S. HRG. 110–757 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 2, 3, 8, AND 10, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

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IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE 

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47–921 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–757 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 2, 3, 8, AND 10, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 

(II)

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Wednesday, April 2, 2008 (A.M.) 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: MILITARY PROSPECTS 

Page 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared statement . 63 

Flournoy, Michele, president, Center for New American Security, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4 

McCaffrey, GEN Barry, USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey Associates LLC, 

adjunct professor of international affairs, U.S. Military Academy, Arlington, 

VA .......................................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Briefing slides presented by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey during his testimony ............................................................................................................... 73 

Odom, LTG William E., USA (Ret.), senior adviser, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, former director, National Security Agency, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA (Ret.), former Commandant, U.S. Army 

War College, CEO/president, Colgen, LP, Washington, DC ............................. 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Wednesday, April 2, 2008 (P.M.) 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: POLITICAL PROSPECTS 

Biddle, Dr. Stephen, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 112 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 116 

Article ‘‘Patient Stabilized’’ written by Dr. Biddle—from The National 

Interest, March 2008–April 2008 ................................................................. 166 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 85 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 86 

Rosen, Nir, fellow, New York University, Center on Law and Security, New 

York, NY ............................................................................................................... 125 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 133 

Said, Yahia, director for Middle East and North Africa, Reveneue Watch 

Institute, New York, NY ...................................................................................... 87 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92 

Thursday, April, 3, 2008 

IRAQ 2012: WHAT CAN IT LOOK LIKE? HOW DO WE GET THERE? 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 171 

Brancati, Dr. Dawn, fellow, Institute of Quantitative Social Studies, Harvard 

University, Cambridge, MA ................................................................................. 187 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 189 

Gause, Dr. F. Gregory III, associate professor of political science, University 

of Vermont, Burlington, VT ................................................................................. 204 

Page

IV 

Gause, Dr. F. Gregory III, associate professor of political science, University 

of Vermont, Burlington, VT—Continued 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 207 

Kelly, Dr. Terrence K., senior operations researcher, RAND Corporation, 

Pittsburgh, PA ...................................................................................................... 191 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 193 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 174 

O’Leary, Carole, research professor, School of International Service and program director, Center for Global Peace, American University, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 176 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 182 

Pascual, Hon. Carlos, vice president, director of foreign policy, Brookings 

Institution, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 212 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 216 

Tuesday, April 8, 2008 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: WHAT NEXT? 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 243 

Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 249 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 256 

Responses to questions submitted by: 

Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr ..................................................................... 329 

Senator Christopher Dodd ........................................................................ 342 

Senator Russell Feingold .......................................................................... 347 

Senator Robert Menendez ......................................................................... 352 

Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr ..................................................................... 357 

Lugar, Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement .................... 246 

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq, 

Baghdad, Iraq ....................................................................................................... 260 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 267 

Responses to questions submitted by: 

Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr ..................................................................... 333 

Senator Christopher Dodd ........................................................................ 344 

Senator Russell Feingold .......................................................................... 348 

Senator Robert Menendez ......................................................................... 355 

Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr ..................................................................... 358 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared statement . 318 

DeMint, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared statement ...... 316 

Dodd, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement . 328 

Thursday, April, 10, 2008 

NEGOTIATING A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 361 

Glennon, Michael J., professor of international law, Fletcher School of Law 

and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA ................................................ 407 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 410 

Long, Hon. Mary Beth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, DC ..................................... 371 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar ................. 447 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 365 

Matheson, Michael J., professor, George Washington University School of 

Law, Washington, DC .......................................................................................... 401 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 403 

Satterfield, Hon. David, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC; accompanied by 

Joan Donoghue, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 368 

Page

V 

Satterfield, Hon. David, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC; accompanied by 

Joan Donoghue, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, 

Washington, DC—Continued 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 369 

Joint responses of Ambassador Satterfield and Assistant Secretary Long 

to questions submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ........................... 439 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar ................. 445 

Joint responses of Ambassador Satterfield and Assistant Secretary Long 

to questions submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. ........................... 448 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator George Voinovich ................. 451 

Wedgwood, Ruth, Edward B. Burling Professor of International Law and 

Diplomacy, director of the International Law and Organizations Program, 

The Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins 

University, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 425 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 428 

(1) 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: MILITARY 

PROSPECTS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008 (A.M.) 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Nelson, Menendez, 

Cardin, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Chairman Lugar and I welcome this panel. What a distinguished 

panel to start off our hearings. We’re going to have about a week’s 

worth of hearings in preparation for, and following on, the anticipated testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and 

we really appreciate folks of your stature being willing to come 

back, time and again, to this committee to give us the benefit of 

your judgment. And we truly appreciate it. 

Nearly 15 months ago, in January 2007, President Bush announced that he was going to engage in a tactical decision to surge 

30,000 additional American forces into Iraq. The following September, when Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus testified 

before the Congress, they told us that the surge would start to 

wind down this spring, at which point they would give the President and the Congress their recommendations for what should 

come next. And that’s the context of the 2 weeks of hearings that 

we start today in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 

for—and the context for several basic questions that we’re going to 

be asking. 

The first of those questions, at least from my perspective, is—has 

the surge accomplished its stated goal? Not merely—‘‘what has the 

surge accomplished?’’—but ‘‘has it accomplished its stated goal?’’ 

And the next question, obviously, is, Where do we go from here 

with the surge? Do we continue it? Do we pause? Do we drawdown 

to presurge levels? But, much more importantly, where do we go 

from here? What has it accomplished? And what does it—does it 

lead us closer to the stated objective of the President of having a 

stable—I’m paraphrasing—a stable Iraq, not a threat to its neighbors, and not endangered by its neighbors, and not a haven for terVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
2 

ror? Does it get us closer to that goal? And if not, why? What do 

we have to do? And if it does, how much do we have to continue 

it? 

And we also heard, yesterday, from the intelligence community, 

in a closed session—Senator Lugar and I have sort of, I guess, informally instituted the notion that we—in these serious hearings— 

and they’re all serious, but these matters relating to Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, Iraq, points of real conflict, potential conflict, we—the 

whole committee participates, in a closed hearing, with the intelligence community, to give us a context, the most current context 

that the intelligence community thinks we’re operating in. And 

that’s what we began with yesterday, in a closed session; we heard 

about the security, political, and economic situation in Iraq, and 

the trend lines in the months ahead, and the new—it just so happened that, even though the hearings were scheduled, the National 

Intelligence Estimate for Iraq came out yesterday, and we had an 

opportunity to thoroughly discuss that with the community. 

And this morning we’re going to hear from experts on the military aspects of the surge and what our military mission and posture should be when it ends, or if it should end. At other hearings, 

we’re going to question experts on the political situation in Iraq. 

Now, I don’t mean to so compartmentalize this. I know each of 

the—each of our witnesses has the capacity to speak to the political 

dynamics, as well, and they’re welcome to do that. But, we have 

somewhat artificially divided it today between the military and political aspects of the consequences of the surge. 

And then we’re going to do what I think is sort of an obligation 

for us to do, and that is try to imagine a reasonable best-case scenario for what Iraq might look like in the year 2012. I mean, what 

is the objective here? What are we hoping to accomplish? And what 

can we do to help us get there? And—and, I guess, parenthetically—is it worth it? We’ll look at the long-term security assurances the administration has started to negotiate with Baghdad, as 

well, in these 2 weeks of hearings, to determine whether or not 

they require congressional approval or they require a rise of the 

level of a treaty, or are they merely Status of Forces Agreements? 

It’s unclear, at this moment. And we’re going to be going into depth 

on that. 

And then we’re going to bring back Ambassador Crocker and 

General Petraeus to learn their recommendations for a post-surge 

strategy. 

Violence in Iraq has declined significantly from its peak in 2006 

and 2007. Many of us in this committee have recently been to Iraq. 

Our staff has been there extensively and written recent reports, 

coming back. There’s no question, violence is down. And it’s no 

small measure because of the—our military and the job they did, 

as they always do with incredible valor and with dispatch. But, 

these gains are somewhat relative. Violence is back to where it was 

around 2005. I’m always forced, whenever I say anything about violence being down, my wife looking at me and saying, ‘‘Yeah, but 

how many—how many are still being killed?’’ And so, Iraq remains 

a very dangerous place, and very far from normal. 

3 

And there are other factors that have contributed, besides the 

valor of our military and the planning of General Petraeus, I believe, contributed to a reduction in violence. 

First, the Sunni Awakening Movement, which preceded the 

surge, and which the administration helped sustain—and I agree 

with them; it’s not a criticism—by paying monthly stipends to tens 

of thousands of former insurgents, that has had a major impact on 

the reduction in the violence. 

Second, Sadr’s decision to declare—until last week, and now 

again—declare and extend a cease-fire with the Mahdi—his Mahdi 

Militia. That cease-fire is looking somewhat tenuous, but, nonetheless, it has played a major role in the reduction in the violence. 

And third, and tragically, the massive sectarian cleansing that 

has left huge parts of Baghdad segregated along sectarian lines, 

and reduced the opportunities for further displacement and killing, 

over 4 million people—a couple of million inside the country, a couple of million outside the country. 

And these are three major factors, I believe—and I’d like the 

panel to let me know whether they think I’m wrong about that— 

that I believe have contributed significantly, beyond—beyond the 

valor of our military, to the reduction of violence. But, they’re all 

tenuous. All of these underscore the fragility of the so-called gains 

that we’ve achieved, and it highlights that, while the surge may 

have been a tactical success, it has not yet achieved a strategic 

purpose, which was to bide time for political accommodation among 

the Iraqi warring factions. Thus far, that strategy appears to have 

come up short. Iraqis have passed several laws in recent weeks, 

but it remains far from clear whether the government will implement those laws in a way that promotes reconciliation, instead of 

undermining it. 

Meanwhile, from my perspective at least in my business, there’s 

no trust within the Iraqi Government in Baghdad, there’s no trust 

of the government by the Iraqi people, and there’s no capacity— 

there’s very little; I shouldn’t say ‘‘no’’—there’s very little capacity 

on the part of the government to deliver basic security and 

services. 

Assuming the political stalemate continues, the critical military 

questions remain the same as they were when President Bush announced his surge, 15 months ago. What should be the mission of 

our Armed Forces? Why are they there? What is the purpose? 

Should we continue an open-ended commitment with somewhere 

near 150,000 troops, hoping the Iraqis will eventually resolve their 

competing visions for the country? Should we continue to interpose 

ourselves between Sunni and Shia, and seek to create a rough balance of forces, or should we back one side or the other? Should we 

continue to intervene in the intra-Shia struggle for power? I remember, I think—I don’t want to get him in trouble, but I think 

I remember talking with General McCaffrey, some time ago, and 

us both talking about how—the inevitability of a Shia-on-Shia war. 

I mean, they’re—you know, I went down, a year ago, into Basra, 

with a British two-star, and we sat there, one of my colleagues 

said, ‘‘Tell me about the insurgency,’’ and the British two-star said, 

‘‘There is no insurgency down here, Senator,’’ and then he laid out 

what was going on, which is pretty straightforward. He said—I 

4 

think he used the phrase, ‘‘The various Shia militia,’’ both well 

organized, like the Badr Brigade, and hard-scrapple groups that 

are—that were coming up—he said, ‘‘They’re like vultures, like 

mafia dons. They’re circling the corner, waiting for us to leave, to 

see who’s going to be in control.’’ Yet, no one wanted to hear us 

talk about the fact that this intramural war—civil war—fight was 

inevitable. 

And so, what should be our posture? Did it make sense for us 

and the British to go in and essentially pick sides in this one? 

Their government is in competition with other Shia parties from— 

in an upcoming election. Did we do the right thing? Or should we 

move to a more limited mission, one that focuses on counterterrorism, training, and overwatch, as the British have done in southern Iraq? Or should we withdraw, as the calls are coming a little 

more clearly—should we withdraw completely, according to a set 

timetable? What are the military and strategic implications of each 

of these missions? What mission can we realistically sustain, and 

for how long, given the stress of our Armed Forces? At least three 

of you have extensive experience dealing with the opportunity costs 

this war is presenting to us. The stress and strain. The Pentagon 

testified yesterday before the Armed Services Committee, talking 

about how beleaguered our military is, and how we can’t sustain 

this very much longer. And so, there are some questions I hope this 

highly respected panel will be willing to address. 

In the interest of time, I’m going to keep the introductions much 

briefer than each of your public service warrants. 

General McCaffrey is a former SOUTHCOM commander. He’s 

president of BR McCaffrey Associates, one of the most decorated 

military people in the—alive and engaged today, an adjunct professor of international affairs at the United States Military Academy, and, as a measure of his courage and undaunting valor, he 

actually took on the job of being a drug czar, which is, maybe, 

almost as difficult as doing anything else. That’s where he and I 

first go to know each other pretty well, and it’s a delight to have 

him here. 

LG William Odom, who has served as director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988. He is currently a senior adviser 

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a voice 

that is always, always listened to and widely, widely respected. 

And Ms. Flournoy, who served in the 1990s as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. She is currently the president of the Center for New American 

Security. 

And GEN Robert Scales, he’s a former commander of the U.S. 

Army War College, and he’s the president and cofounder of the 

Colgen defense consulting firm. 

And, again, we welcome all of you and look forward to your testimony. But, before I yield to the witnesses, in that order, I’d like 

to yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in welcoming our distinguished panel to the Foreign Relations 

5 

Committee this morning. We appreciate, especially, the study that 

our four witnesses have devoted to Iraq and their willingness to 

share their thoughts with us today. The Foreign Relations Committee seeks sober assessments of the complex circumstances and 

policy options that we face with respect to United States involvement in Iraq. We are hopeful that our hearings this week, in advance of the appearance next Tuesday of General Petraeus and 

Ambassador Crocker will illuminate the progress that has been 

made in Iraq, as well as the barriers to achieving our objectives. 

Clearly, conditions on the ground in many areas of Iraq improved 

during the 6 months since our last hearings. We are grateful for 

the decline in fatalities among Iraqi citizens and U.S. personnel, 

and the expansion of security in many regions and neighborhoods. 

The violence of the past week is a troubling reminder of the fragility of the security situation in Iraq and the unpredictability of 

the political rivalries that have made definitive solutions so difficult. Despite security progress, the fundamental questions related 

to our operations in Iraq remain the same. Namely, will the Iraqi 

people subordinate sectarian, tribal, and political agendas by sharing power with their rivals? Can a reasonably unified society be 

achieved despite the extreme fears and resentments incubated during repressive reign of Saddam Hussein and intensified during the 

last 5 years of bloodletting? Even if most Iraqis do want to live in 

a unified Iraq, how does this theoretical bloc acquire the political 

power and courage needed to stare down militia leaders, sectarian 

strongmen, and criminal gangs, who frequently have employed violence for their own tribal and personal ends? And can the Iraqis 

solidify a working government that can provide basic government 

services and be seen as an honest broker? 

We have bemoaned the failure of the Baghdad Government to 

achieve many political benchmarks. The failure of Iraqis to organize themselves for effective governance continues to complicate 

our mission and impose incredible burdens on our personnel. But, 

it is not clear that compromises on political and economic powersharing would result in answers to the fundamental questions just 

stated. Benchmarks measure only the official actions of Iraqi leaders and the current status of Iraq’s political and economic rebuilding effort. They do not measure the degree to which Iraqis intend 

to pursue factional, tribal, or sectarian agendas over the long term, 

irrespective of decisions in Baghdad, and they do not measure the 

impact of regional players, such as Iran, who may work to support 

or subvert stability in Iraq. They also do not measure the degree 

to which progress is dependent on current American military operations, which cannot be sustained indefinitely. 

The violence during the past week has raised further questions 

about the Maliki government. Some commentators asserted that 

operations by Iraqi Security Forces in Basra are a positive demonstration of the government’s will and capability to establish order 

with reduced assistance from the United States. Others claim that 

in attacking militias loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, the government of 

Prime Minister Maliki was operating on a self-interested Shiite faction, trying to weaken a rival prior to provincial elections. 

Regardless of one’s interpretations, the resulting combat poses 

risks with the voluntary cease-fire agreements that have been cruVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
6 

cial to the reduction in violence during the last several months. 

This improvement in stability did not result from a top-down process of compromise driven by the government; rather, it came from 

a bottom-up approach that took advantage of Sunni disillusionment 

with al-Qaeda forces, the Sadr faction’s desire for a cease-fire, and 

America’s willingness to work with and pay local militias to keep 

order. We need to assess whether these voluntary cease-fires can 

be solidified or institutionalized over the long term, and whether 

they can be leveraged in some way to improve governance within 

Iraq. 

For example, can the bottom-up approach contribute to the enforcement of an equitable split in oil revenue? Can it be used to 

police oil smuggling? Can it provide the type of security that will 

draw investment to the oil sector? Can it sustain a public bureaucracy capable of managing the civic projects necessary to rebuild the 

Iraqi economy and to create jobs? If the utility of the bottoms-up 

approach is limited to temporary gains in security, or if the Baghdad Government cannot be counted upon to be a competent governing entity, then United States strategy must be revised. 

As we work on the short-term problems in Iraq, we also have to 

come to grips with our longer term dilemma there. We face limits 

imposed by the strains on our volunteer Armed Forces, the economic costs of the war, competing foreign policy priorities, and 

political divisions in our own country. The status of our military 

and its ability to continue to recruit and retain talented personnel 

is especially important as we contemplate options in Iraq. 

The outcome in Iraq is extremely important, but U.S. efforts 

there occur in a broader strategic, economic, and political context. 

The debate over how much progress we have made in the last year 

may be less illuminating than determining whether the administration is finally defining a clear political-military strategy, planning for follow-on contingencies, and engaging in robust regional 

diplomacy. 

I thank the chairman for calling this series of hearings, and look 

forward to our discussions with this distinguished panel this morning, and an equally distinguished group this afternoon. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Why don’t we begin in the order I introduced you, beginning with 

General McCaffrey, and moving to his right, in that order. 

And we will—when we get to questions, gentlemen. Is 7 minutes 

OK? We’ll do 7-minute rounds. 

So, General, welcome back. It’s a pleasure to have you here. I’m 

anxious to hear what you have to say. I’ve read your testimony, 

but—please. 

STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY MCCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR MCCAFFREY ASSOCIATES LLC, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, ARLINGTON, VA 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, let me thank you, Senator Biden and 

Senator Lugar and the committee members, for the chance to be 

here and to join Michelle Flournoy and Bill Odom and Bob Scales, 

all of whom I’ve known and worked with over the years. 

7 

Let me, if I may, offer—they’re already, I think, in the committee 

hands—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. This presentation, which—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s been handed out. 

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Sort of a summary of our Joint 

Forces Command Working Conference I keynoted a couple of weeks 

ago, and that’s a shorthand way of following the arguments I have 

been making. I’ve submitted a sort of an outline of the comments 

that I would make this morning, if I went through nine assertions 

on where I think we are. 

And let me also, sort of, strike a note of, if I can, complement 

the two of your opening statements. That says it all. Those are coherent, comprehensive. It asks the right questions. You sort of 

wonder, ‘‘How did we end up in this mess?’’ given your pretty acute 

understanding of the situation on the ground. 

Let me, if I can, just talk generally. 

First of all, there’s no question there’s some good news here. The 

best news is, we’ve got Secretary Bob Gates in the Pentagon, so the 

tone of the national security debate has gone from irrational and 

arrogant to one of cooperation. I think Dr. Rice is now empowered 

to begin using the tools of diplomacy. The people we’ve got on the 

ground in Iraq, this Ambassador, Ryan Crocker, is an absolute consummate professional. He’s changed the nature of the way we 

coach-work with the Iraqi factions. Dave Petraeus, the general we 

put on the ground, I think’s a national treasure. I’ve watched this 

guy since he was 25. He’s probably the most talented person we’ve 

had in uniform in the last 40 years, and his tactics have changed 

the nature of this struggle dramatically. I say ‘‘tactics’’ advisedly. 

The whole notion of getting out of the base camps into the downtown urban areas, colocating Iraqi police and army, clearly was 

courageous. It incurred significant casualties. It helped change the 

nature of the struggle. 

And then, finally, I think, we ought to take account—we’ve got 

a fellow there, LTG Jim Dubick, and a pretty good team, now, trying to stand up these Iraqi Security Forces. So, they’ve gone from 

the police being uniformed criminal organizations to—we put all 

nine national brigades back through retraining, new uniforms, 

fired eight of the nine brigade commanders; they’re starting to get 

equipment. The Iraqi Army is appearing now in significant numbers. We’re just now beginning to build a maintenance system, the 

medical system, medical evacuation, command and control. We 

should have done that, clearly, 4 years ago. But, I think that’s moving in the right direction. 

Now, contrast that, though—it seems to me—and I just came 

out, in December—that the Maliki government, in a general sense, 

is completely dysfunction. There isn’t a province in Iraq, from the 

ones that are in Kurdish north, that are economically and politically doing OK, to the incoherent situation in Basra, where a central government holds sway, where electricity, oil production, security, health care—there’s no place in Iraq where that government 

dominates, at provincial level. And it’s not likely to do so. So, Mr. 

Maliki is one of the few people in Iraq who doesn’t have his own 

militia, and he’s not much of a power figure. Hard to know where 

8 

that’s going. He needs provincial elections, a hydrocarbon law. He’s 

got to get consensus from among competing Shia groups. He’s got 

to deal with corruption. That government is incompetent; but, even 

worse, it’s corrupt at a level that it’s hard to imagine. And then, 

finally, he’s got to reach out to the Sunnis. 

The other thing that’s going on is that the Iranians are playing 

an extremely dangerous role, particularly at this phase, where we 

still have enormous combat power in Iraq. They are actively arming, equipping, providing belligerent political purpose, providing 

money, providing out-of-country training to Shia factions. There 

was some argument, in the past years, they’ve provided some support to the Sunni insurgency. If they encourage, which I don’t believe they are, a general uprising among the Shia, in the next 3 

months, we’ll be able to deal with it, militarily; it would be a disaster, politically. But, if—as the months go by, as we withdraw 

from Iraq—and withdraw, we will; we’ll get down to 15 brigades by 

July; I assume we’ll drop to a lower number by the time the administration leaves office—we’ll actually get in a militarily threatening 

situation, where these people, the Shia, sit astride our lines of communication back to the gulf. We’ll actually be in a risk situation. 

Now, it’s added to by—by the way, the other thing, I think it’s 

widely not talked about inside the Beltway—the other good news 

we’ve got is U.S. Armed Forces in country. I mean, I say—I have 

to remind people, 34,000 killed and wounded—a tiny Army and 

Marine Corps and Special Operations—some of these kids are on 

their fourth, or more, combat tour. I just went to a brigade of the 

101st—brigade commander and 400 of his troops were on their 

fourth year-long deployment. So, we’ve run this thing to the wall, 

and they’re still out there. 

I did a seminar of 39 battalion commanders in Baghdad, and 

what struck me, listening to them, for a couple or 3 hours, was 

that—not that they were such great soldiers, which they are, but 

that they were the de facto, low-level Government of Iraq. They’re 

trying to do health care and jump-start industry and create women’s rights groups and doing call-in radio shows for the mayor to 

respond to. It was just unbelievable, what these people are doing. 

That Army is starting to unravel. And GEN Dick Cody, God bless 

him, came over here and laid it on the line yesterday. We have a 

huge retention problem. Mid-career NCOs, our high-IQ, competent, 

experienced captains, are leaving us. We’ve got a significant recruiting problem. I’d say, you know, just a general order of magnitude, 10 percent of these kids coming into the Army today 

shouldn’t be in uniform—non-high-school graduates, Cat-4B, felony 

arrests, drug use, psychotic medication. We’ve got a problem. And 

the problem is multiple deployments to Iraq, where their dad and 

mom are saying, ‘‘Don’t you go in, even for the college money. 

They’ll hold you hostage, given stop-loss, for the next 8 years.’’ The 

Army’s starting to unravel. 

U.S. air and naval power is not resourced appropriately. Our Air 

Force is starting to come apart. The Navy’s the smallest since preWorld War II. You know, down the line, 15 years from now, when 

we’re trying to do deterrence on the legitimate emergence of the 

People’s Republic of China into the Western Pacific, we’d better 

9 

have F–22 and modernized naval forces, and a new airlift fleet, or 

we won’t be able to sustain deterrence. 

And then, finally, as you look at the Army globally, we’re now 

hugely reliant on contractors. I don’t know what the numbers 

really are—120,000 in Iraq, maybe 600 killed, 4,000 wounded. They 

do our long-haul logistics, our long-haul communications, they 

maintain all the high-technology equipment. We need to go back 

and readdress the manpower of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

to decide, Do we really want to be so reliant on these patriotic, 

hardworking, effective contractors, who, at the same time, aren’t 

uniformed, and, when things really go critical, will not, and cannot, 

stay with us? 

The CHAIRMAN. General, when you say—if I’m—excuse me for interrupting—when you say ‘‘contractors,’’ you’re referring, as well, to 

personnel who are toting weapons, not just contractors building 

buildings. You’re talking about—— 

General MCCAFFREY. A lot of these contractors are flying armed 

helicopters, they’re carrying automatic weapons, they have hundreds of armored vehicles. But, in addition, it’s Turkish truckdrivers—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I got it. I just wanted, for the record, to 

make—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Sure we knew what that phrase encompassed. I—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Some of them are egregiously wrong. Some 

of them, by the way, it’s appropriate. I think it’s good to have contractors maintaining communications gear and computers in a brigade TOC. That’s OK. It’s hard to imagine why the U.S. Marine 

Corps doesn’t provide external security for a U.S. ambassador in a 

combat zone, as opposed to a private contractor. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I just wanted to make sure—I knew—I just 

wanted to make sure, for the record, everyone understood that. 

General MCCAFFREY. Right. 

Well, you hear a lot of debate about the contractor community. 

I put in my remarks: Without the contractors, the war grinds to 

an immediate halt, because we simply can’t sustain it without 

these civilian businesses that are supporting us. 

Final note, if you will, is one, really, a point toward the future. 

Personal viewpoint—and I say this as a soldier—there’s no political 

will to sustain the current national security strategy in the United 

States. Period. It’s over. So, we’re going to come out of Iraq in the 

next 2, 3 years, largely. We’re going to hope that our internal strategies, the two of you have already articulated, allows a government 

to form, that we have provincial elections, where there’s some legitimacy at lower level, that the Iraqi Security Forces can maintain 

order, not us. But, out of Iraq, we will come. 

And the jury’s out on what’s going to happen next, in my view. 

I don’t—I am modestly optimistic. These people are courageous, 

they’re smart, they don’t want to be Lebanon or Pol Pot’s Cambodia. But, certainly the events of the last week just underscore the 

chaotic nature inside the three major factions, never mind the current civil war between Shia and Sunni, and the next war that will 

take place, which will be the struggle between Iraqi Arabs and the 

10 

Kurdish north. It’ll be fought over ground and oil. And that’s coming. The question is, Can we buffer that? Can we reduce that outcome? 

And, as you mentioned, all of this, of course, is compounded by 

4 million refugees and a brain drain. The dentists, the engineers, 

they’re leaving, they’re going to Syria, Iran, France. A sensible person gets out of there right now, if they can. 

On that note, let me, again, thank you for the chance to lay down 

some of these ideas, and I’ll look forward to responding, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY MCCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR 

MCCAFFREY ASSOCIATES LLC, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 

U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, ARLINGTON, VA 

I. Thanks to Committee: Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Senator Lugar. 

II. Honored To Join: Hon. Michele Flournoy, LTG Bill Odom, MG Bob Scales. 

III. Was honored to submit earlier to the committee the briefing slides I used as 

opening keynote speaker on 19 March 2008 at USJFCOM Joint Operating Environment Workshop here in Washington, DC. These slides summarize my views on the 

general status of U.S. National Security Policy in the global environment. You may 

find them helpful as a shorthand summary of my views on the employment of military power in the coming years to defend America. 

IV. Purpose of Hearing: ‘‘Iraq after the Surge: Military Prospects.’’ Let me offer nine 

general conclusions. 

1. The tactical situation in Iraq is for now enormously improved; casualties to 

U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces are down dramatically; economic life has improved; 80,000+ CLC members have defused the Sunni insurgency; JSOC has 

defeated an urban AQI insurgency. 

2. We now have brilliant new national security leadership in place: Secretary 

Bob Gates; GEN Dave Petraeus; Ambassador Ryan Crocker; Temp CENTCOM 

Commander LTG Marty Dempsey. 

3. The Iraqi Security Forces are improving in leadership quality, numbers, and 

equipment. 

—400,000 total and growing. 

—National Police—fired 8 of 9 brigade commanders—police retrained. 

Note: Still no maintenance system, no medical system, no helicopter lift 

force, no significant armor nor artillery, no attack aviation. Officer leadership very thin on the ground. 

4. The Maliki Government is dysfunctional. He must: 

—Get Provincial Elections. 

—Get a hydrocarbon law. 

—Organize consensus among competitive Shia groups (many are criminal 

elements). 

—Deal with corruption. 

—Reach out to Sunnis. 

5. The Iranians are playing a very dangerous role. They are supporting Iraqi 

Shia factions with: Money, advisers, training in Iran, EFPs, mortars, rockets, 

automatic weapons, and belligerence. 

—We must open up a multilevel dialog with the Iranians. 

6. We have never had in our country’s history a more battle-hardened U.S. military force; courage (34,000 killed and wounded), leadership, initiative, intelligence, fires discipline, civic action. Our battalion and company commanders 

are de facto the low level Government of Iraq. 

7. The U.S. Army is starting to unravel. 

—Equipment broken. 

—National Guard is under resourced. 

—Terrible retention problems. 

—Severe recruiting problems. 

11 

—Army too small. 

8. U.S. Air and Naval Power seriously underresourced. 

—Sailors and Airmen diverted to ground war. 

—Air Force equipment crashing as a system [need 350 F22A aircraft—600 

C17 (dump C5)]. 

—$608 billion war—diverting resources. 

9. Excessive reliance on contractors because ground combat forces too small. 

—Need more U.S. Army Military Police. 

—Need more U.S. Army medical capacity. 

—Need more U.S. Army Combat and Construction engineers. 

—Need greatly enhanced Special Forces, Psy Ops, and Civil Affairs. 

—Need U.S. Marine Corps to provide all diplomatic security above RSO 

capabilities. 

Note: Without U.S. contractors and their LN employees, the U.S. global 

military effort would grind to a halt. 

—Total contractor casualties may be 600 killed and 4,000 wounded—many 

abducted. 

—Contractors run much of our global logistics, long-haul communications, 

high-technology maintenance, etc. 

V. Summary: 

—As U.S. Forces drawdown in coming 36 months—the jury is out whether Iraq 

will degenerate into all out civil war with six regional neighbors drawn into 

the struggle. 

—There is no U.S. political will to continue casualties of 100 to 1,000 U.S. military killed and wounded per month. 

—Our allies have abandoned us for lack of their own national political support. 

—The war as it now is configured—is not militarily nor politically sustainable. 

—The Iraqis are fleeing—4 million refugees—huge brain drain. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Odom. 

STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), SENIOR 

ADVISER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES, FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC 

General ODOM. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the committee. It’s an honor to be back here again. 

Last year, I rejected the claim that the surge was a new strategy. 

Rather, I said it was a new tactic in pursuit of the same old strategic aim: Political stability in Iraq. And I foresaw no serious prospects of success. I see no reason to change my judgment today. The 

surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for 

unity, as the President claims. 

Last year, as General McCaffrey noted, General Petraeus wisely 

promised that—declined to promise that a military solution is possible to this political problem. Now, he said he could lower the level 

of violence, for a limited time, to allow the Iraqi leaders to strike 

a deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced, but today there is 

credible evidence—little or no evidence that the political situation 

is improving; in fact, it’s the contrary, it’s more fragmented. And 

currently we see the surge of violence in Basra and also in Baghdad. In fact, it remains sporadic, as others have said, throughout 

other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding this drop 

in Baghdad earlier and Anbar province. 

More disturbing is Prime Minister Maliki’s initiation of a military action, down in Basra, which has dragged the United States 

forces in against something they didn’t approve, to try to do in his 

12 

competitors, his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback. This 

is not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge. 

No less disturbing has been this violence in Mosul and the tensions, as just mentioned, around Kirkuk over the oil. A showdown 

there, I think, is—surely awaits us. The idea, I think, that some 

kind of federal solution can cut this Gordian Knot is sort of out of 

touch with the realities, as they are there today. 

Also disturbing is Turkey’s incursion to destroy PKK terrorist 

groups inside Kurdistan. That confronted the U.S. Government 

with a choice either to support its NATO ally or make good on its 

commitment to secure the Kurdish leaders. It chose the former, 

and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will 

sacrifice their interests to its larger interest in Turkey. 

Turning to the apparent success in Anbar and a few other Sunni 

areas, this is not the positive situation it has been reported to be. 

Clearly, violence has declined, as local Sunni leaders have begun 

to cooperate with U.S. forces, but the surge tactic cannot be given 

full credit. The decline started earlier, with Sunni initiatives. What 

are their motives? First, anger at the al-Qaeda operatives, and, second, their financial plight. Their break with al-Qaeda should give 

us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed al-Qaeda precisely because 

they would help kill Americans. 

The concern we hear the President and his aids express, about 

a residual base left for al-Qaeda if we withdraw, is utter nonsense. 

The Sunnis will soon destroy al-Qaeda if we leave. The Kurds do 

not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, 

detest al-Qaeda. To understand why, one only need take note of the 

al-Qaeda diplomacy campaign over the past couple of years on 

Internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and destroy this apostate Shiite regime. 

Now, as an aside, just let me comment that it gives me pause 

to learn that our Vice President, President, and some Members of 

the Senate are aligned with al-Qaeda on spreading the war to Iraq. 

Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid 

for their loyalty. I’ve heard of one example, where the rough estimate for the costs in a one—100 square kilometers—that’s a 10-by10-kilometer area—is $250,000 today to pay these fellows. Now, 

you might want to find out, when the administration’s witnesses 

come next week, what these total costs add up to and what they’re 

forecasted for in the years ahead. Remember, we do not own these 

people, we rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects them from—to some degree—from the government’s troops and its police, hardly a sign of 

reconciliation. 

Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals 

with Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified under any single 

leader. Some remain with al-Qaeda. Many who break and join our 

forces, are beholden to no one else. Thus, the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strongmen who distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. 

Thus, the basic military situation is worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political leaders. 

13 

This can hardly be called military stability, much less progress 

toward political consolidation. And to call it fragility that needs 

more time to become success is to ignore its implications. 

At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s actions last week indicate an even wider political and military fragmentation. We are 

witnessing what could more accurately be described as the road to 

Balkanization; that is, political fragmentation in Iraq. We’re being 

asked by the President to believe that this shift of so much power 

and finance to so many local chiefs is the road to political centralization. He describes this process as state-building from the bottom up. 

Now, I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses to 

explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case 

where power has been aggregated from local strongmen to a central 

government, except through bloody violence in a civil war, leading 

to the emergence of a single winner, almost—without exception, a 

dictator. The history of feudal Europe’s transformation to absolute 

monarchy is this story. It’s the story of the American colonization 

of the West and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue 

the clan rule on the Scottish-English border. And this is the source 

of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo today. 

How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective 

state-building? More accurately described, it has placed the United 

States on—astride several civil wars, not just one, and it allows all 

sides to consolidate, rearm, refill their financial coffers, at U.S. 

expense. 

To sum up, we face a deteriorating situation, with an overextended Army, so aptly described by General McCaffrey. When 

the administration’s witnesses will come before you, I hope you 

make them clarify how long the Army and Marines can withstand 

this Band-Aid strategy. 

The only sensible strategy is to withdraw, but with—in good 

order. Only that step can break the political paralysis that is gripping United States strategy in the region today. 

I want to emphasize this. You can’t devise a new strategy—we 

cannot change the present unhappy course we’re on without first 

withdrawing. That unfreezes the paralysis and begins to give us 

choices we don’t even see now. Until we get out, we won’t even 

know what they are. 

The next step, when we get out, is to choose a new aim: Regional 

stability, not some meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that goal requires revising our strategy toward Iran. If the 

President merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, 

that could prompt Iran to lessen its support for Taliban groups in 

Afghanistan. Iranians hate Taliban, and they support them only 

because they will kill Americans there as retaliation in the event 

we attack Iran. 

Iran’s policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as 

we withdraw. It cannot want instability. Iraq’s Shiites are Arabs, 

and they know Persians look down on them. Cooperation has its 

limits, and people have tended to exaggerate the future influence 

of Iran in Iraq. It has real, important limits. Even the factions in 

the—that are working in—among the Shiites today are divided on 

that issue. No quick retaliation—reconciliation between the United 

14 

States and Iran is likely, but steps to make Iran feel more secure 

could conceivably improve the speed with which we develop some 

kind of cooperation with them, particularly more speed than a policy calculated to increase their insecurity. The President’s policy of 

insecurity in Iraq has reinforced the Iranian determination to 

acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying 

to prevent. 

Now, withdrawal from Iraq does not mean, in my view, withdrawal from the region. It must include realignment of where we 

are deployed in the area, and reassertion of both our forces and our 

diplomacy that give us a better chance to improve our situation 

and reach the goal of regional stability. 

I’m prepared to comment more on that in the questions, but I’m 

going to end here, because I think that answers the question I 

came up to answer, whether the so-called surge strategy is working. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), SENIOR ADVISOR, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to 

appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was 

the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked. 

Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a 

new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim: Political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success. 

I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, 

not creating the conditions for unity as the President claims. 

Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this 

political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited 

time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily 

reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more 

fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it 

has also remained sporadic and significant in several other parts of Iraq over the 

past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar province. 

More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then 

dragged in U.S. forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This 

is a political setback, not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic. 

No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of 

the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with 

Kurdish realities. 

Also disturbing is Turkey’s military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in 

the border region. That confronted the U.S. Government with a choice: Either to 

support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to 

insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that 

the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey. 

Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, 

this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to cooperate with U.S. forces. But the surge 

tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. 

What are their motives? First, anger at al-Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight. 

Their break with al-Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed 

anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al-Qaeda. The concern we 

hear the President and his aides express about a residual base left for al-Qaeda if 

we withdraw is utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al-Qaeda if we leave 

Iraq. 

The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, 

detest al-Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al-Qaeda public 

15 

diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on Internet blogs. They implore the 

United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime. 

As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our Vice President and some Members of the Senate are aligned with al-Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran. 

Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the cost in one area of about 

100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day. And periodically they threaten to defect 

unless their fees are increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these 

deals forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and they do 

not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We merely rent them. 

And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects 

them to some degree from the government’s troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation. 

Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with the Sunni 

strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some remain with 

al-Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the 

decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who 

distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic 

military situation is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under 

local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses. 

This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that needs more time to become success 

is to ignore its implications. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s military 

actions in Basra and Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. What we are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the 

Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being asked by the 

President to believe that this shift of so much power and finance to so many local 

chieftains is the road to political centralization. He describes the process as building 

the state from the bottom up. 

I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses this week to explain this 

absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case where power has been aggregated successfully from local strongmen to a central government except through 

bloody violence leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history 

of feudal Europe’s transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story 

of the American colonization of the West and our Civil War. It took England 800 

years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the 

source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective state-building? 

More accurately described, it has placed the United States astride several civil wars. 

And it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the 

U.S. expense. 

To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an overextended army. 

When the administration’s witnesses appear before you, you should make them clarify how long the Army and Marines can sustain this Band-Aid strategy. 

The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that 

step can break the paralysis now gripping U.S. strategy in the region. The next step 

is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And 

progress toward that goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the President 

merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to 

lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and 

supports them only because they will kill more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a U.S. attack on Iran. Iran’s policy toward Iraq would also have 

to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites 

are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between 

them has its limits. 

No quick reconciliation between the United States and Iran is likely, but U.S. 

steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The President’s policy has reinforced Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent. 

Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must include 

a realignment and reassertion of U.S. forces and diplomacy that give us a better 

chance to achieve our aim. 

A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have 

refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let me try 

again to explain why they don’t make sense. 

First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training element with no 

combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at all. The idea that U.S. miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
16 

tary trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe and effective is flatly rejected by several 

NCOs and junior officers I have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to 

command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills. 

Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard that argument as the ‘‘domino theory’’ in Vietnam. Even so, the path to political stability will 

be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw or not. The idea that the United 

States has a moral responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it. 

The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more Americans. Unlike 

preventing chaos, we have the physical means to stop sending more troops where 

many will be killed or wounded. That is the moral responsibility to our country 

which no American leaders seem willing to assume. 

Third, naysayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional instability. This 

confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and our threat to change Iran’s regime 

are making the region unstable. Those who link instability with a U.S. withdrawal 

have it exactly backward. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the 

sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies’ interest. 

I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the commitment of 

U.S. forces to war in Iraq. 

Thanks for this opportunity to testify today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CEO/ 

PRESIDENT, COLGEN, LP, WASHINGTON, DC 

General SCALES. Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you very 

much for having me here. And it’s a pleasure to join three old colleagues, who I’ve known for many years, to testify before you. 

I’m going to take a little bit more of a military-specific view of 

the situation in Iraq, and talk about what the new strategy might 

look like from a soldier’s perspective. 

I don’t think anyone doubts that General Petraeus, over the last 

year, has wrenched some military advantage out of what was about 

to become a catastrophic defeat; and he did it, not so much by increasing the numbers, to my mind, but by instituting a new strategy that’s focused on counterinsurgency. And he’s reached what we 

soldiers sometimes call a ‘‘culminating point,’’ which results in a 

shift in the military advantage. And when all the variables are 

fixed, a culminating point generally works to the advantage of one 

side or another. The problem is that, in an insurgency, all the culminating point does is buy you time. And, as we’ve seen in Vietnam, as a teachable moment, culminating points aren’t always 

military victories, in an insurgency. So, the advantage can be lost 

if the dynamics in the war change. My concern is that the dynamics will change after the surge. And I guess that’s why I’m here 

today. Because after the surge, and as United States forces begin 

to wind down, the Iraqis will assume the responsibility for their 

own defense, and this battlefield advantage that we’ve won at the 

cost of over 4,000 dead Americans, is at risk if we fail to manage 

this transition properly. 

First of all, let me say, sir, that very little can be done to change 

the battlefield dynamics before the surge ends. The counterinsurgency strategy is right, can’t be altered. The crucible of patience 

among the American people, as my two colleagues have just said, 

is emptying, and is not going to be refilled. Al-Qaeda numbers are 

17 

small, but, though small, they’ve remained a fairly constant force 

in Iraq. It’s sort of like a virus that’s in recession. They’re not going 

away. And, sadly, and most importantly, I guess, to the future, is 

that the United States has run out of military options, as well. For 

the first time since the Civil War, the number of ground soldiers 

available is determining American policy, rather than policy determining how many soldiers we need. It’s a strategy turned on its 

head. 

And I think what’s important here is that the arithmetic is telling. Beyond the surge, at best, we can only sustain somewhere 

between 13–15 brigades without the Army unraveling. Afghanistan 

will require at least three brigades, and I suspect, gentlemen, as 

time goes on, that number may grow, sadly. So, that leaves us with 

no more than 12 brigades for continued service in Iran—in Iraq 

over the long term. So, regardless who wins the election, and 

almost independent of conditions on the ground, by the summer the 

troops will begin to come home. The only point of contention is how 

precipitous that withdrawal is going to be. And after the surge, 

nothing can be done without the ability of the Iraqi military to sustain the security. 

So, I would submit to you, as a thesis, that the new center of 

gravity for the remaining phases of this war will be the establishment of an effective Iraqi national security apparatus. And the 

question you have for me, I believe, is, Are the Iraqis up to the 

task? Some signs are encouraging. If you’ve read the headlines in 

the last few days, the Iraqi 14th Division deployed to Basra, as you 

know, to destroy the Shia militias and the criminal gangs there. An 

Iraqi Motor Transport Brigade moved one national police and three 

army brigades, on short notice, from Baghdad to Basra, a distance 

of over 400 miles. Also out of the news, but also of some interest, 

is that Iraqi Special Forces were transported, some in Iraqi C–130 

aircraft, from the northern regions of Iraq to the vicinity of Basra. 

General McCaffrey talked about logistics. One Iraqi-based support 

unit, so far at least, has managed to sustain the Basra operation, 

with some help from American-supplied civilian contractors. But, 

frankly, problems remain. Some units in the 14th didn’t fight well. 

Sectarian infiltration and desertions are present in that unit. Now, 

the division hasn’t lost its fighting effectiveness or cohesion; that’s 

the good news. This sounds like praise. But, remember, only a year 

ago, it would have been virtually impossible to pull an Iraqi Army 

division from one province and move it to another in shape—with 

a willingness to fight. 

A couple of other encouraging things that we’ve observed over 

the last year is that the officer leadership at the small-unit level 

seems to be improving. And this is kind of a double-edged sword, 

because the leadership has improved through this Darwinian process of self-selection that allows armies to pick the right people in 

the crucible of battle. That’s the most wasteful way to win: To build 

an army when it’s trying to reform itself while fighting. We had 

this experience in the American Civil War, where we had to build 

our Army from scratch during a war, and it’s a very painful process. But, the merit-based promotion system on the field of battle 

seems to be working. The NCOs are the backbone of our Army as 

many of the veterans on the committee will testify. But, there is 

18 

no tradition in Iraq for an NCO corps. It’s an alien concept to them. 

But, in the last year or so Iraqi divisions have started to establish 

schools to try to inculcate the leadership culture, if you will, of the 

NCO ranks, and that’s encouraging. 

But, improvements in the Iraqi tactical area are not going to 

occur without significant American involvement. It’s the American 

military training teams, squad-sized units, that are embedded in 

Iraqi combat battalions and brigades, that are making the 

difference. 

Another important factor are partnership arrangements between 

American units on the ground and Iraqi combat units. One of the 

things we’ve learned in this war, in the recent years, is that the 

most powerful tools for transforming an army are emulation and 

example. Fighting side by side with Iraqis makes the Iraqis fight 

better. It’s wasteful, it’s OJT in combat, if you will, but it seems 

to work. 

The third factor is the personal relationships between the Iraqis 

and the Americans. General McCaffrey talked about battalion commanders and brigade commanders, many of whom I observed in my 

last trip, who not only are helping to rebuild the country, but are 

helping to rebuild the army as well. 

There will be some serious problems within the Iraqi forces after 

the surge. Senior leaders and staffs are doing a reasonably good job 

of moving battalions and brigades from point to point, but their 

ability to do quality planning and execution, frankly, is very immature. Too often, senior leaders are promoted and selected based on 

nepotism or tribal and clan loyalty, another very serious problem. 

Clearly, sectarianism, in many units, still trumps allegiance to the 

nation. Recently we have seen instances of soldiers deserting, 

rather than fight against their tribal peers. 

General McCaffrey alluded to the most serious shortcoming; combat enablers in this army are immature at best. Such things make 

an army robust and able to sustain itself over time, like intelligence, fire support, administration, logistics, communications, and 

medical support, have been put on the shelf for too long. And, unfortunately, we face the prospect of keeping American units of this 

sort in Iraq longer to begin the process of building these functions 

for the Iraqi Army. 

So, several years on, how will the American military help the 

Iraqi Army transition itself as we withdraw? First is this idea of 

a ‘‘thinning’’ strategy. The last thing that we want to do is pull ourselves out, whole cloth, like we did in Vietnam. Instead of brigades 

withdrawing as a brigade, the strategy should be to ‘‘thin’’ these 

brigades, to leave behind the brain and partnership relationships 

in these brigades, once we begin to withdraw in order to help sustain the Iraqi units for as long as we possibly can. Right now we 

have 5,000 embedded trainers and 1,300 headquarters trainers. 

But as we begin to thin our partnership and move our training 

teams out, I just think we’re going to have to increase the number 

of these military training teams, because 5,000 just doesn’t seem 

to be a large enough number. 

So, with enablers left in place, training teams left in place, sadly, 

the casualties will continue to rise. And if al-Qaeda is smart, they 

19 

will target these transition units, simply as a means of getting us 

out of Iraq and toppling the Iraqi Government. 

And the next point is that if the new center of gravity is shifting 

from active combat operations to the advise-assist-and-train function, then we must make these functions, in the American military, 

job one. The Army is beginning to fray. It’s very difficult for the 

Army and the Marine Corps to sustain these functions. We do the 

advising function very well. We’ve had a century of experiences in 

places like the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Greece, Indonesia, and 

El Salvador, where the American trainers and advisers have done 

a good job of building armies in a time of war. Unfortunately, of 

course, after Vietnam, we lost those skills. As we begin to transition, we must move our focus from active combat operations to rebuilding a world-class advisory capacity within the United States 

military. This is not an organizational issue, this is a cultural problem. It’s graduate-level work. It involves knowledge of cultures and 

languages. It requires exquisite personal skills, the ability to sublimate one’s ego, the ability to empathize with an alien culture. 

And, frankly, not all officers and NCOs are very good at this. There 

are those who have this ‘‘cultural right stuff’’ in the American military. They are a rare breed. 

So, what we have to do is find the means to reward the best and 

the brightest who perform these functions during the transition, 

with such things as fully funded civil schooling, advanced promotion, and a chance to command at all levels. 

And, finally, let me say that the post-surge strategy should not 

be focused solely on creating an Iraqi Army in our image. The 

object is to make the Iraqi Army better than the enemy, not mirror 

the United States Army. 

And it’s not necessary, I believe, to build a large Iraqi Army. I 

believe that the Iraqi Army will be the glue that bonds together 

this republic that will begin to emerge in Iraq. If the army is the 

only bonding agent, then it’s the intangibles that will eventually 

determine whether or not this transition is successful. That includes such things as inculcating courage, adaptability, integrity, 

intellectual agility, and leadership, and the commitment of this 

army to a cause higher than clan that will ultimately determine 

whether or not they will be successful. 

But, the greatest task we have is to inculcate into the Iraqi Army 

the will to win, rather than merely teach them how to win. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Scales follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, COLGEN, INC., WASHINGTON, DC 

Once the dogs of war are unleashed all consequences—political, diplomatic, and 

domestic—are shaped by what soldiers call ‘‘ground truth’’ and the truth on the 

ground has changed enormously over the past year in Iraq. Through Herculean 

efforts the military command under the leadership of GEN David Petraeus has 

quite literally wrenched military advantage from what a year ago was the beginning 

of catastrophic defeat. Increasing the number of ‘‘boots on the ground’’ was an important factor contributing to recent successes. But perhaps a more significant reason for the change of circumstances on the ground was Petraeus’ change of strategy. 

For the first time since the invasion in 2003 he has been able to approach the war 

as an insurgency; granted an insurgency of a very unique Middle Eastern character. 

A year’s effort and the loss of nearly 900 lives have placed the military situation 

at what soldiers refer to as a ‘‘culminating point.’’ The culminating point marks the 

20 

shift in military advantage from one side to the other, when, with all other variables 

fixed, the military outcome becomes irreversible: The potential loser can inflict casualties, but has lost the chance for victory on the battlefield. The only issue is how 

much longer the war will last, and what the butcher’s bill will be. 

Battles usually define the culminating point. In World War II, Midway was a 

turning point against the Japanese, El Alamein was a turning point against the 

Nazis and after Stalingrad, Germany no longer was able to stop the Russians from 

advancing on their eastern front. Wars usually culminate before either antagonist 

is aware of the event. Abraham Lincoln didn’t realize Gettysburg had turned the 

tide of the American Civil War. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive was a teachable moment for the situation today in that it proved that culminating points aren’t always 

military victories particularly in an insurgency. 

In an insurgency, culmination just buys time. The temporal advantage gained on 

the battlefield can be squandered if time isn’t used to turn a military advantage into 

a successful political outcome. Another lesson from the past is that the military advantage can be lost if the dynamics of the conflict change over time. After the surge 

the United States will begin to leave and the Iraqis will assume responsibility for 

their own defense. The battlefield advantage won at so costly a price can only be 

continued if this change of players is managed with the same strategic genius that 

gave us the battlefield advantage we now enjoy. 

While the military advantage clearly resides with the coalition very little can be 

done on the battlefield for the remainder of the surge to accelerate the pace of military operations. The counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Petraeus is the 

right one and cannot be substantially altered. The crucible of patience among the 

American people is emptying at a prodigious rate and very little short of a complete 

shift in conditions on the ground is likely to refill it. 

The military balance of power cannot be changed very much throughout the remainder of the surge. Al-Qaeda has been pushed into a northern corner of Iraq and 

constant harassment by the U.S. military supported by the Sons of Iraq effectively 

limits how much mischief they can cause. But their numbers, though small, have 

remained fairly constant. The United States has run out of military options as well. 

The Army went in to this war with too few ground troops. In a strange twist of 

irony for the first time since the summer of 1863 the number of ground soldiers 

available is determining American policy rather than policy determining how many 

troops we need. All that the Army and Marine Corps can manage without serous 

damage to the force is the sustained deployment in both Iraq and Afghanistan of 

somewhere between 13 to 15 brigade equivalents. Assuming that Afghanistan will 

require at least 3 brigades troop levels by the end of the surge in Iraq must begin 

to migrate toward the figure of no more than 12 brigades—perhaps even less. 

Reductions in close combat forces will continue indefinitely thereafter. 

So regardless of who wins the election and regardless of conditions on the ground 

by summer the troops will begin to come home. The only point of contention is how 

precipitous will be the withdrawal and whether the schedule of withdrawal should 

be a matter of administration policy. Adhering to a fixed schedule is not a good idea 

in an insurgency because the indigenous population tends to side with the perceived 

winners. However, some publicly expressed window of withdrawal is necessary for 

no other reason than to give soldier’s families some hope that their loved ones will 

not be stuck on a perpetual rollercoaster of deployments. 

By the end of the surge much will have been accomplished. The ethnosectarian 

competition for power and influence will continue. The hope is that all parties by 

then will seek to resolve these contests in the political realm and not in the streets. 

The campaign against al-Qaeda and the Sunni extremists will continue to show success although insurgent groups will remain lethal. Militia and criminal violence will 

continue to be a thorn in the side of the Maliki regime as gangs roam the streets 

of cities occasionally killing on the order of rouge militia leaders. No solution to this 

festering problem is possible by the time the troops start coming home. 

The influence of Iran will loom very significant—and will seem ‘‘conflicted,’’ given 

Iran’s desire to bloody America’s nose but not let the Shia-led Government of Iraq 

fail. By this January, about the time the drawdown begins in earnest, pressure will 

build to show some progress toward reconciliation nationally and within warring 

ethnic groupings. 

Governmental capacity will still be inadequate though it will continue to develop. 

It will resume only when the dust settles from the recent flareup connected with 

the Iraqi Army operations in Basra. Basic services will remain inadequate but presuming a lull after Basra will slowly improve as long-term electrical and oil projects 

gather momentum. 

In sum after the surge much will remain to be done and nothing substantial can 

be done without the ability of the Iraqi military to maintain security after American 

21 

forces begin to depart. This task is so important for the creation of a stable state 

that the establishment of an effective Iraqi National Security apparatus will become 

a new center of gravity for the remaining phases of the war. Can the Iraqi Defense 

Forces grow competent and confident enough to take up the task in the time 

remaining to them? So far the answer to this question, like so many questions about 

American policy in Iraq, remains clouded in uncertainty. 

Some signs are encouraging. 

The Iraqi Security Forces have shown strength in recent weeks. The Iraqi high 

command deployed elements of the 14th Division to Basra to destroy the Shia militias and criminal gangs that have held the city hostage for years. Iraqi motor transport units moved one national police and three army brigades on short notice from 

Baghdad to Basra, a distance of about 400 kilometers, with less than a week for 

planning and execution. During the operations Iraqi special forces units were transported, some in Iraqi C–130 aircraft, from the very northern most regions of Iraq 

to the vicinity of Basra. An Iraqi Base Support Unit, roughly the equivalent of an 

American combat service support battalion, has so far managed to sustain the Basra 

operation with some help from American-supplied civilian contractors. There have 

been problems. Some units in the 14th have not fought well. There have been some 

sectarian infiltration and desertions. But for all its problems the division has not 

lost fighting effectiveness or cohesion. 

These accomplishments might seem at first glance to be less than impressive. But 

it’s important to recall that only a year ago it would have been virtually impossible 

to pull an Army division from one province and move it to another in shape (and 

willing) to fight. 

Officer leadership at the small-unit level is improving. Sadly the process of leader 

development is driven by the wasteful Darwinian process of bloody self-selection 

that always attends armies that must learn to fight by fighting, the only way to 

build an Army from scratch in wartime. The American Army in the Civil War experienced a similar baptism of fire at a cost of more than half a million dead. 

Noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the American Army but NCOs are 

an alien concept in areas of the world ruled by strict hierarchies. The Iraqi Army 

is no exception. Only last year did the Iraqis start divisional schools to teach and 

build corporals, squad and platoon leaders. Some of these newly minted NCOs are 

filling the ranks of the Iraqi Army and initial reports of their success are encouraging. 

This process of ‘‘on the job training’’ in combat has been made more efficient with 

the addition of American military training teams. These are squad-sized units that 

imbed themselves in each Iraqi combat battalion and brigade. Equally important are 

partnership arrangements between American and Iraqi combat units. Emulation 

and example are powerful forces in combat. Iraqi soldier and leaders tend to mimic 

the example of American professionalism and effectiveness and when fighting side 

by side the Iraqis inevitably fight better. American units habitually partner with 

Iraqi units for the duration of their time in Iraq. These enduring partnerships have 

the added advantage of allowing the development of personal relationships between 

Iraqi and American soldiers and commanders. 

But very serious problems continue to plague the Iraqi military and in spite of 

the best efforts of the coalition these problems will linger well after the surge. Iraqi 

senior leaders and staffs are reasonably competent at moving brigades and battalions from point to point but their ability to do quality planning and execution is 

very immature. While small-unit leaders are being selected by merit higher level selections are too often based on nepotism or tribal and clan loyalty. In some units 

sectarianism still trumps allegiance to the nation and on occasion soldiers desert 

rather than fight against their tribal peers. 

From the beginning the coalition leadership focused on building close combat 

small units as first priority. As a consequence by the end of the surge noncombat 

functions, what the military calls ‘‘enablers,’’ will be immature at best. No army can 

function for long without being competent in intelligence, fire support, administration, logistics, communications, and medical support. The American military will not 

only have to train the Iraqis in these functions but remain in Iraq to provide them 

for a long time; perhaps several years. 

The challenge after the surge will be to increase the effectiveness of training, 

advising, and mentoring to the Iraqis as American forces depart so that the Iraqis 

will be able to fill the void. Rather than pulling out combat brigades whole cloth 

partnership units will probably follow a ‘‘thinning’’ strategy whereby a partner unit 

will thin its ranks gradually leaving the ‘‘brains’’ of the unit in place for as long 

as possible to assist with planning and employment of enablers. 

Today there are 5,000 imbedded trainers and 1,300 headquarters trainers and 

advisers to joint, army, and ministerial staffs. As the Iraqis face fighting without 

22 

partners they will probably need more training teams to imbed with them. More 

Americans left to fend for themselves in an alien and hostile environment might 

also mean more casualties. It certainly will mean that if the enemy sees killing 

advisers and support soldiers as the surest means for getting us out of Iraq and 

toppling the Iraqi Government. 

Training, advising, and assisting the army of an alien culture is now job one for 

the American military. History shows that we are good at this. For over a century 

from the Philippines to Korea, Thailand, Greece, Indonesia, El Salvador, and in 

many other distant and inhospitable places American soldiers have successfully 

assisted in building armies during wartime. Unfortunately after Vietnam we lost 

the skill to do these tasks effectively. Rebuilding a world class advisory capacity is 

a cultural not an organizational challenge. This is graduate-level work and advisers 

need time to learn the language and culture as well as the particular personal skills 

to do their jobs competently. Not all officers are good at training and advising foreign militaries. We must go the extra mile to find those with the cultural ‘‘right 

stuff’’ and reward the best of them with fully funded civil schooling, advanced promotion, and a chance to command at all levels. 

The post-surge strategy should not be focused solely creating an Iraqi Army in 

the image of our own. The Iraqis only have to be better than their enemies. Not 

is the challenge to commit the blood, treasure, and time necessary to train and 

equip a large Iraqi Army. Wars are not won by the bigger forces but by the force 

that wants most to win. It will in the end be the intangibles; courage, adaptability, 

integrity, intellectual agility, leadership, and an allegiance to a cause other than the 

tribe that will ultimately determine who wins. As we move into a new season of this 

sad war the age-old axioms will prevail: We will in the end discover that our greatest task will be to inculcate in the Iraqis the will to win rather than to teach them 

how to win. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELE FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT, CENTER 

FOR NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to speak with you today. I’m honored to be part of the discussion that you are trying to stimulate, not only on Iraq, but how 

the United States balances its strategic interests across the many 

national security challenges that we face. 

In February, I had a chance to visit 10 of Iraq’s 18 provinces over 

a 2-week period, and, even as someone who’s a skeptic of the war, 

I observed that security in many parts of the country had improved 

markedly, due to the many factors that Senator Biden and Senator 

Lugar already cited: The Sunni Awakening, the Sadr cease-fire, the 

sectarian separation that’s occurred over the last couple of years, 

the shift in U.S. strategy toward counterinsurgency and protecting 

the Iraqi population, the surge of forces in Baghdad that enabled 

us to be more effective in implementing that strategy in Baghdad, 

more effective operations against al-Qaeda, which you’re now seeing coming to a head in Mosul, and greater professionalism of 

some, but certainly not all, of the Iraqi military units. And having 

lived through the violence of 2006 and early 2007, many of the 

Iraqis that I spoke to really felt like Iraq had been given a second 

chance. 

But, I think the events of the last couple of weeks have reminded 

us that the situation in Iraq remains highly uncertain. The renewed fighting in Basra and the Shia neighborhoods of Baghdad 

are a reminder that the security gains that we’ve made over the 

last several months are both fragile and incomplete. They’re fragile, because they have not been underwritten sufficiently by true 

23 

political accommodation, and they’re between and within the Shia, 

Sunni, and Kurdish communities. And they’re incomplete, because 

southern Iraq has been left largely under the control of competing 

Shia militia since the British transferred responsibility for that 

area, in December 2007. 

That said, in areas where security has improved, public expectations have risen quite rapidly. Once you have security, people want 

jobs, they want essential services, they want free and fair elections, 

they want real political reconciliation. And these expectations, thus 

far, have not been met. Meeting those expectations will be essential 

to consolidating recent security gains. 

We’re now in what counterinsurgency doctrine calls ‘‘the build 

phase,’’ which is the hardest part of this endeavor, where the primary objective is actually enhancing the legitimacy of the hostnation government, the Iraqi Government, in the eyes of the population. The problem that I saw is that, to date, the security 

improvements have enhanced our legitimacy, not that of the Iraqi 

Government. 

And herein lies the principal cause for my concern. The Maliki 

government appears largely unwilling or unable to take advantage 

of the space created by the improved security, and actually move 

toward political accommodation, provide for the basic needs of the 

Iraqi people, and lay the foundation for stability and its own legitimacy; and our government, the Bush administration, appears to 

lack a strategy for getting them to do so. 

One of the most striking things, to me, when I visited, was, 

whether it was Sunni tribal leaders and business leaders in Anbar 

and Baghdad, whether it was Shia mayors and governors, down 

south, the frustration with the incompetence, the dysfunction, the 

corruption of the central government was not only palpable, it was 

nearly universal. 

And so, Iraqis are deeply frustrated by the lack of politicaleconomic progress overall, and unless this situation changes, recent 

security gains are going to be very difficult to consolidate, and may 

be quite perishable, no matter how many brigades we keep in Iraq. 

So, the real challenge in the near term is for the Bush administration to use the leverage we have—military, economic, political— 

to push toward real power-sharing arrangements. And this is a tall 

order, because it presumes that we will have something we have 

never had in Iraq, and that is a political strategy, a clear and compelling political strategy to push toward accommodation. 

Unless the administration succeeds more than it has in the past 

on this front, I fear that it will bequeath to the next administration 

an Iraq that is backsliding into civil war. 

Let me just take a moment to talk a little bit about the impact 

on the U.S. military, since you asked us to address that. 

Years of conducting two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously have put great strains on the force, particularly our ground 

forces and special operations forces. More than 6 years of repeated 

combat tours—two, three, four, in some cases—with little time at 

home in between, have placed an extremely heavy burden on our 

soldiers, our marines, and their families. 

The operational demands of these wars are consuming the 

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24 

quate pool of Army units ready for other possible contingencies, 

and thereby increasing the level of strategic risk that we are assuming as a nation. 

In my written statement, I’ve gone into great detail on the 

strains on personnel, the compressed and narrow training time, the 

shortages of equipment, the costs of reset, recruitment, and retention challenges. I won’t go into those all here, because I don’t 

want—I know we want to get to the Q&A. 

Let me just highlight one key factor, though, that is very important, and that is the Army’s need to reduce the length of tours from 

15 months down to at least—no more than 12 months, in the near 

term. You’ve heard, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, saying 

that we can’t sustain the current operational tempo at current force 

levels. Getting back to a one-to-one deployment ratio of 12 months 

abroad and 12 months at home is absolutely critical to keeping the 

force from unraveling, as my colleagues have suggested. 

As the surge comes to an end, the Army will have a total of 17 

brigade combat teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army 

planners have told me that they need to get that number down to 

15 to be able to return to this 12-on/12-off cycle that’s so crucial 

to keeping the force from breaking, over time. So, that’s going to 

argue for trying to take two additional brigades out of Iraq as soon 

as conditions on the ground permit. 

At the same time, there are countervailing pressures and arguments. You’ll hear military folks in Iraq talk about the need to 

maintain higher levels of forces in order to secure the provincial 

elections that will come, we hope, at the end of this year. They also 

talk, interestingly, about their concerns about our transition period, and the nobody-home phenomenon between election day and 

inauguration day. They’re very worried about any instability in 

Iraq that could happen in that period, and, again, they want to err 

on the side of keeping the force high and then handing off to a new 

President who can make the choices to bring the force down. I 

think that’s the argument that we’re going to have in the next several months, that competition between, ‘‘What do we need to do to 

relieve the strains on the force?’’ versus what some of the commanders on the ground will argue for, to give themselves more 

flexibility in the—as Iraq enters a critical period. 

So, where do we go from here? Let me just say that I hope that, 

as this committee begins these hearings, that, rather than jumping 

right to troop levels, we—that you will have the discussion, that 

you are so good at having, which is, ‘‘What are our strategic interests in Iraq and the region?’’ and ‘‘What should our strategy be?’’ 

and then, based on that discussion, you know, ‘‘What should the 

troops levels in Iraq look like over time?’’ 

In my view, there are three fundamental premises that we 

should think about as we contemplate how to go forward. 

First, like it or not, we are where we are. Whether we were— 

one was for or against the war, we can’t turn back the clock; we 

have to move forward from the point where we find ourselves 

today. 

Second, like it or not, Iraq involves our vital interests, and we 

have to balance, not only our interests in Iraq, but our interests in 

25 

the region and more globally, to include restoring our moral standing and credibility in the world. 

And, third, how we get out of Iraq matters. I think that the next 

President will have three fundamental options: Unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement, or conditional engagement. And I’ve laid those out in my testimony, but, just briefly. 

Unconditional engagement is basically a continuation of the 

Bush administration’s policy of giving the Iraqi Government a 

fairly open-ended commitment of support for as long as it takes, 

whether they make progress toward political goals or not. This is 

an all-in approach that is all carrots and no sticks, and it gives the 

Iraqis very little incentive to make the hard choices they have to 

make on political accommodation. It’s also unsustainable for us, in 

terms of the U.S. military, our Treasury, and the support of the 

American people. 

The other—second option is unconditional disengagement, which 

argues for a rapid withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraq 

on a fixed timetable, without regard to conditions on the ground or 

the behavior of various parties in Iraq, or the consequence that 

that withdrawal might have on stability in Iraq and the broader 

region. This is the all-out approach, as I would call it, and it’s all 

sticks and no carrots. My concern is that this would substantially 

increase the risk of renewed civil war, and even regional war, that 

would do even greater damage to our vital interests. 

So, the best way forward that I see for the United States is a 

strategy of conditional engagement, in which we use the leverage 

we have—military, political, and economic—which, I would argue, 

we have never used effectively in 5 years, and we use that leverage 

to push Iraqis toward political accommodation in the near term 

and establish the basis for a more sustainable stability over the 

medium to long term. 

Under this approach, U.S. forces would drawdown, gradually 

shifting to an overwatch role that would be based on a timetable 

determined by the conditions on the ground and the extent of political accommodation in Iraq. It would transition U.S. forces out of 

the lead role of providing for the security of the Iraqi population 

and instead put them in the position of, as General Scales suggested, primarily advising, training, and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces in so doing. This makes building the capacity of the 

Iraqi forces the long pole in the tent. It also suggests that United 

States forces would continue to assist Iraqi forces in certain areas, 

like counterterrorism operations, and would certainly provide for 

force protection and a quick reaction force for our military advisers 

and civilians still in country. 

If, however, the Iraqis did not make substantial progress on 

political accommodation, the United States, under this strategy, 

would selectively reduce its support, in terms of political, economic, 

military aid, in ways designed to put additional pressure on the 

Iraqis to make the necessary political compromises, while still protecting our vital interests. 

What this strategy does is, it tries to make clear to the Iraqis 

that our commitment is not open-ended; it is conditional on them 

making the hard choices that need to be made. It also offers a 

missing link that’s been present since the beginning of this endeavVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
26 

or, and that is a political strategy to support our military strategy 

for achieving our objectives. 

Finally, it aims to enable the United States to protect its vital 

interests in Iraq and the region at substantially reduced and more 

sustainable force levels. 

I’d like to conclude there. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHELE FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR NEW

AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me to talk with you about prospects 

for both Iraq and the U.S. military after the surge. I am honored to be part of the 

larger national discussion you are seeking to stimulate on how the United States 

should balance risk across the many national security challenges we face, now and 

in the future. 

I would like to touch on three critical and interrelated issues: Where things stand 

in Iraq today; the impacts of sustained high tempos of operations on the U.S. military, particularly our Nation’s ground forces; and where we should go from here. 

WHERE WE ARE IN IRAQ TODAY

In February, I had a chance to visit 10 of Iraq’s 18 provinces over a 2-week period. 

After walking neighborhoods with U.S. soldiers, conferring with State Department 

and USAID personnel, and meeting with dozens of Iraqis, I came away with both 

a greater sense of hope and a deeper sense of concern. 

Even a skeptic of the war in Iraq could not visit places like Adhamiyah, Doura, 

and Iskandariyah without being struck by how much security has improved. Markets were open, shoppers thronged the streets, and children were back in school in 

areas that were deadly urban battlegrounds only months ago. 

At the time of my visit, security in many parts of the country had improved markedly due to a host of factors: The Sunni ‘‘Awakening,’’ Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire, 

the shift in U.S. strategy to protecting the Iraqi population, the surge of U.S. forces 

in Baghdad, increasingly effective operations against al-Qaeda, and greater professionalism among some (though not all) Iraqi military units. Having lived through 

the sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007, many Iraqis now feel that Iraq has 

been given a second chance. 

Today, the situation in Iraq remains dynamic and uncertain. The renewed fighting in Basra and Shia neighborhoods of Baghdad, as well as the possible cease-fire, 

are a reminder that the security gains made over the past year are both fragile and 

incomplete. They are fragile because they have not been underwritten by fundamental political accommodation between and within Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish 

communities. Security gains cannot be consolidated absent political accommodation 

on multiple fronts. 

The security gains are incomplete because southern Iraq has been left largely in 

the control of competing Shia militias since the British transferred responsibility to 

Iraqi Security Forces in December 2007. The full story behind the Iraqi Government’s latest offensive has yet to be told, but it appears to have been an attempt 

to reassert its control over Basra, which is home to both critical oil reserves and 

the nation’s primary port, and to defeat Sadrist elements who have continued to 

launch attacks despite Sadr’s previously proclaimed cease-fire. Some speculate that 

it may also have been a calculated political move by Prime Minister Maliki and his 

political allies to weaken Sadr’s movement prior to the provincial elections slated 

for this fall. Although Sadr and the Iraqi Government appear to have negotiated the 

terms of a new cease-fire, the situation remains highly uncertain. It will take time 

before both the impetus and outcomes of this latest chapter in Iraq’s history are 

fully known. But there is substantial risk when U.S. forces are drawn into the middle of intra-Shia battles. 

In areas where security has improved, public expectations have risen rapidly—for 

essential services like electricity, for political reconciliation and open, free, and fair 

elections, for equitable distribution of Iraq’s vast oil wealth, and for jobs. These expectations must be met to consolidate recent security gains. 

We are now in what U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine calls the ‘‘build’’ phase—certainly the hardest phase—in which the primary objective is enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government in the eyes of the population. The problem is 

27 

that, to date, improved security has increased our legitimacy, not that of the Iraqi 

Government. 

And herein lies the cause for my deep concern. The Maliki government appears 

largely unwilling or unable to take advantage of the space created by improved 

security to move toward political accommodation, provide for the basic needs of the 

Iraqi people, and lay the foundation for stability—and its own legitimacy. And the 

Bush administration appears to lack a strategy for getting them to do so. 

From Sunni tribal and business leaders in Baghdad and the west to Shia mayors 

and governors in the center and south, mounting frustration with the incompetence, 

dysfunction, and corruption of the central government was palpable and universal. 

While there has been some de facto revenue-sharing by the central government, 

and the Iraqi Parliament recently passed de-Baathification reform, an amnesty law 

and a budget, the Iraqis I spoke to were deeply frustrated by the lack of political 

and economic progress overall. Unless this situation changes, recent security gains 

are likely to be difficult to consolidate and may be quite perishable, no matter how 

many brigades the United States keeps in Iraq. 

The Bush administration must use its remaining time in office to push the Iraqi 

Government toward real power and resource-sharing arrangements. This is a tall 

order, as it requires something that U.S. efforts in Iraq have lacked from the beginning: A clear and compelling political strategy. 

In the near term, the focus must be on building the political coalitions and negotiating the compromises necessary to achieve a handful of critical priorities: A renewed cease-fire with Sadr; a provincial powers law; free and fair provincial elections; an equitable oil law; and concrete steps toward political accommodation, such 

as progress on Article 140 issues, the integration of more Sunnis into the Iraqi Security Forces; and more employment opportunities in former insurgent strongholds. 

This will require actually using what leverage we have to pressure key Iraqi players to take specific actions, particularly as we negotiate a new bilateral agreement. 

Iraq is seeking significant U.S. commitments of political support, security assistance, and economic engagement. These plus U.S. force levels offer leverage for pushing the central government to prove its legitimacy and its worthiness of continued 

American support. Right now, we are negotiating as if we want this agreement more 

than they do. 

In sum, this administration has a vanishing window of opportunity to consolidate 

recent security gains with political and economic progress. But this will require the 

civilian side of the U.S. Government in Washington and Baghdad to act with greater 

urgency and focus, to use the leverage we have to the greatest effect possible, and 

to do more of what we in Washington are supposed to know how to do—figure out 

how to broker political compromises and build political coalitions to get forward 

movement on tough issues. 

Unless the Bush administration succeeds in pushing the Iraqi Government to embrace political accommodation and invest in its own country in the coming months, 

it risks not only losing hard-fought security gains but also bequeathing to the next 

President an Iraq in danger of sliding back into civil war. 

IMPACT ON THE U.S. MILITARY

Years of conducting two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously have 

put great strains on the U.S. military, particularly our ground forces and special 

operations forces. More than 6 years of repeated combat tours with little time at 

home in between have placed a heavy burden on our soldiers, marines, and their 

families. The operational demands of these wars have consumed the Nation’s supply 

of ready ground forces, leaving the United States without an adequate pool of Army 

units ready for other possible contingencies and increasing the level of strategic 

risk. 

At a time when the United States faces an unusually daunting set of national 

security challenges—from a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, instability in 

Pakistan, and a truculent Iran bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, to a rising 

China, a nuclear-armed North Korea, and a host of weak and failing states beset 

by a revitalized global network of violent Islamist extremists—we must give high 

priority to restoring the readiness of the U.S. military for the full spectrum of possible missions. As a global power with global interests, the United States needs its 

Armed Forces to be ready to respond whenever and wherever our strategic interests 

are threatened. 

Stresses on Personnel 

Multiple, back-to-back deployments with shorter ‘‘dwell’’ times at home and longer 

times away, have put unprecedented strain on U.S. military personnel. Due to the 

high demand for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army and Marine Corps personnel 

28 

1 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization 

Request, Future Years Defense Program, and Fiscal Year 2009 Request for Operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, testimony of the Honorable Robert S. Gates, Secretary of Defense and Admiral 

Michael V. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 6, 2008. 2 At the same time, however, some senior military leaders are also concerned about the ‘‘nobody home’’ phenomenon that can occur during our own political transitions, from election day 

in early November to Inauguration Day in late January, and even later as senior administration 

appointees await confirmation. This concern may cause them to err on the side of recommending 

that President Bush keep more forces in Iraq after the pause to maintain stability until a new 

President and his or her team are in place. 3 Ann Scott Tyson, ‘‘Troops’ Mental Distress Tracked,’’ The Washington Post, November 14, 

2007; see also Associated Press ‘‘Army Suicides up 20 Percent in 2007, Report Says.’’ 31 January 

2008. http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/01/31/army.suicides.ap 4 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on Personnel Overview, testimony of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, February 27, 2008. 5 Ibid. 

6The total number of waivers granted by the Army rose from 11.5 percent in 2004 to 16.9 

percent in 2006. Congressional Budget Office, ‘‘The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance.’’ July 2007. 7Department of the Army. Of the more than 10,000 conduct waivers granted, 68 percent were 

for minor misdemeanors, 18 percent were for serious misdemeanors, and 14 percent were for 

felonies. 8Department of the Army, G1 Cohort FY03–FY06 study, 2007. 

have been spending more time deployed than either they or their respective services 

planned. Judging from conversations with dozens of U.S. soldiers in Iraq, the 

Army’s 15-month tours with only 12 months at home in between have been particularly hard on soldiers and their families. 

According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the Nation cannot sustain today’s operational tempos at current force levels.1 Getting back to a one-to-one ratio between time deployed and time at home in the short 

term, and a one-to-two ratio in the mid to long term, would require either a substantial increase in troop supply or decrease in troop demand, or some combination 

of both. As the ‘‘surge’’ in Iraq comes to an end, the Army will have a total of 17 

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to get 

back to a cycle of 12 months deployed and 12 months at home, the United States 

total commitment would need to be reduced to 15 BCTs.2 Over time, growing the 

size of the Army and the Marine Corps will help to reduce the strain, but not in 

the near term, as it will take time to recruit, train, and field the additional personnel. 

Meanwhile, there are signs that the stress of repeated deployments is taking a 

human toll, especially on the Army. Studies show that repeated tours in Iraq increase a soldier’s likelihood of developing post-traumatic stress disorder, and indeed, 

cases of PTSD have risen dramatically.3 The rates of suicide, alcohol abuse, divorce, 

desertion, and AWOLs among Army personnel are all increasing. 

While all four services have met or exceeded their active duty recruiting targets 

in recent years, they have had to take some rather extraordinary measures to do 

so. Each service has relied increasingly on enlistment bonuses to attract the shrinking portion of young Americans (only 3 in 10) who meet the educational, medical 

and moral standards for military service. 

Of all the services, the Army has faced the greatest recruiting challenges. Since 

missing its 2005 recruiting target by a margin of 8 percent, the Army has taken 

a number of steps to bolster its accessions and meet its annual targets. These have 

included: Raising the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 42, offering a shorterthan-usual 15-month enlistment option, giving a $2,500 bonus to personnel who 

transfer into the Army from another service, and providing a new accession bonus 

to those who enter Officer Candidate School.4 Most notably, the Army has accepted 

more recruits without a high school diploma (only 82 percent had a diploma in 

FY2008 to date vice the goal of 90 percent) 5 and has increased the number of waivers granted for enlistment.6 In 2007, for example, more than 20 percent of new 

recruits required a waiver: 57 percent for conduct, 36 percent for medical reasons, 

and 7 percent for drug or alcohol use.7 An Army study assessing the quality and 

performance of waiver soldiers compared to their overall cohort found that while the 

waiver population had higher loss rates in six of nine adverse loss categories, they 

also had slightly higher valorous award and promotion rates in some communities.8

This mixed record highlights the importance of continuing to monitor the performance of waiver soldiers over time. 

The Army is also facing some new retention challenges as it sustains an unusually high operational tempo while simultaneously converting to modularity and 

29 

9 ‘‘U.S. Army Officer Retention Fact Sheet,’’ Army G1, May 25, 2007. 

10 Charles A. Henning, ‘‘Army Office Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress.’’ Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2006. 11 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on Personnel Overview, testimony of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, February 27, 2008. 12 Bryan Bender and Renee Dudley, ‘‘Army Rushes to Promote its Officers.’’ Boston Globe, 

March 13, 2007. 13See, for example, General James T. Conway, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, 

Statement on Marine Corps Posture before the House Armed Services Committee, March 1, 

2007. 14 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization 

Request, Future Years Defense Program, and Fiscal Year 2009 Request for Operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, testimony of the Honorable Robert S. Gates, Secretary of Defense and Admiral 

Michael V. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 6, 2008. 15Statement of General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Posture of the United States Marine Corps, February 28, 

2008. 

growing its force. Remarkably, loss rates for company grade officers (second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain) have remained fairly stable in recent years, 

despite the demands of multiple tours in quick succession. Nevertheless, there is 

cause for concern. A number of the young captains I met in Iraq were seriously contemplating leaving the Army. While they were proud of their service and most loved 

the Army, after two, three, or in some cases four combat tours in a handful of years, 

they needed a break—to resume their education, start a family, or spend time with 

the young family they had left at home. 

In addition, as the Army expands, it will need to retain a higher percentage of 

its experienced officers to lead the force. For example, the number of officers the 

Army needs grew by 8,000 between 2002 and 2006, with 58 percent of this growth 

in the ranks of captain and major.9 A particular gap is at the level of majors, where 

the services estimates approximately 17 percent of spots are empty.10 To decrease 

the historical loss rate of company grade officers, the Army is offering unprecedented incentives to those captains who agree to extend for 3 years, including choice 

of one’s post or branch or functional area, the opportunity to transfer or change jobs, 

assignment at their post of choice, professional military or language training, fully 

funded graduate education, or receipt of up to $35,000 critical skills retention 

bonus.11

Given the criticality of retaining experienced field grade officers as it grows, and 

given the uncharted waters we are in as an All-Volunteer Force sends young officers 

to their third and fourth combat rotations with little time at home, the Army is 

rightly paying serious attention to retaining its field-grade officers.12

Compressed and Narrowed Training 

To remain fully ready, the U.S. military must prepare not only for current operations but also for a broad range of future contingencies, from sustained, small-unit 

irregular warfare missions to military training and advising missions, to high-end 

warfare against regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and other 

asymmetric means. Yet compressed training time between deployments means that 

many of our enlisted personnel and officers have the time to train only for the 

missions immediately before them—primarily counterinsurgency missions in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—and not for the full spectrum of missions that may be over the 

horizon.13 These just-in-time training conditions have created a degree of strategic 

risk.14

With a 12-month dwell time that is compounded by personnel turnover, institutional education requirements, and equipment either returning from or deploying to 

theater, Army units have found themselves racing to get certified for their next 

deployment. While home-station training and exercises at the major training centers 

are evolving, the ability of units to train for the full spectrum of operations has been 

severely limited by time. This same compressed timeline has contributed to the 

overall stresses on the force. 

Equipment Shortages and Wear-Out 

Near-continuous equipment use in-theater has meant that aircraft, vehicles, and 

even communications gear have stayed in the fight instead of returning home with 

their units. For example, 26 percent of the Marine Corps’ equipment is engaged 

overseas and most does not rotate out of theater with units.15 Roughly 43 percent 

30 

16 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, ‘‘Transforming the National Guard and 

Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force: Final Report to the Congress and the Secretary 

of Defense.’’ January 31, 2008, pg. 84. 17 Ann Scott Tyson, ‘‘U.S. Army Battling to Save Equipment.’’ Washington Post, December 5, 

2006. 18Government Accountability Office, Statement of Sharon L. Pickup, ‘‘Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces.’’ 

Testimony before the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, February 14, 2008. 19General James T. Conway, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, statement on 

Marine Corps Posture before the House Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2007. 20Peter Spiegel, ‘‘Guard Equipment Levels Lowest Since 9/11,’’ Los Angeles Times, May 10, 

2007; see also James Halpin, ‘‘Equipment Levels Worst Ever, Guard Chief Says.’’ Associated 

Press, June 6, 2007. 21Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, ‘‘Transforming the 

National Guard and Reserves Into a 21st Century Operational Force.’’ January 31, 2008. 22 Ibid, pg. 74. 23General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, before the House Armed Services Committee, September 2007. 

of the National Guard’s equipment remains overseas or has worn out.16 Given the 

high tempo of operations and the harsh operating environments, equipment has 

been worn out, lost in battle, or damaged almost more quickly than the services can 

repair or replace it. And near continuous use without depot-level maintenance has 

substantially decreased the projected lifespan of this equipment and substantially 

increased expected replacement costs. 

The resulting equipment scarcity has lead to the widespread practice of crossleveling: Taking equipment (and personnel) from returning units to fill out those 

about to deploy. The Marines and the Army have also drawn increasingly from 

prepositioned stocks around the world. So far, these measures have met readiness 

needs in theater, but they have also decreased the readiness of nondeployed units 

and impeded their ability to train on individual and collective tasks. Even those 

deployed are at increasing risk as the equipment they have becomes unusable: Army 

equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan is wearing out at almost nine times the normal 

rate.17

Meanwhile, the Army has told the Government Accountability Office that it will 

need between $12 and $13 billion per year to replace lost, damaged, and worn 

equipment for the duration of the war in Iraq and at least 2 years beyond.18 The 

Marine Corps estimates it will need $15.6 billion for reset.19 Bringing the National 

Guard’s equipment stock up to even 75 percent of authorized levels will take $22 

billion over the next 5 years.20 In the current budgetary environment, the military 

services are struggling to balance resources between reconstituting current stocks 

and modernizing for the future. 

The Reserve Component: Unique Challenges 

The Reserves comprise 37 percent of the Total Force and their battle rhythm has 

accelerated enormously since operations in Afghanistan began in 2001. Each of the 

National Guard’s 34 combat brigades has been deployed to Operations Enduring 

Freedom or Iraqi Freedom, and 600,000 selected reservists have been activated.21

Cross-leveling is especially acute for Reserve units, which do not possess equipment at authorized levels. The Army National Guard lacks 43.5 percent of its 

authorized equipment, while the Army Reserve does not have 33.5 percent of its 

authorized levels. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves found that 

spending on the Reserve Component ‘‘has not kept pace with the large increases in 

operational commitments,’’ 22 making it unlikely that it will be able to eliminate its 

equipment shortfalls any time soon. Additionally, a dramatic shortage of personnel—including 10,000 company-grade officers—has forced the Reserve Component to 

borrow people from other units along with equipment. 

While the Reserve Component is intended for use in overseas operations and 

homeland defense, it is not fully manned, trained, or equipped to perform these missions. The gap in Reserve readiness creates a significant and little-noticed vulnerability in both domestic disaster response and readiness for operations abroad. 

In sum, the readiness of U.S ground forces is just barely keeping pace with current operations. As Army Chief of Staff George Casey has said, ‘‘We are consumed 

with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready 

forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.’’ 23 Indeed, the 

United States lacks a sizeable ready reserve of ground forces to respond to future 

crises. In addition, the fight to recruit and keep personnel combined with the need 

to repair and modernize equipment means that building and regaining readiness is 

becoming increasingly costly. 

31 

24See James Miller and Shawn Brimley, ‘‘Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and 

Out of Iraq’’ (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2007): 5. 25The administration has stated its goals in Iraq as: ‘‘An Iraq that has defeated the terrorists 

and neutralized the insurgency; an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, 

where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country; [and] an Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terror and 

the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.’’ See George W. Bush, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 

(November 2005): 3. 26For more on a strategy of conditional engagements, see Colin Kahl, ‘‘Stay on Success: A Policy of Conditional Engagement,’’ unpublished CNAS Iraq Workshop paper, 18 March 2008. This 

Continued 

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As you hear testimony from General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and others 

in the coming weeks, I would encourage you to place their recommendations in a 

larger strategic context that considers not only the way forward in Iraq but also how 

best to balance risk across the range of national security challenges we face as a 

nation. 

In my view, any change in U.S. strategy on Iraq must be based on three fundamental premises: 

First, we are where we are. Whether one was for or against the war, we can’t 

turn back the clock. We must start from where we find ourselves today and move 

forward. 

Second, like it or not, Iraq affects U.S. vital interests in the region and globally. 

Today, the United States most fundamental interests in Iraq can be summed up as: 

• Preventing safe havens for international terrorism; 

• Preventing a regional war; and 

• Preventing of a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe.24

These interests are a far cry from the maximalist, long-term goals articulated by 

the Bush administration.25 Rather, they are the bottom line of what we must seek 

to achieve. 

In addition to being more pragmatic and realistic, these three preventative American interests in Iraq fit within several broader regional and global goals that are 

closely related to the outcome of the war: 

• Maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East; 

• Stabilizing Afghanistan; 

• Contesting violent Islamic extremism; 

• Restoring American credibility and moral leadership; and 

• Restoring America’s military capacity to meet global contingencies. 

Any new Iraq strategy must start by placing American interests in Iraq within 

this broader regional and global context. Failure to do so would only continue the 

strategic myopia that has plagued this administration’s policies on Iraq and risk the 

continued erosion of America’s strategic position in the Middle East and around the 

world. 

Third, how we eventually transition out of Iraq matters. The next U.S. President 

will have three options on Iraq: Unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement, or conditional engagement. 

Unconditional engagement would be a continuation of the Bush administration’s 

policy of giving the Iraqi Government an open-ended commitment of support for as 

long as it takes, whether they make progress toward stated goals or not. This ‘‘allin’’ approach is all carrots and no sticks, and provides little incentive for Iraqis to 

make the hard choices that are essential to their future. It is also unsustainable 

for the U.S. military, the U.S. Treasury, and the American people. 

Unconditional disengagement argues for a rapid withdrawal of all U.S. combat 

forces from Iraq on a fixed timetable, without regard to conditions on the ground, 

the behavior of various parties in Iraq, or the consequences a rapid withdrawal 

might have for stability in Iraq and the broader region. This ‘‘all-out’’ approach is, 

by contrast, all sticks and no carrots. And it would increase the risk of a renewed 

civil war—and even a regional war—that would do even greater damage to America’s vital interests in the region. 

The best way forward for the United States is a strategy of ‘‘conditional engagement,’’ in which we use what leverage we have—military, political, and economic— 

to encourage political accommodation in Iraq in the near term and establish sustainable stability over the medium to long term.26 Under this strategy, the more 

32 

paper will also serve as a basis for the forthcoming CNAS report on Iraq which will be published 

later this year. 

progress made on key issues like integrating Sunnis into the Iraqi Security Forces, 

holding free and fair elections, and equitably distributing Iraq’s vast oil wealth, the 

more support the Iraqi Government could expect from the United States, and presumably the international community, to help build Iraqi capacity for governance 

and security. 

Under this approach, if the Iraq central government made reasonable political 

progress, U.S. forces would gradually shift to an ‘‘overwatch’’ role as currently envisioned by in the current military campaign plan, on a timetable determined by the 

extent of political accommodation and conditions on the ground. More specifically, 

it envisions a gradual transition of U.S. forces from protecting the Iraqi population 

to advising, training, and assisting Iraqi Security Forces in doing so. Building the 

capacity of the Iraqi Army to act as a capable, nonsectarian military will be a long 

pole in the tent of any future U.S. strategy for Iraq. In addition, U.S. forces would 

continue to assist Iraqi forces in conducting counterterrorism operations and would 

provide force protection and quick reaction forces for U.S. civilians and military advisers in-country. 

This transition to a more sustainable military posture to support stability in Iraq 

would be conducted over a period of a few years, as long as the Iraqis were doing 

their part to make serious progress on political accommodation. If, however, they 

did not make reasonable progress, the United States would selectively reduce its 

support in terms of economic, political, and/or military aid in ways designed to put 

additional pressure on the Iraqis to make the necessary political compromises while 

still protecting vital American interests. 

This strategy aims to make clear to the central government and other players that 

our support is conditional, not open-ended. It offers the missing link in U.S. policy 

toward Iraq over the past 5 years: A political strategy for achieving U.S. objectives. 

It also aims to enable the United States to protect its vital interests in Iraq and 

the region at substantially reduced and more sustainable force levels. 

CONCLUSION

When I was in Iraq, the question I was most often asked by Iraqis was, ‘‘Is the 

United States staying?’’ Whether they were Sunni ‘‘Sons of Iraq’’ who had begun 

working with U.S. forces to drive al-Qaeda out of their town, or Shia judicial investigators who were working to bring the rule of law to Iraq, or teachers who wanted 

newly opened schools to stay open for a generation of Iraqi children that have 

already seen too many years of war, they all looked forward to the day when their 

country was no longer occupied by foreign forces. But they also wanted U.S. forces 

to stay awhile longer to enable Iraqis to take the risks necessary for political accommodation to occur. 

The only way to broaden and deepen recent security gains in Iraq is to use our 

remaining military, economic, and political leverage to push various Iraqi actors 

toward political accommodation. The Bush administration’s success or failure in so 

doing over the coming months will determine which options remain available to the 

next President. 

When the next Commander in Chief takes office, he or she will inherit a number 

of tough but absolutely critical choices: 

• How to put our Iraq policy on a new course that protects our vital interests 

there but also rebalances risk across our larger regional and global goals; 

• How to reduce the corrosive and unsustainable strains on our soldiers, marines 

and their families; 

• How to free up more forces and resources for other immediate priorities like 

Afghanistan; 

• How to restore the readiness and rebalance the capabilities of our military for 

the full range of possible future contingencies; and 

• How to restore America’s moral standing and influence in the process. 

He or she will also need strong partners in Congress to make these tough choices 

and to chart a new way forward for Iraq and U.S. national security more broadly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I would ask you not to answer now, but I’m going to submit, in 

writing, a question to you, if I may, Ms. Flournoy, and that is, the 

‘‘conditional engagement’’ strategy—if, in fact, there is not 

33 

progress, what do we selectively reduce? In other words, how do we 

selectively reduce? And what would you recommend? 

But, let me get—there are so many questions, and we’re going 

to do 7-minute rounds, so I’d appreciate if you could make your answers as short as possible, and augment them with written followup, if you would like. But, answer, as you see fit, obviously. 

Let me be a bit—I guess it would have been thought to be provocative if you asked this question, you know, 3 years ago—I, for 

one—I’ve arrived at the position I think General Odom has—is 

that—this idea of fighting terrorism in Iraq is fighting al-Qaeda in 

Iraq. And I find it not plausible, the argument that if we left, that 

al-Qaeda will gain a foothold. If we leave, my impression, in my, 

I don’t know, eight or nine trips into Iraq, is that the Sunnis will 

kill them, the Kurds will kill them, and the Shia will kill them, because they all have overarching reasons to do that, that the reason 

why al-Qaeda is able to sustain itself by moving north into Mosul 

is that the Sunnis will take help from anyone against what they 

believe is an oncoming Kurdish onslaught for Kirkuk to be occupied 

and Mosul to be controlled by the Kurds, exclusively. 

Would you, General McCaffrey, respond to that assertion, which 

is really, actually, better stated by General Odom. But, if we were 

to leave—we always talk about the downsides of leaving. We don’t 

talk much about the downsides of staying. The downsides of staying are overwhelming, just in terms of our force structure, just in 

terms of the opportunity costs that exist in other parts of the 

world. But, we have fallen into the jargon, many of us, that if we 

were to leave—not precipitously, but announce we’re leaving, 

‘‘We’re going to leave over a certain period of time,’’ that these terrible things would happen. The first of those terrible things that 

would happen, we would have moved al-Qaeda west. We’d move it 

from Afghanistan, 6 years ago, to having its occupation and its 

ability to operate with impunity out of a chaotic Iraq. Is that a reasonable assertion any longer, or is the opposite true, that if we 

leave, over time, we’re likely to damage—not improve—damage the 

ability of al-Qaeda to sustain itself in Iraq? 

General McCaffrey, what do you think? 

General MCCAFFREY. I think there really has been a lot of intellectual confusion on, what are we doing in Iraq? And we’ve tended 

to move our explanation as the situation has evolved. 

It’s hard to imagine that we went to Iraq originally to fight 

al-Qaeda, or that we should stay there to do the same. Al-Qaeda 

is primarily up in Waziristan, it’s in the Pak border, it’s in downtown London, Paris, Madrid, Indonesia. It’s struggling against corrupt, incompetent Arab regimes. It’s hard to imagine it would be 

a logic that would compel us to stay there with a combat force. 

At the same time, I don’t think it’s unreasonable to say that a 

chaotic situation in Iraq, with an all-out civil war, would be a huge 

threat to the Iraqi people, to their regional neighbors, and to U.S. 

national interests, and it would be a threat to oil, which is still a 

factor in all of this. 

So, I take your premise. I think you’re entirely right. 

And, by the way, interestingly enough, this—there’ll be another 

military history study coming out of this—we actually did extremely well in an urban campaign against AQI in downtown 

34 

Baghdad. It’s damndest thing I’ve seen. The—part of it was 

Petraeus’s tactics. Part of it was the Sunnis are sick of being 

pushed around by these people. And part of it was brilliant performance by, particularly, JSOC, our Special Operations groups. 

But, I think your point’s a good one. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me—it’s—so, it seems that maybe, you 

know, the point we’re looking for is, how do we leave, forcing 

events on the ground, without leaving total chaos and full-blown 

civil war behind—arguably, al-Qaeda could benefit in that environment. Absent that environment, it’s hard for me to understand how 

al-Qaeda benefits by us leaving, or us drawing down. 

But, it leads me to the second point, and you’ve all been—you’ve 

all—as usual, you’ve stuck to what we asked you talk about, and 

I appreciate it. And one of the points is the point raised by you, 

General. You talk about a culmination point and—a military term 

that we’ve come to understand. Essentially, that was the point 

which the strategy was looking to accomplish. The surge was—I’m 

a little out of my league here, using these military terms—but, essentially, it was a culminating point. We were looking—the stated 

purpose was to get to the point where there was a change in the 

space on the ground, how it was occupied, who was in control, in 

order to—in order to give an administration an opportunity to come 

up with a political—political—set of initiatives that were likely to 

enhance the prospect of bringing these warring factions together so 

that the need for them to continue to kill one another diminished, 

and the need for our presence diminished. 

Now, it’s interesting that each of you—none of you suggest that 

we’re going to be able—or should sustain American forces at surge 

levels in Iraq, that it’s either not possible or not desirable, or both. 

But, one of the things that was suggested by two of you is that we 

leave—in this transition, we leave at least a sufficient number of 

trainers there to be able to enhance the prospects of an Iraqi military emerging that has the capacity to deliver some security. I, 

quite frankly, parenthetically, don’t understand how that happens 

out of a political determination, who that military should be, who 

controls that military. 

But, having said that, again, back to General Odom. General 

Odom makes the point in his statement, which I read prior to the 

hearing, that the idea of leaving behind—whether it’s 500 or 5,000 

or 12,000 or 15,000—trainers, absent a significant American combat force to protect them, is not realistic. So, how do those of you 

who are suggesting that the training aspect of the Iraqi military 

be continued and beefed up in this transition period, and accommodate the necessity of drawing down combat brigades? 

And I’d note, parenthetically—and I have 30 seconds left, so I’ll 

conclude with this—recent trip to where terror resides—Afghanistan and Pakistan, along the border—John and I and Senator 

Hagel, we were just there. We even had the opportunity to land in 

the middle of the mountains, and to see whether—it wasn’t—well, 

it wasn’t intended, but, you know, to see what’s going on. You want 

to know where terror resides—that’s where it lives. You want to 

know where bin Laden is, you want to know where al-Qaeda is, the 

al-Qaeda we’ve come to know and love—we know where it is. 

35 

Now, we sat with our ISAF commander, an American, saying 

that, ‘‘Look, Helmand Province is—and the southern part of 

Afghanistan’’—you’ve talked about it, General—‘‘is increasingly 

controlled and/or dominated by the Taliban, which is growing in 

that area.’’ He said, ‘‘You want me to take care of that.’’ He said, 

‘‘Give me two combat brigades. I can take care of that.’’ But, he 

said, ‘‘You know what? I have no way to get those combat brigades.’’ Then he went on to say, as other commanders in the field 

said to us, he said, ‘‘Look, even if we could get the combat brigades 

out of Iraq, the truth is, they need decompression time,’’ which is 

your point, getting down from 17 to 15 to 12. It’s not like getting 

down from there and sending them to Afghanistan. It’s drawing 

them down to give them, actually, opportunity to have that 12 

months at home, or whatever that number is. 

So, having said all that, how do you deal with this notion—and 

I’d like you to discuss it, and you chime in, General Odom, since 

I’m sort of making your argument, and you know it better than I 

do—how do you transition to a training emphasis with Iraqi forces, 

reducing combat brigades, and do that without leaving those trainers exposed? 

General, why don’t you expand—or correct my—— 

General ODOM. Yes, sir. Your points are well made. I mean, I 

agree with—obviously, I agree with them. Let me sharpen them, 

just briefly. 

We don’t have the moral choice, or the physical—we don’t have 

the physical choice to prevent chaos in Iraq when we leave. It’s 

going to happen, no matter how many we train, no matter what we 

do. It may not be nearly as high as we’ve anticipated. I don’t think 

it will be. But, I’m going to assume it’s high, because we don’t have 

the choice to make it otherwise. 

We have the blame, because we went in. We made this chaos the 

case. We do have the choice not to send more U.S. troops. That’s 

the moral choice you’re facing, not preventing chaos in the future. 

And you get that through your head, you’ll get—be completely confused about this. 

The other point is, until there’s a political consensus, no matter 

how you train the troops, they’re not going to fight successfully. We 

trained troops in Vietnam that were very effective units. Some 

days, they fought; some days, they didn’t. It was entirely a function 

of loyalties in the local area. That is a political issue. Do you solve 

those—trainers are really beside the point. 

Finally, there is no shortage of military skills in Iraq. The insurgents fight very well. They don’t use the American techniques or 

American NCOs and training systems. But, I’m not sure they need 

to. 

The CHAIRMAN. General. 

General SCALES. Sir, first of all, I agree with you that from the 

military perspective, there is one choice. There is one institution in 

that country, as we begin to leave, that will prevent what Bill 

Odom just said is going to happen from happening—and that’s the 

army. And what’s so interesting is, the army’s only 200,000. The 

police, I believe, has a strength of 500,000. And it’s that small band 

of 200,000, some 12 divisions, that stand between the total fracVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
36 

turing and collapse of the regime and the bloodbath that might 

well happen. 

So, the key, sir, is a delicate balance, if you will, between pulling 

out American power by withdrawing American presence, and increasing and adding to the effectiveness of the Iraqi forces. You almost have to view it as a balance beam or a teeter-totter. This is 

graduate-level work; it is extremely difficult. It’s merely not about 

looking at the facts and figures of enlisted strength, officer 

strength, and materiel. And I think Bill’s right, in that regard. It’s 

about allegiance to the nation, and it’s about an army that’s willing 

to fight, not just able to fight. And you don’t get this by simply 

looking at status reports and counting the number of boots on the 

ground. 

And, oh, by the—and the final thing I’ll say is that it’s not going 

to happen overnight, sadly—— 

General ODOM. I think—— 

General SCALES [continuing]. Just a second, Bill—sadly, because 

it’s taken—we’ve been so slow in building infrastructure, we’ve 

been—we’ve been so reluctant to make our advise-train-and-assist 

function robust, and we’ve been—and the numbers of American 

troops on the ground have been so few, that that will prolong this 

process, and make it far more difficult than, perhaps, it could have 

been. 

General ODOM. Can I just make a brief followup? The tipping 

points, the turning points, are when you say that the critical moment is, here. Don’t just pick out a slice of the war. A war is a 

series—as Clausewitz said—a series of engagements. The first 

engagement was when we went in. We won that engagement. What 

happened was, the tipping point, at that point—the offense had the 

advantage when we went in; it tipped to the defense. Clausewitz 

has always argued that defense is the strongest form. We have 

been on the defense ever since. And if you begin to do the order 

of battle of what supplies the offense, you must not include only 

all those Iraqis who are willing to kill Americans, but all of the 

Arabs who are willing to come from other countries there. And if 

you want to look at the resources, you’ve got to consider all the billions of petrodollars we’ve sent there, which will supply, and are 

supplying, and will continue to supply. 

Now, when you take 150,000 U.S. force and a few trainers with 

a government of people who are not going to end up running this 

country when it’s over, no matter what happens, they’re not the 

winners. The people in Baghdad right now, in the Green Zone, are 

the losers. If you want to see the winners, get outside the Green 

Zone and see who doesn’t have security guards. Those are the people that’ll win. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate this discussion and wish we had 

more time. And I’ve—your answers have taken me much over my 

time, and I appreciate them. 

Let me—staff pointed out, I should note, that the full statements 

that you’ve submitted will be included in the record, as if you presented them, as well. 

Let me yield now to—and thank you all—let me yield to Chairman Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

37 

I want to cite, as one of you did, testimony yesterday at the 

Armed Services Committee in which General Cody gave a historic 

assessment—as reported in today’s Washington Post, General Cody 

said that ‘‘heavy deployments are inflicting ‘‘incredible stress’’ on 

soldiers and families, and that they pose a ‘‘significant risk’’ to the 

Nation’s All-Volunteer Army.’’ And Cody said—he said, ‘‘that even 

if five brigades are pulled out by July, as planned, it would take 

some time before the Army could return to 12-month tours.’’ 

Again quoting General Cody, ‘‘I have never seen our lack of strategic depth to be where it is today,’’ said Cody, who has been senior 

American official in charge of operations readiness for the past 6 

years. 

Now, that, some of you have reiterated in various ways, but I 

want to couple that with a graph that appears in the Washington 

Post, this morning, entitled ‘‘Spike in Attacks,’’ that I would like 

to make a part of the record. 

[The graph referred to follows:] 

Senator LUGAR. And it points out, as you do, General Scales, that 

this surge has bought us time and brought us to a culminating 

point, but the past week had rather startling developments. For 

example, the total attacks on Americans on March 23, a Sunday, 

was 42 in the whole country; on Monday, down to 38. But then the 

Maliki government commenced its offensive operation in Basra, 

and attacks on Americans went, on Tuesday, to 75; on Wednesday, 

to 128; on Thursday, to 138, and so forth, until the truce that the 


post1.eps
38 

Mahdi Army called for. And we’re back down to 53, the following 

Monday. The Post totals all this up and finds 700-and-some during 

a week of time, as opposed to about 300-and-some normally. 

Now, the point is, 60 percent of those attacks occurred in Baghdad. They were not in Basra. And they were largely other Shiites 

who were using road bombs and various other methods to kill 

Americans. 

Now, the point, I think, that General Odom has made, if I remember correctly, is that regardless of what our tactics may be at 

this point, there is likely to be civil strife in Iraq. In this particular 

case, the Mahdi forces and the Maliki government came to a standoff, and both are claiming that they did better than the other. 

Maybe that’s the best we can hope for, that people clash and sort 

of figure out where the advantage lies, and then seek some accommodation. 

But, in any event, the serious point that General Cody made in 

the Armed Services Committee yesterday, is that while all this is 

going on in Iraq—and General McCaffrey’s chart suggests is accelerating with difficulties in Afghanistan and Pakistan—is that 

there’s a worldwide demand for more forces at a time when we 

have fewer to send anywhere. This is a very serious situation for 

our entire defense establishment, leaving aside what is happening 

in Iraq. 

I bring this to the fore, because I keep reading reports that the 

idea, generally, to be presented by General Petraeus, or maybe others—and we’ll hear General Petraeus, what he has to say—has a 

sort of ‘‘stay the course’’—in other words, don’t move people, at this 

particular point; let’s assess for a few more weeks, maybe months, 

what is required here. But, we have the forces there now, and the 

point the—the chart that I’ve mentioned makes is that there are 

even more attacks on Americans at this particular point after the 

surge and because of internal civil conflict among Iraqis, so that we 

are even more vulnerable in the past week than we have been for 

several weeks before that. 

Now, in view of that, you have suggested that we’re coming into 

some difficulties, if there are hostile Shiites who block our ability 

to get our troops out of the place. So, I want to explore that point. 

But, let’s say that we were to withdraw, as some of you have suggested, sort of quietly—a few here, a few there, so almost nobody 

notices, and so forth. But, there are 150,000-plus troops, plus all 

the equipment. I take it the logisticians have a handle on how you 

physically move people by the thousands out of a place. But then 

we get to should we do so simply to save the general strength of 

our Armed Forces, generally, whether it be for Afghanistan or any 

other contingencies? 

Does anybody have a thought about this? 

General Scales, I’ve quoted you and your statement. 

General SCALES. Thank you, sir. 

Let me go back to the process of building an Iraqi Army. The 

best way to get the Iraqi Army to be effective is to get them to 

fight. I’m sorry, that’s all we have left right now. You get them to 

fight by putting them into the fight, with advisers. And the—and, 

to my mind, the best you can withdraw—pace that you can withdraw, would be somewhere between one and two brigades a month. 

39 

That’s just—that’s the logistical problem that you have with just 

getting stuff out across a 400-mile line of communications. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, we got them into the fight last week, and 

they fought, and now there are even more attacks on us. 

General SCALES. That’s right, sir, that’s one division. I think 

what we have to do is begin to back off, and put them up front, 

and let them learn to fight by fighting. And it’s a metering process. 

A partnership unit will watch an Iraqi unit in action, allow it to 

operate on its own, autonomously, begin slowly to pull back all the 

support that you were alluding to earlier, like logistics, communications, training, and so forth. That’s how you—that’s how you temper or measure or balance that pullback. 

My concern is picking up, for instance, an entire brigade that’s 

advising an entire division, and sending it south. I think that 

works against this delicate balance that I mentioned to the chairman. It is an artful craft. And, as Michele alluded, it’s something 

that’s going to take some time. But, to her point, if you just leave 

those American brigades there, then the Iraqi brigades have no incentive to fight. They can’t learn to get better by simply watching 

us. And so, again, that’s where the balance comes in, sir. 

Senator LUGAR. Michele. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, thank you. 

One of the things that I heard again and again from U.S. commanders on the ground is that we’ve hit a plateau, that they felt 

that they could not, with military means alone, get the violence 

below certain levels, that the only way it was going to go down was 

through political accommodation. I think we need to use the fact 

that we have to have some kind of drawdown in order to preserve 

our All-Volunteer Force, in order to address urgent needs, like 

Afghanistan, in order, as a superpower, to have more than one 

ready brigade available to the United States for contingencies that 

may arrive. We have to use that leverage in negotiating with the 

Iraqis, to say, ‘‘Look, this is going to happen. We cannot sustain 

this. Therefore, you—we need to see you making some specific political moves, because we cannot sustain this level of commitment 

any longer.’’ We have never done that. And I think it would give 

us powerful leverage if we were to have those negotiations. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by saying something that’s not always heard in the 

midst of this, which is that every one on this committee expresses 

our gratitude for the sacrifices of our troops and the efforts they 

are making. They’ve done whatever has been asked of them. And 

what we’re here to do is figure out whether or not we have a strategy that’s worthy of their sacrifice. But, we want to make certain 

they understand the full measure of our gratitude and respect for 

them. 

As I listen to three very experienced, distinguished and respected 

generals, the frustration that builds up in me, the anger that 

builds up, is palpable. This is an extraordinary situation for us to 

be in. 

40 

The frank incompetence of the last years puts us in a predicament where we’re being told, by one of our most successful generals 

who’s been involved in that region, that the unstated reality is, by 

some, our troops are coming home, notwithstanding all of the complications that will ensue, that the troop levels are where they are, 

not because of a strategy, but because of the locked-in situation of 

the politics in Iraq, which have come about because we’ve squandered what political capital we had, as well as the military strategic opportunities of the last years. 

You could make an argument that this is essentially the fifth 

war in Iraq that we’re now involved in. The first was against Saddam Hussein and his supposed weapons of mass destruction. And 

then we had the second, the insurgency that Dick Cheney told us, 

nearly 2 years ago, was in its last throes. And then there was the 

fight against al-Qaeda terrorists, when the administration said, 

‘‘It’s better to fight over there than fight over here.’’ Then there 

was the Sunni-Shia civil war that exploded after the bombing of 

the Samarra Mosque. And now, as we’ve seen in Basra, and as we 

hear, even in your descriptions, Generals, of what may follow with 

respect to the Kurds and the difficulties in the north, but also what 

we saw in Basra, you have the teeming pot of sectarianism, that 

has never been addressed, beginning to boil over again and staring 

us in the face of any option we have. Ms. Flournoy is absolutely 

correct, and many of us have been saying this for some time—it 

doesn’t even get heard in the debate—which is that there are only 

three choices: Unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement—both of which are unacceptable—and conditional engagement, which many of us have been demanding for 5 or more years. 

We’re also probably on our fifth or sixth strategy of these wars. 

First there was ‘‘shock and awe,’’ which was supposed to begin the 

peaceful transition to democracy. Then came the ‘‘search and destroy’’ missions that were designed to fight the growing insurgency, 

mainly in Al Anbar. Then there was ‘‘as they stand up, we will 

stand down,’’ which focused on training Iraqi Security Forces. General, I hear you talk about this difficulty of standing up the Iraqi 

Security Forces, knowing that ‘‘We’ve got to build capacity now.’’ 

Now, here we are, 6 years in. I remember meeting with General 

Petraeus when he was building that capacity. That was 31⁄2 years 

ago. Then we had the ‘‘national strategy for victory’’ and the introduction of the ‘‘clear, hold, and build’’ approach. And last year we 

had ‘‘the new way forward,’’ which brought us the troop escalation 

designed to buy time for the Iraqi Government, which we’re now 

being told is corrupt and dysfunctional to the core. 

You’ve described the situation where we’re saying, ‘‘We’ve got to 

bring our troops home.’’ I assume Iraqi militants heard that, as 

well as us, and they know they’re operating in that atmosphere, 

and so, they sit there and say, ‘‘Well, as this peels down, we’ll escalate our violence when it suits our purposes.’’ 

We’ve lived at the mercy of an awakening in Al Anbar that came 

about because they decided, politically, to work with us and be paid 

off and get training and weapons to prepare for whatever comes in 

the future with the Shia, and, of course, the Shia have been at the 

disposal of Muqtada al-Sadr, who declares a truce, which he now 

says may go until August, and who knows what happens then. 

41 

This is intolerable. Absolutely intolerable. It is unacceptable. 

Many of us have been urging this notion that you’ve got to 

change the dynamics. I’ve had the Governor and the sheiks of Al 

Anbar in my office, and I’ve said to them, ‘‘Is it a fact that, as long 

as we say we’re there interminably, you really don’t have to make 

any decisions as to what to do? You’re safe under the President’s 

policy, because he said we’re going to be there as long as it takes. 

They can take as long as they want.’’ Now, isn’t it true that until 

you shift this dynamic and get our troops into a different status, 

where the Iraqis know they’ve got to work this out? That’s why our 

troops had to engage in the last few days. Why doesn’t it make 

sense to have a national policy of a redeployment that forces the 

Iraqis to confront the realities of how they’re going to live with 

each other? It may hasten their own conflict, but the dynamic is 

not going to change without us changing this situation of unconditional engagement, is it, General McCaffrey? 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, let me say, it’s sort of discouraging, 

but I basically agree with your entire assessment of where we are. 

And, of course, now the question is, What are we going to do about 

it? And I think, essentially, we’ve got to come out of Iraq, we’ve got 

to, probably, have a timetable. We won’t be able to keep it secret. 

We need to ensure it doesn’t unwind on this President’s watch, because he has no political leverage left, so we’ve got to make sure 

the next administration gets it, where it’s not in all-out civil war. 

And then, as we come out, I think it would be irresponsible if we 

didn’t attempt to build an Iraqi Security Forces that can maintain 

order. 

Senator KERRY. I agree. And every suggestion that has been 

made in the proposals we’ve put forward in the last years have 

suggested exactly that, that we finish the job of training, but 

change the dynamics by which we have to engage, that we maintain sufficient ability to chase al-Qaeda—although I have argued, 

for years, that I haven’t met anyone in Iraq who wants al-Qaeda 

around. And al-Qaeda will not be there. They’re there because 

we’re there. Al-Qaeda’s not going to stay around if we’re not there, 

wouldn’t you agree? 

General MCCAFFREY. Yes; I think, basically, that that’s the case. 

I think we went into Iraq, and remained in Iraq, because we feared 

their influence on the region, and they’re counter to our national 

security strategy. But, that didn’t mean that the international terrorism groups that struck us, and that still are out there representing a threat, are essentially implicit in Iraq. They’re in 

Madrid, London, Waziristan. They’re a lot of places. But—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, General Odom, General Scales, and General McCaffrey, what is your take on the ability of the Sunni neighbors to play a more constructive role and, in fact, to change the 

dynamics within Iraq itself so that we can redeploy in a way that 

is sensible, and demand as General Zinni’s talked discussed—a different security arrangement for the region, which we haven’t seriously tried to negotiate. Would you comment? 

General ODOM. Yes. My comment on that would be that I think 

it’s unrealistic to think you’re coming out of this slowly, and I think 

it’s unrealistic to think you’re going to avoid chaos and you’re going 

to train any forces there that are going to work to your ends. 

42 

You’re absolutely right that you’ve got to change the dynamics. 

The only thing that will change the dynamics is an unambiguous 

United States beginning its withdrawal, and pretty hastily. And, I 

would advocate, move personnel before you move materiel. They’ll 

string this withdrawal out for a year or two or three, dragging all 

the materiel out. That’s—we’ve just made that infeasible by staying 

as long as we are. 

General SCALES. Sir, if I—— 

General ODOM. I don’t think—I don’t think that these people are 

going to come in and help us on the way out. But, when they see 

you going out, they’ll start listening to you about what’s going to 

be there. And until you start that, all this other talk about, ‘‘Are 

we going to do it in small steps and easily?’’ just are, kind of, beside the point. General McCaffrey and I were speaking beforehand. 

I have, for some time, wondered if Baghdad would end up looking 

like Dien Bien Phu one of these days. If you remember that— 

maybe you’re not old enough to remember—the French were 

trapped in Dien Bien Phu and lost a big part of their army deep 

inside Vietnam. And I think, you know, you need to start taking 

that in—that scenario into account. You’re—they’re—the President—and I even hear it on this committee—think there’s a choice 

that doesn’t exist. You’re not going to get out, leaving order. The 

question is merely the price. Every year we’ve stayed, the price has 

gotten higher. Staying another 6 months won’t lower the price. 

And let me just end by saying—I said something I’d like to reemphasize in my testimony. Victory in Iraq is a losing matter, and it’s 

not really a point that’s major to our interests. Our interests—and 

I remember this, being in the Carter White House and planning for 

the Persian Gulf Security Framework—has always been, since at 

least in the 1950s, regional stability. Our policies for the last 3 or 

4 years have been destabilizing the region. If we want to stabilize 

it, the first thing we have to do is reverse the policy we have right 

now. Then there’s some possibility of getting it back. So, I emphasize the—you don’t have any other choices until you start out. 

Senator KERRY. General Scales. 

General SCALES. Very briefly. It goes back again to balance, in 

terms of Sunni neighbors. We want one thing from them: To engage. They will engage, as long as they see us withdrawing and 

Iraq not collapsing. What we don’t want them to do is engage to 

the point where they invade. So, it’s a delicate balance. 

But I would agree with Bill, in the sense that the sooner the 

Sunni states become engaged, they will do it for their own interests, not for ours. And their own interest is to prevent Iraq from 

fracturing. As we begin to withdraw, you’re going to see a spike in 

violence. You’ve seen it already. Again, it goes back to balance. We 

have to pull our troops out and then show that the other Sunni 

states need to engage very quickly, very emphatically, and very 

dramatically to prevent them from facing the prospects of going in 

with forces. And that is our leverage, I believe, that is to present 

them with a balance, not to present them with stark alternatives. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse my cynicism. I suspect that’s why we’re 

leaving this to the next administration. 

Senator Hagel. 

43 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And thanks, to each of our witnesses, this morning, for your contributions and your continued contributions over the last few years 

on, not only this issue, but service to our country that you’ve all 

given a lifetime to. 

The testimony of the four of you, and in the course of the questions and answers this morning, has brought, I think, into some 

clear focus: First, we have no good options, as you have all noted 

in different ways. We, second, have been captive to the reality of 

a great array of uncontrollables, and we will continue to be held 

hostage to those uncontrollables, regardless of what we have done 

or what we are doing. A third aspect of what you all noted is the 

absolute burden we’ve put on our military, and asked our military, 

essentially, to do everything. And as spectacularly effective as our 

military has been—and one of the comments that General McCaffrey made when he said ‘‘the de facto governments, at the local 

level, are our army units.’’ 

Now, as we are in our sixth year in Iraq, we are not just at a 

point where I believe that the so-called ‘‘pause,’’ which some have 

been talking about—and we’ll get further refinement on that when 

General Petraeus is before our committee next year—or, next 

week—but the bigger point as to the purpose, and what you have 

just had some exchange with Senator Kerry about, and others so 

far, ‘‘Where is this going?’’—you laid out, Ms. Flournoy, three options. One of the points that General McCaffrey made—in fact, 

maybe his opening statement—was, How did we get in this mess? 

Well, the real question is, How do we get out of this mess? I mean, 

that is the only question. 

And as I listened to the four of you, and as General McCaffrey 

started framing, in, I think, a good and clear, comprehensive way, 

the dynamics of not only the dangers that we are dealing with, but 

the astounding amount of damage that we’ve done to our force 

structure, and our standing in the Middle East, and our selfdestructive policies that have actually taken away diplomatic flexibility and latitude—and if you inventory all that, as General 

McCaffrey did, I think, quite well, what struck me about that testimony and the other testimony given here, that all the so-called 

‘‘good news’’ is about—we have a competent Secretary of Defense, 

we have competent generals, we have spectacular soldiers—but all 

the good news is on the American side of the ledger. I haven’t 

heard the four of you talk much about—not because it’s your fault, 

or not because you’re not creative, but the good news should be as 

much on the other side, or at least some good news. In fact, it is 

in the negative column. 

And I am well aware of General Odom’s position on this over the 

years. And, as he says in this testimony, the surge is prolonging 

instability, not creating the conditions for unity in—as the President claims. 

Senator Lugar said something in his comments at the beginning, 

which a number of us have been talking about for many years, and 

that is, we’ve really never had a regional strategy. We’ve never had 

any strategy. We have ricocheted from event to event, catastrophe 

to a catastrophe, crisis to crisis. And until we are framing a regional strategy, and also a strategy within Iraq, and taking the 

44 

heavy burden off the military to do everything, then we will continue to have these kinds of hearings. 

And, of course, the American people—we talk about a confluence, 

General. As we all know, elections are about self-correction. In this 

election, we’ll self-correct on this issue, as other elections do on all 

issues. The American people have made themselves pretty clear on 

this. And the four of you know this—everyone on this committee— 

that we can’t sustain a foreign policy, certainly two wars, the damage we’re doing to our country and the military, without the support of the American people. So, that’s over. This game is over. 

And we can dance around the hearings all morning and all afternoon, but what we must get at is, How do we then unwind in a 

strategic way with our allies, protecting our interests? And it’s 

going to force us into some tough choices, and none will be very 

good. 

And one of the obligations I think we have on this committee, 

and as elected officials, is to prepare the American people for that, 

is that there is—there is not one good choice here, where we’re 

going. 

And I’d like to ask this general question. In picking up what— 

on what General McCaffrey said—at the front end of your statement, General, about, ‘‘How did we get in this mess?’’—I’d like to 

ask you if you could, all four, briefly give me an answer to, ‘‘How 

do we get out of this mess?’’ I know it’s not simple, one, two, three, 

but we’ve heard pieces of this. Certainly, Ms. Flournoy has laid out 

three options that she thinks we have. But, I would like, from the 

three of you, give me two or three, or whatever, points you want 

to make, briefly, on, ‘‘How do we start responsibly unwinding our 

involvement?’’ Because we, if nothing else, know—and it’s pretty 

clear here—what Senator Lugar noted in General Cody’s testimony 

yesterday—it’s unsustainable—if for no other reason than our military can’t sustain the burden. 

Start with General McCaffrey. Thank you. 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, it seems to me that—I totally agree, 

there are a series of unpalatable choices. There are a couple of 

things we’re not going to do, so there’s not much sense in talking 

about them. What we’re not going to do is substantially withdraw 

in the remainder of this administration. And I’m not too sure it’s 

a good idea—if it goes totally chaotic, with no continuity in government between November and January, this isn’t a good thing. So, 

I think the so-called ‘‘pause,’’ they may be able to drawdown to 12 

brigades. Who knows? But, essentially, the next administration 

comes in, they’ve got to sort it out. 

I think step one is, we tell the Iraqis we’re leaving, and we give 

them a timetable. You can argue for a year, you can argue for 3 

years. We tell them, ‘‘We’re coming out.’’ We try and build the Iraqi 

Security Forces. No question. The—we try and—without any prevarication, engage the region in a dialog, in a serious conversation 

with the Iranians, the Syrians, the Turks, the Saudis, the Jordanians, and others, and to include the larger Muslim world. I 

don’t think the Europeans are going to help us, so I’d really focus 

on the regional engagement. It’s not to their advantage to have allout civil war in Iraq as we pull out. 

45 

And then, I think, finally, we do have to rebuild our capability 

to act in phase two. We’ve got to rebuild the Army, rebuild the air 

and naval power in the gulf. So, it’s not ‘‘We’ve turned out the light 

and gone home,’’ but we’ve refused to continue to take part as a— 

in a civil war inside Iraq. And I think that’s essentially where 

we’re going to end up with the next President of the United States. 

Senator HAGEL. General Odom. 

General ODOM. Let me say that—I just have to repeat what I’ve 

been saying all along. You get out of Iraq in boats and airplanes, 

and you drive down to the harbor to get into the boats. And you 

don’t have a much better choice than that. 

And let me say, ‘‘What do you do next?’’ When you’re working in 

a strategy to do something like this, you can’t lay out a bunch of 

steps and follow them, one, two, three. You can have a general concept of where you’re going, but, as everybody knows, in wars, once 

the first shot’s fired in a new movement, you’re going to have to 

adapt. But, you need to keep your eye on where you’re headed. The 

target is regional stability. And we will have regional stability 

when we have better relations with Iran. 

Let me point out the advantages of relations with Iran. They 

don’t want instability there, and they don’t want instability in 

Afghanistan, and they don’t want the Taliban and al-Qaeda. We 

are denying ourselves a major ally in Afghanistan. 

The Russians are able to play a spoiling role in this region because of an unnatural alliance between Russia and Iran. If we had 

better relations, and you took Russia out of the equation here, you 

could then start bringing pipelines out of central Asia, down 

through Iran, and unlock this lock Putin has had on energy—oil— 

to Western Europe. 

You have a country that has very strong interests in Iran, in taking—in stability in Iraq. They don’t want that there. We don’t have 

to worry about stabilizing the Kurdistan area. The Turks, the Iranians, and the residual Kurdish—Iraqi Government will do it. We 

can say all we want to—the problem with training up the present 

army and the present government, it’s probably not going to be the 

army and the present government that rules. So, you’re going to 

have to let that take its natural course. We’ve lost all chance. 

So, I won’t say any more than: Get out, create new options, certainly do the diplomacy General McCaffrey is suggesting, with the 

regional powers. But, you’re going to make real progress when you 

improve your relations with Iran. It’ll have more—as much change 

for that regional balance as the United States-Chinese recognition 

in the cold war. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

General Scales. 

General SCALES. Very briefly, sir. 

First of all, let’s be very clear. Regardless of the strategy or who’s 

in office, we’re not going to get out of Iraq, just driven by the conditions of the military. The question is, How do we do it without 

allowing chaos to reign in the region and without breaking the 

Army and the Marine Corps? That’s really what your question is 

about. And the answer is to do it responsibly. And I agree with 

General McCaffrey in this regard, is—there’s several factors 

involved. 

46 

First of all, we need to have a regional engagement, and we need 

to buttress our alliances there. It’s not just about talking to them, 

it’s about getting regional states to engage. 

Second, as we begin to pull out, as General McCaffrey said, we 

need to do the best we can to leave behind the best fighting force 

that we can that has allegiance to the Iraqi flag. We have an obligation to do that. 

And, third, we have to find regional enclaves that will allow us 

to have an unobtrusive presence in the Middle East, simply because the Middle East is absolutely vital to our national interests. 

And I can’t emphasize this enough—we must spend the resources 

to rebuild the Army and the Marine Corps as quickly as we can, 

to put them back on the shelf so that they can be a responsive force 

to the strategic threats of the future, which we know are going to 

emerge. And I would suggest to you, it’s not about refurbishing 

what we already have. We have to rebuild both of these services 

in light of our very painful experience over the last 6 years. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank you all for appearing today. And let me just say how 

much I appreciate and benefit from the comments of the two Senators on the other side of the aisle who have already spoken today. 

Very much appreciated their remarks. 

I am very concerned that we are bogged down in Iraq, and that 

it’s undermining our ability to respond to the global threat posed 

by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates operate in over 50 nations, 

and yet we are dedicating an overwhelming and disproportionate 

amount of our diplomatic, intelligence, and military resources to 

Iraq alone, and, I’ve said many times, this just makes no sense. 

Let me ask General Odom some specific questions. Some have 

suggested that we transition to a so-called ‘‘strategic overwatch’’ 

role, whereby we continue to embed ‘‘trainers’’ in Iraqi military 

units and provide Iraqi forces with the kind of logistical support 

that we saw last week in Basra, including, as I understand it, 

close-air support. This would require additional combat forces to 

protect our ‘‘trainers,’’ as well as personnel to support our forces. 

And I’m told we could end up keeping as many as 50,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq, long term. 

General Odom, would this approach be likely to promote stability 

in the region? And would it be more or less dangerous for our 

troops? 

General ODOM. It would be a lot more dangerous for our troops. 

If you want to get a sense of that danger, talk to some NCOs and 

officers who have actually trained them out there. They fear for 

their life when they’re living and working close with the Iraqi 

forces. We wouldn’t be training the people that are going to win the 

civil war. We’re training the people who are going to lose it. People 

fight when they have somebody to be loyal to. Nobody is loyal to 

the flag in Iraq right now; they’re loyal to clans, and they’re loyal 

to sectarian groups. And that’s the reality, and there isn’t anything 

that’s going to get anybody off that—off the responsibility for havVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
47 

ing created this, to allow us to change it. So, I can’t really add 

much more than that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So, I assume you—— 

General ODOM. It’s an open-shut case. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So, I, obviously, assume that you don’t think 

this would promote stability in the region, either. 

General ODOM. It promotes instability. It prolongs instability. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you believe that the Iraqi Security Forces 

are operating as a neutral governmental force in Iraq, or is it party 

to the sectarian conflict there? And what steps have been taken by 

Iraqi Government officials to reduce or eliminate sectarianism? 

And have they been successful? I understand General Jones’ Commission recommended that we disband the national police, because 

it is infiltrated by Iranian-backed militia that engaged in sectarian 

fighting, but Maliki refused to do this. Should we be continuing to 

fight alongside such groups, General Odom? 

General ODOM. I don’t think so. I don’t know any reasonably— 

the Iraqi military is neutral, in favor of a government, some sort 

of government that doesn’t exist there. And just look at what the— 

why are the Sunni Shiites not—I mean, the Sunni sheikhs not willing to sign up and go into the army there? They know they won’t 

live if they go in. So, I mean, this is obviously not an independent 

force—or nonsectarian force. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So, if we continue to ask our servicemembers 

to—— 

General ODOM. Pardon? 

Senator FEINGOLD. If we continue to ask our servicemembers to 

prop up the Iraq Security Forces, is there a significant danger that 

we’ll be dragged further into the Iraqi civil war? 

General ODOM. That’s been the story since we went in, and I 

don’t see why it would change now. It hasn’t changed for the last 

5 years. Sure, every month more we stay, the worse it’ll get, the 

higher the price. You cannot recover sunk costs. 

Senator FEINGOLD. General, last week Maliki’s forces attacked 

Sadr’s militias, and U.S. forces were drawn in to support Maliki. 

Can you discuss the role that U.S. forces are playing when it comes 

to the intrasectarian fighting? And, given the national security 

threats emanating from around the world, is this an appropriate 

role for our troops? 

General ODOM. I don’t know any more than I’ve read in the 

newspapers about what the U.S. troops did there with the Iraqi 

forces. Some of the things that General Scales has been describing 

may give you the details of that. I think the—it struck me that 

we’re there because Maliki foxed us into doing it. He gave—I don’t 

think General Petraeus wanted his forces down there. The Prime 

Minister gave him the dilemma of one alternative. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, General. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me get back to the question that Senator Hagel raised, which 

is, ‘‘How do we get out of this mess’’—and, General Scales—‘‘without chaos reigning?’’ I think it would be fair to say that most people 

48 

wouldn’t agree that getting on boats and planes and moving us 

right out would result in anything other than chaos reigning, but 

I’m not going to get into that discussion. I—and, particularly as 

you look at others in the area, who need to play a stronger role, 

the other Sunni nations, even they have that concern. And the 

question is, How can they play a constructive role? 

Let me get back to the question. Just one other observation, because hindsight is always 20-20-20. It really goes, by the way, to 

the point of the surge, by making this observation. There are those 

in this Congress who—first of all, Petraeus has brought us to a 

place—a different place than we were a year and a half ago, in 

terms of stability, in terms of some of the possibilities. Again, the 

question is, How do we take advantage of that? You know, a year 

and a half ago, 2 years ago, those of—some would have wanted us 

to get out, and Anbar was controlled by al-Qaeda, at that point in 

time. I had doubts about what General Petraeus could do, in terms 

of the sectarian violence, which has flared up again, but even that 

has significantly declined, so he has brought us to a place. The 

question is how we take advantage of that. 

First, Ms. Flournoy, I want to push you with a little more specificity. The chairman said ‘‘put in writing,’’ but you’ve really—really 

laid out one strategy, and it’s conditional engagement. That’s the 

strategy, the realistic option. What are one or two of the things 

that we could do to put pressure on the Iraqis to move forward on 

the political side? Petraeus has given us some space. The Iraqis 

are—and some of them are moving forward. The problem is, Maliki 

doesn’t have the credibility, doesn’t have—has not shown the ability to do the things that have to be done to provide for a real resolution of any of the sectarian concerns. What are one or two of the 

things that we could do to show—to say, ‘‘If you don’t do this, 

here’s a price that you pay, and we’ll make sure that price is paid 

to move you quicker, to deal with some of the political problems’’? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you, Senator. 

Just one example. I think we are at a point of great leverage, 

but—you know, but perishable, as we negotiate this bilateral agreement with the Iraqis. One of the things that they are seeking is 

a long-term commitment of security assistance to the—to build 

the—and support—the Iraqi Security Forces. I think we should 

make a—use that request, on their behalf, as a—as leverage to say, 

‘‘Look, the only way that we’re going to provide you with that 

assistance is if you integrate—if you make that institution fully 

representative of your population, and that means integrating 

Sunnis, in a real way, into the Armed Forces of Iraq. If you don’t 

do it, you’re building a sectarian institution; we cannot provide the 

security assistance you need.’’ That’s an example of a very concrete 

place that we could use our leverage to push a form of political 

accommodation that will be a key factor as the Sunnis decide 

whether to keep out of the insurgency or whether to restart it before the end of the year. 

Senator COLEMAN. Got another one? 

General Scales. 

General SCALES. Let me offer one. 

One of the problems that we’ve had in doing what Michele just 

suggested is embedded in the senior ranks, in the ministries, and 

49 

in the senior ranks of the military. Everybody in the U.S. command 

will tell you who the good guys are and who the bad guys are, who 

is loyal to clan, tribe, or sect, and who is loyal to the nation. One 

of the things that we need to insist on, is for us to play a greater 

role in getting rid of incompetents, of those who are not loyal to 

the nation—I don’t mean loyal to the regime, but loyal to the nation—and those who simply don’t have the military skills necessary 

to do what I just suggested in my opening remarks. We know who 

they are. We just haven’t had the leverage that we need to get to 

them. 

Senator COLEMAN. But, how do you—I’m sorry. 

Ms. Flournoy. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Another example, on the economic side. Again, 

Iraqis are asking for things like favorable trade relations, all kinds 

of future economic investment. Again, ‘‘We’re not interested in even 

beginning that discussion until you pass an oil law that guarantees 

the equitable distribution of oil wealth to all of the parties in Iraq.’’ 

I mean, it’s things—another—a political one, ‘‘We want to see free, 

fair, open-list elections—provincial in the fall, national next year— 

and if—you know, our political support is contingent on those 

things happening.’’ Again, there are obvious connections that we’ve 

refused to make in the past, worrying that we’re going to push 

them too hard, too fast. I think we’re at the point where we have 

to push them as hard as we can, because time’s run out. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would agree with that assessment. 

General McCaffrey—well, both generals—General Petraeus is 

going to come up and at least, by all accounts, indicate—say that, 

‘‘Let’s kind of catch our breath a second. We’ve moved—we’re going 

to be moving—what, five divisions will be moving out.’’ What are 

your—as we sit up here—this is graduate-level stuff. You know, 

unfortunately, in this body, folks are often motivated by the next 

election rather than anything else. And the American public is 

speaking. There’s no question about that. So, what is it—how do 

we—what do we say to push him to more aggressively move forward? It seems to me that everyone agrees that we’re drawing 

down. There’s just no question about that. We cannot sustain what 

we have. And that whether we drawdown—again, I would disagree 

with General Odom—but drawdown in a way that avoids chaos 

over—there’s got to be some period of time—what is it that we’re— 

what do we say to General Petraeus, when he comes and says, ‘‘We 

need to kind of catch our breath’’? Catch our breath for what? What 

would be the—what’s the response of the—to the guy sitting up 

here who’s not a general? And this is graduate-level stuff, and he’s 

done some things that some of us questioned whether he could do. 

What’s the statement we make to him? 

General MCCAFFREY. Well—and, by the way, I wouldn’t give 

undue credibility to generals, either. You know, I’d be very cautious 

about—— 

Senator COLEMAN. We’ve got some disagreement right here 

among generals as to—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Yeah. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Approach. Absolutely. 

General MCCAFFREY. No, in fact, let me make that point. I think 

General Odom is a very smart man, who says this thing’s hopeless. 

50 

I don’t agree at all. I do not believe it’s impossible to build an Iraqi 

Army that will see themselves as a nationalist force and have integrated Shia, Sunni, Kurds. I don’t believe it. I’ve been to their battalions. The two Iraqi divisions out in Anbar province are now 60- 

percent Sunni. They’ve put 14,000 Sunni boys into the police force. 

So, I think his premise, ‘‘Throw up your hands, get down to the 

boats, set your equipment on fire,’’ is just not valid. Nor would our 

vital allies—the Saudis and the Gulf Coast States—want to see us 

with a Persian Empire on their northern border and the country 

in flames. So, I do think we have a responsibility, under international law, to try and build an Iraqi Security Forces before we 

go out. And I think that’s feasible. 

Now, I—and I also think—I wouldn’t push General Petraeus. 

This guy’s as good as we can produce. He is just absolutely worldclass. We need to have him hold it together until the next administration comes in, and then we need a national consensus, What do 

we do next? Step one of that consensus is, ‘‘Get out of Iraq.’’ 

The question is, Do we do it in 1 year or 3 years? A lot of that’ll 

be dependent upon how the Iraqis respond. Senator Biden’s made 

a terrific argument, in the past, about, you know, a looser federal 

structure in Iraq. I think we no longer have a vote in the political 

future of Iraq. I don’t think we can meter out embedded trainers 

and possibility of trade sanctions. These people are going to decide 

it in their own way. 

I don’t think it’s necessarily going to be a catastrophe, but it sure 

doesn’t look good right now. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, General, if the idea is to hold it together from now until the new President, then it’s a question of 1 

year or 3 years, which is what you’ve just said, and that would depend on the circumstances at the time. So, the bottom line of what 

you’re saying is that we ought to get out of Iraq. You say you don’t 

think it’s as bad as General Odom has said. So, what is your degree of optimism or pessimism? 

General MCCAFFREY. It’s a helluva mess. I mean, you know, there’s just no ways about it. The $600 billion war, 34,000 killed 

and wounded, we’ve alienated most of the global population, the 

American people don’t support the war, and there we are. And the 

Iraqi Government’s dysfunctional. The Iraqi Security Forces are inadequate, ill-equipped, and we’ve got very little time. 

By the way, I’m not recommending we come out of Iraq in a year 

or three. That’s what’s going to happen. This thing’s over. So, the 

question is, How do we stage it as we come out? I, again, would 

suggest—by the way, I think the actual outcome—we’re going to 

see some Iraqi two-star general in charge of Iraq, 3 years from 

today, and one of these hotshot division commanders is going to 

step in here and start smashing heads. Iraqi mothers are sick of 

the violence in Baghdad. And I think what you’re going to see is, 

they want order, not democracy; they want food and jobs. But, 

we’ve still got, of course, this underlying deep antipathy of the 

Shia-Sunni-Kurdish kind of question. So, again, I think you’ve got 

to build a security force, you’ve got to tell them we’re leaving, and 

51 

you’ve got to, at some point, hit the civil war in the direction of 

somebody who’s more likely to govern Iraq effectively than the current incoherent, dysfunctional regime that’s in power. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, you’re pretty graphic in your description, here, and thank you for sharing it. In essence, what you 

just said—and you tell me if I have correctly interpreted your remarks—is that the way the society is, and the lay of the circumstances, that ultimately it’s going to be a military strongman that’s 

going to take over in Iraq. 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, my guess is, somebody’s got to govern 

Iraq, and I’ve met a—you know, a lot of Iraqi military officers. 

They’re sort of used to being in charge of the country, and that’s 

more likely the outcome. I’m not recommending it. I’d like—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. No, I understand. 

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. A law-based state, one at 

peace with its neighbors, one that isn’t suppressing, brutalizing its 

own people. 

And one other comment, just to add on. The embedded-trainers 

thing, that Baker-Hamilton report, which I thought, you know, had 

some distinguished people on it, scared me to death. I don’t want 

to see 40 National Guard soldiers stuck in an Iraqi commando battalion in the heart of Iraq with the U.S. combat forces out of there, 

or, ‘‘Don’t worry about it, there’s a Marine battalion afloat in the 

Persian Gulf, there’s a half a brigade in Kuwait.’’ We shouldn’t be 

in there with our soldiers all over that country, our contractors all 

over that country, if there’s no combat power. So, there’s some tipping point. 

I actually told the administration—it’s seven brigades—I just invented it. Once you convince yourself you’ve got to go below seven 

brigades, get out of there, leave the Green Zone protected with a 

Marine battalion and come out, because I don’t want to see us end 

up with Mogadishu, where we lose 5,000 U.S. trainers some night 

when a division announces it’s no longer part of the Iraqi Army, 

it’s now a Shia militia unit. 

So, I’d just put that as a caution. Be careful. The only reality in 

Iraq is raw military power. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, this is, Mr. Chairman, some of the 

most graphic testimony that we’ve had, either in this committee or 

the Armed Services Committee. 

Now, you know, what you just said—you tell me if I’m correct— 

what you just said, what you expect—not what you want, but what 

you expect to happen in the future, with a strongman stepping forward, isn’t that the history of what we’ve seen in Iraq since it was 

all cut up after World War I by the British and French? 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, you start getting back there and we’ll 

be lost, and we’ll never reemerge. We almost can’t end up with a 

worse situation than Saddam, who—and his sons and the absolute 

misery he subjected the country to, and the threat he was to their 

neighbors. So, a nice, shiny two-star general, trying to build consensus-based politics to hold the country together, with a strong 

army and a lot of international interaction that’s positive—the six 

neighbors, the Europeans, the United States—that might not be a 

bad outcome. We sure as heck aren’t going to stay in there, at 100 

to 1,000 killed and wounded a month, much longer. 

52 

Senator BILL NELSON. And, although we’d not like to put the 

label on it, we’re talking about another dictator. 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, you know, it certainly isn’t going to 

be Switzerland. And it’s hard to imagine what it could look like. 

I hope it’s a country that has borders, has a national army and currency, and doesn’t brutalize its own people. And that may well be 

the outcome, if we’re fortunate and if the Iraqi leadership makes 

some tough decisions. 

I wouldn’t write them off yet. Maliki won’t be the Thomas Jefferson of Iraq, but there may be others who will step forward. They’ve 

got a lot of brave, well-educated people still left there. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Odom compared what he thought 

might happen to the French at Dien Bien Phu. You just outlined 

the situation, if we left a training unit there—you happened to pick 

the National Guard—that they could be swallowed up by us not 

being able to protect them. Overall, would you agree with General 

Odom that Baghdad has the possibility of becoming another Dien 

Bien Phu? 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, you know, I think there’s a remote 

chance—the U.S. Armed Forces are so powerful and adept that it’s 

a historical anomaly. We’ve lost armies in World War II, divisions 

in Korea, brigades in Vietnam. I find it hard to imagine a U.S. 

Army or Marine battalion getting overrun by anybody in the entire 

country. However, I—you know, and I’ve warned the probable next 

commander going into Iraq, there’s—I told them, I said—invented 

a probability—you’ve got a 5-percent probability of fighting your 

way out of that country, trying to come down 400 miles of logistic 

chain, parallel to the Iranian frontier, with 15,000 al-Quds guys in 

there in civilian clothes, with passive resistance on the road networks—this could be a huge mess, the likes of what we haven’t 

seen since 1951, on the Yalu. It’s very unlikely, but military officers shouldn’t be in the business of probabilities, but capabilities. 

So, again, I’m very concerned. Our retrograde operations, historically, are the most dangerous things we do, coming off the beach 

at Anzio, coming out of, you know, Inchon. We’ve got to really 

watch our step, here in the next year or two or three. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General—— 

General MCCAFFREY. And we can’t leave our equipment there, 

by—we’re not setting fire to 10 billion dollars’ worth of equipment, 

and come down the roads in fighting squadrons, with millions of 

refugees following us. We shouldn’t do that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General, thank you for your candor. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s been an outstanding 

hearing, and I appreciate the witnesses for their testimony. 

General McCaffrey, early on in your testimony, you talked about 

being moderately optimistic. And certainly the picture you just 

painted was very different, in some ways, than that. We’ve talked 

a lot about political solutions in the past—and we’ve talked about 

the fact that there is no military solution. It seems that you’ve sort 

of added a different component, and that the fact is, you do not 

think that we, ourselves, can have a military solution; but, in fact, 

you really don’t see, in the short term, a political solution, either, 

53 

in Iraq. But, what you envision is a military solution, on their side, 

not on ours; them having the ability to maintain order through 

having a well-trained Iraqi force, itself. But, you do not really see 

a political solution, if you will, in the short term, in Iraq. And I 

guess, as we look at conditional involvement—as has been discussed—I wonder whether it’s fruitless, in your eyes, to even talk 

about that conditional involvement involving some of the political 

solutions that have been laid out in earlier testimony. 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I wouldn’t think a political solution’s 

impossible. I actually think it’s—if we get a provincial elections 

law, and they elect regional people who are their kind of people, 

if we get a hydrocarbon law and the Sunnis say, ‘‘We won’t get frozen out of the wealth of this country,’’ if we create strong local 

police, where fearful mothers in Shia and Sunni communities say, 

‘‘It’s our boys protecting us, and they won’t let militias come in and 

murder us,’’ then there’s some granularity to that society that 

would then tolerate a loose federal structure at the top, if there’s 

a strong national army. So, I don’t mean to imply that this is going 

to be easy to do, but the only good outcome, is, How do we get to 

that goal? But, it won’t be sitting on the Iraqis—I would agree with 

General Odom—for another 10 years, with 150,000 troops mentoring Iraqi Army units. Their problem—I agree with General 

Scales—their problem isn’t training. To some extent, it’s not even 

leadership. We do need to leave them with equipment. They’ve got 

to find something that’s worth fighting and dying for. 

Senator CORKER. So, you, in fact, do think that we ought to be 

stipulating—on our side, on the policy side of this—stipulating 

some political activity—benchmarks, if you will—taking place as 

part of our involvement—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Absolutely. 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Regardless of the fact that it may 

end up with a two-star general—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Somehow, you’ve got to end up with—a 

provincial government’s got to be ‘‘My kind of people. I helped put 

them in office. They’ve got police, they’re going to protect me from 

these other people.’’ In some places, in a place like Baghdad, which 

is essentially 20 percent of the nation’s population, it wouldn’t be 

provincial, it would be neighborhoods, ‘‘I’ve got to have neighborhood political leadership that are my people, and police who will 

keep me alive in the coming 3 years.’’ So, I’d—I don’t think that’s 

impossible to do, it’s just going to be mostly Iraqi decisions that get 

there, not U.S. decisions. 

Senator CORKER. You know, the only real input a body like us 

has as it relates to this war is really the funding of the war. And 

the only real decision that we’re going to have to make, or we will 

make between now and the next election, is going to be the supplemental that comes up. 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, also the—— 

Senator CORKER. And I—— 

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Economic support, sir, for the 

nonmilitary component to working in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

There’s got to be more than just a club. You’ve got to offer these 

people jump-starting the economy. And that’s going to take external resources. 

54 

Senator CORKER. But—— 

General MCCAFFREY. That’s another lever. 

Senator CORKER. And certainly we—many of us have talked 

about at length. I guess the question I’m asking all of you, except, 

I think, General Odom—I think I’m pretty clear as to where he 

stands, and that’s an immediate situation—but, as we look—and I 

think all of us realize we’re disappointed at where we are. I think 

General Petraeus has been an outstanding American, and certainly 

our troops have been that way—but, as we move up into this next 

election, really the only issue that’s going to come before us as a 

body is going to be funding, and what I think I’m hearing you and 

the other two witnesses saying is that we need to let things be as 

they are, because this administration is not going to change course, 

and hope that the next administration has a more coherent way of 

dealing with Iraq. And I’d just like to hear the other two witnesses—I know you shook your head in affirmation—but, to state, 

you know, what are the other kind of policy things, and is that the 

course you recommend, if you will, keeping things intact until the 

next administration comes along. 

Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I’m loathe to let this administration completely 

off the hook, because I do think that there is a period—the next 

10 months are very important, in the sense that we have leverage 

now that we won’t have when the next administration comes in, by 

virtue of the fact that the security situation may atrophy, by virtue 

of the fact that the bilateral agreement probably will be concluded 

by that time. So, I want to—I don’t want to let this administration 

off the hook for doing as much—pushing as hard as we can in— 

while it still exists. That said, I think—— 

Senator CORKER. Not pushing. I hear—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. Right. 

Senator CORKER. I mean—OK. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. But—— 

Senator CORKER. Pushing toward what? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Political accommodation. Pushing the Iraqis toward making the hard choices to keep—to consolidate the security 

situation and keep us from sliding back to civil war. 

On the funding, though, the one thing I would underscore is, as 

long as we have American forces there, keeping the CERP levels 

fully funded and high is critical. That money is what gives them 

the flexibility to fill in the gaps where the Iraqi Government isn’t 

acting, to buy, essentially, force protection for our troops. So, keeping that CERP money going is absolutely critical. 

Senator CORKER. General Scales. 

General SCALES. Thank you, sir. 

Well, first of all, let me just back away from the doomsday scenario that both the gentlemen to my left have painted for you. 

I’ve been to Iraq several times, and I’ve spoken to Iraqis. I 

don’t—I think—I don’t see the Iraqi people as a bunch of bloodthirsty anarchists who are just simply waiting for us to leave to get 

at each other’s throats. I don’t see that. I mean, prior to Saddam’s 

regime, and going back into the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Iraq was 

one of the more urbane and secular nations in the Middle East. So, 

55 

I don’t see a withdrawal, precipitous of otherwise, leading to a complete meltdown in Iraq. So, that’s my first point. 

So, that’s where I think it’s important to talk about a responsible 

policy for a responsible withdrawal. 

And then, I’ll also agree with Michele. I think the next 10 

months in Iraq are absolutely critical. It’s that nexus, it’s that 

point of intersection when the Iraqis wake up to see that the Americans are not going to be there, and they look around at each other 

and understand that they now have responsibility for what happens in the future, and they need to be the ones to figure it out. 

Another point I’ll leave with you, to counter my good friend Bill 

Odom, is, more than anyone else, the Iraqis are absolutely sick of 

this war. The mothers of Iraq are fed up. I think that’s true. And 

so, if there’s a catalyst for this, it would be this sense of social exhaustion that seems to be gripping the country right now, that I 

think is palpable. 

And the final point I’ll leave with you, which I’ve said probably 

too many times, is that the bonding agent, the catalyst, the only 

institution that I think that the Iraqis can ever learn to trust, is 

the military. I don’t necessarily buy into this leading to a dictatorship. I don’t know. I don’t think anyone knows. But, I do think that 

a military force with allegiance to the state—not necessarily to a 

leader, but allegiance to the state—is the long-term best hope for, 

not only meeting the Iraqis’ hopes and dreams for their future, but 

to help satisfy our own strategic interests in the region, as well. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask for a written 

response on something, and I’ll stop. 

I thank you for that testimony. We will, obviously, be debating, 

on the floor, soon, funding for the rest of this administration’s time. 

I would appreciate it if you might consider, in writing to our office, 

outlining some of those conditional things that you think would 

leverage this particular next 10 months in an appropriate way. And 

any of you who would like to respond to that, I’d love to have it. 

But, if you would consider doing that in a fairly short amount of 

time, at least the two of you, I would greatly appreciate it. 

General SCALES. If it’s OK, I think Michele and I would like to 

offer you sort of a—I don’t know, a combined response, if that’s all 

right with you. 

[The written response follows:] 

I am writing to respond to the questions you submitted during the hearing sponsored by your committee on April 2, 2008, entitled ‘‘Iraq After the Surge: Military 

Prospects.’’ I appreciate your close attention to the future of Iraq and the evolving 

shape and magnitude of the American commitment there. The active involvement 

of the Congress in these issues is absolutely vital. I look forward to doing what I 

can to continue to support your efforts. 

Regarding the question about a list of specific conditions for continued U.S. 

engagement in Iraq, I believe there is a broad range of areas where the United 

States could exercise more effective influence over the Iraqi Government. In my 

view, every commitment the Iraqis want from us, in principle, should be treated as 

a point of leverage for achieving our objectives, especially greater political accommodation. For example, security assistance, in particular Foreign Military Sales, could 

be tied to a certification that the Iraqi Security Forces is steadily increasing the percentage of the Army and police that are Sunni to a level that is comparable to the 

percentage of the Iraqi population that is Sunni. 

For a fairly comprehensive list of potential pressure points, I would urge you to 

look to ‘‘The Declaration of Principles’’ signed by President Bush and Prime Minister 

Maliki. In this document, the Iraqi Government requests assistance from the United 

56 

States to ‘‘enhance its position in regional and international organizations,’’ to facilitate ‘‘the flow of foreign investments,’’ and to help Iraq ‘‘in recovering illegally 

exported funds and properties.’’ They also ask for ‘‘forgiveness of [Iraq’s] debts,’’ 

‘‘accession to the World Trade Organization’’ and ‘‘most-favored-nation status with 

the United States.’’ This ambitious wish list provides fertile ground for conditional 

negotiations with the Iraqi Government, and the Bush administration and the Congress should begin to capitalize on such opportunities immediately. 

Regardless of which levers the United States chooses to pull, I strongly endorse 

the idea of requiring the administration to provide a report of how future security 

agreements with the Iraqis will be used as leverage to push for political accommodation in Iraq and to enable our eventual goal of military disengagement. 

With respect to how troop reductions may proceed in the event of a partial drawdown, I believe the best course of action will be to transition U.S. forces out of the 

lead population security role over time and into an overwatch and assistance posture. This would involve thinning out our combat forces while refocusing our efforts 

on advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces as they take on greater responsibility. Some U.S. combat forces would still be needed for a time as quick reaction 

forces and to participate in ongoing counterterrorism operations. 

Finally, I am very supportive of a regional engagement mechanism as part of an 

overall stabilization strategy for Iraq. A conference or series of conferences hosted 

by the United Nations and attended by Iraq’s neighbors in the region would create 

an important venue to facilitate foreign assistance, reduce unhelpful foreign meddling in Iraq, and gain the buy-in of key neighbors to address both the challenges 

within Iraq as well as broader regional security issues. I would encourage the committee to examine the possible approaches the United States might take to assist 

in the creation of such a conference or mechanism. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, thank you for your patience. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony. 

You know, General McCaffrey, if you’re right and the future of 

Iraq ends up being in the hands of some two-star general, which, 

for me, really means a dictator, changing—what we will have accomplished is to change from one dictator that we did not like to 

another dictator that we may like, or at least satisfy our purposes. 

And isn’t it sad to have lost 4,000 American lives and spent a trillion dollars for that to be the outcome? 

You know, as I listened to the panel, across the board, while 

there may be some degree of difference about the ultimate result, 

there isn’t any difference, it seems to me, about the question that 

there is undoubtedly a withdrawal to take place. Time and matters 

may be the difference of opinion. If that is the case, isn’t it true 

that President Bush would best serve the next President of the 

United States, who either—no matter who she or he may be—as 

well as the Nation, by now telling the Iraqis that we will be 

transitioning out, and that the unconditional blank check that we 

have given them is up? Wouldn’t the President be doing the next 

President of the United States and the Nation the right thing, the 

responsible thing, by sending that message now? 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think the facts of the matter are, 

this administration is not going to do that. They’re going to hang 

in there and try and make sure it doesn’t come apart on their 

watch. That’s the reality. I think all the—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I don’t disagree with you, but—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Wouldn’t it be the right 

thing—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think the Iraqis—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. The responsible thing? 

57 

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Have all figured out we’re 

leaving, and that that, to some extent was helpful. That’s why the 

Sunnis started joining the police force and joining the army and 

pushing for provincial elections and pushing for the federal government to work in support of their objectives. 

I think most everybody inside the Beltway, most everybody inside the Green Zone, understands we’ve got a limited time left in 

Iraq. So, whether this President tells them that or not is almost 

irrelevant. 

I also don’t think we are well served, though, by having this administration try and solve almost anything. Thank God we’ve got 

Secretary Bob Gates in there, terrific leadership on the ground. 

We’ll probably hold it together through the election and then tee 

it up for the next team to come in and say, ‘‘What are we going 

to do about this?’’ And the solution will probably be a couple or 3 

years in the making. So—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, there’s obviously time. Wouldn’t the 

clock be better served by precipitating it? I think it goes in line 

with some of the suggestions that you’re making about moving 

forward—— 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, we are—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In terms of what conditions 

are—— 

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Remember, drawing down 

right now. We already know we’re going down to 15 brigades. 

Senator MENENDEZ. The question is, What is the ultimate goal? 

And while you disagree on timeframes and conditions, you don’t 

disagree on other issues—this is something that the administration 

still refuses to recognize, and some who are running for President 

still refuse to recognize, as well. So, I have real concerns about— 

the longer we let the Iraqis—maybe they know we’re going to 

leave—think that we’ll hang in there, the more they will fight, as 

General Petraeus, when he was here last year, said, ‘‘for power and 

resources.’’ I don’t want to lose American lives for Iraqis to fight 

over power and resources—for Iraqi politicians to do that. That’s 

not why I would send the sons and daughters of America to fight 

in a cause. And so, that’s my concern. 

Let me ask you this. You know, I just saw what happened, and 

I see the reports that came out, where, in essence, Maliki decides 

to pull the trigger for more political purposes than security purposes. Some U.S. officials were quoted in an article—who said that, 

basically, this is Maliki firing the first salvo in upcoming elections. 

His dog in that fight is that he is basically allied with the Badr 

Corps against forces loyal to Sadr. It’s not a pretty picture. This is 

how U.S. troops should be dragged in, by the determination of 

Maliki to do something that is politically propitious for him, but 

isn’t, at the core, security issues? I mean, when are we going to 

change those dynamics? Is there any disagreement on that? 

General MCCAFFREY. No, you know, I think that’s a reality on 

the ground in Iraq. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me, then, go to the final question. It’s 

about soft power, which we have forgotten about. I agree that there 

are some things that still should be done. But, you know, 43 percent of Iraq’s population currently lives in absolute poverty; 19 perVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
58 

cent of Iraqis’ children suffered from malnutrition prior to the war, 

today it’s 28 percent. Last year, 75 percent of Iraqi elementaryaged children attended school, according to the Iraqi Ministry of 

Education; now it’s only 30 percent. Fifty percent of Iraqis lacked 

regular access to clean water prior to 2003; now it’s 70 percent. 

Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health centers are open to 

the public, and 62 percent of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll 

rated the availability of medical care as ‘‘quite bad’’ or ‘‘very bad.’’ 

We are now $25 billion later appropriated to Iraq in foreign assistance funding. How do we think that we’re going to do anything to 

change those dynamics to make a difference, if these are the 

results, the statistics, where the figures on children suffering from 

malnutrition are greater today than before the invasion, where the 

percentage, in terms of access to clean water, is significantly 

higher, for lack of access to clean water, than it was prior to the 

invasion, where there are less Iraqi children, by well over half— 

75 percent last year, 30 percent this year? How much more money 

does it take before we do this right? What would you suggest? I’m 

sure you’re going to say, and I’ve heard in your written testimony, 

a reference to assistance. But, that seems to me that we have 

thrown the assistance down the drain. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could, sir, I don’t think it’s a matter of providing lots more—you know, billions of dollars of additional U.S. 

assistance. I think this is get—I mean, Iraq has vast oil wealth, 

and what’s keeping that wealth from being appropriately distributed to meet the basic needs of the population are the fundamental 

political issues inside the country, and that’s—again, I think it’s 

not a matter of lacking money, it is a matter that the money isn’t 

going where it should go. And that’s, again, where we need to focus 

on rolling up our sleeves and getting in to try to help broker and 

negotiate political compromises between the factions inside Iraq. 

And we have been loathe to do that, even though we’ve been occupying their country for 5 years. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And a final question, as my time’s up, I 

know what it is to be waiting—so, the bottom line is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, go ahead. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll let everybody have more time. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If, $25 billion later, that soft-power leverage 

didn’t produce anything—and I agree with you that Iraq has its 

own resources, but this is a struggle over power and resources, and 

those who have it don’t want to give it up to those who don’t. And 

so, what is the leverage tool that you’re suggesting? If we’re going 

to not start telling them we’re going to get out, which is a message 

on the security side, if we spent $25 billion and that didn’t produce 

any leverage for them to move to political reconciliation, powersharing, and the sharing of the national patrimony, what is our 

leverage, at this point, to try to get them to do that? What would 

you suggest? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We never used the $25 billion as leverage. That’s 

my point. We never used—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, in other words, we need—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY [continuing]. It as leverage. 

59 

Senator MENENDEZ. And so, my question, then to you, would be, 

Do we need to suggest that there will be more money used—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. I think—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. To create leverage? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think that when you look at the—what’s being 

negotiated in the bilateral agreement, from longer term security 

assistance to political support to issues of economic investment— 

not so much assistance, but, sort of, investment and trade relations 

and that kind of thing—all of those things provide us with leverage. But, the administration has been unwilling to link those issues 

to movement on political accommodation. And that, I think, is a 

huge opportunity missed. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I agree with you on linkages, as well as 

benchmarks, which this administration resisted, then adopted, and 

then kept moving the goal posts. 

But, on that last point, about the long-term strategic security, I 

agree with the chairman, that is something that has to come before 

this Senate, because, to me, it has all the aspects of a treaty. And 

without it coming to the Senate, I would be strongly opposed to it, 

and would join others here to try to make sure that the Senate has 

a voice. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We’ve spent roughly $600 billion on the war in Iraq, so far—military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, Embassy 

costs, and veterans health care. In fiscal year 2008, we’ve spent an 

average of $10 billion per month in Iraq. The Congressional Budget 

Office estimates that if we continue to drawdown gradually, we will 

continue spending about $100 billion per year for the next 5 years, 

and $77 billion per year for another 4 years after that from fiscal 

year 2014 to 2018. 

In February, CBO projected that the future war costs from fiscal 

year 2009 through fiscal year 2018 could range from $440 billion, 

if troop levels remain at 30 brigades by 2010, to $1 trillion, if troop 

levels fell to 75,000 by 2013. 

Under these scenarios, CBO projects that funding for Iraq, 

Afghanistan, the global war on terror, could reach from $1.1 trillion 

to about $1.7 trillion from fiscal year 2001 to 2018. But, none of 

the war costs have actually been paid for. They’ve been added to 

the national tab. This is the first war that I know where we 

haven’t asked the American people to sacrifice and to pay for it. 

Ms. Flournoy, you said that the Army has told the Government 

Accountability Office it will take between $12 and $13 billion per 

year to replace lost, damaged, and worn equipment for the duration 

of the war in Iraq and at least 2 years beyond. The Marine Corps 

estimates it will need $15.6 billion to reset its equipment. Bringing 

the National Guard’s equipment stock up to even 75 percent of 

authorized level will take $22 billion over the next 5 years. In the 

current budgetary environment, the military services are struggling to balance resources between reconstituting current stocks 

and modernizing for the future. 

60 

I raise these issues because I’m concerned that the health of our 

military and the long-term fiscal health of our Nation is really in 

great jeopardy today. This is a serious national security issue for 

the economy and the future of our country. 

When are we going to recognize that we need to balance our 

budget and plan for long-term investments in our military and 

other domestic infrastructure? When will we have sacrificed 

enough lives and families and future investment in the country to 

say that we’ve done the best that we can in Iraq, and we need to 

start moving in another direction and reduce additional costs to our 

country? 

Now, there’s no question at all, from what I have heard today, 

that all of you say that because of circumstances we’re going to 

have to withdraw from Iraq, that it’s got to be done. Now, the issue 

is, How is it going to be done? 

Last year, several of us tried to get this administration to reduce 

the surge troops and then come back to us and lay out a plan on 

how it would reconstitute our involvement in Iraq. We almost had 

enough votes to get it done, but we failed because of a date of when 

it was supposed to happen. Do we just let the status quo continue, 

trust the administration, and let it go? Or does this Congress, does 

this Senate, start to take some action in regard to this situation? 

Now the administration will come back to Congress and ask for 

more money. Congress has never said to the administration, ‘‘In 

order to get the money, we want to know what the plan is, in terms 

of the withdrawal.’’ From what I’ve heard from the witnesses here 

today, it would not be a bad idea if Iraq knew for sure that we 

were going to withdraw. Also, when I was in Egypt, I talked with 

its Foreign Minister. The Egyptians are concerned. The Saudis are 

concerned. The other neighbors are concerned. And if they know 

we’re withdrawing from Iraq, don’t you believe that, because 

they’re concerned about what’s going to happen in the region, they 

will come to the table and start exercising as much leverage as 

they can on the Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites to say, ‘‘Let’s work this 

out’’? And though it is said that withdrawal could bring about a 

civil war, my attitude is that we may have a civil war anyhow, regardless of what we do. About Mr. Sadr, 3 years ago I said, ‘‘This 

guy wants to be the next Ayatollah of Iraq.’’ Study his family 

history. He was out of commission for about 6 months, and people 

said he would no longer be involved—I heard that from some 

responsible people in the administration. I said, ‘‘You know what 

I think?’’ I said, ‘‘He’s in Iran, upgrading his religious qualifications 

to put himself in a position where, when the Grand Ayatollah Ali 

al-Sistani is gone from Iraq, Sadr may be the guy that runs the 

country. 

So, what actions should we take to get the administration to lay 

out a clear vision for our future involvement in Iraq? We have an 

administration who basically says, ‘‘Stay out of our way. Trust us. 

We’re going to handle that.’’ What should we do, as Members of the 

U.S. Senate, to get an exit strategy on track? Because I believe 

that, if we wait and let the current situation meander down the 

stream, it’s going to be a lot worse than if we take action now to 

change it. 

61 

I’ll never forget when I was Governor of Ohio and the legislators 

said to me, ‘‘You shouldn’t make the cuts.’’ I said, ‘‘We are in deep 

trouble here. We have got to make the cuts.’’ They said, ‘‘You don’t 

have to do it.’’ I started to make the cuts. I said, ‘‘If we don’t start 

making the cuts now, then when we finally have to do it, it’s going 

to be a lot worse.’’ 

I’d like your—all of your reactions. 

General ODOM. Can I applaud everything you’ve said. And I 

didn’t even know some of the fiscal detail, and I’m glad to learn 

that. 

I’ve been asked many times, not only by Members of the Senate, 

but also House Members, ‘‘What do we do? What do we do?’’ I’ve 

suggested the Constitution says you have two powers, the budget 

and impeachment. Now, you pass budgets, and the President turns 

them down or won’t let you get one through. There’s one other 

thing you can do with the money leverage. You could just refuse 

to appropriate a bill, or to pass a bill for him to veto. So, if you 

want to bring this to a halt, it’s in the power of this Congress. 

General SCALES. Sir, I’d—you do have the power of the purse. 

And I think Bill is right in that regard. 

But, let me offer you one caution. Last time we did this, in the 

1970s, when I was a captain—I guess I had just made major—a lot 

of the spillover of this effort to get out of Vietnam, at the end of 

the day, wound up on the shoulders of the young men and women 

who were serving in uniform. And legislation, regardless of how it’s 

handled, is a blunt instrument, as you know. 

I’d just offer a caution. As the military begins to move out, and 

as you see these bills coming due, a couple of points. No. 1 is, resetting equipment is not as important as resetting people. I’ve been 

to Iraq, and I have good friends whose sons and daughters have 

been killed and wounded by what’s happened recently. And I will 

tell you that I hope that we go the extra mile to take care of them 

and—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. But, what I’m saying is—— 

General SCALES. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. The administration should have 

some public position that basically says, ‘‘This is the plan’’—— 

General SCALES. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. ‘‘And we know we have to do it, 

and here is what we are going to do.’’ And we should make it clear 

to the Iraqi people and say, ‘‘Take advantage of the opportunity 

that you have while we are still there.’’ Send the message out to 

the neighbors in the region, ‘‘We’re not leaving the entire region. 

We will be there, but we are on our way out of Iraq. We have finished our military engagement there. We paid the money and we 

lost the lives. We have 28,000 people who have come home, half of 

whom are going to be disabled the rest of their lives. It is now time 

for you to do this.’’ And we’ve—— 

General SCALES. Sir, I—— 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Given them enough time. 

General SCALES. Yes, sir. I have no argument with that. My only 

point back to you is, just be careful, so that we don’t wind up hurting those who we’re trying to help. 

62 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, if I could just add, you know, I actually don’t 

believe that all Iraqis think we’re on our way out. I think that 

they—many of them are watching our elections very closely, and 

think it could, you know, be a ‘‘stay the course’’ approach or a, you 

know, phased-transition approach. 

So, I think, for this body to send a bipartisan signal that we are 

beginning a transition, and our posture will change, and our strategy will change, and we want to do it in a way that maximizes— 

that protects our interests and tries to avoid civil and regional war, 

but we are beginning a transition—I think, a bipartisan signal 

from this body, how—whatever it looks like, would be very powerful. Iraqis watch our politics very closely, and I don’t think the 

message is fully received that that transition is about to start 

occurring. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Does anybody think that we should just 

stay the course we are on right now and then let the next administration come in and pick up the baton and deal with it? 

Barry. 

General MCCAFFREY. Well, it’s an odd situation. By the way, the 

last time I was over here—Senator Biden asked me to testify—I 

was pretty strong in my rebuke of Congress. Under Article I of the 

Constitution, you have the responsibility to raise and support an 

army and navy. You have the treaty power, the impeachment 

power, the power of the purse, on and on. And I think Congress 

has been entirely missing at the debate. The Democrats—and I’m 

nonpartisan—the Democrats have been missing in action, fearful of 

being contaminated, as lacking patriotism and courage. And the 

Republican Party has stayed with Secretary Rumsfeld when he was 

leading us over the edge of a cliff. So, I would want you to be introspective in your own role in this. 

We’ve had lonely voices. Senator Biden has certainly been one of 

them, from the start. Senator Hagel and others. But, I think it’s 

time for Congress to act. And I cannot imagine that the war will— 

first of all, the American people don’t support continuation of the 

current strategy. It’s over. And, therefore, Congress will soon reflect that reality. And I think Congress does have to step up. But, 

in the short term, there won’t be—nobody is going to step forward 

and tell a President, ‘‘Draw down to five brigades by the time you 

leave office.’’ It’s just not going to happen. So, what we do want is 

the next administration—and I think Michele’s comment—bipartisan is the key. This shouldn’t be a partisan matter. This is, you 

know, the American Armed Forces at risk. This is our national security policy. And you’ve got to step up, in the next administration, 

and make sure you shape their thinking. This is the dominant 

branch of government. You know, I say that—I apologize for saying 

it that way, but I teach American government, the last 10 years, 

and that’s what you are. So, good luck in your deliberations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Lots of luck—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Certainly. 

First, let me ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be 

made part of the record. 

63 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MARYLAND

We are here today—after more than 5 years, 4,000 lives lost, 30,000 wounded, and $600 billion spent—to once again reevaluate our country’s strategy in Iraq. I welcome this discussion. Because I continue to believe it is imperative that we change 

course now; not next month, not next year. 

I first want to pay tribute to our troops and diplomats serving in Iraq with such 

courage and competence. I am humbled again and again by their skill and their sacrifice. Bearing witness to their service fuels my own conviction that we, our Nation’s 

civilian leaders, owe them a strategy in Iraq and a global foreign policy that is worthy of their commitment. 

I’ve always believed invading Iraq was a mistake. I voted against granting our 

President that authority in 2003. I have opposed, from the beginning, the way this 

administration carried out that effort once begun. Its strategy—I think everyone 

now agrees—was naive and fatally flawed. But as much as we might wish it, we 

cannot change the past. This war was recklessly begun; we’ve got to find the smartest, most prudent way to end it. 

In a speech on January 10, 2007, announcing our ‘‘New Way Forward,’’ the President explained his new ‘‘surge’’ strategy to end the conflict in Iraq. By adding 30,000 

additional troops, ‘‘over time, we can expect . . . growing trust and cooperation from 

Baghdad’s residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain 

confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it 

needs to make progress in other critical areas.’’ By pouring all our military 

resources into Iraq we were supposed to improve security and provide the government there the room to reach political reconciliation. 

But even the President recognized that, and I quote, ‘‘A successful strategy for 

Iraq goes beyond military operations. . . . So America will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks it has announced.’’ 

In March, General Petraeus was quoted in a Washington Post interview saying, 

‘‘no one’’ in the U.S. and Iraqi Governments ‘‘feels that there has been sufficient 

progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation,’’ or in the provision 

of basic public services. Only 3 of the 18 benchmarks have been accomplished. 

Thanks to the excellent work of our troops, and several unrelated factors—the 

Sadr cease-fire, the Sunni ‘‘Awakening,’’ and, tragically, ethnic cleansing—violence 

in Iraq decreased from its highest and most appalling levels. But the Iraqi Government did not take advantage of relative calm to reach accommodation among its 

various factions. Local political and militia groups continue to struggle to amass 

power. Recent violence in Basra and Baghdad demonstrate that our troops continue 

to referee a multitude of civil wars and political power struggles—Shia on Shia in 

Basra and Baghdad, Shia on Sunni, Kurdish on Sunni, and the list goes on. 

Desperate for security, we are undermining our goal of stability. We are arming 

and paying Sunni militia to combat al-Qaeda in Iraq, we arm Shia militia allied 

with Iran to combat other Shia militia that oppose the central government. I have 

yet to hear a clear strategy for how we will unite these disparate armed forces 

under the central government. 

Four million Iraqis have been displaced by this conflict. Half are in neighboring 

countries. All are running out of money creating a humanitarian and a security crisis throughout the region. If all were to try and return home, it would be chaos. 

We aren’t doing what we need to do to resolve the crisis. 

Nowhere in arming opposing militias, our involvement in intra-Shia violence, or 

our neglect of the growing refugee crisis, do I see evidence of a long-term strategy 

toward stability that will outlast our unsustainable military presence. 

So, this summer, we will be in a familiar place. Just as when the President 

announced the ‘‘surge,’’ we will have over 130,000 troops in Iraq, unacceptable 

sectarian violence, 4 million Iraqis displaced, and no political reconciliation to show 

for our efforts. We need a new strategy in Iraq. 

We have several experts before this committee today. I want to hear what you 

think our objectives should be given the political reality on the ground in Iraq and 

the reality of our military capacity. What are your recommendations for what tactics 

we should employ to reach those goals? 

If possible, I would like to hear from you how we should balance the needs in Iraq 

against the reality of needs elsewhere in the world including Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reality of new and growing needs here at home. 

For years, some of us have been calling for a new approach; one that includes a 

changed military mission. Instead of refereeing warring factions, our troops should 

64 

focus on training, counterterrorism, and force protection. Because that mission calls 

for fewer troops, we should continue phased redeployment past this July. Any effort 

must include stepped-up diplomacy. We need our Nation’s most senior officials 

engaged in bringing other nations and international entities such as the United 

Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the 

table. 

The world has an interest in a safe and secure Iraq. But in working toward that 

end, we cannot ignore other competing needs around the world and at home. We 

need a more thoughtful approach that will protect our troops and our All-Volunteer 

Force, step up our diplomatic efforts, and internationalize the effort to bring stability to that country and to the Middle East. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me continue this discussion, because I do 

think it is extremely helpful. 

It’s interesting that the President’s justification for increasing 

our troop levels in Iraq over the past year was to give some breathing space to the Iraqi political situation. He understood, as many 

of us agree, that we need a political solution to what was happening in Iraq. Now, my colleague, Senator Voinovich, has gone 

through the sacrifices that America has made, and I opposed this 

war from the beginning, and have been very critical of the manner 

in which it’s been managed. But, I was certainly hopeful that we 

would have seen more political progress by this date. 

We’re now discussing an important question. What do we do in 

the next 10 months of this administration? What can be done? And 

I certainly believe that Congress needs to take decisive action. And 

I hope we can find a bipartisan manner to do that, a course of 

action that could garner a significant number of votes so that we 

can overcome the procedural problems that we have in the United 

States Senate. I think that will take a good-faith effort by the leaders of both of our parties. And I think there is a growing consensus 

that Congress needs to take action that addresses the realities of 

the situation in Iraq. Realistically, American troops can not stay indefinitely as is required under the current course in Iraq. 

Let me explain why I think the increased American troop levels 

in Iraq were a total failure. There’s been virtually no political 

progress made over the last year. Now, when I take a look, historically, at how we’ve been able to make progress for peace in troubled parts of the world, whether it’s Northern Ireland or South 

Africa or Bosnia, there were courageous political leaders, that were 

prepared to make concessions in order to bring about peace. So, I 

guess my first question to our panel is, Can you identify any political party in Iraq, or any potential leader there, that’s really prepared to step forward and make the type of concessions that are 

necessary to instill confidence in the Iraqi people that there could 

be a central authority that would respect the rights of all the people of Iraq? Do we have that type of political party or leader that 

we can work with? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could, sir. I met a number of Iraqis, at the 

local level, who are exactly those kinds of people, but they are not 

empowered in the current political process. They are not the people 

who gained power in the last set of elections. And this is one of the 

reasons why I think so many people put emphasis on provincial 

elections, that there are, sort of, grassroots leaders who are doing 

real things for their community, and who understand the importance of serving a constituency, but they aren’t the people in power 

in Iraq right now. 

65 

Senator CARDIN. Do we have any leaders that are currently in 

power that we could work on? 

General ODOM. Can I—— 

Senator CARDIN. Certainly. General. 

General ODOM. Pardon? 

Senator CARDIN. General. 

General ODOM. You know, there’s no historical precedent, that I 

know, for political consolidation in a place like Iran, without a war. 

I don’t—we’re just talking academically, theoretically. It’s got nothing to do with the real world, to talk about some kind of—some fellow stepping forward, or this, that, and the other. Can you imagine 

some European power, in the United States, 1868, trying to get Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln to negotiate a peace? No way. 

That’s where you are. Even worse. There are many more sides. 

There—Senator Voinovich, I wanted to say, in addition to your 

comments, I don’t know any case where we’ve provided aid to foreign countries that are in wars like this, where we don’t end up 

funding both sides. The more money you put in, the worse it is. I 

wrote a book on this, comparing several alternative—several cases. 

In every case, the worst thing you can do is give a country money. 

As Michele, I think, said, in here, or someone else, there’s plenty 

of money in the oil, and the issue is who’s going to get it. So—— 

Senator CARDIN. The other question, of course, is that if there’s 

to be progress made in the next 10 months, then there needs to be 

workable compromises so that the oil revenues, in fact, can be used 

to help the people of Iraq. Is there any—— 

General ODOM. That’s not going to happen. 

Senator CARDIN. Is there any hope that there could be significant 

progress in the next 10 months, in that regard? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The oil revenue is actually being distributed, de 

facto, to the provinces, based on, sort of, prior census information 

in Iraq. But, the problem—without a law, it’s not reliable, and people feel they can’t count on it. It’s haphazard, it happens late, it 

may or may not happen in the future. So, the legal framework is 

key to giving the—particularly the Sunnis—the confidence that 

they are going to get a share of the Iraqi wealth and the economy 

that they can use to build on in the future. That’s why the law is 

so important. 

Senator CARDIN. I just want to make sure that there are no further replies from any of the witnesses as to whether there is any 

national party or leader that we could rely upon. I see that there’s 

no real desire to go further on that. 

I want to raise one more question—one more point, if I might, 

in the time I have remaining, and that’s an issue that has not been 

raised today, and that is Iraq’s refugee problem. I don’t see how we 

are going to develop a stable country with so many milllions of 

Iraqis displaced in and outside Iraq. We now have over 4 million 

displaced people in Iraq; 2.2 million, I believe, is the most recent 

number, within Iraq itself; there’s now over a million, I believe, in 

Jordan and Iran and Syria. Is there any game plan for dealing with 

the refugee issue, or is this just being pushed down the road, saying, ‘‘Once we resolve Iraq—or once Iraq resolves itself, then we’ll 

worry about the refugees’’? Is anyone trying to figure out a comprehensive strategy for addressing this issue? 

66 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We met with the new U.N.—the Secretary General’s representative there, who is a very inspiring figure, actually, 

and they are working on plans for dealing with the return of internally displaced people. They’re very concerned that the return of 

some of those refugees and IDPs will be a spark for fighting, as 

people come back, find their homes occupied by someone of another 

sect, you know, battle—— 

Senator CARDIN. Right. 

Ms. FLOURNOY [continuing]. Fighting ensues, and so forth. So, I 

think the U.N. is working on that, but it is not front and center 

in the Iraqi Government’s list of priorities, and not much is actually being done, in a practical way, to deal with the magnitude of 

the problem. They’re dealing with a few dozen families a week 

right now, but the magnitude of the problem is overwhelming. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I think the refugee issue is a critical one 

that no one has really allocated appropriate thought or planning. 

If we get to a stage where we have a political opportunity to make 

advancements, the refugee issues are going to become a huge problem. And I can tell you, the countries in which most of the external 

displaced people—are looking to the International Community for 

some assistance in this regard, and we’ve been very quiet; the 

United States has not provided, I think, the necessary leadership 

on this issue. 

So, I’d just come back to the point. If we’re expecting to make 

progress in the next 10 months, and I’m inclined to agree with the 

advice that the panel has given us, that the Congress needs to 

exert itself in the strongest possible way we can, that the current 

policies have failed, and we need a new plan in Iraq. We should 

make that plan as strong as we can, getting the broadest possible 

support, so it is a bipartisan—a true bipartisan statement. And if 

we can do that, a new bipartisan strategy would be the best thing 

we can get done. I don’t know whether we have enough support for 

it, quite frankly, in the Senate. It’s something we need to explore. 

We’ve tried. We’ve tried to compromise on the way forward, and no 

matter what the proposal we don’t seem to be able to get to that 

60-vote margin that’s required in the Senate. 

But, I think we need to continue to work toward a new strategy. 

But, as we continue to work in Congress, what I find difficult to 

accept is that I don’t believe this administration is conducting its 

own planning. I don’t believe this administration has realistically 

determined how you can make the necessary political progress, understanding it has to come from the Iraqis. Yes, the United States 

needs to be direct in prodding the Iraqis to move in the right directions, and we need to use every point of leverage we can, including 

our international influence, to make that happen. But, realistically, 

what I’m hearing from our experts, is that the current Iraqi leadership is not capable, or willing, to do what is necessary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Webb. As my mother would say, ‘‘God love you.’’ Thank 

you for waiting. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It would seem that everything that can be said has been said. I 

had to leave the hearing for a while, but I was watching most of 

67 

it from my office. I had another meeting I had to go through. But, 

I did want to come back and raise a few points. 

The first thing I would like to say is that—and I’ve read all the 

testimony and listened to most of it—on the testimony that relates 

to your point, Ms. Flournoy, I’d like to offer a little bit of a different 

suggestion here. When you talk about ‘‘the options that we have 

are unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement, or 

conditional engagement,’’ my view would be that what we really 

should be pursuing is conditional disengagement. We should be 

making it very clear that we are on our way out, subject to certain 

conditions, in many ways tantamount to what the Nixon doctrine 

was saying in the early 1970s, that if there were external attack 

or if there were issues of international terrorism that clearly are 

broader than Iraq, we would reserve the right to take military action, but that we’re on the way out. I don’t think we should be putting ourselves in the situation of withdrawing our forces only based 

on circumstances that relate to performance of the Iraqis, which is 

a situation that we can’t control. 

And, in that regard, you also mentioned in your statement, that 

you believe that the only way to take advantage of security gains 

is to use our remaining leverage to push various Iraqi actors 

toward political accommodation. I would just like to say that I 

strongly believe that the only way that we’re going to really resolve 

this is through regional cooperation. And when you have situations 

that have had this much disagreement and violence, it’s almost impossible to push those factions into some sort of an accommodation 

purely from the inside. 

And an analogy is, I worked a good bit of time on the normalization of relations with Vietnam. I still work on that issue. You have 

two entities there that conducted a great deal of violence toward 

each other, for reasons that I supported, from our national perspective. But then, after the war was over, the Communist government 

was absolutely brutal to the people who were on the other side, and 

that’s probably the most irresolvable issue. But, we’re still unable 

to say that those two entities should be making peace between 

themselves, without some sort of an outside bridge. And that’s why 

I’ve continued to say, over and over again for the last 4 years, that 

the way to resolve this is with a strong statement of purpose that 

we are going to remove our forces off of the local defense, the 

street-by-street-level military action, and to assist in the creation 

of an international umbrella under which we can solve this 

problem. 

I strongly agree with General Odom that the question is not 

training the Iraqis. I think the Iraqis have shown, in many cases, 

they know how to fight. I think the insurgency demonstrates that. 

The Iraqi military, in the past, demonstrated that. They fight their 

own way. The way that they handled our initial invasion was a 

classic example of asymmetric warfare. They weren’t going to take 

the hit, but they were going to blend back away from where we 

were and then come back in, piecemeal. The question is whether 

they want to fight, which is something that was also brought up. 

And then, finally, General McCaffrey, I listened to what you 

were saying a few minutes ago about how most of the blame belongs here in the Congress for congressional inaction. I would like 

68 

to offer a different perspective on that. I remember, last year, when 

you testified, and one of the things that you mentioned in the testimony was the Article I power of the Congress with respect to the 

army and the navy. I can remember actually having a conversation 

with you, because there were two separate clauses. The army 

clause is different than the navy clause. The Congress has the 

power to raise and maintain an army. It is required to maintain 

a navy. That does give the Congress the authority to set things into 

motion. I would agree with you that the vote that was taken to set 

this war into motion was a very regrettable experience for this 

country. And I was doing my best, as someone who was not in the 

Congress at the time, to provide a warning voice on that matter. 

From my perspective, the greatest failure since that time, and 

perhaps, to a certain extent, before that time has come from the 

highest-ranking leadership of the military and the retired military. 

I think that there are too many senior military officers who, either 

for reasons of loyalty or reasons of political alignment with the 

Bush administration, or because they were doing business with 

companies that made it very difficult for them to make these judgments, didn’t speak out. They didn’t speak out, like General Odom 

spoke out. They didn’t speak out like Tony Zinni spoke out, or 

didn’t take the risks that people like Greg Newbold and General 

Shinseki took in their positions. 

As someone who grew up in the United States military as a son 

of a career military officer, who served in the military, has a son 

who’s served in Iraq, as well as a son-in-law, that puzzles me. 

Looking back on it, I think that is the most regrettable reason of 

where we are. 

We need the people—like the Greg Newbolds of the world, the 

General Odoms—to be speaking out honestly—loyalty to the country, but finding a solution here, so that we can move forward and 

face our true strategic concerns around the world. 

General MCCAFFREY. Yes; let me, if I may, though, say that I 

don’t think Congress bears a preponderance of the responsibility at 

all, if I left that impression. I do think Congress was sadly lacking 

in the debate. Their only power is not some narrow governance of 

the Armed Forces, or setting the—— 

Senator WEBB. Well, General, I certainly would agree with you, 

in terms of the debate that set this into motion. And once it went 

into motion, it’s very difficult to stop, from a congressional perspective. 

General MCCAFFREY. I agree. 

Senator WEBB. And the Congress, in the last year and 4 months, 

at least from the Democratic side—and I don’t mean to make this 

a party issue—we have tried, time and again, and every single 

issue that is connected to Iraq has been elevated to a filibuster, including an amendment that I put forward that basically said, ‘‘As 

long as you’ve been deployed, you should have that much time at 

home.’’ As someone who has had a dad deployed, who’s been 

deployed, who’s had a son deployed, to me that was just common 

sense. But, even that took on political overtones. So, the Congress 

may have been paralyzed, but I don’t think that Congress has been 

AWOL. 

69 

General MCCAFFREY. No, I agree. And, by the way, make sure 

you add my name to the list of people that spoke up, in writing in 

the Wall Street Journal, on day five of the war. So, I’ve been pretty 

critical of Rumsfeld and his crew for getting us—for starting the 

mess we’ve been—and I also don’t disagree with your view that the 

senior military leadership has been more compliant than they 

should have been. 

Senator WEBB. I think a lot of us who have long experienced the 

national security affairs saw this coming. I wrote a piece in the 

Washington Post, 6 months before the invasion, and I said there 

would be no exit strategy, because they did not intend to leave. 

There were a lot of people who could see that. And we have to do 

what we can now to repair the damage that has been done to our 

country, to our reputation around the world, and to our ability to 

address the issues that we were supposed to be facing in the first 

place. 

General MCCAFFREY. Yes. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, might I respond to your first couple of 

comments? 

It’s interesting that you should mention ‘‘conditional disengagement.’’ We’re actually in the midst of a heated internal debate at 

CNAS as to whether we’ve got the name of our strategy correct or 

not, and the other option is ‘‘conditional disengagement.’’ So, you 

may see that change, over time. 

And I couldn’t agree with you more—— 

Senator WEBB. I think that puts the place of the United States 

in the right—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Right. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Spot if you were to use—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yeah. I mean, I think if—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. That terminology. 

Ms. FLOURNOY [continuing]. You’re talking about the military dimension, that’s probably more fitting. I think if you’re talking 

about broader—all the tools of power, there’ll be continued engagement in Iraq over time. You know, but I do think it’s an important 

framing issue that we’re in discussion on. 

On the regional point, I couldn’t agree with you more, and I— 

forgive me for leaving that out. There cannot be any—you know, 

we absolutely have to push the Iraqis, internally, to make the hard 

choices, but they can’t do that without a broader context of regional 

agreement and regional cooperation and some sort of support 

for—— 

Senator WEBB. You know, as I said, the Vietnamese experience 

is a good microcosm. I started going back to Vietnam in 1991, and 

my concern was always the people who were with us on the battlefield, who were left behind. A million of them went to reeducation 

camps, et cetera. They were lost in the debate. We were talking 

about our Vietnam veterans. We were talking about what the Communist soldiers have done. And when I would raise it to, for instance, the Secretary General, the lineal descendant in the job of 

Ho Chi Minh—he would say, ‘‘I have mothers who have lost five 

sons fighting for the Communist side. You can’t tell me to go give 

the South Vietnam veteran the same veteran benefit as my guy. I 

can’t do it.’’ And the people who fought with us were so bitter about 

70 

the reeducation camp experiences, they don’t talk. So, you need 

that kind of a bridge. And very much so in Iraq, because there are 

so many of these countries that are playing under the table, that 

have interests. And the best way to deal with it is to bring them 

out in the open, in terms of what they’re willing to commit, nationally, toward a solution there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I just—we’re going to be—there are going to be an awful lot of 

volumes written, in the next decade, about who knew what, when, 

and who said what, when. And that’s all legitimate. The thing that 

always amazes me is, the context in which that vote took place was 

how to avoid war, not how to go to war. Everybody now says they 

all knew we were going to war. That’s not what the President personally assured me and other people. That’s not what he had done. 

He had acted rationally for 6 months prior in Afghanistan. There 

was no reason to believe he would be irrational, as he turned out 

to be, in my view. But, that debate will never be won today and 

I predict to you, you’re going to see our neocon friends, very prominent ones—some of the names have been mentioned—I’ll bet you 

they—in the next 2 years, you’re going to hear a book coming out 

from some of the most prominent ones, saying, ‘‘You know, if the 

President had just listened to me and allowed us to put in a dictator from the first—from the get-go, we would have been OK.’’ So, 

there’s going to be a lot of this. 

But, let me conclude by making—raising one point, not for an answer, because I’ve trespassed on your time much too long, but 

maybe for you to think about, and if you’re inclined to respond in 

writing—if not, you all know me well enough, I’ll pick up the phone 

and call you and ask you. 

One of the things that Senator Webb, who’s been very forwardthinking on this whole area for a long time, said—he gave the analogy of Vietnam, and he began going back, in 1990. I would respectfully suggest, in 1990 we still had credibility in the world. We still 

had credibility, and even credibility in Vietnam. I would respectfully suggest we have no credibility. We have no credibility in Iraq, 

we have no—among the factions—we have no credibility in the region, and we have no credibility with our allies and our antagonists, as it relates to Iraq, anywhere in the world. 

I tell that old bad joke, General Odom, about the guy who—my 

baseball coach in college told me, and I’m going to change the 

name. George was a star centerfielder. In the first three innings, 

George makes three errors. He never makes errors. He made three 

errors. Coach says—calls timeout and says, ‘‘George, you’re out,’’ 

and he puts in Barry. And Barry goes in, play resumes, first pitch, 

routine fly ball to centerfield to Barry, hits his glove, and he drops 

it. Coach goes crazy, calls timeout, and says, ‘‘Barry, you’re out.’’ 

And he’s crossing the third base line, he grabs Barry by the number, and says, ‘‘Barry, what in the devil’s the matter with you?’’ 

And Barry looks at the coach and says, ‘‘Coach, George screwed up 

centerfield so badly, no one can play it.’’ [Laughter.] 

Well, the truth is, George has screwed up centerfield so badly, 

we do not have, in my humble opinion, the credibility to be the catalyst to do the things you’re talking about. 

71 

Which leads me to my parting question, not for you to have to 

answer now, unless you—if you want to, you can, but I’m not asking you to. When I put forward the plan General McCaffrey referenced—two plans, actually—I pointed out that—this federal system—time worked against accomplishing it. The more time, the 

more water over the dam, the harder it was to establish a rational 

political way out of Iraq. And we might have to change our policy 

as we moved along, because this President has squandered, in my 

view, so many opportunities to keep a bad thing from getting 

worse. But, one of the things I do think is necessary—everyone 

talks about the need for regional engagement—us engaging within 

the region, but also, by implication, the region engaging as it 

relates to a solution with regard to Iraq. 

And here’s my point. One of the things I think we always vastly, 

in my 34 years, 35 years as a Senator—knowing that all Congresses can do is respond to foreign policy—the blunt instruments 

in the Constitution are just that, they’re pretty blunt—is that we 

always underestimate the stake that the observers have in the outcome of our actions. Case in point: As the French President told 

me—the previous French President told me, the worse mistake you 

ever made was going to Iraq, the only bigger mistake would be for 

you to leave, because he has 14 percent of his population that is 

Arab, and he’s worried about it being—he was worried about it 

being radicalized. The Germans know if this thing goes as badly as 

it might, they’re going to have somewhere between 500 and 1 million Kurds beating the path to their doorstep, if things go really 

badly. The Iranians, this—I find this ridiculous assertion that the 

Iranians and Ahmadinejad really means what he says was, ‘‘Leave, 

and we’ll take care of it.’’ The last thing they want to take care of 

is an all-out Shia war with Arab Shia, and deciding who to pick. 

The last thing Syria needs is us to leave, and leave in chaos. Saudi 

Arabia. But, we don’t play any of those cards. 

And so, here’s what—my question. I have been proposing—and 

actually went and asked for a meeting with the Permanent Five of 

the Security Council. Now it’s—how long ago? Almost a year ago. 

And they were kind enough to meet with me, for almost 2 hours. 

And I asked the question of each of their Ambassadors, including 

our Ambassador, who’s there. And I said, ‘‘What would you do if 

the President of the United States came to you and said, ‘I want 

the Permanent Five of the Security Council—not us, the Permanent Five—to call an international conference on Iraq, where the 

Security Council members, the Permanent Five, invited each of the 

stakeholders in the region to the meeting and, ahead of time, we 

were able to work out, among the major powers, the broad outlines 

of a political settlement for Iraq’—what would you do?’’ Without 

naming the ambassador, one ambassador said, ‘‘The first question 

I’d say is, ‘Mr. President, what took you so long?’ ’’ Literally. 

Then, I asked each of them, including our own, ‘‘Would you participate?’’ And the answer was, ‘‘Absolutely,’’ they were certain 

their governments would. 

So, my question is, If I am correct—and I may not be—that we 

have virtually no credibility with the players—other than to be able 

to threaten to withhold, Michele, that’s a credible—a credible tool 

we have—but, if we have no credibility, or little credibility, isn’t the 

72 

vehicle by which we begin to deal—whether it’s your proposal, General Odom, knowing we’re going to have to stay in the region, we 

can’t leave the region, or whether it’s a proposal of any of the rest 

of you all, whom have said, ‘‘You’ve got to engage the other players,’’ you can’t make it to Basra—my staff just was down in 

Kuwait, we’re talking about them being able to have flow-through 

with equipment no more than one brigade every month and a half 

or so, just to physically get out. So, we’re going to need a lot of cooperation. So, doesn’t it make sense—or, does it make sense for us 

to quietly initiate a proposal through the Permanent Five, or 

maybe others, to call for that regional conference, to begin to set 

the stakes as to what the nature—the broad nature of this political 

arrangement’s going to have to be in Iraq? Because I think a lot 

of the players in Iraq—and I’ve been there as much as anybody, I 

know most of them personally, I’ve spoken with virtually—I actually haven’t spoken to Sadr, and I haven’t spoken to Sistani. I 

think they’re the only two. And my impression, just as a plain, old 

politician, is, they’re each looking for somebody to say, ‘‘The devil 

made me do it. I didn’t want to make this compromise. I didn’t 

want to have to do this, but we have no choice.’’ 

So, I would just raise with you, again—I’m asking—I will ask 

you not to answer it now—but to think about whether or not there 

is any utility, not in the sort of goo-goo good-government, feel-good 

internationalist environment that we’re going to get the International Community involvement, but is there a practical benefit 

by having the major powers first meet and negotiate what—the 

outcome they’re looking for, generically, and then to bring in the 

regional powers, to put pressure on the domestic powers inside 

Iraq, to figure out how we can more easily leave with the least 

amount of blood, carnage, damage, and whatever? 

That’s the thing I’d like to, maybe, be able to pick up the phone 

and call you all about over the next couple of weeks to see what 

you think. 

I truly appreciate it. You’ve been a brilliant panel, and you’ve 

added greatly to our knowledge base. 

Thank you very, very much. 

We’re adjourned until 2:30, when we’ll have another distinguished panel to discuss the political ramifications, as if we didn’t 

discuss it this morning. 

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BRIEFING SLIDES PRESENTED BY GEN BARRY R. MCCAFFREY DURING HIS TESTIMONY


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(85) 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: POLITICAL 

PROSPECTS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008 (P.M.) 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, 

Cardin, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Murkowski, Isakson, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. We thank our 

witnesses, all of them, for being here, and intrepid press, who after 

a long hearing this morning, came back this afternoon. All of—all 

the witnesses we have this afternoon have spent a considerable 

amount of time in Iraq and all have provided very insightful commentary in Iraq over the period of the last several years. 

Yahia Said—I hope I pronounced that correctly—is Director of 

Middle East and North Africa at the Revenue Watch Institute. Dr. 

Stephen Biddle is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. And Nir Rosen is a fellow at the Center on Law and Security 

at New York University. 

Fifteen months ago when the President announced his surge of 

an additional 30,000 American forces into Iraq, he made clear that 

his strategic purpose was to bide time and space for the Iraqis to 

come together with a political solution. Today, we look forward to 

the assessment of each of our witnesses on the progress on that 

central rational for the surge, what political progress has been 

made. In short, we want to know whether or not you believe the 

surge has achieved this strategic purpose. Do the laws approved by 

the Iraqi Government in recent months on de-Baathification amnesty, provincial powers, suggest that we have turned the corner, 

or Iraqis main political force is still pulling in very different directions. What does the violence in Basra, the restlessness of the 

Sunni Awakening movements, and tensions over Kirkuk tell us 

about Iraq’s political development? Is Basra to be celebrated as a 

sign of progress as the President suggests, or as the—I was just 

watching earlier today, just on the way over here, Admiral Fallon’s 

comments saying that the jury is out on whether or not it’s a success or failure—or is it an indication of a bitter and complex power 

struggle with Iran’s influence growing and Sadr emerging stronger? 

86 

Can the administration’s current approach lead to a resolution of 

the fundamental political differences in Iraq? If not, how should we 

be changing our policy? 

The administration believes that deals struck in the Green Zone 

among a narrow cast of actors can resolve Iraq’s political disputes. 

That may be, I wonder whether that’s true though. Provincial elections in the fall are being proclaimed as the next game-changer, reflecting the triumph of hope over experience. And we are told that 

we must continue to support a strong central government, when 

that government does not enjoy the trust of very many Iraqis, and 

has virtually no capacity to deliver security and services. We are 

told there is not a fundamentally different way to more actively involve Iraqi’s neighbors and the major powers in collectively promoting a political solution. 

Iraq’s neighbors have created working groups on border security, 

refugees, and electricity. But, we’ve told them to stay out of the 

central political issues, where they could, in my view, have the 

greatest political impact, and where they have an incentive to help, 

because Iraq’s instability may spill over their borders. 

Maybe the current policy is the best we can do to secure the fundamental interest in leaving Iraq without leaving chaos behind, but 

I’m not sure that’s true, I don’t believe that. It seems to me that 

we can and must do a lot better. So I look forward, we all do, to 

the analysis of the underlying political dynamics in Iraq and for 

the ideas of our witnesses of how we can best promote—what I 

think is the ultimate objective—sustainable political progress, selfsustaining political progress in the coming months. I look forward 

to hearing your testimony, and I now turn over to Chairman 

Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR. U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses to this afternoon’s session, which will focus, as you pointed out, on the political 

situation in Iraq. We appreciate this opportunity to hear insights 

and engage the witnesses in a discussion of United States policy 

options. 

This morning we discussed the security dynamics in Iraq, which 

are inextricably linked to the political outcome. Last year, our 

national debate framed two independent steps of a surge strategy. 

We were attempting first to reduce the violence in Iraq through the 

application of additional American troops, better training of Iraqi 

forces, tactics aimed at sustaining stability in key neighborhoods. 

And second, we were hoping to use the so-called breathing space 

created by improved security to induce Iraqi political leaders to include meaningful compromises on governance and power-sharing. 

Conditions on the ground in many areas of Iraq improved during 

the past year. This progress has helped to save lives and has raised 

hopes that transforming political compromises would follow. But 

overall, progress by the central government in Baghdad on achieving political benchmarks has been disappointing and Iraqi factions 

have been reluctant to negotiate power-sharing arrangements in an 

uncertain environment. 

87 

Meanwhile, the United States took advantage of Sunni disillusionment with al-Qaeda forces, the Sadr factions desire for a ceasefire, and other factors to construct multiple cease-fire agreements 

with tribal and sectarian leaders. Tens of thousands of Iraqi 

Sunnis, who previously had sheltered al-Qaeda and targeted Americans, joined Awakening councils, drawn by their interest in selfpreservation and United States payments. This bottom-up approach remains the most dynamic political development in Iraq, 

but it is uncertain whether it can be translated into a more sustainable political accommodation or whether its utility is only in 

providing a temporary and tenuous system of interlocking ceasefires. 

The violence of the past week is a troubling reminder of the fragility of the security situation in Iraq and the unpredictability of 

the political rivalries that have made definitive solutions so difficult. Even if compromises are made, they have to be preserved 

and translated into a sustainable national reconciliation among the 

Iraqi populace. And that reconciliation would have to be resilient 

enough to withstand blood-feuds, government corruption, brain 

drain, calculated terrorist acts, and external interference that will 

challenge social order. It would also have to be strong enough to 

overcome the holes in responsible governance that are likely to continue to afflict Iraq. 

As the government and competing factions maneuver politically, 

there has to be greater attention to improving the basic functions 

of government, upon which popular support depends. This includes 

competently managing Iraq’s oil wells, overseeing reconstruction 

programs, delivering government assistance to the provinces, and 

creating jobs. 

I’ll be interested to hear from our witnesses their assessments of 

whether the bottom-up approach of voluntary cease-fires can be institutionalized over the long term, and whether it is still possible 

to invigorate the top-down model of political accommodation in 

Baghdad. 

I thank the chairman for calling this hearing and look forward 

to our discussion. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentleman, again thank you for being here. And if you’d proceed 

in the order you’re introduced, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. Said, please. 

STATEMENT OF YAHIA SAID, DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST 

AND NORTH AFRICA, REVENUE WATCH INSTITUTE, NEW 

YORK, NY 

Mr. SAID. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I’m honored to 

be here for the second time. I had the honor and the pleasure to 

speak here on the first hearing before the surge. And at the time 

I sounded skeptical about the likelihood of the surge achieving its 

objectives, particularly in the political area. 

I feel obliged, several months hence, and responsible to say that 

I think, on the whole, the surge has been successful. The approach, 

the politics that were involved in the surge have interacted with 

dynamics that were already on the ground in Iraq, in significantly 

88 

reducing the levels of violence and creating the, sort of, breathing 

space that one hopes could bring political progress. 

In my notes, I will again sound, very skeptical notes, about the 

likelihood of political progress, but I think it’s very important to 

admit, as a student of Iraq and as a observer of Iraq, that the 

surge has been, surprisingly from my perspective, effective. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sir, you just lost all credibility. The only witness 

to ever come before us and acknowledge that maybe what you said 

before wasn’t accurate. I think we should dismiss this witness. 

[Laughter.] 

This hasn’t happened in 35 years since I’ve been here. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SAID. One of the issues I was asked to talk about is national 

reconciliation. And national reconciliation has been taking place in 

Iraq over the past year. It has a different form than what has been 

envisioned, in terms of formal process. The fact that Sunni insurgents have decided that al-Qaeda is the biggest threat to them and 

to their communities and decided to turn their guns on them, 

that’s—that’s national reconciliation. The fact that the Sadrists 

have decided to distance themselves from the special groups and 

have decided to predominantly observe a cease-fire, that’s a very 

important sign of national reconciliation. 

The general backlash that one feels—perceptive backlash in Iraq 

against sectarianism, that has prompted politicians and clerics to 

stop preaching hate, to stop preaching sectarianism, that’s a true 

sign of national reconciliation. And I don’t want to sound too optimistic here, the violence, the murder that took place in 2006 will 

leave very deep scars in society, and historical experience shows 

that countries that go through such bloodshed often relapse into 

conflict. But I think that what we see in Iraq today, in terms of 

backlash, even the events in Basra, which showed how Iraqis are 

really not prepared, are really fed up with the violence and the 

chaos and want to move on in a more calm and civilized way is a 

real sign of national reconciliation. 

Unfortunately, almost the opposite is happening on the political 

front. The reduction in the violence is leading those who are in 

power, who have control of the Government in Baghdad for the last 

5 years, to seek to entrench themselves in power, to preempt any 

challenges to their power. The Government in Baghdad has been, 

now for a year, running without half of its ministers, who have 

quit, from the Iraqi Islamic Party, from the Iraqi list, from other 

opposition groups. And some of these have been desperately trying 

to find a face-saving way back into government and have not been 

allowed. And the government has been essentially run by three political parties, the two Kurdish parties and the Supreme Islamic 

Council. So it’s a narrowly defined government, confined to the 

Green Zone. 

Some compromises have been made, and the Senators have mentioned the package of flaws that we’re past. The picture is entirely 

mixed on those laws and I will try to go through some of them to 

just elucidate what’s at stake. The de-Baathification law, the Justice and Reconsideration Law definitely has shown some progress, 

but in a sense, it’s a confirmation, it’s a ratification of what was 

already taking place. Many Baathists have received exemptions 

89 

from de-Baathification law in order to resume their work in government. There was simply a realization that it’s impossible to run 

government without some of these people, and this law came to 

just ratify that realization. 

The Amnesty Law has a major exception to people charged with 

terrorism, and yet it’s the terrorism charge under which most insurgents are captured, and so rendering it almost meaningless. 

However, we hear that it’s being implemented in almost a blanket 

way. By the way, Kurdistan, the Kurdistan region has declared 

that the law doesn’t apply to their territory. 

The governance, the law on the powers of governance was mostly 

passed because it’s included a clause that sets a deadline for the 

elections, for the provincial elections that are due to happen in 

October. Not many of the people who voted for that law looked very 

deeply into the details of it. It includes a lot of contradictions, it 

attempts to move away from the level of decentralization envisioned in the constitution, but in most cases it tries to paper over 

the differences, and this has been also typical for many of the laws 

that have been passed in the last—in the last year. 

The budget, which is part of that package, shows progress, in 

terms of the economic governance. It shows that the process of designing the budget and negotiating it has improved over the last 

3 years, but it also has a sting in its tail, the budget has a very 

large and a growing allocation to the regions and the provinces and 

it sets a path decentralization that has not been really negotiated 

and agreed on. It’s sort of a stealth decentralization—decentralization by stealth—over 30 percent of the budget has been allocated 

to the regions. And should oil prices drop, it will be very difficult 

to take back those concessions. It’s like raising taxes, and so it’s 

sort of an irreversible process that will—that may significantly 

weaken the federal government. 

So in any respect, there are—otherwise the true signs of those 

who are in power, the groups that are in power in the Green Zone, 

trying to consolidate their hold on power and preempt challenges. 

What Iraq really needs though, is not necessarily political reconciliation, so much as political succession. What Iraq is going 

through today, is very similar to some things, to processes that 

happened in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, that have 

gone through similar processes. What happened in Russia and 

Azerbaijan and Georgia, 3, 4 years after the fall of the regimes, is 

that people in these societies got tired of the former dissidents and 

the exiles, people who came to power like Yeltsin or Elchibey in 

Azerbaijan or Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, and try to change society 

from the ground up, came up with very great ideas about transforming society from the ground up, were generally not very successful at delivering services and carrying out the duties of government. And at the end, were replaced by old structures, by 

representatives of the old regime. Yeltsin went, he was replaced by 

Putin and his structure that draws a lot of its resources from the 

old regime. Aliev came to power in Azerbaijan, Shevardnadze came 

to power in Georgia. 

And there’s a similar process taking place in Iraq today. Many 

of those who came with the invasion have shown Iraq a very low 

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pations. And at the same time, have sought to impose changes, dramatic changes that society was not ready for. And whether they 

were liberal or religious fundamentalists or decentralizers and performance of federation ideas, in most cases they carried ideas that 

were alien to society and the society was not prepared to accept at 

face value. 

And the backlash against them is translating into a nostalgia for 

some of the steady hands of the past, not necessarily, not in any 

way the Baathist leader, but the technocrats, the officers, the people who meant—kept the state running. And this is a process that 

is not unique to Iraq, this has happened in many former totalitarian and authoritarian states, and it’s part of the dynamic we see 

in Iraq. 

So you see the forces in decline, not only the ruling parties, but 

all the new political groups that came with the invasion, whether 

they are in government or in opposition, you see them in decline, 

and you see new forces on the ascent. And these forces are on the 

ascent, in part, as a result of the surge. Part of the strategy employed by General Petraeus was to help Sunni insurgents create a 

distance, distance themselves from al-Qaeda, and he, in many 

ways, empowered the insurgency by bringing it from the cold, giving them recognition, sometimes caching weapons and fire support, 

and working with them in alliance to fight al-Qaeda. He has helped 

the Sadrs distance themselves from the special groups. If you look 

at the command in Iraq, they always try to have a very nuanced 

rhetoric about the Sadrs, about their right to pursue political goals, 

but not military goals. 

So, they have created, that what we have today in Iraq is a new 

constituency, new political groups with strong grassroots support, 

the concerned local citizens, the Sadrs who withstood the—committed themselves to the cease-fire, the bureaucrats that are 

emerging, the officers of the new Iraqi Army, who are seeking— 

who are looking for a place at the table, who are seeking a say in 

the way the country is governed, and who are not very easy to reconcile with the current political leaders. And the political leaders 

are trying to preempt challenges by these groups, from threatening 

their positions. 

And one area where there’s confrontation is going to take place 

along these lines, is the issue of federalism. In a way, the events 

in Basra could be a first salvo in that battle over federalism in 

Iraq. One way that the current political leaders could preempt 

challenges to their power is to proceed faster on the issue of decentralization. The law on the formation of regions comes into force 

next month in Iraq. That law makes it very easy to form a region 

like Kurdistan in the south, and indeed the Supreme Islamic Council, this is one of their main political goals. And this move is seen 

as a way to seal off challenges to their power by the Sadrists and 

by other groups that have more grassroots support throughout the 

country and by other nationalist groups, like the concerned local 

citizens. 

And so there’s an attempt to—one of the interpretations of what 

happened in Basra, is an attempt to trim the Sadrists in size and 

to allow the Supreme Islamic Council then to proceed politically 

with the idea of establishing a region in the south. This could be 

91 

a very divisive issue and that could ignite tensions much more dramatically in the coming months. 

The other issue is, of course, the issue of the Oil Law, which is 

also something I’ve been asked to address. I’ve been recently witness to a conversation on that between the person who drafted the 

law, Mr. Tariq Shafiq, and the head of the Kurdish Parliament. 

And the drafter of the law asked the speaker of the Parliament, 

‘‘Why can’t we just leave the differences of the Baath behind, why 

can’t we—we were all victims of Saddam—let’s leave that behind 

and work together to divvy up this oil wells together for the benefit 

of everyone.’’ And the speaker of the Kurdish Parliament, who is 

a very moderate Kurdish nationalist by any account, was clearly 

upset. He’s like, ‘‘You want me to forget Halapsha, we will never 

forget Halapsha, we will never let the Iraqi State control oil and 

use it against us again to annihilate the Kurdish people.’’ 

And this is the core controversy over the Oil Law, between those 

who feel that the state is the best guardian of that well, who can 

maximize, and those are represented by the Ministry of Oil, and by 

growing majority in Iraq, in terms of the public, and between the 

Kurds and some others who feel that the state should never control 

oil because that’s a recipe for tyranny. The paradox in that is that 

we have a new state in Iraq, it’s no longer Saddam Hussein in 

power. We are building the state together and we have to be able 

to trust it, it’s impossible at the same time to build a state and to 

keep it weak, because you don’t trust it. And this is one of the 

paradoxes, one of the weaknesses of the current political leaders, 

which makes them very similar to those who were in Eastern Europe before them. They maintain the dissident mentality, they still 

view the state as an enemy, even though it—the regime, the dictator should no longer exist. 

So to sum up, in terms of resolving the issue on the Oil Law, of 

course, there is a path to do that. Obviously it’s a fundamental 

issue that touches on the formation of the federation in Iraq and 

how Iraqis share power and resources. It cannot be resolved over 

night, it needs to be resolved through open political debate. But one 

step that could be taken immediately, is to work on a transparent 

mechanism for revenue-sharing. And Iraq has recently joined an 

initiative called the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 

which could serve as the first step on that, it allows Iraq to know 

exactly how much money is being earned and it will provide a very 

good first step toward revenue sharing and distribution. 

Another issue is the Iraqi Government is considering asking the 

United States for an extension of the arrangement for the Development Fund for Iraq, to maintain all the oil resources, the oil account, under the protection and custody of the U.S. Government 

and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. And I think this is 

something that should be considered, because that will allow for a 

third party to act in a way as a guarantor that there’s no abuse 

of those resources. 

But more generally, in terms of ensuring that the surge and the 

effort that went into it, going further are a success. It’s very important to make sure that the path for political succession, for political 

change in Iraq remains open, and that the current political leaders 

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centralization that could leave the rest of the Iraqi people, and 

many of the movements that have emerged out of the surge, feeling 

that they have been robbed of their political rights. It’s very important that the U.S. troops acting in support of the state and restoring the authority of the state, don’t seem as if they are siding with 

one political force over the others, and don’t seem that they are 

taking sides. 

There is a very big danger if the path toward decentralization 

proceeds as it is happening now, that the United States end up 

having to protect a number of weak statelets who have—have to 

prevent them from fighting each other and have to protect them 

from incursions from the outside, which is a real present danger in 

the path decentralization that some Iraqi politicians seem to envision. 

So these are sort of some of the main ideas I have. I have delivered to you a very heavy tone, unfortunately, on these issues, but 

I’m happy to address many of the other questions you have in the 

discussion. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Said follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF YAHIA KHAIRI SAID, DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA, REVENUE WATCH INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

1 Executive Summary 

• The reduction in violence experienced by Iraq today is fragile and fleeting. The 

surge is only one of several factors contributing to it, with the Multi-National 

Force acting as a linchpin for a number of local cease-fires and alliances. 

• A vital factor in the security improvement is public backlash against the chaos 

and extremism of the past 5 years. The backlash is not aimed only at al-Qaeda 

but also at sectarian politics of the mainstream parties and forceful efforts to 

transform society. 

• As a result of the surge strategy the insurgency has in effect ‘‘come in from the 

cold,’’ and attained official recognition and a coherence it lacked before. More 

than 70,000 men, many of whom were members of the former military and security structures, are now armed and financed by the U.S. through the Concerned 

Local Citizens. They pose a challenge to the legitimacy of the official security 

forces and the state’s monopoly on the use of force. They have little trust in the 

government and are seeking their own say in how the country is governed. 

• A bureaucratic awakening is also underway benefiting from the improved security situation and reversal of de-Baathificaiton. Iraq’s once efficient machinery 

of government is slowly beginning to turn in defiance of political gridlock, corruption, and incompetence. Tangible progress is also taking place at the local 

level benefiting from the new local alliances and U.S. military support. 

• Without progress at the political level, improvements to security and administration are likely to falter. Progress is needed to bring the various initiatives 

together and provide them with coherence and resources. Groups currently 

vying for power will need a way to negotiate a shared vision of the future. Yet 

the political process, hobbled by a sectarian allocation formula, is showing little 

signs of movement. 

• Rather than broadening the political process and opening the doors for compromise, forces dominating the government are using the lull in the violence to 

consolidate their hold on power by establishing facts on the ground. 

• Growing differences between government and opposition and within individual 

parties and factions are creating political paralysis. Constitutional review, 

hydrocarbon and election legislation are in limbo. The laws being passed often 

fail to address the underlying issues and tensions. Crucial disagreements over 

the distribution of power, the role of religion or transitional justice remain 

unaddressed. 

• Tensions around Iraqi Kurdistan are at new heights and threaten to spill over 

into open conflict, due to issues including Kirkuk, disputed internal boundaries, 

oil contracts and the presence of the Turkish Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). 

93 

At the same time, challenges to Iraq’s territorial integrity by Iran and Turkey 

are left unanswered, setting a dangerous precedent in a ‘‘bad neighborhood.’’ • Holding of overdue local elections, under a new electoral law, is the best way 

to peacefully introduce the actors emerging through the surge, into the political 

process, be they concerned local citizens, Sadrists observing the cease-fire or old 

technocrats. • An open and inclusive dialog will be required to resolve the critical issues 

addressed by the hydrocarbon legislation,. The current differences can neither 

be papered over nor resolved unilaterally. In the meantime transparency in the 

management of oil revenues based on the Extractive Industries Transparency 

Initiative, which Iraq has just joined, can be a first step toward building lost 

confidence. • The package of issues surrounding the limits of Iraqi Kurdistan’s self-determination, including Kirkuk and the disputed territories, will need to be 

addressed through a special U.N. mandate. This is the only way to give this 

grave issue the attention and resources it requires without siphoning attention 

from Iraq’s other needs. A new resolution on Kirkuk will also help close the 

chapter that began with the 2003 invasion, hasten a transition to a more legitimate U.S. role and broaden international engagement in Iraq. 

2 Introduction 

The situation in Iraq over the past year has been so dynamic that few observers 

were able to keep pace. Burnt by repeated false hopes and disappointed in most of 

the leading personalities, a student of Iraq would be forgiven for assuming that 

nothing will work and that any improvements are bound to be temporary. 

However, last year saw tangible progress on many fronts, not only in the area of 

security following the introduction of the surge. The breathing space provided by 

improved security is critical for all other developments, but the most remarkable 

change taking place in Iraq today is at the grassroots level. 

As this paper will show, Iraqis across sectarian and ethnic boundaries are taking 

a stand against extremism of all varieties, alien ideologies regardless of origin, and 

the chaos and uncertainty of the past 5 years. The public disgust is aimed equally 

at foreign al-Qaeda operatives and hectoring homegrown clerics, narrow-minded sectarian politicians and corrupt officials. 

As Iraqis reject those responsible for the chaos, they turn to those they naturally 

associate with stability and functioning government. These are not the Baath Party 

bosses who have been long discredited, but the professionals, the steady hands who 

kept the state humming while Saddam was busy hatching megalomaniacal plans 

and writing novels. 

The most remarkable ‘‘awakening’’ taking place in Iraq today is that of its onetime efficient bureaucracy. Technocrats and professionals, including military and 

security officers, are trying to jump-start whatever is left of the machinery of government and restore a modicum of normalcy. 

The regime that could emerge from the return of these elites will look different 

from either the theocracy of al-Qaeda or democratic vision of the political exiles. It 

could look a lot more like Russia under Putin than Germany under Adenauer. 

One of the most remarkable failures of Iraq’s observers over the past 5 years has 

been the selective application of other post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian experiences. Those who wanted to reengineer society from the ground up chose the 

model of Germany and Japan. Those who saw partition as the solution thought of 

Yugoslavia as a model. Yet, it is Russia and other post-Communist countries in 

Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union which offer the most pertinent lessons 

for Iraq—first, that the least likely embers to be found under the ashes of totalitarianism are those of liberal democracy and second, that parts of the old elites and 

power structures always find their way back to the top. 

This is not to say that the people of Iraq are unfit for—or undeserving of—democracy and the right to manage their own affairs, but that having suffered through 

so much pain for so long, especially over the past 5 years, their priorities and preferences are skewed toward order, security, and normalcy. 

The grassroots awakening taking place in Iraq today is very fragile. By definition 

it is lacking in political direction. It needs power and resources and a benign security environment to be sustained. The extremists and criminals thriving on the war 

economy will do anything to stop the forces of normalcy. 

This paper does not advance a sanguine view about the return of the old elites 

and the prospects of a Putin scenario in Iraq. It identifies several risks of conflict 

and reaction that such a course of events may entail, chief among them a conflict 

in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the alternatives, short of a permanent surge, are too 

gruesome to contemplate. 

94 

The paper concludes with some recommendations, not only aimed at sustaining 

the current momentum but also at ensuring that it develops in a more democratic, 

less violent direction. 

These observations are based mainly on interactions with policymakers and politicians over the past 2 years and do not give sufficient credit to the courageous civil 

society activists and opinion formers who shaped the public backlash against extremism, sometimes at the cost of their own lives. Dr. Isam al-Rawi, professor of Geology at Baghdad University and a moderate member of the Sunni Association of 

Muslim Scholars is one of those heroes. He sought to stem the slide into civil war 

and was the first to condemn al-Qaeda. He was assassinated while trying to stop 

the carnage working closely with moderate Sadrists through the worst months of 

2006. 

The following sections will look at the improvement in the security situation and 

the dynamics that led to it; the changing political fortunes of the various groups and 

parties forming the Iraqi political scene; and the defunct political process and the 

crises and fissures it is generating. The paper concludes with possible future scenarios and policy recommendations aimed at mitigating the worst possible outcomes. 

3 Security Improvements and the Surge 

According to Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) figures the violence throughout 

Iraq and particularly in its most volatile areas is down to 2005 levels. This is a substantial reduction in comparison to the horrific levels reached in 2006, but 2005 was 

hardly a peaceful year. 

The figures do not reflect the full picture and particularly the perceptions of people on the ground. While many Iraqis assert that there is still a lot of violence particularly crime, their actions speak otherwise. This is not only demonstrated by the 

anecdotal evidence of revived economic activity, traffic on the streets or the trickle 

of returnees. International Organisation for Migration (IOM) figures, for example, 

show a significant decline in displacement rates starting as early as the end of 2006. 

Source IOM. 

These figures do not only demonstrate the drop in violence but may also help 

explain the causes. A significant decline in displacement by early 2007, long before 

the ‘‘surge’’ forces were in place (the deployment of additional brigades was only 

completed in June 2007), indicates that other factors are at play—among the most 

important, is the completion of ethnic cleansing in many areas particularly large 

swaths of Baghdad. 


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Ethnic segregation in Baghdad before and after 2006 (source: BBC.co.uk). 

Much less susceptible to quantification is the public backlash against the excesses 

committed by almost all parties during 2006. The backlash is not limited to the extremist versions of Islam propagated by al-Qaeda or some Shia clerics. It is also 

aimed at some of the sweeping changes which coalition authorities and their Iraqi 

allies sought to push through over the past 5 years. The backlash is forcing most 

religious leaders, politicians, and warlords to distance themselves from the sectarian, fundamentalists, or radical change rhetoric. 

The violence of 2006 seems to have provoked a sense of defiance among Iraqis 

who felt dragged into a civil war against their will and better judgement. The backlash was propagated through formal and informal civil society networks which survived despite the violence and the chaos. Baghdad University, Iraqi Women’s Network, Web sites and blogs like the mysterious Shalsh Al-Iraqi who poked fun at 

everyone from the Sadrists to the Marines all played a role in affirming the public 

consensus against the extremism and chaos of the past 5 years. 

The events of 2006 and the near collapse of the Iraqi state seem to have also 

shocked Iraq’s neighbours who have either condoned or actively supported many of 

the combatants over the past 5 years. MNFI and Iraqi Government reports point 

to a dramatic decline in the flow of fighters and weapons from Syria and Iran during 2007. 

A combination of these factors and the strategy adopted by the Multi-National 

Force under the command of General Petraeus led to the current improvement in 

the security situation. 

The improvement is fragile and fleeting. It could be best described as a truce— 

an informal complex arrangement bringing together (1) most Iraqi insurgent groups 

particularly those drawn from former military, security structures and Baathists; (2) 

the Sadrists and the affiliated Mahdi Army; (3) Iraqi security forces particularly the 

National Police and affiliated Badr militia; and (4) the MNFI who are also acting 

as broker and guarantor. 

Today, MNFI has more substantive control over the situation in Iraq than at any 

other time since the beginning of the invasion. This was not achieved by dominating 

the battlefield, where the troops remain just one of many actors, but by brokering 

a complex web of alliances and arrangements that put them at the centre. 

The first element of the truce began to emerge in mid-2006 long before the surge. 

The Anbar Awakening Council—a coalition of Sunni Arab tribal leaders declared a 

campaign to expel al-Qaeda from the province. The Awakening ‘‘movement’’ originated in rivalries between tribes which aligned themselves with al-Qaeda in Iraq, 

on one side, and those who felt threatened by the group, on the other. What started 

as isolated skirmishes over illicit revenues, gradually evolved into an anti-al-Qaeda 

‘‘uprising’’ uniting the bulk of the insurgency in the Sunni areas. The movement 

grew out of rising alienation and fear caused by the al-Qaeda and the foreign ideology it represented to most Iraqis, particularly, to the relatively secular former 

military and security personnel forming the backbone of the insurgency. 

Al-Qaeda and the regime it attempted to establish through the Islamic Emirate 

of Iraq gradually displaced the occupation as the most immediate threat perceived 

by most insurgents in Sunni areas. This was as much a result of the group’s own 

actions as the reactions they provoked across the country. Al-Qaeda violence was 

seen as providing a pretext for both Shia sectarian violence and greater Iranian inVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY

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fluence, seen by many as an existential threat. Large-scale spectacular attacks and 

day-to-day identity killings, attributed to al-Qaeda, culminating in the bombing of 

the Askariya Shrine in Samarra in February 2006, unleashed a cycle of sectarian 

reprisals that threatened to decimate society. 

The ensuing civil war involved uneasy and, ultimately, unsustainable alliances 

along sectarian lines between al-Qaeda and relatively secular and nationalist Sunni 

insurgents, on one side, and between the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr and the 

new state security services dominated by its arch rival the Islamic Supreme Council 

and its Badr Organization, on the other. 

Both the insurgents and Sadrists condoned and engaged in sectarian violence in 

the name of protecting their respective communities. Both risked losing their legitimacy and nationalist credentials in the process. The violence, at the end, caused 

only more pain and suffering to the communities in the name of which, it was allegedly perpetrated. The numbers of displaced people indicate that the suffering was 

roughly proportionate to all of Iraq’s communities (with the exception of Kurdistan). 

Source: IOM. 

The Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF–I) seized on the opportunity provided by 

the Anbar Awakening Council, not only by refraining from prosecuting armed 

groups engaged in the fight against al-Qaeda, but also by providing them with cash 

and weapons. Coalition forces and Iraqi Army units working under their command 

provided fire support to the armed groups against the better equipped al-Qaeda. 

This amounted to an outright alliance and established a relationship of trust among 

the former adversaries that was to prove invaluable in other parts of Iraq. 

In Baghdad and some of the surrounding countryside, coalition forces under 

Petraeus’s command had to break up the complex cycle of violence into its various 

components in order to allow for the mobilization of efforts by all sides against the 

extremists in their midst. They achieved this by brokering localised cease-fires and 

alliances with all but the most extremist groups, be they al-Qaeda, ‘‘special groups’’ 

or ‘‘death squads.’’ 

A combination of nuanced rhetoric and the threat of force on the part of the 

MNFI, for example, allowed the Sadrists to distance themselves from the so-called 

‘‘special groups’’ (bands attributed to the Sadrist Mahdi Army which have been carrying out lethal attacks on coalition forces, sectarian and vigilante atrocities) and 

led, ultimately, to the Mahdi Army cease-fire in August 2007, which was recently 

extended for another 6 months. Coalition officials and officers go to great lengths 

to distinguish between the ‘‘special groups’’ and the rank and file of al-Sadr’s Mahdi 

Army. 

A similar approach is used with Sunni insurgents, rechristened by the MNFI as 

Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) and Neighbourhood Militias, and distinguished 

from the foreign led, if majority Iraqi al-Qaeda. This is quite a significant shift, if 

one takes into account that the insurgents have, for most of the past 5 years, allied 

themselves with al-Qaeda, and that both they and the Mahdi Army are responsible 

for the bulk of U.S. casualties. 

Coalition forces also pressured the Government in Baghdad to curtail the ‘‘death 

squads’’ associated with the National Police. Heavy and highly visible coalition presence in the most vulnerable areas provided added assurance to communities and 

militias, who purported to act on their behalf. 

The multinational forces succeeded in gaining the trust of communities by changing the focus of the mission from the prosecution of insurgents to protection of civilians. This is a significant departure from past practices and is a reflection of 

Petraeus’s counterinsurgency philosophy. 

U.S. troops were taken out of their fortified basis and placed literally ‘‘in harm’s 

way,’’ as evidenced by the spike in U.S. casualties in the initial months of the surge. 

This was done with the explicit aim of providing protection and assurance to civilians. The troops were often based at Iraqi police stations and carried out police 


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duties along with Iraqi Army units, which are relatively more trusted by the restive 

communities than the police. They often brought with them services and reconstruction relief to areas long ignored by the government. 

Source: Coalition casualties. 

This approach, together with the good will established through cooperation in 

Anbar, allowed both communities and insurgents to provide the coalition with the 

main weapon they need to fight al-Qaeda and other extremists—information. 

Acting on supplied intelligence, coalition forces are devoting more care than in the 

past to minimising collateral damage to civilians by relying on skilled Special Operations Forces to carry out pinpoint raids. 

This approach, while clearly effective, has its limitations and pitfalls. This is particularly visible in Diyala and Ninawa provinces, where the Awakening model can 

not be replicated. Unlike Baghdad and surrounding areas, these provinces, in addition to Salah al-Din and Kirkuk have the added complication of the ‘‘disputed territories’’—areas contested by the various communities. The Kurds have made inroads 

into these provinces, provoking a hostile reaction by other communities. 

In ‘‘disputed areas’’ it has been more difficult to mobilise insurgents to fight alQaeda since they perceive the threat from Kurdish expansion as a higher priority. 

Moreover, the chaotic environment in these areas, pitting the various communities 

against each other, has produced a level of anonymity in which terrorists have 

thrived. Al-Qaeda historically dominated these areas even when it used the Anbar 

as ‘‘base camp.’’ 

Other limitations of the surge approach emanate from the continued use of indiscriminate measures which affect large sections of the population. The numbers of 

administrative detainees have soared to an estimated 40,000, in both Iraqi Government and coalition custody (there are 23,000 in coalition custody as of March 2008; 

source: MNFI). Estimates for those in Iraq Government custody range from 15,000– 

20,000 thousands (source: Brookings Index). Many have been held for years without 

charge or trial. There are still numerous incidents of civilian casualties as a result 

of MNFI actions and those of their contractors. The use of high concrete barriers 

has turned many neighbourhoods into disjointed enclaves limiting freedom of movement and economic activity. 

The mobilization of the insurgents under the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) banner as well as the permissive attitude toward the Mahdi Army, key ingredients of 

the prevailing cease-fire, are problematic in the medium and long term. They detract from the already tarnished legitimacy of the official security forces. The use 

of ‘‘neighborhood watch’’ and militias amounts to a vote of no confidence in the 

National Police, in particular. With no realistic prospects or any real efforts at demobilization and reintegration, these militias and paramilitary formations undermine the prospects for establishing a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 

The surge is also creating tensions with erstwhile allies in the Iraqi Government 

who feel threatened by the new groups, particularly the CLCs. Many CLC commanders are drawn from the ranks of the military and former security services and 


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some are suspected of human rights violations during Saddam’s reign and the past 

5 years. They are openly opposed to current Government parties. However, cooperation between the CLCs and the ruling parties is essential if the ‘‘political surge’’ is 

to be successful. 

The entire arrangement is highly dependent on U.S. mediation, financing, and 

massive troop presence, none of which is sustainable over the long term. More than 

70,000 Concerned Local Citizens receive US$300 a month each (or nearly US$300 

million a year) from coalition forces (New York Times December 22, 2007). The Iraqi 

Government has shown little inclination to assume this burden. So far less than 

2,000 have been integrated into Iraqi Security Forces (Brooking Index). 

The truce between insurgent groups, tribal chiefs, and the Sadrists, on one side, 

and the MNFI and Government forces and militias, on the other is temporary, dictated by political expedience. The tribes are notorious for the fluidity of their alliances. The insurgents continue to view the U.S. as an occupying force and question 

the legitimacy of the regime it helped establish. Their own legitimacy and identity 

is built around resistance to both. Their distrust of the new elites particularly the 

former exiles runs deep. 

Without a clear prospect for a fair political process, which allows all these forces 

to articulate, pursue, and negotiate their interests, including achieving the end of 

the occupation, the truce is liable to disintegrate. 

4 Public Backlash 

The surge has benefited from and fed into: (1) The backlash against extremist 

ideologies including religious politics of both Sunni and Shia varieties; (2) the backlash against Green-Zone politics—a combination of sectarianism, radical change, 

and government failure; (3) the resurgence of local politics and community leaders; 

(4) the resurgence of mid-level prewar elites and structures, particularly military 

and security personnel and the bureaucracy. 

4.1 Parties, groups, and movements 

Iraq’s convoluted political scene continues to fragment as the ebb and flow of 

political fortunes produce new fissures and divisions. The ‘‘National Unity Government’’ collapsed in the middle of 2007 with the departure of the Sunni Arab block 

led by the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the Sadrists and Fadhila, Shia opposition 

groups and the secular Iraqi List of Iyad Allawi. This left a truncated Shia-Kurdish 

alliance comprising of the two main Kurdish Parties, the KDP and PUK, the Shia 

Islamic Supreme Council (ISC, formerly SCIRI) and the fragmented Dawa Party of 

the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Division is growing, however, both among and 

within these groups. 

After al-Qaeda, the first victim of the public backlash against extremism was the 

Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), a group of Sunni Arab clerics, which at some 

point represented the political arm of the insurgency. The AMS has all but imploded 

after failing to come up with a clear condemnation of al-Qaeda and support for the 

Awakening movement. Moderate members of the association, either left, were coopted by the government or assassinated. Others fled the country, sometimes under 

threat of prosecution by the Government, including the head of the organization 

Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari. 

The backlash on the Shia side is less dramatic but, nonetheless, perceptible. The 

largest Shia movement, the Sadrists, had to back down from confrontation with government forces or risk losing public support in the latest confrontation in Basra. The 

movement declared a cease-fire in 2007 in a drastic attempt to distance itself from 

the carnage of 2006. These actions are threatening to splinter the movement among 

raising accusations to the leadership of a sellout. Allowing U.S. forces free reign in 

their bastion of Sadr City and ‘‘turning the other cheek,’’ if not actively supporting 

the targeting of ‘‘rogue’’ commanders and ‘‘special groups’’ is a high risk strategy for 

a movement which lost thousands, building its credibility as a the symbol of ‘‘Shia 

resistance.’’ 

Having left the government almost a year ago, the Sadrists today are firmly in 

opposition. The movement regularly demonstrates its strength through mass protests and challenges to the power of its rivals in the Islamic Supreme Council (ISC), 

the other main Shia group which controls government both in Baghdad and in the 

southern provinces. The Sadrists remain the dominant popular movement among 

the Shia underclass in Iraq, but they are clearly on the defensive. 

The backlash against extremism did not translate into support for the ‘‘moderate 

forces,’’ as the groups engaged in the political process like to refer to themselves. 

Quite the opposite, the mainstream parties are sharing in the backlash. 

To most ordinary Iraqis, ‘‘Green Zone’’ politicians were riding the sectarian wave 

if not actively whipping it up. Continued gridlock along sectarian, ethnic, and party 

99 

political lines reveals more to the public about these politicians’ intentions than 

their ‘‘national reconciliation’’ rhetoric. Their credibility is further eroded by failure 

to deliver improvements in people’s daily lives. 

The first to lose are the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and their allies in the Accordance Front—a coalition of Sunni Arab parties. They are being squeezed, from one 

side, by their erstwhile partners in the National Unity Government (Islamic 

Supreme Council (ISC), the Kurds, and Dawa), who refuse to give them any real 

power and, from the other, by the Awakening movement, which is challenging their 

claim to represent Anbar and other Sunni areas at regional and national levels. The 

IIP is caught between government and opposition neither of whom recognizes it as 

its own. 

The secular (heterogeneous) parties aligned in the disintegrating Iraqi List of 

former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi are not faring much better, having equally 

attempted to be both in government and in opposition and ended up in neither. Like 

the Sadrists, the IIP and the Iraqi List left the National Unity Government almost 

a year ago. Unlike the Sadrists, they have been seeking a face-saving way back into 

the Government without much success. 

The ruling parties (Islamic Supreme Council, KDP, PUK, and Dawa) are attempting to capitalize on the success of the surge, depicting it as a vindication of their 

positions and a result of their actions. The Prime Minister, cutting a melancholic 

figure for most of 2006 and 2007, boldly proclaims ‘‘saving the country from civil 

war.’’ 

The ruling parties are trying to use the decline in violence to consolidate their 

hold on power. Rhetoric notwithstanding, they are showing less flexibility and readiness for compromise on issues of power and resource sharing. They recently (March 

2008) held the Second Political National Reconciliation Conference, which was boycotted by all opposition groups both within and outside Parliament (Al-Hayat, 

March 20, 2008). 

The ruling parties’ efforts to establish facts on the ground including attempts to 

subdue the Sadrists and prevarication on overdue Governorate elections, due in 

2007, betray a lack of confidence in their own strength and ability to remain in 

power through an open political process. 

Together with other parties led by former exiles, including the Iraqi List the ruling parties are suffering from a backlash against the radical change agenda 

espoused by these politicians upon the fall of the regime and supported by the U.S. 

and its coalition partners. Despite differences between them, these politicians, who 

have dominated since the days of the Governing Council, became associated with 

developments maligned by a large cross section of Iraq society, regardless of ethnic 

or sectarian affiliation. Policies like de-Baathification, the dissolution of the military 

and security structures, economic deregulation and liberalization, administrative decentralization, close association with the West at the expense of traditional regional 

and international allies, became synonymous in the minds of many Iraqis with the 

chaos that has engulfed the country since the fall of the regime. 

In some respects, Iraq’s former dissidents and reformers are facing a similar predicament to that of most of their predecessors in Eastern Europe and the Former 

Soviet Union. Russian Reformers, Georgian and Azeri Nationalists, Czechoslovak, 

Polish and Hungarian Dissidents who came to power shortly after the fall of communism have some things in common with Iraq’s leaders of today. They sought to 

impose change faster than their societies were willing to accept. They continued to 

fight the state and the ghosts of the regime even after its fall. They often failed to 

meet the basic requirements of government and ended up losing out to a resurgence 

of former regime elites and bureaucratic structures under new guises (former Communists’ parties and party bosses, the KGB). Similarities are particularly strong 

with Russia and those former Soviet Republics where regime change did not come 

as a result of a popular revolt and where the public was indifferent to change. 

The Islamic Supreme Council (ISC), the main Shia party, which has consolidated 

its control of both the central government and southern Governorates over the past 

5 years, is constantly challenged by a range of actors including the Sadrists, Fadhila 

Party, local clerics and tribal leaders. These challenges regularly spill into open hostilities and assassinations, with the ISC more often than not on the losing end, 

despite its nominal control of the security services. The ISC recently attempted to 

emulate the Anbar Awakening model in Shia areas to mobilize the tribes in the 

south against the Sadrists and other rivals without much success, exposing even 

more weakness in the process. 

The decline in the ISC popularity seems to have even reflected on the Shia clerical establishment (Hawza) which became closely associated with the group. Representatives of Iraq’s Shia Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani are regularly 

targeted for assassination, which is often explained by their closeness to the ISC. 

100 

The past year has seen the religious establishment take a much lower political profile, as a result. Ayatollah al-Sistani routinely refuses to speak out on day-to-day 

political issues and disputes. Most recently he refused to comment or even receive 

information on the ongoing discussions about the Iraqi-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 

Faced with such a predicament the ISC seems to be pursuing a twofold strategy. 

On the one hand, it is seeking to strengthen the Central Government and its institutions, which it dominates (the Ministries of Finance and Interior, for example), 

and on the other, it continues to support the project of a Southern Federal Region. 

Support for this idea among the Shia public is not in evidence (ABC Polls, Bookings). Moreover, it is far from a given that ISC will be able to control the emerging 

region on the basis of free vote. This may explain the on-again-off-again nature of 

ISC’s pursuit of the project. It may be that the ISC is pursuing those strategies as 

alternate, fall back positions. It may also be an indication of splintering within the 

group between the Hakim family who seem to be more in favor of the Southern Federal Regions than other prominent party figures. This contradictory approach, however, is further weakening the party and may foretell its disintegration. 

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of President Jalal Talabani, which along 

with the ISC dominates the Federal Government is pursuing a similar strategy. It 

has been losing ground in Kurdistan, having ceded control over the regional government to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The transition of power from a 

KDP Prime Minister to one nominated by the PUK has just (early 2008) been delayed. The PUK has instead invested in the strengthening of the central government, expending significant political and human resources in the process. For local 

political considerations, the PUK is compelled to side with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on Kurdish issues, particularly Kirkuk and oil, even if in a more 

nuanced way. This position has become increasingly difficult to sustain as polarization on those issues intensifies. 

In this context, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of President Masood 

Barazani has, perhaps, been the most consistent of all Iraqi groups, having pursued 

a Kurdish nationalist policy all along. If anything, the KDP seems to be escalating 

its nationalist rhetoric and actions as evidenced in the hardening of positions on 

issues of Kirkuk, the oil contracts, the PKK and the relationship with Turkey. This 

approach, while possibly bearing fruit in terms of strengthening the party’s position 

within Kurdistan, is putting it in an increasingly isolated position within Iraq and 

contributing to an unprecedented level of Kurdish-Arab tensions. 

It is difficult to gauge the true level of support for the two main Kurdish parties 

and their allies in Kurdistan. The nationalist rhetoric could be interpreted as a way 

to preempt challenges to their dominance by rivals, particularly the Kurdish 

Islamists. Rising disaffection with corruption, and human-rights violations, is 

unlikely to amount to a significant challenge to the entrenched two-party rule. After 

all, they have produced in Kurdistan what most Iraqis only dream of—security. 

Perhaps the clearest winners of the new dynamic are the insurgents, ‘‘brought in 

from the cold’’ as Concerned Local Citizens. Having earned a legitimacy in the 

underground, resisting the occupation, its ‘‘puppet government’’ and the ‘‘deathsquads,’’ they are now given money and weapons by their erstwhile enemies to rid 

Iraq of the scourge of al-Qaeda. Without much exaggeration, they can claim that the 

arrangement they have with the MNFI, particularly in Anbar, as a victory. 

Numbering an estimated 80,000–100,000, the CLCs are a force to be reckoned 

with, especially considering their background in the military and security establishment of the former regime. Their political allegiance and interests are neither clear 

nor coherent. The Islamic fervour of the early days is diminished as part of the 

backlash against al-Qaeda extremism. Allegiance to the local clerics who have failed 

to provide a coherent political leadership seems to have given way to tribal fealty, 

but this too could prove fleeting. 

Several attempts, over the past 5 years, to transform the tribes into a political 

force have faltered on the inherently fractious and parochial nature of these institutions. A tribal alliance in Anbar may hold long enough to dislodge the Iraqi Islamic 

Party from the Governorate’s council but is unlikely to become an effective national 

political force. 

Given their background, a yet to emerge reformed Baath Party, would present a 

more natural home for the former insurgents. All efforts to reincarnate the Baath 

party, however, have failed so far. The new groups are either too close to the discredited party leadership or too close to the new regime to represent viable political 

alternatives to both. 

The Awakening movement is emblematic of a broader revival of local politics and 

economics. In most areas benefiting from the decline in violence, localized economic 

activity and reconstruction efforts are underpinned logistically and financially by 

101 

the MNFI. The Government which still lacks the tools to carry out investments is 

providing the financial resources in some cases. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

are beginning to find their footing after a rocky start. 

However, without a legitimate national framework which ties these localized 

efforts together, coordinates among them and supplies them with resources, they are 

unsustainable. 

The past year also witnessed the resurgence of mid-level elites from the previous 

regime. The New Iraqi Army is the best example. Officers from the dissolved army 

account for 70 percent of the new officer corps, including many high ranking officers 

who had to receive a special exemption from the de-Baathification laws. About 77 

percent of the 117 battalions of the New Iraqi Army are assessed by their U.S. 

trainers to be capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations independently (Section 1227 Report). MNFI claims that up to 20 percent of current counterinsurgency operations are Iraqi Army led. The recent operation in Basra (March 

2008) against the Sadrists demonstrated some of this progress. The army enjoys 

more credibility and trust among the public. These facts do not only indicate that 

the Army is one of the better functioning institutions in the Iraq state today but 

that it is also likely to become a political player sometime in the future. 

4.2 Bureaucratic awakening 

The most remarkable ‘‘awakening’’ taking place in Iraq today is that of the 

bureaucracy. A resurgent bureaucracy is seeking to coordinate localized improvements and fill the gap between the vibrant local and dormant national levels of 

government. 

Benefiting in part from the reduction in violence and the relaxation of deBaathification, this awakening is also an act of defiance by the once efficient machinery of government against political gridlock and incompetence at the top. 

The collapse of the regime, destruction of most files and data banks, and the decimation of the middle levels of the bureaucracy under the impact of de-Baathification, emigration, attrition, and cronyism, all but eliminated the Iraqi Government’s 

ability to translate political programs, declarations, and intentions into concrete 

policies and actions. This is best demonstrated in the repeated failure to implement 

the investment budget. 

The paralysis in the Green Zone, where most ministers work and reside, is allowing technocrats of lower levels to reclaim control of the system. One of the main 

areas of progress is that of policy implementation and follow-up. 

4.2.1 Policy planning and implementation 

This problem with policy planning and implementation has deep historical roots 

which were only exacerbated by the invasion and its aftermath. In the 1960s and 

1970s Iraq built its own version of the socialist central planning system. Each line 

ministry represented a vertical ‘‘stove pipe,’’ living and operating in near perfect 

isolation from other ministries. Bureaucrats’ only lines of communications were 

through their respective ministry’s chain of command. 

Coordination and planning of ‘‘routine’’ investments was carried out by the Ministry of Planning (MoPDC today) which concentrated in its hands most policymaking, data processing and analytical tools. Major projects requiring cross-departmental coordination, such as the post-1991 war reconstruction, were left to the 

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC was the only institution with 

oversight of the entire system including the secret budget. 

This inefficient—if functional—system, suited best to the needs of war economy, 

gradually corroded over the eighties and nineties until it was dealt a mortal blow 

with the invasion of 2003. First, it was decapitated by the removal of the RCC. 

Then, it was dismembered by the introduction of political and ethnic quotas in the 

allocation of ministerial portfolios. The quota system further deepened the isolation 

of the ministries from each other, turning each of them into its own separate 

fiefdom, belonging to one or the other party. Not even the Prime Minister let alone 

the Minister of Planning could ‘‘instruct’’ a new minister to follow a certain policy, 

particularly if it requires sharing of power and resources with other ministries. This 

situation is further complicated by the greater powers given to the Governorates 

and regions without a clear coordinating role at the centre. 

The dual fuel and electricity shortage is a demonstration of this breakdown. The 

ministries of oil and electricity (MoO and MoE) have a history of animosity and 

were only capable of working with each other under RCC duress. Today their lack 

of cooperation is credited, to some extent, with the persistent shortage of both fuel 

and power. The MoE refuses to tailor its plans for power generation expansion to 

coincide with the existing gas and fuel supply network. Instead, the Minister is 

seeking authority to produce his own natural gas. MoE is also refusing to dedicate 

102 

the necessary power to support existing or future refineries. Likewise, the MoO is 

focused on increasing exports and production of refined products for consumption 

and refuses to take MoE needs into account in its investment plans. It will never 

voluntarily cede the prerogative of producing and transporting natural gas to another ministry. To make matters worse, whatever energy and fuel are produced (or 

imported) are prevented from being efficiently shared by competing regions and 

Governorates. Refusal by the Governorates to share power is often credited with unnecessary outages affecting all users. Border regions and Governorates often commandeer fuel shipments transiting their territory. 

Neither the line Ministries nor the Ministry of Finance (MoF) inherited policy 

planning and coordination capabilities from the previous regime. Economic and 

planning functions at the line Ministries were, in reality, accounting and engineering functions. Ministries received detailed instruction from MoPDC which they duly 

carried out. The MoF was the Government’s cashier, releasing funds and ensuring 

proper accounting but had no analytical or policy planning capabilities. 

Within this context, it is no wonder that the budget, now mostly controlled by the 

MoF, is closer to a cash distribution formula than to a monetary embodiment of a 

coherent economic policy. The National Development Strategy, meant to serve as 

the basis for the investment budget is compiled with diminishing rigour by MoPDC 

and is only taken seriously by foreign donors, if at all. The power to approve donor 

financing (through the Iraq Strategic Review Board (ISRB)) is one of few residual 

competencies of MoPDC. Its role has thus been reduced to ‘‘donor coordination,’’ a 

function it is less and less capable of carrying out due to its declining domestic policy coordination role. 

Ministries used only to carrying out clearly detailed instructions are simply not 

equipped to budget and spend multibillion investment allocations. Without proper 

costing, commercial or even technical justification, the projects underpinning allocations, for example, to MoE and MoO over the past 3 years, were simply declarations 

by the government of its intent to alleviate fuel and electricity shortages. The situation is even more challenging at the Governorate level, which never had any spending let alone policy planning functions. The doubling of their investment budgets is 

driven primarily by politics as explained elsewhere in this paper. 

Faced with an extremely low level of investment budget execution, estimated at 

22 percent in 2006, the past year saw concerted efforts by various actors to address 

this problem. 

Source: SIGIR, January 2008. 

Spearheaded by a number of mid- and high-level technocrats, efforts are under 

way to improve budget execution at various institutions, including the Council of 

Ministers Secretariat (CoMSec), the National Security Council (NSC), the Prime 

Minister’s Advisory Council (PMAC), Supreme Economic Council (SEC), Parliament 

and the provinces. 

In all these cases, efforts are aimed at building cross-departmental, multidisciplinary and in some cases interregional policy planning, coordination, and review 


said4a.eps
103 

functions, either at the national program level or around concrete reform and investment projects. Typically, these efforts involve Director General level officials from 

all the relevant ministries and entities. They are usually authorized to draw necessary resources from the private sector and civil society as well as international 

donors. Sometimes, they are also authorized to circumvent or expedite spending procedures and decision. 

The Supreme Economic Council (SEC) and the National Security Council (NSC) 

have worked on the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and the National Security Strategy, both examples of medium-term planning at the national program 

level. Both have established interministerial policy entities. The Policy Planning 

Unit (PPU) at the SEC is meant to coordinate, monitor, and review of policies enshrined in the International Compact with Iraq. The PPU is also meant to provide 

a single point of contact to International Development Partners thus streamlining 

coordination of donor assistance. The Joint Planning Centre at the NSC is focused 

on policy planning and analysis but has no monitoring or review functions. Both 

entities are comprised of Director General level officials from all ministries and government agencies concerned, divided into thematic working groups to address particular issues or projects; e.g., Energy, Human Development, etc. 

The Prime Minister’s Advisory Council (PMAC) is working in the same vein at 

the level of discreet projects such as the US$500 million water and agricultural 

development project. The project involves cross-departmental and interdisciplinary 

cooperation from the design stage through to implementation and monitoring. They 

are also working on resolving problems of coordination between the Ministries of Oil 

and Electricity. 

The PMAC is also cleaning up the legislation from dozens of Revolutionary Command Council Orders and other Saddam era laws. Interdisciplinary teams are preparing documentation and legislation which is then used by Parliament to sunset 

some of these orders and laws. 

Other examples of relatively successful project level coordination include the rollout of the Social Safety Net, spearheaded by the Ministry of Labour and Social 

Affairs and involving a number of ministries and departments. 

The Public Expenditure and Institutions Assessment (PEIA) completed recently 

by World Bank depicts another example of cross departmental cooperation, aimed 

at improving efficiency of public finances. These efforts are spearheaded by MOF 

and involve the Central Bank, Trade Bank, Ministry of Planning (MoPDC) and the 

Supreme Board of Audit. The PEIA draft indicates that Iraq’s public finances are 

not far below the average for the region. 

In a related effort, the MoPDC has been assisting the Governorates in the development of Provincial Development Strategies to provide a rationale for the ever 

growing provincial investment budget allocations. 

The Council of Ministers Secretariat (CoMSec) is playing a similar cross-departmental coordination role, focusing on the seemingly trivial but critical issue of follow-up of decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers. 

It is too early to assess the effectiveness of all these efforts. The Government 

claims that investment budget execution more than doubled in 2007 to reach 40 percent (preliminary figures by the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicate a much 

lower success rate with execution standing at 10 percent by September 2007, 

SIGIR). 

So far these structures have been more efficient in the areas of reporting and 

analysis and less so in the areas of coordination and review. These are, however, 

relatively new functions for the officials involved and it should be expected that they 

will take time to evolve. 

The development of Iraqi policy planning and coordination functions and improvement in budget execution is already changing the dynamic of the relationship with 

foreign donors. There is a growing impatience among Iraqi officials with the donors’, 

hitherto, central role in reconstruction effort. The disconnect is exacerbated by the 

donors’ lack of awareness of many initiatives and their continued dependence on 

mechanisms built around the Ministry of Planning. High turnover and declining 

quality of personnel of donor personnel often means that Iraqi officials see little 

value from the interaction with them. 

The bureaucratic awakening offers unmistakeable signs of a machinery of government adjusting to a new reality as it springs back into action. Directors General and 

experts working in interdepartmental and interdisciplinary teams outside their ministerial hierarchies are taking a leap of faith in their quest to bypass old and new 

political and procedural bottlenecks. The success of their efforts will depend on the 

authority and resources made available to them which in turn determines the ability of these teams to make a difference. 

104 

As these efforts proliferate, the need will increase for coordination among them 

in order to avoid overlap and maintain the integrity of the budget process. 

The main challenge to such efforts remains the lack of clarity in the allocation 

of powers and resources across government and between the centre and the regions. 

As the declining fortunes of the Ministry of Planning reveal, policy planning bodies 

are only worth as much as the enforceability of their policies. 

Like the security achievements of the military surge, the bureaucratic awakening 

is fragile and fleeting. After decades of abuse and years of chaos this may well be 

the last chance to fix Iraq’s machinery of government. Without clear political direction and the resolution of underlying political differences this surge will ultimately 

run its course. 

5 Defunct Political Process 

The surge was meant to create the enabling environment for political dialog and 

compromise, which in turn would provide the foundation for lasting peace. Yet, the 

political process seems to be heading in the opposite direction with the deepening 

of political fissures and the emergence of new cross-cutting faultlines. 

Having all but abandoned the notion of a ‘‘national unity government,’’ there is 

a deepening schism between government and opposition, both within and outside 

Parliament. 

The ruling parties are acting more assertively, seeking to capitalize on the improved security environment and consolidate their control of government. Parties 

engaged in the political process in and outside government have a growing sense 

of unease about new and emerging actors and are seeking to establish facts on the 

ground to consolidate their ‘‘first mover advantage.’’ All Iraqi actors are growing in 

experience and confidence and are less susceptible to external influence. 

These developments are reducing the scope for compromise even when the improved security environment is opening new opportunities for dialog. Yet, compromise is needed on fundamental issues related to the future of Iraq including: (1) The 

degree of decentralization; (2) the relative roles of the state and the private sector; 

(3) the role of religion and the religious establishment; (4) the mechanisms of transitional justice; and (5) relationship with the surrounding region and the wider world. 

Both insiders and outsiders share a high degree of distrust in the political process 

as a platform for the negotiation and resolution of these issues. 

The political process, launched with the formation of the Governing Council in 

July 2003, on the basis of a sectarian and ethnic allocation formula (Muhasasa) remains hostage to that principle despite the succession of elections which have taken 

place since. With deep mistrust and a historical ‘‘tradition’’ of winner-takes-all, ethnic and sectarian quotas have emerged as the main framework for power and 

resource sharing. 

This framework, however, is more often a cause for gridlock than consensus, especially when the issues in question cut across ethnic and sectarian lines. Thus, Iraqi 

political leaders remain deadlocked on almost every issue, even when dialog, within 

the framework of nascent democratic institutions, seems to point to compromise. 

Most opposition ministers left the National Unity Government of Nouri al-Maliki 

in the spring and summer of 2007 protesting the failure of the ruling parties to 

share power. Attempts at reconstituting the government along ‘‘professional’’ lines 

have faltered against the sectarian allocation principles at the heart of the process. 

In the interim the Iraqi Government is run literally by a handful of politicians who 

have all but monopolized decisionmaking over the past 5 years. 

105 

Simplified illustration of tension between position of power and public support for the various 

groups and the cross-cutting divisions and alignments on slected issues. 

It is misleading to interpret the passage of key legislation, such as the Amnesty 

Law as a sign of compromise. Rather than addressing the key political questions the 

passed laws either paper over them or reflect the position of the ruling parties. 

This is not to say that compromise is impossible but that the search is hampered 

by the mechanisms and personalities which dominated the political process over the 

past 5 years. 

The recent passage of the budget, amnesty, and provincial powers laws is a case 

in point. The three laws were passed as a package. Some, including Sheikh Khalid 

al-Atiya, the respected First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, say that this was done 

in violation of the Constitution and Council of Representatives Procedures. The laws 

had to be passed in a package not because all those who voted agreed with each 

law, but because each of those who voted only agreed with one of the three laws 

(or even just parts thereof). 

The most discussed issue on the budget was not how accurately it reflected 

agreed-upon policies and priorities but rather the amount allocated to Kurdistan. At 

the end, an important component of this issue, the allocation to the Kurdish 

Peshmarga (regional guards), was left to the Prime Minister to decide in consultation with the Kurdistan Regional Government. 

There was little discussion about the relevance of an Amnesty Law which 

excludes most charges related to the insurgency (e.g., terrorism, murder). The 

Kurdistan Regional Government who’s members of Parliament voted for the law has 

declared that it is not applicable to the region. The Sadrists supported the 

Governorates’ Powers Law, only because it opened the way for provincial elections, 

which they hope to win. 

The laws were passed despite a boycott by all opposition Members of Parliament 

except the Sadrists with the Speaker casting the tie-breaking vote. The Presidency 

Council then vetoed the Governorates’ Powers Law. This amounted to a breach of 

trust for the Sadrists who made the passage of the whole package possible by breaking rank with other opposition groups in the hope of getting the regional elections 

expedited. Later the Presidency was forced to rescind its veto. 

The ruling parties continue to pursue decentralization as a way of preempting 

challenges by existing and new opposition groups, establishing hard to reverse facts 

on the ground in the process. 

The law on the Formation of Regions which comes into effect shortly—May 2008— 

will make it easy and irreversible to form a Federal Region. If new regions adopt 

a similar attitude to federalism as the Kurds the state could be hollowed out. 


said5.eps
106 

Investment allocations to the Governorates have been doubled again in the 2008 

budget and the largely unspent 2007 allocations rolled over. More than 30 percent 

of the budget is now allocated directly to the regions and Governorates, a process, 

that will be hard to reverse and that could leave the central government without 

sufficient resources to carry out its obligations. These measures have been taken in 

the face of vehement opposition by nationalist opposition parties both within and 

outside the political process. 

5.1 Hydrocarbon legislation 

Nowhere is the gridlock caused by the sectarian political process more evident 

than in the hydrocarbon law discussion. The discussion encompasses many of the 

fundamental issues determining the shape of the future Iraqi state, from the sharing of power and resources between the center and the regions to the role of the 

private sector and the protection of minorities. 

The discussion is closely correlated with the issue of ‘‘disputed territories,’’ relations with neighbors and the wider world. Oil has a symbiotic relation with the 

modern Iraqi state. It played a determining role in Iraqi economy, politics, and 

shaped the relationship between state and society. Petroleum nationalization carried 

out piecemeal in the 1960s and 1970s of the last century is, for many, an integral 

part of Iraqi national identity. 

The negotiations held, formally, between teams representing the Ministry of Oil 

(MoO) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over almost 2 years have 

become a proxy to competing conceptions of Iraq’s past and future. 

The MoO sought to establish continuity with the national industry model, giving 

the state a pivotal role in regulating and managing the sector through the Ministry 

and the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). It sought to improve efficiency and prevent abuse by augmenting the system with market and public accountability mechanisms including transparency and power-sharing with the regions. In particular the 

MoO sought to break with the excessive centralization of the industry by reconstituting INOC, abolished by Saddam in 1987, as an operationally and commercially 

independent enterprise. 

The Kurdistan Regional Government had radically different vision. It sought to 

abolish the existing system altogether, blaming it, not only for inefficiency and 

abuse but also, for the tragedies that befell the Kurds at the hands of successive, 

oil-financed, regimes. What little role they envisaged the state as playing, in the 

areas of policy and regulation, was largely delegated to the regions. Decentralization 

and liberalization were promoted, not only as means to harness market forces for 

the rapid development of the sector but also, to prevent corruption and abuse. 

Despite the gulf that separates those two positions, the parties came close to a 

compromise which combined a high degree of decentralization and liberalization 

with effective policymaking, coordination, and regulation at the national level. 

Emphasizing the constitutional principle of undivided public ownership of oil, the 

compromise involved a tradeoff, constraining regional powers with national coordination. A separate law establishing a transparent mechanism for revenue-sharing 

was meant to assure the Kurds and other regions of their fair share of revenues, 

while allowing for the maximization of revenues through a more coherent management structure. 

Most of the public discussions on the hydrocarbon legislation, especially outside 

Iraq, focused on the role of private sector and the possible use of Production Sharing 

Agreements as the basis for model contracts. This misses the main point of the negotiations—the distribution of powers between the Federal center and the region. 

The compromises encoded in the draft adopted by the Council of Ministers in February 2007 were fragile and vague. The law included many contradictory provisions 

and papered over unresolved differences. At the end it collapsed under the impact 

of a series of events including: 

(1) A review by the Experts (Shura) Committee of Parliament which spelled 

out the compromise in a clear language and deleted the reference to ethnic 

quotas in the formation of the Federal Oil and Gas Council—the highest 

national policymaking body; 

(2) The introduction of an annex by the Ministry of Oil allocating all producing fields to INOC; 

(3) The introduction of a draft revenue-sharing (Financial Resources) law 

which gave the Ministry of Finance nominal control over the oil account; 

(4) A parallel development, which was not directly related to the hydrocarbon 

law discussion but, undoubtedly, affected the political context was the lack of 

progress and eventual lapsing of article 140 of the Constitution pertaining to 

the ‘‘normalization’’ of the situation of Kirkuk and the ‘‘disputed territories’’ (see 

below); 

107 

None of the above developments alone represents a clear break with achieved 

agreements and compromises but together they seem to have intensified the 

Kurd’s mistrust in the intentions of the national government. 

(5) The Kurds then adopted their own Oil and Gas Act; and 

(6) Signed 15 contracts with independent international oil companies including 12 in a period of 1 month. Some contracts were signed for blocks on ‘‘disputed territories,’’ outside the current boundaries of the Kurdistan Region. One 

contract, given to the Kurdistan Region’s own oil company, was for a currently 

producing field, already under development by the Federal Ministry of Oil. 

The right to negotiate and sign contracts, pending review by the Federal Oil and 

Gas Council is contained in the draft oil legislation. The contracts, however, violate 

the spirit of the negotiations and also possibly the letter of the pending law since 

they were awarded through a process that was neither competitive nor transparent 

and in the absence of an agreed national sector development strategy. Although the 

KRG claims that the contracts comply with the region’s own law and their own interpretation of the constitution, they are clearly in violation of currently prevailing 

Iraqi laws, having entirely bypassed the national government. 

Since then (November 2007) no serious efforts have taken place to resume negotiations. Each side seems determined to proceed according to their own script, establishing facts on the ground in the process. The Ministry of Oil has declared the 

Kurdish contracts null and void and is ‘‘blacklisting’’ companies who signed them 

(including OMV of Austria and the Korean National Oil Company). It is proceeding 

with its own negotiations with five oil majors (including Exxon, Shell, BP, Total, 

and Chevron) for 2-year Technical Service Contracts on currently producing fields. 

This could boost output by up to 0.5 million bpd. In February 2008 the MoO completed a short-list of companies for a bidding round which could be held as early 

as mid-2008 for longer term exploration and development contracts. The outline of 

the model contracts is still a work in progress. It is expected to be a risk-sharing 

though not a production-sharing contract since the latter has been all but vetoed 

by public backlash. The KRG are negotiating further contracts. 

The story of the hydrocarbon law demonstrates many of the shortcomings of the 

emerging political system. A small circle of unelected officials debated a law that 

touches upon many of the key issues affecting the future of Iraq. Any compromises 

forged by the technical teams were upturned by the ‘‘political leaders.’’ A similar 

dynamic affected the proceedings of the Constitutional Review Committee, which 

managed to agree on substantive changes to the constitution, addressing some of its 

greatest shortcomings, only to be buried by the very same ‘‘leaders.’’ 

The Kurdish position on the degree of decentralization reveals the depth of their 

mistrust of the new political system and the checks and balances it is supposed to 

have placed on the power of the Federal Government. The Kurds explicitly state 

that government control over the oil industry or over the oil account is unacceptable 

to them. They are even reluctant to allow the national Parliament to ‘‘open’’ the 

agreed law or review contracts. They are pushing for a greater role for the private 

sector to provide an insurance against leaving large parts of the industry in the 

hands of government (or government-owned entities), which they do not trust. 

The difficulty in passing the hydrocarbon law and the tenacity with which the 

Minister of Oil, Dr. Hussain al-Shahristani, is pursuing his state-centric position is 

also indicative of the changing political environment. 

Al-Shahristani, an independent member of the United Iraqi Alliance, is at odds 

with many of his colleagues in Government. He is relying instead on support in Parliament, the Shia religious establishment and the broader public. He is openly challenging some of the more radical interpretations of federalism as depicted in the 

constitutions and is seeking to assert a greater role for the state in economic life 

than was envisioned in the early days of the new regime. He is not shying away 

from open conflict with the Kurds, who have been an indispensable powerbroker for 

most of the past 5 years. 

The Ministry benefited from the ongoing campaign by Iraqi oil experts seeking to 

rationalize the draft law and strengthen the governments capacity to coordinate and 

regulate the sector. The campaign has the added credibility of including the main 

drafters of the first version of the law in addition to the most senior Iraqi oil 

experts. 

The Iraqi oil experts’ championing for a greater state role is another indication 

of the backlash against what is widely seen as excessive decentralization, liberalization, and general weakening of the state since the invasion. This backlash cuts 

across political parties and ethnic groups, perhaps with the exception of the Kurds. 

This is feeding into tensions between them and the rest. 

Persistent U.S. pressure to pass the hydrocarbon law has failed to compel the parties to compromise, revealing the limits of U.S. influence in Iraq today. 

108 

5.2 Potential Conflict over Kirkuk 

The Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General to Iraq, Stefan De 

Mistura recently called Kirkuk a ‘‘ticking bomb.’’ This uncharacteristically blunt 

assessment is a reflection of the gravity of the simmering tensions around the future 

of Kirkuk and more generally the potential for conflict on all issues related to the 

boundaries of self determination for Iraq’s Kurds. 

For most of the past 5 years the two Kurdish parties enjoyed a privileged position 

on the Iraqi political scene. They were better organized and resourced than most 

other parties. They had more government experience from managing the Kurdistan 

Region since 1991. As opposed to most Arab parties, they had a real constituency 

providing them with a strategic depth and a sense of accountability. 

Despite fighting a bloody conflict for most of the 1990s, the two Kurdish parties 

have maintained a more or less united position on most issues, both inside the 

region and in Iraq. They also enjoyed good relationship with the U.S., which had 

to rely on their support especially after Turkey refused to allow the use of its territory for the invasion in 2003. 

Their armed forces, the Peshmarga, are by far the best equipped and most disciplined of all military formation operating in Iraq to this date, so much so that they 

provide close protection to most senior Iraqi officials. Kurds also hold key positions 

within the army and form the core of key military units. 

This has allowed the Kurdish parties, despite their minority status to play the 

role of the powerbroker, shaping many of the policies of the past 5 years. 

The approach of the two Kurdish parties despite the differences between them 

(described above) is twofold. On the one hand, they are working to expand the 

boundaries of Kurdish self-determination, politically, economically and geographically, stopping just shy of outright independence. On the other, they are seeking to 

maintain sufficient influence over the rest of Iraq, to ensure that it does not become 

a threat to the Kurdish people again. This approach is born out of bitter historical 

experience as well as the political reality which makes an independent Kurdistan 

impossible, at the moment. 

For most of the past 5 years, the two Kurdish parties succeeded in convincing 

their key political partners in government that a relatively weak central state 

formed out of semi-independent regions is a win-win solution for everyone. Former 

exile parties, which associated the Iraqi state with tyranny, shared this view, at 

least in theory. This vision was reflected in the political mechanisms developed since 

the invasion, which placed a heavy emphasis on ethnic and sectarian quotas and 

gave party leaders more power than government officials. It is also reflected in the 

Constitution, which vests significant powers in the regions at the expense of the 

Federal Government. 

The Kurdish parties’ main ally in this pursuit was the Islamic Supreme Council, 

and by extension the United Iraqi Alliance (the largest coalition of Shia parties). 

This partnership is showing signs of strain on both practical and political grounds. 

As Parliament and government proceed to interpret and implement the Constitution, it is becoming clear the Kurdish parties had greater degree of decentralization 

in mind than everyone else. Federal officials, attending to the day-to-day business 

of government, are often confronted with the difficulty of managing a state with 

such a high degree of decentralization. The oil law and budget discussions described 

above are cases in point. The Governorates’ Powers Law, adopted without much 

Kurdish input, since it does not apply to them, rolls back many of the decentralizing 

provision of the Constitution. It garnered heterogeneous support in Parliament 

across sectarian lines demonstrating the emerging tilt toward consolidating state 

power. 

Politically, the United Iraqi Alliance, including the Islamic Supreme Council (ISC) 

is less committed to the cause of strengthening the regions than their Kurdish 

allies, particularly since they have much less confidence in their ability to dominate 

them. Many UIA officials have invested in—and aspire to keep—national political 

office and would like to see more power and resources at the center. 

Although nominally only in control of the three Kurdish Governorates (Erbil, 

Duhok, and Suleimania) the Kurdistan Regional Government has been effectively in 

control over a larger area which includes swaths of four other Governorates (Diyala, 

Salah al-Din, At-Ta’mim, and Ninava). They have been dominating the security 

structures and Governorate councils in most of these provinces. Kurdish control over 

these territories is overt and was part of the justification for their claim of 17 percent of the budget instead of the 13 percent understood to be the share of the Iraqi 

population living in the three KRG provinces. 

Perhaps the main case where the win-win narrative falters is Kirkuk and the 

other ‘‘disputed territories’’ in Ninava, Salah al-Din, and Diyala, where Kurdish 

gains are increasingly seen as a loss by all the other actors and vise versa. DisagreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
109 

ment on this issue, though barely articulated, is fueling all other disputes. It is increasingly becoming a harbinger of violent conflict. 

Approximate map of the disputed territories—between the red and green lines, source: geology.com. 

Many Kurds deported forcibly from Kirkuk under Saddam’s policy of Arabisation 

have been allowed to return. There is little evidence of forcible removal of non-Kurdish residents from the disputed areas but the Kurds do not hide their desire to see 

a transfer of those who were brought in by Saddam back to where they came from. 

Article 140 of the constitution was essentially meant to formalize Kurdish control 

over the ‘‘disputed territories,’’ first through a process of ‘‘normalization’’—population transfer and compensation—and then through referenda to determine which 

parts of the disputed Governorates will be included in the Kurdistan Region. 

Without officially reneging on the agreed upon formula, the government allowed 

article 140 to lapse at the end of 2007, largely through inaction. The status of the 

article is unclear, though most including the Kurdish parties are working under the 

assumption that it has been extended for 6 months. 

The issue is so explosive and the differences among erstwhile allies so deep that 

there has not been a real discussion on it since the drafting of the Transitional 

Administrative Law (TAL) under Paul Bremer in 2004. Article 140 of the constitution is almost a verbatim copy of article 58 in the TAL. 

Arab-Kurdish confrontations over other less explosive issues have been more 

overt, acting as both proxies for Kirkuk and being exacerbated by it. There were 

several occasions over the past 18 months where Iraq’s fractious Arab political class, 

including Shia and Sunni parties in government and opposition united against the 

Kurdish parties. The issues ranged from the relatively harmless ban on the Iraqi 

flag, imposed by the Kurdistan Regional Government in September 2006, to the dispute over the allocation to the Kurdistan Regional Government in the 2008 budget 

and the oil contracts. Almost all parties objected to the allocation of 17 percent to 

the KRG although the same percentage was awarded to the region in the previous 

two budgets. The subdued reaction by most Arab politicians to the Turkish incursion in pursuit of the PKK is the clearest indication yet of the rising tension. 

Together these tensions are creating a new schism which is contributing to government paralysis and threatening Iraq’s territorial integrity. If neglected they may 

very well escalate into a new conflict. 


said6.eps
110 

6 Scenarios 

6.1 Putin without Putin 

The first scenario involves a continued rolling back of some of the excesses of the 

past 5 years in every respect—religious extremism, reformist zeal, state failure. This 

process would be coupled with a change in the political leadership. New power 

structures would be drawn from the former regimes’ institutional but not party 

elites—Concerned Local Citizens commanders, military and security services personnel, mid-level technocrats. 

This is similar to the emergence of Putin in Russia at the end of the chaotic 

Yeltsin era, which brought some of the KGB and other Soviet era structures back 

to power but not the Communist Party. This dynamic would be fed by a similar public yearning for order after a prolonged period of chaos and uncertainty. 

This option will necessarily involve the scaling back of some of the achievements 

of the past 5 years along with the excesses but is likely to be the least destabilizing 

in the medium term. 

The largest Shia group, the Sadrists, could accept this development as long as no 

prominent Baathists are involved in the ‘‘restoration.’’ The other dominant political 

groups, including the Kurdish parties and other former exiles, are less likely to 

accept it. 

The holding of elections on schedule and according to new legislation could facilitate a less violent transition. The nature of the political structure that would 

emerge to lead these constituencies and their relation to the Baath Party will determine the degree of resistance (and violence) engendered by this scenario. 

The Kurdish leadership will be the hardest to reconcile with the resurgence of the 

state under structures associated with the former regime. This may further intensify tensions around Iraqi Kurdistan. Indeed the greatest threat associated with this 

scenario is a violent conflict a la Chechnya. ‘‘Standing up’’ to the Kurds may become 

a rallying cry for Iraqi Arab nationalists and the battleground on which they demonstrate their credentials just like Putin used Chechnya to consolidate his grip on 

power. 

6.2 Indefinite surge 

Another scenario would see prolonged, substantial U.S. presence to protect the 

current political leaders, allowing them to hold on to power and resist change. Elections may be postponed or subverted. The ruling parties would continue to dominate 

government, ignoring and at increasingly suppressing descent while maintaining the 

appearance of a political process. The recent operation in Basra, could be a harbinger of this scenario. 

The main avenue for the current leaders to diffuse challenges by emerging actors 

is to accelerate the decentralization of government and liberalization of the oil sector—in essence removing the target for any power claims. Substantial moves have 

been undertaken in this direction, such as the law on the formation of the regions, 

the accelerated increase in provincial budgetary allocations and the Kurdistan oil 

contracts. 

This scenario will maintain the motivation for parts of the insurgency, especially 

as they see U.S. forces propping up a regime they do not accept. It could be less 

violent than before since parts of the insurgency would be co-opted in the process 

and the momentum from the 2006 civil-war would have been broken. 

Without a legitimate and viable central state, the resurgent bureaucracy would 

likely give up. It will be a race against time whether an entirely new machinery 

of government, emerges at both national and regional level before total state 

collapse. 

The constrained legitimacy of the emerging regime would continue to pose a 

threat to Iraq’s territorial integrity. Encroachments on Iraqi territory by Turkey and 

Iran already reveal how vulnerable the Iraqi state has become. 

This scenario will require a ‘‘permanent surge’’—an extensive and prolonged 

MNFI commitment to protect unpopular leaders from domestic challenges, prevent 

conflicts between regions and protect an increasingly fragile Iraq from external 

threats. 

While the most peaceful in the short term, as long as significant U.S. presence 

is maintained, this scenario is likely to be volatile and fragile in the medium and 

long term. 

6.3 Somalia 

The worst case scenario would see the ‘‘surges,’’ both military and bureaucratic, 

run their course without achieving their objectives. 

Neither the current leaders nor the opposition groups challenging them emerge 

as clear winners. Al-Qaeda is revived as unresolved political, sectarian, and ethnic 

111 

conflicts are reignited. Violence creeps back up completing the collapse of the machinery of government and the exodus of the technocrats and middle classes. Recent 

up-tick in violence may be an ominous sign of movement in this direction. 

The U.S. is eventually forced to withdraw or return to the presurge mode of operation, leaving a Somalia-like vacuum behind. Iraq’s neighbors would feel compelled 

to intervene preemptively to prevent violence from spilling over, carving out buffer 

zones and entire regions in the process. 

Eventually, the international community is forced to intervene to address a growing threat to international peace and security and a spiraling humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. is again at the forefront as the only nation capable of leading such 

an intervention and as the party responsible for bringing Iraq to this state. 

7 Conclusion and Recommendations 

None of these three scenarios would count as ‘‘victory’’ for the U.S., in the sense 

that none would leave behind a fully fledged democracy in Iraq. The second scenario 

is only possible if the U.S. is prepared to commit forces at the same level of the 

‘‘surge’’ over a long period. 

The Somali scenario is not only dire for the Iraqi people but could have dangerous 

repercussions for the rest of the Middle East, the United States and indeed the 

world. This kind of stateless ‘‘black hole’’ breeds a kind of predatory political economy in which violence, sectarianism, and crime feed on each other and spread. 

That leaves the Putin scenario. Any U.S. or international strategy should focus 

on the best way to ensure that this scenario does not lead to a Chechnya-like conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan and to moderate likely authritarian trends. 

This will require action in four directions. 

7.1 A U.N. resolution for Kirkuk 

Diffusing the brewing crisis over Kirkuk and the disputed territories will require 

more than the Iraqi political class has to offer at the moment. The United Nations 

efforts need to be bolstered by a separate UNSCR under chapter VII. The resolution 

should not be limited to the disputed geographic boundaries but to the whole package of issues related to extent of Iraqi Kurdistan’s self-determination. This will 

allow for the mobilization of necessary international resources and attention on this 

set of issues, without neglecting Iraq’s other needs. 

A UNSCR resolution under chapter VII is justified by the international nature of 

the problem, involving in addition to Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey and by the real 

threat of contagion it represents. 

It should be possible to persuade the Kurdish leadership of the need of a separate 

U.N. mandate, both as the only realistic way for nonviolent progress on this issue, 

and as a way to legally internationalize their cause. 

The Iraqi Government should also be able to recognize the need for separate, dedicated international attention to the issue, as it is the weakest party in this conflict. 

Another benefit of a separate resolution on Kirkuk is that it offers a path for transition from previous Iraq resolutions. It would allow the rest of Iraq to emerge from 

the chapter VII framework while keeping the most acute issues under international 

responsibility. 

7.2 A transparent and accountable revenue-sharing mechanism 

Resolving the conflict over the oil legislation is a key to unlocking Iraq’s development potential. It can help build trust among Iraqis and provide a blueprint for federalism in other areas. Addressing the issue of oil has a complementary relation to 

efforts aimed at diffusing tensions over Kirkuk. Iraq’s oil, however, merits being 

addressed in its own right as the country’s main source of income. 

One approach for breaking the deadlock on the oil issue would be the establishment of an efficient, transparent and accountable revenue-sharing mechanism: 

(a) Iraq has just declared its commitment to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the KRG commitment to this framework is enshrined 

in the region’s Petroleum Act. EITI could serve as the foundation for building 

trust on the revenues generated by the various parties and the way they are 

managed. 

(b) The next step would be to renew the Development Fund for Iraq’s (DFI) 

arrangement to capture all of Iraq’s oil revenues with a fully empowered international oversight mechanism. The DFI arrangement contained in UNSCR 1483 

expires at the end of 2008. Iraq has expressed interest in renewal which could 

be arranged with the help of International Financial Institutions. 

(c) Third is a revenue-sharing law, which establishes a robust and transparent mechanism, that does not hollow out the budgetary process. Such law 

would combine a formula mechanism that assures the regions of their fair share 

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without rendering meaningless the budgetary process and robbing the Federal 

Government of the ability to set economic policy vested in it by the Constitution. 

These are realistic measures that are in reach of the parties involved, and would 

be much easier to achieve than current efforts to move on the entire hydrocarbon 

package simultaneously. 

Once a modicum of confidence on the management of revenues is established it 

may become easier to exchange concessions on the issue of sector management and 

the role of the private sector. 

7.3 Free, fair and timely elections 

Emerging forces including the Concerned Local Citizens, the bulk of the Sadrists 

observing the cease-fire and the awakening bureaucracy need to be introduced into 

the political process in a meaningful and nonviolent way. 

This necessitates the holding of local elections before the end of this year and national elections in 2009. The elections need to take place under new legislation that 

dispenses with the closed lists, which favor the political parties and their unaccountable bosses. Better assurances against abuse need to be put in place, including a 

more robust Electoral Commission, civil society, and international monitoring. 

The nature of the political structures which would eventually emerge to lead the 

new constituencies, their relationship to the Baath Party and to other centers of 

power will determine both how peaceful the transition, and how authoritarian the 

emerging regime will be. The experience of the surge provides valuable lessons in 

promoting moderation within all groups and isolating the extremists. The nuanced 

approach adopted by General Petraeus toward the insurgents and the Sadrists alike 

needs to be maintained and expanded. 

7.4 New legitimate multilateral framework 

The U.S. role in Iraq needs to transition into a more legitimate and multilateral 

framework. 

This is not only necessary to remove the stigma of the occupation from the U.S. 

forces and the new Iraq, but also offers a path toward disengagement. As a Prince 

Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia once said, ‘‘the withdrawal should not be as illegitimate as the invasion.’’ 

This transition cannot be achieved through the Iraq-U.S. treaty being negotiated 

between two outgoing governments. A treaty of this nature, regardless of its merits, 

will inevitably lack the legitimacy it is meant to confer. It may even further discredit the current government, which few inside and outside Iraq believe capable 

of negotiating with the U.S. on equal footing. 

The UNSCR resolution on Kirkuk proposed above could form the best mechanism 

for transitioning U.S. role in Iraq from the status of occupying forces it acquired 

with the invasion. The mandate will authorize U.S. operation throughout Iraq in 

order to prevent a conflict over Kirkuk which has the potential of engulfing the entire region. Such a mandate would have more legitimacy and appeal to bring more 

international partners on board. 

The experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union does not only 

afford sobering insights into the limits of change in countries emerging from tyranny and the possibility of restoration of—at least part of—the old power structures. 

It also offers hope that over time, old elites will gradually fade from the system, 

opening the way for new leaders who take their countries into the next stage of development. For this to take place, however, two conditions are essential: Peace and 

a functioning mechanism for the succession of power. These are the greatest challenges facing Iraq today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. BIDDLE. Thank you. I’d like to start by highlighting the distinction that Senator Lugar drew a minute ago, between top-down 

and bottom-up approaches to trying to get something that looks 

like tolerable stability in Iraq. 

The top-down approach, emphasizing a national-level deal, in 

which the leaders in Baghdad of Iraq’s Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite 

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ing each other’s needs, and as a result, produce peace and stability 

in the country, has produced very, very slow progress. And I think 

is likely to continue to produce only slow progress in Iraq, because 

of a variety of structural constraints associated with the distribution of political power in the country and the way the government 

is wired together. 

Given this, I think the kind of slow, non-zero, but very slow 

progress we’ve seen in national dealmaking in Iraq, is unlikely to 

accelerate dramatically any time soon. 

By contrast, the bottom-up approach, focusing on local, bilateral, 

piecemeal negotiated cease-fire deals, in which particular former 

combatant factions and especially the United States and to some 

extent the Government of Iraq, reach negotiated agreements, in 

which the parties standdown and observe a variety of other conditions in exchange for, centrally, a promise that neither will attack 

the other, and secondarily, but importantly, a promise that the 

United States will pay the members $300 a person a month, has, 

I think, produced in a remarkably short period of time, a system 

of cease-fires that is largely responsible for the reduction in violence that we saw in 2007, which did not come because we had destroyed the enemy, it did not come because the enemy fled the 

country or because they gave up aspirations to attain their goals 

by force, and instead, agreed to participate in some sort of peaceful 

political process. 

I think centrally the reduction in violence can be attributed to 

the negotiation of the series of cease-fire deals between the former 

combatants. This decentralized, disaggregate, bottom-up approach, 

I think represents far the more promising of the two, in terms of 

avenues by which this country might eventually be stabilized. 

Now, this raises a whole host of important questions and issues. 

I’ll speak briefly about two of them and we can come back to others 

in question and answer. The first is, this system of cease-fires, at 

the moment, is prevalent in western and central Iraq, but is notably absent in the three provinces between Baghdad and Kurdistan, 

Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala. The first challenge we face is 

extending this system of negotiated standdowns from violence into 

the holdout areas in which the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and 

the remaining Sunni insurgent factions who have not stopped fighting are now concentrated. 

There are offensive operations now ongoing in those provinces, 

that are designed to produce this result. It’s not knowable at the 

moment whether this will succeed or not. There is some chance 

that it will, there is no guarantee that it will. 

The second challenge, however, and one that’s been at least as 

widely discussed, is whether or not the system of cease-fires that 

we’ve got at the moment can hold. After all, the people who have 

agreed to these cease-fires, are in many cases, the same people who 

were killing us a year ago. They retain their weapons, they retain 

their organizations, they retain their leaders. In many cases they 

retain their former ambitions and goals. Given this, many people 

have expressed concern that these deals are transient and temporary, will soon collapse and these parties that retain their aspirations to eventually take over control of the country will pursue 

them once again by force after they find themselves in a more 

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advantageous position after the passage of time. And indeed, that’s 

possible. Cease-fire deals of this kind do sometimes collapse in renewed violence, but they don’t always. 

Moreover, the situation is not unique to Iraq. Almost any time 

a civil war anywhere in the world is terminated by a negotiated 

deal, as opposed to the annihilation of the weaker side, the early 

stages of that negotiated deal almost always involve wary, distrustful, well-armed former combatants who retain their ability to go 

back to the war path if they choose, but who are choosing for the 

time being, voluntarily to standdown and not to pursue their 

objectives by violence. Any time a cease-fire—a civil war has ever 

been terminated by a negotiated agreement, it went through a 

phase not unlike the one we now face in Iraq. 

Many of these attempts to negotiate cease-fires fail, some however, succeed. And I would argue that there are at least two key 

requirements for a condition like that we observe in Iraq now, to 

proceed into stability as opposed to proceeding into renewed violence. The first is that it be in these cold, hard strategic selfinterest of the parties themselves to observe a cease-fire, as opposed to pursuing their objectives by force. If it becomes in their 

unilateral self-interest to fight rather than to observe a cease-fire, 

they will do so. 

One of the several reasons why I think there’s some reason to 

hope that the system of cease-fires we observe in Iraq today might 

be stable, is that since the middle of 2006, the underlying selfinterested strategic landscape of Iraq has changed dramatically, as 

a result in large part of happy accidents, especially a series of mistakes by our Sunni—former Sunni and al-Qaeda enemies, especially the bombing of the Samara Mosque in February of 2006, and 

the subsequent Sunni defeat in the sectarian battle of Baghdad 

that followed the mosque bombing, which has dramatically changed 

Sunnis expectations for who would win an all-out war between 

Sunni and Shia in Iraq if the United States were to leave. 

Secondarily, the mistake made by our al-Qaeda in Iraq enemies, 

whose extraordinary brutality has alienated their coreligionists, in 

the form of more secular Sunni insurgent groups. These two conditions taken together, significantly change the Sunni community’s 

interest in cease-fire, as opposed to fighting. We then followed with 

some astute policy decisions, largely by accident, but nonetheless 

astute, in the form of the surge, which provided the combat 

strength to exploit the information that realigned Sunnis were willing to provide on the location of al-Qaeda in Iraq, terrorist cells, 

bombmaking factories, safe houses, and other assets, and which 

then provided the wherewithal to protect the Sunnis who had realigned from the al-Qaeda and Iraq counterattack that unsurprisingly and inevitably followed from their realignment. 

These three developments, two mistakes by our enemies and the 

availability of protection from the United States, has substantially 

changed the self-interest of Iraq’s Sunnis from warfare into ceasefire. The changing strategic calculus of Iraqi Sunnis, then changed 

the strategic calculus of Iraqi Shiites, and especially Muqtada 

al-Sadr’s Jayish al-Mahdi. In the interest of time I won’t articulate 

and detail here, although it’s done in my written statement. The 

particular strategic calculus that Shiite militias and especially 

115 

Jayish al-Mahdi have followed, suffice to say for the time being, 

that Muqtada al-Sadr declared a cease-fire, not out of altruism, it’s 

because he needed it, and because he found it in his unilateral selfinterest to do so. 

So for the first time, I would argue, in Iraq today, the strategic 

landscape is such that the key parties have a self-interested desire 

in cease-fire, as opposed to warfare. 

The second requirement for going from an unstable transition 

moment to the kind we see now, to something that looks like persistent stability in the midst of a civil war, is an outside party to 

act as a peacekeeping force, to police and stabilize the deals that 

have been reached. The locals don’t trust each other with guns, 

that’s the reason we’ve had a cease-fire in Iraq. For that reason, 

Iraqi military forces left to their own devices, whether they be subnational or whether they be the Iraqi Security Forces in the hands 

of the Maliki government, are not sufficient to produce stability in 

the country. 

Some third party, who may not be loved by anyone in Iraq, and 

in fact we’re not, but who’s at least not suspected by anyone in Iraq 

of harboring aims for genocidal violence against them if they were 

to get too much power in the country, needs to be present in order 

to reduce the incentives of all the players to respond to spoiler violence with an escalation in the intensity of the killings, and instead, be willing to wait it out, go slow, damp escalatory spirals, 

and wait to see if the outsider will instead take action. 

For the time being, and probably for several years, the only party 

who’s capable of playing that role in Iraq is the United States. If 

we manage to extend the system of cease-fires, our role in Iraq 

could change from that of war fighters in a raging counterinsurgency, to that of peacekeepers in a situation that looks more like 

Bosnia, and less like Vietnam. But some presence by an outside 

stabilizer is probably necessary for a long time, in order to prevent 

this system of not inherently stable cease-fires from returning to 

active violence. 

If we do this, the result is not going to be Eden on the Euphrates. A stabilized Iraq, along this model, would look a lot more like 

Bosnia or Kosovo, and a lot less like cold war Germany or Japan. 

This is not what the administration had in mind when it launched 

the invasion of Iraq, and it’s a long, long way from an ideal prognosis, or an ideal set of prescriptions for that part of the world. 

But, I would argue, it offers at least the possibility—not a guarantee, but a reasonable possibility—that it could stop the violence, 

that it could save the lives of potentially tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis, who would otherwise die violent and brutal deaths in 

an escalation of violence if stability fails to obtain in Iraq, and I 

think it offers some chance of securing America’s remaining vital 

national strategic interest in this conflict, which is that it not 

spread elsewhere in a part of the world that’s terribly important 

to U.S. strategic interests, and become a regionwide war in the 

Mideast. 

Now again, that’s a long way from something that we would have 

sought back in 2003, but I would argue, it’s also a long way from 

the perfectly plausible worst-case scenario that we could obtain if 

the United States eventually leaves behind an unstable Iraq. ReaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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1 I address withdrawal alternatives and their consequences in greater detail in ‘‘Evaluating 

Options for Partial Withdrawals From Iraq,’’ testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, First 

Session, 110th Congress, July 25, 2007. 

sonable people can differ, given the costs and the risks of this program, but I would argue that it may, at least, offer the least bad 

of the various ways forward available to us in Iraq in 2008. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Biddle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE, SENIOR FELLOW FOR DEFENSE

POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC 

What will happen to Iraq as the recent surge in U.S. troop strength subsides? Violence fell in late 2007; will this trend continue, or was this merely a temporary lull 

created by an unsustainable U.S. troop presence? The last week saw a major spike 

in fighting as the Maliki government launched an offensive against militia fighters 

in Basra; is this a harbinger of future violence? And what do the answers imply for 

the U.S. posture in Iraq? Should we extend the ongoing troop reductions? Or should 

these be slowed or even reversed? 

In fact the violence reduction was more than just a temporary lull. It reflected 

a systematic shift in the underlying strategic landscape of Iraq, and could offer the 

basis for sustainable stability if we respond appropriately. 

But this will not yield Eden on the Euphrates. A stabilized Iraq is likely to look 

more like Bosnia or Kosovo than Germany or Japan. And like Bosnia and Kosovo, 

a substantial outside presence will be needed for many years to keep such a peace. 

If U.S. withdrawals leave us unable to provide the needed outside presence, the 

result could be a rapid return to 2006-scale violence or worse. Nor can we afford 

to hold out for a less Balkanized Iraq that could control its own territory without 

us in the near term: Pushing too hard too soon for the ideal of a strong, internally 

unified Iraqi state can easily undermine the prospects for a lesser but more achievable goal of stability per se. 

This is because the violence reduction of 2007 was obtained from the bottom up, 

not from the top down. Instead of a national political deal, the military defeat or 

disarmament of the enemy, or their conversion into peaceful politicians in a reconciled, pluralist society, violence fell because most of the former combatants 

reached separate, local, voluntary decisions to stop fighting even though they retained their arms, their organizations, their leaders, and often their ambitions. 

These decisions were not accidental or ephemeral—they reflected the post-2006 strategic reality of Iraq, which for the first time gave all the major combatants a powerful self-interest in cease-fire rather than combat. This new self-interest in cease-fire 

creates an important opportunity for stability. But the decentralized, voluntary nature of these cease-fires means that peace would be fragile and would need careful 

and persistent U.S. management to keep it from collapsing, especially early on. The 

required U.S. presence would change from war fighting into peacekeeping, and U.S. 

casualties would fall accordingly. But a continued presence by a substantial outside 

force would be essential for many years to keep a patchwork quilt of wary former 

enemies from turning on one another—if we try to exploit the violence reduction to 

take a peace dividend by bringing American troops home too quickly, the cease-fire 

deals we have reached would likely collapse. And if we try to replace this patchwork 

quilt of local cease-fire deals with a strong central government that could monopolize violence in Iraq and allow us to leave, the result is much more likely to be the 

collapse of today’s cease-fires without any effective central government to put in 

their place. 

This is not what the administration had in mind when it invaded Iraq. Reasonable people could judge the costs too high and the risks too great. But an Iraq stabilized from the bottom up in this way nevertheless offers a meaningful chance to 

stop the fighting, to save the lives of untold thousands of innocent Iraqis who would 

otherwise die brutal, violent deaths, and to secure America’s remaining vital strategic interest in this conflict: That it not spread to engulf the entire Middle East 

in a regionwide war. No options for Iraq are attractive.1 But given the alternatives, 

stabilization from the bottom up may be the least bad option for U.S. policy in 2008. 

I advance this case in four steps. First, I assess the causes of the recent decline 

in violence, and attribute this to a series of voluntary local cease-fires—not national 

political reconciliation, the destruction or elimination of the enemy, an exhaustion 

of violence potential as a result of sectarian cleansing, or improvements in Iraqi 

Government forces. Second, I discuss the chances for these cease-fires to hold. If vioVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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lence is down because the combatants have chosen to stop fighting, will they choose 

otherwise when the surge brigades come home? I argue that while voluntary ceasefires are inherently reversible, they do not always collapse. The new strategic landscape in Iraq creates an opportunity for a lasting cease-fire that outlives the surge, 

but does not guarantee this by itself. Third, I argue that to realize this opportunity 

requires a continuing military presence by an outside peacekeeper. This does not 

mean open-ended war fighting or the U.S. casualties that go with it, and it may not 

require the surge’s troop count. But peacekeeping is labor intensive nevertheless— 

and the right posture for stability maintenance in Iraq is thus the largest force we 

can sustain in steady state for an extended stay. Finally, I assess the alternative 

of strengthening the Iraqi state to enable it to monopolize violence, control its own 

territory, and replace U.S. or other foreign troops with Iraqi security forces. I argue 

that for the foreseeable future, any attempt to replace local cease-fires with centralized state security is far likelier to destroy the gains bought at such cost in 2007. 

Iraq may eventually mature into a workable federal state. But this is a generational 

goal, not an immediate one. For a long time to come, stability in Iraq will require 

settling for what we can get, not holding out for what we once sought. 

I. WHY DID VIOLENCE DECLINE?

The original idea behind the surge was to reduce the violence in Baghdad in order 

to enable Iraqis to negotiate the kind of national power-sharing deal we thought 

would be necessary to stabilize the country. Chaos in the capital, it was thought, 

made negotiated compromise impossible; by deploying more U.S. troops to the city 

and assigning them the mission of direct population security, it was hoped that a 

safe space could be created within which the national leaders of Iraq’s Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds could afford to take the risks inherent in compromise. 

The violence came down, but the compromise did not follow. Although some slow, 

grudging political progress has been made, the pace has lagged far behind the original intentions of the surge’s designers. Many, prominently including the Democratic 

leadership on Capitol Hill, were prepared to declare the surge a failure given its 

inability to produce the reconciliation deal that was the whole point originally. 

In the meantime, however, a completely different possibility arose—one that was 

neither planned nor anticipated nor intended when the surge was designed, but 

which has nevertheless become central to the prospects for stability in Iraq. This 

‘‘Anbar Model’’ or ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach began with a group of Sunni tribal Sheiks 

in Anbar Province, then quickly spread to Sunnis elsewhere in Iraq and now to 

many Shiites as well. 

This model is built not around a national compact, but instead a series of bilateral 

contractual agreements in which particular groups of local Iraqis agree not to fight 

the United States or the Government of Iraq, and to turn their arms instead on 

common enemies—initially al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and increasingly rogue Shiite 

militias as well. These local groups further agree to wear distinguishing uniforms, 

to patrol their home districts, to limit their activities to those home districts, and 

to provide coalition forces and the Iraqi Government with biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and retinal scans), names, and home addresses for all members. In 

exchange they receive recognition as legitimate security providers in their districts, 

a pledge that they will not be fired upon by U.S. or Iraqi Government forces as long 

as they observe their end of the agreement, and a U.S.-provided salary of $300 per 

member per month. (They do not, however, receive arms or ammunition from the 

United States—we are not ‘‘arming the Sunnis,’’ as many have alleged. Cease-fire 

participants use their own weapons and ammunition, of which they have plenty 

without our help.) 

The parties to these local cease-fire deals have been variously termed ‘‘Awakening 

Councils,’’ ‘‘Sons of Iraq’’ (SOI), or ‘‘Concerned Local Citizen’’ (CLC) groups. As of 

March 2008, membership in these CLC organizations had grown from a baseline of 

essentially zero in early 2007 to more than 95,000 Iraqis under more than 200 such 

contracts across much of western and central Iraq. By way of comparison, the entire 

active strength of the British Army worldwide is about 100,000—the growth in CLC 

membership in just a few months has been truly extraordinary. 

For now, the CLC groups are disproportionately, though not exclusively, Sunni 

(about 80 percent of CLC members were Sunnis in January 2008). Many of the principal Shiite combatants, however, are observing their own cease-fires. In particular, 

Muqtada al-Sadr directed his Jayish al-Mahdi (JAM), or ‘‘Mahdi Army’’ militia to 

stand down from combat operations following an altercation with the rival Shiite 

Badr Brigade in Karbala in August 2007. 

The result is that as of early 2008, most of the major combatants on both the 

Sunni and Shiite side were all observing voluntary cease-fires. 

118 

One would expect this rapid spread of local cease-fires to have an important effect 

in reducing violence in Iraq, and indeed it did. In fact it has been largely responsible 

for the dramatic reduction in violence by late 2007. In effect, most of the combatant 

factions that had been fighting the Americans and the government voluntarily 

agreed to stop. Moreover, the remaining hardcore AQI and rogue militia holdouts 

had been seriously disadvantaged by the defection of their erstwhile allies: Without 

the safe houses, financial support, intelligence and concealment provided by their 

coreligionists, AQI and militia rogues were exposed to U.S. firepower in ways they 

had not been previously. Guerillas survive by stealth—their key defense from 

destruction by better-armed government forces is the government’s inability to distinguish fighters from innocent civilians. When their former allies agreed to finger 

holdout guerillas for U.S. engagement, AQI’s military position in western and central Iraq thus became largely untenable and they were forced to withdraw into the 

limited areas of Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Ninawa provinces where CLC deals had 

not yet been reached. The net result was a dramatic reduction in opposition, a dramatic reduction in the number of enemy-initiated attacks, and a corresponding reduction in U.S. casualties, Iraqi civilian deaths, and ISF losses. 

The violence reduction was not, by contrast, caused by our killing the enemy or 

driving them out of Iraq. AQI’s casualties were heavy in 2007, but AQI was never 

the bulk of the Sunni combatant strength, and violence in 2006 was increasingly 

attributable to Shiite militia activity. Neither of the latter has suffered nearly 

enough losses to explain a radical reduction in violence, nor have many such combatants fled the country. 

Nor is the violence reduction attributable to sectarian cleansing. Many have 

argued that violence fell because there was no one left to kill: Baghdad’s once-mixed 

neighborhoods are now purely Shiite, they claim, removing the casus belli that once 

drove the violence. Yet significant Sunni populations remain in Baghdad—many 

fewer than in 2005, but significant all the same. More important, the relative incidence of mixed and pure, or Sunni and Shiite, neighborhoods in Baghdad correlates 

very poorly with the scale of sectarian violence. The killing has always been concentrated at the frontiers between Shiite and Sunni districts, where, typically, Shiite militia fought to expand their control and Sunni insurgents fought to hold them 

off. As this unfolded, Sunnis were often forced out and city blocks would fall under 

Shiite control, but this simply moved the frontier to the next block, where the battle 

continued unabated. Cleansing thus moved the violence, but it did not reduce it. 

This can be seen in the casualty statistics for 2006, which hardly fell as the city’s 

Sunni population shrank: All estimates show increasing civilian fatalities over the 

course of 2006, not the opposite. The only way this cleansing process could explain 

a radical drop in violence is if the frontiers disappeared as a result of Sunni extinction in Baghdad—but this has not occurred. And it is far from clear that even a 

total Sunni eviction from Baghdad would end the violence: The frontier would simply move on to the ‘‘Baghdad Belts,’’ the ring of heavily Sunni towns and suburbs 

that surround the city. In fact this had already started in 2006–07: Both Sunni and 

Shiite combatants maneuvered extensively to improve their positions for continued 

warfare beyond the city by contesting control of key outlying towns. The violence 

did not simply run its course and ebb for lack of interest; regrettably, there remains 

an enormous potential for continued sectarian bloodletting in Iraq. 

Nor is the violence reduction attributable to improvements in Iraqi Government 

security forces. The ISF is better than it was, but its leadership, training, equipment, and logistics remain very uneven. Its key shortcoming, however, remains its 

politics rather than its proficiency. Predominantly Shiite or Kurdish ISF units are 

often distrusted by Sunnis and have great difficulty functioning effectively in their 

neighborhoods. Even Shiite ISF formations can have difficulty functioning in Shiite 

neighborhoods controlled by rival Shiite factions, as the recent fighting in Basra 

demonstrates. A few ISF units have established a reputation for even-handedness 

and can in principle act as nationalist defenders of all, but too few to secure the 

country. Much of the ISF, in effect, thus operates as the CLCs do: They defend their 

own. Local communities, whether Sunni or Shiite, accept defense by coreligionists 

they trust, but not by others—hence Iraq today is increasingly a patchwork of selfdefending sectarian enclaves, warily observing the others but for now declining to 

use violence as long as they are left alone. 

II. CAN THE CEASE-FIRES HOLD?

Of course, a voluntary decision to stop fighting can be reversed. CLC members 

retain their weapons. Many are essentially the same units, under the same leaders, 

that fought coalition forces until agreeing to stop in 2007. Many retain fond hopes 

to realize their former ambitions and seize control of the country eventually. The 

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JAM has mostly stood down but not demobilized; they, too, could return to the 

streets. Many have thus argued that these cease-fire deals could easily collapse. And 

indeed they could. 

But this is not unusual for cease-fires meant to end communal civil wars such as 

Iraq’s. These typically involve very distrustful parties; they often begin with former 

combatants agreeing to cease-fires but retaining their arms; and they are always at 

risk of renewed violence. Many fail under these pressures. But some succeed: In 

Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, for example, 

cease-fires of this kind have held and led to persistent quiet, if not warmth or deep 

reconciliation, between the former warring parties. 

At least two requirements are needed to translate fragile deals into persistent stability. First, peace has to be in the perceived strategic self-interest of all parties. 

If one or several see warfare as superior to cease-fire, then any deal is temporary 

and will collapse at a more tactically opportune moment. 

Until recently, Iraq failed this criterion. Sunnis feared Shiite domination, but believed they were stronger militarily than the Shiites; if only Sunnis could drive the 

Americans out, then a weak Shiite regime would collapse without its U.S. protectors 

and Sunnis could seize control. Hence fighting made sense for them. Shiites, by contrast, feared a Sunni restoration and saw warfare against Sunni insurgents as necessary to avert a takeover. Initially most Shiites were willing to let the government 

and its American allies wage this war for them. Eventually, however, they began 

to lose faith in either actor’s ability to protect them, and thus turned to Shiite militias to wage war against the Sunnis on their behalf. Militia warfare offered Shiite 

civilians protection against Sunni violence. Fighting also offered Shiite militia leaders—and especially Muqtada al-Sadr—a power base they could not obtain otherwise, 

and a possible route to political control via military victory over the Sunnis, and 

eventually, over the Americans (who opposed Shiite warlord autocracy in favor of 

an unacceptable multisectarian compromise with the rival Sunnis). Shiites, too, thus 

preferred warfare. 

Events in 2006 and early 2007, however, changed this strategic calculus fundamentally for both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. The key to this was the 

Sunni’s military defeat in the sectarian Battle of Baghdad that followed the 

Askariya Mosque bombing of February 2006. Until that time, Shiite militias had 

fought mostly defensively and often stood on the sidelines in Sunni-U.S. combat. But 

when AQI destroyed the shrine, the Shiite militias entered the war in force and on 

the offensive. The result was a year-long wave of sectarian violence in Baghdad 

pitting Sunni insurgent factions and their AQI allies against, especially, Muqtada 

al-Sadr’s Jayish al-Mahdi. At the time, this wave of bloodshed was seen as a disaster—and in humanitarian terms it clearly was. The United States tried to stop 

it. But in retrospect, it may prove to have been the critical enabler of a later wave 

of cease-fires by changing fundamentally the Sunni strategic calculus in Iraq. 

Before the mosque bombing, Sunnis could believe they were the stronger side and 

would win an eventual all-out war. The Battle of Baghdad, however, provided a window into what such a war would mean for Sunnis, and they did not like what they 

saw. To Sunnis’ surprise and dismay, the battle produced a decisive Sunni defeat: 

What had once been a mixed-sect city became a predominantly Shiite one as the 

JAM progressively drove the Sunnis out and shrank their remaining strongholds in 

the capital. With the Americans playing no decisive role, Shiites overwhelmed Sunni 

combatants in neighborhood after neighborhood. Sunnis who had harbored fond 

hopes of ruling the country by defeating the Shia in open warfare were now unable 

to call relatives in traditional Sunni strongholds because the JAM had driven them 

from their homes and replaced them with Shiite squatters. Neighborhoods that had 

been Sunni homeland for generations were now off limits, populated with and 

defended by their rivals. In a head-to-head fight, the Sunnis had been beaten by 

Shiite militias they had assumed they could dominate. 

A second major development was a series of strategic errors by AQI. Americans 

have no monopoly on error in Iraq, and AQI’s leadership seriously overplayed their 

hand in 2006. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is exceptionally violent, and not only against Shiites 

and Americans. Fellow Sunnis whom AQI’s leadership felt were not sufficiently 

devout or committed were also targeted with extraordinary brutality—including 

delivery of children’s severed heads to the doorsteps of Sunni Sheiks who failed to 

follow AQI preferences. The smuggling networks that many Sunni Sheiks in Anbar 

province had relied upon for generations to fund tribal patronage networks were appropriated by AQI for its own use. Before the Battle of Baghdad, most Sunnis tolerated these costs on the assumption that AQI’s combat value against Shiites and 

Americans outweighed their disadvantages. As defeat in Baghdad became clearer, 

however, it also became clear that AQI could not deliver real protection. By late 

2006 AQI’s inability to prevent defeat in Baghdad and the costs it imposed on coreliVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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gionists had thus convinced many Sunnis that they needed to look for new allies. 

And the only possible choice was the United States. 

At the same time, the surge made this realignment with the United States much 

easier and safer. Americans had sought political accommodation with Sunni insurgents for years; attempted openings to Sunni leaders had been a major component 

of U.S. policy throughout Zalmay Khalilzad’s tenure as Ambassador, when the U.S. 

tried to broker compromise from both sides. These efforts made little headway, however, with a Sunni leadership that expected to rule Iraq if it instead held out and 

won the ensuing war. By 2007, however, Sunnis had become much more interested 

in American protection. And with the surge, Americans had more protection to offer. 

Any Sunni contemplating realignment against their nominal AQI allies surely realized that a massive AQI counterattack awaited them—no organization with AQI’s 

reputation for brutality would stand back and watch while its allies changed sides 

and betrayed them. And, in fact, the initial wave of Sunni tribal disaffection in 

Anbar was met with an immediate campaign of bombings and assassinations from 

AQI against the leaders and foot soldiers of the rebel tribes. Previous rumblings of 

Sunni tribal disaffection with AQI in Anbar had been reversed by such counterattacks. Now, however, the rebel tribes approached American forces whose strength 

in Anbar and Baghdad was growing, and whose mission was changing to emphasize 

direct U.S. provision of population security through aggressive patrolling and persistent combat presence (as opposed to the previous mission of limiting U.S. exposure while training Iraqis to take over the fighting). After much initial wariness, 

the Americans decided to support this realignment and joined forces with the tribes 

against AQI in Anbar. With American firepower connected to Sunni tribal knowledge of who and where to strike, the ensuing campaign decimated AQI and led to 

their virtual eviction from Anbar province. The result was a provincewide cease-fire 

under the auspices of the Anbar Awakening Council and the U.S. military. 

This outcome provided a model for similar cease-fires elsewhere. Sunnis outside 

Anbar understood their Baghdad defeat’s military implications at least as well as 

the western Sheiks had. As the arrival of U.S. surge brigades and their extension 

of American security capabilities made it possible, more and more local Sunni leaders thus opted to standdown from combat against the Americans and to make common cause with them instead, enabling their new allies to hunt down AQI 

operatives, safe houses, and bomb factories. The result was a powerful synergy: The 

prospect of U.S. security emboldened already-motivated Sunnis to realign with the 

U.S.; Sunni realignment as CLCs enhanced U.S. lethality against AQI; U.S. defeat 

of local AQI cells protected realigned Sunni CLCs; local CLC cease-fires with the 

Americans reduced U.S. casualties and freed U.S. forces to venture outward from 

Baghdad into the surrounding areas to keep AQI off balance and on the run. 

Cease-fires with Sunnis in turn facilitated cease-fires with key Shiite militias. 

These militias began largely as self-defense mechanisms to protect Shiite civilians 

from Sunni attack. But as Sunni insurgents ceased offensive operations and as AQI 

weakened, the need for such defenders waned and the JAM in particular found its 

support base among Shiite civilians weakening. This loss of support was exacerbated by the growing criminality of many militia members, who had exploited their 

supporters’ dependency by preying on them with gangland control of key commodities such as cooking fuel and gasoline for economic extortion. Rising criminality in 

turn created fissiparous tendencies within the militias, as factions with their own 

income sources grew increasingly independent of the leadership and Sadr in particular. Meanwhile the American military presence was strengthening with the 

arrival of the surge brigades in Sadr’s home base of Baghdad, and those Americans 

were increasingly freed of the need to fight Sunnis by the growth of local cease-fires, 

posing an increasing threat to JAM military control in the capital. 

Taken together, this created multiple perils for Muqtada al-Sadr. In previous firefights with the Americans, he had sustained heavy losses but easily made them up 

with new recruits given his popularity. But Shiites’ growing disaffection with his increasingly wayward militia, coupled with declining fear of Sunni attack, threatened 

his ability to make up losses with new recruitment. At the same time, tensions with 

other Shiite militias, especially the Badr Brigade in southern Iraq where JAM was 

weaker but where much of Iraq’s oil wealth was concentrated, posed a threat from 

a different direction, and his weakening control over rogue elements created a danger of the organization gradually slipping out of his hands. When Shiites were unified by a mortal threat from Sunni attack and the Americans were tied down with 

insurgents and AQI, these internal problems could be managed and Sadr could 

afford to keep the JAM in the field and killing Sunnis and Americans. But as the 

Sunni threat waned, Shiite support weakened, the JAM splintered, and the Americans strengthened, Sadr’s ability to tolerate a new battle with the U.S. Army was 

thus progressively diminished. Of course, Sadr is notoriously hard to read, and it 

121 

is impossible to know exactly why he does what he does. But at least one plausible 

hypothesis is that the effect of Sunni cease-fires added to other mounting internal 

pressures to persuade Sadr that he had to standdown himself rather than taking 

another beating from the Americans. Hence the new circumstances drove the JAM, 

too, to observe a cease-fire. 

The result was a major change in incentives for both the Sunni insurgency and 

the key Shiite militia. Of course, this decline in violence is still far from a nationwide cease-fire—hard fighting remains, especially in parts of Diyala, Salah ad-Din, 

and Ninawa provinces where AQI’s remnants have taken refuge and where the CLC 

movement is still taking shape. But if the strategic logic described above holds, then 

there is at least a chance that the local cease-fires of January 2008 could continue 

to expand to cover the remaining holdouts. This does not mean sectarian harmony 

or brotherly affection in Iraq. But it does mean that cold, hard strategic reality increasingly makes acting on hatred too costly for most Sunni insurgents and Shiite 

militias—which has translated into a rapid spread of local cease-fires in accordance 

with the new interest calculus. 

Yet this has not produced national reconciliation among Iraq’s elected representatives in the capital. Why not? 

In time it may. For now, however, the Maliki government’s incentives differ from 

Muqtada al-Sadr’s. Sadr needs peace to avoid further deterioration in his internal 

position and to avert casualties he cannot replace in a costly battle with the Americans. Maliki, by contrast, is not fighting the Americans—the surge is no threat to 

him. On the contrary, U.S. reinforcements and weaker Sunni opposition reduce the 

cost of continued warfare for Maliki’s ISF. For Maliki, moreover, peace is politically 

and militarily riskier than war. Reconciliation along American lines requires dangerous and politically painful compromises with rival Sunnis: Oil revenue-sharing 

with Sunni provinces, hiring of former Baathists, Anbari political empowerment, 

and other initiatives that Maliki’s Shiite allies dislike, and which Maliki fears will 

merely strengthen his sectarian enemies militarily. A predominantly Sunni CLC 

movement adds to these fears. Sadr needs peace because war now risks his political 

status; Maliki, conversely, runs greater risks by compromising for peace than by 

standing fast and allowing the war to continue. Thus the Shiite government makes 

little progress toward peace even as Shiite militias standdown in cease-fires. 

Worse, Maliki may have an incentive to overturn pledged cease-fires in order to 

seek political advantage against internal rivals. For most of his tenure, Maliki had 

been dependent on the Sadrist movement for his legislative majority. Recently, however, Maliki has realigned with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s competing Shiite Islamic 

Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). ISCI has been competing with Sadrists for control 

of the Shiite south, and especially the oil production and export centers around 

Basra and Umm Qasr. ISCI now controls much of the local government and police 

there, but Sadrist gains among the region’s dispossessed Shiite poor threaten this 

control, and the upcoming provincial elections scheduled for this fall could realign 

power in the south to Sadr’s benefit and Hakim’s disadvantage. Maliki now enjoys 

an unusual freedom of maneuver for his ISF by virtue of the combination of Sunni 

cease-fires and U.S. surge brigades. This offers him a potential window of opportunity to use the ISF to weaken Sadr in the south under the guise of suppressing 

illegal militias. By pressing an offensive against JAM elements in Basra now, Maliki 

has a chance to kill or arrest Sadrist gunmen who might otherwise be available to 

intimidate voters in the fall, arrest Sadrist officials, ransack Sadrist offices, and intimidate potential Sadrist voters. The ISF offensive in Basra that began on March 

25 may well have sprung from such motives, though its apparent failure suggests 

that the government’s ability to achieve such ends is very limited. Of course, events 

in Basra are ongoing and too little is yet known to establish with any confidence 

just what is happening or why; I discuss the possibilities in more detail in section 

IV below. But there is reason for concern that the Maliki government may now have 

less interest in cease-fire than its opponents do. If so, it is imperative that the 

United States act to prevent the Government of Iraq from overturning cease-fires 

without being able to replace them with real security of its own (see section IV). 

And either way, the government has limited incentives to pursue costly, risky programs for national-level reconciliation via compromise. 

This is not to deny any progress by the government. It has been distributing revenue to Sunni provinces even without a Hydrocarbon Law to require this. It recently 

passed a new de-Baathification law making it easier to hire Sunnis into some 

government jobs, and had been doing such hiring anyway even without a legal mandate. The result has been a modest degree of grudging movement toward compromise. Perhaps this will eventually produce an accommodation sufficient to resolve Iraq’s communal differences politically. 

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But it is also entirely possible that the near to mid-term future could see a weak 

central government unable to monopolize violence, control its territory, or do much 

more than distribute oil revenue while the real dynamic of Iraqi security devolves 

to localities, where a patchwork quilt of local cease-fires in response to the shifting 

incentives of combatants in the field meanwhile produces an end to the fighting— 

for a time. 

III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

This brings me to the second requirement needed for cease-fires to hold long 

enough to end communal civil wars. An outside party is typically needed to serve 

as a peacekeeper to enforce the deals. 

This is because such deals are neither self-enforcing nor inherently stable. Even 

where peace is in the mutual self-interest of the majority on both sides, there will 

still be spoilers who will seek to overturn the cease-fire and renew the war. Rogue 

elements of Shiite militias, for example, profit from the fighting and will seek to restore the instability within which they flourish. And AQI has no interest whatever 

in stability. Though hurt badly and on the ropes in Iraq, AQI is not annihilated and 

even small numbers of committed terrorists can still bomb selected marketplaces or 

public gatherings. 

Such spoilers hope to catalyze wider violence by spurring the victims to take matters into their own hands and retaliate against the historical rivals that many will 

blame for such attacks. In an environment of wary, tentative, edgy peace between 

well-armed and distrustful former combatants, even a few such attacks can lead to 

an escalatory spiral that quickly returns the country to mass violence and destroys 

any chance of stability. 

Alternatively, the central parties to the cease-fire may try to expand their area 

of control at the expense of neighboring CLCs or militia districts. Ambitious Sunnis 

with dreams of Baathist restoration may use the lull to build strength, probe their 

rivals for weakness, then launch a new offensive if they discover a vulnerability. 

Shiite militia leaders unsatisfied with a limited role in a weak government could 

push the limits of their accepted status at the expense of Sunnis or rival Shiite 

warlords. 

In this context, outside peacekeepers play a crucial role in damping escalatory spirals and enforcing cease-fire terms. As long as the underlying strategic calculus 

favors peace, then an outside military presence allows victims of spoiler attacks to 

wait rather than retaliating—they can afford to delay and see whether the Americans will take action against the perpetrators rather than jumping to immediate violence themselves. This enables their historical rivals, in turn, to stand back from 

preempting them the first time a bombing takes place. The peacekeepers’ ability to 

enable victims to wait and see thus reduces the virulence of the escalatory dynamic 

in the aftermath of the inevitable bombings and terrorist strikes. 

Similarly, if CLC leaders and militia commanders know that a U.S. combat brigade is going to enter their district and arrest any leader whose followers violate 

the terms of the agreed cease-fire—and if the provision of biometric data and locating information for all CLC members means that the Americans know who the violators are and where to find them—then the underlying mutual interest in ceasefire is less likely to be tested. And if the victims of a rival’s expansion know they 

can call on a U.S. combat brigade to penalize their assailants they will be less prone 

to retaliate themselves and incur the cost of unnecessary fighting and casualties to 

their own followers. 

This is not war fighting. It does require troops who can fight if they have to. And 

some fighting would be needed, especially early on, to punish spoilers and cease-fire 

violators and thereby to discourage further violence. But success in this mission 

means that the parties quickly understand that continued wary tolerance suits their 

interests better than renewed warfare, making the foreigners’ role one of maintaining a cease-fire rather than waging a war. Soldiers are needed—but the casualty 

toll of combat should not be. 

Peacekeeping of this kind is, however, labor-intensive, long term, and would 

almost certainly have to be a U.S. undertaking, especially in the early years of a 

cease-fire. We are the only plausible candidate for this role for now—no one else is 

lining up to don a blue helmet and serve in a U.N. mission in Iraq. We are not 

widely loved by Iraqis; among the few things all Iraqi subcommunities now share 

is a dislike for the American occupation. Yet we are the only party to today’s conflict 

that no other party sees as a threat of genocide—we may not be loved, but we are 

tolerated across Iraq today in a way that is unique among the parties. Nor are Iraqi 

attitudes toward Americans fixed or permanent: Sunni views of the U.S. role, for 

example, have changed dramatically in less than a year. Marine patrols in Falluja 

123 

that would have been ambushed a year ago are now met with kids mugging for 

photos from marines carrying lollipops along with their rifles. Of course, what goes 

up can come down; attitudes that change quickly for the better can change just as 

quickly for the worse, and one should not misinterpret friendly words in English for 

real attitudes expressed only to intimates in Arabic. But it is at least possible nevertheless that the United States could play this role, whereas it is very unlikely that 

any internal party within Iraq could. And it is just as unlikely that any international actor other than the United States will agree to do so any time soon. 

Whoever does this is going to have to do so for a long time: Perhaps 20 years— 

until a new generation, which has not been scarred by the experience of sectarian 

bloodletting, rises to leadership age in Iraq. A U.S. role will clearly be important 

for at least part of this time, but it may not be necessary for the United States to 

do this alone the entire time. If 2–3 years of apparent stability makes it clear that 

the Iraq mission really has become peacekeeping rather than war fighting then it 

is entirely plausible that others might be willing to step in and lighten the American load, especially if they can do so under a U.N. or other multinational banner 

rather than a bilateral agreement with the United States or the Government of 

Iraq. So we need not assume a 20-year U.S. responsibility alone. But a long-term 

presence by outsiders of some kind will be needed. And it would be imprudent to 

assume that we can turn this over to others immediately. 

The number of troops required could be large. The social science of peacekeeping 

troop requirements is underdeveloped, but the common rules of thumb for troop adequacy in this role are similar to those used for counterinsurgency: Around one capable combatant per 50 civilians. For a country the size of Iraq, that would mean an 

ideal force of around 500,000 peacekeepers—which is obviously impossible. But 

some such missions have been accomplished with much smaller forces. In Liberia, 

for example, 15,000 U.N. troops stabilized a cease-fire in a country of 4 million; in 

Sierra Leone, 20,000 U.N. troops sufficed in a country of 6 million. It would be a 

mistake to assume that such small forces can always succeed in a potentially very 

demanding mission; but it would also be a mistake to assume that because the 

United States cannot meet the rule-of-thumb troop count that the mission is hopeless. 

Some now hope that lesser measures will suffice to stabilize Iraq’s cease-fires. The 

U.S. leadership in Baghdad, for example, hopes that it can create a financial incentive for CLCs to behave by making them Iraqi Government employees with the 

Maliki regime paying their salaries. The regime, however, is resisting this, and it 

is far from clear that Sunni CLC leaders would trust Maliki to pay them if the U.S. 

withdrew most of its troops. Nor would this solve the problem anyway: Spoiler violence is inevitable even if the CLCs behave themselves, and without U.S. troops in 

sufficient force to respond effectively such attacks would be dangerously destabilizing. 

Perhaps financial incentives alone will suffice all the same; certainly they would 

help. But to rely on them in the absence of a robust peacekeeping presence would 

be very risky. The strongest assumption is thus that more is better when it comes 

to the post-surge U.S. troop posture: The larger and the longer term the peacekeeping presence, the greater the odds of success; the smaller and the shorter term 

the presence, the weaker the odds. And this in turn means that if the United States 

reduces its troop levels in Iraq too quickly or too deeply, the result could be to endanger the stability prospects that have been bought at such cost in lives and treasure. We cannot afford to keep enough troops in Iraq to provide the ideal peacekeeping force. But to leave Iraq without an outside power to enforce the terms of 

the deals we have reached is to make it very likely that those deals will collapse 

in the face of inevitable spoiler violence, ambition, and fear. The right troop count 

depends on the technical details of just what the United States can sustain in Iraq 

given the demands of equipment repair, recapitalization, troop rest, retention, and 

recruitment. But the right number is the largest number that we can sustain given 

these constraints. 

IV. OVERREACHING FOR A CENTRALIZED IRAQI STATE

This is clearly not an ideal prognosis. Americans want to bring the troops home, 

not maintain a peacekeeping mission of unknown duration and considerable cost in 

Iraq. It is widely hoped that a more effective Iraqi Government with an improved 

security force can take the reins and enable American troops to withdraw. As the 

President once put it, as they standup, perhaps we can standdown. To do this, however, would require a real monopoly of force and the ability to assert control over 

substate militias. The U.S. has in the past encouraged the Maliki government to do 

124 

just this—to use the ISF to suppress and ultimately disarm Iraq’s various militias, 

and especially the Shiite Jayish al-Mahdi. 

For this reason, some Americans, including the President, applauded Maliki’s 

recent offensive against JAM elements in Basra and elsewhere. As I note above, this 

offensive is ongoing and its ramifications are as yet unclear. There are ways in 

which it could indeed enhance stability in Iraq. But it could also upset the system 

of cease-fires that largely produced the violence reductions of the last year. Even 

if well-intentioned, this offensive is a dangerous gamble. And it may not be wellintentioned. Either way, it illustrates the danger of overreaching in pursuit of a 

strong, centralized Iraqi state that is unattainable for now. 

The administration and the Maliki government have described this offensive as 

aimed only at criminal, renegade elements of the JAM who have failed to observe 

Sadr’s announced cease-fire. If so, then this operation is nothing more than an extension of longstanding U.S. and Iraqi Government efforts to crack down on ‘‘rogue 

JAM’’ cells that had broken away from Sadr’s control. These efforts have killed or 

captured large numbers of rogue cell leaders over the last year, and contribute to 

stability by eliminating factions unwilling to make peace, thereby rendering the 

JAM as a whole more amenable to a controlled cease-fire under Sadr’s command. 

Sadr has tacitly accepted such strikes in the past, as this actually benefits him as 

much as it does the U.S. or Maliki. And Sadr’s muted reaction to Maliki’s offensive 

suggests that he is, so far, interpreting it as aimed chiefly at rogue elements beyond 

his control: Not only did Sadr not order the mainstream JAM to war, he recently 

ordered it explicitly to standdown from combat with the government or the Americans, effectively reinforcing his prior commitment to cease-fire. All of this is consistent with the notion of a limited offensive meant only to target rogue JAM in support of Sadr’s cease-fire. 

It is also possible, however, that the Basra offensive’s motives may have been less 

pure or limited. As I noted above, the combination of upcoming provincial elections, 

Sunni cease-fires, and U.S. surge brigades created a potential incentive for the 

Maliki government to press a temporary advantage in order to weaken the mainstream Sadrist movement in Basra to the benefit of Maliki’s political allies in the 

competing ISCI bloc. If so, this would represent an empowered government unilaterally breaking a cease-fire with the JAM in order to exploit a window of opportunity 

for partisan internal political advantage. 

If the ISF were actually strong enough to crush the whole JAM, such an offensive 

might offer an alternative route to stability in Iraq: A monopoly of force under the 

Maliki government. After all, the JAM has been Iraq’s strongest internal military 

force—it was largely the JAM that defeated the alliance of Sunni insurgents and 

AQI in the Battle of Baghdad. If the ISF could defeat the JAM, and if Maliki’s political interests now motivated him to fight them (which he had been unwilling to do 

heretofore), then perhaps the ISF would now be strong enough to beat Iraq’s other 

internal armies, too, and to centralize power accordingly. 

But the evidence in Basra suggests otherwise. By all accounts, the ISF has been 

unable to defeat the JAM. After nearly a week of fighting, press accounts were 

reporting that less than a third of Basra was in ISF control. Even with coalition 

air and artillery support and reinforcement by U.S. Special Forces teams on the 

ground, the ISF still proved unable to oust the JAM and secure the city. The ISF 

is apparently still not able to monopolize violence in Iraq—even with active coalition 

support in the critical sector, and the passive support of 18 brigades of U.S. ground 

forces elsewhere to free ISF troops for offensive action in Basra. Stability under a 

strong central state is thus not forthcoming any time soon in Iraq. 

Worse, a failed attempt to monopolize violence under Maliki could now have grave 

consequences for the entire country. Hopes for stability in Iraq today rest chiefly 

on the system of local cease-fires in which former combatants have voluntarily 

stopped shooting in exchange for a pledge that they will not be shot. But if the 

Maliki government is now seen as ignoring these deals and attacking piecemeal 

those who now observe them, starting with the JAM in Basra, then all such commitments will evaporate. Any faction who waits quietly until the ISF finishes off the 

others one by one before getting around to them is either foolish or suicidal; a truce 

that only one side observes will soon be observed by no one. The result would be 

a rapid return to the violent days of 2006 and early 2007—but with declining U.S. 

troop levels, not increasing ones. 

If we are to stabilize Iraq from the bottom up, via local cease-fires among willing 

factions, then we must be prepared to observe the terms ourselves and to compel 

the Iraqi Government to do so, too. And that means accepting the continued existence and security of the local factions that agreed to stop fighting—unless they 

break the cease-fire terms themselves. To change the terms in the middle of the 

deal by trying to centralize power involuntarily over the objection of armed factions 

125 

2See Biddle, ‘‘Evaluating Options for Partial Withdrawals From Iraq,’’ for a more complete 

discussion of withdrawal alternatives. 

who cannot be destroyed at tolerable cost is to invite a return to mass violence as 

each strives to defend itself by attacking its neighbors once more. Bottom-up stability and the pursuit of a powerful, centralized state by force of arms are thus 

incompatible. 

We can and must strive to persuade Iraqi factions to join a unified Iraqi political 

process peacefully. In the long run this process may succeed. But if we try to shortcut a glacial process of peaceful accommodation by disarming militias involuntarily 

in the meantime—or if we permit an Iraqi Government to try this itself for whatever motives it may hold—the result could be a return to mass violence with neither 

bottom-up nor top-down reconciliation in the offing. 

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Iraq’s system of local cease-fires may thus offer an opportunity to stabilize the 

country and avert the downside risks of failure for the region and for U.S. interests. 

To realize this opportunity will not be cheap or easy. And it will not produce the 

kind of Iraq we had hoped for in 2003. A country stabilized via the means described 

above would hardly be a strong, internally unified, Jeffersonian democracy that 

could serve as a beacon of democracy in the region. Iraq would be a patchwork quilt 

of uneasy local cease-fires, with Sunni CLCs, Shiite CLCs, and Shiite militia governance adjoining one another in small, irregularly shaped districts; with most essential services provided locally by trusted coreligionists rather than by a weak central 

government whose functions could be limited to the distribution of oil revenue; and 

with a continuing need for outside peacekeepers to police the terms of the ceasefires, ensure against the resumption of mass violence, and deter interference from 

neighbors in a weak Iraqi state for many years to come. 

Moreover there are many ways in which such a peace could fail even if the United 

States and the key Iraqi factions play the roles described above. Long term peacekeeping missions sometimes succeed, but peacekeepers can also become occupiers in 

the eyes of the population around them. If the U.S. presence is not offset or replaced 

in time by other tolerable alternatives under a U.N. or other multinational banner, 

nationalist resistance to foreign occupation could beget a new insurgency and a war 

of a different kind. If spoiler violence or early challenges to the peacekeepers’ 

authority are not met forcefully and effectively, then the volume of challenges could 

overwhelm the availability of enforcement and the effort could collapse into renewed 

warfare. If ongoing operations do not keep AQI from regrouping, or if today’s growth 

of negotiated cease-fires does not ultimately spread through the remainder of Iraq, 

then the U.S. mission could remain that of war fighting without any peace to keep. 

If Sadr eventually loses patience with the Maliki government’s offensive in Basra, 

or if he loses control of enough of the JAM splinter groups now under assault, then 

today’s entire system of local cease-fires could unravel. 

There are no guarantees in Iraq. And given the costs and the risks of pursuing 

stability, a case can still be made for cutting our losses now and withdrawing all 

U.S. forces as soon as it is logistically practical. 

But none of the options are cost or risk-free in Iraq, including withdrawal. A U.S. 

departure from an unstable Iraq risks an escalation in violence, the prospect of 

regional intervention, and a much wider war engulfing the heart of the Mideast’s 

oil production—any responsible proposal for troop withdrawals in Iraq must contend 

with their risks, which are substantial. All U.S. options in Iraq thus remain unattractive.2 But we must choose one all the same. 

And the case for cutting our losses in Iraq is weaker today than it was a year 

ago. The rapid spread of negotiated cease-fires and the associated decline in violence 

since then has improved the case for remaining in Iraq and paying the price needed 

to maximize our odds of stability. It will not be cheap, and it is hardly risk-free. 

But in exchange for these costs and risks we now have a better chance for stability—not a guarantee, but a better chance—than we have seen for a long time. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman has asked me to recognize Mr. Rosen. 

STATEMENT OF NIR ROSEN, FELLOW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 

CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. ROSEN. Good afternoon, thank you for having me. 

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I’ve spent most of the last 5 years in Iraq, especially with Sunni 

and Shia militiamen in mosques and powers of center, other than 

the Green Zone, so I hope to give you a different perspective. 

I left last—last left Iraq in last February, a month ago—a little 

over a month ago. The Bush administration and the U.S. military 

have stopped talking of Iraq as a grand project of nation-building. 

The American media has obeyed this, as well, and they also abandoned the larger narrative presenting Iraq as a series of small 

pieces. And just as Iraq is being physically deconstructed, it’s also 

being intellectually deconstructed. 

It’s no longer a state undergoing an occupation and a civil war 

in a transition, but small stories of local heroes and villains, and 

well-meaning American soldiers, of good news here, and progress 

there, but the whole is much less than the sum of its parts. 

Iraq is basically Somalia, leaving aside Kurdistan—when I talk 

about Iraq, I’m not referring to Kurdistan—you have warlords and 

militias controlling fiefdoms. Most of the experts who give their 

opinion on Iraq, such as Fred Kagan for the American Enterprise 

Institute—people who don’t speak Arabic, who go around on babysit tours with the American soldiers—the view they present of Iraq 

is false, and it’s very dangerous to rely on them, and they’ve done 

you a disservice. 

There is no shortage of Iraqis—I applaud you for bringing Mr. 

Said—Iraqis who can speak for themselves, and journalists who 

spent much of their time there. 

I know it’s true that fewer Americans are dying in Iraq, and perhaps from a purely American point of view, that’s a success. But 

less Americans are dying in Iraq, because no longer—the dominant 

story is no longer a resistance to a foreign occupation—it’s no 

longer a war of national occupation. 

Less Americans are dying because Iraq has been in a civil war. 

That’s why less Americans are dying, because Iraq is now a battle 

for control between various Iraqi factions. And the proper standard 

for judging progress in Iraq isn’t the number of American deaths, 

but the quality of life for Iraqis, and unfortunately for most Iraqis, 

life under Saddam was better. Even opponents of Saddam are saying this, and I was just a few weeks ago, the people from the 

Mahdi Army, asking them, after 5 years, was life better for you, 

under Saddam? And they said, yes, it was. 

Iraq doesn’t exist today. It has no government, it’s in control of 

warlords, as I said, and events in the Green Zone have never 

mattered, and still don’t matter. It’s always been a theater. The 

people who control power in Iraq, the militia leaders, have never 

inhabited the Green Zone. And therefore, focusing on laws passed 

in the Green Zone, and political deals made in the Green Zone or 

the international zone is a distraction, and a dangerous one. 

Since the escalation of American soldiers began last year, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have continued to flee their homes, 

mostly from Baghdad, and Baghdad has become virtually a Shia 

city, leaving aside a few Sunni pockets. 

So, one of the main reasons why less Iraqis are dying, are because there are less Iraqis to kill. The civil war was very successful 

in achieving the goals of the various parties. This is a key to understanding the drop in violence. Shias were cleansed from Sunni 

127 

areas, and Sunnis were cleansed from Shia areas. This is bound to 

stop, eventually, the violence was logical, and it achieved its logic, 

it achieved its goals. The enemy’s population was displaced. And if 

war is politics by other means, then the Shias won, and they now 

control most of Iraq. 

Fortunately, for the planners of the surge, events are working in 

their favor internally, in the Iraqi civil war. The Sunnis have lost, 

and beginning in 2006, when I interacted with Sunni resistance 

leaders in Iraq, and Syria and Jordan, they began to realize, ‘‘Oh 

my God, we’ve lost, what do we do now?’’ There were internal recriminations, they blamed Sunni clerics in 2003, who had issued 

fatwas prohibiting Sunnis from joining the Iraqi Government. They 

began to wonder what they should do next, and they realize that, 

from their point of view, their main opponent might have been the 

same main opponent that the Americans had—Iran. And they may 

have begun to pursue that route, and they hope that Americans 

would realize that they had this common enemy, although it took 

awhile for them to come on board. 

In many ways, they were shocked how they became the enemy. 

They thought they were the rightful rulers of Iraq, and they would 

have been very happy to accommodate an American presence, and 

you heard Iraqi resistance leaders saying this throughout the 

years, as long as they were the ones in power, these mostly Sunni 

men. 

Now, the Americans arm both sides of a civil war, and this is 

also basically allowed for some temporary stability. How are you 

arming both sides in the civil war? The Iraqi Security Forces, majority Mahdi Army, of course, and now you’re allowing for Sunni 

militiamen to arm themselves, or to use money that they’ve been 

given by Americans, to arm themselves. David Kilcullen, the influential counterinsurgency adviser, defined this as balancing competing armed interest groups. 

Now, supporters of the war and the surge tie this to the success, 

but they forget that tens of thousands—hundreds of thousands, 

perhaps—of Iraqis have been killed, millions displaced, and thousands of dead and American wounded, have also been a price. Just 

so that the violence can go back to the horrifying levels it was a 

couple of years ago. 

And much of the violence doesn’t get reported. American officers 

underreport the violence—much of the violence that occurs outside 

of the sight of the American military, or of the media. When I was 

living in Baghdad these last few months, several times there were 

dead bodies in front of my house. This didn’t make the media. A 

guy was shot in the head on his way to work—he was an Interior 

Ministry official—these sorts of things happen all the time, they 

don’t get reported. Although it’s true that violence is down a little 

bit. 

Now, at the same time the Sunnis are realizing they lost the civil 

war, Muqtada al-Sadr realized that his militia was out of control, 

he had lost control of many of his men, they were no longer merely 

resisting the Americans, or protecting areas from Sunnis, but they 

were establishing their own mafias, they were terrorizing civilians. 

And he fears that clashing with the Americans and with Sunnis 

who were being empowered, would threaten his own power. And he 

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knew that, within the context of the surge, he was one of the main 

targets—or his militia was. 

So, he imposed a freeze, which is often mistranslated as a ceasefire, so that he could reform his troops, so he could consolidate his 

control over them—he could take out the bad ones, and sort of wait 

the Americans out. Because, like the Sunnis, he knew that the 

Americans were bound to leave, eventually. 

The Mahdi Army freeze, which began in late August of last year, 

coincided immediately with a huge drop in violence which, among 

other things, shows us just how responsible they were for the 

recent violence. 

At the same time, the Sunni militias imposed, basically, their 

own cease-fire. They’ve been battling the Americans, the Shias, and 

al-Qaeda, and they’ve failed on every front. Resistant to the occupation, have not succeeded in liberating Iraq from the Americans, or 

in seizing power, or overthrowing the Iraqi Government, the Shia 

militias have won the civil war. 

And Sunnis are being purged from Baghdad, purged from the 

Iraqi state—physically purged, and also purged from ministries. 

The majority of the Iraqi refugees outside of Iraq were Sunni. They 

had initially allowed al-Qaeda elements to enter the areas to protect them from the Americans and from the Shias, but while this 

has been a temporarily successful tactic, al-Qaeda began to impose 

its own reign of terror in Sunni areas, establishing its own mafias, 

often times—this would be familiar to inner-city Americans, teenagers, stealing cars, calling themselves al-Qaeda because it sounds 

cool, makes you sound tough. 

But they’re out of control, these young men, undermining traditional authorities, undermining traditional smuggling routes, and 

something had to be done. As a result, Sunni militiamen began to 

cooperate with the Americans against al-Qaeda. Members of the 

Sunni resistance who fought the Americans, and engaged in organized crime, just couldn’t take it any more. 

These new militias—called the Awakening groups, or Sons of 

Iraq, or Concerned Local Citizens, critical infrastructure security 

guards, Iraqi security volunteers—are for the most part, former 

members of the resistance. I spent a lot of time with them in Baghdad and elsewhere. Members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the 

Islamic Army of Iraq, Army of the Mushadin, and other groups. 

Now, the tactic of the U.S. supporting these armed groups 

worked best in the Anbar province. It’s partially worked in Baghdad, though many Iraqis in Baghdad and elsewhere fear that 

al-Qaeda has imposed its own cease-fire, sort of waiting out the 

surge, as well, and that they’re lying low. 

Now, in the very violent Diyala province and Salah ad-Din, the 

Anbar model has so far not succeeded at all. And like the Mahdi 

Army, the Sunni militia’s hope to wait for the Americans to reduce 

their troop levels, before they resume fighting the Shia militia. 

Joining these American-backed militias has given them territory 

in Baghdad and elsewhere that they now control. This was their 

dream—to seize power in as many areas as possible, and from 

there, eventually seize control of the Iraqi state. These Sunni militias also have political goals, and are attempting to unite to become 

a larger movement that will be able to regain Sunni territory, and 

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effectively fight the Shia militias, in a Shia-dominated government, 

which they refer to as an Iranian occupation. 

So, they say we have a temporary cease-fire, a hudna, with the 

Americans, so we can fight the Iranian occupation of Iraq, which 

to them means the Shia-dominated government, the Shia militias. 

And I have actually accompanied, a few weeks ago, members of 

some of these Sunni militias from South Baghdad, from Durra, to 

Ramadi where they paid homage to Abu Risha, the brother of the 

slain Awakening leader that President Bush met, and they hope to 

join his movement. They didn’t view themselves as security guards, 

they view themselves as a—to make some political movement, we 

have achieved military success, now we’re going to translate that 

into some sort of political success. And to them, the main enemy 

is the Iraqi State. They’re very explicit about that, at least when 

the American soldiers are not around. 

These Awakening groups are paid by the U.S. military, and operate in much of the country, and they employ former fighters and 

they are empowering them. And this is much to the consternation 

of the Shia-dominated government, as well as the Shia militias, 

who thought they had defeated the Sunnis, just to see the Americans let them come into Baghdad, through the back door. 

So, the militias were the main problem in Iraq, we just created 

new ones. American soldiers, officers, call this the ‘‘Iraqi solutions 

for Iraqi problems,’’ but it’s really quite a very frightening scenario 

when you have more militias in a country that’s been terrorized by 

militias. 

By accepting money from the Americans, the Sunni militiamen 

have ridden themselves, from their point of view, of an onerous 

American presence. The Americans think they’ve purchased Sunni 

loyalty, but the Sunnis think that they’ve purchased American loyalty. They think they’ve gotten the Americans off of their back, for 

a little while, so they can rebuild their power, rebuild their 

strength, and eventually take on the Shias once again. And they’re 

very open about this when you talk to them. 

Now, in both cases, Sunni and Shia militia, the militiamen are 

chaffing under the restrictions based on them. The Mahdi Army 

fighters are losing power on the street—they’re no longer out there 

with their guns, either the Americans are there, or Awakening 

groups are there. Crime is increasing in these areas, because the 

Mahdi Army was preventing some source of crimes, and they’re 

very frustrated, and they were for awhile, that the Americans are 

still targeting them, still arresting them, and that the Iraqi Army 

is targeting them. And they’re very frustrated with what they see, 

as al-Qaeda guys who were killing us a few months ago, now being 

empowered and paid by the Americans. 

Many Mahdi Army groups, of course, have ignored the cease-fire, 

and are rejecting Muqtada al-Sadr’s commands, they view him as 

a sell-out—he’s over there in Iran, living the good life, we’re over 

here—in fact, his followers are much more radical than he is, these 

days. And there have been demonstrations lately in Baghdad 

where they’re chanting that he’s basically betrayed them. 

Now, Sunni militiamen are also very frustrated, the Awakening 

groups. They were promised 20 percent of them would be integrated into Iraqi Security Forces, that’s not happening, it’s clear 

130 

that it won’t happen. Those who have tried to go, many of them 

complain that they’re treated as suspects, they’re harassed, they’re 

abused by the Shia-dominated security forces, and they also complain very often that the Americans are late in paying them, they 

frequently threaten to quit in protest, they feel very humiliated, 

they threaten to resume fighting—it’s well-known that the American military cannot sustain its numbers there, in the same levels, 

for very much longer. 

It’s going to be forced to reduce its numbers, and when this 

occurs, there’s going to be increased space for Sunni militias to operate, for Shia militias to operate, they have not abandoned their 

political goals, their ideological goals. 

The Government of Iraq is dominated by sectarian Shia Islamist 

Parties. They also dominate the security forces, and they often target Sunni civilians for cleansing. The government and the security 

forces worry about the empowered Sunni militias that they will 

have to fight one day, again. 

As we saw last week, rival Shia militias are also bitter enemies, 

and when I was in Baghdad, in Sadr City, there were displaced 

Iraqis who had moved up from Karbala and from Diwaniyah, because their families had been Sadr supporters, and they complained that militias, or the security forces loyal to the Supreme 

Council, the Badr organization, had targeted them. And they distributed videos of dead children and dead families, houses that had 

been burned, et cetera, and they were very bitter, and they also 

threatened to resume fighting. 

Now, it’s wrong to view the clashes in Basra last week as between the Mahdi Army bad guys and the Iraqi Government good 

guys. They were between rival militias for control over resources, 

over voters, and the Iraqi Security Forces themselves are divided 

in their loyalty, hence the Iraqi Army units that fought in the 

south, were recruited from the south, and they were loyal to the 

Supreme Council. Elsewhere, we saw that the Iraqi police units— 

most of them who are loyal to the Mahdi Army—refused to fight. 

And many of the soldiers are also loyal to the Mahdi Army. 

As we saw, were it not for the American military and Air Force, 

the Iraqi Army could not have stood up to the Mahdi Army, and 

the Mahdi Army would have had no reason to sue for peace, as it 

did. 

Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement is the most popular movement in 

Iraq today, and the most powerful one. The Sadrs started a large 

humanitarian organization in Iraq, as well. They provide the most 

aid to the most people—their supporters, mostly, but that’s true, 

nevertheless. 

The one bright spot you could see in the recent fighting in the 

south is that this inter-Shia fighting means that there’s no longer 

a united Shia block that can purge Sunnis. The Badr organization, 

the Mahdi Army, had worked together quite closely in expelling 

Sunnis from Baghdad and elsewhere, and killing them and operating as death squads. That’s not going to happen anymore, now 

that the rivalry between them is so intense. And the hatred 

between them is intense, and it’s real. 

So, as a result, we might see cross-sectarian alliances between 

different militias, Sunni militias aligning with Shia militias, such 

131 

as the Sudras, when it comes to issues of federalism, when it comes 

to the elections in the future, and perhaps that means that at least 

the most frightening scenario of a Sunni/Shia war spreading 

throughout the region, is no longer as realistic. 

Many Americans are unaware, and this hasn’t come up in today’s 

meeting, as well, that the American military is not a benign presence in Iraq. While things aren’t—the occupation isn’t as brutal as 

it once was, it’s still very brutal. And a foreign military occupation 

is a systematic position of violence and terror on an entire people. 

American soldiers are not in Iraq as peacekeepers or policemen, 

and they’re also not helping the Iraqi people. The numerous and 

routine raids that Americans engage in, terrorize an entire population. I’ve gone on many of these raids, and I’ve experienced that 

terror myself. 

Tens of thousands of Iraqi men are arrested, the majority of 

them are innocent, they’re never charged with anything, they’re 

never tried, their homes are destroyed, their families traumatized. 

Children watch their fathers being taken away for a day, for 2 

years, and perhaps eventually they’re released. 

At least 24,000 men are still in American-run prisons in Iraq. At 

least 900 of those are juveniles. Now, even when the Americans 

hand over a fraction of the Iraqi prisoners to Iraqi authorities, if 

Iraqi authorities find them innocent, the Americans can still hold 

them, these are called ‘‘on-hold cases,’’ and there are 500 cases of 

Iraqis who are being held by the Americans after they were found 

innocent of anything, of committing any crime by Iraqi authorities. 

Now, of course, the international human rights organizations are 

loathe to make the recommendation that the Americans hand their 

prisoners over to the Iraqis, because it’s well known that it’s much 

better to be held by the Americans than to be held by the Iraqis. 

And I have witnessed a situation where Sunni leaders in an area 

complained to the American officers in the area, ‘‘Why did you let 

the Iraqi Police arrest them? Why can’t you arrest our men?’’ 

Because at least they know they won’t be executed when they’re 

being held in American detention. The conditions in the Iraqi prisons are really horrifying, and the women’s prison in Kadhmiya, the 

female prisoners are routinely raped by their Iraqi prison guards. 

And conditions in the Iraqi prisons got much worse during the 

surge, because the Iraqi system couldn’t cope with the massive 

influx of prisoners. 

I visited, while I was there, numerous Iraqi ministries and government offices. This is the Muharram Month, the Shia holy 

month, during which they have Ashura celebrations, ceremonies 

are held. In all of the government buildings I visited, there were 

Shia religious banners on all of the walls, Shia flags on top of the 

buildings, radios and television stations inside these government 

buildings were tuned in to Ashura ceremonies, the Karbala. And 

this creates the impression among Sunnis that there’s a Shia ownership of the government. And Sunnis, who feel that they are excluded and unwanted, which is true—this sort of reinforces that. 

But, in truth, the government is irrelevant, anyway. It provides 

no services, not even the fundamental monopoly on the use of violence. So, the focus we have here on the government, on laws being 

passed, it’s a distraction, because power is really in the hands of 

132 

militias in the street, and these militias are very small—local, 

neighborhood militias that sometimes are formed from local soccer 

leagues, local gangs from before the war, where the gang leaders 

became Mahdi Army leaders, or resistance leaders. 

I met Iraqi National Police officers while I was in Baghdad who 

complained to me that all of their men were loyal to the Mahdi 

Army, and that many of their commanders were loyal to the Badr 

organization. And if they were suspected of disloyalty, then their 

own men would turn them into Shia militias. And Mahdi Army 

commanders had come into police stations, and threatened Shia 

police officers who were suspected of not being sufficiently loyal to 

the Mahdi Army. 

I was actually in the neighborhood of Washash, which is close to 

the Mansour neighborhood, it’s a Shia slum adjacent to the rich 

Mansour neighborhood, and I was filming over there for a documentary, and it’s controlled by the Mahdi Army, but sort of a rogue 

Mahdi Army group that’s disliked by other members of the Mahdi 

Army, and they were complaining to me about how the Iraqi Army 

abuses them in a sectarian in their area. 

And as I was filming, the Iraqi Army came in, because they were 

upset that there was a journalist there. So, the Mahdi Army said, 

‘‘Don’t worry, we’ll smuggle you out through the back, we’ll take 

you to the Iraqi police.’’ And behind one of the concrete blast walls, 

there were a couple of Iraqi National Police vehicles. And the men 

said, ‘‘Don’t worry, these guys are with us.’’ 

The Iraqi Police were with the Mahdi Army, so I was handed by 

the Mahdi Army to Iraqi police to protect me from the Iraqi Army. 

This sort of stuff is quite common. 

You mentioned, in closing, a few recent developments, reconciliation, the de-Baathification law—the de-Baathification law served 

to only alienate more Sunnis, because it was perceived as actually 

being more Draconian that what had previously been in place. 

There have been many recent steps—legal steps—that alienated 

Sunnis further. The release of two Health Ministry officials, who 

are widely known to be members of Shia death squads was a huge 

insult to Sunnis. 

The reconciliation—to the extent it’s occurring—is occurring 

between Iraqis and the Americans, not between Iraqis and one 

another. There’s zero political reconciliation, zero reconciliation 

between the communities, they’re more and more divided, they’re 

separated by concrete blast walls, and within these communities 

that are being created—these sort of ‘‘city states’’ throughout the 

country—everything that is essential for life is available there. So, 

we’re creating power stations there that are separate from the national power grid, we’re creating neighborhood advisory committees, district advisory committees, that are separate from the government, sort of independent institutions, further undermining the 

Iraqi state. 

It appears to me that the future of Iraq, in the best case scenario, is a Somalia-like situation, where powerful warlords are able 

to consolidate control, at least over some territories, and I imagine 

that those warlords who are in control of areas that are rich in 

resources, will receive foreign backing from the Americans, from 

133 

the Saudis, et cetera, but it’s also quite possible that civil war will 

be reignited. 

There’s a key flashpoint in East Baghdad, Adhamiya, where the 

Abu Hanifa Mosque is, the most important Sunni mosque in Baghdad. Hundreds of thousands of Sunni pilgrims used to go there, 

Abu Hanifa is a theologian who was sacred to many Sunnis around 

the world. The Mahdi Army has been trying to hit that mosque 

with mortars for a long time, in retaliation for the Samarra attack. 

It’s the last Sunni stronghold in East Baghdad. If that mosque 

were to fall to Shias, you could see Sunnis throughout the whole 

region being galvanized. There are many flashpoints, and the violence that we saw last year, could really reignite tomorrow, it could 

happen at any moment. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NIR ROSEN, FELLOW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, CENTER ON

LAW AND SECURITY, NEW YORK, NY 

The Bush administration and the U.S. military have stopped talking of Iraq as 

a grand project of nation-building, the American media have dutifully obeyed, and 

they, too, have abandoned any larger narrative, presenting Iraq as a series of small 

pieces. Just as Iraq is being physically deconstructed so, too, is it being intellectually deconstructed, not as a state undergoing transition but as small stories of local 

heroes and villains, of well-meaning American soldiers, of good news here and progress there. But the whole, in this case, is less than the sum of its parts. 

In May 2002 the newly arrived American proconsul for Iraq, Paul Bremer, promulgated an edict that unceremoniously disbanded the former ruling Baath Party 

as well as the Iraqi Army, police, and other security services. Hundreds of thousands of men were left jobless and Iraqis began to perceive the Americans as occupiers, not liberators. The ideologues behind this war believed Iraq was a state in 

which Sunni Muslims ruled Shiite Muslims. Most Muslims in the world are Sunnis. 

Shiites, a majority in Iraq and Iran, descend from a dispute over who should lead 

the Muslim community. Iraq has no history of serious sectarian violence or civil war 

between the two groups, and most Iraqis viewed themselves as Iraqis first, then 

Muslims, with their sects having only personal importance. Intermarriage was widespread and indeed most Iraqi tribes were divided between Sunnis and Shiites. The 

Baath Party which ruled Iraq for four decades had a majority Shiite membership. 

And the Iraqi Army, though a nonsectarian institution that predated the coming of 

the Baathists, was also majority Shiite, even in its officer corps. 

But the American ideologues who saw themselves as liberators needed an evil 

worthy of their lofty self-image. To them the Baath Party was a Sunni Nazi Party 

that ruled Shiite Jews. They would de-Baathify just as their role models had deNazified. Sunnis were suspect of loyalty to the former regime and as a result the 

American military adopted a more aggressive posture in majority Sunni areas, resulting in clashes in places like Falluja that indeed led to the formation of a powerful popular resistance. Sunnis were weakened by the fact that Saddam, a Sunni 

himself, from attaining too much popularity or power, to avoid rivals. Sunni Muslims also lacked any charismatic religious leaders who could represent the community. Shiite Islam on the other hand has an established hierarchy with only a few 

key clerical leaders that Shiites can follow. 

Today Iraq does not exist. It has no government. It is like Somalia, different 

fiefdoms controlled by warlords and their militias. I have spent most of the last 5 

years since April 2003 in Iraq, with Iraqis, focusing on their militias, mosques, and 

other true centers of power. Events in the Green Zone or International Zone were 

never important, because power was in the street since April 2003. When the Americans overthrew Saddam and created a power vacuum, massive looting followed. 

That first month of occupation there was enormous hope, but the looting created an 

atmosphere of pervasive lawlessness from which Iraq never recovered. The entire 

state infrastructure was destroyed and there were no security forces, Iraqi or American, to give people a sense of safety. They quickly turned to inchoate militias being 

formed, often along religious, tribal, and ethnic lines. Those same militias dominate 

Iraq today. This would have happened anywhere. If you removed the government 

in New York City, where I am from, and removed the police, and allowed for the 

state infrastructure to be looted and then you dismissed the state bureaucracy you 

134 

would see the same thing happen. Soon Jewish gangs would fight Puerto Rican 

gangs and Haitan gangs would fight Albanian gangs. 

The most powerful militias belong to Shiites who rallied around populist symbols 

such as Muqtada al-Sadr. The Americans then fired the entire state bureaucracy, 

and for some Shiite leaders, this was an opportunity to seize control. While many 

Sunni clerical and tribal leaders chose to boycott the occupation and its institutions, 

many of their Shiite counterparts made a devil’s bargain and collaborated. The 

Americans maintained their sectarian approach, unaware that they were alienating 

a large part of Iraqi society and pitting one group against the other. Most of the 

armed resistance to the occupation was dominated by Sunnis, who boycotted the 

first elections, effectively voting themselves out of Iraqi politics. Radical Sunni militants began to attack Shiites in revenge or to provoke a civil war and disrupt the 

American project. Sectarian fundamentalist Shiite parties dominated the government and security forces and punished Sunnis en masse. By 2005 the civil war 

started. Later that year the Americans realized they had to bring Sunnis into the 

fold, but it was too late, the Shiites in power saw no reason to share it. 

Millions of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis fled their homes, while tens 

of thousands died in the fighting. But by 2007 it was clear the Shiites had won. 

The Americans began to realize they were empowering the Iraqi allies of Iran, the 

next target in their plans for a ‘‘new Middle East.’’ They also felt the pressure from 

Sunni Arab dictators in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, the so called ‘‘moderates,’’ 

who feared Iran’s populist and antiimperialist message, its support for groups such 

as Hamas and Hezbollah who resisted Israel and made the ‘‘moderates’’ look like 

sell outs. 

The Bush administration was also feeling pressure on the home front. The war 

was unwinnable and unpopular. Victory was an empty and undefined term and the 

motives for the war were constantly changing. In 2007, when most reasonable observers were calling for a reduction of American troops and an eventual withdrawal, 

the Bush administration decided to increase the troops instead. The immediate impact was nothing, and since it began nearly 1 million Iraqis fled their homes, mostly 

from Baghdad, and Baghdad became a Shiite city. So one of the main reasons less 

people are being killed is because there are less people to kill. This is a key to 

understanding the drop in violence. Shiites were cleansed from Sunni areas and 

Sunnis were cleansed from Shiite areas. Militias consolidated their control over 

fiefdoms. The violence in Iraq was not senseless, it was meant to displace the enemy’s population. And if war is politics by other means, then the Shiites won, they 

now control Iraq. Fortunately for the planners of the new strategy, events in the 

Iraqi civil war were working in their favor. The Sunnis had lost. They realized they 

could no longer fight the Americans and the Shiites, and many decided to side with 

the Americans, especially because many Sunnis identified their Shiite enemy with 

Iran, America’s sworn enemy as well. The Americans armed both sides in the civil 

war. David Kilcullen, the influential Australian counterinsurgency adviser, defined 

it as ‘‘balancing competing armed interest groups.’’ Though supporters of the war 

touted the surge as a success, they forgot that tens, if not hundreds, of thousands 

of Iraqis who have been killed, the millions displaced, and the thousands of dead 

and wounded Americans just so that violence could go back to the still horrifying 

levels of just a couple of years ago. 

At the same time that the Sunnis were realizing they had lost the civil war, 

Muqtada al-Sadr realized his militia was out of his control, and he feared its clashes 

with Americans, Sunnis, and fellow Shiites would threaten his own power. Moreover 

he knew that his militia was the main target for the increased American troops. So 

he imposed a ‘‘freeze’’—often mistranslated as a cease-fire—on his powerful militia 

so that he could ‘‘reform’’ it. The Americans had declared that the Mahdi Army 

would be targeted so the Mahdi Army largely withdrew to wait for the eventual reduction in American troops. The Mahdi Army was also ill-disciplined and out of control, so Muqtada took advantage of the opportunity to consolidate control of his men 

and root out the unruly ones. When the Mahdi Army Freeze began there was an 

immediate and huge drop in violence, which shows just how responsible they were 

for the violence. 

At the same time the Sunni militias imposed their own cease-fire. They had been 

battling the Americans, the Shiite, and al-Qaeda and failed on all fronts. Resistance 

to the occupation had not succeeded in liberating Iraq or in seizing power or overthrowing the government. The Shiite militias had won the civil war and Sunnis 

were being purged from Baghdad and from the Iraqi state. Most of the Iraqi refugees were also Sunnis. Al-Qaeda, which initially had been useful in protecting Sunni 

areas from the Americans and the Shiites was now out of control, imposing a reign 

of terror in Sunni areas. As a result Sunni militiamen began to cooperate with the 

Americans against al-Qaeda. Members of the Sunni resistance who fought the 

135 

Americans and engaged in organized crime grew weary of the radicals in the Anbar 

province who undermined traditional authority figures and harmed their smuggling 

routes and highway robbery and rebelled against them. These new militias, called 

Awakening groups, Sons of Iraq, Concerned Local Citizens, Critical Infrastructure 

Security Guards, and Iraqi Security Volunteers are largely former insurgents who 

have shifted tactics. This tactic worked best in the Anbar province and has partially 

worked in Baghdad, though many Iraqis fear that al-Qaeda has imposed its own 

cease-fire and is lying low to avoid its enemies. In the very violent Diyala and Mosul 

provinces the Anbar model has so far not succeeded. Like the Mahdi Army, the 

Sunni militias hope to wait for the Americans to reduce their troop levels before 

they resume fighting Shiite militias. Joining these American backed militias has 

given them territory in Baghdad and elsewhere that they now control. These Sunni 

militias also have political goals and are attempting to unite to become a larger 

movement that will be able to regain Sunni territory and effectively fight the Shiite 

militias and the Shiite-dominated government, which they call an ‘‘Iranian Occupation.’’ 

These Awakening groups are paid by the U.S. military and operated in much of 

the country, employing former fighters and often empowering them, to the consternation of the Shiite-dominated government as well as the Shiite militias, who 

thought they had defeated the Sunnis, just to see them trying to regain power 

through the backdoor. So although militias and an irrelevant central government 

were among the main problems in Iraq, the Americans were creating new militias. 

They called it ‘‘Iraq solutions for Iraqi problems.’’ By accepting money from the 

Americans, Sunni militiamen rid themselves of the onerous Americans as well. The 

Americans think they have purchased Sunni loyalty, but in fact it is the Sunnis who 

have bought the Americans, describing it as a temporary cease-fire with the American occupation so that they can regroup to fight the ‘‘Iranian occupation,’’ which 

is how they refer to the Shiite-dominated government and security forces. 

In both cases, the militiamen are chafing under the restrictions placed on them. 

The Mahdi Army fighters are losing power on the street since they have withdrawn. 

They are frustrated that the Americans still target them for arrests and that security forces loyal to rival Shiite militias such as the Badr militia are also targeting 

them. They worry about the creation and empowerment of new Sunni militias. Some 

Mahdi Army groups ignore the cease-fire or reject Muqtada al-Sadr’s command, others merely grow impatient and hope to confront the Americans and the Sunnis once 

again. Sunni militiamen were promised that 20 percent of them would be integrated 

into the Iraqi Security Forces. This has not happened. Instead they clash regularly 

with Iraqi Security Forces and are rejected by the Government of Iraq. Often the 

Americans are late in paying them as well. They increasingly feel humiliated and 

threaten to resume fighting. The American military cannot for much longer sustain 

the increased number of troops it has in Iraq. It will be forced to reduce its numbers. When this occurs and there is increased space for Sunni and Shiite militias 

to operate in, they will resume fighting for control over Baghdad and its environs. 

The Government of Iraq is dominated by sectarian Shiite Islamist parties. They also 

dominate the security forces which often targeted Sunni civilians for cleansing. The 

Government and Security Forces also worry about the empowered Sunni militias 

who they will one day have to fight again. As we saw last week, rival Shiite militias 

are also bitter enemies. The clashes throughout Shiite areas of Iraq were not between the Mahdi Army bad guys and the Iraqi Government good guys. They were 

between more nationalist and populist, and popular, Shiite militias who reject the 

occupation and are opposed to federalism and on the other side the Shiite militias 

such as Badr who collaborate with the Americans and are competing for power, territory, resources, and votes with the Mahdi Army. The Iraqi security forces are 

divided in their loyalties and hence the Iraqi Army units that fought in the south 

were recruited from areas where they were more likely to be loyal to the Iraqi 

Supreme Islamic Council, formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq, and its Badr militia. As we saw, were it not for the American military and 

air force, they could not have stood up to the Mahdi Army anyway. Muqtada’s 

Sadrist movement is the most popular movement in Iraq today and his militia is 

the most powerful one. The one bright spot in the recent increase in violence between Shiite militias is that it marks the end of the Sunni-Shiite civil war. There 

will no longer be a Shiite bloc united in fighting Sunnis as there was in the past, 

when Badr and the Mahdi Army collaborated to expel and kill Sunnis. Now we may 

start to see cross sectarian alliances between militias. 

Now thanks to the Americans, the Sunnis, formerly on the run, are once again 

confident, and control their own territory. The Mahdi Army is consolidating its 

forces, ridding itself of unruly elements and waiting for the inevitable reduction in 

American troops. Iraqi Security Forces will also be able to once again operate with 

136 

impunity when there are less Americans present. Both sides are getting ready to 

resume fighting. Refugees International is concerned that when violence resumes 

there will be fewer options for displaced Iraqis. Syria and Jordan, the main safe 

havens for Iraqis in the first round of the civil war, have now virtually closed their 

borders to new Iraqis. Additionally, 11 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have closed their borders to internally displaced Iraqis. There will be nowhere to run to and as a result 

large-scale massacres may occur. 

Iraq remains an extremely unstable and failed state, with many years of bloodshed left before an equilibrium is attained. There is no reconciliation occurring between the two warring communities, and Shiites will not allow the territorial gains 

they made to be chipped away by Sunnis returning to their homes, or Sunni militias 

being empowered. Violence is slightly down in Iraq in large part because the goal 

of the violence, removing Sunnis from Shiite areas and Shiites from Sunni areas, 

has largely succeeded, and there are less people to kill. Baghdad and much of Iraq 

resemble Somalia. Warlords and their militiamen rule neighborhoods or towns. In 

many cases displaced Iraqis are joining these militias. There is no serious process 

of reconciliation occurring between the communities. Armed groups are preparing 

for the next phase of the conflict. Shiites will not allow the gains they made to be 

chipped away by returning Sunnis and the ISVs or Sahwa are intent on fighting 

the ‘‘Iranians,’’ which is how they describe the government and virtually all Shiites. 

The Americans have never grasped the importance of ideology and of the idea of 

resisting an occupation. They have insisted that Iraqis joined militias and the resistance for the money, and so they believe that they are now joining the Americanbacked Sunni militias for the money too. The Sunnis the Americans are paying 

joined the resistance not for money but out of a desire to fight the occupation, to 

protect themselves, to seize power, to kill Shiites and ‘‘Persians,’’ and for an array 

of other reasons, none of them related to money. Likewise men don’t join the Mahdi 

Army, which does not even provide salaries, for the money, but out of loyalty to the 

Sadrist movement, to Muqtada and his father, out of solidarity with their dispossessed Shiite brethren, out of fear of Sunni attacks, resentment of the American 

occupation and other reasons. 

Most embedded journalists, just like embedded politicians and embedded members of think tanks on Washington’s K Street or Massachusetts Avenue, lack language skills and time on the ground in Iraq—and since they are white, they cannot 

travel around Baghdad without attracting attention and getting kidnapped or killed. 

They know nothing about Iraq except what they gain through second- or third-hand 

knowledge, too often provided by equally disconnected members of the U.S. military. 

Recently we have seen positive articles about events in Iraq published by so-called 

experts such as Anthony Cordesmen, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth Pollock, Fred 

Kagan, and even former members of the Coalition Provisional Council such as Dan 

Senor. These men speak no Arabic and cannot get around without their babysitters 

from the American military. But it seems that the more they get wrong, these and 

other propagandists for the war, such as Thomas Friedman, manage to maintain 

their credibility. 

They should ask Iraqis, or those journalists who courageously risk their lives to 

spend enough time with Iraqis to serve as their interlocutors—such as Leila Fadel 

of McClatchy, Ghaith Abdel Ahad of the Guardian or Patrick Cockburn of the London Independent—what is actually happening in Iraq, rather than continue to 

deceive the American people with the fantasy of ‘‘victory.’’ It is true that fewer 

American soldiers are dying today, but that is not the proper metric for success. Of 

course less Americans are dying. In 2006 the conflict in Iraq stopped being a war 

of national liberation against the American occupation and became chiefly a war between Iraqis for control of Iraq. The proper standard for judging Iraq is the quality 

of life for Iraqis, and sadly, for most Iraqis, life was better under Saddam. 

There is no reconciliation occurring between the various sects and ethnic groups, 

the warring communities, and Shiites will not allow the territorial gains they made 

to be chipped away by Sunnis returning to their homes, and they are determined 

to keep the Sunni militias out of power. Violence is slightly down in Iraq in large 

part because the goal of an earlier stage of the conflict—removing Sunnis from Shiite areas and Shiites from Sunni areas—has largely succeeded, and there are fewer 

people to kill. There may be many years of bloodshed left before equilibrium can 

be attained. 

Many Americans are also unaware that a foreign military occupation is a systematic imposition of violence and terror on an entire people. American soldiers are not 

there as peacekeepers or policemen, they are not there to ‘‘help’’ the Iraqi people. 

At least 24,000 Iraqis still languish in American-run prisons. At least 900 of these 

are juveniles, some of whom are forced to go through a brainwashing program called 

the ‘‘House of Wisdom,’’ where American officers are arrogant enough to lecture 

137 

Muslims about Islam. The Americans are supposed to hand over Iraqi prisoners to 

Iraqi authorities, since it’s theoretically a sovereign country, but international 

human rights officials are loath to press the issue because conditions in Iraqi prisons are at least as bad as they were under Saddam. One U.S. officer told me that 

6 years is a life sentence in an Iraqi prison today, because that is your estimated 

life span there. In the women’s prison in Kadhmiya prisoners are routinely raped. 

Conditions in Iraqi prisons got much worse during the surge because the Iraqi 

system could not cope with the massive influx. Those prisoners whom the Americans 

hand over to the Iraqis may be the lucky ones, but even those Iraqis in American 

detention do not know why they are being held, and they are not visited by defense 

lawyers. The Americans can hold Iraqis indefinitely, so they don’t even have to be 

tried by Iraqi courts. A fraction are tried in courts where Americans also testify. 

But we have yet to see a trial where the accused is convincingly found guilty and 

there is valid evidence that is properly examined, with no coerced confessions. Lawyers don’t see their clients before trials, and there are no witnesses. Iraqi judges 

are prepared to convict on very little evidence. But even if Iraqi courts find Iraqi 

prisoners innocent, the Americans sometimes continue to hold them after acquittal. 

These are called ‘‘on hold’’ cases, and there are currently about 500 of them. And 

the Americans continue to arrest all men of military age when looking for suspects, 

to break into homes and traumatize sleeping families at night, and to bomb heavily 

populated areas, killing civilians routinely. Most recently the Americans killed civilians while bombing Tikrit and now 5 years into a war allegedly to liberate Shiites 

the Americans are bombing Shiite areas, serving as the air force for the Dawa party 

and the Badr militia. 

I visited numerous Iraqi ministries and government offices in January and February. It was the Shiite holy month of Muharram and Shiite flags and religious banners covered these buildings. Radios and televisions in government offices were 

tuned in to Shiite religious stations. This creates the impression of Shiite ownership 

of the government among Sunnis, a feeling that they are excluded and unwanted, 

which is true. But the government is irrelevant anyway, it provides no services, not 

even the fundamental monopoly on the use of violence. So the focus we have back 

in Washington on laws being passed is flawed, power is in the hands of militias 

whose leaders are not in the Green Zone, so events there are a distraction. 

Driving to the Amriya district in western Baghdad last month, my friend pointed 

to a gap in the concrete walls the American occupation forces have surrounded this 

Sunni bastion with. ‘‘We call it the Rafah Crossing,’’ he laughed, referring to the 

one gate to besieged Gaza that another occupying army occasionally allows open. 

Iraqi National Police loyal to the Mahdi Army had once regularly attacked Amriya 

and Sunnis caught in their checkpoints which we drove through anxiously would not 

long ago have been found in the city morgue. Shiite flags these policemen had 

recently put up all around western Baghdad were viewed as a provocation by the 

residents of Amriya. Our car lined up behind dozens of others which had been 

registered with the local Iraqi Army unit and were allowed to enter and exit the 

imprisoned neighborhood. It often took 2 or 3 hours to finally get past the American 

soldiers, Iraqi soldiers, and the ‘‘Thuwar,’’ or revolutionaries, as the Sunni militia 

sanctioned by the Americans to patrol Amriya was called. When it was our turn we 

exited the vehicle for Iraqi soldiers to search it as an American soldier led his dog 

around the car to sniff it and I was patted down by one of the Sunni militiamen. 

Not knowing I was American, he reassured me. ‘‘Just let the dog and the dog that 

is with him finish with your car and you can go,’’ he laughed. 

We drove past residents of Amriya forced to trudge a long distance in and out 

of their neighborhood past the tall concrete walls, because their cars had not been 

given permission to exit the area. Boys labored behind push carts, wheeling in goods 

for the shops that were open. One elderly woman in a black robe sat on a push cart 

and complained loudly that the Americans were to blame for all her problems. 

Amriya had been a stronghold of the Iraqi resistance since the early days of the 

occupation, and after Falluja was destroyed in late 2004 resistance members as well 

as angry displaced Sunnis poured in. Shiites were attacked, even if they were 

former Baathists, their bodies found lying on the streets every day, and nobody was 

permitted to touch them. 

Forty percent of Amriya’s homes were abandoned, their owners were expelled or 

had fled and over 5,000 Sunni families from elsewhere in Iraq had moved in, mostly 

to Shiite homes. Of those who had fled to Syria, about one-fifth had returned in late 

2007 when their money ran out. This Ministry of Migration, officially responsible 

for displaced Iraqis, did nothing for them. The Ministry of Health, dominated by sectarian Shiites, neglected Amriya or sent expired medicines to its clinics. There was 

no hospital in the area but Amriya’s Sunnis were too scared to go to hospitals outside, because Shiite militias might kidnap and kill them. Like elsewhere in Iraq, 

138 

the government run ration system, upon which nearly all Iraqis had relied upon for 

their survival, did not reach the Sunnis of Amriya often, and when it did most items 

were lacking. Children were suffering from calcium shortages as a result. Over 

2,000 children were made orphans in Amriya in the last few years. This is Baghdad 

today. Fiefdoms run by warlords and militiamen. The Americans call them gated 

communities. In various Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods I found that displaced 

Iraqis were overwhelming joining militias. They were said to be more aggressive 

than locals. 

Around the same time I was smuggled into the Shiite bastion of Washash, a slum 

adjacent to the formerly upscale Mansur district. Unusually for a Shiite area, 

Washash was walled off as well. ‘‘We are like Palestine,’’ one local tribal leader told 

me. I first visited Washash in April 2003, when its unpaved streets were awash 

with sewage and the nascent Shiite militia of Muqtada Sadr, the Mahdi Army, was 

asserting itself. Not much had changed but the Mahdi Army now firmly controlled 

the area and had brutally slaughtered or expelled nearly all the Sunnis. Mahdi 

Army raids into neighboring Mansur to fight al-Qaeda or otherwise terrorize locals 

had prompted the Americans to surround Washash with walls, wiping out its markets which had depended on the surrounding districts for their clientele. Washash’s 

Shiites complained that the Iraqi Army had besieged them and the commander of 

the local unit was sectarian, punishing them collectively. The Mahdi Army provided 

what services they had, and as Mahdi Army men gave me a tour and I filmed them 

on the main intersection and by the walls that kept them in, somebody alerted the 

Iraqi Army and its soldiers came in looking for me. Mahdi Army men smuggled me 

out through a small exit in the concrete walls, handing me over to Iraqi National 

Police for protection from the Iraqi Army. ‘‘They are from our group,’’ meaning from 

the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militiamen assured me when they handed me over to 

their comrades in the police. 

I met Iraqi National Police officers who complained to me that all their men were 

loyal to the Mahdi Army and their commanders were loyal to the Mahdi Army or 

the Badr militia. If they were suspected of disloyalty to the Shiite militias their own 

men informed on them and the Mahdi Army threatened them with the knowledge 

of their superior officers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very encouraging. [Laughter.] 

I’m being a bit facetious, but let me ask you—we’ll do 7-minute 

rounds. Based on what you’ve—and you’ve had obviously extensive 

experience, you demonstrate and with—I’ll not make a judgment 

whether it was good or well-founded reasons that you point out all 

the other so-called experts don’t speak the language, haven’t been 

on the ground, don’t—haven’t walked the walk, as I would say— 

that you’ve walked. But, based on what you’ve said, there’s really 

no hope, we should just get the hell out of there right now, right? 

I mean, there’s nothing to do. Nothing. 

Mr. ROSEN. As a journalist, I’m uncomfortable in advising, sort 

of an imperialist power, about how to be a more efficient imperialist power. And I don’t think that we’re there for the interest of 

the Iraqi people, I don’t think that’s ever been a motivation. 

However, I have mixed emotions on that issue. Many of my 

Sunni friends, beginning about a year ago, many of them who were 

opposed to the Americans, who supported attacking American 

troops in Iraq, began to get really nervous about the idea of the 

Americans leaving Iraq. Because they knew that there would be a 

massacre. It could be Rwanda the day the Americans leave. 

And the creation of these Sunni militias—the Awakening 

groups—militates against that kind of a massacre of civilians 

occurring, because now there are actually Sunni safe zones, and 

thousands of Sunnis from Shia areas are inhabiting territories that 

are controlled by the Sunni militia. 

But, I do believe if the Americans were to withdraw, then you 

would see an increase in violence—at least temporarily—until some 

sort of equilibrium is reached—— 

139 

The CHAIRMAN. But the good news is, we wouldn’t be imperialists anymore in Iraq, from your perspective. 

Mr. ROSEN. Only elsewhere in the region. 

The CHAIRMAN. Only elsewhere in the region. [Laughter.] 

I’m sure glad we invited you, let me tell you. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROSEN. There’s really no—there’s no positive scenario in Iraq 

these days. Not every situation has a solution. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha. No, no—I’m not suggesting that there is 

a solution. I—it seems as though that you’ve made a—from your 

testimony it’s pretty clear that there is no solution. And the status 

quo’s not a good thing. There’s no political solution. You make the 

case very compellingly that there is good reason for the bad guys 

in the central government not to want the Sunnis there, because 

the Sunnis only want to gain power in order to take power, and to 

deal and go after the Iranian occupation agents, who are the 

present—the government, et cetera, so I don’t see any mix there 

that, where there’s any political ground upon which to settle disputes intra-Shia/Shia or inter-Sunni/Shia, or for that matter, the 

Kurds. 

So, I’m not taking issue with your description, I’m just—want to 

make sure I understand what you’re saying. And that is that there 

doesn’t seem to be any solution, except possibly our continued presence may mitigate in the direction of allowing one side or other to 

build up more capability, so that when we do leave, they will be 

better positioned to be able to have their grievances—better able to 

be dealt with, because they’re more powerful. 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s a pretty—OK. 

Gentlemen, to the nonimperialist side of the witness stand—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, you both talk about the idea 

that there is—there is some progress made, there is some relative 

optimism about the politics, but it seems to depend on the continued presence of a large American military force. 

First of all, is that premise correct? Listening to both of you, both 

of you believe that there’s a need for continued large American 

presence for some time. And that seems to fly in the face of what 

we heard from the previous panel this morning, three Generals, 

and an analyst who—basically stating not their opinion, but their 

judgment—that this is over. The idea that we’re going to be able 

to sustain a large American presence in Iraq for the next 2, 3, 4, 

5 years is not possible. 

And so the real question I have—what, if anything, can we do 

to positively influence the politics, and political compromise that 

you believe is necessary to be able to leave something stable behind 

in the context of what many observers believe is an inevitability of 

significant and continued drawdown of American military forces in 

Iraq? That’s my question, and then I’ll yield to my colleagues. 

Either one of you, if you would. 

Mr. SAID. Yes, the answer to your question is yes, I think that 

the progress, I think even Nir agrees that there has been some 

progress, that there has been some reduction in the violence. 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. 

140 

Mr. SAID. He attributes it mostly to the fact that ethnic cleansing 

has taken place, and I agree that this is a big part of the picture. 

But I do think that some of the policies that have been employed 

by the U.S. forces, and by General Petraeus have worked. The 

localized cease-fires, the new ones that the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. They’ve worked in the sense that they’ve reduced 

violence. 

Mr. SAID. Reduced violence. They’ve worked in the sense of reducing violence, which means saving lives. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. SAID. Which means that thousands of Iraqis are alive today 

that wouldn’t have been, otherwise. It’s a very big difference. 

They have actually worked, and I think in this case, inadvertently, in producing the beginning of a political solution. But the 

political solution is not an amicable one, it’s not one that is negotiated in the Green Zone, and in this respect, I fully agree with 

Nir—that the negotiations in the Green Zone are meaningless. 

But political solutions and things are crystallizing, in terms of 

identifying political constituencies, that’s going to eventually come 

to power, and want a more or less coherent Iraqi state. 

Now these forces are not necessarily very pretty. These are not 

the nice dissidents, democrats who came with the United States 

into the Green Zone. And these are not the typical sort of Kurdish 

Sunni/Shis leaders, but some of these people are in the Awakening 

movement, and some of these people are within the Sadrists, some 

of these people are within the technocrats that are emerging today. 

And this is one area, by the way, where I would disagree with 

Nir, because it’s the area where I have worked most in Iraq, which 

is with the state machinery. I think there is an Awakening that 

can buy into this machinery of the state. The things, matters, on 

the bureaucratic level, within the Ministry of Finance, within the 

Ministry of Oil, I mean some of the critical junctures of the Iraqi 

Government are beginning to stir, beginning to work more efficiently. Iraq has produced $41 billion of money last year, of oil. 

Growth is expected to be 80 percent, this year. 

So, there is some real progress. It’s very minute, and it’s not reflecting—and this I agree—that it’s not reflecting an improvement 

of the daily lives of Iraqis, but there is progress, there are signs 

of hope. 

But the political solution, and again, I emphasize here, is about 

importance of maintaining succession, what the United States 

could do in terms of a guardian, in terms of a peacekeeper between 

now, and a year or two from now, is not guard an ethnic segregation, a la Bosnia, but to ensure that the political process proceeds 

as envisioned by law. That we have elections in October—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But how does that occur? 

Mr. SAID. It does not occur by, for example, there will be attempts between now and the elections in October and the elections 

next year, by those who are entrenched in power by the Skiri, by 

some of the Kurdish parties, to circumvent the political process, by 

going to a very decentralizing policy of federalism. By setting up 

regions in the south—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But that’s part of their Constitution, so you—it’s 

interesting, and I’ll end with this. I’m amazed by you guys when 

141 

you come and testify. You pick the parts of the Constitution you 

like. You want the law to apply, but the portion of the law that you 

want to apply is selective. You want the law to apply on provincial 

elections, but you do not want the portion of the Constitution, 

which calls for the ability to set up regions. And it was supposed 

to be implemented within 6 months after the Constitution was put 

in place, but you all say, ‘‘No, that’s a very bad idea. Having federalism here, man, that’s a bad idea, we can’t let that happen.’’ Yet, 

that’s what the Constitution calls for. 

Mr. SAID. I think that should happen after the elections, I think 

we have a caretaker—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s not what the law says, though. Let’s just 

get it straight. Let’s make sure we understand what the law, the 

law you keep invoking, the Iraqi Constitution does not prioritize it. 

It says from the get-go, any one of the governorates could chose to 

vote by a majority vote to become a region. A region can write its 

own constitution, and have its own domestic security, local security, and join with another governorate, or not. 

Now, I don’t understand, you know, we get criticized for interfering, and for not interfering. And we interfered in the sense of 

saying, ‘‘We don’t think that’s a good idea.’’ So we kicked that can 

down the road, we used our influence to make sure it got kicked 

down the road, it kicks in now. April the 15th or 17th. 

But I assume, if any one of the governorates wanted to have that 

vote now, you’d probably encourage us not to let them have that 

go forward, no? 

Mr. SAID. No, I would not call for such interference in the political process. But, if the Iraqi Government does what seems to have 

happened in Basra recently, which is an attempt to prepare the 

ground to make sure that the vote in Basra goes the right way—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. SAID [continuing]. As in—as they want. 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. 

Mr. SAID. Then we should not be—at least the United States 

must not be part of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, I’m over my time by 3 minutes here, 

so let me yield now to the chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m struck by the fact that, your suggestion, Mr. Rosen, that conceivably Iraq might turn out to have some of the characteristics of 

Somalia, with warlords, and all of the aspects of that. But, what 

I’m wondering, if that is the case, and this would require an extension of the power of Somalia in one way or another—what does this 

mean with regard to the region? 

Is it conceivable, for instance, being the devil’s advocate for a 

moment, that a situation that had all the governmental frailties of 

Somalia, but simply there in Iraq, does not make that much difference, with regard to Iran, or with regard to Saudi Arabia, Syria, 

Turkey. Or, does the fact that that you have a Somalia situation 

mean that they have increased difficulties, or that they perceive 

difficulties, in such a way that they prey upon this ‘‘new Somalia.’’ 

What is your reading of that situation? 

Mr. ROSEN. I think it’s in the interest of all of Iraq’s neighbors 

that Iraq be a stable country, and that this civil war end. None of 

142 

the countries are promoting that kind of instability, because it’s 

against their best interests, economically, but certainly in terms of 

their refugee flows. I don’t think that there’s a very high likelihood 

of a regional war. I think we’ve seen that the Iranians and the 

Saudis, when they had their proxies in Lebanon, for example, come 

to blows, the Iranians and Saudis very quickly come to the table. 

There’s a great fear in the region of the Iraq war drawing them in. 

I think that what you’ll see, of course, is that Iraq’s neighbors 

will support their own proxy militias, but not that they’ll be drawn 

in significantly, but with the one lesson that everybody’s learned 

from this, that nobody wants to be a foreign military presence in 

Iraq. 

And the Iranians, certainly, as close as some of the Shia militias 

are to them, the Sadrist movement is very hostile to Iran, very suspicious of them, and they were only pushed into some of them seeking shelter in Iran out of a real necessity, of a sense of persecution, 

no where else to go. 

But, Iran being the main concern—no other country in the 

region—other than Turkey—can really intervene militarily. The 

Syrians don’t have that capability. Certainly, the Saudis and the 

Jordanians won’t. The Saudis will use their money, just as they’re 

using Saudi money now to support the creation of Sunni militias 

in Lebanon. So, too, if the Americans were to stop paying the Sunni 

militias, the Saudis would take over that role. 

I don’t see the threat of a regional war—which is a relief. I think 

that the refugees—the continued presence of refugees in Syria and 

Jordan could undermine the stability of those countries. In many 

ways, people in the region perceive that as a second Palestinian 

refugee problem, but yet more extreme—much more significant in 

numbers, but also with more ties to militias back home. 

All of the countries in the region, of course, are pretty fragile 

themselves. No shortage of Sunni radical opposition in Jordan and 

Syria that could link up with dissident Sunni militias from Iraq, 

with the same ambitions of retaking Baghdad. But, I think those 

are long-term problems, and not ones that we’re likely to see in the 

next few years. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just ask, last year I made a suggestion 

in a speech on the Senate floor that it would be advisable for the 

United States, which was on the threshold of inviting all of the 

countries that surround the country—and maybe others, in the 

European community, or the United Nations or anybody else—to 

sort of meet, side by side in the Green Zone and sit around a table 

and discuss each others’ interests as they discussed Iraq. 

Such a conference, obviously, never occurred. There were a couple of attempts to bring together parties in various regions and 

then smaller meetings on specific issues—border security, displaced 

persons and refugees, and energy—but they met perhaps once each 

in the past year and dissipated in due course. The International 

Compact is a grander, 5-year vision for economic independence, but 

would such a regular meeting forum be effective in reinforcing 

efforts, or would it be a contribution the United States could make? 

Would this be a construction maneuver, or an imperialist one, if 

you perceive it? 

143 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, the Iraqis are always resentful, and they could 

complain, ‘‘Why are foreign countries being brought in to negotiate 

our fate?’’ The conflict in Iraq is between Iraqi groups, and while 

the neighbors have a role, I think it’s also an exaggerated—I think, 

especially the role of Iran within the conflict in Iraq is exaggerated. 

I think it would be a very healthy step for the United States to 

engage Iran and Syria and not treat them as enemies, and recognize that they have legitimate interests when it comes to Iraq, but 

I don’t think that engaging Iran and Syria would make much of a 

difference when it came to Iraq, because the conflict—it’s not even 

a Bosnia-like situation, where you can bring Milosevic and 

Tudjman to the table, and Izetbegovic to the table—you don’t have 

three leaders in Iraq, you have so many small militias, that at this 

stage, those types of leaders haven’t emerged. 

So, it wouldn’t matter what the leadership in Iran said, and 

Syria said. The guys on the ground in the small neighborhoods 

aren’t going to obey that, they’re going to look out for their own interests of their constituencies. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Said. 

Mr. SAID. Yes, I think there is an opportunity, actually, coming 

up, to allow not only for a more legitimate, international legitimate 

United States role in Iraq, but also for expanding international 

participation in that. And the fact that the U.N. Security Council 

authorization for U.S. forces, for the multinational forces, expires 

this year, and there is intention to proceed along a different line. 

And in this respect, I think the treaty that is being discussed 

today between the Iraqi Government and the United States Government is not necessarily the right way to proceed. I think what 

is needed is something with international legitimacy. 

Now, there’s one conflict in Iraq that we haven’t spoken about 

yet, which is nearing boiling point, which is the conflict over 

Kirkuk. And the special representatives to the Secretary General 

have recently called it a ticking bomb. And I think there is an opportunity there for the International Community to come together 

with a special United Nations Security Council Resolution for 

Kirkuk, in an attempt to preempt or to prevent a conflict, that will 

allow the United States to cast its role in Iraq from a different perspective—not as an invader, but as a peacemaker, but also to bring 

in other parties to the table, other partners, to multilateralize 

efforts in Iraq in a way that hasn’t been possible before. 

And I think this is something that will deserve an attention in 

the coming months. The status of Kirkuk that was supposed to be 

resolved in December has lapsed, they have made an extension 

until June, but there is no progress on that, and the Iraqi politicians are incapable of resolving that by their own. 

Mr. ROSEN. If I could just bring up Kirkuk—people have been 

talking about Kirkuk as a powder keg, as a spark for civil war 

since 2003, and that hasn’t been the case. And that’s because it’s 

so firmly in the hand of Kurdish security forces that there’s no 

other force that can challenge their control of Kirkuk. And, it’s 

basically a fait accompli—they own Kirkuk. Occasionally you can 

have a suicide car bombing, or something, but they dominate it, 

and I don’t think that were they to seize it, it would—you would 

144 

have some demonstrations in Baghdad, but there’s nobody who 

could really confront them on that. 

And many of the Turkmen who previously had feared the Kurdish hegemony, and Kurdish nationalism—they now view life in the 

Kurdish-controlled area as better for them, many of them are quite 

wealthy in Kirkuk, better for them than living under, sort of, the 

rest of Arab Iraq, where life is much more dangerous. So, I don’t 

think that Kirkuk is the powder keg, as it’s often portrayed to be. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Rosen, I know you have written extensively, lived in and researched these conflicts—the elections in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Somalia, Iraq, obviously, Jordan—looking closely at the madrasahs 

and the Taliban and Zarqawi and his evolution, and so I ask if 

would share with us, using a little color, if you will—how do you 

get to go on these raids? And how do you assure your own safety 

in that context? 

Mr. ROSEN. You need a good smile. 

Senator KERRY. Say again? 

Mr. ROSEN. You need a good smile. 

Senator KERRY. That’s the trick? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. [Laughter.] 

People of every faction are very eager to get their point of view 

across, especially those who don’t have access to—— 

Senator KERRY. So, in your capacity as a journalist, you felt relatively able to move around? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes, admittedly, the last year in Iraq was much more 

difficult, and I’ve benefited in the ways—the media has benefited 

from the control, the increased control that warlords have over 

parts of Baghdad, because as a guy, you can call them up, and he’ll 

guarantee your safety. 

Likewise, the Red Cross and other agencies are also benefiting 

from this, because like in Somalia and Afghanistan, they can now 

deal with the guy in charge with the gun. 

Senator KERRY. Based on all of this research that you’ve been 

able to do, and obviously you’ve drawn a lot of lessons, I assume, 

from the cultural divide, and the problems that exist. Let me ask 

you first, as a threshold question—did you hear the testimony this 

morning of the generals? 

Mr. ROSEN. I did not. 

Senator KERRY. If I told you that three generals sat here this 

morning and told us that it is inevitable, in their judgment, that 

troops are going to drawdown, do you agree with that? 

Mr. ROSEN. I do, certainly. I think that’s the unanimous opinion 

of most Americans. 

Senator KERRY. Do you all agree? 

Mr. SAID. That seems to be the mood, in this country, to withdraw. I’m not saying that this would be the right thing for Iraq. 

Dr. BIDDLE. Withdrawal is the policy of everyone, including the 

administration, I think the question is, How far and how fast? 

Senator KERRY. Let me probe that for a moment. 

145 

Let us assume that there is an inevitability that the current levels of troops have proven to be inadequate to maintain, and we 

know we’re coming back to the level we were at last year when the 

violence rose. The escalation, by definition, was temporary—it ends 

this summer. It’s over. We’re facing the reality that there are going 

to be fewer troops. We can’t sustain this current level, according to 

our generals. There will be testimony tomorrow, to that effect, and 

it’s been in the newspapers lately. Everybody reads the newspapers, so the bad guys know, as well as we do, that we’re under 

this constraint and they can play to that, incidentally. It’s not a 

very good way to manage security or other choices, but that’s 

where we are. 

In that light, is it also inevitable that the fundamental forces 

driving the divide between Sunni and Shia and the Kurds, and 

that there will be sectarian violence of some level, no matter what 

we do. Is that not inevitable? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Yes. 

Senator KERRY. Dr. Biddle. 

Dr. BIDDLE. I think the level of sectarian violence can get down 

to the point where it will no longer be on the front pages of American newspapers, which it actually did over the whole course of the 

last 6 or 8 months. 

Senator KERRY. By what means, absent political reconciliation on 

these fundamental differences? By what means? 

Dr. BIDDLE. By the means of the local bilateral cease-fires that 

we’ve seen over the course of the last 6 to 10 months. 

Senator KERRY. By bilateral cease-fires. So, we’re going to have 

to buy out each individual group, and each individual group will, 

in essence, be in power within their own little area? 

Dr. BIDDLE. I think our payments to them is actually a secondary—— 

Senator KERRY. Then leave the payments out of this. Take this 

reality—that such groups are going to have power within their own 

areas, which are highly decentralized? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Absolutely. 

Senator KERRY. Yet that works completely contrary to the fundamental strategy of this administration, which is to have a central 

government of Iraq, an Iraqi national identity, and a functioning 

national government? 

Dr. BIDDLE. The original—the explanation of our policy that the 

President continues to make—as he did, for example, in describing 

Maliki’s offensive in Basra, would not be the one I would choose, 

for example. I don’t think stability in Iraq through top-down reconciliation is realistic. I don’t think that means that stability is impossible, I do think that mechanism is unlikely. 

Senator KERRY. But that stability is only going to be maintained 

so long as we’re there, as a dampening force. 

Dr. BIDDLE. And that’s precisely the heart of the primary prescription I would offer to the committee. 

Now, the question of how many troops we keep there, and for 

how long, and with what mission, is yet to be determined. 

Senator KERRY. So, you’re in the 100-years-war school? 

Dr. BIDDLE. No, no—I’m not, for a variety of reasons. 

Senator KERRY. Then where do you draw the line? 

146 

Dr. BIDDLE. Well, I think you draw the line much the way we’ve 

drawn it, for example, in the Balkans. 

Senator KERRY. Ad hoc? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Well, the objective, if we’re going to take a bottomup approach, as opposed to the top-down approach, is we’re going 

to try and keep the violence down, keep the country stable long 

enough for very long-term, slow political processes—— 

Senator KERRY. Can the United States responsibly support $10 to $12 billion a month until that happens? 

Dr. BIDDLE. I would hope and assume that as our mission 

transitioned out of war fighting and into peacekeeping, both our 

casualties, and our expenditures, and our troop count, could all 

come down. Could any of them come down to zero in Iraq without 

the violence escalating? I think that’s very unlikely. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Said. 

Mr. SAID. I think it could be, I think a high level, a significant 

level of troops could be drawn down within 2 years if—I don’t think 

there’s a dichotomy between a bottom-up and a top-down approach. 

I think the bottom-up approach has to coalesce into a national 

approach. 

Senator KERRY. But you talked about people conceivably coming 

to power, and rising to the surface here, that would not necessarily 

be either our choices or particularly pleasing to us. 

Mr. SAID. Yes. 

Senator KERRY. And that smacks of what I’ve been hearing from 

certain sectors, that we may even see the appearance of a strongman—one strongman, two—one in Shia, one in Sunni—is that 

what you’re talking about? 

Mr. SAID. I’m talking about, definitely Iraq looking more like 

Russia under Putin. 

Senator KERRY. Is that what our troops ought to be doing? Is 

that what they went over there to die for, and that we’re paying 

for? 

Mr. SAID. It will be better than Saddam Hussein, Putin is better 

than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan is better than it was under the Soviet Union, and the most important 

thing is, that Iraq will not become a hotbed for al-Qaeda, will not 

become a source of instability—— 

Senator KERRY. Well—I haven’t met an Iraqi who has suggested 

to me that if we weren’t there al-Qaeda will find any rationale to 

exist. Average Iraqis hate them. They don’t want foreign jihadists 

in their territory. Particularly, if we weren’t there, one or the other 

is going to fight to run the show. Sunni or Shia. 

Mr. SAID. And the Sunni militia got rid of it very easily—— 

Senator KERRY. Excuse me? 

Mr. SAID. The Sunni militias got rid of al-Qaeda quite easily 

throughout Iraq recently, when they head out. 

Senator KERRY. Absolutely. And if they don’t find a rationale into 

welcoming them into their community, i.e., they serve their purpose, to stir up the Shia waters, or the United States—to keep us 

on edge of the knife—they’re not going to stay around. 

Mr. SAID. No. 

Senator KERRY. The issue of al-Qaeda—the administration and 

everybody else has to drop it as a rationale for anything that’s hapVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
147 

pening in Iraq. This is instead a question of how do you resolve the 

Kurd, Sunni, and Shia interests, is it not? 

Mr. ROSEN. I think al-Qaeda is a distraction, it’s not a significant 

presence in Iraq, it never was—— 

Senator KERRY. But, Dr. Biddle, you nonetheless hear it as a 

rationale from this administration? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Speaking as this witness, I would say, certainly 

al-Qaeda in Iraq is not the issue, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd and the 

various subfactions among those are the issue, and the concern for 

the United States, as opposed to Iraqis—other than the humanitarian issues at stake which are important—is we don’t want to 

have a situation, not a guarantee, but a possibility in Iraq in 

which—like Lebanon, a civil war metastasizes into a larger conflict 

that draws in the neighbors. 

Senator KERRY. We all agree with that, but it seems to me there 

are options that have been significantly unexplored, which you 

touched on, with respect to Syria, Iran, regional diplomacy, and 

other interconnected interests in the region—of which there are 

many, none of which have been sufficiently leveraged and put on 

the negotiating table—that would allow the United States to 

address many of those concerns. 

Dr. BIDDLE. And which, I doubt at the end of the day will be sufficient, absent the U.S. presence, to keep the situation—— 

Senator KERRY. But nobody—the Democratic proposals, and I use 

this term, because we’ve often heard such proposals characterized 

as withdrawal—has been planning, really, how to finish the job of 

training and standing up the Iraqi forces so they, among other duties, finish the job of combating al-Qaeda and protecting American 

forces and facilities? These are not bad missions. 

Dr. BIDDLE. The central disagreement I have with that mission 

is, I think, that relying on the ISF—whether we build them up and 

advise them, or not—is a dangerous prospect in Iraq, as—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, when can we rely on them? 

Dr. BIDDLE. As this recent offensive in Basra, I think, suggests—— 

Senator KERRY. But when you say relying on them—if you’re 

there as a backstop, if you’re there for emergencies to prevent 

chaos, but they’re on the front line, isn’t there a point of transition? 

That’s the only way to begin to withdraw, is it not? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Well, I think for many years—5, 6, I’m reluctant to 

give you a specific month figure—but for many years, we’re going 

to be required as more than a backstop. Iraqi Sunnis do not trust 

the government security forces. 

Senator KERRY. I understand that, but if you did some of the 

diplomacy along the lines that Senator Biden and I and others 

embraced on the floor recently, in strongly bipartisan vote, with 

respect to how you put in effect the Constitution of the country 

itself, then you could provide empowerment and security to Shia, 

provide empowerment and security to Sunni, and likewise to the 

Kurds, and create the stability we want with far less expenditure 

of money and treasure. We aren’t even trying to do that. 

Mr. SAID. Yes, I just wanted to comment on two things, and this 

is the main message that I would like to say. And I think a decision that goes along sectarian lines will produce—will require a 

148 

stronger and longer U.S. engagement than less. Because, unless 

the Iraqis have a national regime that keeps the peace—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, we’re not talking about Iraqis not having 

it under that. They would have a national regime. 

Mr. SAID. Because, if you would have these little statelets, the 

United States will have to stay forever to protect them from each 

other, and from incursions from the outside. 

Senator KERRY. You have given us nothing that indicates any encouragement at all for how you fundamentally avoid them playing 

to those very sectarian desires and needs right now. 

Mr. SAID. I think we heard two stories today, first of all, the 

story of Basra, that shows that actually they are—Iraqis are divided along different lines from the ethnic, Shia, and Kurdish 

thing. 

Senator KERRY. We’ve all known that. 

Mr. SAID. There are political coalitions that could be made there, 

for example, the Iraqi Army—which I actually disagree here—has 

been a rising star within the Iraqi state administration, that they 

enjoy much more trust within the Sunni community than the police. They have shown—regardless of how you interpret Basra, they 

have shown very good progress in Basra, and actually the community there has been much more reluctant to see them attacked— 

so there is progress on that issue. 

If the Army becomes a tool for political advancement of interests 

of one group or the other, that’s a problem. But if we can manage 

to keep—and the United States have done a good job with the Iraqi 

Army, in terms of trying to keep it neutral and give it credibility, 

I think it offers hope for the future. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I went over, I apologize. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s OK. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know this is—we could all—it would be useful 

if we had the time to each of us do a half an hour, and I understand. 

But, Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here this afternoon. 

Dr. Biddle, in your written testimony and in an article that you 

provide us, you focus on how you’re defining stabilizing Iraq from 

the bottom-up. And I am trying to discern how we identify a stabilized Iraq. And in reading through your testimony, and then listening to Mr. Rosen and Mr. Said—I’m sorry that I wasn’t able to 

hear your oral testimony, but I have gone through your written— 

how can we agree on what a stable Iraq is? Can we? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Well, I can tell you what I think it is, and see if anyone else agrees. My definition of stability is an end to large-scale 

violence. And I define it that way, in part, because I think that 

meets our two central interests in the country, at this point. That 

we not allow—to the extent that we can prevent it—needless 

deaths of tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis, and that we reduce, 

to the degree that we can, the risk that the war spreads. 

I think if we end large-scale violence in Iraq, we secure those two 

critical interests. 

149 

Senator MURKOWSKI. And we do that through this bottom-up 

approach that you’re suggesting? 

Dr. BIDDLE. I think that’s a much better bet than from the top 

down, yes. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Said. 

Mr. SAID. I think the bottom-up approach has almost reached its 

limit. It has been very effective so far, but it has reached its limits. 

We see those limits—as the other speakers have pointed out—in 

the areas where the situation is more complex—like Diyala province, Kirkuk, and Maysan—where the threat of Kurdish expansion 

and Kurdish incursion into the disputed territories have prevented 

Sunni insurgents from turning their guns on al-Qaeda. 

And that is why I’m emphasizing the danger of the situation in 

Kirkuk. Kirkuk itself may not become a point of the conflict, but 

the whole issue of the disputed territories along the borders of 

Kurdistan, is going to be a problem for advancing, or for addressing 

the bottom-up approach. 

The other thing I’m trying to say, is the bottom-up approach is 

not enough. The Concerned Local Citizens and the Sadrists now 

have stuck to the cease-fire, and all of those groups who have 

agreed to lay down their weapons, or to turn their weapons on the 

enemies of the Iraqi people, need to have the other shoe to drop. 

And the other shoe is, for them to feel empowered politically. For 

them to have jobs. For them to have a say in the country’s future. 

And therefore, we need to fix the political process, which has been, 

so far, closed. The political process has not been an open one, it has 

been very exclusive. We need to make sure that the political process proceeds as per book, and that these people can contest elections, can contest power, and can present their own vision of the 

country’s future, which is distinct from what is presented from the 

Green Zone today. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, this is the same type of a plateau that 

was discussed this morning in the earlier panel—that you get to a 

point, and we’re no longer making the progress that we would like 

to have seen, and it seems this all hinges on what we can do with 

a political solution. 

Mr. Rosen, how do you define stability? 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, I certainly agree that it means less violence, 

and ideally, some sort of a central government that is able to impose its will on the entire country, and that Iraqis respect. While 

I don’t see that occurring, I think tragically, although the United 

States has an immense moral obligation to solve things in Iraq, 

given that we broke it, I don’t see any actions that the United 

States can take, and I think in the end it’s going to be up to the 

Iraqis to reach accommodations, and I think that eventually they 

will. 

And, at a minimum, they’ve been demanding, for a very long 

time, from the beginning, some sort of a timetable, a date of a 

United States withdrawal, even if we find an immediate withdrawal, Iraqis are united in their wish for the Americans to leave 

sooner rather than later, and united in their belief that they can 

solve their own problems, and that their fate is theirs, and that 

they should be the ones who determine it. 

150 

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, this plateau that we are—I’m assuming 

you agree, also, that we’re at a place where we’re not making the 

progress that we had been making, and that we must do something 

different. And your solution to that, then, is for the United States 

to withdraw, and for, basically the Iraqis to assume leadership? 

Mr. ROSEN. I would—the one point I would disagree on, is when 

you say that we’re not making the progress that we had been making, I’m not sure which period of progress you refer to, but I don’t 

think there’s been any. But, yes, I think that they should withdraw 

as soon as possible. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Insofar as how you advance the political 

resolution or reconciliation, from where we are right today, what 

is the first thing that you would do, Mr. Said? 

Mr. SAID. Well, as I said, it’s very important that the elections 

take place in October, that the local elections—— 

Senator MURKOWSKI. You’re talking about a very real likelihood 

of delay to that, what does that do? 

Mr. SAID. That’s a big problem. As I said, the people who have 

laid down their weapons, and the people who have stopped attacking American forces, and stopped attacking Iraqi forces, needs to 

be—need to have an option, need to have a way to express their 

political interests, and their grievances, and their aspirations. And 

this is not something they could do in the enclaves that the surge 

has created for them, this is something they need to do by contesting local elections, by contesting federal elections, by participating in referenda—if they would happen—about the formation of 

regions. 

By determining—what happened is—and this is part of the discussion I had with the Senator—is the Constitution was passed at 

a certain political moment, reflecting a consensus of a certain 

group of people that is no longer actually true today, and we have 

additional players in the picture, we have new players that have 

emerged, that need to have a say in the way that Iraq is governed 

and run. And if they have a peaceful way of expressing and achieving their interests, of negotiating their interests with the others, 

then we will have less conflict. 

But, if that tool is withdrawn, whether it’s elections or referendum, or whether it’s subverted through falsification or abuse, then 

we will have conflict, and there’s no alternative to conflict. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. How important is it that the economy be 

stronger? That people feel a sense of optimism within their economy? You still have unemployment at very, very high levels, so 

you’ve got an opportunity to express yourself through the electoral 

process, but life is still not good at home. Have you really been able 

to advance the political reconciliation, then, if you don’t have—— 

Mr. SAID. Iraq has lots of money. Iraq has no shortage of 

resources to prove a very good living standards for its citizens. The 

Iraqi budget, with the a similar population, has 10 times the 

budget of Afghanistan, with the same number of population. So, 

Iraq has enough resources, the resources are mismanaged. And the 

resources are mismanaged, because the political process is dysfunctional, and because we have a government that is not very competent. 

151 

So, as a matter of fact, the political process, allowing new forces 

to contest and to come up—whether it’s the technocrats that are 

working, actually, quite valiantly to fix the machinery of the state, 

or some of the other forces—that will help address that issue, too. 

It’s not an issue of a dysfunctional economy, but really of a dysfunctional government that is not managing, to use economic 

resources properly. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the panel, very much. 

And, since Mr. Rosen mentioned timetables, and a view of the 

Iraqi people about timetables, let me ask the whole panel, is there 

a chance that setting a timetable for the redeployment of the 

United States forces from Iraq will create an incentive for Iraq’s 

neighbors, the Iraqi Government, and Iraqi factions to come to the 

table and negotiate? What are the key diplomatic steps needed to 

ensure that Iraq’s neighbors are engaged to deal with the challenges that they will face as our troops redeploy? 

Dr. Biddle. 

Dr. BIDDLE. I think it’s clearly a good thing to have Iraq’s neighbors engaged, and moreover, I think most of the participants in the 

debate over Iraq would agree. 

I think the problem has to do with how much leverage they can 

actually exert. At the end of the day, Iraq is a problem that’s internal to Iraq. The problem is a serious security dilemma within Iraq, 

in which each of the major parties, and many of the factions within 

them, are scared to death of the others. 

In an environment where they’re scared to death of each other, 

and they see the stakes as potentially genocidal, the kinds of leverage that the neighbors can bring to bear, I suspect, are insufficient 

to resolve the problem, until and unless the parties within Iraq 

reach a decision that it’s in their self-interest to obtain a cease-fire. 

Which, I think has been happening, actually, over the course of the 

last year. 

If we get that precondition, then the neighbors at the margin can 

make a helpful difference. If we don’t get that, I don’t think the 

neighbors can make the difference. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Said. 

Mr. SAID. I think a timetable for withdrawal has always been a 

good idea, I think it will set a very clear and a very firm indication 

that the United States is not there, is not in Iraq as an occupying 

force for a long term, does not have any long-term views on staying 

in Iraq, so it’s always good to defang al-Qaeda or any of the other 

groups, and remove any additional reason for violence. 

I think it should take place within an international, legitimate 

framework. I think Prince Turki al-Faisal, who used to be Ambassador of Saudi Arabia here, mentioned once that the withdrawal 

should not be as illegitimate as the invasion. And I think this is 

a very important, very important point. 

And I think a timetable for withdrawal will provide incentives, 

if it was within a negotiated framework, and as a matter of fact, 

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olution for Iraq, probably centered around the package of issues 

that are coming to a head around the borders of Kurdistan, and 

that involve Iraq’s neighbors, and that could be a much more uniting platform—that will be a platform that could attract other forces 

to be engaged with Iraq. 

But, where I agree with the speaker here, is that Iraq will need 

an international presence, of one sort or the other, including, probably a strong U.S. military compound, because the United States 

is the most capable to safeguard the cease-fires that have existed, 

and to chaperone the political process for the next steps that will 

bring a more legitimate, and a more rooted, and a more connected 

government. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Rosen. 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, I think certainly on the humanitarian side, 

there should be an attempt to encourage Jordan and Syria to 

reopen their borders, to be aware that the potential for greater displacement can still occur, should the United States withdraw—and 

even should the United States not withdraw and some continued 

plan should be created for that, there should be safe havens, perhaps. 

Certainly the infrastructure in Jordan and Syria is not sufficient 

to handle the refugees they already have, and something should be 

done to support that. I know steps are being taken, but certainly 

there’s a lot more that can be done to deal with the humanitarian 

impact of a withdrawal, and at least a temporary flare in violence 

that I would predict would follow that, sort of gradual withdrawal. 

I think the Syria regime is unique among countries in the region, 

in that it’s managed to maintain a good relationship with all of the 

actors in Iraq—Kurds and Arabs and Sunnis and Shias. And the 

United States has been alienating Syria, and I think that’s been a 

tragic era, but they’re in a position where they have the era of 

Muqtada, they have the era of the Dawa Party, Maliki himself was 

in exile there, Talibani formed his party in Syria—many of the 

Sunni resistance groups are now basing themselves in Syria—the 

leadership, at least, or people go to Syria for treatment when 

they’ve been wounded in attacks against the Americans, or just for 

some R&R. 

Jordan used to be sort of the dados for the resistance, but Syria 

is more that location, a place where they can think about what the 

next steps are, what do we do now? 

So, if any country can, at least, have a positive influence on Iraqi 

actors, certainly Syria would be that country. But the United 

States has been very focused only on the refugee issue, and has 

refused to discuss other issues with them, in fact, we treated them 

with a great deal of hostility on most other issues—they have no 

incentive, obviously, to—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask you something else, Mr. Rosen, 

I’d like to ask you about the current strategy of working with the 

Sunni local militias, more commonly known as Concerned Local 

Citizens, as you discussed in your testimony. 

Does such an approach promote reconciliation and legitimate integration in national political structures, or does it deepen fragmentation of the Iraqi political system? 

153 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, it’s had a positive and negative response, or reaction, I’m sorry. Certainly, Sunnis are very appreciative, in many 

cases, of these new Sunni militias. Sunnis in Amirya, in western 

Baghdad, now feel safe. In the past they not only were afraid of 

Americans and al-Qaeda, but the Iraqi police used to go up to their 

neighborhoods and open fire on their houses—likewise in Dora— 

and many of the Sunnis fled. Admittedly, they also killed Shias in 

that area. 

But now you have Sunni refugees from all over Iraq who are 

seeking safe havens—shelter—in the areas that are controlled by 

the Sunni militia. So, they’re certainly grateful, and for them it’s 

a very positive development. They no longer fear al-Qaeda, they no 

longer fear the Shia militias, and for the moment, they also don’t 

fear American raids, as much. 

But, long term, the creation of new militias obviously militates 

against any sort of stable Iraq. These militias aren’t being integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces, it’s quite clear that that’s not 

going to happen. 

On the other hand, the creation of these militias also strengthens 

the Sunnis and makes it more difficult to envision a Rwanda-like 

scenario where Shia militias just overrun Sunni neighborhoods and 

finish them off—which was a real possibility. 

So, it’s had a positive and negative effect, and it really depends 

on what point of view you’re looking at. But, from a Shia point of 

view, this is horrifying. These are the guys who were killing us a 

few months ago, and now the Americans have empowered them. 

And they will often point, and name specific individuals, ‘‘This guy 

in the Fidel neighborhood is famous for beheading Shias, and now 

he’s wearing an American badge, and being paid by the Americans.’’ So, they’re quite upset about it. 

At this point, I think it’s too early to tell, indeed, if these militias, the Sunni militias, join into a political movement, and it’s 

quite clear that they want that—one could envision that they 

would be able to reach some accommodation with rival Shia parties. Once you have a larger Sunni block, it’s much easier for the 

two sides in Iraq to strike some sort of a deal, rather than you have 

a Sunni leader in each little neighborhood, who’s clashing with the 

Shia rivals. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to ask one question of all three of you, and it’s going to 

be a summary of what I’ve heard in almost a full day of testimony 

today. 

This morning, General Scales said that the surge had brought us 

to what they refer to in the military as ‘‘the culminating point,’’ 

meaning you’re at a point where you make the next-step decision, 

and conditions on the ground can destroy this moment very 

quickly. So, this culminating point is time-sensitive. 

Mrs. Flournoy said there are three options: Conditional engagement, unconditional engagement, or unconditional disengagement. 

All of the generals—the best I heard them, even General Odom— 

said, yeah, conditional engagement is where we are, because unconditional engagement is not where we are right now, without an 

154 

end, and disengagement immediately would be a disaster. I think 

Mr. Said said a good bit about that as well. 

So, we’re at a culminating point, conditional engagement, according to everyone’s testimony. And then Dr. Biddle made the comment, if I understood it correctly in your testimony that, we were 

at a point, given the bottom-up cease-fires and what’s been taking 

place, where maybe an outside peacekeeper could maintain peace 

for a period of time while the political situation developed. You said 

that we had the credibility to be the peacekeeper—I thought I 

heard you say that. At least, we’re the most trustworthy of the 

other alternatives. 

That being the case—conditional withdrawal which has conditions upon which we stay, is the best place to be, and we are at 

a culminating point. 

And taking you—Dr. Biddle, what you said about the peacekeeping role—if we said, we’re going to remain, our role is going 

to be maintaining the peace, and the conditions for doing that are, 

the Iraqi Government has to do ‘‘x’’, what are those things that 

should be the conditions, that are the predicate for the peacekeeping? 

Dr. BIDDLE. I don’t think conditional engagement, in the sense 

that we tell them if things don’t come together, we leave, is the 

right way to get leverage. 

Senator ISAKSON. You tell me, I want you to tell me what you 

think is the right way. 

Dr. BIDDLE. I think there’s several better sources of leverage 

than that. 

The first is the Iraqi Security Forces itself. The Iraqi Security 

Forces today amounts to Nouri al-Maliki’s militia. He values it 

deeply, for a variety of reasons. I don’t believe that it’s the central 

route to security in this country, however, because I don’t think it’s 

trusted by Iraqi Sunnis, and I think it’s deeply divided within 

itself—there are variations between its elements, of course, but I 

think it’s deeply divided, especially in the National Police. 

Given that, our degree of willingness to support the operations 

of, and the expansion of, the Iraqi Security Forces are a substantial 

point of potential leverage with the Maliki government, and for 

that matter, with other parties in Iraq, whose stakes are affected 

differentially by the growth and the increase in efficacy of the Iraqi 

Security Forces. That would be my No. 1 choice for prospective 

leverage over Iraqi players, in general, and the Iraqi Government, 

in particular. 

Others include the particulars of the legal basis on which the 

U.S. presence either continues or doesn’t continue. This is a situation, too, in which the Iraqis have interests, we have interests, 

there’s an ongoing negotiation in which they would like things from 

us, we have the ability to offer them or withhold them. 

We’ve been talking for a long time about using questions of aid 

and assistance—whether in the form of advising, either to the Iraqi 

military, or to ministries of the Iraqi Government, or financial aid. 

We tend not to use these conditionally as sources of leverage. We 

tend to offer them in a blanket way, in the hopes that somehow it 

will render Iraq capable of governing itself—those are also potenVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00162 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
155 

tial sources of leverage to the United States in trying to get better 

behavior out of key Iraqi actors. 

If, instead, we say the only form of leverage we’re going to use 

with the Iraqis is a threat to depart, wholesale, and if we accept— 

as, apparently, some of the witnesses did this morning—that total 

disengagement would be a disaster, what we’re doing is threatening suicide in order to get Iraqis to behave. And I don’t think 

that’s a credible threat. I think there are far more credible threats 

than that available to us, and I think they have, potentially, a good 

deal more leverage opportunity than we’ve exploited. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Said. 

Mr. SAID. Yes, I think the United States has very little leverage 

in Iraq, with a threat or without a threat or with any of the tools 

that other speakers have just pointed out. 

The United States is playing, currently in Iraq, the role of 

enabler. They have created a level of security through the surge 

and with other dynamics, that allows the political process to move 

in certain direction. And I think, as an enabler, as a provider of 

a certain service—which is security service—the United States 

could accept—should accept that at least the political process proceeds, as advertised. Elections, local elections at the end of this 

year, national elections at the end of next year. I think these are 

the main benchmarks I would be looking at, and to make sure that 

the state institutions that are being built—whether it’s the Army 

or the police—are not used as political tools, are not used as 

militias. 

And this is an area where the United States has been relatively 

effective, by working with the U.S. Army. And I think there are 

opportunities there, with the state institutions. But otherwise, I do 

agree, there’s very little in terms of leverage. 

Just one point, I do think it’s the way of proceeding through a 

treaty, through ratifying the U.S. presence in Iraq next year 

through a treaty, rather than the U.N. Security Council Resolution, 

is very dangerous. It’s an outgoing administration here, and it’s an 

outgoing Government in Iraq. And it will have—the Government in 

Iraq will have very little legitimacy to sign any long-term agreement with the United States. As a matter of fact, no matter what 

the merits of an agreement are, they’re going to be used against 

the Iraqi Government—they will be treated as some sort of a surrender of sovereignty, as sort of a backing off, because nobody has 

trust that this government will be able to negotiate on equal footing for the United States, so it’s a very dangerous route to go. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Rosen. 

Mr. ROSEN. I can’t think of many examples—on the question of 

whether threatening to withdraw must get leverage, when the majority of Arab-Iraqis, at least, want the United States to withdraw, 

I don’t think they would perceive that as a threat. 

On the local level, leaving aside the Iraqi Government, the 

United States has a great deal of leverage when it comes to dispensing money to local actors, and one of the reasons why areas 

like Durra are temporarily peaceful, is because we’re just tossing 

contracts for construction, and other stuff, at actors on both sides. 

And the United States is going to become a commodity—at lease 

temporarily—people want to take as much as they can. And officers 

156 

on the U.S. side who are engaged in this are certainly very aware 

that we’re sort of buying people off with contracts, temporarily. 

The Government of Iraq, of course, doesn’t need United States 

money, it has a surplus, it just isn’t able to spend it. But I don’t 

think you need leverage—I think the Iraqis are united in wanting 

peace, and I think that they’ll eventually reach that commendation 

on their own. And I trust that, left on their own, they’ll be able to 

do that. Eventually, although initially, as I said, I think the fighting will continue. 

Senator ISAKSON. I know my time is up, but Mr. Said made a 

point that I’d just like to comment on. You were referring to Article 

VII of the U.N., under which we now operate in Iraq, versus when 

this authority expires at the end of this year, and you refer to a 

future treaty or agreement. 

I think I agree with what you said—a treaty would be problematic, I think you said. But some people are calling an agreement 

a treaty, and it’s not. My understanding is that the predicate for 

those agreements are that they are cancelable by either party at 

any time, which is anything but a treaty, I think. 

It’s an interesting point that you made about leverage. You all 

said, ‘‘Well, we don’t have any leverage,’’ in one way or another— 

except, you said, that maybe that agreement may, in fact, provide 

a forum by which we could actually get to some conditions, with 

regard to the relationship between the two countries. Did I hear 

that right? 

Mr. SAID. I don’t think negotiations between the—because the 

point is, the current set of political leaders in Iraq face a real 

threat of being deposed from power, through either the political 

process, or through violence. And the only reason they want the 

U.S. troops is to protect them and to keep them in power. As a 

matter of fact, this is part of the rationale behind the treaties—to, 

what they call, ‘‘protect the constitutional order,’’ which to many 

Iraqis, when I read that, I see that saying, ‘‘Keep me in power.’’ 

And that is something that is going to severely jeopardize the legitimacy of the government, and reduce the efficiency of state institutions, including the Army. 

So, it’s a very dangerous route to go, regardless of the possible 

concessions one might log. But, at the end of the day, they will not 

give the United States any concessions that would have a chance 

to leave power, because then—why negotiate the United States 

staying in? I mean, these political leaders only want the United 

States to keep them in power. 

If the condition is for them to allow for a process that will take 

them out of power, then they won’t—they won’t agree. 

Dr. BIDDLE. By way of clarification, I think we have a great deal 

more potential leverage than we have used, or exploited, to date. 

I don’t happen to think a threat of withdrawal is the best source 

of it, but I do think there is potential leverage to be had. 

Senator ISAKSON. I know I’m over time—I would love for you to 

send me a quick note on what you think that is. Would you do that 

for me? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

157 

And by the way, for the record, treaties all have unilateral withdrawal clauses in them, as well, requiring no bilateral agreement. 

But anyway, Senator—Chairman Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Chairman Biden. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is this easier than global warming, or harder? 

Senator BOXER. They’re both extremely daunting tasks, as you 

know. 

Let me say that this panel has been really interesting, and 

shocking. You shocked me, many of you, with what you said. 

Maybe I didn’t hear it right, Dr. Biddle, so correct me if I’m 

wrong. But did you just say that Maliki uses the Iraqi Security 

Forces as his militia? Did you say that? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. OK. 

Well, that’s unbelievable, Mr. Chairman. If that’s true, and 

Maliki uses the Iraqi Security Forces as his militia, as opposed to 

it being a force to bring about peace and security in the country, 

that’s scandalous. And the fact that we would have paid $20 billion 

to train a force that is supposed to be securing peace in the country, and somebody who’s a so-called expert says it’s a militia, is 

really shocking. 

Now, Mr. Rosen, it seems to me out of everyone here, and I may 

be wrong, but you have spent more time in Iraq than our other witnesses in the last year? Is that accurate? 

Mr. ROSEN. I suspect if you say, I spent more time—born there. 

Mr. SAID. I spent 6 months over the last year. 

Senator BOXER. Six months over the last year? 

And you, sir? 

Mr. ROSEN. OK, most of the last 5 years. 

Senator BOXER. You’ve spent most of the last 5 years there. So, 

you’ve spent a lot of time in Iraq. 

Now, this is the picture you painted for us. Please tell me if I’m 

overstating it, or understating it in any way. 

I heard you say in your description of what’s going on, and it 

took you quite a while, and you gave us a lot of detail, that the 

picture of Iraq today is a bloody, lawless place, run by militias. It’s 

a place that has undergone ethnic cleansing—and the Shia won 

that battle, basically—and now there’s Shia on Shia violence, and 

the Sunnis are basically hanging on, because we have given them 

this payment, and they’re able to, in some ways, secure what’s left 

of their population. And that is what I took away from your description. Am I missing something? I also took away that the U.S. 

presence there is only putting off the day that the Iraqis will find 

their own way. Is that pretty much accurate? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes; that’s correct. I’m surprised that you would find 

it shocking that the Iraqi Security Forces operate as a militia, because they’re notorious for this, over the last 2 years. 

But, the one point I would disagree about with Mr. Biddle is 

that, I don’t think they’re Maliki’s militia. I think that would actually be a better case scenario, that at least there would be one 

united militia. Unfortunately, they’re vociferous like everything 

else in Iraq, and—— 

Senator BOXER. OK, well, let me tell you why I’m surprised. I’m 

surprised, because that’s not what General Petraeus tells us. He 

158 

tells us he’s proud. He’s proud of the Iraqi Security Forces. That’s 

what Condi Rice tells us. The fact of the matter is, I am surprised, 

because our military, who has done everything we’ve asked them, 

has said very clearly—very clearly—that the Iraqi Security Forces 

are our great hope. And a lot of us who want to get out of there, 

OK? Because we think this war was a horrible mistake from the 

start. It’s a disaster happening right before our eyes, and we are 

counting on the fact that the Iraqi Security Forces can step in and 

take the lead. 

But what you’re telling us, unlike the American military, is that 

they are nothing more than a militia. Now, let me—— 

Mr. ROSEN. I should elaborate. We must distinguish between the 

Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police and Iraqi—— 

Senator BOXER. I’m talking about the Security Forces—they’re 

the police. And then there’s the military. So, you say there’s a difference. So, the military, you think, has stepped up, but not the 

police. 

Mr. ROSEN. The Army is less sectarian, and more trustworthy. 

Senator BOXER. Fine. 

Mr. ROSEN. But, however, it’s still also divided in its loyalties to 

Kurds, to Shias, and to various Shia factions, which is why Maliki 

only uses certain Army units. 

But certainly, when it comes to the police, just one quick example of how extreme the situation is, I have a friend who is a captain 

in the Iraqi National Police, and he complained to me that all of 

his men are loyal to the Mahdi Army, and that he’s been threatened by Mahdi Army commanders, coming into his police station, 

telling him, ‘‘If you don’t collaborate with us, we’ll kill you,’’ and 

this happened in front of his commanding officer. 

Senator BOXER. Well, the reason I appreciate this distinction 

that you’re making is because I do want to ask General Petraeus 

about that. Because there are about equal numbers of the police 

and the army. And, I mean if they are what you suggest it’s a disaster. 

Mr. ROSEN. Former officers of Saddam’s army, who are now, actually, many of them are officers in the police, but also in the 

army, tend to be less sectarian—— 

Senator BOXER. OK, but I’m trying to understand—you said that 

the Security Forces, the police forces, are acting like a militia for 

Maliki. You said it’s beyond that, sometimes they even act in the 

name of other militias—— 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, the Badr and the Mahdi Army—— 

Senator BOXER. All right. 

Dr. BIDDLE. In the interest of clarity, Mr. Rosen and I are in 

agreement on the nature—the heterogeneous composition of the 

Iraqi Security Forces, which consists of the Army, the local 

police—— 

Senator BOXER. I understand. I understand that. 

Dr. BIDDLE. Not all units are equally sectarian or equally 

factional. 

Senator BOXER. I am saying that you said that the Iraqi Security 

Forces were being used by al-Maliki as his private militia, let’s 

move on. 

159 

Dr. BIDDLE. And what I’m trying to do when I draw that distinction is to draw a distinction between the way many Americans 

think of the Iraqi Security Forces, is that this is a disinterested, 

nationalist defender of the interest of all Iraqis—that, I think, is 

an inaccurate characterization of how it’s operated. 

Senator BOXER. I’m just interested in what you said. And I reiterate that’s what you said, and I’m going to ask the generals about 

it, and I appreciate the fact that you brought it up, because I think 

if these are the facts, I don’t know where the end of the road is 

on this situation. 

Now, let me just go to the issue, Dr. Biddle, of your comment 

that we’re the only ones, pretty much, who can take care of this 

thing. By becoming peacekeepers, you don’t know how long we’ll 

have to be there. You don’t think it’ll be 100 years. But let’s see, 

we’re going into our sixth year, it’s costing us $12 billion a month, 

but you’re saying, in your opinion, that we’re going to have to stay 

there, because we’re the only ones who are trusted. 

Now, I just don’t agree that that’s the case. Last month, a poll 

of Iraqis was conducted for ABC News and the BBC and other 

news organizations. Seventy-two percent of Iraqis continue to 

oppose the presence of U.S. forces—this is during the peaceful lull 

over the past 6 months—72 percent of Iraqis continue to oppose the 

presence of United States forces in Iraq; and 61 percent believe the 

presence of United States forces in Iraq is actually making the 

security situation worse. When asked what would happen if American forces left the country entirely, 46 percent said the security 

situation in Iraq would actually get better, while only 29 percent 

said that security would get worse. 

And perhaps more telling, only 21 percent of Iraqis believe that 

the surge has improved conditions for political dialog in Iraq, while 

79 percent of Iraqis say the surge is having no effect. They say that 

it’s actually making conditions for political dialog worse. 

Now, what I just want to say, because my time is over, so I feel 

I have to conclude, is that I don’t see how the U.S. can transition 

to a peacekeeping force with the numbers we have seen from 

Iraqi’s in this poll? 

And moreover, your whole notion that one of the great powers in 

the world, America, who shed so much blood in Iraq, is now going 

to go around negotiating in a ‘‘bilateral’’ fashion—and I note the 

word ‘‘bilateral’’ which gives it a lot of, you know, diplomatic 

oomph—is ridiculous. That we’re going to go around to all of the 

militias, now, and sit down in a bilateral way with these killers 

and warlords, and make a decision that peace lies with them is 

ridiculous, for the reason that you cannot count on those people. 

You know, Sadr woke up the other day and he decided he was off 

the playing field. He gave the signal, and there’s rioting all over 

the streets, and so on and so forth. So, for this policy to be your 

idea of how to get out of this, a policy that says that we should now 

have bilateral negotiations with people who have killed our troops 

and who once again, could wake up and decide to fight each other, 

I think it’s a disaster. And in the name of the people who have 

died, to have it lined up as a series of agreements with warlords, 

is just unbelievable to me, and for taxpayers who have paid all this 

money for that ending, it is just horrible. 

160 

Now, the reason we have these kind of ideas, which I think are 

ludicrous—is because there’s no good solution to a nightmare that 

this President got us into. 

Dr. BIDDLE. Of course there’s no good solution. 

Senator BOXER. There is no good solution to this nightmare. So, 

why not just figure out a way to tell the Iraqis, we spilled the 

blood—it’s your turn. Let them negotiate with each other. Let them 

sit down, Shia on Shia militia, and figure it out. We’ll be there to 

help, in the background, but this has got to end, and it’s got to end 

soon. And if it doesn’t—the path you are defining for us, I think, 

is just a nightmare. 

Dr. BIDDLE. As long as we don’t care what the outcome is, we can 

absolutely disengage and allow the Iraqis to work this out however 

they would like. The Iraqis may very well work it out in a way that 

doesn’t serve either the interests of many innocent Iraqis, or the 

United States. But as far as negotiating with people that have 

killed Americans, 200 Concerned Local Citizens contracts, already 

negotiated within Iraq are already precisely the form of—— 

Senator BOXER. I understand. 

Dr. BIDDLE [continuing]. That you’re describing. 

Senator BOXER. I do understand. 

Dr. BIDDLE. If we’re going to reach a negotiated solution to a 

war, by definition that means negotiating with people who killed 

Americans. And, in turn—— 

Senator BOXER. How many of these warlords are we going to 

negotiate with; got a number? 

Dr. BIDDLE. So far, over 200. 

Senator BOXER. Oh, OK, well, ipso facto. Two hundred warlords, 

we’re going to have bilateral agreements—— 

Dr. BIDDLE. We already have bilateral agreements. 

Senator BOXER. Excuse me—you’re talking a diplomatic surge, 

that’s a military surge. You’re talking about diplomacy with warlords. And all I can say to you is that it’s a frightening prospect. 

And for you to suggest that I don’t care about the outcome is a 

total, total slap in the face of us who are against this war. We care 

a lot about the outcome. We knew there might be a horrible outcome, and that’s why we voted ‘‘no’’ in the first place. So, don’t say 

we don’t care about the outcome. You think Mr. Rosen doesn’t care 

about the outcome? His solution is, get out as fast as possible. 

Because if you get out as fast as possible, that will bring the 

Iraqis—— 

Dr. BIDDLE. The reason I framed the observation as, ‘‘if’’ one 

doesn’t care about the outcome, is because I’m convinced that we 

all do, which is why I think that approach is unsound. 

Senator BOXER. That’s not the impression that I got from your 

comments, but I’ll take it as an apology. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. [Laughter.] 

Senator, the floor is yours—— 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I have to tell you now, I have to leave at 

10 of, so you are going to become chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I hope to be—perhaps I’ll be finished 

before then, I’ll try to be as brief as possible. 

161 

I just want to quickly follow up on a discussion we had during 

the first panel this morning regarding the prospect of making some 

progress in the next 10 months, under this administration. I must 

tell you, I think our policies during the past 5 years have not been 

in the best interests of the United States or the Iraqis, and I’m convinced that unless we change our policies in Iraq during the next 

10 months, that we’ll have 10 more months of decisions that are 

not in the best interest of the United States. 

And I reach that judgment while recognizing that our military 

has performed with great distinction. And during this most recent 

period, it has been successful, as we know our military can be, in 

trying to bring as much security as possible to the streets of Iraq. 

But the purpose of the surge was to give time for a political solution, in Iraq, so that the government could have the confidence of 

its people, and that political solution certainly has not occurred 

during this past year. 

So, my first question for the panel is, if we are going to make 

progress in Iraq, we need responsible Iraqi political leaders who 

are willing to make concessions. When I look, historically at what 

happened in South Africa, what happened in Northern Ireland, 

what happened in Bosnia, we had leaders who were willing to step 

forward and make courageous concessions for the good of their 

country. 

Can you name a political party, or an individual at the national 

level in Iraq, that we perhaps could work with? That is prepared 

to step forward, and make those types of courageous concessions, 

in an effort to bring about a significant change in Iraq? 

Mr. ROSEN. The concessions to the United States, or concessions—— 

Senator CARDIN. No, concessions within Iraq. That would be willing to step forward and say, ‘‘We’ve got to change, we’ve got to give 

up this, and we’ve got to do that, in order to bring about a national 

reconciliation,’’ and is prepared to be a leader, and make the type 

of concessions necessary, so that you can have a political process— 

political progress toward reconciliation in Iraq. 

Mr. ROSEN. I think the Sadrist movement, actually, led by 

Muqtada al-Sadr, is one such example. They’ve been offering—— 

Senator CARDIN. What type of concessions are they willing to 

make? 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, they’ve shown themselves willing to negotiate, 

and even work with Sunnis in the past, with the Sunni militias, 

when it came to fighting against the Americans together—— 

Senator CARDIN. What concessions are they willing to make now? 

Mr. ROSEN. Concessions about what issues? 

Senator CARDIN. I’m asking you, Are they in a position to exercise national leadership to bring the country together by moving 

forward with, admittedly, unpopular positions for their constituency, in order to bring about national reconciliation to a government that perhaps could have the credibility? 

Mr. ROSEN. They’re certainly one of the movements with the 

greatest legitimacy in Iraq, and if they have this popular appeal, 

and they have local leaders who—— 

Senator CARDIN. I haven’t seen them put forward a program that 

would be viewed upon as being conciliatory. 

162 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, certainly in the last year, that wouldn’t be the 

case. 

Senator CARDIN. Right. 

Mr. ROSEN. But prior to that, they had reached many accommodations with Sunnis, and I think most recently—certainly when 

it comes to issues of federalism, of nationalism, the Sadrist movement is perceived—even by Sunnis—as being not loyal to Iran, 

which, the Supreme Council, for being opposed to federalism, so 

we’ve seen them strike deals with al-Awi, with some of the Sunni 

parties on those issues. 

They’re the most trusted group by Sunnis, in terms of their 

nationals, and they have those credentials, because they fought the 

Americans, they said, we had two fighters against the American 

occupation, and even if inter-Shia fighting actually increases their 

legitimacy, they’re not perceived as being mere pawns of Iran. 

And I think on the Sunni side, as well, you can imagine concessions, we’ve seen actually, now I remember, the Mahdi Army protecting Sunnis fleeing from al-Qaeda in different parts of Baghdad. 

So, sectarianism is important, but it’s the fear of being killed that’s 

motivating many Iraqis. It’s not something ingrained, there’s no 

ancient hatred of Sunnis—on the contrary, as Mr. Said said, are 

intermarried—and I think that could occur again. 

I think you also rely on these nationalist groups, and these 

nationalist groups, often by definition, are the ones who fought the 

Americans, but they are the ones who have the greatest appeal and 

popularity among people. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Said, you want to give me a couple of 

names of—— 

Mr. SAID. I’m not going to give you any names, actually, but the 

point is, the criteria for identifying the leaders is very important, 

because so far, the criteria for identifying leaders was the people 

we like. The people who speak to us, the people who speak our language, and that’s what—how the 24 governing Council Members 

were selected, and that’s what brought us to this situation. And 

what is needed is to find out the leaders who have shown leadership, and the Sadrist movement is clearly a group that has shown, 

not only that it’s the most popular movement in Iraq today, but 

that it’s capable of showing leadership. 

The fact that the Sadrists backed off confrontation with the government this time in Basra, although they had the military upper 

hand, shows a level of wisdom that is not usually attributed to 

them. 

And likewise on the Sunni side—— 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. You don’t think that retreat was 

politically motivated because of the timing of the elections? 

Mr. SAID. Yes, it was—from the Sadrist position—they realize 

there was a public backlash against them—— 

Senator CARDIN. It was in their interest. 

Mr. SAID. Exactly. 

Senator CARDIN. Again, I appreciate your response, I’m not sure 

I’ve heard whether they would be willing to step forward to make 

the type of concessions necessary, so that the different—— 

Mr. SAID. It’s not about concessions—it’s about their platform is 

actually identical with the platform of many of the Sunni insurVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00170 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
163 

gents—nationalism, a unitary country, a stronger central government, restoring state services and resistance to occupation—— 

Senator CARDIN. I don’t know if they would share the power, 

from what my—— 

Mr. SAID. They are more likely to share power with these guys, 

they have—there is more bitter animosity among the Shia between 

the Sadrist and the Skiri and the current government, than there 

is between them and the Sunni insurgents. 

Senator CARDIN. Nationalism leaves a lot to be desired, as far as 

sharing a power. 

Dr. Biddle, can you give me a name? 

Dr. BIDDLE. I don’t think anyone in Iraq, at the moment, is going 

to make large-scale concessions in the short term, and that’s why 

top-down progress has been as slow as it is. I think many parties 

in Iraq are willing to make small-scale, grudging, slow concessions, 

which is why there has been some movement, but I think it’s unrealistic to expect a radical acceleration of that process any time 

soon, absent major uses of coercive leverage by the United States 

that we’ve not been willing to do heretofore, and which may not 

succeed, were we to try them. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, since I have the gavel, I’ll ask one more 

question—I don’t normally get the gavel, so I hate to give this 

up—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARDIN. But, I don’t think Senator Biden is back until 

tomorrow, so I think I’m safe until then. 

Let me ask you one more question I asked this morning, and that 

is, do any of you have a suggestion on how we should handle the 

displaced individuals—those within Iraq and the refugees outside 

of Iraq? The estimates we hear are somewhere around 4 million 

people in Iraq have been displaced, a little over 2 million within 

Iraq. A large number of refugees are in Jordan and Syria and Iran. 

Obviously if these individuals wanted to go back to their original 

homes, it would create all types of problems. Is there any solution 

to this problem that—within the next several years—that could 

bring people back to the communities in which they want to live? 

Mr. ROSEN. I’m a consultant for Refugees International, and 

we’re actually coming out with a report in 2 weeks on this issue, 

exactly. 

But, just briefly, internally, when you’re engaged in a civil war 

it’s a bit—it’s the wrong time to return people to their homes, it’s 

much too dangerous for Iraqis to be returning to their original 

homes these days, and indeed they’re not. 

So, there was a trickle of Iraqi refugees from Syria who came 

back late last year, the majority of those did not go back to their 

homes, they actually went to safe areas, Shias went to Shia areas, 

Sunnis to Sunni areas. 

There is also no body to adjudicate the property disputes for 

post-2003. There is a body for pre-2003, so, certainly a body should 

be set up to adjudicate those disputes, because that’s going to be 

a spark for violence for many years to come. 

Right now, there’s nobody—there’s no one body who decides who 

gets to go where. In some areas it’s the Iraqi Army, in some areas, 

it’s the Mahdi Army or one of the Awakening groups. 

164 

The official U.S. military policy is not to be involved in returns, 

and certainly not to take people out of their homes. So, basically, 

the Shia gains in the civil war have been frozen. And, they, of 

course, wouldn’t allow anybody to chip away at that by allowing 

Sunnis to return to those areas, but the displaced are much too 

scared to go back. There are rumors of a displaced guy trying to 

go back to his home, and being killed—these rumors spread like 

wildfire throughout the displaced population. 

So there’s not much you can do politically, but on the humanitarian level, the displaced have no access to electricity, they don’t 

have access to their ration cards—their ration cards which were essential for so many Iraqis—80 percent of the Iraqis depend on that. 

When you’re displaced, you can’t move your ration card with you 

from your original home to your new home, so you don’t have access to your rations. And even though there are those who do have 

access to their rations, are only getting about 50 percent of that. 

So, at a time when the needs in Iraq are worse than ever, the public distribution system which supplies food and nonfood items to 

Iraqis, is really at a breaking point. And that’s something that the 

International Community can support, and certainly should. 

And you should also envision some sort of safe havens, perhaps 

a contingency plans for where to house the displaced, that’s internally, at least. People should also be aware that the displaced 

Iraqis are actually joining militias—in Sunni areas they’re joining 

the Awakening groups, and people complain that these guys are 

more radical than elsewhere. 

Now, officially, according to the U.S. contracts with these groups, 

displaced Iraqis aren’t supposed to join, it’s supposed to be people 

from the neighborhood itself. So, that’s a problem that should be 

monitored. 

And you also have to acknowledge, if you’re concerned about humanitarian aid, that the major Humanitarian aid providers in Iraq 

are nonstate actors, are the Sadrist Movement, are Awakening 

groups, are militias and warlords. And if you want to have humanitarian access in Sadr City, you have to cut a deal with the local 

Sadrists, you have to recognize them, people that you might not 

like. 

Externally, in Syria and Jordan, some pressure should be put on 

them to grant the Iraqis some sort of legal status, so that they 

might be able to work. Because you have a population that was 

often in the middle class, or wealthy, that’s growing impoverished, 

and they’re not able to work, so their children work in the black 

market, because nobody really monitors child labor. 

People are living off of whatever savings they had, they sold 

whatever they had in Iraq and fled to Syria, and now they’re running out of savings, they’re unable to work. So, there should be, 

perhaps, financial assistance offered to the Jordanians and Syrians 

to grant some sort of status to the Iraqis, they might feel more secure, so their kids will be able to go to school. 

The infrastructure in Syria and Jordan isn’t able, at this point, 

to handle so many Iraqis in terms of water and sewage and health 

and education, and the United States—which clearly has a debt, 

has a moral obligation, at least, if we’re not going to accept the 

165 

Iraqi refugees ourselves, we should do what we can to improve 

their quality of life in Syria and Jordan. 

Senator CARDIN. I think that was an excellent explanation of 

what is the best-case scenario, which is not very good, and stands 

little chance of being implemented in the next couple of years. And 

I think that’s a very sobering thought. 

I think it’s going to fall on the International Community to provide help to the refugees, I think that’s the only way it’s going to 

happen. I think the longer it takes for Iraq to acknowledge the 

legitimate rights of people who have been displaced within their 

own country, the more difficult it’s going to be to resolve it. 

And I couldn’t agree with you more, it’s not safe for Iraqis to 

return to their former communities under the circumstances. But 

their properties are being taken over, and when they return, it 

means that someone would have to give up their property, which 

is something people don’t relish doing—it’s just a formula for 

future disaster. 

Mr. ROSEN. Very often you have displaced Iraqis who come from 

poor areas, so a Sunni from the Shah District in east Baghdad, 

who now find themselves living in the home of a middle-class, 

upper-class Shia in western Baghdad, so they have their own incentive—why would we want to go back to our small, poor house 

when we can live in a very nice house that the local Sunni militia 

has given us in this wealthier Sunni area? 

Senator CARDIN. Well, that is the best case scenario, I guess, in 

that circumstance. 

Mr. ROSEN. Some sort of registry of deeds should be established, 

so in the future, people can refer to that and prove who owned 

what. 

Senator CARDIN. I think as we look at how we move forward 

from where we are, and we can’t rewrite history, and looking at 

how U.S. policy can assist in dealing with Iraq in the future, this 

is one area that is just a huge problem. And one that needs to be 

taken into consideration, and in fact, our government is doing virtually nothing in this regard. 

We’re not taking Iraqi refugees in any great numbers. We give 

verbal support to some of the refugee issues, and we give some 

financial assistance, but it’s other countries that are really burdened. I understand that refugees should have the right to work, 

I agree with you on that. But when you talk to the host countries, 

they are really pressed, financially, from dealing with the refugee 

issues. 

So, these are going to be tough issues that are going to have to 

be dealt with, and I don’t think we’re even thinking about these 

issues. And we talk about what progress can be made in the next 

10 months—I’m not terribly optimistic, but I think we have a 

responsibility to do everything we possibly can to chart the right 

course for the United States and for Iraq. 

You get the last word. 

Mr. SAID. If I may, just a key area to work on the refugees is 

the millions that are in Syria and Jordan. These are very poor 

countries, the Iraqi Government is sitting on billions of unspent 

money, I think it’s very important to put as much pressure on the 

Iraqi Government to allocate Syria—I mean, the Iraqi Government 

166 

has been giving some pennies, some crumbs to Syria and Jordan 

to take care of the refugees—$20 million, $30 million—I think the 

costs are in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and it’s within the 

power of the Iraqi Government to spend that money. It could be 

allocated directly to the refugees as pension payments, as compensation for the public distribution system that is not being delivered to them. But, I think it’s very important that the Iraqi Government steps up, at least, on that one. 

The other issue which the Iraqi Government should be able to do 

in the short term, is to keep internal borders open, so that refugees 

could move on and find a better place. 

Senator CARDIN. I think they are excellent suggestions, I just 

would point out, I don’t believe they’re high on the priority list of 

our government when working with the Iraqis, and I think these 

issues need to be addressed at a higher level. I think you’re correct. 

These are great interim steps, and they need to be taken. I just 

hope that our government will make refugee issues the priority 

they should be, I just have not seen that in the past. 

With that, I’m going to take the power of the Chair and the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

‘‘PATIENT STABILIZED’’—BY STEPHEN BIDDLE, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, MARCH

2008–APRIL 2008 

Iraq’s progress is better today than it has been for a long time. An end to major 

violence, and with it a major reduction in the risk of a wider war and the human 

cost of further bloodshed, is now a real possibility. But to realize this potential won’t 

be cheap or easy. And it won’t produce Eden on the Euphrates. A stable Iraq would 

probably look more like Bosnia or Kosovo than Japan or Germany. 

This is because the likeliest route to stability in Iraq is not by winning hearts 

and minds or reaching a grand political bargain in Baghdad. It is by building on 

a rapidly expanding system of ‘‘bottom up’’ local cease-fires, in which individual 

combatant factions who retain their arms nevertheless agree to stop using them and 

standdown. Of course, fighters who voluntarily stop shooting can voluntarily start 

again; such deals are not inherently stable or self-policing. But neither are these 

merely accidents or brief tactical breathing spells. Cease-fires in Iraq have spread 

so rapidly because they reflect an underlying, systematic shift in the war’s strategic 

calculus since early 2006 that has now made peace look better than war for the 

major combatants. This same strategic reality gives most of the remaining holdouts 

a similar incentive to standdown, which could bring an uneasy stability to Iraq. 

If so, the challenge for the United States would not end. The mission would shift 

from war fighting to peacekeeping, and U.S. casualties would fall accordingly. 

But a continued presence by a substantial outside force would be essential for many 

years to keep a patchwork quilt of wary former enemies from turning on one 

another. 

This was not what the administration had in mind when it designed the surge 

or invaded Iraq. And it will not produce a strong, internally unified, Jeffersonian 

democracy that spreads liberty through the Middle East while standing in alliance 

with America against extremist and hegemonic threats in the region. But it can stop 

the fighting, save the lives of untold thousands of innocent Iraqis who would otherwise die brutal, violent deaths, and secure America’s remaining vital strategic interest in this conflict: That it not spread to engulf the entire Middle East in a regionwide war. Eden this is not. Reasonable people could judge it too costly or too risky. 

But there is now a greater chance of stability in exchange for this cost and risk than 

there has been since this war’s early months—and given the stakes, the case for 

staying and doing what is needed is stronger now than it has been for years. 

The original idea behind the surge was to reduce the violence in Baghdad, enabling the Iraqis to negotiate the kind of national power-sharing deal we thought 

would be necessary to stabilize the country. The violence came down, but the comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00174 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
167 

promise did not follow. Instead, a completely different possibility arose—a ‘‘bottom 

up’’ approach beginning with a group of Sunni tribal sheikhs in Anbar province. 

In a span of just a few months, this ‘‘bottom up’’ approach has yielded more than 

100 local cease-fires across much of western and central Iraq. The participants agree 

not to fight U.S. or Iraqi Government forces, to turn their arms instead on common 

enemies, to wear distinguishing uniforms, to patrol their home districts, to limit 

their activities to those home districts and to provide coalition forces with biometric 

data (e.g., fingerprints and retinal scans) for all members. In exchange they receive 

recognition as legitimate security providers in their districts, a pledge that they will 

not be fired upon by U.S. or Iraqi Government forces as long as they observe their 

end of the agreement and a U.S.-provided salary of $300 per member per month. 

More than 80,000 Iraqis have now joined the ‘‘Awakening Councils’’ or ‘‘Concerned 

Local Citizen’’ (CLC) groups that implement these deals. 

This was very bad news for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The CLC members had once 

been their allies, providing the safe houses, financial support, intelligence and concealment that had been essential to AQI. Without this, al-Qaeda was left exposed 

to U.S. firepower in ways it had never been before. Their ensuing heavy losses in 

Anbar and Baghdad drove AQI’s remnants into the limited areas of Diyala, Salah 

ad-Din, and Ninawa provinces where CLC deals had not yet been reached. 

The CLCs are mostly Sunni. But many of the principal Shia combatants are now 

observing their own cease-fires. In particular, in August 2007 Moktada al-Sadr, the 

principal Shia militia warlord in central Iraq, directed his Jaish al-Mandi (JAM) or 

‘‘Mahdi Army’’ militia to standdown, too. 

Holdouts remain, especially in the northern provinces between Baghdad and 

Kurdistan. But by January 2008, most of the major combatants on both the Sunni 

and Shia sides were all observing voluntary cease-fires. This produced a dramatic 

reduction in opposition, a dramatic reduction in the number of enemy-initiated 

attacks, and a corresponding reduction in U.S. casualties, Iraqi civilian deaths and 

Iraqi Government military losses. There are no guarantees, but it is now increasingly plausible that enough of today’s holdouts can be brought around to bring 

something resembling a nationwide cease-fire to Iraq. 

If this happens, will the cease-fires hold? After all, voluntary decisions to stop 

fighting can be reversed. CLC members and JAM militiamen retain their weapons. 

Many are essentially the same units, under the same leaders, that fought coalition 

forces until agreeing to stop in 2007. Many retain fond hopes to realize their former 

ambitions and seize control of the country eventually. Many observers have thus 

argued that these cease-fire deals could easily collapse. And indeed they could. 

But this is not unusual for cease-fires meant to end communal civil wars such as 

Iraq’s. These typically involve very distrustful parties; they often begin with former 

combatants agreeing to cease-fires but retaining their arms; and they are always at 

risk of renewed violence. Many fail under these pressures. But some succeed: In 

Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, for example, 

cease-fires of this kind have held. 

Translating fragile deals into persistent stability requires at least two key conditions: Peace has to be in the perceived strategic self-interest of both parties, and 

outside peacekeepers have to be present to keep it that way. 

Until recently, Iraq failed to meet the first condition. But two major errors by AQI 

changed the strategic landscape dramatically by mid-2007. 

Their first big mistake was to bomb the Shia Askariya Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. Before this, Sunnis believed they were the militarily stronger side; if 

only they could drive the United States out, they thought they could defeat a weak 

Shia regime and rule Iraq again. The Shia had largely allowed the U.S. and Iraqi 

Governments to wage war against the Sunnis for them; Shia militias had fought 

mostly defensively and often stood on the sidelines in Sunni-U.S. combat. But when 

AQI destroyed the shrine, the Shia militias entered the war in force and on the 

offensive. The result was the Battle of Baghdad: A year-long wave of sectarian violence in the capital pitting Sunni insurgent factions and their AQI allies against, 

especially, the Jaish al-Mandi. At the time, Americans saw this wave of bloodshed 

as a disaster—and in humanitarian terms it was. But in retrospect, it may prove 

to have been the critical enabler of a later wave of cease-fires by changing fundamentally the Sunni strategic calculus in Iraq. 

The Battle of Baghdad gave the Sunnis a Technicolor view of what an all-out war 

would really mean, and they did not like what they saw. With the Americans playing no decisive role, the JAM overwhelmed Sunni combatants in neighborhood after 

neighborhood, turning what had been a mixed-sect city into a predominantly Shia 

one. Districts that had been Sunni homeland for generations were now off-limits, 

populated with and defended by their rivals. By goading the JAM into open battle, 

168 

AQI had triggered a head-to-head fight in which Sunnis were clearly and decisively 

beaten by Shia they had assumed they could dominate. 

AQI’s second mistake was a systematic alienation of its Sunni allies. Fellow 

Sunnis whom AQI’s leadership judged insufficiently devout or committed were 

treated with extraordinary brutality—including delivery of children’s severed heads 

to the doorsteps of wayward sheikhs. The smuggling networks that Sunnis in Anbar 

province relied upon to fund tribal patronage networks were appropriated by AQI 

for its own use, leaving sheikhs impoverished and disempowered. Before the Battle 

of Baghdad, most Sunnis tolerated these costs on the assumption that AQI’s combat 

value against Shia and Americans outweighed their disadvantages. Defeat in Baghdad, however, showed that AQI could not deliver real protection, making AQI all 

cost and no benefit for its coreligionists. 

By late 2006, Sunnis who once thought they were on the road to victory thus realized they faced defeat unless they found new allies. This forced them to abandon 

AQI and turn to the United States while they still could. After initial wariness, U.S. 

forces took the plunge and aligned with the tribes against AQI. With American firepower connected to Sunni tribal knowledge of whom and where to strike, the ensuing campaign decimated AQI and led to their virtual eviction from Anbar province. 

U.S. protection in turn enabled the tribes to survive the inevitable, brutal AQI counterattacks. The result was a provincewide cease-fire under the auspices of the Anbar 

Awakening Council and the U.S. military. 

News of the Anbar model spread rapidly among disaffected Sunnis elsewhere. And 

as word spread, U.S. surge brigades began arriving. The combination of Sunni 

realignment, increased U.S. troop strength and a new U.S. mission of direct population security created a powerful synergy. The prospect of U.S. security emboldened 

Sunnis outside Anbar to realign with the United States; Sunni realignment enhanced U.S. lethality against AQI; U.S defeat of local AQI cells protected realigned 

Sunnis; local cease-fires with the Sunnis reduced U.S. casualties and freed U.S. 

forces to venture outward from Baghdad into the surrounding areas to keep AQI 

off balance and on the run. 

Cease-fires with Sunnis in turn facilitated cease-fires with key Shia militias. For 

Moktada al-Sadr, leader of the JAM, the Sunni standdown and the U.S. surge transformed the strategic landscape. The JAM arose to defend Shia civilians from Sunni 

violence. But that violence was now on the wane as Sunnis brokered cease-fires. In 

the interim, JAM thugs had increasingly exploited the population’s dependency on 

the militia to extort personal profit through gangland control of key commodities 

such as cooking oil and gasoline, inspiring growing resentment among Shia civilians. This was tolerated when the JAM was all that stood between Shia and mass 

murder by Sunnis. But as the Sunni threat receded, the continuing exploitation 

turned the JAM into a parasite rather than a protector, and its Shia public support 

waned. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. military buildup in Baghdad posed an increasing threat to 

JAM control over its base. The Americans offered Shia security without gangsterism, and the Sunni cease-fires meant not just diminished public tolerance for 

the gangsters, but greater U.S. freedom to swing troops into a battle with the JAM 

for control over Shia population centers. Al-Sadr could have fought this, staking his 

reputation and his militia on a gamble that he could defeat the Americans. But 

al-Sadr had tried this twice before and been decimated by U.S. firepower each time. 

In the past, he had nevertheless emerged from these defeats stronger than ever, as 

his popularity among Shia brought fresh recruits in droves to replace his losses. 

Now, by contrast, his popularity was declining. And his control over his own militia 

was splintering as rogue lieutenants with their own income took an increasingly 

independent path. With a weaker army and a declining ability to replace its losses, 

al-Sadr thus had no assurance that he could survive another hammering from the 

U.S. Army. He chose instead to standdown. 

Yet, the local reductions in violence have not produced national reconciliation 

among Iraq’s elected representatives in the capital. Why not? 

In time they may. For now, though, the Shia-dominated al-Maliki government’s 

incentives differ from those of its coreligionist Moktada al-Sadr. Al-Sadr needs peace 

to avoid further deterioration in his internal position and to avert casualties he 

cannot replace in a costly battle with the Americans. Al-Maliki, by contrast, is not 

fighting the Americans—the surge is no threat to him. On the contrary, U.S. reinforcements and weaker Sunni opposition reduce the cost of continued warfare for 

the al-Maliki government’s army. For al-Maliki, moreover, peace is politically and 

militarily riskier than war. Reconciliation along American lines requires dangerous 

and politically painful compromises with rival Sunnis: Oil-revenue sharing with 

Sunni provinces, hiring of former Baathists, Anbari political empowerment and 

other initiatives that al-Maliki’s Shia allies dislike, and which al-Maliki fears will 

169 

merely strengthen his sectarian enemies militarily. A predominantly Sunni CLC 

movement adds to these fears. Al-Sadr needs peace because war now risks his political status; al-Maliki, conversely, runs greater risks by compromising for peace than 

by standing fast and allowing the war to continue. Thus, the Shia-dominated government makes little progress toward peace even as Shia militias standdown in 

cease-fires. 

This is not to deny any progress by the government. It has been distributing revenue to Sunni provinces even without a hydrocarbon law to require this. It recently 

passed a new de-Baathification law making it easier to hire Sunnis into some 

government jobs and had been doing such hiring even without a legal mandate. To 

date this has resembled a form of toe dipping: the al-Maliki government has been 

willing to experiment tentatively with compromise as long as it retained the ability 

to back off again later if the results were unfavorable. These moves could lay the 

basis for eventual compromise. But for the near- to mid-term future we are likelier 

to see a weak and sclerotic central government unable to do more than distribute 

oil revenue, while the real dynamic of Iraqi security devolves to localities. 

Thus, for now, local cease-fires look more likely to end the fighting than national 

grand bargains. But for these cease-fires to hold, an outside party will be needed 

to serve as a peacekeeper. 

This is because such deals are neither self-enforcing nor inherently stable. Even 

where peace is in the mutual self-interest of the majority on both sides, there will 

still be spoilers who seek to overturn the cease-fire and renew the war. Rogue elements of Shia militias profit from the fighting and will seek to restore the instability 

within which they flourish. And AQI has no interest whatsoever in stability. Though 

on the ropes, even small numbers of committed AQI terrorists can bomb selected 

marketplaces and public gatherings. In an environment of wary, tentative, edgy 

peace between well-armed and distrustful former combatants; even a few such 

attacks can lead to an escalatory spiral that quickly returns the country to mass 

violence. 

In another bad-case-but-likely scenario, the central parties to the cease-fire may 

try to expand their area of control at the expense of neighboring CLCs or militia 

districts. Ambitious Sunnis with dreams of Baathist restoration may use the lull to 

build strength, probe their rivals for weaknesses, then launch a new offensive if 

they discover a vulnerability. Shia militia leaders unsatisfied with a limited role in 

a weak goverment could push the limits of their accepted status at the expense of 

Sunnis or rival Shia warlords. The military balance limits what Sunnis, especially, 

can actually accomplish via renewed violence, but some will surely test the waters 

anyway or simply miscalculate; either way, it is easy to imagine the cease-fire parties cheating on the terms. 

Outside peacekeepers play a crucial role in damping such escalatory spirals and 

enforcing cease-fire terms. As long as the underlying strategic calculus favors peace, 

then an outside military presence allows victims of spoiler attacks to wait rather 

than retaliate—they can afford to delay and see whether the Americans will avenge 

them. Similarly, if CLC leaders and militia commanders know that a U.S. combat 

brigade is going to enter their district and arrest any leader whose followers violate 

the terms of the agreed cease-fire—and if the provision of biometric data and locating information for all CLC members means that the Americans know who the violators are and where to find them—then the underlying mutual interest in ceasefire is less likely to be tested. 

This is not war fighting. But it does require troops who can fight if they have to. 

And some fighting would be needed, especially early on, to punish spoilers and 

cease-fire violators, thereby discouraging further violence. Peacekeepers must thus 

be combat capable, but peacekeeping should not require the casualty toll of sustained warfare. 

Peacekeeping of this kind is labor intensive, long term, and would almost certainly have to be a U.S. undertaking, especially in the early years. We are the only 

plausible candidate for this role for now—no one else is lining up to don a blue helmet in Iraq. We are not widely loved by Iraqis; among the few things all Iraqi subcommunities now share is a dislike for the American occupation. Yet we are the only 

party to today’s conflict that no other party sees as a threat of genocide. We may 

not be loved, but we are tolerated. And Iraqi attitudes toward Americans are not 

fixed: Sunni views of the U.S. role, for example, have changed dramatically in less 

than a year. Marine patrols in Falluja that would have been ambushed are now met 

with kids mugging for photos from marines carrying lollipops along with their rifles. 

This mission will be long—perhaps 20 years long—until a new generation, which 

has not been scarred by the experience of sectarian bloodletting, rises to leadership 

age in Iraq. A U.S. role will clearly be important for at least part of this time, but 

it may not be necessary for the United States to do this alone the entire time. If 

170 

2 to 3 years of apparent stability make it clear that the Iraq mission really has become peacekeeping rather than war fighting, then it is entirely plausible that others 

might be willing to step in and lighten the American load, especially if they can do 

so under a U.N. banner rather than a bilateral agreement with the United States 

or the Government of Iraq. So we need not assume a 20-year U.S. responsibility 

alone. But a long-term presence by outsiders will be needed. And it would be imprudent to assume that we can turn this over to others immediately. 

The number of troops required could also be large. The social science of peacekeeping-troop requirements is underdeveloped, but the rule of thumb for troop adequacy in this role is similar to that used for counterinsurgency: Around one capable 

combatant per 50 civilians. For a country the size of Iraq, that would mean an ideal 

force of around 500,000 peacekeepers—which is obviously impossible. But some such 

missions have been accomplished with much smaller forces. In Liberia, for example, 

15,000 U.N. troops stabilized a cease-fire in a country of 4 million, in Sierra Leone, 

20,000 U.N. troops sufficed in a country of 6 million. It would be a mistake to 

assume that such small forces can always succeed in a potentially very demanding 

mission—but it would be just as bad to assume that because the United States cannot meet the rule-of-thumb troop count, the mission is hopeless. The best assumption is that more is better when it comes to peacekeeping: The larger the force, the 

better the odds, hence the right troop count is the largest one we can sustain for 

a potentially extended stay. 

Some now hope that lesser measures will suffice to stabilize Iraq’s cease-fires. The 

U.S. leadership in Baghdad, for example, hopes that it can create a financial incentive for CLCs to behave by making them Iraqi Government employees. But the 

al-Maliki regime is resisting this, and it is far from clear that Sunni CLC leaders 

would trust al-Maliki to pay them if the United States withdrew most of its troops. 

Nor would government paychecks for CLCs do much for the JAM, which is an 

equally grave threat to stability. 

Financial incentives alone won’t prevent spoiling, but they would help. They are 

just another useful tool for effective peacekeeping. The chance of maintaining a stable Iraq is highest with the largest number of peacekeepers we can sustain; other 

measures help, but they are not substitutes. 

Iraq is thus not hopeless—there is a real chance for stability. But this is no time 

for a victory parade. Stability’s requirements are hard, and its payoff is likely to be 

imperfect. 

Nor is it guaranteed. Peacekeeping sometimes succeeds, but peacekeepers can also 

wear out their welcome. If the U.S. presence is not replaced in time by tolerable 

alternatives, nationalist resistance could beget a new insurgency and a war of a different kind. If spoiler violence or probes for weakness are not met forcefully enough, 

then challenges could overwhelm the peacekeepers and Iraq could collapse into 

renewed warfare. If ongoing operations do not spread today’s cease-fires through the 

rest of Iraq, then the U.S. mission could remain that of war fighting without any 

peace to keep. 

Given these costs and risks, a case can still be made for cutting our losses now 

and withdrawing all U.S. forces as soon as logistically practical. But withdrawal has 

costs and dangers of its own: U.S. departure from an unstable Iraq risks regional 

intervention and a much wider war engulfing the heart of the Middle East’s oil production, plus the human consequences of spiraling sectarian bloodshed if the war 

escalates in our wake, even without foreign intervention. 

Any policy for Iraq is thus a gamble. Stability cannot be guaranteed by staying; 

disaster cannot be excluded if we leave; exact odds cannot be known for either in 

advance. The scale of cost and uncertainty here makes all options for Iraq unattractive and risky. 

But we have to choose one. And the strategic landscape of 2008 shifts the odds 

and the risks in ways that make the case for staying less unattractive than it has 

been for a long time. 

(171) 

IRAQ 2012: WHAT CAN IT LOOK LIKE? HOW 

DO WE GET THERE? 

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Bill Nelson, Obama, Lugar, and 

Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished panel. We gave you 

an easy assignment: Tell us what Iraq is going to look like, what 

it should like, in 2012. But, in some ways this session is the most 

important we’re going to be holding during this 2 weeks of hearings, including when Petraeus and Crocker come to testify, because 

my guess is they’ll still be talking tactics, and not overall strategic 

objectives. And so, we’re very delighted that all of you agreed to 

participate. 

Before we begin, I would like to remind everybody: Before the 

war began, this committee held an extensive set of hearings in the 

summer of 2002—and I know it’s very easy to, you know, rewrite 

history, but we had distinguished witnesses, like yourselves—left, 

right, and center—testifying. They were, according to the press and 

the ratings, very heavily watched hearings. And the chairman and 

I and others raised an awful lot of the questions that—and, quite 

frankly, warned of some of the dilemmas we’re likely to face, 

absent taking some action, which we did not take. 

That’s not so much to try to say, you know, well, boy, we got this 

right, because I’m not making that assertion, but it is to put back 

in perspective what Dick Lugar raised—and I, as well, but I think 

he was the leading voice—of raising the question about, ‘‘OK, we 

do this. What’s the endgame?’’ Not, ‘‘What’s the exit strategy?’’ 

What’s the endgame? What do we want this country to look like? 

What is—what do we think will happen? What do you think we’ll 

be left with? 

Everyone remembers, back then, there was the famous—quote 

‘‘famous’’—Powell axiom, ‘‘You break the China, you own it.’’ You 

know, ‘‘You invade Iraq, you own it.’’ Well, we own it. And it turns 

out that it may not have been such a good buy. 

172 

And so, what we’re trying to do today, the purpose of this hearing, is, a little bit, to go back—we are at a culmination point, to 

use a military term that a number of our witnesses used yesterday—we’re at a potential turning point, we’re at a place where possibly—possibly—we can change our strategy—or adopt a strategy, 

and possibly change some of the course of events by different 

actions. 

And so, what we want to look at is, today, what we tried to look 

at 6 years ago, which is: OK, where—the best-case scenario—where 

do we end up? Because I would note, parenthetically—and I apologize to my staff for wandering off their beautiful opening statement—but, the truth of the matter is that I don’t know of any democracy where the people in that democracy will, over an extended 

period of time, shed blood and a great deal of financial treasure to 

maintain the status quo ante. I don’t know where that’s ever occurred. Now, it’s one thing when you say we’ve been in the Balkans 

a long time, but people aren’t dying, Americans aren’t dying, and 

we’re not spending 12 billion bucks a month. 

So if the best case is, we keep worse things from happening, that 

may be, from a policymaker standpoint, a legitimate justification 

for our national interest, to remain engaged as deeply as we are. 

But, it will not sell in a democracy. It will not sell in a democracy. 

And, based on our records, we’re pretty good salesmen. We’ve been 

doing this for a long time. We’ve—I’ll speak for myself—we’ve 

fooled our voters, for 35 years, into reelecting us. 

Yeah. Well, I hope you’re there in Delaware. I look forward to 

meeting you, whoever is the person that said that. 

But, the point I’m making is that it’s not going to—this cannot 

be sustained unless we have a pretty clear goal as to what we 

think will be the endgame here if we continue to ask the American 

people to do what we’re asking them to do. We can’t continue to 

make this up as we go along. We have to, in my view, mark a 

direction on our strategic compass and deliberately move in that 

direction. 

Ironically, despite all the debate in Washington and beyond 

about our Iraq policy, there is one premise just about everyone 

shares: Lasting stability will come to Iraq only through a political 

settlement among the warring factions. 

So, the single most important question you would think we would 

be debating is this: What political arrangements might Iraqis agree 

to? And what are the building blocks to achieve them? Yet, we 

almost never ask ourselves those questions, and we very seldom 

ever debate them, either in Presidential debates and/or in debates 

among policymakers. But, today, hopefully, we will. 

We’ve asked each of you to think ahead. In a reasonable, bestcase scenario, What might Iraq look like, politically, 4 years from 

now, in the year 2012? And what policies should we pursue now— 

inside Iraq, in the region, and beyond—to help the Iraqis get there, 

assuming we can? 

My own view, as my colleagues know all too well, is this. Absent 

an occupation, we cannot sustain or return to a dictator that we 

say we don’t want—and we’ve not been able to find a suitable candidate yet—Iraq will not be governed from the center, at least at 

this point in history. That’s the premise from which I start. 

173 

I want to make it clear, I wish that were not true. It would be 

much, much, much, much, much better if there was a prospect Iraq 

could be governed from the center with a democratic government 

in place, or at least a government in place that had the confidence 

of the majority of the people. 

I believe Iraq’s best chance to remain unified and stable is 

through a decentralized system of government that devolves considerable power to local and regional levels—in a word, federalism— 

but has a sustainable, identifiable, and real Central Government 

that has real powers. We can’t impose this—this view or any other 

view—or any other solution—on the Iraqis. But, we don’t have to, 

because, in fact, in my view, federalism is enshrined in their 

Constitution. 

Now, I notice, at all the hearings we have, we have a lot of very 

qualified witnesses, and they selectively choose what laws they 

think should, in fact—when you really get you guys and women in 

the room, the truth is, people really don’t like that Constitution, 

outsiders don’t like the Constitution—many. They don’t—it doesn’t 

jibe with what the ideal state would be. Yet, it’s the Constitution. 

And if we suggest that the Constitution, in and of itself, is not 

workable to produce a stable government, we should say so. 

And it’s a vision my colleagues in the Senate, by the way—of this 

federal system—my colleagues in the Senate and the House have 

endorsed, overwhelmingly, and put into law. And so, one of the 

things we want to find out, Are we right about that? Seventy-five 

Senators said the federal way to go—federal system is the way to 

go. The House overwhelmingly voted for the Biden resolution. 

Whether or not that makes any difference remains to be seen. But, 

if it’s not the way to go, we should be talking about, What is the 

way to go? 

I’m not wedded to that plan. If there’s a better way to meet our 

objectives of leaving Iraq without leaving chaos behind, I will 

strongly support it. And, as I said at the outset, the plan that I put 

forward, that we voted on, every day and month and year that goes 

by, absent moving on it, it makes it harder for it to be implemented. So, it may outrun—theoretically, it may have been a good 

idea, a year ago or 2 years ago. Maybe it’s not a good idea anymore, 

because of—events have moved beyond it. I think not; but, maybe. 

As important as defining the objective that we should be seeking 

is how we get to whatever the objective is. It’s critical, in my view, 

that we establish a process that gets Iraqis’ neighbors and the 

world’s major powers much more actively involved in helping the 

Iraqis arrive at a political accommodation. And that’s based on my 

observation of 35 years in the Senate, dealing with foreign policy 

issues, but also as an amateur student of history, that I don’t recall 

many circumstances, as one witness said, yesterday, where there is 

a spontaneity among—between warring factions, absent expiring 

on the battlefield, where one says, ‘‘You know, let’s work this out. 

We can work this out.’’ So, even among my Democratic colleagues, 

who said, ‘‘We’ll leave it up to the Iraqis. We’ll say we’ll leave, and 

they’ll get it right,’’ I’m not so sure—I don’t—I’m not so sure of 

that. Matter of fact, I’m pretty sure that’s probably not going to 

happen. 

174 

So, what’s the mix? Our influence in Iraq is a waning asset—I 

would argue, a wasted asset. I think we’ve basically run the string. 

Our influence is influence relating to our money and our physical 

power, but not our judgment. The influence of Iraq’s neighbors and 

the major powers is also, in my view, a—not a waning, but a wasted asset we’re not taking advantage of. 

So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, who have 

given a great deal of thought to a vision of what a future Iraq 

might look like, and the willingness to share with us that vision, 

and how, if at all, the International Community can help it be realized. 

Professor Carole O’Leary is a program director and scholar in 

residence of the Center for Global Peace at American University. 

Dr. Brancati—am I pronouncing it correctly? Dr. Brancati is a fellow—I’m married to Dominic Giacoppa’s daughter, so I’d better get 

it right—is a fellow at the Institute of Quantitative Social Studies 

at Harvard University, and we appreciate her coming down. Dr. 

Gregory Gause is an associate professor of political science at the 

University of Vermont; where as—from all the time you spend, several years ago, in New Hampshire, and I did, they affectionately 

refer to it as the ‘‘Republic of Vermont.’’ I—but, it’s a great university, and it’s nice to have you here, Doctor. And Dr. Terrence Kelly 

is the senior operations researcher at the RAND Corporation, one 

of the most respected think tanks in the world. And Ambassador 

Carlos Pascual is a vice president and director of foreign policy at 

the Brookings Institution, another great, well-respected think tank. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you all for being here. And let me 

yield, now, to Chairman Lugar, and then we’ll begin your testimony. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

appreciate this further opportunity for our committee to consider 

the future of Iraq, in advance of the testimony we’re preparing to 

hear from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, next week. 

Yesterday, in two hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee 

examined the status of military and political efforts in Iraq. And 

today, our witnesses will look beyond immediate problems, to the 

prospects for Iraq, 4 or 5 years into the future. 

Now, this is a very important exercise, because our consideration 

of policy in Iraq has often been focused on short-term considerations. Demonstrations of progress in Iraq are welcome, and we are 

grateful for the efforts of our military and civilian personnel in 

Iraq, who have risked their lives to improve the security situation 

during the last year. 

However, if we are unable to convert this progress into sustainable political accommodation that supports our long-term national 

security objectives in Iraq, this progress will have limited meaning. 

In other words, we will not achieve success without progress, but 

progress may not be enough for success. 

I have cautioned against seeing Iraq as a set piece, as an end in 

itself, distinct from broader United States national security interests. If we see Iraq as a set piece, we are more likely to become 

175 

fixated on artificial notions of achieving victory or avoiding defeat 

when these ill-defined concepts have little relevance to our operations in Iraq. What is important is not the precise configuration 

of the Iraqi Government or the achievements of specific benchmarks, but, rather, how Iraq impacts our geostrategic situation in 

the Middle East and beyond. 

Fifteen months ago, at the beginning of the Foreign Relations 

Committee January 2007 hearing series on Iraq, I suggested a set 

of objectives for American involvement in Iraq. And these objectives 

were: Preventing the use of Iraq as a safe haven or training ground 

for terrorism; preventing civil war and upheaval in Iraq from 

creating instability that leads to regional war, the overthrow of 

friendly governments, the destruction of oil facilities or other 

calamities; and preventing a loss of U.S. credibility in the region 

and the world; and preventing Iran from dominating the region. 

Now, although observers might quibble over the exact definition 

of these objectives and the importance of achieving them, they 

remain a useful distillation of United States motivations for continuing involvement in Iraq. 

The questions before us now are, Can the U.S. strategy achieve 

these objectives? What adjustments can be made to our current 

strategy to improve its chances of success? If the current strategy 

cannot achieve them, is there an alternative strategy that might 

work? And if no strategy is likely to succeed at an acceptable cost, 

how do we minimize the damage of failing to adequately achieve 

some or all of these objectives? 

We begin this inquiry, knowing that we have limited means and 

time to pursue an acceptable resolution in Iraq. Testifying before 

us yesterday, MG Robert Scales joined our other witnesses in 

underscoring the limits imposed by the strains on our own Armed 

Forces. He wrote, in the prepared testimony, ‘‘In a strange twist of 

irony, for the first time since the summer of 1863 the number of 

ground soldiers available is determining American policy rather 

than the policy determining how many troops we need. All that the 

Army and Marine Corps can manage without serious damage to 

the force is the sustained deployment, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, of somewhere between 13 and 15 brigade equivalents. Assuming that Afghanistan would require at least three brigades, troop 

levels by the end of the surge in Iraq must begin to migrate toward 

the figure of no more than 12 brigades, perhaps even less. Reductions in post-combat forces will continue indefinitely thereafter.’’ 

The limits of our military endurance elevate the importance of 

achieving political progress that can take advantage of the improved security on the ground. But, we have to be mindful that the 

task of stabilizing Iraq is not a fixed target. The lack of technical 

competence within the Iraqi Government, external interference by 

the Iranians and others, the corruption at all levels of Iraqi society, 

the lingering terrorist capability of al-Qaeda in Iraq, intractable 

disputes over territories and oil assets, and power struggles 

between and within sectarian and tribal groups can frustrate careful planning and well-reasoned theories. The violence of the past 

week is a troubling reminder of the fragility of the security situation in Iraq and the unpredictability of the political rivalries that 

have made definitive solutions so difficult. Even if compromises are 

176 

made, they have to be preserved and translated into sustainable 

national reconciliation among the Iraqi populace. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ assessment of how the 

United States might achieve our objectives in Iraq, given these 

challenges. 

And I thank the chairman for calling this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. 

We have a small attendance right now. 

John, did you want to make a brief opening statement? 

Senator KERRY. No, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

What has been suggested by staff, based on the approach being 

taken, is that we start in the—and we move in the following order. 

Start with Professor O’Leary, Dr. Brancati, then Dr. Kelly, Professor Gause, and Ambassador Pascual, if we do it in that order. 

OK? That’s how I’ll recognize you. 

And Professor O’Leary, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF CAROLE O’LEARY, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, 

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE AND PROGRAM 

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GLOBAL PEACE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Professor O’LEARY. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Biden and 

Senator—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And I might add—excuse me for interrupting— 

I’ll make sure that the entirety of each of your statements is placed 

in the record, and—I mean, it’s all right to go and do the whole 

statement, but I just want you to know it will be placed in the 

record, without objection, each of you, and you can move from 

there. 

Thank you. 

Professor O’LEARY. Thank you. 

Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to appear here today 

to consider what Iraq can look like in 2012, and how to get there. 

This morning, I will focus on several key recommendations, 

which, if implemented, I believe can build the foundation for a stable, federal, and democratizing Iraq in 2012. In other words, I’m 

going to focus on how we get there. 

First, I would like to refer to my written testimony and mention 

that I’ve listed eight core stipulations for what Iraq will look like 

in 2012. And, having worked in Iraq continuously since May 2003, 

I’m a gradualist. So, among my core stipulations, No. 3, I’d like to 

read it now. 

Under an amended federal regions law, at least one new federal 

region will have been created in Iraq, bringing the number of 

regional governments to at least two—the Kurdistan Regional Government, of course, being the second. 

The new federal region, I will call the Kufa Regional Government 

that combines the governorates of Najaf, Karbala, and Qadisiyah 

with Babil and Wasit, soon to hold referenda on whether to join 

this new region. 

So, without elaborating from the written testimony, my Iraq, in 

2012, is a federal Iraq; the Constitution has been amended; it’s still 

177 

a unified Iraq, in the sense that it’s one country; and it is slowly 

democratizing. 

My first theme relates to federalism itself, and I am a strong proponent of federalism. 

Words matter, and gradualism is the way forward if the goal is 

the establishment of a federal system in Iraq. Establishing stability 

in a future Iraq is a necessary precondition for the development of 

good governance and a vibrant civil society. The Iraqi experience 

of state-directed violence against specific ethnic and sectarian 

groups, including mass murder and ethnic cleansing, requires a 

new framework for governance that accommodates the political and 

cultural significance of pluralism in Iraqi society. Federalism, as an 

organizing framework for pluralistic societies, is one model that 

can promote stability in Iraq. 

Now, in this regard, it’s been suggested, at various times, that 

the partition of Iraq may be the path that leads to political stabilization. Taking an Iraqi point of view, it is clear to me that the 

term ‘‘partition’’ is unhelpful, perhaps even detrimental, to the goal 

of stabilizing Iraq. The term ‘‘partition’’ immediately causes Iraqis 

to become suspicious, to tune us out, and to be reluctant to engage 

in dialog on power-sharing, decentralization, and federalism. And 

there’s a real irony here. Federalism as a model for governance in 

Iraq has long been supported by proponents such as myself precisely because it is a model that can hold Iraq together as a single 

state, minus the presence of a new dictator. Unfortunately, in the 

current political environment, many Iraqis believe that when 

American officials, scholars, and/or the media use the word ‘‘federalism,’’ we are really using it as a gloss or code word for ‘‘partition.’’ We need to be clear in our use of these terms. If we mean 

‘‘partition,’’ as in the economic and political breakup of Iraq, then 

we should say so. If we mean ‘‘federalism’’ as a means to keep Iraq 

unified, then we should be clear about that, too. Conflation of the 

terms ‘‘partition’’ and ‘‘federalism’’ on our side is not only erroneous, but dangerous, as it contributes to an environment of confusion and mistrust on the part of the Iraqi body politic. 

In order to support the goal of a federally organized Iraq, the 

United States should support workshops, wherein international 

experts on federalism engage directly with Arab Iraqis on issues 

relating to decentralization and power-sharing through case-study 

analysis of examples of federal systems across the globe. In doing 

so, we should emphasize that federalism is not just a Kurdish 

issue; rather, the different models of federalism should be examined on their own merits as they apply or don’t apply to the needs 

and goals of the majority of the citizens of Iraq who live outside 

the Kurdistan region. 

In other words, the situation calls for a fresh analysis of how 

good or bad a fit federalism is for Iraq, irrespective of the longstanding Iraqi Kurdish view that federalism is the only option for 

post-Saddam Iraq. This fresh start, I strongly believe, will encourage Arab buy-in. In particular, emphasis should be placed on the 

case of the UAE, the United Arab Emirates, an Arab state which 

espoused federalism as a model for governance precisely because it 

offered a pathway toward holding the country together and distributing the oil resources fairly in a tribal context. The UAE is an 

178 

example of a pluralistic society in which the pluralism stems from 

tribalism, not ethnicity. This, of course, is an important point for 

Arab Iraqis who reject what they see as the Kurdish insistence on 

ethnic federalism. 

And I would point out here that Washington, DC, has several experts on the UAE, including Edmund Ghareeb at American University, who can attest to the fact that Sheikh Zaid, the founder of the 

Emirates, convened a gathering of political science experts in 1970, 

about there, to consider all the different models of governance, and 

he settled on federalism as a way to avoid tribal warfare in what 

would become the Emirates, and as a way to share the oil fairly 

across the population; i.e., those parts of the Emirates—those federal units that had oil would have to share their resources with 

those parts of the Emirates that did not have oil. 

So, my second theme is that words matter and ‘‘reconciliation’’ 

has been a divisive term in how we have pushed Iraqis to embrace 

it. I would recommend dropping the emphasis on ‘‘reconciliation.’’ 

It’s a term that many Shia—in fact, every Shia person I have ever 

interviewed—rejects, irrespective of their party affiliation. Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani himself rejected the notion as unnecessary, in 

2004, as did his son and spokesman. The Shia community in Iraq 

believes that there is nothing to reconcile about, in terms of Shia/ 

Sunni relations. That is, they assert that they have no problem 

with the Sunnis, per se; rather, the Shia believe that the crucial 

issue is the timely prosecution of crimes committed by the Baath 

Party under the Saddam regime. 

So, I would propose that an alternative to continued United 

States support for the concept of reconciliation is to refocus our 

efforts on activities that bring Iraqis—Iraq’s communities together 

using traditional Arab, tribal, and Islamic mechanisms for dialog 

and conflict resolution that can produce, for example, enhanced 

understanding, ‘‘tafahom’’ in Arabic, which—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, do you elaborate that on your statement, 

what some of those mechanisms are? And if you don’t, I’d like to 

ask you now—not to go into it now, but to amend—you know, make 

an appendix to your—— 

Professor O’LEARY. OK. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. So we—those of us—speak for myself—— 

Professor O’LEARY. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Who don’t fully understand all those 

mechanisms, would have a better sense of what, mechanically, they 

are. 

Professor O’LEARY. I will. 

Senator KERRY. What do you call it? 

Professor O’LEARY. And what do I—— 

Senator KERRY. What do you call it? If it’s not reconciliation, 

what is—— 

Professor O’LEARY. I would—the—I’m getting to that point, Senator. 

I would argue that enhanced understanding—understanding, 

‘‘tafahom’’ in Arabic, which can lead to agreement, ‘‘tawafiq,’’ as in 

the name of the political coalition, which can then lead to consensus, ‘‘ijma.’’ And so, I would say our goal would be to lead Iraqis 

179 

toward a consensus on how to move forward from this painful past, 

rather than reconciliation, which has a different set of implications, 

in my view. And I would argue that we do this using a gradualist 

approach—in other words, let Iraqis take the lead—bringing 

Sunnis and Shia together to focus on how to use traditional Arab 

conflict resolution tools to move toward consensus. That forms the 

basis of my approach, and I will submit the appendix on those 

tools—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be helpful. 

Professor O’LEARY [continuing]. And what they are. 

[The written response of Professor O’Leary follows:] 

This document was prepared in response to Chairman Biden’s request to Professor 

Carole O’Leary at the April 3rd hearing ‘‘Iraq 2012: What Can It Look Like? How 

Do We Get There?’’ to submit additional material on traditional Arab tribal and Islamic traditions of conflict resolution and appropriate terminology to replace the misplaced emphasis on ‘‘reconciliation.’’ 

Specifically, this briefing contextualizes the progression from understanding 

(tafahom) to agreement (tawafiq) to consensus (ijma) within the core tenets of Arab 

tribal and Islamic peace and conflict resolution. 

MUSALAHA PROCESS

Musalaha 

Sulh is the cessation of hostilities—the point arrived at through the process of 

musalaha, and it is related to the word sulah, which along with salaam, means 

peace. It should be noted that Islamic Peace theorists consider sulah to be ‘‘negative 

peace’’, or peace that is not in and of itself a state of long-term amiability and fellowship between two formerly conflicting parties. The conceptual basis for sulh 

comes from the Qur’an, where it is used to refer to righteously reformed behavior, 

or making peace and conciliation. It is a term that applies strictly to conflicts 

amongst Muslims, and is not mentioned in the application of disagreements between 

Muslims and non-Muslims, although there is no limitation to its use in this capacity 

within the Qur’an. In the Qur’an, the use of sulh for resolving conflicts between factions within the Muslim community twice, both verses of which have application to 

Iraq. They are: ‘‘If two parties among the faithful fight, make peace between (aslihu) 

between them. But if one of them transgresses against the other, then fight the aggressor till they comply by the command of God,’’ (49:9) ‘‘The faithful are brothers; 

make peace (aslihu) between your two brothers,’’ (49:10). Within the context of Iraq, 

so long as the Iraqis are themselves willing to recognize that they are in need of 

aslihu, then there are processes by which sulh, or a cessation of hostilities, can lead 

to sulah, or a period of general peace without fighting, which would, with patience 

and time, lead to salaam or a long-lasting sense of goodwill of all the Iraq communities towards each other as part of a Iraqi nation-state. This is all theoretical, so 

the best context in which to place sulh would be in the tribal sense of the word, 

where sulh is used to refer to the positive product of tribal negotiation. 

In conclusion, sulh and its related word musalaha both mean ‘‘cessation of conflict/state of peace/achievement of conciliation)’’, and sulh is the most commonly 

used of the words. Sulh is used in the rural areas of Lebanon, in the Biqa’ Valley 

especially, in Israel amongst Palestinians in the Galilee and Bedouins of the Negev, 

and it is an officially recognized form of conflict resolution by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. For Jordanian Bedouin tribes, sulh means ‘‘the best of judgements’’, 

and they use it in the context of the process of peacemaking and in the outcome 

of the peacemaking (Irani and Funk, 2001: 182–183). There are two varieties of 

sulh, public and private. Public sulh is similar to a peace treaty between countries, 

and is used when there is conflict between two or more tribes that leads to significant bloodshed and property destruction. Public sulh leads to muwada’a, or a peaceful period of a cessation of warfare. Private sulh is a happens when the aggrieved 

parties are within a tribe, and the victim and the perpetrator of the crime is known 

(Irani and Funk, 2001: 183). 

Tawafiq 

The term tawafiq does not have an Islamic connotation, but it means either 

‘‘accordancy’’ or ‘‘accordance’’ in Arabic. The term in English can have three main 

meanings, ‘‘consensus’’, ‘‘adherence to a correct process’’, and ‘‘the bestowal of a particular status or treatment on somebody or something.’’ In English, tawafiq would 

180 

be an equivalent term to ijma’, however there is an important difference between 

the two terms in Arabic. Tawafiq does not appear to be used in a religious sense, 

which ijma’ carries historically and in modern use, and is thus more of a secular 

term. This may be why the Sunni Iraqi political movement, the Tawafiq Bloc, 

named itself ‘‘Tawafiq’’, to imply a strong sense of united strength that must be recognized by its competitors in Iraq, and that it was created from a process of consultation amongst the various Sunni groups that make up that particular coalition. 

Tawafiq may be a better word to use than ijma’ in trying to describe the end product 

of a musalaha that would be promoted amongst the Iraqis, because it does not carry 

the same theological baggage with it. 

Ijma’: A tribal practice that has been Islamicized) 

Ijma’ is a concept that has strong resonance amongst Middle Eastern and Islamic 

people. Ijma’ essentially means ‘‘consensus,’’ usually in the context of reaching a decision that will have a broad impact upon the umma, or community of Muslims. In 

most situations, the emphasis upon ijma’ as a legitimate method of establishing the 

rules of Middle Eastern societies is applied through the offices of scholars of Islamic 

law, who it is asserted, must come to ijma’ in order to create rulings on daily life 

for the Muslim community. Sunni religious scholars differ from their Shia counterparts in that they emphasize the role of ijma’, while Shia religious figures tend to 

highlight the role that ijtihad, or the use of the individual’s intellect and not necessarily with the consultation and consensus of other Shia scholars, in creating daily 

guidelines for living a good Muslim life. Ijma’ is not in and of itself a controversial 

idea, having a long established precedence from the time of the first Islamic Caliph 

Abu Bakr as a legitimate source of decisionmaking in Muslim society, it is the scenarios in which ijma’ can rightly be applied that is up for debate. Generally, ijma’ 

has been the reserve of Islamic religious scholars, who sought ijma’ in relation to 

the creation of, and ruling on, religious laws and norms based upon the historical 

example of the Prophet Muhammad encoded in the sunna, his sayings reported in 

the hadith, and by the immutable revelations of God given to the Muslims through 

Muhammad in the Qur’an. Interestingly enough, the Qur’an was collected and codified through a process that sought ijma’ to ensure the accuracy of the final collected 

Qur’an. 

The grave necessity for a system of consultation to collect the Qur’an into one 

book was a cause of the nature of the revelation of the Qur’an, which was oral, projected by the Prophet Muhammad to his community of believers, who would then, 

inspired by the beauty of the language of God entrusted to Muhammad, often 

memorize the verses word for word, or, if their memory was not strong enough and 

they could write, record the verses that had been revealed on scraps of bark or on 

camel bone. As the Islamic state expanded across the Arabian Peninsula, first under 

the Prophet Muhammad, and then under the command of his successors, especially 

the Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, the number of Companions of the 

Prophet who could recite the entire Qur’an were diminished by death in warfare, 

old age, or senility. Worse still, as the Arab armies were established in military 

bases outside of the main cities of conquered territories of the Near East, Persia, 

Central Asia, and northwestern India, the written Qur’ans that emerged in these 

areas were not all the same. Groups of competing Muslims began to accuse each 

other of heresy, and tried to support their claims by upholding their version of the 

Qur’an as right and true. Mortified by the dissention, which was at times violent, 

amidst the fledgling Islamic umma, Companions of the Prophet, who had special 

status as amongst the first converts of Islam who had known the Prophet and who 

had heard him recite the Qur’an in person, worked with the third Caliph, Uthman, 

to unify the divergent versions of the Qur’an through a process of consultation that 

sought to verify every reported verse of the Qur’an in the various texts before they 

would be accepted as truthfully the words of God. And in fact, there are references 

to the use of ijma’ to unite the Muslim community in the Qur’an itself, the inspiration of which could not be lost upon the Companions of the Prophet and the Muslim 

community, Especially important are these two verses: ‘‘Hold fast to the rope of 

Allah, all of you, and do not split into factions,’’ (3:103) ‘‘Obey Allah and obey the 

Messenger and those who are in charge of affairs among you. Should you happen 

to dispute over something, then refer it to Allah and to the Messenger’’ (4:58–59). 

At the end of this work, an ijma’ was brokered amongst the umma, which led to 

the recording of a faithful version of the Qur’an. 

In the present day the historical example of the collection of the Qur’an into its 

final form is considered one of the most important examples of the application of 

ijma’ as not only a source of democratic intention, but also as a tool to resolve conflict. Ijma’ is vital to the well-being of the Muslim body-politic, and in the absence 

of divine revelation through the Prophet Muhammad, who is the last of the ProphVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00188 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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ets of God, political power of the umma, which is not divine, must incorporate the 

ijma’ of the umma and it is the umma that is sovereign in all political matters. Concerned proponents of democracy in a society that is Muslim, have tried to promote 

the democratic spirit of ijma’ as a means to marry Islamic ideas with ‘‘Western’’ 

ideas of a liberal, citizen-based democracy. The advantage of using a term such as 

ijma’ is that it has a strong historical precedent in the Islamic community, and is 

sought-after product of Islamic theological consultation to determine sharia (Islamic 

religious law). 

Hypothetically, the necessity for ijma’ could lead to a whole range of reforms within Muslim countries that would be in the spirit, if not the exact form, of what is 

now considered ‘‘Western liberal democracy,’’ so long as these reforms do not contradict the Qur’an. In the modern Middle East, public settings such as tribal councils (shuraat), NGO meetings, Parliament assemblies, already employ ijma’, or at 

the very least pretend to utilize ijma’, to solidify public support for policies or decisions. The social negotiations that lead to ijma’ are considered, although still with 

debate, to apply to any person who is above all a member of the umma, whether 

male or female, and who is not a child or mentally handicapped. It should be noted, 

however, that generally speaking, ijma’ is still a concept that has been confined to 

the religious sphere of Islamic societies, and specifically to the debates amongst 

Islamic religious scholars on the merits of this or that point of the sharia. However, 

beyond all the debate that surrounds ijma’ amongst Islamic religious scholars, the 

need for an ijma’ is not disputed. A hadith of the Prophet Muhammad addresses 

ijma’, stating, ‘‘My community will not agree upon misguidance. Therefore you must 

stay with the congregation, and Allah’s hand is over the congregation.’’ As part of 

Islamic political theory, there are four accepted levels of government, all of which 

are required to sustain themselves upon ijma’. These are: The construction of a 

khalifa (an Islamic political society which is not necessarily one led by a Caliph with 

authoritarian powers like some Islamist movements in the modern world suggest) 

that utilizes shura, or a governing body based upon consultation of the umma, 

which tries to implement the sawad al-a’zam, majority rule, which has the ultimate 

objective of supporting what is right action and forbidding what is wrong action. 

Again, these Islamic concepts, invested heavily with ijma’, have application to Western liberal democratic society, with the same issues of majority versus minority 

rights, and determining what is lawful versus unlawful, that vexed the ‘‘Western 

liberal democracies’’ such as the United States. The issue of contention here is what 

exactly is meant by the construction of a khalifa, and what would the role be, and 

the ideological persuasions of, the Islamic religious scholars who would attempt to 

become the de facto ‘‘judicial’’ branch of the Islamic democratic state. Another question to ponder is in the context of multisectarian, multiethnic nation-states, such as 

Iraq, what type of system would develop to incorporate non-Muslim, or divergent 

Muslim, citizens? Would the model be the old millet system of the Ottoman Empire, 

where each community tended to its own civil affairs, and was accorded protection, 

so long as it was considered one of the ‘‘People of the Book,’’ and what role will secular law play within state structures? The most idealistic application of ijma’ would 

be to move it beyond its traditional role of applying to the umma as an Islamic community, and expand the right of participation in the creation of ijma’ to the umma 

of Humanity, beyond the confines first of Islam, and also of ethnicity. But, it might 

be necessary to focus first on the trees rather than the forest, by supporting the 

appreciation of ijma’ as a secular political idea for a nation-state rather than just 

a local (although possibly trans-national) tribal shura secular concept of local governance. At any rate, it will be necessary to move the concern for ijma’ away from 

the strict realm of politics in the context of religious debate. 

Professor O’LEARY. My third theme relates to the importance, in 

my view, of tribalism in Iraqi society. Tribalism is a reality in Iraq. 

That’s a fact. Tribes are an entry point into Iraqi society, and 

United States efforts to promote democratic values in civil society, 

including the rights of women and minorities, should incorporate 

the indigenous tribal system. Why? Tribes have existed in the Middle East for thousands of years. They are a stable form of traditional Middle East collective identity that has weathered the storm 

of colonialism and modernity. And inasmuch as some of the largest 

tribes in Iraq are mixed Sunni and Shia, such as the Shammar and 

the Jabour, it is important for the United States to engage tribesmen and tribeswomen and their leaders in efforts to confront secVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
182 

tarianism and to achieve consensus on the local and national level 

on such important issues as federalism. 

Tribes can also provide a productive avenue for efforts to promote civil society and democratic values. Tribes can offer a safe 

space for discussion of human rights, democratic values, and civil 

society through family and community discussions and low-key 

training programs within tribal communities. Moreover, there are, 

clearly, democratic ideas and traditions within the Arab tribal system itself. Such ideas include notions of consensus-building, of a 

person’s individual autonomy, and of the sheikh as the first among 

equals, as well as such practices as mediation, negotiation, and 

compensation, which come under ‘‘urf,’’ or traditional tribal law. 

My fourth and final theme is personal, and based on my 5 years 

of work in Iraq: Strategic planning for capacity-building is critical. 

In fragile states, management, organizational development, and 

technical capacity are often overlooked. Based on my experience 

with capacity-building efforts in Iraq, I believe it is necessary to 

stress the importance of continued U.S. support for direct assistance to senior-level managers at the national, regional, and 

governorate level. I’m referring, of course, to ministers, deputy ministers, director generals, governors, and the like. 

In particular, I am recommending that U.S. funds be directed at 

one-on-one mentoring, or you might call it ‘‘twinning,’’ programs in 

which an outside expert with high-level management and organizational development experience, as well as the necessary technical 

expertise, is matched to a particular Iraqi senior-level manager for 

a minimum period of 6 months. I have seen, firsthand, the fruits 

of this approach in my work with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In this regard, a key tool, which can be transferred to Iraqi 

managers, is strategic planning, and I can’t stress this enough, how 

valuable this tool is, and how valuable and empowering it can be 

for Iraqis, for whom strategic planning is literally an unknown 

concept. 

And, for those of you who may worry that this approach is hegemonic, I can state that my experience in Baghdad and in the 

Kurdistan region has been that Iraqis are avid consumers of information on how to do strategic planning, particularly through the 

use of strategic planning charts that allow Iraqis to fill in the 

vision of where they want to be in 6 months, a year, 2 years; goals, 

outcomes, and deliverables tied to a timeline. The international 

community has a role to play in advancing these capacities to help 

mitigate the consequences of a lack of political will at the center, 

and also to strengthen emerging political will in the absence of 

strong technical capacity. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Professor O’Leary follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAROLE A. O’LEARY, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF INTER- NATIONAL SERVICE AND PROGRAM DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GLOBAL PEACE, AMER- ICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

I would like to thank Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and the distinguished 

Committee on Foreign Relations for inviting me to appear today to consider what 

Iraq can look like in 2012 and how to get there. I bring to my analysis a cultural 

perspective informed by my background in anthropology and research on governance, human rights, and communal identity dynamics in the former Kurdish Safe 

Haven between 2000 and 2003. Since May 2003, I have been able to work in other 

183 

parts of Iraq, including Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad. My research has focused on understanding tribalism in the post-Saddam context, as well as identifying 

traditional tribal and Islamic mechanisms for conflict resolution and reconciliation. 

Throughout this period, I have had the privilege of supporting USAID and the State 

Department on various grants and contracts for education and human rights capacity-building. It has been an honor to support the brave men and women in our 

Armed Services, USAID, and the Department of State in their efforts to build a stable, democratic Iraq. 

CORE STIPULATIONS

By 2012: 

1. Iraq will have held at least one round of National Elections. 

2. More locally representative provincial governments will be in place after at 

least one round of provincial elections. 

3. Under the Amended Federal Regions Law at least one new federal region will 

have been created in Iraq, bringing the number of regional governments to at least 

two (the Kurdistan Regional Government, plus a second ‘‘Kufa’’ Regional Government that combines Najaf, Karbala, and Qadisiyyah, with Babil and Wassit soon to 

hold referenda on whether to join the new region). 

4. A new election law will replace the closed-list system with either an open-list 

or district-by-district elections. 

5. The Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq or ISCI (formerly known as SCIRI) will 

not survive the passing (from terminal lung cancer) of Sayyed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, 

at least in its current form. His son Sayyed Ammar will establish a moderate faction 

of the party that will remain close to the Kurds and attempt to position itself to 

reach out to professional/technocrat Shia, as well as Iraqis who define themselves 

as tribal and Arab (both Shia and Sunni). 

6. An emerging coalition focused on ‘‘Iraq First’’ and made up of more secular, 

independent Iraqis, Sunni, and Shia, professionals, tribal sheikhs, and their followers, as well as some Kurds, Christians, and Turkmen will challenge the overtly 

religious parties (Shia and Sunni) in the Council of Representatives. Sunni politicians formerly linked to the insurgency will gravitate toward this coalition. 

7. The Shia religious parties—The Sadr Movement, ISCI, Dawa, and Fadhila will 

still have constituencies, but not a majority in the Council of Representatives. 

8. The USG will be focusing its efforts on diplomatic and economic support, particularly in the areas of decentralization and local governance, public administration, management and organizational development, including human resources. 

To achieve a desirable outcome in 2012, the U.S. should: 

1. Set expectations lower than a western-style democracy model for the new Iraq. 

2. Support education and training initiatives that explore how federal models of 

governance work to the benefit of pluralistic societies across the globe (from the U.S. 

and Canada to Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium, to the UAE and India). In particular, support discussion within and across Arab society in Iraq in order to facilitate analysis of the issue separate from Kurdish interests. 

3. Support stability before rapid reforms. 

4. Step back from unrealistic efforts to produce a ‘‘grand bargain’’ reconciliation 

and localize the issue, focusing our efforts and funding on supporting consensus 

building (ijma) within and across communities in a regional context. 

5. Understand that tribalism is part of the fabric of civil society and, with our 

support, can help to mend the sectarian rift in Iraq. 

6. Support the development of new political parties that cut across regional, ethnic, and sectarian divides. 

7. Support capacity-building initiatives that focus on good governance practices, 

including management training in strategic planning, finance, and economic development. 

8. Establish partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi institutions of higher learning, 

to promote exchanges, faculty enhancement and program development. 

Below I identify four key actions which we can take to build a foundation for a stable Iraq in 2012. 

1. Words matter: Parting with ‘‘Partition’’ 

Establishing stability in a future Iraq is a necessary precondition for the development of good governance and a vibrant civil society. The Iraqi experience of statedirected violence against specific ethnic and sectarian groups, including mass 

murder and ethnic cleansing, requires a new framework for governance that accommodates the political and cultural significance of communalism in Iraqi society. FedVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
184 

eralism as an organizing framework for pluralistic societies is one model that could 

promote stability in Iraq. 

In this regard, it has been suggested at various times that partition of Iraq may 

be the path that leads to political stabilization. Taking an Iraqi point of view, it is 

clear that the term ‘‘partition’’ is unhelpful—perhaps even detrimental—to the goal 

of stabilizing Iraq. It immediately causes Iraqis to become suspicious, to tune us out, 

and to be reluctant to engage in dialogue on power-sharing, decentralization, and 

federalism. There is a real irony here—federalism as a model for governance in Iraq 

has long been supported by its proponents, including myself, precisely because it is 

one model that can hold Iraq together as a single state minus a new dictator. 

Unfortunately, in the current political environment many Iraqis believe that when 

American officials, scholars, and/or the media use the word federalism, we are really 

using it as a gloss or codeword for partition. We need to be clear in our use of these 

terms—if we mean partition as in the economic and political break up of Iraq, then 

we should say so—if we mean federalism as a means to keep Iraq unified then we 

should be clear about that, too. Conflation of the terms partition and federalism on 

our side is not only erroneous but dangerous, as it contributes to an environment 

of confusion and mistrust on the part of the Iraqi body politic. 

My second point is that it is not for us as Americans to decide how many federal 

units Iraq should have—for example, if we are analyzing how a model based on regional federalism would work in Iraq, it is not for us to suggest that a three-region 

model is the only, or even the optimal, solution. Rather, our role should be to 

present case study models for comparative analysis and discussion to our Iraqi 

friends so as to empower them in their decisionmaking. Based on my own ongoing 

research, Arab Iraqis who are open to federalism are without doubt more likely to 

think in terms of at least five federal regions, not three. 

In order to support the goal of a federally organized Iraq, the U.S. should support 

workshops wherein international experts on federalism and its variants engage 

directly with Arab Iraqis (without the presence of Kurds) on issues relating to 

decentralization and power-sharing [within the context of case study analysis of examples of federal systems across the globe]. In doing so, we should emphasize that 

federalism is not just a Kurdish issue—rather, the different models of federalism 

should be examined on their own merits as they apply (or don’t apply) to the needs 

and goals of the majority of the citizens of Iraq who live outside the Kurdistan 

Region. In other words, the situation calls for a fresh analysis of how good or bad 

a ‘‘fit’’ federalism is for Iraq, irrespective of the longstanding Iraqi Kurdish view 

that federalism is the only option for post-Saddam Iraq. This fresh start, I believe, 

will encourage Arab ‘‘buy in.’’ 

Particular emphasis should be placed on the case of the UAE, an Arab state 

which espoused federalism as a model for governance precisely because it offered a 

pathway toward holding the country together and distributing the oil resources 

fairly in a tribal context. The UAE is an example of a pluralistic society in which 

the pluralism stems from tribalism, not ethnicity. This of course is an important 

point for Arab Iraqis who reject what they see as a Kurdish insistence on ethnic 

federalism. 

Ongoing interviews conducted [in Jordan and Iraq since 2006] with Sunni and Shia 

Arab Iraqis with tribal identities, suggest the following trends: 

1. Only a very small percent of Arab Iraqis—Sunni and Shia—support regional 

federalism in the sense of a small number of large regions tied to sect and ethnicity. 

2. While the majority of Arab Shia accept federalism as a general concept, they 

reject regional or ethnosectarian federalism in favor of much smaller administrative 

federal units based on the existing governorates outside the Kurdistan Region. 

Moreover they support a limited amount of decentralization and a power-sharing 

formula that leaves intact key powers for the central government. I say this not 

withstanding the well-known position espoused by Sayyed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in 

support of a large, unitary southern federal region for Iraq. 

3. Iraqis in general appear to overwhelmingly reject partition—and here I would 

include the leadership of the Kurdish coalition which is openly committed to a single 

Iraq under a democratic, pluralistic, and federal system. That said, the same leadership openly asserts that if Iraq moves away from a democratic, pluralistic, and federal model of governance, they will exercise their right to self-determination—whatever form that might take under a given scenario. 

4. Pundits and the media—both here and in Iraq—have often twisted the meaning 

of the so-called Biden-Gelb plan, as well as the Biden-Brownback nonbinding resolution. In no part does either document call for the partition or dismemberment of 

Iraq. Both documents are clearly committed to a vision of a unified Iraq under a 

system of regional, economic federalism in which the glue, so to speak, is that the 

185 

1See, for example, ‘‘Iraq: Reconciliation Conference Underscores Political, Sectarian Rifts,’’ 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RRE/RL Newsline) Wednesday, March 26, 2008. 

regions—including the Sunni region—will receive a fair share of the oil revenues to 

be distributed on the basis of population, not on the basis of how much oil or gas 

a particular region may have. 

5. The longstanding and robust Kurdish support for regional and economic federalism has obfuscated the issue for Arab Iraqis, as well as served to ‘‘turn them 

off’’ (as the Kurdish embrace of federalism created a visceral Iraqi Arab reaction and 

rejection of the concept). 

We are not yet at the point where we can talk about implementing an Arab vision 

of federalism for Iraq. Rather, an education campaign is needed to debunk the idea 

that ‘‘federalism for Iraq’’ is a conspiracy by the U.S. aimed at dividing Iraq and 

stealing its oil. 

Engaging Sunni rejectionists on this issue requires understanding Sunni concerns. 

Among the issues raised by my Iraqi Sunni Arab interviewees are the following: No 

clear understanding of how federalism provides economical benefits to local communities; and no clear understanding of how federalism will serve to equitably divide 

Iraq’s resources among its citizens. 

The Arab Sunni view is driven by the need to see Iraq unified under a central 

government not tied to Iran, ensuring equal distribution of resources. The Kurds 

favor regional and economic federalism in order to consolidate de facto independence. The Shia political figures are seeking some form of federalism allowing them 

more control over the Iraqi population and natural resources in the south, a view 

supported by Iran. From an Arab Sunni point of view: (1) Iran’s interference in Iraqi 

politics is at the heart of the problem; (2) the Shia-controlled central government 

has been unable to impose its political will in Shia areas in the south and, at the 

same time, has almost no ability to assert power in Sunni areas, rendering it an 

ineffective political contributor to the federalism debate; and (3) the Arab Sunni 

community will not even begin to contemplate federalism as a viable form of governance until it feels comfortable with and confident about the Shia-controlled central 

government’s political intensions. 

2. Words matter: Moving away from ‘‘Reconciliation’’ as a rallying theme 

U.S. civilian and military personnel should strive to use terms and experiences 

that Iraqis can relate to. But, this is not just about using words Iraqis can understand, rather it is about helping them make the changes they think they need— 

keeping Iraqis at the fore. Indeed, it is not about pushing America ideas, but rather 

supporting Iraqi ones, letting Iraqis come up with their own ideas about how they 

think development should proceed, and, in turn, U.S. personnel providing support 

for these ideas as they see appropriate. 

Renewed focus should also be given to the importance of the culture of honor 

(sharaf) in Iraq. Keeping one’s word of honor and following through on promises, 

especially at the communal level, is something that transcends any cultural or religious differences, not to mention proving key to strengthening ties among Iraqis and 

between Iraqis and Americans. Indeed, increasingly, for Iraqis, honor is not only 

meant to be employed in the rhetorical sense, but also practically speaking. Meeting 

some of their most basic needs remains a priority for many Iraqis. Thus, taking 

more initiatives to show how keeping one’s word of honor (on both sides) can materialize in terms of real benefits is a worthy goal. This may prove critical to any continued U.S. reconstruction efforts. 

Second, I would recommend dropping the emphasis on reconciliation—a term that 

many Shia, irrespective of party affiliation, find offensive.1 Grand Ayatollah Sistani 

himself rejected the notion as unnecessary in 2004. The Shia community in Iraq 

believes that there is nothing to reconcile about in terms of Shia-Sunni relations; 

that is, they assert that they have no problem with Sunnis per se. Rather, the issue 

for them is the timely prosecution of crimes committed by the Baath Party under 

the Saddam Regime. 

An alternative to continued U.S. support for the concept of reconciliation, is to 

refocus our efforts on activities that bring Iraq’s communities together using traditional tribal and Islamic mechanisms for dialogue and conflict resolution that can 

produce enhanced understanding (tafahom) which can then lead to agreement 

(tawafiq) which can then lead to consensus (ijma), utilizing a gradualist approach. 

Bringing Shia and Sunnis together, to focus on how to use traditional ‘‘Arab’’ conflict 

resolution tools to move toward consensus, forms the basis of this approach. 

186 

3. Tribalism: An example of traditional communal identity in Iraq that transcends 

sect and is part of the fabric of civil society 

The image of a triangle or pyramid is used to represent people who organize 

themselves socially and politically through the metaphor of blood: Descent from a 

common ancestor, real or imagined, through one’s father’s line. Tribe represents a 

communal identity which is both a form of sociopolitical organization (e.g., like a 

state, nation-state, or a kingdom) and a cultural identity based on notions of kinship 

and genealogy, honor and autonomy. Persons holding a tribal identity are not limited in their economic activities. Tribesmen and women can be pastoral nomads, village agriculturalists, shopkeepers in towns, heads of corporations in cities or rulers 

of nation-states (e.g., in Saudi, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Yemen, etc.). 

Far from being a relic of the past or a ‘‘primitive’’ vestige of social organization, 

‘‘tribe’’ in some modern contexts can be a constructive element in sustaining modern 

national identity (e.g., Jordan and Saudi Arabia). Thinking about how Middle Easterners understand their tribal identities allows us to have a window on how shared 

ideas about morality, honor, and the nature of society relate to concepts of reconciliation and conflict resolution as we understand them. Thus, while this is not an 

argument in support of tribalism per se, tribalism is a reality (or ‘‘social fact’’) in 

Iraq. Tribes are an entry point into Iraqi society and U.S. efforts to promote democratic values and civil society in Iraq, including the rights of women and minorities, 

should incorporate the indigenous tribal system. Why? Tribes have existed in the 

Middle East for thousands of years. They are a stable form of traditional Middle 

East collective identity that has weathered the storms of colonialism and modernity. 

And, inasmuch as some of the largest tribes in Iraq are mixed Sunni and Shia, it 

is important for the U.S. to engage tribesmen and tribeswomen and their leaders 

in efforts to confront sectarianism and achieve consensus on the local and national 

levels. 

Tribes can also provide a productive avenue for efforts to promote civil society and 

democratic values in Iraq inasmuch as tribes men and women understand their 

tribal identity through the metaphor of family (kinship and genealogy). Thus, tribes 

can offer a safe space for discussion of human rights, democratic values, and civil 

society through family and community discussions and low-key training programs 

within tribal communities. Moreover, there are clearly democratic ideas and traditions within the tribal system itself. Such ideas include notions of consensus-building, of individual autonomy and of the sheikh as the first among equals, as well as 

such practices as mediation, negotiation, and compensation which come under ‘urf 

or traditional tribal law. 

4. Strategic planning for capacity-building from the top and the bottom 

In fragile states, management, organizational development, and technical capacity 

are often overlooked. We assume that governments make bad decisions because of 

the lack of political will, when the lack of management, organizational development 

and technical capacity can also feed bad decisions. Capacity works at all levels— 

national, regional, local. But approaches to building capacity require education and 

training—introduction of strategies to strengthen relationships, promote a shared 

vision, determine the allocation of resources in line with national goals, etc. Building technical capacity includes leadership and leadership training, so that organizations at all levels of the system understand how to implement their mandates under 

a clear set of rules and regulations. Capacity includes knowledge and skills that are 

necessary for administrators and managers who must manage an emerging system. 

Based on my experience with capacity-building efforts in Iraq, I want to stress 

the importance of continued U.S. support for direct assistance to senior-level managers at the national, regional, and governorate levels (e.g., Ministers, Director Generals, Governors, etc.). In particular I am recommending that U.S. funds be directed 

at one-on-one mentoring, or twinning, programs in which an outside expert with 

high-level management and organizational development experience, as well as the 

necessary technical expertise, is matched to a particular Iraqi senior-level manager 

for a minimum period of 6 months. I have seen first-hand the fruits of this approach 

in my work with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In this regard, a key tool 

which can be transferred to Iraqi managers is strategic planning. I can not stress 

enough how valuable this tool can be for Iraqis for whom strategic planning is an 

unknown concept. And, for those of you who may worry that this approach is hegemonic, I can state for the record that my experience has been that Iraqis are avid 

consumers of information on how to do strategic planning, particularly through the 

use of strategic planning charts that allow Iraqis to fill in goals, outcomes, and 

deliverables matched to a timeline. The international community has a role to play 

in advancing these capacities to help mitigate the consequences of a lack of political 

187 

will, and to strengthen emerging political will in the absence of strong technical 

capacity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. It was very helpful. 

Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAWN BRANCATI, FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF 

QUANTITATIVE SOCIAL STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 

CAMBRIDGE, MA 

Dr. BRANCATI. Thank you very much. 

So, I, too, agree that a federal system is an important tool to 

implement in Iraq. In order to achieve a sustainable peace in 2012 

and beyond, I argue, Iraq needs to put in place a viable federal 

system. 

At the outset, the Iraqi Constitution defines Iraq as a single, 

independent federal state. Subsequently, it carves out a political 

system that broadly shared decisionmaking authority among multiple tiers of government. Great strides, however, have yet to be 

made before this system is realized in practice. 

Federalism is not only an appropriate political system for Iraq, 

but a vital one with which to build peace in the country. Federalism is not partition, nor is federalism necessarily the first step 

on a short road toward partition. On the contrary, federalism can 

be a crucial tool for avoiding state dissolution in Iraq. 

So, why is federalism an appropriate system for Iraq? Federalism 

can promote peace by moving issues that are potential sources of 

conflict from the national sphere to the subnational level, where 

groups can decide these matters on their own. At the subnational 

level, groups, in turn, can tailor policies that meet their specific 

needs and goals, allowing for what former President Clinton has 

described as ‘‘the best of all worlds.’’ 

Why doesn’t federalism necessarily lead to separatism? Federalism allows groups to benefit from being a member of a larger 

state, which may include, as the Iraqi Constitution stipulates, border protection and revenue-sharing, while still exerting control over 

issues that are most important to them. 

Nonetheless, the effect of federalism on Iraq will not necessarily 

be immediate. Initially, federalism will be characterized by a lot of 

push and pull as Iraqis struggle to find the appropriate level of 

decentralization for their country. This push and pull will likely be 

present for the foreseeable future, although probably not with as 

much intensity as of now. 

Federalism’s flexibility, in this respect, is one of its key 

strengths, however. A system that is not flexible will snap under 

pressure. 

I make these claims, not based on anecdotal evidence or a few 

selectively chosen case studies; instead, I make these claims based 

on hard data. So, in a statistical analysis of 50 democracies around 

the world over nearly six decades, I find that decentralization results in a 70-percentage-point decrease in antiregime rebellion and 

a 44-percentage-point decrease in the intercommunal conflict. 

I also find that having more extensive forms of decentralization 

decreases intrastate conflict over less extensive ones. The specific 

areas I examined in this analysis include the ability of regions to 

188 

raise their own revenue and exert control over education and public 

order or police. 

While these numbers may seem obtuse, in terms of human lives 

they are starkly apparent. Moreover, there is also a tendency, 

when you hear figures like these, to claim that a particular case 

is unique and does not fit an established mold. It is true, countries 

are unique, and Iraq is different from other countries in many respects. After all, Iraq has no prior history with federalism. In fact, 

federalism is not a very common practice in the Middle East at all, 

as many critics of a federal Iraq have pointed out. 

The fact, however, that Iraq has no prior history with federalism, 

or that federalism is an uncommon form of governance in the Middle East, is irrelevant to this discussion. Many countries that have 

vibrant democracies today did not have strong prior histories with 

democracy. The same is true with federalism. History must begin 

somewhere, and Iraqi’s democratic history must begin with federalism. 

Not every variant of federalism will engender peace in Iraq, however. For federalism to be successful, the central authority must 

not be hollow. If it is, subunits of the state are likely to have very 

little incentives to stay within Iraq. The central government must 

also be independent; that is, it must not rely on the goodwill of the 

subunits to function, since this goodwill is unlikely to be forthcoming. Various parties within Iraq, and the Middle East more 

generally, are also unlikely to accept this system in practice. 

Dissolving specific powers to the subnational level in Iraq will 

not necessarily lead to peace, for federalism is not a one-size-fitsall system. Whether devolution of certain powers encourages peace 

is likely to depend on the particular demands of the Iraqi people. 

Devolving authority in areas not solicited by specific groups is unlikely to contribute to a stable Iraq. 

Only a federal system, moreover, that builds ties across subunits 

of the state and across ethnolinguistic and religious and tribal 

groups will promote peace in Iraq. Federalism requires cooperation 

among subunits of the state, but it does not necessarily encourage 

it. 

Cooperation must, therefore, be incentivized. In other words, cooperation must be built into the system. This is particularly the 

case in terms of oil revenue-sharing. The party system, I believe, 

is key in this regard. Party systems must be overarching. That is, 

they must fully incorporate people from different regions, 

ethnolinguistic, religious, and tribal groups. Parties in the conflict 

situation, such as in Iraq, may not naturally involve this way. The 

system must, therefore, require it legislatively. 

In the same 50-country study of federalism I’ve already mentioned, I found that the effectiveness of federalism in reducing conflict is severely curtailed when the party system is dominated by 

regional parties. Regional parties focus on what is in the best interest of their group, and not necessarily what is in the best interest 

of the country as a whole or that of other groups. As such, regional 

parties can be a major hindrance to peace. 

It is foolhardy to believe, however, that federalism alone can engender peace in Iraq. Federalism will not bring the war in Iraq to 

an end. The war must first end for federalism to operate effectively. 

189 

1Former U.S. President Bill Clinton once stated that ‘‘I think if we will keep this in mind— 

what is most likely to advance our common humanity in a small world, and what is the arrangement of government most likely to give us the best of all worlds, the integrity we need, the selfgovernment we need, the self-advancement we need . . . I think more and more people will say, 

this federalism, it’s not such a bad idea.’’ See Edison Stewart, ‘‘Clinton Weighs in With Plea 

to Quebec,’’ Toronto Star, October 9, 1999. 

Federalism must also be buttressed by economic development 

and a stable security force that acts as a deterrent to violence. This 

is particularly problematic if the United States pulls out of Iraq before stability is achieved and key structures are in place. 

In order to realize these goals in 2012 and beyond, federalism 

needs the support and encouragement of the United States, as 

called for in the Biden-Brownback amendment. The United States, 

of course, should not impose federalism on Iraq, but this amendment does not call for such action. U.S. encouragement is needed, 

however, to overcome classic commitment problems; that is, in 

order to realize federalism, parties must share power and trust 

that the other side will share power, as well. However, since one 

party may shirk, other parties may be reluctant to commit to federalism in the first place; thus, a third party, like the United 

States, is needed to ensure that both parties commit to federalism 

and take action against violations of the system. 

While it is impossible to know what will befall Iraq in the leadup 

to 2012, extant knowledge suggests that, even with federalism, the 

current prognosis for Iraq looks weak. However, without federalism, the prognosis looks even bleaker. 

[The prepared statement of Professor Brancati follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. DAWN BRANCATI, FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF

QUANTITATIVE SOCIAL STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA 

In order to achieve a sustainable peace in 2012 and beyond, Iraq needs to put in 

place a viable federal system. At the outset, the Iraqi Constitution defines Iraq as 

a ‘‘single independent federal state.’’ Subsequently, it carves out a political system 

that broadly shares decisionmaking authority among multiple tiers of government. 

Great strides have yet to be made, however, before this system is realized in practice. 

Federalism is not only an appropriate political system for Iraq, but a vital one 

with which to build peace in the country. Federalism is not partition. Nor, is federalism necessarily the first step on a short road toward partition. On the contrary, 

federalism can be a crucial tool for avoiding state dissolution in Iraq. 

Why is federalism an appropriate system for Iraq? Federalism can promote peace 

by moving issues that are potential sources of conflict from the national sphere to 

the subnational level, where groups can decide these matters on their own. At the 

subnational level, groups can tailor policies that meet their specific needs and goals, 

allowing for what former President Clinton has described as the ‘‘the best of all 

worlds.’’ 1

Why doesn’t federalism necessarily lead to separatism? Federalism allows groups 

to benefit from being a member of a larger state, which may include, as the Iraqi 

Constitution stipulates, border protection and revenue-sharing, while still exerting 

control over issues that are most important to them. 

Nevertheless, the effect of federalism on Iraq will not necessarily be immediate. 

Initially, federalism will be characterized by a lot of push and pull as Iraqis struggle 

to find the appropriate level of decentralization for their country. This push and pull 

will likely be present for the foreseeable future although probably not with as much 

intensity. Federalism’s flexibility in this respect is one of its key strengths, however. 

A system that is not flexible will snap under pressure. 

I make these claims not based on anecdotal evidence or a few selectively chosen 

case studies. Instead, I make these claims based on hard data. In a statistical analysis of 50 democracies around the world over nearly six decades, I find that decentralization results in a 70-percentage-point decrease in antiregime rebellion and a 

190 

2These figures are based on a statistical analysis of antiregime rebellion and intercommunal 

conflict in Dawn Brancati, forthcoming, ‘‘Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict Through 

Decentralization’’ (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford UP). The models include variables for decentralization, 

regional party vote, political and civil rights, type of electoral system, age of democracy, 

ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and GDP. The models show that holding every variable but decentralization at its mean, that decentralization decreases antiregime rebellion by 0.70 points and 

decreases intercommunal conflict by 0.44 points. Different models yield different figures 

although across models, the effect of decentralization is strongly significant. 3Typically, central governments have jurisdiction—singular or shared with regional authorities—over issues that affect a country as a whole or issues that subunits of a state cannot provide for individually. 

44-percentage-point decrease in intercommunal conflict.2 I also find that having 

more extensive forms of decentralization decreases intrastate conflict over less extensive ones. The specific areas I examined in this analysis include the ability of 

regions to raise their own revenue and exert control over education and public order 

or police. 

While these numbers may seem obtuse, in terms of human lives, they are starkly 

apparent. There is also a tendency when you hear figures like these to claim that 

a particular case is unique and does not fit an established mold. It is true countries 

are unique and Iraq is different from other countries in many respects. After all, 

Iraq has no prior history with federalism. In fact, federalism is not a very common 

practice in the Middle East at all, as many critics of a federal Iraq have pointed 

out. 

The fact, however, that Iraq has no prior history with federalism, or that federalism is an uncommon form of governance in the Middle East, is irrelevant to this 

discussion. Many countries that have vibrant democracies today did not have strong 

prior histories with democracy. The same is true of federalism. History must begin 

somewhere and Iraq’s democratic history must begin with federalism. 

Not every variant of federalism will engender peace in Iraq, however. For federalism to be successful, the central authority must not be hollow. If it is, subunits 

of the state are likely to have very little incentive to stay within Iraq.3 The central 

government must also be independent. That is, it must not rely on the goodwill of 

the subunits to function since this goodwill is unlikely to be forthcoming. Various 

parties within Iraq and the Middle East more generally are also unlikely to accept 

this system in practice. 

Devolving specific powers to the subnational level in Iraq will not necessarily lead 

to peace, for federalism is not a one-size-fits-all system. Whether devolution of certain powers encourages peace, is likely to depend on the particular demands of the 

Iraqi people. Devolving authority in areas not solicited by specific groups is unlikely 

to contribute to a stable Iraq. 

Only a federal system, moreover, that builds ties across subunits of the state and 

across ethnolinguistic and religious groups will promote peace in Iraq. Federalism 

requires cooperation among subunits of a state, but it does not necessarily encourage it. Cooperation must, therefore, be incentivized. In other words, cooperation 

must be built into the system. This is particularly the case in terms of oil revenue 

sharing. 

The party system, I believe, is key in this regard. Party systems must be overarching. That is, they must fully incorporate people from different regions and 

ethnolinguistic and religious groups. Parties in a conflict situation, such as in Iraq, 

may not naturally evolve this way. The system must, therefore, require it legislatively. 

In the same 50-country study of federalism I’ve already mentioned, I found that 

the effectiveness of federalism in reducing conflict is severely curtailed when the 

party system is dominated by regional parties. Regional parties focus on what is in 

the best interests of their group and not necessarily what is in the best interests 

of the country as a whole, or that of other groups. As such, regional parties can be 

a major hindrance to peace. 

It is foolhardy to believe, however, that federalism alone can engender peace in 

Iraq. Federalism will not bring the war in Iraq to an end. The war must first end 

for federalism to operate effectively. Federalism must also be buttressed by economic development and a stable security force that acts as a deterrent to violence. 

This is particularly problematic if the U.S. pulls out of Iraq before stability is 

achieved and key structures are in place. 

In order to realize these goals, federalism needs the support and encouragement 

of the U.S., as called for in the Biden-Brownback amendment. The U.S., of course, 

should not impose a federal system on Iraq. But, the Biden-Brownback plan does 

not call for such action. U.S. encouragement is needed to overcome classic commitment problems. That is, in order to realize federalism, parties must share power and 

191 

trust that the other side will share power as well. However, since one party may 

shirk, other parties may be reluctant to commit to federalism in the first place. 

Thus, a third party, like the U.S., is needed to ensure that both parties commit to 

federalism and take action against violations of this system. 

While it is impossible to know what will befall Iraq in the lead up to 2012, extant 

knowledge suggests that even with federalism the current prognosis for Iraq looks 

bleak. Without federalism, however, the prognosis looks even bleaker. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Kelly. 

STATEMENT OF DR. TERRENCE K. KELLY, SENIOR OPERATIONS RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION, PITTSBURGH, 

PA 

Dr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members 

of the committee, it’s an honor for me to be here today to share 

some thoughts on Iraq’s prospects in the future and how this will 

be shaped by, and influence, United States interests and policies. 

My observations that I’ll share with you today are based on two 

tours in Iraq, 5 months with the CPA, trying to demobilize militias, 

at which time I met almost daily with the leaders of these groups, 

and then 14 months running the policy planning and analysis shop 

for the Embassy. I came back almost a year ago; a year ago next 

week, I returned. 

Permit me to jump right to my conclusions and to refer you to 

my written statement for the arguments that lead me to them. 

First, the conflict in Iraq is not likely to be resolved anytime 

soon. Efforts to create a government that would not only include 

all major Iraqi sectarian and ethnic factions, but also equitably 

address their needs, will not succeed in the near future, if at all. 

Many of the most influential Iraqi political players have fought 

each other and killed the others’ family members, friends, and colleagues for their entire adult lives. Reconciliation is at least a generation away. 

Next, we are trying to do too much in Iraq. Unless one thinks 

that the United States can maintain very high troop and civilian 

manpower levels in Iraq for the foreseeable future, we need to 

define what we must do, as opposed to what we would like to do, 

and commit resources accordingly. This requires a clear articulation of U.S. vital interests and policies and strategies based on 

these. Securing United States, rather than Iraqi, interests will 

have profound implications for our approach and required resources. 

Finally, although reconciliation may be far off, violence must be 

controlled. Rather than try to force reconciliation, we should focus 

on how Iraq could reach a modus vivendi and what needs to be 

done within this process to secure United States vital interests. As 

the development of this modus vivendi will take a long time, U.S. 

efforts should focus on achieving long-term effects. Policies aimed 

at affecting facts on the ground today, that have limited long-term 

effects, may have good, altruistic justifications, but should not 

drive U.S. policy, and should be based on cost-benefit calculations. 

If a modus vivendi is what is needed, what might it look like? 

On the political front, Iraq is likely to be dominated by Shia religious parties for some time to come. Confederalization—and I 

believe it is a confederal arrangement they have, not a federal 

192 

arrangement—may produce three or more regions, and will take 

time. This may cause population migrations and the development 

of political, social, and security circumstances unique to each 

region. Some mix of regions, along with provinces not part of any 

region, may be the end result; in fact, it’s likely to be the end result. Iran will have a lot of influence on this process, and the 

United States should work with, and seek to influence, Iran and 

Iraq’s other neighbors to get the best outcome. 

Secular or moderate Islamic parties could come into being if they 

are funded and protected, but otherwise will not. Given current circumstances, it is unlikely that there will be any such parties of significance soon. If the United States large-scale presence departs before these parties are an established part of the Arab-Iraqi political 

and social fabric, they will not be able to start for a very long time, 

if at all. 

The Iraq Security Forces will become more sectarian as the Shiadominated government puts its people into key positions, and will 

remain weak and of questionable loyalty until sometime after a 

modus vivendi is reached. The security forces will eventually become more competent, after a period of turmoil, as they expand and 

new leaders take charge. If Iran plays a major role in the development of these forces, and they have offered to provide security assistance to the Government of Iraq, then some part of them will be 

radicalized under the influence of Iran’s Quds Force. This makes 

it critical for the United States military to stay engaged with the 

Iraqi Security Forces for some time, in my opinion. 

Unless a reasonable modus vivendi is reached, one implication of 

sectarian government may be government-sponsored violence that 

targets the Sunni population as the security forces go after terrorists and insurgents. We should expect to see many civilian casualties of U.S. forces leave before stable order is established. 

If large-scale political violence continues as regions are formed, 

this may lead to measures aimed at controlling the flow of people 

across regional borders and armed confrontation between the various Iraqi Government and regional security forces. Shia militias 

will be impossible to disband, and will likely be rolled into these 

forces. 

Social developments driven by Iraq’s education system, Iraqi and 

regional media, and religion will cause many of these changes. If 

radical influences are left unchecked, the Iraqi education system 

and the poisonous regional media could produce generations of 

Iraqis who hate and distrust the United States. This could result 

in a social structure that is inward-looking, and, in the worst case, 

combine a political anti-Americanism, like that in Iran, with a popular anti-Americanism, like that in Saudi Arabia. 

This is a grim portrait, but long-term United States efforts can 

help mitigate the worst of these scenarios, particularly if undertaken in partnership with other major players, both inside and outside of Iraq. Short-term efforts will not significantly mitigate these 

ill outcomes. 

To be successful, we should recognize a few critical facts. First, 

we must put U.S. interests first and clearly recognize the limits of 

U.S. capabilities, both institutionally and politically and over the 

long term. In particular, efforts to help Iraqis create a stable Iraq 

193 

that is a friend of the United States will not be completed in the 

next few years. As a result, the United States needs a nonpartisan 

set of basic understandings about what is important to America in 

Iraq, and a sustainable level of investments that will enable the 

United States to take care of its vital interests. 

I should point out that, although I’m speaking now about vital 

interests, the United States has other types of interests, which 

should also be part of our strategic calculations. 

Second, Iraq’s political leaders and organizations, along with the 

foundation provided by Iraq’s social structures, will play a more important role in the long term than military efforts, with the exception of those required to prevent the overthrow of the Iraqi Government or the dissolution of the state. They will determine what kind 

of security forces Iraq will have, how Iraq views terrorism in the 

West, and how they approach their problems. This is an area in 

which I believe we can have a positive influence. To make gains 

here, we must change the political calculations of Iraq’s major 

political players, and we can only do that by demonstrating a willingness to use strong measures and providing lasting benefits. Our 

investments should reflect this reality. 

Third, Iraq will not be a secular, democratic, pluralistic society 

anytime soon, but could be a country with which the United States 

has a good relationship, and, in the long run, does well by regional 

standards of development and human rights. It is worth noting 

that the United States may not want as a formal ally, as it would 

be a dependent client for a long time. An Iraq that is not hostile, 

controls its territory, and does not threaten its neighbors might be 

a better outcome. 

Finally, the United States must bring its goals in line with its 

capabilities or invest in the additional capabilities needed to 

achieve its goals. The current mismatch between ends and means 

is neither effective nor sustainable. 

None of this is likely to come about as a result of U.S. unilateral 

actions. Five years of large-scale, largely unilateral actions have 

made this clear. Successful American efforts to influence Iraq’s 

modus vivendi will necessarily involve working with, and influencing, not only those states and political actors with whom we 

agree, but also many with whom we disagree; and, in particular, 

Iraq’s neighbors. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kelly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. TERRENCE K. KELLY, SENIOR OPERATIONS

RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION, PITTSBUGH, PA 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the committee, it is an 

honor for me to be here today to share some thoughts on Iraq’s prospects in the 

future, and how this will be shaped by, and influence, U.S. interests and policies. 

You have asked me to address what Iraq may look like in 2012, and how we might 

get there. Permit me to first give you an overview of the argument I would like to 

make today. 

First, the conflict in Iraq is not likely to be resolved any time soon. True reconciliation is likely at least a generation away. Furthermore, though some talk of ‘‘victory’’ and similar terms, we do not know what that means, though we may know 

it after we see it. In particular, this is not a war between nation-states, there is 

no enemy army to defeat, and in several important cases it is quite difficult to identifying who the ‘‘enemy’’ is. Even when we know who he is, there are often no easy 

194 

1 As one senior Kurdish politician put it in February 2006, making reference to the SunniShia conflict, ‘‘They killed the grandsons of the Prophet here 1,200 years ago [sic], and nothing 

much has changed since.’’ His point was that Iraqis had to either agree to move forward together—establish a modus vivendi—or go their separate ways. 

ways to ‘‘defeat’’ him, as he may be an integral part of the government we have chosen to support and is always among the population we are committed to defend. 

Next, we are trying to do too much in Iraq. Unless one thinks that the U.S. can 

maintain very high troop levels in Iraq for the foreseeable future, we need to clearly 

understand what we must do as opposed to what we would like to do, and commit 

resources accordingly. This requires a clear articulation of U.S. vital interests. While 

it is difficult to build a strategy that relies on hindsight to assess progress and success, it is not difficult to articulate U.S. interests in Iraq—something that has not 

been done in a manner that is useful to strategist and planners. U.S., not Iraqi, interests should drive our strategy, and they will have profound implications on our 

approach and required resources. 

To explore such an approach and provide a statement on how we get to 2012, I 

will first review some facts about the situation in Iraq, and then propose two vital 

U.S. interests that I believe should drive our approach. I then argue that what is 

needed is an Iraqi modus vivendi rather than a comprehensive reconciliation, and 

discuss how such arrangements might come about, as well as what U.S. interests 

and capabilities imply that we should do to affect this modus vivendi. I will conclude 

by touching on what Iraq, and our involvement in Iraq, might look like in 2012 and 

beyond. 

PRELIMINARIES

Violence in Iraq has decreased dramatically. Pundits have conflicting arguments 

for why this has happened, but in one important way such discussions are academic. 

The fact of the matter is that violence needed to be reduced for political progress 

to be made, and violence has been reduced. That, in itself, gives cause for cautious 

optimism. However, this decrease has been achieved by working with local leaders, 

due to the realization that national reconciliation was not likely in the near term. 

I believe that this process has gone about as far as it can to reduce violence. Further 

advances will require Iraqi national-level leaders to eschew political violence, as 

they control most of the levers for large-scale violence. Yet, I also believe that 

national reconciliation remains far off. So, what is to be done? 

First, let us review some facts. 

Principal among these facts is that efforts to create a government that would not 

only include all major Iraqi sectarian and ethnic factions, but also equitably address 

their needs, will not succeed in the near future, if at all. Many of the most influential Iraqi political players hold longstanding, blood-soaked negative perspectives of 

other major players. Many of these actors have fought and killed each other for 

their entire adult lives, and in some cases their factions have fought each other for 

centuries.1 The Shia leadership currently in power is in the process of establishing 

a sectarian government that favors the Shia; the Kurds are seeking to ensure that 

they maintain effective, though not formal, independence; and the Sunni continue 

to be torn by deep internal divisions and an emerging struggle over political leadership, which, together with the violent trends and anti-Shia worldviews current in 

that community, make the continued existence of Sunni political violence very 

likely. As the Shia consolidate power under the cover of the U.S. presence in Iraq, 

their internal divisions are coming to the fore and increasingly manifesting themselves in Shia on Shia violence, as we have seen over the past few years, and the 

past 10 days in particular. In short, the political situation in Iraq is not, and will 

not be, conducive to creating a pluralistic, democratic society for some time. But, 

that does not mean that Iraq’s future cannot benefit U.S. strategic interests. That 

is a tougher question, and one I will return to shortly. 

With respect to security, 5 years of data indicates that political violence will 

remain a characteristic of Iraqi society for some time to come. Even with the reductions seen since mid-2007, violence remains at unacceptably high rates. In particular, two facts are critical. First, the ‘‘accelerants’’ of violence—primarily suicide 

bombings and assassinations carried out by Sunni and Shia extremists—are 

extremely difficult to defend against, and will only be defeated when and if the government develops security forces and intelligence capabilities that are large enough, 

capable enough, and loyal enough to control and secure the population, and the population in turn identifies the violent actors to enable the government to kill or capture them. The population can, and will only, turn extremists in when it feels safe 

to do so. General Petraeus and the men and women of the MNF–I, along with some 

195 

sectors of the Iraqi Security Forces, have done great work, but it is not yet enough. 

Further reductions in violence will require more, and more capable and trustworthy, 

Iraqi security forces. 

The second consideration is that political power in Iraq is largely held by those 

parties that have armed factions answerable to party leaders. Almost all of these 

parties have leaders who are senior members of government. This all but ensures 

that many of the most influential government leaders will not truly cooperate to 

eliminate the extra-governmental armed groups that are responsible for violence. It 

is critical to understand that they maintain these armed organizations for their 

political and physical survival, not just their ambitions. Only significantly different 

political and security conditions will change this. 

An important and often overlooked fact that has a large effect on the prospects 

for political and security gains is the widespread and largely unchecked criminal activity in much of Iraq. Criminality not only makes economic activity difficult, but 

contributes to the circumstances that permit all violent actors to operate without 

detection, and in many cases provides funding for these actors (though some of the 

most important of these have succeeded in putting most of their armed members 

on the government payroll, and so are no longer dependent on criminal activity or 

external funders to meet payroll). However, addressing this problem will be difficult 

as many of leaders of the illegal armed groups that depend on criminal proceeds 

are, again, political leaders with important roles in government. This symbiotic relationship between crime and political violence is a hallmark of almost every state 

plagued by political instability and lacking mature and capable security forces and 

judicial systems. Real progress in solving Iraq’s political and security problems will 

not be made until its leaders address the criminal elements within their own ranks. 

Often, external pressure and assistance is needed to do this. 

Combining the political and security observations above, it is clear that Iraq will 

not reach reconciliation in the near future if ‘‘reconciliation’’ is understood in the 

literal sense. What we should pursue in the short- and mid-term is not reconciliation, but the cessation of large-scale violence based on an agreed upon way forward—a modus vivendi—that all major Iraqi players accept. I will explore this in 

greater depth in the next section. 

A final and perhaps the most critical observation is that the U.S. has operated 

in Iraq as if it were attending primarily to what is important for Iraq, not what 

is important for the United States. Under the Coalition Provisional Authority this 

was appropriate from both an ethical and practical point of view, as the CPA was 

the occupying Government of Iraq. U.S. interests in Iraq will be discussed in the 

next section as well. However, there is one additional observation that I would be 

remiss if I did not take this opportunity to make. 

Critically important, is the fact that the U.S. Government does not have the institutional capabilities to accomplish the things it has set out to do in Iraq, even under 

much more benign circumstances. No U.S. Government institution is designed for 

nation-building or counterinsurgency, and the task in Iraq requires large-scale, 

interagency capabilities to do both. The only agency whose mission is close to that 

of nation-building is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but 

the total number of USAID Foreign Service officers worldwide is only slightly over 

1,000 (roughly the size of a deployed army battalion task force). The State Department, though given responsibility for this task by NSPD–44, does not have the manpower, operational culture, or resources to do this. It is a fine institution that excels 

in diplomacy, and in particular one that is designed to interact with existing states. 

But diplomacy is only one of several important capabilities required for nation-building and counterinsurgency. The criticism of State and other civilian agencies for not 

‘‘stepping up to the plate’’ ignores these important facts. It is like asking your 

grandmother why she won’t run a 6-minute mile. It is not that she won’t, but rather 

that she can’t. If the U.S. is to be successful at all, it will need goals that are more 

in line with its capabilities or capabilities more in line with its goals. The importance of a sober, apolitical assessment of what can be done cannot be overstated. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The first and principal implication of the observations above is that any assessment of what the U.S. can and should try to accomplish in Iraq must start with 

U.S., not Iraqi, interests—they are not the same and the U.S. will end up with a 

different strategy if it does this. This in turn requires a definitive statement of U.S. 

vital interests in Iraq, and a thorough analysis based on those interests leading to 

a strategy and plan that is in line with U.S. capabilities. Furthermore, in order to 

bring American activities into line with capabilities, the U.S. needs to focus on what 

is really important—starting with those activities required by its vital interests, and 

196 

2Others could be, and have been, proposed. For example: The mode of U.S. departure does 

not give the appearance of defeat at the hands of radical Islamists, nor undermine the U.S.’s 

ability to use power in other vital areas in the Middle East or elsewhere when needed; that 

Iraq not be so dominated by a neighbor that they could pose a challenge to U.S. positions in 

the Persian Gulf; and preventing one or more large-scale humanitarian disaster(s) caused by 

civil strife. As important as these are, I do not believe they rise to the level of vital interests, 

and so I do not carry them forward in the discussion that follows. However, they should be 

major considerations in the development of our strategies. 

cautiously adding other efforts that support other important interests under a conservative understanding of what it is capable of. 

U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAQ

The U.S. has two major categories of interests in Iraq and in general—its vital 

interests and other important, but lesser, interests. A definition of vital interests 

might be that they are those ends that would eliminate an existential threat to the 

U.S., or prevent outcomes that could significantly and negatively change our way 

of life. In order to understand what U.S. actions should be and how they could effect 

Iraq’s development, these must be the starting point for any analysis. For the purposes of this testimony, I consider the following to be the U.S.’s vital interests in 

Iraq: 

• That Iraq not become a launching pad for large-scale international terror, and 

• That what happens in Iraq does not lead to regional instability of a magnitude 

that has a significant, long-term negative effect on the U.S. economy or security.2

A brief look at what is needed to secure these vital interests reveals that achieving them requires regional approaches not confined solely to Iraq. What Iraq’s 

neighbors and other international players with an interest in Iraq do will affect U.S. 

interests there. 

Focusing on these two interests alone does not mean that other U.S. interests will 

not affect our actions to some degree. But, vital interests should drive policy, and 

all other interests are subject to cost-benefit analysis. Efforts to secure other interests should be undertaken only after sober consideration of the magnitude and duration of these efforts, and a clear understanding of the limitations of U.S. capabilities. 

Turning first to preventing Iraq from being a launching pad for major international terrorist groups, note that if we disaggregate this interest into its critical 

factors there are a few observations that are particularly important. First, if the 

Iraqi people support international terrorism, then it would be difficult to prevent it 

from originating in Iraq. The most important aspect of this goal is the attitude of 

the Iraqi people toward the rest of the world, and the U.S. in particular. This will 

be determined, at least in part, by a few influential social and cultural factors, and 

in particular the education Iraqis get, what they see on their televisions and in their 

papers, and what they hear in their mosques and on their radios. If this is so, then 

efforts to influence Iraq’s education system, conduct effective strategic communications, and reach out to Iraq’s religious leaders are critical. I will address these in 

the section on Iraq’s modus vivendi. 

Equally important is whether Iraqi political leaders support such a state. Unquestionably, many of these leaders would support international terrorism if they saw 

it as in their interests. Indeed, some Iraqi leaders, both inside and outside of government, are actively supporting terrorism inside of Iraq today. What this means 

for the U.S. is that it must change the political calculations of Iraqi leaders by making clear to them that terrorism is not in their best interests, and that if they violate U.S. vital interests we will ensure that they cannot achieve their own goals. 

This will require the willingness to use strong measures against those who would 

threaten U.S. vital interests, and to make real commitments to those who further 

our interests. This will also require influencing and working with Iraq’s neighbors. 

It is worth noting that our ability to exercise this influence will diminish when the 

U.N. Security Council resolution that authorizes the Multi-National Force–Iraq 

lapses at the end of this year. 

Finally, we must recognize that for the foreseeable future Iraq will have a weak 

government and security forces, and therefore limited ability to ensure that international terror does not seek to put down roots there. To balance these facts, the 

U.S. must have policies to ensure that Iraq does not contain ungoverned space or 

sectors of society in which large-scale efforts to develop international terrorist capabilities go undetected, and that the forces are in place to destroy such capabilities 

when they are discovered. It is worth noting that interdicting terrorist activities 

197 

3 Economic issues are noticeably absent. While Iraq’s economic progress is important, and decisions on economic issues such as oil- and state-owned enterprises are important and contribute 

to violence, they are the product of political forces at this point. Importantly, the violence is at 

its essence political. Were Iraq much poorer than it is, or if the violence in Iraq was over economic grievances, then economic processes would demand more prominent consideration. 4 It is important not to think of Iraqi political parties in Western terms—their goals, the 

means they are willing to use to achieve their goals, and the interactions between them are 

much different than in Western-style democracies. 

without Iraqi cooperation would be extremely difficult—a good reason for maintaining working relationships with the Iraqi Government and security forces. 

Turning next to those actions in Iraq that could lead to large-scale regional instability, note that instability and violence are not synonymous; political violence in 

Iraq is inevitable for some time to come; regional instability is not. The key questions are: What events in Iraq could so destabilize the region that the U.S.—and 

world—economies suffer significantly, and what conditions would lead to large-scale 

intervention by other countries that could threaten U.S. security to the extent that 

U.S. troops are forced to go back into Iraq in large numbers, possibly without reliable regional partners? 

Events in Iraq alone are not likely to have a major effect on the U.S. and world 

economies. Rather, such effects would be the result of regional events and would 

likely generate a large-scale regional response and intervention on the order of that 

mentioned above. Should Iraq’s oil exports fall entirely off the world market, it 

would not rise to the level of a vital U.S. interest due to its impact on oil prices, 

though it would remove almost all indigenous funding from the Iraqi Government 

and create other effects that could in turn have dire consequences. Economic disruptions that could significantly damage world economies would be something on the 

magnitude of a large-scale interruption of northern gulf oil exports (e.g., oil coming 

from Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) that lasted for several months. It is 

worth noting that these oil exports are of critical importance to other major world 

powers, to include European countries, China and India, and their actions to prevent major disturbances to oil markets should be an important consideration in U.S. 

strategy. 

Should the situation in Iraq cause neighboring or other states to intervene, or 

cause other large-scale disturbances in Middle Eastern stability (e.g., large-scale violence migrating out of Iraq into neighboring countries), the U.S. as well as other 

countries could be sucked into military confrontations that could cause unforeseeable changes to regional and perhaps global security. Although such scenarios are 

less of a worry than a year ago, regional stability should remain a vital interest for 

the near future. 

WHAT MIGHT AN IRAQI MODUS VIVENDI LOOK LIKE?

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqis understood the rules of society. That modus 

vivendi, though brutal and oppressive, was the basis for how Iraq ran. Since March 

2003, Iraqis have been competing with each other to determine the new rules for 

society. Policymakers should realize that the U.S. will have a limited role in the gestation of Iraq’s modus vivendi—certainly nothing approaching the ability to dictate 

it—and that most aspects of Iraq’s social arrangements do not affect U.S. vital interests or other important interests, and so should not be the subject of intense U.S. 

efforts. 

The question of how the Iraqi leaders and people arrive at a modus vivendi is 

what I consider next, because our policies and actions will affect those processes 

rather than their product—the modus vivendi itself. Note that many of these processes will take a long time to play out—many beyond 2012—and so U.S. efforts 

should place significant effort on achieving long-term effects. According to this logic, 

policies aimed at affecting facts on the ground today that have limited long-term 

effects on Iraqi political and social arrangements important to U.S. vital interests 

may have good altruistic justifications, but should not drive U.S. policy. Note as well 

that it is also possible that Iraqis will not reach a modus vivendi. U.S. policy should 

take this possibility and scenarios that come from it into account as well, but I do 

not discuss that possibility here. 

Of the several major processes that will determine what kind of modus vivendi 

Iraq will arrive at, some the U.S. can directly influence, some it can indirectly influence, and over some it will have little or no influence. These processes can be placed 

in three general categories—political, social, and security.3 These categories are not 

distinct. Political processes will be considered in two major categories; the formal 

elements of government, and political parties, trends and leaders.4 Social aspects 

198 

5 ‘‘Regions’’ is the term used in the Iraqi Constitution for the nearly sovereign entities that 

are envisioned—the Kurdistan region is the only currently existent one. The term ‘‘region’’ is 

also commonly used for Iraq’s immediate neighbors and the Middle East in general. The intended meaning should be clear from the context. Illegal armed elements will be considered as 

part of the problems to be addressed. 

are many and cannot be considered comprehensively in this short testimony, but 

three will be briefly addressed—the roles of education, the media, and religion. 

Finally, security will be addressed in terms of the armed forces, police forces, and 

regional forces (e.g., the Kurdish Peshmerga and similar ‘‘regional guards’’ that are 

likely to come into being as more regions are formed).5

POLITICAL PROCESSES

Iraq’s formal political processes are defined by its Constitution, adopted in October 2005. Although there are strong arguments for why Iraqis should significantly 

amend their Constitution, it is unlikely that significant changes will be made, as 

it currently favors a majority of the population. The Iraqi Constitution gives the 

Prime Minister little real control of his government or federal fiscal resources. For 

example, he cannot hire or fire ministers without the approval of Parliament, and 

so has very limited ability to influence their behavior and that of the government. 

Furthermore, Iraqi regions have near-sovereign powers (only one currently exists, 

but under current law more may be formed starting this month), and provincial governors are not beholden to the Prime Minister for power, though they do depend 

on the central government for some resources and support. Additionally, the deal 

that was struck to form the current ‘‘Unity’’ government distributed what little 

power does exist in the Executive to the participating political parties. In particular, 

individual ministries ‘‘belong’’ to participating political parties, giving the leaders of 

those parties the power to select and dismiss ministers—arguably, more real influence over ministerial posts and actions than the Prime Minister. The notable exceptions to this rule are the original security ministries (the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior), the ministers of which were selected based on their not having a major 

party affiliation. While this avoids giving control of these critical ministries to any 

political party, it does not increase the formal control of the Prime Minister. Keeping the security ministries out of party hands may also not hold in future governments. 

There are two ways for the Prime Minister to exercise control—through political 

leadership and dealmaking, and by subverting the Constitution. If the Prime Minister is able to subvert the Constitution and control the security forces without 

checks and balances, then Iraq will resemble many other countries in the region 

that hold elections and have legislatures, but honor them in the breach with all 

effective power residing in the Executive. Subversion of this kind is currently kept 

in check by the fact that real power resides with those parties that maintain large 

armed forces (e.g., Islamic Supreme Council of Iraqi, the Office of Martyr Sadr, the 

Kurdish parties, and with the Sunni awakening and associated ‘‘sahwa’’ forces, some 

Sunni parties). Should one of the Arab parties with a large and capable extra-governmental armed force secure the premiership, or should a Prime Minister successfully raise a strong militia—as some reports indicate PM Maliki is trying to do— 

then the chances of the Executive monopolizing power would be greatly increased. 

However, it is important to recognize that should the Executive seize power it would 

not necessarily violate U.S. vital interests, though it would likely have a significant 

effect on U.S. domestic support for our efforts in Iraq. There are certainly realistic 

scenarios in which U.S. vital interests would be better served by a friendly though 

authoritarian government, rather than a democratic government that is either incapable of managing large-scale levels of violence or unfriendly. 

The legislature is a work in progress. Issues more contentious than those debated 

in the U.S. Congress in the 1850s are being fought over in the Parliament, and may 

not see the light of day. This does not imply that the Parliament is a capable legislature—it is not. Its efforts to reach a quorum and conduct routine business illustrate many significant problems. However, it does illustrate that U.S. expectations 

of what is possible are overly optimistic. Further, unless the Prime Minister succeeds in usurping much of the Parliament’s powers, it is perhaps the principal institution that provides a forum for productive and nonviolent interactions between 

Iraq’s various factions on critical issues that could positively contribute to a healthy 

modus vivendi. However, important voices and forces that will affect Iraq’s modus 

vivendi are not represented in the Parliament or the formal government bodies, 

most notably a large portion of the Sunni leadership. Parliamentary elections will 

not be held for almost 2 years. 

199 

6 ‘‘Takfiris’’ is the term used for those who declare other Muslims to be apostates, thereby 

making their murder permissible and even virtuous. 

The judiciary is undermanned, facing a caseload much larger than its capabilities 

in better circumstances, and besieged by the violence that surrounds it and pervades much of Iraq. Its principal role in forming an Iraqi modus vivendi is to provide access to justice, but it will not likely make much progress in this regard, as 

doing so would require taking on the major political powers in Iraq who are behind 

the violence, as well as the crime necessary to support them. Doing this must be 

a political decision if it is to succeed, because it will require the Iraqi Security 

Forces to deliver prisoners with political influence to the courts and to truly protect 

witnesses and judges, and the prison systems to keep those convicted in jail. Iraq’s 

recent experience with the dismissal for lack of witnesses of the criminal charges 

against former Deputy Minister of Health Hakim al-Zamili, a high ranking Sadr 

Movement official reportedly responsible for using Health Ministry facilities to kill 

Sunnis in Iraq, clearly illustrates this challenge. As a result, the government justice 

system is not likely to play a large role in shaping Iraq’s modus vivendi for the foreseeable future. It is important to note that without a functional judiciary of appropriate capacity, access to justice for most Iraqis will come from other sources—principally tribal justice and sharia courts run by religious officials, or not at all. This 

implies that these other forms of justice—over which the U.S. has little influence— 

will play a larger role in shaping Iraq’s modus vivendi than the Iraqi judiciary. 

In Iraq, as in many countries emerging from conflict, political parties play an important if not dominant role in establishing a modus vivendi. Iraqi political parties 

are often strongly affiliated with religious sects or leaders, and in some parts of Iraq 

tribes are organizing or joining with existing parties to enter the political process. 

Real power is held by those political leaders who have armed financial, and in some 

cases religious, wherewithal. Some of this power stems from legitimate sources 

(elections, popular allegiance, services provided to the people) while some stems 

from illegal and destructive activity (e.g., the maintenance of militias, funds raised 

through corruption and organized crime, external sponsors, nepotism, and other exclusionary practices). Importantly, the current situation in Iraq has all but eliminated the ability for secular or centrist parties to operate in the Arab parts of Iraq, 

driving former and would-be secularists and centrists to the extremes of the political 

spectrum for survival. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan has long discouraged parties 

other than the KDP and PUK, though not in the extremely violent way currently 

seen in much of Arab Iraq. 

A final consideration that cuts across political and social processes is what I call 

the Sunni and Shia ‘‘narratives’’ for Iraq’s ills. While not a process in the sense of 

the political, social, and security processes, it is an important manifestation of the 

problem that deserves consideration. If one talks with Iraqi Shia, their characterization of Iraq’s problems are often articulated something like this: ‘‘The violence is 

done by the Saddamists and takfiris, and if you help us eliminate them then everything will be OK.’’ 6 Sunnis, on the other hand, say ‘‘The violence is the fault of the 

militias and the Iranians who control them. If you help get rid of them then everything will be OK.’’ The result of this is that both groups look at the overall situation 

as well as individual events, and come to incompatible conclusions. For example, I 

have had more than one senior Shia government official tell me that the Shia death 

squads are not really Shia, but rather former Fedayeen Saddam who are really part 

of the Baathist problem, thus distancing their parties and the government from responsibility for acting against Shia murderers. With no common understanding of 

the root causes of Iraq’s problems, there is no basis for finding solutions. The Kurds 

also have a narrative that is at the moment less widely reported, but which will 

become louder and more important as the issues of Kirkuk and other disputed areas 

(the Article 140 process) come to a head. 

SOCIAL PROCESSES

Americans do not understand Iraqi social processes well, and so have not been 

effective at recognizing their importance. In many, though not all, ways, the U.S. 

cannot significantly influence these processes. Nor should it try to in most cases. 

The U.S.’s roles in these issues are primarily to support institutions and pressure 

political leaders to make needed changes. Here I briefly consider education, media, 

and religious influences on Iraq’s modus vivendi. 

The Iraqi education system is of strategic importance. Not only will the education 

that young Iraqis get play a pivotal role in determining how they see the world, but 

access to education and education of a certain type will help determine their parents’ world views as well, and so has a major impact on U.S. and Iraqi counterinsurVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
200 

7The current Minister of Education, Dr. Khudayyir al-Khuza’i is, in the words of one senior 

and well-informed observer who spent years in Iraq, ‘‘an Iranian’’ in his political philosophy and 

outlook. 

gency efforts. In particular, the Iraqi Ministry of Education will hire teachers and 

select a curriculum that will greatly affect young Iraqis’ world views.7 Whether their 

education supports tolerance and a pluralistic society, or an extreme Islamist one 

that support violence against those that disagree with it, is of paramount importance. This fact was not lost on Saddam Hussein—all teachers under his regime had 

to be members of the Baath Party, and the curriculum was carefully crafted to serve 

his needs—nor is it lost on any major Iraqi political leader. These two aspects—the 

influence of education on young Iraqis’ world view and the impression access to education leaves on their parents—will play major long-term roles in determining who 

will win the social, political, and violent struggle for Iraq, and whether or not Iraq 

supports terrorism. The impact of these issues on Iraq’s modus vivendi over the 

long-term will be profound. The U.S. has all but ignored this critical aspect of Iraqi 

society. 

The media has an enormous impact on how Iraqis, and indeed the entire region, 

see the conflict in Iraq and its principal players. Trends in Iraqi, Arab, and Muslim 

public opinion indicate that insurgents, terrorists, and Islamist political parties have 

done much better than the U.S., the coalition and the Iraqi Government at persuasion. Unless the U.S. and its allies in the region soon find effective ways to communicate with the Iraqi, Arab, Middle Eastern, and Islamic populations, America’s best 

hope for success in this field will be that the heinous acts of those who would 

radicalize Iraq alienate other Muslims. Yet even this will not alter the gross distortions of U.S. intentions and efforts that are commonly heard in Iraq today. The U.S. 

could, and has in the past (though not in Iraq), done better in this field. It should 

be a, if not the, major effort. 

Religion plays a pivotal role in determining Iraqi attitudes and actions, influencing not just individuals, but also Iraqi political parties and even the security 

forces. While religious influences always existed in Iraq, what was once a large and 

important secular segment of society has been marginalized due to the violence that 

has driven most Iraqis to transfer their allegiance to identity-based groups who can 

offer some protection. The U.S.’s ability to influence Iraqi religious figures is very 

limited, at least in their religious domain—politicians who lead religious parties 

may be a different story. Efforts to mitigate some of the worst influences that wrap 

themselves in religious banners should be directed at their manifestations. In particular, the U.S. cannot and should not attempt to choose Iraq’s religious leaders 

or censor what they say. But it can and should support Iraqi political leaders who 

work for moderation, and seek to deter those who foment violence. 

SECURITY PROCESSES

Finally, we turn to Iraq’s security forces and ministries. To date the U.S. efforts 

to build nonsectarian security forces have not been successful. The police are overtly 

sectarian in many places in the country, and there are concerns about some Iraqi 

Army leaders and units. It is important to consider why this is so, and under what 

circumstances it matters. 

With respect to Iraq’s security forces in general, there are three factors that will 

determine their effectiveness—quantity, quality, and loyalty. Efforts are underway 

to significantly increase the size of the Iraqi security forces (ISF). Furthermore, 

quality ranges greatly from the well-trained Iraqi Special Operations Forces to some 

Iraqi police who have not even been through basic police training. Yet, the most difficult element of the equation is the issue of loyalty. Large parts of the security 

forces are loyal to political parties rather than the Iraqi Government, other parts 

of the security forces are so intimidated by militias and insurgents that they cannot 

perform their jobs, and other parts are so corrupt as to make their loyalty to any 

entity questionable. As with other aspects of security, the trends are largely positive, but most observers believe there is a long way to go. Finally, the Defense and 

Interior Ministries, which oversee the armed forces and police forces, have had 

severe problems with basic support functions such as supplying fuel for vehicles, 

feeding deployed forces, or buying them the appropriate equipment. Most troubling 

is the penetration of the Ministry of Interior by Shia Islamist parties. The tensions 

between ISCI and the Sadrist Trend which have been playing out in much of Baghdad and southern Iraq for some time also exist there, with the management largely 

dominated by ISCI and much of the rank and file belonging to Sadr. 

Iraq’s security forces will not be stable and professional for some time. Even without the challenges highlighted above, building an Army and Defense Ministry from 

201 

scratch, and reforming police forces and the Interior Ministry, are not things that 

can be done quickly. As a point of comparison, in Northern Ireland it took approximately 10 years to reform the Royal Ulster Constabulary, despite the cultural affinity and common language between the British and the police force, and far greater 

resources per-capita devoted to the problem than we are spending on Iraqi police 

reform. 

Turning now to the challenges of creating nonsectarian forces in Iraq, note that 

political actors are actively seeking to make permanent the safety of their populations and secure their hold on power by affecting the makeup of the military and 

police forces, and the intelligence service (and should additional regions form, this 

will be the case for their regional guards as well). Iraq’s history of brutal suppression, as well as the fact that it is in the middle of ongoing sectarian, and perhaps 

soon to be ethnic, violence makes these efforts to consolidate power a very reasonable and anticipatable thing for Iraqi political leaders to do. Indeed, it would be 

amazing if they did not. However, other less laudable reasons also exist for this behavior, such as the raw contest for power, wealth, and interpretations of Islam 

among Iraq’s many faction and leaders. Power in Iraq does in fact reside with the 

parties that have the greatest ability to use violence. 

Whether this matters to the U.S. is a more difficult question, and is contingent 

on different scenarios for Iraq’s future. Keeping in mind that what matters most to 

the U.S. are its vital interests, any government that meets these criteria and exercises real control over the security forces could be acceptable. The U.S. has other 

interests as well, such as avoiding humanitarian catastrophes and not deserting its 

friends in Iraq, which would likely be harmed by many of the most probable outcomes in Iraq. Most important to the U.S. is the fact that a sectarian government 

that came to and remained in power would all but certainly try to change the leadership of the security forces over time to cement its dominance. This would in turn 

likely lead to injustices perpetrated by the ruling faction, and efforts to counter this 

should be undertaken if they could be done at an acceptable cost. But, when we try 

to determine what U.S. policy should be in these difficult circumstances, facts matter. One principal fact is that the U.S. will only be able to stave off the sectarianization of the Iraqi Armed Forces while the MNF–I is in Iraq in large numbers. 

It will not be able to permanently deny Iraq’s Government the ability to put their 

people in charge of Iraq’s security forces. If this is so, then our current efforts to 

prevent the sectarianization of the Iraqi security forces are the proverbial finger in 

the dike, unless one envisions either an enlightened political change, or Iraqi security forces—the army in particular—that refuses to permit civilian leadership to affect its makeup, which is unlikely. If this is the case, then a compelling argument 

can be made for permitting this process to go forward while the MNF–I is in Iraq 

in large enough numbers so that it can prevent the worst excesses and influence— 

and develop relationships with—the new security force leadership; things that the 

U.S. might not be able to do after a significant drawdown. 

The previous discussion applied primarily to the Iraqi Army. Iraq’s police are local 

forces, and have already largely been shaped by the dominant factions in each area. 

The effort required to reverse this nationwide is beyond what the U.S. could accomplish in the near term, as it would not only require fundamentally changing the 

approach of security force leaders, but also creating a fundamentally different social 

and political environment that would require decades to take root. This is truly a 

long-term challenge. 

The formation of regions could mitigate some of the worst excesses that might 

come to pass under sectarian security forces in a unified, nonconfederal Iraq, but 

only after populations have moved to render each region overwhelmingly of the 

same ethnic and sectarian composition as its ruling faction. While the displacement 

of large numbers of Iraqis would cause significant hardships and damage U.S. credibility, it would not rise to the level of a vital interest, though it would create large 

numbers of Iraqis with real grievances against the government (and the U.S.), with 

the attendant implications for internal security. Some of the worst effects might be 

mitigated with a proactive effort to assist those who are forced to flee their homes, 

but to date the Iraqi Government has proven far less capable or willing to aid displaced Iraqis than some political leaders, such as Muqtada al-Sadr. Additionally, a 

confederal Iraq would pose other significant diplomatic and security challenges for 

the U.S., as each region would have a distinct, nearly sovereign, government and 

might require a separate approach. 

Before leaving the issue of security forces, it is important to note that coalition 

and Iraqi security forces are not the only ones operating in Iraq. Iran’s security and 

intelligence forces operate there (as all but certainly do the intelligence agencies of 

other neighbors), and Iran has formally offered security assistance to the Iraqi Government. It is also well known that Iran trains Shia militias and provides weapons 

202 

and explosively formed penetrators to their proxies in Iraq. Without a doubt, Iran 

will have a large influence on both the security situation in Iraq through direct action, funding, and other support, and on the Shia-dominated Iraqi security forces. 

So too will Iraqi militias. The Peshmerga, though not formally a militia, serves as 

the regional security force for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), an arrangement recognized under the Constitution. When new regions form, as is likely after 

the Regional Formation Law goes into effect later this month, militias and insurgent 

groups will all but certainly provide the core of each region’s guard and police forces. 

These militias will remain largely answerable to their parent political parties, as do 

the two Peshmerga forces to the two major Kurdish political parties. Whether this 

leads to a true confederalization of Iraq or something that looks more like warlords 

and fiefdoms remains to be seen. Some combination of the two is likely. 

OTHER INFLUENCES ON IRAQ’S MODUS VIVENDI

Finally, there will be other competing internal and external influences that will 

affect Iraq’s political, security, and social arrangements for the future. The primary 

ones, and the ones that will have the greatest influence, will include those external 

parties that seem to the Iraqi leaders and population to be permanent factors they 

must consider. In particular, Iraq’s neighbors who have demonstrated the intent and 

ability to influence Iraqi domestic events over the long term will be important. 

Whether they are more influential than the U.S. will depend in part on whether 

or not the U.S. makes believable, long-term commitments to the Iraqi Government. 

In addition, there are forthcoming events that will bring major conflicts to a head, 

such as the requirement to resolve the Kirkuk and disputed areas issue this year, 

provincial elections in October 2008, and national elections in late 2009 or 2010— 

all will affect Iraq’s modus vivendi. Ways to work with and influence each important 

party, and all collectively, as well as well-thought-out approaches to upcoming major 

events need to be developed. This is an area in which considerable work remains 

to be done. 

WHAT IRAQ’S MODUS VIVENDI MIGHT LOOK LIKE

What does this discussion tell us? 

On the political front, Iraq is likely to be dominated by Shia religious parties for 

some time to come. If ISCI dominates, its arrangement with the Kurds will continue 

to provide Kurdish leaders with the autonomy inside Iraq that they demand. The 

wild cards posed by the health of key religious and political players could have an 

impact on these dynamics, but likely not as great as some fear. Should President 

Jalal Talibani or ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim pass from the scene, their parties 

would replace them with other substantive leaders who would not significantly 

change the trajectory of their parties, though the loss of the close personal relationships that President Talibani in particular has with many other Iraqi leaders could 

lead to a decline in cooperation between Arabs and Kurds. Should Grand Ayatollah 

Sistani pass from the scene, the impact, though probably the most significant, would 

be less severe than some think, particularly as Sistani’s desire to actively influence 

politics declines, and Iraqi Shia become disillusioned with Islamist parties. The influence of Muqtada Sadr remains less predictable. There were hopes in early 2007 

that his prolonged absence from Iraq would lessened his influence both within the 

political and armed branches of his movement and on the general Iraq political and 

security scene. There are currently signs that his political movement and Jaysh 

al-Mahdi—the Sadrist militia—may be splintering. But events of the past 10 days 

illustrates the continued influence of the Sadrist ‘‘trend,’’ whether controlled by Sadr 

and his aides or not, will remain important. 

The dominance of these religious parties and Sadr’s prolonged absence make it 

increasingly unlikely that there will be major changes to the Constitution that 

would give the central government significantly increased powers. Confederalization 

will take some time (perhaps 5 to 10 years), but is likely to produce three or more 

regions. This will cause population migrations and the development of political, social and security circumstances that are unique in each region, posing significant 

challenges for the U.S., other international players, and the Government of Iraq. 

Shia-on-Shia violence will be one result of this realignment of and quest for political 

power, but will eventually result in a more or less steady, though violent, state. 

More than one Shia region is likely to be formed, and some mix of regions along 

with provinces not part of any region may be the end result. Iran will have a lot 

of influence on this process, and the U.S. should work with and seek to influence 

Iran and Iraq’s other neighbors to get the best outcome. 

Should confederalization lead to the breakup of Iraq, the Kurdish issue could 

throw the northern part of the Middle East into chaos as Turkey, Iran, and perhaps 

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Syria intervene to protect their domestic security situation, as they, too, have large 

restive Kurdish minorities. With no Iraq for the Iraqi Kurds to remain in, solutions 

to that situation would be difficult to identify and painful. 

Secular or moderate Islamic political parties could come into being if they are 

funded and protected, but otherwise they will not. I believe it is unlikely that there 

will be any such parties of significance soon. If the U.S. large-scale presence departs 

before these parties are an established part of the Arab Iraqi political and social 

fabric, they will not be able to start for a long time unless they can find other protectors and sources of funding. 

The Iraq security forces will become more sectarianized as the Shia-dominated 

government puts its people into key positions in the security forces and the security 

related ministries. The security forces will eventually become more competent, after 

a period of turmoil as they undergo a great expansion and new leaders take charge. 

If Iran plays a major role in this professionalization process, then the security 

forces, or some part of them, will likely be radicalized under the guidance of the 

Iranian Republican Guard Corps. This makes it critical for the U.S. military to stay 

engaged with the Iraqi security forces for some time. Policies that support such engagement, such as encouraging the Iraqis to buy U.S. military equipment, providing 

ongoing U.S. technical support, joint professional military education programs, and 

above all assistance in combating Iraq’s internal enemies who could also threaten 

the United States, should be seriously considered. 

One implication of the sectarian government and the sectarianization of the security forces is that the U.S. will have difficulty keeping government-sponsored violence targeted at Sunni terrorists, insurgents, and the surrounding Sunni populations in check. Also, it will be nearly impossible to get the government to disband 

Shia militias. Many in the Shia population will look positively at strong actions 

taken against the Sunni population in the name of fighting those who make carbombs, and those Shia militias that do not prey on the Shia population. Militias will 

continue to be condoned by the Iraqi Government, and they will not be disbanded 

short of rolling them into either the central or regional security forces. A large, 

though unknown, percentage of the membership of the major militias is already on 

the government payroll due to the ‘‘ownership’’ of the various ministries by the 

major political parties discussed earlier. The Iraqi Government will use very violent 

measures against al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni insurgents and their supporters after the 

MNF–I draws down. We should expect to see many civilian casualties if U.S. forces 

leave before a stable order is established. If large-scale internal terrorist threats and 

political violence continue as regions and regional security forces form up, this will 

likely lead to measures to control the flow of people across regional borders, as well 

as potentially to armed confrontations between the Iraqi Army and regional security 

forces—in the Sunni region(s) in particular—and between the security forces of different regions. 

Social developments driven by Iraq’s education system, Iraqi and regional media, 

and religion will drive many of these changes. If left unchecked, the Iraqi education 

system and poisonous media will contribute to the production of a new generation 

that hates and distrusts the U.S., and a society that is anti-American. Civil society 

programs could have a positive effect if properly funded and protected (and assuming other U.S. actions do not negate their efforts), but otherwise the only NGOs able 

to prosper outside of Iraqi Kurdistan will be associated with Islamist parties. This 

would contribute to a social structure that is inward-looking, and in the worst case 

could combine the political anti-Americanism of Iran with the popular anti-Americanism of Saudi Arabia. 

CONCLUSIONS

This is a grim portrait, but not one that needs to come about. Long-term U.S. 

efforts can mitigate the worst of these scenarios, particularly if undertaken in partnership with other major players both inside and outside of Iraq. Short-term efforts 

will not mitigate these ill effects. This can only happen if we recognize several critical facts. 

First, we must put U.S. interests first, and clearly recognize the limits of U.S. 

capabilities—both institutionally and politically, and over the long term. In particular, efforts to help Iraqis create a country that is a friend of the U.S. will not 

be completed in the next few years. As a result, the U.S. needs a nonpartisan set 

of basic understandings about what is important to America in Iraq, and a sustainable level of investments that will enable the U.S. to take care of its vital interests 

there. 

Second, Iraq’s political leaders and organization along with the foundation provided by Iraq’s social structures are more important than short-term military 

204 

efforts, with the exception of those required to prevent the overthrow of the Iraqi 

Government or the dissolution of the state. They will determine what kind of security forces Iraq will have, and how Iraqis view the West and approaches its problems. This is an area in which we can have positive, though limited, effects. To 

make gains here, we must change the political calculations of Iraq’s major players, 

and we can only do that by demonstrating a willingness to use strong measures and 

provide lasting benefits. Our investments should reflect this reality. 

Third, Iraq will not be a secular, democratic, pluralistic society any time soon, but 

could be a county with which the U.S. has a good relationship, and that in the long 

run does well by regional standards of development and human rights. It is worth 

noting that the U.S. may not want Iraq as a formal ally, as it would then be a 

dependent client for a long time. An Iraq that is not hostile, controls its territory 

and does not threaten its neighbors might be a better outcome. Our goals for Iraq 

must recognize this reality, or they will not be reached. 

Finally, the United States must bring its goals in line with its capabilities or invest in the additional capabilities needed to achieve its goals. The current mismatch 

between ends and means is not sustainable. 

None of this is likely to come about as the result of unilateral U.S. actions. Five 

years of large-scale, largely unilateral efforts have made this clear. American efforts 

to influence Iraq’s modus vivendi will necessarily involve working not only with and 

influencing states and other political actors with whom we agree, but also those 

with whom we disagree, and in particular with Iraq’s neighbors. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

And the—our next witness is Professor Gause. 

STATEMENT OF DR. F. GREGORY GAUSE III, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT, 

BURLINGTON, VT 

Dr. GAUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, other members of the 

committee. I do want to add one line to my biography, to try to 

score points with the chairman. I was born and raised in Wilmington, DE. 

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, What high school did you go to? 

Dr. GAUSE. Salesianum. 

The CHAIRMAN. You’ve just lost big points. [Laughter.] 

Dr. GAUSE. I figured I’d lose points—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I went to that other Catholic high school. 

Dr. GAUSE. I’m fully aware. 

The CHAIRMAN. I say to my colleagues, this—when he went to 

this school, there were 2,100 boys in that school, that drew the best 

athletes in the State. I went to the school with 240, and they used 

to beat the hell out of us. So, let’s go to the next witness. [Laughter.] 

Welcome, Professor. 

Dr. GAUSE. Thank you, Senator. 

In the spirit of the hearing, calling for an optimistic scenario 

about Iraq in 2012, I think that there might be five elements to 

that optimistic scenario. 

One, the country remains loosely united, with the Kurdish region 

still officially part of Iraq, though clearly it will enjoy a large 

amount of autonomy from Baghdad, but with no other quasiindependent regional governments. If there’s federalism in Iraq, 

it’s—in the Arab sections—it’s going to have to be federalism of the 

provinces. 

Two, the Arab Sunni Awakenings and Sons of Iraq Movements 

are integrated into the state structure through regional elections, 

national elections, and the integration of a substantial portion of 

their militias into the national security services. 

205 

Three, parliamentary and electoral alliances will have to cross 

the sectarian divide, providing for some stability at the center. I 

don’t think there’s going to be parties that cross those divides, but 

alliances among parties can do so. 

Four, the central government will have to control the bulk of 

Iraq’s oil revenues, allowing it to slowly and carefully build its 

reach throughout the Arab parts of the country. 

And, five, this point be reached without a sustained, bloody, sectarian civil war. 

I think this is a plausible scenario, though not a likely one. 

The staff asked me to focus on regional factors that might influence how Iraq could get to this point. 

While I think that decisions by Iraqis and by Americans will 

have the most influence on the course of events in Iraq, there are 

three regional powers—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—that can 

affect the Iraqi scene. I’d like to make four points about them and 

our regional diplomacy. 

First, the Turks are the easiest of the three to understand and 

with which to deal. Their interests in Iraq are filtered almost 

exclusively through the Kurdish lens. They worry about events in 

Iraqi Kurdistan affecting Turkish Kurds directly through the PKK 

and more generally in encouraging thoughts of autonomy, if not 

independence, among Turkish Kurds. 

Given American regional influence both with the Turkish Government and with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, we’re 

well positioned to calm tensions and prevent the occasional crisis 

between the Turks and the Iraqi Kurds from escalating. 

Second, for Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq is one part of a larger 

contest for regional influence. That contest extends from the Persian Gulf to Iraq to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The 

Saudi-Iranian contest is not a direct military confrontation, and it 

is unlikely to become one. It’s more subtle, played out in the 

domestic politics of these countries and in Arab public opinion. But, 

it is very real. 

The most important regional question affecting Iraq’s stability is 

whether Saudi Arabia and Iran can find a workable arrangement 

that satisfies both of their regional ambitions. If they can, they can 

encourage their local Iraqi allies to work out an accommodation. If 

they cannot, the Saudis will seek to prevent the consolidation of 

Iran’s predominant influence in Iraq. 

Third, many have urged the United States to take a more active 

role in bringing regional powers together in an international conference to stabilize Iraq. It’s not a bad idea, but we should not 

exaggerate its importance. 

More important would be the agreements and understandings 

which would have to precede such a conference. The key prior 

understanding would have to be between the United States and 

Iran, the two outside powers that have the most influence in Iraq. 

And that requires an engagement on the bilateral AmericanIranian relationship. 

If there’s anything that Iran wants from us, it’s not things in 

Iraq, where they have many cards to play already, it’s things in 

their relationship with us: An end to the threat of attack and 

206 

regime-change efforts, some acceptance of its nuclear program, an 

acknowledgment of its regional role. 

Now, we should not assume that direct engagement with Iran 

will lead automatically to a more cooperative Iranian attitude. Lots 

of Iranians, at least at the outset, will see such a bilateral initiative as an admission of weakness on our part. However, such engagement could strengthen those in Iran who argue for more modest Iranian regional goals, and it would certainly place the Iranian 

leadership before hard choices that they have been able to avoid, 

up to now. 

My fourth and final point. I believe that the negative regional 

consequences of an American military withdrawal from Iraq have 

been exaggerated. Undoubtedly, withdrawal will be accompanied by 

violence within Iraq, as made—as various groups test their 

strength in both intra- and intersectarian and interethnic contests, 

but it is hard to see, in most cases, how that violence would spill 

over the borders. The Kurdish area would not be subject to such 

violence, with the important exception of violence in the Kirkuk region, should the KRG move to formalize its control there. Sectarian 

tensions could rise in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, with increased sectarian violence in Iraq. However, these states have adequate police and security forces, and are more than willing to use 

them, to maintain order and state power. 

The most likely areas of spillover are Syria and Jordan, which 

have taken in the bulk of Iraqi refugees. International efforts 

would be necessary to relieve the burden upon them of new refugee 

influx. This is a serious issue, but a far cry from widespread regional destabilization. 

A second argument about American withdrawal’s regional consequences is that the prospect of regional intervention into Iraq 

could lead to a broader regional war, making the Iraqi civil war a 

Middle East war. I think this is highly unlikely. The Iranians already have what they want in Iraq: Substantial influence, both 

with the Baghdad government and with major Iraqi actors across 

ethnic and sectarian lines. They do not have to intervene militarily. 

The Turks, for their part, do not want to occupy Iraqi Kurdistan 

or annex it. The Saudi Army is hardly capable of serious cross-border operations. Foreigners will play in Iraqi politics as long as Iraq 

is weak and as long as Iraqi parties seek foreign support. They are 

doing so now, with us there. They will continue to do so. But, they 

do not appear to have the desire, in the case of Turkey or Iran, or 

the means, in the case of Saudi Arabia, to intervene militarily in 

a direct and sustained way which could lead to a wider regional 

war. 

A third objection to American military withdrawal, from the 

point of view of regional politics, is that al-Qaeda will claim victory 

and be emboldened in its regional aims. Undoubtedly, al-Qaeda 

will claim victory with an American withdrawal, but making that 

fact the reason to maintain our presence in Iraq gives Osama bin 

Laden a veto over American policy, and I can’t imagine that that 

would be a good thing. 

Were we to have withdrawn in 2006, as al-Qaeda in Iraq were 

enjoying successes in the Sunni Arab areas, this objection would be 

compelling. However, thanks to the turn in Sunni Arab politics 

207 

over the past 18 months, and to the surge, AQI has suffered important reverses. It’s not eliminated, but it’s certainly not on the 

march. As long as the Sunni Arab sentiment continues on its current course, it’s highly unlikely that a group as small as AQI will 

be able to achieve any major victories in the area. Bin Laden can 

claim what he wants, but people in the region and the world will 

see the results on the ground. 

On the contrary, I think that the prospect of our withdrawal 

might—and I emphasize ‘‘might’’—lead both Iran and Saudi Arabia 

to face up to the prospects that a complete deterioration of security 

in Iraq could harm their interests. It could lead to a more realistic 

sense of what an acceptable outcome for both states would be, and 

a willingness on Iran’s part to compromise on its more ambitious 

goals in Iraq. Such an understanding would have to involve Iran 

discouraging its client, the Islamic Supreme Council, from pushing 

for the nine-province regional government of the center and the 

south, Iran encouraging the Baghdad government to include Sunni 

Arab leaders who emerge from the new provincial and national 

elections, and Iran accepting a Prime Minister other than Nouri 

al-Maliki, who’s unacceptable to the Saudis. Such an understanding would require Saudi Arabia to encourage its allies in the 

Awakening Movements to accept the reality of Shia demographic 

weight in Iraqi politics, and discourage them from trying to defeat 

the government and Shia militias and claim power on their own. 

American withdrawal, rather than leading to regional stability, 

could, if properly managed, actually contribute to greater regional 

stability. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gause follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. F. GREGORY GAUSE III, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT, BURLINGTON, VT 

IRAQ IN 2012: AN OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

The most optimistic scenario for Iraq in 2012 is that: (a) The country remains 

loosely united, with the Kurdish Region still officially part of Iraq, though clearly 

it will be enjoying a large amount of autonomy from Baghdad, and no other quasiindependent regional governments; (b) the Arab Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq 

movements are integrated into the state structure through regional elections, 

national elections, and integration of a substantial portion of their militias into the 

national security services; (c) parliamentary and electoral alliances cross the sectarian divide, providing for some stability at the center; (d) the central government 

controls the bulk of Iraq’s oil revenues, allowing it to slowly and carefully build its 

reach throughout the Arab parts of the country; and (e) this point is reached without a sustained, bloody sectarian civil war. 

While this is a plausible scenario, it is not a likely one. It seems almost inevitable 

that the various Arab parties will test their political-military strength against one 

another. This is already happening among Sunni Arabs, with the happy result that 

al-Qaeda in Iraq and its local fellow-travelers have seen their influence reduced. 

This is happening among Shia Arabs, with a number of major incidents between 

government forces/Badr Organization militia and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, 

most recently just this week. There is no guarantee that the brutal Sunni-Shia conflict of 2006-early 2007 will not be repeated. The risks of large-scale violence between Kurds and Arabs, not particularly high since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 

regime, will rise if the Kurdish leadership pursues efforts to include Kirkuk in the 

KRG. However, while violent conflict is likely, it is not inevitable. We have seen the 

Kurdish leadership be willing to defer a decision on Kirkuk. While the Mahdi Army 

and the government forces/Badr Organization have clashed, political agreements 

have limited the extent and duration of their confrontations. The Awakening Movements seem anxious to enter the political process. Violence is likely over the next 

208 

4 years, but there is also hope that it can be mitigated by agreements among the 

Iraqis themselves. 

REGIONAL POWERS AND IRAQ

The course of Iraqi politics, for good or for ill, is largely in the hands of Iraqis 

themselves and in our hands. However, regional parties can contribute either to the 

stabilization of Iraq or to its fragmentation. The most important regional players 

in the Iraq game are Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. While Ankara views Iraqi 

developments almost exclusively through the lens of Kurdish issues, for Riyadh and 

Teheran Iraq is one part of a larger contest for regional influence. That contest 

extends from the Persian Gulf states through Iraq to Lebanon and the Palestinian 

territories. That contest is the reason for the boycott by many Arab heads of state 

of the Arab summit meeting in Syria, Iran’s major Arab ally, this past weekend. 

That contest is the reason that Lebanon has been without a President for the past 

months and will likely remain without a President for some time. That contest is 

the reason that most Arab countries want Fatah and Hamas to find some workable 

arrangement in the Palestinian territories, for fear that continued confrontation will 

push Hamas closer to Iran. 

The Saudi-Iranian contest for influence is not a direct confrontation. Iran does not 

pose a military threat to Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis do not see Iran as such. 

While Riyadh worries about the Iranian nuclear program, that is an issue for the 

future, not the immediate present. President Ahmadinejad visited Saudi Arabia in 

2007 and the two countries have kept lines of communication open. The Iranians 

are not trying to destabilize the Saudi regime in its own domestic politics, as they 

tried to do in the 1980s. The Saudis do not want to see an American-Iranian military confrontation, because they fear that the Arab side of the gulf will be targeted 

for Iranian retaliation. For their part, the Iranians do not seek out a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, hoping to avoid a sectarian Sunni-Shia polarization 

that might benefit them in Iraq but could hobble their influence elsewhere in the 

Muslim world. Their contest for influence is more subtle, played out in the domestic 

politics of Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, and in Arab public opinion. 

But it is very real. 

The Saudi leadership realizes that Iran has more cards to play in Iraq than it 

does. It does not seek to reverse the reality of post-Saddam Iraq: That the Shia Arab 

majority is going to have a central role in the future of Iraqi politics. What Riyadh 

seeks is to prevent Iraq from becoming an Iranian client state. It sees the current 

Iraqi Government of Nouri al-Maliki as, in effect, an Iranian client regime. King 

Abdallah refuses to meet with al-Maliki and Riyadh has backed the failed efforts, 

led by former-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, to put together an alternative parliamentary majority to unseat the Maliki government. It also opposes the proposal by the 

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to create a 9-province regional government 

in the center and south of Iraq—a ‘‘Shiastan’’ on the model of the KRG. Riyadh 

views that prospect as the end of Iraq as a state, with the Shia-dominated regional 

government as a permanent client of Iran. 

The Saudis have limited but important assets by which to affect Iraqi politics. For 

years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Riyadh was paralyzed regarding the development of Iraqi politics. They had advised Washington against going to war, but 

cooperated to a limited but important extent in the war plan. They had no desire 

to support the elected Government of Iraq after 2005, because they saw it as an 

Iranian client. However, they were leery of supporting their sectarian allies in Iraq, 

the Sunni Arab insurgency, for two reasons: (1) The insurgency was killing Americans, which could place their bilateral relationship with Washington at risk; and (2) 

part of the Sunni insurgency was in league with al-Qaeda, which by 2003 the Saudi 

leadership realized was a threat to its own rule in Saudi Arabia. The emergence 

of the Awakening Movements in late 2006-early 2007 provided the Saudis with ideal 

clients—anti-al-Qaeda Sunni Arabs cooperating with the United States. Riyadh is 

supporting those movements, but we should not exaggerate the Saudi influence 

upon them. They are indigenous, not Saudi-created or controlled. As mentioned 

above, Saudi Arabia also maintains ties with important Iraqi politicians across the 

sectarian divide. 

The Iranians have a wider array of local allies, particularly armed allies, in Iraq. 

They created and continue to support ISCI, formerly the Supreme Council of the 

Islamic Revolution in Iraq. They have ties to other Shia groups, including the 

Sadrist movement. They have good relations with Kurdish parties, particularly the 

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. They have a 

thriving trade with Iraq; tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims visit the holy sites 

in Iraq every year. While the Shia religious establishments in Najaf and Qom have 

209 

something of a historical rivalry for leadership in Shia theology, we should not discount the personal and family ties and corporate identity which link the Shia ulama 

across the Iran-Iraq border. 

The most important regional question affecting Iraq’s stability is whether Saudi 

Arabia and Iran can find a workable arrangement that satisfies both of their 

regional ambitions. If they can, then they can encourage their local Iraqi allies to 

work out an accommodation. If they cannot, we can expect both states to continue 

to see Iraq as a contest for influence, with the Saudis seeking to prevent the consolidation of Iran’s predominant influence in the country. 

As mentioned above, the Turkish perspective on Iraq is not regional; it is domestic. Ankara views events in Iraq through the prism of its own Kurdish issue. It has 

accommodated itself since 1991 to the de facto independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. 

Turkish businesses are developing substantial interests there. However, it will not 

long tolerate any actions by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership which it sees as encouraging Turkish Kurds to dream of independence and revolt against the Turkish Government. While Turkey’s military options are limited, it has demonstrated that it 

will use force in the border region against the PKK. It will use its diplomatic and 

economic influence to support Iraqi Turkomans in Kirkuk against the KRG’s desire 

to annex the area. It will stand foursquare against Iraqi Kurdish independence. 

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, REGIONAL POWERS AND IRAQ

Many observers of the Middle East have urged the United States to take a more 

active role in bringing regional powers together in a diplomatic effort to stabilize 

Iraq. This was a major recommendation of the Iraq Study Group. It is not a bad 

idea, but we should not invest it with more importance and efficacy than it merits. 

It is not so much the actual convening of such a conference as the agreements and 

understandings which would precede it that could improve the prospects for a good 

outcome in Iraq. None of the regional parties will pay a price just to sit at that 

table. Each believes that it has assets regarding Iraq which it will not give up just 

for the privilege of joining such a meeting. 

The kinds of understandings which Turkey would require to play a constructive 

role in stabilizing Iraq could be achieved comparatively easily by an active American 

diplomatic effort, because we have influence both in Ankara and with the Iraqi 

Kurdish leadership. As long as we can assure the Turks that the Iraqi Kurds will 

not harbor and support the PKK and will not move to separation from Iraq and formal independence, we can reassure Ankara that its vital interests will not be compromised. The Kirkuk issue will be harder for American diplomacy to finesse, as the 

Kurdish leadership appears intent upon integrating Kirkuk into the KRG. Turkey 

will oppose this, but it does not pose the same kind of threat to fundamental Turkish interests that the PKK and Kurdish independence do. The Bush administration 

has handled the Turkish side of the Iraq issue relatively well, at least since the 

debacle of Turkish refusal to allow the opening of a northern front during the 2003 

war. Working out and sustaining a modus vivendi between Turkey and the KRG 

can be accomplished without a regional conference. 

American diplomatic efforts to encourage a Saudi-Iranian understanding would be 

much more difficult. First, we have no influence on the Iranians. Second, we join 

the Saudis in seeking to contain their influence in the region. We are not brokers, 

as we could be between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. We are participants in the regional contest for influence. In fact, the Saudis have a more nuanced 

view of their contest with Iran, including keeping lines of communication open to 

Teheran, than we do. The Iranians are certainly not going to pay a price simply to 

sit at a table with us and other regional powers to discuss Iran’s future. By skipping 

the last scheduled bilateral meeting in Baghdad, the Iranians signaled that they are 

hardly panting for dialogue with us. 

Any constructive engagement with Iran on regional issues, including Iraq, 

requires an engagement on the bilateral American-Iranian relationship. There is not 

much that we can give the Iranians in Iraq. They already have enormous influence 

with many of the Iraqi players, including the Iraqi Government. If there is anything 

that Iran wants from us, it involves their relationship with us—an end to the threat 

of attack, some acceptance of its nuclear stance, an acknowledgement of its regional 

role—not our ability to ‘‘give’’ them something in Iraq. 

In the same way that we should not exaggerate the results of convening a 

regional conference, we should not assume that direct engagement with Iran will 

lead automatically to a more cooperative Iranian attitude. The Iranian leadership 

will inevitably see such a bilateral initiative as an admission of weakness on our 

part, at least at the outset. However, such engagement will place the Iranians, who 

are themselves divided on a number of regional issues, in front of difficult choices. 

210 

It could constrain the more ambitious elements of the leadership, strengthening 

those who argue for more modest Iranian regional goals. It will place the Iranian 

leadership before hard choices that they have been able to kick down the road up 

to now. 

In the context of an Iranian-American bilateral engagement that is moving forward, it might be (I emphasize ‘‘might’’) possible to achieve a larger regional understanding that major regional parties can live with. Such an understanding would 

involve acknowledgement of Iran’s influence in Iraq, Iran’s acknowledgement that 

Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli peace is a global concern which Iran should not 

block and an understanding in Lebanon that gives Hezbollah a commensurate role 

in Lebanese politics without a veto over an elected Lebanese Government while 

assuring a stable Israeli-Lebanese border. There is no guarantee that a bilateral 

American-Iranian understanding can be achieved and can lead to these other positive results, but it is almost certain that we will not be able to reach these goals 

without some kind of American-Iranian understanding. 

With an American-Iranian dialogue commenced, if it demonstrates any promise, 

the possibility of a successful regional conference on Iraqi issues increases. The U.S. 

can then use its influence with Saudi Arabia to urge Sunni Arab Iraqi groups to 

play a constructive role. Moreover, such regional progress could put pressure on the 

Syrian-Iranian alliance, as Damascus could begin to doubt Teheran’s commitments. 

Distance in that relationship can only increase the chances of positive movement in 

Lebanon and opens up the possibility of progress on the Syrian-Israeli track of the 

Arab-Israeli peace process. 

This analysis of regional politics has been made in the spirit of the hearing, calling for imaging a relatively positive outcome for Iraq in 2012 and how we might 

get there. While the positive effects of American-Iranian bilateral understandings 

are plausible, they are by no means inevitable—neither American-Iranian agreements nor the positive consequences. However, it is hard to imagine good Iraqi and 

regional outcomes without some kind of American-Iranian understanding. 

AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ AND REGIONAL POLITICS

One of the persistent arguments put forward against American military withdrawal from Iraq is the spill-over effect of Iraqi instability in the region as a whole. 

The argument has three elements: (1) That domestic violence in Iraq will spill over 

into bordering countries—Kurdish violence in Turkey, Iraqi refugee flows destabilizing Syria and Jordan, Sunni-Shia tensions leading to domestic violence in 

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain; (2) that all-out civil war in Iraq will draw in 

the forces of neighboring states, with Turkish intervention in the north, Iranian 

intervention in the south and Arab state interventions in response, turning Iraq into 

a full-fledged regional war; and (3) that al-Qaeda would be so emboldened by our 

withdrawal that it would be able to take its fight against pro-American Arab 

regimes across Iraq’s borders. 

One should never bet against the worst possible outcomes in the Middle East. 

However, it is hardly inevitable that American withdrawal from Iraq would lead to 

any of these bad results. On the contrary, I will make the case that an announced 

intention to withdrawal on a realistic timetable might (again, I stress ‘‘might’’) actually push regional powers to take more cooperative stances on Iraq. 

The prospects of violent spill-over from Iraq are much more limited than the 

worst case scenarios about American withdrawal assert. Undoubtedly, withdrawal 

will be accompanied by violence within Iraq, as various groups test their strength 

both in intra- and intersectarian contests. But it is hard to see in most cases how 

that violence would spill over the borders. The Kurdish area would not be subject 

to such violence, as it is relatively well ordered now (with the important exception 

of violence in the Kirkuk region should the KRG move to formalize its control 

there). The spill-over prospects into Turkey have more to do with the status of the 

PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan, which would not be greatly affected by events to the south. 

Sectarian tensions could rise in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain with increased 

sectarian violence in Iraq. That was certainly the case during 2006-early 2007. However, increased tensions and violence are two different things. The states in all three 

countries have adequate police and security forces and are more than willing to use 

them to maintain order and state power. The most likely areas of spill-over from 

Iraq are Syria and Jordan, which have taken in the bulk of Iraqi refugees. International efforts would be necessary to support these states and relieve the burden 

upon them of new refugee inflows. This is a serious issue, but a far cry from the 

picture of widespread regional destabilization one sometimes hears. 

The prospect of regional intervention into Iraq, making an Iraqi civil war into a 

regionwide conflict, is also highly unlikely. First, there is already substantial foreign 

211 

intervention (besides our own) in Iraq. The Iranians have considerable influence and 

the Saudis are building theirs, as was discussed above. The Turkish military will 

intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan when it thinks it is necessary. It is hard to see why 

these interventions would escalate with American withdrawal. The Iranians already 

have what they want in Iraq—substantial influence both with the Baghdad government and with major actors in border regions to the south and the north. The Turks 

do not want to occupy Iraqi Kurdistan or annex it. The Saudi Army is hardly capable of serious cross-border operations. Foreigners will play in Iraqi politics as long 

as Iraq is weak and Iraqi parties seek foreign support. They are doing it now, with 

the American military there. They will continue to do it. But they do not appear 

to have the desire (in some cases, like Turkey and Iran) or the means (Saudi Arabia) to intervene in a direct, sustained military way that could lead to a wider 

regional war. 

Undoubtedly, al-Qaeda will claim victory with an American withdrawal. But making that fact, over which we have no control, the reason to maintain our presence 

in Iraq gives Osama bin Laden a veto over American policy. That cannot be a good 

thing. Were we to have withdrawn in 2006, as al-Qaeda in Iraq was enjoying some 

successes in Sunni Arab areas, this objection to withdrawal would be more compelling. However, thanks to the turn in Sunni Arab politics over the past 18 months 

and to the surge, AQI has suffered important reverses. It is not eliminated, but it 

is certainly not on the march in Iraq. As long as Sunni Arab sentiment continues 

on its current course, it is highly unlikely that a group as small as AQI will be able 

to achieve any major victories in the area. Bin Laden can claim what he wants; people in the region will see the results on the ground. 

The regional risks of American withdrawal are not as great as some contend. 

There could also be regional benefits to withdrawal. As long as we remain in Iraq 

with substantial military forces, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia has to face up to the 

regional consequences of a chaotic Iraq. The Iranians can rest assured that we will 

not allow the government which they support to be defeated militarily. The Saudis 

can assume that we will not allow complete Iranian control over Iraq. Both can 

build up their allies with little regard to the consequences for longer term Iraqi politics, as both are protected against their worst-case outcomes. However, the prospect 

of our withdrawal might (again, I emphasize ‘‘might’’) lead both Teheran and Riyadh 

to face up to the prospect that a complete deterioration of security in Iraq could 

increase the prospects of their worst-case outcomes. It could lead to a more realistic 

sense of what an acceptable outcome for both states would be and a willingness on 

Iran’s part to compromise on its more ambitious goals in Iraq. 

Such an understanding would involve Iran: (a) Discouraging its client ISCI from 

pushing for the 9-province regional government of the center and the south, (b) encouraging the Baghdad government to include Sunni Arab leaders who emerge from 

new provincial and national elections, and (c) accepting a Prime Minister other than 

Nouri al-Maliki. Such an understanding would require Saudi Arabia to encourage 

its allies in the Awakening Movements to accept the reality of Shia demographic 

weight in Iraqi politics and discourage them from thinking that they had the chance 

to defeat the government and Shia militias and claim power on their own. 

CONCLUSIONS: IRAQ 2012

While regional actors will be important players in how Iraqi politics develops, the 

real decisions will be made by Iraqis themselves. Iran’s allies in Iraq have varying 

degrees of loyalty to Teheran, from relatively strong for ISCI to relatively weak for 

the Sadrists. The Saudis exercise only influence, not control, over Sunni Arab 

actors. The Kurds answer only to the United States as an outside power patron, and 

we certainly do not control them. 

While more violence is inevitable over the coming years, the hope for a minimally 

violent transition to a more effective Iraqi state relies on two political processes. 

First, the new Sunni Arab leadership which has emerged in the Awakening and 

Sons of Iraq movements must be integrated into provincial and national political 

and security structures. This could be accomplished through new elections, at both 

the provincial and national levels, which would empower this new leadership. Second, the split among the Shia components of the Unified Iraqi Alliance, which has 

been obvious for the past year and was most recently manifested in the fighting of 

this week, has to work itself out politically. The Sadrists need to compete on their 

own against ISCI and Dawa and other Shia groups in the provinces and in national 

elections. Splitting the Shia bloc opens up the possibilities for cross-sectarian political alliances which could mitigate sectarian tensions and encourage a more stable 

central government. 

212 

This optimistic scenario relies upon other important developments. The Kurdish 

leadership must show forbearance regarding Kirkuk. Efforts to incorporate the 

Kirkuk area into the KRG could spark new violence between Kurds and Arabs. 

While this might unite Arabs across sectarian lines, it would hardly be a good thing 

for the development of a more stable Iraq. The central government must control oil 

revenues, at least in the Arab areas. Only through its ability to use and distribute 

revenue can the central government begin to build its capacity to govern. ISCI must 

give up its dream to establish a 9-province ‘‘Shiastan’’ in the center and the south. 

It is a divisive proposal among Shia (the Sadrists are dead set against it) and absolutely unacceptable to even the most moderate Sunni Arabs. 

There is no guarantee that Iraq can be saved from a descent into worse political 

violence, either if the United States remains in the country or if it leaves. If there 

were easy solutions to the problems of Iraq, we would have found them by now. 

However, there is the possibility that domestic and regional forces might be able to 

mitigate violence and encourage the gradual establishment of state authority in 

Iraq. On the regional level, that result will require an American-Iranian understanding. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Pretty good for a ‘‘Sallies’’ 

guy. 

Dr. GAUSE. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. No. Thank you. It was very good. I appreciate it 

very much. 

Dr. Pascual. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS PASCUAL, VICE PRESIDENT, 

DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you very 

much for the opportunity to testify before this committee, particularly given the leadership role that you’ve played in sustaining a 

dialog on the political aspects of the conflict in Iraq. And, as you 

emphasized from the beginning, Mr. Chairman, this is a really crucial issue that we face today. 

I believe that the failure of American policy in Iraq presents us 

with an untenable situation as we consider the situation in 2012. 

On the one hand, I believe that withdrawal of American troops will 

most likely result in an internal conflagration that could, to some 

extent, spill over borders, although, as we have just heard, not in 

a formal war; that it can increase the threat of transnational terrorism; that it can send oil prices soaring even further; and that 

it would add to the number and anguish of 4.5 million Iraqi refugees and displaced people. Yet, keeping American troops in Iraq is 

an unsustainable stopgap in the absence of major progress toward 

a political settlement among Iraq’s competing and warring factions. 

As we consider what Iraq might look like in 2012, Mr. Chairman, 

I think this presents us with quite a challenge. We can’t predict 

precisely what Iraq will look like in 4 years. We do have some certainty that Iraqis will determine what Iraq will look like. We can 

make a reasonable guess at what some of the principal factors 

might be. Let me outline what I think some of those core issues 

might be, based on some of the discussions that we already have 

had. 

The first is that there must be some understanding on federalregional relations. That issue has been clearly put on the table. 

The second is that there must be an understanding around the 

sharing of oil revenues, and that, inevitably, will require some level 

of compromise and revision to the Constitution, because currently 

213 

the Constitution provides for the provinces to have the dominant 

authority for the development of oil resources in the country. 

The third is that militias and their roles must be formalized and 

brought into state control. They can no longer be allowed to operate 

on their own. 

Fourth, there must be an understanding for the protection of 

minority rights, particularly in areas where those minorities are 

seeking to continue to live their lives where they no longer have 

national protections in law. 

The fifth is the need for working out provisions for political inclusion. Some legislation has been passed to reverse some of the 

aspects of de-Baathification which have occurred, but it is unclear 

how it will be implemented and how it will be extended to senior 

levels. 

And, sixth, there must be an understanding around Kirkuk and 

the Kurdish areas in a way that provides for the autonomy of those 

regions, yet, at the same time, is sufficiently reassuring, that 

doesn’t result in the kinds of Turkish incursions that we have seen 

over the past months. 

These provisions may very well require some suspension of formal competitive politics in Iraq. The Iraqis will need to decide if, 

during this period, they actually need to consolidate their government, rather than engage in further politics. 

What, ideally, we would see is a return of some of the 4.5 million 

refugees and displaced persons. We, ideally, would see some consistent degree of security on the ground. But, it is inevitable that 

what would also be required is a major international security presence, most likely on the order of 50,000 troops, if not even higher. 

And I think it would be delusionary if we think that a sustainable 

peace can be maintained in Iraq, under any circumstances, if there 

isn’t this kind of international presence. But, it can only happen if, 

in fact, there is, as you said at the beginning, Mr. Chairman, a political settlement. 

I would like to take a couple of minutes to underscore why that 

political settlement is so critical right now, and why it is such a 

critical factor in sustaining some of the progress that we’ve seen in 

the reductions of violence. 

You have already heard, in the hearings that you’ve conducted, 

and you certainly will hear from General Petraeus, an impressive 

array of statistics of how violence has gone down. And the question 

I think we all have to ask is, Is it sustainable? The answer to this 

lies in the briefings that the U.S. military has, in fact, been giving 

us. Over the past weeks, we’ve had an opportunity, at Brookings, 

at hosting some of the generals and colonels who have been involved in the war in different parts of Iraq, and here are some of 

the things that we hear. 

The first is credit to the willingness of Sunni militias and tribes 

to cooperate with the United States against al-Qaeda in Iraq. They 

hate al-Qaeda in Iraq more than the United States. And that has 

been positive. There are now 85,000 people participating in the 

Sunni Awakening, which is, in fact, actually extending beyond the 

Sunnis. The United States is paying them. And, as a result, that 

is putting food on the table, but there is also an argument to be 

made that some may be using that money to rearm. 

214 

The second factor that we hear is the de facto truce that the Shia 

have declared against American troops. The reasons for that may 

vary, but one of the things that certainly has occurred is a refocusing of Shia attention to conflict in the Basra region in the 

south as they seek to control Iraq’s wealthiest areas. And we have 

seen how that truce could so easily break apart in the last few 

weeks as a result of an extraordinarily convoluted set of relationships, of perceptions of whether the United States was supporting 

an Iraqi incursion—Iraqi Security Forces attacking, particularly 

the Sadrist forces and supporting the Islamic Supreme Council of 

Iraq. As a result of that, retaliatory attacks occurred in the Green 

Zone. The greatest irony is that the Sadrists were acting in retaliation for American support of what was perceived as the strongest 

pro-Iranian party in the south. It underscores the complexity and 

the bizarre nature of these arrangements, and how fragile that 

they can be. 

In addition to that, what we have to recognize is that we have, 

in fact, a situation which is almost impossible to understand. You 

have an increase of capacity and strength on the Sunni militias, a 

stand down on the part of the Shia, what would normally be absolutely untenable with one another, and has been allowed because 

of U.S. forces maintaining a balance in between. And whether that 

can be sustained very much depends on the nature of the Iraqi political base. 

What we’ve seen is that there has been some progress: The passage of an amnesty law, which one would expect. Most militias 

would want the prospect of amnesty. There has been a reversal of 

some de-Baathification measures, which still have not been implemented. There’s been a very important 2008 budget law that was 

passed, which was given a boost, obviously, by high international 

oil prices. There is a provincial election law that was passed, with 

elections that are going to take place in October, and could be potentially destabilizing, because the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 

knows that it will lose seats, and it will resist it in every possible 

way. 

And then, beyond that, let’s look at the core factors. There’s still 

no agreement on federal-regional relations, there’s no agreement on 

revenue-sharing, there’s no agreement on militias, there is no 

agreement on minority rights. And we’ve seen the sensitivity of the 

Turkish situation, vis-a-vis the Kurds. 

If U.S. forces are taken away from this equation, I think the results are predictable: An upsurge in violence, possibly at even 

greater levels than seen in the past, because of the regrouping of 

Sunni militias that have still not accepted a Shia-dominated 

national government. Yet, to leave United States forces in the 

midst of this quagmire is also irresponsible if efforts are not made 

to address the fundamental political issues that drive the Iraqis to 

war. And hence, your opening statement and the importance of this 

kind of political settlement. 

Now, on this matter, I would hope that there should be no partisan divide in the United States, and that there should be a 

focused and urgent attention given to negotiating a political settlement, where Iraq’s neighbors will at least agree to honor the settlement, if not support it. 

215 

President Bush has made clear that force levels are not dropping 

significantly during his term. The process of implementing a diplomatic strategy focused on the future of Iraqi politics, I believe, has 

to start now, when the United States force presence can at least 

enhance diplomatic leverage. 

In my testimony, I have tried to outline some specific steps that 

need to be taken. I have proposed that the United Nations can be 

an important and constructive force. There are many who are skeptical about the U.N., but let’s remember that in April 2004, when 

the United States could not reach a deal on an Iraqi interim government, the United States turned to the United Nations and 

Lakhdar Brahimi essentially negotiated and brokered that deal on 

behalf of the United States to be able to make it possible. 

What we have to see from the U.N. has to be of that nature— 

not business as usual, but a specialized team, and a specialized 

team that has the capacity to talk to all Iraqis of all political 

stripes, across the core negotiating issues that I mentioned at the 

outset of my testimony. 

On the basis of that, judgments have to be made about whether 

a deal can be brokered. Discussions are going to have to be held 

with the neighbors. I believe those discussions have to start out 

sequentially, rather than initially bringing them together into a 

room where the posturing will be overwhelming and it will be impossible to get to some form of a deal. 

I believe that, at some point, a judgment call will have to be 

made about whether to have something that resembles a Dayton 

Conference or something like the Bonn Agreement. But, I would 

also underscore that if the United Nations is playing a role here, 

it does not mean a suspension of American diplomacy. Let’s remember the Bonn Agreement process, where Lakhdar Brahimi was 

at the center of negotiations, yet the United States had Jim Dobbins and Zalmay Khalilzad playing a critical and essential role 

with all of the individual parties, bilaterally, and in reinforcing the 

United Nations process. 

I think we also have to be realistic. The chances of something 

like this succeeding are not high; yet, at the same time, I believe 

the costs are low. And even if it does not succeed, I think it is still 

worth the effort. 

Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and India all have a stake in the 

stability of the Middle East and the gulf. They should have an incentive to invest in regional stability. I think a focused diplomatic 

effort by the United Nations could begin the process of reengaging 

these countries and seeking their support to control the potential 

spillover of war into the region, as well as to address the plight of 

refugees. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that, without such an initiative, we have 

a danger of continuing to allow our troops to remain in an untenable situation, and I believe you have an opportunity now, with 

this committee, to begin to refocus attention, not so much on the 

military dimensions of the war, but how you bring in a diplomatic 

and a political process that can help support a sustainable peace. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pascual follows:] 

216 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS PASCUAL, VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR OF

FOREIGN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony. It is an 

honor to appear before this committee. I commend the role so many of you have 

played to focus attention on the need for a political and diplomatic strategy in Iraq. 

The lack of a meaningful U.S. strategy in this area continues to threaten the prospects for sustainable progress. If anything has become clear over the past 5 years 

in Iraq it is that a strong military strategy, underpinned with poorly conceived gestures at political reconciliation, will not result in Iraq becoming a peaceful and viable state. 

The failure of American policy in Iraq presents us with an untenable situation. 

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq will most likely result in an internal 

conflagration that could spill over borders, increase the threat of transnational terrorism, send oil prices soaring further, and add to the number and anguish of 4.5 

million Iraqi refugees and displaced people. Yet, keeping American troops in Iraq 

is an unsustainable stopgap in the absence of major progress toward a political settlement among Iraq’s competing and warring factions. 

This is a critical moment for Congress to give the administration the strongest 

possible impetus to undertake a focused diplomatic initiative with the United 

Nations and key international partners to seek a brokered political settlement in 

Iraq. Such an initiative must go beyond well-worn platitudes about the administration’s commitment to diplomacy. It must focus on building a sustainable compromise 

among key Iraqi parties. It must recognize that the U.S. would benefit from a strong 

U.N. political role—if that role and its leadership are well structured. It must reflect 

the need to coordinate diplomatic activity and American military assets. 

We must also be realistic. Although the chances for a diplomatic initiative producing a brokered political settlement are not high, it is still worth trying. The cost 

of trying is low. The gains from succeeding are huge. The fallout from failure is limited. The process of reviving an international diplomatic process on Iraq could help 

our friends and allies come to appreciate that they too have a stake in contributing 

to regional efforts to mitigate the spillover from war. 

In this testimony, I would like to address the vulnerability that Iraq’s ongoing crisis presents for U.S. troops, key elements for a revised diplomatic strategy for Iraq, 

and critical issues that I hope this committee can inject into the policy debate. 

FRAGILE AND UNSUSTAINABLE PROGRESS

There is no doubt that General Petraeus will present an impressive array of statistics illustrating reductions of violence in Iraq when he testifies before Congress. 

All key indicators on insurgent attacks, bombings, and civilian and military fatalities demonstrate that violence is down, even if attacks and fatalities still remain 

unacceptably high. General Petraeus and the U.S. military deserve credit and praise 

for the ways in which they have carried out a new counterinsurgency strategy in 

Iraq. 

I would also predict that if most senior military officers were asked if this 

progress in security is viable without a political settlement in Iraq, their answer 

would be ‘‘no.’’ The reasons for that lie in the fragile underpinnings of the factors 

contributing to the reductions in violence. U.S. military spokespersons acknowledge 

that the military surge was necessary to reduce violence, but the surge alone was 

not enough. Sunni militias in Anbar and increasingly in other parts of the country 

decided that they hated al-Qaeda in Iraq more than the United States, and beginning in late 2006 they started cooperating with the U.S. military against al-Qaeda’s 

brutality. Now there are around 85,000 ‘‘concerned citizens’’ participating in this 

Sunni ‘‘Awakening.’’ They are paid by the U.S. military for contributions to local 

security. These payments have no doubt helped put food on the table for many families, and they may have also provided the cash they need to rearm. 

Shia militias, particularly Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, called a cease-fire 

against U.S. troops that generally held until late March. In part, the Shia ceasefire toward U.S. forces may reflect a calculated judgment to gauge the impact and 

capacity of surging U.S. forces. Meanwhile, Shia militias have confronted each other 

in Basra, with the Mahdi Army, the Badr Organization associated with the Islamic 

Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Fadhila engaged in a struggle to control the 

resources and power in Iraq’s wealthiest city and region. 

The Shia cease-fire toward the U.S. came apart, at least temporarily, in late 

March when the Iraqi Security Forces launched a campaign against what the Iraqi 

Government deemed ‘‘outlaws’’ in Basra. Others argue that the Iraqi Government 

used Iraqi forces to target Sadr’s Mahdi Army and take sides in favor of ISCI, which 

is reputed to have strong ties to Iran. Details are far from clear, but it is plausible 

217 

1For an overview of international oil supply options, see the 10 August 2007 International 

Energy Association Oil Market Report (http://omrpublic.iea.org/archiveresults.asp?formsection= 

full+issue&formdate=2007&Submit=Submit), especially pp. 18–27. The Saudis continue to have 

the largest spare capacity at about 2 million barrels per day (mbd). Russia is producing far 

Continued 

that some Sadr followers retaliated against the U.S. compound in the Green Zone 

because the U.S. supports the Iraqi Government and security forces, which are supporting Sadr’s pro-Iranian enemies in Basra. As of April 1, 2008, it appears that 

a new cease-fire may have been struck with Sadr, but the convoluted web of fighting 

and retaliation over the previous week underscored the fragility of the Shia ceasefire toward coalition forces. 

The combined development of strengthened Sunni militias and a Shia cease-fire 

would normally seem unimaginable. It has been possible because both Sunni and 

Shia have seen a strong U.S.-force presence as a balancing factor that, for now, 

serves each of their interests. Putting aside the current conflict in Basra, one can 

argue that better security has facilitated incremental political progress: An improved 2008 budget, an Amnesty Law that (unsurprisingly) militia leaders support, 

some reversal of the de-Baathification laws, legislation to authorize provincial elections in October, and signs of improved governance in some provinces. 

One must see this narrow base of political progress against a wider backdrop. 

There is still no understanding of the core political issues dividing Iraqi society: 

Federal-regional relations, long-term revenue allocation, disarmament and demobilization of militias, the inclusion of former Baathists in senior political positions, and 

protection of minority rights. We have already seen in the past month the fragility 

of the situation in the Kurdish areas and the potential for Turkish incursions. Iran’s 

role also remains a point of debate, but there is no question that Iran can be disruptive when it wants to. Iraqi Security Forces have improved, but they still cannot 

carry out operations effectively on their own. The Iraqi police have not succeeded 

in enforcing the rule of law. 

If U.S. forces are taken away from this equation, the results are predictable: An 

upsurge in violence, possibly at even greater levels than seen in the past given the 

regrouping of Sunni militias that have still not accepted a Shia-dominated national 

government. Yet to leave U.S. forces in the midst of this quagmire is also irresponsible if efforts are not made to address the fundamental political issues that drive 

the Iraqis to war. 

On this matter, there should be no partisan divide in the United States: There 

must be focused and urgent attention to negotiating a political settlement in Iraq, 

where Iraq’s neighbors will at least agree to honor the settlement, if not support 

it. President Bush has made clear that force levels are not dropping significantly 

during his term. The process of implementing a diplomatic strategy focused on the 

future of Iraqi politics must start now, when the U.S.-force presence can enhance 

diplomatic leverage. It will take time and other partners, as I will discuss shortly. 

The diplomatic options must be set up for the next U.S. President to expeditiously 

demonstrate a new course that is nonpartisan and can be accepted internationally. 

The argument for a brokered settlement in Iraq has a strong foundation in international experience. Civil wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Haiti, 

South Africa, and Northern Ireland have all demonstrated that peace cannot be 

achieved without a political agreement among the warring parties. Military force 

can help induce a political settlement or create space to implement it, but force 

alone cannot sustain peace. Even when parties reach agreements, they often fail— 

and it could very well be the case that Iraqis are simply not ‘‘done fighting.’’ Shias 

may still believe they can ‘‘win.’’ Sunnis are committed to making sure that Shia 

do not. Militias may be so splintered that it is difficult for any actor to rein them 

in, or for any group of leaders to speak credibly on behalf of the sectarian groups 

they claim to represent. 

If a settlement is not reached, the spillover from Iraq could threaten the entire 

region. The refugee crisis could become a new source of instability, as major refugee 

flows have in virtually every other part of the world. Insurgents would likely cross 

borders seeking support, recruits and perhaps to widen conflict. Neighbors would 

likely be drawn further into backing sectarian brethren. Wider instability would 

help al-Qaeda franchises gain stronger holds in the region, including the potential 

for further destabilization in Lebanon. A referendum in Kirkuk and signs of Kurdish 

nationalism could risk Turkey acting again in Kurdistan. All these factors would 

create greater instability around Israel. And beyond the region, the risks to energy 

production and transit would likely manifest themselves in yet higher prices—radically so if there are real disruptions to supply when there is virtually no spare 

short-term oil production capacity outside of the gulf.1

218 

above historical trends and is seen to have little spare capacity. Neither Nigeria nor Iraq are 

reliable fallbacks for oil. A disruption or perceived disruption in gulf oil production or transit, 

with few ready alternatives, could produce sharp price hikes and fuel international speculation. 2 Carlos Pascual and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘‘The Critical Battles: Political Reconciliation and 

Reconstruction in Iraq,’’ Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 3, Summer 2007. 

A NEW DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

All of these factors make peace in Iraq a long shot. Yet that should not stop serious attempts at reconciliation. U.S. efforts, however, must match the complexity of 

the task. 

Even if the path to stability is uncertain, what should be clear is that the current 

American strategy for reconciliation—setting benchmarks and demanding that a 

failed Iraqi state achieve them—will not succeed. As of March 2008, over one-quarter of Iraq’s Cabinet seats are vacant or only nominally filled. The state cannot perform basic functions such as maintaining law and order. It is unrealistic to expect 

Iraq to fix itself through a sequential process of passing laws and holding elections 

and referendums. Issues such as oil revenues, federal-regional relations, and the 

question of de-Baathification are interrelated. It is unrealistic to expect warring parties to settle on part of this equation without understanding the outcomes on related 

issues. Local reconciliation in some provinces where security has improved is indeed 

important, but at some point that needs to translate into a willingness to accept and 

support a national government, which is certainly not yet the case among Sunni 

militias in Anbar. 

Regional diplomatic efforts have not had the strategic focus to advance prospects 

for a settlement, nor is it likely that they could without massive work. Regional 

meetings in Istanbul, Baghdad, and Sharm el-Sheikh did not have a clear goal of 

supporting an Iraqi settlement or an agenda to sustain it. The International Compact for Iraq (ICI) is a framework for assistance conditioned on policy actions by 

Iraq, similar in spirit to the conditionality packages developed for the former Soviet 

states in the 1990s. In the short term, the ICI is a self-defining mechanism for stalemate as Iraq cannot realistically meet the conditions. Visits by Secretaries Rice and 

Gates intended to encourage the Gulf States to support Iraq will produce little 

concrete action as long as ‘‘support’’ suggests bolstering what is perceived as Shia 

dominance in Iraq. Moreover, simply convening regional actors without a strategic 

agenda could complicate serious negotiations among Iraqis, as each regional player 

may seek to advance its parochial interests. To move forward with a realistic agenda for peace in Iraq, regional gatherings would need a clear focus around a defined 

agenda, which to date is nonexistent. 

A new approach is needed. It should be led by the U.N. But in order for the U.N. 

to even consider such a role, the United States must make clear that it welcomes 

U.N. involvement and that it will coordinate military action to support the diplomatic process. All Iraqi parties that are not associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq should 

be given a voice in the process. To succeed, regional actors would have to endorse 

a political settlement, or agree at a minimum not to undermine it. If an agreement 

is reached, it will require international troops and oversight to implement it.2 Political agreements to end civil wars require massive preparation and negotiation. They 

do not spontaneously generate. 

To be effective, the U.N. must also be mindful of its shortcomings, and Member 

States must take seriously that they constitute the U.N. Members of the Security 

Council must place international imperative over political bickering. Given widespread anti-American sentiments, some countries will be content to see the United 

States continually bogged down in a protracted and humiliating quagmire. China 

and Russia could play a constructive role in advocating for the U.N. to seek a viable 

place in Iraq, if they act on their interests in a stable Middle East and international 

energy markets. All Member States have to put behind them the controversies of 

the Oil for Food program, drawing lessons on corruption and transparency from past 

management mistakes. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1770, passed on August 10, 2007, provides the 

necessary mandate to seek political reconciliation in Iraq. Implementing this mandate will require U.N.-equivocal political backing, careful calibration of expectations, 

and skilled diplomacy. To undertake this task, the U.N. needs a special team and 

a flexible mandate. It cannot be business as usual. The lead negotiator should report 

to the Secretary General, and must be empowered to engage regional and international actors directly. The team should include individuals who know Iraq, and 

who can liaise effectively and credibly with key external constituencies such as the 

United States, the EU, the Permanent Members of the Security Council, and the 

Gulf States. 

219 

3Thomas E. Ricks, ‘‘Deals in Iraq Make Friends of Enemies,’’ Washington Post, 20 July 2007. 

Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071902432. 

html?nav=emailpage; accessed: 9 August 2007. 

Running such a political process is as much art as science. It will require engaging all the key actors in Iraq, all the neighboring states, and all the major external 

actors (the U.S., EU, others in the P5, major donors, and potential troop contributors). The following are some of the critical strategic considerations. 

• Core Elements. Any agreement will likely revolve around a ‘‘five plus one’’ agenda: Federal-regional relations; sharing oil revenues; political inclusion (redressing the de-Baathification issue); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 

of militias; and minority rights. Even under a minimalist Federal Government 

arrangement, Sunnis will need assurance of a role in an equitable allocation of 

oil revenues. Minority rights are key to protecting those who do not succumb 

to sectarian pressures to move. Demobilization of militias will be needed for the 

state to regain control over the use of force. The Kurds will insist on retaining 

regional autonomy. The ‘‘plus one’’ is the timing of a referendum on Kirkuk, 

which is guaranteed by the Constitution but could trigger pressures for Kurdish 

independence and draw Turkey and Iran into the conflict. Because these issues 

are so interconnected they should be negotiated as a package rather than 

sequentially, in order to maximize options for viable compromises. 

• Five-Year Truce. The focus should be agreement on a 5-year truce—provisions 

that can create sufficient confidence to stop the fighting—with the option to extend the timeframe annually. At this point animosities are too sharp to expect 

that the parties can negotiate permanent solutions to the core agenda. Also, 

developments over the coming years may produce better options than those can 

be developed in just a few months. 

• Iraqi Positions. As a condition for participating in the negotiation process, Iraqi 

political parties and militia leaders will need to condemn the role of al-Qaeda 

in Iraq and agree to cooperate against it. The U.N. negotiator must have leeway 

on whom to consult. As seen in the current U.S. military experience, that may 

entail militias that once attacked American forces.3 The U.N. Representative 

will likely need to meet separately with the Iraqi actors, mapping out their positions against the ‘‘five plus one’’ agenda in order to determine if there are potential deals to be made that also respect core substantive objectives. That may 

lead to small group meetings among parties to test potential alliances. 

• Regional Players. Along with surveying Iraqis, the neighboring states should be 

engaged on the core agenda. Again, these meetings should start separately to 

mitigate the inevitable posturing and gamesmanship that occurs when competing actors are in the same room. From these meetings, the U.N. Representative will need to determine which outside actors have useful leverage, with 

whom, and issues where potential spoilers need to be isolated or neutralized. 

• Support Team. Iraqi and regional consultations will need a dedicated expert 

support team to provide guidance on issues ranging from the commercial viability of revenue-sharing arrangements on oil, to international experience on legal 

and constitutional arrangements. The U.N. will need to organize experts available in real time to support the negotiation process. It will also need to develop 

public information strategies, using local and regional television and radio, to 

explain the U.N. role and mitigate attempts at disinformation from al-Qaeda 

and other potential spoilers. 

• Brokering an Agreement. Eventually a judgment will need to be made on 

whether to try for a major meeting to broker an agreement—like the Bonn 

Agreement for Afghanistan or the Dayton Accords for Bosnia. The meeting must 

be a carefully orchestrated process of negotiating among an inner circle of key 

Iraqis while engaging (separately and in a more limited way) a wider contact 

group of the neighboring states. The U.S. will need to sustain constant bilateral 

diplomacy throughout this process, coordinating every step of the way with the 

U.N. Representative. The Bonn Agreement exemplified such coordination, with 

the U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi running the core meetings, 

and U.S. Special Envoys Jim Dobbins and Zalmay Khalilzad engaging the external actors. 

The desire for a political agreement should not result in accepting any settlement. 

The U.N. Representative, the negotiating team, and key partners in the negotiations 

will need to determine if the commitments are genuine, adequate, and sufficiently 

encompassing of the key players to be viable. The initial peace agreement for Darfur 

in April 2006, for example, was stillborn because it did not involve all key rebel facVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
220 

tions. In 1999, the Ramboulliet negotiations on Kosovo were called off because the 

Serbs would not consider viable compromises on Kosovar autonomy. 

Strong coordination is critical between diplomacy and military action to control 

potential spoilers. U.S. forces must continue during this period to prevent and 

respond swiftly to insurgent attacks. The Iraqi Government must say publicly and 

unequivocally that it supports the peace process. Similar support must be gained 

from Sunni, Shia, and Kurds for the process, even if they cannot precommit to the 

outcomes. Every step must be taken to isolate insurgents in their opposition to seeking a settlement, making it more difficult for them to find shelter among Iraqis. 

For Republicans, the hardest point to accept in this strategy is this: If Iraqis are 

given the chance to broker a political settlement and reject it, then this eclipses the 

rationale to keep American troops in Iraq. U.S. forces cannot fix Iraq for them. We 

would need to tell Iraqis clearly that if they do not take this opportunity, we will 

withdraw and reposition U.S. forces to control the spillover from Iraq. For Democrats the point of discomfort comes with success. If a settlement can be reached, 

then Iraqis will need sustained international support in order to implement it. A 

unbrokered settlement increases the prospects to diversify the international military 

presence, but the core military effort would still have to be borne by the United 

States. 

If attempts at a settlement fail, this diplomatic initiative is still worth the effort. 

As argued earlier, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and India all have a stake in stability in the Middle East and the gulf. They should have an incentive to invest in 

regional stability. A focused diplomatic effort, led by the U.N., could begin the process of reengaging these countries and seeking their support to control the spillover 

of war into the region, as well as to address the plight of refugees. Without such 

an initiative that can change the diplomatic dynamics around Iraq, the military 

costs of containment will fall on the United States, as well as the people in the surrounding countries who would feel the direct impacts of a return to an intensified 

Iraqi conflict. 

KEY ISSUES FOR THE CONGRESS

To date, the debate on Iraq has focused on the role of the U.S. military—whether 

to continue to fight for a decisive outcome or to withdraw from a seemingly 

irresolvable quagmire. Military force must factor into any future strategy in Iraq, 

but America’s fixation on the military has obscured both attention to, and pressure 

for, a diplomatic process than can help produce a sustainable payoff for the lost lives 

and trillions of dollars that the United States will eventually invest in Iraq. 

Congressional hearings next week are a chance to put into central focus the need 

for a diplomatic strategy that can take Iraq toward a political settlement. The Bush 

administration has already signaled that it will not shift its strategy in Iraq. That 

clearly ties the hands of the Congress. However, it does not prevent the Congress 

from sustaining pressure for diplomatic action in order to give the next American 

President a chance to take the actions, ignored by this administration, to at least 

create the prospect for a political settlement in Iraq. In that spirit, I offer the following 10 questions as a contribution to framing the interrelationship between political process and military action in Iraq, and the role that the United States and the 

internal community might play. 

1. Can a U.S. military presence in Iraq, of whatever size, produce sustainable 

results without a political settlement? 

2. What are the critical issues that must be addressed together to achieve a sustainable political outcome in Iraq? The administration has already highlighted federal-regional relations, revenue-sharing, minority rights, and the status of militias. 

What is the best way to achieve an understanding across these issues? 

3. Is the Iraqi Government, Parliament, or any Iraqi group or political party capable of leading and conducting a political process that could produce a political settlement that secures a truce among Iraq’s competing and warring factions? 

4. What are your expectations for Kirkuk, and how will developments there play 

into the fragile status between Turkey and Kurdish areas? 

5. Will provincial elections in October increase the prospects for stability by giving 

a chance to more credible leaders, or will they sharpen political and ethnic competition in the provinces? 

6. What are prospects for and limits of political reconciliation at a provincial level 

as long as there is disarray in national politics? How far can the bottom-up process 

go and how can it be used more constructively? 

7. How significantly has Iraqi military capacity expanded? Can Iraqi forces substitute for U.S. forces to sustain the relative balance among Sunni militias and 

between Sunni and Shia militias seen since the surge? 

221 

8. Can Iraqi police enforce any semblance of a rule of law in Iraq, or is order still 

largely dependent on U.S. or Iraqi military forces? 

9. What are the implications for U.S. military strategy, tactics, and force levels 

taking into account these political factors and the status of Iraqi capabilities? 

10. What is the administration’s strategy to mobilize a focused diplomatic initiative that can put before Iraqis clear options for a brokered political settlement? 

CONCLUSION

Realities on the ground in Iraq and in American and international politics will 

shift rapidly and affect the nature of what can be done in Iraq. American policy has 

thus far failed in dealing with the complex nature of security, political, and economic challenges in Iraq. This failure has created new threats: Risks of a wider sectarian conflict in the region between Sunni and Shia, an emboldened Iran, a network of al-Qaeda franchises operating throughout the Middle East and North Africa, 

U.N.-governed spaces in Iraq that can become bases for exporting transnational terrorism, and instability and lack of resiliency in international oil markets. These 

threats are regional and global. They call for multilateral engagement that the 

United Nations can lead. Yet there should be no illusions about simple success. 

A political agreement to end the war is not an end point, but a milestone on a 

course to sustainable peace. From there, the complexity of implementing the agreement takes hold. It will be a long-term proposition. International forces stayed in 

Bosnia for over a decade, they are still in Kosovo, and even in resource-rich countries such as Russia and Ukraine that went through massive transitions without 

wars, it took almost a decade to halt their economic declines after the collapse of 

communism. The international community must recognize that it will take a decade 

of sustained peace for Iraq to become stable and prosperous. 

That timeframe alone underscores why any single nation, even the United States, 

cannot unilaterally support Iraq onto a path of prosperity. The demands on personnel and resources are too great to be sustained credibly by one international 

actor. The strains on our military and Foreign Service personnel serving in Iraq 

demonstrate that the current strategy is not sustainable. If the international community does not have a role in brokering peace, there will be less incentive to contribute seriously to the expensive and time-consuming process of building a viable 

state. 

The United Nations should consider a peace-building role in Iraq only if there is 

a binding political settlement, which is accepted by the main sectarian groups in 

Iraq (with clear indication that militia leaders will follow political leaders) and endorsed by Iraq’s neighbors. Without such an agreement, attempts at peace-building 

will result in unsustainable half measures constrained by violence and will not 

make a meaningful difference to most Iraqis. The U.N. will fare no better than the 

United States. Without a political agreement, the U.N. should limit its role in Iraq 

to humanitarian relief. 

To maximize the next U.S. President’s chances to advance a political settlement 

in Iraq, the process needs to begin to explore the prospects now. It should be made 

clear to Iraqis and the international community that if the Iraqis will not take 

advantage of a credible multilateral process to reach a political compromise, then 

American troops cannot make a sustainable difference in Iraq and will be withdrawn. What should not be forgotten under any circumstance is that diplomatic and 

military strategies must reinforce each other as part of a coherent policy. In Iraq, 

the United States seems to have forgotten the meaning of proactive diplomacy to 

achieve peace. 

The limits of unilateralism also apply to containing the spillover from war in Iraq 

if it is not possible to broker, at this point, a political compact among the parties. 

The United States should encourage a U.N. role in diplomacy to get commitments 

from Iraq’s neighbors not to fuel the Iraq civil war with money and weapons, and 

by implication exacerbate the foundations for international terrorism. Perhaps other 

nations, not from the Middle East, could contribute troops or observers to control 

the spillover. An even broader lesson is that the disruption of diplomatic ties with 

perceived enemies only hampers our capacity when we have no choice but to find 

common ground. At present the very question of a dialogue with Iran has become 

an issue, when the real focus should be on the substance of such a dialogue. 

America’s image around the world has reached an all time low. The Pew Global 

Attitude Project Survey Report from June 2006 showed that the United States military presence in Iraq is seen by most nations as a greater threat to world peace 

222 

4 ‘‘America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share.’’ ‘‘U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,’’ Pew Global 

Attitudes Project, Survey Report, 13 June 2006, p.3. Available: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252; accessed: 9 August 2007. 5 ‘‘Global Unease With Major World Powers,’’ Pew Global Attitudes Project, Survey Report, 27 

June 2007, p.44. Available: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256; accessed: 9 

August 2007. 6 ‘‘World Public Opinion 2007,’’ the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublic 

Opinion.org, 25 June 2007, p.30. Available: http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/ 

POS%20Topline%20Reports/WPOl07%20full%20report.pdf; accessed: 9 August 2007. 

and security than Iran.4 The Pew Global Attitude Project Survey Report released 

on June 27, 2007, showed that, in nearly all countries surveyed, more people view 

China’s influence positively than make the same assessment of U.S. influence.’’ 5

World Public Opinion 2007, a report published by the Chicago Council on Foreign 

Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org, shows that ‘‘In 10 out of 15 countries, the most 

common view is that the United States cannot be trusted to ‘act responsibly in the 

world.’ ’’ 6 The United Nations cannot solve these problems for the United States. 

But the next American President may well find that engaging seriously in multilateral fora, investing in rebuilding the United Nations, respecting and abiding by 

international law, and resorting to unilateral action only under imminent threats 

could restore respect for the United States and American leadership. In Iraq, American advocacy for U.N. political and humanitarian leadership may not only help the 

United States in Iraq, it may begin to give credence to a reawakening of American 

diplomacy and international engagement. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Well, thank you very much. 

The Chairman had to take an emergency call, and asked me to 

conduct my questioning, and then I will yield to him as he returns. 

And he’s asked that we have a 10-minute spell for each of our 

members. 

It has been mentioned in these hearings that the United States 

presence will be required for the foreseeable future, and clearly 

we’re going to hear, I suspect, from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, at least a similar thought. A question from yesterday intersects with our thoughts today, was over the level of the 

United States presence, and how it is to be sustained over an extended period of time. And the generals, in essence, were saying 

that our Armed Forces are stretched. We are in a position in which, 

in order to fulfill our obligations in Afghanistan, and to encourage, 

as we are doing presently, NATO allies to be there, and at the 

same time to have at least the forces that could meet other strategic problems facing the United States, we are headed toward 

fewer troops in Iraq. 

Now, at one point, one of you mentioned ‘‘perhaps 50,000’’ was 

an adequate level. Whether that be the number, clearly this would 

raise the question: If there are 150,000-plus now, where do you redeploy them from, or how do you disperse, or what missions would 

you assign to the 50,000 who remain? Or what is the nature of the 

U.S. military presence while, as some of you have said, a diplomatic process, which is clearly uncertain, may or may not work out, 

may involve the U.N., may involve other parties? Perhaps our 

diplomacy becomes more active and successful. But, if you can, 

address what I suspect is going to be an immediate problem for our 

Armed Forces, and the successful continuation of all of our missions—which is: How do we do this with fewer people? What would 

that fewer number be in your judgment, and over what period of 

time? Give us as well, some of your thoughts on the expense of this 

in terms of levels of expenditure among the many economic and 

budgetary challenges we will face. And if we’re to look at a costbenefit analysis, is it worth it? And why? 

223 

Ambassador Pascual, would you try that out for size? And then 

I’d invite others. 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Senator, thank you. I’d be pleased to 

begin, especially since I used the figure of 50,000. And let me explain the context of that. 

I put that in the context of 2012, with the assumption that there 

is a political agreement that all sides have agreed to. I would add 

that it would be a political agreement that would be brokered by 

the United Nations. And my assumption is that it would be an 

international force, with multicountry—multiple countries participating in it. 

That level is certainly not viable today. And the dilemma that we 

face right now is that we have seen that we need a significant force 

presence, and I think it would be hard to argue that 160,000 is too 

many to be able to continue to play the role that has been needed 

to, in fact, begin to sustain the reductions in violence throughout 

the country. 

The problem is that even that number cannot do it for all of Iraq. 

And so, what we end up facing right now is that 160,000 allowed 

some progress in the security situation, but the argument that I 

was seeking to make is that it’s an unsustainable progress, and 

that what we need to refocus attention on is not just the troop levels, but, in fact, the political process that makes any level of troops, 

whether that be 100,000 or 150,000, in fact, a viable and sustainable one. 

The difficult part of this process is that, for, I think, many 

Republicans, if we engage in Iraq in a political—provide for the 

Iraqis a chance to engage in a brokered political process, and the 

Iraqis say ‘‘No,’’ and do not take that option, then the rationale for 

sustaining a U.S. force presence is, I think, eclipsed. The flip side 

of the equation, which is difficult for many Democrats, is that if, 

in fact, there is a brokered political process and the Iraqis say ‘‘Yes, 

we are willing to buy into this,’’ it’s going to mean a sustained 

international presence for a period of time, and the United States 

is going to have to play into that. 

And so, I think that right now what we find ourselves at is a 

juncture point, that we have 150,000 or so troops there, the President has indicated he’s going to sustain that throughout the rest 

of his term, for the most part, and can something be done over the 

next 6 months that puts in place a prospect for the next President 

of the United States to actually create something which is sustainable. And I would argue that the focus to make that sustainable 

should be not so much on the security side or the military side, but, 

right now, really has to come on the political side, because that’s 

the part that we have not been able to give enough of an impetus. 

Senator LUGAR. What evidence is there that other countries want 

to participate in this international aspect? Most of our allies have 

indicated that they’ve rejected our idea of going into Iraq, to begin 

with, are not about to be drawn back into this. You’ve mentioned 

the neighbors. Perhaps. But, what gives you any confidence that 

some type of international group is going to wrestle with this? 

Ambassador PASCUAL. I think one of the critical factors is—and 

this is one of the important reasons to try to approach this brokered settlement through the United Nations—in the past months, 

224 

we’ve had discussions with a number of European friends, and we 

have engaged them in this very question, because we’ve said, ‘‘You 

have as much of a stake here in stability as we do, and you have 

as much of a concern about international energy prices as we do, 

and so, you should be willing to invest in this stability.’’ And what 

many have indicated is that they need something that shows that 

there has been a change in the dynamic of the political process. 

And that is, in part, what a brokered political process can actually 

do. It can at least begin to send the signal that it is not business 

as usual, with the United States dominating the scene, but that we 

are, in fact, trying to encourage a multilateral process that can 

bring in other countries to make investments. Some of those might 

be in the form of troops, some of them might actually be in form 

of money. 

It will not be simple. It does not play well in the politics of 

Europe or in the politics of Asia. Yet, at the same time, many recognize that we have to get beyond where we are today, and the 

combination of a U.N.-brokered process and the incumbency of a 

new President of the United States who will be given some degree 

of leeway, actually makes—gives us an opportunity to turn the corner and to try something new. 

Senator LUGAR. Professor O’Leary, do you have any comment 

about the situation? 

Professor O’LEARY. Yes, if we’re starting from 2008, I think we 

have to revisit the oil law. And remember that there was a draft— 

the Kurds and the Shia had come to an agreement—there was a 

draft. I’ve seen the draft. Things happened. Personalities got involved. And so, we have to bring them back to that draft, because 

having a viable oil law, I think, can set the stage, along with moving forward on federalism, for the political parties to be able to control their areas. 

The militias are a reality. I think we have to accept them, for the 

time being. And from my point of view, although I have no military 

expertise, we will be drawing down troops, and we simply have to 

deal with Iraq as it is, and push them forward, particularly on the 

oil law. 

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Kelly, do you have a thought? 

Dr. KELLY. I would not hazard a guess on what troop levels are 

needed, because I don’t think the analysis has been done, based on 

what U.S. interests are. And I think, Senator Lugar, the interests 

that I have in my written testimony are very close to what you 

have in your opening statement. 

But, I would observe that the need for security forces is to 

address the dysfunctionality of Iraqi political and social structures. 

And until those are fixed, no amount of security forces is going to 

fix the situation in Iraq. So, that raises the question of whether or 

not we need 150,000 United States troops there, or do we need 

some other combinations of ways to influence both Iraqi society and 

Iraqi political leaders. 

I would also point out that there’s two tiers of players here. 

There’s the local, or maybe provincial, players, who we’ve dealt 

with to get the violence down. There’s also national-level leaders 

who control the big levels of violence, and there are a discrete number of people there; we know who they are. I think we can provide 

225 

them carrots and sticks to change their behaviors if we go about 

it in a logical way. 

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Gause. 

Dr. GAUSE. I’ve never worn the uniform and don’t know much 

about the military, but it does seem to me that, in the inevitable 

circumstance of the drawdown of our forces, whether it’s total withdrawal or just a reduction to a sustainable level, we should be concentrating on our enemy, which is al-Qaeda in Iraq. And that 

means supporting the Sunni turns that we’ve seen in the last 18 

months, making sure that those areas in the west, the northwest, 

and in Baghdad do not become safe areas for al-Qaeda to operate. 

And I don’t think that we should be picking sides in inter-Shia 

fighting, as we’ve done in the last few days, because we don’t have 

the resources to materially affect—to have one side actually beat 

the other, which might actually lead to some progress. If we can’t 

do that, then we should stay out of that kind of fighting. 

Senator LUGAR. How about the charges that, by arming the 

Sunnis, that we are setting up a civil war in which they’re better 

prepared to fight the Shiites? 

Dr. GAUSE. It’s entirely possible. But, given that, it seems to me, 

our major enemy in Iraq is al-Qaeda in Iraq and preventing Iraq 

from becoming a base for al-Qaeda operations, the turn in Sunni 

politics is something that’s been positive for us, and should be supported. There’s also the ancillary benefit that, when we eventually 

do withdraw, the fact that the Sunni militias are armed up in a 

better way, while it might lead to some fighting, would reduce the 

chances of a complete victory for one side over another that could 

actually lead to enormous civilian casualties. I don’t say that there 

won’t be fighting, but there might be a balance of forces, which 

would allow a better negotiated outcome. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I’ve run through my time. I yield 

back to you. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Well, thank you very much. 

And let me say to my two colleagues, even if other Senators come 

in, you’ll be recognized next, because of the 10 minutes we’re using 

here, and because of your incredibly patience the last couple of 

days. So—although that’s not a formal new rule, I say to my friend 

from Florida. But, I—I’d like, first of all, thank you all. The testimony—you’ve responded exactly what we asked, and it’s impressive, and I thank you very much. 

What I’m going to do, if I may, in the few minutes I have, is ask 

each of you a specific question, and then—rather than have you all 

comment on each of the questions I ask, to try to get through some 

elements of what you said. 

Let me start where you ended. Mr. Ambassador, I’m very impressed with your testimony, and I’d like to pursue the U.N. piece 

a little bit. I, for one, happen to think you’re right, that you—I 

don’t know that an attempt at coming up with a consensus is 

likely, but I know, absent trying, there’s no good likely outcome. 

And the downside is not nearly as down as the upside, if we make 

any progress. 

And I want to state, for the record, as one Democrat who tried 

to become a nominee, that I’ve said, throughout the process—and 

I’ve not changed my view—that I am one Democrat who would supVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00233 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
226 

port—in the dilemma you outlined, support American forces 

remaining in Iraq if, in fact, it was in the context of a political settlement. 

And the third point I’d like to make, leading to this question, is 

that I have believed all along—and I—realizing it is—it’s a—just 

a best guess—that, in the context of a political settlement, and the 

threat of us physically getting out because of the political pressure 

here, it would have a significant impact on our European and 

Asian allies to consider participating in a—with a security force— 

much smaller, probably constrained, in terms of responsibilities. 

But, in that context—and I can make an analogy, broadly, to Bosnia—I think, in the context of people not being killed in large numbers, people would be much more prepared to sit on top of an internationally condoned, an internationally accepted, and regionally 

accepted, and locally noninflammatory settlement that will have, 

still, trouble, but, in that context, people participate. 

The question, for me, is a practical one, as it is, I know, for you 

and everyone else—How do you get there? My view is that—and 

I hope I’m wrong, but my view is that we don’t have a lot of credibility, the United States of America, right now, in the region or 

with our Asian and/or our European friends. And so, some months 

ago I went to see the Permanent Five ambassadors. They all expressly said, at that time—I haven’t spoken to them since preChristmas—at that time, they would be prepared to participate— 

their countries, they believe, were prepared to participate, under 

the auspices of the Security Council. And the Secretary General 

implied to me that he would be prepared to have the U.N. be the 

broker, here. 

So, the question I have, though, is—you talk about a specialized 

team—is it more likely that that specialized team could materialize 

under a broader umbrella of it being sought through, and by, the 

Security Council, or at least the Permanent Five in the Security 

Council, or is that an unnecessarily step? Do we have enough on 

our own, enough juice on our own, to get this done? To get it 

begun, let me put it that way. 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Mr. Chairman, I think, first of all, one important measure is that the last U.N. Security Council resolution 

on Iraq for the mandate, 1770, actually provides the necessary authority to actually do something like this, so I don’t think it actually requires further Security Council action. 

One of the things that is critical—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But, I don’t think—I know it does not legally 

require—— 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. More action. But, this administration has made it clear it does not want the United Nations—— 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Determining what the next stage— 

I’m going to use layman’s terms—the next stage of U.S. involvement is, relatively. That’s why they’re bilaterally negotiating this, 

quote, ‘‘agreement,’’ whatever it is—whatever form it’s going to 

take. They could easily do it through the United Nations—— 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Right. 

227 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Under the existing resolution. So, 

I—you understand? 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Yes, I think—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s very important. 

Ambassador PASCUAL. Absolutely. I think you’re exactly right. 

And that is exactly the next point to come to, which is that this 

goes absolutely nowhere unless the United States is absolutely 

unequivocal, at the highest levels, that it’s willing to engage and 

cooperate with such a process, and, ideally, would identify and 

name an individual that would work with a United Nations team. 

Originally, when I had written on some of these issues, I proposed that it should be a senior international official. I had, in 

some cases, used somebody like Minister Bernard Kushner as an 

example of the kind of individual who—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Who took another job. 

Ambassador PASCUAL. He has another job. [Laughter.] 

He might take a leave of absence. [Laughter.] 

But, in fact, what we’ve actually seen on the ground is, Stefan 

de Mistura has actually done a tremendously impressive job—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. 

Ambassador PASCUAL [continuing]. And has gained the respect of 

many people all across the board. And if the United States were 

willing to come to the U.N. and basically say to the Secretary General that, ‘‘We want to engage in this process, that we are committed to coordinating with you, that we want you to take this 

lead, that we will also coordinate on the security side, and that we 

want you to come to us with a proposal on how you would structure 

a team,’’ my sense is that the other P–5 would be supportive of 

that, you know, if we—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s my sense, as well. The thing that startles 

me, I say to my colleagues, is, I don’t know why it’s not in the political interests of the administration to do this. Why not let somebody else help take ownership of this? It boggles my mind. But, 

that’s a different issue. 

Let me move to you, Doctor, if I may—Dr. Gause. First of all, 

there’s a second strike you have against you. Puneet Talwar, of my 

staff, was one of your students. You really messed him up. [Laughter.] 

And that’s an attempt at humor. 

But, let me—there’s so much you said that I agree with, but let 

me focus on one piece of what you said. And that is that the 

regional consequences of withdrawal are exaggerated. I’ve come to 

personally adopt that position. I did not believe that, 2 years ago, 

although, obviously, the caveat is, God only knows, anything could 

happen, and there are a lot of unintended consequences from 

actions. But, toward that end, if you—if you’re going to also do a 

little bit of failsafe here—should we be doing more now through the 

International Community and us, as well—in dealing with and discussing with the nations which are, unfortunately, the beneficiaries 

of over 2 million refugees, helping accommodate their—the cost 

that they’re incurring and the impact on the—potential impact on 

their domestic stability? And what would you do toward that end 

now, if you would? 

228 

Dr. GAUSE. I think the most important thing you can do on the 

refugee issue, for Jordan, is money. The Jordanians are overburdened, their school system is overburdened. Throwing money at 

problems doesn’t always solve them, but it’s certainly a first step 

toward solving them. 

On the Syrian issue, we have conflicting interests, here. We’re 

not particularly friendly to the Syrian Government, and the Syrian 

Government hasn’t been particularly friendly to us recently, but 

they are the recipient of the vast bulk of the refugees who have left 

Iraq, not counting the displaced persons within Iraq. 

And I do think that we have an interest in regional stability, 

more generally, and thus, in not seeing a Syria so destabilized by 

the 800,000 refugees that it’s taken in that there’s a political upheaval there. And thus, we might have to hold our nose a bit, but 

I do think that it’s worth, maybe, throwing a little money at the 

Syrians, through U.N. mechanisms, so it doesn’t go directly to the 

Syrian Government—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My time is running out. Let me—and 

I’m going to come back, if others don’t stay, to ask a few more questions. 

But, again, I’m not being solicitous, Dr. Kelly, I was really impressed with your testimony. I’d like to ask you to—and I, unfortunately, have not read it, so you may have already answered this 

in your written statement—about some of the specific mechanisms 

you’re talking about, that you reference in here. But, let me go to 

one specific point you made that I think is really an important 

point, and if you could elaborate on it a moment, and that is that 

‘‘We may not want Iraq as a formal ally.’’ Would you elaborate on 

that? 

Dr. KELLY. Yes, Senator. I think the logic for what we do and the 

resources we expend needs to start with our core interests. And so, 

having Iraq as an ally may or may not provide any extra benefit 

toward those interests. So, if Iraq is capable of securing its own 

borders and it’s capable of maintaining decent security forces that 

can keep international terrorism—and, by the way, I do agree that 

the prospects of regional instability are less now than they were a 

year ago—if Iraq is able to do that, then the question has to be 

asked, What benefit is to be gained from having Iraq as a formal 

ally? 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. Look, one of the things that I 

think I’ve come to—again, not that it matters to anyone—but, one 

of the conclusions I came to is, here we have some very, very, very 

bright people in this administration, and—who are—some are no 

longer there, some are still there—who had to understand some of 

the consequences that the Senator and I and this committee—and 

the committee—had pointed out we’re likely to face. But, I can’t believe they didn’t understand it. I can’t believe that they thought 

things were going well, for the 4 years that they talked about how 

well they were going. And the conclusion I came to is, I think they 

had a—at least two of the major players have a very Machiavellian 

view, and it would be great if it could have worked. One is, we’d 

be able to install a government that was beholden to us, which 

would not allow us to own the oil, but have leverage over it, in 

229 

OPEC environment. And, two, we’d have a permanent base in Iraq 

to thwart Iranian ambitions. 

Which leads me to the issue of—now I don’t quite understand, 

quite frankly, the administration’s desire—strong desire to do 

something other than—other than have a Status of Forces Agreement—which is necessary—and go back to the U.N., under the existing authority. 

So, it seems to me—I acknowledge the cynic in me—I think there 

is still a larger motive as to what they view to be our national interest as it relates to Iraq. To me—I’ve been saying it for 6 years— 

the best that could possibly happen is have a stable Iraq, not 

threatened by its neighbors, not a threat to its neighbors, not a 

haven for terror, that basically functions and is not a—does not 

operate a repressive regime. That—you give me that now, I take 

it, ‘‘Lord, you—, I got it, sign me up.’’ And I don’t need to be the 

ally of that country—a formal ally of that country. I don’t want to 

be the enemy. I’d cooperate with it. So, that’s why I raised the 

question. 

And one of the things that, Dr. O’Leary, that I really am taken 

by—mainly because I think it makes sense—the idea of us using 

our—I mean, the biggest problem I find, whether I’m in—and this 

has been the case for 6 years, in the many times I’ve been to Iraq 

or Afghanistan—is the practical incapacity to turn on the street 

lights, have the water function, spray for that varmint that eliminates the date palm tree, actually have somebody who knows how 

to run something: Bureaucrats. As one three-star general said to 

me—General Chiarelli; he was three-star at the time—he said, 

‘‘Senator, next time I hear anybody criticize a bureaucrat, I’m going 

to shoot them.’’ I’m paraphrasing. He said, ‘‘God, give me some 

bureaucrats to actually figure out how to make a department function.’’ And we even went to the point, as you remember, when the 

Brits proposed the idea of—— 

Professor O’LEARY. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ‘‘Adopt an agency,’’ you know, and— 

whether that would or would not have worked, I don’t know. 

But, I’m over my time, so I’ll quickly get to this. With regard to 

the oil law, it seems to me, in my discussions with the CEOs and/ 

or representatives of the major multinational oil companies—and 

they’re all multinational—as well as with Mr. Yergin, of Cambridge 

Institute, whatever it is called—is that—I don’t understand it. I 

suggested to the President, 4 years ago, that maybe he get together 

with some of these key oil powers to invite the major informed representatives of the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds, who understand the oil 

situation in Iraq, to Switzerland, or some neutral spot, and to lay 

out for them, and literally chart it, how much better off the Kurds 

would be if they gave up 10 percent of their oil, how much better 

off the Shia would be. Now there’s no major, major investment taking place; not likely to be, unless there’s a unified oil law, according 

to all the major oil interests—major companies in the world. And 

right now, to—figuratively speaking, they’re getting—each getting 

50 percent of $10 instead of 40 percent of $100. It seems to me, 

literally, part of this is an education process. Not us going in and 

instructing, but us doing what you talked about, and that is to 

actually run workshops on federalism, run workshops on oil, you 

230 

know, development. Is that the context in which you’re talking 

about these workshops? I mean, it’s kind of block-and-tackle stuff, 

but—— 

Professor O’LEARY. It is block-and-tackle, but that’s exactly what 

we need. And from one person’s perspective of 5 years’ duration, it 

can work, and it does work. It may not, you know, have the resonance of, perhaps, some broader plan, but it works, it’s ‘‘getting 

down and dirty.’’ I think the idea of bringing the key oil brokers— 

Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia—together with oil experts is a very good 

idea, because now the impasse has hardened, and, I think, personally, as someone who focuses on culture, that the—when they were 

so close, at the draft level, and then it broke apart, it was old fears 

and—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha. 

Professor O’LEARY [continuing]. Notions of each other—self and 

others—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m going to get back to this, but I’ve really 

trespassed on the time of my colleagues, and I believe Senator 

Isakson is next. 

And, Doctor, I have—if you’re patient enough to wait, after we 

get a second round, I have three or four questions for you, if I may. 

John. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask Dr. Kelly. You said, ‘‘To make gains here, we must 

change the political calculations of Iraq’s major players.’’ What 

exact political calculations are they currently operating under that 

we must change? 

Dr. KELLY. I think it’s, perhaps, useful to talk about who these 

people are, and where they’re coming from, and where they think 

they’re going to, and then maybe—— 

Senator ISAKSON. Please do. 

Dr. KELLY. Most of these political parties were resistant groups 

of one sort or another. The older ones were in Tehran or Damascus 

or London. The newer ones that have formed up since the violence 

started were mostly against the coalition and against the Iraqi 

Government. So, the way that they approach problems is a very 

confrontational one. It’s not just ambitions, it’s their calculations of 

political and personal survival that are critical here. And those are 

very important facts, and they drive people to make certain judgments and decisions. 

I think, also, that most of the Iraqi political parties have maximal visions of what they can achieve. In other words, they believe 

that they can achieve all of their goals, and prevent the other people from achieving their goals. 

And so, I think what’s critically necessary is to make clear to 

them that—and this is all within the context of U.S. vital interests 

that we’re agnostic to what their individual political and personal 

goals are, as long as they don’t violate our interests in Iraq. And 

I think that in order to make that argument, the penalties and 

benefits of being with the United States or against the United 

States need to be made clear. We’ve made those rhetorically clear, 

but we’ve not used as strong measures as we could, in the past. 

Well, let me leave it at that, Senator. 

231 

Senator ISAKSON. So the way we change it is, make it clear to 

these individuals that there are risks to them not being supportive. 

Is that what you mean? 

Dr. KELLY. What I’m saying is, if they violate key U.S. interests, 

they need to know that there’s a penalty. And if they support key 

U.S. interests, they need to know that there’s a benefit to doing 

that. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. Give me, just conceptually, what the penalty is and what the benefit is. 

Dr. KELLY. I’d prefer not to be too specific on that in open session. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. Well, then, let me just follow up. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve listened for 2 days, and I find myself at an 

interesting point. I think a lot of us are at this point where we’re 

not focusing on the immediacy that’s ahead of us. Everybody’s worrying about whether we’ve won or lost something. 

I was thinking, as I was listening to them talk, if, backing away 

from politics for a second, and trying to be as objective as I can, 

we went in, under the authorization of U.N. Resolution 1441, if I 

remember, and that was the U.N. resolution which the whole world 

thought—and the intent of the resolution was to find weapons of 

mass destruction. And everybody—Republicans, Democrats, our 

friends, our enemies—had some bad intelligence. Although we 

found the remnants and pieces; we didn’t find the weapon. 

The President declared two other goals when we went in. One 

was to allow the Iraqis to hold free elections, and, second, for the 

body they created to write a constitution. 

So, although we may have made some mistakes here and there, 

we have actually accomplished the goals the President laid out— 

one, the U.N. authorization; second, the latter two—and it seems 

like now we need to establish a goal for the stage we are at. I 

think—I forgot what the general said, yesterday. I think he called 

it a ‘‘gathering place.’’ Is that what he called it? We’re at a—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Culminating place. 

Senator ISAKSON [continuing]. Culminate—we’re at a ‘‘culminating place.’’ And it seems to me like everybody’s talking around 

what the place ought to be. I mean, with all due respect, Dr. 

Kelly—and I understand why you said it—but, when you said, ‘‘I’d 

rather not get into the details in this forum,’’ we need to start getting into the details of what this political calculation or political 

goal needs to be, and how it needs to be stated as the next point 

of achievement. I guess that’s what I get to. 

Everybody up here, with the exception of Dr. Gause, has said, 

‘‘Look, there’s going to have to be American troops there for a 

while.’’ We’re talking in the context of 2012. And even Dr. Gause 

said—he used the word ‘‘might,’’ not ‘‘certain,’’ in terms of what the 

future will bring—none of us know what the future’s going to be. 

But, it seems like to me we—the United States Government, the 

President, and the Congress—need to decide if we are at the—what 

was it called? I know it wasn’t ‘‘gathering place,’’ it was called 

what? 

The CHAIRMAN. Culminating place. 

Senator ISAKSON. If we’re at a culminating place—what is the 

next step? I mean, because we really accomplished the last three, 

232 

and can claim success, although we had some problems along the 

way. And it needs—I hear you all saying we basically need to have 

some political resolution in Iraq. I know we don’t want to tell them, 

necessarily, what the resolution is. And I understand why we can’t 

talk, sometimes, about certain things in open forum. But, if we 

don’t ever describe—and I’m talking too much, and I asked a question. I apologize. But, if we don’t ever describe what ‘‘it’’ is, you 

know, then we’re never going to get to that next step. 

So, I’m looking for some input from you all on what you would 

say that next step needs to be, if we are truly at that point. 

We’ll just start at that end, with the ladies, and work down. 

Professor O’LEARY. Thank you. 

I think the next step is very clear. The next step is to focus on 

the oil law, get that resolved and passed, and then to move toward 

an open discussion of federalism in which the majority Arab body 

politic—Sunni and Shia, tribal and not—can, in a sense, visit this 

issue anew, through the support of American and international 

experts convening meetings and workshops. Those, for me, are the 

next two key steps, because I believe the outcome we’re moving to 

is a stable Iraq though a federal system of governance. 

Senator ISAKSON. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

Dr. BRANCATI. I agree. Once violence on the ground has been stabilized, the next step is then to look toward a political settlement. 

I also believe that we should bring in experts from the United 

States, as well as abroad, on federalism, to discuss how this political settlement should be, in practice. But, I also want to encourage 

it to look very specifically at the details of the federal system, 

rather than where the discussion lies right now, which is very 

general. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ambassador. 

Ambassador PASCUAL. I would underscore the importance of 

moving toward a political process, that that has to be the next step 

that brings together the parties, moving toward a political settlement, with the U.N. at the center of it. And I think, from the discussion on this panel, even though there have been disagreements 

on some points, the things that have been emphasized have been 

federal-regional relations, the sharing of oil revenues, an understanding of what to do with militias, dealing with minority rights, 

dealing with political inclusion, and dealing with Kirkuk. Those are 

the fundamental questions around which a deal has to be struck, 

and that’s where we need to focus attention. 

Dr. GAUSE. But, that deal can only be struck if we get new leadership in Baghdad and we rearrange—we can’t do it—if Iraqis rearrange the power relations at the center. I think that entails two 

things: Provincial elections, which very possibly will generate new 

leadership, both in the Sunni community—we have Sunni leaders 

in Baghdad who cannot commit and who cannot bring their constituents along—we need new Sunni Arab leadership through provincial elections; and national elections, which I think should be 

accelerated, to be able to commit their side, to consolidate the 

security gains, politically. 

On the Shia side, we actually need the opposite. We need elections, but to divide what was a dysfunctional electoral coalition, the 

Unified Iraqi Alliance. Right now, elements of that alliance are 

233 

fighting each other on the street. We need to get those elements 

of that alliance to test their real strength through elections at the 

provincial and, I would say, at the national, level, and then hope 

that new political alliances that cut across that sectarian divide 

can come to new understandings on federalism and on oil laws, 

because we’re stuck, with the current configuration of power in 

Baghdad, on those important things. 

Dr. KELLY. I’d like to make three quick points. 

The first is that this is a much longer challenge than 2012. And 

while I agree that a political agreement is necessary for any kind 

of progress, I think that the prerequisites are not in place right 

now to reach a political agreement. In fact, we don’t know, particularly on the Sunni side of the equation, who the valid representatives of that portion of the Iraqi polity is. So, I think, establishing 

the conditions for a political agreement is the short-term steps. 

I would like to just say one thing on the oil law. The oil law is 

fundamentally a political issue that’s tied up with Kurdish independence or quasi-independence, it’s not an economic issue. So, 

while economic education on the cost and benefits of an oil law may 

be important, it’s the overriding political issue which is driving the 

Kurdish perspectives on that. 

And last, as a retired Army officer, I’d like to translate the Army 

term ‘‘culminating point’’ into the English language. That’s not the 

point where you achieve your goals, rather that’s the point where 

your resources are exhausted, and usually is reached before you 

achieve your goals. So, if that general was talking about a ‘‘culminating point,’’ he’s not talking about a place where everybody 

comes together, but a point where we can no longer continue on 

toward our objectives. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. Well, I’ll just take an extra minute on 

that. I understood that. I mean, all of the generals—and I think 

everybody recognizes—one of them said, ‘‘Our troop levels are dictating our strategy, rather than our strategy dictating our troop 

levels.’’ And that’s because we are at a point of maximum deployment. And I guess what we really need is a catalytic agent to force 

people to come—I guess the sense I get from what I’ve heard a lot 

of you all say, and heard yesterday, is that the calculations by the 

Iraqis are, ‘‘Everything’s going to stay the same for a while, so nobody’s doing anything.’’ And—that’s simple English—and if we had 

a catalyst, which might be a new face appointed to go to the region 

to start talking, it would seem to me like if you brought somebody 

out of retirement who was well respected, and their authority was 

to go start bringing back a political settlement, all of a sudden 

these parties, who right now are accepting the status quo, might 

say, ‘‘Hey, I need to sit down and talk, or the train might leave the 

station.’’ And, second, there, maybe needs to be a definitive requirement of the Iraqi Government to give them a chance to succeed or 

fail. And the oil law probably is that most likely requirement. 

And my last point, I think a lot of these political divisions or 

power-sharing arrangements—once these provincial elections take 

place, a lot of people are going to have to show their hand, and 

that’s when Maliki and everybody else are going to have to show 

their colors. 

234 

So, I’ve talked too much, but I’m looking for that catalyst. Instead of declaring victory or defeat, I think we can declare success 

that we’ve come to a point where we now need to determine how 

we culminate this thing. And it’s going to take a catalytic agent to 

force the political parties and factors to come together and talk. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Those same generals, yesterday, basically 

have a different cut than any of you do about what’s going to happen. They said that you can’t sustain a war without the support 

of the American people; and therefore, we’re going to withdraw; 

and, when we withdraw, another dictator is going to take over. 

He—one of the generals, General McCaffrey or General Odom, I 

can’t remember which, said that it’s—he posed that it would 

mean—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It was McCaffrey. 

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. The rise of a new face, perhaps a major general. 

Now, these are two completely different points of view. What do 

you all think about what they said? And that’s my only question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator, if you can solve the Florida primary situation, you can handle this. [Laughter.] 

We’re—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m working on it. 

The CHAIRMAN. We’re looking to you to move to settle Iraq after 

you settle Florida. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m working on it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are. 

Sir—go ahead, Doctor. 

Dr. KELLY. Senator, I would agree that the current commitment 

is not sustainable. And I think that was a key point I tried to make 

in my written testimony. And that is why it’s critical that we define what it is the United States needs to do, rather than what we 

would like to do for the Iraqis, and have a commitment that’s sustainable over the long term. Otherwise, there is likely to be an 

unfortunate outcome. 

And what that future for Iraq looks like may or may not include 

a democratic country. Whether that is one of our goals is a decision 

that will have to be made, based on analysis of what United States 

key vital interests are in Iraq. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, you all are talking about all this 

democracy and balancing all these interests. You’re talking about 

what the chairman has proposed for some period of time, which is 

a kind of federalist system. And these generals are up there and 

telling us this is all for naught. 

Professor O’LEARY. To the general, with all respect, I would suggest that the devil is in the details of who the Iraqi general would 

be. And I have conducted interviews and conversations with former 

high-ranking Iraqi officers, in Jordan, and, at a minimum, let me 

say, the Kurdish issue is off the table, they accept the Kurdistan 

Regional Government, as it exists today. They wouldn’t go to war 

with Kurdistan, which is not to say they would accept Kirkuk being 

annexed by the current Kurdistan Regional Government. 

235 

I think that a change in government in that direction depends 

very much on the motives of the military person. And if it were a 

tribal Arab Shia military—returned retired military officer who 

had made his bones, so to speak, in the Iran-Iraq war, I think that 

could be a rather, actually, unifying cross-sect phenomenon. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What do you think, Ambassador? 

Ambassador PASCUAL. I think one of the lessons that we’ve 

learned from the history of conflict is that you end conflicts 

through, eventually, some form of political agreement. Iraq is a— 

for the most part, in a failed state. It’s been at war with itself. The 

expectation that it’s simply going to fix itself through the passage 

of laws that somehow rectify the situation and go through—and 

that it goes through a normal political process to rectify its wounds, 

I think, is unlikely. It’s almost an ahistorical experience. But, it 

does raise the question of, How do you, in fact, actually get to an 

agreement? And what we have understood over time, whether 

that’s been in South Africa or Mozambique or Northern Ireland or 

in Bosnia or in Kosovo, is that it usually is necessary for some 

external actor to play a mediating role. You find exactly the same 

thing in labor negotiations in the United States. It shouldn’t be 

surprising that you would—one would need it elsewhere. 

And so, I think that if that is the case, the question is, Can we, 

in fact, spark it? And can we get some form of a brokered deal 

across this range of issues to, in effect, have a truce for a period 

of 4 to 5 years that then allow the Iraqis themselves to regroup and 

come together and make some of the bigger decisions about the 

future in—of the country, and a little more of a normalized situation that—they have right now? 

Dr. GAUSE. About a year and a half ago, I participated in a scenario-building exercise in Iraq, at New York University, and that’s 

exactly the scenario we came out with as most likely. We called 

this person the ‘‘national unity dictator.’’ We assumed that he’d 

have a Sunni father and a Shia mother, and, hopefully, Kurdish 

grandparents somewhere in the background. 

It does seem to me that when we go, whenever we go, this is a 

very plausible outcome. The things that work against that, though, 

in my view, Senator, are—Are you going to have an Iraqi Army by 

then that’s not simply a representation of one particular sectarian 

party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq? Are you going to have 

the reintegration of some of the old officer corps?—to the extent 

that you would have some kind of cross-sectarian Arab understanding that this was a national army and not a sectarian militia 

in army uniforms. I know that we’ve been working hard to do up 

an army like that. I don’t know how far we’ll get. 

The other thing is that a number of these militias are pretty well 

armed now; some of them, by us. And to the extent that these militias can take on the army in their own particular areas, then it 

decreases the likelihood that any general would say, ‘‘Yeah, this is 

a job that I would want.’’ 

But, I do think that, given the dysfunction in Iraqi politics right 

now, if we don’t see any change through catalytic events, as Senator Isakson said, that, when we go and we’re no longer protecting 

the Iraqi Government in the Green Zone, I think that that’s a very 

plausible outcome. 

236 

Dr. KELLY. One more comment, if I could, Senator. 

Democracy in Iraq is actually a misnomer. Going to the ballot 

box and putting a piece of paper in a box does not a democracy 

make. It requires a set of laws that people understand and more 

or less follow, which is absolutely absent in Iraq. Perhaps the largest single challenge in Iraq is the total absence of the rule of law 

for anyone with any political power. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, given what you’ve just said, is it possible that you’d have a dictator impose, on top of a—what do you 

call it? The federal system, where you’ve—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Federalism—— 

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. Where you’ve got a tripartite—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Or a confederation. No, it’s not a tripartite—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Confederation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I mean, you—it’s a federal system, but I 

think that Dr. Kelly—I don’t think it’s inconsistent—he’s talking 

about, it’s more like a confederation than it is—more like our Articles of Confederation than it was like—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Can you—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Our present legal system. 

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. Have that with a dictator on 

top of it? No? 

Dr. GAUSE. I don’t think you can, because that dictator would 

want to have a unitary Iraqi Government, at least in the Arab sectors. I mean, I agree with Professor O’Leary, that, I think, for the 

time being, almost every Arab in Iraq basically says there’s nothing 

they can do about the autonomy of the Kurdish Regional Government area. If they do try to get Kirkuk, then there could be fighting. But, I don’t think that an army officer would say, ‘‘Yeah, I 

want to be President of Iraq, but I want the real power to be held 

by people out in the provinces.’’ 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, my question, then, would come to you, 

Mr. Chairman. How do we get your system of a federal system to 

work? 

The CHAIRMAN. You missed that chance. I’m not going to be the 

nominee. [Laughter.] 

No, I’m—that was an attempt at humor again. I’ll be happy to 

discuss that. But, the bottom line is, I think, my understanding— 

and this is more of a conversation—is—I say to my colleague—is 

that the—I understood the generals to say that, at this point we’ve 

reached—as Dr. Kelly talks about it—which just essentially means 

the strategy that we’ve been running has run its string. We’re at— 

as Yogi Berra said—we’re at the fork in the road, and we’ve got to 

take it. So, what’s next? What happens here, at this point? And my 

understanding from the generals was, if there was a consensus, 

that the most likely outcome, absent a strategy for a political 

accommodation, a political consensus, a political compromise, a 

political power-sharing arrangement—absent that, the country 

devolves into chaos, the chaos that we leave, in essence, and it is 

resolved by the emergence of a military strongman. That’s what I 

thought they were saying. 

237 

And, since they did not speak to the political solution—they were 

not asked to—we did not have much discussion of what everyone 

here has said—and I think that it is stated most succinctly by the 

Ambassador—which is that it is—and I could find the exact statement, but it is not certain that a political compromise or a political 

accommodation or a political power-sharing is possible, but it is 

necessary to try. And it is the only real hope to not get to where 

the generals are saying we’re going not to get. Or, another way 

people would say it is, it may not be a general, it may be an allout civil war, it may be chaos, it may be a lot of things. 

But, I think the way the general, yesterday, were talking about 

it, Bill, was in the context of, if there is no political accommodation 

made, we are not going to be able to sustain American forces at the 

level they are, and there is no political will. Several used the 

phrase ‘‘it’s over,’’ meaning the military side of this is over. That’s 

how I read what the generals were saying. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I hope you’re right, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. So—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. I read it the other way—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. 

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. That they would certainly 

like the political accommodation, but they didn’t think that was 

going to happen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I think that’s true. I think they think it’s not 

likely to happen. And I don’t think anybody here is willing to bet 

their career that it will happen. But, I think what we heard today 

is—everyone said, in one form or another—it is important to try to 

make that happen. It’s better—to use an old saw, it’s better to have 

tried and failed than it is not to have tried at all, here. And I think 

the way that Dr. Kelly has stated this is the most succinct and 

appropriate way to look at it from the standpoint of U.S. strategic 

interests, and that is that the current commitment is not sustainable. What we should decide is, What commitment is sustainable, 

consistent with our national interest? And that’s what we’re 

searching for here. And—at least as I see it—and so, I believe, still, 

because you’ve been supportive of the notion of federalism, I believe 

it is—some version of it is the last best hope for there to be the 

beginnings of a truce, to use the Ambassador’s phrase, that may 

mature into a different system, 2 years, 5 years, 7 years, 10 years 

from now, but there’s got to be something that takes away the 

need, from the perspective of the warring parties, to continue to attempt to dominate, at the expense of the rights of other constituencies in Iraq. 

And so, for me, it is a federal or a confederation. It is only likely 

to come about as a consequence of—in my view, of international 

brokered intervention. I think the more the major powers are 

brought in, the more likely the outcome to succeed. But, it’s really 

hard. It’s really hard. And it may be that the only way this 

works—and I apologize to Senator Nelson for answering your question—I think the only way—and I’d be interested in a comment— 

the only other way is that we let it expire on the battlefield, we 

just—we’re out of there, and we’re not a player, and, you know, we 

just, sort of, as—a number of the generals did say that we should 

238 

withdraw and have a regional policy. I’m not sure that—how easy 

that is to do. I think that’s a hard deal. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Would any of you like to comment on the last point? Because 

that was raised by some of the generals, that we can’t leave the 

region, but we’re going to have to leave Iraq. Are they compatible? 

Yes, Dr. Kelly. 

Dr. KELLY. What happens in Iraq certainly needs to be seen from 

a regional perspective. It’s not an Iraqi problem, it’s a regional 

problem. I don’t see how you can have a logical, regional approach 

that doesn’t have some major effort invested in Iraq. All of these 

pieces are tied together. And, in some ways, for some of them, they 

come together in Iraq. That doesn’t mean we have to have largescale military presence there. But, staying engaged, I think, will be 

necessary, in some way. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dick. 

Senator LUGAR. I have no more questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’d like to—and I don’t want to hold you up, Senator, but I’d like to ask, if I may, Doctor, you a couple of questions 

about your statement, if I may, and maybe invite some comments, 

if I may. I promise I won’t trespass on your time much longer. 

You talked about the party system. And what—Professor O’Leary 

is one of the few people who have spoken to—is that there are— 

if you look at—I think you have to—far be it from me, but—have 

to look at the smallest subset, here, where there’s real power, and 

that’s tribal. It’s a tribal society. And there are a couple ‘‘large’’ 

tribes that are neither fish nor fowl, in the eyes of most American 

commentators. Everyone thinks every tribe is either all Sunni or 

all Shia or Kurd. But, there are some tribes that span, internally, 

that religious division. And some of the experts we’ve had—on the 

culture, that we’ve had over the years, have come in and said that 

this is more of a tribal society than it is a religious society. It is 

divided more on tribe than religion. But—so, how do you—you say 

the system must, therefore, require, legislatively, that these parties 

are able to span regions, as—I assume, as well as ethnicity and/ 

or religion, and how—what do you mean by ‘‘legislatively’’? 

Dr. BRANCATI. A number of countries have different mechanisms 

in part of their—in terms of their electoral systems that actually 

legislatively require groups to compete in multiple regions in order 

to take a seat in the government. So, you may say that, ‘‘In order 

to win seats in the legislature, you have to compete in these three 

regions.’’ You not only have to compete in these three regions, you 

may even have to compete in a certain number of districts within 

each region. And that would allow you to have parties—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I see. 

Dr. BRANCATI [continuing]. That are crosscutting. We have that 

system, essentially, in the Electoral College in the United States. 

It works the same way. 

The CHAIRMAN. I see. 

Dr. BRANCATI. And I think it’s better to have them, within a 

party, working out their differences than across coalitions, because 

those coalitions wouldn’t be stable. 

239 

1One should not interpret the level of conflict in these countries as indicative of the utility 

of these laws since many other factors within these countries may contribute to conflict. 2See ACE Electoral Project http://www.aceproject.org regarding the second point. 

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Again, for the record, if you could lay out 

for us any countries, other than our electoral system, that reflects 

that notion, legislatively or constitutionally, I’d appreciate it. 

[The written response of Dawn Brancati as an amendment to her 

testimony in answer to Senator Biden’s question follows:] 

In my research I have found that the effectiveness of federalism is greatly reduced 

by the presence of regional parties, which reinforce regional identities, pass legislation harmful to other regions in a country and regional minorities; and mobilize 

groups to engage in intrastate conflict or support extremist organizations dedicated 

toward these ends. Electoral systems, however, may facilitate broad-based, multicultural political parties in a decentralized context. Below I have summarized four features of electoral systems that may facilitate party development in this direction, 

and examples of countries that have these systems in practice.1

CROSS-REGIONAL VOTING LAWS

If groups (e.g., ethnolinguistic, religious, and tribal) are segmented into different 

regions of countries, electoral laws requiring parties to compete in multiple regions 

(or every region) of a country, will encourage parties to incorporate various groups 

into their agendas. The U.S. Electoral College achieves this end in practice by requiring Presidential candidates to win 270 Electoral College votes in order to win 

the Presidency. 

Additional examples 

Hungary: Political parties that compete in multimember (MMD) districts must 

compete in one-fourth of the constituencies within these districts, and must compete 

in at least two MMD districts. To win compensatory seats, parties must compete in 

at least seven MMD districts.—Chapter 2, Article 5, Act Number XXXIV of 1989 on 

the Election of Members of Parliament. 

Indonesia: Political parties must have branches in 9 of the country’s 27 provinces 

and half of the districts in each of these provinces.—Indonesian Electoral Law 1999. 

Mexico: Political parties must have members in at least 20 federal entities in Mexico or 300 members in at least 200 of the country’s single-member districts.—Second 

Title, Chapter 1, Article 24, Federal Code of Institutions and Electoral Procedures, 

1990. 

Russia: Political parties must have: (1) Regional branches in more than half of 

the subjects of the Russian Federation, and (2) at least 10,000 party members and 

regional branches (with at least 100 members) in more than a half of the subjects 

of the Russian Federation.—Article 3, 2001 Federal Law ‘‘On Political Parties.’’ 

Turkey: Political parties must: (1) Be fully organized in at least half of the country’s provinces and one-third of the districts within these provinces, and (2) have 

nominated two candidates for each parliamentary seat in at least half of the country’s provinces.2—Article 14, Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers, 1961. 

If regions are not completely homogenous, laws requiring parties to compete in 

a certain number of districts within a region may increase the likelihood of parties 

incorporating multiple groups into their agendas. This, of course, depends on the 

distribution of groups across districts and the demographic composition of these 

districts. 

If regions are completely heterogeneous, laws requiring parties to compete in a 

certain number of regions of a country in order to win seats will not encourage parties to incorporate multiple groups into their agendas, since parties may incorporate 

a single group within each region and the same group across all regions. 

ELECTORAL SEQUENCING

Holding national elections concurrently with subnational (i.e., provincial or local) 

elections can reduce the strength of regional parties at the subnational level. Statewide parties typically have stronger positions in national elections than in subnational ones, and when national and subnational elections are held at the same 

time, there is a coattails effect of national elections on subnational ones. Accordingly, parties that win a lion’s share of national legislative seats tend to win a lion’s 

240 

share of subnational legislative seats when national and subnational elections are 

concurrent. 

RESERVED SEATS/QUOTAS

Reserved seats are legislative seats that are set aside for representatives of particular groups (e.g., ethnolinguistic, religious, and tribal). While they ensure that 

certain groups are represented in the legislature, they may encourage people to vote 

on the basis of group membership rather than issues and consequently reinforce 

group identities. 

Quotas, in contrast, require parties to place a certain number of representatives 

from different groups onto their electoral lists. Quotas have been commonly used to 

improve the representation of women in legislatures throughout the world (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Iraq and Spain). Quotas, as a result, may encourage 

more broad-based political parties but they may also reinforce identities like 

reserved seats. 

INTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

Organizing statewide parties (i.e., parties that compete in every region of a country) to ensure strong representation of regions or groups within key committees or 

structures, can also facilitate representation of multiple groups within statewide 

parties. 

The CHAIRMAN. My other question is that—you indicate that, 

‘‘The war must first end, for federalism to operate effectively. Federalism also must be buttressed by economic development and a 

stable security that acts as a deterrent to violence. This is particularly problematic if the United States pulls out.’’ What are the key 

structures that you envision having to be codified or put in place 

or agreed upon in order to get to the point where the—you know, 

the war has to end? I mean, part of—I must admit to you, part of 

what I’ve been thinking—and I think others—some others have— 

Les Gelb, and others—have been that federalism would not guarantee peace, but an accommodation, an agreement that that’s the 

direction we’re moving, is the thing that will cause these groups to 

focus on their own concerns. 

Let me be purely Machiavellian for a moment. I do not take 

great comfort from Maliki using the Iraqi National Army for what 

I believe are both—you could argue are practical, but political reasons in trying to impact on events leading up to elections, provincial elections. Some cynics might suggest that was the purpose, or 

one of the overriding purposes. But, I think, ironically, just purely 

Machiavellian comment, it’s better to have Shia fighting Shia for 

power and dominance than it has this—this intercommunal fighting of the same thing happening, only this time in Anbar province 

with Shia going in, with mosques being bombed, along sectarian 

lines. 

Now, that’s not much comfort, but—so, I’ve assumed that the 

basic requirement of agreeing that somehow there’ll be some implementation of the Constitution—and that’s where the rubber meets 

the road in the definition of what ’’regionalism‘‘ means, what a 

’’region‘‘ means, and what some version of ’’federalism‘‘ means. 

So, how do you end the war to get to the point where you can 

have a federal system? I mean, you don’t talk about how you end 

the war. 

Dr. BRANCATI. In 10 minutes or less? [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, no, I—— 

Dr. BRANCATI. No—— 

241 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. You’d get the Nobel Prize if you do 

it in an hour. [Laughter.] 

Dr. BRANCATI. Actually, I think the discussion among this group 

has actually changed my position slightly. I think—I’ve been enlightened, and I think you’re right that a federal system would be 

something in—to hold out as a—to bring people to the table to 

allow this peace settlement. 

But, I—what I mean here is that unless you stop violence and 

fighting first, that federalism can’t stop violence and fighting. 

The CHAIRMAN. I see what you’re saying. OK. 

Dr. BRANCATI. But, it can—you need military force to stop that 

fighting. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

And the last question I have—and I—I’m not picking on you, I’m 

just impressed with your statement. You point out that, ‘‘In order 

to realize the goals, federalism needs the support and encouragement of the United States,’’ and then you say, ‘‘Thus, a third party, 

like the United States, is needed to ensure that both parties commit to federalism and take action against violators of that system.’’ 

Would you comment on how that notion intersects with what the 

Ambassador is talking about, more of—that is, the third party—us 

being part of the third party, but that it be a U.N. auspice—or 

have the patina, at least of broader international, you know, support? 

Dr. BRANCATI. Absolutely. I think it’s really important to have a 

third-party influence in—through workshops or through the United 

Nations, because if you allow the groups simply to design their system on their own, they’re probably going to design the system that 

codifies their power and ensures that that, in the immediate term, 

it benefits themselves. That might allow for peace in the short 

term, but in the long term that’s not a good idea. And so, you need 

experts there to move the system toward one that is more equitable 

among the different groups, and one that has both short-term perspectives in mind, as well as long-term perspectives. And that’s 

what I mean about the commitment—classic commitment problems. 

The CHAIRMAN. I see. 

Oh, I’m glad Mr. Talwar pointed this out. Professor, you talked 

about this—the gradualist approach, here, and that, in effect, if the 

region’s law were allowed to take effect now, and you had—of the 

18 governates, you had—in addition to the ones that are already 

decided to be a region, in Kirkuk—if you had five, or three, or two 

more, it would be a problem. So, you talked about the ‘‘kafoo’’—is 

that how you pronounce it? 

Professor O’LEARY. Kufa. 

The CHAIRMAN. Kufa. I’m sorry. The Kufa Regional Government. 

Can you elaborate on, why only one? And why Kufa? What that is 

about? 

Professor O’LEARY. Yes. I spent a good number of minutes, obviously, pondering this question. I took to heart the instruction to be 

somewhat positive, and then I started to think as an anthropologist, and think hard about subnational divisions, both ethnic, 

tribal, and sectarian. And I pondered the Sunni region, Anbar. But, 

I came back to—to me, the next—after the Kurdistan region, the 

242 

next most likely region, based on sect, political parties, and, most 

of all, the influence of Sayyid Sistani, to come together, would be 

this region I’m calling the Kufa Regional Government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Which is primarily Shia. 

Professor O’LEARY. It would be primarily Shia, it would be the 

two holy cities, plus Qadisiyah—meaning Karbala, Najaf and 

Qadisiyah. And, because the next two—inasmuch as the next two 

governorates that might logically join—Babil, which contains 

Hillah, and Wasit, there is more inter-Shia political diversity, including the strong influence of Sadr, such as in Kut, so that I 

couldn’t join them—in 2012—I decided not to be that optimistic— 

and to, instead, suggest their toughing it out and holding referenda 

to make the decision themselves. 

The CHAIRMAN. I see. 

Well, any of you—unfortunately, I have a thousand questions. I 

won’t do that to you. I promised I’d let you go. Is there any closing 

comment any one of you would like to make? 

[No response.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I truly appreciate how seriously you’ve taken 

this, and all the work you’ve done. And, Dr. Kelly, I’d like to, 

maybe even just on the telephone or—follow up with you on getting 

into what you did not want to discuss in public session, and try to 

get more specific, for—at least illustrative for me—about this 

notion, which I agree with—I think we all agree with—What is 

sustainable? You know, what commitment is sustainable, consist 

with our interest? And that would be a—if you’d be willing to do 

that, at some point. 

You’ve really been superlative. I appreciate it very, very much. 

And I just wish and hope—we’re going to try to make sure all our 

colleagues get a sense of what you are about. I particularly 

thought—and I asked staff to compile it, ad seriatim, for me—each 

of your answers—2-minute answers to Senator Isakson, I thought 

were particularly succinct and informative, and they seemed to 

have a coherence to them, even though there were slightly different 

perspectives in each of them. And I found that very useful. 

Again, thank you so much for your time. We truly appreciate it. 

And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(243) 

IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: WHAT NEXT? 

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, DeMint, Isakson, Vitter, and 

Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. While our witnesses are taking their seats, let 

me begin by saying, to the audience: Welcome, we’re delighted to 

have you here, but I will tell you now, anyone who speaks up, 

whether it’s praiseworthy or otherwise, under any circumstances 

during the hearing, I will ask the Capitol Police to escort them permanently from the hearing room so that we can spend our time 

talking to the witnesses. 

As I said in the anteroom to our distinguished witnesses, we’re 

delighted to have you back. I don’t know how delighted you are to 

be back. But, thank you for your patience. And, again, welcome to 

the Foreign Relations Committee. 

To state the obvious, gentlemen, we—the two of you and all of 

us on this platform—share a common responsibility: To defend the 

security of the United States of America. And your assignment to 

do so is focused on Iraq, and you perform that mission with extraordinary skill and courage, in my view. This country owes you, 

and all the women and men who serve under each of you, a genuine debt of gratitude, both those in uniform and out of uniform. 

I want to, as one of the many on this platform who’ve visited Iraq 

on many occasions, point out that there are—that civilians are 

being killed, U.S. Foreign Service personnel are wounded, civilian 

personnel are injured, as well as our military women and men, and 

we owe them all—all of them—a great debt of gratitude, a debt, to 

state the obvious, we’re not going to be able to fully repay. 

But, gentlemen, your mission is limited to Iraq, and Congress 

and the President have a broader responsibility. We have to decide 

where and when to send troops, how to spend our treasure, not just 

in Iraq, but around the entire world. We have to prioritize among 

the many challenges to our security—I know you’re fully aware of 

244 

what they are—but the many challenges to our security and the 

many needs of the American people, that extend and exceed Iraq. 

We have to judge how our actions in one place affect our ability to 

act in other places. And we have to make hard choices based on 

finite resources. 

As you rightly said this morning, General, it is not your job to 

answer those questions, although you’re fully capable of answering 

those broader questions; it’s the responsibility of those, as you put 

it in an exchange, as I recall, with Senator Warner, who have a 

broader view to make these larger decisions about allocation of resources. Your focus is, and should be, and has been, well focused 

on America’s interests in Iraq and how our interests are affected, 

based on how things go in Iraq. Our focus, then, must be America’s 

security in the world and how to make us more secure at home, 

overall. 

The purpose of the surge was to bring violence down so that Iraq 

leaders could come together politically. Violence has come down, 

but the Iraqis have not come together, at least not in the fashion 

that was anticipated. Our military has played a very important 

role, and the surge has played a role, in reducing the violence, but 

so, as you’ve acknowledged, did other developments. First, the 

Sunni Awakening, which preceded the surge, but was, in fact, enabled by the surge. Second, the Sadr cease-fire, which, to state the 

obvious, could end as we’re speaking. And, third, the sectarian 

cleansing that has left Baghdad—much of Baghdad separated, with 

fewer targets to shoot at and to bomb, over 41⁄2 million people displaced, in and out of Iraq. And a tactic—these tactical gains are 

real, but they are relative. Violence is now where it was in 2005, 

and spiking up again. Iraq is still incredibly dangerous. And, despite what the President said last week, it is very, very, very far 

from normal. These are gains, but they are fragile gains. 

Awakening members, frustrated at their government’s refusal to 

integrate them into the normal security forces, as you know better 

than I, General and Ambassador, could turn their guns on us tomorrow. Sadr could end his cease-fire at any moment, and maybe 

his cease-fire is beyond his control to maintain. Sectarian chaos 

could resume with the bombing of another major mosque. Most importantly, the strategic purpose of our surge, in my view, has not 

been realized, and that is genuine power-sharing that gives Iraqi 

factions the confidence to pursue their interests peacefully. 

What progress we have seen has come at the local level, with 

deals and truces made among tribes and tribe members and other 

grassroots groups; that is political progress. Very different than 

was anticipated. There is little sustainable progress, though, at the 

national level; and, in my view, little evidence we’re going to see 

any anytime soon. 

Yes; Iraqi leaders have passed some laws, but the details, as they 

emerge, and implementation, as it lags, this progress seems likely 

to, in many cases, undermine reconciliation, as opposed to advance 

it. 

Despite this reality, it is your recommendation that when the 

surge ends we should not further drawdown American forces for 

fear we’d jeopardize the progress we’ve made. If that’s the case, are 

we appreciably closer than we were 15 months ago to the goal the 

245 

President set for Iraq when he announced the surge—and that is, 

a country that can, ‘‘govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself 

in peace?’’ If we stay the course, will we be any closer, 15 months 

from now, to that goal than we are today? 

It seems to me that we’re stuck where we started before the 

surge, with 140,000 troops in Iraq and no end in sight. That, in my 

view, is unsustainable. It is unsustainable from a military perspective, according to serving and retired military officers, and it is unacceptable to the American people. 

The President likes to talk about the consequences of drawing 

down our forces in Iraq, and he makes a dire case, which you 

echoed this morning. That’s a debate we should have. The President’s premises are highly debatable. We’ve heard detailed testimony in this committee, from military and civilian experts that disagree with the premises and the conclusions, as to what would 

follow if, in fact, we withdrew from Iraq. Would starting to leave 

really strengthen al-Qaeda in Iraq and give it a launching pad to 

attack America, as has been asserted, or would it eliminate what’s 

left of al-Qaeda’s indigenous support in Iraq? What about al-Qaeda 

in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the people who actually attacked us 

in—on 9/11? We know where they live, we know who they are, and 

we don’t have the capacity to do much about it. If we leave, would 

they be emboldened, or would—to paraphrase the National Intelligence Estimate on Terrorism—would they lose one of their most 

effective recruiting tools, the notion that we’re in Iraq to stay, with 

permanent military bases and control over the oil? Not our stated 

goals, but the propaganda tool being used. And would they, in fact, 

if we left Iraq, risk the full measure of American might, which 

they’re able to avoid now in Afghanistan and Pakistan? What about 

Iran? Would leaving actually increase its already huge influence on 

Iraq, or would it shift the burden of Iraq from us to them and make 

our forces a much more credible deterrent to Iranian misbehavior? 

These are open questions. Equally competent people as you have 

testified before us that the results would be the opposite that you 

and the President have posited. Worth debating. 

Would our departure accelerate sectarian chaos, or would it 

cause Iraqi leaders and Iraqis’ neighbors to finally begin to act responsibly and make the compromises they have to make in order 

to literally be able to live, if they’re as exhausted with fighting as 

is asserted? 

We should debate the consequences of starting to leave Iraq. It’s 

totally legitimate. But more importantly is the debate we’re not 

having. We should also talk about what the President refuses to acknowledge: The increasingly intolerable cost of staying in Iraq. The 

risks of leaving Iraq are debatable. The cost of staying with 

140,000 troops are totally knowable, and they get steeper and 

steeper and steeper every single day. The continued loss of life and 

limb of our soldiers, the emotional and economic strain on our 

troops and their families due to repeated extended tours, as Army 

Chief of Staff George Casey recently told us, the drain on our treasury, $12 billion every month that we could spend on housing, education, health care, or reducing the deficit, the impact on the readiness of our Armed Forces, tying down so many troops that we’ve 

heard, from Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Richard Cody, we don’t 

246 

have any left over to deal with new emergencies; the inability to 

send enough soldiers to the real central front in the war on terror, 

which lies between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda has 

regrouped and is plotting new attacks, and is alive and well, and 

we know where they live. 

Last month, in Afghanistan, General McNeill, who commands 

the international forces, told me that, with two extra combat brigades, about 10,000 soldiers, he could turn around the security situation in the south, where the Taliban is on the move. But, he then 

readily acknowledged, he knows they’re not available. There’s no 

way he can get 10,000 troops, because they’re tied down in Iraq. 

Even when we do pull troops out of Iraq, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, says we would have to send 

them for a year of rest and retraining before we could even send 

them to Afghanistan, where everyone acknowledges more troops 

are needed. 

Senator Levin, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 

and I wrote to Secretaries Rice and Gates to request that, like you, 

General McNeill and our Ambassador to Afghanistan testify jointly 

before our committees so we can make logical choices based on specific requests coming out of each of those theaters as to which is 

the place we should spend our limited resources. 

We still don’t have a response, I might add. 

Fifteen months into the surge, we’ve gone from drowning to treading water, we’re still spending $3 billion every week, and 

we’re still losing—thank God it’s less, but—30 to 40 American lives 

every month. We can’t keep treading water without exhausting 

ourselves. But, that’s what the President seems to be asking us to 

do. He can’t tell us when, or even if, Iraqis will come together 

politically. He can’t tell us when, or even if, we will drawdown 

below the presurge levels. He can’t tell us when, or even if, Iraq 

will be able to stand on its own two feet. He says we’ll stand down 

when the Iraqi Army stands up. Which Iraqi Army? A sectarian 

Iraqi Army, made up of all of Shia, or an interethnic Iraqi Army, 

trusted by all the people? He can’t tell us when, or even if, this war 

will end. 

Most Americans want this war to end. I believe all do, including 

you gentlemen. They want us to come together around a plan to 

leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. They are not defeatist, as 

some have suggested. They are patriots. They understand the 

national interest and the great things America can achieve if we 

responsibly end the war we should not have started. 

I believe it’s fully within our power to do that, and the future of 

our soldiers, our security, and our country, will be much brighter 

when we succeed in getting out of Iraq without leaving chaos 

behind. 

I yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Crocker back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We truly 

commend their skilled service in Iraq and the achievements that 

247 

United States military and diplomatic personnel have been able to 

bring forward under their leadership. We are grateful for the decline in fatalities among Iraqi civilians and United States personnel and the expansion of security in many regions and neighborhoods throughout Iraq. 

Last week, our committee held a series of hearings in anticipation of today’s inquiry. We engaged numerous experts on the situation in Iraq and on strategies for moving forward. Our discussions 

yielded several premises that might guide our discussion today. 

First, the surge has succeeded in improving the conditions on the 

ground in many areas of Iraq and creating, ‘‘breathing space,’’ for 

exploring political accommodation. Economic activity has improved, 

and a few initial political benchmarks have been achieved. The 

United States took advantage of Sunni disillusionment with 

al-Qaeda tactics, the Sadr faction’s desire for a cease-fire, and other 

factors that construct multiple cease-fire agreements with tribal 

and sectarian leaders. Tens of thousands of Iraqi Sunnis, who previously had sheltered al-Qaeda and targeted Americans, are currently contributing to security operations, drawn by their interest 

in self-preservation and United States payments. 

Second, security improvements derived purely from American 

military operations have reached, or almost reached, a plateau. 

Military operations may realize some marginal security gains in 

some areas, but these gains are unlikely to be transformational for 

the country, beyond what has already occurred. Forward progress 

depends largely on political events in Iraq. 

Third, despite the improvements in security, the central government has not demonstrated that it can construct a top-down political accommodation for Iraq. The Iraqi Government is afflicted by 

corruption, and shows signs of sectarian bias. It still has not 

secured the confidence of most Iraqis or demonstrated much competence in performing basic government functions, including managing Iraq’s oil wealth, overseeing reconstruction programs, delivering government assistance to the provinces, or creating jobs. 

Fourth, though portions of the Iraqi population are tired of the 

violence and would embrace some type of permanent cease-fire or 

political accommodation, sectarian and tribal groups remain heavily armed and are focused on expanding or solidifying their 

positions. The lack of technical competence within the Iraqi Government, external interference by the Iranians and others, the corruption and criminality at all levels of Iraqi society, the departure 

from Iraq of many of its most talented citizens, the lingering terrorist capability of al-Qaeda in Iraq, seemingly intractable disputes 

over territories and oil assets, and power struggles between and 

within sectarian and tribal groups, all impede a sustainable 

national reconciliation. Iraq will be an unstable country for the 

foreseeable future. And if some type of political settlement can be 

reached, it will be inherently fragile. 

Fifth, operations in Iraq have severely strained the United States 

military. These strains will impose limits on the size and length of 

future deployments to Iraq, irrespective of political divisions or the 

outcome of the elections in our country. 

Last week, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, GEN 

Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, testified, ‘‘Today, 

248 

our Army is out of balance. The current demand for forces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply of soldiers, of units 

and equipment, and limits our ability to provide ready forces for 

other contingencies. Our readiness, quite frankly, is being consumed as fast as we build it. Lengthy and repeated deployments 

with insufficient recovery time at home station have placed incredible stress on our soldiers and on their families, testing the resolve 

of the All-Volunteer Force like never before.’’ Later in the hearing, 

General Cody said, ‘‘I have never seen our lack of strategic depth 

be at where it is today.’’ 

The lmitations imposed by these stresses were echoed in our own 

hearings. GEN Barry McCaffrey asserted that troop levels in Iraq 

have to be reduced, stating that the Army is experiencing ‘‘significant recruiting and retention problems’’ and that ‘‘10 percent of recruits should not be in uniform.’’ 

MG Robert Scales testified, ‘‘In a strange twist of irony, for the 

first time since the summer of 1863 the number of ground soldiers 

available is determining American policy, rather than policy determining how many troops we need. The only point of contention is 

how precipitous will be the withdrawal and whether the schedule 

of withdrawal should be a matter of administration policy.’’ Now, 

if one accepts the validity of all or most of these five premises, the 

terms of our inquiry today are much different than they were last 

September. At that time, the President was appealing to Congress 

to allow the surge to continue, to create breathing space for a political accommodation. Today, the questions are whether and how improvements in security can be converted into political gains that 

can stabilize Iraq, despite the impending drawdown of United 

States troops. 

Simply appealing for more time to make progress is insufficient. 

Debate over how much progress we have made and whether we can 

make more is less illuminating than determining whether the administration has a definable political strategy that recognizes the 

time limitations we face and seeks a realistic outcome designed to 

protect American vital interests. 

Our witnesses last week offered a wide variety of political strategies for how we might achieve an outcome that would preserve regional stability, prevent the worst scenarios for bloodshed and protect basic United States national security interests. These included 

focusing more attention on building the Iraqi Army, embracing the 

concept of federalism, expanding the current bottom-up cease-fire 

matrix into a broader national accommodation, negotiating with 

the Iraqis in the context of an announced United States withdrawal, and creating a regional framework to bolster Iraqi security. 

But, none of our witnesses last week claimed that the task in 

Iraq was simple or that the outcome would likely fulfill the ideal 

of a pluralist democratic nation closely aligned with the United 

States. All suggested that spoiling activities and the fissures in 

Iraqi society could undermine even the most well-designed efforts 

by the United States. 

Unless the United States is able to convert progress made thus 

far into a sustainable political accommodation that supports our 

long-term national security objectives in Iraq, this progress will 

have limited meaning. We cannot assume that sustaining some 

249 

level of progress is enough to achieve success, especially when we 

know that current American troop levels in Iraq have to be reduced 

and spoiling forces will be at work in Iraq. We need a strategy that 

anticipates a political endgame and employs every plausible means 

to achieve it. 

I thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for joining 

us. I look forward to our discussion of how the United States can 

define success and then achieve our vital objectives in Iraq. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen. Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO 

THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members 

of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to provide my assessment on political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. 

When General Petraeus and I reported to you, in September, I 

gave my considered judgment on whether our goals in Iraq were 

attainable. Can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with a 

democratically elected government operating under the rule of law? 

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political, 

economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq was upward, 

although the slope of that line was not steep. 

Developments over the past 7 months have strengthened my 

sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain, and progress 

is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but it is also 

reversible. 

Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in 

Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But, 

as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and early part 

of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the enormous investment we have made in the lives of our young men and 

women and our resources. Let me describe the developments upon 

which I base such a judgment. 

The first is at the national level, in the form of legislation and 

the development of Iraq’s Parliament. 

In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet completed key laws. In the last several months, Iraq’s Parliament has 

formulated, debated vigorously, and, in many cases, passed legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation-building. 

A Pension Law extended benefits to individuals who had been 

denied them because of service with the previous regime. 

The Accountability and Justice Law, de-Baathification reform, 

passed after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflecting a 

strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does the far-reaching Amnesty Law. 

The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining 

the relationship between the federal and provincial governments. 

This involved a debate about the fundamental nature of the state, 

250 

similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult debate 

over states rights. The Provincial Powers Law also called for provincial elections by October 1 of this year, and an electoral law is 

now under discussion that will set the parameters for these elections. All major parties have announced their support for elections, 

which will be a major step forward in Iraq’s political development, 

and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009. 

A vote by the Council of Representatives, in January, to change 

the design of the Iraqi flag means that flag now flies in all parts 

of the country for the first time in years. 

And the passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for 

capital expenditures, ensures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending. 

All of this has been done since September. These laws are not 

perfect, and much depends on their implementation, but they are 

important steps. 

Also important has been the development of Iraq’s Council of 

Representatives as a national institution. Last summer, the Parliament suffered from persistent and often paralyzing debate— 

disputes over leadership and procedure. Now it is successfully 

grappling with complex issues, and producing viable tradeoffs and 

compromise packages. 

As debates in Iraq’s Parliament become more about how to resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become 

more fluid. While these politics still have a sectarian bent and 

basis, coalitions have formed around issues and sectarian political 

groupings, which often were barriers to progress, have become 

more flexible. 

Let me also talk about the intangibles: Attitudes among the Iraqi 

people. In 2006 and 2007, many understandably questioned 

whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds 

were so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The Sunni Awakening 

Movement in Anbar, which so courageously confronted al-Qaeda, 

continues to keep the peace in the area, and keep al-Qaeda out. 

Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of 

Iraq’s safest cities. The Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf are 

enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular 

rejection of extremist militia activity. 

The Shia clerical leadership, the Marjaiyah, based in Najaf, has 

played a quiet, but important, role in support of moderation and 

reconciliation. 

In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against each 

other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere of 

suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian identities. 

When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city 

district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces 

were just moving into neighborhoods still gripped by al-Qaeda. 

Residents also were being terrorized by extremist Shia militias. 

Less than a year later, at the end of February, tens of thousands 

of Shia pilgrims walked through those streets on their way to 

Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni 

251 

residents offered food and water as they passed through, and some 

joined the pilgrimage. 

Mr. Chairman, news from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basra. Taken as a snapshot, the scenes 

of increasing violence and masked gunmen in the streets, it is hard 

to see how this situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq. 

And there is still very much to be done to bring full government 

control to the streets of Basra and eliminate entrenched extremist, 

criminal, and militia groups. 

But, when viewed with the broader lens, the Iraqi decision to 

take on these groups in Basra has major significance. 

First, a Shia majority government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, 

has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists, regardless of sectarian identity. 

Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these operations in Basra and 

in towns and cities throughout the south. British and United 

States elements played important roles, but these were supporting 

roles, as they should be. 

The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The 

Prime Minister returned to Baghdad from Basra shortly before 

General Petraeus and I left for Washington, and he is confident in 

his decision, and determined to press the fight against these illegal 

groups, but also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned. 

The efforts of the government against extremist militia elements 

have broad political support, as a statement, April 5, by virtually 

all of Iraq’s main political leaders—Sunni, Shia, and Kurd—made 

clear. 

A wild card remains the Sadrist trend and whether the Iraqis 

can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the trend 

and Iranian-supported special groups. A dangerous development in 

the immediate wake of the Basra operation was what appeared to 

be a reunification between special groups and mainline Jayish 

al-Mahdi. We also saw a potential collapse of the Jayish al-Mahdi 

freeze in military operations. 

As the situation unfolded, however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a 

statement that disavowed anyone possessing heavy weapons, which 

would include the signature weapons of the special groups. The 

statement can further sharpen the distinction between members of 

the Sadrist trend who should not pose a threat to the Iraqi state 

and members of the special groups, who very much do. 

One conclusion I’d draw from these signs of progress is that the 

strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean 

that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level and 

nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is in 

this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship 

between Iraq and the United States. 

In August, Iraq’s five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include economic, political, 

diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship 

will be a legal framework for the presence of American troops similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the world. 

The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong 

affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty, placing Iraq on par with other U.S. 

allies and removing the stigma of Chapter VII status under the 

252 

U.N. Charter, pursuant to which coalition forces presently operate. 

Such an agreement is in Iraq’s interest and ours. 

United States forces will remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 

2008, when the U.N. resolution presently governing their presence 

expires. Our troops will need basic authorizations and protections 

to continue operations, and this agreement will provide those 

authorizations and protections. 

The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and 

we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement 

will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the 

next administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next President 

arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy 

decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in 

the coming weeks and months. 

Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated Cabinet is necessary, both for political balance and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq’s people. Challenges to the 

rule of law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed internal 

boundaries, the article 140 process, must be resolved. The return 

of refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The 

rights of women and minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are 

aware of the challenges they face, and are working on them. 

Iraq’s political progress will not be linear. Developments, which 

are on the whole positive, can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial elections, 

vital for Iraq’s democratic development and long-term stability, will 

also produce new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently in southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shia 

community as the political and security context changes. Such inflection points underscore the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but 

it would be wrong to conclude that any eruption of violence marks 

the beginning of an inevitable backslide. 

With respect to economics and capacity-building, in September I 

reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq’s economy 

and in the country’s efforts to build capacity to translate these 

gains into more effective governance and services. The Iraqis have 

built on these gains over the past months, as it most evident in the 

revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private 

Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi businessowners surveyed expect the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next 2 

years. 

With improving security and rising government expenditures, the 

IMF projects that Iraq’s GDP will grow 7 percent, in real terms, 

this year, and inflation has been tamed. The dinar remains strong, 

and the central bank has begun to bring down interest rates. 

Iraq’s 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction, 

and a $5 billion supplemental budget, this summer, will further invest export revenues in building infrastructure and providing the 

services that Iraq so badly needs. This spending also benefits the 

United States. Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 

commercial aircraft from the United States, at an estimated cost of 

$5 billion. 

253 

As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricksand-mortar construction through oil production and exports, our 

assistance focus has shifted to capacity-development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic development through our network 

of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and ministerial advisers. The 

era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. We are 

seeking to ensure that our assistance, in partnership with the 

Iraqis, leverages Iraq’s own resources. 

Our 25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve provincial and local governance capabilities, particularly in budget design and execution. They are also helping to establish critical linkages between provincial and federal governments. Our PRTs are 

great enablers, and we are working to ensure their continued viability as our forces redeploy. The relatively small amounts they disburse through quick-response funds have major impacts in local 

communities, and congressional support is important, as it is for 

other vital programs in the FY08 global war on terrorism supplemental request. 

Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support projects 

and programs that we have developed. It has committed nearly 

$200 million in support of a program to provide vocational training 

for concerned local citizens who stood up with us in the Awakening. 

Our technical assistance advisers have helped design new procurement procedures for Iraq’s oil ministry. We developed the technical specifications from which Iraq’s state-owned oil company will 

build new oil export platforms and underwater pipelines worth over 

a billion dollars. 

And in Baghdad in the last 3 months, the municipality has 

stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we 

had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program. 

Like so much else, Iraq’s economy is fragile, the gains reversible, 

and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will need to continue to 

improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon 

legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve 

the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create short- and 

long-term jobs, and tackle the structural and economic problems of 

the vital agricultural sector. We will be helping the Iraqis as they 

take on this challenging agenda, along with other international 

partners, including the United Nations and the World Bank. 

Mr. Chairman, along with the security surge last year, we also 

launched a diplomatic surge focused on enhancing U.N. engagement in Iraq, anchoring the international compact with Iraq, and 

establishing an expanded neighbors process which serves as a contact group in support of Iraq. 

The United Nations has taken advantage of an expanded mandate granted to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, 

UNAMI, to increase the scope of its activities and the size of its 

staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role 

in preparing for provincial elections and in providing technical 

assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries. 

UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist with 

the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. 

254 

The International Compact with Iraq provides a 5-year framework for Iraq to reform its economy and achieve self-sufficiency in 

exchange for long overdue Saddam-era debt relief. 

Preparations are underway for a ministerial-level compact meeting in Sweden next month. Seventy-four nations were represented 

in last year’s gathering in Egypt. 

Iraq’s neighbors also understand they have a major interest in 

Iraq’s future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of 

Iraq’s neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host the third meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq’s neighbors, these 

expanded conferences also include the Permanent Five Members of 

the Security Council, the Arab League, and the G–8. 

Support from Arab capitals has not been strong, and it must improve, for the sake of Iraq and for the sake of the region. Bahrain’s 

recent announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad 

is welcome, and other Arab states should follow suit. 

Iraq is a multiethnic state, but it is also a founding member of 

the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab world. Last 

month, Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab Parliamentary Union, 

bringing the leaders of Arab Parliaments and consultative councils 

to Iraq for the first major inter-Arab gathering since 1990. It is 

noteworthy that the meeting was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, 

under the recently redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable prosperity and stability of Iraq’s Kurdish region and the 

presence of the Iraqi federal state. 

We hope that this event will encourage more active Arab engagements with Iraq, and we expect that Prime Minister Maliki’s effort 

against Shia extremist militias in Basra will receive Arab support. 

The presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the remote 

mountains of Iraq, along the Turkish border, have produced tension between Turkey and Iraq, and led to a Turkish cross-border 

operation in February, including movement of Turkish ground 

forces into Iraq. At the same time, both governments are working 

to strengthen their ties, and Iraqi President Talibani made a successful visit to Turkey in March. 

Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts 

to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, 

but others continue to cross the border. Syria also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqi insurgency. 

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government 

to establish a stable, secure state through the arming and training 

of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi Security Forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s 

malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when these militia elements clashed with Iraqi Government forces in Basra and 

Baghdad. 

When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek and 

destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know 

more about these networks and their Quds Force sponsors than 

ever before, and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them. 

At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran 

and Iraq, and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the 

security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make. 

255 

Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma 

inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule. But ‘‘hard’’ does 

not mean ‘‘hopeless.’’ And the political and economic progress of the 

past few months is significant. These gains are fragile, and they 

are reversible. 

Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood as well 

as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth 

it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis fend for 

themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure, 

multiethnic, multisectarian democracy under the rule of law. 

Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical. 

I said, in September, that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. 

This is still the case, although I think we are now closer. I remain 

convinced that a major departure from our current engagement 

would bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about 

what failure would mean. 

Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. AlQaeda’s leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang 

on. Osama bin Laden has called Iraq ‘‘the perfect base,’’ and it reminds us that a fundamental aim of al-Qaeda is to establish itself 

in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq. We cannot allow it 

a second chance. 

And it is not only al-Qaeda that would benefit. Iran has said, 

publicly, it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shia militias 

would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad, 2 weeks ago. 

And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far 

beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could also 

draw in neighbors, with devastating consequences for the region 

and the world. 

Mr. Chairman, as monumental of the events of the last 5 years 

have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans, and the world ultimately will 

judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what has 

happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will 

be more important than how we came. 

Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is real, 

although fragile. We need to stay with it. 

Mr. Chairman, in the months ahead, we will continue to assist 

Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation and economic 

development. Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi 

process, as it should be. 

Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq’s integration, regionally 

and internationally; assisting Iraqi institutions, locally and nationally, to strengthen the political process and promote economic activity; and supporting the United Nations as Iraq carries out local 

elections toward the end of the year. These efforts will require an 

enhanced civilian commitment and continued support from the 

Congress and the American people. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those 

who serve our country in Iraq, military and civilian. Their courage 

and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of 

256 

all Americans. They certainly have mine. And it is an honor to be 

with them out there. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC

OF IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, it is an honor to 

appear before you today to provide my assessment of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. When General Petraeus and I reported to you in September, I gave my considered judgment as to whether our goals in Iraq were attainable—can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with a democratically elected 

government operating under the rule of law? 

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and 

diplomatic developments in Iraq was upward, although the slope of that line was 

not steep. Developments over the last 7 months have strengthened my sense of a 

positive trend. Immense challenges remain and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow; but there is progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but 

it is also reversible. Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in 

Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But as Iraq emerges 

from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early part of 2007, there is reason to 

sustain that commitment and the enormous investments we have made both in the 

lives of our young brave men and women and our resources. Let me describe the 

developments upon which I base such a judgment. 

RECONCILIATION: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL POLITICS

The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and the development 

of Iraq’s Parliament. In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet enacted some key pieces of legislation. In the last several months, however, Iraq’s Parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation 

dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation-building. A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had previously been denied them because of their 

service under the former regime. The Accountability and Justice Law (de-Baathification reform), passed after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflects a 

strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far-reaching Amnesty Law. 

The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining the relationship 

between the federal and provincial governments. Passage of this legislation required 

debate about the fundamental nature of the state, similar in its complexity to our 

own lengthy and difficult debate over states’ rights. The Provincial Powers Law also 

called for provincial elections by October 1, 2008, and an Electoral Law is now 

under discussion that will set the parameters for elections. All major parties have 

announced their support for these elections, which will be a major step forward in 

Iraq’s political development and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009. 

In January, a vote by the Council of Representatives to change the design of the 

Iraqi flag means the flag now flies in all parts of the country for the first time in 

years. The passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital expenditures, insures that the federal and provincial governments will have the resources 

for public spending. All of this has been done since September. These laws are not 

perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps. 

Also important has been the development of Iraq’s Council of Representatives 

(COR) as a national institution. Last summer, the COR suffered from persistent and 

often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now, it is successfully 

grappling with complex issues and producing viable tradeoffs and compromise packages. As debates in Iraq’s Parliament became more about how to resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become more fluid. While politics still 

have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have formed around 

issues, and sectarian political groupings which often were barriers to progress have 

become more flexible. 

Let me also talk about the intangibles: Attitudes among the population and the 

conversations that are occurring among Iraqi leaders. In 2006 and 2007, many people understandably questioned whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian 

backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The Sunni Awakening 

movement in Al Anbar, which so courageously confronted al-Qaeda, continues to 

keep the peace in the area and keep al-Qaeda out. Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq’s safest cities. The Shia holy cities of An Najaf 

257 

and Karbala are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular 

rejection of extremist militia activity. The Shia clerical leadership—the Marjaiyah— 

based in An Najaf—has played a quiet but important role in support of moderation 

and reconciliation. In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against each 

other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the 

past months have diminished the atmosphere of suspicion and allowed for acts of 

humanity that transcend sectarian identities. 

When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city district was to the 

predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces were just moving into the neighborhoods still gripped by al-Qaeda. Residents also were being terrorized by extremist 

Shia militias. Less than a year later, at the end of February, tens of thousands of 

Shia pilgrims walked through those streets on their way to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and water as 

they passed through, and some joined the pilgrimage. 

News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basra. 

Taken as a snapshot, with scenes of increasing violence, and masked gunmen in the 

streets, it is hard to see how this situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq. 

There is still very much to be done to bring full government control to the streets 

of Basra and eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal, and militia groups. 

When viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to combat these groups in 

Basra has major significance. First, a Shia majority government, led by Prime 

Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these operations, in Basra, and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and U.S. 

elements played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as they should be. 

The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The Prime Minister returned to Baghdad from Basra shortly before I left for Washington—and he is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight against illegal groups, but 

also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned. The efforts of the government against extremist militia elements have broad political support as a statement 

April 5 by virtually all of Iraq’s main political leaders—Sunni, Shia, and Kurd— 

made clear. 

A wildcard remains the Sadrist Trend—and whether the Iraqis can continue to 

drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend and Iranian-supported Special 

Groups. A dangerous development in the immediate wake of the Basra operation 

was what appeared to be a reunification between Special Groups and the mainline 

Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). We also saw a potential collapse of the JAM ‘‘freeze’’ in military operations. As the situation unfolded however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a statement that disavowed anyone possessing ‘‘heavy weapons’’—which would include the 

signature weapons of the Special Groups. This statement can further sharpen the 

distinction between members of the Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a threat to 

the Iraqi state, and members of Special Groups, who very much do. 

One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the strategy that began 

with the surge is working. This does not mean, however, that U.S. support should 

be open-ended or that the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish 

over time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States. In August, Iraq’s five principal leaders 

requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include economic, 

political, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship will be 

a legal framework for the presence of American troops similar to that which exists 

in nearly 80 countries around the world. 

The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong affirmation of Iraqi 

sovereignty—placing Iraq on par with other U.S. allies and removing the stigma of 

chapter VII status under the U.N. Charter, pursuant to which coalition forces presently operate. Such an agreement is in Iraq’s interest—and ours. U.S. forces will 

remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently governing their presence expires. Our troops will need basic authorizations and protections to continue operations—and this agreement will provide those authorizations 

and protections. 

The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that 

it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels, and 

it will not tie the hands of the next administration. Our aim is to ensure that the 

next President arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy 

decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain 

fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months. 

Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated Cabinet is 

necessary both for political balance and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq’s 

people. Challenges to the rule of law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed 

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internal boundaries—the article 140 process—must be resolved. The return of refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of women and 

minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware of the challenges they face, 

and are working on them. 

Iraq’s political progress will not be linear. Developments which are on the whole 

positive can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to 

hold provincial elections—vital for Iraq’s democratic development and long-term stability—will also produce new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently 

in southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shia community as the political and security context changes. Such inflection points underscore the fragility of 

the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong to conclude that any eruption of violence 

marks the beginning of an inevitable backslide. 

ECONOMICS AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

In September, I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq’s economy 

and in the country’s efforts to build capacity to translate these gains into more effective governance and services. Iraqis have built on these gains over the past months, 

as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of 

long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed expect the Iraqi 

economy to grow significantly in the next 2 years. 

With the improving security and rising government expenditures, the IMF projects that Iraq’s GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this year, and inflation has 

been tamed. The Iraqi dinar remains strong and the Central Bank has begun to 

bring down interest rates. 

Iraq’s 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction, and a $5 billion 

supplemental budget this summer will invest export revenues in building the infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly needs. This spending also 

benefits the United States—Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 

commercial aircraft from the U.S at an estimated cost of $5 billion. 

As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricks and mortar construction through oil production and export, our primary focus has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic development through our 

network of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ministerial advisers. The 

era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. We are seeking to ensure 

that our assistance, in partnership with the Iraqis, leverages Iraq’s own resources. 

Our 25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve provincial and local 

governance capabilities, particularly in budget design and execution. They are also 

helping to establish critical linkages between provincial and federal governments. 

Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are working to insure their continued viability 

as our forces redeploy. The relatively small amounts they disburse through Quick 

Response Funds (QRF) have major impacts in local communities, and congressional 

support is important, as it is for other vital programs in the FY08 Global War on 

Terror Supplemental request. 

Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support projects and programs that 

we have developed. It has committed nearly $200 million in support of a program 

to provide vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up with us in 

the Awakening. Our technical assistance advisers have helped design new procurement procedures for Iraq’s Oil Ministry. We developed the technical specifications 

from which Iraq’s state-owned oil company will build new oil export platforms and 

underwater pipelines worth over a billion dollars. And in Baghdad, in the last 3 

months the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 

million that we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program. 

Like so much else, Iraq’s economy is fragile, the gains reversible and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will need to continue to improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and 

distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create shortand long-term jobs and tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital 

agricultural sector. We will be helping the Iraqis as they tackle this challenging 

agenda, along with other international partners including the United Nations and 

the World Bank. 

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS

Along with the security surge last year, we also launched a diplomatic surge— 

focused on enhancing U.N. engagement in Iraq, anchoring the International Compact with Iraq, and establishing an expanded neighbors process, which serves as a 

contact group in support of Iraq. 

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The United Nations has taken advantages of an expanded mandate granted to the 

Untied Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to increase the scope of its activities and the size of its staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing 

a key role in preparing for provincial elections and in providing technical assistance 

to resolve disputed internal boundaries. UNHCR has returned international staff to 

Iraq to assist with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. The 

International Compact with Iraq provides a 5-year framework for Iraq to reform its 

economy and achieve economic self-sufficiency in exchange for long overdue 

Saddam-era debt relief. Preparations are underway for a ministerial level Compact 

meeting in Sweden next month; 74 nations were represented at last year’s gathering 

in Egypt. 

Iraq’s neighbors also understand they have a major interest in Iraq’s future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of Iraq’s neighbors in November, and 

Kuwait will host the third meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq’s 

neighbors, these expanded neighbors conferences also include the Permanent Five 

members of the Security Council, the Arab League, and the G–8. 

Support from Arab capitals has not been strong—and must improve, for the sake 

of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain’s recent announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab states should follow 

suit. Iraq is a multiethnic state, but it is also a founding member of the Arab 

League and an integral part of the Arab world. Last month, Iraq hosted a meeting 

of the Arab Parliamentary Union, bringing the leaders of Arab Parliaments and consultative councils to Iraq for the first major inter-Arab gathering since 1990. It is 

noteworthy that the meeting was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, under the 

recently redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable prosperity and 

stability of Iraq’s Kurdish region and the presence of the Iraqi federal state. We 

hope that this event will encourage more active Arab engagement with Iraq, and 

we expect that Prime Minister Maliki’s effort against Shia extremist militias in 

Basra will receive Arab support. 

The presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the remote mountains of Iraq 

along the Turkish border has produced tension between Turkey and Iraq, and led 

to a Turkish cross-border operation in February, including movement of Turkish 

ground forces into Iraq. At the same time, both governments are working to 

strengthen their ties, and Iraqi President Talabani made a successful visit to Turkey in March. 

Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts to interdict some 

foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, but others continue to cross the 

boarder. Syria also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqi insurgency. 

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government to establish a 

stable, secure state through the authority and training of criminal militia elements 

engaged in violence against Iraqi Security Forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements armed and trained by Iran clashed with Iraqi Government forces in 

Basra and Baghdad. When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek 

out and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know more about 

these networks and their Quds Force sponsors than ever before—and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them. At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make. 

LOOKING AHEAD

Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is difficult. It will continue to be difficult as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule. But hard does not mean hopeless, and the political and economic process of the past few months is significant. I must underscore, however, 

that these gains are fragile, and they are reversible. Americans have invested a 

great deal in Iraq, in blood as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask 

whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the Iraqis 

fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop into a stable, secure multiethnic, multisectarian democracy under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that 

potential is ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue 

to be critical. I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That is 

still the case, although I think we are now closer. I remain convinced that a major 

departure from our current engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear 

with ourselves about what failure would mean. 

260 

Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al-Qaeda’s leaders are 

looking for every opportunity they can to hang on. Osama bin Ladin has called Iraq 

‘‘the perfect base,’’ and it reminds us that a fundamental aim of al-Qaeda is to 

establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq; we cannot allow it 

a second chance. 

And it is not only al-Qaeda that would benefit—Iran has said publicly it will fill 

any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shia militias would reassert themselves. We saw 

them try in Basra and Baghdad 2 weeks ago. And in all of this, the Iraqi people 

would suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict 

could draw in neighbors with devastating consequences for the region and the world. 

Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last 5 years have been in Iraq, 

Iraqis, Americans, and the world ultimately will judge us far more on the basis of 

what will happen than what has happened. In the end, how we leave and what we 

leave behind will be more important than how we came. Our current course is hard, 

but it is working. Progress is real although still fragile. We need to stay with it. 

In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues further steps 

toward reconciliation and economic development. Over time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be. Our efforts will focus on increasing 

Iraq’s integration regionally and internationally; assisting Iraqi institutions locally 

and nationally to strengthen the political process and promote economic activity; 

and supporting United Nations efforts as Iraq carries out local elections toward the 

end of the year. These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and 

continued support from the Congress and the American people. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those who serve our 

country in Iraq—military and civilian. Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and 

it is an honor to be with them. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Petraeus. 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE–IRAQ, BAGHDAD, IRAQ 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update 

on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided by my chain of command. 

Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you, 7 months 

ago, there has been significant, but uneven, progress in Iraq. Since 

September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced 

substantially. Al-Qaeda–Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows. And capabilities of Iraqi 

Security Forces elements have grown. 

There has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis and local 

security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory, and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events 

in the past 2 weeks have reminded us, and as I have repeatedly 

cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador 

Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago, when Iraq was on the 

brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional 

United States forces to Iraq. 

A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has 

been made. 

First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. You’re well aware of the U.S. surge. Less 

recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 

100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security 

forces in 2007, and slowing increasing its capacity to deploy and 

employ these forces. 

261 

A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi 

forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the 

country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue 

al-Qaeda, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local 

reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress. 

Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among 

certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni 

Awakening, in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly 

have rejected al-Qaeda’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These communities also recognize that they could not share 

in Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate in the political arena. 

Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of 

Iraqis, some former insurgents, to contribute to local security as socalled ‘‘Sons of Iraq.’’ With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of al-Qaeda–Iraq, the threat posed by AQI, while still lethal 

and substantial, has been reduced substantially. 

The recent flareup in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad, underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada alSadr last fall, as another factor in the overall reduction in violence. 

Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. 

Though a Sadr standdown order resolved the situation to a degree, 

the flareup also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in 

funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called ‘‘special 

groups,’’ and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds 

of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked the special groups pose the 

greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq. 

As we look to the future, our task, together with our Iraqi partners, will be to build on the progress achieved, and to deal with the 

many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this 

while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces. 

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict 

in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities 

for power and resources. This competition continues, influenced 

heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq. Various elements push Iraq’s 

ethnosectarian competition toward violence. Terrorist insurgents, 

militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. 

Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front 

in their global strategy, send funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. 

Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria 

has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through 

its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that 

supports al-Qaeda–Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its legal support to the special 

groups. 

Finally, insufficient Iraqi governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq’s problems. 

These challenges in recent weeks, violence notwithstanding, 

Iraq’s ethnosectarian competition in many areas is now taking 

place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the 

recent escalation of violence in Baghdad in southern Iraq was dealt 

with, temporarily at least, by most parties acknowledging that the 

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rational way forward is through political dialog rather than streetfighting. 

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent 

country, we do see progress in the security arena. As this chart illustrates, for nearly 6 months security incidents have been at a 

level not seen since early to mid-2005, though the level did spike 

in recent weeks as a result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad. 

The level of incidence has, however, begun to turn down again, 

though the period ahead will be a sensitive one. 

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we 

closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence. 

As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past 

year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque 

bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the 

very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. 

This chart also reflects our increase in use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and Iraqi data, and the 

bottom line reflecting coalition-confirmed data only. No matter 

which data set is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been 

reduced significantly, though more work clearly needs to be done. 

Ethnosectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is 

a cancer that continues to spread, if left unchecked. As the box on 

the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to 

ethnosectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor has been the reduction of ethnosectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown in the boxes 

depicting Iraq’s capital over time. 

Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening 

of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial 

explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines and numerous mixed 

neighbors still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere. In fact, coalition 

and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the 

violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their local communities. 

As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile 

attacks increased in March as al-Qaeda–Iraq lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago. 

Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on 

enemy networks, we’ve seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such 

attacks. The number of deaths due to ethnosectarian violence, in 

particular, as I mentioned, has remained relatively low, illustrating 

the enemy’s inability, to date, to reignite the cycle of ethnosectarian violence. 

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local 

communities has been an important development. As this chart 

depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq—Shia as well as 

Sunni—under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect 

their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These 

volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the 

savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved, have far outweighed the cost of their 

monthly contracts. 

Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised 

explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next 

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chart shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 2008 

than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of Sons of Iraq, 

we are working closely with the Iraqi Government to transition 

them into the Iraqi Security Forces or other forms of employment, 

and over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army 

or other government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully. 

Al-Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and 

al-Qaeda elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these 

attacks, in addition to AQI’s use of women, children, and the 

handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated al-Qaeda– 

Iraq from the Iraqi people. And the tenacious pursuit of al-Qaeda– 

Iraq, together with AQI’s loss of local support in many areas, has 

substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. 

This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against 

AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we have reduced, considerably, the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, 

though there clearly is more to be done. 

Having noted the progress, al-Qaeda–Iraq is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on 

the resource flows that sustain it. 

This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the 

Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what al-Qaeda–Iraq needs. As you can see, defeating 

al-Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces, but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations 

initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee operations, and many other actions. 

As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that al-Qaeda’s senior leaders view as a tool to spread its 

influence and foment regional instability. Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen al-Qaeda–Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Middle East region. 

Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on 

the ‘‘special groups.’’ These elements are funded, trained, armed, 

and directed by Iran’s Quds Force, with help from Lebanese 

Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and 

mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of government 2 weeks ago, causing 

the loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi 

and coalition actions in response. Iraqi and coalition leaders have 

repeated noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by 

President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop 

their support for the ‘‘special groups.’’ However, nefarious activities 

by the Quds Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly 

recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. 

We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and 

months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran 

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wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq. 

The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as 

their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. 

Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq’s 18 provinces are 

under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the 

successful provinces in the Kurdish Regional Government area, but 

also a number of southern provinces, have done well. Challenges 

have emerged in some others, including, of course, Basra. Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah 

provinces to transition in the months ahead. 

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 

540,000 individuals now serve in the ISF. The number of combat 

battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with 

some coalition support, has grown to well over 100. These units are 

bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact 

that Iraqi Security Forces losses have recently been three times our 

own. We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with 

our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were 

units and leaders found wanting, in some cases, and some of our 

assessments may be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their 

footing and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable. 

Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq’s security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqirun training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to grow by over 

133,000 soldiers and police over the last 16 months, and the stillexpanding training base is expected to generate an additional 

50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 army and special operations battalions 

throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 

national police battalions. 

Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving 

their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, 

as in 2006, Iraq’s Security Ministry spent more on their forces than 

the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund. 

We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this 

year and $11 billion next year, and this projection enabled us, 

recently, to reduce, significantly, our Iraqi Security Forces Fund 

request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. 

While improved Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend 

Iraq or maintain security throughout the entire country on their 

own, recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the 

ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers 

of units, supplies, and replacements on very short notice. They certainly could not have deployed a division’s worth of army and police 

units on such notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent 

operations also underscore the considerable work still to be done in 

the areas of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control. 

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military 

Sales Program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government has purchased over 2 billion dollars’ worth of equipment and services of 

265 

American origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations in the FMS process, delivery has 

improved as the FMS system has strived to support urgent wartime requirements. 

While security has improved in many areas, and the Iraqi Security Forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq 

remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a 

resurgence of AQI, or additional Shia groups could violate Muqtada 

al-Sadr’s cease-fire order and return to violence. External actors, 

like Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq. And actions by other 

neighbors could undermine the security situation, as well. 

Other challenges results, paradoxically, from improved security, 

which has provided opportunities for political and economic 

progress and improved services at the local, provincial, and national levels. But, the improvements have also created expectations 

that progress will continue. 

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the State 

Department’s Quick-Response Fund, and the USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us, by June, the additional CERP funds 

requested in the supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the Sons of Iraq alone 

cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the 

enhanced security in local communities. 

Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 

million for us to manage, as Iraqi CERP, to perform projects for 

their people while building their own capacity to do so. The government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of 

Iraq contracts, $510 million for small-business loans, and $196 million for a joint training, education, and reintegration program. The 

Iraqi Government pledges to provide more as they execute the 

budget passed 2 months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important 

to have our resources continue, even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours. 

Last month, I provided my chain of command recommendations 

for ‘‘The Way Ahead in Iraq.’’ During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains 

while we drawdown to the presurge level of 15 brigade combat 

teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition responsibilities to 

the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing 

the security gains that have been made. 

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations 

include recognition that the military surge has achieved progress, 

but that that progress is reversible; Iraqi Security Forces have 

strengthened their capabilities, but still must grow further; the 

provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, 

and efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes and article 140 

issues will be very challenging; the transition of Sons of Iraq into 

the Iraqi Security Forces or other pursuits will require time and 

careful monitoring; withdrawing too many forces too quickly could 

jeopardize the progress of the past year; and performing the necVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
266 

essary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well 

as special operations forces and adviser teams. 

The strategic considerations include recognition that the strain 

on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable. A number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also 

related to significant regional and global threats. A failed state in 

Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against 

al-Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian 

influence. 

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown of the surged combat forces, 

and that, upon the withdrawal of the last surged brigade combat 

team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation of our 

forces and evaluation. At the end of that period, we’ll commence a 

period of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and 

determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions. This process will be continuous, with recommendations for 

further reductions made as conditions permit. 

This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal 

timeline; however, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the 

ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our troopers 

have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve. 

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 

2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the gulf 

region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq prevent 

the resurgence of al-Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help 

Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethnosectarian violence that could spill over Iraq’s borders 

and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq 

to expand its role in the regional and global economies. 

In closing, I, too, want to comment briefly on those serving our 

Nation in Iraq. We’ve asked a great deal of them, and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal 

awareness of the strain on them, and on the force as a whole, has 

been an important factor in my recommendations. The Congress, 

the executive branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers, our civilians, and their loved 

ones, and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more to 

those in harm’s way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families. 

Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and 

women, civilian as well as military, serving our Nation in Iraq, and 

in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It remains the greatest of honors to 

soldier with them. 

Thank you very much. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The slides presented by GEN Petraeus during his 

testimony were not reproducible in this printed hearing. They will 

be maintained and can be viewed in the permanent record of the 

committee.] 

267 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL

FORCE–IRAQ, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

Mr. Chairman, ranking member, members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to provide an update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss 

the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command. 

Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you 7 months ago, there has 

been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, al-Qaeda–Iraq and a 

number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities 

of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy 

involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain 

areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as 

events in the past 2 weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, 

the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq 

is better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on 

the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional U.S. forces 

to Iraq. 

A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been made. First, 

of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. 

You are well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks 

of its security forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its capability to deploy and 

employ these forces. 

A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue al-Qaeda–Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress. 

Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements 

of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni ‘‘Awakening’’ in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have rejected AQI’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These communities also recognized that they could not share in 

Iraq’s bounty if they didn’t participate in the political arena. Over time, Awakenings 

have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis—some, former insurgents—to contribute 

to local security as so-called ‘‘Sons of Iraq.’’ With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of al-Qaeda–Iraq, the threat posed by AQI—while still lethal and substantial—has been reduced significantly. 

The recent flareup in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada al-Sadr last fall as another factor in the 

overall reduction in violence. Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr standdown order resolved the situation to a degree, the 

flareup also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, 

arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and generated renewed concern 

about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose 

the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq. 

As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners will be to build 

on the progress achieved and to deal with the many challenges that remain. I do 

believe that we can do this while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge 

forces. 

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This 

competition continues, influenced heavily by outside actors, and its resolution 

remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq. 

Various elements push Iraq’s ethnosectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. 

Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global 

strategy, send funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the 

flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key 

network that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups. Finally, insufficient 

Iraqi governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to 

Iraq’s problems. 

268 

These challenges and recent weeks’ violence notwithstanding, Iraq’s ethnosectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more through debate and 

less through violence. In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and 

southern Iraq was dealt with temporarily, at least, by most parties acknowledging 

that the rational way ahead is political dialogue rather than street fighting. 

CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do 

see progress in the security arena. 

As this chart [slide 1]* illustrates, for nearly 6 months, security incidents have 

been at a level not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though the level did spike in recent 

weeks as a result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, 

however, begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one. 

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the 

number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence. As this chart [slide 2] reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 

2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore 

the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. This chart also reflects our 

increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and 

Iraqi data and the bottom line reflecting coalition-confirmed data only. No matter 

which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly, 

though more work clearly needs to be done. 

Ethnosectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box on the bottom left of this chart [slide 

3] shows, the number of deaths due to ethnosectarian violence has fallen since we 

testified last September. A big factor has been the reduction of ethnosectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which are shown in the boxes depicting Iraq’s 

capital over time. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening 

of certain Baghdad neighborhoods; however, that is only a partial explanation as 

countless sectarian faultlines and numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in 

Baghdad and elsewhere. In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the 

faultlines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the 

long process of healing in their local communities. 

As this next chart [slide 4] shows, even though the number of high profile attacks 

increased in March as AQI lashed out, the current level of such attacks remains far 

below its height a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and 

focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such 

attacks. The number of deaths due to ethnosectarian violence, in particular, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy’s inability to date to reignite the cycle 

of ethnosectarian violence. 

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local communities has 

been an important development. As this chart [slide 5] depicts, there are now over 

91,000 Sons of Iraq—Shia as well as Sunni—under contract to help coalition and 

Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These 

volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence—not to mention the priceless lives saved— 

have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts. 

Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices 

and weapons and explosives caches. As this next chart [slide 6] shows, in fact, we 

have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the 

importance of the Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraqi Government 

to transition them into the Iraqi Security Forces or other forms of employment, and 

over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army or other government 

jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully. 

Al-Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and AQI elements 

have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks—in addition to AQI’s use of 

women, children, and the handicapped as suicide bombers—have further alienated 

AQI from the Iraqi people. And the tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI’s 

loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart [slide 7] displays the cumulative effect 

of the effort against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we have reduced 

considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, though there 

clearly is more to be done. 

Having noted that progress, AQI is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must 

maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that 

support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it. This chart [slide 8] lays out 

269 

the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you can see, defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces, 

but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated 

intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information 

operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency 

principles in detainee operations, and many other actions. Related to this effort, I 

applaud Congress’ support for additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming supplemental, as ISR is vital to the success of our 

operations in Iraq and elsewhere. 

As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major 

source of instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization that al-Qaeda’s senior 

leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama 

bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen AQI involved in destabilizing activities in the 

wider Mideast region. 

Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special 

Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Quds 

Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of government 2 weeks ago, causing 

loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions 

in response. Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran 

live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the 

Quds Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they 

pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months 

ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq. 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since September, and we 

have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart [slide 9] shows, half 

of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces— 

not just the successful provinces in the Kurdish Regional Government area, but also 

a number of southern provinces—have done well. Challenges have emerged in some 

others, including, of course, Basra. Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we 

expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the months ahead. 

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown 

to well over 100 [slide 10]. These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi Security Force losses have recently been 

three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with 

our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders 

found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as 

a result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they 

got their footing and gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements 

proved quite capable. 

Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq’s security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi 

Security Forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. 

And the still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 

Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special Operations battalions throughout the rest 

of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 National Police battalions. 

Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart [slide 11] shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq’s security 

ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the 

Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF). We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion 

on security this year and $11 billion next year, and this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for fiscal year 

2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. 

While improved, Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial 

numbers of units, supplies, and replacements on very short notice; they certainly 

could not have deployed a division’s worth of Army and Police units on such short 

270 

notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the 

considerable work still to be done in the areas of logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control. 

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. 

As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government has purchased over 2 billion dollars’ worth 

of equipment and services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and 

with your encouragement of the organizations in the FMS process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to support urgent wartime requirements. On 

a related note, I would ask that Congress consider restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training Program, which supports education for 

mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future. 

UPCOMING CHALLENGES

While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security Forces are 

shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and 

challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of AQI or additional Shia groups could violate Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire order and return to violence. External actors, like 

Iran, could stoke violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well. 

Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities for political and economic progress and improved services at the 

local, provincial, and national levels. But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue. In the coming months, Iraq’s leaders must 

strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would 

challenge any government, much less a still developing government tested by war. 

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the State Department’s Quick 

Response Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional 

CERP funds requested in the supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. 

As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the 

cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security in local communities. 

Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for us to manage as ‘‘Iraqi CERP’’ to perform projects for their people, while building their own 

capacity to do so. The Iraqi Government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small business loans, and $196 

million for a Joint Training, Education, and Reintegration Program. The Iraqi Government pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed 2 months ago. 

Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue, even as Iraqi 

funding begins to outstrip ours. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead 

in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our 

hard-fought security gains while we drawdown to the presurge level of 15 brigade 

combat teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to 

secure the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as 

conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been made. 

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic 

considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: 

• The military surge has achieved progress, but that the progress is reversible; 

• Iraqi Security Forces have strengthened their capabilities but still must grow 

further; 

• The provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and 

efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes and article 140 issues will be 

very challenging; 

• The transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces or other pursuits 

will require time and careful monitoring; 

• Withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the 

past year; and 

• Performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces 

as well as special operations forces and adviser teams. 

The strategic considerations include recognition that: 

271 

• The strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable; • A number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant 

regional and global threats; and • A failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight 

against al-Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian 

crisis in Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian influence. 

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we 

continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces and that, upon the withdrawal 

of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, we will commence a process 

of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over time, determine 

when we can make recommendations for further reductions. This process will be 

continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit. 

This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable; however, 

it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still 

fragile security gains our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to 

achieve. 

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form 

a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is 

not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq; it is also vitally important to 

those in the gulf region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of 

al-Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment 

on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethnosectarian violence that could spill over 

Iraq’s borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq 

to expand its role in the regional and global economies. 

CLOSING COMMENTS

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation in Iraq. We 

have asked a great deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force 

as a whole has been an important factor in my recommendations. 

The Congress, the executive branch, and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us are grateful 

for that. Nothing means more to those in harm’s way than the knowledge that their 

country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families. 

Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our 

Nation in Iraq and in the courage, determination, resilience, and initiative they 

demonstrate each and every day. It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with 

them. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

With Chairman Lugar’s permission, I think we should do 7- 

minute rounds. And thank you, gentlemen, for your physical constitution, here, for being able to sustain all this. Let me begin with 

a statement. 

Mr. Ambassador, I would not presume that, if the security agreement with Iraq goes beyond a Status of Forces Agreement, that you 

need only inform the Congress. You need to do much more than inform the Congress; you need the permission of the Congress if 

you’re going to bind the next President of the United States in anything you agree to. But, that’ll be something—— 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. There will be no response, please, from the audience. 

But, we have plenty of time to discuss that. Let’s assume, gentlemen, all the progress you assert has been made—and I don’t think 

anybody denies there’s been progress made. And let’s assume that 

you—and I believe you mean what you say, that our commitment 

is not open-ended—how far along this continuum, if—as they say— 

as average Americans say, on a scale of 1 to 10, how far along are 

272 

we on this progress scale before we get to the point where we can 

significantly reduce American forces? Three, four, five, seven, eight, 

nine? Where are we? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Give us some sense of how much progress has 

been made, relative to how much needs to be made—not in specific 

kinds of progress—that needs to be made in order for you to recommend to the President of the United States, ‘‘Mr. President, we 

can not only drawdown, totally, the surge, but well below—well 

below what we have committed—have had in place the last 3 

years.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, Senator, you just mentioned the 

fact that we are, in fact, drawing down the forces that did constitute the surge, and that was part of the recommendation. It 

would have been a very, very difficult recommendation to do, otherwise; but, certainly that was in the realm of the possible, and that 

was made possible by the progress that we have made, particularly 

against al-Qaeda in Iraq—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You’re allowed to draw—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Sunni insurgents—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You recommended drawing down, before a pause, 

to the level that’s 10,000 above what it was before the surge. Is 

that about right? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it’s actually less than that. But, again, 

it’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But, it’s—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. That’s in the ballpark. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, it’s above—— 

General PETRAEUS. It is—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What it was—— 

General PETRAEUS. It is above, because of certain enablers; in 

particular—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But, in the interest—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Military—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Of time, can you give me a sense— 

if you don’t want to answer, just tell me you don’t want to answer—on this scale of 1 to 10, to get to the point where you turn 

to the President and say, ‘‘Mr. President, we can go down well 

below 130,’’ which is the presurge level—how far along are we? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think we’re in a 6 or a 7, or somewhere along there, Senator Biden. And—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. And what we’ll do, again, is assess the conditions. Now, it doesn’t mean that we have to wait, beyond—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I understand. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Much longer—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Much longer beyond 45 days. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Get a sense of where we are in this 

continuum. 

General PETRAEUS. OK, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Second, Mr. Ambassador, is al-Qaeda a greater 

threat to United States interests in Iraq or in the Afghan/Pakistan 

border region? 

273 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, al-Qaeda is a strategic 

threat to the United States wherever it is, in my—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Where is—— 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. Judgment. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Most of it? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That—— 

The CHAIRMAN. If you could take it out—you had a choice, the 

Lord Almighty came down, sat in the middle of the table there and 

said, ‘‘Mr. Ambassador, you can eliminate every al-Qaeda source in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan or every al-Qaeda personnel in Iraq,’’ 

which would you pick? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, given the progress that has been 

made against al-Qaeda in Iraq, the significant decrease in its capabilities, the fact that it is solidly on the defensive and not in a position, as far as—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Which one would you—— 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. I can judge—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Pick, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. I would, therefore, pick alQaeda in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be a smart choice. 

Now, assume that all the progress you assert has occurred. What 

further is required for you to suggest—either of you—that the 

progress can be sustained at levels under 140,000 troops, $12 billion a month, 30 to 40 deaths a month, and 225 wounded a month? 

Because that’s where we are now. To maintain where we are now, 

you’re saying to us, at least for the next 45 days, we have to continue to have 140,000, roughly, troops in place, we have to spend 

$12 billion a month, we’re going to probably sustain 30 to 40 

deaths a month, and we’re going to have somewhere around 225 

wounded a month. So, what has to happen—what has to happen 

for us to be able to reduce the costs in life and in dollars and in 

deployment? 

General PETRAEUS. There has to be progress in various local 

areas that we will look at, Senator. Because, again, what we’ll be 

doing is the—an essentially—a combination of battlefield geometry 

that looks the enemy in the friendly situations, it looks at other 

factors. And there’s also what the Ambassador has termed the ‘‘political/military calculus.’’ And you take that into account in local 

areas—most likely, province by province—and determine—we already have four or five locations that we are looking at most closely 

and determining whether to off-ramp those units at an appropriate 

moment—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Assuming progress can continue. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My time is running out. Tell me 

whether or not there are any conditions under which you would 

recommend to us leaving—‘‘conditions,’’ meaning they got a lot 

worse—you say, ‘‘to maintain the progress’’—is there any conditions in which—those charts you showed us—if, this time in November or October, the American deaths have spiked back up to 

2006 levels; if, in fact, the Awakening has decided it’s awake and 

it’s not going to be integrated, and it’s better to go to war with the 

Shia, the civil war becomes more a reality; if, in fact, the numerous 

274 

militia that exist among the Shia are in open war, not just in 

Basra, but for an extended period of time with one another—are 

any of those conditions such that you would say, ‘‘We’re going to 

have to withdraw and contain,’’ or would you just automatically 

say—not ‘‘automatic’’—would you say we have to, once again, infuse more forces back into Iraq to settle it? 

We talk about this in terms of—you say, ‘‘to sustain the 

progress.’’ What happens, notwithstanding the pause, if, in fact, the 

progress is reversed obviously, significantly, and unalterably? What 

do you do then? Do you just come back and tell us the same? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, it would be—it would depend on the specifics at the time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me give you the specifics: 90,000 Shia say, 

‘‘We’re not getting dealt in,’’ and the same kind of exchange in violence between Sunni and Shia is reignited in September, from 

Anbar province into Baghdad, and that same level of ethnosectarian violence is once again established. That’s the condition. 

What do you do? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I really don’t think you 

can have a productive conversation that is purely based on those 

hypotheticals. 

The CHAIRMAN. They’re not—— 

Ambassador CROCKER. I mean, how did it—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Hypotheticals. 

Ambassador CROCKER. How did it get that way? How did it get 

that way? I don’t see that as likely, given what is lying ahead, in 

terms of provincial elections, for example. I think that is where 

you’re going to not see both Sunnis and Shia focus to prepare for 

those who—— 

The CHAIRMAN. What happens if the elections don’t get carried 

off because of violence? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Then we’ll—we’ll look at the circumstances and assess. 

The CHAIRMAN. I can’t think of any circumstance where you fellows are likely to recommend—no matter how bad things got, 

where you would withdraw. But I may be mistaken. That’s part of 

everyone’s concern, at least mine. 

I yield to my colleague Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You have mentioned in your response to questions this morning, 

and, likewise, a little bit in your testimony, that you cannot assess 

the entire circumstances of our country. For example, presently, 

hopefully, somebody in the Defense Department or elsewhere is 

taking a look at the status of our military equipment overall. Briefings and hearings in other committees have highlighted deficiencies in a good number of categories of equipment for all of our 

Armed Forces. Or, as I mentioned in my opening statement, taking 

a look at the personnel situation. How are we going to maintain 

the Armed Forces that we have? Do we make changes in how we 

recruit and retain people for our Armed Forces? Are young Americans prepared, or even qualified to serve in sufficient quantities 

that may be required to meet our national security demands? 

Likewise, you cannot quite assess, nor can most of us, what impact a potential economic recession in our country means, or should 

275 

it spread to other countries in the world, which then deprive us of 

resources, generally speaking. 

Likewise, what deficiencies do we have in energy security? How 

do food shortages throughout the world come into play. 

As you’ve pointed out, your job today is to discuss your responsibilities and the United States responsibilities in Iraq. But, these 

come in the midst of huge changes that are going on in our own 

context, some of them of our own making—the lack of savings on 

the part of the American people, the problems of subprime mortgages, and many other things that really are not a part of Iraq— 

but factor into our preparedness, and our ability to respond. 

Now, I put it this way because usually when persons—not yourselves, but others—are asked, ‘‘What if we were to withdraw significant American forces from Iraq?’’—some people say we would 

have to rely, then, upon diplomacy to a greater extent, we would 

have to have a better consort with the countries that surround 

Iraq, or the United Nations, or NATO, or somebody else to fill in 

for that which we are not providing; or others would just simply 

say there will be dire consequences, and the consequences might be 

civil war, increased sectarian violence in many parts of the country, 

intervention by other countries, a halt in oil production that could 

cause further economic upheaval. 

But, let me just pose that particular question to the two of you. 

What are the dire circumstances? 

And then, second, what sort of contingency planning are we making, as a nation, for those dire circumstances? In other words, in 

the event that these dire circumstances occur, with or without 

140,000 troops, what and who really comes to the rescue? How do 

we meet greater civil war, for example, or intervention by other 

countries, or the things that are usually predicted in the event that 

the core of American forces is mitigated or removed? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, what we have both identified 

as concerns if the progress is put into jeopardy, if other factor conspire against it, revolve around al-Qaeda regaining lost ground and 

influence, and then perhaps using that as a base to spread further—— 

Senator LUGAR. Well, what do we do about that—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. The—— 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. General? Let’s—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, we’re staying after al-Qaeda, is what 

we’re doing about it, Senator, tenaciously. We are—— 

Senator LUGAR. Then you need—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. We are battling—— 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. More forces—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Al-Qaeda every day. And—— 

Senator LUGAR. But, you’d need more forces, would you not, in 

the event that—— 

General PETRAEUS. We—— 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Despite all of this—— 

General PETRAEUS. We have the forces that we need right now, 

I believe. We’ve got to continue—we have to—we have our teeth 

into their—our teeth into their jugular, and we need to keep it 

there. We have tough fighting to do—in particular, in Mosul and 

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tinue and press the fight. And that’s why I laid out the comprehensive approach that we are taking, which, by the way, very much 

involves diplomacy with source countries, it involves communications indirectly to Syria, it involves help from neighbors and so 

forth just to take action, such as, for example, not allowing a military-aged male to take a one-way ticket from some Sunni Arab 

country to Damascus, for example. 

Beyond that, other concerns, of course, the resumption of the 

ethnosectarian violence that tore Iraq apart in 2006 and 2007—you 

saw the statistics on that; over 55 dead bodies a day, just in Baghdad, just from ethnosectarian violence—which caused so much of 

the tearing of the fabric of Iraqi society, and which the surge was, 

indeed, intended to stop and then to try to help people have the 

time to put a few stitches back into it. 

The Ambassador and I have both raised concerns about Iranian 

influence. As we mentioned this morning, the involvement of Iran 

with the so-called special groups and their activities in this indirect 

fire on the international zone, the seat of Iraqi Government came 

out in very high relief and generated enormous concern among 

Iraqi leaders, as well as, of course, among coalition leaders and 

civilians, because a number of these fell short, and, in fact, probably more civilian lives were lost than were others. 

Senator LUGAR. What do you do about that, General, about the 

Iranian influence, even as it is high profile? 

General PETRAEUS. What we have done, sir, is, we have detained 

special-group members. We are going to lay out for the press, here, 

at some point in the future, what we have learned from them about 

their—the Quds Force training, equipping, funding, and directing 

of the so-called special groups, and the help that Lebanese 

Hezbollah has provided them. As I believe I reported to you in September, we detained the deputy head of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which is responsible for assisting the Iranian Quds 

Force in the training and equipping of these so-called special 

groups. And we’ve since detained a number of the special-group 

members, some of their financiers, some of their leaders, and four 

of their 16 master trainers. We’ll lay that out, and we’ll lay out the 

various weapons caches and other finds that we have had, that, 

again, show the very, very clear involvement of Iran in Iraq. 

That ties into regional stability. And then, of course, it all ties, 

eventually, into the global economy. And it is noteworthy that the 

progress in Iraq has enabled it to reach, in fact, recently, the highest export levels ever, I believe it is, out of the north, and the levels 

have exceeded their export goals now for the first 3 months of the 

year. And so, again, an area of progress, due to security progress, 

as well. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, to both of you. As the chairman has said, you’ve 

got a long day, and a long day tomorrow coming up, and I’m sure 

some of these questions will be repeated, in one form or another. 

So, we thank you for your patience and your willingness to share 

with us your thoughts on all of this. 

277 

I’d like to, first of all, pick up on something Senator Lugar has 

begun. I think it’s very important in making these assessments, to 

look at the broader context, what we’re dealing with. And one of 

the reasons I was a couple of minutes late getting over here, was 

that I was in the midst of trying to deal with a piece of housing 

legislation. We’ve got some 8,000 people a day in this country that 

are entering into foreclosure on their homes. Numbers on inflation, 

unemployment rates, all of these factors which are contributing to 

a lot of people’s concerns about, generally, where things are heading. 

I’d like to focus, if I can, just on two quick questions. One, I 

think, more specifically, for you, General, and one for the Ambassador. 

One has to do with the condition of our troops. I think all of us 

here, certainly at this dais, representing our constituency—whatever views we have on policy, there’s an incredible admiration for 

what our men and women are doing in uniform. You’ve both raised 

it. It’s been raised by others. It’s very important, I think, that our 

troops know that. Arguments over policy are one thing, but our 

commitment to these men and women serving know no division 

whatsoever. 

But, I was sort of surprised and stunned on some of the recent 

numbers. A study done by the Department of Defense found that 

with each additional deployment, soldiers are 60-percent more 

likely to develop severe combat-related stress issues, while a study 

conducted by the Surgeon General of the Army found that soldiers 

suffering from high levels of combat stress are twice as likely to 

find themselves in a situation where they are in violation of the 

Armed Forces ethics standards, and seven times more likely to hit 

an Iraqi civilian. 

So, I’d like to ask you, if I could, General, as someone who has 

really written the book on counterinsurgency—and I say that with 

great admiration for your background and abilities—what impact is 

the stress of repeated combat tours having on our military’s ability 

to effectively conduct the counterinsurgency campaign? What 

effects could such high levels of combat stress have on soldiers who 

must regularly interact with Iraqis, and ultimately win the heartsand-minds argument? 

Both the Army Chief of Staff, GEN George Casey, and Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, have raised serious 

concerns about our Armed Forces capability to react to emerging 

threats, going to the point Senator Lugar raised about other contingencies where our forces may be called upon. I’ll just quote for you, 

which I’m sure you’re aware of, General Cody’s comments at a recent hearing before the Armed Services Committee, where we were 

this morning. And I think, in relationship to the surge, talking 

about the surge, he said, ‘‘Right now, all the units that are back 

at home station are training to replace next units in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. If the surge comes down the way we predict, and we get 

so many troops back and brigade combat teams back, and we can 

get the dwell time right, we’ll start getting those units trained to 

full-spectrum readiness for future contingencies. I don’t know what 

those future contingencies are,’’ he went on to say, ‘‘but I know that 

this Nation and this Joint Force needs to have a division-ready briVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00285 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
278 

gade, an airborne brigade ready for full-spectrum operations, a 

heavy brigade combat team ready for full-spectrum operations, and 

a Stryker brigade combat team ready for full-spectrum operations. 

And we don’t have that today.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘Right now, as 

I’ve testified—and I’ve been doing this for 6 years—I was a G–3 of 

the Army, and a Vice Chair,’’ now former Chair, ‘‘and I’ve never 

seen our lack of strategic depth at where it is today.’’ 

Now, if we’re talking about continuing our forces in Iraq, adding 

to the stress with assessments being done by the Surgeon General 

and the Defense Department’s own study, in light of these other 

issues you’re dealing with, on the ground in Iraq, what additional 

pressures are we placing on these men and women serving? What 

additional pressures are we placing on ourselves and our ability to 

respond to other contingencies, given the pressures that have been 

recognized by some of your colleagues here at the Department of 

Defense? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, let me talk about Iraq, Senator. Obviously, that’s what I’m riveted on, and that’s what my mission is. 

And when I got back to Iraq, in February 2007, there were two 

enormous changes. The first was the damage done to Iraq by 

ethnosectarian violence—as I mentioned, the fabric of society torn; 

the second, how much more our troopers understand what it is that 

we are trying to do in this very complex endeavor that is counterinsurgency operations. 

By the way, counterinsurgency operations require full-spectrum 

operations. They require offense. And we do a lot of it. In the past 

year, we did the Ramadi clearance, Baqubah, south Baghdad. Some 

of these were multiple—certainly multiple battalions and beyond 

brigade combat team operations. These are big operations, in other 

words, not just hearts-and-minds activities. Certainly, it involves 

force protection, some defense, and it involves stability-and-support 

operations, which a lot tend to associate with counterinsurgency, 

once the security situation reaches that point. 

Our troopers really very much understand it, and they are far 

better at this—far better because of changes made in the institution, in the Army that General Cody is the Vice Chief of, in the 

training of our troopers, their education of the leaders, the collective mission rehearsal exercises, the lessons-learned process, and 

all the rest of that. 

Now, there’s no question but that these multiple tours have put 

enormous strain on the force. Absolutely. It is something, again, I 

am personally very keenly aware of. 

Paradoxically, reenlistment rates seem to be quite high. Again, 

I track the units in Iraq, and one of the divisions that is there on 

its third tour—in fact, getting ready to come home—is a unit 

that—the division commander reported the other day—that met 

their reenlistment goal for the entire fiscal year at this point right 

now—obviously, about halfway into it. 

So, again, while the troopers very much feel the strain, while I 

would personally welcome—I look forward to the opportunity for 

the Army and so forth to come back to 12-month tours, vice 15- 

month, which are particularly difficult, the troopers that we see in 

Iraq are doing a magnificent job. They also happen to be the bestequipped force—they are vastly better equipped than we were 

279 

when I was a division commander and we went through the berm, 

flew over the berm in the fight to Baghdad. And I can give you case 

after case after case of equipment that places our forces in an absolutely unique position in the world now. And we monitored this 

when we saw another country starting to do some operations 

recently in that area, and recognized the vast differences between 

our situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, the satellite communications, the fusion of conventional special forces and special mission units, and all the rest of 

that. It is vastly better than we were in the beginning. And, again, 

our troopers do an extraordinarily good job, despite the enormous 

strain that clearly they and their families have experienced over 

the course of the last number of years. 

Senator DODD. Well, I thank you for that answer. I’m still deeply 

concerned about these reports on stress levels and so forth that are 

mounting up. And—— 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I share that. Again, as I stated—and 

that is a factor in my recommendations. And again, I have, you 

know, personal experience with that. 

Senator DODD. No, I know you do. I didn’t get to the question, 

Ambassador Crocker, about these militias. Again, the good news is 

this Awakening and dealing with the Sunni militias dealing with 

al-Qaeda is the good news. But it’s not a long-term strategy. And 

exactly the point I think Senator Biden is driving at, in a sense, 

here, where we’re arming and engaging these militias, and, at the 

same time, calling for a strengthened central government to 

respond to all of this, how you turn that around, it seems to me, 

when you’re counting on these militias, and then—— 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator DODD [continuing]. Trying to integrate them is going to 

raise some huge issues, I think. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, let me take that one, if I could, because there’s few misconceptions. We don’t arm any of these Sons 

of Iraq. They are tribal members, to begin with. Every Iraq is 

allowed an AK–47 in his own house, by law, and they are more 

than heavily enough armed. 

What we have done is, we’ve stood by them—initially, when the 

first tribe came forward, in October 2006, before the surge; but 

then, subsequent to that, as the chain reaction took place in 

Ramadi and went up and down the Euphrates River Valley in the 

early spring and then summer of 2007, enabled by the additional 

forces out in Anbar, then in Baghdad, south Baghdad, Diyala, and 

so forth—these individuals have decided to reject the extremist ideology of al-Qaeda, their oppressive practices, and the indiscriminate violence that they’ve visited on this—on all communities in 

Iraq—not just Shia, but Sunni Arab communities, as well. And 

that’s a hugely significant shift. It’s a seismic shift in the Sunni 

Arab world, and one that we hope to see extend even farther. 

Senator DODD. I hear that. We’re paying them, of course. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, sir, they started out, volunteering. And 

they did volunteer for a long time. And we said—you know, we did 

the math, and that math is $16 million a month that we pay them 

with CERP, and now, as I mentioned, the Iraqis are giving $300 

million in CERP, or how many tens of millions of loss of vehicles 

280 

or loss of priceless lives? And I think that was the best investment 

that we’ve made in Iraq. And now we are transitioning them; as 

I mentioned, over 21,000 transitioned to Iraqi Security Forces or 

other positions, and slowly, but surely—not easily—nothing in Iraq 

is easy. 

Senator DODD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, gentlemen, welcome. 

I want to go back, just very briefly as I open my questions, to 

a point that Chairman Biden noted at the beginning, and that is, 

we all recognize that the two of you and who you represent are implementers of policy. You don’t set policy. You can help influence 

it, shape it, mold it. But, I know from my brief military experience, 

General, when the commander tells you to take the hill, you take 

the hill, or you sure as hell try. And we have the best force structure in the world to do that. And I think we all acknowledge that. 

And my point in opening with that comment is to make certain 

that you understand, as well as all of your colleagues, that this is 

not a session—— 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Today, to pick on you, to pick on 

any of you, or certainly not acknowledge the kind of sacrifices that 

you both acknowledged here today, and we respect that, and we 

appreciate it. 

But, I have always believed in one dynamic of this business, and 

that is, if we are to be held accountable—elected officials—for any 

one thing, it is that we should be held accountable to developing 

and setting policy worthy of the sacrifices of our men and women 

that we ask to implement policy. So, I wanted to put that on the 

table before I ask a couple of questions. 

As we sit here today—and the two of you are acutely aware of 

this—your headquarters in the international zone, Green Zone, the 

last few days, has continually been rocketed, mortared. We took 

casualties there the other day, as you know, of course; a number 

of Americans killed and wounded. And there’s, it seems to me, 

some disconnect in the abstraction that we’re dealing with today, 

as you both have presented—not a glowing report, but, I think, a 

fair report—what you see as not just progress made, but where 

we’re going and what this is about. But, the reality is, since the 

President announced the surge, last January, we have lost over 

1,000 dead Americans—January of 2007. And I know you’re painfully aware of that, General. We’ve lost certain elements of our 

units, as well as in—the wounded, over 6,300 wounded, and all the 

other dynamics that have been alluded to. 

And the reason I’m bringing that up is because I think those are 

the realities that we’re talking about here, and I want to move to 

one particular area that you have both covered in your testimony, 

and that is, Where do we go from here? Whether it’s to pause and 

then you will assess, or whether it’s what Ambassador Crocker 

noted, that I will get to specifically, the regional and international 

dynamics—as you have it, a diplomatic surge. But, the fact is, 

also—and I think anyone who takes an honest evaluation of this— 

281 

and certainly we’ve seen the U.S. Institute of Peace’s report, the 

part-two of the Iraqi Study Group Report, your former colleagues, 

General, who were up here last week, and others who have been 

involved with Iraq, the military, and foreign affairs for some time. 

The fact is, regardless of whether we’re in or whether we’re out or 

whether—when we leave, or the timeframe when we leave— 

because we are going to unwind, we are going to leave, at some 

point, if for no other reason than what my colleagues have noted 

here, because we don’t have the capacity to sustain it—if for no 

other reason—and, just as you said, Ambassador Crocker, it’s a 

matter of how we leave and what we leave, as best we can, but 

we’re dealing with uncontrollables well out of the capacity for the 

world’s finest military to deal with this. And I would—just want to 

remind you, General, of something that you said in March last 

year, and I think it’s something we should keep our eye on. You 

noted—this is your quote, ‘‘There is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq, for the insurgency of Iraq.’’ And then you 

went on to say, ‘‘A political resolution is what will determine, in 

the long run, the success of that effort.’’ 

When you were both here in September, you both noted that, 

that the surge was to buy time, essentially, for some political reconciliation, or at least some accommodation. 

And then, a couple of weeks ago, General Petraeus, you gave an 

interview, which was in the Washington Post, and you noted, ‘‘No 

one in the U.S. and Iraqi Government feels that there has been 

sufficient progress, by any means, in the area of national reconciliation.’’ 

Now, if we all generally agree that the sacrifices that we’re making are all about the underpinning dynamic that, in the end, is all 

that’s going to count—certainly, security is important; we understand that—but, how we arrive, or the Iraqis arrive, at some political accommodation to sort all this out, then that’s—should be our 

focus. And the fact is, by any analysis, we’re going to continue to 

see a bloody Iraq. We are going to continue to see, as you have both 

noted in your testimony, an Iraq that will ricochet from crisis to 

crisis. And I am wondering, as I have listened to both of you carefully, if we are not essentially holding our policy captive to Iraqi 

developments. Certainly, conditions, as you’ve noted, General, dictate tactics. But, I’m not sure that conditions should dictate policy. 

And, with that, I want to launch into Ambassador Crocker’s testimony, when you talk about a ‘‘diplomatic surge.’’ Now, a ‘‘diplomatic surge,’’ I assume, is somewhat similar to the surge we saw, 

militarily, meaning that you put tens of thousands of more troops 

on the ground, and you did the things you felt you needed to do 

to surge. But, as I read the testimony, Ambassador, it’s pretty thin. 

I don’t know if I would equate ‘‘surge’’ with ‘‘Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of Iraq’s neighbors in November—last 

November, and Kuwait will now host the third meeting later this 

month.’’ I don’t know if that’s a surge. ‘‘Support from Arab capitals 

has been strong—has not been strong.’’ I don’t know how we think 

we would find any regional diplomatic effort that’s going to work 

if we can’t get the regional neighbors to work with us. ‘‘Syria plays 

an ambivalent role. Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the 

Iraqi Government.’’ 

282 

So, where’s the surge? What are we doing? I don’t see Secretary 

Rice doing any Kissingeresque flying around. Where is the diplomatic surge? In my opinion, the one core issue that, in the end, is 

going to make the difference as to the outcome of Iraq, and will certainly have an awful lot to do with how we come out of this—so, 

where is the surge? What are you talking about? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The neighbors process is predicated on 

biannual ministerial meetings. So, in November, in Istanbul; April, 

a little bit ahead, at 6 months, in Kuwait. That’s the schedule we 

run to. The first ministerial was in last May, in Sharm el-Sheikh. 

In between the ministerials, there are meetings of working groups 

on energy, border security, and refugees. The border security—the 

energy and refugee working groups have met over the course of the 

last month. Border security will meet, I think, in this coming week. 

So, there is activity. 

Does there need to be more activity on the part of the region? 

Clearly, yes. And I noted in my statement, the Arabs need to be 

more engaged. We have pressed them on that. I have made a swing 

through the region. Of course, the President and the Vice President 

were both on regional tours in the first part of this year. And, ultimately, again, the Arabs are going to have to make their own decisions. But, they also need to understand that this is important to 

their interests, it’s not a favor to us or to Iraq. So, that is a message we continue to press them on. 

Similarly, with Iran, as I noted in my statement, we have taken 

the position that we are prepared to discuss, face to face with the 

Iranian security, Iraq—at Iraqi request. The Iraqis have announced 

that they would like to see another meeting occur. We have said 

we’re ready to participate. It’s now up to the Iranians. 

Again, we can’t compel the neighbors to behave constructively 

and positively, but we can certainly send a message that it’s in 

their interest to do so. 

Senator HAGEL. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, welcome. We are delighted to have you here. And we thank you both for what you are 

doing on behalf of our country. 

General Petraeus, I particularly want to thank you and acknowledge, as I don’t think you’ve heard enough from all sides of the 

aisle in this country, that we really do respect and understand that 

you have achieved some measure of a kind of progress. And it’s a 

progress that is within your purview, as commander of Armed 

Forces in Iraq and on the military field, to be able to achieve. And 

you’ve done about as good a job of playing a tough hand as somebody could do. So through you, to all of our troops, we want them 

to understand the degree to which we respect and recognize that 

accomplishment. 

The problem is, for all of us, that there’s a larger set of balancing. I think you know that. You’ve repeatedly said how you’re 

limited to Iraq. We Senators are not. We’re looking at how we 

283 

defend the larger interests of our country, protect it, and do a better job of fighting the war on terror. 

So I look at this larger field, and I see a fundamental equation 

with respect to Iraq that essentially stays the same, notwithstanding whatever progress we have made. 

There is a fundamental struggle—a sectarian power struggle— 

taking place, over which we do not have a lot of control; in fact, 

the Iranians have an increasing amount, partly because of our 

presence. 

There is a dysfunctional Iraqi Government, stumbling here and 

there, occasionally trying to stand up, but fundamentally, most 

would agree, unable to effectively deliver services, only with the 

greatest difficulty to be able to reconcile the oil law, the constitutional changes—the real fundamentals that go to the core of the 

sectarian division. 

There is a decreasing ability, as Senator Dodd has pointed to, 

and General Odom, last week, before our committee, and General 

McCaffrey, General Scales, and others, have all pointed to the 

decreasing ability of our military to sustain this over a long period 

of time. That is a message that, not only we have heard, but our 

opponents have heard; everybody in the world has heard it, including our troops, who live it with repeated deployments and stop-loss 

and other hardships. 

The issue here is how do we see our way to conclude this successfully? In that regard, there has been much misinterpretation and 

sloganeering, and exploitation, because I don’t know anybody on 

our side who is suggesting that you create chaos, pull the plug, and 

avoid responsibility. That is not the suggestion. The suggestion is 

that we change the dynamics, which require something more of the 

Iraqis themselves. 

Your quote on March 14, that Senator Hagel pointed to earlier, 

‘‘No one feels there has been sufficient progress, by any means, in 

the area of national reconciliation.’’ Is that an accurate quote, General? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Senator, but thanks for the opportunity 

to note that I then laid out a number of areas in which there has 

been progress. And I think—— 

Senator KERRY. I agree. And you’ve laid them out to this committee already. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KERRY. I have limited time, so I don’t want to go 

through them all again now. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator KERRY. You have laid them out. And I’ve acknowledged 

them, too. There is some progress in those areas. 

General PETRAEUS. What I was conveying was the impatience, 

candidly, that, well, actually all of us feel, and including the Iraqis. 

Senator KERRY. You said, this morning, to the Armed Services 

Committee, that war is not a linear phenomenon, and that you 

can’t predict certain things. That is true, if only war were, in fact, 

the determinant of what is going to happen in Iraq. Yet you yourself have said, ‘‘The war is not the determinant. There is no military solution.’’ The solution lies on the political side, where you 

have now also acknowledged there is not sufficient progress. 

284 

I’ve met with the Sunni chiefs, who are now part of the Awakening. We have, basically, rented their allegiance. You’ve acknowledged the money we’re paying them. There is a time when that 

allegiance may shift. They are not being integrated into the Shia 

forces, into the ISF forces. That lack of integration is viewed by the 

Shia, whether the chiefs arm themselves, they are being paid by 

us, they are viewed as an increasing force. And the fundamental 

struggle of Iraq remains the same. 

My question is this: Has it struck you—as the chiefs acknowledged to me, saying, ‘‘Yes, we don’t have to make a decision as long 

as we know you guys are here’’—has it struck you, as I know it did 

your predecessor, at the open-endedness of the commitment of 

large forces without a sense of what the process will be—without 

specific deadlines and times—that it actually empowers Iraqis to 

avoid making the decisions and the reconciliation they have to 

make? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s an important question, Senator. And 

it’s something I have thought about. Are there alternatives that 

give you as good, or better, outcomes? And I’m familiar with the 

argumentation on that one. 

What I have seen during my little more than a year in Iraq now, 

is that when we do see movement forward, when we do see a spirit 

of compromise, something other than a zero-sum mentality, it’s 

when leaders and the communities behind them are feeling relatively secure, secure enough to make tradeoffs, which is what—— 

Senator KERRY. We gave them security with 160,000 troops, and 

we didn’t achieve the political progress we needed. How do you 

achieve it with fewer troops, facing the drawdown realities of our 

forces’ sustainability? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, what we are doing, in fact, is helping achieve local bottom-up reconciliation. And, in fact, by the way, 

they are being integrated into the ISF. In fact, as a number of the 

Sons of Iraq in Anbar province, others in Baghdad, have been integrated into the police. Some of those fighting in Basra actually are 

from the 1st Iraqi Army Division, which has a substantial Sunni 

complement in it. 

I do weigh this issue all the time. But, what we are seeing, at 

local level, actually—— 

Senator KERRY. Sunnis where? 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. In Anbar—— 

Senator KERRY. But it’s a Sunni complement that operates as a 

Sunni complement. 

General PETRAEUS. No. No, sir. It’s part of—— 

Senator KERRY. It’s fully integrated? 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Part of an integrated Iraqi 

Army, yes, sir. In fact, the first commander of the 1st Division, I 

think, was Shia, and the second commander is actually Sunni. 

So—— 

Senator KERRY. How many are there? 

General PETRAEUS. There are 13 divisions now, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Again, that are fully integrated? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, varying levels. And, again, depending 

on where they were raised, but the Iraqi Army is an integrated 

force. Again, some of it is less integrated than others—again, deVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00292 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
285 

pending on where it was recruited and trained. But, certainly, 

those in the midsection, and that’s where the Iraqi 1st Division, as 

an example, is from. 

In Anbar province, what we are doing is precisely this. There’s 

a substantial reduction going on there, from 14 battalions down to 

about 6, and it is because there’s not just—not just paying off the 

Sons of Iraq, they’re actually being integrated into the provincial 

structure. There’s all kinds of political to’ing and fro’ing. Some of 

that isn’t pretty, at times. It hasn’t been overly violent, though. 

And, gradually, they’re also engaging with Prime Minister Maliki. 

Sheikh Ahmed, the head of the Awakening in Anbar province, has 

gotten more money out of Prime Minister Maliki—— 

Senator KERRY. But, isn’t there a contradiction? 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Than the provincial governor. 

Senator KERRY. Isn’t there a contradiction in your overall statement of the strategic imperative? You’ve kept mentioning al-Qaeda 

here today. First of all, al-Qaeda didn’t exist in Iraq until we got 

there. The Shia were not deeply interrupted by AQI. 

General PETRAEUS. Oh, sir, they were—— 

Senator KERRY. The Kurds—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. They were blown up—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. To the same degree—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Right and left by AQI. That was 

the height of the sectarian violence. 

Senator KERRY. I understand that. But most of the evidence of 

what’s happened in the Anbar province with the Sunni—is that 

once they decided to turn on al-Qaeda and not welcome them, they 

have been able to turn around their own security. 

General PETRAEUS. And we helped them, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Of course. 

General PETRAEUS. We cleared—— 

Senator KERRY. We helped them. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Ramadi, we cleared Fallujah, we 

cleared the belts of Baghdad—— 

Senator KERRY. And every plan—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Diyala, Baqubah, and everything 

else. 

Senator KERRY. Every plan I’ve seen here in Congress that contemplates a drawdown contemplates leaving enough American 

forces there to aid in the prosecution of al-Qaeda and to continue 

that kind of effort. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s exactly right. Yes, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Then why doesn’t that change the political 

dynamics that demand more reconciliation, more compromise, accommodation, so we resolve the political stalemate, which is at the 

core of the dilemma? 

General PETRAEUS. Sure, that’s a—sir, it’s a great question. One 

of the key aspects is that they are not represented right now, and 

that’s why provincial elections, scheduled for no later than October, 

are so important. The Anbar sheikhs, for example, will tell you, 

‘‘We want these elections,’’ Senator, as they, I’m sure did, because 

they didn’t vote in January 2005. Huge—— 

Senator KERRY. They expect—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Mistake. 

286 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. To do well. 

General PETRAEUS. And they know it. They’ll do much better this 

time than they did before. More important, even in Ninawa province, where, because they didn’t vote, you have a different ethnic 

group, actually, that largely is the head of the provincial council. 

So, again, all of those—— 

Senator KERRY. I am out of time. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to continue the discussion about this bottom-up approach. 

Ambassador, that’s something you’ve talked about a lot, that when 

we weren’t seeing the success, before we got de-Baathification, 

before we got the central government doing a budget, a range of 

things, you talked about the bottom-up level. 

There’s a piece in the New York Times today, David Brooks, 

and—quotes Philip Carl Salzman. He’s talking about—in societies, 

‘‘Order is achieved not by top-down imposition of abstract law; instead, order is achieved through a fluid balance-of-power agreements between local groups.’’ I take it that’s a fair assessment of 

some of the things that we’ve been seeing in Iraq today. Is that a— 

would that be a fair assessment? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, actually, I think it’s more complex than that. That is true, at one level. But, there also has to be 

a vertical integration, if you will. 

Senator COLEMAN. And my—my question, that—the conclusion of 

this piece is, you know, this—if you kind of follow this, you can 

establish order that way, drawing down United States troops at a 

slow pace, continuing the local reconstruction efforts, supporting 

local elections, reaching informal agreement with Iran and Saudis, 

reduce outside inference, and then Iraq can, kind of, be held together. But, my question is, I’d—it is about the vertical piece, and 

I think there is something else missing. And I’m a little frustrated 

as—what can we do—where is the pressure that we can put on 

Maliki to do those things that we’re still a little frustrated that 

aren’t done? Where is the—it’s—we can’t have unconditional support, here; there’s got to be conditions. What are some of those conditions, that are not in place today, that can help us accelerate at 

least the vertical piece to support the horizontal piece that is taking place? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, if I could approach it from this 

direction, picking up on some of Senator Kerry’s comments, too, 

because there is a synergy here. As the Sunnis turned against alQaeda in Anbar, then in Baghdad and other places, the Shia took 

note of that. They were less threatened by al-Qaeda, obviously. 

And, as General Petraeus notes, al-Qaeda did enormous damage to 

Shia civilians. As that diminished, the Shia began to relax a little. 

And that meant two things. First, there was no longer the need to 

rely on groups like Jayish al-Mahdi for security. And you then saw 

the reaction, in August, in Karbala, when Jayish al-Mahdi elements tried to take over one of the shrines—popular outrage 

against them, and that led Muqtada al-Sadr to declare a cease-fire. 

The Sunnis take note of that. 

287 

So, you see a lot of positive developments, bottoms-up, as it were, 

but that then begins to inform the national level. And that’s what 

gives you the climate in which some of the legislative compromises, 

that we just couldn’t get in the summer or in the fall, were then 

achievable in January and—December, January, and February. 

You take it another step. 

You mentioned Prime Minister Maliki. I think his decision to go 

after extremist Shia militias in Basra, again, was a product, in 

part, of a much better cross-sectarian climate than existed heretofore. He could go after extremist Shia groups. How well he did 

it is something General Petraeus can address, but, on the political 

side, we saw, then, further reaction from the leadership, including 

the Sunni leadership. And right now—I can’t say how it’s going to 

develop, but right now there is probably broader support from the 

entire leadership for the Prime Minister and for getting on with 

the business of the state, including a reconciliation, than I’ve seen 

at any time since I got there. 

Senator COLEMAN. Let me take—I’ll give an optimistic scenario— 

we’ve had a number of worst-case scenarios—but, perhaps getting 

to the same question. 

General, what you note, the surge has been, I think, certainly 

way beyond even my expectations, and I had some concerns, early 

on. But—I think it set the stage for what the Ambassador’s talking 

about; the two go hand in hand—but, at a certain point in time, 

there’s going to be a new administration coming in, you’re going to 

be part of a transition, and they’re going to ask the question, with 

the success that we’ve had militarily, with the movement that 

we’ve seen, both horizontally, from the ground up, as well as some 

vertically—all, I think, these pieces fit together. That is complex. 

What’s, then, the best-case scenario, to say that we’ve reached 

that—Ambassador, your words—that stable, secure, multiethnic, 

multisectarian democracy that has the ability to support—to defend itself against enemies, both internal and external—assuming 

we’re moving in that direction, what’s, then, the best-case scenario 

to say, ‘‘Now we can set a timetable and tell the American public 

that when we step out’’—not in failure, but in achieving success? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, as I’ve explained, again, from 

a military perspective, as you would imagine, as a commander on 

the ground and the commanders under me, given the enormous 

effort it’s taken to achieve this progress, it has to do with conditions again. And what we want to do is to look at conditions and 

determine where it is that we can make reductions without taking 

undue risks. 

This is really about risk, by the way. It’s also a risk well beyond 

Iraq. It’s, Where do you take risk? Do you take it in Iraq? Do you 

take in the region? Do you take it elsewhere? And I fully understand the role of those folks up the chain of command from me in 

determining, Where do they take the risk? And, at the end of the 

day, as Senator Hagel said, you salute, and you try to take the hill 

with what you’re given. But, what you have to do is lay out—‘‘If 

this is the mission that you want us to perform, these are the objectives’’—and you have to have that dialog very, very clearly— 

‘‘then this is what we believe the resources will be to accomplish 

that, here’s how we might be able to project again for you, just, 

288 

again, hypothetically at that point, to lay out what the requirements will be,’’ and then it is up, of course, to the policymakers to 

determine, again, where do they want to take that risk, and based 

on, again, the various consequences and various locations. 

Senator COLEMAN. I may have time for one more question. And 

perhaps this is one that you can’t answer. 

The—you mentioned, talked about Quds Force Iran is funding, is 

supporting the killing—efforts that resulted in the killing of coalition soldiers. In other times, that would be an act of war. What is 

it that we need to be doing that we’re not doing to make it very—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well—— 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Clear that that kind of action 

is—simply can’t be tolerated? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, again, my job is in Iraq. What 

we have done in Iraq is attempted to interdict the flow of what are 

called ‘‘lethal accelerants,’’ this—these trained and equipped individuals and the weapons that have been provided to them in the 

funding, provided to them by the Iranian Quds Force. And then, of 

course, at the next level up, there has to be a regional approach; 

eventually, a global approach. But, that obviously has to be taken 

up by folks above me in the chain of command. But, again, obviously it’s my job to raise what’s going on, to lay out—you know, 

we’ve detained these individuals, we have detained Quds Force officers in Iraq, as I mentioned; we’ve detained the deputy head of 

Lebanese Hezbollah 2800. So, again, there’s no secret about this. 

And, as the Ambassador and I have mentioned, their involvement 

came out in much higher relief during this latest violence. 

Senator COLEMAN. I thank both you gentlemen, and those who 

serve under you, for your extraordinary service. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your coming again to testify here today. 

While we may not always see eye to eye on the current situation 

in Iraq or the way forward, I have great respect for your service 

to our country and for the difficult work that you’re undertaking. 

I hope you won’t, and you should not, take it personally when I 

say that I wish we were also hearing today from those who look 

at Iraq from a broader perspective. The participation at this hearing of those charged with regional and global responsibilities would 

have helped us answer the most important question we face, which 

is not whether we are winning or losing in Iraq?’’ but ‘‘are we winning or losing in the global fight against al-Qaeda?’’ 

Right now, Iraq is hurting our national security. It is the ‘‘ ‘cause 

celebre’ for jihadists, creating a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world,’’ as the Intelligence Community so 

clearly stated. That is why we need to redeploy our troops. If we 

do, Iran, as well as Turkey, Syria, and other regional actors, will 

have to decide if Iraqi instability is really in their interests once 

we are no longer on the hook. Iraqi factions will have a new incentive to come to the negotiating table to create a viable power-sharing agreement. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will be 

able to adequately address what must be our top priority—the 

289 

threat posed by al-Qaeda around the globe, and particularly its safe 

haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. 

In that regard, again, according to the Intelligence Community, 

al-Qaeda has regenerated the core operational capabilities needed 

to conduct attacks inside the United States. And terrorists who 

would conduct those attacks, including an influx of Westerners, are 

being trained in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that, ‘‘The 

most likely near-term attack on the United States will come from 

al-Qaeda,’’ via its safe haven in Pakistan. 

So, General, you were just talking about, Where do you take the 

risks? You repeated it several times. Where do you take the risks? 

General and Ambassador, do you agree with me that our top 

national security priority should be addressing the threat posed by 

al-Qaeda? 

General. 

General PETRAEUS. Go ahead. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Clearly, al-Qaeda is our strategic threat. 

We, of course, have to look at this from the Iraq perspective. That’s 

where our jobs are, that’s what our mission is. 

With respect to al-Qaeda, that’s why I think what the surge has 

achieved over this past year has been so important, because 

al-Qaeda, in Anbar, in Baghdad, as well as the north, was well on 

its way to having the kind of base or safe haven in which it would 

be sufficiently unthreatened that it could do strategic planning 

from Iraq against us here. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let me ask the General, too, then. 

You’ve answered my question. 

General, do you think al-Qaeda is our top threat? 

General PETRAEUS. I do, Senator. And I think it’s very important 

to remember what Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden have repeatedly 

stated, both publicly and privately, and that is that the central 

front of their global war on terror is in Iraq, and it is actually 

hugely important, not only that we have made the gains against 

al-Qaeda in Iraq, but that Sunni Arabs have come to reject alQaeda in Iraq. And that—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. But, General, al-Qaeda’s safe haven is in 

Pakistan, not Iraq. 

General PETRAEUS. There is certainly—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Iraq is—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. A safe haven in Pakistan, as 

well. The safe havens they had in Iraq are very much under threat, 

certainly—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. You would agree that—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. By our effort. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. The greater safe haven, at this 

point, and their greater operability, is in Pakistan or Afghanistan, 

rather than Iraq, correct? 

General PETRAEUS. I believe that’s so. Again, you’d—I’d go with 

the intelligence analysts, because my focus is in Iraq. 

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. But, if Iraq is—— 

General PETRAEUS. I’m obviously aware that there is, in the 

Fatah area, a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and that’s where al-Qaeda 

senior leadership issues its directives to folks like al-Qaeda–Iraq. 

290 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, if Iraq is really the key, why has our 

current approach to counterterrorism in Iraq been an increased 

threat from al-Qaeda around the world? Why does our Intelligence 

Community say things are actually worse than they were before? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I—Senator, I’m talking about alQaeda in Iraq. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I—I’m talking—— 

General PETRAEUS. I can’t speak—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. About that, too. I’m asking 

about—given the fact that you say the key is to deal with them in 

Iraq—— 

General PETRAEUS. No, sir, I said—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Why is it that—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. I said that—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. As we’re dealing with them in 

Iraq, has the threat, internationally, increased from al-Qaeda, 

rather than decreased? 

General PETRAEUS. What I said, Senator, was that al-Qaeda 

views its central front in its global war on terror as being in Iraq. 

In other words, in a sense, their main effort. I can’t speak to what 

they have been doing in the Fatah or how they have been growing 

there. Again, that’s obviously not my area of—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, that’s interesting—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Operations. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Because al-Qaeda said several 

things. In fact, Osama bin Laden gave quite the speech, in 2004, 

which I think bears reading. He says that his goal is to destroy the 

United States by bankrupting the United States. I would suggest 

what he’s doing to us, if that—in Iraq, is really—his goal is to suck 

our economic and military capacity and that—for us to somehow 

believe that staying in Iraq is not playing into his hands, I think, 

is a mistake. 

General, you have stated that Iran is backing militias that are 

targeting U.S. forces. According to the Congressional Research 

Service, Iran also backs Maliki’s political party, as well as the 

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Badr Brigade. Isn’t it true 

that the Iraqi Security Forces we are arming, training, and fighting 

alongside continue to be infiltrated by militias, including the Iranian-backed Badr Brigade? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, it is no secret that Iran has supported all Shia movements, to varying degrees, in Iraq. The 

Supreme Council is a—in the Badr Corps were elements in Iraq. 

By the CPA law that was adopted, by policy, there is an integration 

of militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. And when they don’t 

serve in the interests of the Iraqi Security Forces, then they are 

discharged. And, in fact, that’s what’s happened with some militia 

members and with some others. 

So, there has been an integration of several different militias 

over time by, again, CPA law that was passed, back in 2004. But, 

backing, in a sense, politically, perhaps with money, undoubtedly 

with money, and providing training, arming, equipping, and direction of individuals, in particular, the special groups, is a very different matter. 

291 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ambassador, following what Senator Kerry 

was talking about, wouldn’t you agree that part of the political 

stalemate in Iraq is the result of disagreement among Iraqi leaders 

about our military presence there? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Actually, I don’t think that is a significant 

element. As we have consulted with Iraq’s leaders—we saw this in 

August, in the leadership communique there—the five principal 

leaders—again, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd—all stressed the importance of a long-term relationship with the United States, including 

security. 

The only major element of the Iraqi political constellation that is 

on record as opposing U.S.-force presence is the Sadr trend. Just 

about everybody else understands that our presence there is 

extremely important to security and stability, at this juncture. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I see—my time’s up, but let me just add 

the fact that the majority of Iraqi parliamentarians have called for 

a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. That’s a pretty significant group. 

And Prime Minister Maliki was apparently so concerned that the 

Parliament would not agree to a renewal of the U.N. mandate that 

he basically did an end run around them and signed it without 

their consent, which I think may have been a violation of Iraqi law. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, to the two of you, I want to thank you very much for your 

service and your patience with all of us today. And certainly, I 

have deep respect for what you both do and what our men and 

women in uniform are doing in Iraq. And, again, thank you both 

for your testimony. 

I’ve noticed, in today’s questions, that whereas in the past we 

might have talked about some of the smaller issues, if you will, 

that relate to Iraq, and some of the things that are happening in 

a sectarian way, I think most of the questioning today is focused 

on the bigger picture. The surge has been successful, from the 

standpoint of creating greater security, and yet, I think people 

want a sense of what the end is going to look like. And I know that 

you share that same frustration. 

And this morning, with Mr. Hadley and General Lute—talking 

a little bit with them about, historically, how we find ourselves in 

a unique place, where our military is performing exceptionally well 

and doing the things—everything that they’ve been asked to do, 

and more, and yet we’re dependent upon a government, that we 

have, really, no control over, to perform equally well, for us to 

really be victorious. I don’t even know if I want to use that word. 

But, to be successful. And so, it’s a very frustrating situation. 

I know we’ve described what our endgame is. In the big picture, 

we describe the country. But, General Petraeus, I wonder, for us 

if you could articulate, from the military standpoint, what you see 

the end to be. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, what we want to do—and it will be 

done by local areas, not by a national light-switch, Senator—is to 

continue the handoff of security responsibilities to Iraqi officials 

and Iraqi forces, province by province—in some cases, district by 

district—enabling us to draw down, enabling us to move more to 

292 

an overwatch instead of a lead, a process that has been very much 

underway. 

It’s important to note, in fact, that in the recent flareup of violence during the Basra operations, that, in most of the other southern provinces, Iraqi Security Forces performed well. That was the 

case in Karbala and Babil province, in—Najaf was not really tested, but Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and, to a degree, Wasit. So, 

really all of the other southern provinces, again, forces did—generally did well. In some cases, we did provide overwatch or backup 

or some kind of assistance, but they were the ones carrying the 

ball. That’s what we want to extend farther, in other provinces. As 

I mentioned, there are two additional provinces identified for provincial Iraqi control. 

And that process continues, trying to keep the pressure, certainly, on al-Qaeda–Iraq, on their Sunni insurgent allies, and, over 

time, continue to reduce our footprint, our mission profile, and increase that of the Iraqi Security Forces, over time. That means that 

we will have—will stay heavily involved, over time, I would think, 

with the transition-team effort, with the adviser effort, certainly 

with our Special Operations Forces, and with a conventional base 

that is sufficient to support these other efforts. But, again, gradually coming down, in terms of enablers, in terms of our brigade 

combat teams, and so forth. 

Senator CORKER. As we’ve drawn down, certain significant things 

have occurred, as has been mentioned, from the standpoint of 

benchmarks. And I don’t know how the two of you go about 

leveraging, if any takes place—I hope it does—of existing government, but can you state to us any sense of how the drawdown has 

affected leverage, if you will, with the Maliki government and/or 

others, and whether a pause in that drawdown—what effect that 

may or may not have in regards to the same? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there’s a dual-edged sword there, Senator. Again, the recognition that we are drawing down obviously 

does put pressure on them. There’s no question about that. And 

what we want to do is put enough pressure on them to generate 

productive activity, but not so much pressure that they go into 

their corners, hang onto what they’ve got, and posture themselves 

to take on each other, once we have—no longer have the capacity 

to keep everybody making way together. 

There are other methods, obviously, of leverage. Obviously, 

they—you know, they do request our support, our advice, everything from passes for the Green Zone to even occasionally showing 

that we have emotions other than endless patience. And we do try 

to employ every single tool at our disposal. Sometimes that has 

worked; sometimes, frankly, it has not. But, certainly, the progress 

in January and February, are a result of their efforts, again, recognizing, certainly, the imperative of achieving that progress. 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s an important point. The dynamic in 

Iraq is such that the Iraqis, the Maliki government, others, want 

to be in charge of their own country, you know. I don’t think any 

nation wants to have to rely on outside forces for their internal 

security. So, I think they very much feel the imperative to make 

this kind of progress on their own. And, again, that’s part of the 

293 

interpretation I lend to the Prime Minister’s decision to go down 

to Basra, to demonstrate that Iraqi forces, under his leadership, 

are capable of taking independent action. So, I think that’s an important step, and an important indication of Iraqi willingness— 

we’ll leave the ‘‘ability’’ thing aside—but of a willingness and intention to increasingly be directing their own affairs. So, it’s not so 

much that we’ve got to constantly press them to do things so that 

we don’t have to, it’s more, kind of, guiding and channeling, and 

helping them see over the short-term horizon as to how deals can 

be dealt. And it’s a constant, complex process. 

But, the intention, I think, very much, on the part of the national 

leadership, is to take the steps that increasingly will allow them 

to be in charge of their own destiny. 

Senator CORKER. So, if I could summarize that—and I appreciate 

the statement—in essence, there are those who argue strongly for 

withdrawal causing the Iraqis to act more responsibly or take on 

more responsibility. You, in essence, are arguing the same thing, 

that, in essence, as we drawdown, it does put more pressure on 

them to act responsibly. But, at the same time, that needs to be 

done in a measured way so that it’s not done in a way that creates 

chaos, that causes them to then begin looking at self-protection, but 

done in a way that’s steady. And that, in essence, is what you’re 

taking a look at here, for 45 days, once this drawdown gets to a 

certain point. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s exactly right, Senator. Again, it’s important to remember that we will be withdrawing—or we will have 

withdrawn, by July, over one-quarter of our ground combat forces, 

5 of 20 brigade combat teams, plus the Marine expeditionary unit 

and two Marine battalions. That is a very substantial reduction in 

a relatively short period of time in about a 6- or 7-month period. 

And, again, it was the Secretary of Defense, actually, that coined 

this concept, or the phrase, if you will, of a period of consolidation, 

really assessing where we need to adjust our forces, physically on 

the ground, an evaluation that then can be the basis for the assessments that allow us to make further recommendations for a reduction in forces, and determining where that should be. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both of 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

General, help me with some of the numbers, here. It is my understanding that we’ve trained over 400,000 Iraqi Security Forces. 

And after we reduce U.S. forces, we’ll be down to about 140,000, 

is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct. A little—— 

Senator BOXER. OK. So—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Under that, Senator. 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. 400,000 plus 140,000. And I understand that there are 6,000 al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq. How many 

insurgents are there? 

General PETRAEUS. I would actually assess that there are fewer 

al-Qaeda—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, give me a—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Iraq—— 

294 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Number. Fewer, OK. 

General PETRAEUS. Again, we typically say a couple of thousand. 

Again, we can provide a classified—— 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, let’s—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Laydown for you. 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Say a few thousand al-Qaeda. 

General PETRAEUS. And then—— 

Senator BOXER. And how many insurgents? 

General PETRAEUS. And then there are other additional thousands of Sunni insurgent extremists, as well. 

Senator BOXER. So, I was just saying to my colleagues, we’ve 

done a lot for the Iraqis, in terms of helping to build up their security forces. It’s pretty overwhelming, folks, on the Iraqi side. 

Now, I’ll tell you what concerns me and a lot of my constituents. 

You have said—both of you—that ‘‘the gains in Iraq’’—and you’ve 

said this many times before today—‘‘are fragile and reversible.’’ 

You’ve used those terms—which are terms of art—and I appreciate 

it. They’re important words. So, my constituents and I believe that, 

after 5 years of unbelievable bloodshed on all sides, and 4,024 

Americans killed—although I remember it seemed like just yesterday that it was 4,000—but today we have 4,024 dead—30,000-plus 

wounded, and nearly $600 billion spent. You have to wonder why 

the best you can say is that ‘‘the gains are fragile and reversible.’’ 

Now, I think most of us agree—those who have not particularly 

supported this endeavor—that the reason this is the best you can 

say is because there’s been no political solution. I listened carefully 

to Senator Hagel, and—Ambassador Crocker—in listening to your 

answer to the Senator’s question, I don’t get the sense that you’ve 

been given instructions from our Commander in Chief to change 

the dynamics. I find your testimony very status quo. And the status quo has been an absolute disaster. And I just don’t see anything changing. I don’t see us saying to the Iraqis, ‘‘It is your turn. 

We will help you. Step out and get the politics resolved.’’ 

So, in line with demanding more from the Iraqis, General 

Petraeus, you are asking us for millions more to pay off the militias. 

And, by the way, I have an article here that says that Maliki recently told a London-based paper that he was concerned about half 

of them, and would not put them into the militia, into the ISF, because he thinks—and this is a quote from him—that ‘‘they oppose 

the central government.’’ But, that aside, we’ve been paying $182 

million a year—that’s on an annual basis—$18 million a month. 

And I would say to you, here at home we could get health care for 

123,000 kids and we could send 210,000 kids to after-school programs with that money. 

My question is, Why don’t you ask the Iraqis to pay the entire 

cost of that program? I think, in Senator Lugar’s testimony, he 

made the point that it could be an opportunity for them to then 

turn it into something more long term. But, when that supplemental comes, I’m going to be saying to my colleagues we should 

not be paying off those militias. And I wonder why, given the fact 

that the Iraqis have billions of dollars in surpluses, including $30 

billion in American banks, and we have nothing but raging deficits, 

295 

one reason is this war—why we wouldn’t ask them to pay for the 

cost of that program of paying off the militias. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, these are not actually 

militias. What they are is, typically, tribal members; in some cases, 

former insurgents. But, this is how you end these wars, you sit 

down with—— 

Senator BOXER. I didn’t say I objected to it—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Former insurgents—— 

Senator BOXER. I asked you why they can’t pay for it. 

General PETRAEUS. Well—— 

Senator BOXER. I understand—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. In fact—— 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Your point on it—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Senator, what they are doing is, 

they have committed $163 million to gradually assume their contracts. They have committed the $300 million, that I mentioned in 

my statement, to Iraqi CERP that offsets, in fact—— 

Senator BOXER. OK. I just—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. What we are spending. 

Senator BOXER. I don’t want to argue—— 

General PETRAEUS. And, beyond that—— 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. A point that—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. The savings in vehicles—— 

Senator BOXER. Yeah. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Not lost, actually is certainly—— 

Senator BOXER. No, no. I—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Worth it. 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Understand your point. I’m just asking you why you would object to asking them—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well—— 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. To pay for that entire program, 

given all we are giving them—— 

General PETRAEUS. Senator—— 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. In blood, in everything else. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, it is a very fair question, and I think 

that if there’s anything that the Ambassador and I will take back 

to Iraq, candidly, after this morning’s session and the—this afternoon’s—is, in fact, to ask those—— 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Kinds of questions—— 

Senator BOXER. Excellent. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. More directly. 

Senator BOXER. I’m very happy about that. 

When the Bush administration told the American people, more 

than 5 years ago, that we’d be greeted as liberators in Iraq, and 

supporters of the war said that people would be dancing in the 

streets, waving American flags, there was a whole other vision put 

forward. And now, last month, Iranian President Ahmadinejad was 

given the red-carpet treatment, while our President has to sneak 

in there in the dead of night. 

So, I’m wondering, why, after what we have given—4,024 Amer- ican lives gone, more than $1⁄2 billion spent—all this for the Iraqi 

people, is it that the Iranian President is greeted with kisses and 

296 

flowers. And I’m quoting from an article in the Boston Globe. Suzanne Maloney, an expert on the Middle East, argues that, ‘‘Iraqi 

leaders will only begin to differentiate themselves from Tehran 

when they’re forced to grapple independently with the painful alternatives of governing and assuming greater responsibility for 

their country’s security, and that will only happen when we put a 

timeframe on our presence.’’ 

So, if either of you could answer this question, Do you agree that, 

after all we have done, after all the sacrifices—and God bless all 

of our troops and all of you who put yourselves in harm’s way— 

after all of this, that Iran is stronger and more influential in Iraq 

than ever before? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, that’s an important and complex 

issue, obviously. 

With respect to President Ahmadinejad’s visit, I’d just make the 

point that presumably when he comes to Iraq he doesn’t have to 

worry about Iranian-based extremist militias. More broadly—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We will—the committee will stand in recess, and 

the police will clear the people who are talking, back there. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume. 

Senator. 

Senator BOXER. OK. If I could say—I agree with you that there 

are certain factions there that certainly support Iran. That’s part 

of the problem. But, my question is this. Ahmadinejad was the first 

national leader—— 

Can you please cool it, back there? 

Ahmadinejad was the first national leader to be given a state 

reception by Iraq’s Government. Iraqi President Talibani and 

Ahmadinejad held hands as they inspected a guard of honor, while 

a brass band played brisk, British marching tunes. Children presented the Iranian President with flowers. Members of Iraq’s Cabinet lined up to greet him, some kissing him on both cheeks. 

So, it’s not a question about the militias out there. I’m saying, 

after all we have done, the Iraqi Government kisses the Iranian 

leader, and our President has to sneak into the country. I don’t understand it. Isn’t it true that, after all we’ve done, Iran has gained 

ground? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, Iran and Iranian influence in 

Iraq is obviously an extremely important issue for us. But, it’s very 

much, I think, a mixed bag. And what we saw over these last couple of weeks, in Baghdad and in Basra, as the Prime Minister 

engaged extremist militias that were supported by Iran, is that it 

revealed not only what Iran is doing in Iraq, but it produced a 

backlash against them and a rallying of support for the Prime Minister in being ready to take them on. 

Iran, by no means, has it all its own way in Iraq. Iraqis remember, with clarity and bitterness, the 1980–88—— 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. Iran-Iraq war—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, that’s my point. 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. In which—— 

Senator BOXER. And now he’s getting kissed on the cheeks. 

That’s my point. 

297 

Ambassador CROCKER. And there was a lot of commentary 

around—among Iraqis, including among Shia Iraqis, about just 

that point, ‘‘What’s he doing here, after what they did to us during 

that war?’’ But, you—Iraqi Shia died by the tens—by the hundreds 

of thousands, defending their Arab and Iraqi identity and state 

against a Persian enemy, and that’s, again, deeply felt. It means, 

when Iran’s hand is exposed in backing these extremist militias, 

that there is a backlash, broadly speaking, in the country, including from Iraq Shia. And I think that’s important, and I think it’s 

important that the Iraqi Government build on it. 

Senator BOXER. I give up. It is what it is. They kissed him on 

the cheek. I mean, what they say over the dinner table is one 

thing, but they actually kissed him on the cheek. He had a redcarpet treatment, and we are losing our sons and daughters every 

single day for the Iraqis to be free. It is irritating, is my point. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, the Vice President was in Iraq, 

just a couple of weeks after that, and he also had a very warm reception. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did he get kissed? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I believe—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to know whether he got kissed, that’s 

all. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, he did get kissed. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, I want to thank both of you for 

the terrific partnership that you’ve established in Iraq. A lot of us 

pray to the Holy Spirit; I’ve been praying to the Holy Spirit that 

somehow you would be enlightened and make the right decisions 

there, and that the leaders in Iraq would be enlightened to understand the wonderful opportunity the members of our Armed Forces 

have provided them. Over 4,000 troops have died in the line of duty 

and more than 28,000 are coming home wounded, half of whom are 

going to be disabled the rest of their lives. Progress has been and 

will continue to be difficult. When I talked to Ambassador to the 

United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad, he said, ‘‘Iraqis are going to 

probably have to kill each other a little bit over there to realize 

that something’s going to have to be different, because they’re destroying lives and infrastructure.’’ 

But it’s heartening to see the Sunni Awakening. This movement 

was evident when I visited Iraq in August 2007. My impressions 

were that the Sunnis know that the United States is not an occupying force, that they are increasingly opposed to al-Qaeda, and 

that our Provincial Reconstruction Teams are effective and appreciated by local communities. Iraqi Sunnis also like being paid when 

they cooperate with coalition aims. Groups like the Sons of Iraq are 

now coming forward. 

But, if you look at the enormous costs that we have incurred, and 

will incur, from operations in Iraq, I see cause for serious concern. 

I’ve received from the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of 

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cal year 2017 under two redeployment scenarios. These estimates 

range from $1.2 trillion to $1.7 trillion. And, of course, we have to 

take into account health care and other associated costs. I think 

you all know that the Government Accountability Office has estimated that the Army will require $12 to $13 billion per year to replace lost, damaged, and worn equipment for the duration of the 

war in Iraq. The Marine Corps has estimated it will need $15.6 billion for equipment reset, and the National Guard has said that 

they are going to need $22 billion. So, in other words, the United 

States is at a point right now where we are really strained and 

stressed. In addition to the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a national debt of more than $9 trillion. This year’s 

budget is going to be out of balance by about another $660 billion. 

And I hate to agree with Senator Feingold, but I think that—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. If Osama bin Laden is assessing 

this situation, he might think he has achieved some of his aims— 

in effect, we’re kind of bankrupting this country. We are eating our 

seed corn. We have got some really big problems today. We’re in 

a recession, and God only knows how long it will last. 

So, it seems to me that there’s some urgency that we need to 

pray a little bit harder to get Iraq and its neighbors to understand 

that we’re going to be on our way out. Some of my colleagues and 

I have talked about this, and what we think we need is a surge 

of diplomacy during this period of time. 

The witnesses that appeared before this committee on April 2 

argued that the United States should take advantage of the 10- 

month period between now and the beginning of the next administration. We will have wasted this opportunity if we don’t make a 

concerted effort at diplomacy, if we don’t sit down with the Syrians 

and the Saudis and the Egyptians, and tell them, ‘‘Hey, guys, we’re 

on our way out. We have to leave here because of our own financial 

situation, and we’re stressed out to the point where we’ve got to 

pursue gradual redeployment. Now, understand this. And it’s not 

in your best interest to see this situation deteriorate. It’s time for 

you to step in and start taking some action and bring regional and 

global actors together.’’ 

I also believe that this administration has lots of problems 

around the world. I just finished a book, ‘‘The Much Too Promised 

Land’’ by Aaron Miller, which discussed instances where the 

United States really made some difference. And that was when we 

had someone in our Government involved in diplomatic efforts on 

a full-time basis. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should get together with both of you, and she should work, day in and day out, 

to let parties in the region know, ‘‘Folks, we’re on our way out.’’ 

And I just wonder, do you understand that that is where we are 

at? We have somebody sitting across the table here who may be the 

next President of the United States. The American people have had 

it up to here. We appreciate the sacrifice that you’ve made, and 

that your families have made. Lives have changed forever. But the 

truth of the matter is outside of those who have served and their 

families, we haven’t sacrificed one darn bit in this war. We’ve never 

been asked to pay for a dime, except for the people that we’ve lost. 

And I’m sure the men and women who serve alongside you underVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00306 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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stand that. I’d like to know what do you think about the idea of 

developing a diplomatic surge during this 10-month window to let 

regional players know, ‘‘It’s going to be over, here, folks, and you’d 

better start working together’’? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, Senator, look, I appreciate the—you 

know, the sense of frustration that you articulate. I share it. I, kind 

of, live it every day. I mean, the reality is, it is hard in Iraq. And 

there are no light switches to throw that are going go dark-to-light. 

It’s going to be—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. But, don’t you think that if we said, ‘‘Folks, 

you know we’re going to leave’’ wouldn’t that be effective? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, first, with respect to the region, we 

have been sending that message, and that’s why my testimony was 

written the way it was. We do need to see the region, particularly 

the Arabs, step forward. That’s a message that’s been sent by the 

President and the Vice President during their visits to the region 

over the last couple of months. They do need to understand that 

they have an interest here, and that staying disengaged is dangerous for Iraq, it’s dangerous for the world, and it’s dangerous for 

the Arab world, in particular. 

Now, again, with respect to the frustration you articulate, if— 

and these are not decisions we make, these are decisions that you 

will make, as well as others—if you decide—as I said in my testimony, if we decide that we just don’t want to do this anymore, then 

we certainly owe ourselves a very serious discussion of ‘‘Then 

what?’’ What are the consequences? Because my experience in the 

Middle East—which goes back a lot longer than I’d care to remember, frankly—are that things can get really, really bad, indeed. So, 

we’ve got to have—we’ve got to have a pretty sober discussion as 

to what the consequences of alternative courses of action are. 

Senator VOINOVICH. General. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I would echo what the Ambassador 

said, sir. I certainly share the frustration. I’ve been at this, I think, 

about as long as anybody in uniform in Iraq. There may be some 

more out there longer, but not many. And, again, it is very easy 

to dislike where we are, to be frustrated at it, and so forth. But, 

we are where we are. And, again, as the Ambassador, I think, has 

very clearly stated, there are very, very real consequences of the 

different options that we consider. And, I think, as long as it’s very 

clear that we address those and we go into those with our eyes 

wide open, then that is—the job has been done. 

There has been pretty extensive diplomatic activity. Even the 

Ambassador and I have participated in this. I’ve gone to Jordan, 

he’s gone to a number of different Arab countries. We’ve both been 

to Bahrain, to Qatar, and others. We may stop, on the way back, 

in the country, as well. We—certainly, anything that generates 

that kind of supportive activity is welcome—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. I just want to—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. On the military side. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Say one thing, and my time is 

up. 

General PETRAEUS. So—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. I was in Egypt, and spent time with their 

Foreign Minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit. I was in Jordan, talking to 

300 

Prime Minister Nader al-Dahabi. And they don’t have the urgency 

that they need to become really engaged today. And I think this is 

the case because regional actors believe that we’re going to continue to be there for a while, and that they really haven’t faced the 

reality of our eventual withdrawal, and don’t understand that 

they’d better start working together. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator from Ohio, and I wish he 

would not reference the Senator from Illinois and cause anyone to 

cheer. I can only imagine the headline in the Washington Post, 

‘‘Biden Throws Out People for Cheering for Democratic Candidate.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. So, I hope you’ll refrain from referencing that 

again. 

I yield to the Senator from Florida. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, before I continue my questioning from this morning in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I want to let Senator Obama go first, because he’s got a 

scheduling problem. So, with your permission. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll just imagine that headline, as a supporter for 

Hillary, I—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. So, anyway, I think it’s a good idea. [Laughter.] 

No—Senator Obama. And then we’ll go—we’ll go back to Republican and then back to you. 

Senator Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. Well, first of all, thanks to Senator Nelson for 

his graciousness. 

And I want to thank both General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Crocker for their dedication and sacrifice. And, obviously, our 

troops are bearing the largest burden for this enterprise. I think 

all the—both of you take those sacrifices very seriously. And we appreciate the sacrifices that you, yourselves, are making. 

I want to just start off with a couple of quick questions, because 

in the ‘‘parade of horribles’’ that I think both of you have outlined, 

should we leave too quickly, at the center is al-Qaeda in Iraq and 

Iran. So, I want to just focus on those two things for a moment. 

With respect to al-Qaeda in Iraq, it’s already been noted they 

were not there before we went in, but they certainly were there 

last year, and they continue to have a presence there now. Should 

we be successful in Mosul, should you continue, General, with the 

effective operations that you’ve been engaged in, assuming that, in 

that narrow military effort, we are successful, do we anticipate that 

there ever comes a time where al-Qaeda in Iraq could not reconstitute itself? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think the question, Senator, is 

whether Iraqi Security Forces, over time, with much less help, 

could deal with their efforts to reconstitute. And I think it’s a—— 

Senator OBAMA. That’s my—— 

General PETRAEUS. I think it’s—— 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Point. 

General PETRAEUS. I think it’s a given that al-Qaeda–Iraq will 

try to reconstitute, just as any movement of that type does try to 

reconstitute. 

Senator OBAMA. I don’t—— 

301 

General PETRAEUS. And the question is—— 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Mean to—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Whether—— 

Senator OBAMA. I don’t mean to interrupt you, but I just want 

to sharpen the question so that—because I think you’re getting 

right at my point, here. I mean, if one of our criteria for success 

is ensuring that al-Qaeda does not have a base of operations in 

Iraq—I just want to harden, a little bit, the metrics by which we’re 

measuring them—at what point do we say they cannot reconstitute 

themselves? Or are we saying that they’re not going to be particularly effective, and the Iraqis themselves will be able to handle the 

situation? 

General PETRAEUS. I think it’s really the latter, Senator, that— 

again, if you can keep chipping away at them, chipping away at 

their leadership, chipping away at the resources, that comprehensive approach that I mentioned, that, over time—and we are reaching that, in some other areas, already, as I mentioned; we are 

drawing down very substantially in Anbar province, a place that, 

I think, few people would have thought would be at the situation 

we’re in, at this point now, say, 18 months ago. And, again, that’s 

what we want to try to achieve in all of the different areas in 

which—— 

Senator OBAMA. OK. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Al-Qaeda still has a presence. 

Senator OBAMA. So, I just want to be clear if I’m understanding. 

We don’t anticipate that there’s never going to be some individual 

or group of individuals in Iraq that might have sympathies toward 

al-Qaeda. Our goal is not to hunt down and eliminate every single 

trace; but, rather, to create a manageable situation, where they’re 

not posing a threat to Iraq or using it as a base to launch attacks 

outside of Iraq. Is that accurate? 

General PETRAEUS. That is exactly right. 

Senator OBAMA. OK. And it’s also fair to say that, in terms of 

our success dealing with al-Qaeda, that the Sunni Awakening’s 

been very important, as you’ve testified. The Sons of Iraq and other 

tribal groups have allied themselves with us. There have been talks 

about integrating them into the central government. However, it’s 

been somewhat slow, somewhat frustrating. And my understanding, at least, is, although there’s been a promise of 20 to 30 percent 

of them being integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces, that has 

not yet been achieved; on the other hand, the Maliki government 

was very quick to say, ‘‘We’re going to take another 10,000 Shias 

into the Iraqi Security Forces.’’ And I’m wondering, does that undermine confidence, on the part of the Sunni tribal leaders, that 

they are actually going to be treated fairly and they will be able 

to incorporate some of these young men of military age into the 

Iraqi Security Forces? 

General PETRAEUS. No, that is ongoing, Senator. As I mentioned, 

there’s over—well over 20,000 who have already been integrated 

into either Iraqi Security Forces or other government positions. It 

doesn’t just have to be the ISF, it can be other positions. And there 

are thousands of others who are working their way through a process with the Iraqi National Committee for Reconciliation in the 

Ministry of Interior, and so forth. It hasn’t been easy, because, in 

302 

the beginning, certainly, there was understandable suspicion about 

groups that were predominantly Sunni Arab, although about 20 

percent are actually Shia, as well. But, the process is moving. It’s 

not been easy, but it is actually ongoing. And it is generally, now, 

a relatively routine process, although it takes lots of nudging. 

Senator OBAMA. OK. Let me shift to Iran. Just as—and, Ambassador Crocker, if you want to address this, you can—just as it’s fair 

to say that we’re not going to completely eliminate all traces of 

al-Qaeda in Iraq, but we want to create a manageable situation, it’s 

also true to say that we’re not going to eliminate all influence of 

Iran in Iraq, correct? That’s not our goal. That can’t be our definition of success, that Iran has no influence in Iraq. So, can you 

define more sharply what you think would be a legitimate or fair 

set of circumstances in the relationship between Iran and Iraq that 

would make us feel comfortable drawing down our troops? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, as I said in my statement, we 

have no problem with a good, constructive relationship between 

Iran and Iraq. The problem is with the Iranian strategy of backing 

extremist militia groups and sending in weapons and munitions 

that are used against Iraqis and against our own forces. 

Senator OBAMA. Do we feel confident that the Iranian Government is directing these—this aid to these special groups? Do we 

feel confident about that? Or do we think that they’re just tacitly 

tolerating it? Do you have some sense of that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. There’s no question in our minds that the 

Iranian Government—in particular, the Quds Force. This is a conscious, carefully worked out policy. 

Senator OBAMA. If that’s the case, can you respond a little more 

fully to Senator Boxer’s point. If, in fact, it is known—and I’m 

assuming you’ve shared this information with the Maliki government—that Iran’s Government has assisted in arming special 

groups that are doing harm to Iraqi Security Forces and undermining the Iraqi Government, why is it that they’re being welcomed the way they were? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, we don’t need to, again, tell the 

Prime Minister that, he knows it—— 

Senator OBAMA. OK. 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. And is trying to take some 

steps to tighten up, significantly, on the border. 

In terms of the Ahmadinejad visit, you know, Iran and Iraq are 

neighbors. A visit like that should be in the category of a normal 

relationship. 

Senator OBAMA. OK. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think what we have seen since then, in 

terms of this very clear spotlight focused on a malign Iranian influence, puts that visit into a very different perspective for most 

Iraqis, including Iraqi Shia. 

Senator OBAMA. OK. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that I’m out of time, so let me just—if I 

could have the indulgence of the committee for one minute. 

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody else has. [Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA. I just want to close with a couple of key points. 

303 

No. 1, we all have the greatest interest in seeing a successful resolution to Iraq. All of us do. And that, I think, has to be stated 

clearly in the record. 

I continue to believe that the original decision to go into Iraq was 

a massive strategic blunder, that the two problems that you’ve 

pointed out—al-Qaeda in Iraq and increased Iranian influence in 

the region—are a direct result of that original decision. That’s not 

a decision you gentlemen made; I won’t lay it at your feet. You are 

cleaning up the mess afterward. But, I think it is important, as we 

debate this forward. 

I also think that the surge has reduced violence and provided 

breathing room, but that breathing room has not been taken the 

way we would all like it to be taken. And I think what happened 

in Basra is an example of Shia-versus-Shia jockeying for power 

that underscores how complicated the political situation is there, 

and how we still have to continue to work vigorously to resolve it. 

I believe that we are more likely to resolve it, in your own words, 

Ambassador, if we are applying increased pressure in a measured 

way. I think that increased pressure in a measured way, in my 

mind—and this is where we disagree—includes a timetable for 

withdrawal—nobody’s asking for a precipitous withdrawal, but I do 

think that it has to be a measured, but increased, pressure—and 

a diplomatic surge that includes Iran. Because if Maliki can tolerate, as normal, neighbor-to-neighbor relations in Iran, then we 

should be talking to them, as well. I do not believe we’re going to 

be able to stabilize the situation without them. 

Just the last point I will make. Our resources are finite. And this 

has been made—this is a point that just was made by Senator 

Voinovich, it’s been made by Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, Senator Hagel. There’s a bipartisan consensus that we have finite 

resources. Our military is overstretched, and the Pentagon has 

acknowledged it; the amount of money that we are spending is 

hemorrhaging our budget; and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, I think, is 

feeling a lot more secure as long as we’re focused in Iraq and not 

on Afghanistan. When you have finite resources, you’ve got to define your goals tightly and modestly. 

And so, my final—and I’ll even pose this as a question and you— 

I won’t—you don’t necessarily have to answer it; maybe it’s a rhetorical question. If we were able to have the status quo in Iraq 

right now without U.S. troops, would that be a sufficient definition 

of success? It’s obviously not perfect; there’s still violence, there are 

still some traces of al-Qaeda, Iran has influence, more than we 

would like. But, if we had the current status quo, and yet, our 

troops have been drawn down to 30,000, would we consider that a 

success? Would that meet our criteria? Or would that not be good 

enough and we have to—we’d have to devote even more resources 

to it? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I can’t imagine the current status quo being sustainable with that kind of precipitous drawdown. 

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn’t the question. 

Senator OBAMA. No, no, that wasn’t the question. I’m not suggesting that we’d yank all our troops out all the way. I’m trying 

to get to an end point. That’s what all of us have been trying to 

get to. And so—see, the problem I have is, if the definition of sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00311 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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cess is so high—no traces of al-Qaeda, and no possibility of reconstitution; a highly effective Iraqi Government; a democratic multiethnic, multisectarian, functioning democracy; no Iranian influence, 

at least not of the kind that we don’t like—then that portends of 

the possibility of us staying for 20 or 30 years. If, on the other 

hand, our criteria is a messy, sloppy status quo, but there’s not, 

you know, huge outbreaks of violence; there’s still corruption, but 

the country’s struggling along; but, it’s not a threat to its neighbors, and it’s not an al-Qaeda base—that seems to me an achievable goal within a measurable timeframe. And that, I think, is 

what everybody here on this committee has been trying to drive at, 

and we haven’t been able to get as clear of an answer as we would 

like. 

Ambassador CROCKER. And that’s because, Senator, it is a—I 

mean, I don’t like to sound like a broken record, but—— 

Senator OBAMA. I understand. 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. This is hard, and this is complicated. I think that when Iraq gets to the point that it can carry 

forward its further development without a major commitment of 

U.S. forces, with, still, a lot of problems out there, but where they, 

and we, would have a fair certitude that, again, they can drive it 

forward themselves without significant danger of having the whole 

thing slip away from them again, then clearly our profile, our presence, diminishes markedly. But, that’s not where we are now, 

Senator. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

On a second round, we’ll go back and ask you to answer the 

question you were asked, which you haven’t answered. But, we’ll 

do that in the second round. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your service. Certainly thank you 

for your endurance here this afternoon. It’s certainly a marathon 

day for you. But, truly, thank you for all that you do to serve so 

many in this country. 

When you were here before the committee last—in September, 

we were talking, at that point in time—we were—the focus was on 

the military surge, and a great deal of discussion as to how that 

was going to play out, and what we could anticipate, and what we 

could expect. I asked the question of both of you, at that time, more 

along the lines of, ‘‘Let’s talk about the civilian surge. What are we 

doing on the other side that can help facilitate the military mission, the military surge?’’ And at that time, General, you responded 

that you would like to see more from the civilian side. You indicated, at that time, that there were some—there were some elements of the government that truly were at war—the Department 

of Defense clearly was engaged, the Department of State was 

engaged, USAID—but not all the others. And there were some 

departments that you specifically mentioned at that time. 

From your standpoint, at this point in time now, are you satisfied that we have a level of participation from those other departments, from those other areas of government where we can and 

should be making a difference? 

305 

Now, Ambassador Crocker, in your testimony, you go into some 

length about what we are seeing with the PRTs and the efforts 

that have been made there, but—I’ll just repeat the question from 

September to both of you again, as to whether or not you’re satisfied that all areas that need to be engaged are fully engaged. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, there has been a surge on the 

civilian side that has been very helpful, frankly. The Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams, and the so-called EPRTs, the Embedded 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are actually subprovincial, 

in most cases, have been enormously helpful and valuable. 

They have augmented at Brigade Headquarters, Division Headquarters, the assets of our Civil Affairs personnel, and brought 

really useful skill sets to bear in a number of different provinces 

and districts. And that has been of enormous value, and enormous 

help. 

There has also been an increase in certain areas in the capacitybuilding arena. And again, that has helped—as has been the organization of what we call ‘‘fusion cells,’’ where the—as you may 

know, I’ve reported before—that the Multi-National Force–Iraq and 

the Embassy actually have a joint campaign plan. This truly is one 

team. And we head it together, in that regard. Yes, we report to 

different chains of command, but we try to achieve unity of effort 

in what we do, and so we’ve actually combined our assets in areas 

such as the Energy Fusion Cell, which looks at oil and electricity. 

There is a Voter Security—it just goes on and on, a number of 

these different fusion cells. 

Having said all that, there still is a need for capacity-building 

help in certain areas. And I think—I’m sure the Ambassador would 

agree that there are certain ministries in Iraq that still could use 

help in the capacity-building arena, and still probably don’t have 

all that they should have. 

Beyond that, I think we do need to take a look at the PRT composition, and that is ongoing, actually. Just to report out, that that 

is taking place. To determine, for example, do you need more agriculture experts in Ninawa than you do in Baghdad? Do you need 

more oil experts in, say, Kirkuk than you need in—right now, at 

least—in Anbar? Although there’s oil out there, too. 

So, that is what is ongoing, and again, bottom line is there’s been 

a substantial civilian surge in the PRT arena, and in some capacity-building areas, but there is still more needed in others. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Ambassador, when you address this—in 

your comments to the committee, you’ve indicated that the era of 

U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. When we’re talking about the assistance that is being provided from here on out 

in Iraq, it is more of the—when you say the capacity-building— 

those experts that can come in to help facilitate. Because I think 

the—the concern that you have certainly heard around this dais 

today is, the American patience is not unlimited, the President has 

said that you have indicated that our support—our financial support—equally cannot be unlimited. 

And when Iraq is at that point—as they are now—where they 

clearly have reserves that are available to them, I think the American public looks at this and says, ‘‘OK, well, we can understand 

the need to continue funding that equipment for our troops. We 

306 

appreciate that. But when it comes to building schools, or building 

hospitals—I’ve got schools and hospitals in my own community 

that need to be addressed.’’ So, can you speak to that aspect of the 

U.S. investment into Iraq at this point? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That’s an important point, Senator, and 

that is exactly right. I mean, our emphasis has shifted away from 

infrastructure—we’re not doing schools and clinics anymore—and 

into capacity-building, as we’ve discussed. But also, developing 

local capacity, that’s again where the PRTs come in with their 

quick-response funds. To be able to do things that local governments cannot do for themselves, and are—as of yet—unable to 

resource through higher echelons of government. 

And also to pay attention to categories of people or circumstances 

that, again, may not get the assistance they need from other 

sources at this point. NGOs, women’s groups, we do a lot there, 

and so forth. I, broadly speaking, would say that what is motivating our thinking now is kind of the traditional construct of foreign aid, of using it where it makes a difference in ways that are 

important to us, and where it wouldn’t happen if we weren’t able 

to step forward. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Can I just ask very, very quickly, Mr. 

Chairman, and this is to you, General. 

As we approach July and this 45-day period of consolidation and 

evaluation, we’ve also been talking with the Pentagon about 

achieving the goal of reducing the deployment rotations from the 

current 15 months, to the desired level of 12 months. What will 

this do, if anything, to the length of deployments? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, obviously I’m not the one that determines the level of deployments, but I do certainly read newspaper 

articles, at least, say that there is discussion about this, and there 

may be some mention of this in the days or weeks to come. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. But you don’t think that your proposal—— 

General PETRAEUS. I’m fine with 12-month tours. I’m fine with 

12-month tours, I would—we would welcome 12-month tours. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. And you think you can do it, given the 

numbers that you have, currently, keeping them at 12-month 

deployments. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, we’re not the force providers, we’re obviously the force employers and the ones who have to answer that 

rightly are the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, 

and the case of the Marine Corps. 

But, again, my understanding is there has been discussion of 

that, we have been asked if, are we OK with 12-month tours. We 

have replied that that is fine. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I think that’s where we all would like to 

get, now. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, that’s obviously for other people 

to determine. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Let me explain to my colleagues—I appreciate your patience in 

my allowing people to go, if they’re in the midst of a question, 

beyond the 7 minutes. As one of my colleagues from New Jersey 

307 

recently said, he said, he appreciates my patience, he’ll learn to 

appreciate it more, the more senior he is. 

But I do appreciate all of you—I know it’s a long, long wait, 

and—but I don’t want to cut people off in the midst of them finishing up. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, I want to continue to follow 

up on my questioning this morning. And I had quoted from two 

retired generals that had testified to us last week. 

And General Odom, let me state another quote of his, ‘‘Let me 

emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their 

loyalty. I’ve heard, for example, the cost in one area of about 100 

square kilometers is $250,000 per day, and periodically they 

threaten to defect unless their fees are increased. And many who 

break with al-Qaeda and join our forces are beholden to no one, 

thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens 

of local strongmen.’’ 

So, are these figures accurate? Are we paying these Sunnis up to $250,000 in 100-square mile—100-square kilometer area? 

General PETRAEUS. I’m not familiar with that particular statistic, 

Senator. Again, I did present the figure that we provide per month 

in my briefing earlier. And, as I mentioned, the math is very much 

in our favor, candidly, when we look at the savings, and the vehicles that are not lost, not to mention, again, the priceless lives that 

are saved by the increased security. 

The key, over time, and General Odom is exactly right—that over 

time, these have to be integrated into, again, Iraqi governmental 

institutions, employment, and so forth. And there’s a variety of programs that are designed to facilitate that, including a number of 

those that I mentioned have been funded by the Iraqi Government, 

in terms of the retraining and integration programs, as well as the 

Iraqi Security Forces integration efforts. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, it’s not necessarily bad that we’re 

paying them. We pay in a lot of areas, including for intelligence. 

But General Odom’s point was, and I’ll quote him again, ‘‘We don’t 

own them, we merely rent them.’’ And he was concerned that these 

groups don’t have any allegiance to our U.S. forces. And so, with 

this decline, what do you think about his comment about a ‘‘decline 

in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of the local 

strongmen?’’ 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, there has always been a tribal 

structure in a number of these areas. And what we have done is 

come to realize that we should work with tribal sheikhs. They are 

important organizing elements in their society. They, frankly, do a 

lot more than just sheikh work, they also typically have a construction business, an import-export business, and a trucking company. 

So, they’re very integrated into the economies, as well. 

Again, over time, what we have to do is provide avenues for their 

tribal members to find either slots in the Iraqi Security Forces and 

local police, or what have you, or be integrated into the economy, 

through job training, through these small loans that the Iraqis are 

providing and so forth. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I started my questioning today of the 

surge, militarily, has worked. Has it provided the environment in 

308 

which we, in fact, can get the political reconciliation? Let me tell 

you what General McCaffrey, retired four-star, testified to us. 

He says, ‘‘The war as it is now configured is not militarily nor 

politically sustainable.’’ That’s a quote. And he further says, ‘‘There 

is no U.S. political will to continue casualties of military killed— 

of U.S. military—killed and wounded every month.’’ 

Do you want to comment on General McCaffrey’s comments? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think again, we’re keenly aware of— 

as I’ve mentioned a number of times—the enormous strain, the 

enormous sacrifice, and the enormous cost of the effort in Iraq. And 

it was factored into my recommendations, and it is a reason that 

the surge, for example, is going to come to an end, and it’s a reason 

that we will look as hard as we can, to make farther reductions 

once the dust has settled, after we’ve taken one quarter—over one 

quarter—of our combat power out, over about a 7- or 8-month 

period. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask you, also, 

about what General McCaffrey felt very strongly. He said that the 

only thing that could keep Iraq united, at the end of the day—once 

we start pulling out—he says, either you have the strong security 

commitment by the United States, or a strongman emerges. And 

that begs the question from General McCaffrey’s comments, are we 

facing a situation where we’ve removed a dictator, and is another 

one likely to replace him? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I don’t think that is what any segment of 

the Iraqi population wants to see. Iraqis know about dictators. 

They suffered under one of the worst in the world, and they also 

suffered—not quite as severely, but significantly—from his predecessors from 1958 on. So, if there is a unifying view among Iraqis, 

it is that they do not want to go back to that. 

At the same time, I think Iraqis from all communities see the 

value—not just the value, but the necessity—of maintaining in 

Iraqi identity, and that includes the Kurds. I think the recent 

events with the PKK and the Turks, have demonstrated to the 

Kurds the value of being part of a larger Iraqi entity. 

So, you know, I’m familiar with the thinking on the strongman 

theory, but I don’t think that is where anyone in Iraq wants to take 

this. 

And finally, I’d make the point on another piece of glue that 

holds the country together, and those are revenues, oil revenues. 

While it is true that they have not yet wrestled their way through 

to a comprehensive hydrocarbon and revenue-sharing package, revenues are distributed. And all the provinces, and all of the communities, obviously, have an interest in having that happen, and it 

goes through the center. So, I think that’s also a powerful force 

that holds Iraq together. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, thank you for your service to the country, and 

the same to you, Ambassador Crocker. 

General Petraeus, I want to acknowledge that Naval Officer 

Maria Miller, who’s leaving the room, accompanied you here from 

309 

Baghdad. I just wanted to brag about her for a second, as an example of the brave men and women that are representing us. 

She worked in the House of Representatives on the Education 

Committee and post-9/11, volunteered to go to OCS, the United 

States Navy, and eventually deployed to Iraq to be your administrative assistant. She is just one example of countless tens of thousands of American young people who are doing a magnificent job. 

So, I commend you on her selection, and her on her selection of 

you. 

Ambassador Crocker, when I voted for the surge last year, I did 

so clearly in the anticipation that it gave us a chance to both buy 

time and an opportunity for there to be some political action and 

movement on behalf of the Iraqis. 

You made a comment during your remarks about Basra, about 

Maliki actually deploying Shia troops against a Shia militia to regain control. Although there were a lot of comments about that 

being a sign of deterioration, it seemed to me to send a signal that 

they were willing to lead, am I right there? 

Ambassador CROCKER. You are right, Senator. This was an initiative he took on himself, and politically it’s had very positive resonance throughout Iraq. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, if you combine that with the fact that 

they’ve established provincial elections for before October of this 

year and, if I recall the Iraqi Constitution correctly, if you are a 

political party and operate a militia, you can’t gain voting status, 

or electable status, is that right? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is—that is correct, and that is what 

Prime Minister said publicly, I think, yesterday or the day before. 

Senator ISAKSON. So, I think it’s important for us to understand 

we have an opportunity—or they have an opportunity—with Maliki 

having demonstrated he’s willing to deploy Shia troops to enforce 

security, as he did in Basra and at the port, and if those operating 

a militia can’t gain political power, that possibly these elections in 

the provinces this fall could be more about politics, and less about 

militias, am I right? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think you are right, Senator. These elections will be important, because—indeed, critical—because that is 

how this contest for power and influence gets sorted out by nonviolent means. It’s how the Sunnis regain representation. It’s how 

the contest among Shia gets resolved, again, by a means other than 

violence. So, these are very important. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the Sunnis are going to turn out this 

time, right? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Absolutely. They’ve made that very clear, 

that boycotting didn’t work for them, and they’re not going to do 

it again. 

Senator ISAKSON. And do Muqtada al-Sadr and some of the other 

Shia who operate militias understand that to be a part of the political process, you can’t have a militia? Do we have the chance to get 

these parties to the same table, politically? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think we do, and I think we’re seeing 

some signs of that debate within the Sadr Trend, that may have 

been what motivated him to issue the statement he did in late 

310 

March, saying, ‘‘Put the guns down, guys.’’ That this was not working to his political advantage. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, it’s my hope that as you do the consolidation and review that takes place in that 6 weeks post-July, that 

there is continuing political movement on behalf of the Iraqis, and 

then you really do see a political resolution to the problem that we 

all know ultimately must come. And that’s what, I think, we’ve got 

to hope and actually work for. 

General Petraeus, your comment about a unit that had just enjoyed meeting its entire goal for reenlistment in the first quarter 

of this year, I think that’s the 3d Infantry Division out of Fort 

Stewart, GA. 

General PETRAEUS. It is. 

Senator ISAKSON. And I was there last week when the first of 

those men and women came back. Fort Stewart, in dealing with 

this stress on the force, and the pressure on the force, the orthopedic injuries that are becoming more common, and PTSD, and 

traumatic brain injury—the Army has installed a tremendous warrior transition facility at Fort Stewart, which I visited and met 

with the 71 soldiers who are being treated there. It’s remarkable 

to me what they have done to deal with the typical injuries incurred in the global war on terror—both soft tissue as well as non. 

But, it’s just fantastic. And I hope if you ever get the chance—and 

I know you’re a busy man—you’ll get to visit there, because it is 

truly an impressive facility. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I’ve also visited the facility at Walter 

Reed, which is state of the art as well, in fact we’ll see soldiers 

from there on Friday. 

Senator ISAKSON. I have two last comments. One is about what 

Senator Murkowski and some others have said. The cost of this 

war has been tremendous on the taxpayers of the United States, 

and it appears to me for the first time, the Iraqi Government is 

really making some steps to take over a significant part. I know 

they’re budgeting more than they’re actually deploying and that’s 

going to be the root of my question. If I look in here, they budgeted 

$10.1 billion for capital spending, but only deployed $4.7 billion in 

2007. Are they getting better at deploying the resources they have, 

to replace what we, as Americans, were paying for? 

Ambassador CROCKER. They are getting better, Senator. Overall, 

budget execution for 2007 is going to come in at something like 62, 

63 percent. Obviously not what it needs to be, but that’s almost 3 

times better than they did in 2006. So, they are getting increasingly skillful at being able to not only design, but then execute 

their budgets. 

Equally truthfully, they’ve got a—we’ve got some ways to go, and 

that’s why we’re making a major effort at improving their budget 

execution efforts. We’ve got—if we can get the DEOB–REOB 

through, we’ll have another—for some old reconstruction money— 

we intend to bring out a dozen Department of Treasury folks to 

work specifically on this issue. 

Senator ISAKSON. I’ll question you more, but I’ll ask General 

Petraeus to comment—our chairman was probably the leader in 

the Senate on the effort to appropriate the money for the MRAP. 

When I was there in January, I got to actually ride in one with a 

311 

squad that went into Ghazaliya, and I’ve read—tried to keep up 

with the amazing results—of the MRAP. Can you give me an update? It’s been 3 months since I was there—is it still performing 

and protecting lives like it was? 

General PETRAEUS. It very much is, Senator. I don’t have a count 

of the lives it has saved, but I can assure you that it is certainly 

in the dozens. It has performed magnificently. And I don’t want to 

in an unclassed, get into the etches of all of this stuff, but what 

it provides in terms of additional protection for our soldiers is very, 

very substantial. And, I thank the earlier committee, I guess, today 

about the MRAP, because of just the sheer speed of providing that 

to us has been breathtaking, as well. I mean, it’s almost been like 

a Manhattan Project to get these v-shaped hulls out there for us. 

And that MRAP family of vehicles has been exceptional. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thanks to both of you for your service and 

your commitment. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will say to the Senator, I have had my staff 

look at that question, and, at least from one Senator’s perspective, 

it looks like these vehicles are getting to where they are needed 

and performing as promised. 

Senator Menendez. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank both of you for your service. When I was in Iraq 

in January and visited with you, I came to even go beyond my admiration, not only for your service, but the extraordinary service of 

all our men and women in uniform, as well as in the Foreign Service—it’s certainly not an easy assignment. 

And that’s why I particularly believe that we need to give them 

a policy worthy of the sacrifices that we ask them to make. And 

I just don’t believe that our present policy is in accord with the sacrifice we are asking our people to make. 

You know, General Petraeus, on page 2 of your testimony you 

said something that, I think, is very profound. You said it in 

September, you said it again in your testimony today. It says, ‘‘I 

describe the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition continues.’’ 

And it just seems to me, if I were to ask a mother or a father 

in America, is their sons’ and daughters’ sacrifice for a fight among 

Iraqi politicians and sects for power and resources the national interest of the United States, I think they would clearly say, no. And 

I have a real problem when we see the sons and daughters of 

America dying, so that a fight over power and resources is the central essence of the fundamental nature of the conflict, as you described. That’s a real problem. And so, when we start there, I don’t 

know where we go that makes it better. 

Let me just ask you, Ambassador Crocker—what are the specifics 

of what we are doing to get rid of Iranian influence in Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, again, as General Petraeus has 

said, we are going after those that are trained and supplied from 

Iran. And we have certainly gone after Quds Force officers when 

they come into the country. 

312 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m not talking about the military context, or 

I would have asked General Petraeus. I’m talking about, what are 

we doing with an administration in Iraq that we have given $600 

million in investments, the lives of over 4,000 Americans, and yet 

they seem to be very welcoming of the type of influence from Iran 

that we clearly don’t want to see, and is not in the national interests of the United States? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, that’s actually not what we’re 

seeing. Again, the whole motivation for Prime Minister Maliki’s decision for the Basra operation was to take on these groups that are 

supported by Iran. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But all of these groups, Ambassador, have 

been supported by Iran, including the side that he lined up with. 

As a matter of fact, there are some reports that suggest that 

Maliki did this for political purposes because the Iraqis can not 

sustain their own fight, and we get dragged into a major fight. 

Once again, backing up Maliki in a way in which we put our sons 

and daughters at risk. Those are American officials who were 

quoted, unofficially as saying this is what Maliki did. All sides in 

that side have been trained by the Iranians. 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is not how Iraqis are viewing the 

whole Basra operation. There has been very broad-gauged support 

for Prime Minister Maliki and his government for what he did and 

of course is still doing down in Basra. This is, again, Sunni, Shia, 

and Kurdish support. They see this as a courageous decision to go 

after Shia extremists, as well as Sunnis. And, again—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador, let me read to you what I’m 

talking about. 

In an article in the Washington Post it says, among other things, 

‘‘Maliki decided to launch the offensive without consulting his U.S. 

allies. U.S. officials who are not authorized to speak on the record, 

say they believe Iran has provided assistance, in the past, to all 

three groups, the Mahdi Army, the Badr organization of the 

Islamic Supreme Council—Iraq’s largest Shia party—and forces 

loyal to the Fadhila party, which holds the Basra governor’s seat. 

But the officials see the current conflict as a purely internal Iraqi 

dispute. And some officials have concluded that Maliki himself is 

firing, ‘The first salvo in upcoming elections.’ ’’ Again, power and resources where American troops are being used in a way that I don’t 

understand how pursues our national interests. 

Let me ask you this, General Petraeus, you said this morning in 

the Armed Services Committee that you described our reconstruction efforts as ‘‘priming the pump’’ for the Iraqi Government to be 

able to provide basic services, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. Not reconstruction efforts, sir, these are local 

small—very small grants, small projects, and so forth—that once 

we have cleared an area—typically, most typically, of al-Qaeda or 

other Sunni extremist influence—just to get very small businesses 

going again. Very small repair jobs and so forth. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador Crocker, what about the $25 

billion that we have spent in foreign assistance in Iraq? Have those 

achieved the goals that we want? 

Ambassador CROCKER. If you’re talking about the Iraqi reconstruction funds, the $20 billion that was, in many cases, they have. 

313 

In some cases, security conditions have made it difficult to bring 

projects to closure in a timely fashion. We have kept at these. 

We’ve recently handed over, for example, a major water treatment plant that we finished up in Nasiriyah—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m glad you mentioned that. Let me read to 

you a series of facts: $25 billion in Iraq later of American taxpayer 

moneys, 43 percent of Iraq’s population currently lives in absolute 

poverty, 19 percent of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition 

prior to the war. Today that figure is higher, 28 percent. Last year, 

75 percent of Iraqi elementary-aged children attended school, 

according to the Iraqi Ministry of Education. Now, it’s only 30 percent. Fifty percent of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean water 

prior to 2003. Now, it’s higher—70 percent. Only 50 of 142 U.S.- 

funded primary health care centers are open to the public—and I 

could go on and on. 

To me, you know, I look at Iraq having $30 billion in reserves, 

held in the Federal Reserve of New York, and another $10 billion 

in development funds. Significant budgetary surpluses from 

previous years, and a projected 7-percent economic growth rate, 

and I say, ‘‘How is it that the American taxpayer is, after $25 

billion—’’, and those are the results? How is the American taxpayer 

expected to pay for more? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I don’t know where those figures 

came from, or what reliability—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you dispute them? Do you dispute them? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I don’t know what their basis is, you 

know? I do know there is other data out there. There was an ABC/ 

BBC poll, and these organizations have been conducting polling in 

Iraq since 2004. Their March poll would tell a different story of, 

you mentioned education—63 percent believed their local schools 

were good, 78 percent thought their teachers, their children’s 

teachers were good—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Maybe for those who have a school to go to. 

I know that our statistics are from some recent reports that are 

pretty reliable. And as the subcommittee chair on all of our foreign 

assistance, I can’t imagine continuing to justify the type of resources that we are spending for the results that we are having, 

politically and otherwise. 

And so, let me close in deference to my colleagues, by saying, 

look—when we went into Iraq, we were told that they would be 

overwhelmed by shock and awe. And I think that it’s the American 

people who have a shock of being misled into a war, of having a 

set of circumstances where, in fact, it has cost well beyond. Paul 

Wolfowitz sat at a table similar to yours and told us that Iraqi oil 

would pay for everything. Iraqi oil would pay for everything. And 

$600 million later, it has paid for virtually nothing—$600 billion 

later, it has paid for virtually nothing. 

And, awe? Yeah. I think the American people are in awe of a 

government that will not come to a realization. We had a panel of 

experts here last week that said that there’s no question that it is 

over in terms of transitioning out, it’s just how we do that, and the 

timeframe. Despite how many questions have been asked here, you 

will not give us the endgame of success? It sounds like, ‘‘When I 

314 

see it, I’ll realize it. But until then, give us an open checkbook.’’ 

And that’s a problem. 

What’s the troop strength that needs to finally hit when we say, 

‘‘OK, they can do it on their own ability’’? What is the political 

dynamics in which we say, OK, that’s it, you know, they can move 

forward. 

I mean, at some point you cannot expect the Congress of the 

United States on behalf of the American people to continue an open 

checkbook, and say, ‘‘Trust us, trust us. When we see it, we’ll tell 

you that we’ve finally hit success.’’ And that’s what we hear up 

here, and the American people are not supportive of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, thank you very much. 

I would invite the Ambassador—I know your Embassy has that 

data, on number of people in school, et cetera. If you believe the 

data not stated by the Senator is—if it’s not accurate, according to 

your Embassy records, then I’d appreciate you submitting it for the 

record. If not, we’ll assume what was given here by the Senator, 

as to school, water, et cetera, is correct. 

Ambassador CROCKER. We’d appreciate that opportunity, Mr. 

Chairman. 

And, Senator Menendez, if it would be possible to get the data 

you have, we’d be grateful. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The Senator from Wyoming. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, General, thank you very much for being with 

us, I appreciate you taking the time to spend it with me on 

Thanksgiving Day, when I was visiting Wyoming troops throughout 

Iraq. And I want to thank both of you for your service to our 

Nation. 

There were a group of veterans here today—the Veterans for 

Freedom—many from Wyoming, many who have served in Iraq. 

And they wanted to have me personally extend to you their thanks, 

as well. 

In my short time here in the Senate, I do understand that the 

politics of Iraq is divisive, but I clearly understand that we must 

make our judgment based on facts, not on politics. 

But, whichever way you wish to look at this issue, Iraq is a matter of national security, and as you’ve said, Ambassador Crocker, 

earlier today, hard does not mean hopeless. 

After we visited on Thanksgiving, I also went and had a chance 

to visit with Prime Minister Maliki, and I told him about being 

from Wyoming, a Western State, and our Western way, and our 

Western culture. And in Wyoming, we like to get things done. We 

are a generous people, but our patience is not unlimited. 

Which gets me to the question of the discussions we had last 

week, where we heard in testimony that we need to instill the will 

to win with the Iraqi Security Forces. What’s the best way to do 

that? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, what we need to do, Senator, is what 

has been done, successfully, in a number of areas, actually. And 

that is, of course, to train them, equip them, and then guide them 

in the early stages of their operations, get them some confidence. 

315 

One of the challenges in Basra, frankly, was that a very brand 

new brigade, right out of unit set fielding, and basic training unfortunately ended up getting thrust into some pretty tough combat, 

and the results of that are, frankly, predictable. 

So, we’ve got to figure out how to enable them to get their feet 

on the ground, to get some experience, to get combat under their 

belt, and then gradually ease back, and slowly but surely, take 

your hand off the bicycle seat and let them pedal it for themselves. 

Now, that has worked in a number of areas, and is working. I 

mean, Fallujah is a tremendous example, of course, as the Ambassador mentioned, one of the most dangerous cities in Iraq, in the 

past. And a city where, albeit, there are challenges, but has done 

extremely well. 

They have 10 police precincts, I believe it is now. There are no 

Iraqi Army forces required in the streets of Fallujah at this point 

in time. We have, I believe, the latest is a Marine squad with each 

of those precincts, but gradually going down to where we have one 

for every other precinct. And slowly but surely, again, taking our 

hands off the bicycle seat, even in Fallujah. 

Ramadi, similar results there. So, some of the very tough areas, 

this has indeed worked, a number of the southern provinces, as 

well. But then, others where there clearly are challenges, because 

of the security efforts that are required. 

Senator BARRASSO. General, earlier today you testified that the 

Sunni communities have rejected al-Qaeda in terms of their 

extremist ideology. How important is that in the things that you’re 

trying to accomplish? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it is—it’s very important. It’s not complete, across the board, Senator, I don’t want to give that impression. But, the fact that numerous Sunni communities—and probably the majority of Sunni communities—across Iraq have rejected 

al-Qaeda and, more importantly, extremist ideology; have been 

repelled by its indiscriminate violence and abhor the practices that 

they brought to their communities—that al-Qaeda did—as they let 

them into their communities for a whole variety of reasons in the 

early years, after liberation. This is very, very significant—again, 

not just for Iraq—but for the broader Arab world. 

And, in fact, over time, the answer to al-Qaeda–Iraq, of course, 

is not going to be to kill or capture every single one of them. It is 

going to be painstaking changes in education systems in Arab 

countries, it’s going to be changes, in some cases, in the Imams. 

There is a country in the Middle East that, in fact, is working 

through determining who is preaching in its mosques. It’s going to 

be a course in employment, in other opportunities. But it is, it has 

to be, again, a comprehensive effort to combat extremism, and the 

conditions that lead young men—in particular, in the Arab world— 

to embrace it. Particularly in, and again, in the Sunni-Arab world. 

So, the rejection in Iraq is very, very important, and the chain 

reaction that it set off, there in Ramadi, again has a huge significance, not just for Iraq, but for the region. 

Senator BARRASSO. If I could go into another area, Senator Dodd 

earlier talked about the mental health of the troops. Senator Isakson talked about the physical health of the troops and what’s being 

done now with physical medicine, rehabilitation. 

316 

My training is as an orthopedic surgeon, and was basically practicing medicine until last year. I’ve just gotten back from Afghanistan, where I had a chance to go the Baghram and visit the hospital there. I watched the transport, how they do it with patients, 

what they can do, and their lifesaving techniques. I thought they 

had absolutely the best equipment that you could imagine. I went 

into the operating room, watched the reconstruction of a leg that 

had been severely injured. 

The equipment, the plates, the screws, the rods—everything they 

had is what you would expect to find at any major trauma center 

in the United States, and I thought that the level of care was absolutely outstanding, in terms of limb and lifesaving abilities. 

General PETRAEUS. It is phenomenal, Senator. And it is present 

in a variety of different locations, so that it’s within the golden 

hour, if you will, of—from point of injury to trying to get the soldier 

to the location where that level of care is available, if needed. 

Senator BARRASSO. And, in Afghanistan what I saw was, actually, the transport system was better than what you would find at 

pretty much any major trauma center in the United States, in 

terms of quick access in the golden hour of trauma. And I just 

wanted to make sure that in Iraq, our soldiers are receiving that 

same high level of care. 

General PETRAEUS. It is, and in fact Senator, that’s one of the 

elements of this battlefield geometry that I’ve talked about. That 

even as we drawdown, we have to make sure that we have a sufficient footprint out there, so that adviser teams and other small 

elements—Special Operations teams, and so forth—still have the 

access to that transportation system so that, again, we can make 

use of that golden hour in the best way possible, to get our soldiers 

to the care they need. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank 

you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you for staying within your time. 

Yeah, I think you ought to get a special award for that. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Senator, on my time—before we start 

the clock—Senator DeMint is unable to return, and I ask unanimous consent that the statement that he has on these hearings be 

entered in the record, at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Senator DeMint follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you for holding this hearing today. No 

other issue is more pressing on the minds of Americans than the situation in Iraq 

and the national security of the United States. 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, thank you for appearing today. I know 

today and tomorrow will be long exhausting days, but we appreciate your service 

and your efforts to better inform us about what is really going on in Iraq. 

Seven months ago, you both appeared before this committee to discuss the shift 

in U.S. policy in Iraq and present your impressions about what the ‘‘surge’’ of U.S. 

forces could accomplish. During the four hearings we heard many of my colleagues 

say that your strategy had no chance of success, that the sky was falling, and that 

your plans required, as one Senator put it, the ‘‘willing suspension of disbelief.’’ 

Several months later, the picture in Iraq is very different. The credit is due to 

our men and women in uniform and the incredibly hard work they have performed; 

but we also thank you both for your steadfast leadership and commitment to this 

317 

effort. Fortunately, today we can say the sky didn’t fall, and that we remained true 

to the belief that people want to be safe and free. 

Without a doubt, the situation in Iraq is still fragile. Iraq is at a crossroads, but 

substantial progress has been made. Over the last year, U.S. deaths are down about 

70 percent and Iraqi deaths are down almost 90 percent. U.S. security assistance 

for Iraq is down more than 30 percent, U.S. Assistance for Reconstruction is down 

more than 70 percent, and Iraqi security spending has increased by more than 25 

percent. At the same time, Iraq’s economy is growing by more than 7 percent. These 

are significant signs of progress. 

On my recent trip, I was encouraged by the Sons of Iraq and their willingness 

to stand up for their country and put it back on a path to peace and stability. The 

Sunni Muslims that confronted al-Qaeda, sided with the United States, and turned 

the country around are to be commended. They have suffered immensely for Iraq 

and have sacrificed their lives and the lives of their families so that America’s 

efforts will not fail. We should not easily dismiss their hardships. 

And still we hear my colleagues say the surge has worked in military terms, but 

has failed politically. But in the past few months the Iraqi Government passed a 

de-Baathification law, an amnesty law, a law to govern provincial elections, and a 

budget—by the way, something our Government has been unable to do this year. 

There are still more items the Iraqis must address, but they have made progress. 

Despite shortcomings, I was encouraged by Prime Minister Maliki’s efforts to go 

after the militias in Basra and the Mahdi Army throughout Iraq. Through these 

actions, we saw Iraq’s President and two Vice Presidents, joined by every major 

political group in Iraq—except the Sadrists—condemn Sadr’s militia, and endorse 

Prime Minister Maliki’s demand that Sadr’s militia disarm. 

Sadr’s militia is now virtually the only militia left in Iraq that illegally challenges 

the authority of the Iraqi Security Forces or the coalition. Other major militias have 

disbanded and transformed into political organizations. This is another sign of the 

growing legitimacy of the rule of law and respect for the authority of the central 

government in Iraq. 

However, I am concerned by a recent increase in violence in Iraq. I am concerned 

that Iran is beginning to realize that a stable Iraq is not beneficial to the Iranian 

regime and that they will seek to undermine the progress going forward. We must 

ensure Iran does not have the ability to threaten stability in Iraq. 

I am cautiously optimistic about the future of this war-torn nation. But the reality 

of the situation here in Washington is often very different than reality in Iraq. Here 

in Congress, political agendas tend to obscure the facts. I hope that for the sake 

of our country, our soldiers in Iraq, and the Iraqi people, we can put politics aside 

and soberly address the situation on the ground in Iraq. 

That is why I am disheartened by some Senators’ recent statements that we 

should withdraw immediately and that if the terrorists regain a foothold in Iraq, 

we should then reenter the country. It is always better to stay and defend than to 

run away and fight another day to regain something that was already purchased 

with such a high price in blood and treasure. That was a failed strategy in Vietnam 

and should not be repeated here. 

The future of Iraq is uncertain, but the future of the United States was uncertain 

for decades after the signing of our Constitution. Iraq realizes their future lies in 

a sustained alliance with the West and an embrace of democratic principles; we cannot and should not abandon a friend in a bad part of town, and this is no time to 

walk away from Iraq. 

There is too much at stake here to get this wrong. Defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq is 

a central fight in the war on terror. Success in Iraq against al-Qaeda and other terrorists will in fact make Americans safer and the world safer, too. 

We all grieve the losses of our fallen soldiers and our hearts go out to those who 

have been wounded in battle. I hope we will honor their sacrifice by staying and 

completing their mission. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I yield to you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my statement also be made part of the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:] 

318 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, I want to join my colleagues in welcoming General Petraeus and 

Ambassador Crocker. I disagree with the mission to which this administration has 

committed their talents, but I want to recognize their dedication and their service. 

They answered their government’s call to duty under the most difficult circumstances. That took courage and we are grateful. 

I also want to pay tribute to all of our troops and diplomats serving in Iraq with 

such courage and competence. I am humbled again and again by their skill and 

their sacrifice. Their service fuels my own sense of urgency that this Nation develop 

a strategy in Iraq and a global foreign policy that is worthy of their commitment: 

A strategy that brings our troops home. 

After more than 5 years, more than 4,000 American lives lost, 30,000 wounded, 

and $600 billion spent—we still don’t have the strategy we need in Iraq. I believe 

it is imperative that we change course now, not in 10 months. This President should 

not put off the hard decisions to the next administration. 

Ambassador Crocker, you’ve stated we have a ‘‘moral imperative to keep bringing 

violence down in Iraq.’’ I agree with you; we do. But we also have a moral obligation 

to the men and women of our Armed Forces. We have a moral obligation to their 

families. We have a moral obligation to the American people that we will use our 

military to pursue a thoughtful strategy that is best for the long-term security of 

our Nation and our allies. 

I’ve always believed invading Iraq was a mistake. I voted against granting our 

President that authority in 2002. I have opposed this administration’s strategy from 

the beginning. But as much as we might wish it, we cannot change the past. This 

war was recklessly begun; we’ve got to find the smartest, most prudent way to end 

it. 

In January 2007, the President explained his new ‘‘surge’’ strategy to end the conflict in Iraq. By adding 30,000 troops, ‘‘over time,’’ he said ‘‘we can expect . . . the 

government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical 

areas.’’ But even the President recognized that, ‘‘a successful strategy for Iraq goes 

beyond military operations. . . . So America will hold the Iraqi Government to the 

benchmarks it has announced.’’ 

Well, the political epiphany for the Iraqi Government has yet to come. 

In March, General Petraeus, you said, ‘‘no one’’ in the U.S. and Iraqi Governments 

‘‘feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national 

reconciliation.’’ In a March 27 speech declaring ‘‘normalcy’’ had returned to Iraq, the 

President agreed that ‘‘substantial work remains.’’ And, in fact, only 3 of the 18 

benchmarks the Iraqi Government and our Government agreed were important have 

been accomplished. 

Yes; it is clear that, thanks to the excellent work of our troops, and several unrelated factors—the Sadr cease-fire, the Sunni ‘‘Awakening,’’ and, tragically, ethnic 

cleansing—violence in Iraq decreased from its highest and most appalling levels. 

Iraqi Government did not take advantage of relative calm to reach accommodation 

among its various factions. Local political and militia groups continue to struggle 

to amass power. Recent violence in Basra and Baghdad demonstrate that our troops 

continue to referee a multitude of civil wars and political power struggles—Shia on 

Shia in Basra and Baghdad, Shia on Sunni, Kurdish on Sunni, and the list goes 

on. 

I continue to believe, that in the name of security, we are undermining our overall 

goal of stability. We are arming and paying Sunni militia to combat al-Qaeda in 

Iraq, we are arming Shia militia allied with Iran to combat other Shia militias that 

oppose the central government. I have yet to hear a clear strategy for how we will 

unite these disparate armed forces under a central government and bring our troops 

home. I have only seen how we are entrenching ourselves deeper and deeper into 

an Iraqi civil war. 

U.N. officials reported this past Friday that nearly 5 million Iraqis have been displaced by this conflict. An estimated 2 million are in neighboring countries. All are 

running out of money creating a humanitarian and a security crisis throughout the 

region. If all were to try and return home, it would be chaos. We aren’t doing what 

we need to do to resolve the crisis. 

Arming opposing militias, meddling in intra-Shia violence, tinkering around the 

edges of the growing refugee crisis: What I see is our country ricocheting between 

the crisis-of-the-day rather than employing a comprehensive strategy that shifts the 

U.S. from our current, unsustainable military presence to a longer term diplomatic 

role. Running out the clock on this President’s term is not an appropriate strategy 

for the United States of America. 

319 

This summer, we will be back in a familiar place. Just as when the President 

announced the ‘‘surge,’’ we will have over 130,000 troops in Iraq, unacceptable sectarian violence, millions of displaced Iraqis, and no fundamental political reconciliation to show for our efforts. We need a new strategy in Iraq and we need it now. 

The American people are tired of waiting. 

For years, some of us have been calling for a new approach; one that transitions 

our mostly military effort to a diplomatic effort, one that brings our troops home 

and lets Iraqis take control of their own streets. We need our Nation’s most senior 

officials engaged in bringing Iraq’s political actors, Iraq’s neighbors and international entities with such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the table. At this time, these international 

organizations have far greater regional credibility than we do. 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, I look forward to your testimony. Beyond 

your reports about stability achieved and laws passed, I most want to hear what 

our country’s objectives should be going forward given the political reality on the 

ground in Iraq and the reality of our military capacity. The ‘‘substantial work that 

remains,’’ according to President Bush, includes ‘‘implementing the laws [the Iraqi 

Government] passed, reviewing its Constitution, drafting a electoral law, and passing laws to reform its oil sector and codify revenue-sharing.’’ What are your recommendations for the tactics we should employ to reach these most fundamental 

goals? 

Our country and the world has an interest in a safe and secure Iraq. But in working toward that end, we cannot ignore other competing needs, especially at home. 

We need a more thoughtful approach that will protect and bring home our troops, 

step up our diplomatic efforts, internationalize the effort to bring stability to that 

country and the region, and allow us to pursue terrorists like al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and wherever they seek refuge. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me thank General Petraeus, and Ambassador Crocker, and all of the soldiers and diplomats that have 

served our Nation so well, and with tremendous sacrifice. And, we 

can’t say thank you enough, and I just really want to express our 

appreciation on behalf of the people of Maryland, that I have the 

honor of representing. 

I want to go back to what the President of the United States said 

on January 10, 2007, when he announced our new way forward in 

Iraq. 

He said, ‘‘Over time, we can expect growing trust and cooperation 

from Baghdad’s residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in 

other critical areas.’’ 

Senator Menendez has talked about the daily life for Iraqis. The 

President, this administration, and the Iraqi Government agreed 

on certain benchmarks to judge progress in other critical areas. By 

any indication, those benchmarks have not been met. 

Last week, in hearings that we held in this committee, I asked 

the panelists to name a politician or political party that could be 

our partner for making peace in Iraq, who would make the type of 

concessions that are required to have a lasting government that 

has the respect of its people? 

When peace broke out in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 

there were local leaders and national leaders in those countries 

that were willing to make those types of concessions. At the hearing last week, there was no consensus that there are no national 

leaders today in Iraq that are prepared to make the type of concessions to move forward with a lasting peace. 

I must acknowledge that I would like to see, in the next 10 

months of this administration, a change of mission. I opposed the 

war in Iraq, and have opposed the way this war has been pursued 

320 

by this administration. But, I certainly don’t want to see the status 

quo maintained—I would like to see a change, I would like to see 

a greater focus on diplomacy as some of my colleagues have talked 

about. 

But, I’m now concerned that this administration might negotiate 

a long-term security agreement, framed in a way to avoid the 

approval of the Congress, in order to try to affect the flexibility of 

future administrations or future Congresses to change course. 

So, Mr. Ambassador, let me just give you an opportunity to 

either clarify, or comment on any of the assumptions I’ve made, 

with the ability to move forward with a partner who is prepared 

to make concessions, or the security plan that is being contemplated, being drafted in a way that the Iraqi Government—and 

perhaps their Parliament—would have more to say than this Congress? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. 

On the first, as I tried to describe, I think, in response to Senator 

Corker’s questions, we are seeing as a result of improved security 

conditions, bottoms-up reconciliation that then affects moods and 

attitudes—— 

Senator CARDIN. I think my question deals with Iraqi national 

leaders who are prepared to make concessions. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. My point was, you have both bottoms up and top down, and they link. 

The improved security situation, and the corresponding relaxation, if you will, on the part of both Sunni and Shia communities—as the Sunnis repudiate al-Qaeda and related groups, the 

Shia no longer see the need to rely on militias to protect them. 

Senator CARDIN. I understand that. I’m looking for, though, a 

national leader who’s prepared to step forward to make the types 

of unpopular positions that are required if you’re going to have real 

compromises made in the government. If you want to name a person, fine. If not, let me try to move on to the next point. 

Ambassador CROCKER. OK, just to say that that atmosphere, 

then, affects national-level leaders and gives you a dynamic, in 

which you can start to see progress on complex pieces of legislation 

that are tied to reconciliation, that—the package that the Parliament voted in February—that you simply could not have gotten 

6 months before. And it takes all the leaders in on this. 

Is there a Nelson Mandela out there? I don’t think so. But, we 

are seeing, kind of, the tradeoffs starting to be made, and a move 

away from zero-sum thinking that any concession is a weakness. 

And that is progress. 

With respect to your second point, on a long-term relationship, 

we are currently negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement in many 

respects—— 

Senator CARDIN. Is it being drawn in a way to exclude the Congress’ approval? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is being drawn in a way that will be 

similar to the 80-odd others that we have around the world, as an 

executive agreement. 

Senator CARDIN. Iraq has a history with this Congress. And I 

just urge you, if you want the cooperation of many of us, that 

agreement better come before us. 

321 

Let me—I want to raise one other issue. One of the facts that 

have happened over the last 5 years, that is clearly without dispute, is there is now 5 million displaced Iraqis—about 2 million in 

neighboring countries, 3 million, now, close to 3 million within Iraq 

itself—you’ve acknowledged that in your statements. 

The refugees’ impact on surrounding countries cannot be underestimated. 

My point is that, you stated in your testimony that, in coming 

months, the Iraqi Government must resettle Iraqis, both internally 

displaced and refugees. My concern is that the United Nations 

High Commissioner on Refugees does not believe the conditions are 

stable enough for the return of internally displaced individuals. My 

question is, Do you disagree with the High Commissioner? 

No. 2, you state that the role that the United Nations is playing 

is to, in fact, help resettle. The High Commissioner says that’s not 

accurate, that it is to make an assessment as to whether it’s safe 

to resettle. If you could clarify that, I think it would be helpful to 

us. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, we work very closely with the 

U.N. in Iraq, and now with UNHCR, since they have put international staff back into the country. And General Petraeus and I 

have both met, incidentally, with the High Commissioner. Both the 

U.N., and ourselves, and other concerned governments are all 

working with the relevant Iraqi authorities, to be sure that they’ve 

got the resources and the planning to deal with returns as they 

happen, because the people have a vote, themselves. 

Senator CARDIN. My question is, Do you disagree with the High 

Commissioner as to whether the conditions today are safe for 

resettlements of internally displaced individuals? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, it’s not a blanket issue. It 

depends on the area. There are some areas where people can safely 

return, there are areas where they probably should wait a bit. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we’re getting there. And, thank you 

for your patience, and I thank my colleagues for theirs, as well. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 

want to thank you for your patience, as well. It’s been a long day, 

and the witnesses have been here awhile, I’ll do my best to stay 

within my time. 

I want to thank the Ambassador and the General for your testimony today, and your service to the country. You have both been 

given terribly difficult assignments and we’re grateful for your 

service. 

Really, I have two areas of questioning. One pertains to the 

renewal of Blackwater Worldwide contract. We know what we’re 

talking about, with regard to a private security firm. All kinds of 

controversy and investigations, as you know, have been involved in 

the case of Blackwater, I guess it was September, when there were 

shots fired in a crowded area and 17 Iraqi civilians were killed, in 

addition to other investigations. 

Ambassador Crocker, the question I have for you is, Can you 

describe the process that you and/or the administration undertook 

to make a determination about the renewal of that contract? 

322 

Ambassador CROCKER. This was a decision made in the Department—the Department of State. Blackwater is, I think, in the third 

year of a 5-year contract, so the decision was to go ahead with the 

next year of that contract. 

The fact is, Senator, that we—in order to move around securely, 

we are—and will need to continue to rely on private contractors. 

We just simply don’t have the assets with the State Department 

Diplomatic Security System to do it any other way. 

In the wake of the September incident, we took a number of 

steps. There was a Memorandum of Agreement signed between the 

Departments of State and Defense. The Multi-National Force and 

the Embassy had worked out a set of procedures, you now have an 

officer in our tactical operations center, so that the battle space 

owners have full visibility on any of these movements. 

We’ve put diplomatic security agents from the State Department 

with each security contractor motorcade, installed TV cameras and 

recorders—again, a number of steps to ensure that we’ve got the 

tightest possible control that we can, over all of this. And since 

September, there have been just three escalation-of-force incidents, 

I believe, none of them involving any injuries. 

Now, with respect to the contract, as you know, there is an FBI 

investigation underway of the September incident that is not yet 

concluded. When it is, I—along with others in the Department—are 

going to be looking at what the investigation has turned up. If I 

feel it’s warranted, I would not hesitate to recommend a cancellation of the contract, at the discretion of the Government. 

Senator CASEY. But at this point in time, no other firm was 

considered when that renewal determination was made, is that 

correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. To the best—I’m not sure that’s exactly 

correct, Senator. And we’d have to check back with the people who 

actually made the determination at State. I don’t think there was— 

it was felt there was another qualified firm available. 

[The written information from Ambassador Crocker follows:] 

The Department considered a variety of options in deciding to extend the Worldwide Personal Protective Services Task Order. Given the enhanced accountability 

and oversight measures put in place, along with the continuous operational requirements in Baghdad, the determination was made that extension of the current task 

order would best facilitate ongoing support of our foreign policy initiatives in Iraq. 

It is important to recognize that this action can be terminated by the U.S. Government at any time. 

Senator CASEY. I want to move to my last question and it really 

is directed at both of you, but I think General Petraeus is probably 

the one who would answer this. 

I was in Iraq back in August, Senator Durbin and I were there 

and we had a dinner with both of you, and I appreciated your hospitality. One of the things that I was complaining about was the 

language that I thought the administration was using, about victory and defeat, and that I think this language doesn’t necessarily 

describe what is happening in this particular conflict—unlike other 

wars our country has been engaged in. 

Ambassador Crocker, you said at the time, sitting next to me 

that the way you would frame the debate, so to speak, is how we 

measure success should be sustainable stability. And I guess my 

323 

question pertains to that description, but in particular, that 

description juxtaposed with the levels of readiness. 

I know that, General, the old Level 1, Level 2, 3, and 4 are now 

Operational Readiness Assessments, which you have in chart No. 

10. But the way I look at this, in terms of where we were back in 

January 2007, as opposed to where we are in March 2008, is that 

at the Level 1, the highest level—which in your chart is in green— 

we have about 10 to 12 battalions who are at Level 1, who can 

function independently. 

I guess my basic question, in the limited time I have, is: What 

do you think is sustainable stability, as it pertains to Level 1, the 

number of Level 1 battalions needed? And, two, if you can tell us 

what we’ve spent on training the Iraqi Security Forces, to date? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, thanks for the opportunity to explain the ORA process, and what it means, because, it’s 

a fairly mechanical action. It depends on having all of the—certain 

percentage of the—commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, personnel fill, qualified people, vehicles, readiness status of 

the vehicles, training readiness, if you will, ability to carry out 

tasks, and so forth. 

And the problem with the Iraqis increasing the number of ORA 

1 Level units, is that as they get ORA 1 Level units, they tend to 

take leaders out from them, and to use them to build additional 

elements. It’s, in fact, why there’s that additional category of ‘‘in 

the lead.’’ 

You don’t need ORA 1 Level units, necessarily, to achieve security in a location, depending on, again, obviously, what the enemy 

situation is, what the threat is, what the level of local support is, 

and so forth. So there’s, again, not a mechanical or arithmetical 

layout of how many ORA 1 Level units are needed in this area or 

that area. Obviously, the enemy gets a vote, and in fact they— 

while we’d like to see ORA Level 1 units, again, we actually agree 

with the approach that they have taken, where they tend to raid 

those units, and the good leaders, and create more units, because 

they do, in fact, need more units and more troopers and more 

police. 

And they need them, because in a counterinsurgency, of course, 

the demand for security forces to citizen ratio is very substantial. 

We have reached sustainable security in some provinces. And 

again, not just the successful and secure Kurdish Regional Government provinces, but also in a number of the other provinces that 

have moved to provincial Iraqi control. And then, in some other 

areas, obviously, we have a long way to go, because of the enemy 

situation. And, in some cases, because of the local ethnosectarian 

dynamics, as well. 

But, by and large—certainly since you visited in August—the 

forces have grown, their capability has grown. It is still uneven, 

and in fact, the number of provinces that they have taken over has 

grown, as well. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, I’m out of time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I’ve been at it almost as long as you have today, I 

think. 

324 

I would first like to say that, obviously from the questions that 

you’ve received on this committee, we’ve got a pretty strong consensus on this committee that this country has put itself in two 

distinct strategic disadvantages with the situation that we’ve been 

in, in Iraq. 

The first is that we’ve had the greatest maneuver forces in the 

world, the United States Army, and the United States Marine 

Corps, tied down block by block, city by city, talking about sectarian strife, et cetera, in one country, while the forces of international terrorism have remained mobile and, in many cases, have 

recentered themselves elsewhere. 

And the second is, as Senator Voinovich was so adamantly talking about, our national strategic posture, when you look at the 

economy, our ability to focus on larger strategic interests—particularly, in my view, what has been happening with the evolution of 

China during this process, have also been falling by the wayside. 

A note, really quickly, on the questions that you received, very 

heavily on this side, but also from the other side, about the diplomatic surge, I think we all know what people were really talking 

about. And you’ve answered, I think, as best you can with respect 

to what’s been going on, but increased civilian participation, particularly in an atomized way, is not really what people are talking 

about. 

Ambassador, I know when you and I were visiting before your 

confirmation hearing, we were pretty much in agreement as to 

what robust diplomacy really would mean, and how it would impact the future of the region. Robust diplomacy can only happen 

from the very top. And it hasn’t happened, in many reasons, as a 

conscious decision. 

And with respect to the ability to address al-Qaeda wherever it 

would reform itself—I have a pretty strong faith in the Iraqis, if 

you look at what they did in Al Anbar. They finally got sick enough 

of it, that it was the Iraqis developing the will to fight. I’m not that 

concerned, long term, if we reposition our forces. 

Now, that being said—Ambassador Crocker, I want to get back 

into this diplomatic arrangement that I was talking to you about 

earlier. If one reads your testimony, page five of your testimony— 

you speak about, and I’m going to quote you here, ‘‘We have begun 

negotiating a bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United 

States.’’ 

I’ve been having meetings for several months on this, trying to 

understand exactly what that means, and from what I can understand, there are actually two documents that go into this, is that 

not correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct. There is a—— 

Senator WEBB. It would be a Strategic Framework Agreement, 

and then—pursuant to the Strategic Framework Agreement—there 

would be a Status of Forces Agreement. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Status of Forces Agreement. 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct. 

Senator WEBB. That was not clear from your testimony, and it 

hasn’t been completely clear from your oral testimony today, either. 

I think we need to understand that. 

325 

And Mr. Chairman, I think we need to pay very close attention 

in the next couple of months, to the first agreement, the Strategic 

Framework Agreement. 

We’ve asked to actually be able to see what the document looks 

like and I would give you the same question I had earlier, in terms 

of that document—what would have to be in that document 

before—in the view of this administration—it would require congressional approval? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, with respect to the Status of 

Forces Agreement, as I have said earlier, we expect that will have 

a number of elements in common with—— 

Senator WEBB. I understand Status of Forces Agreement. But, in 

my experience—and I’ve been doing this pretty well as long as you 

have, a Status of Forces Agreement is pursuant to an agreement 

that gives two countries some sort of a relationship, it could be the 

United States-Japan bilateral security arrangement, or it could be 

the collective situation like we have in NATO. 

So, the real question is the strategic framework. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Right. I was—the point I was going to 

make on the SOFA, and I know you know this, but I just, I think 

it needs to be out there where it’s clear to everyone—our intention 

is to negotiate that as we have done all of our other SOFAs, except 

the NATO SOFA, as an executive agreement. 

The Strategic Framework Agreement, which we and the Iraqis 

conceive as setting out a vision for our ongoing relationship, in a 

variety of fields—political, economic, cultural, scientific—— 

Senator WEBB. And security. 

Ambassador CROCKER. And security—that is correct. We do not 

see that Strategic Framework Agreement as rising to the level of 

an executive agreement. 

Senator WEBB. I’m looking at an article that came from The 

Guardian today, which at least ostensibly quotes from the working 

draft of that agreement. And there’s some very, very careful language in there, in terms of how external threats would be dealt 

with, but it really seems to me, very clearly, to be tiptoeing to the 

edge of what would require overt congressional approval. 

I’m not going to take any more time from the day on this, but 

I would hope that we could do some follow-on examination of this, 

Mr. Chairman. 

And also, Ambassador Crocker, from what we were told when we 

met with people from the administration, you are the lead negotiator on both of those agreements, is that not correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I’m overseeing the process from Baghdad, 

yes, in terms of the SOFA. We’ve got someone out to head that 

effort, who is a specialist in the field, but it is true that I am overseeing the overall effort, and it is certainly our intention to be fully 

transparent with this. I believe the committee has had briefings, or 

the staff has had briefings on where we are, and—— 

Senator WEBB. We’ve had briefings, but, to my knowledge, at 

least from the perspective of our office—the administration has 

declined to show us the document. So, we really don’t know what 

we’re dealing with. 

326 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, it’s obviously important that we do 

have a relationship of some confidence on this, and I will talk to 

my colleagues to see that we do. 

Senator WEBB. And I thank you for your testimony and I wish 

you luck tomorrow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, let me say, with the witnesses here, 

that we’re having a hearing on this with the administration on 

Thursday, on this very thing. I guarantee you, as sure as the sun 

will rise tomorrow, this committee will know exactly what is in 

that agreement, No. 1. 

No. 2, we’ve been told thus far, it doesn’t settle it, that as was 

just stated it will not be an executive agreement, so it does not rise 

to any enforceable agreement. 

The danger, in my view, I think we’re going to find, is the Iraqis 

are going to think it means something, and we’re going to be 

acknowledging it doesn’t mean anything other than a wish, an 

aspiration. Because it says—I’ve been told by the administration— 

they would consult with the Iraqis if the following things were to 

occur, consult. Not binding anyone. 

If it’s anything beyond that, then it rises to a different level. But, 

I promise you, we will know exactly—exactly—what this Strategic 

Framework Agreement entails. 

And I asked the chairman a moment ago whether he had any 

closing statement, his indication was no. I just want to do a little 

bit of housekeeping, it’ll take two more minutes. There are some 

things I’d like to follow up with, in writing, and to see if you would 

be prepared to respond to. 

I’ll just say, generically, General, that you said, you know, we’re 

at the early stages of the Iraqis being able to do—take care of 

themselves. General, we’re long past the early stages. We’re 6 

years into this. We’re very long in the tooth. I know what you mean 

by it, but just so you know up here, and in the country—we’re way 

beyond the early stages. There’s just a little bit of time left. 

And the second point I’d make is, the reason why you find so 

many people, Mr. Ambassador, fixating on the Iraqis paying 

more—we’ve spent, we’ve sat with the Pentagon, we’ve been in theater, we have met with the State Department—everyone agrees we 

should be doing roughly $150 million for Pakistan now, to aid their 

new government, to deal with the construction, to deal with the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, et cetera—we can’t find $150 

million. Let’s just get at this. We can’t find $150 million. 

So, if they picked up the $150 million that we’re doing, which I 

think we should be doing, ‘‘paying,’’ ‘‘compensating’’ the forces, it 

means it’s this big deal. It means that what everyone says is a critical, critical, critical moment for us in United States-Pakistan relations, right now, we need $150 million. We can’t get it. 

We can’t even be assured we’re going to get the money that the 

Defense Department says, and the State Department says they 

need for a piece of legislation that was spearheaded—I cosponsored 

it, but the real credit goes to my colleague, here—to provide for, in 

the future, a civilian force available to compensate for, or to add 

to, or to take over, responsibilities that need—in the future. 

327 

So, I just want you to understand, when we’re—this is not about 

being punitive with the Iraqis—we’re scraping, just there, $175 

million for two things everybody says—the Secretary of Defense 

makes a speech, saying that a 19-to-1 ratio that we’re spending on 

military versus diplomacy is unacceptable. We’ve got to change it. 

Ryan, we can’t get it done. Money. So this is nickel and dimes 

when you’re talking about a continued commitment of $3 billion a 

week, for some period, anyway. But it’s a big, big, big, big deal 

strategically. And, so that’s why you’re going to get a lot of pressure on that. 

And the last point—it’s been a long day, Ambassador Crocker, 

but I would like you to, in writing, answer the question that was 

posed by Senator Obama. If not, we have a lot of other 

hypotheticals—if, in fact, the status quo as it exists today were 

guaranteed to be able to be sustained over the next 5 years, would 

that be sufficient for us to considerably drawdown American forces? 

We’ve got to get some kind of matrix for people to get a sense 

of what we’re talking about, here. Otherwise, we’re going to lose all 

support for anything—just a politician speaking now—in my opinion. 

So, there’s a number of things that—it will not be a long list of 

things—but there’s three or four things I’d like to, a little, clean 

up—not clean up—but follow up on some of the things we’ve mentioned. 

And it is not, again, a desire to embarrass anybody, but you 

know, if you had to guess for me, who’s close—Maliki or Sadr—to 

the Iranians, that’s a kind of hard call. You know, the Badr 

Brigade was called the Badr Brigade because it was part of the 

Iranian Revolutionary Guard. And the Badr Brigade is the place 

where Maliki—no? You don’t think he’s—— 

Ambassador CROCKER. The Badr Brigade is associated with the 

Supreme—Islamic Supreme Council, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim—Prime 

Minister Maliki is from the Dawa Party. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I know he’s from the Dawa Party, but he is 

siding now, with Hakim, relative to Sadr. That’s all I’m saying. 

I don’t want to—I’ve kept you too long, I’m going to put some of 

this down. You guys have an incredibly difficult job—you’re doing 

your job, I think, very well. 

And the last point is, Ambassador Crocker—just so you know. 

Nobody thinks you’re surging. Nobody thinks there’s a diplomatic 

surge anywhere. Nobody. Nobody. And we need a surge. But that’s 

another issue. 

So, if you have—I invite any closing comment you’d like to make. 

And I’ll close by saying thank you, your patience is amazing, and 

your physical stamina exceeds your good judgment, I think. I 

mean, this has been a long day for you, but thank you very much. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

328 

ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM

CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing on the administration’s strategy for Iraq following the troop surge. Iraq remains one of the most 

important components of American foreign policy, and I deeply appreciate the opportunity to reexamine U.S. strategy in Iraq. I would also like to take a moment to 

thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for their service, and express my 

deep gratitude for the thousands of Americans serving in uniform in Iraq as we 

speak. 

The recent outbreak of fighting between Iraqi Security Forces and Shiite militias, 

and the tenuous cease-fire that has followed, is a clear indication that Iraq has far 

to go before it can be considered a stable, secure, and self-sustaining state. The most 

important question we must ask today is not ‘‘where did the surge get us,’’ but 

rather ‘‘where do we go from here’’? All too often, this administration has shown an 

aversion to answering this all important question. Our strategy in Iraq, it seems, 

is predicated on planning for tomorrow rather than next year, on short-term marriages of convenience rather than long-term plans for sustainability. 

Mr. Chairman, the so-called ‘‘breathing space’’ provided by the troop surge does 

not appear to have achieved the most important goal of the troop surge, that of longterm sustainable political reconciliation, or even the outlines of one. General 

Petraeus himself has suggested that Iraqi political leaders have failed to take 

advantage of the relative calm provided by the troop surge to bring about political 

reconciliation. The few pieces of reconciliation legislation that have been passed by 

the Iraqi Parliament, such as the de-Baathification laws and the Provincial Powers 

Law were both passed by razor-thin margins along highly polarized sectarian lines. 

Perhaps more troubling, at the same time that the Maliki government has sought 

to wrest control from Iraq’s sectarian militias, the administration has seen fit to employ Sunni militias, many made up of former insurgents, to combat al-Qaeda in 

Iraq. While this strategy may be advantageous in the short run, and certainly the 

decline of al-Qaeda is a positive development, it raises serious questions about the 

long-term ability of Iraq’s central government to provide for the security of its people, particularly as it has become clear that the Maliki government has made little 

progress in integrating these sectarian militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. 

The cost of this war, Mr. Chairman, is another matter that this administration 

has shown little interest in addressing. Estimates have suggested that the United 

States will have spent $720 million a day in Iraq, and Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has suggested that the ultimate cost of this war, including the 

cost to the United States economy, including fully rebuilding our military and caring 

for our veterans in the long term, may be as high as $3 trillion. The citizens of New 

Britain, Connecticut, alone, have paid some $204 million in tax dollars for this war, 

a number that falls just below the town’s $211 million yearly budget. 

Meanwhile, the United States has spent well over $20 billion on reconstruction 

costs alone. All of this is being spent despite the fact the Maliki government holds 

close to $40 billion in reserves and development funds in banks from New York to 

Switzerland and has reported budget surpluses on numerous occasions. Once again, 

we must ask, ‘‘where do we go from here,’’ how much longer must the United States 

foot the bill for Iraq’s reconstruction? 

Mr. Chairman, taken all together, we seem to be no better or worse off than we 

were in the autumn of 2005, both in regards to the number of U.S. troops in Iraq 

and the level of violence. Despite this administration’s predictions of the surge’s success, we seem to be right where we started. And despite all of this, the American 

people have yet to hear about what our strategy is going forward? Where will Iraq 

be in the next 6 months, or the next year, and equally important, where will the 

United States be? How many soldiers will we have on the ground in Iraq? I hope 

that during today’s hearing we will finally start hearing answers to these important 

questions; questions that have frankly never been answered during the nearly 6 

years of this disastrous war. 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, I thank you for your testimony today, and 

I look forward to a frank and direct answer to this all important question. 

329 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. When do you expect the next round of Iran-Iraq-United States talks? 

Why were talks planned for March called off? 

Answer. No date has been set for another round of United States-Iraq-Iran talks. 

We have been willing for some time to participate in further trilateral talks with 

Iran on security in Iraq, at the request of the Government of Iraq. The Iranians 

have repeatedly found reasons not to come to the table. We remain open to further 

talks when the circumstances indicate that these would be helpful to improve security in Iraq. 

Question. What is the latest on the situation in northern Iraq between Turkey and 

the PKK? What is the status of tripartite diplomatic efforts between Turkey, Iraq, 

and the United States? What role do you see for the Kurdistan Regional Government in this process? 

Answer. The United States recognizes the PKK terrorist organization as a common enemy of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. Over the past several weeks, 

the Turkish military has continued to carry out air strikes against the PKK in 

northern Iraq, which has become more active as the weather in northern Iraq has 

improved. 

We also continue to press for increased diplomatic engagement between Turkey 

and Government of Iraq officials in Baghdad in coordination with regional officials 

from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil. We continue to strongly 

urge the KRG to cooperate with both the Turkish Government and Iraqi Government to confront the threat posed by the PKK. Recently we have observed encouraging movement toward such cooperation by officials in Ankara, Baghdad, and 

Erbil. 

Question. In your September testimony you told the committee that a meeting of 

Iraq’s neighbors last year had discussed the idea of creating a permanent secretariat. Has that happened? If not, why not? 

Answer. In lieu of a Secretariat, the participants in the Expanded Neighbors process have created an ad hoc Support Mechanism. Participants in the April 22 Expanded Neighbors Ministerial approved the Terms of Reference of the Ad Hoc Support Mechanism. The Support Mechanism is located in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs in Baghdad and is actively assisted by the United Nations on substantive, 

technical, and organizational issues. The Support Mechanism is intended to liaise 

with Member States on preparing for upcoming meetings, developing draft agendas, 

maintaining records of decisions reached, and carrying out other administrative 

tasks necessary to ensure that the process continues to be successful. 

Question. On February 14, during his trip to the region, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, said that he did not believe that conditions 

currently exist for safe and sustainable returns in Iraq. Necessary conditions according to the United Nations include refugees being free of fear from discrimination 

and persecution, and confident of their physical safety and material security. 

• Do you concur that these conditions should be used as standards when assessing the appropriateness of returns? 

• Do you believe that these conditions currently exist in Iraq? Do you believe that 

Iraq is safe enough for refugees and IDPs to be going home? 

Answer. We support UNHCR’s assessment that the situation in Iraq does not yet 

merit the promotion of large-scale refugee returns. We do support planning for refugee and IDP returns and have been actively engaged with the GOI to develop the 

policy guidance, infrastructure, and basic service requirements that need to be in 

place to support large-scale returns. We have urged UNHCR to develop and conduct, 

in coordination with the Government of Iraq (GOI), a Returns Assessment identifying these same elements in areas of anticipated returns. The terms of reference 

for that assessment have been finalized and we expect a final report in June. We 

have also supported the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in its 

collaboration with the GOI to finalize the National Policy on Iraq Displacement that 

would provide overall policy guidance to the GOI in assisting returnees to reintegrate back into their communities. 

Question. On November 26, 2007, you sent a letter to Prime Minister al-Maliki 

recommending that he issue an Executive order to coordinate government action 

related to Iraqi refugees. The letter outlined a number of recommendations, with the 

suggestion that they be dealt with by the end of January 2008: First, for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration to develop a mandate. Second, for the Ministry 

330 

to develop a National Policy. Third, for the Ministry to establish an interministerial 

committee to address issues faced by internally displaced persons and returning refugees. Fourth, for the Ministry to develop a clear role for Iraqi Security Forces in 

relation to internally displaced persons and returning refugees. Fifth, for the Ministry to delineate a clear legal framework for returning refugees and internally displaced persons. 

• To what degree has the Iraqi Government addressed these recommendations? 

If so, which ones? If not, what are the impediments? Are you continuing to raise 

these recommendations and urge that they be undertaken? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq has responded to several of the recommendations made in our November 26 letter to Prime Minister Maliki. The Basic Law, 

which establishes the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) as an official Ministry, was submitted to the Council of Representatives (COR) for approval 

earlier this year and awaits further review. 

In April 2008, the MODM finalized a National Policy which defines its day-to-day 

operations. The policy was approved by the Council of Ministers (COM) for approval 

on May 20; it permits the MODM to develop a detailed action plan on displacement 

and returns. 

MODM has begun work on a returns plan. The Ministry has prepared an addi- tional budget request of $195 million that would be used to provide support to up 

to 100,000 returning families. The COM has appointed an interministerial group, 

consisting of MODM, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

and the Ministry of Finance, to work on the returns plan in order to get this budget 

passed. 

The Government of Iraq still needs to delineate a role for the Iraqi Security 

Forces in relation to displaced Iraqis and establish a legal framework on returns, 

as per recommendations four and five in our letter to PM Maliki. The National Policy on displacement and the returns plan underway may address these issues. 

Embassy and Department officials continue to engage the Government of Iraq at 

high levels on the issues of IDPs and refugee returnees. Embassy staff meet with 

senior officials of the Government of Iraq, the MODM, and UNAMI/UNHCR on a 

regular basis to ensure a unified USG and international community message to the 

Iraqis and to bring maximum pressure to bear for urgent senior-level Government 

of Iraq attention to the humanitarian situation of its displaced citizens. 

Question. How much financial support has the Government of Iraq given to its 

neighbors to support the needs of Iraqi refugees? What is your view of this level 

of assistance, given the resources of the Government of Iraq? Do you have any sense 

of the future spending plans of the Government of Iraq to respond to the continuing 

needs of Iraqi internally displaced persons and refugees? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq (GOI) pledged $25 million to support Iraq’s 

neighbors that have taken in Iraqi refugees. Of that amount, $15 million has been 

disbursed to Syria and $2 million to Lebanon. The GOI earmarked $8 million for 

Jordan, but the funds have not yet been disbursed. The U.S. Government continues 

to encourage the GOI to increase its refugee assistance, as such increases would improve the living conditions of Iraqi refugees and advance relations between the GOI 

and its neighbor countries. 

The GOI recognizes the importance of providing assistance to internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) and preventing the current situation from deteriorating. It has allocated increasing amounts to the Ministry of Displacement and Migration each year 

since 2005. The Ministry received an allocation of $3.7 million in 2005 and $17.6 

million in 2008, $7.8 million of which is for social benefits. 

With the assistance of the U.S. Government and the United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the GOI has increased its assistance to the displaced. The 

GOI has finalized the National Policy on Iraq Displacement and has submitted to 

the Council of Representatives the Basic Law formally establishing the Ministry of 

Displacement and Migration. With the U.N., the GOI is planning an international 

conference in June to discuss and review its plans to support the return of displaced 

persons. The Iraq Cabinet recently approved a $195 million plan drafted by the 

MODM that will support the return of displaced families. President Bush recently 

called on the GOI to use its increasing resources to aid all Iraqis, including IDPs 

and refugees. 

Question. In his trip to the region last month, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that humanitarian aid in Syria and Jordan may have to 

scale back dramatically within the next several months because of underfunding. 

Last month I sent, with several of my colleagues, a letter to the President urging 

the United States to fund 50 percent of the estimated $900 million that will be necVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00338 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
331 

essary to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) in 2008. While I welcome the $275 million that the President requested in the 2008 Emergency Supplemental, it is not enough. Furthermore, the 

President’s 2009 budget request did not include any funding to support Iraqi refugees and IDPs. 

• What is your understanding of why the 2009 budget request did not include 

funding for assistance to Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons based 

upon its best assessment of the needs? • Are you concerned about insufficient international support to meet the projected 

needs for Iraqi refugees and IDPs in 2008? What are you doing to assure that 

calls for assistance are adequately funded? 

Answer. The administration requested $141 million in MRA as part of its FY 2009 

supplemental request specifically to assist Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons and conflict victims. This request demonstrates the administration’s continued 

commitment to support Iraqi refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims. 

We remain concerned that the international community, including the Government of Iraq, has not stepped forward to adequately fund Iraqi refugee assistance 

projects. Ambassador Foley raised our concerns during his travel to the gulf and 

Europe in late March when he encouraged greater engagement on the part of regional countries and traditional European donors in helping displaced Iraqis, including stepping up their respective contributions to international humanitarian appeals. The Secretary also highlighted the need for increased collaboration on the 

part of European and regional countries in assisting Iraqi refugees during the April 

22 Expanded Neighbors of Iraq Ministerial meeting in Kuwait. Embassy Baghdad 

is also actively engaged at senior levels with the Government of Iraq (GOI) encouraging the GOI to make substantial contributions to international humanitarian appeals and bilaterally to countries hosting large numbers of Iraqi refugees. 

Question. In his trip to the region last month, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that humanitarian aid in Syria and Jordan may have to 

scale back dramatically within the next several months because of underfunding. 

Last month I sent, with several of my colleagues, a letter to the President urging 

the United States to fund 50 percent of the estimated $900 million that will be necessary to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) in 2008. While I welcome the $275 million that the President 

requested in the 2008 Emergency Supplemental, it is not enough. Furthermore, the 

President’s 2009 budget request did not include any funding to support Iraqi refugees and IDPs. 

• What is the United States doing to protect Iraq’s fragile ethnic and minority 

groups (such as Yazidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Mandeans, Sabeans, Shabaks, 

Turkmen, etc.) from terrorist and sectarian attacks, ethnic cleansing, physical 

intimidation, and economic dislocation? 

Answer. Since 2003, the U.S. Government has been the single largest contributor of humanitarian assistance for Iraqis, providing nearly $1.2 billion to date, including 

$208 million in FY 2008 with additional assistance to follow. Regarding the FY 2009 

supplemental request, the administration requested $141 million in Migration and 

Refugee Assistance (MRA) and an additional $45 million in International Disaster 

Assistance (IDA) specifically to assist Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons, 

and conflict victims. This new request demonstrates the administration’s continued 

commitment to support Iraqi refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims. 

The Government of Iraq is focused on improving and maintaining security for all 

Iraqis, including its ethnic minority citizens. When the fight against al-Qaeda in 

Iraq shifted to the northern province of Ninawa, which is also home to a large number of religious minorities, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made it a priority 

to send Iraqi forces to the area. Iraqi Security Forces, with support from coalition 

forces, continue their campaign to bolster security in the area. In fact, this support 

deters criminal organizations from targeting and intimidating minority groups. 

Our PRT and coalition forces have been working closely with the Iraqi Security 

Forces to ensure that Christians from Ninawa are recruited into the Iraqi Police 

Force. The Iraqi police in Ninawa are in the process of filling 700 positions with 

Christians from the area to serve in their own communities. By maintaining a 

diverse police force, Iraq will be in a better position to protect its religiously and 

politically diverse minority communities. 

Question. Ambassador Satterfield testified to the committee that one of the elements to be negotiated in the Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq is Iraq’s consent 

to ‘‘the conduct of combat operations and associated detainee operations.’’ 

• What sorts of combat operations are anticipated? 

332 

• Would U.S. forces be permitted to conduct combat operations on their own, 

without any Iraqi participation or approval? 

• Would there be any limitations on such operations? 

• Against whom would the United States be ‘‘authorized’’ by the Iraqis to conduct 

combat operations? 

Answer. U.S. forces currently conduct military operations as part of the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I), which is authorized by the U.N. Security Council under 

UNSCR 1546 as continued by UNSCR 1790 (2007) to take ‘‘all necessary measures 

to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.’’ With the anticipated expiration of the mandate of MNF–I in December 2008, the United States and 

Iraq will discuss appropriate authority from the Government of Iraq for U.S. forces 

to continue to undertake military operations in Iraq. We expect to preserve the operational flexibility needed to allow U.S. forces to be effective, and we will continue 

to discuss with the Government of Iraq the precise modalities involved in ensuring 

this flexibility. The majority of MNF–I operations are already conducted in close coordination with Iraqi forces, and this coordination would undoubtedly continue and 

grow as the security situation evolves. As with other negotiations, we do not publicly 

discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating partners, on key issues. 

We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept fully informed as the 

negotiations proceed; briefings have already begun, and will continue. 

Question. What sorts of detention authorities are anticipated in the SOFA? Will 

they likely match the detention authority currently provided for under the relevant 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions? 

Answer. We expect the Iraqi justice system, as it continues to grow in capacity, 

to take the lead role in conducting detention and imprisonment tasks. As with other 

negotiations, we do not publicly discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our 

negotiating partners, on key issues. We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already 

begun, and will continue. 

Question. Is it possible or even likely that the SOFA will require that individuals 

detained by U.S. forces ultimately be turned over to the Iraqis? 

Answer. As with other negotiations, we do not publicly discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating partners, on key issues. We will ensure, however, 

that Members of Congress are kept fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already begun, and will continue. 

Question. When is the last time that you discussed with the Iraqis the possibility 

of extending the Multi-National Force’s mandate under the U.N. Security Council 

Resolutions? 

Answer. On November 26, 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister signed the 

Declaration of Principles for a Long Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship, in which the two leaders affirmed Iraq’s goal of ending its status under chapter VII. In his letter to the U.N. Security Council on December 7, 2007, requesting 

a 1-year extension of the U.N. mandate, Prime Minister Maliki wrote that the Government of Iraq considered this to be its final request to the Security Council for 

extension of the mandate. 

Question. Assuming that the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic 

Framework Agreement are presented to the Iraqi Council of Representatives for 

approval, how confident are you that the Council will in fact approve these two 

documents? 

Answer. The United States and Iraq are negotiating agreements that will be in 

the best interests of both countries. We believe those who review the documents will 

come to that conclusion. However, we cannot predict how the Council of Representatives will act. 

Question. The Declaration of Principles that President Bush and Prime Minister 

al-Maliki signed last November contemplates ‘‘providing security assurances and 

commitments’’ to Iraq to ‘‘deter foreign aggression against Iraq.’’ What sources of 

foreign aggression does Iraq worry about? 

Answer. Leaders within the Government of Iraq have made public statements on 

several occasions noting their concerns about foreign aggression. For example, a 

number of Iraqis, both inside and outside the government, are increasingly concerned about malign Iranian influence in their country manifested through the 

funding, training, and supplying of militias in Iraq. In addition, Syria continues to 

harbor former Iraqi regime elements, and foreign fighters continue to enter Iraq 

333 

from Syrian territory. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which consists mainly of non-Iraqis, is also 

an ongoing threat. 

Question. The committee has heard reports that former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad 

Allawi and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi, both of whom are previous visitors of President Bush to the White House, expressed interest in traveling 

to the United States, but believed they were discouraged from doing so by the U.S. 

Embassy. 

• Have Dr. Allawi or Dr. Pachachi applied for visas or otherwise been in touch 

with the Embassy regarding a visit to the United States? 

• What is the status of these applications? 

Answer. See below. 

[Please note that the information provided in response to these two questions will 

not be printed in this hearing. The information was derived from visa records and 

it is therefore confidential and protected from unauthorized disclosure under Section 

222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1202(f), and, in accordance 

with that law, may only be used for the ‘‘formulation, amendment, administration, 

or enforcement of the immigration, nationality, or other laws of the United States.’’] 

Question. Does the Embassy support their plans to visit the United States? 

Answer. The Embassy supports the travel of all qualified visa applicants, including officials or former officials of the Government of Iraq. The Embassy notes that 

Dr. Pachachi is currently a member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR). 

Dr. Allawi is also a member of the COR and is Iraqyya’s bloc leader in the COR. 

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

OUR STRATEGIC GOALS IN IRAQ

Question. The President has said our strategic goal in Iraq is: ‘‘A free Iraq that 

is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself, and be a strong 

ally in this war against radicals and who would do us harm.’’ Where are we in meeting each of the objectives? What is your best estimate as to when Iraq will meet 

these objectives? 

Answer. The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally 

in the war on terror. The United States is pursuing this goal along political, security, economic, and diplomatic lines of operation. The security environment in Iraq 

continues to improve, with all major indicators reduced 40 to 80 percent from 

presurge levels. Civilian deaths are 65 percent lower than July 2007 levels and 75 

percent lower than the peak number of monthly deaths that occurred in the last 

2 months of 2006 at the height of the sectarian violence. The impetus for violence 

in Iraq remains the communal struggle for power and resources. However, in many 

areas of the country, Iraqis now settle these differences through debate and the 

political process rather than violent measures. Other factors that contribute to a 

long-term reduction in violence include coalition and Iraqi forces’ operations against 

al-Qaeda in Iraq and their Sunni extremist allies, the revitalization of sectors of the 

Iraqi economy, local reconciliation measures, and the government’s actions to crack 

down on militias. Perhaps more importantly, the government’s success in Basra and 

Sadr City against militias, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Groups, has reinforced a widespread attitudinal shift in the population toward 

greater rejection of militias. This rejection, while still developing, is potentially as 

significant for Iraq as the Sunni rejection over the past 18 months of al-Qaeda in 

Iraq’s indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and extremist ideology. 

These gains are very significant; however, they can be reversed if not accompanied by continued progress toward national reconciliation and economic development. In that broader sense, the government’s efforts in Basra demonstrated two 

very positive and long-awaited improvements. First, the government demonstrated 

its willingness to confront criminal militias and extremists, regardless of sectarian 

identity. As a result, the government achieved broader support, which it is now 

applying toward other political challenges. Second, Iraqi forces assumed the lead 

and, after some initial difficulties, executed a significant counterinsurgency operation, winning the support of the majority of Basrawis and a greater share of the 

Iraqi population, all the while developing a sense of confidence that enabled more 

effective operations. The Iraqis have capitalized on the Basra operation by conducting additional major operations elsewhere in Basra province, in Sadr City and 

334 

other Baghdad neighborhoods, and in Ninawa province. Iraqi Security Forces 

continue to grow in size and capabilities, but at varying rates. In the northern provinces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces and Iraqi Army battalions operate independently or side by side with coalition forces, demonstrating proficiency in counterinsurgency operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups. In many 

population centers, such as Ramadi and Kirkuk, the Iraqi Police are in the lead for 

population security, performing well and earning the trust of the population. In the 

opening days of the Basra offensive, performance was mixed, but new units that 

performed poorly in March have already been retrained and are now conducting offensive operations in Basra. Since then, Iraqi Security Forces in Baghdad and 

Ninawa are performing effectively, particularly when assisted by coalition advisors, 

reconnaissance and surveillance assets, close air support, and other key enablers. 

The Joint Headquarters and Division staffs have demonstrated an improved capability in terms of deploying and sustaining Iraqi Army units in battle and more sophisticated planning for operations. 

The Government of Iraq continues to assume broader ownership of Iraq’s security 

programs. Iraq’s security ministries have improved their ability to execute their 

budgets but still require increased capacity to man, train, sustain, and field forces. 

The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior training capacity continues to 

expand but will require more time to fully address the training demand backlog. 

The current shortage of Iraqi Security Force leaders will take years to overcome, 

but several measures are in place to address this problem, including rehiring former 

officers and noncommissioned officers. Both ministries lack all the institutional capacity needed and have found it difficult to make procurement decisions in a timely 

manner. The current security and political environment has become more hospitable to 

compromises across sectarian and ethnic divides, while expanding oil export revenues have generated the capital resources needed to support the emerging set of 

development and reconciliation programs. However, recent debates within the Government of Iraq related to the Provincial Powers Law and ministerial appointments, 

as well as considerable bureaucracy and continuing challenges with corruption and 

sectarian behavior suggest that development of governmental capacity will require 

time and effort. In general, the Council of Representatives has shown a greater willingness and capability to address difficult issues, having passed a package of important laws in early 2008 and making progress on the provincial elections law currently being debated. 

Negotiations continue to formalize a bilateral relationship between Iraq and the 

United States. The Iraqis view the development of this relationship as a strong 

affirmation of their sovereignty, placing them on a par with other U.S. allies. The 

Government of Iraq continues to assume greater provincial security responsibility 

through the Provincial Iraqi Control process. Nine of eighteen provinces have 

assumed Provincial Iraqi Control, and the remaining provinces are progressing well. 

Anbar and Qadisiyah are expected to transition to Iraqi control in the early summer 

of 2008. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are helping provincial development by strengthening local government capacity, political and economic development, reconciliation, 

rule-of-law implementation, and basic services delivery. Their support of provincial 

governments was essential in the effort to develop Provincial Development Strategies, which outline the provincial objectives and areas of focus for the next 3 to 5 

years, for 17 of the 18 Iraqi provinces. Macroeconomic data illustrates the extent 

of progress achieved in developing a healthy economic environment in which employment and business can expand. The United States Treasury Department reports 

that the Iraqi economy grew 4 percent in real terms in 2007 and projects the Iraqi 

economy to grow 7 percent in real terms for 2008, reaching an estimated gross 

domestic product of $60.9 billion. Oil production increases of 9–10 percent this 

year—coupled with the higher prices of oil—should drive growth in that sector and 

support increased government spending. The nonoil sector is likely to grow at 3 percent. Core inflation fell to 12 percent in 2007 compared to 32 percent in 2006—the 

result of the combination of an improving security environment in the second half 

of 2007, tight monetary policy throughout 2007, and dinar appreciation of 7 percent 

against the euro and 20 percent against the United States dollar from November 

2006 through the end of 2007. Lower inflation rates improved Iraqi purchasing 

power for basic needs and provided a more stable environment in which the private 

sector could grow. The Government of Iraq’s ability to execute its capital budget, 

while steadily improving, remains constrained by spending units’ lack of capacity 

and cumbersome budgetary approval and funding processes. Despite these difficulties, the overall trend for capital budget execution continues to improve, allowing 

the Government of Iraq to spend or commit 72 percent of its $10B capital budget 

335 

for 2007 by year’s end. Provincial budget execution also improved overall, but 

progress was uneven. Due to greater emphasis by government leaders, Iraqis have 

seen an increase, albeit uneven, in the delivery of essential services such as electricity, water, sanitation, and health care. Despite these improvements, the population’s level of satisfaction with essential services remains low. While the Government of Iraq acknowledges it has the revenues to support large projects, budget and 

program execution rates demonstrate that the Government of Iraq needs to develop 

greater ability to execute programs on the scale required. This is a critical deficiency, because improving the delivery of essential services in places like Basra, 

Sadr City, and Mosul is essential for the Iraqi Government to swing popular support 

away from militias and insurgents and toward the central government. The coalition 

is working with the Government of Iraq to improve ministerial capacity. 

We continue to believe that we will have established sufficient stability to enable 

a reduction to 15 Brigade Combat Teams by July 2008. Subsequent reductions will, 

as I explained in the April testimony, be based on conditions on the ground. 

Question. In 2004 you stated ‘‘any army of liberation has a certain half-life before 

it becomes an army of occupation.’’ You have also stated that the typical insurgency 

lasts at least 9 or 10 years. What is your best military judgment as to the half-life 

of our military operations in Iraq? Are we seen by most Iraqis as an army of liberation or of occupation? As we begin the sixth year of military operations in Iraq, what 

is your best military judgment as to how far into their lifespan the current insurgency—or, if you will, insurgencies—in Iraq are? 

Answer. Since we began last year to emphasize the security of the Iraqi population and to orient our Joint Campaign Plan toward establishing sustainable security in Iraq, many Iraqis have come to view the presence of coalition forces in their 

country as a necessary part of a ‘‘reliberation’’ of the country from extremist groups 

and other malign forces that the Iraqi people have come to reject. Our emphasis 

over the past year on partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces also means that 

in the vast majority of our security operations we are seen alongside Iraqi forces 

at every step, rather than operating independently. Furthermore, as the Iraqi Security Forces have undertaken their own ‘‘surge’’ over the past year, adding well over 

100,000 members to their ranks, they have increasingly taken the lead in security 

operations around the country. The ongoing ISF-led campaigns to secure Basra and 

Mosul are models in this regard, with capable Iraqi forces in the lead and coalition 

forces providing support and combat enabler systems that the Iraqis do not yet 

have. In general, there is a greater acceptance today among the Iraqi people of our 

supporting role in establishing sustainable security, while we in the coalition forces 

take care that our actions reinforce to the Iraqis that we recognize and respect their 

sovereignty—and help them to defend it. 

IRAN

Question. President Bush recently designated the Iranian Quds Force, part of the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a terrorist organization under Executive Order 

13224, for providing material support to terrorists. According to press reports, General Qassem Suleimani, the commanding general of the Quds Force played a role 

in negotiating the cease-fire between Maliki’s government and Muqtada al-Sadr. 

What role did Iran play in negotiating the cease-fire? How much influence does Iran 

exert in Basra? On the Government in Baghdad? On the Kurds? How does it exercise that influence? Do the United States and Iran have any common interests in 

Iraq? 

Answer. Iran facilitated the Basra cease-fire negotiations between members of the 

Government of Iraq and Muqtada al-Sadr in Qom, Iran. Iranian officials, including 

Qassem Suleimani, reportedly helped draft a cease-fire document. Prime Minister 

Maliki, however, continued operations in Basra until Iraqi Security Forces achieved 

his objective of disarming the militia groups there and restoring government control 

throughout the city. Iran seeks to create economic dependencies in Basra through 

the provision of electrical power, banking services, infrastructure investment, and 

the sale of Iranian products in Basrawi markets. Separately, Iran supports Shia 

militias with funds, training and weapons as a means of exerting and maintaining 

influence. Iraqi Security Forces discovered numerous large ammunition caches in 

Basra while clearing Jaysh al-Mahdi-dominated neighborhoods, to include substantial quantities of Iranian-produced explosively formed penetrator and improvised explosive device components, rockets, small arms and numerous mortar and artillery 

rounds of various calibers—including some manufactured as recently as February 

2008. Iranian influence on the Government of Iraq has been substantial, although 

there are signs its influence may increasingly be resented by Iraqi leaders and citiVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00343 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
336 

zens. Iranian Government officials maintain ties with Iraqis who lived in exile in 

Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime. Iran provides funds to various Shia political parties in addition to providing training, weapons, and funding to Shia militias 

such as the Jaysh al-Mahdi. Iran exerts influence by acting as a moderator in disputes between the government and Muqtada al-Sadr. Additionally, Iran has built 

power lines linking several border cities to the Iranian electrical power grid and has 

recently offered a $1 billion loan for reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, provided 

Iraq employs Iranian contractors and labor for associated construction projects. 

However, Prime Minister Maliki and other members of the Shia-led government 

publicly expressed frustration with Iran following the clashes in Basra and Sadr 

City, blaming the recent intra-Shia violence on Iranian provision of lethal aid to 

Shia militias. 

The Kurdistan Regional Government seeks to maintain cordial relations with the 

United States and Iran, with whom the region shares a large land border. Iranian 

officials maintain ties to several Kurdistan Regional Government leaders, including 

Iraqi President Jalal Talibani, dating to the Saddam Hussein regime, when Iran 

and Kurdish officials shared a common antipathy toward the Baathist government. 

Iran seeks to exert influence in the Kurdish-administered area by creating economic 

dependencies through investment, reconstruction, and infrastructure projects, provision of electrical power and trade. Following the September 2007 detention of highranking Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force officer Mahmoud Farhadi 

in the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, Iran attempted to apply economic pressure on 

the Kurdistan Regional Government for his release by closing all border crossings 

to Iran, halting trade for approximately 2 weeks before realizing that the action was 

hurting Iran’s economy and creating resentment in Iraq. 

Iranian long-term interests in Iraq include ensuring a Shia-dominated, friendly 

government in Baghdad, strengthening economic ties between Iran and Iraq, and 

ensuring access for Iranian pilgrims to Shia religious sites in Iraq. The United 

States and Iran share an interest in a stable Iraq, however, Iran’s apparently seeks 

a weak Iraq that it can dominate and is not likely to share or support U.S. policies 

in the region or in the war on terror. 

THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. How many Iraqi battalions do you judge to be fully capable of planning, 

executing, and sustaining independent operations Level I combat readiness? How 

many Iraqi battalions are at Level II readiness, meaning they are ‘‘in the lead’’ in 

the counterinsurgency effort? 

Answer. The Operation Readiness Assessment (ORA) level is determined though 

the use of specific criteria and mathematical formula based on percentages of 

assigned soldiers, leaders, and equipment. Iraqi leaders tend to find the ORA 

method of assessment to be too mechanical and prefer to focus on a unit’s demonstrated capability for performing actual missions, which is typically referred to as 

‘‘in the lead.’’ Depending upon local security conditions, Iraqi Army units at ORA 

I, II, or III may all be ‘‘in the lead’’ for conducting counterinsurgency operations in 

their assigned sectors. As of 11 May, 2008, there are a total of 121 Iraqi Army and 

National Police combat battalions capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

independent counterinsurgency operations. Iraqi Army battalions make up 111 of 

the 121, and 10 Iraqi National Police battalions make up the remainder. The 111 

Iraqi Army battalions consist of 107 Iraqi Army combat and 4 Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) battalions, which are fully capable of planning, executing, and 

sustaining independent operations and are in the lead for counterinsurgency operations. Of the 111 Iraqi Army units, there are currently 12 Iraqi battalions that are 

rated Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) level I, 80 that are rated ORA level 

II, and 19 that are rated ORA level III. There are 10 ORA level II battalions within 

the Ministry of Interior; 9 are National Police battalions and 1 is an Emergency 

Response Unit (ERU) capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. 

Question. Of these level I and level II units, how many are of mixed tribal, ethnic 

and sectarian affiliation—and how many are comprised of members of the same ethnic, sectarian, or tribal affiliation? 

Answer. The Iraqi Army is an integrated, national army comprised of the many 

ethnicities that make up the country of Iraq. There is currently no method for tracking tribal, ethnic, or sectarian affiliation for the entire Iraqi Army. Units do tend 

to have recruits from the general area of Iraq in which they are based; however, 

they also get recruits from across the country and deploy throughout it as well. For 

example, two of the brigades operating in predominantly Shia Basra province are 

337 

from Anbar province, a nearly exclusive Sunni area; however, the units are mixed 

in their ethnosectarian makeup. 

The Iraqi Army and National Police have proven to be generally effective, nonsectarian organizations over the past year, completing over 20 major deployments 

throughout the country conducting counterinsurgency operations. 

The National Police (NP) provide the Government of Iraq with a rapid response 

paramilitary police force capable of countering large scale civil disobedience, enforcing law and order and responding to national emergencies. Their capabilities are 

similar to the Iraqi Army. Although initially recruited almost exclusively from the 

Baghdad area and once heavily influenced by militias and sectarian agendas, the 

National Police have undergone serious retraining and revetting of the entire force 

over the past 18 months resulting in a capable and less sectarian influenced organization. Recent plans now have the development of the entire Sunni-manned Abu 

Risha Brigade formed from forces recruited and trained from Al Anbar province. 

While there is no dedicated method to track the ethnicity of soldiers in units, 

there is a concerted effort made during Iraqi selection boards to ensure command 

selection rates are representative of all ethnicities across Iraq. Demographics of 

Iraqi Army leadership are tracked and monitored by coalition forces and embedded 

Transition Teams to ensure unit leadership does not display sectarian trends, can 

maintain impartiality, and will serve all of Iraq’s people. A small number of Iraqi 

Army commanders have been relieved of duties for sectarian issues and several others have been relieved for corruption. 

The Iraqi Army has largely been able to transcend sectarian agendas by fostering 

a strong esprit de corps and sense of nationalism. The units are composed of many 

different ethnicities but each is striving toward the same goal; a safer more secure 

Iraq. 

REQUEST FOR DATA

Question. How many contractors in Iraq have their salaries paid for by American 

taxpayers? Of these, how many are American, how many are Iraqi, and how many 

are third-country nationals? 

Answer. Per the results of the Fiscal Year 2008, First Quarter Contractor Census, 

there were 163,591 contractors reported in Iraq under Department of Defense Contracts. Of the 163,591 contractors reported, 31,325 are United States citizens, 75,898 

are local nationals, and 56,368 are third country nationals. 

Question. Could you please provide the committee, for the public record, updated 

versions of the following charts which accompanied your testimony to include the 

entire duration of the war—weekly security incidents (chart 2), civilian deaths 

(chart 3), ethnosectarian violence (chart 4), high-profile attacks (chart 5), and caches 

found and cleared (chart 7)? 

Answer. The attachment contains requested updates to the testimony charts. Data 

is not available prior to 2004. Data for ethnosectarian deaths is not available prior 

to 2006. 

338 


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339 


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340 

Question. Prime Minister al-Maliki has called for the dissolution of the entire 

Jaysh al-Mahdi, not just the so-called ‘‘Special Groups.’’ What is the difference between the Special Groups and the mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi? Does Prime Minister 

al-Maliki make a distinction between the two? Does Muqtada al-Sadr? How many 

Special Groups members do you assess there to be? How many members are there 

of the mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi? 

Answer. Jaysh al-Mahdi is not a single, cohesive organization with clear delineations between mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi and Special Groups; rather, networks and 

membership are interwoven, with Special Group leaders and members typically recruited from JAM and often still connected to them during operations. Prior to 25 

March 2008, it was estimated that the Jaysh al-Mahdi contained 25,000 and 40,000 

total members, including the Special Groups. Mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi are generally 

Muqtada al-Sadr loyalists who have complied with his August 2007 ‘‘freeze’’ order, 

February 2008 ‘‘freeze’’ extension, and subsequent cease-fire orders. 

Special Groups accounted for approximately 5–10 percent of the total strength of 

Jaysh al-Mahdi. Special Groups have evolved since they were originally formed by 

Muqtada al-Sadr as a counter to coalition forces. Special Groups, of which there are 

several different subentities that share the name, are Iranian trained, equipped, 

and funded, employ relatively sophisticated armaments and weapons systems, and 

often operate outside of Sadr’s control. 

Muqtada al-Sadr has attempted to differentiate between loyalists, mainstream 

Jaysh al-Mahdi and loyal Special Groups, and noncompliant Special Groups. Prime 

Minster Maliki also seems to recognize the distinctions between Jaysh al-Mahdi and 

Special Groups, but the current operations in Basra and Sadr City tended to blur 

any substantial distinctions, as Special Groups tended to work with JAM and to use 

JAM to provide security for them. 

IRAQI QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

Question. How many al-Qaeda operatives do you estimate there to be in Iraq? 

What is the approximate breakdown between Iraqis and foreign fighters? 

Answer. MNF–I estimates that AQI is comprised of approximately 1,200 to 3,000 

personnel in April 2008. AQI is primarily made up of Iraqis, but it is the only group 

among the Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq known to have foreign facilitators in key 

leadership roles. MNF–I assesses foreign terrorists comprise approximately 10 percent of AQI (approximately 120–300 personnel). 


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341 

THE ISLAMIC SUPREME COUNCIL OF IRAQ

Question. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq is a key partner of the United 

States in Iraq, though it has strong ties with Iran. What is the relationship of ISCI 

and its affiliated Badr Organization with Iran and the Quds Force? Has the Badr 

Organization ever formally been a part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps? 

Would you characterize the relationship between ISCI and Iran as stronger, weaker, 

or about the same as the relationship the Sadr Trend enjoys with Iran? Which party 

do Iraqis perceive as more closely aligned with Iran—ISCI or the Sadr Trend? 

Answer. Some members of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the 

Badr Organization maintain links to Iran that they formed during their decades of 

exile while the regime of Saddam Hussein was in power. Although ISCI and the 

Badr Organization seek to publicly distance themselves from Iran, some senior current and former Badr Organization members maintain ties with Iranian intelligence 

and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Badr Organization traces 

its origins to the 9th Badr Division, founded in Iran in 1983. It was later renamed 

the Badr Corps. Badr Corps was subordinate to the IRGC, with financial support 

from the Iranian Government and its basing arrangements on Iranian territory. Following Iraq’s liberation in 2003, Badr Corps reorganized itself into a political party, 

the Badr Organization. Its former forces were integrated into the Iraqi Security 

Forces, with the exception of elements that transitioned into service as security 

guards for ISCI offices. The ISCI and Badr relationships with Iran are substantially 

different from the Sadr Trend’s relationship, and therefore it is difficult to make 

direct comparisons. ISCI and Badr have deep historical ties to Iran, but the groups 

have gradually grown more independent from Iran as they have acquired political 

power in Iraq. The Sadr Trend embraces nationalism as part of its ideology, which 

distances its members ideologically from the Iranians (and the leaders of the Sadr 

movement remained in Iraq during the Saddam regime). In practical terms, however, Sadr’s movement now has strong ties to Iran. The Sadr-associated Special 

Groups and, to a degree, militia receive arms, funding, training, and direction from 

Iran. In addition, Muqtada al-Sadr has resided in Iran for most of the last 18 

months. Iraqis perceive that the Iranians exercise influence over all of these organizations, but tend to view ISCI as more closely aligned with Iran than the Sadr 

Trend. This perception is based on the longer history of association between ISCI 

and Iran, and the fact that the Sadr Trend embraces a nationalist agenda. 

SHIA POLITICS, BASRA AND IRAN

Question. When you testified before the committee in September you described a 

competition in Basra between the Fadhila Party, the Supreme Council and its Badr 

Corps, and Sadr’s party and its Mahdi Army. You added: ‘‘there have been deals 

there recently, and the violence level has just flat plummeted. It’s included some 

release of some Jaysh al-Mahdi figures, and, again, accommodations between all of 

them. Again, for the Shia south, that’s probably OK. These are Iraqi solutions for 

Iraqi problems.’’ What happened between last September and last month that led 

to Maliki’s decision to attack? Why did the violence levels recently climb again after 

previously declining? 

Answer. Local accommodation between groups in Basra, which formed the basis 

for maintaining the peace in the city late last year, had become increasingly threatened by the Sadr militia and criminal activity by early 2008. I think that Prime 

Minister Maliki decided that crime, corruption, and militia activity in Basra had 

reached intolerable levels. For this reason, in late March he initiated Operation 

CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS to defeat criminals and militias in Basra and restore 

the authority of the Government of Iraq. This operation, which is still ongoing, has 

significantly curtailed the activities of armed militias by capturing or killing a 

number of criminals and militia members, degrading their freedom of movement, recovering significant arms and munitions at cache sites, and expanding the Iraq 

Security Force presence in the city and surrounding areas. The initial response of 

criminal gangs and militias to Iraqi military operations in Basra produced a temporary increase in violence in late March and into April. However, as Iraqi Security 

Force operations in Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad’s Sadr City progressed, the level of 

security incidents across Iraq reached the lowest level in more than 4 years and the 

levels in Basra reached historic lows as well. 

Question. Press reports indicate that Prime Minister Maliki is hiring 10,000 

mostly Shia tribesmen to counter the Mahdi Army in Basra and Baghdad, in part 

to counter desertions from the Iraqi Army. What can you tell us about these programs and his plans? Is or will the United States pay monthly stipends to these 

volunteers as we have Sunni Awakening members? What does this say about the 

342 

reliability of Iraqi Security Forces? Do the predominantly Sunni ‘‘Sons of Iraq’’ perceive a sectarian bias and a double standard given the slow rate of their hiring into 

official security forces? 

Answer. Despite press accounts that Prime Minister Maliki at one point planned 

to hire large numbers of Shia tribesmen to provide security, it does not appear that 

this plan has been fully implemented in either Basra or Baghdad. During the initial 

stages of the Basra operation, Iraqi forces utilized local tribesmen to create additional security presence in some areas outside the city. Two tribal security forces 

of approximately battalion size were formed, but the Iraqi Government appears to 

have done little to sustain this effort, and the tribesmen have not been officially 

hired following their initial voluntary assistance to Iraqi forces. Given the fact that 

the government has not pursued this initiative to organize Shia tribal forces, there 

is no reason that this initiative should have caused Sunni Sons of Iraq to perceive 

a double standard. In the meantime, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have proven, 

despite initial difficulty, capable of effectively conducting clearing operations and 

reducing the mafia-like grip of criminal gangs and militias on Basra and, increasingly, on Sadr City. Atmospherics now indicate that most Basrawis and residents 

of Sadr City are grateful for ISF presence and activity in their cities. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD

Question. What is the situation of the Iraqi education system? How many children 

are currently attending school? 

Answer. Although education is culturally very important and highly prized in 

Iraq, the education system faces significant challenges. Degradation of infrastructure over the last three decades and a lack of security in recent years have significantly hampered improvements in the education sector. Action is needed in the following areas in order to improve the country’s educational system: 

• Hire and develop more qualified and experienced staffs and senior ministry officials; • Decentralize authority and support internally proposed improvements; • Develop improved communication and coordination within and between ministries responsible for education; • Improve the quality of strategic planning, needs assessments, and database systems; • Provide additional training for teachers and professors; • Identify and prioritize the areas of highest need for infrastructure and investment development. 

During the 2006–07 academic year (the last year for which we have approximately 

reliable data), four ministries were charged with educating Iraq’s students. Two 

Ministries of Education (Central and KRG) were responsible for approximately 7.1 

million Iraqi children in grades K–12. These ministries are also responsible for vocational education and teacher training institutes. Two Ministries of Higher Education 

and Scientific Research (Central and KRG) were responsible for educating approximately 367,000 undergraduate students (graduating about 75,000 in 2007), and 

20,000 post-graduate students. 

Question. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, can you or anyone in the 

administration assure members of this committee and the American people that the 

$19.2 billion that has been allotted for developing the Iraqi Security Forces since 

2003 is fully accounted for and appropriately allocated? 

Answer. National Security Presidential Directive 36 assigns direction of U.S. 

efforts to organize, train, and equip the Iraqi Security Forces to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of 

Defense. Public Law 109–10, ‘‘Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005,’’ provides for the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The Multi-National Security Transition Command– 

Iraq (MNSTC–I) obligates ISFF to provide equipment, supplies, services and training for the Iraq Security Forces. As the train-and-equip program for Iraq operates 

under the authority of the CENTCOM and is implemented by MNSTC–I, the issue 

of ISFF accountability falls under the aegis of the Department of Defense. 

Question. What is the status of Iraqi hospitals and its public health system? What 

is the ability of Iraqis to access health care? 

Answer. The Iraqi health care system suffered greatly under sanctions from the 

Oil for Food Program due to actions of the Saddam regime. Corruption diverted critVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00350 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
343 

ical resources such as medicines and equipment from hospitals and clinics. Subsequently, intimidation and assassination of Iraq doctors has drastically reduced the 

number of medical professionals in Iraq. Further, it has been difficult for doctors 

to receive continuing medical education training—necessary training to keep their 

skills current. 

In November 2007, Dr. Salih al-Hasnawi was approved by the Council of Ministers as the Minister of Health following the Sadrist block’s withdrawal from the 

Iraqi Cabinet. Since his appointment, we have seen steady progress in addressing 

critical areas that should result in improved health care delivery. For the first time 

in over two decades, Dr. Hasnawi organized a Continuing Medical Education conference in Baghdad in January and has repeated similar smaller conferences since. 

Also, Dr. Hasnawi has submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister a proposal to increase the salary of doctors to encourage the many who have left Iraq to return, 

as well as a request to provide housing for doctors and nurses near hospitals and 

clinics. 

The Iraqi public health system requires further improvements, many of which will 

take time. The Minister of Health has identified the key areas which require attention, such as medicine procurement and distribution, repairing hospitals and clinics 

damaged by insurgents and improving physician training. The Ministry of Health 

is working closely with the United States and other partners to increase the delivery 

of health services. The United States Primary Healthcare Center (PHC) construction 

program will be completed by the end of 2008. We will have turned over 136 newly 

constructed PHCs, across all provinces, to the Ministry of Health. Through our hospital program, we will have completed 25 hospital rehabilitation projects. Seven renovation projects are currently underway now. We are expected to complete construction of the Basra Children’s Hospital, a specialized pediatric oncology hospital and 

training center, this August. The Ministry of Health is currently in the process of 

writing contracts for construction of new hospitals. Through a $1 billion grant from 

the World Bank, the Ministry of Health is constructing approximately six new 

teaching hospitals with 400 beds each. 

Iraqis do have access to health care—doctors are working and clinics and hospitals are open. The reputation of hospitals has improved, and fears of sectarian targeting have significantly decreased. There are Ministry of Health facilities, which 

provide free services, as well as private facilities. In the afternoons and evenings, 

many public service doctors provide care for a fee in their private clinics. Doctors’ 

clinics are busy, often seeing over 100 patients a day. Medical facilities still suffer 

from shortages of supplies and medicines to treat patients. The Ministry of Health 

is working to improve the situation, but it will take time. 

Question. How many Iraqis have access to adequate sanitation and potable drinking water? 

Answer. There are no systematic data on the number of Iraqis actually receiving 

public water and sewage services. When completed projects funded by the USG will 

have the capacity to provide potable water to 8 million Iraqis and sewage service 

to 5 million. However, as a result of leaky distribution network, intermittent electricity supply, and shortages of technical staff, the number receiving service is 

almost certainly smaller than the projects’ capacity. 

There are no systematic data on the current capacity of non-USG-funded potable 

water and sewage plants, but the service actually provided by those plants would 

be subject to the same limitations that affect the USG projects. 

Question. Do Iraqis have adequate access to affordable staple goods such as flour, 

cooking oil, and gasoline? 

Answer. Iraqis generally have access to staples such as food and cooking oil. Taking into account inflation, market prices for food and grains have increased moderately relative to last year’s prices. The people of Iraq are largely insulated from 

the current rise in world food prices, as the Government of Iraq (GOI) supplies the 

bulk of their nonperishable staples under the auspices of the Public Distribution 

System (PDS). The PDS is a program of in-kind food aid given by the Government 

of Iraq to Iraqis, all of whom are officially eligible for PDS rations. An estimated 

20 percent of Iraqis rely heavily or solely on PDS for their food, and another 20– 

25 percent count on PDS to supplement their other food purchases. Major PDS reforms planned in 2008–09 would allow the GOI to better target vulnerable Iraqis 

for assistance as part of a larger social safety net program. 

For the most vulnerable Iraqis, the U.N. World Food Program recently began implementing a food assistance program. It is designed to reach 750,000 people, with 

a focus on those who are not fully covered by PDS and internally displaced people 

(IDPs). 

344 

The GOI has lowered subsidies on refined fuel oils, bringing prices up to regional 

market levels, in line with its commitments under an International Monetary Fund 

(IMF) economic restructuring program. Prices for fuel oil, including cooking gas and 

gasoline, have been steady since June 2007. The primary Iraqi cooking gas, liquefied 

petroleum gas (LPG), costs approximately $2.49 per 12-kilogram cylinder. The price 

of gasoline (about octane 87) is $1.41 per gallon. We are not aware of gasoline or 

cooking gas shortages. 

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD

MISSING U.S.-FUNDED LETHAL EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. Late last summer, the GAO released a report entitled ‘‘DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S. Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,’’ which found 

that the Pentagon had lost track of about 190,000 AK–47 assault rifles, and nearly 

90,000 pistols given to Iraqi Security Forces in 2004 and 2005. In response to this 

egregious dereliction of duty, I authored an amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization Act requiring the President to implement a weapons tracking program which 

mirrors the Foreign Military Sales program that the U.S. uses to track weapons 

shipments to the rest of the world. I am proud to say that it was signed into law. 

The Chief of Mission in a particular country is supposed to be responsible for overseeing U.S. policy on foreign military assistance—not to mention the adherence to 

specific U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 

• What actions have you or your office played in implementing the weapons 

tracking program required by the Defense Authorization Act? 

Answer. The National Defense Authorization Act, 2008, Public Law No. 110–181, 

section 1228, requires the President to implement a policy to control the export and 

transfer of defense articles into Iraq, including the implementation of a registration 

and monitoring system. Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) has implemented many 

policies and procedures which will help meet the intent of this law as it comes into 

effect in late July 2008. First, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 

(MNSTC–I) implemented a database tracking system for weapons accountability. 

Following the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of July 2007, 

MNSTC–I requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) 

conduct an inspection in October 2007. In implementing GAO and DODIG recommendations, MNSTC–I reconciled serial numbers of weapons and created a weapons database. All small arms procured for the Government of Iraq (GOI) through 

MNSTC–I, either from Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) or Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS), are now registered by serial number in this database, which is managed by 

MNSTC–I logistics personnel. Additionally, 100 percent serial number inventories 

were completed on all weapons held at Taji National Depot and Abu Ghraib Warehouse, enabling reconciliation of the database. 

Also, we have also worked to assess and improve Iraq’s internal weapons accountability. In coordination with the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), MNSTC– 

I established an Iraqi/coalition joint inspection team in October 2007 to inspect and 

assess Iraqi Divisions’ equipment records and verify on-hand quantities. MNSTC– 

I was able to establish a baseline of where weapons are located and to provide an 

operational snapshot of accountability in several Iraqi divisions. This data was utilized to reconcile the coalition issue log with Iraqi hand receipts and assess the 

effectiveness of ISF accountability procedures. 

The 3-month audit provided MNSTC–I the first opportunity to exercise end-use 

monitoring with direct support from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Additionally, 

we have further regulated contractor delivery of weapons in-theater. Since September 13, 2007, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) has 

ensured that all weapons contracts to procure and deliver munitions include a number of clauses to increase accountability. Contracts now require vendors and shippers to do the following: Deliver munitions to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of 

entry within Iraq; provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq; post serial numbers on the inside and outside of weapons 

shipping containers; and provide en route visibility of weapons and munitions, to 

include the arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq. 

Question. What steps has the Defense Department taken to track these weapons 

and ensure that they stay out of the hands of Iraqi insurgent groups? 

Answer. MNF–I has contributed to the Defense Department’s efforts by setting 

forth and enforcing comprehensive policies and procedures regarding weapons 

345 

accountability. We have worked to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the 

accountability and control of munitions under U.S. control from entry into Iraq to 

issuance to the ISF. We have increased the number of logistics and property 

accountability specialists in-country (in MNSTC–I, in particular) and increased security procedures throughout the chain of custody. We have also worked with the 

ISF to build their property accountability systems and structures. In July 2007, we 

partnered with the ISF to establish an M–16 Biometrics Program that links individual soldiers to the particular weapons they are issued. Prior to weapons issue, 

each soldier is required to provide biometric data in the form of a retinal scan, a 

voice scan, and fingerprints. In addition, soldiers’ personnel and payroll data are 

verified before a weapon is issued. The final step in the process is to take a picture 

of each soldier holding his new weapon with the serial number visible. Similar biometric procedures have been implemented for Iraqi police badge and weapon issue, 

as well, and the Ministry of Interior requires policemen to present their identification card and weapon in order to receive monthly pay. The fidelity of data and level 

of detail captured in these accountability procedures are significant. 

Question. Can you or anyone in the administration assure members of this committee and the American people that the $19.2 billion that has been allotted for 

developing the Iraqi Security Forces since 2003 is fully accounted for and appropriately allocated? 

Answer. MNSTC–I accounts for and allocates the ISFF. MNSTC–I submits a detailed accounting of ISFF commitments, obligations, and expenditures as part of a 

quarterly report required by section 3303 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ 

Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007. 

MNSTC–I’s quarterly report and the processes it documents are also subjected to 

numerous internal reviews and outside agency audits and inspections. In addition, 

the Department of Defense Inspector General conducted an audit of ISFF execution 

in FY07 (D–2007–060, ‘‘Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest 

Asia, Phase II’’) and determined that MNSTC–I’s obligations of the ISFF ‘‘complied 

with the intent of ’’ the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 

the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005.’’ MNSTC–I has also instituted 

a monthly funds reconciliation and review process in coordination with the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service that led to the deobligation and reallocation of a total of $993 million from FY06/07 and FY07/08 ISFF (as of 29 Feb 08). This process earned 

MNSTC–I the Department of Defense Manager’s Internal Control Plan ‘‘Check It’’ 

Campaign Most Improved Process Award for FY08. 

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN IRAQ

Question. We are spending billions of dollars in reconstruction funding in Iraq. 

And many have argued that Iraq is now better off than it was before. 

• What is the status of Iraqi hospitals and its public health system? 

• What is the ability of Iraqis to access health care? 

• How many Iraqis have access to adequate sanitation and potable drinking 

water? 

• Do Iraqis have adequate access to affordable staple goods such as flour, cooking 

oil, and gasoline? 

• What are the living conditions of the nearly 2 million internally displaced persons living in Iraq? 

• What are the living conditions of the nearly 2 million refugees who have fled 

that conflict to Jordan and Syria? 

• What is the situation of the Iraqi education system? 

• How many children are currently attending school? 

• From a purely humanitarian respect, are the Iraqi people any better off than 

they were 4 years ago? 

Answer. Statistical data from the International Organization for Migration suggests that the humanitarian situation in Iraq varies considerably by province. Many 

Iraqis living in northern and western Iraq indicate a better humanitarian situation 

today as compared to 5 years ago. In part due to the security situation, other Iraqis 

throughout central and southern Iraq have indicated little or negative change in 

their humanitarian situation since 2003. The still inadequate capacity of the Iraqi 

Government has limited the provision of essential services necessary to address 

lacking humanitarian conditions in some areas. The U.S. Mission–Iraq (USM–I) and 

Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) are partnering with Iraqi ministries to develop 

further capacity. 

346 

Access to health care and the quality of the Iraq public health system remain concerns that are being actively addressed by the Iraqi Government and by the coalition. In 2003, Iraqi civilian health care lagged behind the region based on the number of physicians in the country; the ratio of physician-to-population served; health 

care expenditures per capita; lack of equipment maintenance/modernization; 

extremely inefficient national medical supply system, and leading health statistics. 

With improving security conditions, Iraqi health care has shown a measured 

increase in capability throughout the past 12 months, with a clear potential for significant gains within the next 12–24 months. The Iraqi Government, with coalition 

assistance, has now completed the construction of 105 of 137 planned Primary 

Healthcare Centers (PHCs), with the remaining 32 scheduled for completion by September 2008. Also, of the 47 hospital renovation projects in 20 hospitals across the 

country, 32 have been completed with the remainder ongoing. Though a shortage 

of medical providers exists, these infrastructure improvements helped increase the 

capacity of Iraqi medical facilities to treat 3.25 million patients annually in hospitals and 630,000 outpatients annually at PHCs. 

We continue to engage with Iraqi ministries to develop a national health care 

strategy, encourage repatriation of Iraqi physicians, reengineer the Iraqi medical 

supply distribution system, and improve national emergency medical services communication ability. The status of water, wastewater, and solid waste treatment services vary by locale. In partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, the 

U.S. Government has completed the rehabilitation, expansion, and/or construction 

of 21 major water treatment plants and hundreds of small water compact units. 

These projects have restored or added around 2.2 million cubic meters per day of 

treatment capacity, which is sufficient to serve around 7.5 million Iraqis at a standard level of service. To address the recurring challenge in Iraq of a summer outbreak of cholera, we have worked with Iraqi ministries to ensure adequate stocks 

of chlorine are on hand. Many wastewater treatment projects have also been completed and rehabilitated, and results from recent water testing reveal that 87 percent of samples were adequate. Solid waste management in urban areas is conducted by local municipalities and reliability of municipal programs depends heavily 

on local officials. In rural areas, open trench solid waste disposal is the norm. To 

address long-term sustainability issues, MNF–I and USM–I continue to work with 

Iraqi officials to develop operations and maintenance capability and to train staff 

from the relevant ministries. 

Access to staple goods in Iraq is generally good. Iraqis have access to affordable 

staple goods through several means. The first method is through the Public 

Distribution System, a public food program managed by the Ministry of Trade that 

delivers basic food items and commodities to nearly all Iraqis for a nominal fee. The 

system is part of a social safety net that provides the population with 10 products, 

including wheat flour and cooking oil. Besides the commodities provided through the 

Public Distribution System, increased security and stability have allowed many 

markets to reopen, farmers to return to their fields, and food commodities to be imported into the country, thus increasing the availability and affordability of staple 

goods by the average Iraqi. In terms of access to gasoline, the availability of benzene 

and diesel has also increased as the security situation has improved. More petrol 

stations are open, and importation and distribution of refined oil products have increased. The best indicator of that positive change is the lack of vehicle lines at the 

petrol stations. Previously, Iraqis had to wait in long lines to fuel their cars or purchase benzene for their generators. 

According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), conditions among Iraq’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees vary widely. For 

IDPs, conditions vary from governorate to governorate, with an estimated 1 million 

persons in need of adequate shelter, food, and regular income. Around 300,000 individuals do not have regular access to clean water and are in need of legal aid to 

enable them to access other basic services. 

The UNHCR reports that between September 2007 and March 2008 approximately 60,000 displaced Iraqis returned to their homes, with the majority returning 

to Baghdad. The U.N. also reported that the rate of displacement in Iraq is slowing. 

As security conditions improve, USAID, the lead agency for coordinating U.S. Government assistance to IDPs, is working with partner nongovernmental organizations 

and members of the international community to help the Iraqi Government fulfill 

its commitment to improving essential services to IDPs. 

The UNHCR also reports that refugees suffer from a variety of shortages and 

share many of the same limitations on employment and access to services as IDPs. 

To assist its neighboring countries as they care for Iraqi refugees, the GOI has 

pledged to give $25 million ($15 million has been dispersed to Syria, $2 million to 

Lebanon, and $8 million to Jordan). 

347 

The most pressing issue for the Iraqi Education System is the construction and 

rehabilitation of schools. Currently, there are 20,000 schools in Iraq, with an estimated 4,000 more needed to accommodate the large numbers of children enrolled. 

Improved security has had an effect on enrollment, as total primary school enrollment rose by over 180,000 students to 4,334,511 for 2007–2008. Total secondary enrollment for 2006–2007 was 1,491,933; data for the current year is not available. 

There is a sufficient number of teachers, though training is needed to integrate 

modern teaching standards. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR RUSSELL FEINGOLD

Question. A recent report issued by Refugees International noted that ‘‘as a result 

of the vacuum created by the failure of the Iraqi Government and the international 

community to act in a timely and adequate manner, nonstate actors play a major 

role in providing assistance to vulnerable Iraqis.’’ Mr. Ambassador, how are we 

responding to the grave needs of displaced Iraqis? How do the problems identified 

by Refugees International impact plans for national reconciliation? 

Answer. Refugees International identifies a number of issues in its April 2008 

report, including the provision of assistance by nonstate actors, the lack of visible 

U.N. involvement, and absence of conditions for safe and dignified returns. These 

issues are being addressed by the USG, Government of Iraq (GOI), and U.N., so we 

do not believe that they will have a negative impact on national reconciliation 

efforts. 

The United States has been the largest donor to the international humanitarian 

effort to assist displaced and vulnerable Iraqis. Thus far in this fiscal year, the 

Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have contributed $208 

million, and both are in the process of finalizing additional contributions ($100+ million) to international and nongovernmental organizations with available FY 2008 

funding. Since the start of the conflict in 2003 and despite an increasingly challenging security environment, USG-funded NGOs have continuously provided assistance to Iraqis throughout the country targeting more than 830,000 IDPs as well as 

host communities. With recent improvements in security, USG-funded partners are 

better able to access and assist the populations that they have been serving for 5 

years, building upon previously established connections to local communities. 

Within Iraq, as provincial governments improve their ability to execute their 

budgets and program funds to deliver services and address local needs, Iraqi citizens will increasingly turn to GOI institutions for assistance instead of nonstate 

actors. Over the past 2 years, provincial governments have proven increasingly 

capable of committing and spending their own budget allocations, spending upward 

of $2 billion since early 2006 according to data gathered by our PRTs. The GOI 

recently increased its efforts to address citizens’ needs through targeted post-kinetic 

reconstruction funds in Basra and Sadr City, both of which are areas that have long 

been dominated by militia groups. 

International organizations, including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, the International Organization for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 

are also increasing and expanding their presence throughout the country, particularly through engaging international and national NGOs as implementing partners. USAID works closely with all of them to increase cooperation on operational, 

security, and logistics concerns as well as program and project areas. 

The USG strongly supports the return of Iraqi refugees from abroad when conditions in Iraq permit their safe and dignified return. The USG is in agreement with 

UNHCR guidance and is not advocating returns at this time. The GOI continues 

to work with the U.N. and USG to prepare for returns when conditions permit. 

Alongside humanitarian assistance for IDPs, USAID provides capacity-building 

assistance to the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) through the 

National Capacity Development program. MODM demonstrated its improved capacity when it submitted and received a $195 million budget from the Iraqi Council 

of Ministers in order to assist returning IDPs and refugees. The MODM’s budget 

includes, among other things, targeted assistance to Iraqi families in the form of stipends and funding for transport. USAID is also working closely with the MODM 

to facilitate coordination with the other humanitarian efforts led by the U.N., IOM, 

and NGOs. The MODM has drafted a National Policy on Displacement that defines 

the rights and needs of the displaced that is now being considered by the Council 

of Ministers, and expects approximately $195 million budget allocation to provide 

assistance to returning families and to needy IDPs. 

348 

Question. During your testimony, you stated that talk of Iranian involvement in 

brokering a cessation of hostilities in Basra was speculative. GEN Petraeus later 

testified that ‘‘Iran, at the end of the day, clearly played a role in—as an arbiter, 

if you will, for talks among all of the different parties to that particular action.’’ Do 

you still believe that reports of Iranian involvement are unsubstantiated? 

Answer. There is a lack of clarity on this issue. Moreover, there are limitations 

associated with discussing the subject matter in a public forum due to the sensitivity (classified nature) of the information. According to Iraqi officials, leaders of 

a number of Shia groups, including Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), met in Iran with representatives of the GOI prior to the declaration of a cease-fire. Nevertheless, it is 

important to note that Iran still supports militant-armed groups in Iraq which harm 

Iraqi and coalition interests and lives. We call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran 

to refrain from such negative activities and to work with the Government of Iraq 

in a constructive and sustainable manner. 

Question. General Petraeus testified that ‘‘Iran has supported all Shia movements 

to varying degrees in Iraq. The Supreme Council is and the Badr Corps were elements in Iraq.’’ Ambassador Crocker, what is the current state of Iranian support 

for the Supreme Council and the Badr Corps? 

Answer. There is a strong relationship between Iran and ISCI due to historical, 

cultural, and religious ties. Although the Badr Corps has been officially disbanded, 

Iran still continues to support ISCI financially and politically as one of its most 

important and influential allies in Iraq. 

Question. Have you or Prime Minister Maliki received any communications from 

members of the Iraqi Parliament expressing concern about the long-term security 

arrangements,? If yes, what concerns have they expressed and how are they being 

addressed? If you haven’t received any communications at this time but you were 

to receive some in the future, how would such concerns be incorporated in the 

process? 

Answer. Both the President and Prime Minister Maliki signed the Declaration of 

Principles last November, which ends with, ‘‘Taking into account the principles discussed above, bilateral negotiations between the Republic of Iraq and the United 

States shall begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, 

agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres.’’ Negotiations of a strategic framework are underway, 

and both governments remain committed to establishing a strong basis for our bilateral relations, including in the security field. While a wide range of opinions are 

being registered in Iraq’s climate of free expression, we deal with the issues brought 

to the table by Iraqi negotiators. 

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR RUSSELL FEINGOLD

U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAQ AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES COMPETENCE WITH EXTERNAL

SECURITY

Question. You have proposed that we slowly drawdown to a smaller presence in 

Iraq after we have ‘‘trained’’ the Iraqi Security Forces. Do you anticipate that we 

will need to maintain U.S. troops in Iraq until the Iraqi Security Forces is able to 

defend itself from external threats? 

Answer. The long-term vision for victory in Iraq is an Iraq that is peaceful, 

united, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources 

they need to govern themselves and provide security for their country. The desired 

strategic end state for Operation Iraqi Freedom is a stable Iraq that can govern, 

defend, and sustain itself and serve as an ally in the war on terror. To accomplish 

the long-term vision for Iraq and the Operation Iraqi Freedom strategic end state, 

coalition forces must assist the Government of Iraq in developing an Iraqi Security 

Force capable of defeating both internal and external threats to Iraq. Furthermore, 

until the Government of Iraq is capable of defending itself against external threats, 

coalition forces will play a role in deterring regional threats to Iraqi sovereignty. 

References: 1. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq; 2. Update to Joint Campaign 

Plan Operation Iraqi Freedom dated 27 November 2007; 3. Long-Term Security Posture in Iraq dated 27 August 2007. 

349 

EMBEDDED U.S. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES TRAINERS

Question. Can you confirm that, currently, over 6,000 U.S. ‘‘trainers’’ are embedded in Iraqi Security Forces and serve side by side with them while they conduct 

operations? What specifically are U.S. trainers doing while embedded in Iraqi units? 

Answer. There are currently 7,360 transition team personnel embedded with Iraqi 

Security Forces at all levels. Approximately 6,400 of those personnel are embedded 

with the Iraqi Army, the National Police, the Department of Border Enforcement, 

and the Iraqi Police on a regular basis. The remaining personnel train and 

assist the upper echelons of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in 

support of the mission of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 

(MNSTC–I) 

U.S. trainers on transition teams advise the Iraqi Security Forces on counterinsurgency operations, security and policing, and border enforcement with a focus 

on enhancing the maneuver, logistical, intelligence, command and control, and fires 

capabilities of Iraqi units. These advisers provide dedicated assistance and expertise 

to the Iraqi Security Forces from the initial planning of an operation through its 

execution. These teams also provide situational awareness and enhance Iraqi Security Force effectiveness through their links to key coalition and U.S. enablers, particularly intelligence, surveillance assets, and air support. 

U.S. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES TRAINER CASUALTIES

Question. When General Odom appeared recently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I asked him whether he thought it would be safe to leave tens of 

thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq for the purpose of continuing such a ‘‘training’’ mission. He testified that ‘‘[i]t would be a lot more dangerous for our troops. If you want 

to get a sense of that danger, talk to some NCOs and officers who have actually 

trained them out there. They fear for their lives when they’re living and working 

close with Iraqi forces.’’ How many U.S. servicemembers have died while serving as 

embedded ‘‘trainers’’? How many have died while conducting joint operations with 

Iraqi Security Forces? Have any members of the Iraqi Security Forces been dismissed due to concern that they may have participated in hostilities against U.S. 

forces? 

Answer. Since the adviser mission began in late 2004, 57 U.S. transition team 

members have been killed in action while serving with Iraqi Army, National Police, 

and Border Enforcement units. In addition, there have been 33 U.S. members of 

Iraqi police transition teams killed in action since July 2006. Every transition team 

member killed in action died while traveling in support of, or while conducting, joint 

operations with Iraqi Security Forces. 

To date, we have no evidence that members of the Iraqi Army, National Police, 

or Department of Border Enforcement have been dismissed due to concern that they 

may have participated in hostilities against U.S. forces. Within the Iraqi police, 

there have been very rare instances of personnel being dismissed on suspicion of 

anticoalition activities. There are no reported incidents of a transition team member 

being attacked by the unit in which the team member was embedded. 

In the past 12 months there has been one attack by an Iraqi soldier on U.S. 

servicemembers who were not embedded advisers. On December 26, 2007, an attack 

on a U.S. company operating jointly with an Iraqi patrol in Mosul resulted in the 

death of two U.S. servicemembers. 

BADR CORPS ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ

Question. During your testimony you said that ‘‘The Supreme Council is and the 

Badr corps were elements in Iraq.’’ During his testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee on January 17, 2008, Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, testified that the Badr Corps remains active 

in Iraq. Is the Badr Corps still operational in Iraq at this time? Does the Badr Corps 

receive arms, funds, or training from Iran? 

Answer. Currently, the Badr Organization is part of the legitimate political process in Iraq and supports the Iraqi Security Forces. Until 2003, Badr Corps was the 

armed wing of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (now the 

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), a Shia political movement. From 2003 to 2005, 

the Badr Corps transformed into the Badr Organization—a political entity that 

holds elected seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. While the Badr Organization retains some discrete, narrow security responsibilities (for example, it provides security for some of its party offices in southern Iraq), almost all of its militia 

350 

members were integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces under Coalition Provisional 

Authority Order 91. 

Undoubtedly, the Badr Organization leaders maintain links to Iran that were 

formed during its decades in exile there prior to 2003. Although the Islamic 

Supreme Council of Iraq—with which Badr Organization remains associated—seeks 

to publicly distance itself from Iran, some current and former Badr Organization 

members still receive training in Iran and maintain ties with Iranian intelligence. 

IDENTIFICATION METHODS OF ROGUE BADR CORPS MEMBERS IN IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. You noted in your testimony that the Badr Corps has been ‘‘integrated’’ 

into the Iraqi Security Forces and that rogue elements are thrown out of the Iraqi 

Security Forces. How are you able to identify these rogue elements? Do you believe 

that sectarianism has been eliminated from the Iraqi Security Forces, including all 

those individuals who remain loyal to ISCI or the Badr Brigade? 

Answer. Significant strides have been made to reduce the level of sectarianism 

within the Iraqi Security Forces, but there is more that remains to be done. Certainly, there are individuals in the Iraqi Security Forces who were previously members of groups such as the Badr Organization (formerly Badr Corps); in fact, the 

Badr Corps was among the elements that a CPA order directed should be integrated 

into the ISF. In the majority of cases, this has not proven to be a problem. We occasionally see reports of individuals within the Ministries of Interior and Defense pursuing sectarian agendas. Those individuals are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 

Identification of sectarian elements within the Iraqi Security Forces is accomplished 

through a combination of covert and overt collection methods to include human intelligence and the use of biometric tools. 

STRATEGIC OVERWATCH BRIGADES

Question. Last year you indicated that, even after an eventual drawdown of our 

troops, you still envisioned leaving five brigades in Iraq indefinitely to perform a 

‘‘strategic overwatch’’ role. Can you elaborate on the nature of this overwatch role, 

how many troops you anticipate leaving in Iraq and for how long? At what point 

in the current plan to which President Bush has agreed would we, by your assessment, reach this state of ‘‘overwatch’’? 

Answer. As Iraqi Security Forces increasingly assume primary responsibility for 

security in Iraq, their relationship with coalition forces will continue to transition 

from coalition forces in the lead, to partnership, and then to overwatch. Within the 

‘‘overwatch’’ relationship, three subcategories further distinguish the coalition role: 

Tactical overwatch, operational overwatch, and strategic overwatch. During strategic overwatch, coalition forces may: Provide certain combat enablers to Iraqi Security Forces upon request; perform a limited set of missions in coordination with the 

Government of Iraq; and maintain a strategic reserve capable of intervening in a 

timely manner throughout Iraq in the event of crisis. 

Transition between security relationships will be conditions-based, and may be expected to occur at varying rates in different parts of the country. For these reasons, 

it is not prudent to place a specific timeline on transitioning to tactical, operational, 

or strategic overwatch. When conditions do allow coalition forces to assume a role 

of strategic overwatch throughout Iraq, the actual force strength required at that 

point would be dependent upon the strategic context and the situation at the time. 

U.S. AND IRAQI FUNDING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. In your testimony you noted that Iraqi expenditures on Iraqi Security 

Forces exceeded U.S. expenditures on those forces. If you count U.S. expenditures 

on logistics and training for the Iraqi Security Forces, wouldn’t U.S. expenditures 

exceed Iraqi expenditures? 

Answer. A comparison of the annual budget expenditures of the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior and the U.S. Iraqi Security Force Fund (ISFF) reveals that 

Iraqi spending exceeded U.S. spending in 2006 and 2007, and Iraqi spending is projected to be triple the amount of U.S. spending in 2008. The table below shows annual expenditures for the Government of Iraq’s security ministries as well as the 

U.S. Government’s ISFF. 

Year of appropriation and source Appropriation Amount executed ($US) 

2004: 

Government of Iraq ........................................... MOD/MOI Budget ................................................... $1,770M. 

U.S. Government ................................................ ISFF ........................................................................ $5,210M. 

351 

Year of appropriation and source Appropriation Amount executed ($US) 

2005: 

Government of Iraq ........................................... MOD/MOI Budget ................................................... $2,043M. 

U.S. Government ................................................ ISFF ........................................................................ $5,391M. 

2006: 

Government of Iraq ........................................... MOD/MOI Budget ................................................... 4,548M. 

U.S. Government ................................................ ISFF ........................................................................ $3,007M. 

2007: 

Government of Iraq ........................................... MOD/MOI Budget ................................................... $5,717M. 

U.S. Government ................................................ ISFF ........................................................................ $5,542M. 

2008: 

Government of Iraq ........................................... MOD/MOI Budget ................................................... $9,000M (projected). 

U.S. Government ................................................ ISFF ........................................................................ $3,000M (projected). 

SECURITY OF SUPPLY LINES FROM KUWAIT

Question. Is it true that the majority of our essential supplies and equipment are 

transported by land over 400 miles from Kuwait? Have these convoys been subjected 

to attacks in some cases? If the fighting between Maliki’s forces and rival Shia 

groups in the south deepens, could it further endanger that supply line? 

Answer. The bulk of our supplies are transported into Iraq by land from Kuwait. 

The average distance from these ports to the first Army General Support hub is 

approximately 370 miles. Additionally, almost all deploying and redeploying unit 

equipment transits Kuwait. 

The following list breaks out various classes of supply and the percentages that 

enter Iraq through Kuwait: 

Class I (Food and Water): 85 percent; 

Class II (Clothing & Personal Equipment) & Class IV (Construction Material): 85 percent; 

Class III (Bulk) (Fuel and Petroleum Products): 50 percent; 

Class V (Ammunition and Explosives): 98 percent; 

Class IX (Repair Parts): 10 percent. 

During the course of U.S. involvement in Iraq, convoys heading north from 

Kuwait have been attacked. However, there have been no improvised explosive device attacks along these supply routes in the past 6 months, and no small-arms fire 

or other forms of attack for the last 3 months. 

We protect the southern supply routes through the use of patrols. Though we 

have done contingency planning, we do not expect the Iraqi Government’s ongoing 

operations in Basra and elsewhere in southern Iraq to result in an escalation of 

security incidents that significantly affects our sustainment operations. 

DOD SUPPORT TO IRAQI STATE BOARD OF ANTIQUITIES

Question. How is the Department of Defense supporting the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in Iraq to protect Iraq’s cultural heritage—specifically, how is 

DOD supporting the protection of archeological sites? Could DOD’s civil affairs play 

a greater role in helping to protect Iraq’s cultural heritage and if so, how? 

Answer. On May 3, 2008, Multi-National Force–Iraq published a Protection of 

Archaeological Sites Cautionary Note advising all personnel to stay clear of archaeological sites throughout Iraq per the Iraq Antiquities and Heritage Law No. 55 of 

2002 and General Order 1B. Department of State Cultural Affairs, specifically the 

Cultural Heritage Officer, is the main point of contact on all issues related to cultural heritage and leads an Iraq Antiquities Working Group that includes the following members: 

—Environmental Engineers from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Central Command 

Air Forces, and U.S. Army Central. 

—Cultural Resource Managers from Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence 

and U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command. 

—Environmental Program Managers from Multi-National Force–Iraq and MultiNational Corps–Iraq. 

—Deputy Federal Preservation Officer. 

—Environmental Division Cultural Resources Manager from Fort Drum Cultural 

Resources Center for Environmental Management of Military Lands from Colorado State University. 

This working group collaborates on issues related to site protection, including: 

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1Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian 

Challenge in Iraq,’’ July 2007. 2Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian 

Challenge in Iraq,’’ July 2007. 3Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian 

Challenge in Iraq,’’ July 2007. 4 Newsweek, 1/22/07. 

5 Newsweek, 1/22/07. 

6Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian 

Challenge in Iraq,’’ 7/07. 7Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian 

Challenge in Iraq,’’ 7/07. 8Department of Defense Report to Congress: ‘‘Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,’’ 

March 2008. 9 BBC, 3/14/08. ABC News/BBC/NHK National survey. 

—The implementation of a Historic/Cultural Resources Fragmentary Order for military presence on and near archaeological sites. The implementation of a ‘‘Contingency Based Environmental Guidance Document’’ for U.S. personnel in-theater. 

—The implementation of an ‘‘Archaeological Construction Checklist’’ for military 

presence on and near archaeological sites (including the use of maps for planning 

purposes). 

—Multi-National Force–Iraq is represented on a team that assists the Iraqi State 

Board of Antiquities and Heritage submit budget requests to the Minister of Tourism and Antiquities. Projects include renovation of the Baghdad Museum, new 

construction of a warehouse to store and secure Iraq antiquities, and a modern 

security system throughout the museum facility. 

DOD Civil Affairs personnel work closely with the local Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams within each Iraqi province; however, they are not specifically trained in cultural heritage protection. Appropriately trained Civil Affairs personnel could provide 

cultural resource management and cultural heritage protection expertise to local 

commanders. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. the following are the statistics that Senator Menendez presented during 

the hearing: 

• 43 percent 1 of Iraq’s population currently lives in ‘‘absolute poverty.’’ • 19 percent 2 of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition prior to the war; today, 

that figure is 28 percent.3

• Last year, 75 percent 4 of Iraqi elementary-age children attended school, according to the Iraq Ministry of Education. Now, it is only 30 percent.5

• 50 percent 6 of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean water prior to 2003. Now, 

it is 70 percent.7

• Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health care centers are open to the public.8

• 62 percent 9 of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll rated the availability of medical care as ‘‘quite bad’’ or ‘‘very bad.’’ 

If the Department of State has different or updated statistics, please provide them 

for the indicators above, and please provide any additional statistics that the administration has gathered that capture the overall welfare of the Iraq people today, as 

compared to before the 2003 invasion. 

Answer. Iraq has a long way to go in providing the necessary essential services 

on a regular and equitable basis to the Iraqi population. For over two decades, Saddam Hussein’s destructive policies laid waste to much of the country’s essential 

services infrastructure, and ignored the needs of the Iraqi people. During the sanctions period, the Oil for Food Program allowed unrestricted sales of food and medicines through regulated sales of oil. Saddam Hussein used this money not for the 

benefit of the Iraqi people, but for his own selfish purposes. Data from the Saddam 

era is often unreliable, as government statistics were produced for political purposes. 

In the period between 2003 and early 2006, U.S. programs began making improvements in the lives of many Iraqis. However, al-Qaeda’s attack on the Golden 

Mosque of Sammara in 2006 began a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that overwhelmed the gains the Iraqis had made after conducting peaceful, democratic elections in 2005. Some of the statistics provided above on health care services and 

school attendance are from that dire period. 

353 

For these reasons, in January 2007 President Bush announced a ‘‘surge’’ to combat the violence spreading throughout Iraq. Following consultations with Congress, 

the United States increased American force levels and the Iraqi Army and Police 

Brigades increased as well. At the same time, the State Department increased the 

number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the number of other U.S. 

civilian advisers in Iraq. 

The surge created a more secure and stable environment. In my testimony I reported on gains in Iraq’s economy, governance, and delivery of essential services. 

Iraq is increasingly using its own resources to build on the progress made under 

U.S.-funded efforts. 

The gains of the surge are fragile. We will continue to work with Iraqi leaders 

and build their capacity to meet the needs of their people long after our presence 

has been reduced. 

Forty-three percent of Iraq’s population currently lives in ‘‘absolute poverty.’’ 

When the Social Safety Net Program was introduced by the Government of Iraq 

with support from the World Bank and the U.S. Government, the World Bank estimated that there were about 1.2 million poor families or 9.6 million people who 

should be assisted with the program. This represents about 33 percent of Iraq’s population. As Iraq makes progress on governance and economic development, employment will rise. Employment is the key to reducing poverty. Officially, unemployment 

is 18 percent but underemployment is much higher—perhaps as high as 40–50 percent. The improved security situation has led to increased retail trade and other economic activity. This is one reason for the 9.1-percent jump in business registrations 

in 2007 over 2006. Focused USG-funded programs also play a significant role. The 

Community Stabilization Program provides jobs, essential services, vocational training and microgrants, particularly in areas recently stabilized. The pilot Civilian 

Service Corps program by the U.S. military will provide jobs and vocational training 

to Iraqis who band together to undertake local reconstruction and infrastructure 

development projects. The Task Force for Business Stability Operations is reviving 

some of Iraq’s state-owned enterprises and recently concluded investment agreements with international companies for cement factories. 

Nineteen percent of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition prior to the war; today, 

that figure is 28 percent. 

In the most recent comprehensive survey, the United Nations World Food Programme found that 15.4 percent of Iraqis had insecure access to food in 2006. Some 

food needs are met by PDS, an Iraqi program of in-kind aid. All Iraqis are eligible, 

with an estimated 20 percent of Iraqis relying heavily on PDS for food, and another 

20–25 percent counting on PDS aid as a supplement. 

Among other major PDS reforms, the GOI plans to roll PDS food aid into a broad 

social safety-net program that will target the needy. Improved targeting will allow 

the GOI to better support the most vulnerable Iraqis. 

Iraq’s domestic agricultural sector was left underdeveloped under Saddam’s rule, 

resulting in a low quality of Iraqi domestic agricultural products and a sector that 

cannot provide sufficient food to meet Iraq’s needs. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki 

recently launched a $500 million agricultural development initiative, approved in 

the GOI’s 2008 budget, to increase domestic food production and quality. 

Last year, 75 percent of Iraqi elementary-age children attended school, according to 

the Iraq Ministry of Education. Now, it is only 30 percent. 

The single largest factor in school attendance is the level of violence in-country. 

The Iraqi statistical agency COSIT reported 2006 attendance in primary schools 

throughout the country at 83.1 perecent. This would approximate to near the figure 

quoted in the Newsweek source, dated January 22, 2007, for 2006 figures. During 

the upswing in violence experienced in the fall of 2006 and summer of 2007, the 

number of children attending school dropped as parents kept their children at home. 

While the 2007 figures from COSIT on school attendance are not available at this 

time, it is expected that student attendance will have increased to reflect greater 

regular attendance as the security situation improved. If military and police security 

operations continue in certain areas, however, it is expected that school attendance 

would be temporarily disrupted. 

Prior to 2003 Iraq had a total of 14,121 schools. The United States and coalition 

partners have rehabilitated 5,618 of 11,000 schools needing repair. Additionally, 

more than 61,000 teachers have been trained and more than 8,700,000 textbooks 

provided for Iraqi children by USAID. 

Fifty percent of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean water prior to 2003. Now, it is 

70 percent. 

354 

10Department of Defense, Essential Services—Water (Draft Working Paper, 17 November 

2003). 11GAO–05–872, at p. 5. 12 Iraq Watching Briefs. Water and Environmental Sanitation (UNICEF July 2003). 

Fifty percent lack of access in 2003. The immediate source of this figure is a July 

2007 report, ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq.’’ As the basis for the 

figure, that report cites the January 2006 SIGIR report to the Congress, which in 

turn cites a November 2003 Department of Defense ‘‘draft working paper.’’ 10

The working paper is a single-page document that does not indicate source or 

methodology; because of its lack of substantiation, it subsequently was withdrawn. 

Taking the paper on its face, it is not even clear whether it refers to service prior 

to the war or at the time it was prepared. Assuming it does refer to the earlier period, it may, despite its lack of substantiation, be a plausible estimate of the amount 

of potable water produced at that time, but it is substantially too high for the potable water service actually received by Iraqis. 

A 2005 GAO report 11 found that in 2003 Iraq still produced enough water to supply about 60 percent of urban Iraqis and 50 percent of rural Iraqis, but that the 

percentage of Iraqis receiving adequate amounts of clean water was much lower due 

to heavy leakage and contamination. For example, sewage leaked into the water 

network, which was too damaged to keep contaminants out. 

For Baghdad in particular, a July 2003 UNICEF study estimated that in late 

2002 the theoretical supply of potable water was 218 liters per person. By comparison, the standard level of service used to estimate the number of Baghdad residents 

that can be served by USG water projects is a delivered supply of 312 liters per person. Moreover, most Baghdad residents did not receive even the theoretical daily 

supply of 218 liters. ‘‘[T]he majority of people never got such large amounts of 

water, especially those at the end of leaking and damaged water distributions networks. In many places water flowed for only a few hours each day, and when it did 

the pressure was low and it was contaminated by raw sewage and other pathogens 

seeping into the leaking system. Additionally, water quantities were limited and 

many families received as little as 50 litres per person per day, with long queuing 

times for collection.’’ 12

Due to a lack of metering, it is not possible to translate these observations into 

a reliable estimate of the percentage of Iraqis that lacked access to adequate supplies of potable water in 2003. However, it is possible to conclude that the percentage was much higher than 50 percent. 

Current 70 percent lack of access. The immediate source of this figure is again 

‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq.’’ That report in turn cites a published summary of a March 2007 UNHCR press conference. The summary does not 

provide a source or methodology for the 70-percent figure. 

The lack of metering again makes it impossible to directly measure the number 

of Iraqis with access to potable water. For the current level of service, however, it 

is possible to estimate the number of Iraqis with access to potable water provided 

by facilities constructed or rehabilitated by the principal USG projects. 

Water treatment facilities financed by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

(IRRF) have the capacity to provide an estimated additional 8 million Iraqis with 

potable water. This estimate is based on the plants’ capacity and characteristics (for 

example, estimated leakage) and on a standard level of per capita usage. 

We do not have the data that would be needed to make a similar estimate for 

the number of Iraqis that can be served by non-USG projects. However, the 8 million Iraqis that can be served by USG projects are themselves approximately 30 percent of the population. The 70-percent figure therefore would imply that no Iraqis 

receive potable water from non-USG facilities. That clearly is not the case. 

Because we cannot make a reliable estimate of the number of Iraqis who receive 

potable water from facilities not constructed or rehabilitated by USG projects, we 

cannot reliably estimate the overall number of Iraqis who lack access to potable 

water. We can, however, conclude that the 70-percent figure is substantially too 

high. 

Sixty-two percent of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll rated the availability of medical care as ‘‘quite bad’’ or ‘‘very bad.’’ 

The Iraqi health care system suffered greatly under post-Desert Storm sanctions 

due to actions of the Saddam regime, despite provisions made for humanitarian relief under Oil for Food. Corruption and Saddam’s political purposes diverted critical 

resources such as medicines and equipment from hospitals and clinics. Currently, 

medical professionals are subject to threats and assassination, causing many to 

leave the country and drastically reducing the number of professionals in Iraq. 

355 

We are, however, seeing progress in addressing critical needs that should result 

in improved health care delivery. In November 2007, Dr. Salih al-Hasnawi was approved by the Council of Ministers as the Minister of Health following the Sadrist 

block’s withdrawal from the Iraqi Cabinet. For the first time in over two decades, 

Dr. Hasnawi organized a Continuing Medical Education conference in Baghdad in 

January and has held similar smaller conferences since. Also, Dr. Hasnawi has proposed increasing the salary of doctors to encourage the many who have left Iraq to 

return, as well as housing doctors and nurses near hospitals and clinics. 

The Iraqi public health system requires further long-term improvements. The 

Minister of Health has identified the key areas as medicine procurement and distribution, repairing hospitals and clinics damaged by insurgents, and improving 

physician training. The Ministry of Health is working closely with the United States 

and other partners to increase the delivery of health services. 

The reputation of hospitals has improved, and fears of sectarian targeting have 

significantly decreased. There are Ministry of Health facilities, which provide free 

services, as well as private facilities. In the afternoons and evenings, many public 

service doctors provide private clinic care for a fee. Doctors’ clinics are busy, often 

seeing over 100 patients a day. Medical facilities still suffer from shortages of supplies and medicines, but the Ministry of Health is working to improve the situation. 

Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health care centers are open to the public. 

The United States Primary Healthcare Center (PHC) construction program will 

be completed by the end of 2008. We will have turned over a total of 136 newly constructed PHCs, across all provinces, to the Ministry of Health. To date we have 

turned over to the Ministry of Health 86 PHCs, of which 59 are open to the public. 

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

IRAQI QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

Question. The following are the statistics that Senator Menendez presented during the hearing (derived from Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq 

(NCCI), ‘‘Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,’’ July 2007; Newsweek 1/ 

22/07; Department of Defense Report to Congress: ‘‘Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,’’ March 2008; and BBC, 3/14/08. ABC News/BBC/NHK National survey): 43 percent of Iraq’s population currently lives in ‘‘absolute poverty’’; 19 percent 

of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition prior to the war, today, that figure is 

28 percent. Last year, 75 percent of Iraqi elementary-age children attended school, 

according to the Iraq Ministry of Education. Now, it is only 30 percent. Fifty percent 

of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean water prior to 2003. Now, it is 70 percent. 

Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health care centers are open to the public. 

Sixty-two percent of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll rated the availability of medical care as ‘‘quite bad’’ or ‘‘very bad.’’ If the Department of State has different or 

updated statistics, please provide them for the indicators above, and please provide 

any additional statistics that the administration has gathered that capture the overall welfare of the Iraq people today, as compared to before the 2003 invasion. 

Answer. The last formal comprehensive study of humanitarian conditions was 

conducted by the World Health Organization in 2006. This study, as well as many 

of the statistics cited above, reflects data collected at an especially turbulent period 

of time in Iraq, one during which Iraq was embroiled in horrific ethnosectarian violence. Significant progress in the security situation since then has enabled progress 

in many areas, though it is to be expected that improvements in essential services 

and many other factors that affect quality of life would take time to catch up. To 

better gauge how Iraqis are currently faring, the U.S. Government is currently 

working with Gallup on a survey that will be completed within the next 30–60 days 

and will address issues of health and education. We anticipate having updated statistics by September 2008. While we do not have updates on most of the particular 

statistics cited in this question, we do have other more current data on the humanitarian conditions in Iraq. Statistical data from the International Organization for 

Migration suggests that the humanitarian situation in Iraq varies considerably by 

province. Many Iraqis living in northern and western Iraq indicate a better humanitarian situation today compared to 5 years ago. In part due to the security situation, 

other Iraqis throughout central and southern Iraq have indicated little or negative 

change in their humanitarian situation since 2003. The still inadequate capacity of 

the Iraqi Government has limited the provision of essential services necessary to 

address lacking humanitarian conditions in some areas. The U.S. Mission–Iraq 

356 

(USM–I) and Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) are partnering with Iraqi ministries to develop further capacity. 

Access to health care and the quality of the Iraq public health system remain concerns that are being actively addressed by the Iraqi Government and by the coalition. In 2003, Iraqi civilian health care lagged behind the region based on the number of physicians in the country; the ratio of physician-to-population served; health 

care expenditures per capita; lack of equipment maintenance/modernization; 

extremely inefficient national medical supply system, and leading health statistics. 

With improving security conditions, Iraqi health care has shown a measured increase in capability throughout the past 12 months, with a clear potential for significant gains within the next 12–24 months. The Iraqi Government, with coalition 

assistance, has now completed the construction of 105 of 137 planned Primary 

Healthcare Centers (PHCs), with the remaining 32 scheduled for completion by September 2008. Also, of the 47 hospital renovation projects in 20 hospitals across the 

country, 32 have been completed with the remainder ongoing. Though a shortage 

of medical providers exists, these infrastructure improvements helped increase the 

capacity of Iraqi medical facilities to treat 3.25 million patients annually in hospitals and 630,000 outpatients annually at PHCs. We continue to engage with Iraqi 

ministries to develop a national health care strategy, encourage repatriation of Iraqi 

physicians who left the country, reengineer the Iraqi medical supply distribution 

system, and improve national emergency medical services communication ability. 

The status of water, wastewater, and solid waste treatment services vary by 

locale. In partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, the U.S. Government has completed the rehabilitation, expansion, and/or construction of 21 major 

water treatment plants and hundreds of small water compact units. These projects 

have restored or added around 2.2 million cubic meters per day of treatment capacity, which is sufficient to serve around 7.5 million Iraqis at a standard level of service. To address the recurring challenge in Iraq of a summer outbreak of cholera, we 

have worked with Iraqi ministries to ensure adequate stocks of chlorine are onhand. Many wastewater treatment projects have also been completed and rehabilitated, and results from recent water testing reveal that 87 percent of samples were 

adequate. Solid waste management in urban areas is conducted by local municipalities and reliability of municipal programs depends heavily on local officials. In rural 

areas, open trench solid waste disposal is the norm. To address long-term sustainability issues, MNF–I and USM–I continue to work with Iraqi officials to develop 

operations and maintenance capability and to train staff from the relevant ministries. 

Access to staple goods in Iraq is generally good. Iraqis have access to affordable 

staple goods through several means. The first method is through the Public 

Distribution System, a public food program managed by the Ministry of Trade that 

delivers basic food items and commodities to nearly all Iraqis for a nominal fee. 

The system is part of a social safety net that provides the population with 10 

products, including wheat flour and cooking oil. Besides the commodities provided 

through the Public Distribution System, increased security and stability have 

allowed many markets to reopen, farmers to return to their fields, and food commodities to be imported into the country, thus increasing the availability and 

affordability of staple goods by the average Iraqi. In terms of access to gasoline, the 

availability of benzene and diesel has also increased as the security situation has 

improved. More petrol stations are open, and importation and distribution of refined 

oil products have increased. The best indicator of that positive change is the lack 

of vehicle lines at the petrol stations. Previously, Iraqis had to wait in long lines 

to fuel their cars or purchase benzene for their generators. 

The most pressing issue for the Iraqi Education System is the construction and 

rehabilitation of schools. Currently, there are 20,000 schools in Iraq, with an estimated 4,000 more needed to accommodate the large numbers of children enrolled. 

Improved security has had an effect on enrollment, as total primary school enrollment rose by over 180,000 students to 4,334,511 for 2007–08. Total secondary enrollment for 2006–07 was 1,491,933; data for the current year is not yet available. 

The Iraqi Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology will not 

speculate on the overall percentage of children enrolled in school until a census is 

completed. There is a sufficient number of teachers, though training is needed to 

integrate modern teaching standards. 

357 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. In recent testimony before the Congress, both Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have affirmed that the United States does not intend to extend security assurances or commitments to the Iraqi Government under the aegis of the 

Strategic Framework Agreement or Status of Forces Agreement currently under 

negotiation between the United States and Iraq. Ambassador Crocker, you were the 

lead U.S. negotiator on the Declaration of Principles and are now heading the U.S. 

team drafting both the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic Framework 

Agreement. Can you confirm to the committee that the United States will not, under 

any circumstances, extend security assurances or commitments to the Government 

of Iraq this year? 

Answer. As both Ambassador Satterfield and I have testified, neither document 

will extend security commitments to Iraq this year. 

Question. On Friday, the State Department announced a 1-year renewal of a contract with Blackwater Worldwide, the private security contractor, to provide security 

for U.S. diplomats in Iraq. In response to the announcement of the contract renewal, 

Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki declared on Sunday that this renewal is not final 

because ‘‘they committed a massacre against Iraqis and until now this matter has 

not been resolved.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘No judicial action has been taken and no 

compensation has been made. Therefore, this extension requires the approval of the 

Iraqi Government, and the government would want to resolve the outstanding 

issues with this company.’’ 

• A. Please review the process by which this contract renewal was made. Was any 

consideration given to stripping Blackwater of the contract and giving it to another qualified entity? To what extent did the views of the Iraqi Government 

factor into the decision of the State Department? 

• B. How does the decision to renew this contract with a company that, in the 

eyes of the Iraqi people, represents U.S. arrogance and impunity serve your 

overall mission of counterinsurgency and winning the hearts and minds of the 

Iraqi people? 

• C. As the United States and Iraq negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement, how 

do you envision that agreement will treat private military contractors in Iraq? 

Will they be subject to Iraqi law? Will the Iraqi Government have the right to 

veto the presence of certain companies? 

Answer to Part A. This task order with Blackwater for protective services in 

Baghdad is a 5-year contract with an initial year and then four option years. The 

Department exercised option year two of the task order as an interim measure. One 

of the principal recommendations of the report by the Secretary of State’s Panel on 

Personal Protective Services is that U.S. Embassy Baghdad submit a recommendation on whether the continued services of Blackwater is consistent with the accomplishment of the overall United States mission In Iraq, based on the results of the 

FBI investigation into the September 16 incident, which is still ongoing. The 

Department has the right to terminate this contract for convenience or for cause at 

any time. 

Answer to Part B. The Department of State agrees that winning the hearts and 

minds of the Iraqi people is key to our overall mission in Iraq. To that end, since 

the Nisoor Square incident on September 16, 2007, the Department has taken numerous steps to minimize the risk of future incidents, while continuing to protect 

our diplomats in a highly dangerous environment. For example, the Embassy 

revised the use of force policy applicable to private security contractors in order to 

emphasize that the overall success of any mission must not be viewed solely in 

terms of whether the protectee was kept safe, but also to reflect the impact on the 

local population. 

The Department has instituted numerous other measures to improve the oversight and accountability of its security contractors, including placing a Diplomatic 

Security Special Agent in every convoy, revising the procedures for reporting 

and investigating incidents, and improving communication and coordination with 

MNF–I and Government of Iraq officials. 

It was due in part to these considerations that the Department took the interim 

measure of exercising another option year of Blackwater’s task order to provide protective services in Baghdad, pending the results of the FBI investigation. 

Answer to Part C. Jurisdiction over private security contractors is a subject of 

deep concern to both Iraq and the United States. This matter will be carefully considered by both sides in the course of the SOFA negotiations. As with other negotiaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00365 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
358 

tions, we do not publicly discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating partners, on key issues. 

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PATRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

ELECTROCUTION DEATHS

According to information provided by the Army and Marine Corps to the office of 

Representative Altmire, at least 12 servicemembers have died in Iraq as a result 

of accidental electrocutions since 2003. On January 2, 2008, Staff Sergeant Ryan 

Maseth of Shaler, Pennsylvania, was electrocuted while taking a shower in his living quarters in the Radwaniyah Palace Complex (RPC) in Baghdad. Recent news 

reports and statements from the Department of Defense in response to Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death indicate that a lack of government oversight and poor contract 

management may have contributed to accidental deaths or injuries of U.S. personnel 

serving overseas. 

Question. Since 2003 when the first accidental electrocution death was reported, 

how many deaths or injuries from accidental electrocutions of military and contract 

personnel in Iraq, as well as any other military installation, have occurred? 

Answer. According to safety records maintained by the Multi-National Corps–Iraq 

(MNC–I) Safety Office and U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center, between September 2003 and May 2008, 11 military personnel and 2 contractor employees died 

due to accidental electrocutions in Iraq. The same records show two soldiers died 

in the United States and one in Germany by accidental electrocution. The 13 recorded deaths due to accidental electrocution in Iraq occurred under the following 

circumstances: 5 died from contact with power distribution lines, 2 installing 

communications equipment, 2 performing maintenance on generators, 2 taking a 

shower, 1 while power washing equipment, and 1 while swimming. The only two 

events that occurred inside billeting facilities (both while taking a shower) were on 

different bases in Iraq and occurred 31⁄2 years apart (May 2004 and January 2008). 

Question. Did the Army or Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) actually fund Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) to perform electrical repair 

work at the RPC complex, prior to the death of Ryan Maseth? 

Answer. Yes, the Army funded KBR to perform maintenance as part of a contract 

modification under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. The funds were for 

limited maintenance to include electrical repairs initiated by customer service order 

requests. 

Question. What were the dates of this contract? 

Answer. The contract modification was made using a ‘‘change letter’’ that was 

issued on 23 February 2007. 

Question. Did KBR submit reports documenting safety hazards relating to the improper grounding of electrical devices at the RPC complex? 

Answer. Yes, KBR submitted reports documenting potential grounding issues. It 

is my understanding that, prior to the 23 February 2007 contract modification, KBR 

conducted only limited technical inspections of the RPC complex. The last inspections were performed on 10 February 2007. These inspections revealed no deficiencies related to the water pump contributing to SSG Maseth’s death but did indicate other grounding issues. 

Question. Did KBR receive $3.2 million under ACL07–139–D9–005 to repair deficiencies identified in KBR’s February 10, 2007 technical inspection report? 

Answer. KBR received an estimated $3.2 million pursuant to the 23 February 

2007 contract modification in order to perform maintenance services. 

Question. What measures have the Department of Defense and its affiliates taken 

to ensure proper safety and code enforcement by contractors operating in Iraq, specifically KBR, in eliminating issues of electrical safety hazard since 2003? 

Answer. Multi-National Force–Iraq is currently reviewing facilities maintenance 

electrical standards and incorporating changes into our theater support contracts to 

help insure proper electrical safety standards. The Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) has directed KBR to implement a theaterwide, full technical inspection of all maintained facilities where no prior inspection was performed. Additionally, DCMA directed KBR to perform life, health, and safety inspections on all other 

maintained buildings to begin any necessary repairs. The MNC–I Safety Office has 

359 

issued several safety alerts on electrocution hazards. Additionally, the Army 

Sustainment Command has made annual improvements to the contract statements 

of work based on lessons learned to insure electrical safety. 

(361) 

NEGOTIATING A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP 

WITH IRAQ 

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Bill Nelson, Menendez, 

Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Coleman, Voinovich, Murkowski, and 

Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I apologize for 

keeping my colleagues and the witnesses waiting. 

Last November, the President of the United States and Prime 

Minister Maliki of Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles, which 

they—or, what they referred to as a Declaration of Principles, 

which set out what is referred to these days, in Washington jargon 

and international jargon, as a framework. It’s interesting—I don’t 

know—the good news for you all is, you have to explain this to 

other diplomats. The bad news for us is, we have to explain it to 

ordinary, very smart Americans, who don’t understand the jargon, 

and it’s confusing. So, part of what I hope we can do is demystify 

some of what is being discussed here. 

So, the Declaration of Principles set out a framework for our 

countries—that is, Iraq and the United States—to negotiate by the 

end of July of this year, agreements governing cooperation in political, economic, and security spheres. And, among other things, the 

Declaration contemplates, ‘‘providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression 

against Iraq,’’ and—that’s the end of the quote—and supporting 

Iraq, ‘‘in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups,’’ including 

al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and ‘‘all other outlaw groups, regardless of 

affiliation,’’ which means all those folks fighting in Iraq and killing 

each other. So, to average Americans and to slow Senators like me, 

that sends up a—not one red flag, but 25 red flags, because I don’t 

know of any time we’ve ever had a Status of Forces Agreement or 

an agreement not requiring congressional approval that says, ‘‘Not 

only are we going to talk to you and consult with you when it 

comes to whether or not you’re going to be attacked from outside, 

but we’re going to consult with you—the government and—on anyVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00369 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
362 

thing that may happen to you inside,’’ when, in fact, we don’t know 

what the hell the government is—heck the government is inside. 

We just witnessed the ‘‘government,’’ Mr. Maliki, a Shia, the 

Dawa party, engaging in a—I’m not making a judgment, but engaging in using force against another Shia group that helped put 

him in office, the Sadr operation, along with—you know, so it gets 

pretty complicated for average Americans and average Senators. 

So, we’re going to hear, today, about these two agreements that 

the administration’s negotiating with Iraq which were anticipated 

in the November declaration. 

On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker told us that these agreements 

would set forth a vision—that was his phrase—of our bilateral relationship with Iraq. One of the problems is, you’re about to set forth 

a vision of an administration that is not shared by many other people. We’re likely to have a—we’re going to have a new President, 

who has an even shot. It may be—of the three people competing, 

the vision this administration shares for Iraq is clearly not one 

shared by two of the three, and the third—may or may not share 

the vision. I suspect he might. 

One agreement is a Strategic Framework Agreement that will include the economic, political, and security issues outlined in the 

Declaration of Principles, and that document, I think, might be better titled ‘‘What the United States Will Do for Iraq,’’ because it consists mostly of a series of promises that flow in one direction, promises by the United States to a sectarian government that has, thus 

far, failed to reach any political compromises necessary to have a 

stable country. 

Now, whether they’re binding or not, if I look at this—and excuse 

me for speaking not in diplo-speak or in foreign-policy terms, but 

like, I think, normal people look at these things—here we are, the 

reason why we’re not going to continue the U.N. umbrella that 

allows us to be where we are now and extend it, is the Iraqis said, 

‘‘Hey, look, we’re not an occupied country, we’re a sovereign country, we’re going to deal with ourselves.’’ The reason why we’re not 

just doing a straight Status of Forces Agreement—as I said, ‘‘You 

want a Status of Forces Agreement, we want some promises. We 

want something in return. And what you all seem to be saying to 

us’’—and this is—I just want to put this in the framework, I may 

be wrong, speaking of frameworks—‘‘You all are coming to us and 

saying, ‘Well, we’re going to make commitments’ ’’ that are not 

binding to them, but in Iraq, they think we mean it. It may not 

be binding. We’re binding you to come up and get a treaty. But, in 

Iraq, when we say, ‘‘We’ll do the following things,’’ the Iraqi people 

and the Parliament we’re going to try to sell them on is, ‘‘We’re 

going to them,’’ because if—otherwise, we wouldn’t be having this 

discussion, we wouldn’t be trying to have a strategic agreement 

with Iraq at this moment, were it not for the Iraqis demanding 

something more for our continued presence, and an agreement relative to our forces in Iraq. I just want to put this in context, at 

least as I understand it. 

The second agreement is what officials call standard Status of 

Forces Agreement which will govern the presence of U.S. forces in 

Iraq, including their entry into the country and the immunities to 

be granted to our forces under Iraqi law. But, unlike most SOFAs, 

363 

as they’re referred to, unlike most Status of Forces Agreements, it 

will permit U.S. forces, for the purposes of Iraqi law, to engage in 

combat operations and detain insurgents; put another way, detain 

people we conclude are bad guys. 

Now, no other Status of Forces Agreements that I’m aware of 

allows us the ability—and I think we should have—if we’re going 

to be there, we should have this authority, though I’m speaking for 

myself, but it is unusual. I can’t think of any agreement, of the 80 

or 90 or so we have, where we have—an American military commander commanding forces under a Status of Forces Agreement in 

another country can say, ‘‘By the way, there are some bad guys 

over there. Let’s go get them.’’ I don’t think there’s any, but I’ll be 

happy to hear—to be corrected, if that’s the case. 

So, unlike most other of these agreements—and there may be 

some—we’re going to ask to be able to continue to engage in combat operations and detain people that the U.N. mandate allows us 

to do under our control. 

In February, Secretaries Rice and Gates made clear that, despite 

the unambiguous reference to ‘‘security commitments’’—that’s the 

phrase—security commitments in the declaration, these agreements would not include a legally binding security commitment to 

defend Iraqis, if attacked, or—or to defend the government against 

other militia groups within this country and what—whether we call 

it a civil war or not, you know, competing interests for control of 

Iraq. And I welcome that clarification, but it obscures a critical 

point: The likelihood that the United States will promise some response if Iraq is threatened or attacked—often called a ‘‘security 

assurance’’ or a ‘‘security arrangement’’—it will likely create the 

perception, at least, in Iraq, that the United States—and, I would 

argue, in the region—that the United States would come to Iraq’s 

rescue if it’s threatened to be attacked. Next President may not 

want to do that. Next President may say, ‘‘I’m not buying into that 

deal. That’s not my vision. I’m no piece of that vision.’’ 

It also ignores the further startling pledge in the declaration, to 

support the Iraqi Government in its battle with, ‘‘all other outlaw 

groups.’’ So, I assume that means any group that is at odds with 

the Prime Minister—‘‘the government’’—is an outlaw group. And 

that’s a potentially expansive commitment to take sides in an Iraqi 

civil war. 

The key question before this committee, in my view, is whether 

either agreement should be approved by the Congress, either as a 

treaty, approved by two-thirds of the Senate, or as a congressionalexecutive agreement approved by both houses. It is a fact that 

security arrangements with several countries were made without 

explicit congressional or Senate approval, but not all security 

arrangements are created equal. 

Our present military commitment in Iraq, in the context—you 

can’t discuss this other than the context in which it’s in—the context in which this agreement would be made and concluded are important factors in evaluating, in my view, whether congressional 

approval is required. Moreover, past practice is not a reason to bypass Congress, nor can it answer the question of the President’s 

authority, as the Supreme Court reminded us when it struck down 

364 

dozens of statutes providing for a legislative veto in the landmark 

case INS v. Chadha. 

This committee has long been concerned with unilateral efforts 

of the executive branch to bind the Nation. In 1967, the committee 

held a series of hearings that led to Senate approval of the 

National Commitments Resolution, which states that a national 

commitment by the United States can only result, ‘‘from affirmative action taken by the executive and the legislative branch of the 

United States by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution in both Houses of Congress specific to providing for such commitment.’’ 

In its report on the resolution, the committee expressed concern 

that some foreign engagements, such as our base arrangements in 

Spain, form a kind of quasi-commitment unspecified as to the exact 

import, but like buds in springtime, ready under the right climatic 

conditions to burst into full bloom. I’m continuing to quote, ‘‘In 

practice, the very fact of our physical presence in Spain constitutes 

a quasi-commitment to the defense of the Franco regime, possibly 

even against internal disruptions.’’ 

In 1970, a special subcommittee of this committee engaged in the 

study of security arrangements and commitments abroad. It 

described the practice of creeping commitments—that’s the phrase, 

‘‘creeping commitments’’—and observed that, ‘‘Overseas bases, the 

presence of elements of U.S. Armed Forces, joint planning, joint 

exercises, or extensive military assistance programs represent to 

host governments more valid assurances of U.S. commitment than 

any treaty or executive agreement.’’ 

The Constitution gives Congress the power to authorize the use 

of force, the power to raise and support the military, and the power 

of the purse, and it gives the Senate the power to approve treaties. 

The President, as Commander in Chief and Chief Diplomat, can direct forces in war, once authorized, and negotiate and sign treaties. 

This division of power was intentional, and, among other things, 

was designed to prevent one person from making national commitments that could result in taking the country to war. I’ve often 

stated that no foreign policy could be sustained in the United 

States of America, no matter how enlightened, no matter how brilliant the vision, without the informed—the informed consent of the 

American people ahead of time; basically, without them knowing 

what they’re getting into. That old expression of Vandenberg’s, 

‘‘You want me in at the landing, I’ve got to be in on the takeoff.’’ 

I think it was Vandenberg. 

Five years ago, President Bush went to war in Iraq without gaining that consent. He did so by overstating the intelligence and understating the difficulty, cost, duration, and mission. He had a legal 

basis, but he didn’t get the informed consent from the American 

people, and we’re seeing the consequence now. With just 9 months 

left in his term, the President is on a course to commit the Nation 

to a new phase of a long war in Iraq, and, thereby, bind—at least 

politically and internationally, perceptively—bind his successors to 

his—what I consider to be a failed policy. Once again he appears 

poised to do so, without the informed consent of the American people, by rushing to conclude long-term agreements with the Iraqis 

without adequate public debate and without a voice of the people’s 

365 

representatives in Congress. Instead of giving us a strategy to end 

the war without leaving chaos behind—this is purely me, I do not 

associate anyone else, I do not speak for my party in this regard, 

I’m not speaking for the Presidential candidates on the Democratic 

side either—but, from my perspective, he’s—instead of giving us a 

strategy to end the war without leaving chaos behind, the President has made it clear that he intends to pass on the problem to 

his successor, and, by these agreements, to make it harder— 

harder, not easier—for a successor to change course. 

The President may have the power to initiate these talks, but I 

think it’s a mistake for him to do so. The situation in Iraq can 

hardly be described as normal, and the government in Baghdad is 

far from established and reliable, even in the eyes of the Iraqi people. That is a very shaky edifice for building a long-term relationship. 

Instead, I believe the President should devote his energies—notwithstanding what he legally may be able to do, I think he should 

devote his energies to working with Iraq and its neighbors on a 

diplomatic surge, I think, to help developing a lasting political settlement and provide the foundation for a stable Iraq, and he should 

defer discussion of such long-term agreements to his successor. 

But, the President persists in this course. And if he does, the 

Congress will insist on its role in approving or disapproving these 

agreements. 

I conclude—before I yield to the chairman—by saying I believe 

that the President would be well suited, the country would be better off, there would be clear and more precise understanding on the 

part of both the Iraqis, as to what we’re promising, and on the part 

of the American people, as to what they’re committing to, for him 

to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement, period. A Status of 

Forces Agreement, period. And—but, that’s my view. 

We’re going to get a chance—and I genuinely—and I mean this 

sincerely—and I’m anxious to hear what the administration has to 

say on this. And they’re going to be followed by a panel of witnesses who have varying degrees of difference—legal scholars—on 

what is required by the President, what is required by the Congress. And we’re anxious to hear it. 

With that, let me yield to Chairman Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in thanking our witnesses for joining us today to discuss the legal framework for our presence in Iraq. Although the 

issue may seem technical, it is highly consequential, both for 

United States policy and for the welfare of our soldiers and diplomats. 

American military and civilian personnel in Iraq and the other 

members of the multinational coalition have worked under a series 

of Chapter VII United Nations Security Council resolutions, the 

latest being UNSCR 1790, adopted on December 18, 2007. This 

Chapter VII resolution authorizes the presence of the MultiNational Force in Iraq until December 31, 2008. It notes the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00373 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
366 

quests made by Prime Minister Maliki in his letter of December 10, 

2007, which is part of the resolution. 

Prime Minister Maliki declares that, ‘‘The Government of Iraq 

considers this to be its final request to the Security Council for the 

extension of the mandate; and expects, in the future, that the Security Council will be able to deal with the situation in Iraq without 

the need for action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 

Nations.’’ 

Chapter VII actions give a U.N. force internationally recognized 

authority to use deadly force if necessary without having to ask the 

permission of the host nation. It’s distinguished from Chapter VI 

missions—such as those in Cyprus and Lebanon—that require the 

consent of the host government. 

The Multi-National Force in Iraq also operates under an order 

issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003. CPA Order 

Number 17, as it is called, ensures that our personnel will not be 

subject to Iraqi legal proceedings. This protective legal umbrella 

will expire when the mandate for the Multi-National Force expires 

at the end of this calendar year. 

I lay out these points, because they make clear the technical reasons for our hearing today. Our presence in Iraq must be governed 

by international law or a bilateral agreement, and our military and 

diplomatic personnel must have appropriate legal protections. 

Transitioning to a bilateral agreement can deliver benefits with 

respect to our relationship with Iraq. Such an agreement would be 

a tangible expression of Iraqi sovereignty, it would provide a predictable legal framework for both sides. Negotiations on such an 

agreement also have the potential to enhance United States leverage in our dealings with the Iraqi Government. 

Last summer, Senator Warner and I proposed an amendment to 

the Defense Authorization bill. Among the elements of that amendment was an acknowledgment that the rationalization for the 

authorization to use force, passed in 2002, is obsolete and in need 

of revision. Many of the conditions and motives from 6 years ago 

no longer exist or are irrelevant to the current situation. The 

amendment stated an expectation that the President would send to 

Congress a new rationale for the authorization. Our amendment 

also included a requirement that the administration, ‘‘initiate negotiations with the Government of Iraq on a Status of Forces Agreement, with the goal to complete work not later than 120 days after 

enactment of this Act.’’ 

The administration has told our committee that there are two 

agreements being negotiated in parallel. The first is a Status of 

Forces Agreement, which prescribes how criminal jurisdiction over 

our troops and claims against activities by our military personnel 

will be handled. The second agreement is a Strategic Framework 

Agreement that addresses broader issues in the United States-Iraqi 

strategic relationship. Clearly such agreements have the potential 

to be extremely consequential for the future of American activities 

in Iraq. 

On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker testified that the agreements 

being negotiated, ‘‘will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and 

we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement 

will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the 

367 

next administration. Our aim is to ensure the next President arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy 

decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in 

the coming weeks and months.’’ 

Although this is reassuring, Congress has legitimate concerns 

about commitments or understandings that might be made in these 

agreements, and the subjects covered in a Strategic Framework 

Agreement may directly or indirectly affect how and when American forces would be used in Iraq in the future. 

We know that Iraq presents an extraordinarily complex environment for United States troops who might be drawn into future 

scenarios related to ethnic strife, competing militias, internal territorial disputes, terrorist attacks, foreign incursions, or even coup 

attempts. The complexity of these legal issues is not a reason to 

avoid talks with the Iraqis, but as these negotiations go forward it 

is essential that the administration be fully transparent about 

their intentions and the progress of their deliberations. 

We are 7 months from a Presidential election. Even before that, 

our mission in Iraq may well evolve, based on conditions on the 

ground, Iraqi political developments, and concerns about the 

strains on the American military. Congress and the American people should be thoroughly apprised of the details of any agreement 

related to the future of American involvement in Iraq. Therefore, 

I thank the administration for the briefings that our committee has 

received, thus far. We will appreciate very much the testimony we 

hear today. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And, again, I welcome our witnesses. 

Ambassador David Satterfield, the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraqi Policy, career Foreign 

Policy Officer with significant credentials. He spent most of his 

career dealing with the Middle East, serving as Deputy Chief of 

Mission in Baghdad, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the 

Bureau of Near East Affairs, and Ambassador to Lebanon—all 

cushy jobs. [Laughter.] 

And Mary Beth Long is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs. She’s previously served as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and for the 

Central Intelligence Agency, and has briefed us before, both in 

closed session and open, and it’s a delight to have her here. And 

I thank you for being here, Madam Secretary. 

And Joan Donoghue is a Principal Deputy Legal Advisor for the 

Department of State. She’s previously served as Deputy General 

Counsel for the Department of Treasury. Probably happy to be with 

State and not Treasury right now, in light what—all that’s going 

on. I’m joking. [Laughter.] 

But, thank you all for being here. And, as I understand it, both 

Assistant Secretary Long and Ambassador Satterfield are going to 

testify. 

We’ll begin with you, Mr. Ambassador. 

368 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR 

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR 

IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC; ACCOMPANIED BY JOAN DONOGHUE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY LEGAL 

ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would ask for concurrence that my prepared remarks be 

entered into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. They will be. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today to discuss the U.S. Government’s intent and purpose, as well 

as progress toward developing a basic framework for normalized relations with the Iraqi Government, which would include a Status 

of Forces Agreement. 

Our overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people establish 

their country as a stable, democratic nation with an effective sovereign government that can meet its people’s needs and play a positive role in the region and in the International Community. There 

is healthy debate about the future presence, composition, and role 

of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, it is clear that U.S. forces will need 

to operate in Iraq beyond the end of this year. 

The Government of Iraq has expressed its intent that the U.N. 

Chapter VII mandate expire at the end of this year, and not be renewed. The United States and the U.N. Security Council support 

this goal. It’s therefore imperative that the United States negotiate 

with the Iraqi Government an agreement that would provide a 

post-Chapter VII framework applicable to U.S. forces, including 

Iraqi consent to the presence and operation of those forces and the 

protections necessary for our troops to continue to operate in Iraq. 

Such an agreement is similar to many SOFAs we have across the 

world. This SOFA is indeed unique, in that it also takes into 

account the special circumstances and requirements for our forces 

in Iraq; in particular, in providing for consent by the Government 

of Iraq to the conduct of military operations and associated 

detainee operations. 

In addition to a Status of Forces Agreement, we intend to establish a strategic framework for a strong, forward-looking relationship with Iraq, a relationship that reflects our shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests. Such a strategic framework 

would broadly address the topics outlined in the Declaration of 

Principles signed by the President and Prime Minister Maliki in 

November 2007. 

Both the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic Framework come at the urging of, and with explicit support from, the 

Iraqi Government and moderate political forces from across the 

spectrum of Iraq’s ethnic, religious, and political communities and 

parties. Together, they seek an accord that both affirms Iraqi sovereignty and continues to permit United States and coalition forces 

to assist in addressing the threat posed by extremists and outside 

actors who seek power through violence and terror. 

On the U.S. side, Ambassador Crocker will be in the lead, and 

he is assisted by an interagency team of experts charged with negotiating the details of the Status of Forces Agreement. The Iraqis 

369 

have also set up a broadly representative and technically capable 

team, a team that represents, if you will, a national decision on 

their part. And together we are in the initial stages now of engaging and clarifying positions on key issues. 

The Status of Forces Agreement will set the basic parameters for 

the U.S. military presence in Iraq, including the appropriate necessary consent from the Government of Iraq and protections necessary for our troops to operate effectively. These provisions are 

vital for our military. We owe it to our forces in Iraq to obtain for 

them the protections they enjoy elsewhere in the world. 

The Strategic Framework and the Status of Forces Agreement 

will not tie the hands of the next President. They will ensure that 

every policy option remains on the table. As for the size of the 

United States presence in Iraq, the nature of our operations in 

Iraq, the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic Framework 

will do nothing to commit or limit the discretion of this President 

or the next President to make those important decisions. 

Neither the Framework nor the Status of Forces Agreement will 

include a binding commitment to defend Iraq or any other security 

commitments that would warrant Senate advice and consent. 

I want to be clear. They will not establish permanent bases in 

Iraq—indeed, the agreements will be explicit on this point—nor 

will they specify the number of forces or the role of forces to be stationed in that country. 

In keeping with past practice, our intent is to conclude the Status of Forces Agreement as an executive agreement, rather than a 

treaty. We intend to consult, as the Secretaries of Defense and 

State and we have pledged, with the Congress throughout this entire process. We are committed to a fully transparent process, and 

we understand the importance of such engagement. 

Background briefings by senior administration officials, including 

this panel, have already begun. Ambassador Crocker, our lead negotiator, testified before both the House and the Senate this week, 

as you know. And, as with other negotiations, I must make clear, 

we will not be publicly discussing our negotiating positions, but we 

will ensure Members of the Congress are kept fully informed. 

Mr. Chairman, members, the United States has enduring national security interests in Iraq; 2008 is a year of critical transition, 

both for the United States and for Iraq. Our primary objective is 

to build a sustainable foundation for success in promoting U.S. interests. We are committed to doing everything we can to ensure 

that the situation in Iraq continues to stabilize and that the next 

administration has maximum flexibility to consider and to adopt its 

own policies to conditions and circumstances on the ground. This 

is precisely what the agreements we seek with Iraq must and will 

achieve. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR TO

THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Government’s 

progress toward developing a basic framework for normalized relations with the 

370 

Iraqi Government, which would include what is known as a Status of Forces Agreement. 

Our overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people establish their country 

as a stable democratic nation, with an effective sovereign government that can meet 

its people’s needs and play a positive role in the international system. Our efforts 

are now paying off. Not only have Iraq’s army and police played an increasing role 

in dramatically improving security over the past year, but also Iraq’s democratically 

elected government is increasingly providing services for the Iraqi people and building relationships with other nations to combat regional instability. More and more, 

the Iraqis are taking greater control of their own destiny, and they desire a more 

normal relationship with the United States. 

There is healthy debate about the future presence and composition of U.S. forces 

in Iraq. However, it is clear that U.S. forces will need to operate in Iraq beyond the 

end of this year. For nearly 5 years, the presence in Iraq of the United States and 

our coalition partners has been authorized by United Nations resolutions. The Government of Iraq has expressed its strong desire that the U.N. Chapter VII mandate 

expire at the end of this year. The U.S. and the U.N. Security Council support this 

goal. It is therefore imperative that the United States negotiate with the Iraqi Government an agreement that would provide a post-Chapter VII framework applicable 

to U.S. forces, including Iraqi consent to the presence and operation of our forces 

and the protections necessary for our troops to continue to operate in Iraq. This 

agreement is similar to the many status of forces agreements (SOFAs) we have 

across the world, which address such matters as jurisdiction over U.S. forces; the 

movement of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; nontaxation of U.S. activities and the 

ability of U.S. forces to use host-government facilities. The SOFA is also unique in 

that it also takes into account the particular circumstances and requirements for 

our forces in Iraq, in particular, by providing for consent by the Government of Iraq 

to the conduct of military operations. Neither we nor the Iraqis intend for this to 

be a permanent provision of the SOFA. 

In addition to a status of forces agreement, we intend to establish a framework 

for a strong relationship with Iraq, reflecting our shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests. This strategic framework will broadly address the topics outlined in the Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime 

Minister Maliki on November 26, 2007. Both the SOFA and the strategic framework, which will build upon the improving security in Iraq and the increased capabilities of the Iraqi Government, come at the urging of the Iraqi Government and 

moderate political forces from across the spectrum of Iraq’s ethnic, religious, and political communities. Together, they seek an accord that both affirms Iraqi sovereignty and continues to permit U.S. and coalition forces to assist in restraining 

extremists and outside actors who seek power through violence and terror. Strengthening those moderate political voices is vital to Iraq’s long-term stability and regional security. And it is vital to our national security that they succeed. 

On the U.S. side, Ambassador Crocker is the lead strategist, and he is assisted 

by an interagency team of subject-matter experts charged with negotiating the details of the SOFA. The Iraqis also have set up a broadly representative and technically capable team, and, together, we are in the initial stages of engaging and 

clarifying our positions on key issues. 

The status of forces agreement will set the basic legal parameters for the U.S. 

military presence in Iraq, including the appropriate consent from the Government 

of Iraq and the protections essential for our troops to operate effectively. These provisions are vital for our military, and we owe it to our troops in Iraq to obtain for 

them the protections they have elsewhere in the world. 

Far from constricting the policy options available to the next President, the SOFA 

and strategic framework will ensure that every policy option remains on the table. 

These options include a range of missions that the next administration may wish 

to pursue, such as helping the Iraqi Government fight al-Qaeda, develop its security 

forces, and stop the flow of lethal training and aid from outside Iraq. As for the size 

of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the SOFA and the strategic framework will do nothing 

to limit the discretion of this President—or the next President—to make that important decision. Neither the framework nor the SOFA will include a binding commitment to defend Iraq or any other security commitments that would warrant Senate 

advice and consent. The SOFA, like all of our other bilateral SOFAs, will not contain provisions that govern the status for foreign forces in the United States and 

thus will differ from the NATO SOFA, which was concluded as a treaty because it 

does contain such reciprocal provisions. Also, let me be clear; the SOFA and strategic framework will not establish permanent bases in Iraq or specify the number 

of American troops to be stationed there. 

371 

In keeping with past practice, our intent is to conclude the SOFA as an executive 

agreement, rather than a treaty subject to Senate approval. We will continue to consult Congress throughout the entire process as negotiations proceed in the coming 

months. Background briefings by senior administration officials have already begun, 

and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, our lead negotiator, testified before both the House 

and the Senate this week. As with other negotiations, we will not publicly discuss 

our negotiating positions on key issues. But we will ensure that Members of Congress are kept fully informed. 

A bilateral security agreement with Iraq has long been noted as a necessary milestone in our relationship by bipartisan commissions and by leading Members of Congress from both political parties. The Independent Commission on the Security 

Forces of Iraq, chaired by GEN James L. Jones, the former Marine Corps Commandant and NATO Commander, recommended negotiating a bilateral agreement. 

This echoed a call from a diverse group of senior Senators, including Carl Levin, 

John Warner, and Richard Lugar. The Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group similarly 

advocated a series of longer term missions that would require agreement with the 

Iraqi Government. 

The United States has enduring national interests in Iraq—2008 is a year of critical transition, both for the United States and Iraq. Next year will bring new Iraqi 

national elections and new tests for Iraqi Security Forces who are slated to assume 

the lead in security efforts in all of their country. Our primary objective now is to 

build a sustainable foundation for success. We are committed to doing everything 

we can to ensure that the situation in Iraq continues to stabilize and that the next 

administration has maximum flexibility to adapt its own policies to conditions and 

circumstances on the ground. This is precisely what an agreement with Iraq must, 

and will, achieve. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Madam Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BETH LONG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to start out by thanking this body and its members for 

your continued support of our men and women in uniform and to 

the Department of Defense. Thank you, again, for everything that 

you do for us. 

The Department of Defense, of course, has a strong interest in 

not only achieving the Strategic Framework that Ambassador 

Satterfield will speak to you about, but, as well, the Status of 

Forces Agreement that we’re here to talk about today. This latter 

document, of course, provides the protections and the authorities 

for the United States military, its civilian personnel, and the contractors supporting for them to operate, and continue to operate, in 

Iraq. It is, as a matter of course, an essential document in 

transitioning the institutional relationship between our countries 

in a military way. 

As all of you are aware, on January 1, 2009, the day following 

the expiration of the current United Nations UNSCR resolution, 

our men and women in uniform, as well as our coalition partners, 

will need an international authority under which to maintain their 

continued operations in Iraq. The United States is very interested, 

in addition to the SOFA and arranging this for our troops, in providing a robust coalition presence in Iraq well into 2009 and 

beyond. 

As we move ahead in our negotiations with Iraq, I would like to 

join Ambassador Satterfield in guaranteeing and assuring you, 

we’re committed to a transparent and cooperative process with the 

Members of this body, as well as the other legislative body. 

372 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I stand ready for your questions. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Maybe we’ll start with 7-minute rounds. Let me begin. 

I don’t think there’s been many times when I’ve taken issue with 

a position taken by Chairman Lugar, and he points to the need for 

U.S. leverage, in his opening statement. I would think we’re at the 

maximum point of U.S. leverage we’ll ever be, at this moment. If 

we don’t have leverage now over this government, then we’re in 

real trouble with the decision having to make about—we have 

140,000 troops there, and more than that now. If that doesn’t constitute leverage, I don’t know what does. 

But, anyway—and, again, I’m going to try to—I’m going to try to 

pursue this so that, I think, that my constituency can understand 

what we’re talking about here. 

And let me begin with the last statement, your concluding point, 

Mr. Ambassador. You say, ‘‘We have enduring national interests in 

Iraq.’’ What are they? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we believe strongly that, 

both in and through Iraq, the future of United States interests in 

a stable, secure Middle East, in an Iraq and a broader region which 

is fully prepared and able to confront the challenge posed by extremism, whether al-Qaeda’s terror or Iran’s expansionist, hegemonistic ambitions, is facilitated, is supported through what happens 

in Iraq. This is not solely about Iraq or the future of that country, 

although that is an important issue. It is, more broadly, about the 

price and the advantages of failure and success in making of Iraq 

a stable state, a state that is able to assist in our, and in regional, 

efforts to confront the extremism, the terror, and Iranian ambitions, of which I spoke. Those are our fundamental interests. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, would you acknowledge that it’s possible 

that two of the three Presidential candidates don’t share that 

vision? There are those—I’m not speaking for either candidate, but 

it may very well be, the next President does not believe that Iran 

is seeking hegemony in the region and that Iran may very well be 

worse off with an Iraq in disarray. You would acknowledge that’s 

a possibility, wouldn’t you? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I speak on behalf of 

this administration. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. That’s the point I want to make. You 

speak in behalf of ‘‘this’’ administration, whose views are not 

shared by two of the three potential next Presidents. And we’re 

about to codify, we’re about to lay out for the whole world to see, 

this President’s vision of our rationale to be in Iraq. I think that, 

as they say, overmakes my point. 

You are speaking, as you should, for this President. You’ve laid 

out two premises that there is significant disagreement on with the 

competing parties’ candidates. One, that the fight against terrorism 

resides in Iraq—that is not a view shared by—they acknowledge 

terrorism exists, but it is not a view shared by a lot of the witnesses that have appeared before us in the past. Witnesses appeared before us—very confident women and men of very respected 

backgrounds have said that if we leave Iraq, there’s no rationale 

373 

for al-Qaeda to stay, that the real war against terrorism is on the 

Pakistan/Afghan border. 

I’m not making the case who’s right or who’s wrong, but I’m 

making the case, at the front end of this, you have a vision that— 

representing the President—that is not a vision at least wholly 

shared by two of the candidates who may very well—at least based 

on polling data, have an even chance of being the next President. 

So, what in the heck are we doing? Forget the legalities of this. 

Just think of the practicalities. Just like big nations can’t bluff, big 

nations can’t make implied promises that you have a pretty good 

idea the next guy coming along may not—or woman coming 

along—may not be committed to. This is folly. This is a serious, 

serious mistake, in terms of the interests of the United States of 

America. Forget the constitutional requirements. Forget the precedents. 

Well, let me ask you another question, if I may. What—as you 

point out, you’re not going to tie the hands of the next President 

of the United States of America. Yet, the security arrangement 

envisions, at a minimum, we will consider protecting the government—because that’s what we’re talking about now, we’re going to 

have to deal with the Government in Iraq—the government against 

threats, both internal and external. 

What would happen if, tomorrow, the Maliki government decided 

that The Awakening was a threat—I predict, to my colleagues, that 

may cross his mind—and decides that he is going to move with 

Iraqi forces, primarily Shia, against an element of The Awakening, 

the Sunnis, in a remote part of Anbar province, gets tied down, just 

like he did in Basra? What is the expectation, do you think, of the 

Government of Iraq? That would use, as we did in Basra, helicopters, we would use intelligence data, we would use communications, we would use—you know, we would coordinate with them? 

I would expect that would be the expectation. And then, what happens when the United States doesn’t? What happens to those forces 

of ours who are sitting on the ground? 

This is a bad idea. What do you think is the notion, here, that 

is contemplated by—let me back up. 

Have we had discussions, to the best of your knowledge, with the 

Maliki government about extending the U.N. mandate for 3 

months? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I led the negotiations 

in Baghdad last December that produced the extension for 1 additional year, to December 31 of this year—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s why I asked the question. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Of the Security Council 

resolutions. I participated in the prior 2 years’ negotiations, as 

well. I can assure you that, in the course of those 3 years of discussions, of negotiations, particularly this last one, it became quite 

clear that the Government of Iraq—and this is beyond Prime Minister Maliki—but that the political structure of Iraq wished to 

bring to an end, by December 31 of this year, and no later, that 

Chapter VII mandate, based on reasons of sovereignty assertion, as 

well as a national will and a sense of national preparedness. 

In two previous years, in 2005 and 2006, we secured an additional extension, based upon our judgment, in consultation with the 

374 

Government of Iraq and its political leadership, that that was both 

a possible goal and a desirable goal. That is not our conclusion— 

was not our conclusion last year. 

The CHAIRMAN. You haven’t answered my—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We do not believe, Mr. Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You haven’t answered my question. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. That this can be—— 

The CHAIRMAN. With all due respect, has there been a direct request, in the last month or so, of the Iraqi Government to consider 

a binding Status of Forces Agreement and an extension—an extension of the U.N. mandate for 3 months? They are not unaware— 

I speak with the same principals you speak with. I may have spoken to them as many times as you have in my close-to-dozen trips 

to—or 10 or 12, whatever it is—to Iraq, whether it’s Maliki or 

whether or not it’s the Vice Presidents representing each of those 

constituencies there or—I mean, you know, and—all of us have, not 

just me; we’ve all spoken to them. Has anyone said to them—they 

know there’s an election coming up, they know the debate that’s 

going on, they’re watching this, as well as—I mean, the TVs are 

turned on for this hearing, not because we’re important, because 

they’re wondering what’s going on—has anyone said to them, in the 

last several months, ‘‘Consider extending the mandate for 3 months 

to allow the next administration to work out its relations’’? 

I mean, you say the following. You say that we want a normalized relationship with the Iraqi Government. There is no Iraqi Government that we know is likely to be in place, a year from now. 

They haven’t even worked out, under their Constitution, the two 

provisions they’re required to work out, a law—a regions law, 

which is written in their Constitution, which goes into effect the 

middle of this month, because they’ve postponed it, kicked it down 

the road 16 months; that expires—I ask my staff for help—I think, 

mid-April. So, come a couple of days from now, any of the—any of 

the 18 governorates—they may not—will have the legal authority 

to vote within their governorate to establish a region defining its 

own security arrangements, not in contravention to the Constitution, the national Constitution, and defining a number of other 

things. They are able to write a constitution, any one of those 

governorates, just like the constitution of the State of Indiana, the 

constitution of the State of Minnesota. They’re able to do that. Just 

like Minnesota has their own State Police, they can decide to have 

their own State Police. Nothing done yet. 

We don’t know what the shape of this government’s going to look 

like. We’re having provincial elections that are coming up, which 

most of the witnesses before us said are probably not going to take 

place on time. Hope they do. 

So, the idea we’re normalizing relationships with a government 

that is far from normal or normalized—half the Cabinet has 

walked away. There’s not a normal Government in Iraq. 

My time is up. I’ve gone 3 minutes beyond it. Almost 4. I apologize. But, if you want to respond, you can. I understand if you don’t 

want to. But, just understand my frustration here. The premise is, 

there’s a normalized government—we’re going to normalize relations with a government that really doesn’t thoroughly exist. It is 

375 

sovereign, but it does not—who are we normalizing it with? What 

is the shape of that government? 

And you point out that the enduring national interest that we 

want to essentially codify—not bindingly, but codify with the 

Iraqis—is one that is not necessarily shared by the next President. 

I think you’re making a big mistake for our national interests, 

in pushing this without telling the Iraqis—and if we don’t have 

leverage now, what are they going to say, ‘‘Go home’’? Good. Have 

us go home. Tell us they don’t want us there. Not a lot of Americans are going to say, ‘‘Oh, no, no, no; let’s stay when you don’t 

want us.’’ 

We just heard, for 2 days, from two incredibly competent government servants—one military, one civilian; Petraeus and Crocker— 

that the Iraqis really want us to stay. This sure as heck would be 

a good test. 

I yield to my colleague. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The chairman has laid out, in some detail, political analysis of 

conditions in the United States, as well as an analysis of developments of the Government in Iraq. 

Let me just pursue, for a moment, that proposition, that—and 

both are, if not in flux, at least subject to substantial changes. 

Now, given that predicament, why have you chosen the current 

path of the presentation of these two agreements? For example, the 

chairman has mentioned, if I gather his argument correctly, extending the U.N. Security Council resolution for another 3 months. 

One alternative might have been to approach the Security Council 

for an extension of the next year—that is, 2009—on the basis, literally, of these very substantial prospective changes in Iraq, quite 

apart from changes in the United States. 

Now, from the standpoint that you described, Ambassador 

Satterfield, as having negotiated the last go-round of this, the 

Iraqis with whom you dealt would find that very unsatisfying. As 

a matter of fact, they have said, ‘‘This is it, with 2008, that year 

extension, and that’s it.’’ And I understand the point of view of 

those leaders with whom you visited, or maybe even some more 

substantial group of people. But, on the other hand, the situation 

is one in which the political changes have to be recognized by the 

Iraqis, really, in their own country, and perhaps they also recognize political change that may occur in the United States of America in our debate, regardless of which party wins. 

Now, under those circumstances, it would appear that we have 

at least some leverage—speaking of leverage—to indicate that, 

although it may be the preference of the Iraqis, at least those in 

the leadership, to see the Security Council mandate come to an end 

at the end of 2008, in our judgment it really won’t work out that 

way. 

And I mention that very candidly, in view of the opposition to the 

proposition of the two agreements, that you must sense that it was 

at least manifest in some comments in the hearings with General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and certainly have been in the 

chairman’s opening statement and questioning of you this morning. 

But, this is, in essence, is not likely to be a laydown hand. Knowing 

this, that you had a political argument in this country, why did you 

376 

proceed as you have to present these two agreements in the form 

you have presented them? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, as you note, the Iraqi Government, beyond Prime Minister Maliki, the entire structure of the 

Iraqi political establishment, has made quite clear, in growing fashion, but explicitly so in the concluding part of last year, they wish 

this to be the end of the Chapter VII mandate. We believe—they 

certainly believe—that that reflects the broadest view of their constituents, because, indeed, they have constituents in Iraq. We believe it’s an appropriate moment, given that Iraqi demand—and 

that is exactly what it is, a demand that the mandate come to a 

close—it is their request which is the requirement, not a U.S. request for extension of the Security Council mandate—given their 

demand that it come to an end, we determined that a course which 

laid out both a framework that presented the Status of Forces 

Agreement in context—that is a specific agreement in which the 

Iraqis offer to us authorities, offer to us permissions, offer to us 

protections for our personnel in country—that this would be presented by the Iraqis to their people, as we will present it here, in 

the context of a broad and overarching strategic partnership and 

relationship with Iraq and with its people for the time to come. 

With respect to the political environment here, this administration, as is the case, Senator, with any administration, must pursue 

what it determines to be U.S. national interests, as well as the best 

means of pursuing those interests, until the last day, the last hour 

that it remains in office. And we believe these undertakings, the 

Strategic Framework and the Status of Forces Agreement, provide 

a stable platform for the next administration—indeed, for this administration in the next months—to look at the situation in Iraq, 

to make judgments about how best to carry forward United States 

interests with the greatest ability to make appropriate and 

thoughtful decisions possible. It does not tie the hands of the next 

President. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, let me just follow a little bit further on 

that. And this is not meant to demean, for a moment, that argument you presented. But, the context of the argument I presented 

was that this administration surely recognizes the argument that 

we’re having here today, and have had a little bit before. Taking 

into account these two agreements, along with the testimony we 

heard from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker regarding a 

45-day pause in the drawdown for further consultations we begin 

to arrive at a more stable understanding—at least from the administration’s perspective—for what things may look like as we reach 

the end of this administration and the end of the year, as far as 

the Iraqis are concerned. What the committee is trying to figure 

out in a bipartisan way—and this is difficult in the middle of a political campaign—is where does this leave the next administration? 

Now, your assertion would be, ‘‘Well, it leaves it with a stable situation. You have two agreements. The Iraqis have made proposals 

for security. Whoever the incoming President is, or Secretary of 

State or Defense or so forth, ought to be happy to have a lay of 

the land.’’ Maybe so, maybe not. Maybe the incoming folks are not 

at all happy with that situation; as a matter of fact, did not really 

like the particular agreement that was fostered, but at least proVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00384 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
377 

ceeded to make things stable for this administration through the 

rest of the year. And, in simply commonsense terms, this is why 

we’re having, it seems to me, if not an argument, at least a debate, 

about an issue that otherwise, as you say, would seem very matterof-fact, that we’d finally get the U.N. out of it, turn it into a bilateral agreement about Iraq and the United States. 

But, as the chairman has pointed out—and I don’t necessarily 

want to get into the detail of how stable I believe the Iraqi Government is, how comprehensive, and so forth—but we’ve had, not endless hearings, but a good number, trying to describe ‘‘a bottom-up 

scenario where stability in the provinces might somehow ever get 

to the Green Zone.’’ Even discussing the Iraqi Government as if it 

is an entity that is definable, that is strong—and so forth—seems 

to me to be a stretch; although diplomatically, I understand your 

standpoint. Nevertheless, as you’re dealing in these negotiations, 

who else do you deal with? Do you go to the Green Zone, not out 

into one of the 18 provinces, to try to find and divine the future? 

Let me just, sort of, get back to the thought that it may very well 

be that the administration’s point of view is simply to try to ride 

this one through with the two agreements. 

I would hope, in the course of these hearings, and in other consultations that you have promised, that as we get into details that 

will not be public today, that there is even some degree of give 

within our own conversations, quite apart from that which we 

might ask of the Iraqis. Because I think the chairman’s points are 

well raised. Ultimately, although we haven’t promised Mr. Maliki 

what we would do if this force or that force came at him, or if 

somehow the Parliament can’t move on anything, or if, in fact, corruption or lack of service, or the breakdown of the power system, 

or all these things occur, and you can’t really cover all those contingencies, and yet all of them are very real, given testimony we’ve 

already heard about the country. So that although the Iraqis may 

insist that, ‘‘We are sovereign, we want the U.N. out of there, the 

U.N. Security Council, it’s all passe ́,’’—we have some leverage with 

them, I would contend—in fact, quite a bit, in terms of their security and their future. And, I think, probably we ought to utilize 

that in the coming weeks as we discuss these agreements. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, if I could respond to the 

points that you’ve made, and a point, a very good point, which the 

chairman made, as well. 

We have very deliberately chosen to negotiate these documents, 

not with a given figure or office, or even with a given party or faction. These have to reflect a national decision on the part of the 

Iraqis, has to reflect national will, which is why we have very deliberately structured these negotiations—insisted on it, in fact, and 

have had that reciprocated by the Iraqi side—in seeing a broad collective, reflecting, frankly, the majority of all of the forces in Iraq, 

except those on the extreme margins, which, of course, are a different story. The vast majority of Iraqis and their political representatives are part of this process because of the concerns over 

what might be the course of different governments, different parties taking office through the constitutional provisions of Iraq. 

With respect to the issue of, ‘‘Wouldn’t it be better to simply continue with the Security Council resolution?’’—putting aside the 

378 

point that the Iraqis themselves have made clear to the Council 

and to us, they don’t wish that to be the course, we believe that 

acknowledging, formally, Iraqi sovereign status is, itself, a major 

contributing element to stability in the time ahead in Iraq. It has 

its own intrinsic value and merit, in terms of that country’s future 

and in terms of how we see that country’s future impacting on the 

region. 

And, finally, a point which the chairman and you both raise 

about, ‘‘What would be the consequences of a decision—a request 

on the part of this or any other Iraqi Government, for a particular 

engagement of U.S. forces?’’ The case would be, under the Status 

of Forces Agreement, as is the case today, at this moment—any 

such request would be subject to consultation, reflection, and analysis on the part of our leaders, diplomatic and military, in Iraq as 

well as here in Washington, and a decision would be taken on that 

basis, based on our assessment of national interest. And we have 

been extremely clear and fully transparent with the Iraqi Government on this issue of what consultations mean. It’s reflected in sort 

of the ‘‘web and woof’’ of everything we do in Iraq today. It will not 

change with these agreements. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Taking advantage of being chairman, for 30 seconds here. The difference is, there is no formalized agreement 

guaranteeing the present government’s security internally. That’s 

the big difference. Or at least implying we would do that. 

And I want to make it clear to the witnesses, I don’t doubt for 

a minute the veracity of everything you say about these not being 

binding. So, understand I am not in any way questioning your 

assertions about the intentions of the administration, relative to 

not formally binding the next administration. I just wanted to 

make that clear. 

I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

In his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

this week, Ambassador Crocker was asked about the agreement 

being negotiated with the Iraqi Government and whether, ‘‘you envision this after we succeed in this conflict.’’ Ambassador Crocker 

responded that he, ‘‘would actually envision it as helping us to succeed in the conflict.’’ 

I’d like to confirm that what we are in fact seeking to establish 

a long-term relationship with Iraq, even as the fighting continues. 

Is that correct? Are we—are we—is that what we’re trying to do? 

And are there any conditions the Government of Iraq must meet 

before the United States agrees to anything, such as achieving 

national reconciliation? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we do, indeed, believe, as 

Ambassador Crocker stated, as I have stated, that the conclusion 

of these arrangements, we believe, will contribute to stability in 

Iraq, security in Iraq, and, indeed, to our common success—ours 

and Iraq’s. And in terms of conditionality, obviously we continue to 

work with the Government of Iraq, as it continues to work on 

advancing the goal of national reconciliation, along with greater 

379 

assumption of its responsibilities on the security side, on the economic side. 

Senator FEINGOLD. But, are we trying to establish this long-term 

relationship as the fighting continues? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, we are obviously negotiating 

these arrangements now while the fight for a stable and secure 

Iraq continues; yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. Given the fact that the Maliki government with which you’re negotiating does not represent a true coalition of the main Iraqi political parties, won’t this agreement have 

the effect of exacerbating the perception that we are taking sides 

in a civil war, especially since the majority of the Iraqi Parliament 

has called for a timetable for the withdrawal of the American 

troops? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, in fact, we believe the Government of Iraq, the Presidency Council, Prime Minister Maliki, as 

the head of the executive branch, do indeed reflect the broad range 

of centrist parties in Iraq. Those parties that have excluded themselves from participation in the government in whole, the Sadrist 

Movement, although they do continue to participate in the Council 

of Representatives, represent a rather extreme position. Prime 

Minister Maliki does have the participation in his government, and 

is in active dialog with the principal Sunni interlocutor, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. He is very much part of this process. As I 

said to the chairman and Senator Lugar, we have structured this 

negotiation, the Iraqis have structured their negotiating team, to 

reflect all—and I will underscore ‘‘all’’—of the major political parties in Iraq, ethnic, sectarian parties. They are all part, formally, 

of—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK, but this is a—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. This process. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Duly elected Parliament. Are you 

not concerned at all that the majority of the Iraqi Parliament has 

called for a timetable for the withdrawal of United States troops? 

Is that not relevant? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, I do not believe that the 

majority of the members of the Iraqi Parliament do not support the 

conclusion of these arrangements, and would not offer their support 

for these arrangements. We believe, quite to the contrary, that, 

indeed, they will enjoy broad popular and broad legislative support 

in Iraq. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Historically, security commitments to other 

countries have only been made in treaties that were ratified by the 

Senate. Now, I understand that you are saying that this agreement 

will not provide any commitments or bind future Presidents. I 

would note that the agreement will not bind the Congress either. 

If the Congress were to enact legislation prohibiting enforcement of 

the agreement, would you agree that this statute would be binding 

and would override the executive agreement? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we do intend to negotiate the 

Status of Forces Agreement as an executive agreement, as is the 

course with virtually all such arrangements that don’t contain 

reciprocal or other binding commitments. 

380 

With respect to the speculative question on possible legislation, 

we would have to assess that legislation in its context. 

Senator FEINGOLD. If Congress passes a clear law overriding the 

executive agreement, would the law override that agreement, in 

your view, from a matter of law? 

Ms. DONOGHUE. Senator, as Ambassador Satterfield indicated, 

we would obviously have to look carefully at it, at the time. It 

would certainly present difficult questions for us if we were at that, 

sort of, loggerheads and we would hope that, through additional 

briefings and discussions with you about the content of the agreement and the extent to which it provides protections for our troops, 

we wouldn’t reach that point. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I would suggest your difficulty is in the 

nature of our Constitution. If we pass a law overriding it, that’s the 

law. 

What would your—in your view, have to be in these negotiated 

documents to cause them to rise to the level of needing congressional approval? 

Ms. DONOGHUE. Senator, we haven’t done a laundry list of the 

things that ‘‘could’’ create a problem, because we simply aren’t contemplating those things. We’ve tried to identify some of the topics 

that have arisen in discussions of these agreements to try to make 

clear what we don’t intend to cover. So, for example, there certainly 

has been a practice that a binding security commitment has been 

submitted to the Senate. We don’t intend one of those, and we 

haven’t done thorough analysis about whether there’s any possible 

way that we could make an argument that we wouldn’t have to 

submit that to the Senate. 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. 

Ambassador Satterfield, you note in your testimony, ‘‘our overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people establish their country as a stable democratic nation, with an effective sovereign government that can meet its people’s needs and play a positive role 

in the international system.’’ Wouldn’t this objective be better 

served by establishing the basis for an international peacekeeping 

force, which would be perceived by the local population as impartial, unlike the Iraqi perception of United States forces? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, Senator, that is not the intent 

or goal of the Iraqi Government. It is not something that we believe 

would be a practical or achievable goal, now or in the foreseeable 

future. 

Senator FEINGOLD. During the Iraq hearing, on Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker committed to submitting the agreement to the Iraqi 

Parliament for approval. Ambassador Satterfield, do you believe 

that this agreement should be approved by the Iraqi Parliament, 

rather than just being signed by the Prime Minister or the Presidency Council? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we will leave to the Iraqi 

Government decisions on how to proceed with this agreement, in 

accordance with their constitutional requirements. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And do you understand that requirement to 

be submitting to the Iraqi Parliament? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We leave that decision to the Iraqi 

Government. 

381 

Senator FEINGOLD. Then why would Ambassador Crocker have 

committed to submitting the agreement to the Iraqi Parliament? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. What Ambassador Crocker said was, 

that was our understanding of what the Iraqi Government intended to do with the agreement. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Is that your understanding, as well? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes, indeed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, in terms of Status of Forces Agreement, can you do a Status of Forces Agreement and not do the Security Agreement? Could 

you do one without the other? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we believe, as I noted in a 

prior remark, that presenting the Status of Forces Agreement to 

the Iraqi Parliament, to the Iraqi people, to their political leadership, is best done, most successfully done, in context. That context 

is the broad nature of a cooperative partnership, strategic relationship that we see as a value both to the United States and a value 

to Iraq and its people as we go forward. Now, that kind of broad 

overarching relationship certainly has a security dimension, but it 

also has economic, cultural, technical dimensions to it. This helps 

the Status of Forces Agreement be understood fully in the context 

of a relationship that goes beyond dimensions of security alone. 

Senator COLEMAN. The challenge that we face—and I would— 

and I think the question, by the way, is, In the middle of a Presidential election, our political situation, can you put politics aside? 

Can folks of goodwill on both sides of the aisle look at this and 

say—we know there’s going to be a new President. They may have 

a different perspective of what our enduring national interests are, 

they may have the same perspective. I suspect, whoever the President is is going to have some differences and some different perspectives. In understanding our own situation, is it possible to—for 

the administration to engage in a dialog with this Congress, with 

Members of Congress, with representatives of candidates, and have 

some kind of commitment that we don’t go forward—we can’t go 

forward with anything unless we have that solid understanding 

and commitment? 

I think we’re fighting about—not ‘‘fighting’’—I think there’s some 

conflict here that you would think we could avoid. The reality is, 

we’re in a Presidential election, and leadership’s going to change, 

and we’re going to have some—we have some long-term interests 

in Iraq. We’re going to—no question about that—we have some 

long-term interests in Iraq. And even in this committee, I know— 

I mean, there is disagreement. 

I listened to General Odom the other day. I disagree with his 

perspective about Iran. I don’t think—or I don’t think Israel’s going 

to be safer. I don’t think Hamas is going to be less emboldened. I 

don’t think Hezbollah is going to be quieter. And it—you know, if 

we’re simply somehow out of Iraq, that that’s going to make Iran 

a better friend. They’re going to still do what they’re doing, which 

is undermining security in the region. 

382 

All that said and done, I think, in terms of our future relationship with Iraq, because of the political environment that we’re in, 

it would just make sense that, rather than have some of the exchanges we’re having, that we—the administration says, ‘‘Congress, 

we’re going to work with you, and we’re not going to go forward unless we have the chairman of the committee, the ranking member, 

the former chairman, sit down and we have an understanding that 

we’re comfortable with what’s being done here. And if we can’t get 

to that, then we have to have something else to continue the relationship.’’ But, otherwise, we’re going to engage in this debate, and 

one side’s going to say, ‘‘Well, the Iraqi Congress is approving this, 

but we’re not approving it.’’ It’s become a—people are going to be 

making political points over something that I don’t think the intent 

is to make political points on. 

The intent is to protect our troops, protect their interests. They 

operate now under a U.N. mandate. That mandate’s going to end. 

I have the concern—I certainly agree the issue was conditionality— 

I have some concerns about the Iraqis’ ability to move forward 

aggressively on the political front, and I think this is an opportunity for us to have some conditionality. 

But, rather than a question, my humble suggestion is that, if 

we’re going to engage in full conversation, and full transparency 

and full recognition of the political reality, that somehow, when 

we’re done with this hearing, that there be some conversation with 

the leadership on both sides of the aisle, and say, one, we’ve got 

to get Status of Forces Agreement. Our folks—troops have to be— 

there are some basic protections they have to have in place, no 

question about that. And I don’t think there’s much argument 

about that. But then, on the other issue, we recognize that, unless 

we have that understanding, this is going to be—people are going 

to be making political points over something that shouldn’t be a 

matter of politics. And I can see the debate, and I can hear the 

debate. We’ve already heard some of it. And if there’s a way to 

avoid that, I think it would be in the best interests of this country, 

the best interests of the administration. I’d certainly work closely, 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, with whoever, to see if we 

can find some common ground here. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, I very much appreciate the 

points that you’ve made, and we certainly do hope that, through a 

full transparency in briefings, which we can provide in open, as 

well as in other more confidential settings, on the issue of strategic 

framework, we can, indeed, meet the concerns, address the concerns which you and many others have expressed about this. 

We do believe that the two pieces of this process go together, 

have to go together, that together they advance long-term, beyond 

this administration, U.S. national interests. But, indeed, we are 

committed to the kind of exchanges, the kind of full transparency 

you discuss. 

Senator COLEMAN. Well, then my concern is, rather than get to 

the point where there are going to be some resolutions in Congress 

that are going to attempt to create—tie the hands of an administration, create constitutional challenges as to what Article I says, 

versus Article II, of the Constitution, executive—or legislative 

versus executive—that there be a very clear understanding that 

383 

we’re not going to go forward with a security arrangement unless 

and until there is full buy-in from this body. It doesn’t have to be 

a formal treaty, but I just think there has to be that recognition. 

Otherwise, we’re going to proceed down a very bitter, partisan, 

political divide that is going to be used for scoring points and not 

protecting our troops. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think it’s a good suggestion. 

I would add, if I could, it’s not—the reason why these political 

points are so sharp is, I think everyone would acknowledge, the 

underlying policy differences are so real. Sometimes political points 

are just scored for political points. But, the policy differences 

among the candidates are really significantly different, and that’s 

what agitates the—this whole issue. So, I think it’s an interesting 

suggestion. 

Senator from Florida. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin and Senator Casey were here before me, and, as a courtesy, I would defer 

to them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank my friend from Florida, Senator Nelson, for yielding the time. 

First, I want to thank our panel for their service to our country— 

I mean that sincerely—and for their commitment to a transparent 

process in dealing with Congress on these two agreements. 

But, I must tell you, I strongly disagree with the way that you 

are proceeding. I don’t think it’s in the interest of this country. I 

agree completely with the chairman. I find it very difficult to understand—and my constituents find it difficult to understand—why 

we could not have a 3-month extention of the U.N. resolution set 

to expire at yearend if only the United States made that request 

to Iraq. I find it unbelievable that Iraq would not yield to our recommendation on that point, considering the national elections here 

in the United States. And I believe that’s the way we should proceed. 

As the chairman has pointed out, there are strong differences of 

opinion in this country with regard to a Strategic Framework. 

There is just a different view by the majority of Congress and the 

American people as to how we should proceed in Iraq versus how 

this administration intends to proceed in Iraq. 

So, I must tell you, I just disagree with any effort by this administration to enter into an agreement with Iraq without the approval 

of Congress. The administration’s expressed intent to do so is being 

interpreted by the people of this Nation as an effort to affect the 

next administration and future Congresses. I don’t think there’s 

anything you could say that would convince me or the people of 

Maryland—and that’s people who support and those who oppose 

the President’s plans otherwise. There’s simply a belief that the 

President’s trying to affect the options of the next administration, 

the next President—and the next Congress. 

So, Mr. Ambassador, let me just ask you something about the 

language you have used. Language is important. You know that; 

you’re a diplomat. You say that neither the Framework nor the 

384 

Status of Forces Agreement will include a binding commitment to 

defend Iraq. And you’ve mentioned that word ‘‘binding’’ several 

times. All of you have. Would you commit to us that we could eliminate that word ‘‘binding,’’ that neither agreement will include a 

commitment of any sort in regards to the United States defending 

Iraq? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, this administration believes, 

the President believes, and these arrangements will certainly express that view, that the stability and security of Iraq is vital to 

broad, long-term U.S. national security interests in and beyond the 

Middle East. The President believes, the administration believes, 

that assuring—not in the form of a binding legal commitment, but 

assuring the people of Iraq and the Government of Iraq that we do 

believe their security is important, that we will act as we believe 

necessary and appropriate to protect and advance that security, 

that that is our policy. That, we think, is important to do. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, that’s where we disagree. We disagree as to the appropriate manner to make that 

agreement. We do not believe that this administration should enter 

an agreement which will clearly have an effect on U.S. military 

presence in Iraq and will clearly affect the options of the next administration or the next Congress. As you know, last summer this 

Congress passed legislation requiring the President begin to bring 

our troops home. The President vetoed that bill. So, there’s a different view here in Congress. And I don’t know how you can come 

before us and say that the agreement you are proposing will allow 

all the options a future President and a future Congress might 

choose to pursue. I look at the options that you lay out and I don’t 

see any options that outline the drawing down of U.S. troops. 

I just believe that, out of respect for our Constitution and the responsibilities that each of us have to the American people, that this 

administration should not be negotiating an eleventh-hour agreement. That is just wrong. 

And I am not encouraged by your statements. I think the word 

‘‘binding’’ is somewhat in the eyes of the beholder. I have seen the 

United States—I’ve seen the State of Maryland—spend a lot of 

money, not because they had a ‘‘binding’’ commitment, but because 

they thought they had lead people to believe they would and that 

created a moral obligation to do so. 

And I don’t take comfort from your statement here, that ‘‘2008 

is a year of critical transition, both for the United States and Iraq.’’ 

If you were here 1 year ago, you would have said 2007 was a year 

of critical transition. If you were here 2 years ago, you would have 

said 2006 is a year of critical transition. If you were here in 2005, 

you would have said 2005 is a year of critical transition. 

So, yes; I think 2008 will be a year of transition for Iraq and the 

United States. And I don’t believe it’s appropriate for this administration to bind our Nation’s options, especially without the approval of Congress. I just want you to know that. I want you to 

know that. 

I think you’re moving into very dangerous territory. 

I look forward to the open process that you have committed to. 

And I can assure you this will not be the last time you’re going to 

hear from us on the negotiations that you’re pursuing. 

385 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Governor. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m sorry I missed the other discussion. 

The question I have is this. Iraqis want to let the Chapter VII 

mandate expire in the U.N. Security Council at the end of this 

year. We say we support it. Is there some overwhelming feeling on 

the Security Council that should entertain Iraq’s request that 

Chapter VII be allowed to expire? And in light of the fact that we 

have an election coming up here in the United States, don’t Iraqis 

understand that this is going to be a fairly controversial thing between now and our November election? That’s No. 1. 

No. 2, the agreement said it would ‘‘take into account numerous 

principles, including the United States supporting the Republic of 

Iraq in defending its democratic system against internal and external threats.’’ And the chairman of the committee mentioned internal threats being perhaps the Sunnis, if the central, Shia-dominated government feels threatened. Who are the external threats? 

‘‘Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of 

Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.’’ This 

looks like a real commitment from Uncle Sugar, to Iraq. 

And then, in the February 13, 2008, Washington Post article by 

Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates, they said, 

‘‘In these negotiations, we seek to set the basic parameters for the 

U.S. presence in Iraq, including the appropriate authorities and 

jurisdiction necessary and to operate effectively to carry out essential missions, such as helping the Iraq Government fight al-Qaeda, 

develop its security forces, and stem the flow of lethal weapons and 

training from Iran. In addition, we seek to establish a basic framework for a strong relationship with Iraq, reflecting our shared 

political, economic, cultural, and security interests. Nothing to be 

negotiated will mandate that we continue combat missions. Nothing will set troop levels.’’ 

Well, it seems to me that if you’re talking about ‘‘supporting the 

Republic of Iraq and defending its democratic system against internal and external threats,’’ and ‘‘providing security assurances and 

commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression 

against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and the integrity of its 

territory,’’ implicit in those statements is a commitment by the 

United States to participate. 

Even though Secretaries Rice and Gates say a Status of Forces 

Agreement (SOFA) will not mandate U.S. participation, the United 

States actually is making commitments in the agreement. And I 

have to say to both you and the administration that you aren’t 

going to conclude such an agreement between now and the November election. 

In the past, the administration often has not listened to the Congress. They basically have said, ‘‘Trust us. We’ll take care of it. 

Don’t worry about it.’’ The fact of the matter is that this Congress 

and this Senate are going to get involved in this issue. My best 

advice to you would be to try to work out the Status of Forces 

Agreement. If I were you, I’d also go to the United Nations and 

386 

say, ‘‘You know what, folks? We’ve got an election coming up. We’ve 

got lots of political problems. You understand that. You all come 

from countries some of which face similar situations.’’ 

I think that you ought to consider some other options. Instead of 

spending all this time concentrating on the agreement, try to work 

with members of the Security Council to see if Iraq can delay the 

agreement until after the U.S. Presidential election. Proceeding 

with this agreement now will embroil us in controversy, allegations 

will be made, you name it. I mean, that’s the reality of this situation. Do you understand what you’re up against in trying to get 

this done now? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the two issues that you pose, 

the question of the Security Council—the Security Council, in 

December of last year, welcomed—indeed, the members strongly 

supported the Iraqi request that the Chapter VII mandate terminate and not be extended after December 31 of this year. That is 

the formal position of the Security Council—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, why doesn’t the Security Council delay 

the conclusion of the agreement for 6 months? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Because the Government of Iraq, Senator, requested that the mandate be terminated, and because the 

members of the Council, on reflection of the strategic interest in 

seeing a sovereign agreement and all that a sovereign agreement 

entered into by the Government of Iraq with the United States or 

other coalition members would mean for security in that country, 

a goal shared by the Council, supported—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. What if you tell the Iraqis that you’re not 

going to be able to complete this second agreement between now 

and the end of this administration? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, with all respect, that is not 

the position of this administration. 

Secretary LONG. Senator, I think there—I could provide an illuminating point that might be helpful to the point that you raised. 

One of the things that’s often overlooked about the Security 

Council resolution is that, by the nature of that resolution, it may 

be revoked by Iraq, as the requestor, at any time. So, on the issue 

of the protections of our forces in Iraq, we could put ourselves, very 

possibly, in the position, by going around the Iraqi request or by 

not recognizing the reality that it may be revoked, of putting men 

and women in uniform who are in Iraq in the position of having 

no document which internationally provides them with the protections that they require. And, in fact, the Baker-Hamilton Study 

Group recommended that we have such a SOFA agreement. So, I 

just wanted to illuminate that—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well why don’t you concentrate on the SOFA 

and back off from formulation of the framework? This administration is not going to get it done. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, again, I understand the point 

on the linkage here, but we do see a linkage. The Strategic Framework, we do not believe in any way obligates or commits this or the 

next administration in a fashion which should be seen as unacceptably binding. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I don’t think—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We do see it as useful—— 

387 

Senator VOINOVICH. No—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. In getting the SOFA. 

Senator VOINOVICH. All right. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Do you—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. You look at it that way. I’m just saying to 

you, from my perspective and from what I’m picking up from my 

colleagues, it’s not going to happen. Proceeding toward a strategic 

framework with Iraq is going to turn into a big political thing between now and the election. I think, in the long run, rushing such 

an agreement could even hurt, rather than help, the situation. I’m 

asking you to look at reality. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, a vote has just started, but I would 

suggest we keep going. There’s going to be three votes in a row. 

And I suggest you all miss the votes and continue the hearing. 

[Laughter.] 

No; I suggest we keep this going for as long as we can, to get 

through the first vote. Then we’re going to have to adjourn or 

recess until the two votes are completed. 

We have a very distinguished panel behind this panel, and I 

hope we’ll come back. 

But, I yield to the Senator from New Jersey. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I understand that Senator 

Nelson had yielded—— 

The CHAIRMAN. He has set a bad precedent for you. [Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’m happy, at this moment, to yield to 

Senator Casey. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Senator Casey. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I now owe the State of New Jersey, as well as the State of 

Florida. Thank you—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY [continuing]. For breaking the rules. We’re grateful. I’m the beneficiary—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Our interest rates are higher, though. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. I want to thank the panel. 

Mr. Ambassador, I want to return to a point that several of my 

colleagues have been probing—I think it’s important to establish 

something for the record. 

It’s just a very simple question. Is it your testimony today, and 

is it the legal position of the administration, the President, and the 

Department of State, that the Strategic Framework Agreement 

that you’re seeking to negotiate and to put into action is legally 

binding on the next administration or not legally binding? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, at present, we contemplate 

the Strategic Framework as a collection of political assurances on 

the character, the content of the partnership with Iraq that includes, but goes beyond, security measures, that, as such a collection of political assurances, it would not rise to the level of a legal 

commitment that would trigger advise-and-consent procedures. 

Senator CASEY. And I would also ask the counsel, Is it your legal 

position of the State Department, that this is not legally binding? 

388 

Ms. DONOGHUE. That is the current understanding of the text. 

And, of course, with any text, we watch it closely as it develops— 

and we constantly evaluate whether we need to change that. 

Senator CASEY. Well, look, one of the reasons why there’s such 

skepticism—you sense it here today, and I know you understand 

this prior to today—is that this isn’t happening in a vacuum. 

What’s been happening for a number of years now, and certainly 

the last number of months, is that the question of this Strategic 

Framework being debated and discussed and argued about in the 

context of signing statements. This and other issues have caused 

a lot of concerns. Language from months ago seemed to commit us 

to deterring foreign aggression in Iraq. It’s not as if this just is a 

difference of opinion about this Strategic Framework. It’s in that 

context, why you have a high degree of skepticism. You’re hearing, 

from both sides, about the problems you face in getting this done, 

at least from the vantage point of Congress. 

And what I don’t understand is—and I’d ask you about—however, let me just return to one aspect of your testimony, first. 

Mr. Ambassador, on page 3 of your testimony, the continuation 

from page 2, right in the middle of that paragraph, you say, 

‘‘Together they’’—meaning both the SOFA and the Strategic 

Framework—‘‘seek an accord that both affirms Iraqi sovereignty 

and continues to permit U.S. and coalition forces to’’—and this is 

the language I’m focusing on—‘‘to assist in restraining’’—‘‘assist in 

restraining extremists and other outside actors who seek power 

through violence and terror.’’ What does that mean? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, what that means is the following: For U.S. forces to be present in—to be effective in their 

presence in Iraq, in advancing the security goals that we believe 

are important, they will require from the Iraqi Government, after 

the expiration, December 31, no later than the 31st of December, 

of the Chapter VII mandate, permissions from the Government of 

Iraq for the conduct of combat operations and associated detainee 

operations, as they will require certain protections from the Government of Iraq. Whether or not forces are or are not present, and 

at what levels, whether or not they should conduct these operations 

is a decision for the Executive, this and the next administration. 

But, for that Executive to have the ability to make such decisions, 

they will require permission from the Government of Iraq. The Status of Forces Agreement codifies, sets forth, those post-Chapter VII 

permissions. That is what that testimony means. 

Senator CASEY. Well, for the life of me, I can’t understand why 

you wouldn’t want to have greater consensus here, through the 

Congress and through the American people, for any kind of Strategic Framework, because it’s going to be very difficult to give integrity to what you’re trying to accomplish here if you don’t have 

the support of the American people and have a Congress which, at 

best, is highly skeptical about what you’re trying to do. 

I know I’m low on time, because we have to vote. Senator Webb 

and Senator Menendez are—and others—are waiting. 

I guess the last thing I wanted to cover is just the question of— 

we’ve been hearing a lot of different perspectives on this, and we 

know that, months ago back in November, in the Declaration of 

Principles, that declaration asserted, ‘‘security assurances and comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00396 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
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mitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression 

against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, and airspace.’’ If there was a lost-in-translation, or 

a bad translation, why didn’t the administration immediately clarify that, or repudiate it, or explain? Why did this comment sit 

there, so to speak, on the paper until it was questioned by others 

in Congress? Principally why didn’t the administration immediately say, ‘‘That translation was bad,’’ if it was that ‘‘We didn’t 

mean to say that. That’s misleading language’’? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, indeed, as soon as concerns 

were raised over that language—Secretary Gates was, I think, the 

most forceful and detailed member of the administration to speak 

to the fact that that language was not interpreted by us at the 

time, should not be interpreted now as to imply a binding security 

commitment or guarantee. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be very brief. 

Counselor Donoghue, is there any historical precedent in the 

United States that lends any guidance on this? I know we had declarations of war in World War I and World War II and Korea was 

a U.N. action, if I’m not correct. Did the transition from Truman 

to Eisenhower also necessitate a Status of Forces Agreement? Do 

you know? 

Ms. DONOGHUE. Well, we have Status of Forces Agreements of a 

wide variety. We have about 80 that we consider to be enduring 

Status of Forces Agreements, and a smaller number, perhaps 40, 

that were negotiated for specific arrangements. Is that—— 

Senator ISAKSON. But, none preceding a transition of Executive 

power from one administration to the next? The pending issue is 

the election in November and what status we’re going to negotiate 

in advance of that, and whether that agreement might possibly 

bind somebody. I’m just wondering if there is a historical precedent 

in the United States. 

Ms. DONOGHUE. Senator, I don’t know the answer to that. We 

would have to look at the dates on which each of these agreements 

were concluded, and tie them to the election cycle. 

Senator ISAKSON. If there is one, I’d like to know it. And if you’d 

let me know, I’d appreciate it. 

Ms. DONOGHUE. Yes, Senator. 

[The written information and charts supplied by Ms. Donoghue 

follow:] 

The United States began negotiating status of forces agreements (SOFAs) after 

World War II, when it began deploying U.S. forces abroad for extended periods. At 

least 18 agreements concerning the status of U.S. forces abroad have been signed 

in the final year of a Presidential term. The attached chart lists these agreements. 

Furthermore, we are not aware of any case in which an incoming administration 

has terminated a SOFA recently concluded by the outgoing administration. In fact, 

we are not aware of any U.S. administration terminating any SOFA under any circumstances whatsoever. 

390 


done.eps
391 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Satterfield, can this agreement, if completed, be canceled by either party at any time? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes, Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, you informed me, the other day 

that any treaty that we negotiate is cancelable by either party at 

any time. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s correct. I don’t know of a treaty we’ve 

written that doesn’t allow either party to an escape clause saying 

the treaty is no longer their national interest, and unilaterally 

withdraw from it, as President Bush did with the ABM Treaty. 

Senator ISAKSON. My only comment would be, if either an adviceand-consent treaty, or the agreement are both cancelable at any 

time by either party, no matter how deep a debate we get into— 

is it really relevant? 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if you’re—— 

Senator ISAKSON. Or, what’s the difference? 


done1.eps
392 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you’re asking me, they’re relevant 

in the sense that withdrawal from treaties and withdrawal from 

executive agreements have political consequences that—you saw 

when we withdrew from the ABM Treaty, what that did internationally, the responses we received. And, again, it falls under the 

category, in my view, Senator, that big nations can’t make assurances lightly, whether they’re legally binding or not, without having consequences when they don’t fulfill that obligation. That’s the 

generic point I was making. 

And you asked about the treaty—any treaty like it. I would like 

to suggest that, when you’re looking—I don’t know of any treaty 

that allows the latitude and protection for civilians and contractors 

as broadly as is being sought here, 180,000. So, civilian, nongovernment security forces contracted, like Blackwater, and the ability of 

a stationed force being able to, on its own, initiate military action 

in the country in which the Status of Forces Agreement exists—I 

know of no such treaty. I’d be delighted to hear if there was one; 

I may be mistaken. 

Senator ISAKSON. I’ll yield the balance of my time to Mr. Menendez, who has been waiting. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have about 3 minutes, which means we’ll 

have 5 minutes after the vote. So, if you—I think you could probably get in, and I’ll go protect you on the floor—I’m not being facetious—so that you get shut out, in terms of voting, if you want to 

begin. 

Senator MENENDEZ [presiding]. OK, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, let me ask you this. What was the purposes of the 

Declaration of Principles for a long-term relationship? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The purpose of the Declaration of 

Principles, last November, was to begin to lay out the broadest 

parameters of shared Iraqi-United States goals, to be fleshed out 

in the form of the Strategic Framework and, in terms of security 

issues, the Status of Forces Agreement this year. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And in that declaration, the language clearly 

said, in the security sphere, ‘‘supporting the Republic of Iraq in 

defending its democratic system against internal and external 

threats’’ and providing, ‘‘security assurances and commitments to 

the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that 

violates its sovereignty, integrity of its territories, waters, or airspaces.’’ Is that not correct? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we have explained—Senator, 

I believe I addressed Senator Casey on the point that Secretary 

Gates and others have made clear. This does not, the language you 

refer to, constitute a binding security guarantee or commitment on 

the part of the U.S. Government. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, words have meaning. Certainly those 

of us who have practiced in the law understand that words have 

real meanings. And when you start off in a Declaration of Principles that basically commits the United States to support the 

Republic of Iraq in all of these ways, it raises real flags for those 

of us who are concerned. And I echo the comments of the chairman 

and the ranking member and others who are concerned about your 

Status of Forces Agreement that you are pursuing. 

393 

Isn’t it true that, under the Provisional Authority’s resolution, 

that has been signed, that if we had an extension of the U.N. resolution, we’d have all of the guarantees we would be able to achieve 

under a Status of Forces Agreement? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the U.N. Security Council 

Chapter VII mandate empowers what was CPA legislation on privileges and immunities, but it is the intent of the Government of 

Iraq, as expressed to the Security Council and accepted by the 

Council and by the U.S. Government, to terminate that mandate. 

We are approaching this from the standpoint of a successor to the 

Chapter VII mandate. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I understand that. If you had an extension 

of the resolution, you’d need no Status of Forces Agreement. Yes 

or no? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. From the strict standpoint of protections for U.S. forces and the bases for the presence of those forces, 

that is correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. Now, let me ask you this. It seems to 

me that what we are looking at here is a real concern in which we, 

I think, on both sides of the aisle, largely believe that such an 

agreement needs to come before the Congress. I know that that’s 

not the administration’s point of view—or certainly at least before 

this Senate. But, it is a real challenge to having seen the Statement of Principles, having seen the precedent set here by the 

administration in signing statements and other relevant issues to 

what they will dictate what they believe the law is, notwithstanding what the Congress says the law is, that there is a total 

lack of confidence that we will not be committed in the longer term 

context in the Status of Forces Agreement. 

Let me ask you, in a different context, isn’t it true that, in fact, 

we have probably the greatest leverage right now? Moving aside 

from a Status of Forces Agreement and the necessity, we believe, 

for the administration to come to the Senate, isn’t this a moment, 

as this agreement is negotiated—of tremendous interest to the 

Iraqis, as well as to us? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Indeed, it is, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Therefore, isn’t this a moment, as you pursue this, even though I believe you should pursue it with the Senate’s concurrence, that it should be used for real leverage to get the 

Iraqis to move in a direction that we want them to move and they 

have not? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, Senator, we certainly—and not 

just in the context of these negotiations, but in terms of our broad 

dialog and engagement with the Government of Iraq—are, indeed, 

making clear, as we have in the past, the need for continued 

progress. But, I would say, as Ambassador Crocker spoke over the 

past 2 days, that, indeed, progress is being made. More needs to 

be done, but significant, substantial progress has been made. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes, well let me just say, I believe that to 

the extent that Iraq is equally, if not as—greater than us, in terms 

of our interest in having such an agreement, that it provides a tremendous leverage opportunity, one that I don’t hear the administration even talking about using as a tool in pursuing greater acceleration of some of the key political elements that we need for an 

394 

opportunity in Iraq to be successful. And I just think that that is 

a huge mistake and undermines a critical opportunity to make the 

Iraqis make the hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary 

for a government of national unity, as well as bearing more of its 

funding of its own domestic responsibilities. 

I have a message from the chairman, that he would ask you to 

stay, because Senator Webb and maybe one other may have some 

questions. And if you would do so, we would appreciate it. 

And thank you for your responses. 

[Recessed.] 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The hearing will come to order. We 

do apologize. The witnesses are pros, though; they know how this 

place works. I apologize. 

What we’ve done is—there’s going to be another vote, but we 

have plenty of time for Senator Webb, who I think is the last questioner of this panel, to be able to get in his questions. And then 

we’ll—for the next panel, we’ll let you know—we’re going to dismiss 

this panel, but there’ll probably be another 10 minutes before we 

begin your panel. I’m sorry. I hope none of you have planes or 

trains to catch in the meantime, because we’re anxious to hear 

what you have to say. 

I yield to the Senator from Virginia. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Satterfield, I’m trying to get myself straightened, 

here. Let me start off by saying that I agree with the chairman on 

the question of the political wisdom of the way this is moving forward. I also happen to agree with Senator Feingold, particularly on 

the potential that there is a constitutional issue here, certainly an 

issue in federal systems, in terms of how the different branches of 

government really should be working. 

And I don’t know if you all read Arnaud de Borchgrave, the columnist, commentator. I think he’s pretty good. He had an article, 

that came out yesterday, actually, and one of the paragraphs in 

this article said, ‘‘The full’’—I’m quoting, here—‘‘The full impact of 

Bush’s answer to a question put to him by a European author in 

a private Oval Office meeting a year ago leaves no room for doubt. 

After an optimistic briefing on Iraq, the author asked the President, ‘What about your successor?’ and Bush replied, ‘Don’t worry 

about him, we’ll fix it so he’ll be locked in.’ ’’ 

Whether it is accurate or not, as it pertains to the issue before 

it, it certainly defines the mood of distrust that has followed the 

way that we ended up in Iraq, from many of us who were warning, 

prior to the invasion, that there was no exit strategy, because people who were putting this together did not intend to leave. 

And particularly in terms of putting together this larger Strategic Framework, the way that it’s been repeated identified, going 

to political, economic, cultural, and security matters, I think you 

can understand the hesitations from both sides of the aisle on that. 

I’d like to get some clarification on a couple of things, if I may, 

just in a sense of attempting to understand the actual legal environment in which you are proposing to move forward. 

First, Secretary Long, you mentioned—and this is my best 

attempt at trying to get a quote while you were speaking. I think 

395 

the operative words are exact. I don’t know if I got your whole 

quote. But you said, ‘‘After 31 December, we will need an international authority in order to maintain our military presence in 

Iraq. We will need an international authority.’’ What international 

authority will that be? 

Secretary LONG. Senator, I apologize if I implied that there was 

a legal necessity for an international authority. What I meant to 

say was that the—our authorities now to operate in a combat 

nature in Iraq are derived from the United Nations Resolution 

Chapter VII and subsequent related agreements. The auspices 

under which we are operating will expire, as you know, on December 31, 2008, the end of this year, and we will—we are looking to 

replace those with an authority granted by the Iraqi Government, 

pursuant to the SOFA. 

Senator WEBB. So, in your view, the international authority, 

after December 31, would come from what document? 

Secretary LONG. I don’t want to make a legal determination, but 

I know that, in the view of many of our coalition partners, they are 

operating now with our Armed Forces under the Chapter VII resolution, and that they believe they are required—and I don’t have 

insight into their legal structures for a subsequent legal authority 

under which our coalition partners will continue to operate with us. 

Now, whether that is granted as a bilateral agreement with— 

between whatever country and the Iraqis, or whether it is a subsequent United Nations resolution, we don’t know yet. Some of them 

are contemplating operating with our forces under an—— 

Senator WEBB. No, no, what—for the United States—— 

Secretary LONG. For the United States—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. After December 31, 2008, is there an 

operative legal authority in place right now for us to continue in 

Iraq? 

Secretary LONG. Not for combat operations, no. 

Senator WEBB. And so, what is the operative legal authority that 

you believe will allow us to move forward? 

Secretary LONG. The Status of Forces Agreement—— 

Senator WEBB. In terms of the Status of Forces Agreement, 

under what legal authority is that going to be negotiated? 

Secretary LONG. That’s an executive agreement that is binding, 

sir. 

Senator WEBB. So, essentially what you are maintaining is that 

an executive agreement from the United States Government can 

bind us—let me choose a better word—can authorize the continued 

presence of the United States military in Iraq. 

Secretary LONG. Go ahead. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the Status of Forces Agreement relates to, specifically and exclusively, authorization or permission from the Government of Iraq, as the host government, for 

the presence of forces, for privileges extended to those forces—— 

Senator WEBB. I understand—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Or for the ability to conduct combat and associated detainee operations. It is quite distinct 

from—entirely distinct from the authorizations or the authorities 

within the U.S. system required for that presence of forces and 

their conduct. 

396 

Senator WEBB. That’s exactly the point that I’m trying to make. 

So, what is this other authority that authorizes us to be there after 

December 31? What is the legal authority? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The legal authorities in the U.S. context—— 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Are the same authorities 

under which we are present and under which we conduct operations in Iraq today. 

Senator WEBB. In other words, the congressional authorization of 

2002. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is, Senator, the President’s authorities as Commander in Chief, it is both the 2001 counterterrorism, 

as well as the 2002 congressional authorizations. 

Senator WEBB. So, in your view—you and I have had a discussion about this before, the congressional authorization of 2002 and 

this other document authorize the United States to maintain a 

presence in Iraq until when? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Along with the President’s constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, that authorization is not 

limited in time. I’d defer to the counselor for further detail on that. 

Senator WEBB. So, in perpetuity, arguably, your position would 

be that the United States Congress probably does not abrogate that 

authority, because, since it goes to the Commander in Chief. That’s 

actually the wording of the Presidential signing statement when he 

signed the 2002 authorization. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the two specific pieces of legislation do not contain a temporal calendar for termination of their 

authorities. 

Senator WEBB. Right. So your view would be—and I have read, 

carefully, the Presidential signing statement in 2002, where the 

President doesn’t say that this congressional authorization limits 

his ability to function as a Commander in Chief. So, we’re obviously going to be in disagreement on this. I’m just trying to get 

clear, here. You’re maintaining that the congressional authorization of 2002 and the other one you mentioned, in 2001—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. 2001. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Plus, or perhaps superceded by, the 

President’s authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes the 

United States to be in Iraq after December 31—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Along with—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Into perpetuity, unless something 

else happens. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Along with the President’s constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief are the authorities in the 

United States system for the presence of conduct of operations of 

United States forces in Iraq. 

Senator WEBB. So, if you don’t have the Strategic Framework 

Agreement, you would say that this is the authority for negotiating 

United States bases in Iraq, et cetera. What is the—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well—— 

Senator WEBB. What is the impact of the Strategic—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Framework Agreement? 

397 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Whatever authorities this 

or any other U.S. President may have through the Constitution or 

statute, when U.S. forces are present in a foreign country, they 

require some form of authorization for that presence and for their 

operations. Now, that can come in the form of an international 

mandate. That is the extent—but, terminating, December 31, 

Chapter VII—— 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Resolution—or they are 

based upon a sovereign agreement that is either bilateral or multilateral, as in the case of NATO, for—— 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. That presence and those 

operations—— 

Senator WEBB. Or bilateral, as in the sense of Japan, the Philippines—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Or—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Et cetera. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes, exactly, sir. 

Senator WEBB. OK. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. You must have one of the two. 

Senator WEBB. So, it would be your position, then, that the Strategic Framework Agreement, from a United States perspective, is 

the authorizing agreement for bases—for negotiating bases and 

these other sorts of things. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is the basis for the Government of 

Iraq’s permission for forces to be there and to conduct certain operations, if the Executive determines to do so. 

Senator WEBB. Or if the United States Government determines 

to do so. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Post-December 31. 

Senator WEBB. So, this is an essential document. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is, Senator. 

Senator WEBB. OK. And I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that it’s 

a document that would need some congressional consent. 

What is a ‘‘permanent base’’? 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the administration has made 

quite clear that we are not seeking permanent bases in Iraq, and 

the agreement—— 

Senator WEBB. Right. But—— 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Would explicitly exclude 

that. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. What is a permanent base? Are our 

bases in Japan permanent bases? 

Secretary LONG. I have looked into this. As far as the Department is concerned, we don’t have a worldwide, or even a departmentwide, definition of ‘‘permanent bases.’’ I believe those are, by 

and large, determined on a case-by-case basis. But, as Ambassador 

Satterfield pointed out, the Secretary of Defense has said, explicitly, that this agreement does not—— 

Senator WEBB. Well, I understand that. But, basically, my point 

is, it’s sort of a dead word. 

Secretary LONG. Yeah, Senator—— 

Senator WEBB. It doesn’t—— 

398 

Secretary LONG [continuing]. You’re exactly right. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Really mean anything. 

Secretary LONG. It doesn’t. We’ve had—— 

Senator WEBB. We’ve had—— 

Secretary LONG [continuing]. Bases—— 

Senator WEBB. We’ve had bases in Korea since 1953 anyway, and 

I would be hard-pressed to say they’re permanent. How long is permanent? We have bases in Japan, under a security agreement, 

that—we are relocating a lot of those to Guam, so I wouldn’t say 

that they are permanent. So, to say that these won’t be permanent 

bases really doesn’t go to the question of what they will be; it goes 

to the question of what they won’t be. And what we’re saying they 

won’t be is a dead word. 

Secretary LONG. Senator, you’re exactly right. I think most lawyers, from a ‘‘permanent’’ standpoint, would say that it—the word 

‘‘permanent’’ probably refers more to the state of mind contemplated by the use of the term. 

Senator WEBB. Exactly. And I would say that the state of mind, 

in a governmental sense, should be established by all the appropriate constitutional players. I mean, you’re saying that this agreement will reflect all of the major political parties of Iraq, but, at 

this point, it doesn’t really reflect all the major political parties of 

the United States. That’s why we’re interested in continuing this 

discussion. 

And I thank you for your time. I’m well over my time. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I’m glad you were able to have the 

extra time. 

Let me follow up, as we’re about to—this last vote—and I’ll 

thank you for your presence and let you all go. But, there’s a certain irony here. The irony is that we’re acknowledging that the 

Iraqis will not give us a Status of Forces Agreement, absent other 

commitments that are not technically binding, but, nonetheless, 

commitments of stating to what the relationship is going to be in 

the future. And we are—making the argument—and you always 

use the phrase, Secretary Long, of ‘‘multinational forces.’’ The truth 

is, when this U.N. resolution expires, in January, no other forces 

are allowed to be in that country, unless the Iraqis negotiate, independently with them, a Status of Forces Agreement. So, if you’ve 

got 8 Czechs or 27 Czechs or 15 whoever, they require, in order for 

their troops to be protected—because they can’t piggyback on ours, 

there is no national, there is no international, thing that allows 

them to do that. 

And the irony here is, the—you are correct, I believe, that the 

authorization of use of force in 2002 is the basis upon which we are 

able to use force in Iraq, but it says, ‘‘to defend the national security of the United States against continuing threats posed by Iraq 

and to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.’’ 

All U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq will cease 

and desist as of January 1 of this year. So, that’s no longer relevant. And the Government of Iraq is the very government we’re 

negotiating the Status of Forces Agreement, so, ipso facto, it is not 

a threat to the United States of America. So, I would respectfully 

399 

suggest you have no constitutional basis upon which to argue that 

the resolution of authorizing the use of force of 2002 gives you any 

constitutional or legal jurisdiction, justification for what you’re 

about to do. 

And the last point I’ll make is that the agreements referenced 

are accurate, you need either an international mandate or a sovereign agreement for American forces to be there. Status of Forces 

Agreements in every other country do not call for the ability— 

whether it’s Korea or Japan—for the United States, in this Status 

of Forces Agreement, to engage in war unilaterally within that 

country or with anyone else. NATO, which was cited, is a treaty 

and a different breed of cat, does not at all relate to this. It is not 

at all remotely comparable. 

And so, the irony here is, we are saying the Iraqis will not give 

us a Status of Forces Agreement to protect our forces, which you 

all agree we need, absent a larger agreement, a separate agreement; and in the Status of Forces Agreement, we’re asking for 

something we’ve not asked in any other Status of Forces Agreement I’m aware of, the ability to unilaterally conduct military operations—not in defense of our troops being attacked—unilaterally— 

as well as be able to take prisoners in the country of Iraq, whether 

Iraqi citizens or otherwise, and hold them without the permission 

of the Iraqis. They’re two things we’re asking for in this Status of 

Forces Agreement. 

I’d respectfully suggest you don’t have a constitutional leg to 

stand on for this agreement. So, I’d also suggest—and I’ll be 

happy—I’m going to cease, so let you—because I’ll submit some of 

these in writing, and I’d appreciate a written answer, as well. 

I’d also suggest you negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement, period. Because I’d also suggest that if the answer is, ‘‘The Iraqis 

won’t give it to us because they want more,’’ that’s an awful hard 

case to explain to the American people, why we ain’t giving everything. We’re giving, and going to continue to give, 30 to 40 American lives a month, even with the downturn in violence. We’re continuing to give 230 to 240 Americans wounded a month, even with 

the reduced violence. We’re continuing to give $3 billion a week. If 

that ain’t enough, then, guess what? If the Iraqi Parliament votes 

for us to go home, guess what? I predict to you, 85 percent of the 

registered Republicans in Americans, 95 percent of the Democrats, 

and 90 percent of the Independents will say, ‘‘Hey, man, they don’t 

want us? OK, we’re out of there.’’ 

I think you need a different game plan, respectfully, because I 

do think we have to protect our troops. And that’s selfish, because 

some of us have special troops that are going to be there. And so, 

I will submit some of these in writing, if you will. 

I thank you, as always, for your candor. You’ve been straightforward with us. I truly appreciate it. I understand your point. But, 

I think we have a political—in a broad sense, a political dilemma 

here, as well as a legal and constitutional one. And hopefully we 

can resolve it. 

But, if you’d like to make any closing comment, I’d be delighted 

to hear you, your view. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, Senator; we certainly understand 

the points that have been raised here today by you and all of your 

400 

colleagues. We understand the importance of a full understanding 

on the part, not just of this body, but the American people, of what 

both of these documents do and don’t do. And we certainly understand the sacrifices made—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I know you do. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. By America—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I wasn’t implying you didn’t. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. In that country. They’re 

extraordinary. And they continue to be—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Extraordinary. 

But, what we are seeking to do here is to secure, for the long 

term, fundamental American interests, interests that we, frankly, 

believe will be shared by this and all administrations. 

Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s my hope. And I thank you all. 

I apologize to the next panel, I’ve got to run and make this vote. 

And if I can get one of my colleagues to come back, I’d ask them 

to start, so we don’t hold you up, if they come back. 

So, I’d ask my staff, whoever comes back, Democrat or Republican, if they’d empower the panel and begin. 

But, I thank you all. 

We’re recessed until the next vote. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

We have a very distinguished panel. We’ve kept you waiting a 

great deal already, for which I apologize. And I’m glad they, 

though, had an opportunity to hear the testimony today of the 

administration so—because I may ask you to comment on some of 

what they’ve said and I acknowledge that there are varying interpretations, constitutionally and legally, of what they said. 

Mike Matheson is a visiting research professor of law at George 

Washington University, here in Washington, DC. He was a career 

attorney in the Offices of the Legal Advisor at the Department of 

State for 28 years, including 13 years as Deputy Advisor to two of 

the Acting Legal Advisors. 

It means you’ve got to go back, though, right? Good luck on your 

testimony. You’re not going back? Oh, I thought you were staying, 

I thought you were on leave, I’m sorry. I misspoke, I misunderstood. 

Mike Glennon is an old friend of this committee, as a matter of 

fact he used to sit back here, back in the old days, when he and 

a guy named John Ritch ran this place. He’s a professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. We’ve 

called on him—both Republican chairs and Democratic chairs have 

called on him repeatedly since his stint here as counsel from 1977 

to 1980. Happy to have him back. 

And Ruth Wedgwood is director of the International Law and 

Organization Programs at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, a really fine outfit. 

She’s also a member of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee 

on International Law, and a member of the Defense Policy Board 

as well as a member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 

401 

I thank you all for being here, and maybe if you could proceed 

in the order in which you were recognized, and then we’ll have 

some questions, with your permission. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MATHESON, PROFESSOR, 

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the invitation to testify today. I have submitted a written statement which 

I suggest be included in the record, and that I give you a summary. 

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be placed in the record. 

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you. 

I just want to focus on certain questions about these agreements 

which the administration apparently intends to conclude, pursuant 

to the joint declaration. I will be focusing on legal issues, but of 

course this, in no way, obviates the very legitimate policy and practical concerns that you—and other members of the committee— 

have been raising. 

First of all, with respect to the question of security commitments 

and security assurances: As you know, the term ‘‘security commitments’’ has been the subject of considerable dialog between the 

political branches over the years, as to what it means, and what 

the consequences of it are. It’s most commonly been used in the 

sense of a binding obligation of the United States to act in the common defense of another country, in the event of armed attack. Of 

course, such security commitments were included in a number of 

defense treaties after World War II—the NATO treaty, Korea, 

Japan, and so on. 

This term has often been used in distinction from ‘‘security 

assurances,’’ or ‘‘security arrangements,’’ which typically have been 

used to mean a commitment to take some lesser action, in the 

event of a security threat to another country. One good example of 

that was in the 1975 agreement with Israel, in which the United 

States agreed that in the event of a threat to Israel’s security, that 

the United States would—and let me quote this, ‘‘consult promptly 

with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance, it can lend in accordance with its 

constitutional principles.’’ 

As we know, the Declaration of Principles with Iraq refers both 

to security commitments and assurances. The administration has 

now told us that it does not intend to give security commitments. 

Assuming that’s the case, I suppose that’s an answer to the legal 

question, but obviously it does not, in any way, dispose of the considerations you and other members were suggesting that there 

could be significant political and practical consequences of a security assurance, even though it may not rise to the level of a security commitment. 

Next, with respect to the status of the U.S. forces, when U.S. 

Armed Forces are deployed in another country for an extended period, the United States will always want to have in place some 

form of agreement or other instrument which defines the status of 

those forces, and assures that they have appropriate privileges, and 

appropriate immunities from local law and local jurisdiction. 

402 

There isn’t any uniform model or content for these SOFAs—some 

are very brief and general; some are very extensive and may include a number of formal understandings or appendices. But they 

typically have certain common objectives. They give U.S. forces the 

right to enter, to move about in conducting their mandate; they 

grant exemption from some, or all, local taxes and charges; they 

grant exemption from local criminal or civil jurisdiction, in whole 

or in part. The specific terms may vary, depending on the circumstances and the demands of the host country. 

With respect to Iraq, United States forces are in Iraq as part of 

the Multi-National Force that’s been authorized by the Security 

Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as you know. And 

the Security Council authorized the Multi-National Force to use 

‘‘all necessary measures’’ to maintain security and stability in the 

country, and to protect the international contingents, and for various other purposes. And it’s commonly understood that this authorizes those units to use force in carrying out that mandate. 

The status of the Multi-National Force is governed by an order 

issued in 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority, as the occupying authority; this is known as CPA 17, and its been maintained 

in force since the end of the occupation by a provision of the Iraqi 

Constitution, for the duration of the Multi-National Force mandate. 

CPA 17 does those things which a typical SOFA will do. It gives 

immunity to Multi-National Force personnel from Iraqi criminal 

jurisdiction; it governs such matters as contracting, and taxes, and 

travel, and so on. It does differ from a typical SOFA in one respect, 

which is that it gives immunity to civilian contractors, as well as 

to government personnel. 

Now, CPA 17 only covers U.S. forces as they are part of the 

Multi-National Force. As you know the current mandate of the 

Multi-National Force only extends through the end of this current 

year. If no follow-on SOFA were concluded by then, then it would 

be prudent to extend the current protections of CPA 17. 

This could be done by action of the Security Council to extend 

the current U.N. mandate, but there could be other ways to do the 

same thing—to preserve the status quo. For example, one might 

have a simple exchange of notes between the United States and the 

Iraqi governments, which would agree to maintain the current authority and status of United States forces for some interim period 

while the follow-on agreement was negotiated. And that applies not 

only to the technical status of those forces, but also to any authorization to conduct military operations that might be desirable. 

Next, the role of Congress in all of this: With respect to security 

commitments, as we know, they have almost always been done in 

the form of treaties, but at a minimum, in any event, by some kind 

of act of Congress. More limited security assurances, such as a simple promise to consult in the event of a security threat, could be 

done by executive agreement, and has been done in the past by 

executive agreement, pursuant to the President’s constitutional 

authority. 

With respect to SOFAs, there’s no uniform model or format. 

The NATO SOFA was in the form of a treaty. There were other 

SOFAs which were concluded as agreements implementing treaties, but also there have been a large number of SOFAs concluded 

403 

1See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/1/20071126–11. 

as executive agreements, pursuant to the President’s constitutional 

authority. 

If a SOFA with Iraq were limited to giving United States forces 

exemption from Iraqi law, then the President could do this without 

the necessity for congressional approval. If other types of commitments were added, that might or might not require congressional 

approval as a legal matter, depending upon their content, and their 

relationship to other statutory restrictions. 

For example, if there were a commitment to permanent bases— 

whatever that might mean—in an Iraqi SOFA, then that would be 

contrary to the DOD Appropriations Act, and consequently, the 

administration has told us there will be no such commitment. 

But even if you had a case where an agreement fell completely 

within the President’s constitutional authority, that doesn’t mean, 

in my mind, that Congress should not play a significant role. On 

the contrary, given the very obvious importance of the future 

United States-Iraqi relationship, and given the importance of the 

role of the United States forces in that relationship, it seems to me 

as a minimum that the administration should fully consult and involve Congress in decisions about both the form and the substance 

of the agreement. 

And I would go further—I would say that, ideally, the two 

branches should be arriving at some consensus on the future role 

and status of the U.S. forces, and this might be confirmed in some 

form. It might take the form of formal congressional approval, it 

might take the form of a sense-of-Congress resolution, it might 

take the form of formal exchanges with the congressional leadership; the important thing is that it should be a joint endeavor, it 

seems to me, in defining the future role of the United States and 

its forces in Iraq. This, I think, would be necessary to acknowledge 

and accommodate the legitimate interest of Congress, both with 

respect to U.S. foreign and national security policy, and the use of 

U.S. funds, and the disposition of U.S. forces. 

Mr. Chairman, that completes my summary. Of course, I’d be 

very glad to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MATHESON, PROFESSOR, GEORGE WASHINGTON

UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, WASHINGTON, DC 

I have been asked to give my views on the agreements with Iraq that are contemplated pursuant to the November 2007 United States-Iraq Declaration of Principles.1 It would appear that the administration intends to conclude a Status of 

Forces Agreement (or SOFA) to govern the rights and immunities of U.S. forces in 

Iraq, and a Strategic Framework document to establish a broader blueprint for future cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, and security fields. These documents are intended, among other things, to govern the United States-Iraq security 

relationship after the expiration of the current U.N. Security Council mandate, 

which currently provides for the presence of U.S. and other coalition forces through 

December of this year. 

SECURITY COMMITMENTS AND ASSURANCES

According to the Declaration of Principles, the new documents will include ‘‘security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression 

against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or 

airspace.’’ 

404 

2S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., June 25, 1969. 

3Sec. 1457, Public Law 101–510; codified in 50 U.S.C. 404c. 

4See Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, a 

study prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Congressional Research 

Service, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., November 1993, p. 206–07. 5The State Department also maintains a list of ‘‘U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,’’ consisting of these treaties. See www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense. 6 April 4, 1949; 63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964; 34 UNTS 243. 

7 June 23, 1960; 11 UST 1652; TIAS 4510; 373 UNTS 186. 

8September 1, 1975; 32 UST 2150; TIAS 9828. 

The question of what constitutes a ‘‘security commitment’’ to another country has 

been the subject of dialog between the executive branch and Congress for decades. 

In 1969, the Senate adopted the National Commitments Resolution,2 which asserted 

that any ‘‘promise to assist’’ a foreign country ‘‘by the use of Armed Forces’’ would 

be a ‘‘national commitment’’ that could only be given by means of a treaty, statute, 

or concurrent resolution. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 included a provision 

requiring the President to submit a report to Congress describing all existing ‘‘security arrangements with, or commitments to’’ other countries.3 In 1992, President 

George H.W. Bush submitted a report listing current U.S. security commitments 

and arrangements.4 He defined a ‘‘security commitment’’ as ‘‘an obligation, binding 

under international law, of the United States to act in the common defense in the 

event of an armed attack on that country.’’ He provided a list of current U.S. security commitments, almost all of which were contained in treaties concluded between 

1947 and 1960, including the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty (with Latin 

American countries), the Southeast Asia Treaty, and treaties with Australia, New 

Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.5

The provisions of these treaties vary somewhat, but each contains language that 

contemplates U.S. action in the common defense in the event of armed attack 

against one of the treaty parties. For example, Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic 

Treaty says that the Parties agree ‘‘that an armed attack against one or more of 

them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 

and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 

exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense . . ., will assist the Party 

or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 

other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, 

to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’’ 6 Article V of the 

1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United 

States says that each Party ‘‘recognizes that an armed attack against either Party 

in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own 

peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.’’ 7

The 1992 Presidential report contrasted such security commitments with ‘‘security 

arrangements’’—that is, pledges by the United States to take some action in the 

event of a threat to the other country’s security, typically to consult with that country—but containing no commitment with respect to the use of U.S. Armed Forces. 

It listed a number of such arrangements, including those with Israel, Egypt, and 

Pakistan. For example, it cited the 1975 Memorandum of Agreement with Israel, 

which stated that in the event of a threat to Israel’s security or sovereignty, the U.S. 

would ‘‘consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend in accordance with its constitutional practices.’’ 8 Pledges of this sort have also been called ‘‘security assurances.’’ 

In addition to such ‘‘security commitments’’ and ‘‘security assurances,’’ there are 

a variety of other steps that the United States might take to enhance the security 

of a friendly country, including providing military assistance, sales of military items 

and technology, and stationing U.S. forces. Some or all of these steps may be taken 

in conjunction with security commitments or assurances. 

Once again, the United States-Iraq Declaration of Principles refers to ‘‘security assurances and commitments.’’ However, on reflection, the administration has now 

stated that the agreements contemplated will not include any security commitments 

to Iraq. Other forms of security assurances or arrangements may be included in either the SOFA or the strategic framework document, but the administration has not 

yet, to my knowledge, indicated exactly what is intended. 

405 

9 Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, ‘‘What We Need Next in Iraq,’’ Washington Post, February 12, 2008. 10See U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) and letters incorporated by reference. 11 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007). 12See http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ 

20040627lCPAORDl17lStatusloflCoalitionlRevlwithlAnnexlA.pdf. 

STATUS OF U.S. FORCES

When U.S. forces are deployed to a foreign country for a significant period— 

whether under U.N. authority or not—the United States will typically wish to have 

in place an instrument making clear the status of U.S. forces and the extent of their 

immunity from the law and jurisdiction of the state in which they are operating. 

If the U.S. is acting as an occupying power, this may take the form of an occupation 

order; otherwise, it will take the form of an agreement with the state in question, 

either concluded by the U.S. Government itself or by the Multi-National Force or 

coalition of which it is a part. According to the administration, the United States 

has such agreements with more than 115 countries.9

There is no uniform model or template for SOFAs, but they typically have certain 

common objectives: To give U.S. forces the right to enter, leave, and move about the 

country, wear their uniforms and use their vehicles; to exempt U.S. forces and personnel from some or all taxes and charges of the host country; to regulate claims 

and contracts; and to exempt U.S. personnel from local criminal and civil jurisdiction in whole or in part. This may be stated in brief and general terms, or it may 

be complex and detailed. For example, the SOFA concluded in 2002 with East Timor 

was less than 3 pages in length, while the Korea SOFA ran to more than 150 pages 

and was accompanied by a series of agreed understandings. 

The terms of these agreements may vary, depending on the needs of the situation 

and the attitude and demands of the foreign government in question. For example, 

on the question of foreign criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, some SOFAs 

allocate criminal jurisdiction between the United States and the host country, depending on whether or not the offenses alleged were committed against other U.S. 

personnel or in the course of official duty; while other SOFAs give U.S. personnel 

complete exemption from foreign criminal jurisdiction. 

U.S. forces are present in Iraq as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Security Council Resolution 1511 in October 2003 authorized that force ‘‘to take all necessary 

measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,’’ including the security of U.N. and Iraqi operations and ‘‘key humanitarian and economic 

infrastructure.’’ This ‘‘all necessary measures’’ language is understood to include 

freedom of movement and the right to use necessary force to carry out the MNF 

mission. Subsequent resolutions referred also to ‘‘preventing and deterring terrorism 

and protecting the territory of Iraq,’’ combat operations against violent groups and 

internment of their members, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction.10

This authorization and mandate has been periodically renewed by the Council. In 

December 2007, the Council extended the mandate until December 31, 2008. It declared that it would terminate that mandate earlier if requested by the Iraqi Government, and noted that Iraq had advised that it would not request a further extension of that mandate.11 (Of course, the Council still retains the right to extend the 

mandate if it should wish to do so, and any early termination of the mandate would 

still require affirmative Council action.) 

The status, privileges, and immunities of U.S. forces in Iraq are still governed by 

an order issued in June 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority as the occupying authority during the initial period of U.S. operations in Iraq. That order, 

known as Coalition Provision Authority Order Number 17 or CPA 17, grants immunity to all MNF personnel from Iraqi arrest and criminal jurisdiction, and regulates 

other matters usually covered by SOFAs, such as contracting, travel, taxes, and 

fees. It differs from typical SOFAs in one significant respect, in that it grants such 

immunity to civilian contractors with respect to acts performed under their contracts.12

Article 126 of the Iraqi Constitution states that ‘‘existing laws shall remain in 

force, unless annulled or amended in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,’’ which is apparently understood to mean, among other things, that CPA 17 

will continue in force unless specifically rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Parliament. However, CPA 17 does not provide a clear basis for the status of U.S. forces 

after the termination of the MNF mandate. It only covers U.S. forces as part of the 

MNF, and it states that it will remain in force for the duration of the MNF mandate 

406 

13See note 9 above. 14 14 Apparently security commitments were given to the Marshall Islands and Micronesia 

under Compacts of Free Association approved by Congress. See note 4 above at p. 206. 15 North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, 4 UST 1792, June 19, 1951. Since this 

agreement granted exceptions and immunities from U.S. law to foreign NATO personnel, it had 

to be done as either a treaty or pursuant to act of Congress. 16For example, the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 

United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the 

Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, TIAS 6127, July 9, 1966. 17 Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, Section 8113. 

under Council resolutions ‘‘and shall not terminate until the departure of the final 

element of the MNF from Iraq.’’ 

While this language might give some room for the continuation of immunities for 

any U.S. forces that may temporarily remain in Iraq as part of the MNF after 

December 31, 2008, it would, if possible, be better to clarify the matter in a definitive way. In the event a permanent SOFA is not agreed by that date (which the 

administration evidently intends to do), it would seem prudent to take some affirmative step to continue the CPA 17 provisions for a further period while negotiations 

continue. This might, for example, be done by a temporary extension of the MNF 

mandate by the Security Council, an exchange of notes between the United States 

and Iraq temporarily extending the current status of U.S. forces, or an act of the 

Iraqi Parliament. 

Finally, the question arises as to whether any other agreement to be negotiated 

pursuant to the November 2007 Joint Declaration would in any way define or affect 

the future mission or status of U.S. forces. Secretaries Rice and Gates have stated 

that the coming negotiations with Iraq will ‘‘set the basic parameters for the U.S. 

presence in Iraq, including the appropriate authorities and jurisdiction necessary to 

operate effectively and to carry out essential missions’’ but that nothing to be negotiated will mandate combat missions, set troop levels, provide security commitments 

or authorize permanent bases in Iraq.13 It may be worthwhile to clarify what is intended along these lines, and in particular whether anything is intended that would 

go beyond the traditional scope of SOFAs as described above. 

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

With respect to security commitments and assurances, U.S. practice gives useful 

guidance as to the form these commitments or assurances should take. Security 

commitments in the technical sense have generally been undertaken by treaty, or 

at a minimum by act of Congress.14 Certainly a binding commitment to defend Iraq 

would call for such action. On the other hand, properly limited security assurances—such as a simple promise to consult—have taken various forms, including 

sole executive agreements and policy statements, and the President could offer them 

on the basis of his own constitutional authority. 

With respect to Status of Forces Agreements, there is no uniform model or format. 

The NATO SOFA took the form of a treaty; 15 some SOFAs have been agreements 

implementing prior mutual defense treaties; 16 but a great many take the form of 

executive agreements concluded under the President’s own constitutional authority. 

If the agreement is limited to giving U.S. forces and personnel exemption from foreign law, the President may conclude it without further congressional approval. 

Other types of commitments would have to be evaluated within the context of any 

relevant existing legislation, which might or might not require further congressional 

action, depending on the content of the commitments and the applicable statutory 

restrictions. Particular attention would have to be paid to any commitments of U.S. 

funds, any commitments to provide military assistance or arms sales, any arrangements involving U.S. bases in Iraq or access to Iraqi bases, any forgiveness of obligations to the United States, and any immunities or exceptions from the application 

of U.S. law. For example, any commitment to permanent U.S. bases in Iraq would 

be inconsistent with the most recent DOD Appropriations Act,17 and the administration has now indicated that there will be no such commitments. 

But even if a proposed commitment or arrangement falls within the President’s 

independent constitutional authority, this does not mean that Congress should play 

no role in the process. Given the obvious importance of the future United StatesIraq relationship and in particular the role of U.S. forces in the future security of 

Iraq, it would seem at a minimum that the administration should engage in serious 

consultation with Congress on both the form and substance of the agreements that 

will implement the United States-Iraq Declaration of Principles. Ideally, the two 

branches should arrive at a consensus on the future role and status of U.S. forces, 

407 

which might then be confirmed in some form—for example, by statute, joint resolution, provisions in authorization or appropriations legislation, sense-of-the-Congress 

resolution or formal exchanges with the congressional leadership. Such steps would 

acknowledge and accommodate the direct interest and responsibility of Congress in 

U.S. foreign and national security policy, in the use of U.S. funds, and in the disposition of U.S. Armed Forces. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Professor Glennon. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, MEDFORD, MA 

Mr. GLENNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It’s very good to see you again, and very nice to be back in this 

room where I spent so many days over the years. 

First, let me apologize for the length of my written statement. I 

know it’s a bit longer than normal, but I also know that the administration is going to disagree very strongly with what I’m about to 

say, so I wanted to lay out my reasoning and the supporting evidence completely, so that the committee can come to an informed 

judgment on these matters. 

In any event, I can summarize it very quickly. 

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be placed in the record. 

Mr. GLENNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There are two issues. The first, Mr. Chairman, is whether the 

administration’s negotiating something with Iraq that ought to be 

submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent as a treaty. My 

answer is yes. 

I know that the administration has said that it intends to make 

no explicit security commitment to Iraq that creates a binding legal 

obligation, but in my view, that does not resolve the issue. I must 

say, in listening to the administration’s testimony here this morning, I was rather reminded of that famous Magritte painting of a 

pipe, and it’s entitled, ‘‘This is not a pipe.’’ 

The question still arises whether the administration—whatever 

it says—will be making an implied security commitment to Iraq, as 

you noted earlier, in your initial comments. 

As you well know, Mr. Chairman, this committee was greatly 

concerned about the abuse of implied security commitments in the 

late 1960s and early 1970s. Senator Stewart Symington’s Subcommittee on Security Commitments held extensive hearings in 

the full committee, and the Senate concluded that military base 

agreements with other countries could create implied commitments. 

This conclusion then led the committee and the Senate to find 

that the base agreements with Spain and Portugal created implied 

commitments to those countries, commitments that were constitutionally required to be submitted to the Senate for its advice and 

consent as treaties. 

The rationale for that conclusion was that the context of a base 

agreement—as you indicated earlier—the context of the base agreement, taken in its entirety, and viewing all relevant elements of 

the bilateral relationship, created an implied commitment. 

The Symington subcommittee listed some of the factors that create an implied commitment. It said, ‘‘Overseas bases, the presence 

408 

of elements of United States Armed Forces, joint planning, joint 

exercises, or extensive military assistance programs, represent to 

host governments more valid assurances of United States commitment than any treaty or executive agreement.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, every one of those factors identified by the 

Symington subcommittee is present with respect to Iraq. There will 

be bases, combat troops, joint planning, joint exercises, and extensive military assistance programs. And there will be more than 

that. There will be American troops, on the ground, fighting sideby-side with the Iraqis. When American troops stop fighting, they 

may still be present, in effect, as a tripwire in a situation that remains volatile and potentially explosive. If they are attacked, they 

will, no doubt, fight. 

Added to all that will, of course, be the security framework 

arrangement itself. Recall that President Bush and Prime Minister 

al-Maliki formally agreed last November that it would include 

security assurances and commitments against both external and 

internal threats. 

I am not aware, Mr. Chairman, of any treaty to which the United 

States is a party that commits the United States to defend a government against internal threats. And, indeed, Mr. Chairman, I 

don’t believe that the United States has ever been a party to such 

a treaty. 

So in sum, if all of these factors taken together do not add up 

to an implied security commitment, it’s hard to imagine what 

would. It is hard to conceive of an international agreement more 

significant than the new security agreement with Iraq. The proverbial Martian stepping off a flying saucer could only react with bewilderment in comparing the proposed security arrangement to the 

international agreements that this administration has submitted to 

the Senate for its advice and consent as treaties. These include an 

agreement to control antifouling systems on ships, an agreement 

against doping in sports, an agreement governing the international 

registration of industrial designs, and a treaty to govern port privileges for tuna ships. 

I do not understand, Mr. Chairman, how the United States Constitution could solemnly require Senate advice and consent to the 

regulation of steroids, bilge pumps and tuna boats, but not to a 

commitment to use armed force to defend another government from 

its own people. 

So, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that constitutionally the new security arrangement with Iraq should be submitted to the Senate for 

its advice and consent as a treaty. 

This would be good, in my view, not only for the Senate, but for 

the Executive. Treating the security arrangement as a treaty is the 

best way to ensure that the United States and Iraq share the same 

understanding of what that arrangement means. It imputes no ill 

intent to the Executive to observe that the administration has an 

understandable incentive to overstate the scope of the security 

arrangement in its communications with the Iraqis, and to understate the scope of the arrangement in its communications with the 

Congress. It is essential that the Congress not be led to believe 

that there is no security commitment if there is one. It is also 

essential that the Iraqis not be led to believe that there is a secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00416 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
409 

rity commitment, if there is not one. When it comes to the role of 

the United States in Iraq’s future security, Congress and Iraq must 

be on the same page. If they are not, the consequences could be catastrophic, both internationally and domestically. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, it would be easy to stop here, but I would 

be remiss if I did so. As important as the Senate’s treaty power is, 

there is a second, even larger, issue before the committee today 

that Congress urgently needs to confront. That issue concerns its 

war power. The question is whether there is any continuing authority under United States domestic law under which use of force can 

be continued in Iraq, and my answer to that question is, ‘‘No.’’ 

None of the sources of authority that the administration relies 

upon to use force in Iraq, in fact, authorizes use of force—not the 

Commander-in-Chief clause, not Congress’s 2002 joint resolution, 

not the 2001 AUMF, and not subsequent appropriations legislation. 

The Commander-in-Chief clause, Mr. Chairman, is not a source 

of authority, because the President cannot constitutionally exceed 

limits that Congress imposes when it authorizes use of force. Congress imposed limits in the 2002 joint resolution—it authorized use 

of force for two, and only two purposes: To defend the national security of the United States against a continuing threat posed by 

Iraq, and to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions 

regarding Iraq. 

Those two limits are now being exceeded—or, as Senator Lugar 

put it—the resolution is obsolete. First, as you pointed out earlier, 

there is no threat posed by Iraq that has continued to exist from 

before the United States-led invasion. The continuing threat posed 

by Iraq was seen as stemming from the Government of Iraq, from 

the regime of Saddam Hussein—and that regime is now gone. The 

threats that we’re fighting against today are new threats that come 

from within Iraq. The legislative history is clear that the 2002 joint 

resolution does not authorize the use of force against those sorts 

of threats. 

Second, each relevant Security Council resolution that Iraq was 

flouting before the invasion has now been honored. The 2002 joint 

resolution did not authorize the use of force to enforce future Security Council resolutions that did not then exist. To interpret 

Congress’s 2002 joint resolution that way would raise very grave 

constitutional problems, concerning delegation, appointments, and 

presentment; problems that can be avoided by construing that resolution as applying—in Representative Gephardt’s words, and he 

was the chief sponsor of this on the House side—as applying to 

‘‘outstanding resolutions that existed at the time of enactment of 

the 2002 joint resolution,’’ not as applying to any future Security 

Council resolution that the Security Council might, at any point in 

the future, adopt. The Constitution permits only 535 Members of 

Congress to place the United States in a state of war, not the 

United Nations Ambassadors of Belgium, Croatia, and Indonesia. 

The so-called AUMF is also a thin reed on which to base authority to use force in Iraq. First, there are very serious doubts whether 

the organization called ‘‘al-Qaeda in Iraq,’’ or ‘‘al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia’’ is, in fact, the same organization that was behind the 

2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. In any event, it’s clear 

that only a very small portion of the casualties being suffered by 

410 

the United States in Iraq today are being inflicted by al-Qaeda in 

Iraq. No, force is being used against elements, for the most part, 

that are not affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

It is true that in the fog of war it’s uncertain where the line is 

drawn. But that very uncertainty has legal consequences under the 

War Powers Resolution, because the War Powers Resolution requires that any use-of-force authorization be specific. And the ambiguities that I’ve just referred to mean that under the War Powers 

Resolution, it is not permissible to infer authority to use armed 

force, either from the 2001 AUMF, or, any longer, from the 2002 

joint resolution with respect to Iraq. 

Finally, the administration’s claim—that Congress has, since 

2002 enacted lots of appropriations legislation, which implicitly approves what is being done in Iraq—also runs afoul of the War Powers Resolution. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the War Powers Resolution singles out appropriations legislation in section 8(a)(1), and 

says that authority to infer the use of armed force may not be inferred from appropriations legislation, unless the authority is specific, and it specifically refers to the War Powers Resolution. No appropriations legislation does that. 

So, I conclude, Mr. Chairman, that first, the administration 

should submit the new security arrangement to the Senate for its 

advice and consent as a treaty, and second, that Congress has got 

to enact new authority to use force in Iraq, and that if the Congress does not do that, the administration constitutionally will be 

required to wind up that use of force with all deliberate speed, consistent with the safety of the United States troops now on the 

ground in Iraq. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glennon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW, FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW & DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, MEDFORD, MA 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today on negotiating a long-term relationship with Iraq. It is a pleasure to be back. 

I testified about the constitutionality of the administration’s proposed security arrangement on February 8 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, where I 

was asked whether a binding security commitment could constitutionally be made 

by the President without approval by the Senate or the Congress. My view was that 

the President could not make such a commitment on his own. Since then, the administration has indicated that it does not intend to enter into a binding security 

commitment with Iraq. However, the administration apparently continues to adhere 

to the November 26, 2007, Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and 

Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki, and to the position that the strategic framework contemplated by that Declaration can be put in place without Senate or congressional 

approval. The Declaration, as you know, envisions ‘‘security assurances and commitments . . . to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and 

integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.’’ The question that arises is whether, 

in light of the surrounding circumstances, what is now contemplated by the Declaration might still include components that should be accorded Senate or congressional 

approval. 

Mr. Chairman, my view is that the absence of a binding, explicit security commitment to Iraq does not resolve the issue whether Senate advice and consent is required. Even absent an explicit security commitment, an implicit security commitment can exist—and, in fact, will exist if the President proceeds to put in place the 

security framework arrangement that is apparently contemplated. That arrangement should therefore be presented to the Senate for its advice and consent as a 

treaty. 

411 

In my view, however, there is an even bigger question at stake today: What is 

the source of authority to prosecute the war in Iraq, and what will be the source 

of authority after the relevant Security Council resolution expires on December 31? 

The harsh truth is that U.S. military action in Iraq has gone far beyond what Congress authorized in October 2002 in the Joint Resolution on Iraq, or in the Authority 

to Use Military Force (AUMF) that it enacted following the September 11 attacks. 

I know that this committee is primarily interested in the former question—the constitutionality of a Presidential security commitment. I raise this issue, however, because the Senate cannot intelligently consider the lawfulness of a Presidential security commitment to Iraq without considering at the same time what authority, if 

any, exists for the President to use force in Iraq. If authority to use force in Iraq 

does currently exist, a plausible argument can be made that, in principle, the new 

security arrangement with Iraq might be authorized implicitly by the same statute 

or statutes that authorize use of force; the President can, after all, agree to do what 

he is lawfully authorized to do. On the other hand, if authority to use force does 

not exist, or if it will not exist in the future, a new security arrangement with Iraq 

cannot substitute for constitutionally required statutory authority to use force. The 

administration’s proposed security arrangement—whether it is entered into as an 

executive agreement by the President alone or whether it is accorded the advice and 

consent of the Senate as a treaty—cannot constitutionally serve as a source of ’’authority to fight.’’ And except as force is used incident to the need to protect forces 

being withdrawn, the Executive cannot constitutionally continue the use of force in 

Iraq without renewed statutory authority. Authority that earlier existed to use force 

in Iraq has now expired. 

I will address these use-of-force issues in a moment, but let me begin with constitutional questions posed by the proposed security framework arrangement. 

THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK ARRANGEMENT

The absence of a binding, explicit security commitment to Iraq does not resolve 

the issue whether Senate advice and consent is required. Even absent an explicit 

security commitment, an implicit security commitment may exist. An implicit security commitment derives from all pertinent aspects of the United States bilateral 

relationship with a given country. This committee and the Senate have long posited 

the belief that commitments requiring the approval of the Senate as treaties can 

be inferred from a variety of contextual factors, such as the establishment of U.S. 

military bases. These factors pervade the proposed strategic arrangement with Iraq. 

I therefore believe that the arrangement should be submitted to the Senate for its 

advice and consent as a treaty. An elaboration follows. 

The international law backdrop: Tacit commitments 

Contract lawyers in the United States domestic legal system are familiar with the 

concept of a ‘‘contract implied in fact.’’ A contract implied in fact, as the Supreme 

Court described it, is a contract ‘‘inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties 

showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.’’ 

Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (1923). It exists in the absence of explicit words of agreement. Agreement is deemed to be implied by the entire ‘‘course of dealing’’ between the parties, including nonverbal practice. ‘‘A treaty 

is in its nature a contract between two nations.’’ Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 

(U.S. 1829). 

An analogous concept exists in international law. It is variously called a tacit 

agreement, a de facto agreement, a quasi-agreement or a special custom. A special 

custom arises, the International Court of Justice has found, when a certain practice 

between two states comes to generate lawful expectations, as when one state has 

consistently granted another a right of passage. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12). Treaty law and customary international 

law in such circumstances conjoin. ‘‘Such special customary law may be seen as essentially the result of tacit agreement among the parties,’’ notes the Restatement 

(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. § 102, comment e. Treaties 

are to be liberally construed, the Supreme Court has made clear. All pertinent contextual elements are to be taken into account in determining the scope of the obligations undertaken. ‘‘Like other contracts,’’ it has said, ‘‘they are to be read in the 

light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered 

into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.’’ Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (U.S. 1912). The U.N.’s International Law Commission has underscored the possibility that binding international 

commitments can be created by conduct rather than words. ‘‘[B]ehaviours capable 

of legally binding States,’’ the Commission has noted, ‘‘may take the form of formal 

declarations or mere informal conduct including, in certain situations, silence, on 

412 

which other States may reasonably rely.’’ International Law Commission, ‘‘Unilateral Acts of States: Report of the Working Group’’ 3–4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.703 (Jul. 

20, 2006). 

Even if a textual disclaimer purported to make a commitment nonbinding on a 

party, there is authority that violation could still be unlawful. The late legal scholar 

Oscar Schachter, for example, wrote that it would be unlawful to act inconsistently 

with such an instrument if other parties ‘‘reasonably relied’’ upon it. Mere ‘‘political 

texts,’’ he wrote, are still governed by the general requirement of good faith. Oscar 

Schachter, ‘‘International Law in Theory and Practice’’ 95–101 (1991). Henry Kissinger underscored this same point in referring to the Sinai Accords in 1975. ‘‘While 

some of the undertakings are nonbinding,’’ he said, ‘‘they are important statements 

of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States as long as the 

circumstances that gave rise to them continue.’’ Hartmut Hillgenberg, ‘‘A Fresh 

Look at Soft Law,’’ 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 499, 511 (1999). The Reporters’ Notes to the 

Restatement emphasize the potential gravity of nonbinding commitments: ‘‘Parties 

sometimes prefer a nonbinding agreement in order to avoid legal remedies. Nevertheless, the political inducements to comply with such agreements may be strong 

and the consequences of noncompliance may sometimes be serious.’’ § 301, Reporters’ 

Note 2. 

In reality, therefore, there often is little practical difference in the international 

order between legally binding security commitments, which are normally unenforceable, and nonbinding security commitments, the breach of which can lead to disastrous costs, reputational and otherwise. 

Long-standing Senate concern about tacit commitments 

The possibility that international commitments can be created implicitly through 

a combination of words and conduct gives rise to domestic constitutional concerns, 

for the Treaty Clause prohibits the President from making a treaty without the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and the Declaration of War Clause confers upon Congress the decision to place the nation in a state of war. 

As you know, the question whether the President constitutionally can make security commitments on his own, without Senate or congressional approval, is not a 

new issue. In fact, this committee was the forum in which that question was debated at length in the 1960s and 70s. The committee established a Subcommittee 

on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad headed by Senator 

Stuart Symington. The Symington subcommittee held a lengthy series of hearings 

on the issue, as the full committee did later. 

Those hearings, and their collective wisdom, produced a measure that has abiding 

relevance. It is called the ‘‘National Commitments Resolution’’ and was adopted by 

the Senate in 1969. It warned that a national commitment ‘‘results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government 

by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress 

specifically providing for such commitment.’’ S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 

Looking back, the National Commitments Resolution seems a bit impressionistic. 

It sets out no bright lines or three-part tests. But the Senators behind it—Symington, Fulbright, Mansfield, Church, Case, Javits, and Aiken—understood the need to 

focus on fundamentals and, by doing that, to set the framework for debate. And the 

National Commitments Resolution did precisely that. The resolution, and the thinking that animated it, laid the conceptual predicate for later efforts to rein in what 

many believed had become an ‘‘imperial presidency’’ in the realm of diplomacy. Following the resolution’s logic, this committee led the Senate in an effort to curb unauthorized national commitments: 

• In December, 1970, after it was reported by the committee, the Senate adopted 

S. Res. 469, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), expressing the sense of the Senate that 

nothing in an executive bases agreement with Spain should be deemed to be 

a national commitment by the United States. 

• In March, 1972, The Senate adopted S. Res 214, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), expressing the sense of the Senate that ‘‘any agreement with Portugal or Bahrain 

for military bases or foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the 

Senate for advice and consent.’’ 

• In 1972, the committee declined to report the Vienna Convention on the Law 

of Treaties in the belief that the rule set out in Article 46 would permit the 

President to commit the nation in violation of constitutional limits set out in 

the Treaty Clause. 

• In 1972, Congress adopted the Case-Zablocki Act, Public Law No. 92–403 

(1972), requiring that the President to transmit to Congress the text of any 

international agreement other than a treaty as soon as practicable but no later 

than 60 days after it entered into force. 

413 

• On May 15, 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a measure 

(section 502 of S. 3076, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)) that would have subjected 

an unauthorized agreement to a point-of-order procedure that would have cut 

off funds for the implementation of the agreement in question, but the measure 

was rejected by the full Senate. (Section 502 incorporated the ‘‘Treaty Powers 

Resolution,’’ S. Res. 24, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)). • In September, 1978, the Senate adopted S. Res. 536, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 

(1978), stating the sense of the Senate that in determining whether a particular 

international agreement should be submitted as a treaty, the President should 

have the timely advice of the Committee on Foreign Relations through agreed 

procedures established with the Secretary of State. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to underscore the premise underpinning these steps, because that premise is directly pertinent to the proposed strategic framework with 

Iraq. The premise is that a national commitment can result not only from explicit 

words but can also result implicitly from deeds. The premise is that it is essential 

to look not only to text but also to the surrounding context—in its entirety—to determine whether a commitment in fact exists. The premise is that there is no bright 

line that separates commitment from noncommitment; that commitment often is 

subjectively created in the eye of the beneficiary state; and that all elements comprising the relevant bilateral relationship are pertinent. This committee put it well 

in its report on the National Commitments Resolution: ‘‘Some foreign engagements,’’ 

it said, ‘‘such as our bases agreement with Spain, form a kind of quasi-commitment, 

unspecified as to their exact import but, like buds in springtime, ready under the 

right climatic conditions, to burst into full bloom.’’ 

This was the premise that led this committee and the Senate to urge that the 

base agreements with Portugal and Spain be submitted to the Senate as treaties. 

There was no formal, explicit, ‘‘binding’’ commitment by the United States to either 

Spain or Portugal. Rather, the committee, and the Senate, inferred from the surrounding context that the presence of bases in those countries constituted—in the 

words of the Symington subcommittee—de facto commitments. The full committee 

in its 1969 report on the National Commitments Resolution noted the real-world 

consequences of what it called a ‘‘quasi-commitment’’ to Spain: 

In practice the very fact of our physical presence in Spain constitutes a 

quasi-commitment to the defense of the Franco regime, possibly even 

against internal disruptions. At some point the distinction between defending American lives and property and defending the host government would 

be likely to become academic, if not to disappear altogether. . . . It is not 

difficult to envision a situation in which the need to protect American servicemen would lead to large-scale military intervention in Spain and, as a 

result, to another military enterprise unauthorized by Congress. 

The Symington subcommittee listed a number of the contextual factors from 

which an implied commitment might reasonably be inferred: ‘‘Overseas bases, the 

presence of elements of United States Armed Forces, joint planning, joint exercises, 

or extensive military assistance programs represent to host governments more valid 

assurances of United States commitment than any treaty or executive agreement.’’ 

It continued: 

[E]ach of these acts created an atmosphere in which the United States 

was better prepared and more inclined to undertake military action in the 

country in question; and the host government was increasingly led to believe that such actions would be taken should contingencies develop. An expectation of involvement or action was created on both sides. 

The subcommittee recognized the practical reality that the mere presence of U.S. 

troops in a country entailed a U.S. military response if that country were attacked. 

It recalled the 1968 acknowledgement of GEN Earle Wheeler, then Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, that ‘‘the presence of United States troops on Spanish soil represented a stronger security guarantee than anything written on paper.’’ Thus, the 

subcommittee found, ‘‘[f]aith on both sides is no longer placed primarily in the language of treaties, but in the presence of United States forces or facilities in the territory of those countries which are seeking United States protection through involvement.’’ 

Application to Iraq 

Whether denominated an ‘‘implied,’’ ‘‘tacit,’’ ‘‘de facto,’’ or ‘‘quasi’’ commitment, the 

security arrangement with Iraq, viewed, as this committee has counseled that it 

must be, in light of the entire surrounding context, must reasonably be considered 

to constitute a national commitment of precisely the sort contemplated by the SenVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:04 Mar 13, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00421 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\IRAQ0402 BETTY
414 

ate in the National Commitments Resolution and its legislative progeny. Every one 

of the contextual factors identified by the Symington subcommittee as giving rise 

to an implicit security commitment appears to present in the planned security arrangement with Iraq. 

Verbal as well as nonverbal indicia of commitment support this conclusion. The 

November 26, 2007, ‘‘Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of 

America’’ lays out the substance of what the United States and Iraq intend to agree 

upon in negotiations to be concluded before the end of this year. According to the 

Declaration of Principles, the Agreement will, among other things, provide ‘‘security 

assurances and commitments . . . to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.’’ Further, 

the Agreement will commit the United States to defend Iraq not simply against foreign aggression but ‘‘against internal and external threats,’’ and will commit the 

United States to support the Iraqi Government in its effort to ‘‘defeat and uproot’’ 

‘‘all outlaw groups’’ from Iraq. The proposed Agreement apparently will have no expiration date and no termination provision. 

More important than these words, however, will be conduct. Thousands of members of the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to be stationed in Iraq. If attacked, 

those forces will no doubt become engaged in hostilities. Significant casualties over 

a protracted period of time are possible, particularly if the United States becomes 

involved in a wider regional conflict. Substantial military bases and other facilities 

apparently will continue to be maintained in Iraq. Joint planning will take place 

with the Iraqi armed forces, police, and other security elements. Joint exercises will 

be held. An extensive military assistance program will be carried out. Continued appropriations of public funds will unavoidable. 

There can be little doubt, therefore, that whatever caveat or disclaimer the United 

States might formally apply in purporting to qualify its involvement, the Iraqi Government might reasonably conclude that the new strategic framework constitutes a 

national commitment by the United States. These and other factors, taken together, 

constitute, in the words of Senator Symington’s subcommittee, ‘‘more valid assurances of United States commitment than any treaty or executive agreement.’’ 

Implications for the Senate’s treaty power 

The Framers of the Constitution believed that such a commitment should not be 

made unless it is accorded the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate as 

a treaty. 

On some matters, it is true, the intent of the Constitution’s Framers is opaque. 

As Justice Jackson wrote, their purposes often must be ‘‘divined from materials 

almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.’’ Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634 

(1952). Here, however, their intent is luminously clear. I will focus on one, Alexander Hamilton, because he was the Framer least enthusiastic about legislative 

power. Hamilton wrote extensively about the treaty power. His views are therefore 

as significant as they are representative. Hamilton considered the treaty clause ‘‘one 

of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan.’’ The Federalist No. 

75 (Alexander Hamilton). He opined that ‘‘the vast importance of the trust, and the 

operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a 

portion of the legislative body in the office of making them.’’ Id. Hamilton noted that 

although the King of England could make treaties by himself, this power was denied 

to the President: ‘‘In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The 

one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch 

of the legislature.’’ The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton therefore 

considered ‘‘it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an 

elective magistrate of four years’ duration.’’ He concluded with a famous warning: 

The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of 

human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of 

so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse 

with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and 

circumstanced as would be a President of the United States. The Federalist 

No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). 

The institutional virtues of the Presidency famously identified by Hamilton— 

unity, secrecy, and dispatch—have no relevance to the conclusion of a strategic arrangement with Iraq. No emergency exists: The administration has known since last 

year that the Government of Iraq wishes to enter into a bilateral arrangement with 

the United States to replace the governing U.N. Security Council resolution, which 

415 

expires at the end of this year. If the process of negotiating a new security arrangement, or approving it as a treaty, necessarily extends beyond the end of this year, 

there is no reason why the Security Council resolution itself cannot be extended, as 

was in fact done before. Extension of the resolution would, indeed, have the salutary 

effect of involving the next administration in the process of formulating the terms 

of the security arrangement, which seems fitting inasmuch as it is, after all, the 

next administration that will be called upon to execute it. 

The unity and secrecy of the Executive are similarly more vice than virtue in the 

making of a security arrangement with Iraq. The approval process will be strengthened by the expression of diverse views. Executive officials normally are chosen for 

their support of an administration’s policies. When the spread of opinion voiced in 

the decisionmaking process is overly narrow, its legitimacy suffers. The Senate, on 

the other hand, is a clearinghouse for multiple opinions. Deputy assistant secretaries of state do not fly home regularly to Indianapolis or Wilmington or Hartford 

to get an earful of constituent opinion about taxes, combat deaths, and war costs. 

Senators do. The sense that their viewpoints have been heard and considered gives 

divergent constituencies a sense of participation in policymaking that is crucial to 

a policy’s legitimacy. Public deliberation in considering those views is a further element that is essential for legitimacy; the Senate was, of course, designed for deliberation. Anonymous staffers of the National Security Council who meet in secret, 

however great their expertise, cannot confer the needed measure of legitimacy on 

a policy. In short, the policy outcome is strengthened if the process is seen by the 

public as ‘‘regular,’’ as having produced a decision as a matter of right. This is perhaps why the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of free and open debate to the proper operation of separated powers. It said: 

That this system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, 

confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was deliberately so 

structured to assure full, vigorous and open debate of the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on the 

exercise of governmental power. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3187 

(1986). 

An executive decisionmaking process removed from the full panoply of public or 

at least congressional opinion easily falls prey to the peculiar distortions of 

groupthink, to the pressures that cause the myopia of the quick fix to substitute for 

insight of statesmanship. Diversity of viewpoint is thus a crucial means of avoiding 

error and of achieving consensus. The greater the number of viewpoints heard, the 

greater the likelihood that the resulting policy will reflect accurately the common 

interests of the whole. 

An open treaty-making process of the sort contemplated by the Framers injects 

productive new ideas into policy. It is no secret that the United States has no national strategy in Iraq. The ‘‘surge’’ is not a strategy. A funding cutoff is not a strategy. The United States has yet to develop a national consensus in answering the 

overarching question: What long-term support should the United States provide Iraq 

as the United States seeks to promote stability in the Middle East? The American 

people have a huge and obvious stake in their government’s answer to that question. That answer ought not be worked out behind closed doors, solely between negotiators for Iraq and the current administration—an administration that will be in 

office for less than 3 weeks after the new arrangement takes effect. It is entirely 

conceivable that open, robust debate in the Senate could generate a national consensus around a genuine strategy for supporting long-term regional stability. Potentially new and different options could emerge from Senate debate, concerning, perhaps, broadening the negotiating process to include states other than just Iraq and 

developing a genuine collective regional security arrangement. Perhaps the Senate 

would insist upon an Iraqi commitment to movement toward political reconciliation 

as a condition for any U.S. commitment to Iraq. There are many possibilities. In 

any case, the United States needs a national strategy for dealing with Iraq in the 

coming years. The Senate is not only the logical place to develop that strategy—it 

is the constitutionally required place to do so. 

Open Senate consideration of the security arrangement as a treaty would also ensure that the United States and Iraq share the same understanding of what the arrangement means. It imputes no ill intent to the Executive to observe that the administration has an understandable incentive to overstate the scope of the security 

arrangement in its communications with the Iraqis and to understate the scope of 

the arrangement in its communication with the Congress. It is essential that the 

Congress not be led to believe that there is no security commitment if there is one. 

It is also essential that the Iraqis not be led to believe that there is a security commitment if there is not one. When it comes to the role of the United States in Iraq’s 

416 

future security, Congress and Iraq must be on the same page. If they are not, the 

consequences could be catastrophic, both internationally and domestically. 

Why not include the House of Representatives? All are familiar with George 

Washington’s famous suggestion that the Senate was to be the proverbial saucer 

where hot ideas from the cup of the House cooled. There is, in fact, continuing truth 

in the metaphor. A 6-year term does provide a measure of insulation from sometimes excessive popular pressure. Long-term national security strategy should weigh 

public opinion heavily, but cannot be automatically dictated by it. With two-thirds 

of the Senate not facing immediate reelection, Senators are better situated institutionally to formulate prudent policies that reflect the nation’s long-term interests. 

In any event, while it is surely true that many international agreements are in this 

day and age approved as ‘‘congressional-executive agreements’’—i.e., authorized by 

majority votes in both the House and Senate—there are sound interpretive reasons 

for construing the Constitution as not viewing these as interchangeable with treaties. The view that the President is constitutionally free to designate any agreement 

a congressional-executive agreement, and thereby to lower the Senate’s required approval margin from two-thirds to one-half, would altogether eliminate a key check 

on the President’s power that the Framers placed purposefully and explicitly in the 

constitutional text. Some international arrangements, constitutionally, must be concluded as treaties. The President cannot, as the late Philip Kurland put it, call a 

treaty something other than a treaty and thereby dispense with the obligation to 

secure Senate approval. Philip Kurland, ‘‘The Impotence of Reticence,’’ 1968 Duke 

L.J. 619, 626. That would also seem to be the view of the United States Supreme 

Court, which in the famous case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), emphasized that the treaty power is broader than the legislative power, implying that 

treaties and executive agreements are not interchangeable instruments. 

If some agreements must be concluded as treaties, it makes sense to think that 

the most important agreements must be so concluded. It was for these reasons that 

this committee has said that ‘‘[t]he Treaty Clause requires that, normally, significant international commitments be made with the concurrence of two-thirds of the 

Senate. Acting on the basis of his sole constitutional power, the President would be 

without the power to enter into such an agreement.’’ Exec. Rept. No. 95–12, 95th 

Cong., 2d Sess. (Panama Canal Treaties). It would be hard to conceive of an international agreement more significant than the new security arrangement being negotiated with Iraq. The proverbial Martian stepping off a flying saucer could only 

react with bewilderment in comparing the proposed security arrangement to the 

international agreements that this administration has submitted to the Senate for 

its advice and consent as treaties. Among them are an agreement to control 

antifouling systems on ships, an agreement against doping in sports, an agreement 

governing the international registration of industrial designs, and a treaty to govern 

port privileges for tuna ships. It is hard to understand how the United States Constitution could seriously require Senate advice and consent to the regulation of 

steroids, bilge pumps, and tuna boats but not to a de facto commitment to use 

armed force to defend another government—from its own people. 

The argument will no doubt be heard that submission of the Iraq security arrangement as a treaty would complicate United States-Iraqi relations or somehow 

delay the implementation of needed initiatives. But it would be useful to remember, 

as Justice Brandeis reminded us, that the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine is designed not to promote efficiency but to save the people from autocracy. 

One of the key structural safeguards in that design is the check on executive power 

provided by the requirement that two-thirds of the Senate approve treaties. It is 

perilous to disregard such checks in the cause of administrative convenience. This 

committee put it well in its 1979 report on treaty termination: 

The constitutional role of the Congress has too often been short-circuited 

because it was viewed—in the executive branch and even by some Members 

of Congress—as an impediment to the expeditious adoption of substantive 

policies commanding the support of a majority. Thus, when in our recent 

history the substance of those policies lost that support, the procedures once 

available as checks had atrophied, and Congress was forced to struggle to 

reclaim its powers. The lesson was learned the hard way: Procedural requirements prescribed by the Constitution must not be disregarded in the 

name of efficiency, and the substance of a policy, however attractive, can 

never justify circumventing the procedure required by the Constitution for 

its adoption. S. Rept. No. 96–119 at 5–6 (1979). 

Conclusion 

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I believe that new security framework arrangement with Iraq should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent as a 

417 

treaty. I have not yet addressed constitutional requirements that govern the use of 

force within that framework, or whether constitutional requirements governing use 

of force are now being met in Iraq or will be met when the current Security Council 

resolution, Res. 1790, expires on December 31. If the constitutional requirements 

are being met, it is arguable that the same authorities that permit use of force also 

permit conclusion of the new security arrangement without a need for further authorization. It is to these crucial questions that I now turn. 

AUTHORITY FOR USE OF FORCE IN IRAQ

The administration has cited a number of potential sources of authority for use 

of force in Iraq. In a February 13, 2008, opinion piece in the Washington Post, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that 

the new security arrangement with Iraq would include a provision that, in their 

words, confers ‘‘authority to fight.’’ In a March 5, 2008, letter to Representative 

Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs of 

the Department of State, transmitted a paper from Ambassador David M. 

Satterfield, dated March 4, 2008, responding to Representative Ackerman’s question 

whether the administration believes it has constitutional authority to continue combat operations in Iraq beyond the end of this year absent explicit additional authorization from Congress. He answered in the affirmative. The President’s authority, 

Ambassador Satterfield wrote, would derive from four sources: 

(1) His constitutional authority as Commander in Chief; 

(2) The Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 

Against Iraq, Public Law 107–243, enacted October 2, 2002; 

(3) The Authority for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Public Law 107–40, enacted September 18, 2001; and 

(4) The fact that ‘‘Congress has repeatedly provided funding for the Iraq war, 

both in regular appropriations cycles and in supplemental appropriations.’’ 

In my opinion, authority to use force in Iraq will not be conferred after December 

31, and is not currently conferred, by any of those sources. To summarize my view, 

an executive agreement cannot confer authority to use force. A statute can confer 

such authority, but the Constitution prohibits use of force that exceeds statutorily 

authorized limits. Force now being used in Iraq exceeds the limits imposed by both 

the 2002 Joint Resolution and the AUMF. The 2002 Joint Resolution authorizes use 

of force against Iraq for two purposes: To ‘‘defend the national security of the United 

States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,’’ as its resolution put it, and to 

‘‘enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.’’ 

The first purpose has been fulfilled: The ‘‘continuing threat’’ posed by Iraq was seen 

as stemming from the Government of Iraq—principally the regime of Saddam Hussein, and that regime is gone. The second purpose also has been fulfilled: ‘‘All relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions’’ referred to resolutions in effect 

at the time of enactment of the 2002 Joint Resolution, and, to the extent that they 

are still relevant, the current Iraqi Government is now in compliance with them. 

A contrary interpretation would raise serious delegation, presentment and appointments problems under the Constitution and should therefore be avoided. As to the 

AUMF, while it does permit the use of force against ‘‘organizations’’ that ‘‘planned, 

authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 

2001,’’ and while force currently is being used against al-Qaeda in Iraq, it is doubtful whether al-Qaeda in Iraq is the same organization that engaged in the 2001 attacks, and in any event force is being used in Iraq against persons and entities not 

related to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Authority to use force cannot lawfully be inferred from 

either of these two ambiguous statutes, or from subsequent appropriations statutes; 

such an inference is prohibited under the section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which requires that use of force be specifically authorized. An elaboration follows. 

The President’s Commander-in-Chief power as authority to use force in a limited or 

‘‘imperfect’’ war 

The starting point must be the Constitution. In its earliest cases, the Supreme 

Court recognized a President’s obligation to respect congressional restrictions when 

Congress has authorized ‘‘imperfect war’’—a war fought for limited purposes. In an 

imperfect war, Justice Bushrod Washington said in Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 41 

(1800), those ‘‘who are authorized to commit hostilities . . . can go no farther than 

to the extent of their commission.’’ The following year, in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 

1, 27 (1801), Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that ‘‘[t]he whole powers of war 

being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that 

body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry.’’ In the 2001 AUMF 

and in the 2002 Joint Resolution on Iraq, Congress in effect authorized limited or 

418 

1 Under international law, police activities, enforcement action and other uses of force by one 

state within the territory of another state are permitted if the government of that state consents. Provisions such as those in question could constitute consent by the government of Iraq 

for use of force by the United States within the territory of Iraq. Of course, any relevant limitations or restrictions imposed by humanitarian law (concerning, for example, requirements of humane treatment, proportionality, or the need to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants) would apply to any use of force by the United States. There is authority that a government 

cannot, under international law, lawfully consent to military intervention by another state if significant areas of its country or substantial parts of its population are under the control of an 

organized insurgency—i.e., if the country is in a civil war. The theory is that principles of selfdetermination require that the people of a state be permitted to determine their own destiny 

free from outside interference. According to this theory, intervention in a civil war is impermissible whether that intervention occurs on behalf of the sitting government or on behalf of insurgents—unless another state has intervened unlawfully on behalf of either, in which case 

‘‘counter-intervention’’ is permitted on behalf of the other side. These rules have been violated 

so many times by so many states in so many conflicts, however, that it is in my opinion doubtful 

whether they now constitute binding international law. As a question of fact it is, moreover, 

doubtful whether the insurgency in Iraq has risen to a level that would constitute a civil war 

for international law purposes, although that could of course change over the period within 

which any security arrangement is in effect. 

‘‘imperfect’’ war. The President is therefore constitutionally required to respect the 

limits imposed in those two laws; Congress has implicitly prohibited any use of force 

not authorized therein, and the President’s authority is at its ‘‘lowest ebb’’—lower 

than it might have been had Congress been silent. This is the critical lesson imparted by Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, 343 

U.S. 579 (1952), which has since been adopted by the Supreme Court as the governing analytic framework. 

An executive agreement as authority to use force 

Ambassador Satterfield did not, in his March 4 paper, refer to the February 13, 

2008, opinion by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggesting that the new arrangement will confer ‘‘authority to fight.’’ In 

any case, whatever the import of such a provision under international law,1 under 

U.S. domestic law, authority for the President to use force—‘‘authority to fight’’— 

in Iraq must come from either the Constitution or the Congress. The arrangement 

with Iraq, if entered into as a sole executive agreement, therefore could not serve 

as a source of such authority. The question whether a sole executive agreement can 

provide authority to use force was put to the State Department during the administration of President Gerald Ford. In connection with the appearance of Secretary of 

State Henry Kissinger’s appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

on November 19, 1975, Senator Dick Clark submitted the following written question 

to the Department of State: ‘‘Does any executive agreement authorize the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations wherein imminent 

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances?’’ Assistant Secretary of State Robert J. McCloskey responded as follows on March 1, 1976, in a 

letter to Senator Clark: 

The answer is ‘‘no.’’ Under our Constitution, a President may not, by 

mere executive agreement, confer authority on himself in addition to authority granted by Congress or the Constitution. The existence of an executive agreement with another country does not create additional power. 

Similarly, no branch of the Government can enlarge its power at the 

expense of another branch simply by unilaterally asserting enlarged 

authority. 

The State Department’s 1976 conclusion was correct. The President cannot confer 

upon himself authority to use force. So obvious is this principle that, when Congress 

made clear in 1973 in the War Powers Resolution (in section 8(a)(2)) that no treaty 

may be construed as conferring implied authority to use force, it made no reference 

to executive agreements. Congress no doubt deemed it unnecessary to affirm that 

if a treaty approved by two-thirds of the Senate cannot provide such authority, a 

fortiori a sole executive agreement cannot. 

A treaty as authority to use force 

Even if the new security arrangement were accorded the Senate’s advice and consent as a treaty, it could not constitutionally authorize the use of force. Authority 

to use force would have to be conferred by implementing legislation, the enactment 

of which would of course include participation by the House of Representatives. 

‘‘A treaty may not declare war,’’ the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in 

its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, ‘‘because the unique legislative history of 

419 

the declaration-of-war clause . . . clearly indicates that that power was intended to 

reside jointly in the House of Representatives and the Senate.’’ S. Exec. Doc. No. 

95–12, at 65 (1978). The events to which the committee alluded are recorded in 

Madison’s notes of the Constitutional Convention. The Convention considered a proposal that would have permitted the President to make war by and with the advice 

and consent of the Senate, and the plan was rejected. The plan was rejected in the 

face of arguments that both Houses of Congress should participate in the decision 

to go to war. Accordingly, the United States has never entered into a treaty that 

would have placed the nation in a state of war. The Covenant of the League of Nations was rejected by the Senate in part because of concern that it would oblige the 

United States to use force if so required by the League’s Assembly. In each of its 

post-World War II mutual security treaties, the United States has therefore made 

clear that none of those treaties imposes an automatic obligation upon the United 

States to use force. 

The 2002 Joint Resolution as authority to use force 

Section 3 of the 2002 Joint Resolution provides as follows: 

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of 

the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order 

to— 

(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and 

(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. 

The resolution provided no automatic termination date and remains in effect until 

these objectives are accomplished. Each of the two ‘‘prongs’’ will be examined in 

turn. 

The first prong: A ‘‘continuing threat posed by Iraq’’? 

The first question is whether the joint resolution continues to authorize use of 

force on the basis of its first prong—defense against ‘‘the continuing threat posed 

by Iraq.’’ A review of the resolution’s text and legislative history reveals that it does 

not. The ‘‘continuing threat’’ referred to the danger posed in 2002 and earlier by the 

Government of Iraq. That threat was seen to flow from the regime’s pursuit and 

possession of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq, the joint resolution noted, ‘‘attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy’’ these 

weapons. The joint resolution found that Iraq continued ‘‘to possess and develop a 

significant chemical and biological weapons capability,’’ actively sought a nuclear capability, and supported and harbored terrorist organizations. The threat, the resolution found, was that ‘‘the current Iraqi regime’’ would either employ weapons of 

mass destruction in a surprise attack against the United States or ‘‘provide them 

to international terrorists who would do so.’’ 

That threat is gone. Saddam Hussein’s regime is history, and the threat posed by 

it is gone. Hussein is dead. A different government is in place. It does not possess 

or seek weapons of mass destruction. It does not support or harbor terrorists. There 

are, of course, terrorists present in Iraq today who pose a threat to American troops 

there. They may someday pose a threat to the general U.S. population. But Congress in 2002 authorized use of force against the old Iraqi Government, not against 

groups unaffiliated with Saddam Hussein’s regime (many of which actually opposed 

it). 

Our starting point is of course the text of the joint resolution. In and of itself, 

the text of the first prong says little about the scope of the ‘‘continuing threat posed 

by Iraq.’’ Two aspects of the wording are significant, however. First, the text refers 

to the continuing threat posed ‘‘by Iraq’’—not a continuing threat from Iraq. The 

joint resolution is not, and was not intended to be, an open-ended authorization to 

use force against any future threat arising from a group within the territory of Iraq. 

Its sponsors had in mind a particular ‘‘continuing threat’’—one emanating in some 

way from the Iraqi Government. Second, the threat in question was ‘‘continuing,’’ 

i.e., it is one that existed before the joint resolution was adopted and would continue 

to exist afterward, until it could be eliminated with the use of force. Threats that 

emerged after the enactment of the joint resolution therefore would not be continuing threats—they would not have continued from the period before use of force 

was authorized. Whatever threat may be posed today by entities that were not operating within Iraq before enactment of the joint resolution—such as, for example, alQaeda in Iraq—these are not among the entities against which the joint resolution 

authorizes the use of force. 

420 

During the debate over this authorization and the decision to go to war, the most 

cited threat posed by Iraq was that arising from Iraq’s programs to develop weapons 

of mass destruction. Nevertheless, based on the legislative history of the resolution, 

it is not possible to construe the authorization as limited to the threat posed by 

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Nor was the authorization limited to the WMD 

threat posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Several amendments offered in the 

House and the Senate that would have imposed such restrictions were rejected. In 

the House Committee on International Relations, Representative Smith proposed an 

amendment that would have substituted the words ‘‘the current Iraqi regime’’ for 

‘‘Iraq.’’ The amendment was rejected by committee. H. Rept. No. 107–721, at 38 

(2002). In the Senate, Senator Durbin proposed an amendment that would have replaced the words ‘‘the continuing threat posed by Iraq’’ with ‘‘an imminent threat 

posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.’’ 148 Cong. Rec. S10229 (daily ed. Oct. 

9, 2002) (text of Amend. 4865). That amendment was rejected by the Senate. 148 

Cong. Rec. S10272 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002) (Rollcall Vote No. 236 Leg.). 

The House committee report likewise confirms that the ‘‘continuing threat posed 

by Iraq’’ was not limited to the primary threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, though it does focus on the Iraqi Government in power at the time. The report’s description of ‘‘The Current Threat in Perspective’’ mentions the threat posed 

by the Iraqi Government’s aid to and harboring of terrorist organizations. H. Rept. 

No. 107–721, at 6–8 (2002). The Report declares that: 

The current Iraqi government’s demonstrated capability and willingness 

to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime 

will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the 

United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result 

to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify 

action by the United States to defend itself. H. Rept. No. 107–721, at 7 

(2002)(emphasis added). 

Nevertheless, the House committee report repeatedly uses the ‘‘Iraqi regime’’ as 

a code word for ‘‘the Baathist government of Iraq led by Saddam Hussein.’’ The report traces the history of Iraqi aggression and obstinacy in the face of international 

demands for transparence and compliance with human rights law and international 

standards for inspection and monitoring of its WMD-capable facilities. The report 

notes specifically: 

Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United 

States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and 

remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations 

by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant 

chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear 

weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations. 

The continuing threat posed by Iraq is the motivation for the committee’s 

favorable action on H.J. Res. 114. 

The report highlights repeated Iraqi renunciations of its obligations under U.N. 

Security Council resolutions, ‘‘brutal repression of its civilian population,’’ Iraqi ‘‘capability and willingness’’ to use WMD externally and internally (against Iran and 

its own Kurdish citizens), and continuous hostile acts toward the U.S., including the 

attempt to assassinate former President G.H.W. Bush in 1993. The report cites Iraqi 

attacks on U.S. and coalition aircraft enforcing the unilaterally imposed no-fly zones 

over northern and southern Iraq. 

These are the sorts of ‘‘continuing threats’’ that Congress had in mind. 

It is thus clear from the House committee report, the floor debate, and the text 

of the joint resolution itself that the authorization’s supporters were concerned 

about the continuing threat posed by the Government of Iraq, not a threat from terrorist groups operating in Iraq or from Iraq. Numerous Members of the House saw 

the ‘‘continuing threat’’ as stemming from the then-existing Iraqi Government. 

The same was true in the Senate. This interpretation is supported specifically by 

discussion in the Senate surrounding an amendment proposed by Senator Bob Graham that would have added authorization to ‘‘defend the national security of the 

United States against the threat posed by the following terrorist organizations: (A) 

The Abu Nidal Organization, (B) Hamas, (C) Hezbollah, (D) Palestine Islamic Jihad, 

(E) Palestine Liberation Front.’’ 148 Cong. Rec. S10088 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2002) (text 

of Amend. 4857). In opposing the amendment, Senator Joseph Lieberman, one of the 

original cosponsors of the Senate version of the text that became H.J. Res. 114 

(2002), argued that this would ‘‘open up new territory,’’ 148 Cong. Rec. S10159 

(daily ed. Oct 9, 2002), and would likely be opposed by Senate Democrats, but he 

421 

did not suggest that the authority to use force against terrorist organizations was 

already contained in the underlying resolution. Rather, he characterized the Authorization as follows: 

[I]n responding to the threat to our national security posed by Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, it represents our best effort to find common ground to 

dispatch our constitutional responsibility and to provide an opportunity for the 

broadest bipartisan group of Senators to come together and express their support 

of action to enforce the United Nations resolutions that Saddam Hussein has 

constantly violated. . . . 148 Cong. Rec. S10159 (daily ed. Oct 9, 2002) (emphasis 

added). 

To conclude, both the text and legislative history of the joint resolution indicate 

that the authorization to use force in Iraq was limited to the continuing threat 

posed by the Government of Iraq, in particular, but not limited to, the regime of 

Saddam Hussein and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. At present, U.S. 

forces in Iraq are engaged in the joint use of force with Iraqi forces and President 

Bush has praised the leadership of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. It is hard 

to see how any ‘‘continuing threat’’—a threat that has continued since before 2002— 

is still posed by that government. 

The most sensible conclusion, therefore, is that the first prong of the 2002 Joint 

Resolution is no longer available as a source of authority to use force in Iraq. 

The second prong: ‘‘enforce all relevant Security Council resolutions’’? 

The second prong of the 2002 Joint Resolution further authorizes the use of force 

to ‘‘enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.’’ 

To the extent that any resolutions adopted before enactment of the 2002 Joint Resolution are still applicable, all have been honored by the Iraqi Government; the 

United States surely is not contemplating the use of force to enforce them against 

that government. The question, therefore, is the meaning of ‘‘relevant’’: Does the 

term, as used in the second prong, refer to future United Nations Security Council 

resolutions—resolutions relevant to Iraq that might at some point in the future be 

adopted by the Security Council? The joint resolution, it is worth noting, does not 

set a pertinent time period; if it were construed as authorizing force to enforce a 

future Security Council resolution, there would be no reason, in other words, to believe that that authority would not continue indefinitely into the future, until the 

2002 Joint Resolution is formally repealed. 

The text of the second prong is ambiguous. The legislative history, however, is 

not. Congress appears clearly to have intended to authorize the enforcement of those 

Security Council resolutions outstanding at the time of the enactment and, at most, 

a limited set of potential future Security Council resolutions directed at implementing the outstanding resolutions. This set of future resolutions would not include Resolution 1790, which provides the current mandate for the Multinational 

Force in Iraq. 

The second prong of the Authorization is not the only reference to ‘‘all relevant 

Security Council resolutions’’ in the 2002 Joint Resolution. 107 Public Law No. 243 

§ 2(2) (2002). The immediately preceding section expresses congressional support for 

U.S. diplomatic initiatives regarding Iraq using the same language regarding Security Council resolutions. In addressing this provision, the House committee report 

specified exactly what constitutes a relevant Security Council resolution for these 

purposes: 

This section states that Congress supports the efforts of President Bush 

to strictly enforce, through the United Nations Security Council, all Security Council resolutions adopted prior to the enactment of this Act addressing the threats posed by Iraq, or adopted afterward to further enforce the 

earlier resolutions. H. Rept. No. 107–721, at 41 (2002) (emphasis added). 

The use of the same language in the subsequent section authorizing the use of 

the Armed Forces implicitly includes the same set of Security Council resolutions. 

Further support for this interpretation is provided by statements made during the 

House and Senate floor debates by Representative Richard Gephardt and Senator 

Lieberman, the original cosponsor and sponsor of the House and Senate versions of 

the bill, respectively, who played a significant role in managing the debate over H.J. 

Res. 114. In the House, Representative Gephardt stated: 

The resolution and its accompanying report define the threat posed by 

Iraq as consisting primarily of its weapons of mass destruction programs 

and its support for international terrorism. They also note that we should 

continue to press for Iraqi compliance with all outstanding U.N. resolutions, 

422 

but suggest that we only contemplate using force to implement those that 

are relevant to our nation’s security. 

As for the duration of this authorization, this resolution confines it to the 

continuing threat posed by Iraq; that is, its current and ongoing weapons 

programs and support for terrorists. We do not want Congress to provide 

this or subsequent Presidents with open-ended authority to use force 

against any future threats that Iraq might pose to the United States that 

are not related to its current weapons of mass destruction programs and 

support for international terrorism. The President would need to seek a 

new authorization from Congress to respond to any such future threats. 148 

Cong. Rec. H7779 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002) (emphasis added). 

In the Senate, Senator Lieberman emphasized that the two prongs of the Authorization are linked and that relevant resolutions are those relating to the continuing 

threat by Iraq: 

It seems to me these two parts have to be read in totality as modifying 

each other. The resolutions that are relevant in the U.N. Security Council 

are to be enforced particularly in relationship to the extent to which they 

threaten the national security of the United States. In doing this, we are expressing our understanding that the President is unlikely to go to war to 

enforce a resolution of the United Nations that does not significantly affect 

the national security of the United States. 148 Cong. Rec. S10269 (daily ed. 

Oct 10, 2002) (emphasis added). 

The legislative history thus conclusively reveals that the second prong of the 2002 

Joint Resolution was intended to authorize (1) the enforcement of preexisting Security Council Resolutions and (2) at most, future Security Council resolutions that 

were aimed at implementing the earlier resolutions and were related to ‘‘the continuing threat posed by Iraq.’’ Security Council Resolution 1790—the current U.N. 

authorization for the Multinational Force—does not fall within the scope of either 

class. 

Neither Resolution 1790 nor preceding resolutions passed to authorize the Multinational Force in Iraq can be construed as resolutions aimed at implementing resolutions that were active at the time H.J. Res. 114 was passed. Security Council Resolution 1790 renews the mandate of Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004). During the period in which the Coalition Provisional Authority exercised sovereign control over Iraq, the Multinational Force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003). Not one of these resolutions makes any reference, even in 

preambular language, to Security Council Resolution 687 or any other resolution relating to Iraq that was in force when the 2002 Joint Resolution was passed. Nothing 

in Resolution 1790 suggests that it was adopted to implement or enforce resolutions 

that were outstanding in October 2002 when Congress’s joint resolution was enacted. 

If the 2002 Joint Resolution were to be interpreted as authorizing the enforcement 

of an unlimited set of future resolutions regarding Iraq that the Security Council 

might pass, three potentially serious constitutional problems would arise. 

The first concerns the delegation of legislative power. The doctrinal specifics of 

constitutional jurisprudence governing the delegation of power to international organizations are amorphous; however, the constitutional principle that restricts the domestic delegation of legislative power—the principle that no delegated powers can 

be further delegated (delegate potestas non potest delegari)—would seemingly apply 

equally to international delegations. Among the domestic branches of the U.S. Government, the delegation doctrine precludes Congress from delegating power without 

providing an ‘‘intelligible principle’’ to guide its application. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 

Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) Internationally, an open-ended grant 

of power to the U.N. Security Council to determine—within U.S. domestic law—the 

time, place, manner, and objectives of U.S. use of force in Iraq would squarely raise 

such concerns. Although not expressed in explicit constitutional terms, the statements by a number of Senators who opposed the Levin amendment reflected the 

same concern. The Levin amendment would have made Congress’s authorization 

contingent upon a resolution from the U.N. Security Council authorizing the use of 

force; a number of Senators were concerned that its adoption would give the Security Council a veto over U.S. security policy in Iraq. President Bush himself expressed similar concerns in signing the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 

Cooperation Act. The law as enacted prohibits the transfer of nuclear material to 

India in violation of guidelines set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a consortium 

of 40 nuclear fuel producing nations that includes the United States. The President’s December 8, 2006, signing statement said that ‘‘a serious question would exist 

423 

as to whether the provision unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to an 

international body,’’ and that to ‘‘avoid this constitutional question’’ his administration would interpret the provision ‘‘as advisory.’’ To construe the joint resolution as 

delegating to the U.N. Security Council power to determine whether authority to 

use force is available in U.S. domestic law would raise the same constitutional question. The Constitution permits only 535 Members of Congress to place the United 

States in a state of war—not the U.N. Ambassadors of Belgium, Croatia, and Indonesia. 

A second constitutional problem is posed by construing the second prong as applying to future Security Council resolutions. That problem concerns the Constitution’s 

Appointments Clause. Article II gives the President the power to appoint ‘‘officers 

of the United States’’ only with the advice and consent of the Senate, and permits 

Congress to permit the appointment of ‘‘inferior officers’’ by the President, the 

courts, or department heads. The Supreme Court has made clear that ‘‘any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States 

is an ‘Officer of the United States’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner 

prescribed’’ by the Clause. The question arises whether the U.N. representative of 

a state that is a member of the Security Council would be exercising ‘‘significant 

authority pursuant to the laws of the United States’’ if that individual were permitted, in casting a vote within the Security Council, to give the resulting resolution 

force and effect within the domestic law of the United States. It is one thing to incorporate by reference into existing federal law Security Council resolutions that already exist; their terms are set and known to Congress when they are incorporated. 

It is be quite another, however, to so incorporate any and all Security Council resolutions that may be adopted at any point in the future—whatever their purposes, 

whatever their terms, and whatever their justification—with no time or subject matter limitations beyond the vague requirement of ‘‘relevance.’’ 

Construing the second prong as applying to future Security Council resolutions 

creates a third constitutional problem, concerning presentment. In Immigration and 

Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the United States Supreme 

Court made clear that Congress cannot give a measure the force and effect of law 

unless it is presented to the President for his signature or veto. Yet that would be 

precisely the effect of a future-looking construction of the second prong: It would 

give a future Security Council resolution the force of federal law without presentation to the President for his signature or veto. 

That these three problems attend a future-looking interpretation of the term ‘‘relevant’’ counsels that that interpretation should be avoided. It is a settled canon of 

statutory construction that interpretations that raise constitutional doubts are to be 

avoided. As the Supreme Court made clear in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 

(1932), ‘‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even 

if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 

Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 

which the question may be avoided.’’ This is the canon on which President Bush relied in his signing statement on the United States-India nuclear law. 

When President Bush signed the 2002 authorization, he said that ‘‘Iraq will either 

comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and end 

its support for terrorists, or it will be compelled to do so.’’ He, too, seemed to believe 

that ‘‘relevant’’ referred to past resolutions, not future ones. Weighing all the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the second prong of the 2002 Joint Resolution also is no longer available as a source of authority to use force in Iraq. 

The AUMF as authority to use force 

The pertinent provision of the AUMF reads as follows: 

[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 

against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 

by such nations, organizations or persons. Pub. L. No. 107–40 § 2(a) (2001). 

For two reasons, the AUMF ought not be construed as providing authority for the 

use of force in Iraq. 

First, the AUMF requires some nexus between the organization or entity in question and the 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. It is not clear 

that ‘‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’’ is properly considered to be the same organization that engaged in those attacks. The mere fact that both organizations share the same name 

is not legally sufficient to bring the Iraqi entity within the scope of the AUMF. As 

I understand it, a serious question exists whether al-Qaeda cells operating within 

424 

Iraq are in a ‘‘command and control’’ relationship with the al-Qaeda leaders who 

were present in Afghanistan at the time of the 2001 terrorist attacks. A thorough 

examination of this question probably would require a closed session of the committee. Suffice it to note, however, that one would have to scrutinize very closely 

the comparative leadership structure, personnel, weaponry, strategic objectives, tactical targets, recruiting methods, physical facilities, theaters of operation and other 

aspects of the two organizations before concluding that they are in fact one and the 

same. Second, even if the AUMF were applicable to al-Qaeda in Iraq, force is being used 

by the United States in Iraq against persons and entities not related to al-Qaeda 

in Iraq. As I understand it, fewer than 20 or 25 percent of U.S. casualties in Iraq 

can be attributed to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Military operations directed at insurgents responsible for the remaining 75 or 80 percent of U.S. casualties are not authorized 

by the AUMF. Perhaps for this reason, as recently as January 2007 the administration did not rely upon the AUMF as a source of authority for U.S. military operations in Iraq. In response to a written question concerning sources of authority that 

was put to Secretary Rice by Senator Biden following her oral testimony, Secretary 

Rice cited only the 2002 Joint Resolution and the President’s constitutional authority, not the AUMF. Securing America’s Interest in Iraq: The Remaining Topics: 

Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 110th 

Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (2007). 

The War Powers Resolution’s ‘‘clear statement’’ rule: No implicit authority, from appropriations or elsewhere 

At most, it is debatable whether authority to continue to use force in Iraq is provided by the 2002 Joint Resolution. At most, it is debatable whether such authority 

is provided by the AUMF. (It is not even debatable whether such authority is provided implicitly from appropriations or other sources—it is not.) The War Powers 

Resolution establishes as a rule of law that, when it comes to the monumental question whether a statute confers authority to use force, debatable authority is not 

enough. The War Powers Resolution requires that such authority be specific. Section 

8(a)(1) provides not only that the statute in question must explicitly refer to the resolution; it provides that it must specifically authorize the use of force. That section 

provides as follows: 

Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities 

or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 

circumstances shall not be inferred— 

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of 

the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in 

any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution . . . 

Because serious ambiguities are present in both the 2002 Joint Resolution and the 

AUMF if they are construed as authorizing the use of force in Iraq, it cannot be 

said that either statute ‘‘specifically’’ does so. 

This section also undercuts Ambassador Satterfield’s claim that authority may be 

inferred from the fact that ‘‘Congress has repeatedly provided funding for the Iraq 

war, both in regular appropriations cycles and in supplemental appropriations.’’ The 

section explicitly provides that authority to introduce the armed forces into hostilities ‘‘shall not be inferred . . . from any provision of law . . ., including any provision contained in any appropriation Act,’’ unless those two conditions are met. No 

appropriations act meets either condition. 

Accordingly, the War Powers Resolution precludes inferring authority to use force 

in Iraq from the 2002 Joint Resolution, from the AUMF, or from any appropriations 

legislation. 

CONCLUSION

The administration’s proposed strategic framework agreement concerns the longterm nature of the U.S. relationship with Iraq; renewed authorization for the use 

of force concerns the role of our Armed Forces in that relationship. These are two 

sides of the same coin. Both matters lie at the core of our long-term relationship 

with Iraq. Both raise issues that the executive alone is not empowered to decide. 

Both require the involvement of the legislative branch of this government: Whether 

to make a long-term security commitment to Iraq is a question that is constitutionally committed to the President and the Senate by the Treaty Clause; whether 

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425 

tionally committed to the Congress by the Declaration of War Clause. Neither issue 

can be addressed in isolation. Both must be addressed if either is to be resolved. 

The Constitution specifies how they must be addressed. Setting long-term strategy 

in a security arrangement is the task of the Senate and President as treaty-makers; 

authorizing use of force to carry out that strategy is the task of Congress. This is 

the process that the Constitution mandates. 

In contemplating that process, it is useful to recall the words of this committee, 

written 39 years ago in its report on the National Commitments Resolution: 

Foreign policy is not an end in itself. We do not have a foreign policy because it is interesting or fun, or because it satisfies some basic human need; 

we conduct foreign policy for a purpose external to itself, the purpose of securing democratic values in our own country. These values are largely expressed in processes—in the way in which we pass laws, the way in which 

we administer justice, and the way in which government deals with individuals. The means of a democracy are its ends; when we set aside democratic 

procedures in making our foreign policy, we are undermining the purpose 

of that policy. It is always dangerous to sacrifice means to ostensible ends, 

but when an instrument such as foreign policy is treated as an end in itself, 

and when the processes by which it is made—whose preservation is the 

very objective of foreign policy—are then sacrificed to it, it is the end that 

is being sacrificed to the means. Such a foreign policy is not only inefficient 

but positively destructive of the purposes it is meant to serve. S. Rept. No. 

91–129 (1969). 

STATEMENT OF RUTH WEDGWOOD, EDWARD B. BURLING PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY, DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 

PROGRAM, THE PAUL NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. It’s a pleasure to be here, I’ve never been before 

you, Senator Biden. I’ve seen you on the train, sometimes, coming 

up to Wilmington. 

The CHAIRMAN. Every day. 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. You always look very regal and elegant. 

But, it’s a pleasure to be with Mike Glennon and Mike Matheson, 

who are my good old friends, and to appear before this committee. 

I will, I think, to some degree, stray from my prepared statement, because much of it was covered in the morning session, so 

I will, where I can give you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We’d like to be able to insert your full statement, 

if we could. 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. Thank you very much. 

But, for value-added, let me react to some of those statements in 

the morning, and a couple of supplementary things. 

First, I wanted to draw attention to the interesting parallel between the May 2005 United States-Afghan framework called the 

‘‘Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership’’ and this current framework, the Iraq-United States Declaration of Principles from November 2007. My surmise is that lawyers got to the text of the Afghan 2005 Strategic Partnership declaration a little earlier than they got to the Iraq declaration, if at 

all. The Afghan framework uses precatory language—it speaks 

about ‘‘consult with respect to taking appropriate measures, in the 

event that Afghanistan perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened, or at risk.’’ But it also has 

some more imperative language, ‘‘continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in cooperation with Afghan forces.’’ 

426 

So one curious fact for me—and I’m a mugwump, I stay in academia so I can be independent in my views—but one curious thing 

to me, is in the Afghan-United States 2005 arrangement, nobody 

seems to have kicked up the same amount of dust—in the press, 

on the Hill, anywhere, frankly. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I can interrupt you for a second, there’s a simple reason for that. They think that was a necessary war. There’s 

overwhelming consensus that these are the guys who attacked us, 

and there was overwhelming consensus that we had to go in there, 

and stay there as long as it took. 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. I think sometimes—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Just practically, politically, that’s the difference. 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. No; I understand the practical, political judgment. Sometimes, I think, formal arguments get kicked up when 

people don’t like the substance. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, valid point. No, I wasn’t questioning your 

point, I was just answering your question, why it didn’t kick up as 

much dust. 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. Sure enough. But from a formal point of view, 

a constitutional point of view, I think you have to reconcile the two 

documents, and say that whatever one lays down as a template for 

the Iraq case, you’ve got to read it back into the Afghan case, and 

be content to live with it there, to the extent that it may inhibit 

the discretion of future Presidents to do what they feel the need to 

do in a very fluid, temporally changing security environment. 

I have ICRC Red Cross friends in Geneva who were telling me 

that, you know, once Karzai is sworn in there’s not really a war 

any more, and of course there clearly is, in Afghanistan. 

So, my point is just to try to take a candid view of both documents. 

Second point, on the Iraq framework, or Declaration of Principles: The difficulty I see in delaying its completion is posed by 

Security Council Resolution 1790—I have never seen a U.N. resolution like that before. Essentially, it says, by the pull of a plug, the 

Prime Minister of Iraq can end the Chapter VII mandate. And the 

Security Council has committed itself to honoring Prime Minister 

Maliki’s request. And not only this time, but it was done before, the 

year before, in Resolution 1723—it’s kind of like my kid’s homework, the last, last delay—in Resolution 1723, it’s said to be the 

final extension, we’re now into the final final extension. Both of 

them at the pleasure of Prime Minister Maliki. 

So, from the point of view of worrisome exposure, one could be 

left without belt or suspenders on a Thursday morning if Prime 

Minister Maliki changed his mind, and the Security Council felt 

morally obliged to rescind the Chapter VII resolution, as they said 

they would. 

Third point is a simple historical observation: Presidents often do 

enunciate security doctrines. I don’t make light, at all, of the Senate’s power, and Congress’s power—I’m not from way across the 

street. But, Presidents often do make strategic declarations—Potsdam, Yalta—that do have a real effect on what the country, then, 

can do. And Congress has to fight for its influence. 

I don’t think there’s quite as bright a line as some might like, 

distinguishing what a President can enunciate, in a nonbinding 

427 

fashion, which may create a political reality, but not a legally binding instrument. There are instances where we’re quite content to 

have had that happen in the past. 

I think Iraq probably sees this declaration as essential to its reclamation of full independence. Every so often, I embark on a form 

of post-conflict tourism. A year after the fighting stops, I go there 

in my high heels to take a look around. 

And typically, in a post-conflict situation, the administered territory, whether it’s Timor, or Kosovo, or Bosnia—they want their 

propers back. They want to get independence, they’re eager. Sergio 

Vieira de Mello was pushed very hard in East Timor by local leaders—to make the transition from U.N. administrators to local 

Timorese. And, in fact, the U.N. transferred authority earlier than 

they probably meant to, originally. 

I don’t think that the push for the important, formal reclamation 

of independence is one that we should take lightly—as a matter of 

the pride of local folks. After all, we’re pushing Iraq to be more 

responsible for themselves. So, there would be a certain irony in 

telling them, ‘‘You’ve got to do that, but wait another year, until 

we get our political house in order after the American Presidential 

campaign.’’ 

So, I see the push seeking to assert sovereign jurisdiction over 

your own territory and waterways, and how force is used as a natural concomitant of every post-conflict situation in transition. 

I worry about what delay would mean as a signal to Iraq’s neighbors. The Iranians are very frisky. And they read our tea leaves 

better than we can, sometimes. And if we seem to be querulous, or 

tremulous, or just uncertain because we have a Presidential campaign coming up, I worry that people who aren’t terribly friendly 

might take advantage of that. 

And finally, in the same kind of point—whatever political party 

is in power, it just can’t be the case, to my mind, that in the first 

year, and last year, of every Presidential tenure, you can’t do business. We all know it takes a new administration a year to get 

staffed up, even at the Assistant Secretary level. And, if the last 

year you’re a lame duck, that means there’s a lot of ungoverned 

time, which I, again, worry would leave us in drift, and leave our 

interlocutors to perhaps take advantage from time to time, and 

leave the people that we’re trying to help in a state of uncertainty 

that’s demoralizing. 

Finally, let me just address, if I could, Mike Glennon’s point on 

the use of force. And it’s a point I’ve raised in front of Congressman 

Delahunt in the prior hearings that we had. When you try to be 

a purist on when a treaty is required or an executive agreement, 

or whether a Declaration of Principles will suffice, or whether you 

have to go to Congress for a formal authorization for the continued 

use of force, you discover there are more counterexamples out there 

than you could ever bear to live with. 

In the Kosovo air war in 1998, and the Bosnian campaign in 

1995, Madeleine Albright and Bill Clinton, there was no congressional authorization for the use of force. 

In the follow-on force called KFOR, supporting UNMIK, under 

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428 

rate congressional resolution authorizing the participation of U.S. 

troops in the NATO force there. 

Now that we’re once more in legally uncertain waters in Kosovo, 

in what a former SRSG in Kosovo has called a ‘‘legally messy’’ situation, we are going to have our troops in a situation where there’s 

not even a new Security Council resolution. 

So, there often are instances of important commitments of armed 

force—if only in deterrence—where it’s not as clean as you’d like 

it to be, either congressionally, or in regard to the Security Council. 

And so, on that problem of security tails, when you’re already in 

a place, under a clear authorization for the use of military forces, 

such as the 2002 congressional authorization for the use of force in 

Iraq—I would be very cautious in enunciating any doctrine that 

says that as soon as you’ve reached benchmark 3, it expires, you’ve 

got to go back, and there’s a vacuum until you do, retreat and then 

advance again. 

I could—if we were to do legal briefs, I could find plenty of language in the preambular clauses of the AUMF, that talk about the 

need to prevent acts of international terrorism, all appropriate actions against international terrorists, promote the emergence of a 

democratic government to replace the prior regime. There’s enough 

preambular language to give a practical reading to the operative 

language in the 2002 authorization for the use of force, to not give 

it this Draconian, Calvinistic, absolute cutoff point. 

I’d be cautious on this. Because, every political party, indeed, 

every actor, soon discovers that the doctrines they enunciate in 

year one, can come back and bite them in the tail in year five. And 

there’s got to be a shoe you can put on all of your feet. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wedgwood follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUTH WEDGWOOD, EDWARD B. BURLING PROFESSOR OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY, DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

ORGANIZATIONS PROGRAM, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (SAIA), JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

I appreciate the invitation to comment on the matter of ‘‘Negotiating a Long-Term 

Relationship with Iraq.’’ 

The impetus for today’s hearing may stem, in part, from the events of November 

26, 2007—in particular, from a document entitled ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ that 

was announced on that date by President George W. Bush and by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki of Iraq. 

This ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ touches on a host of topics, sketching many of the 

common interests shared by the United States and the Iraqi people. It is quite similar to the declaration of mutual interests announced by the United States and 

Afghanistan on May 23, 2005. 

There has been a concern in some quarters that this ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ 

amounts, in form and substance, to a binding agreement between the United States 

and Iraq, akin to an ‘‘executive agreement’’ that could be binding under international law. 

In my view, this is not the case. The Declaration of Principles was not styled as 

a binding legal agreement. The document discusses a broad range of matters of aspiration and shared interest, including issues that the United States and Iraq could 

not possibly address without also seeking the cooperation of many other countries. 

This includes, for example, enhancing the position of Iraq in regional and international organizations and helping Iraq to obtain debt forgiveness, as well as Iraq’s 

future accession to the World Trade Organization. These goals depend upon the actions of many other countries beyond the two states that joined in the declaration, 

and could not be made the subject of a self-executing agreement. 

429 

Rather, the Declaration of Principles reflects Iraq’s timely sense of its sovereign 

independence, as well as the ambitions that are shared by any free and democratic 

country. 

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE AND THE STATUS OF AMERICAN FORCES

The Declaration of Principles records Iraq’s wish to gain full recognition of its sovereignty—most notably, its return to the fully independent status enjoyed by the 

Iraqi nation before Saddam Hussein chose to invade neighboring Kuwait and embroil the world community in a difficult conflict. In the language of the Declaration 

of Principles, Iraq looks forward to exercising ‘‘full sovereignty . . . over its territories, waters and airspace, and its control over its forces and the administration 

of its affairs.’’ 

The November 2007 Declaration of Principles thus looks toward a future period 

when the United States and other allied forces may be hosted in Iraq for a number 

of purposes—but may no longer have the legal umbrella of a United Nations security mandate, including provisions concerning the immunity of Multi-National 

Force. 

It is the issue of an appropriate legal framework for U.S. forces working in Iraq 

that accounts, in part, for the timing of the Declaration of Principles—and for some 

of the urgency felt in future plans to negotiate a formal bilateral Status of Forces 

agreement. 

The Multi-National Force has operated in Iraq under a series of U.N. Security 

Council mandates since 2004. Resolution 1546, approved by the Council on June 8, 

2004, was extended in November 2005 and November 2006 in Resolutions 1637 and 

1723. These resolutions invoke the authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 

which permits the use of military force by the United Nations and cooperating 

states in the Multi-National Force. 

Resolution 1723 was due to expire on December 31, 2007. Hence, in November 

2007, the Declaration of Principles prominently focused on Iraq’s intention to ‘‘request to extend the mandate of the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter for a final time.’’ (Emphasis added). 

The Iraqi representative to the United Nations also noted that this extension 

would be ‘‘for the last time.’’ 

Upon Iraq’s request to the United Nations, on December 18, 2007, the Security 

Council passed Resolution 1790 for a final extension of the Multi-National Force 

mandate until December 31, 2008. 

But this was subject to the important proviso, recorded in the operative language 

of Resolution 1790. Namely, in operative paragraph 2, the Council noted that it ‘‘Decides further that the mandate for the Multi-National Force shall be reviewed at the 

request of the Government of Iraq no later than 15 June 2008, and declares that 

it will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq.’’ (Emphasis added). 

Thus, it could be the case that at any moment, the Government of Iraq could request a termination of the mandate of Resolution 1790, and the United States would 

be faced anew with the immediate question of the legal protections available to its 

forces in Iraq. 

This is a topic typically treated through bilateral status of forces agreements, and 

the future intention of the United States to negotiate such an agreement is thus 

not surprising. 

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS

The role of ‘‘status of forces agreements’’ (or ‘‘SOFAs’’) is a matter of general importance to all American servicemembers and their families, as well as to political 

leaders interested in the posture and protection of American Armed Forces around 

the globe. 

Recent headlines concerning events on the Japanese island of Okinawa highlight 

the importance of providing safeguards both to American forces stationed abroad 

and to the civilian populations with whom they come in contact. So, too, the decision 

by the United States to recognize Kosovo as a newly independent nation, separate 

from Serbia, may pose the question of how to assure appropriate status and legal 

protections to American servicemembers who will be stationed in Kosovo as part of 

NATO peacekeeping forces. 

A status of forces agreement is, in fact, a manifestation of the full sovereignty of 

the state on whose territory it applies. In particular, this kind of agreement serves 

to structure the relationship between a sovereign host (often called a ‘‘receiving’’ 

state) and one or more so-called ‘‘sending’’ states whose forces are permitted to visit 

or be stationed on foreign territory. 

430 

Status of forces agreements (‘‘SOFAs’’) are widely used in modern international 

relations. Status of forces agreements govern the working relationship between 

states in the NATO alliance, as well as member states of the Partnership for Peace. 

Status of forces agreements govern and protect United Nations forces dispatched on 

peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions around the globe. 

Status of forces agreements also serve to structure bilateral relationships between 

states, where the two parties conclude there is a common interest in permitting the 

location of a military force, or a monitoring station, or a prepositioning of supplies, 

or indeed, any other anticipated military function or presence. Even a joint military 

exercise may be governed by a status of forces agreement, where there is any presence on foreign territory. 

In a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the status of forces will typically be 

based on a model U.N. status of forces agreement. However, in a Chapter VII peace 

enforcement operation, the status of forces will not necessarily depend upon the consent of the state where they are deployed, since Chapter VII resolutions have coercive power. 

For its part, the United States has attempted to assure that in United Nations 

mandates for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, there is an assurance that U.S. 

forces will not be subject to any assertion of international jurisdiction by a treaty 

court to which it has not assented. 

Status of forces agreements can serve several purposes. In many respects, SOFAs 

are the military equivalent of diplomatic or consular immunity agreements. Status 

of forces agreements may describe the method of entry and departure of international troops. They may describe the division of legal authority in regard to any 

alleged misconduct. 

Typically, primary criminal and civil jurisdiction over any act of misconduct committed in the course of the performance of ‘‘official acts’’ is reserved to the so-called 

sending state, while jurisdiction over private acts of misconduct can be assumed by 

the receiving state. There may, however, be instances in which the sending state 

is primarily or exclusively responsible for both spheres. 

A SOFA agreement often has procedures for handling any commercial claims that 

arise from the presence or activities of international troops. The provision of buildings and grounds, the applicability or inapplicability of local taxes, customs issues, 

foreign exchange regulations, and the hiring of local workers, are also typical features. Alongside its substantive provisions, a SOFA will typically provide a standing 

structure for consultation and settlement of any disputes between the state parties. 

The relationship between the receiving and sending states may also be structured 

by a basing agreement concerning any approved installations, improvements, training activities, permissions for overflight, communications, and services. 

For the further work of the committee, I should note the detailed examination of 

the history and structure of SOFA agreements available in a collaborative study organized by a German international law scholar, Dieter Fleck, entitled ‘‘The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces’’ (Cambridge University Press 2001). The issues 

that arise in overseas deployments are also addressed by John Woodliffe, a British 

scholar, in ‘‘The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations Under Modern 

International Law’’ (Martinus Nijhoff 1992). And finally, Professor Kent Caldor, my 

colleague at Johns Hopkins University, has recently finished an important work entitled ’’Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism’’ 

(Princeton University Press 2007). 

CONCLUSION

The negotiation of a status of forces agreement does not suggest that the United 

States is seeking any permanent bases in Iraq. Indeed, we have status of forces 

agreements even for transient activities. The United States has expressly eschewed 

any desire for permanent bases in Iraq. Both the President and Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates have publicly embraced that position. 

While status of forces agreements are typically concluded as an executive agreement between two governments, this does not trench upon the longstanding interest 

of both political branches of government in foreign policy issues concerning the use 

of force. The Congress still retains its authority over the budget of the Armed 

Forces, and its oversight capabilities. The constitutional and statutory provisions 

concerning the use of force, as a matter of American domestic law, also remain intact. Thus, the issue of the negotiation of a future SOFA arrangement with Iraq 

may be a far more technical matter than some voices have suggested. Insofar as the 

future relationship with Iraq may involve mutual cooperation in training local forces 

and assisting in the fight against the type of terrorism that can ravage civilian lives 

and harm America’s security, this is a common interest that we share with a great 

431 

many countries in the world. Its nature, scope, and duration would not ordinarily 

be determined in a status of forces agreement. 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you for your very practical way 

of approaching this. I assure you, I’m not a Calvinist. I have great 

respect for Calvinists, but I am not one. 

And, but—all kidding aside—the points you make, I think, are 

very valid. 

If I can—I’m going to raise a couple of assertions, make a couple 

of statements, I would invite you all to comment on what I say, and 

what one another have said, OK? Since one of the real disadvantages for you is, I’m the only one here. 

And this is—I look forward to this, don’t turn the clock on, 

Bertie, turn the clock off. 

But, maybe you can help me, at least, and the committee record. 

I suffer from—for the last 18 years, teaching a course in separation of powers at Widener University Law School, and that old 

joke—at least when I was in law school, which I wish I had paid 

more attention when I was—if you want to learn a subject, teach 

it. And you all are much more proficient and knowledgeable in 

teaching, and the subject matter than I am. But let me just walk 

through a couple of things for you, if I can, maybe help us get our 

arms around this. 

Professor Donoghue, a number of the points you raised are, I 

think, technically correct—in the Calvinistic sense—pardon me? 

Oh, I’m sorry, I did say Donoghue, I apologize. She was here before, I apologize. I introduced you as that too, I’m sorry, you were 

very kind. You can call me Bidden if you like. [Laughter.] 

I truly apologize, and I even wrote it down here, Donoghue, I 

apologize. 

But, look—there are practical explanations for each of the legal 

points that you’ve raised, constitutional points. For example, I can’t 

think of any other time in the 20th century where, other than the 

Vietnam war, where—when the passing of power from one President to the next—has been almost solely based upon the issue of 

whether or not the pursuit of that war, and the way it was being 

pursued, is appropriate. That’s what this election is about. It’s the 

economy, stupid, economy—but guess what? The end of the day, it’s 

about the war. 

So, we’re about to have a referendum in the United States of 

America on whether or not, essentially continue—based on my 

friend John McCain’s assertions—whether we continue the policy of 

this administration, relative to the use of force in Iraq for the 

rationale offered by this President and offered by John, which 

relates to the threat of Iran, internal destabilization resulting in 

regional instability, the hegemony of Iran, the growth of terrorism 

in the region, et cetera. These are all propositions that underlie the 

continuation of the use of this force that are literally being debated 

by the public. 

The point I raised with a couple of my colleagues on the way over 

to the last vote—just imagine the circumstance, to make a point, 

if this administration said, ‘‘We want a Status of Forces Agreement,’’ this is essentially a continuation, a letter—if you will, as 

you suggested, a letter, just of an understanding between us—of 

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432 

tains in CPA 17. And assume they said, ‘‘No; we’re not going to do 

that. And we’re not going to give a Status of Forces Agreement unless you have these other commitments,’’ whether you argue they’re 

constitutionally binding, legally binding, or not binding, ‘‘unless 

you do that, we’re not going to give you the right to stay.’’ 

I ask you all just to imagine what the American people would say 

if the Iraqi Government said, ‘‘We don’t want you here any longer 

unless you do more of what we want beyond shedding your blood 

and draining your Treasury.’’ My guess is, just being a plain old 

politician, that Americans would say, ‘‘No problem, Jack, we’re 

coming home.’’ 

Because I don’t know that Americans—average Americans, Republicans, Democrats, and Independents—view Iraq in the context 

of the region, view Iraq in the context of these larger, arguably 

rational, I mean, arguably real conditions of what might happen in 

the region and in the world if we were to leave. They view it as 

Iraq. 

And so, I would suggest that, in answer to your question about 

this Calvinistic notion of one President not being able to bind another President, when, in fact, we’re already engaged in something, 

and if we had to every 4 years know that, you know, we may fundamentally change things. I think that you’re right, that’s a dangerous precedent to formalize, I think, formalize constitutionally, or 

any other way. But, practically—practically, it occasionally occurs, 

and it’s occurred in my lifetime—this is my 35 years in the Senate—twice. 

It didn’t occur in Bosnia, there was no fundamental disagreement in the American public about American forces staying in Bosnia. There was no fundamental intellectual and/or political rift 

about the bombing campaign in Kosovo. Well, I was here, I mean 

let me put it this way, there’s not a single solitary person that ran 

for reelection in the Republican ticket saying, ‘‘Get out of Bosnia. 

Do not use force in Kosovo.’’ I can’t think of one campaign. 

My skittish Democratic friends—since I was the author of that 

idea here—to use that force, to prove I am a Catholic, not a Calvinist. All kidding aside, you know, what happened here. Technically, or legally, or constitutionally, I may have been wrong, but 

the effect here in the political environment, no one stood up on the 

floor of the Senate, they just voted, ‘‘No.’’ It did not engender a debate that’s so consequential that it’s dividing the country. 

And so, I can’t think of anything other than Vietnam, which I 

ran in Vietnam, 1972, I ran on a platform saying, ‘‘I disagree with 

Nixon and end this war, almost under any circumstances.’’ My 

argument in that war was, the underlying rational for the war had 

no, no historical basis. And the underlying rational was, if we 

didn’t stay there and protect the South, the dominoes were going 

to fall, you’re going to have Camrhan Bay, a Russian port, the Russians and the Chinese were going to be in league and they’re going 

to take over, and the next thing under San Francisco Bridge. 

I went so far in the debate, in the last debate—it was pointed 

out to me 4 years ago by a press person who was still around covering me then—I allegedly said—I don’t remember it—in a debate, 

that I make the following commitment, ‘‘I am so certain the administration’s rational for the war in Vietnam is unfounded, that if a 

433 

Russian fleet ever docks in Camrhan Bay and if I’m lucky enough 

to have been elected, I will offer my resignation from the Senate, 

on the floor of the United States Senate the moment that happens.’’ 

That’s how certain I was, the rational was flawed, regardless of the 

constitutional justification or the constitutional powers the President had. 

Well, that’s kind of where we are now. In the minds of an awful 

lot of Democrats, some Republicans, and a lot of Americans. So, I 

just lay that basis, that premise down as to the reason why this 

is different, is it’s different. This is a pipe, this is a picture of a 

pipe. It’s different than any other circumstance I can think of in 

the 35 years I’ve been a Senator and, I would argue, in the 20th 

century, including Korea. 

So, having said that, let’s go to the more difficult pieces of this. 

I think the Professor raises a good point, Mike, Michael. How— 

from a legal standpoint, distinguish Afghanistan and Iraq? 

Mr. GLENNON. It is an interesting point, I’m not persuaded that 

it’s a convincing point. 

Are there examples of executive agreements that should have 

been sent up to the Senate as treaties, over the course of 200 years, 

that the Senate didn’t object to? Answer; of course. 

Second, are there instances in which the President has used 

force, in which he should have gotten advanced authorization from 

Congress as required by the War Powers Clause? Answer; of 

course. That’s not really the question, Senator. 

The question is, given the, in effect, atrophy of congressional 

power that has occurred as a consequence of these precedents, is 

it constitutionally impermissible for Congress to reclaim its power? 

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about that, Mike. I understand that. You can not—you can not change the essential fabric 

of the Constitution by any precedent, you can’t do it. I understand 

that and I understand, you know, the famous Harvard professor, 

the name escapes me right now, years ago who said, this is in the 

area of foreign policy, the Constitution issues an invitation for the 

executive and legislation—— 

Mr. GLENNON. Corwin. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. You know, who was it? 

Mr. GLENNON. Corwin. 

The CHAIRMAN. Corwin. And Corwin made that—and so really 

that’s the area we fall in here. But my point is, from a constitutional standpoint—not whether or not it binds us in Iraq—is it 

correct that there are not fundamentally different—there are not 

fundamentally different justifications for—from a constitutional 

standpoint—for the Afghan agreement and the Iraqi contemplated 

agreement? That’s the question. 

Mr. GLENNON. Well, Senator I have to say I haven’t looked 

closely at the Iraqi agreement, but I would apply the same multifactor test that you yourself alluded to earlier. And the question is, 

viewing the entire bilateral relationship in context, taking into account every element in the surrounding context, what is the implicit commitment, if any, that is contained in the words and conduct of the United States, viewed in conjunction with the words 

and conduct of the other side? So, the argument from precedent is 

not terribly useful in this context. 

434 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I’m just making—I think it’s important for 

someone like me, who is making a constitutional, a legislative, as 

well as a political argument, to be honest with my colleagues. And 

so, the only thing I’m trying to figure out is, I’m prepared to—if 

it’s true—acknowledge that it may not be, from a constitutional 

perspective, any more within the power of the administration to do 

what it did in its agreement in Afghanistan, and acknowledge that, 

but say that from a political perspective in the context, the American public are much more prepared to support that. And the next 

President will be bound by it, as a practical matter, because these 

are the guys that killed our guys. These are the guys that killed, 

these are the guys that launched the attack. They’re still living in 

the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, they’re still 

hanging around. And so, whether or not there is a more compelling 

legal rational for the next President to honor that, as a practical 

matter, the next President is going to honor that. There is no disagreement among us. 

As a matter of fact, all three candidates are saying we have to 

devote more resources. You have both Senator Clinton and Senator 

Obama saying we should be surging forces into Afghanistan. Now 

that may still create a constitutional dilemma for us if we’re going 

to be, you know, if we’re going to go by the numbers. I’m not disagreeing with that. I’m just trying to figure out what it is. 

Professor. 

Mr. MATHESON. Of course you have two separate questions here, 

and it’s useful to keep them apart analytically. 

The first question is whether the executive branch has the 

authority to commit United States forces into hostilities, and that’s 

a question which differs between Iraq and Afghanistan, in the 

sense that I think the joint resolution for Afghanistan is pretty 

straightforward. We’re still fighting, as you say, against those entities that caused 9/11, whereas it’s a more gray area with respect 

to Iraq, since it’s a debate about whether the threat posed by Iraq 

really only relates to that posed by Saddam Hussein. 

The CHAIRMAN. Quite frankly, that’s the answer I was looking 

for. 

Mr. MATHESON. But the other side of the question is whether 

there’s some constitutional inhibition on the President to get 

authority to use force from a foreign government. And here I think 

I would—with apologies to my good friend and colleague—take 

issue with the idea of implied or implicit security commitments, as 

a legal matter, in the sense that I think a security commitment is 

an obligation to come to the defense of another country. That’s 

probably the most significant obligation a state could have. And I 

think we should always expect that would take express form, 

rather than implied form, and I don’t think we should agree that 

that kind of obligation could be created implicitly simply by the 

fact that hostilities are occurring, or that we have authority to use 

force. So, I think I would draw a different line there. 

As a practical matter, of course, this kind of situation can have 

very significant impacts. But I would make that distinction, legally, 

so that comparing Iran and Afghanistan, I think in both cases the 

President could constitutionally get authority to use force as a 

matter of international law, but then as a domestic constitutional 

435 

issue, you have to inquire as to whether the congressional authorization still stands. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

You wanted to respond, Professor, or make a statement, I 

thought. Were you seeking to—— 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. Oh, just a couple of things. First, on the argument that two wrongs don’t make a right, which was Michael 

Glennon’s point. 

I still give some credit to the Dames and Moore decision that 

Chief Justice Rehnquist handed down on the Algiers Accords, when 

we were transferring cases from domestic federal courts to the 

United States-Iran Claims Tribunal. The Chief Justice said that 

‘‘the institutional practice, over time, does matter.’’ It shows each 

institution’s understanding of the practical contours of the Constitution. So, maybe not one instance, but if you do have a series, 

say, of precatory statements by Presidents, wanting to reassure 

their allies or their beneficiaries about what the state of play is, 

that look a lot like this, the practice adds up to something that 

could be, I think, carving out an area, as I think you, yourself, perhaps suggested. 

The only other point I want to suggest is that, after today’s hearing, after all the conversation in the Washington Post over the last 

couple of weeks, if there’s one thing the Iraqis know, it’s that not 

everybody thinks this is binding. So that any worry that we’ve misled them, that having a framework agreement would amount to 

some kind of double-play upon them, they have to be aware that 

there indeed is a campaign on, and that somebody coming in the 

White House might take quite a different view. 

But even that person, whoever it is, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, or John McCain—no one is prescribing immediate, instantaneous withdrawal. So we’re going to have some military folks there 

for quite awhile, even if we are in the process of leaving, and in 

that interim period, it’s equally crucial to have the Status of Forces 

Agreement to protect them during an exit. 

Mr. GLENNON. Two quick comments, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Professor Matheson raises a very important point. The 

question really is, What’s the effect, under international law, of an 

agreement, implicit or explicit, that is entered into in violation of 

your domestic law—indeed in violation of rule of fundamental importance of your domestic law? There is authority in Article 46 of 

the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the effect that 

that is not binding in international law, if the violation is manifest. 

And I would suggest to you that this constitutes precisely that kind 

of manifest violation that the Vienna Convention had in mind. 

So, I agree with Mike, that we would not be and should not be 

bound by an ultra vires agreement of this sort, but it’s because of 

the applicable international law principle. 

Second, there’s no question, as Ruth points out, that custom and 

practice, as you know as a professor of separation of powers, have 

an impact in setting practical and operational rules of law in allocating authority, as between the two political branches of the Federal Government. 

The question however, is this: Can explicit Supreme Court holdings be overturned by contrary custom and practice? The applicable 

436 

case is not Dames and Moore. There are three cases that were decided by the Marshall court, in which it found that when Congress 

authorizes the use of force with limits attached, the President is 

constitutionally required to respect those limits, his Commander in 

Chief power does not permit him to exceed congressionally imposed 

limits. I don’t think that John Marshall was being Draconian or 

Calvinistic in the way he decided those three cases. 

Finally, you’ve really touched on something important in focusing 

on the transition. The truth is that this new framework agreement 

is only going to be in effect for less than 3 weeks, governing the 

current administration. If the intent is not to tie the hands of the 

next administration or remove some options from the table, or 

cause the new administration to buy into, as you said, the vision 

of this administration, what’s the purpose in extending it beyond 

that 3-week period? Why not let the new administration negotiate 

it for themselves? 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the argument they’re going to make is that 

that they will not negotiate, they will no longer, from January 1 

to January 20, will our troops be protected. They will not have 

the—this the administration’s argument—they will not have the 

protection of the Status of Forces Agreement, and they’ll all be in 

jeopardy of being able to be tried in Iraqi court or whatever. That 

would be their argument, I expect. 

You were going to say something, Professor. 

Mr. MATHESON. I just wanted to address that practical situation, 

because I think there are some false dichotomies here. 

It isn’t necessarily the case that you have to have the Security 

Council extend the Chapter VII mandate. Apparently the Iraqis 

have some kind of political difficulty with that. I’m not sure why 

they do, because there are lots of countries where there are Chapter VII operations going on, and in fact, every country, including 

the United States, has obligations under at least two Chapter VII 

resolutions right now on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 

But assuming, for the moment, that they have this political 

hangup about the Security Council renewing the mandate, that 

doesn’t preclude some kind of extension of the status quo by simple 

agreement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. No; that’s exactly—look, this is their 

attempt, the Iraqis, to hold us up. And, you know, it’s real simple, 

I mean, there is no—their sovereignty need not be in any way compromised, they would need only do what you just said. And say we 

will not extend Chapter VII, use the same language, call it, we’ve 

entered into a new agreement with the United States of America, 

and it’s consistent with what, the following, boom, and then lay it 

out in a letter agreement. 

Mr. MATHESON. And if they refuse that kind of a very reasonable 

accommodation, then my answer as the U.S. Representative would 

be, all right, in that case we’re going to have to go back to the 

Security Council and impose this on you under Chapter VII, you 

don’t give us any feasible option. And I’m sure that that’s not the 

way they would want to go. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, look, I agree, this is—I must tell you, and 

I’ve kept you a long time. I have made no—I’ve not made any 

437 

secret of my view of the administration’s intentions, for the last 

year and a half. 

I know it sounds cynical, Professor Wedgwood, for me to say this, 

but I said well over a year and a half ago, I think the intent of 

this administration, because they don’t have a solution—they’re 

very smart people—they don’t know what to do in Iraq, is to just 

make sure the dog doesn’t die on their doorstep. Just keep this 

thing from imploding and hand it off to the next President, Democrat or Republican. I don’t think it’s a partisan thing, I think it’s 

a historical perspective thing. 

And, because you can’t, I mean, I knew, and I’ve known Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney—I know he’s gone, 

Rumsfeld—for 30 years. These are really smart guys, these guys 

aren’t stupid, these guys know how bad things are going, were 

going. 

And if you notice, there’s been no political suggestion as to how 

to reconcile the party’s offer by the administration—none. They 

haven’t offered any political, they argue political progress is being 

made, bottom-up, by agreements between tribes and among tribes 

and our military on the ground. They’re positive things, but it’s not 

like there is an overarching political prescription that this administration is pushing nationally, i.e., Iraq or internationally. 

And so I’m absolutely convinced that this—and I’m revealing my 

prejudice so I don’t fly under false colors—I believe, in my discussions with the President—he never used the same language—but 

I believe that—I believe that the quote used by Senator Webb, 

quoting a relatively conservative commentator saying that Bush 

has said in the Oval Office, ‘‘Don’t worry, the next President’s going 

to not have any choice.’’ That’s what I think this is about. This is 

about continuing a policy he doesn’t know how to settle into the 

next administration. 

And so, we all know this is going to take on an almost—it’s not 

going to be, no court’s going to take this issue. This political question doctrine will be invoked by—particularly this court, and I suspect probably any court. So we’re down to that invitation Corwin 

talked about, to struggle for the control of the conduct of foreign 

policy. And in this case, I hope the administration listens to my Republican colleagues. Not to me, my Republican colleagues. There’s 

very little stomach—very little stomach—to make an agreement 

with a government whose longevity is questionable at best, whose 

support is, I would argue, very shaky in its own country. 

For example, you heard the Secretary—the Ambassador say, that 

this brings in all the parties, we’re negotiating with them all, 

except the bad ones, basically. Why is Maliki still Prime Minister? 

Because 32 Sadrites said, ‘‘You’re Prime Minister.’’ How do you 

negotiate an agreement they aren’t in on? I don’t know, and still 

keep you political, actually have that party, you know, have this 

being a consensus, you know, I don’t know. There’s not even a Cabinet. 

Professor, you wanted to respond? 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. Now I’m straying well out of my legal competence, but just into citizenry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, sure. 

438 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. But I guess the point I’d make is—or offer for 

consideration is that I don’t think this agreement would look terribly different no matter whom you negotiated it with. It doesn’t 

pledge troth to Maliki as a person, it pledges—it’s an agreement 

with the Government of Iraq. 

The CHAIRMAN. And by the way, I think it would be materially 

different if, in fact, Sadr controlled the Parliament. Materially different. There would be no agreement. There would be a commitment to require a timetable to get out. And watch what happens 

between the Sunnis and the Sadrites in Parliament on this. I’ll 

make a prediction to you, I’ll make a prediction. They’re going to 

say, ‘‘Hey, go.’’ 

So I don’t know, I mean, look that’s—now we’re into, you know, 

into an area which is the reality of where we find ourselves, but 

it just seems to me that we’re begging for trouble and confusion, 

and what we’re doing—the irony of all ironies is—by going the separate route of bilateral negotiations here for whatever reasons 

required, demanded by the, I mean by, excuse me, by the Iraqis or 

not. Nobody’s going to talk about a Multi-National Force anymore, 

this President is going to have an awful hard time saying this is 

a multilateral action. 

So it’s kind of, in a sense, exposing the reality of what’s going 

on in Iraq. In that sense it’s a good exercise for the American people to see. It’s a sham that we have a multilateral organizational 

structure condoned by the International Community. It’s about to 

be withdrawn. And, you know, I just think it’s—I just think it’s a 

gigantic—beyond the legal consequences—a gigantic mistake. 

Because—I’ll end where I began and let you close, Professor—but 

the one thing, and I know neither, none of you are as old as I am, 

but the one thing that I think my generation walked away from 

our experience in Vietnam with—that is our experience dealing 

with that war and that generation of Vietnam—whether you were 

for the war or against the war, thought we should have left earlier, 

thought we should have stayed longer, whatever position you 

take—is no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed 

consent of the American people. And the idea that anybody thinks, 

if we put up to a referendum in America, an agreement whereby 

we would agree to protect this government, a Maliki government 

that exists today, against threats from—internal threats, not alQaeda alone—any threats, because there are insurgents, bad guys, 

et cetera, from the perspective of Maliki. They’re going to send 

there, they’re going to continue to spend $3 billion a month, a week 

for that? Whoa. I don’t think there’s any consensus for that, none, 

none at all. But that’s—that’s what elections are about, we’ll find 

that out. 

Professor, you wanted to make a comment. 

Mr. MATHESON. I just wanted say that I suppose it’s only fair 

that we remind ourselves that we’ve been focusing today on the 

question of whether this administration or the next one should 

negotiate this, but even if it is postponed into the next administration, it will still leave a lot of very difficult issues about how to do 

these agreements. Do we give immunity to civilian contractors? If 

so, how do we enforce that responsibly? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yep, exactly. 

439 

Mr. MATHESON. What will we demand in terms of a right to conduct combat operations? will it be open-ended? what are the implications of that? What do we do about certain other U.N. resolutions, which are currently in effect: The one that prohibits WMD 

for Iraq, the one that ensures continuing draws on Iraqi oil revenues for compensation? What do we do about those resolutions? 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. We kick the can down the road on all 

of those, but at least it would be in the context of full-blown debate, 

after the American people have spoken about whether the degree 

and extent of the involvement in Iraq is one they’re willing to continue to support. I think. 

Mike. 

Mr. GLENNON. Senator, I think that’s really the key point. I, you 

know, Ambassador Satterfield underscored the procedure that 

they’re following, is one that is intended to generate a consensus 

within Iraq. It would be good if the administration were as concerned about generating a consensus behind a strategy within the 

United States, and the way to do that is to submit this to the Senate for its advice and consent. And if he can get a two-thirds—if 

the President can get a two-thirds vote in support of that, then 

you’ve got a consensus. 

The CHAIRMAN. Last word for you, Professor. 

Ms. WEDGWOOD. Two last quick thoughts. One is just to note 

that—the Defense Science Board did a study a little while ago, 

showing the time horizon for all manner of humanitarian missions, 

Bosnia, Kosovo—they’re all taking longer than we thought. When 

you stack them up you get huge demands on force structure. So 

there really is a serious conversation to be had about what we can 

and can’t do. 

But then as the law professor in me impishly rises to the surface, 

I did want to note, that as far as I can tell, the only mention in 

the United States-Iraq Declaration of Principles that has to do with 

internal matters, is in the first part of the declaration, in a section 

entitled ‘‘Political, Diplomatic, and Cultural Spheres.’’ It speaks of 

‘‘supporting the Republic of Iraq in defending its democratic system 

against internal and external threats.’’ I wouldn’t take that to 

mean that you have to keep any particular politician, including 

Prime Minister Maliki in power. 

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that’s true. 

I thank you all very much. I apologize, I’m late for a 1 o’clock. 

Thank you so much. 

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JOINT RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR DAVID SATTERFIELD AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MARY BETH LONG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

NEW SOFA OR EXTENSION OF MNF MANDATE

Question. You stated that the reason we need to negotiate a Status of Forces 

Agreement is that Iraq does not want to extend the mandate of the Multi-National 

Force under the Security Council resolutions. Has Secretary Rice raised the possibility of extending the mandate of the Multi-National Force under the U.N. Security 

Council resolutions with the Government of Iraq? 

440 

Answer. U.S. officials have engaged Iraqi officials on the importance of concluding 

the Status of Forces Agreement and any other necessary arrangement in a timely 

manner. The United States is working on normalizing its relationship with Iraq 

through a Status of Forces Agreement and other bilateral arrangements. 

IRAQI REACTION TO SOFA

Question. Are these agreements likely to be controversial in Iraq? What happens 

if either of them is rejected by the Iraqi Council of Representatives? 

Answer. These agreements will likely encounter vigorous political debate in Iraq 

given the number of views espoused by the various political parties. 

The United States will support the Iraqi leadership in ensuring that any agreement is approved by the Council of Representatives and earns the support of the 

major Iraqi political representatives. 

ABSENCE OF U.N. MANDATE AND U.S. LEGITIMACY

Question. Won’t the absence of a U.N. mandate mean that our presence would 

have even less international legitimacy than it does today? Why shouldn’t we wait 

until the mission is narrowed and a smaller presence envisaged before seeking to 

end the U.N. mandate? 

Answer. The current U.N. mandate would be replaced by an arrangement that 

further recognizes Iraq’s rights as a democratic, free, and sovereign country, and 

affirms the legitimacy of the coalition in Iraq. The United States will work with Iraq 

and other international partners to ensure the continued participation of a large 

number of partners in a broad coalition of nations. 

CPA ORDER NO. 17, SECTION 20 LANGUAGE CLARIFICATION

Question. The language in Section 20 of CPA Order No. 17 is ambiguous—it says 

that the Order ‘‘shall remain in force for the duration of the mandate authorizing 

the MNF under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546 and any subsequent relevant resolutions and shall not terminate until the departure of the final 

element of the MNF from Iraq. . . .’’ Have you discussed with the Government of 

Iraq its view of when the privileges and immunities provided to the ‘‘Multinational 

Force’’ and ‘‘MNF Personnel’’ pursuant to CPA Order No. 17 will terminate? Assuming that the MNF mandate expires on December 31, 2008, as anticipated in U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1790 and we have no SOFA in force—is it your view 

that CPA Order No. 17 would no longer apply to U.S. personnel, property, funds, 

or assets currently in Iraq and covered by the Order as of December 31, 2008? What 

is the view of Iraq on this point? What is the administration’s plan, should the scenario outlined become a reality at the end of this year (i.e., if we have no SOFA 

in force when the MNF mandate expires on December 31, 2008, and there is no 

other mechanism in place that would otherwise extend the status quo)? 

Answer. CPA Order No. 17 (Revised), as part of Iraqi domestic law, is an important source of privileges and immunities for the Multi-National Force in Iraq 

(MNF–I) and its personnel in Iraq. As Iraqi law, it could be amended or rescinded 

legislatively by Iraq, as Section 20 of the Order states, either before or after the termination of the U.N. Security Council mandate for the MNF–I. The United States 

and Iraq have begun negotiations concerning the status of U.S. forces in Iraq upon 

the expiration of the U.N. Security Council mandate for the MNF–I. Our expectation is that we will be able to reach agreement with Iraq to have appropriate protections and authorities in place for U.S. forces prior to any date upon which privileges 

and immunities under CPA Order No. 17 (Revised) may terminate. Ensuring the 

protections and authorities for U.S. forces assisting Iraq continue uninterrupted as 

we transition from the U.N. Security Council mandate is one of our central goals. 

Accordingly, we remain in consultation with Iraq on issues related to the scope and 

effectiveness of CPA Order No. 17, as part of our ongoing negotiations. 

We remain confident that we will be able to agree with Iraq on appropriate protections and authorities for U.S. forces and their supporting personnel in Iraq, and 

remain committed to our goal of achieving this agreement in a timely manner. 

SOFA AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK DRAFT TEXT REQUEST

Question. Earlier this week, the Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom reported on a draft text, dated March 7, of one of the agreements—although it is unclear whether it was the Status of Forces Agreement or the Strategic Framework 

agreement. Will you be willing to share draft texts with the committee, on a classified basis if necessary? 

441 

Answer. Our Secretaries of State and Defense are committed to keeping the negotiation process as transparent as possible, and will keep the Congress fully apprised 

as we proceed. 

SOFA PROVISIONS REQUEST

Question. Please provide a list of the types of provisions that will be in the SOFA 

that you expect to conclude with Iraq. 

Answer. Like most other SOFAs, this SOFA contains provisions that are designed 

to address the vast majority of day-to-day issues that arise over the course of a deployment of U.S. forces. These include provisions addressing criminal and civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces and civilian personnel, use of agreed facilities and areas, 

movement of vehicles, tax and customs exemptions, contracting procedures, utilities 

and communications, status of personnel, and entry and exit from the host nation. 

The United States also envisions temporary attachments to the SOFA that are 

designed to address the particular circumstances and requirements of our forces in 

Iraq. Our objectives include the authorizations necessary for U.S. forces to conduct 

military and detention operations in Iraq, and provisions related to contractors. 

Question. What existing SOFA would you say is most like the SOFA you hope to 

negotiate with Iraq? 

Answer. The SOFA being negotiated with Iraq will reflect, in general, many of 

the current SOFAs in place with allies in the region. In light of the unique security 

circumstances facing U.S. forces in Iraq, the SOFA would likely contain temporary 

attachments allowing U.S. forces, at the request of the Government of Iraq, to conduct military and detention operations, and provisions concerning contractors. 

TRANSFER OF DETAINEES

Question. Will the SOFA cover any aspect of the possible transfer of detainees currently in the control of the Multi-National Force to the control of the Iraqi Government? 

Answer. We expect that the SOFA will provide a basis for U.S forces to detain 

individuals who pose a threat to the people of Iraq and coalition forces present in 

Iraq. This authority is necessary as long as the United States is engaged in combat 

operations; we will not deprive our troops of the authority to detain hostile elements. The SOFA may also serve as a starting point for more detailed discussions 

related to the Government of Iraq transition to primary responsibility for detention 

operations, which may include the transfer of some detainees to the Government of 

Iraq. 

EXPIRATION OF MNF–I MANDATE

Question. The Declaration of Principles by President George Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki indicates that upon expiration of the MNF–I mandate, ‘‘Iraq’s status 

under Chapter VII and its designation as a threat to international peace and security will end, and Iraq will return to the legal and international standing it enjoyed 

prior to the issuance of U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 661 (August, 1990). 

. . .’’ Please elaborate on what this means, specifically: 

• Do you expect, as this statement indicates, that all U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq adopted after August 1990 will no longer be applicable 

to Iraq? If not, which resolutions will continue to apply upon expiration of U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1790? 

• Is it the administration’s position that with the expiration of the MNF–I mandate at the end of this year, Iraq will no longer pose a threat to international 

peace and security? 

• What will be the status of the U.N. Compensation Commission as of December 

31, 2008? Will Iraq continue to be obligated to contribute to the Compensation 

Fund after December 31, 2008? What will happen to the money that is in the 

Fund as of December 31, 2008? Is the administration exploring the possibility 

of a new U.N. Security Council resolution that would address the U.N. Compensation Commission? 

• What will be the status of the Development Fund for Iraq as of December 31, 

2008? Will the monitoring of the Development Fund by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board come to an end? What will happen to the money 

that is in the Fund as of December 31, 2008? Is the administration exploring 

the possibility of a new U.N. Security Council resolution that would address any 

of these issues? 

442 

Answer. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790 continues the mandate of the 

Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF–I) to ‘‘take all necessary measures to contribute to 

the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’’ through December 31, 2008 (unless earlier terminated). Both the United States and Iraq are committed to moving 

beyond a U.N. Security Council Chapter VII mandate. This will serve as the basis 

on which to begin the process of normalizing the United States-Iraq bilateral relationship. Such a step is consistent with Iraq’s sovereignty and will help Iraq regain 

its rightful status in the international community—something both we and the 

Iraqis seek. 

UNSCR 1790 anticipates that the mandate for the MNF–I and the arrangements 

and protections related to Development Fund for Iraq will terminate on December 

31, 2008, unless earlier terminated. The Security Council would have to act affirmatively to terminate other Chapter VII actions applicable specifically to the situation 

in Iraq, including provisions in resolutions 661 (1990), 687 (1991), 707(1991), 1284 

(1999), 1483 (2003), 1518 (2003), 1546 (2004), and 1762 (2007). The mandate for the 

U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) is also established in a U.N. Security 

Council resolution. 

The status of the U.N. Compensation Commission (‘‘UNCC’’), which was established by UNSCR 687 (1991), is unaffected by the expiration of the Development 

Fund for Iraq provided for in UNSCR 1790 (2007) and will continue to exist after 

December 31, 2008. Under the terms of UNSCR 687 (1991) and UNSCR (1483) 

(2003), Iraq will also continue to be obligated to pay 5 percent of the proceeds of 

its exports of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas, until the UNCC Governing Council, in consultation with Iraq, decides otherwise. Money held by the 

Compensation Fund as of December 31, 2008, as well as future contributions from 

Iraq’s proceeds of petroleum exports, will remain in the Fund for disbursement by 

the UNCC to pay the remaining outstanding awards, which currently amount to approximately $28 billion. Because Iraq’s obligation to pay UNCC awards remains in 

force under UNSCR 687 (1991) and UNSCR 1483 (2003) and is not affected by 

UNSCR 1790 (2007), a new U.N. Security resolution to address this obligation is 

unnecessary at this time. 

UNSCR 1790 continues until December 31, 2008, the provisions originally outlined in UNSCR 1483, which recognized the establishment of the Development Fund 

for Iraq (DFI) and mandated that 95 percent of the proceeds from the export sale 

of Iraqi oil and natural gas products be deposited in the DFI for the benefit of the 

Iraqi people, and required all states to extend protections to these Iraqi assets. The 

United States implements its obligations to provide immunities to the DFI by Executive orders declaring a national emergency that the President must renew annually each May, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

U.S.C 1701–1701) (‘‘IEEPA’’) and the United Nations Participation Act. . 

Monitoring of DFI by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) 

will come to an end with the expiration of the U.N. Security Council resolution that 

is currently in place. However, since 2007, the IAMB has been working closely with 

the Iraqi oversight body—the Committee of Financial Experts (COFE)—to provide 

independent oversight of Iraq’s oil export revenues. COFE, which was established 

by the Council of Ministers in October 2006 to exercise oversight over petroleum 

revenues, is intended to ensure the continued oversight of external audits and succeed the IAMB starting January 2009. COFE is chaired by the President of the 

Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit and includes two independent experts chosen by, and 

reporting to, the Council of Ministers with required public disclosure of their reports. The IAMB and COFE will fully coordinate their efforts through 2008, with 

the IAMB placing increasing reliance upon the work of COFE while discharging its 

responsibilities under UNSC Resolution 1790, to ensure a smooth hand-over in 

2009. 

As part of the International Compact with Iraq, the Government of Iraq has committed to establishing a new single oil proceeds account as a successor to the DFI 

by the end of 2008, and we hope to see the government maintain the auditing and 

transparency of this account. 

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN THE SOFA

Question. Most SOFAs provide a blend of jurisdiction. For example, a SOFA frequently establishes which party to the SOFA is able to assert criminal and/or civil 

jurisdiction over certain personnel and assets. Do you anticipate that Iraq will be 

able to assert criminal and/or civil jurisdiction over U.S. personnel? 

Answer. Jurisdiction over U.S. forces and personnel is one of the issues under discussion in the ongoing SOFA negotiations with Iraq. Our view is that the United 

443 

States should retain criminal and civil jurisdiction for our troops and government 

employees. 

CONTRACTOR IMMUNITY

Question. Do you expect the scope of contractor immunity to be similar to that 

found in CPA Order No. 17? If it is not as broad as the immunity found in Order 

No. 17, in what respect might it be narrowed? If it is narrower, do you expect that 

the wide array of U.S. contractors will be willing to operate in Iraq? 

Answer. Contractor support is critical to the U.S. mission in Iraq. The status of 

contractors is an issue of concern to both the United States and Iraq. 

We seek an outcome that will ensure our ability to maintain an effective contractor presence in Iraq. 

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES JULY 31, 2008, DEADLINE

Question. Do you expect to meet the deadline of July 31, 2008, that is contained 

in the Declaration of Principles? What is the administration’s plan if this deadline 

is not met? 

Answer. We believe the July 31, 2008 deadline is achievable, and we are working 

with Iraqi officials to conclude the agreement under negotiation by the date specified. 

EXPECTED DURATION OF THE SOFA

Question. What is the expected duration of the SOFA? Indefinite? A fixed term 

of years? 

Answer. The SOFA with Iraq is intended to be an enduring agreement that sets 

the basic legal parameters for a U.S. military presence in Iraq in a variety of circumstances. The agreement will not establish permanent bases or commit the 

United States to maintaining a particular level of forces in Iraq. The agreement 

reflects the authorities and protections common to U.S. Status of Forces Agreements 

with our friends and allies, although it also takes into account the current circumstances in Iraq. 

EXPLAINING THE NECESSITY OF A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Question. Why is it necessary to have a Strategic Framework agreement? 

Answer. The Strategic Framework will help set the structure for a more normalized bilateral relationship between the United States and Iraq as two sovereign 

states. This document would acknowledge the shared political, economic, cultural, 

and security components of our bilateral relationship. 

SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

Question. In which document are you going to include the security arrangement 

that has been discussed—in the SOFA or in the Strategic Framework agreement? 

What is it likely to say? Has Iraq requested an assurance? 

Answer. The Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki set forth a political commitment to negotiate bilaterally on a broad variety of topics, including security issues. The Declaration affirmed that the United 

States recognizes Iraq’s interest in taking into account concerns about internal and 

external threats to its security in bilateral negotiations. 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Question. The Declaration of Principles states that one of the principles is supporting Iraq ‘‘in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups’’ including al-Qaeda, 

Saddamists and ‘‘all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation.’’ In the last 2 

weeks, the Government of Iraq attacked groups it deemed to be ‘‘criminals’’ and 

‘‘outlaws’’ in Basra. The United States assisted in this operation. These were Shia 

militias—not al-Qaeda, and not Saddamists. Why should the committee not believe 

that the Strategic Framework agreement is going to commit us, in writing, to participate in a civil war? 

Answer. Nothing to be negotiated will mandate that we continue combat missions. 

Nothing will commit the U.S. to join Iraq in a war against another country or provide other such security commitments. 

444 

KURDISTAN ISSUES

Question. In recent months, the United States gave Turkey a green light to engage in military operations against the PKK in Iraq. What if this occurs again, and 

Kurdish Regional Government forces retaliate in Turkey, under the Iraqi banner? 

How will the security assurance you are considering for Iraq be balanced against 

our obligations to Turkey under the North Atlantic Treaty? 

Answer. The United States recognizes Turkey’s sovereign right to defend itself 

against terrorist threats, and values its strategic relationship with Turkey. 

Neither the Strategic Framework nor the Status of Forces Agreement will include 

a binding security commitment obligating the United States to act in common 

defense against any external threat to Iraq. 

The United States recognizes Turkey’s struggle against the PKK as a legitimate 

pursuit against a terrorist enemy of the United States, Turkey, and Iraq. We will 

continue to support the ongoing efforts between the Government of Iraq and Turkey 

to counter the PKK threat inside Iraq by encouraging Turkey, Iraq, and the 

Kurdistan Regional Government to cooperate in countering the PKK. 

SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS

Question. Would the Government of Iraq have a reasonable expectation that the 

next President will honor the security arrangement, if you include it in the nonbinding Strategic Framework agreement? Or do you think it only commits this 

President? 

Answer. Neither the SOFA nor the Strategic Framework will bind this or any 

future U.S. President to a security commitment with Iraq, and the Government of 

Iraq is aware of this point. 

Our primary goal in negotiating these agreements is to set a policy structure with 

Iraq that normalizes our bilateral relationship so that the next administration will 

have all the options available under the Constitution when it takes office in January 

2009. It will also ensure that U.S. forces are granted the protections and authorities 

they need after the expiration of the mandate of the Multi-National Force on December 31, 2008. 

CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT FROM IRAQ

Question. The Authorization for the Use of Force in 2002 (Public Law 107–243) 

authorizes the President to use force in Iraq to ‘‘defend the national security of the 

United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq’’ and to ‘‘enforce all 

relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.’’ Iraq today is 

an ally, not an adversary. What is the threat to U.S. national security today that 

is posed by the Government of Iraq? If the Security Council mandate for the 

MNF–I expires, what Security Council resolutions will U.S. forces be enforcing? 

Does the executive branch believe that the Authorization for the Use of Military 

Force enacted on September 14, 2001 (Public Law 107–40) is relevant to Iraq? If 

so, why? Which persons or organizations that were involved in the attacks against 

the United States are present in Iraq? Please provide any relevant legal analysis. 

Answer. At the time of the resolution, Congress recognized that the threat posed 

to the national security of the United States by Iraq was not limited to the Saddam 

regime itself. In particular, Congress recognized the threat posed by terrorist groups 

known to be in or supported by Iraq and the critical U.S. interest in the stability 

of the Persian Gulf region. The Congressional Report on the 2002 Authorization for 

the Use of Military Force in Iraq found, ‘‘Iraq also aids terrorists who have attacked 

the United States and its allies, including terrorists who use weapons of mass 

destruction.’’ 107 H. Rpt. 721 at 6 (2002). The report further noted that ‘‘[i]t is in 

the national security interest of the United States to restore international peace and 

security to the Persian Gulf region. . . . [S]afeguarding the free flow of energy supplies has been recognized as a vital national security concern of the United States 

for scores of years.’’ 107 H. Rpt. 721 at 7. The situation in Iraq, including the threat 

posed by terrorist and insurgent elements present in Iraq and the consequent threat 

to regional stability, continues to present a threat to U.S. national security, even 

after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. 

There are Iraq-related provisions in a number of Chapter VII resolutions that will 

continue in force after December 31, 2008, unless the Security Council takes specific 

action to terminate them. Whether or not U.S. forces are understood to be enforcing 

these or other Security Council resolutions through their continuing activities in 

Iraq, U.S. forces will have the authority to continue their mission after the expiration of UNSCR 1790 under both the President’s authority as Commander in Chief 

under the Constitution and relevant legislation, including Public Law 107–243. 

445 

In addition to the authority U.S. forces have under the Constitution and Public 

Law 107–243, as described, Public Law 107–40 is relevant to Iraq, as it authorizes 

the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against nations, organizations, or persons that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001, ‘‘in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States’’ by those same entities, and our forces continue 

to fight al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations in Iraq. 

DEFINING A SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

Question. Is a ‘‘security arrangement’’ simply a political statement that would not 

legally bind the United States to any particular course of action? 

Answer. As discussed in the 1992 Report to Congress on U.S. Security Commitments and Arrangements, required under Public Law 101–510, section 1457 (1990), 

a security arrangement is understood to be a pledge by the United States to take 

some action in the event of a threat to another country’s security. Security arrangements may appear in legally binding agreements, such as treaties or executive 

agreements, or in political documents, such as policy declarations by the President, 

Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense. They are distinct from security commitments, which are understood to be an obligation, binding under international law, 

of the United States to act in the common defense in the event of an armed attack 

on another country. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR DAVID SATTERFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. Recognizing that we need some sort of predictable international legal 

grounding for our mission in Iraq, a mission that will clearly not be over before the 

end of 2008 or 2009 for that matter, what options are there to establish this framework? I had conversations a month or so ago with our Ambassador to the United 

Nations, Zal Khalilzad, and he described to me the environment in New York during 

the negotiations for the current resolution. 

• Can you get another UNSCR if you need it, say a 6-month extension? • Would that be preferable, purely from a legal viewpoint? • Why have you chosen the current path, given the alternatives, and the obvious 

opposition you are seeing from certain circles on the Hill? • Under what circumstances or reassurances might Iraq be willing to extend the 

U.N. Security Council resolution for a limited duration? • How would other coalition allies view a renewed security council resolution vice 

being rolled under a U.S.-negotiated SOFA? 

Answer. Through a number of conversations on this topic, the Iraqis have made 

it clear to me, to Ambassador Crocker, and to Secretary Rice that they are opposed 

to seeking any further renewals of the Chapter VII MNF–I mandate, currently extended in UNSCR 1790. President Bush has said that he supports Iraq’s goal of normalizing its international standing and bilateral relationships and believes that an 

alternative to another Chapter VII resolution needs to be found for 2009 and beyond. Accordingly, the United States and Iraq have begun negotiation of new bilateral accords that would continue to permit U.S. and coalition forces to operate in 

support of Iraq’s security and stability. 

That said, the Council has the authority to renew the mandate in UNSCR 1790 

for a period of time shorter than 1 year. A written request from the Iraqi Government is one of the key elements that the U.N. Security Council has taken into account when considering previous resolutions to extend the mandate of the MNF. 

Given its clear public opposition to renewal of the Chapter VII MNF–I mandate, we 

do not currently anticipate that Iraq will pursue a renewal of this mandate. If Iraq 

continues to oppose such a resolution, it is unlikely that Security Council members 

would agree to extend the mandate of MNF–I for 6 months. However, the option 

for Iraq to request such an extension will remain open. 

The United States has consulted with coalition partners about our plans to negotiate bilateral accords with the Iraqi Government that would permit the continued 

presence of a coalition force in Iraq. In general, coalition partners have emphasized 

the importance of ensuring that their troops stationed in Iraq have appropriate 

rights, responsibilities, and authorities to allow them to perform their necessary 

functions. We remain in consultations with them, and with Iraq, on this issue. 

Question. Ambassador Satterfield, in your statement, you have echoed prior 

administration statements by noting that, ‘‘This strategic framework will broadly 

address the topics outlined in the Declaration of Principles signed by President 

446 

Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on November 26, 2007.’’ And you state clearly, as 

Ambassador Crocker did Tuesday—what the agreement will not contain. But it is 

still unclear to me what this document will contain. 

• Can you provide further clarity for us as to the contents of the Strategic Framework agreement? • How closely will it follow the Declaration of Principles? • What sort of legal or historical precedent is there for a Strategic Framework 

agreement of this kind? • How do the Iraqis view this? Do their laws stipulate the same distinctions we 

are making between security commitment and security arrangement? • Will they be conveying either document to their Parliament for ratification? 

Answer. As you noted, the Strategic Framework will broadly address the topics 

outlined in the Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, to reflect shared U.S. and Iraqi political, 

economic, cultural, and security interests. As with other negotiations, we do not generally publicly discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating partners. We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept fully informed 

as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already begun and will continue. While 

we do not generally comment on specific text or negotiating positions during the 

course of ongoing negotiations, we have confirmed that we will not enter into a binding commitment to defend Iraq or any other security commitments that would warrant Senate consent. 

The United States makes declarations and enters into understandings outlining 

its strategic political, economic, and security interests with its friends and allies in 

a variety of contexts. To give two recent examples, the United States and Afghanistan issued a Joint Declaration of United States-Afghan Strategic Partnership in 

2005, and the United States signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership and 

Cooperation Framework with Uzbekistan in 2002. The United States also has concluded binding agreements that contain security arrangements, which do not 

amount to commitments to act in the common defense in the event of an armed 

attack on another country. 

The Iraqis have indicated to us that they intend to submit the documents to the 

Iraqi Council of Representatives. Iraq’s domestic legal requirements are established 

by Iraqi laws and customs and may be different from the United States domestic 

legal requirements. 

Question. What are the Iraqis requesting in this agreement? 

• Are we leveraging their requests with demands for political movement on provincial elections, or the hydrocarbon law, or even better budget execution? • Are we negotiating troop withdrawal terms? • Will they be conveying either document to their Parliament for ratification? 

Answer. Again, as with other negotiations, we do not generally publicly discuss 

our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating partners. We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept fully informed as the negotiations proceed; 

briefings have already begun and will continue. With regard to the need for Iraqi 

progress in such areas as budget execution, provincial elections, and a national 

hydrocarbon law, we continue to engage on these issues energetically, in all appropriate venues. Also, as we have stated, the Strategic Framework and Status of 

Forces Agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq or specify the number 

of U.S. forces that may be present in Iraq. Every policy option will remain on the 

table for the next administration. 

The Iraqis have indicated to us that they intend to submit the documents to the 

Iraqi Council of Representatives. Iraq’s domestic legal requirements are established 

by Iraqi laws and customs and may be different from the United States domestic 

legal requirements. 

Question. Can you describe the difference between a U.N. Security Council Resolution Chapter VII mandate and a Chapter VI mandate? 

Answer. In general, the key distinction is in the ability of the Security Council 

to make decisions under Chapter VII that U.N. Member States have an international legal obligation to accept and carry out. When the Council decides, under 

Chapter VII, to take action for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international 

peace and security, it can do so with or without agreement from the Member 

State(s) affected by it. 

Question. How do the Iraqis view this politically (internally)? 

Answer. In a letter to the Security Council dated December 7, 2007, which was 

annexed to Resolution 1790, Prime Minister al-Maliki declared, ‘‘the Government of 

447 

Iraq considers this to be its final request to the Security Council for the extension 

of the mandate of MNF–I and expects, in future, that the Security Council will be 

able to deal with the situation in Iraq without the need for action under Chapter 

VII of the Charter of the United Nations.’’ The GOI has been very firm in its opposition to extending the Chapter VII MNF–I mandate. 

Question. Is there discord among factions? 

Answer. The Iraqi Government appears to be united in its opposition to a renewal 

of the Chapter VII MNF–I resolution. 

Question. How is a Chapter VII mandate viewed in the international arena? 

Answer. It is widely accepted that Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council 

to decide in appropriate cases to provide a mandate with or without agreement from 

the Member States affected. That said, there is a widespread view that such authority should be used judiciously. 

Question. How many ongoing Chapter VII missions are there, and what are their 

duration? 

Answer. There are numerous peacekeeping and other missions currently authorized under Chapter VII, with mandates typically having durations from 6 to 12 

months. 

Question. On our second panel, Professor Matheson suggested an exchange of letters might do the trick when it comes to laying out a set of understandings regarding our strategic relationship. Might this be a viable option? 

Answer. Through the negotiation of a status of forces agreement, we are seeking 

to normalize our security relationship with the Government of Iraq and ensure that 

U.S. troops are sufficiently protected. Currently, Coalition Provisional Authority 

Order 17 (CPA 17) protects U.S. forces, as part of MNF, for the duration of the MNF 

mandate and ‘‘until the departure of the final element of MNF from Iraq.’’ Professor 

Matheson testified that while this language may provide some room for the continuation of immunities after the expiration of UNSCR 1790, the more prudent course 

of action would be to clarify our protections in a definitive way. Professor Matheson 

suggested that the protections afforded under CPA 17 could be temporarily extended 

through an exchange of diplomatic notes as a solution ‘‘in the event a permanent 

SOFA is not agreed by [the expiration of the UNSCR].’’ The negotiation of a more 

durable SOFA is, in our view, the most appropriate way to achieve that goal. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY BETH LONG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

COMMITMENTS TO IRAQ AND IN SOFA

Question. Ms. Long, as the Armed Services’ voice here, perhaps you can comment 

on this point. I mentioned in my opening statement some rather dire situations 

which could arise in Iraq. Since we are talking about how such a document would 

set the stage for a strategic partnership between the U.S. and Iraq, it would be 

helpful if you could try to explain to us what commitments the document would contain with respect to U.S. military forces in 2009 and beyond, recognizing that Iraq 

presents an extraordinarily complex environment for U.S. troops, and these agreements will affect the military establishment more than anyone else. For example, 

are we trying to assure the Iraqis that we would help them defend their territorial 

integrity if they were attacked? What scenario do you envision? What is the Iraqi 

Government’s expectation? 

Answer. We do not envision that either the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 

or Strategic Framework (SF) will commit U.S. forces to any particular action in 

2009 or beyond. To respond to your example, we do not envision making a security 

guarantee to the Iraqis to help defend their territorial integrity if they should be 

attacked. 

In the course of the negotiations, we have made clear to the Iraqis that we cannot 

provide a security commitment. We believe that the Iraqi Government understands 

this point, although they have made public statements that would indicate that they 

are seeking such a commitment. 

We have explained to the Iraqi Government that a close relationship with the 

United States, which would be bolstered by the conclusion of a SOFA, and of a mutually beneficial SF, will be the best deterrent of external aggression that the Iraqis 

can have. We have also stressed that such a relationship would not constitute a 

binding obligation to defend the territory of Iraq from external attack. 

448 

Question. Ms. Long, Ambassador Satterfield mentioned in his opening statement 

that this SOFA would be unique compared to most SOFAs, for example, by gaining 

consent from the Government of Iraq for military and detainee operations. If possible, in open session, please describe the combat and detainee principles. Will these 

special provisions have a shorter or renewable duration? Would you envision General Petraeus having to consult with Iraqi authorities before acting? When would 

and when would he not have to seek concurrence? Please be specific. 

Answer. Two of the three ‘‘attachments’’ we envision to the SOFA would provide 

the authority for U.S. military operations and detainee operations. The general principle of these two attachments is to provide the authorities needed for U.S. forces 

to operate as required in Iraq and to provide the authorities needed to allow us to 

detain individuals as a result of military operations. 

The idea of the ‘‘attachments’’ is that they would be terminated when no longer 

necessary, without affecting the basic SOFA, which we envision as a longer term 

agreement. 

Our general principle is that our authority to conduct these operations would result from Iraqi consent. While the precise wording of that consent is a matter under 

negotiation, our concept is that our authority would be general in nature, but that 

the implementation would be governed by Implementing Arrangements (IAs) that 

would call for close coordination of U.S. forces and Iraqi forces’ activities. As the 

Iraqis become better able to provide for their own security, they will increasingly 

take the lead in these operations. 

We would, of course, retain the necessary freedom for our commander to take 

whatever actions he regards as necessary for the safety of the forces under his command and for countering any threats to U.S. national security. 

JOINT RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY

BETH LONG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT P. 

CASEY, JR. 

TRANSLATIONS

Question. The Declaration of Principles signed last November asserts that the 

United States will provide ‘‘security assurances and commitments to the Republic 

of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.’’ Despite that plain language, Secretary 

of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates have asserted that the United States 

does not intend to provide legally binding security assurances or commitments to 

the Iraqi Government. 

It remains unclear why such disconnect exists between the Statement of Principles and subsequent statements by senior administration officials. On March 13, 

the Politico newspaper reported that administration officials blame this misunderstanding on a sloppy language translation. According to an unidentified administration official, the original Arabic phrase in the Joint Declaration was ‘‘translated in 

kind of an interesting way’’ and that a better translation may have been only ‘‘We 

will consult in the event of a threat to Iraq’s security.’’ 

• Was the original language in the Declaration of Principles signed last November 

inaccurately translated? Was the original document negotiated between the two 

governments in Arabic and then translated to English? 

• Why did three whole months pass before this inaccurate translation was first 

disclosed by an administration official, especially on such a weighty matter as 

committing American blood and treasure to protect another nation? Why did the 

administration not immediately point out, upon release of the Declaration of 

Principles on November 26, 2007, that the United States only wished to consult 

on, not guarantee, Iraq’s security? 

• Please explain what a promise to consult with the Iraqi Government in the 

event of a threat to its security entails. How is such a promise affected by the 

continued presence of large numbers of U.S. military forces on Iraqi soil? 

Answer. The language in the Declaration of Principles signed last November was 

an accurate translation of both the English and Arabic texts. The Declaration of 

Principles does not, however, include a binding security commitment. 

In regard to what ‘‘a promise to consult’’ with Iraq means, the United States has 

entered into a number of security arrangements around the world that take the 

form of a pledge to consult a foreign government in the event of a threat to the security of the foreign country. Consultations may involve discussion of appropriate 

courses of action and possible responses, including potential U.S. assistance. A 

449 

promise to consult, however, does not commit the United States to any action beyond consultation. Such a promise is not affected by whether there are U.S. military 

forces in the foreign country. 

BINDING NATURE OF STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Question. Please clarify whether the Strategic Framework agreement will be considered legally binding upon the United States, even if, per the testimony of Ambassador Satterfield today, ‘‘it would not rise to the level of a legal commitment that 

would trigger advise-and-consent procedures.’’ 

Does the administration consider the Strategic Framework agreement only a 

political document expressing nonbinding goals and aspirations for the future 

United States-Iraqi relationship? 

Answer. As we have stated, the Strategic Framework would reflect the shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests of the United States and Iraq, and 

would be signed at the highest levels, similar to strategic declarations signed with 

Afghanistan, Russia, and other states, none of which triggered advice-and-consent 

procedures. As with any text, we watch it closely as it develops and constantly 

evaluate where it may fall along the continuum of a nonbinding political commitment or an executive agreement, neither of which, however, would trigger adviseand-consent procedures, similar to the strategic declarations noted above, and will 

not tie the hands of the next administration. 

TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Question. While recognizing that the President will remain Commander in Chief 

for the next 9 months, it is also clear that the future of the U.S. relationship with 

Iraq is one of the key issues in the upcoming Presidential election. Please explain 

why the administration views it essential to negotiate a Strategic Framework agreement prior to the end of 2008. 

Why not allow the next President to negotiate a Strategic Framework agreement 

with Iraq? Won’t an agreement agreed to by the successor to President Bush carry 

more force and credibility with both the Iraqi people and the broader Middle East 

region? 

Answer. The administration and the Government of Iraq consider both the Strategic Framework and the SOFA important and complementary. The SOFA negotiations must be completed by the end of 2008 when the U.N. Security Council 

mandate for MNF–I expires. We cannot leave SOFA discussions to the next administration; to do so could leave our military forces and civilians without the protections and authorities that they need. The Iraqis have made clear that they want 

to consider the Strategic Framework and SOFA together. We cannot, therefore, 

delay the negotiation of the Strategic Framework. 

Question. Did the Iraqi Government request the negotiation of a Strategic Framework agreement in exchange for the promise to conclude a Status of Forces Agreement authorizing the continued presence of U.S. troops on Iraqi soil past December 

31, 2008? 

Answer. The Strategic Framework and the SOFA are complementary and mutually reinforcing. One is not an ‘‘exchange’’ for the other. The Strategic Framework 

encompasses cooperation in the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres. 

The SOFA will provide the protections and authorities necessary when U.S. forces 

are present in Iraq. 

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Question. Putting aside the question of whether or not the administration is 

legally required to submit a Strategic Framework agreement for congressional 

approval, has the administration considered that formal congressional approval of 

a Strategic Framework agreement would send the strongest possible signal to Iraq 

and the region regarding the integrity of the U.S. commitment to the Iraqi people? 

Answer. The Strategic Framework agreement itself—to be signed by the President—is a strong enough signal to Iraq and the region regarding the integrity of 

the U.S. commitment to the Iraqi people. Further, we will ensure that Members of 

Congress are kept fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already 

begun and will continue. 

PERMANENT BASES IN IRAQ

Question.On Tuesday, Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified before this committee, 

as part of his opening statement, that the Strategic Framework agreement and the 

450 

Status of Forces Agreement ‘‘will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly forswear them.’’ Administration officials continue to 

reiterate that both the United States and the Iraqi Governments are opposed to the 

establishment of permanent U.S. military facilities on Iraqi soil. 

Please provide an update on the progress of negotiations with the Iraqi Government regarding a provision explicitly forswearing permanent U.S. military facilities 

on Iraqi soil. 

Answer. SOFA and SF negotiations, which address this provision, are currently 

underway. It would be premature to announce progress while the negotiations are 

ongoing. 

Question. At the hearing today, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long, 

in response to a question from Senator Webb, testified that ‘‘As far as the [Department of Defense] is concerned, we don’t have a worldwide or even a departmentwide 

definition of permanent bases. I believe those are, by and large, determined on a 

case-by-case basis.’’ 

Will the Strategic Framework agreement or the Status of Forces Agreement define the specific nature of a ‘‘permanent’’ military facility? If so, what definition will 

the U.S. side propose in the upcoming negotiations? 

Answer. The Status of Forces Agreement provides for authorities, rights, and obligations of U.S. forces when present in the territory of Iraq. Neither the SOFA nor 

the Strategic Framework would obligate the United States to maintain any military 

presence in Iraq or to a specific duration of use for any facility in Iraq, when U.S. 

forces are present. While we do not generally comment on specific text or negotiating positions during the course of ongoing negotiations, we have confirmed that 

we do not seek permanent bases in Iraq. 

Question. If no definition is provided, what value does such a provision forswearing ‘‘permanent’’ U.S. military facilities in Iraq carry? Will either the SOFA 

or the Strategic Framework agreement include any other specific constraints on the 

duration of future U.S. military facilities in Iraq? 

Answer. As we have stated, the SOFA and the Strategic Framework will ensure 

that all policy options remain open for this and future administrations. While we 

do not generally comment on specific text or negotiating positions during the course 

of ongoing negotiations, nothing in these documents will bind the United States to 

maintain a military presence in Iraq or to a specific duration of presence for any 

military facilities in Iraq. 

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

Question. In his opening statement to the committee that was entered into the 

record, Ambassador Satterfield asserted that the Status of Forces Agreement to be 

negotiated between the United States and Iraq ‘‘is similar to the many Status of 

Forces Agreements (SOFAs) we have across the world, which address such matters 

as jurisdiction over U.S. forces; the movement of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; nontaxation of U.S. activities and the ability of U.S. forces to use host-government 

facilities.’’ 

Nevertheless, as he partially acknowledged in the next sentence, this SOFA will 

go beyond those we have negotiated with over 100 other nations in three significant 

respects: 

• Authority for U.S. forces to conduct military operations on Iraqi soil; 

• Authority for U.S. forces to detain Iraqis for indefinite periods; 

• Sweeping immunity for all U.S. contractor personnel, both those attached to the 

U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies. 

Please evaluate the degree to which the United States-Iraq Status of Forces 

Agreement will include provisions not included in a typical SOFA. 

Answer. The United States typically seeks to negotiate Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) wherever we have U.S. troops stationed abroad. While SOFAs, like 

other international agreements, must be tailored to the specific circumstances and 

environment of each country, these agreements typically include provisions addressing criminal and civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces and civilian personnel; entry and 

exit from the host nation; tax and customs exemptions; licenses, contracting, motor 

vehicles, utilities and communications; the environment; and claims between the 

parties, among other issues. We have proposed in negotiations that our SOFA with 

Iraq would address, if agreed by the Government of Iraq, in addition to such standard SOFA topics, provisions relating to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, including the 

authorizations necessary for U.S. forces to continue to conduct military operations 

451 

and related detentions, and limited U.S. jurisdiction over contractors for offenses 

related to the performance of their contracts. 

Question. To the degree to which this Status of Forces Agreement is unique and 

goes beyond a typical SOFA, what weight should that determination have with 

respect to whether or not the Congress should have a formal role in approving the 

final agreement? 

Answer. The Department’s procedures for determining whether an agreement 

may properly be concluded as an executive agreement or a treaty require consideration of a variety of factors, including the extent to which the agreement involves 

commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole; past practice as to similar 

agreements; the preference of Congress as to a particular type of agreement; the 

need for prompt conclusion of the agreement; and the general domestic and international practice as to similar agreements. The Department’s analysis of the proposed SOFA in light of the factors set forth in Department regulations, including 

relevant constitutional considerations, determined that conclusion of the proposed 

SOFA as an executive agreement would be appropriate. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR DAVID SATTERFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD BY SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH

Question. Does the State Department have a Memorandum of Understanding with 

the Iraqi Government about the security assistance provided to the Iraqi Security 

Forces through U.S. assistance? If so, does that MOU include any expectations from 

the United States about the management of the ISF or the inclusion of various ethnic groups in the ISF by the Iraqi Government? 

Answer. National Security Presidential Directive 36 assigns direction of U.S. 

efforts to organize, train, and equip the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary 

of Defense. Public Law 109–13, ‘‘Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005,’’ provides for the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The Multi-National Security Transition Command– 

Iraq (MNSTC–I) obligates ISFF to provide equipment, supplies, services and training for the Iraq Security Forces. 

The ISF is a professional force that the Government of Iraq intends to be representative of the diverse ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq. In order to achieve this, 

the security ministries strive to recruit personnel from across the spectrum of Iraqi 

society. As the train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under the authority of 

CENTCOM and is implemented by MNSTC–I, details of ISF train-and-equip program are better provided by the Department of Defense. 

Question. Is the State Department doing anything to make sure that various bids, 

including those from small businesses, are considered when soliciting contracts for 

the Iraq reconstruction effort? Specifically, what is the justification for sole-source 

contracting for large solicitations for the Iraqi Security Forces, such as the current 

solicitation for a ‘‘Universal Fire Truck’’ (Solicitation: W56HZV07RG202)? Were any 

small businesses considered to help in supplying the deliverables? 

Answer. The State Department considers bids from all levels of potential business 

prospects when reviewing contractual proposals for the Iraq reconstruction effort. 

Primarily due to the challenging and unpredictable security environment, small 

businesses are less likely to submit a competitive bid on reconstruction projects 

within Iraq. However, every effort is made to ensure a comparative analysis is conducted when considering all bid proposals. 

The Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq coordinates the acquisition of equipment and supplies for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) based on Iraqi 

security ministry requirements. Military equipment acquisition requests in support 

of ISF, such as Universal Fire Trucks, are fulfilled by the Tank-Automotive and 

Armaments Command under the purview of the U.S. Army’s Material Command. 

Details of military equipment solicitations are better provided by the Department 

of Defense. 

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