COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Alston, Deck er and Senior Judge Coleman

CHRISTINA MAXSON, S/K/A CHRISTY MAXSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0455-14-4 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 16, 2014 STAFFORD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF STAFFORD COUNTY J. Martin Bass, Judge (James J. Ilijevich, on brief), for appellant. (Catherine Miller Saller; Ellen B. Hagan, Guardian ad litem for the infant child, on brief), for appellee.

Christina Maxson, s/k/a Christy Maxson (hereinafter “mother”), appeals the termination of her residual parental rights to her child, A.M. Mother asserts the evidence was insufficient to justify termination of her parental rights becau se it failed to prove th at the Stafford County Department of Social Services (“the Department”) provided reasona ble and appropriate efforts to assist her in remedying the conditi ons that led to A.M.’s foster care placement. For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s decision. Background When reviewing a decision to terminate pare ntal rights, we presume the circuit court “‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, consider ed the statutory requirements, and made its

determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2005) (quoti ng Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). On November 13, 2012, mother left her seven-month-old daug hter, A.M., alone in a motel room strapped into a car seat perched on top of a bed. Mother left her alone fo r approximately two

hours while mother smoked crack co caine with a friend. The police were noti fied when the baby’s cries were heard. When the police arrived, they fo und the child in an overtu rned car seat “hanging upside down.” Drug para phernalia was in the ro om with the baby, and when mother finally returned, she “reeked of alcohol. ” Mother was charged with fel ony cruelty to children and child abuse and neglect. Blood tests show ed mother had cocaine, Butalbital, and Tramadol in her system. Mother stated that A.M. might test positive for marijuana and cocai ne “because of the heavy drug

use in the room.”

A.M. was removed and placed in foster care . Although mother was incarcerated, the initial foster care plan in January 2013 established a goal of return home. By June 2013 , however, the Department decided to seek termination of mother’s parental rights. Upon further investigation, it learned that mother was a fugitive from Florida at the time of her arrest. Mother had fled from Florida to Virginia while pregna nt with A.M. She acknowledged she had us ed drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy and that she was homeless. Fr om the time of A.M.’s birth, mother and child

had lived in several counties with several different caretakers. Ot her than A.M., mother had three other children, none of whom she was able to parent. 1 On February 10, 2014, the trial court terminated mother’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Th is appeal followed.

1 Mother had one of the children while she was incarcerated on the charges related to A.M. Mother agreed to place th is child in an adoptive home.- 3 - Analysis The “termination of residual parental rights is a grave, drastic, and irreversible action,” Helen W. v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Hu man Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), and we presume the trial court “‘to have thoroughly weighed all th e evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determ ination based on the chil d’s best interests,’” Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without eviden ce to support it.’” Id. (quotin g Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988)).

The trial court terminat ed mother’s parental rights pursuan t to Code § 16.1- 283(C)(2). That section provides that ter mination is warranted if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that: * * * * * *  The parent . . . without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or requ ired continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, me dical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof that the parent or parents, without good cause, have failed or been unable to make substantial progress towards elim ination of the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement in accordance with their obliga tions under and within the time limits or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court or any other plan jointly designed and agreed to by the parent or parents and a public or private so cial, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agency shall c onstitute prima facie evidence of this condition. The court shall take into consideration the prior- 4 - efforts of such agencies to rehabil itate the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in foster care. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).

Mother contends the evidence was insufficien t to warrant termination of her parental rights because the Department failed to provide her with reasonable and appropriate services. However, the record demonstrates that mother was incarcerated from the time of A.M.’s removal until the time mother’s parental rights were terminated. In Harrison v. Tazewell Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 590 S.E.2d 575 (2004), we stated that, “as long as [a parent] [i]s incarcerated, the Department [has] no avenue available to offer [the parent] se rvices aimed at assisting h[er] in regaining custody of the child.” Id. at 163-64, 590 S.E.2d at 583. “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a court must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropr iate efforts given the facts be fore the court.” Ferguson v. Stafford Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992). Here, the record supports th e trial court’s determination that the Department made reasonable and appropriate efforts to comm unicate with mother and to strengthen the parent-child relationship. At the time A.M. was removed, she was only seven months old. After finding mother guilty of abuse or neglect, the ju venile and domestic re lations district court

ordered reasonable visitation betw een mother and A.M. at the De partment’s discretion, but only “upon [mother’s] release from [i ncarceration].” This order was entered on January 15, 2013, and mother appeared before the court on that date re presented by counsel. Mother cites nothing from the record suggesting she objec ted to the court’s dispositi on, and she never petitioned for visitation through her attorney. Furthermore, while the Service Ma nual of the Virginia Department of Social Services directs social wo rkers to “[m]aintain cont act” between a child and an incarcerated parent, nothing in the manual dictates “contact” thr ough visitation in jail or- 5 - prison. As for other forms of contact, such as telephone calls, A.M. was too young to engage in

conversation with her mother. Devonne Johnson, the social worker assigned to mother, testified that the initial service plan contemplated offering multiple services to mother upon her rel ease from jail. This plan was drafted, however, prior to mother being sentenced on multiple criminal charges. By November 15, 2013, mother had received a sent ence totaling six year s, with four years suspended, and was awaiting transfer from the regi onal jail to the pe nitentiary. Johnson explained that the Department could not offer any serv ices outside of the jail, but he confirmed with mother’s case manager, Darlene Gallahan, that mother had partia lly complied with the initial service plan goals during her incarceration. [W]hile long-term incarceration does not, per se, authorize termination of parental rights or negate the Department’s obligation to provide services, it is a valid and proper circumstance which, when combined with other evidence concerning the parent/child relationship, can s upport a court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the children will be served by termination. Id. at 340, 417 S.E.2d at 11-12. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’ ” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). In addition to her incarceration, mother ha d a long history of drug abuse and had been diagnosed with traumatic stress disorder and ma nic depression. Prior to her incarceration, she was unemployed, homeless, and unable to care for her other children. A.M. tested positive for cocaine, and mother admitted usi ng drugs during her pregnancy with A.M. Mother continued to place her need for drugs above A.M.’s best intere sts after A.M.’s birth, leaving the infant alone

in a motel room for hours while mother used co caine. These circumstances, combined with- 6 - mother’s incarceration, when view ed as a whole, constituted clear and convincing evidence that termination of mother’s parental rights was in A. M.’s best interests, that mother was unwilling or unable to remedy substantially th e conditions leading to A.M.’s foster care placement within twelve months of her removal, and that the De partment made reasonable and appropriate efforts to assist mother in remedying the co nditions leading to A.M.’s removal. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court’s decision. See Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.