07-0142-c r

USA v. Pearson
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

_______________ August Term, 2008 (Submitt ed: May

20, 2009 Dec ided: J uly 2, 2009) Docke t No. 07-0142-c r

_______________ U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee , —v.— A B R AH AM P EA R S ON ,

Defendant-

Appellant
.

_______________ B e f o r e : M I NER , K ATZ MANN , and R

AGGI , Circuit Judges
.

_______________ Appea l from a judg ment enter ed January 12, 2007, in the United States District Court for the Northe rn District of Ne w York ( McAvoy , J. ) c onvic tin gde fe nd ant- a pp e lla nt, fo llo wi nghis g uil ty ple a to m ult ipl e c ounts of

pr od uc ing , tr ans po rt ing , r e c e ivi ng , a nd po sse ssi ngc hil d pornog raphy , and sente ncinghim to, inte r a lia , p a y r e s ti tuti o nin

th e amo un t o f

$ 9 7 4 , 9 0 2
. We find that the district court ha s not ex plained ade quately its calculation of the r estitution amount2

and the re fo re va c ate that po rt ion of the jud g me nt a

nd re mand fo r f ur the r s e nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s.

_______________ L aurie S. Hershey , Manhasse t, NY, for Defendant-Appe llant
. Pa ul D . Si lve r, As sis tant Unit e d St ate s A tto rn e y , a nd Ste ve Gr oc ki, Trial Attorne y , for Andre w T. B axter, Interim United States Attorney for the N orthern D istrict of NewYork, Alba ny , NY, for Appellee
.

_______________ P ER C UR I AM : Def endant- appellant Abr aham Pea rson appe als from a

judgme nt entere d J anuar y 12, 2007, in the United States District Court for the N orthern D istrict of NewYork (Mc Avoy , J. )
co n v i ct i n g h i m , fo l l o wi n g a gu i l ty p l eat o mu l t i p l e c o un t s o f p ro d u ci n g, tra n s p o rt i n g, re ce i v i n g, and possessingchild pornog raphy , and sente ncinghim, inte r a lia , to se rv e fi ft e e n ye ars ’ imprisonment and to pay

restitution to the child victims of his crime in the a mount of $974,902. B e c a us e we c on c lud e that th e de fe nd ant h a s n ot w a ive d h is r ig ht t o a pp e a l th e re sti tut ion

amou nt,
we a re c alled upon to consider whether a re stitut ion order pur suant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259 may include an a

mount for estimated futur e medica l expenses, and, if so, whethe r the amount of
re sti tut ion

or de re d, wh ic h in c lud e d a n e sti mate of

the vic tim s’ futur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s, is
rea sonable. We hold that a re stitut ion order pur suant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259 may provide for estimated future medical e x penses, but we find that the district court ha s not ex plained adequately

its calculation of the r estitution amount. Therefor e, we vacate that portion of the judgme nt and re mand for f urther se ntencingproce eding s limi ted to that issue.

B ACKG ROUND3

In J anuar y 2006, Pearson wa s char g ed in a se venty -four count sec ond superse ding indictment with the production, transportation, possession, and rec eipt of child pornography , and with failing to keep r ecor ds pertainingto individuals portray ed in sexually expli cit conduct. The indictment alleg ed that he ha d, inter alia, videotaped a nd photogr aphed two minor f emales (“ Jane Do e #1 ” and

“ Jane Do e #2 ” ) i n s e xua lly e xplic it p os iti on s, and

e nti c e d th e m to e ng a g e in sexually expli cit conduct f

or the purpose of produc ing visua l depictions of such c onduct.

A. The Plea

Ag ree ment On June 6, 20 06 , Pe ars on

e nte re d into a

ple a a g re e me nt i n whic h h e a g re e d to ple a d guil ty to t we nty -o ne c ounts of

the se c on d s up e rs e din gind ic tme nt. In the first par ag raph of

the agree ment, the par

ties stipulated that “the par ticular sente nce specifie d below is the appr opriate disposition of this case.” Plea Ag ree ment ¶ 1(b) . That para g raph a lso stated that “[Pearson] consents to the entry of an or der dire ctinghim to pay restitution in full t o any

person who w ould qualify as a vic tim, under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 or § 3663A, of the a

bove mentioned of

fense (s).” Id. ¶ 1(c ). “I

n further ance of his restitution obligations,” Pearson a g ree d to provide $100,000 to the g overnme nt, prior to sentenc ing, to be divided equally

betwee n J ane D oe #1 and Jane Doe #2. Id. The ne x t para g raph, e ntitled “Potential Penalties,” confir med Pear son’s understa

nding that “[p] ursuant to the Mandatory Victim Restitut ion Act, the sente ncingCourt must order that the De fe nd ant p ay

re sti tut ion

to a ny vic tim s o f t

he of fe ns e s o f c onvic tio n, a s mo re fu lly se t f or th in para g raph 1.” Id. ¶ 2(e ). In para g raph 3, e ntitled “Ag ree d-Upon Sentenc e,” the g overnme nt and Pear son, pursuant4

to F e de ra l Ru le of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 11 (c )( 1) (C ), a g re e d th at
a se nte nc e of

15 y e ars imp ri so nme nt, a te rm of su pe rv ise d r e le a se of

up to life, an or der of

restitution as specified above , a spec ial assessment of $2,100, an orde r of f

orfe iture as se t forth below, a nd the other c onditions se t f or th i n p ara g ra

ph1 a bo ve is the a

pp ro pr iate dis po sit ion

of thi s c a se (her einaf ter re fer red to a s “the a g ree d dispositi on”). Id. ¶ 3 (e mphasis added) . The a g ree ment specifie d that the term of supe rvised re lease was not pa rt of the Rul e 11 (c )( 1) (C ) a g re e me nt a nd wo uld be de te rm ine d b y

the c ourt . Finally , in para g raph 11, the ag ree ment provided: [P ear son] acknowledg es that, af ter c onsultation with defense c ounsel, he fu lly un de rs tand s th e e xtent of his ri g hts to a

pp e a l, a nd /or to c oll ate ra lly at t ac k th e c o n v i ct i o nan d

s en t en ce i nth i s ca s e, i n cl u d i n g b y a c h al l en ge based on United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005) and its prog eny . [P ear son] waives any

and all rig hts, including those c onfer red by 18 U. S.C. § 3 74 2 a

nd /or 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 5, to a

pp e a l or c oll ate ra lly

atta c k h is conviction and a

ny sentenc e incor

poratingthe agree d dispositi on specifie d here in, including a

ny related issues with respe ct to the establishment of the advisory SentencingGuidelines ra ng e or the rea sonablene ss of the sentenc e imposed. Id. ¶ 11.

B. T h e P l eaP ro ce ed i n gs In J une 2006, Pear son appea red be fore the district court to plea d g uilty pursuant to the plea a g ree ment. Duringthose proce eding s, the district court conf irmed that Pear son understood the rig hts that he was wa iving by pleadingg uilty . On inquiry from the c ourt, Pearson sa id that he had talked to his attorne y about pleadingg uilty

to the rele vant counts and that his attorney had told him “the conseque nces of pleadingg uilty

and the de al.” Plea T r. 6:17-18. Pear son then pled g uil ty to t we nty -o ne c ounts of

the se c on d s up e rs e din gind ic tme nt.5

There afte r, the g overnme nt identified the maxim um and minimum penalties for the counts involved, including the maxim um and mandator y minimum terms of imprisonment and supervised r elea se, and the amount of the spec ial assessment. The g overnme nt did not, however, de sc ri be Pe ars on ’s po te nti a l r e sti tut ion ob lig atio ns . T h e d i s tr i c tc o urtth e nc o n f i r m e d th atP e ar s o nh a d

s i g n e d th e p l e a a g r e e m e n tv o l un t ar i l y,
rea d it before he sig ned it, discussed it with his attorney , and under stood it. DirectingPearson’ s attention to the appea l waiver provision of the agree ment, the cour t asked if Pea

rson under stood that he wa s waiving“the r ight to appe al or c ollatera lly attack your convic tion arising out of y our plea of g uilty here today

and any sentenc e the Court mig ht impose on y ou.” Plea Tr . 28:17-20. Pearson state d that he under stood. The c ourt ac cepte d Pearson’ s g uilty plea.
C. The SentencingProcee ding Pr ior to s e nte nc ing , th e g ov e rnme nt s ub mitte d in su pp or t of its re qu e st f

or re sti tut ion

to Pe ars on ’s vic tim s r e po rt s p re pa re d b y Dr . K e nn e th R e a g le s, the owne r o f K .W. Re a g le s & As so c iate s, L .L .C. , a

c omp any that pr ov ide s “ [f]o re ns ic vo c atio na l, r e ha bil itatio n, and

e c on omi c consultation service s, as well as e mploy ee a ssistance, c ase ma nag ement, and psycholog ical counselingservice s.” Gov’t App. at 65, 132. Reag les conc luded that ea ch victim “has a number of mental he alth issues that will require tre atment and se rvice s prese ntly and into the future , some for the rest of he r life” as a r esult of her sexual assault by

Pearson. Id. at 12-14, 109-10. He e stimated the future cost to Pearson’s vic tims of obtaining medica l car e to be $2,002,732 a ndReag les estimated that Jane Doe #1 w ould need pe riodic psychiatric evaluations (four 1 times a y ear) and a

reg imen of medications for the re st of her life , estimated to be a period of 39 y ear s, Gov’t App. at 15- 17; personal c ounseling once a wee k for the ne x t seven year s and twelve to six teen times a year

for the twe nty -seve n y ear s after that, id. at 17; and g roup counse ling twice a month for f

ive y ear s, id. at 18 . Re a g le s e sti mate d th at Jan e Do e #2 wo uld ne e d p e ri od ic psy chiatric evaluations (four times a year) and a reg imen of medications for the re st of her life , estimated to be a

period of 42.2 year s, id. at 112-13; per sonal counselingonce a wee k for the next t hree y ear s and eig ht to ten times a y ear for r est of her

life af ter that, id. at 114; and g roup counselingtwice a

month for four year s, id. For eac h treatment, Reag les provided the pr esent annual c ost, which, in the ca se of f uture tre atments, he a

pprec iated “by

a per centa g e fa ctor e qu iva le nt t o th e annua l c ha ng e in a pp ro pr iate e le me nts of

the Me dic a l Pr ic e Ind e x for the pa st 10 y ear s, viz . 4.6% per

y ear .” Id. at 16, 112. His total estimates wer e base d on the estimated tr e atme nt r e qu ir e me nts and the e sti mate d c os t f

or e a c h tr e atme nt. 6 $921,976 for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2, r espec tively . Gov’t App. at 18, 114. 1 In J anuar y 2007, Pearson a

ppear ed bef

ore the district court for

sentenc ing. A t the hear ing, the district court stated that it had r eviewe d the “plethor a of infor mation” and se ntencing
me mor and a

su bmi tte d b y

the pa rt ie s, a s w e ll a s “ the mate ri a ls s ub mitte d o n b e ha lf of the vic tim s with the restitution issue” by Reag les. Sent’gHr’g . Tr. 3:17-25. Di sc us sin gRe a g le s’ s r e po rt s, the c ourt no te d th at it

“ d[id ]n’ t be lie ve ” that D r. Re a g le s, “who is a ve ry

g ood economist, [is ] qualified to make diag noses in the ca se of se vere psy cholog ical impediments ca used alleg edly

by the def endant.” Id. at 10:10-15. The c ourt found that the victims’ “psycholog ical impediments” we re “ cause d, at least in par t, by the def endant,” but th e c ourt

ob se rv e d th at th e vic tim s “ ha d s ome pr ob le ms b e fo re ” and that it wa s d if fi c ult “ to quantify” or “ pinpoint the etiology” of the victims’ mental health issues that re quired ong oing treatment. Id. at 10:13-11:8. Althoug h Reag les’s re ports included “a very detailed a

naly sis of what the [victims’] problems wer e bef ore the y encounte red Mr . Pearson a nd what the . . .
exacer bation turned out to be a fter the ir experience s with Mr. Pearson,” id. at 11:17-20, the c ourt

“ dis c ount[e d] su

bs tanti a lly

wh at D r. [Re a g le s] ha s p ut b e fo re us be c a us e he ’s no t c omp e te nt t o7

make a ll these judg ments,” id. at 13:5-6. The c ourt conc luded also that the victims’ future medical e x penses should not be discounted to a prese nt value bec ause the restitution could not be p a i d p r e s e n t l y. Th e c ourt re lie d o n Re a g le s’ s p ro po se d r e sti tut ion amou nts a s st art ingpo int s, but it did not adopt those amounts. Wit h respe ct to J ane D oe #1, the c ourt order ed that Pear son pay restitution of $667,577, an amount equa l to one-third of the a mount proposed by

Reag les. The court orde red that Pearson pay J ane D oe #2 re stitut ion of $307,325, explaining that it had applied the “same mathematica l formula” a s it had employ ed for the first victim. Id. at 14:12. The dis tr ic t c ourt

ind ic ate d th at th e re we re “ a lot of oth e r t hin g s” that it

ha d p ut i nto the c a lc ulatio ns , inc lud ingwh at th e tw o v ic tim s h a d “ do ne su bs e qu e nt t o th e tim e the y we re inv olv e d w ith [P ear son].” Id. at 14 :15 -1 9. In a dd iti on , th e c ourt se nte nc e d Pe ars on

to 1 80 -m on ths ’ imprisonment and a lifetime ter m of supervised r elea se.

D I S CUS S I ON A. Appellate Waiver A threshold question is whether Pearson wa ived his rig ht to appeal the r estitution order. A def endant’ s knowing and voluntary waiver of his rig ht to appeal a

conviction and se ntence within an ag ree d upon g uideline ra ng e is enfor cea

ble. See U

nited States v. He rnandez , 242 F.3d 11 0, 11 3 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 1) (p e r c ur iam) . “ Wai ve rs of a pp e llate ri g hts
. . . a

re to b e a pp lie d n arr ow ly and construe d strictly

ag ainst the Gover

nment.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). Howeve r, “[i] n no circ umstance . . . ma y a def endant, who ha s secur ed the be nefits of a plea ag ree ment and knowing ly and voluntarily

waived the rig ht to appeal a cer tain sentenc e, thenAlthough w e ac knowledg e that the de fenda nt consented to the e ntry

of an or der 2 dir e c tin ghim

to p ay re sti tut ion

“ in f ull ,” we do no t e nd or se the us e of su c h v a g ue langua g e to purportedly

specify the agree d upon dispositi on of a r estitution order in a c riminal case
. 8 appea l the merits of a se ntence confor ming to the a g ree ment.” United States v. SalcidoContreras , 990 F.2d 51, 53 ( 2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In this case, Pea

rson waive d his right to appe al “his convic tion and any sentenc e incorpora ting the a g ree d dispositi on specifie d here in.” Plea Agree ment ¶ 11. Ac cordingto the parties’ stipulation, t he “a g ree d dispositi on” included, inte r a lia , an orde r of r estitution “as specifie d above,” id. ¶ 3, to wit, an orde r to pay restitution “in full,” id. ¶ 1(c ). Such an 2
a g re e me nt p la inl y

c on te mpl ate s a

futur e de te rm inatio n o f t he amou nt n e c e ssa

ry to p ro vid e “ fu ll” restitution to defenda

nt’s victims. I n these c ircumstance s, we c onclude that Pea rson has unambig uously

waived his right to appeal a district court’s a

war d of full re stitut ion, but he has not unambiguously

waived a ppeal of possible error s in the determination of what amount constitutes full restitution. In United States v. Re ady , we c onsidered the following waiver languag e:

“ [Th e de fe nd ant] a

nd the Un ite d St ate s k

no wi ng ly and e xpre ssl y wa ive a ll ri g hts c on fe rr e d b y

18 U. S.C. Se c tio n 3 74 2 to a pp e a l wha te v e r se nte nc e is imposed , including a

ny issues that relate to the establishment of the g uid e lin e ra

ng e , r e se rv ingon ly

the ri g ht t o a

pp e a l f ro m a sentenc e resulting from an adjusted ba se off ense le vel of g reater than twe nty -three .” 82 F.3d 551, 560 ( 2d Cir. 1996) (alter ation in orig inal). Elsewhe re the ag ree ment provided: “Th[e] Court m ay

also order

y our client to make restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sections 3663 and 3664 .” Id. at 559 (a lteration in orig inal). Notingthis latter provision of the agree ment, we
c on c lud e d th at [t]ho ug h Re a dy ’s wa ive r o f h is a pp e llate ri g hts
. . . is a dmi tte dly9 br oa d .
. . , it

do e s n ot d ist inc tly

ne g ate [the ] state me nt t

hat r e sti tut ion

wi ll be imposed in a c c or

da nc e with there

sti tut ion sta tute . There is thus an ambig uity (at the le ast) as to the pa

rties’ intent with reg ard to re stitut ion penalties imposed illeg ally . Construing this ambig uity strictly ag ainst the Gover nment, we must presume that on the issue of re stitut ion, the parties intended the phr ase, ‘ ”whatever sentenc e is imposed,” to mean “ whateve r sentenc e is imposed by

law.” Id. (empha sis added). Her e, as in Ready , “the a g ree ment expli citly applie[d] the bac kg round pre sumption of leg ality ,” id. , to the court’s r estitution order whe n it provided that “[Pearson] consents to the entry of an or der dire ctinghim to pay restitution in f

ull .” Ple a Agre e me nt ¶

1( c ) ( e mph a sis added) . We conclude, the ref ore, that Pearson has not unambiguously waived his right to appeal whether the amount of re stitut ion ordere d compensates the victims “in full.”

B. Restitution Amount We reviewan orde r of r estitution “defer entially , and we will rever se only for a buse of discretion. To identify

such abuse , we must conc lude that a c halleng ed rulingrests on an e rror of law, a c lear ly

err oneous findingof fa ct, or other wise ca nnot be locate d within the rang e of permissible dec isions.” United States v. Boc cagna , 450 F.3d 107, 113 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks and c itations omi tted). Pearson a rgues that the re stitut ion order in this ca se is err oneous bec ause the district court did not have a sound ba sis for deter mining what the projec ted costs of ther apy wer e for the two vic tim s. Our Circuit has not addr essed whe ther re stitut ion ordere d pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259Section 2259 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides the a pplicable f

rame work 3 for the c alculation of r estitution i n this case. See U nited States v. Julian , 242 F.3d 1245, 1246 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 1) (“ [E]ve n if

the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr on e ou sly

us e d th e g e ne ra l r athe r t

ha n th e sp e c if

ic restitution statute as a basis for its judgment, it is the lang uag e of § 2259 w ith which we a re conce rned in de termining whether the cour t had statutory

authority and discre tion to award f uture costs for c ounseling .” (c itation omit ted)). 10 may include re stitut ion for estimated f uture medic al expenses. Section 2259(b) pr ovides for 3
mand ator y re sti tut ion

of “ the fu ll amou

nt o f t he vic tim ’s los se s, ” wh ic h in c lud e s “ any c os ts incurre d by

the victim” for “ medical se rvice s relatingto phy sical, psychiatric , or psycholog ical
car e.” T hree of our sister c ircuits have c onsidered this languag e and c oncluded that § 2259 authorizes compensation for future counselingexpenses. See United States v. Doe , 488 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Danse r , 270 F.3d 451, 455 ( 7th Cir. 2001); Julian , 2 42 F .3 d at 12 46 -4 8; United States v. Laney , 1 8 9 F
. 3 d 9 5 4 , 9 6 6
- 6 7 ( 9 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 9 )
. We
are not awar e of a

ny of our sister c ircuits that have r eac hed a c ontrary conclusion. We are persua ded by

the ana ly sis of our sister circ uits and conclude that a re stitut ion order pur suant to 18 U. S.C. § 2 25 9 ma

y inc lud e re sti tut ion

fo r e sti mate d f

utu re me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Whil e a r estitution order pursua nt to 18 U.S.C . § 2259 may include an a

mount for future medical e x penses, “ an orde r of r estitution for future losses may be inappr opriate [wher e] the amount of loss is too difficult to confirm or ca lculate.” Laney , 1 89 F .3 d at 96 7 n .1 4; see D oe , 488 F.3d at 1160 (“We will uphold an awa rd of r estitution under Section 2259 if the district court is a ble to e sti mate , b a se d u

po n f a c ts i n th e re c or d, the amou nt o f v ic tim ’s los s w ithso me
re a so na ble c e rt a int

y .” ); Danser , 270 F.3d at 455-56 (conc luding that the r estitution figure was not plainly

err oneous base d on the unce rtainty of the proje cted c osts where the cour t held a hear ing c oncer

ning the victim’s need f

or longterm counse ling a nd had evide nce of

the costs of11

futur e c ouns e lin g ); Julian , 242 F.3d at 1248 (vac atingand re mandingfor a hear ing on the victim’s need f

or future counselingand the e stimated cost of that counse ling) . Where fur ther losses are likely

but the amount cannot be calc ulated with re asonable cer tainty at the time of the initial sentence, a

victim may

never theless be a

ble to secur e compe nsation for the f urther losses pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)
. In this case, a lthough the r ecor d contains evide nce of the victims’ need f

or longterm counselingand of the cost of that counse ling, the district c ourt did not ex plain how it estimated the victims’ future e x penses. Plainly , it was not persua ded that Dr . Reag les’s ca lculations
re lia bly pr e dic te d f

utu re los s, and

it o rd e re d r e sti tut ion

in a su bs tanti a lly

low e r a mou nt. Stil l, wi tho ut m or e inf

or matio n a s to ho w the dis tr ic t c ourt re a c he d th e low e r f

igur e , w e are un a

ble to
c on du c t e ve n d e fe re nti a l r e vie w o f whe the r t he fi na l r e sti tut ion

or de r r e fl e c ts a

re a so na ble estimate of the c ost of future c ounseling . We express no view on this point. At t his point, we
rema nd the ca se simply

to secure a more thoroug h explanation from the district court a s to the basis for its restitution determination. In doing so, w e vac ate that pa rt of the judg ment order ing $974,902 to affor d the district court fle x ibilit y to adjust the awa

rd if, in providingits ex planation, it determines that the or igina l order doe s not acc urate ly ref lect “f ull” restitution, as ag ree d to by the de fe nd ant.

C ONCL US I ON Acc ording ly , we VA CATE that part of the judg ment order ing $974,902 r estitution and R E M A N D th e c a s e f

o r th e l i m i t e d

p ur p o s e o f o r d e r i n gr e s t i tu t i o nc o n s i s t e n tw i thth i s o p i n i o n . In all other re spects, the district cour t’s judgme nt of conviction is AFF I RMED.