private

financing

Construction of high

speed rail project

a

In countries such as the Netherlands where the contract partnership structure has been 

implemented, the private sector entity was a consortium consisting of construction, engineering, 

management, and financial firms.

Sustaining Public and 

Political Support over 

Lengthy Development 

Process and Reaching 

Multistakeholder 

Consensus Will Also Be 

Challenges 

Additional challenges faced in developing high speed rail projects include

sustaining public and political support over lengthy development timelines 

for high speed rail. As we have previously mentioned, high speed rail 

projects require long lead times. The five new right-of-way rail projects we 

reviewed have been in project development between 4 years and 18 years, 

and on average 13 years. Similarly, in France, transportation ministry 

officials told us that high speed rail projects in their country take about 14 

to 16 years to complete. This time comprises when project planning begins 

to when the project opens for revenue service. A considerable amount of 

this time is for studies and analysis as well as public debate about the 

Page 38 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

merits of a project. Sustaining public support over this length of time can 

be difficult and can have significant impacts on a project. As the 

experience with the FOX project demonstrated, development of high 

speed rail projects can occur over multiple electoral cycles, which not 

only can change the course of project development but can also lead to 

project termination if public and political support is not sustained. For 

example, as we have previously discussed, the Florida DOT had planned to

provide $70 million annually to help construct the FOX project. The 

project began under one gubernatorial administration that supported the 

project. The project was terminated under a different administration that 

did not support the project. Several public and private sector officials we 

spoke with cited the need for someone or some organization to 

“champion” a project over a long period of time. French officials told us it 

is easier to sustain public support for a high speed rail project once it has 

the commitment of the central government. 

There are also challenges associated with the ability to provide 

transparency and confidence in project cost estimates and rider forecasts. 

As we have previously discussed, these estimates and forecasts can often

be inaccurate, which may erode public support for high speed rail. During 

the FOX project, advocacy organizations, state transportation agencies, 

and GAO each questioned the reliability of project cost estimates and rider

forecasts.58 The governor of Florida decided to cancel state funding for the 

project, in part due to the skepticism raised by these organizations. 

Cancellation of state funding led to termination of the project. More 

recently in California, a report by numerous advocacy organizations raised 

similar concerns about the rider forecasts and costs estimates for the 

statewide high speed rail project. Although the public approved nearly a 

$9.95 billion bond to support this project, over time public support could 

erode, along with public funding, if confidence in rider, revenue, and cost 

estimates is lost. 

Reaching consensus on project decisions, such as a rail line’s actual route, 

involves difficult negotiations, which can cause substantial project delays 

and disagreements among stakeholders. Given that high speed rail projects

can span hundreds of miles and sometimes cross multiple states, 

numerous stakeholders and jurisdictions are involved. Stakeholders 

typically include, among others, federal, state, and local governments; the 

private sector; and advocacy organizations. For example, project sponsors 

 58GAO/RCED-99-44. 

Page 39 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

of the Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor (a project from Washington, 

D.C., to Charlotte, North Carolina) noted that some 50 federal, state, and

local government agencies are involved in the project as well as a 214-

member advisory committee. Coordinating on project decisions with these 

stakeholders—each with their own priorities and views—can be difficult, 

particularly without an established institutional framework within which 

this can occur, as exists for other transportation modes. For example, in 

planning highway and transit projects, federal agencies, local transit 

agencies, metropolitan planning organizations, and state transportation 

departments benefit from established procedures for planning and public

involvement.

Development of domestic high speed rail projects may typically be led by 

rail divisions within state DOTs or by high speed rail authorities and 

commissions. These organizations are often limited in terms of 

institutional and financial resources. For example, in the case of the 

California High Speed Rail Authority, funding has fluctuated from a little 

over $1 million per year to a little over $14 million (see table 4) as a result 

of changes in its annual appropriation from the state legislature. The $3.9 

million in state funding for fiscal year 2005-2006 was planned to support 

approximately 4 staff members in developing a $45 billion, 800-mile 

statewide high speed rail system. Rail divisions within state DOTs also 

face similar funding and manpower issues, since there is typically no

dedicated state funding for rail services, as we previously discussed. In 

addition, rail has generally not been a primary focus of state 

transportation plans, which are more focused on highway projects. 

Table 4: State Funding for California High Speed Rail Authority

Dollars in millions (nominal) 

Fiscal year Budget

2004-2005 $1.1

2005-2006 3.9

2006-2007 14.3

2007-2008 1.2

Source: GAO analysis of California budgets. 

Commissions and authorities may face other institutional challenges 

related to their role and authority. For example, a Virginia official told us

that legislation to create a high speed rail authority fails every year it 

comes up for a vote because of concerns that an authority might issue 

bonds and jeopardize the state’s triple A bond rating. In addition, the role 

Page 40 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

of high speed rail authorities is sometimes unclear. According to the final

report of the Texas High Speed Rail Authority, as well as the former 

director of the authority, rail authorities can sometimes be conflicted 

between advocating for a high speed rail project and objectively 

determining whether a system is in the “public convenience and 

necessity.”59

Stakeholder consensus is also a considerable challenge for projects that 

involve incremental improvements for high speed rail service. Nine of the 

11 incremental project sponsors with whom we spoke said that working 

with stakeholders such as Amtrak, commuter railroads, and private freight 

railroads can be difficult and time-consuming since each has its own 

interests. Projects that cross state lines pose additional stakeholder 

challenges, particularly with respect to allocating benefits and costs 

among the states. To address multistate issues, some states have pursued 

interstate compacts and commissions as a means to formalize decision 

making. For example, the Virginia-North Carolina Interstate High Speed 

Rail Compact established a commission to provide project leadership and 

vision and to define roles. However, interstate compacts can be difficult to

implement and involve working out many practical issues, including 

deciding on what type of service to provide, how financial contributions 

will be distributed, and what occurs if and when one or more states do not 

meet their financial or other responsibilities. 

 59Texas High Speed Rail Authority, High Speed Rail in the Rear-View Mirror: A Final 

Report of the Texas High Speed Rail Authority (October 1995). 

Page 41 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

In the United States, the federal government has not historically had a 

strong leadership role in high speed rail. The recently enacted PRIIA 

provides a framework for developing a federal role. ARRA will also likely 

affect the federal role by providing $8 billion for high speed rail. Following 

reexamination principles we have reported on for surface transportation 

programs would help ensure that the implementation of the act, and a 

possible heightened federal role, is efficient, effective, and focused on 

yielding maximum benefits for its investment. 

Federal Leadership 

Has Been Limited, but 

Following 

Reexamination 

Principles Can Ensure 

That the Federal Role 

Is Focused on 

Yielding Maximum 

Benefits

Federal Leadership Has 

Been Limited, but Recent 

Legislation Provides for a 

Potentially Greater Federal 

Role 

Since the 1960s, Congress has authorized various programs dealing with 

high speed ground transportation, including high speed rail, but no federal

vision or national plan for determining the role of high speed rail in the 

U.S. transportation system exists. FRA officials told us that they do not 

have a high speed ground transportation policy, and, as one FRA official 

told us, policies related to high speed rail have varied from one 

administration to another. FRA officials also told us that creating interest 

in promoting high speed rail at the national level has been difficult to 

sustain. 

The recently enacted PRIIA, in addition to authorizing funding, provides 

numerous other opportunities for a greater federal role in high speed rail 

development, as follows: 

• the act requires the Secretary of Transportation to establish and carry out 

a rail cooperative research program that will address, among other things, 

new high speed wheel on rail systems;60

• the FRA Administrator is tasked with the development of a long-range 

national rail plan consistent with approved state rail plans and the rail 

needs of the nation; 

 60Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 306, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24910. 

Page 42 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

• the FRA Administrator is required to support high speed rail development, 

including high speed rail planning;61

• the act explicitly provides a framework for the establishment of a High 

Speed Rail Corridor Development Program, which permits the Secretary 

to make grants to states, groups of states, and others to finance capital 

projects in high speed rail corridors;62

• the act requires the Secretary to issue a request for proposals for the 

financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of high speed 

intercity passenger rail systems operating within high speed rail 

corridors;63 and 

• the Secretary is to study high speed rail routes and establish a process for 

states or groups of states to redesignate or modify designated high speed 

rail corridors.64

High speed rail projects will largely continue to be initiated at the statelevel, but the federal government can be expected to play an increased 

role in funding and assisting in the development of high speed rail 

corridors and projects. 

 61A preliminary national rail plan is to be developed within 1 year after the enactment of the 

PRIIA, Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 307, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 103(j)(2), (3), and (5). 

62For the purposes of this section, “high speed” is defined as intercity passenger rail service 

that could reasonably be expected to reach top speeds of at least 110 miles per hour. 

Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 501(d), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26106(h)(4).

63Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 502(d), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26106 note. The law defines “high 

speed rail corridors” as the Northeast Corridor and those corridors which have been

designated by the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to provisions of the law. The latter 

corridors were designated under laws that predated the PRIIA. The request for proposals

was issued on Dec. 16, 2008. 73 Fed. Reg. 76443 (December 16, 2008). This is just the first 

step in the process. Expressions of interests received will be reviewed by the Secretary and 

possibly by a commission formed by the Secretary. The results of these reviews will be

summarized in one or more reports to Congress, which will make recommendations for 

further action regarding no more than one project concept for each corridor. 

64Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 224(c)(1),(2). The high speed rail corridor studies are to be

submitted to Congress within 1 year after enactment of the PRIIA. 

Page 43 GAO-09-317 
 

A number of principles could help guide the potential federal role in high 

speed rail, particularly as the newly enacted PRIIA and ARRA are 

implemented. These principles will increase the likelihood that the federal 

role in high speed rail is efficient, effective, sustainable, and focused on 

maximizing public benefits. We have discussed such principles in our 

work calling for a reexamination of federal surface transportation 

programs.65 As applied here, the principles would address, going forward, 

the federal interest in developing a high speed intercity passenger rail 

policy, based on high speed rail purpose and relevance, its effectiveness in 

achieving goals and outcomes, its efficiency and targeting, its affordability, 

and its sustainability. These principles are as follows: 

Following Reexamination 

Principles Can Help 

Ensure the Federal Role Is 

Effective and Efficient and 

Focused on Yielding 

Maximum Benefits 

• Create well-defined goals based on identified areas of national interest. 

This would include establishing the expected outcomes related to each 

goal, and the federal role in achieving each goal.

• Incorporate performance and accountability for results into funding 

decisions. 

• Employ the best analytical tools and approaches to emphasize return on 

investment. 

• Ensure fiscal sustainability. This would include consideration of such 

things as whether funding is affordable and stable over the short- and longterm; the extent to which costs and revenues are shared among federal,

state, and local participants; and whether any project fees and taxes are 

aligned with use and benefits. 

Given the current fiscal crisis facing the nation and the pressing needs 

facing the federal government in many areas, it is critical that federal 

dollars are used efficiently and effectively and are focused where they can

produce the greatest benefits. Failure to apply these principles could lead 

to an unfocused federal investment in high speed rail corridors or projects 

and, as a consequence, little impact on the congestion, environmental, 

energy, and other issues that face the U.S. transportation system. 

 65See, for example, GAO, Surface Transportation: Principles Can Guide Efforts to

Restructure and Fund Federal Programs, GAO-08-744T (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2008); 

and Surface Transportation: Restructured Federal Approach Needed for More Focused, 

Performance-Based, and Sustainable Programs, GAO-08-400 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6,

2008). 

Page 44 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

We have previously reported that specific, measurable, achievable, and 

outcome-based goals that are in turn based on identified areas of federal

interest, improve the foundation for allocating federal resources and 

optimizing the results from the investment. Determining the federal 

interest involves examining the relevance and relative priority of 

programs, including high speed rail, in light of 21st century challenges and 

identifying areas of emerging national importance, such as congestion, 

dependence on foreign fuel sources, and the impacts of transportation on

climate change. With the federal interest clearly defined, policymakers can 

clarify the goals for federal involvement (i.e., specific goals could be set on 

the basis of the expected outcomes), and can clearly define the roles of 

federal, state, and local government in working toward each goal. Where 

the federal interest is greatest, the federal government may play a direct 

role in setting priorities and allocating resources, as well as fund a higher 

share of program costs. Conversely, where the federal interest is less 

evident, state and local governments could assume more responsibility. 

To date, there has been little consideration at a national policy level of 

how high speed rail could or should fit into the national transportation 

system and what high speed rail development goals should be. In the 1990s

FRA studied the commercial feasibility of high speed rail and focused on 

the economics of bringing high speed ground transportation (including 

high speed rail) to well-populated groups of cities in the United States. Its 

report identified potential opportunities where high speed rail could 

complement highway or air travel.66 One purpose of the study was to lay 

the groundwork for high speed rail policy in the United States. However, 

according to FRA, this policy was never developed. 

The PRIIA requires the FRA Administrator to prepare a long-range 

national rail plan; preparing that plan will provide an opportunity for the 

federal government to identify the vision and goals of high speed rail for 

the nation and identify how, if at all, high speed rail fits into the national

transportation system.67 Although the act does explicitly require that high 

speed rail be included in the national rail plan, the national rail plan must 

be consistent with state rail plans and, among other things, state rail plans 

are to include a review of all rail lines in a state, including proposed high 

Identify Areas of Federal 

Interest, Create Well-Defined 

Goals, and Establish and Define 

the Federal Role 

 66DOT/FRA, High Speed Ground Transportation for America. 

67Certain provisions of the PRIIA reflect intermodal considerations; for example, FRA’s

high speed rail project selection will be based, in part, on a project’s anticipated ability to 

help relieve air and highway congestion. 

Page 45 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

speed rail lines. National vision and goals, influenced by an intermodal 

perspective, have been key components in the development of high speed 

rail systems and national rail plans in both Europe and Asia. For example, 

in Europe, the vision and goals laid out by the central governments have 

evolved from being focused on reviving an industry (the railroads) and 

addressing transportation capacity constraints, to being focused on 

increasing the role of rail in an intermodal transportation system, making

rail a preferred transport mode in short-distance intercity corridors, and 

using rail to achieve broader environmental, energy, and economic 

development goals. In Japan, after the initial success of the first high speed 

rail line between Tokyo and Osaka, the central government developed a 

national rail master plan that laid out the vision and goals for how the 

system would develop (including making passenger rail competitive with

air travel), where it would extend, and the benefits that were to be 

expected. That master plan has guided high speed rail development ever 

since. 

The development of a vision for high speed rail in the United States may 

need to be coordinated with reexamination of other federal surface 

transportation programs. As we reported, in March 2008, one reason that 

existing federal transportation programs are not effective in addressing 

key challenges, such as increasing highway and airport congestion and 

freight transportation demand, is because federal roles and goals are not 

clear. In addition, we reported that many programs lack links to needs or 

performance, the programs lack the best analytical tools and approaches, 

and there is modal stovepiping at DOT.68

Project sponsors, states, and others with whom we spoke are looking for

federal leadership and funding in creating a structure for high speed rail 

development and in identifying how to achieve the potential benefits that 

these projects may offer. All but 1 of the 11 high speed rail proposals we 

reviewed have a projected need for federal funds in addition to any state, 

local, or other funding they may receive. Aside from funding, project 

sponsors and others are also looking for a stronger federal policy and

programmatic role. For example, officials from 15 of the 16 projects we 

reviewed told us that the federal role should be to set the vision or 

direction for high speed rail in the United States. An official with the 

Florida DOT told us that no high speed rail system would be built in 

Florida or elsewhere in the United States absent a true federal high speed 

 68GAO-08-400. 

Page 46 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

rail program. Private sector officials also told us of the importance of a 

federal role and vision for high speed rail, and that leadership is needed 

from the federal government in providing governance structures for high 

speed rail projects that help to overcome the institutional challenges 

previously described in this report. Other stakeholders similarly 

mentioned the need for a federal role in promoting interagency and 

interstate cooperation, and identified other potential federal roles, such as

setting safety standards, promoting intermodal models of transportation, 

and assisting with right-of-way acquisition. 

As we reported in July 2008, our work has shown that an increased focus 

on performance and accountability for results could help the federal 

government target resources to programs that best achieve intended 

outcomes and national transportation priorities.69 Tracking specific 

outcomes that are clearly linked to program goals can provide a strong 

foundation for holding potential grant recipients responsible for achieving

federal objectives and measuring overall program performance. 

Accountability mechanisms can be incorporated into grants in a variety of 

ways. For example, as we reported in March 2008, grant guidelines can

establish uniform outcome measures for evaluating grantees’ performance 

toward specific goals, and grant agreements can depend in part on the 

grantees’ performance instead of set formulas. Incentive grants or penalty

provisions in transportation grants can also create clear links between 

performance and funding and help hold grantees accountable for 

achieving desired results. 

The PRIIA establishes criteria for the selection of high speed rail corridors 

and high speed rail projects for development.70 The criteria include a 

determination that the proposals are likely to result in a positive impact on

the nation’s transportation system. The Secretary of Transportation will 

select proposals that provide substantial benefits to the public and the 

national transportation system, is cost-effective, offers significant 

advantages over existing services, and meets other relevant factors 

determined by the Secretary. The PRIIA also requires that the FRA 

Administrator develop a schedule for achieving specific, measurable 

performance goals related to such things as the development of a longrange national rail plan, and, beginning in fiscal year 2010, to submit to the 

relevant congressional committees the administration’s performance 

Incorporate Performance and 

Accountability for Results 

 69GAO-08-744T. 

70Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 501(d), 502, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26106. 

Page 47 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

goals, schedule, and a progress assessment.71 FRA has not yet determined 

how performance and accountability will be incorporated into the review 

and evaluation of grant applications under the PRIIA. 

The extent to which other countries we visited used performance and 

accountability measures in their high speed rail systems was limited. In 

France, postproject evaluations of the performance of major transport 

infrastructure projects have been required since 1982. However, a French 

government official told us that most of the current French high speed rail

network was built before this 1982 postproject evaluation requirement 

began to be enforced. Consequently, few postproject evaluations have 

been done, even though this official said some evaluations had been done. 

Government officials in Spain said that economic evaluations of high 

speed lines had been conducted but, in some cases, did not determine the 

government’s choice of lines to develop. Rather, the government chose to

develop lines that would create a high speed network that extends the 

benefits of high speed rail to the whole national territory. Territorial 

criteria have played an important role in the Spanish government’s 

decision to prioritize high speed rail. In Japan, historical postproject 

evaluations have generally not been done. A comparison of actual and

forecasted ridership has been done for recent high speed rail lines and the

estimates have been within 90 percent accuracy. The performance of high

speed rail lines has focused on the accuracy of ridership forecasts, and 

these estimates are an integral part of negotiations between the 

government and private operators for construction of new high speed rail

lines. For example, construction of new lines is carried out by the 

government, but a private operator assumes control over the line and 

assumes all the operating and maintenance responsibilities and ridership 

risk. Under the Japanese rail structure, the private company has an 

incentive—the profit motive—to ensure that the line performs well. We 

discuss Japan’s incentive structure further in the next section on analytical 

tools. 

The effectiveness of any overall federal program design can be increased 

by promoting and facilitating the use of the best analytical tools and 

approaches. We have reported on a number of analytical tools and 

approaches that may be used.72 These include using quantitative analyses 

based on identifying benefits and costs, managing existing transportation 

Employ the Best Analytical 

Tools and Approaches to 

Emphasize Return on 

Investment 

 71Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 307, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 103(k). 

72GAO-08-400. 

Page 48 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

capacity, and developing public-private partnerships. Benefit-cost analysis, 

in particular, is a useful analytical tool for evaluating projects and ensuring

goals are met. Benefit-cost analysis gives transportation decision makers a 

way to identify projects with the greatest net benefits and compare 

alternatives for individual projects. By translating benefits and costs into 

quantitative comparisons to the maximum extent possible, these analyses 

provide a concrete way to link transportation investments to program 

goals. 

The PRIIA specifies various criteria for which high speed rail grant 

proposals will be evaluated to determine federal investment. Specifically, 

project selection is partially dependent on the consideration of the 

project’s anticipated favorable impact on air or highway traffic congestion, 

capacity, and safety. Project selection criteria encourage a project sponsor 

to evaluate public benefits. For example, greater consideration is to be 

given to proposed projects that, among other things, provide 

environmental benefits and positive economic and employment impacts. 

The rail cooperative research program established by the PRIIA will also, 

among other things, include research into developing more accurate

models for evaluating the impact of rail passenger and freight service, 

including the effects on highway and airport and airway congestion, 

environmental quality, and energy consumption. 

Although the PRIIA does not provide explicit guidance for quantifying or

valuing the economic and other impacts specified in the project selection 

criteria, a more established approach to analyzing proposed projects and

quantifying and valuing nonfinancial benefits may emerge, given the 

potential results of the rail cooperative research program and since future 

proposed rail projects may be evaluated within the context of state 

transportation systems and will need to meet specific criteria contained in 

the PRIIA to obtain federal funding. In our view, any approach developed,

to the extent practicable, should conform to Executive Order 12893.73 This 

order directs federal executive departments and agencies with 

infrastructure responsibilities to develop and implement infrastructure 

investment and management plans consistent with the principles in the 

order. A key principle is that infrastructure investments are to be based on

a systematic analysis of expected benefits and costs, including both 

quantitative and qualitative measures reflecting values that are not readily

 73Executive Order 12893, Principles for Federal Infrastructure Investment. 59 Fed. Reg.

4233 (Jan. 31, 1994). 

Page 49 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

quantified. The order also directs that agencies encourage state and local

recipients of federal grants to implement planning and information 

management systems that support the principles articulated in the order.

In creating a more consistent approach, proposed projects may be more 

easily compared with one another, ensuring that public funding is applied

to the projects and corridors with the greatest potential benefits. 

Similarly, the PRIIA requires that consideration be given to projects with 

positive economic and employment impacts, but again does not provide 

explicit guidance on determining what is or is not a positive economic or 

employment impact. As we have previously discussed in this report, 

economic impacts are difficult to isolate, therefore, economic 

development locally may not constitute a national net benefit—rather it 

could be a redistribution of resources. For example, development of a high 

speed rail system could increase economic development in the area where 

it is built. However, this increased economic development could be a 

redistribution of resources rather than a net benefit. Consequently, it will 

be important in implementation of the PRIIA for guidelines to be 

developed on how to consider national economic and employment 

benefits in relation to local benefits. FRA is currently in the process of 

evaluating the PRIIA and preparing final rules for how high speed rail 

projects will be reviewed and selected for federal funding under 

provisions of the act. The final rules are required to be issued in October 

2009.

74

Forecasts of riders and costs are two key components of evaluating the 

economic viability of high speed rail projects, and rider forecasts are the 

anchor for the array of public benefits that a new line might bring. 

However, as we have discussed, these forecasts are often optimistic, 

calling into possible question the credibility of information being used by 

decision makers to pursue high speed rail. Development of stronger 

policies, procedures, and tools could enhance the accuracy and credibility 

of the forecasts and contribute to better decision making. There are a 

variety of means that have been discussed in the transportation literature

and could potentially be employed to strengthen the accuracy of 

forecasting.75 These means include the following: 

 74Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 501(d), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26106(g). 

75Bent Flyvbjerg, “Measuring inaccuracy in travel demand forecasting: methodological 

considerations regarding ramp up and sampling,” Transportation Research Part A: Policy

and Practice, vol. 39 (2005), 522-530. 

Page 50 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

• obligating state and local governments to share some of the risks of 

underestimated costs for those projects seeking federal financial support;

• obtaining forecasts and estimates from independent sources, such as a 

state auditor or a federal agency, rather than sources contracted to 

construct projects for a high speed rail project sponsor; 

• subjecting forecasts to peer review with possible public disclosure of all 

relevant data and public hearings; and 

• conducting horizontal comparisons of projects—that is, using data from 

different projects reported using a standardized accounting system to 

prepare probability distributions of the accuracy of project estimates of 

cost and demand—to evaluate new high speed rail projects.

Another potential means to improving the accuracy of these estimates is to 

align the incentives of public and private interests. For example, in Japan,

for a new line to be built, the private operator must be able to make a 

reasonable profit over and above operating costs, maintenance costs, and 

lease payments made to the government for use of the track. The private 

operator then has an incentive to maximize riders, but also to minimize the 

lease payments, to increase its profit potential. Therefore, the private 

operator wants to be conservative regarding rider forecasting and wants 

the government to build the infrastructure in order to allow for the lowest 

cost operation and maintenance. The central government has an incentive

to keep costs low in constructing the line and to extract the highest lease 

payment it can negotiate from the private operator. The private rail 

operator and the central government negotiate and agree upon a lease 

payment, which remains set over a 30-year period. These negotiations are 

based on forecasts of riders over the ensuing 30 years and the existing cost

estimates. According to officials and academics in Japan, this structure 

has resulted in a discipline that has vastly improved the accuracy of rider 

forecasting and cost estimation. For one newly constructed line, actual 

riders were within 90 percent of forecasted riders, and the construction of 

the line was within budget and ontime. 

In Europe, we found that the use of analytical tools and approaches for 

analyzing the public benefits of high speed rail projects was generally a 

requirement, and that these analytical tools led to public benefits being 

more systematically quantified and valued compared with projects in the 

United States. As we previously discussed in this report, evaluation of 

benefits can often be difficult and give rise to disagreements, and few 

standards exist in the United States to govern such analyses. A French 

Page 51 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

official said evaluations of public benefits and costs began in the 1980s as 

the result of a 1982 law. France’s current approach to analyzing proposed

projects includes analysis of public benefits—including travel-time 

savings, security, noise, and pollution—in conjunction with financial 

benefits to calculate financial and socioeconomic indicators (such as 

financial internal rate of return and socioeconomic rate of return). These 

financial and socioeconomic indicators are generally used to compare 

proposed projects that meet certain minimum thresholds76 and to prioritize 

them for construction. France’s 2004 Ministerial Order for analyzing 

proposed transportation infrastructure projects provides guidance to 

project sponsors in quantifying and valuing these benefits, and sets forth 

monetized values for specific public benefits and costs. In addition, France 

plans to soon build a multicriteria analysis tool that will take into account

additional nonfinancial benefits and costs, such as building in greenhouse 

gas emissions reductions, as a means to advance sustainable development 

objectives. This tool will guide France in adopting a new national 

infrastructure planning scheme. Spain began explicitly including public 

benefits and costs in proposed project analyses in 2003. Specific benefits 

of rail projects are also outlined in a European Commission guide for 

investment projects, and include time savings, additional capacity, and 

wider economic benefits such as economic development.77

Our work has shown that transportation funding faces an imbalance of 

revenues and expenditures and other threats to its long-term 

sustainability.78 We have reported that a sustainable surface transportation 

program will require targeted investment, with adequate return on 

investment, from not only the federal funds invested but also investments 

from state and local governments and the private sector. In the context of 

high speed rail, fiscal sustainability includes consideration of such things 

as whether federal, state, and other funding is affordable and stable over 

the short- and long-term (i.e., both while a project is being planned and 

Ensure Fiscal Sustainability

 76For example, according to French officials, a project’s financial internal rate of return

should exceed 8 percent, and the socioeconomic internal rate of return should exceed 4

percent for the project to proceed. 

77European Commission, Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects, Final 

Report (June 16, 2008). This guide updates and expands the previous edition (2002), which

in turn was the follow-up of a first brief document (1997) and of a subsequent substantially 

revised and augmented text (1999). The guide was developed under specific requirements

for the European Commission to provide guidance on project appraisals because projects

receiving funding from the European Union require a cost-benefit analysis. 

78GAO-08-744T. 

Page 52 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

constructed as well as after the high speed rail line is in operation); the 

extent to which costs and revenues are shared among federal, state, local,

and private participants; and whether any project fees and taxes are 

aligned with use and benefits. Moreover, sustainability can refer to the 

extent to which ticket revenues will cover ongoing operating and 

maintenance costs to avoid ongoing public subsidy. 

The PRIIA includes recognition of the potential fiscal sustainability high 

speed rail projects that might be selected for development. For example, 

the PRIIA requires the federal government to give greater consideration to 

high speed rail corridor projects that incorporate, among other things, 

equitable financial participation in the project’s financing, including 

financial contributions by intercity passenger, freight, and commuter 

railroads commensurate with the benefits expected to their operations as 

well as financial commitments from host railroads, nonfederal entities, 

and nongovernment entities.79 Similarly, proposals under the PRIIA for 

specific high speed rail projects are required to contain a description of 

the projected revenues and sources of revenue, including the expected 

levels of both public contributions and private investment.80 The level of 

public and private contributions, in addition to a summary of the potential

risks to the public, including risks associated with project financing, must 

be considered in project selection by commissions set up by the Secretary

to review the proposals.81

The National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study 

Commission,

82 created to study the condition and needs of the nation’s 

surface transportation infrastructure, called for an increase in intercity 

passenger rail service, including high speed rail service, and also proposed 

a system of fiscal sustainability in its final report in January 2008. The 

commission’s final report suggested that funding should come from a 

variety of sources, and that a fund should be set up for rail investment that 

 79Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 501, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26106 (e)(2)(C)(ii). 

80Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 502, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26106 note. 

81Section 502 requires the Secretary to establish and support the formation of commissions, 

representing affected governors, mayors, freight railroads, transit authorities, labor 

organizations, and Amtrak. 

82Congress created the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study

Commission in 2005 under Section 1909 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1909, 119 Stat. 1471 

(Aug. 10, 2005). 

Page 53 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

would collect money from a new federal ticket tax levied on users of the 

system. Currently, users of intercity passenger rail in the United States do

not pay ticket taxes or user fees similar to those paid by users of the 

aviation system or fuel taxes used to support the highway system. 

In other countries, high speed rail systems appear to be fiscally sustainable 

on an ongoing financial basis. For example, new high speed rail lines are 

not constructed in Japan unless they can cover their operating and 

maintenance costs, not including the payback of the initial investment in 

the infrastructure. Similarly, European officials told us that some of their 

high speed rail lines require little, if any, public operating subsidies outside 

of initial capital costs, since revenue is sufficient to cover operating costs. 

High speed rail does not offer a quick or simple solution to relieving 

congestion on our nation’s highways and airways. High speed rail projects 

are costly, risky, take years to develop and build, and require substantial 

up-front public investment as well as potentially long-term operating 

subsidies. Yet the potential benefits of high speed rail—both to riders and 

nonriders—are many. Whether any of the nearly 50 current domestic high 

speed rail proposals (or any future domestic high speed rail proposal), 

may eventually be built will hinge on addressing the funding, public 

support, and other challenges facing these projects. Determining which, if 

any, proposed high speed rail projects should be built will require decision 

makers to be better able to determine a project’s economic viability. 

It is not likely high speed rail projects will come to fruition without federal 

assistance. The PRIIA establishes a good framework for helping craft a 

federal role in high speed rail (which, to date, has been limited) to address 

these challenges. Given the complexity, high cost, and long development 

time for high speed rail projects, it will be critical to first determine how 

high speed rail fits into the national transportation system and establish a 

strategic vision and goals for such systems. This will establish the baseline 

for federal involvement. To maximize returns on federal investments, it 

will also be critical when reviewing grant applications under the PRIIA 

high speed rail provisions to clearly identify expected outcomes and to 

incorporate performance and accountability measures to ensure these 

outcomes are achieved. The failure to incorporate such measures is a 

common drawback of federal transportation programs. Finally, it will be 

incumbent upon the federal government to develop the guidelines, 

methods, and analytical tools to develop credible and reliable ridership, 

cost, and public benefit forecasts. Without such guidelines, methods, and 

tools, reliable determinations of economic viability will continue to be the 

Conclusions 

Page 54 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

exception rather than the norm, and the efficiency and effectiveness of any 

federal assistance to high speed rail could be jeopardized. 

To ensure effective implementation of provisions of the PRIIA related to 

high speed rail and equitable consideration of high speed rail as a potential

option to address demands on the nation’s transportation system, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with 

Congress and other stakeholders, take the following three actions: 

• Develop a written strategic vision for high speed rail, particularly in 

relation to the role high speed rail systems can play in the national 

transportation system, clearly identifying potential objectives and goals for 

high speed rail systems and the roles federal and other stakeholders 

should play in achieving each objective and goal.

• Develop specific policies and procedures for reviewing and evaluating

grant applications under the high speed rail provisions of the PRIIA that 

clearly identify the outcomes expected to be achieved through the award 

of grant funds and include performance and accountability measures. 

• Develop guidance and methods for ensuring reliability of ridership and 

other forecasts used to determine the viability of high speed rail projects 

and support the need for federal grant assistance. The methods could 

include such things as independent, third-party reviews of applicable 

ridership and other forecasts, identifying and implementing ways to 

structure incentives to improve the precision of ridership and cost 

estimates received from grant applicants, or other methods that can 

ensure a high degree of reliability of such forecasts. 

We provided copies of our draft report to DOT for comment prior to 

finalizing the report. DOT provided its comments in an e-mail message on 

March 10, 2009. DOT said that it generally agreed with the information 

presented and noted that with the passage of ARRA, its work on high 

speed rail has been considerably accelerated. Specifically, the act calls for 

FRA to submit, within an expedited time frame, a strategic plan to the 

Congress describing how FRA will use the $8 billion funding identified in 

the act to improve and deploy high speed passenger rail systems. DOT 

indicated that the strategic plan may include the Department’s vision for 

developing high speed rail services, criteria for selecting projects, an 

evaluation process that will be used to measure effectiveness, and a 

discussion of the relationship between the ARRA grant programs and the 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 55 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

recently enacted PRIIA. DOT said it is also working to comply with 

statutory requirements to issue interim guidance in June 2009, describing 

grant terms, conditions, and procedures. DOT told us that in order to 

provide information to the public and potential grantees as expeditiously

as possible, it has posted a set of questions and answers relating to ARRA 

on its Web site. These questions and answers provide potential program 

applicants with some preliminary but specific information on what to 

expect in terms of coverage, limitations, and potential selection criteria. 

Finally, DOT noted that the draft report does not include information 

relating to the administration’s new federal commitment to high speed rail. 

Specifically, as described in the President’s proposed fiscal year 2010 

budget, the administration has proposed a 5-year $5 billion high speed rail

state grant program. DOT indicated that this program is intended to build 

on the $8 billion included in ARRA for high speed rail. The Department 

said the President’s proposal marks a new federal commitment to practical 

and environmentally sustainable transportation. DOT did not take a 

position on our recommendations. 

We agree that the recently enacted ARRA will likely accelerate activity 

related to the consideration and development of high speed rail in the 

United States and will place a new emphasis on the federal role in such 

development. We also agree that the President’s proposed fiscal year 2010 

budget, if enacted, could further increase the emphasis on high speed rail

and its potential development. As discussed in the report, high speed rail

systems can offer a number of benefits. However, these systems are very 

expensive, can take a long time to develop, and face numerous financial 

and other challenges to bring to fruition. Given the renewed interest in 

high speed intercity passenger rail and its development and the substantial

resources that might be made available, it is even more important that 

potential challenges are addressed and a clear federal role be established.

This includes developing a strategic vision for high speed rail that includes 

consideration of how high speed rail fits into the nation’s transportation 

system; that the review and evaluation of grant applications under PRIIA, 

ARRA and other programs clearly identify outcomes to be achieved and 

incorporate into grant documents appropriate performance and 

accountability measures to ensure these outcomes are achieved; and that 

guidance and methods be developed that increase the reliability of 

ridership and other forecasts used to determine the economic viability of

high speed rail projects. Each of these actions is essential for ensuring that 

federal expenditures on high speed rail are efficient, effective, and focused 

on maximizing the return on the investment. 

Page 56 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

We also received comments from Amtrak in an e-mail message dated 

March 3, 2009. Amtrak said it generally agreed with our conclusions. 

Amtrak did not take a position on our recommendations. Amtrak also 

provided technical corrections and comments, which we incorporated 

where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Transportation; the Administrator of the 

Federal Railroad Administration; and the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget. The report will also be available at no charge on

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

Susan A. Fleming 

listed in appendix VIII. 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Page 57 GAO-09-317 
 

High Speed Passenger Rail

List of Requesters 

The Honorable Harry Reid 

Majority Leader 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John L. Mica 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John W. Olver 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and 

 Urban Development, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bill Shuster 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 

 Hazardous Materials 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

Page 58 GAO-09-317 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To better understand the potential viability of high speed rail service in the 

United States, we reviewed (1) the factors affecting the economic viability 

of high speed rail projects—that is, whether a project’s total social benefits 

offset or justify the total social costs—and difficulties in determining the 

economic viability of proposed projects; (2) the challenges that U.S. 

project sponsors experience in developing and financing high speed rail 

projects; and (3) the federal role in the potential development of high 

speed rail systems. 

For the purposes of this report, we used the Federal Railroad 

Administration’s (FRA) definition of high speed ground transportation, 

which is “service that is time-competitive with air and/or automobile for 

trips in corridors of roughly 100 and 500 miles in length,”1

 as opposed to a 

specific top speed threshold. As a result, we included in our review a wide 

range of projects, including “incremental” projects that are designed to 

increase the speed (generally above 79 miles per hour up to 150 miles per 

hour) or reliability of existing rail service on existing track usually shared 

with freight or other passenger trains; and “new” high speed rail projects 

(above 150 miles per hour and, in some cases, above 200 miles per hour) 

designed to operate on new tracks or guideway on dedicated right-of-way 

not shared with other rail services. Our review was technology neutral,

meaning that we did not analyze or consider the technical feasibility of 

diesel, electrified, or magnetic levitation trains, but only considered the 

service and performance aspects of the different technologies in the 

project proposals we reviewed. The scope of our work did not include an 

assessment of commuter rail or transit service where the primary purpose 

is to travel between a suburb and a city center or within a metropolitan 

area. However, the presence of these transportation modes as intermodal 

connections to high speed rail service was considered in identifying 

characteristics significant to how proposed high speed rail service is 

analyzed and evaluated. Furthermore, it was not the intent of this study to 

identify specific routes or corridors that are viable. Rather, this study 

identifies characteristics of corridors and service and other factors that 

contribute to a proposed project’s benefits and costs and the challenges in

developing and financing such projects. 

 1

DOT/FRA, High Speed Ground Transportation for America (Washington, D.C.: 

September 1997), 2-1.

Page 59 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To address our objectives, we conducted structured interviews with 

officials for 5 projects that currently exceed Amtrak’s predominant top 

speed of 79 miles per hour, and project sponsors for 11 different high 

speed rail proposals in the United States. The criteria used to select which

existing or proposed domestic projects to review were twofold, as follows: 

Structured Interviews 

with Domestic Project 

Sponsors 

1. The project’s planned or existing high speed rail service must include 

operating at a top speed greater than 79 miles per hour (generally the 

top speed for intercity passenger trains). 

2. The project’s planned service must be supported by a completed 

environmental review (or equivalent project review) that would make 

the project eligible for federal funding, or the project sponsor needed

to be actively pursuing the completion of such a review. 

To identify projects for inclusion in our study, we reviewed a recent 

survey of high speed rail projects in 64 corridors across the United States 

to identify potential projects.2

 The survey identified 16 projects that met 

our criteria.3

 To verify this information, we contacted project sponsors, or 

another project affiliate, for each of these projects (16 projects). We also 

contacted project sponsors (or another project affiliate) for the remaining 

projects in the survey to verify that they had not advanced in their 

planning process since issuance of the survey report, such that they would

now meet our criteria. As a result of this verification, one additional 

project was included in our study, and two projects were dropped since 

they had either not progressed to the environmental review phase or were 

 2

Joseph P. Schwieterman and Justin Scheidt, “Survey of Current High-Speed Rail Planning 

Efforts in the United States,” Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 

Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, no. 1995 

(Washington, D.C.: 2007). 

3

The survey authors considered the Washington, D.C., to New York City, New York, and the 

New York City, New York, to Boston, Massachusetts, high speed rail project as two 

separate projects. For the purposes of this report we considered these projects as one 

since they are both part of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor Acela Express service. The author

also considered the Bay Area, California, to San Diego, California, project and the 

Sacramento, California, to San Diego, California, project as two separate projects. Again,

for the purposes of this report, we considered these projects as one since they are both

part of the California High Speed Rail Authority’s planned statewide high speed rail 

initiative. Finally, the author considered the Washington, D.C., to Raleigh, North Carolina, 

project and the Raleigh, North Carolina, to Charlotte, North Carolina, project as two 

separate projects. For the purposes of this report, we considered these projects as one, 

since they are considered by project sponsors to be one project under the Southeast High

Speed Rail Corridor development initiative. 

Page 60 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

High Speed Passenger Rail

not being pursued for high speed rail. We also added another project (Los 

Angeles, California, to San Diego, California) that met our criteria on the 

basis of discussions with Amtrak. The latter project is separate from the 

California High Speed Rail Authority’s statewide high speed rail initiative, 

which also plans to serve San Diego from Los Angeles. 

All 5 existing projects were incremental projects, and of the 11 proposed

projects included in our review, 6 were incremental improvements to 

existing rail service in a corridor, and the remaining 5 projects would 

implement service on new high speed track or guideways using dedicated 

right-of-way. Three of the 5 dedicated right-of-way projects were 

considering magnetic levitation technology at the time of our study.4

 To 

collect information about the high speed rail projects in development, we 

conducted structured interviews with each project sponsor. The 

interviews were structured to identify such things as (1) the important 

characteristics and factors that affect a project’s viability; (2) the most 

important challenges faced by project sponsors in developing the project;

and (3) the roles of various federal, state, local, and private sector entities 

in the development of the project. We pretested the structured interview 

instrument and made changes based on the pretest. These changes 

included additional questions about project development and background 

and stakeholders involved with the project. In addition, we requested and 

reviewed any available data on ridership forecasts and evaluations, project 

cost estimates and evaluations, costs to construct and maintain any 

existing high speed rail service as well as any environmental reviews, 

transportation plans, and other studies associated with the projects. 

Information about the projects was shared with project sponsors to ensure 

its accuracy.

We also conducted case studies of international high speed rail systems in 

France, Japan, and Spain. In selecting these three countries, we 

considered a number of factors, including location, how long high speed

rail has been in service, and the availability of data and other information. 

At the time of our visit, France and Spain had the highest kilometers of 

high speed rail lines in Europe. Japan similarly had extensive high speed 

rail lines and was one of the first countries to implement high speed rail 

service. We conducted interviews in these countries with relevant 

International Case 

Studies

 4

The Atlanta, Georgia to Chattanooga, Tennessee, project is considering both magnetic 

levitation and electrified locomotives. 

Page 61 GAO-09-317 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

High Speed Passenger Rail

government officials, including transportation bureaus and embassy 

officials; high speed rail infrastructure owners and service operators; and 

other stakeholders, including academic professors and domestic airline 

carriers or their trade associations. We requested and reviewed any 

available data on ridership forecasts and evaluations, project cost 

estimates and evaluations, as well as the costs to construct and maintain 

high speed rail service in these countries. We also reviewed relevant 

literature and studies on high speed rail systems in these and other 

countries. To the extent available, we reviewed relevant laws, directives, 

and guidance related to high speed rail systems in France, Japan, and 

Spain, and the European Union. The information presented in this report 

on international high speed rail systems, however, cannot be generalized 

beyond these three countries. 

To further identify the challenges encountered by previous high speed rail 

projects in the United States, we conducted a case study analysis of two 

terminated domestic high speed rail projects: the Florida Overland 

Express (FOX) and the Texas TGV. To conduct the case study analyses, 

we interviewed stakeholders affiliated with the projects and reviewed 

documents, such as legislation, ridership studies, and other research 

materials related to the projects. 

To further address our objectives, we obtained and analyzed information 

from a variety of other sources, including reports and documentation from

FRA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), Amtrak, and the Surface 

Transportation Board; prior GAO work; and other evaluations and studies 

on transportation infrastructure projects and high speed rail service. In 

addition to our structured interviews and international case studies, we 

conducted over 90 interviews covering a wide range of stakeholders and 

interested parties, including officials at FRA, DOT, Amtrak, the Surface

Transportation Board, state and local government agencies and 

organizations, academics, consultants involved in high speed rail ridership 

forecasting and planning, representatives from private equity firms that 

invest in transportation infrastructure, and engineers involved in 

developing various rail technologies. 

To review how characteristics of corridors and proposed service identified 

in our structured interviews and international case studies compare with 

other corridors in the United States and internationally, we obtained and 

analyzed data on corridor and service characteristics from numerous 

sources, including the DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the 

Case Studies of 

Terminated Projects 

Additional 

Methodologies

Page 62 GAO-09-317 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Census Bureau, and other domestic and international academic studies 

and government reports. We used standard tests and methodologies to 

ensure reliability of the data collected. This included reviewing the data 

for abnormalities, omissions, and obvious errors and corroborating 

information obtained to the extent possible. These data are not intended 

to make definitive conclusions on viability, but rather to allow us to make

reasonable comparisons using the best available data. For example, 

variations exist in how data sources report population numbers based on

differences between the geographical definitions of cities, metropolitan 

and other areas. In trying to maintain consistency, we attempted to use the 

same population data source for international corridors, but this was not 

always possible. 

To further assess the roles and relevant interests of national and state 

government agencies and officials, and the private sector in planning, 

developing, and operating high speed rail projects, we reviewed applicable 

federal laws and regulations. This included analyzing selected high speed 

rail legislation from 1965 to 2008, including the Passenger Rail Investment 

and Improvement Act of 2008. The latter includes a review of the high 

speed rail provisions contained in the act, the role of the Secretary of 

Transportation in relation to these provisions, and application procedures 

for federal high speed rail grants. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 63 GAO-09-317 
Appendix II: De

Corridors Oper

79 M

scription of U.S. Rail 

ating at Speeds Greater Than

iles per Hour

Page 64 GAO-09-317 

Appendix II: Description of U.S. Rail 

Corridors Operating at Speeds Greater Than 

79 Miles per Hour 

Projects and improvements associated with Amtrak’s 456-mile Northeast 

Corridor began in the 1970s. This included the Northeast Corridor 

Improvement Program and the Northeast High Speed Rail Improvement 

Program. Improvements included electrifying the line from New Haven 

Connecticut, to Boston, Massachusetts, enhancing signaling systems, and 

acquiring new high speed rail trainsets called Acela Express. The average 

speed from Washington, D.C., to New York City, New York, is 82 miles per 

hour, and the top speed is 135 miles per hour. The average speed from 

New York City to Boston is 68 miles per hour, and the top speed is 150 

miles per hour. 

1970s 

Electrified locomotives on existing railroad right-of-way 

Amtrak 

FRA 

$3.8 billion (estimated since 1990) 

$3.8 billion (estimated since 1990) 

Project is open for passenger operations. Amtrak, in conjunction with the 

nine states along the corridor, is currently developing a master plan for the 

corridor that includes additional capital improvements. 

Washington, D.C.-New 

York-Boston Corridor 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix II: Description of U.S. Rail 

Corridors Operating at Speeds Greater Than

79 Miles per Hour

Los Angeles to San Diego 

Corridor 

Amtrak began operating on the Los Angeles to San Diego corridor in 1971. 

When Amtrak began operations, the passenger trains were already capable 

of maximum speeds of 90 miles per hour on segments between Santa Ana 

in Orange County and the Sorrento Valley because of an automatic track 

signaling system that was already in place. Average speed along the 130-

mile corridor is approximately 55 miles per hour. 

1971 

Diesel locomotives on existing railroad right-of-way 

Amtrak 

Southern California Regional Rail Authority 

North County Transit District 

Orange County Transit Authority 

California Department of Transportation 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad 

Not available 

Not available 

Passenger rail operations are under way with top speeds of 90 miles per 

hour in certain segments; however, continuing capital improvements are 

occurring along the corridor to increase total average speed. 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 65 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix II: Description of U.S. Rail 

Corridors Operating at Speeds Greater Than

79 Miles per Hour

From 1977 to 1997, the New York State Department of Transportation 

made a series of incremental improvements to existing passenger rail 

service between New York City and Albany/Schenectady along the Empire 

Corridor, which stretches to Buffalo. Doing so has allowed for passenger 

rail service to operate at a top speed of 110 miles per hour and an average 

speed of between 80 and 90 miles per hour along the 158-mile corridor. 

1977 

Diesel locomotives on existing railroad right-of-way 

New York State Department of Transportation 

Amtrak 

$97.2 million (actual) 

$97.2 million (100 percent from state funds) 

Intercity passenger rail operations are currently under way with a top 

speed of 110 miles per hour. The New York State Department of 

Transportation is planning on making $22 million in additional incremental 

corridor investments, and is also anticipating new federal funding to make 

further improvements. 

New York City to 

Albany/Schenectady 

Corridor 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 66 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix II: Description of U.S. Rail 

Corridors Operating at Speeds Greater Than

79 Miles per Hour

The Keystone Corridor Improvement Program consisted of making 

incremental improvements (e.g., track work, bridge repairs, 

communication and signaling improvements, and enhanced power 

generation) along the Harrisburg to Philadelphia corridor to allow for 

speeds of up to 110 miles per hour. 

Late 1990s 

Electrified locomotives on existing railroad right-of-way 

FTA 

Amtrak 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 

$145.5 million (actual) 

$145.5 million (50 percent from Amtrak, 40 percent from FTA, and 10 

percent from state funds) 

Intercity passenger operations are currently under way with a top speed of 

110 miles per hour. There are currently discussions under way to plan for 

a second phase of improvements for the corridor. 

Harrisburg to Philadelphia 

Corridor 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 67 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix II: Description of U.S. Rail 

Corridors Operating at Speeds Greater Than

79 Miles per Hour

Implementation of a positive train control system on 55 miles of Amtrakowned right-of-way (Kalamazoo, Michigan, to about the Indiana state line) 

along the Chicago, Illinois, to Detroit, Michigan, corridor. Improvements to 

signaling and communication systems will allow Amtrak to operate up to a 

top speed of 110 miles per hour along the 55-mile stretch. 

1994 

Positive train control and diesel locomotives on existing railroad right-ofway 

Michigan Department of Transportation 

Amtrak 

General Electric 

FRA 

$39 million (actual) 

$39 million (49 percent from FRA, 27 percent from state, and 24 percent 

from Amtrak and General Electric) 

From Kalamazoo, Michigan, to Niles, Michigan, trains operate at 95 miles 

per hour. From Niles, Michigan, to a point 20 miles west, positive train 

control equipment is installed but is currently in the process of getting 

approval from FRA for its use. Amtrak is currently testing a new radio 

system with different frequencies. When testing is complete and the radio 

system is installed, passenger rail operations would be able to operate at 

110 miles per hour along the 55 mile-test bed. 

Chicago to Detroit 

Corridor 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 68 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: D

High Speed

Environ

escription of Current U.S. 

 Rail Proposals in the 

mental Review Phase 

Page 69 GAO-09-317 

Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The project will connect Atlanta, Georgia, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, 

along a combination of new right-of-way, rail right-of-way, and highway 

right-of-way with a new high speed rail system. The length is 

approximately 110 miles between the two cities. The envisioned system is 

expected to operate at a top speed of 200 miles per hour and an average 

speed of 180 miles per hour. 

1998 

To be determined. Project sponsors are considering both magnetic 

levitation and electrified steel-wheel on steel-rail technology. The 

preferred technology will be recommended as a result of the program level 

environmental impact statement. 

Georgia Department of Transportation 

FRA 

Federal Highway Administration 

Not available 

Funding for the feasibility study, which was conducted by the Atlanta 

Regional Commission, was provided through the Transportation Equity 

Act of the 21st Century (TEA-21).1

 Additional funding was authorized by 

the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 

Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), to study various transportation 

technologies2

 as well as through the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections 

Act of 2008.3

Georgia Department of Transportation officials noted they were half way 

through the 36-month program level environmental impact statement. The 

department plans to have a record of decision on the program level 

environmental statement by 2010. 

Atlanta, Georgia, to 

Chattanooga, Tennessee, 

High Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

 1

Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998). 

2

Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). 

3

Pub. L. No. 110-244, 122 Stat. 1572 (2008). 

High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The Baltimore, Maryland, to Washington, D.C., project is a magnetic 

levitation project that plans to connect the two cities, with a planned stop 

at Baltimore-Washington International Airport. The length is 40 miles 

between the two cities. The system is expected to operate at a top speed 

of 250 miles per hour and an average speed of 125 miles per hour. 

1992 

Magnetic levitation 

FRA 

Maryland Department of Transportation 

Baltimore Development Corporation 

District of Columbia Department of Transportation 

$5.15 billion (projected - 2007) 

The project completed a preliminary feasibility study in 1994 in response 

to the Maglev Prototype Development Program created by the Intermodal 

Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. In 1998, the project was one 

of the seven projects selected and funded for study by the FRA as part of 

the Maglev Deployment Program. In 2001, FRA selected this project to 

receive funds for a draft environmental impact statement as part of the 

TEA-21 Maglev Deployment Program. In 2003, a draft environmental 

impact statement was completed and accepted by FRA. 

In October 2007, a draft of the final environmental impact statement was 

submitted to FRA. FRA has requested additional information as part of 

their review of this statement. Project sponsors are pursuing funding 

under the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008 to complete the 

final environmental impact statement. 

Baltimore, Maryland, to 

Washington, D.C., 

Magnetic Levitation 

Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 70 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

This project is planned to connect Las Vegas, Nevada, to Anaheim, 

California, with stops in Ontario, Victorville, Barstow (California) and 

Primm (Nevada) with a magnetic levitation system. The length is 269 miles 

between Anaheim, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada. The initial segment

to be developed is 40 miles from Las Vegas to Primm, Nevada. The system 

is expected to operate at a top speed of 311 miles per hour and an average 

speed of between 150 and 200 miles per hour. 

1988 

Magnetic levitation 

FRA 

California Nevada Super Speed Train Commission (created by California 

and Nevada legislatures) 

$12 billion (projected - 2005) 

$45 million, from the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008 

The commission recently received $45 million from the SAFETEA-LU 

Technical Corrections Act of 2008, of which the commission will need to 

provide 20 percent matching funds. Work on the environmental impact 

statement is continuing, as is design/engineering work and preparation of 

cost estimates. Project sponsors expect to issue a fixed price contract to 

construct this project. The commission continues to have legislative 

authority in Nevada, but its authorizing legislation in California was 

allowed to lapse. However, according to the commission, the project 

enjoys strong support in California, and is supported by the California 

Department of Transportation in preparation of the environmental impact 

statement. 

Anaheim, California, to Las 

Vegas, Nevada, Magnetic

Levitation Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 71 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The Desert Xpress is a high speed rail project intended to connect Las 

Vegas, Nevada, with Southern California through a station in Victorville, 

California, a city that is less than 50 miles east of Palmdale where an 

intermodal station is planned on the California High Speed Rail system; 35 

miles northeast of Ontario International Airport; and 80 miles northeast of 

downtown Los Angeles. The system is planned to operate on a new 

dedicated right-of-way. The distance between Victorville, California, and 

Las Vegas, Nevada, is approximately 183 miles. Project sponsors expect to 

operate at a top speed of 150 miles per hour and an average speed of 125 

miles per hour. Project sponsors also expect to construct the project using 

existing highway right-of-way and using public lands owned by the Bureau

of Land Management. Desert Xpress is being implemented by a private 

sector entity without public funding. 

2002 

A dedicated right-of-way, steel-wheel on steel-rail system 

Desert Xpress Enterprises 

$3.5 billion (projected - 2003) 

No public funding has been expended. All funding to-date has come from 

Desert Xpress Enterprises. 

The draft environmental impact statement is currently being developed 

and is scheduled for publication in early 2009. Desert Xpress officials 

expect the final environmental impact statement to be completed in July 

2009 with a final record of decision issued by the federal government 

shortly thereafter. 

Victorville, California, to 

Las Vegas, Nevada, High 

Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Primary Sponsor 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 72 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The California High Speed Rail Authority is pursuing a statewide high 

speed rail system in California. Phase 1 of system will be from Anaheim, 

California, to Los Angeles, California, then through California’s Central 

Valley, and through the Pacheco Pass to the San Francisco Bay Area. 

Phase 2 will include extensions to Sacramento, California, and San Diego, 

California. Phase 1 of the system is 520 miles, and the authority expects 

the service will operate at a top speed of 220 miles per hour. Authority 

officials did not provide an average speed. 

1996 

A predominantly dedicated right-of-way electrified steel-wheel on steel-rail 

system. According to the authority, about 10 percent of the line will be 

shared with other rail services. 

FRA 

California High Speed Rail Authority (created by the California legislature)

$32.8 - $33.6 billion for Phase 1 of project (projected - 2008)

$9.95 billion in state bond funding (in addition to state support provided 

for administration of California High Speed Rail Authority) 

As of July 2008, all program-level environmental review work has been 

completed. The authority is now undertaking the project-level review and 

approval process. In addition, on November 4, 2008, California voters 

approved a ballot initiative that allows the state to issue $9.95 billion in 

bonds for transit and other projects, $9.0 billion of which will go for 

development of the statewide high speed rail system. Authority officials 

said they plan to seek additional funding from the federal government and 

private sector, as well as from local governments for the construction of 

the system. 

Los Angeles, California, to 

San Francisco, California, 

High Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 73 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation is pursuing 

improved passenger rail service between Richmond, Virginia, and the 

Hampton Roads area of Virginia (Norfolk, Newport News, and other 

cities). This service will ultimately connect to the Northeast Corridor in 

conjunction with development of the Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor. 

This project will use existing right-of-way. Depending on the preferred 

alignment, the length of the corridor could be 74 miles or 93 miles, with a 

planned top speed of 90 miles per hour. On December 14, 1995, FRA 

administratively extended the Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor from 

Richmond, Virginia, to Hampton Roads, Virginia. 

2004 

Steel-wheel on steel-rail

FRA 

Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation 

Not available 

Not available 

Portions of the draft environmental impact statement were sent to FRA for 

review in spring 2008. The project sponsor is currently awaiting FRA’s 

response. 

Richmond, Virginia, to 

Hampton Roads, Virginia, 

High Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 74 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The federally designated Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor stretches from 

Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, to Eugene, Oregon, a distance of 

466 miles. The Washington State Department of Transportation is pursuing 

incremental improvements to intercity passenger rail service between 

Portland, Oregon, to Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, a distance of 

341 miles. Improvements include upgrading grade crossings, improving 

tracks and facilities, enhancing the signaling system, purchasing passenger 

train equipment and improving stations, which would allow the top speed

to be 110 miles per hour. 

Late 1980s 

Nonelectric locomotives on existing freight railroad right-of-way, with 

minor alignment changes as needed. 

FRA 

Washington Department of Transportation 

Amtrak 

State of Oregon 

Province of British Columbia 

$6.5 - $6.8 billion (2006 – projected) 

$563.7 million 

Current intercity passenger rail operating speeds are at or below 79 miles 

per hour and, according to the department, increases in speed will require 

a new signaling system along the corridor, although increases in 

frequencies and travel times have occurred due to capital investments in 

the corridor. 

Eugene, Oregon, to 

Vancouver, British 

Columbia, Canada, High 

Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 75 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

This is an extension of New Jersey Transit service to Scranton via existing

railroad right-of-way. The corridor is 133 miles and work will include 

refurbishing 28 miles of abandoned railroad right-of-way. The top speed is

expected to be 110 miles per hour, with an average speed of just under 80 

miles per hour. 

1995 

Diesel locomotives on existing railroad right-of-way 

FTA 

FRA 

Pennsylvania Northeast Regional Rail Authority 

New Jersey Transit 

$551 million (projected) 

According to project sponsors, $21 million in federal funding has been 

received, primarily through earmarks in legislation. 

Project received a Finding of No Significant Impact4

 by the FTA and, 

according to one of the project sponsors, is ready to begin construction 

upon availability of funding. The project sponsors are currently working 

on a bistate funding agreement to allocate Pennsylvania’s and New 

Jersey’s share of funding.

Scranton, Pennsylvania, to 

New York City, New York, 

High Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

 4

A Finding of No Significant Impact presents the reasons why an action, not otherwise 

excluded, will not have a significant effect on the human environment and for which, 

therefore, an environmental impact statement will not be prepared. 

Page 76 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

Page 77 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail 

This project includes making track, station, bridge, and culvert 

improvements along the Chicago, Illinois, to Minneapolis/St. Paul, 

Minnesota, corridor, with stops in Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin. 

Enhanced passenger rail service, along existing railroad right-of-way, is 

being pursued for a top speed of 110 miles per hour and average speeds of 

between 66 and 70 miles per hour. 

1994 

Diesel electric on existing railroad right-of-way 

FRA 

Amtrak 

Wisconsin Department of Transportation 

$1.5 billion (2002-projected) 

$5 million from Capital Assistance to States—Intercity Passenger Rail 

Service Program5

The environmental review for the Madison to Milwaukee segment is 

complete, and FRA has issued a Finding of No Significant Impact. 

Engineering design work is complete for the Madison to Milwaukee 

segment. In addition, updates to ridership and cost estimates were 

recently completed for the full project. A grant of $5 million from FRA’s 

Capital Assistance to States—Intercity Passenger Rail Service Program 

will be used to complete track work between Milwaukee and the Illinois 

state line. The Wisconsin Department of Transportation has also applied 

for federal funds to improve highway-rail grade crossings between 

Madison and Watertown. 

 5

This program was established in the fiscal year 2008 DOT appropriations act that provided 

$30 million in fiscal year 2008 in matching grants to states for intercity passenger rail 

capital projects. 

Chicago, Illinois, to 

Minneapolis/St. Paul, 

Minnesota, High Speed 

Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The Illinois Department of Transportation said numerous incremental 

improvements have been made along this corridor to allow for increased 

speeds. This includes track work and grade crossings on 118 miles of track 

between Mazonia, Illinois, and Springfield, Illinois, completed in 2004. In 

addition, the department is currently pursuing three phases of

improvements: a new cab signaling system (similar to the signaling system

used by the private freight carrier that owns this corridor); track work that 

has been completed in Springfield, Illinois; and a centralized traffic control 

system for the Joliet, Illinois, to Mazonia, Illinois, segment of the corridor. 

1991 

Diesel locomotives on existing railroad right-of-way 

FRA 

Amtrak 

Illinois Department of Transportation 

$125 million (actual) 

According to project sponsors, $125 million in funding has been received 

to date (28 percent from FRA, 56 percent from the states (Illinois and 

Missouri), and 16 percent from private entities). 

A $1.55 million Capital Assistance to States—Intercity Passenger Rail 

Service Program grant was received that will be used to continue work on 

the project. Planned top speed is 110 miles per hour between Joliet, 

Illinois, and Mazonia, Illinois. 

Chicago, Illinois, to St. 

Louis, Missouri, High 

Speed Rail Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 78 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix III: Description of Current U.S. 

High Speed Rail Proposals in the 

Environmental Review Phase 

The Washington, D.C., to Charlotte, North Carolina, corridor, which is 468 

miles in length, will connect to the Northeast Corridor. Both Virginia and 

North Carolina have established an interstate compact to pursue this 

project. The project will make incremental improvements to existing 

infrastructure, including track, route alignment, signaling systems, 

highway-rail grade crossings, stations, train equipment, and facilities. 

These improvements will allow a top speed of 110 miles per hour and an 

average speed of between 85 to 87 miles per hour. 

In 1992, FRA designated the corridor as a federal high speed rail corridor. 

Diesel locomotives primarily on existing railroad right-of-way 

FRA 

Federal Highway Administration 

North Carolina Department of Transportation 

Virginia Department of Transportation 

Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation 

$3.8 – 5.3 billion (2011 to 2016 - projected) 

Over $300 million in state and federal funds have been invested in the 

Washington to Charlotte portion of the corridor since 1999. 

The program-level environmental impact statement has been completed 

for this project. Project sponsors are currently in the process of preparing 

the project-level environmental impact statement for the Richmond, 

Virginia, to Raleigh, North Carolina, segment of the corridor. This 

statement has been in development since 2003 and is expected to be 

available for public review in the summer of 2010. 

Washington, D.C., to 

Charlotte, North Carolina, 

Southeast High Speed Rail 

Project 

Project Description 

Date Originated 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimate 

Funding to Date 

Current Status 

Page 79 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix IV: D

Florida Over

Projects 

escription of Past Projects: 

land Express and Texas TGV 

Page 80 GAO-09-317 

Appendix IV: Description of Past Projects: 

Florida Overland Express and Texas TGV 

Projects 

Proposed using an electrified high speed rail system similar to the French

Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV) system, capable of operating at a maximum 

speed of 200 miles per hour. 

Florida Department of Transportation 

FOX Consortium1

FRA 

Federal Highway Administration 

The preliminary cost estimates ranged from $6 billion to $8 billion, 

depending on the route chosen. In general, the FOX Consortium planned 

on the system costing about $6 billion (in 1997 dollars). 

The FOX project would have operated along a 320-mile long dedicated

right-of-way from Miami, Florida, to Tampa, Florida, via Orlando, Florida. 

The project was planned to serve seven stations: Miami International 

Airport, Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, Orlando International Airport, 

Orlando Attractions, Lakeland, and Downtown Tampa. 

In total, the FOX Consortium planned to raise $9.3 billion to finance the 

estimated $6.3 billion needed for construction. The additional $3 billion 

accounts for inflation and to pay for such things as interest on state and 

system infrastructure bonds during the construction period, establish 

reserve funds required by bondholders, and cover the costs of issuing the 

bonds. According to the FOX Consortium, the following sources were 

expected to provide the $9.3 billion in funding: 

Florida Overland Express 

(FOX) 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimates 

Proposed Route 

Financing Plan 

• State contributed equity – $256 million (3 percent) 

• FOX Consortium contributed equity – $349 million (4 percent)

• Train equipment financing – $569 million (6 percent) 

• Interest earnings and balances – $588 million (6 percent) 

• Federal loan – $2.0 billion (22 percent) 

• State infrastructure bonds – $2.146 billion (23 percent) 

• System infrastructure bonds – $3.346 billion (36 percent) 

 1

The FOX Consortium consisted of the Fluor Daniel Corporation, a U.S.-based engineering 

and construction firm, Odebrecht Contractors of Florida, Bombardier Corporation, the 

manufacturer of rail passenger cars, and GEC-Alstom (now known as Alstom). 

High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix IV: Description of Past Projects: 

Florida Overland Express and Texas TGV 

Projects 

High Speed Passenger Rail

KPMG Peat Marwick projected annual ridership of 8 million passengers by 

2010. Systra projected ridership of 8.5 million by 2010. The consensus 

average of the two ridership studies was approximately 8.3 million 

passengers by 2010. 

Table 5 shows the timeline of events in the development of high speed rail

in Florida. 

Ridership Forecasts 

Timeline 

Table 5: Timeline of High Speed Rail Development in Florida 

Date Event

1982 The Governor of Florida established a committee to study high speed rail development in Florida. 

1984 The committee recommended using a public-private partnership to develop a high speed rail system on existing 

right-of-way. State legislation created the Florida High Speed Rail Commission (the commission) to grant a franchise 

to develop a privately funded high speed rail system. 

1989 One of two private entities that submitted proposals to the commission withdrew its proposal when it became 

apparent that Florida would not provide any public funding. 

1990 The Florida High Speed Rail Corporation revised its proposal after the commission concluded that the proposed use 

of real estate development rights along the route would not pay for the project. 

1991 The Florida High Speed Rail Corporation withdrew its revised proposal after the Governor rejected it, citing high 

project costs. 

1992 State legislature transferred the commission’s responsibilities to the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT). 

1992-1996 After conducting corridor studies, FDOT said it would provide $70 million annually for at least 40 years, to be 

adjusted for inflation, to construct a high speed rail system. FDOT issued a request for proposals. The FOX

Consortium submitted the winning proposal from among five, and entered into agreements with FDOT to develop the 

system. 

1997-1998 Stakeholders conducted work on environmental review, preliminary engineering, ridership studies, and composed a 

financing plan and safety regulations. Two external groups issued reports questioning ridership studies, cost 

estimates, and construction schedule. Citizens and elected public officials who were concerned about the potential 

effect on land in their area formed an advocacy organization to oppose the FOX project. 

1999 After GAO and others issued reports raising concerns about ridership and construction cost estimates, the 

construction schedule, and the financing plan, the Governor recommended withdrawing FOX project funding. The 

Florida legislature did so, ultimately terminating the project. 

2000-2001 Florida voters passed a constitutional amendment requiring Florida state government to build a high speed ground 

transportation system. The Florida legislature passed an act creating the Florida High Speed Rail Authority (the 

authority) in response. 

2002-2004 The authority selected a winning proposal from among four responding to its request for proposal. Work on 

environmental review, ridership studies, financing plan, and additional design work was initiated. 

2004 A general election ballot initiative passed, repealing the state’s 2000 constitutional amendment, which restricted the 

activities of Florida High Speed Rail Authority. 

Source: This timeline is primarily based on information contained in: High Speed Rail Projects in the United States: Identifying the 

Elements of Success, MTI Report 05-01, Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University (October

2005). 

Page 81 GAO-09-317 
Appendix IV: Description of Past Projects: 

Florida Overland Express and Texas TGV 

Projects 

A new electrified, steel-wheel on steel-rail high speed rail system similar to 

the French TGV system. 

Texas High Speed Rail Authority 

Texas TGV2

FRA 

The cost estimate was $4 billion. 

The high speed rail system would have provided service to Dallas, Fort 

Worth, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, Houston, Austin, and San Antonio. The 

initial service between Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston would have begun 

in 1998, and subsequent service between San Antonio and Austin to Dallas 

would have begun by 1999. Special or limited service would have been 

provided to Bryan/College Station and Waco if it were determined to be 

economically feasible. In addition, service from Houston to San Antonio 

would have been provided if it were determined to be economically 

feasible. 

We were not able to obtain a complete financing plan. The 1993 security 

offering was for $200 million in notes, backed by a $225 million letter of 

credit from the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and a $75 million 

counter-guarantee to be provided by Morrison Knudsen Corporation (one 

of the original project developers). The Texas High Speed Rail Authority 

Act prohibited use of public funds for constructing the system, and, as a 

result, all construction costs would have been privately financed. 

Based on the five route alternatives, ridership projections by 2015 ranged

from 11.3 million to 18.0 million. 

Table 6 shows the timeline of events in the development of high speed rail

in Texas. 

Texas TGV 

Proposed Technology

Project Sponsors 

Cost Estimates 

Proposed Route 

Financing Plan 

Ridership Projections 

Timeline 

 2

Texas TGV Corporation consisted of Morrison Knudsen (USA), Bombardier (Canada), 

Alstom (France/UK), Crédit Lyonnais (France), Banque IndoSuez (France), Merrill Lynch 

(USA), and others. 

Page 82 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix IV: Description of Past Projects: 

Florida Overland Express and Texas TGV 

Projects 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Table 6: Timeline of High Speed Rail Development in Texas 

Source: This timeline is primarily based on information contained in the following: Marc H. Burns, High Speed Rail in the Rear-View 

Mirror, Final Report of the Texas High Speed Rail Authority (October 1995). 

Date Event

1982 A Texas legislature joint committee recommended that feasibility studies examine the potential of conventional 

rail and high speed rail between Texan cities. Proposed legislation to enact the joint committee report 

recommendations failed. 

1985 A German Consortium reported that a high speed rail system would be viable from Dallas to Houston if the 

project obtained $500 million for start up contributions and was financed with tax exempt bonds. 

1987 German Consortium unsuccessfully lobbied the Texas legislature to undertake the proposal. A job creation task 

force created by the then-Governor recommended that the Governor support enabling legislation for the Texas 

Turnpike Authority to conduct a high speed rail feasibility study. The enabling legislation passed. 

1989 After receipt of the study, the Texas legislature created the Texas High Speed Rail Authority (THSRA). The 

THSRA was charged to review objectively applications and grant a franchise for the financing, construction, 

operation, and maintenance of a high speed rail facility if it found that it is for the public convenience and 

necessity. 

1990 - 1991 The THSRA issues requests for proposals, in which two of three applications met the criteria. Texas TGV

Corporation was ultimately granted the franchise after evidentiary hearings were held on franchise applications. 

Court dismissed lawsuits filed by Southwest Airlines to postpone the hearings and to rescind the rules of the 

THSRA. Texas TGV Corporation, the THSRA, and FRA signed a memorandum of understanding establishing 

environmental review responsibilities as well as other responsibilities. 

1992 The THSRA and Texas TGV Corporation signed the franchise agreement and outlined responsibilities of Texas 

TGV Corporation, many of which were time-sensitive. Work began on environmental review and ridership

studies, but environmental review work was eventually stopped because of cost overruns. The first portion of 

public financing offering of Texas TGV Corporation was delayed until December 31, 1993. The Texas TGV

argued it was due to lack of progress on environmental review and investment grade ridership studies as well as 

other reasons.

1993 Delays forced renegotiation of franchise agreement, and additional requirements were placed on the Texas TGV

Corporation. The corporation submitted a plan to the THSRA, which did not include required detailed financial 

and milestones information, and released its independent ridership study. Texas TGV Corporation issued its 

initial security offering as we have previously described. A day before the pricing and sale of the notes was 

scheduled to occur, Morrison Knudsen announced that it was no longer going to provide the counter-guarantee, 

and that the offering was going to be withdrawn. The Texas TGV Corporation could not meet its deadline of 

December 31, 1993. 

1994 Work was halted by the Texas TGV Corporation, which led to the termination of the franchise agreement. 

1995 The Texas legislature abolished the THSRA and its enabling legislation.a

a

Texas has taken no further action to establish a state high speed rail system. However, a grassroots

organization comprising of local elected officials and others is pursuing high speed rail in the Texas 

Triangle. 

Page 83 GAO-09-317 
Appendix V: D

Systems

escription of High Speed Rail 

 in France, Japan, and Spain 

Page 84 GAO-09-317 

Appendix V: Description of High Speed Rail 

Systems in France, Japan, and Spain 

France first developed high speed rail lines with the opening of the TGV 

Sud Est line from Paris to Lyon in 1981. Since then, France has 

constructed additional high speed rail lines connecting major cities in 

France, as well as connecting high speed rail lines to cities in Germany, 

Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The French railway system has 

undergone a couple of major reforms, the most notable one occurring in 

1997, with the creation of Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), France’s national 

intercity rail network infrastructure manager. This reform took place as 

France had to comply with European Union directives, which required the 

separation of passenger operations and infrastructure management. In 

addition, the ownership of the rail network, including the high speed rail 

network, was transferred from the national government to RFF. RFF is 

also responsible for capacity allocation, contracting, traffic management, 

and maintenance, although it subcontracts the traffic management and 

maintenance to the passenger rail operator, Société Nationale des 

Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF). The Ministry of Ecology, Energy, 

Sustainable Development, and Spatial Planning sets policy, enforces laws 

and regulations, and approves and finances projects. Moving forward, 

France is pursuing a high speed rail plan on the basis of a recommendation 

from a national environmental conference (Le Grenelle Environnement), 

which called for investments in sustainable transportation modes. 

Specifically, it recommended building about 1,200 miles of additional high 

speed rail lines before 2020 and studying the viability of another 

approximately 1,500 miles of high speed rail lines.

France 

Background 

Snapshot of the French High Speed Rail System 

• Date of initiation: 1981

• Length of high speed rail system: 1,180 miles 

• Top commercial speed: 199 miles per hour

• High speed rail ridership: Approximately 100 million (2007)

Prior to the creation of RFF in 1997, most of the funding for the 

construction of high speed rail lines came from the national government 

(through SNCF). Since then, funding for high speed rail construction is 

Funding 

High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix V: Description of High Speed Rail 

Systems in France, Japan, and Spain 

High Speed Passenger Rail

derived from a variety of sources, including the national government, 

regional governments, RFF, SNCF, and the European Union.

SNCF is the sole provider of domestic high speed rail operations in 

France. The Eurostar and Thalys TGV, of which SNCF is a shareholder, 

provide international high speed rail operations to locations in Belgium, 

Holland, and the United Kingdom. According to European Union 

directives, international high speed rail lines must be opened for 

competition starting in 2010. Therefore, France will be required to allow 

private and public competitors to operate their trains over these lines. 

Operations 

In terms of track ownership, RFF is an owner of all intercity railway 

property in France. RFF is also responsible for allocating capacity for the 

high speed rail infrastructure and for the maintenance and management of 

traffic of the high speed rail system. However, these responsibilities have 

been subcontracted to SNCF. SNCF pays RFF infrastructure fees to use 

the high speed rail lines. 

Infrastructure 

Japan 

Japan was the first country in the world to develop high speed rail 

operations, which occurred in 1964 with the opening of the Shinkansen 

between Tokyo and Osaka. In addition, in 1970, the Nationwide 

Shinkansen Railway Development Act was established, which created a 

master plan for the expansion of high speed rail lines throughout Japan. 

After this, four high speed rail lines were constructed prior to the 1987 

reform of the passenger rail industry in Japan. The 1987 reform broke the 

fully integrated state railway entity, Japanese National Railways, into six 

private intercity passenger rail operators based on six distinct geographic 

regions, as well as a freight operator. Since then, three high speed rail lines 

have been built under the reformed structure, and the high speed rail 

system continues to expand on the basis of the high speed rail master plan. 

Background 

Page 85 GAO-09-317 
Appendix V: Description of High Speed Rail 

Systems in France, Japan, and Spain 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Snapshot of the Japanese High Speed Rail System 

• Date of initiation: 1964

• Length of high speed rail system: 1,360 miles 

• Top commercial speed: 188 miles per hour

• High speed rail ridership: Approximately 300 million (fiscal year 2006) 

Prior to the 1987 reform, the construction of high speed rail in Japan was 

funded through debt incurred by the national government and Japan 

National Railways. After the 1987 reform, the national government funds 

two-thirds of the construction cost, and local governments fund one-third

of the construction cost under the Nationwide Shinkansen Railway 

Development Act. The national government funding is derived from the 

revenues from the sale of rail lines to private companies and the national

public works budget. Private companies purchased the four constructed 

high speed rail lines from the national government in 1991, and in turn the 

companies have to pay an annual fee to the national government for 60 

years. For high speed rail lines built after the 1987 reform, the companies 

pay a lease payment to the Japan Railway Construction, Transportation, 

and Technology Agency for the use of the high speed rail lines, on the 

basis of projected ridership. The national government does not provide 

operating subsidies for high speed rail passenger operations. 

Funding 

Prior to the 1987 reform, Japan National Railways was a fully integrated 

state-owned entity that was the sole high speed passenger rail operator in

Japan. After the 1987 reform, Japan National Railways was split into six 

private operators, three are on the mainland (JR East, JR Central, and JR 

West) and the other three are each on an island (JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, 

and JR Kyushu). JR East, JR Central, JR West, and JR Kyushu operate high 

speed rail lines. JR East operates Shinkansen lines between Tokyo and 

Nagano, Tokyo and Niigata, and Tokyo and Hachinohe; JR Central 

operates the Shinkansen line between Tokyo and Osaka; JR West operates 

the Shinkansen line between Osaka and Fukuoka; and, JR Kyushu 

operates the Shinkansen line between Kagoshima and Shin Yatsushiro. 

The three mainland operators are considered fully privatized entities. 

Operations 

High speed rail lines built after the 1987 reform are constructed and 

owned by the Japan Railway Construction, Transportation, and 

Infrastructure 

Page 86 GAO-09-317 
Appendix V: Description of High Speed Rail 

Systems in France, Japan, and Spain 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Technology Agency, and are leased to the JR companies. As a result of the 

1991 law, JR East purchased the high speed rail line from Tokyo to Niigata

and the track from Tokyo to Morioka. JR Central purchased the high speed 

rail line from Tokyo to Osaka, and JR West purchased the high speed rail

line from Osaka to Hakata. 

Spain 

Spain first developed high speed rail lines with the opening of the Madrid 

to Seville line in 1992. Since then, Spain has constructed additional high 

speed rail lines from Madrid to Barcelona and Madrid to Valladolid, in 2007 

and 2008, respectively, and from Córdoba to Málaga, with extensions built 

off these main lines as well (i.e., to Toledo in 2005). The construction of 

these lines was based on a national rail plan created in 1987 and national

transportation plans created in 1993, 1997, and 2005. In 2005, Spain’s 

railway system was restructured in accordance with the European Union 

directive requiring the separation of passenger operations and 

infrastructure management. In accordance with these directives, Spain 

passed its own legislation, which split its state railway entity, Renfe, into 

two entities, Adif and Renfe-Operadora. Adif is responsible for 

infrastructure management and capacity allocation, and Renfe-Operadora 

is responsible for passenger operations. The Ministerio de Fomento 

(Ministry of Public Works) is responsible for setting policy, enforcing laws 

and regulations, and approving and financing projects. Spain’s most recent 

national transportation plan calls for $103.9 billion in investment for 

creating 5,592 miles of high speed rail lines. 

Background 

Snapshot of the Spanish High Speed Rail System 

• Date of initiation: 1992

• Length of high speed rail system: 981 miles 

• Top commercial speed: 186 miles per hour

• High speed rail ridership: 9 million (2007)

Page 87 GAO-09-317 
Appendix V: Description of High Speed Rail 

Systems in France, Japan, and Spain 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Spanish transportation officials with whom we spoke noted that a majority 

of funding to construct the Madrid to Seville high speed rail line was 

provided by the national government. Of the high speed rail lines built 

since then, construction costs have been derived from funding from the 

national government, the European Union, and Adif. Moving forward, it is 

planned that funding for expansion of the existing high speed rail network 

will be derived from the national government, local governments, Adif, and 

loans from the European Investment Bank. For cross-border high speed 

rail lines, it is also planned that funding will be derived from the European 

Union as part of the Trans-European Transport Network. 

Funding 

Renfe-Operadora is the sole provider of high speed rail operations in 

Spain. According to European Union directives, international high speed 

rail lines must be opened to competition starting in 2010. Therefore, Spain 

will be required to allow private and public competitors to operate their 

trains over these international lines.

Operations 

In terms of track ownership, Adif owns the current high speed rail lines as

well as passenger rail stations, freight terminals, and the 

telecommunications network. In addition, Adif constructs and maintains 

high speed rail lines, allocates capacity to passenger rail operators, and 

manages traffic control operations and safety systems. Renfe-Operadora

pays Adif infrastructure fees to use the high speed rail lines. 

Infrastructure 

Page 88 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VI: D

Forec

escription of Travel Demand 

asting

Page 89 GAO-09-317 

Appendix VI: Description of Travel Demand 

Forecasting 

The benefits of a proposed project depend on the popularity of a new 

service, that is, high ridership. Thus, a critical factor in determining the net

benefits, or viability, of a proposed project is its ridership forecasts. 

Ridership forecasts are generally conducted by modeling travel demand 

for the corridor in which the new service is being proposed. Travel 

demand modeling can be conducted at the macro level or the micro level, 

depending on the types of available data and the level of information 

needed from the results of the model. The use of travel demand models in 

the policy process could be conceived of in terms of the following three 

activities: data collection, model building, and estimation. 

Travel Demand 

Modeling 

1. Data collection: Aggregate data refers to variables that summarize the 

characteristics of a group of individual units, such as an average, a total, or 

a median. Examples include per capita income or vehicle miles traveled. 

An aggregate model is founded on such data. In the case of travel demand, 

the analysis applies to those residing or doing business in a region. Data 

sources are typically official statistics routinely collected by public 

agencies, including administrative data. An advantage of such data is that

they are inexpensive for the secondary user and have been subjected to

some degree of quality control by the originating agency. One 

disadvantage is that the results of any analysis do not necessarily apply to

a specific transportation project. Another limitation is that the model is 

limited by the available data. Micro models can help inform specific policy 

changes, such as the option of adding high speed rail service to a 

transportation system. Micro data refers to individuals’ characteristics and 

behavior. These data are often gleaned from surveys of travelers or 

households.1

 Micro data, however, are generally expensive to obtain, their

collection may be limited due to privacy considerations, and their quality

depends on the sophistication of the survey methodology. A danger in 

survey data, just as in political polling, is that the design or 

implementation of a survey could lead to biased survey results. Survey 

instruments can be scrutinized by third parties, but the process of data 

collection is less accessible to outside observers, especially after the fact.

Typically, a survey, as well as ensuing analysis, will be commissioned by 

the public agency that is sponsoring a project, raising conflict-of-interest 

concerns. Surveys can provide ambiguous results for innocent reasons as 

well (e.g., such results may be due to differences in methodology). 

 1

Surveys may collect data on circumstances surrounding actual choices (i.e., “revealed

preference”), or they may collect data on a hypothetical setting for a new mode of 

transportation (i.e., “stated preference”). 

High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix VI: Description of Travel Demand 

Forecasting

High Speed Passenger Rail

2. Model building: Constructing a formal travel demand model2 generally 

entails a number of choices and professional judgment. For example, a 

modeler usually makes choices on the theory and assumptions upon 

which the model is based, the mathematical form of the model, and the

variables to be included. Because models entail professional judgment, 

many models are sufficiently diverse (e.g., include differing assumptions) 

such that alternative models of the same problem can yield different 

results. Also, alternative theories of travel demand could imply different 

models with diverse findings. Models with conflicting rationales can both 

claim legitimate empirical support.

In predicting future demand for an existing or new transportation facility, 

two types of data are typically involved: historic and prospective. A model 

is often initially developed using historic data. The effects and implied 

outcomes of the model are then compared with actual experience to test 

the structure of the model (e.g., the theory and assumptions on which the 

model is based). Details of the model may be adjusted to improve the 

results—that is, to make the modeled effects more closely match actual 

experience. Once a model has provided satisfactory results, it may be 

deployed with data on projected future conditions. Again, forecast 

modelers may adjust and readjust the structure of the model. The use of 

statistical methods in testing models is usually a trial-and-error process, 

thus, rarely is the first result the end of the study. 

3. Estimation: There are usually multiple criteria by which to analyze or 

interpret the results of a model, and the analyst enjoys considerable 

discretion in determining the direction of the analysis. In addition, the 

foundation of the analysis is survey data, and the data collected could 

yield results dramatically at variance with theory, expected empirical 

impacts, and past experience. For these reasons, the nature of the data

and the decisions on how to handle them may enable the analyst to steer 

the result in the analyst’s preferred direction. For an external, 

disinterested reviewer, the evolution of such decisions is very difficult to 

trace. Because circulation of data and models for outside review may be 

restricted by proprietary considerations and the population of private 

sector organizations equipped to conduct large-scale projects may be 

sufficiently limited, the evaluation by independent peer reviewers may be

difficult. 

 2

In this context, a model is a mathematical equation describing a relationship among a set 

of variables. 

Page 90 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VI: Description of Travel Demand 

Forecasting

In the intercity context, the standard framework for estimating travel 

demand has been the four-step model.3

 The four steps are as follows: 

1. Trip generation: This step refers to the total number of trips, based on 

the idea of “productions” (households are the most important source of 

production) and “attractions” (places of employment or retail 

establishments are obvious attractors). Trips can have the purpose of 

moving people or freight, either within a region, to or from a region, or 

through a region. The main purposes for persons to travel include 

commuting, business travel, and leisure travel. Thus, household and 

business patterns of commuting and shopping are the most stable source 

of information used in modeling, while a more variable source of 

information are trips aimed at recreation, and other more episodic 

decisions. Model inputs (or variables) used to explain trip productions 

include trip purpose (e.g., commuting and home-to-school) household size, 

auto ownership, and income. Trip attractions are chiefly workplaces and

retail outlets. These data can be obtained through records, such as ticket 

sales, and supplemented by or derived exclusively from surveys. 

Standard Framework 

for Travel Demand 

Modeling 

2. Trip distribution: This step pertains to trips in terms of connected 

origins and destinations. The standard approach to estimating trip 

distribution is what is known as a “gravity model.” Gravity models were 

used in models of trade and migration. In the context of this discussion, 

trips from point A to point B are positively affected by measures of mutual 

attraction (i.e., “productions” at point A and “attractions” at point B). The 

analogy is to Newton’s law of the gravitational force between two bodies: 

that it increases with the mass of each, and decreases with the distance 

between them. Trips are negatively affected by some measure of 

“impedance” or friction affecting the desirability of a trip between the two 

points, such as distance, travel time, cost of travel, or some combination of 

such factors. The inputs to a gravity model could be the number of trips 

originating and ending at a given number of zones. A problem in 

distribution is the feedback implied by possible congestion or crowding of 

a transit facility. The more people decide to move from point A to point B, 

the greater the impedance factor could be, depending on how the factor is 

represented. This in turn could influence the number of trips. Allowing for 

 3

Edward A. Beimborn, “A Transportation Modeling Primer,” Center for Urban 

Transportation Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (June 2006). Kenneth A. Small 

and Clifford Winston, “The Demand for Transportation: Models and Applications,” UCIITS-WP-98-8, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California/Irvine (October 

1998). 

Page 91 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix VI: Description of Travel Demand 

Forecasting

High Speed Passenger Rail

feedback requires additional complexity in a trip distribution model. More 

complex models can be implemented. An alternative approach to the 

gravity model—where time series data are available—is a model that 

combines steps one and two.4

 In such a model, the number of trips 

between a given origin and destination is explained by population levels at 

each end, travelers’ incomes, and the level of service available for the 

mode (e.g., rail and automobile) in question. The apparent simplicity of 

such an approach may obscure the advantages of implementing such a 

model for the full gamut of trip purposes, in each mode, for each origindestination pair. 

3. Mode choice: This step pertains to the decision on how to travel, such as

driving alone, carpooling, or taking some type of public transportation. 

The probability of choosing among modes is modeled as a function of the 

characteristics of individuals, trip purpose, and the relative costs of 

alternative modes, among other possible factors. The estimated probability 

for a population is the share estimated for a given transportation mode.5

Obvious factors in the choice of a travel mode include the relative costs, 

travel time, convenience, and comfort of the travel alternatives in 

question. The choice of a travel mode interacts with personal decisions on 

whether to own an automobile, and, if so, how many, and where to reside. 

This chicken-egg interaction complicates the analysis of causality in mode 

choice. Mode choice models are founded on microeconomic consumer 

theory that depends on a bevy of controversial, technical economic 

assumptions about human behavior. In general, the theory assumes a high 

degree of rational and consistent behavior on the part of individuals, 

including foresight, self-discipline, an aversion to risk, and the capacity to

process information. Over the past two decades, a growing literature has 

developed providing empirical evidence against such notions of 

rationality.6

The purpose of a mode split analysis is to predict the shares of trips over 

existing and prospective modes. In principle, the factors that distinguish 

 4

Charles Rivers Associates Incorporated, Independent Ridership and Passenger Revenue

Projections for High Speed Rail Alternatives in California, draft final report prepared for 

the California High-Speed Rail Authority, CRA Project no. 1680-04 (January 2000). 

5

These estimates are derived from binary choice models, often with the use of what are 

known as probit or logit specifications. 

6

Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin (eds.), Advances in

Behavioral Economics, Princeton University Press, 2003. 

Page 92 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VI: Description of Travel Demand 

Forecasting

High Speed Passenger Rail

choices in Europe from those in the United States would be accounted for 

in the model. For example, if motor fuel in the United States, factoring in 

the relevant taxes, is cheaper than in Europe, the impact of differences in 

the costs of trips under different modes would be reflected in the overall

explanation of the extent to which travelers might choose high speed rail 

over automobile and air. A good mode split model will indicate the 

strengths of the assorted factors, including the preference for one 

transportation mode over another, assuming all other factors are equal. 

The extent to which government policies—such as the impact of motor 

fuels’ taxes on travel costs—influence the choice, can be abstracted from, 

to assess underlying preferences. 

4. Route assignment: The final step of travel demand modeling is to 

determine the distribution of trips between two given points for all modes 

over the possible routes between the points. Assuming travelers prefer the 

route that takes the least time, given decisions about destination and 

mode, in a regional setting with many zones and a multitude of paths 

between a multitude of points, a mathematical programming problem of 

considerable complexity is encountered. Even so, such a problem glosses 

over the extent of congestion and resulting changes in travel time to which 

particular routes can be subjected. Reckoning with the associated 

feedback—travelers on congested routes choose alternatives—adds 

complexity to the exercise. When travel times are minimized on all routes

and no traveler has an incentive to choose yet another alternative, the 

system is said to be in equilibrium. Uncovering such an equilibrium is a 

goal of route assignment modeling. Pressure on particular route segments 

provides information to the policymaker on the possible expansion of the 

network or the use of tolls to reduce congestion.

Page 93 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed High Speed Rail Corridor 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, 

Nevada, High Speed Rail Corridor 

Three separate high speed rail proposals connecting the Los Angeles, 

California, and Las Vegas, Nevada, metropolitan areas illustrate the 

ridership and cost trade-offs that are associated with selecting, among 

other things, a particular route or train technology. The three options 

being explored include an incremental improvement to an existing 

conventional rail line, a high speed electrified (or diesel) steel-wheel on 

steel-rail line on dedicated track (project sponsor – Desert Xpress), and a 

magnetic levitation (maglev) proposal on dedicated guideway (project 

sponsor – California-Nevada Super Speed Train Commission). (See fig. 7.) 

One selection of route or train technology may maximize ridership and 

increase construction costs, while another option may draw lower 

ridership but at a substantially lower cost. 

Las Vegas is one of the most visited cities in the United States, and, 

according to project proponents, the mostly flat and desert terrain 

between Los Angeles and Las Vegas makes high speed rail development 

relatively straightforward, although some portions of the corridor are 

mountainous and have steep grades. Project sponsors for each option 

indicated that a transportation need exists between the two regions, due 

to capacity constraints on existing transportation modes, significant 

growth in population and employment, and projections for future growth 

in the long term. One-third of all visitors to Las Vegas are from California, 

and more than 10 million visitors are estimated to come from the Southern 

California area. This travel is estimated to grow substantially by 2030, 

although the Las Vegas economy has been hit particularly hard by the 

recent economic crisis, as reflected in the recent decreases in visitor 

volume. However, according to one project sponsor, travel from Southern 

California to Las Vegas has not been as severely impacted as visitation 

from elsewhere, as reflected by traffic counts on Interstate 15 (I-15) at the 

Nevada state line, which show only about a 5 percent reduction in 

automobile traffic. 

High speed rail stakeholders with whom we spoke said ridership on any 

high speed rail line will be impacted by the location of the rail stations in 

relation to where potential riders live for all stations along the line, but 

especially at the ends of the line. Desert Xpress will most likely forgo some 

ridership by terminating service outside of the Los Angeles area (in 

Victorville). Because riders must first drive their personal vehicles to 

Victorville—typically the most congested portion of the automobile trip 

between the Los Angeles area and Las Vegas—and then board a train, 

stakeholders have expressed concern regarding the level of risk related to

the estimates of riders. Similarly, the maglev project is designed to 

terminate in Anaheim, which may also result in fewer riders than 

Page 94 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

High Speed Passenger Rail

connecting directly to the more populous Los Angeles area, and similar 

concerns over risks associated with overly optimistic ridership estimates 

have been expressed.1

 The conventional rail proposal, while connecting 

directly into downtown Los Angeles, is plagued by slow speeds and travel 

times that are not as competitive with automobile or air travel. As such, 

the conventional rail proposal is likely to attract far fewer riders than the 

other proposed services.

Table 7: Summary of Three High Speed Passenger Rail Proposals in the Los Angeles to Las Vegas Corridor 

Project 

Corridor

length (in 

miles) Rail technology 

Onboard

travel 

time 

Service

frequency 

(daily) 

Projected

construction 

costs / Cost per 

milea

Annual 

ridership

(forecast 

year)b

Revenue

forecast 

(forecast 

year) 

Los Angeles – 

Las Vegas 

Conventional Rail 

Option 

321 Steel-wheel on steel-rail 

(diesel) 

Shared use with other 

commuter and freight rail 

services 

5 hrs. 

30 min. 

Between 4 

and 9 oneway trips/day 

$1.1-3.5 billion / 

$3.4-10.8 million 

322,000-

406,000 

(2010) 

$16.7-20.9 

million 

(2010) 

Desert Xpress 183 Steel-wheel on steel-rail 

(either diesel or

electrified) 

Exclusive, gradeseparated right-of-way 

1 hr. 

24 min. 

Between 69-

102 one-way 

trips/day 

$3.5 billion / 

$19.5 million 

16.2 million 

(2030) 

$1.2 billion 

(2030) 

California – 

Nevada Super 

Speed Train 

269 Magnetic levitation

Exclusive guideway 

1 hr. 

20 min. 

114 one-way 

trips/day 

$12.1 billion / 

$44.9 million 

42.9 million 

(2025) 

$517.4 

million 

(2025) 

Sources: IBI Group, Transmax Group, and American Magline Group. 

a

In nominal dollars. 

b

We did not validate the ridership and cost estimates. 

 1

BSL Management Consultants. Maglev or high speed rail in the Las Vegas to Southern 

California Corridor. A report prepared at the request of the City of Victorville. November,

2008. 

Page 95 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

High Speed Passenger Rail

The Regional Transportation Commission of Southern Nevada, the 

metropolitan planning organization for Southern Nevada, which 

encompasses Las Vegas, has been focusing on reestablishing conventional

rail passenger service between Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Amtrak’s 

Desert Wind service2

 was discontinued in 1997 as part of a broader 

restructuring of intercity passenger rail service that included the 

discontinuation, truncation, or restructuring of service on a number of 

Amtrak’s routes. The conventional rail option would make incremental 

improvements to existing rail track (using diesel equipment) and operate

in a shared-use environment with commuter and freight trains, and, as 

such, would require negotiations with the private freight railroads that 

own the tracks. With the incremental improvements, train speeds would 

be increased to allow for up to 90 miles per hour. The line would most 

likely begin in Los Angeles and terminate in Las Vegas—a total length of 

over 300 miles and an estimated travel time of over 5 hours. Prior 

passenger rail service on Amtrak’s Desert Wind took approximately 7 

hours and 15 minutes between Los Angeles and Las Vegas. The 

conventional rail option projects to draw approximately 300,000 riders per

year, and the estimated construction costs to implement these upgrades 

would be between $1.1 and $3.5 billion, which would be less than either of 

the following two options (see table 7 for a comparison of trip times, 

riders, and costs for all three proposals). 

Project Proposals 

Los Angeles-Las Vegas 

Conventional Rail

Desert Xpress The Desert Xpress option would operate on dedicated right-of-way with all 

new tracks not shared with other rail service with no grade crossings, 

using steel-wheel on steel-rail electrified (or diesel) equipment, with 

maximum speeds of up to 150 miles per hour, between Victorville and Las 

Vegas—a distance of a little less than 200 miles. Travel time between the 

two cities would be about 84 minutes. Victorville, California—located in 

San Bernardino County—is the first population center beyond the Cajon

Pass from the Los Angeles basin. Traffic from the Los Angeles area funnels

onto I-15 south of Victorville. Passengers from the Los Angeles area would 

need to drive to Victorville to catch the train. According to project 

sponsors, Victorville is generally within 1⁄2 to 11⁄2 hours for many of the 

 2

The Desert Wind service originated in Chicago and operated via Denver, Salt Lake City, 

and Las Vegas to Los Angeles. 

Page 96 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

High Speed Passenger Rail

more than 20 million residents of the 4 county area (Los Angeles, San 

Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange). However, according to transportation 

officials, this segment of the trip can be significantly delayed depending on

traffic conditions, in some cases, resulting in travel times to Victorville of 

up to 3 hours. Therefore, the overall envisioned trip time for a traveler 

using the Desert Xpress is expected to be between 2 and 3 hours, with the 

potential to go to over 4 hours on the basis of traffic conditions between 

Los Angeles and Victorville. According to ridership forecasts prepared for 

Desert Xpress and reviewed by a third-party contractor, the service is 

expected to attract up to 16.2 million riders per year by 2030 (8.1 million 

round trips), and Desert Xpress estimates the total project to cost 

approximately $3.5 billion. Desert Xpress officials indicate that the project

costs are significantly less than most dedicated high speed rail projects, 

primarily because, by terminating service in Victorville, they would avoid

the construction challenges and high costs of building through both the 

densely populated and developed areas in Los Angeles and Orange 

counties and the mountainous Cajon Pass. The planned route would also 

help reduce project costs by mostly using existing right-of-way, running 

either within or adjacent to the I-15 right-of-way and using adjacent federal 

lands where the use of highway right-of-way is not possible. The project 

sponsor is a private entity and would not be seeking any public funding to 

finance the costs of this project. 

California-Nevada Super 

Speed Train 

The California-Nevada Super Speed Train option would operate on 

dedicated right-of-way, using maglev technology, with maximum speeds of 

up to 300 miles per hour. The line would begin in Anaheim, California, and 

terminate in Las Vegas—covering a distance of 269 miles in approximately 

1 hour and 20 minutes. Project sponsors indicate that connecting Anaheim 

(where Disneyland is located) and Las Vegas, two popular tourist 

destinations, will help them draw significant ridership. The project is also 

being designed to connect to a new intermodal facility that is planned to 

be the Anaheim station terminus and would house transit connections to 

the Los Angeles area, including the proposed Los Angeles to San Francisco 

high speed rail line. In addition, project sponsors are considering a stop at 

the Ontario Airport that would allow for a 15-minute trip from Anaheim 

and, thus, make possible some diversion of air travelers from Los Angeles 

International and Orange County airports, which are soon to be at 

capacity. The estimated project costs of over $12 billion is the highest 

among the three high speed rail options, mostly due to the higher costs of 

constructing a maglev system. However, project sponsors highlighted 

some advantages unique to maglev technology, such as lower ongoing 

projected operation and maintenance costs and its ability to handle 

Page 97 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

High Speed Passenger Rail

steeper grades and curves as compared with steel-wheel on steel-rail 

technologies. 

Page 98 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

High Speed Passenger Rail

Figure 7: High Speed Rail Project Proposals from Los Angeles to Las Vegas 

San Bernadino

Riverside

Ontario

Victorville

Barstow

Los Angeles

Jean

Las Vegas

Palmdale

Lancaster

CALIFORNIA

NEVADA

Los Angeles

International

Airport 

Long Beach

Airport

Anaheim

LA Palmdale

Regional

Airport

Bob Hope

Airport

Proposed

Ivanpah

Airport

McCarren

International

Airport

15

15

15

Ontario

International

Airport

Technology:

Distance:

Travel time:

California-Nevada Super Speed Train ( )

Magnetic levitation

269 miles from Anaheim, CA, to Las Vegas, NV

1 hour, 20 minutes

Technology:

Distance:

Travel time:

Conventional train route ( )

Conventional steel-wheel on steel-rail (diesel)

321 miles from Los Angeles, CA (Union Station), to Las Vegas, NV

5 hours, 30 minutes

Technology:

Distance:

Travel time:

High speed steel-wheel on steel-rail (either diesel or electric)

183 miles from Victorville, CA, to Las Vegas, NV

1 hour, 24 minutes

Desert Xpress ( )

Cajon Pass

Sources: Nevada DOT, Caltrans, and GAO.

City

Airport

John Wayne

Airport

Page 99 GAO-09-317 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

It is estimated that 90 percent of the visitors to Las Vegas from the 

Southern California region drive on I-15, which is the major highway and 

the only available driving route connecting Las Vegas and Southern 

California. According to stakeholders, congestion on I-15 has gotten 

increasingly worse over the years, with a major choke point occurring in 

Victorville, where the eight-lane highway narrows to three through lanes in 

each direction for 30 miles to Barstow, and then to only two through lanes 

in each direction through the desert to Las Vegas. Travel times between 

the Los Angeles area and Las Vegas can increase 2 hours or more (from 

approximately 4 to 6 hours) during weekend and holiday peak travel times 

(reflective of the recreational nature of most travelers). I-15 is also a 

heavily traveled freight route between the two regions. Both Desert Xpress 

and the California-Nevada Super Speed Train Commission anticipate that 

their high speed rail will help relieve congestion along the I-15 corridor 

during peak periods. For example, Desert Xpress anticipates that 87 

percent of its riders will be diverted from automobiles. However, other 

stakeholders indicated that none of the current proposals are holistically 

looking at the transportation problems endemic to the corridor, such as 

looking at how to most effectively relieve some of the main drivers of 

traffic congestion in the Southern California area, and as we discussed 

earlier in this report, high speed rail’s ability to have an impact on highway 

congestion may be limited by the properties of induced demand and the 

preferences of drivers. 

The single largest air market to Las Vegas is from Southern California, and 

airports in Los Angeles and Las Vegas anticipate reaching and exceeding 

capacity by 2025. Clark County Department of Aviation3

 officials estimate 

that in 2007, approximately 3.6 million passengers (15 percent of all 

passengers) flew in from 1 of the 5 Southern California airports (Los 

Angeles International Airport, Bob Hope Airport in Burbank, Long Beach 

Airport, John Wayne Airport in Orange County, Ontario International 

Airport) servicing Las Vegas’s McCarran International Airport (McCarran). 

Both Desert Xpress and the California-Nevada Super Speed Train 

Commission anticipate that their service will draw a significant number of 

travelers off of planes and into trains. Desert Xpress estimates that just 

over 12 percent of its passengers will be diverted from air, while 

Highway Congestion 

Airport Congestion 

 3

The Clark County Department of Aviation is responsible for the management of five 

aviation facilities in the Las Vegas region, including McCarran International Airport and the

proposed Ivanpah Airport. 

Page 100 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail 
Appendix VII: Description of the Proposed 

Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, 

High Speed Rail Corridor 

California-Nevada Super Speed Train Commission estimates attracting 20 

percent of its passengers from air. In addition, as we have previously 

mentioned, the commission is planning a potential connection to Ontario 

International Airport to relieve capacity constraints at other Southern 

California airports. 

Current airport and highway expansion projects in the corridor also 

complicate the decision of whether to invest in high speed rail and how to

design the system, and highlight the importance of comparing high speed 

rail proposals with investment alternatives in other modes. However, no 

single institutional entity exists to consider these investments relative to 

one another, or in comparison with one another to determine how the 

transportation needs in the corridor can best be served. For example, two 

airport projects are currently being developed that will significantly 

expand airport capacity in the Las Vegas area. To address future projected 

growth, Clark County Department of Aviation officials said they are 

preparing to add a third terminal to expand McCarran’s capacity by an

additional 8 million passengers. In addition, the department has plans to 

build a new airport in the Ivanpah Valley, which is 6 miles north of the 

California state line and 30 miles south of downtown Las Vegas 

(approximately a 45-minute drive from Las Vegas). McCarran would then 

handle most of the domestic air travel, while the Ivanpah Airport would 

handle primarily international air travel. The planned opening of Ivanpah

is in 2018, and, at full build-out, the airport is expected to accommodate 30 

to 35 million annual passengers. The officials were incorporating the 

planned maglev line or Desert Xpress line into plans for the new Ivanpah 

Airport, but primarily as a means to transport international travelers from 

Ivanpah to the Las Vegas city center. Officials indicated that the existence

of a high speed rail line could provide capacity that could delay the need 

to build the Ivanpah Airport for several years, although eventually they 

anticipate enough demand to support an additional airport. However, 

airport expansion proposals do not consider the effects of a potential new 

high speed rail line, nor are airport expansions evaluated comparatively 

with high speed rail or highway expansion proposals. Similarly, capacity 

improvements are also planned on I-15 between Los Angeles and Las 

Vegas, and as with planned airport expansions, highway expansion 

proposals do not consider the potential effects of either rail or air travel 

alternatives and are not considered comparatively with such investments. 

Planned Capacity 

Improvements for 

Highways and 

Airports 

Page 101 GAO-09-317 High Speed Passenger Rail 
Appendix VIII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 102 GAO-09-317 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Andrew Von Ah, Assistant 

Director; Jay Cherlow; Colin Fallon; Greg Hanna; David Hooper; Delwen 

Jones; Richard Jorgenson; Catherine Kim; Max Sawicky; Gretchen Snoey; 

Jason Vassilicos; and Mindi Weisenbloom made key contributions to this 

report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(544150) High Speed Passenger Rail 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its Web site newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, 

go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

Please Print on Recycled Paper